JACKSON Defendant. _____________________________________________________________/ Mark Alan Jackson, Pro Se 129 North Lowell Road Windham, NH 03087 313 478 8061 _____________________________________________________________/ DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT
Pursuant to United States Constitution 4th Amendment, United States Constitution 8th Amendment, United States Constitution Article 1 Section 9 and MCL 764.1, et al. Now comes, Defendant, Mark Alan Jackson, to challenge subject matter jurisdiction and charge this honorable court to vacate judgment dismiss the indictment.

Case No. 00-69257 HON JAMES R. CHYLINSKI



The incident On November 4, 2000, at approximately 4:30 p.m., Mark Jackson, hereafter known as “Defendant”, was working upstairs on his residence at 1309 Crawford Street, Detroit, Michigan [48209], where he resided with his wife and three (3) children. The lights were off and the power was off. The Defendant heard crashing noises outside and banging on the windows; noises that he perceived to be coming from the front of the house. He ran over to the window to see where the noises were coming from. Because he could not see where the noise was coming from, he grabbed his shotgun from the closet and ran downstairs into the front vestibule. The Defendant witnessed two (2) people on his porch. One was carrying off materials that the Defendant had on the porch while the second intruder was exiting the porch and walking down the steps, grabbing the large trash cans in front of the steps, knocking them over which caused the contents to spill out onto the ground. The Defendant placed the shotgun down, near the door, opened the door and yelled at the two (2) transgressors to stop what they were doing. The trespassers became belligerent and started cursing at the Defendant. The Defendant approached them and told them to drop the items that they had stolen. One dropped the materials and ran off down the sidewalk while the other, whom the Defendant later learned was identified as Larry Mason II, dropped the items and took a combative stance, stating, “What are you going to do now, Bitch?” while approaching the Defendant. Larry made a sudden movement in the Defendant’s direction. Fearing he was going to be struck, the Defendant moved to block his attacker and struck him in the lower jaw with an open hand, knocking the attacker back. The attacker backed off, made more threats and ran 

down the sidewalk. The Defendant collected his items from the ground, walked back to the house, placed the items on the porch, began picking up the trash cans and replacing the trash into the cans. As he was finishing cleaning up, the Defendant witnessed five (5) people running towards his residence. He could see that one, Larry Mason II, had a bat and one had a stick. The Defendant ran back onto his porch and turned to face the group. Momentarily, the group stopped at bottom of the steps, where the steps met the front sidewalk. Larry began approaching with the bat and cursing. The Defendant also saw one member of the mob reaching behind his back and keeping his hand there. The Defendant backed up to the door, reached inside and grabbed the shotgun that he had placed there earlier. Without uttering a word, the Defendant walked back out onto the porch, with the gun at his side. Larry backed up for a few seconds and then came towards the Defendant, again, saying, “Shoot me. I dare you.” At this point, Larry was in front of the Defendant, but slightly to the right. The rest of the group was further to the right than Larry was. The Defendant raised the shotgun and fired one shot into the lawn, off to the left. The group immediately scattered. Larry threw down his bat as he ran off. The Defendant went back into the house put the gun down and came back out, finished picking up the trash, picked up the bat and threw it into the trash. In between the Incident and “Arrest” The Defendant grabbed the items off the porch and took them into basement storage. He finished up his work and turned the power back on in the house. On or about 2 hours later, the Defendant called his father, Bruce Jackson, to discuss the incident that happened between the Defendant and the intruders. 

The Defendant’s father, drove over to sit with the Defendant to “keep him company”. The father arrived within 30 minutes. The Defendant’s father was at the residence for approximately 2 hours when a loud banging on the door was heard. The “Arrest” The Defendant approached the door and tried to look out the door’s window, but he could only see a flashlight shining into the house. The Defendant opened the door and was

immediately shoved back by the door as someone yelled, “Get down! Hands behind your head!” Employees of the Detroit Police Department streamed into the house yelling and cursing, with guns raised. The Defendant kneeled down and placed his hands behind his head. The Defendant witnessed his father do the same. One “officer” held a gun to the Defendant’s head and yelled, “tell us where the guns are at!” Knowing that no one from the outside could see anything going on in the house and understanding the situation was escalating, still having a gun pointed at his head, the Defendant told the “officers” that the shotgun was in the bathroom and that a Ruger model 10/22 was in the closet of the master bedroom. One “officer” went upstairs and retrieved the weapons. The Defendant witnessed the “officer” coming back down the stairs with both weapons in hand. The “officers” pulled the Defendant out onto the front porch, and closed the door slightly behind the Defendant, with the Defendant’s father still in the house. The Defendant could hear the “officers” screaming at his father. It was at this time that the Defendant witnessed the neighbor, next door, yelling towards the “officers”, “They attacked him. What are you doing?” The “officers” handcuffed the Defendant and placed the Defendant in the backseat of the waiting vehicle, on the street. The Defendant sat in the vehicle for, approximately, 15 minutes 

when an officer got into the driver’s seat and drove to the 4th precinct located at the intersection of Fort Street and Green, “running” red lights and ignoring stop signs, along the way. The Defendant’s Father was released at the scene, without charge. Incarceration “Officers” escorted the Defendant inside the precinct to a large room with a machine. The “officers” uncuffed the Defendant, finger printed him, removed his glasses. The “officers” also told the Defendant to remove his shoelaces, which he complied with. An “officer” inside the precinct began questioning the Defendant, when the Defendant asserted his “right to remain silent”. The “officers” escorted the Defendant to a Cell and locked the cell door. The Cell “block” was a “hallway” which had a prison cell door on each end. The entrance that the Defendant was brought through also had a large wooden door on the outside of the Cell door. On the other end of the hall, the cell door lead into a much larger “community cell”. On each side of the “hallway” was approximately 6 cells. On the Southern side, was one cell that had been retrofitted as a “bathroom” with one toilet. On the Northern side, was 2 cells that had solid doors and the only two cells with windows were also on that side. There was only limited light from the “hallway”, but no lights were in the cells. Phones were installed into some of the cells, which each had their own barred doors. The floor was comprised of very old terrazzo flooring. Toilet paper and gum were stuck to the walls in various places and to the benches and phones. The Defendant’s Cell had one bench, which was missing one brace, so it slanted towards the cell door. The air was frigid and there were several men already incarcerated. Urine smell permeated the cell. Later on in the evening and throughout the duration of incarceration, the defendant 

