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CORDON

AND
SEARCH
MULTI-SERVICE
TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND
PROCEDURES FOR
CORDON AND
SEARCH
OPERATIONS
FM 3-06.20
MCRP 3-31.4B
NTTP 3-05.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.62
APRIL 2006
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the
DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or
operational information from automatic dissemination under the
international Exchange Program or by other means. This
determination was made on 16 August 2005. Other requests
must be referred to:
HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-RD, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-5000;
HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021;
NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207;
or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ, Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must


prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
FOREWORD
This publication has been prepared under our direction for use by our respective commands
and other commands as appropriate.

This publication is available through the ALSA Web site


(www.alsa.mil); through the Army at Army Knowledge Online
(AKO) (www.us.army.mil) and at the General Dennis J.
Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library
(www.train.army.mil) Web sites; and through the Air Force at
the Air Force Publishing Web site (www.e-publishing.af.mil).
PREFACE
1. Purpose
This publication consolidates the Services' best tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)
used in cordon and search operations into a single multi-Service TTP (MTTP) publication with
the objective of increasing the probability of mission success. It provides MTTP for the planning
and execution of cordon and search operations at the tactical level of war. Currently there is
very little Service doctrine available on cordon and search operations and even less that
addresses special operations forces (SOF) and aviation integration into these types of
operations. This publication captures the fragmented TTP currently in the form of unit standing
operating procedures (SOPs), class outlines for cordon and search training, operations orders,
and the integration of SOF, interoperability, and aviation considerations into one publication.
2. Scope
This MTTP publication is a comprehensive reference source to assist ground commanders
and subordinates, SOF, and aviation personnel in planning, training, and conducting tactical
cordon and search operations. It fills a void in Service doctrine by highlighting commonalities
and consolidating the TTP of the Services, SOF, and aviation concerning cordon and search
operations. This publication captures lessons learned from recent operations and the Services
best practices concerning cordon and search operations. This publication:
• Supplements established doctrine and TTP
• Provides reference material to assist ground, SOF, and aviation personnel in
planning and coordinating tactical cordon and search operations
• Promotes an understanding of the complexities of cordon and search operations
emphasizing urban terrain considerations
• Incorporates TTP, lessons learned, information from ongoing combat operations, and
training exercises applicable to cordon and search operations
3. Applicability
This publication is a tactical-level document that focuses at the battalion level and below for
the planning and conduct of cordon and search operations. The TTP in this document are
applicable to joint forces of the United States, to include personnel planning. It applies to
commanders, planners, ground forces, SOF, and aviation personnel who conduct cordon and
search operations. This publication is intended to be theater non-specific. Services can use
this MTTP as a basis for both institutional and operational training as deemed appropriate and
feasible. Any use of force detailed in this TTP is governed by the rules of engagement (ROE)
applicable to the operation. ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. In addition to the rules for use of
force contained in the ROE, units also retain the inherent right of self-defense. A use of force in
self-defense must be necessary (that is, responsive to a hostile act or demonstration of hostile
intent) and proportional (that is, reasonable in intensity, duration, and magnitude).
4. Implementation Plan
Participating Service command offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) will review this
publication, validate the information and, where appropriate, reference and incorporate it in
Service manuals, regulations, and curricula as follows:
Army. Upon approval and authentication, this publication incorporates the procedures
contained herein into the United States (US) Army Doctrine and Training Literature Program as
directed by the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 i


Distribution is in accordance with (IAW) applicable directives and the Initial Distribution Number
(IDN) listed on the authentication page.
Marine Corps.∗ The Marine Corps will incorporate the procedures in this publication in US
Marine Corps training and doctrine publications as directed by the Commanding General, US
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). Distribution is IAW the Marine Corps
Publication Distribution System (MCPDS).
Navy. The Navy will incorporate these procedures in US Navy training and doctrine
publications as directed by the Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC)[N5]. Distribution is IAW Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure Desk Guide
(MILSTRIP Desk Guide) Navy Supplement Publication-409 (NAVSUP P-409).
Air Force. The Air Force will incorporate the procedures in this publication IAW applicable
governing directives. Distribution is IAW Air Force Instruction (AFI) 33-360.
5. User Information
a. TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC, Headquarters AFDC, and the Air Land Sea Application
(ALSA) Center developed this publication with the joint participation of the approving Service
commands. ALSA will review and update this publication as necessary.
b. This publication reflects current joint and Service doctrine, command and control
organizations, facilities, personnel, responsibilities, and procedures. Changes in Service
protocol, appropriately reflected in joint and Service publications, will likewise be incorporated in
revisions to this document.
c. We encourage recommended changes for improving this publication. Key your
comments to the specific page and paragraph and provide a rationale for each
recommendation. Send comments and recommendations directly to—

Army
Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command
ATTN: ATFC-RD
Fort Monroe VA 23651-5000
DSN 680-3951 COMM (757) 788-3951; E-mail: doctrine@monroe.army.mil
Marine Corps
Commanding General, US Marine Corps Combat Development Command
ATTN: C427
3300 Russell Road, Suite 318A
Quantico VA 22134-5021
DSN 278-2871/6227 COMM (703) 784-2871/6227; E-mail: deputydirectordoctrine@usmc.mil
Navy
Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command
ATTN: N5
686 Cushing Road
Newport RI 02841-1207
DSN 948-1070/4201 COMM (401) 841-1070/4201; E-mail: alsapubs@nwdc.navy.mil
Air Force
Commander, Air Force Doctrine Center
ATTN: DJ
155 North Twining Street
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6112
DSN 493-2640/2256 COMM (334) 953-2640/2256; E-mail: afdc.dj@maxwell.af.mil
ALSA
Director, ALSA Center
114 Andrews Street
Langley AFB VA 23665-2785
DSN 575-0902 COMM (757) 225-0902; E-mail: alsa.director@langley.af.mil

∗ Marine Corps PCN: 144 000 162 00

ii FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


FM 3-06.20
MCRP 3-31.4B
NTTP 3-05.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.62