witnessed several of the men urinating out of their cells into the “hallway” to relieve themselves, because the cell doors were locked for most of the day for many of the days that the Defendant was incarcerated. One meal was offered daily. The Defendant witnessed an “officer” give one of the prisoners a loaf of bread and a package of bologna to hand out to the other prisoners. With poor sanitary conditions, the Defendant declined the meals quietly intending not to bring attention to himself. Day after day passed and the Defendant remained incarcerated. The Defendant used his boots as a pillow. Two times during the incarceration, an “officer”, also known as the “turnkey”, came in and offered all of the prisoners a cigarette. On or about the third day of

incarceration, the temperature changed and the cell block went from frigidly cold to intolerably hot. The Defendant was able to call his wife ”collect”, from the phone in his cell, and talk to her several times during the incarceration at great expense to his family. On or about day 5 of incarceration, the Defendant was moved to another location by way of a van and brought back to the 4th precinct without being allowed to exit the van. Also on that day, the Defendant visited with his attorney at the precinct. Habeas Corpus Granted, Ignored and Granted and Ignored Again On November 7, 2000, Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, filed a Complaint for Habeas Corpus [exhibit A] on the Defendant’s behalf alleging that the Defendant’s incarceration and continued detention was illegal. It was granted on November 8, 2000 by the Honorable John R. Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the 

purpose of returning for arraignment or to bring the Defendant to arraignment scheduled for November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. at 36th District Court, Room 4039 [exhibit C]. Defendant remained in the custody of the Detroit Police Department and the order was ignored. On November 9. 2000, a second Habeas was filed by Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, [exhibit B] and the Honorable John R. Perry entered an order to deliver the Defendant to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant and that arraignment was scheduled for November 13, 2000 [exhibit D]. Release and Arraignment and Release On or about November 9, 2000, the Defendant was released to his lawyer’s custody. Contrary to the second order of Habeas, on November 10, 2000, the Defendant was arraigned, rather than November 13, 2000. The Defendant arrived early in the day, was taken into custody again and the arraignment was held. The State of Michigan charged the Defendant with

Felonious Assault [750.82] and Felony Firearm [750.227B-A] Bond was set at 10% $5000 and the Defendant was taken into custody at the Wayne County Jail. Bond was posted and the Defendant was released approximately 6-8 hours later. Defendant was held for 5 days at the 4th precinct and roughly 13 hours with the Wayne County Jail. A Preliminary Examination was scheduled. Before Preliminary Examination Between the Arraignment and Preliminary Examination, the Defendant met with his attorney, Paul Semperger, Bar # 20214, and discussed the preliminary examination. Counsel prepared the Defendant for the exam, stating how excited he was to get “these liars on the stand”.


Preliminary Examination The morning of the Preliminary Examination, on November 22, 2000, counsel changed his position and advised the Defendant to wave the right to a preliminary examination. The

Defendant and his family expressed their concern with this decision and questioned counsel on his advice, but chose to wave preliminary examination on the advice of counsel. Pretrial was scheduled. Before Pretrial The Defendant met, once again, with his counsel at counsel’s office in Plymouth, Michigan. The Defendant was concerned with the issue of the weapon used by Larry Mason II. Because the Defendant had thrown it in the trash, he retrieved it from the trash, upon his release and brought it to counsel’s office. Counsel had been advised of this weapon from the very first meeting with the Defendant, but Counsel advised the Defendant “not to worry about it right now”. Counsel, once again, expressed excitement over moving the case forward. Pretrial On the morning of Pretrial, the Prosecuting Attorney offered a Settlement and Counsel advised the Defendant that this was a “good deal” and it was likely the “best he could get”. Once again, on the advice of counsel, the Defendant chose to sign and the Defendant accepted the plea deal of a lesser charge of Reckless Discharge of a Firearm [752.9863] and Felonious Assault [750.82] which was set for 3 years of Probation with last 6 months reviewable in the Wayne County Jail, mandatory psychiatric examination and treatment as needed, no contact with the victim and anger management counseling.


Sentence Defendant plead nolo contendre before Judge James R. Chylinski, bar #24293, on January 24, 2001. It was on this day that the extra costs were disclosed to the Defendant of $60 Crime Victim Assessment Fee and $165 Costs per year. Duration of Probation After Sentencing, the Defendant was sent to the local probation department for processing, psychological testing, 11 weeks of anger management counseling and attended 2 years of probation at the Lahser office and was discharged without incident on January 15, 2003, signed by Judge Chylinski on January 23, 2003.

Due Process Fundamental The founding fathers understood the importance of due process. They understood how critical it was to allow for fair dealings in the courts and that the rules were followed. They jealously protected the liberty of each man. They understood that the only way to ensure that an innocent man not be violated in his own home is for due process to be vigilantly guarded. "The Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that no State 'shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' undoubtedly intended . . . that equal protection and security should be given to all [and] they should have like access to the courts of the country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and


redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts...."1 It was understood that the only way the innocent could stand a chance and to avoid injustice was to put restraints on the government and create a government “by the people and for the people” in a Republican form of government (not to be confused with the Republican Party). This is demonstrated in the words, “Congress shall make no law…” that are repeated over and over again or as Michigan put it, Political power. All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.2 The idea of having a Democratic form of government was not popular until the 20th century. Until that time, our legislators, members of the judicial branch and members of the executive branch understood the importance of having a Republican form of government, based on property rights, including the most valuable property of all, our very selves, guaranteed by an excerpt from Article IV, Section 4: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion;…” The founding fathers called Democracy, a “Tyranny of the Majority3”, where 51% of the people can vote away the rights of 49% of the people. It is fundamental, it is imperative, it is crucial that the rights of all men are diligently protected, no matter if they should be in the 


U.S. Supreme Court Justice Steven Field, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 35 (1885), Constitution of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 1 by Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America




minority or majority. It is important to distinguish between the idea that “this is the way that we have always done it” and “this is the law, therefore we are commanded to obey.” This has been lost in our country. This has been lost in our court system. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Challenged at Any Time This case started and concluded in late 2000 and early 2001. The Sentence was discharged in 2003. It has not been appealed and time for most appeals have come and gone. The Court must be satisfied why this matter should be brought before it, at this time. The Courts have rules, time and time again, that any judgment made without subject matter jurisdiction are null and void. They have no force and effect in law. This is an error that must be addressed and must be corrected, once the issue has been raised. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Texas says of this right in Stine v. State, 908 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (Meyers, J., concurring) "The writ of habeas corpus, for example, is available to set aside a criminal conviction on the basis of any jurisdictional defect in the proceedings which led to it, no matter how remote in time." An 1803 case, Marbury v. Madison, tells us that “anything repugnant to the Constitution is null and void”. The other issue that the Court needs to address is why these issues were not previously raised. Insufficiency of Counsel The Defendant was a young man when this incident took place. He was a pillar in the community, working for the Detroit Rescue Mission and other organizations as an Assistant


Director of a Christian camp for many seasons. The Defendant believed in the advice of counsel and the authority of his elders. The Defendant had no idea how much that trust would be abused. The Defendant was lead to believe that counsel was a powerful advocate and would fight diligently on his behalf. From the very beginning, it appeared that this was the case. When Counsel submitted the Complaint for Habeas Corpus on November 8, 2000, he argued that “this detention and incarceration is illegal…” [exhibit A] This was good and proper to do. There was also a filing of a second habeas [exhibit B]. But, that was the extent of what counsel did. In the body of this motion, the arguments will be made that should have been made at that time. When the full story is in, it will become clear that there was no way that the Defendant could have known and that Counsel chose to maintain status quo rather than being a staunch advocate for his client, which ultimately cost the Defendant dearly and stained his good name. No discovery was filed in the case. No witnesses were called, cross examined, no evidence was challenged and civil rights violations were not addressed. Lack of Counsel’s due diligence is not reason enough to deny the Defendant of his rights. Of the contention that the law provides no effective remedy for such a deprivation of rights affecting life and liberty it may well be said-as in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 , 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 98 A.L.R. 406- that it 'falls with the premise.' To deprive a citizen of his only effective remedy would not only be contrary to the 'rudimentary demands of justice' but destructive of a constitutional guaranty specifically designed to prevent injustice.4 While it may not be paramount to this case, it must also be noted that Paul Semperger, Bar 


v. ZERBST, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) 13

#20214, had been reprimanded in Case Nos. 91-245-GA; 91-272-FA, in 1994, by the Attorney Discipline Board Tri-County Hearing Panel #31 for conduct was found to be in violation of MCR 9.104 (1-4,7); Canons 1, 6 and 7 of the then-applicable Code of Professional Responsibility; and the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct, 1.1(c); 1.2(a); 1.3; 3.2; 8.1(b); 8.4(a,c). No Oath of Office on Record On May 24th, 2010, the Defendant requested a copy of Judge Chylinksi’s Oath of Office, among others, from the Office of the Great Seal, c/o Terri Lynd Land, the current Secretary of State [exhibit H]. The Defendant asked for Judge Chylinski’s Oath of Office on file for the years covering 2000 and 2001 and his current Oath on file. The Defendant also asked for a copy of Judge Perry’s Oath of Office for the years covering 2000 and 2001. Defendant’s request was answered [exhibit I]. The FOIA coordinator, Michelle Martin, responded by sending a letter of response [exhibit I] pursuant to the Defendant’s request and certified copies of Oaths on file on and certified copies of no Oaths on File. Contained herein were certified copies of the following: 1. Judge Chylinski’s current Oath of Office on file [exhibit J] filed on December 14, 2004. 2. Judge Chylinski’s lack of Oath for the years of 2000 through 2001 [exhibit K]. 3. Judge Perry’s lack of Oath for the years of 2001 through 2001 [exhibit L]. In the Michigan State Constitution, the requirement for holding public office is clear: Oath of Public Officers On May 27th, the


All officers, legislative, executive and judicial, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of this state, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of .......... according to the best of my ability. No other oath, affirmation, or any religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust.5 6 This is further reiterated and codified in statute, in full effect and force at the time of this matter: Revised Statutes of 1846 (EXCERPT) FILING OATHS AND BONDS BY COUNTY OFFICERS. 45.318 County officers; oaths of office, deposit, filing. Each of the officers named in this chapter, except notaries public and prosecuting attorneys, shall before entering upon the duties of his office, and within 20 days after receiving official notice of his election, or within 20 days after the commencement of the term for which he was elected, take and subscribe the oath of office prescribed by the constitution of this state, before some officer authorized by law to administer oaths, and

Constitution 6

of Michigan 1963 – Article XI § 11

Const. 1963, Art. XI, § 1, Eff. Jan. 1, 1964 Former Constitution: See Const. 1908, Art. 