FM 3-06.20 US Army Training and Doctrine Command


Fort Monroe, Virginia

MCRP 3-31.4B Marine Corps Combat Development Command


Quantico, Virginia

NTTP 3-05.8 Navy Warfare Development Command


Newport, Rhode Island

AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center


Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

25 April 2006

CORDON AND SEARCH


MULTI-SERVICE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
FOR CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................viii
CHAPTER I PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ....................................................... I-1
Planning Considerations..................................................................... I-1
Task Organization............................................................................... I-7
Snipers/Recon Infiltration.................................................................... I-9
Search Considerations ..................................................................... I-10
Direct and Indirect Fire Planning ...................................................... I-11
Aviation Integration ........................................................................... I-12
Special Operations Forces (SOF)..................................................... I-13
Logistical and Support Considerations ............................................. I-13
Information Operations (IO) .............................................................. I-13
Public Affairs (PA)............................................................................. I-13
Communications ............................................................................... I-14

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD contractors only to protect technical or operational
information from automatic dissemination under the international Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was
made on 16 August 2005. Other requests must be referred to: HQ TRADOC, ATTN: ATFC-RD, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-5000;
HQ MCCDC, ATTN: C427, Quantico, VA 22134-5021; NWDC, ATTN: N5, Newport, RI 02841-1207; or HQ AFDC, ATTN: DJ,
Maxwell AFB, 36112-6112

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 iii


CHAPTER II INTELLIGENCE AND URBAN PLANNING
CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................ II-16
General ............................................................................................ II-16
Civilian Considerations .................................................................... II-16
IPB Considerations .......................................................................... II-17
ISR Planning.................................................................................... II-20
Urban Planning Considerations ....................................................... II-22
CHAPTER III CORDON AND SEARCH EXECUTION PROCEDURES ................ III-1
Cordon and Search Methods for Success ........................................ III-1
Command Element ........................................................................... III-2
Security Element............................................................................... III-3
Search/Assault Element ................................................................... III-6
Support Element ............................................................................... III-9
Movement to the Target.................................................................... III-9
Tactical Control Measures .............................................................. III-11
Deception Techniques .................................................................... III-11
Driving Considerations.................................................................... III-12
Helicopter Insertion......................................................................... III-12
Emplacement Techniques and Timing of the Cordon and
Search Elements ..................................................................... III-13
Withdrawal from the Objective........................................................ III-16
Road Blocks.................................................................................... III-21
Control of the Populace in the Target Area .................................... III-23
Breaching Techniques .................................................................... III-23
Room Clearing................................................................................ III-24
Searches......................................................................................... III-26
Exiting the Cleared Building(s) ....................................................... III-29
CHAPTER IV AVIATION CONSIDERATIONS ....................................................... IV-1
Overview........................................................................................... IV-1
Air-Ground Coordination................................................................... IV-1
CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Personnel ....................................... IV-2
Rotary Wing Aviation Integration in the Cordon and Search ............ IV-2
Fixed-wing Aviation Considerations.................................................. IV-6
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operations.............................. IV-11
Airborne C4ISR Considerations...................................................... IV-12
CHAPTER V SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION......................... V-1
SOF Overview ................................................................................... V-1
SOF Core Tasks ................................................................................ V-1
SOF Applications in Cordon and Search Operations ........................ V-1
Integrated Operations ........................................................................ V-2
Planning Considerations.................................................................... V-3
SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Lessons Learned ........ V-6

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CHAPTER VI LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS ....................... VI-1
Support to Cordon and Search Operations ...................................... VI-1
Transportation and Vehicle Recovery............................................... VI-1
Detainee Operations......................................................................... VI-1
Medical ............................................................................................. VI-2
Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Captured Enemy
Ammunition (CEA)..................................................................... VI-3
Classes of Supply Considerations .................................................... VI-4
Urban Operations Kits ...................................................................... VI-5
APPENDICES
A. Historical Lessons learned ............................................................ A-1
B. Planning Checklists ....................................................................... B-1
C. Smart Cards ..................................................................................C-1
D. Information Operations..................................................................D-1
E. Civil-Military Operations (CMO)/Civil Affairs (CA) ......................... E-1
F. Rehearsals .................................................................................... F-1
G. Interpreter Considerations ............................................................G-1
H. Communications ...........................................................................H-1
I. Urban Area Reference System........................................................ I-1
REFERENCES .......................................................................................... References-1
GLOSSARY .............................................................................................. Glossary-1
INDEX .................................................................................................... Index-1

FIGURES
Figure I-1. Task Organization ............................................................ I-8
Figure II-1. Urban Terrain ............................................................... II-24
Figure II-2. City Core ...................................................................... II-25
Figure II-3. Core Periphery ............................................................. II-25
Figure II-4. Dense Random Construction ....................................... II-26
Figure II-5. Close Orderly Block Construction ................................ II-26
Figure II-6. Dispersed Residential Area.......................................... II-27
Figure II-7. High-Rise Area ............................................................. II-27
Figure II-8. Industrial-Transportation Area...................................... II-28
Figure II-9. Permanent or Fixed Fortifications ................................ II-28
Figure II-10. Shantytowns............................................................... II-29
Figure II-11. Street Patterns and Effects ........................................ II-30
Figure III-1. Outer Cordon................................................................ III-5
Figure III-2. Inner Cordon ................................................................ III-6
Figure III-3. Search Assault Element ............................................... III-8
Figure III-4. Single Point of Ingress ............................................... III-10
Figure III-5. Multidirectional Ingress............................................... III-11
Figure III-6. Simultaneous Occupation .......................................... III-14

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 v


Figure III-7. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 1 Outer
Cordon) ................................................................................... III-15
Figure III-8. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon)... III-15
Figure III-9. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 3 Search
Element) .................................................................................. III-16
Figure III-10. Simultaneous Egress ............................................... III-17
Figure III-11. Sequential Egress (Sequence 1 Search Element) ... III-17
Figure III-12. Sequential Egress (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon)........ III-18
Figure III-13. Sequential Egress (Sequence 3 Outer Cordon)....... III-18
Figure III-14. Single Point Egress .................................................. III-19
Figure III-15. Multidirectional Egress ............................................. III-20
Figure III-16. Sectors of Fire .......................................................... III-26
Figure C-1. Cordon and Search Smart Card ....................................C-3
Figure H-1. Wolf Tail.........................................................................H-3
Figure I-1. Building Numbering System ............................................. I-2
Figure I-2. Building Numbering System With Many Buildings ........... I-2
Figure I-3. Urban Area Reference System ........................................ I-3
Figure I-4. Target Reference Point .................................................... I-3