XVI, § 2. 

deposit the same with the clerk of the proper county, who shall file and preserve the same in his office.7 While reading the statues in Para Materia, we find the full intent of the legislature and Constitution: REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961 (EXCERPT) Act 236 of 1961 600.2153 Public officers; administration of oaths for certain purposes. Whenever any application is made to any public officer or board of officers to do any act in an official capacity, and such officer or board requires information or proof to enable him or them to decide on the propriety of doing such act, such information or proof may be required to be given by affidavit, and such officer or any member of such board, may administer all necessary oaths for that purpose.8 Furthermore, the statutes lay out the guidelines for the supreme court justices: REVISED JUDICATURE ACT OF 1961 (EXCERPT) 


R.S. 1846, Ch. 14 ;-- CL 1857, 466 ;-- CL 1871, 608 ;-- How. 638 ;-- CL 1897, 2641 ;- CL 1915, 2505 ;-- CL 1929, 1417 ;-- CL 1948, 45.318 Compiler's Notes: This section, as originally enacted, was numbered section 119.In this section, “the constitution of this state” evidently refers to the Constitution of 1835. See now Const. 1963, Art. XI, § 1.

1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963

Act 236 of 1961 600.206 Justices; oath. The supreme court justices shall take and subscribe the oath required by the constitution before entering upon the discharge of their duties.9 Once again, laid out in the Federal Constitution: Debts, Supremacy, Oaths All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; 


History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963


but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.10 This is codified in: United States Code (USC) Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3331 Oath of Office An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: “I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.” This section does not affect other oaths required by law. Furthermore, the statutes, in the Federal code, are clear on when this oath must be filed: United States Code (USC) Title 5, Part 2, Subpart B, Chapter 33, Subchapter II § 3332 Officer affidavit; no consideration paid for appointment 


Unites States Constitution – Article IV


An officer, within 30 days after the effective date of his appointment, shall file with the oath of office required by section 3331 of this title an affidavit that neither he nor anyone acting in his behalf has given, transferred, promised, or paid any consideration for or in the expectation or hope of receiving assistance in securing the appointment. Therefore, both Judge Chylinski and Judge Perry, acted through color of law and had no jurisdiction to perform in an official capacity. These acts amount to malfeasance in office and official oppression. It also amounts to a further violation of due process and is irreparable. Charged with a Non-Crime In the Complaint [exhibit E], dated on November 6, 2000, the State of Michigan charges the Defendant with 2 counts, the first one being MCL 750.82, which states: 750.82 Felonious assault; violation of subsection (1) in weapon free school zone; definitions. Sec. 82. (1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who assaults another person with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, brass knuckles, or other dangerous weapon without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. (2) A person who violates subsection (1) in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a felony punishable by 1 or more of the following: (a) Imprisonment for not more than 4 years. (b) Community service for not more than 150 hours.


(c) A fine of not more than $6,000.00. (3) As used in this section: (a) “School” means a public, private, denominational, or parochial school offering developmental kindergarten, kindergarten, or any grade from 1 through 12. (b) “School property” means a building, playing field, or property used for school purposes to impart instruction to children or used for functions and events sponsored by a school, except a building used primarily for adult education or college extension courses. (c) “Weapon free school zone” means school property and a vehicle used by a school to transport students to or from school property. The second charge is from MCL 750.227B, which says, 750.227b Carrying or possessing firearm when committing or attempting to commit felony; “law enforcement officer” defined. Sec. 227b. (1) A person who carries or has in his or her possession a firearm when he or she commits or attempts to commit a felony, except a violation of section 223, section 227, 227a or 230, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under this section, the person shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall be imprisoned for 10 years. (2) A term of imprisonment prescribed by this section is in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the


conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony. (3) A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall not be suspended. The person subject to the sentence mandated by this section is not eligible for parole or probation during the mandatory term imposed pursuant to subsection (1). (4) This section does not apply to a law enforcement officer who is authorized to carry a firearm while in the official performance of his or her duties, and who is in the performance of those duties. As used in this subsection, “law enforcement officer” means a person who is regularly employed as a member of a duly authorized police agency or other organization of the United States, this state, or a city, county, township, or village of this state, and who is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of this state.11 However, in count 2, the prosecutor lists MCL 750.227B-A, which was originally charged in the Investigator’s Report [exhibit F]. There is no B-A in the statute, therefore the charges are void on their face. This is a fatal flaw which cannot be repaired. It is the Defenses allegation that the prosecutor realized this and offered a plea, so that it would not be challenged. Standing In the Investigator’s Report [exhibit F], dated November 6, 2000, in the circumstances described, it states, “complt was walking down the street when a friend pushed him into the def’s trash cans knocking them over…” It wouldn’t take very much investigating to realize that the complt was not credible. At the time of the arrest, the trash cans were still out in front of the 


History: Add. 1976, Act 6, Eff. Jan. 1, 1977 ;-- Am. 1990, Act 321, Eff. Mar. 28, 1991


home. They were large “Detroit Issued” trash cans placed very close together, full of debris. The only thing that could have “accidentally” knocked them over could have been a Mack Truck. The report goes on to state, “def then ran out of the above loc. and slapped complt in the face, def then ran back into the loc. [and] came out with a 12 ga shotgun and pointed at complt and fired it.” Yet, the complt had no gun shot wounds and to the Defendant’s knowledge was not taken to a hospital. The fact is that the investigators report is prima facie evidence of

contradictory statements and lack of credible fact witnesses and lazy detective work, which as become the standard of the Detroit Police force. It must be further stated that in 2003, at least, 17 indictments were handed down to officers on the fourth precinct. While this may not necessarily implicate these officers, it casts disparity on the whole precinct and a lack of credibility. Without a credible fact witness this court has no standing. The prosecuting attorney has a duty to disclose of any knowledge of improprieties on behalf of the witnesses or officers or his office. The Defendant alleges that not disclosing this vital information was done in order to avoid civil litigation. Trespass Ab Initio The Doctrine of Trespass Ab Initio is the doctrine that states that an officer that acts under color of law is wrong from the very beginning and all his acts are defeated. The very moment he chooses to step out of the mandates of his authority and act is the moment that he becomes a trespasser ab initio. Thus, in this case, when the officers chose to violate any of the Defendant’s rights, he invalidated the arrest and had a duty to release the Defendant. There were many opportunities to correct their actions along the way, beginning with the initial interaction with the Defendant, 

when the officers ignored his fourth amendment rights, ignored the due process requirements in MCL 764.1, ignored his 8th amendment rights, ignored orders granted by the Court to bring him before a Magistrate and perjured themselves on government documents, among many other violations. Any on (1) of these violations would have violated due process and been enough to surrender subject matter jurisdiction. 4th Amendment Violations When King George granted his generals the ability to quarter the soldiers in the Colonist’s homes, this left the colonists bitter. The soldiers were brutal. They would take what they wanted. They would destroy property. They would displace families. Even those who were loyal to the crown found themselves very bitter against the British. It was for this reason that the 3rd and 4th Amendments were drawn up. It was the intent of the Convention to make sure that these would not happen here, again. The Bill of Rights in the 4th Amendment guarantees us, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. This is remunerated in the Michigan State Constitution: § 11 Searches and seizures. Sec. 11. The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, 

supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.12 When the Defendant opened his door on November 4, 2000, the police stormed in. They assaulted the Defendant and his Father, damaged his property, invaded his privacy and stole items from his house. The Defendant never believed that the police were “out to get him”, but were characterized by zealousness and sloppiness. If the Court is inclined to believe investigator’s report, [exhibit D] the police would still have no reason to enter the home without a warrant, since they claim to have already have advised the Defendant of his rights, which would have meant that he was already in custody. The Defendant does maintain, however, that no rights were ever read, at any time. Regardless of that fact, the logic in the police report does not follow the practices and procedures of common sense and certainly does not meet the definition of due process. Beyond all of this evidence that points to misconduct and laziness, there is no mention, anywhere, to account for what was taken from 1309 Crawford, Detroit, MI [48209]. No receipt was given. There is certainly no mention of a second gun, a Ruger 10/22, which was removed. There was no mention of all the clips and ammunition that was taken. The Defense believes that these were not listed for nefarious reasons. It does not rise to the standards outlined in either Constitution.


of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 11 24

Improper Complaint Filed / Requirement of Magistrate Ignored The duty to be bring a person before a magistrate in a timely manner is paramount in our system of justice. It has been adjudicated by the courts, time and time again. Michigan Compiled Laws says, 764.13 Arrest without warrant; taking arrested person before magistrate of judicial district in which offense charged to have been committed; complaint. Sec. 13. A peace officer who has arrested a person for an offense without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the judicial district in which the offense is charged to have been committed, and shall present to the magistrate a complaint stating the charge against the person arrested. In this case, the Defendant was arrested on November 4, 2000 and not brought before a Magistrate until November 10, 2000. The investigator’s report [exhibit D] was not dated until November 6, 2000. This reiterated in case law, including notable cases, such as, Gerstein v. Pugh 420 U.S. 103 (1975) and County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin 989-1817), 500 U.S. 44 (1991). (The Riverside case clarifies rulings in the Gerstein case.) “The Court thus established a "practical compromise" between the rights of individuals and the realities of law enforcement. Id., at 113. Under Gerstein, warrantless arrests are permitted but persons arrested without a warrant must promptly be brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause…..

Given that Gerstein permits jurisdictions to incorporate probable cause determinations into other pretrial procedures, some delays are inevitable. For example, where, as in 

Riverside County, the probable cause determination is combined with arraignment, there will be delays caused by paperwork and logistical problems. Records will have to be reviewed, charging documents drafted, appearance of counsel arranged, and appropriate bail determined. On weekends, when the number of arrests is often higher and available resources tend to be limited, arraignments may get pushed back even further. In our view, the Fourth Amendment permits a reasonable postponement of a probable cause determination while the police cope with the everyday problems of processing suspects through an overly burdened criminal justice system.

But flexibility has its limits; Gerstein is not a blank check. A State has no legitimate interest in detaining for extended periods individuals who have been arrested without probable cause. The Court recognized in Gerstein that a person arrested without a warrant is entitled to a fair and reliable determination of probable cause and that this determination must be made promptly.

Unfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have demonstrated, it is not enough to say that probable cause determinations must be "prompt." This vague standard simply has not provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and county practices, putting federal judges in the role of making legis lative judgments and overseeing local jailhouse operations. See, e. g., McGregor v. County of San Bernardino, decided with McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F. 2d 1276 (CA9 1989); Scott v. Gates, Civ. No. 84-8647 (CD Cal. Oct. 3, 1988); see also Bernard v. Palo Alto, 699 F. 2d 1023 (CA9 1983); Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (SD Tex. 1982), affirmance order, 741 F. 2d 1379 (CA5 1984); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 

F. Supp. 1000 (DC 1978).

Our task in this case is to articulate more clearly the boundaries of what is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit, it is important to provide some degree of certainty so that States and counties may establish procedures with confidence that they fall within constitutional bounds. Taking into account the competing interests articulated in Gerstein, we believe that a juris diction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein. For this reason, such jurisdictions will be immune from systemic challenges…

Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. Nor, for that matter, do intervening weekends. A jurisdiction that chooses to offer combined proceedings must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible, but in no event later than 48 hours after arrest.”