TABLES
Table IV-1. Rotary Wing Aircraft Capabilities .................................. IV-3
Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities.............. IV-6
Table B-1. Urban Priority Intelligence Requirements........................ B-1
Table B-2. Urban Intelligence Requirements.................................... B-1
Table B-3. ROE/Escalation Procedures ........................................... B-2
Table B-4. Controlling Civilian Populace .......................................... B-2
Table B-5. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Reserve ............................ B-2
Table B-6. Command, Control, Communications (C3) and
Locations .................................................................................... B-2
Table B-7. Direct Fire Planning......................................................... B-3
Table B-8. Air Considerations (Rotary and Fixed-wing) ................... B-4
Table B-9. Consolidation, Reorganization, and Withdrawal ............. B-4
Table B-10. Perception Management (IO and CA Operations) ........ B-5
Table B-11 Media Facilitation and Public Affairs Checklists............. B-5
Table B-12. Sniper Employment....................................................... B-5
Table B-13. Traffic Control Point/Blocking Positions ........................ B-6
Table B-14. Patrol Checklist ............................................................. B-6
Table B-14. Patrol Checklist ............................................................. B-7
Table B-15. Mission Equipment Checklist ........................................ B-7
Table C-1. CAS Terminal Attack Control Attributes..........................C-1
Table C-2. CAS Battle Drill ..............................................................C-1
Table C-3. CAS Briefing (9-Line) ......................................................C-2
Table D-1. Cordon and Search.........................................................D-2
Table D-2. Employment of QRF .......................................................D-3

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Table D-3. Insurgent-Related Violence.............................................D-3
Table D-4. Violent Demonstration.....................................................D-4
Table F-1. Rehearsal Checklist ........................................................ F-3
Table G-1. Interpreter Checklist........................................................G-2
Table G-2. Example Smart Card Used in Iraq ..................................G-3
Table H-1. Communications Checklist..............................................H-1
Table H-2. Target and Friendly Marking Methods ............................H-4

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 vii


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CORDON AND SEARCH


Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations

Overview
Cordon and search operations involve isolating the target area and searching suspected
buildings to capture or destroy possible insurgents and/or contraband. A cordon and search
may also be thought of as a movement to contact, raid, deliberate attack, or area
reconnaissance based on the accuracy of intelligence. While the actual operation may fall
under the category of any of these missions, the cordon and search is typically oriented at
finding insurgents or their caches. This publication:

• Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning and execution of cordon and search
operations.
• Provides reference material to assist supported and supporting personnel and
organizations in planning, coordinating, and executing cordon and search
operations.
• Applies to all elements of the force when planning, executing, and supporting cordon
and search operations. This includes both ground personnel and the supporting
aviation assets in the conduct of operations.
• Is focused on the scope of cordon and search operations.
Planning Considerations
Chapter I provides considerations for staff planning in the conduct of cordon and search
operations. This chapter, in conjunction with appropriate follow on chapters and appendices,
provides the tactical staff planner and the small unit leader a foundation from which to plan,
coordinate, integrate, and execute cordon and search operations. It addresses the capabilities
brought to the fight of land, sea, and air in the conduct of cordon and search operations.
Intelligence and Urban Planning Considerations
Chapter II provides information pertaining to the intelligence preparation of the battlefield
with focus upon the variables inherent in cordon and search operations such as the specific
characteristics of urban terrain, the geography, the impact of structural features, and the impact
of the populous. The information provided also addresses the applicability and appropriateness
of available capabilities. These include, but are not limited to, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), using both traditional and non-traditional ISR.
Execution Procedures
Chapter III provides TTP derived from historical sources with emphasis on recent operations
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The lessons
learned, in conjunction with available resources, provide the backdrop for more detailed
discussion of the ground elements and their role(s). Specific areas discussed include the
conduct of, and responsibilities within, the elements of the cordon and search force; the
command element security element, search/assault element, and the support element. This

viii FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


chapter provides insight into the composition and inherent responsibilities of each element.
Details include moving to and from the objective; locating, preparing, and emplacing check
points; and techniques associated with moving and searching personnel and vehicles within the
objective area.
Aviation Considerations
Chapter IV provides information on aviation considerations in the conduct of supporting
cordon and search operations. This chapter highlights the unique capabilities aviation platforms
bring to the fight, as well as an understanding of potential limitations based upon the
environment. Areas of discussion include fixed and rotary wing employment in an urban
environment, air to ground integration, and marking procedures for friendly positions and enemy
targets. This chapter provides the planner and executor information and insight critical to
maximizing aviation assets and capabilities in support of cordon and search operations.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Integration Considerations
Chapter V provides information regarding the principles for integrating and employing
special operations forces, in a coordinated effort, with conventional forces. The focus is to
maximize the available capabilities of SOF units as they are used in the conduct of cordon and
search operations. This chapter provides planning considerations, command relationships, and
task organization that pertain to SOF and conventional force integration.
Logistics/Support
Chapter VI provides information pertaining to logistical considerations during planning,
preparing, and executing cordon and search operations. Focus includes planning, special
equipment capabilities, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and classes of supply needed to
support cordon and search operations.
Appendices
The appendices provide details and amplifying information for use in planning,
preparing, and executing cordon and search operations. These appendices provide tactical-
level focus in the form of checklists, smart cards, and references that are easily accessible and
rapidly digested. Specific topics and products include:

• Lessons learned
• Planning checklists
• Smart cards
• Rehearsals
• Information operations (IO)
• Civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs (CA)
• Communications
• Interpreter considerations
• Urban reference systems

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 ix


PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS
The following commands and agencies participated in the development of this publication:

Joint
US Special Operations Command, MacDill AFB, FL
Commander Naval Special Warfare Command, NAB, Coronado, CA
JFK Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, NC

Army
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA
US Army Infantry Center, CATD, Fort Benning, GA
US Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO
Combat Doctrine Development, Army Medical Dept Center and School,
Fort Sam Houston, TX
Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA
3-16 Cavalry, US Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, KY
1-360th Infantry Battalion, 2nd-91st Brigade, Fort Carson, CO
Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS
DOTD, Fort Rucker, AL
C Company 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, NC

Marine Corps
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA
Marine Special Operations Command Detachment 1, Camp Pendleton, CA
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1, Yuma, AZ
2nd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA
3rd Battalion 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA
1st Battalion 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, I MEF, 29 Palms, CA
1st Battalion 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, II MEF, Camp LeJeune, NC
Provost Marshal Office, MCAS Miramar, CA
Infantry Officer Course, The Basic School, MCCDC, Quantico, VA
Marine Air Control Squadron 23, Marine Forces Reserve, Buckley AFB, CO

Navy
Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport RI

Air Force
Air Combat Command/DOTW, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command/Joint Air Ground Office, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command/DOYC JTAC/Air-Ground Office, Langley AFB, VA
Air Combat Command, Security Forces A-3/SFO Moody AFB, GA
Air Force Special Operations Command, Weapons and Tactics Division, Hurlburt Field, FL

x FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Chapter I
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Planning Considerations
a. Planning Overview. Commanders must consider numerous factors when planning and
preparing for a cordon and search operation. Commanders and their staffs apply the same
steps used in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). When the objective of the cordon
and search operation is a high payoff target (HPT), the planning time can be extremely limited
between when a battalion first receives the mission from "higher" and when it is actually
executed. Given the complexity of the mission and the many assets task organized to support
the operation, planning time may require immediate collaborative planning by key leaders of all
the elements and a very accelerated MDMP. As in all cases the quality of the information
associated with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available and civilian (METT-
TC) becomes critical. Commanders should ask, “What is the focus of our planning?” In
particular the “civilian” part of the factors of METT-TC should be specifically considered.

Note: The US Army uses METT-TC; the USMC uses METT-T.

(1) Terms. The following four terms are used when discussing cordon and search
operations throughout this publication:
(a) Objective Area—The area where the cordon and search takes place.
(b) Target Area—The area immediately surrounding the target, which may be a
house, a series of houses, etc.
(c) Target—The location of the HPT, weapons cache, etc.
(d) Objective—The goal of the operation.
(2) Population. The basic principle when conducting any search of a village or built up
area is to complete the cordon and search mission with the least amount of disruption to the
local population as possible. The populace may be inconvenienced to the point where they may
discourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remaining, but not to the point that the
search drives them into sympathy with the movement. Respect for the inhabitants, their homes,
property, customs, traditions, and religion is of paramount concern. Rough handling and abuse
will alienate the populace, close the lines of communication, and drive the critical focus of the
insurgent’s efforts into the arms of the movement. Ideally a search within the area is conducted
by local forces with some US advisors, counterintelligence personnel, etc., as required.
Moreover, civilian populations in occupied areas are entitled to specific protections under the
law of war, including Geneva Convention (IV) and customary international law.
(3) Civil-Military Operations (CMO). If possible the cordon and search should be
executed as a combined civil and military operation. The presence of regional officials and local
police should not be automatic; their effectiveness will depend on how the population being
cordoned and searched views these officials: i.e., if as a friend—bring them; if as an enemy—
leave them behind. The operation can be enhanced if the host nation (HN) government has
intelligence roots in the area and the people are pro-government or neutral. The use of HN
forces can increase legitimacy of CMO.
(4) Goals for the Operation. These include the following:
(a) Psychological: a positive political message.
(b) Presence: show of force.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-1


(c) Civic action: demonstrating that the government works.
(d) Counterinsurgency: gathering weapons/supplies, capturing rebels, etc.
(e) Intelligence: on enemy behavior.
(5) Contingency Plans. As commanders and their staffs plan the operation they must
address all possible branches and sequels to the course of action (COA). Few aspects of any
operation are as important as the development and dissemination of contingency plans.
Contingency plans must cover such possibilities as intense booby trapping of the area, sniper
fire from within the village or surrounding areas, and location of major hostile force within the
area. Commanders should always have a contingency plan for transitioning to other combat
operations in the event contact is made. The transition to a raid encompasses all aspects of
conducting a raid detailed in Service doctrine. Key to the successful transition is the rehearsal.
Commanders should always have a contingency plan for transitioning from a raid to a hasty
cordon and search in the event actionable time sensitive intelligence is discovered.
(6) Cordon and Search Methods. The cordon and search method selected to accomplish
the mission is dependant on a number of factors. The primary consideration is to capture the
designated personnel, site, or equipment but additional factors such as the enemy threat, local
populace support, and host-nation security forces (HNSF) capabilities must be taken into
account during planning the operation. The deciding factor in determining the type method to
use will generally depend on the level of intelligence available on the objective and target. The
more specific the intelligence read of the situation the more direct the method of mission
execution.
(a) Cordon and Kick—The cordon and kick method is used to maintain speed,
surprise, and timeliness in entry to the target within the objective. In this instance
considerations of population perceptions and integration of HNSF are less important than
accomplishing the task(s) of capturing the target individual, site, or equipment. Cordon and kick
operations seek to breach barriers or doors into the target structure to support the unit taking
immediate control maintaining the initiative. If intelligence indicates enemy presence and either
local populace neutrality or opposition, the principles of speed and surprise will be the keys to
successfully achieving the mission.
(b) Cordon and Knock/Ask—If the mission is focused on increasing the legitimacy
of the HN government and security forces, it may be necessary to sacrifice a degree of surprise
and timeliness to achieve that goal. In this instance the unit will focus more on maintaining a
presence and control of an area by incorporating local authorities into the mission. Units will still
approach the target with as much speed and surprise as possible to isolate the objective but will
generally integrate HNSF or authorities to obtain the agreement by the occupants of the target
to the subsequent search. The difference between cordon and knock and cordon and ask is
that the first method simply informs the occupants of the search while the second seeks
permission either directly from the occupants or through the local authorities. The intelligence
picture in this case is more general in nature and indicates some enemy activity and local
populace neutrality or aid to the insurgents possibly coerced through fear of retribution.