In fact, the courts are so serious on the timing of being brought before a magistrate, immediately, in the even of an arrest without a warrant, that it mandates that a judicial officer be made available every day of the year specifically for this purpose.


(G) Plan for Judicial Availability. In each county, the court with trial jurisdiction over felony cases must adopt and file with the state court administrator a plan for judicial availability. The plan shall (1) make a judicial officer available for arraignments each day of the year, or (2) make a judicial officer available for setting bail for every person arrested for commission of a felony each day of the year conditioned upon (a) the judicial officer being presented a proper complaint and finding probable cause pursuant to MCR 6.102(A), and (b) the judicial officer having available information to set bail. This portion of the plan must provide that the judicial officer shall order the arresting officials to arrange prompt transportation of any accused unable to post bond to the judicial district of the offense for arraignment not later than the next regular business day. Furthermore, in the Investigator’s report, there is no perjury clause as required by the statute, 764.1e Complaint signed by peace officer; statement; making materially false statement in complaint as perjury; penalty; contempt of court. (1) For purposes of sections 1a to 1d of this chapter, a complaint signed by a peace officer shall be treated as made under oath if the offense alleged in the complaint is a misdemeanor or ordinance violation for which the maximum permissible penalty does not exceed 93 days in jail or a fine, or both, that was committed in the signing officer's presence or that was committed under


circumstances permitting the officer's issuance of a citation under section 625a or 728(8) of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.625a and 257.728, and if the complaint contains the following statement immediately above the date and signature of the officer: “I declare under the penalties of perjury that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.” (2) A peace officer who, knowing the statement is false, makes a materially false statement in a complaint signed under subsection (1) is guilty of perjury, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years, and in addition, is in contempt of court. As stated previously, flaws of this nature are fatal and render the charges void. 8th Amendment Violations As mentioned in the history of the case, the Defendant was brought to the 4th precinct, located at 7140 W Fort Street or at the intersection of Fort Street and Green, where he was held for approximately 5 days. Conditions at the jail amounted were equivalent to inhumane, but may have reached the level of torturous. Sanitary conditions were horrid and no bedding or bed was provided for a stay that long. Regular access the restrooms were also unavailable. Regular meals were not provided. The climate and temperature were not properly regulated. The Defendant alleges that the conditions amounted to violations of his rights guaranteed by the 8th amendment of the US Constitution, which reads, Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 

The argument can be made that up until that time, the Defendant had no trial and due process had already been violated. The Defendant had already been restricted of his liberty and to impose such conditions on the Defendant amounted to a sentence, a further violation of due process. Article 1 § 16 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 also states that, § 16 Bail; fines; punishments; detention of witnesses. Sec. 16. Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted; nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained. The Defense argues that after such cruel treatment and violation of rights, the Defendant was in not mentally capable of making a decision that may have lead him back into such an environment. When a plea deal was offered, the Defendant feared similar treatment and abuses in both process and sentencing, specifically in the event of another incarceration. The very reason why these laws were enacted were to defend against such abuses on the innocent. The Great Writ Denied As stated previously, on November 7, 2000, Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, filed a Complaint for Habeas Corpus on the Defendant’s behalf alleging that the Defendant’s incarceration and continued detention was illegal [exhibit A]. It was allowed on November 8, 2000 by the Honorable John R. Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of returning for arraignment or to bring the Defendant to arraignment scheduled for November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. at 36th District Court, Room 4039 [exhibit C] Defendant remained in the custody of the Detroit Police Department and the order was ignored. On November 9. 2000, a second Habeas was filed [exhibit B] and the Honorable John R. 

Perry entered an order to deliver the Defendant to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, and that arraignment was scheduled for November 13, 2000 [exhibit D]. The Defendant was arraigned on November 10, 2000, before a different judicial officer, in further violation of the order and denial of due process rights. Twice, the Detroit Police Department and the Prosecuting Attorney chose to suspend the Michigan Constitution and the United States Constitution. To the Defendant’s knowledge, no proclamation of rebellion or invasion had been declared as required by both Constitutions, which read: Constitution of the State of Michigan, Habeas corpus. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.13

Constitution of the United States: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.14 Furthermore, Judge Chylinski did not acknowledge this violation of the Defendant’s rights, as required by statute, nor did he follow any of the commands issued in those statutes, further covering up the criminal behavior of the officers and judicial officials: 600.4313 



of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 12

States Constitution - Article I § 9 31

Habeas corpus; refusal to consider; malfeasance of judge. Any judge who willfully or corruptly refuses or neglects to consider an application, action, or motion for habeas corpus, is guilty of malfeasance in office.15

600.4325 Habeas corpus; person served; duty to bring body of prisoner. If a writ of habeas corpus is issued, the person on whom it is served shall bring the body of the person in his custody according to the command of the writ, except as provided in section 4328.16

600.4328 Habeas corpus; sickness or infirmity of prisoner. If, from the sickness or infirmity of the prisoner directed to be produced by any writ of habeas corpus, the prisoner cannot, without danger, be brought before the court or judge, the party having custody of the prisoner may state that fact in his answer. The court or judge, if satisfied of the truth of the allegation, and if the answer is otherwise sufficient, shall proceed to dispose of the matter on the record.17



History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963. History: 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963. 1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963. 32



Habeas corpus; refusal or neglect to obey; arrest; close custody; proceeding against sheriff; prisoner to be brought before court; power of county. (1) If the person upon whom the writ of habeas corpus was duly served refuses or neglects to obey the writ without sufficient excuse, the court or judge before whom the writ was to be answered, upon due proof of the service thereof, shall direct the arrest of such person. (2) The sheriff of any county within this state, or other officer, who is directed to make the arrest, shall apprehend such person, and bring him before the court or judge. The person shall be committed to close custody in the jail of the county in which the court or judge is, without being allowed the liberties thereof, until the person complies with the writ. (3) If the person ordered arrested is the sheriff of any county, the order may be directed to any coroner or other person, to be designated therein, who has thereby full power to arrest the sheriff. Such sheriff upon being brought up may be committed to the jail of any county other than his own. (4) The person directed to make the arrest shall also bring the prisoner named in the writ of habeas corpus before the court or judge which issued the writ. (5) In making the arrest the sheriff or other person so directed may call to his aid the power of the county as in other cases.18