Note: The USMC employs only cordon and knock, not cordon and ask.

b. Principles of Cordon and Search.


(1) Speed—Cordons should be rapidly established with an immediate transition to a
search of the target . Rapid tempo is critical to maintain the initiative and to reduce the enemy’s
ability to react or escape. Speed will limit the enemy’s capability to react and mitigate organized
opposition by the local populace.

I-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


(2) Surprise—All efforts must be made to deny the enemy the opportunity to react.
(3) Isolation—The target area and the target must be physically isolated by establishing a
cordon around each site. The cordon serves to prevent escape from the area, repositioning by
enemy elements, or reinforcement.
(4) Target Identification—Personnel must be properly tasked and trained to identify,
capture, and/or exploit targeted enemy personnel and material.
(5) Timeliness—It is critical to strike a balance between actionable intelligence, target
activities, desired end state, and execution of the cordon and search. Failure to do so allows
the enemy to gain the initiative, reposition as he desires, and escape.
(6) Accountability—Frequently during a cordon and search several elements are
executing decentralized operations. It is critical that all personnel and assets are accounted for
and not left behind during the egress.
(7) Minimization and Mitigation of Collateral Damage—Cordon and search operations are
focused on eliminating threats or potential threats. If the operations cause excessive or
unnecessary collateral damage, this may create resentment, which emboldens the enemy’s
cause. Actions that cause extensive collateral damage may also constitute violations under
both the law of war and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
(8) Detailed Search—Target areas must be thoroughly and extensively searched to
ensure all of the enemy’s assets are captured. This requires proper coordination, marking, and
adherence to unit SOPs. Target areas cannot simply be cleared they must be properly
searched.
(9) Legitimacy—Cordon and search operations focus on supporting the efforts of a
legitimate HN government. The use and integration of properly trained HNSF are a requirement
toward this end.
c. Phases of a Cordon and Search.
(1) Planning—The planning phase is used to define the sequence of action by each
element to synchronize their tasks to ensure mission success. As time available to plan and
prepare for a cordon and search mission is generally limited, it is often necessary to conduct
planning while reconnaissance and intelligence collection are ongoing. As additional
information becomes available, it is integrated and the plan updated as necessary. While many
of the tasks required by a cordon and search is part of standard battle drills or unit SOPs, it is
necessary that premission rehearsals be conducted to identify any gaps or seams and that all
mission elements and teams understand their tasks.
(2) Reconnaissance—Every target area should be reconnoitered prior to execution using
many of the available resources. The reconnaissance plan must not provide the enemy with
indicators of an impending cordon and search. For example: A reconnaissance patrol should
not be conducted in an area where our forces do not habitually operate since it could
compromise execution of the cordon and search.
(3) Movement to the Objective—The timing, routes, and execution of movement to the
objective should consider the factors of METT-TC and whether it should be simultaneous or
phased.
(4) Isolation—This is key to successful execution of the search. It consists of an outer
cordon and an inner cordon. The objective may be isolated simultaneously or sequentially.
Frequently, the search may have to be executed immediately after the cordon is established.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-3


(5) Search—This includes everything from clearing and search of target areas,
consolidation and reorganization, and mitigation of negative effects caused by the search.
(6) Withdrawal—During this phase the unit may be the most vulnerable. To mitigate risk,
a relief in place may be effected, stay-behind elements may be left to cover the withdrawal,
different routes and timing may be used, or other techniques may be employed such as
simultaneous or phased withdrawals to mitigate the enemy’s ability to attack.
d. METT-TC Considerations. A commander should use the full range of intelligence from
his subordinates and staff and apply all lessons learned about his area of operations (AO) to
each mission (civilian considerations may change on a daily basis).
(1) MISSION—Most cordon and search operations are enemy-oriented and designed to
capture or destroy enemy forces, material, or capability to operate covertly.
(2) ENEMY—Enemy considerations drive the tactical planning. Commanders should
consider the following enemy actions when planning a cordon and search:
(a) Enemy resistance in the direction of attack into the target area—This includes
the emplacement and use of mines and booby traps as well as ambushes. Using aviation,
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or mounted patrol reconnaissance just ahead of the cordon
and search force will assist the commander in finding and using the path of least resistance into
the target area.
(b) Enemy resistance in the objective area—In an urban area the commander must
consider the possibility of enemy outposts in adjacent houses or courtyards, on the roofs of
adjacent buildings, in subterranean hide positions, etc. The cordon forces must be aware of
these suspected enemy positions.
(c) Enemy resistance at the target—During planning the commander must assess
the type and level of resistance expected. Intelligence and other information sources will assist
in defining the necessary scheme of maneuver based on the threat.
(d) Enemy resistance departing the objective area—Again, this includes
emplacement and use of mines, booby traps, and ambushes. Using aviation or UAS
reconnaissance assets will assist the commander in a quick egress. Commanders should
strongly consider using a separate ingress and egress route or a stay behind force.

Note: If intelligence indicates several armed insurgents are at the target, the commander
might plan a support by fire (SBF) position with a crew-served weapon capable of
penetrating the building's walls to facilitate the assault force's entry, as well as
facilitating the tempo and aggressiveness of the assault team's clearance of the
building. If intelligence indicates a more passive target, the commander might elect
to knock on the door and allow the occupants to come to the consolidation point
before the assault force enters the room.

(3) TERRAIN—Terrain considerations for a cordon and search are similar to those for
most other operations in urban terrain. As with any military operation, commanders must
consider obstacles, avenues of approach (to include enemy avenues of withdrawal), key terrain,
observation/fields of fire, and cover and concealment when evaluating the terrain.
(4) TIME—The time available before mission execution determines whether the unit will
execute a hasty or deliberate cordon and search. Commanders must also consider the time of
day they are conducting these operations, whether they want to conduct them in the early
morning hours before people arise and go to work or if in warmer climates they want to conduct

I-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


them in the middle of a hot afternoon when people are likely to be indoors trying to escape the
weather.

"We conducted these operations in both day and night, depending on the
time sensitivity of the target, minimizing potential for collateral damage (i.e.,
most folks are off the streets in late night), the availability of resources to the
battalion, and the ability to achieve surprise. In some cases, the timing of the
operation is based on when the targeted activity occurs (i.e., blackmarketing)
or patterns detected for such activity. When conducting the operation at night
in the urban environment, vehicles should approach the objective area with no
lights and under NVGs if the illumination is poor and the sector of the city has
poor night lighting. In some cases of objectives in smaller villages and towns
where the entire village is the objective, the operation should often commence
just at Before Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) so that the movement to the
objective area is under cover of darkness and yet the actual search can be
conducted in partial daylight. Working around the BMNT timing also
minimizes the COB interference on the operation.”
LTC Stephen Bruch
Battalion Commander
2-502nd 101st Air Assault Division
OIF 2003

(5) TROOPS AVAILABLE—Commanders must thoroughly evaluate the number of assets


available for each cordon and search mission. The composition of each element of the cordon
and search will vary from unit to unit, but commanders must ensure they have adequately
resourced each element to meet the possible threats and accomplish their task and purpose.
(6) CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS—Most cordon and search operations will occur in
populated areas and civilians must be considered in the planning process.
(a) Occupants and Neighboring Buildings—Commanders must consider the
various categories of occupants they will find and how to separate them from the search
activities. Units must be prepared to deal with women, children, ill, and elderly occupants of the
target and to provide for their security and safety. The cordon and search elements must be
prepared to search buildings immediately neighboring the target site. Neighboring buildings
may share walls or fences with the target site and provide either a covered means of escape or
additional cache sites for equipment.
(b) Neighbor(s)—Units must plan to communicate with the people in the
surrounding area. Commanders must plan to use a megaphone or tactical psychological
operations (PSYOP) team (TPT) assets to inform the neighbors of any specific instructions the
unit needs the community to follow.
(c) Cultural Sensitivity—Service members and junior leaders must be aware of
cultural taboos and ensure that their action or inaction does not incite the non-combatants in the
target area.
(d) Perception Management (Neighborhood Follow-up)—Units may plan to follow-
up with the neighborhood after a cordon and search. Either through a TPT or civil affairs (CA)

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-5


team or through conversations with local leaders, the unit may communicate some information
about the cordon and search. For instance, if the unit found an insurgent with bomb-making
materials, the unit may communicate that to the neighborhood. If a unit fails to communicate
that information to them, then the neighborhood may perceive the detention of their neighbor as
a sign of American cruelty or unfairness. The benefit of the neighborhood understanding cordon
and search operations could be the difference between that neighborhood supporting and
harboring insurgents or that neighborhood denying safe haven to future insurgents. It may be
necessary to prepare a TPT or CA team to document damage caused during a search and
reimburse the occupants on-site.
e. Combat Multipliers. A commander may receive several assets to assist him in
accomplishing his mission. As an example the search/assault element may have TPTs, tactical
human intelligence (HUMINT) teams (THTs), interpreters, and/or HNSF. The security element
may have CA teams, TPTs, THTs, interpreters, military police (MP), and/or HNSF. The support
element may have a CA team, interpreters, and/or HNSF. A company commander might also
use his executive officer (XO), fire support officer (FSO), First Sergeant, or Gunnery Sergeant
(Marine senior enlisted tactical advisor) to command and control (C2) some of these additional
assets.
(1) Tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) [or human exploitation teams (HETs) in the USMC].
These teams may be collocated with the search/assault element. THTs should be placed where
they can interact with the local populace and suspected individuals. They may require the
assistance of an interpreter. They are trained at interrogation and interview techniques. They
might assist in identifying or refining targets. They might also assist in developing other targets
and with managing informants.
(2) Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs). TPTs can assist the commander in communicating
with the local populace and in crowd control. They will require security. TPTs can be divided
into a mounted and dismounted element. TPTs can provide pre-approved handbills, posters,
mission specific signage, and loudspeaker messages. Mission specific signage and
loudspeaker messages should be planned well in advance of the operation to allow ample
production and preparation time. Messages may include non-interference, surrender, and civil
disturbance response.
(3) Fire Support Team (FIST). Fire support should be considered in the planning phase.
The FIST should be collocated with the on-scene commander. Target reference points need to
be specifically designated for lethal and nonlethal planning. A detailed fire plan should be
developed to assist the cordon team with sealing off the objective area.
(4) Civil Affairs Teams. They provide limited assistance during the execution of the
actual cordon and search. They can assist in dissolving unwanted crowds, and with assistance
from the TPT, can help to control the local populace. They can also provide the commander
with the atmospherics of a specific area. (See appendix E.)
(5) Document and Computer Exploitation (DOCEX) Team. This team is highly organized
and trained to search for, seize, maintain custody of, translate, make available to intelligence
units, and return to owners intelligence related items (such as computers, financial
documentation, cellular communications, large amounts of currency, maps, etc.).
(6) Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC)/FAC. The JTAC should be employed where they
can effectively control supporting air IAW the maneuver plan.
(7) Forward Treatment Teams. Casualty collection points (CCPs) should be
predetermined during the planning phase; this ensures that these critical medical assets are
positioned where they are most effective. They may also be used to treat wounded or injured

I-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


civilians. Security must be provided for these teams, they may be placed with part of the outer
cordon to facilitate security for these medical assets.
(8) Aviation Assets. They are a great combat multiplier; however, they cannot block or
hold ground. Therefore, it is imperative to incorporate these assets during COA development.
Ground force commanders must have a contingency plan for recovering downed aircraft during
the cordon and search operation.
(9) Sniper Employment. Sniper employment considerations need to be addressed
throughout all phases of the operation. Considerations for sniper employment are:
(a) Early infiltration into the objective area to provide current intelligence on the
target and to cover ingress route(s) with direct fire.
(b) Overwatch of rooftops and security to search element while moving or during
search operations.
(c) Overwatch during egress.
(d) Withdrawal of sniper teams.
(e) Counter sniper.
(10) Interpreters. Interpreters are a limited asset. Based on availability the commander
will have to determine where to task organize his interpreters. (See appendix G for a detailed
discussion on interpreters.)

f. Host-Nation Security Forces (HNSF) (Police and Military). It is critical that these forces
are integrated in the operation because it adds legitimacy to the HN government and ultimately
allows US forces to transition operational responsibilities to the host nation.
(1) HNSF have different levels of proficiency and capabilities. If not properly evaluated
HNSF can become a liability rather than an asset.
(2) Training should be conducted with these forces when possible to improve
capabilities, relationships, and confidence.
(3) Rehearsals are critical with these forces.
(4) Operational security may also be a concern when working with these forces. It is best
if they are only provided with generalities regarding execution time and location until they are
completely embedded and under the control of the mission commander.
(5) It may be necessary to assign a liaison officer (LNO) or specific individual(s) to
coordinate and control the actions of these security forces. The LNO should not take direct
control of this element but should communicate instructions directly to the HNSF element leader
and monitor for compliance.
(6) See chapter VI for HNSF logistical considerations.