1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963. 33

Arrest in support of writ. If any person attempts wrongfully to carry the prisoner out of the county or state after service of a writ of habeas corpus or order to show cause, the person serving the writ or order to show cause, or other officer, shall arrest the person so resisting, and bring him together with the prisoner before the court or judge issuing the writ or order to show cause.19

Again, this amounted to a violation of the Defendant’s rights, guaranteed by both Constitutions, State and Federal, and is a fatal defect which cannot be remedied. With this act, the State, again, surrendered subject matter jurisdiction, forever. Furthermore, the act of

changing the date may have been an attempt by the prosecutor to “judge shop” and was also in violation of the Defendant’s rights and is irreparable. Court Record Tampered With On November 9. 2000, a second Habeas was filed with the court clerk by Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant, Bar # 20214, [exhibit B]. Further examination of this document shows that the date has been tampered with. On March 15, 2010, the Defendant received from the Court Clerk [see receipt, exhibit E] 20 different documents in the case file # 00-69257. The Defendant asked for all of the

documents in the file, but the clerk of the court withheld four (4) documents for reasons unknown to the Defendant. The Defendant questioned the Clerk, but the clerk stated that she could not copy them, according to the law. The Habeas [listed as exhibit B] was one of those 


1961, Act 236, Eff. Jan. 1, 1963. 34

documents, but the Investigator’s Report, if it was in the case file, was not given to the Defendant. The Defendant subsequently learned that the Clerk had a duty to redact the

“victim’s” information and release the document. It is not known if this was in the case file. Furthermore, the exhibits listed as C and D, were not given to the Defendant by the clerk. It is not known if those documents were in the case file. If these documents were in the case file, it would be primae facie evidence of the corruption and cover-up that occurred in this case and the hiding of exculpatory evidence. United States Federal Code states: If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;... They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.20 and United States Federal Code states:


18, U.S.C., SECTION 241

Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.21 The Defense alleges serious charges against the Detroit Police Officers, the Prosecution, the Judge and the State of Michigan. The facts back up the Defendant’s statements and it appears that the Clerk of the Court has made an effort to do the same, further violating the due process rights of the Defendant under color of law. Branded a Criminal When police officers chose to violate the law, who is there to stand in the gap? For most citizens, the burden is far too great. It’s insurmountable. If a citizen’s right have been violated, it can be devastating. Citizens are taught that “the police are there to protect you.” When the reality becomes one that the police are the violators, the whole weight of the judicial system 


18, U.S.C., SECTION 242

bears down on the citizen, in this case, the Defendant, and justice is elusive, at best. At worst, justice is not within reach of an innocent man. In 2003, when 17 or more officers were indicted, the Detroit reported how those complainants were not believed because they were “convicts”. The truth is, “innocent until proven guilty” is not a reality in a system where rights are not protected. If an officer chooses to charge an individual with a crime, “who will believe you over me?” In this case, the Defendant believed in moral excellence. The Defendant believed in his 2nd amendment rights and his ability to protect his house, his family and his property. If the officers had taken just one moment to truly look at the facts on November 4, 2000, then all of this could have been avoided and the arrest would have never happened. The Defendant has taken the position, despite police reports claiming the contrary, from the very beginning, that he was right to Defend himself and had he not done so, he probably would not be here. Logic dictates that it simply does not make sense that the Defendant would “attack” someone for simply knocking over his trash cans and jeopardize his liberty and all that he had worked for. It also does not follow a logical conclusion that the Defendant would jeopardize his family, by way of retribution, over such a menial issue. However, in a Court of Law, logic is not the standard. Due process is. The hope is that if due process was followed, the logical outcome would be what happens. Due process is there to weed out corruption, to weed out the innocent from the guilty and to make sure that justice happens. Justice just did not happen in this case and the Defendant has lived under this cloud for 10 years. It is imperative that the court sees this and follows the standards, as prescribed by law.


Pro Se Litigant The Defense reminds this Court that the Defendant has a right, prescribed by law, to represent himself in this matter. In the Michigan Constitution, it reads, Conduct of suits in person or by counsel. A suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.22 Denial of this right, prejudice based on the practice of this right is illegal, immoral and a violation of US 18 § 242. In 2008, James Gill of the Times-Picayune Publishing Corporation published an article on Edward Dufresne, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Federal, in Louisiana. In the article, it describes how Judge Dufresne systematically denied Pro Se Litigants the right to be heard, as a matter of practice. It also describes how a staffer working for the Court committed suicide, attributing his suicide to guilt over the blatant corruption and wanton disregard over violations to Pro Se applicants, among other things. While the Defense knows that this Court is not a party to such corruption, it reiterates the right to be heard and the right to remedy this wrong, which has gone too long without being cured. Damages While this is not a Civil Proceeding, the Defendant reminds the Court that he has suffered damages. The Defendant does not believe the Court or any of its Judicial Officers were party to 