2. Task Organization
a. Elements within the Cordon and Search Force. Organization of the force is similar to the
method used in task organizing a patrol or raid force, in that a general organization to conduct
major tasks is established. This breaks the unit into subelements. Subelements can be further
broken down into teams to conduct special tasks based on mission requirements. The below
figure depicts the task organization of a cordon and search force.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-7


Figure I-1. Task Organization

(1) Command Element—The command element is the headquarters of the unit


conducting the mission. It provides command and control for the operation, coordinating the
various assets.
(2) Security Element—The security element is responsible for isolating the objective and
specific target areas within an objective. This element is normally divided into two separate
groups: the outer cordon and the inner cordon. The security element prevents possible outside
influence affecting the mission of the search/assault force and prevents ingress/egress of
enemy and indigenous personnel from the target area and objective area.
(a) Outer cordon prevents anyone from entering the objective area and assists the
inner cordon in preventing the enemy from escaping from the objective area. Possible tasks
include:
• Block—to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy
advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach.
• Interdict—to prevent, hinder, or delay the use of an area or route by enemy
forces. To seal off an area by any means; to deny use of a route or
approach.
(b) Inner cordon accomplishes a similar task as the outer cordon but only for a
specific area such as a block, building, or portion of a building. An inner cordon is established
to isolate the specific area in which the target is located. An inner cordon prevents enemy
movement within the specific area and prevents enemy ingress into and egress from the target
area. The cordon and search commander may have the search/assault element perform the
inner cordon task. Possible tasks include:
• Fix—to prevent the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific
location for a specific period of time.
• Isolate—to seal off, both physically and psychologically, an enemy from his
sources of support, to deny an enemy freedom of movement, and to prevent
an enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces.
• Block—to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy
advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach.
• Interdict—to prevent, hinder, or delay the use of an area or route by the
enemy forces. To seal off an area by any means; to deny use of a route or
approach.
• Neutralize—to render ineffective or unusable. For specific TTP concerning
the following: To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering
with a particular operation, see FM 3-90.3. To render safe mines, bombs,
missiles, and booby traps, see FM 5-250.4. To make harmless anything
contaminated with a chemical agent, see FM 5-250.4.

I-8 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


• Suppress—to temporarily degrade the performance of a force or weapons
system below the level needed to accomplish the mission.
(3) Search/Assault Element—The search/assault element’s mission is to clear, search,
and assault targets within the specific building or area that the target(s) are located and to
capture, kill, or destroy the target. The search/assault element initiates action once the outer
and inner cordons are in place. It is imperative that this element not only understands but can
comply with rules of engagement (ROE) in a dynamic environment and this issue is addressed
upfront during planning and throughout all phases of the cordon and search. The commander
of the unit conducting the cordon or the search/assault element leader may break this element
down into separate groups to accomplish its assigned tasks. Possible tasks include:
(a) Search—to conduct a movement to go over or look through with the intent of
finding something.
(b) Seize—to clear the target area and obtain control of it.
(c) Clear—to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an
assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy
forces.
(d) Secure—to gain possession of a position or terrain feature with or without force
and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action.
(e) Destroy—to physically render an enemy force combat ineffective. To render a
target so damaged it cannot function as intended nor be restored to a usable condition without
being entirely rebuilt.
(4) Support Element—The support element is designed to act as a force multiplier during
a cordon and search operation. This element should be positioned where they can best
accomplish their assigned planning priorities and be prepared to tasks.
b. Special Teams and Assets. The following special teams and assets should be
considered during planning. Team leaders should be included where applicable in the planning
phase of the operation to advise commanders on their capabilities. These functions may be
performed by multiple personnel/teams and may include:
(1) Detainee Teams
(2) Field Interview Teams
(3) Documentation Teams
(4) Demolition Teams
(5) Mine Detection Teams
(6) Tunnel Reconnaissance Teams
(7) Fire Support Teams
(8) Joint Terminal Attack Controller
(9) Aviation assets
(10) Tactical HUMINT Teams
(11) Tactical PSYOP Teams
(12) Civil Affairs Teams
(13) Interpreters
(14) Host Nation Security Forces
(15) Military Working Dogs
(16) Medical Teams
(17) Sniper Teams

3. Snipers/Recon Infiltration
Snipers and/or small recon units can be used in order to secure routes into the objective
area as well as provide timely information concerning road conditions and civilian activity.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-9


Snipers/recon units can generally provide 24-72 hours of on target surveillance as well as cover
movements onto the objective with precision fires as needed. Care must be taken during
extraction of snipers/recon units to ensure that a proper and safe link up is conducted. Possible
insertion methods for snipers/recon units that have been used successfully include:
(1) Security halt: moving sniper/recon teams into the area with a patrol and leaving them
behind after a security halt. Special care must be made to ensure all members of the patrol are
using similar equipment as local populations will quickly become attuned to who snipers/recon
units are and their specialized equipment (scoped rifles, different packs etc.).
(2) Vehicle patrol: having snipers roll out of a moving vehicle at night in a dark area.
(3) False vehicle break down: having vehicle patrol act as though it was broken down in
order to give snipers time to get out of the vehicle and into an initial insertion point.