of Michigan 1963 – Article I § 13


the larger conspiracy, at this time, but was rather an unwilling participant in the corruption of both, the Prosecutor and the Detroit Police Department. However, the Defendant acknowledges that the Court was participant, nonetheless, and that the Court had a duty to obey the laws. The Defendant also believes that the facts are overwhelming that the Attorney, Paul Semperger, Bar # 20214, was inept and apathetic in his representation of the Defendant. Regardless of who might be to blame for inept or conspiratorial practices and procedures, or what reasons they might have had to do so, the Defense reminds the Court that it stands to gain very little by revisiting this matter. The Defendant is not incarcerated. The Defendant is no longer under any Sentence Restrictions or Supervision by any Probation offices. Nonetheless, the Defendant has suffered and is still suffering damages to this very day because he the Defendant remains constrained at his liberties. The Defendant has suffered invasion of privacy, invasion of property, theft of property, including, but not limited to one (1) shotgun and one (1) Ruger 10/22 Rifle and equipment. The Defendant was falsely imprisoned and falsely charged. The Defendant has had his due process rights violated on multiple occasions and continues to live under a cloud of impropriety. The Defendant has had his 2nd Amendment rights stripped. The Defendant has found it difficult to find employment with a criminal history. The Defendant was forced to pay fees and penalties to the Probation Supervision office and attorney’s fees. It is also important to note that the Defendant was victimized many times. It began with destruction of property and attempted theft by Larry Mason II and his friends and continued on throughout the legal proceedings into sentencing where everyone got “their pound of flesh.” The Law of Void Judgments The Defense holds that this judgment is void and subject matter jurisdiction was 

surrendered ab intio. While the human element is important to keep in mind, it is far more pressing to realize that due process was violated at key stages throughout this case. Case Law supports this principle. In Smith v. McCullough 46 S.Ct. 338, dealing with in personam jurisdiction, it states that jurisdiction cannot be assumed and until proven, “he/she is without jurisdiction and case should be dismissed, jurisdiction cannot be presumed”; reiterated in Smith v. McCullough 46 S. Ct. 338, “once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven.” Hagens v. Lavine 415 U.S. 533, tells us that, “No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.” In NGUYEN V. UNITED STATES (01-10873) 540 U.S. 935 (2003) 284 F.3d 1086, the Supreme Court held that any judgment entered without a qualified judge must be vacated. No argument is subjective in this case. The documentation is conclusive and self

authenticating. The prosecution and, thus, the State of Michigan, has lost all subject matter jurisdiction by ignoring law and violating Michigan Court Rules, making the burden too great on the defendant to properly adjudicate a fair defense. Most importantly, due process has been ignored, which has been guaranteed by the 14TH Amendment of the Constitution of the united states of America: “…nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws…”

The Defense prays that this Court recognize the violations of law, civil rights and the damage caused. The Defendant moves the Court to void judgment and dismiss this case with prejudice. With that, the Defendant thanks the Court. 

Failure to enforce the law does not change it. Lousville & N.R.R. v U.S., 282 U.S. 740, 759.

WHEREFORE, the defendant moves the Court to void the judgment and dismiss the charge with prejudice for the reasons stated herein and because it is the right thing to do, the law commands it and justice demands it. The defendant further moves the court to return all of his property and fees or in the alternative, make him whole again and anything else that the court sees fit to grant. If the Court denies this motion, the defendant moves the court to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law why this motion should be denied in accordance with MCR 2.613(C).

Respectfully Submitted,

______________________ Mark Alan Jackson 129 North Lowell Road Windham, NH 03087 313-478-8061

Notary Stamp Here


All exhibits have been attached to the end of this document and labeled. Some are part of the original Court Record and some are unclear, but should have been entered into the Court Record. A. Complaint for Habeas Corpus, filed by defendant’s Attorney (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff, Bar #20214, on November 7, 2000 against Benny Napoleon, Detroit Chief of Police. B. Complaint for Habeas Corpus, filed by defendant’s Attorney (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff, Bar #20214, on November 8, 2000 against Benny Napoleon, Detroit Chief of Police. C. Writ of Habeas Corpus, granted on November 8, 2000, by the Honorable John R. Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of returning for arraignment or to bring the Defendant to arraignment scheduled for November 9, 2000 at 9:00 a.m. at 36th District Court, Room 4039. D. Writ of Habeas Corpus, granted on November 9, 2000, by the Honorable John R. Perry, Bar # 18808, to be delivered to the custody of Paul Semperger, Attorney for the Defendant (listed as Attorney for the Plaintiff), Bar # 20214, for the purpose of returning for arraignment on November 13, 2000. E. Felony Complaint, dated on November 6, 2000, signed by Magistrate Charles W. Anderson III, charging the Defendant with 2 counts. F. 2 Sections. The Investigator’s Report [04-583476], dated November 6, 2000, filed by the 4th precinct. 

G. Receipt from Cathy M. Garett, Wayne County Clerk, dated March 15, 2010, for 20 documents, for a total of $20.00. H. Defendant’s FOIA request to the Office of the Great Seal c/o the Secretary of State, written on May 24th 2010, requesting Oaths of Office. I. Michelle Martin’s response, pursuant to the Defendant’s May 24th, 2010 FOIA request, answered on May 27th, 2010. J. Judge Chylinski’s current Oath of Office on file with the Secretary of State, filed on December 14th, 2004. K. Certified copy of response that Judge Chylinski had no Oath of Office on file for the years of 2000 through 2001, by Terri Lynn Land, the current Secretary of State. L. Certified copy of response that Judge Perry had no Oath of Office on file for the years of 2000 through 2001 by Terri Lynn Land, the current Secretary of State.


 Exhibit A

 Exhibit B

 Exhibit C

 Exhibit D

Exhibit E


 Exhibit F – Section 1

 Exhibit F – Section 2

Exhibit G


Exhibit H





Exhibit I



Exhibit J 


Exhibit K


Exhibit L 



I, Mark Alan Jackson, do swear and affirm that all statements made herein are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, in all respects.



To be completed by the court.

I certify on this date a copy of this motion was served upon the prosecutor by Personal Service: Mail:


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