4. Search Considerations
a. Units conducting operations in Southwest Asia have found that search considerations
vary among provinces, cities, and neighborhoods. This will most likely be the case in future
theaters.
b. For each search, commanders must plan for a point to consolidate the occupants of a
building or set of buildings.
c. There are different types of searches, as follows:
(1) US-only Search. This search is conducted by the designated search team without an
informant or a member of the family or a worker from that building being present. This search
technique allows for a very rapid search and minimizes the number of personnel dedicated to
securing the building’s occupants. The disadvantage to this type of search comes from the fact
that US personnel may not know all the hiding spots in the building, may not have keys to all the
rooms or outer buildings, and it may place the search element in a position where they are
implicated in theft allegations. The US-only search is best used when time in the target location
must be minimized or troops are not available to escort occupants around a building.
(2) Occupant-assisted Search. This search is conducted with a selected occupant of the
household moving with the search element. This search technique allows the head person of
the building to observe the search and confirm that none of his property was stolen and
provides the US personnel with an indigenous person to open locked or possibly booby trapped
rooms or storage areas. The disadvantage to this search technique comes from the
requirement to devote extra personnel to secure the head person of the building during the
search. The occupant-assisted search is best used when time in the target building(s) is not
critical and when the intelligence on the target building is not very firm.
(3) Informant-assisted Search. This search is conducted with the informant assisting the
search team in their search. This search technique provides the search element with the actual
informant who provided the intelligence on the target building. The disadvantage to this
technique comes from the possibility of compromising the identity of your informant. Units must
provide an adequate disguise for their informant during this type of search. The informant-
assisted-search is best used when intelligence on the target building(s) is believed to be very
accurate.

Note: The identity of the informant may be compromised if taken into the target building as
part of an occupant-assisted search. The search element must search the entire
building and adjacent property in addition to the informant-identified areas.

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(4) Host Nation Search. This search is conducted by the HNSF with US forces in
support. In this type operation US forces provide security while the HNSF conduct the search of
the target area or building. In this situation the HNSF conduct the physical search to locate
personnel or material and document the result for prosecution. An advantage of this type
search is that the HNSF will understand the culture and more readily identify likely hiding spots
within the target. Lacking organic capability in the US force, an interpreter must accompany US
forces on this type search to effectively coordinate with the HN personnel. A disadvantage of
the HNSF search is that the US forces may be linked to damage or harm caused by their
security forces and the commander of the cordon and search mission must closely monitor the
activity of the search element as a result.
d. Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed during both the planning process
and execution. Military personnel must know that they may perform searches only in areas
within military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). Searches may be conducted only to
apprehend suspects or to secure evidence proving an offense has been committed.
(1) The military or civil police who work with the populace are contacted before the
search operations or periodically if search operations are a continuing activity. Units must
consider the impact of early warning on the effectiveness of their operation.
(2) Search teams use a minimum essential force to eliminate any active resistance
encountered. The size of the force and escalation of force are appropriate to the threat.

5. Direct and Indirect Fire Planning


a. The commander’s fire plan must explain how the unit will achieve its purpose while
maintaining the safety of his unit members. This is enabled by taking into account the
dispositions of the friendly elements conducting the cordon and search operation and the
ballistics of the direct and indirect fire weapons supporting the operation. The USMC calls this
process battlespace geometry.
(1) Direct Fire Planning Considerations Specific to Cordon and Search.
(a) Outer Cordon—The outer cordon force commander needs to establish clear
sectors of fire that are oriented away from the cordon. Planners must analyze the area of the
outer cordon and identify local conditions that will restrict or limit direct fire capability. Weapons
mix and capabilities will be adjusted based on the analysis of the objective area.
(b) Inner Cordon—The inner cordon element must use strict and well planned fire
control measures to avoid fratricide with the search/assault element and the outer cordon. The
personnel of search/assault element must recognize the hazard to both the inner and outer
cordon forces caused by firing through exterior doors and windows. Planning for the cordon
and search must position each element and establish clear fire control measures to prevent
fratricide.
(2) ROE and Escalation of Force Training. ROE specify the circumstances and
limitations under which forces may engage. They include definitions of combatant and
noncombatant elements and prescribe the treatment of noncombatants. Factors influencing
ROE are national command policy, the operational requirements, and the law of war. ROE
always maintain the right of US personnel to use the force necessary to accomplish self-
defense and specify the conditions which allow the use of deadly force. ROE must be briefed
and checked during the preparation phase of the operation to ensure all members of the cordon
and search understand it. Changes to the ROE must be immediately disseminated by the chain
of command and briefed to each Service member and leader in the cordon and search mission.
Both lethal force and nonlethal force are included in the planning for the various conditions or

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-11


circumstances that require force escalation. Escalation procedures are briefed and rehearsed
during the preparation phase of the cordon and search mission. Escalation procedures should
be planned for and briefed during the orders process to include transitions to a higher threat
environment; i.e., assault or raid. The procedures should be based on the theater ROE.
(a) Joint ground forces conduct cordon and search missions as part of an on-going
operation or in support of the HN as they respond to security issues. As a rule, post major
combat operations (MCO) are governed by restrictive ROE and are more sensitive to political
considerations and public perception than direct combat military operations. Cordon and search
operations may be further bound by additional rules for the use of force (RUF), with the use of
deadly force being the last option and then only under very specific, limited conditions. When
employed within the ROE/RUF as an option in the force continuum, nonlethal weapons provide
an alternative to lethal weapons and provide an effective capability to protect the joint force
while still accomplishing the mission. Nonlethal capabilities simply provide the combatant
commander additional options for applying military force consistent with the situation to
accomplish stated or directed objectives.
(b) Use of nonlethal systems can aid in capturing target personnel alive and also
mitigate negative public perception of cordon and search operations. Flash-bang grenades,
stun-guns, riot control agents, smoke and other nonlethal systems provide the means to
disorient or incapacitate personnel in the target area. When planning use of nonlethal systems
the commander must ensure that the using force is trained and understands the capability and
limitation of each.
b. Indirect fire considerations with munitions effects should be planned, however, indirect
fire assets frequently are not used because of the operational situation and theater specific
ROE.

6. Aviation Integration
a. Aviation should be a part of the planning process to include rehearsals. Aviators must
completely understand the ground maneuver plan, commander’s intent, and their task and
purpose for each phase of the operation. Air assets require the same mission planning
products as any ground unit: maneuver graphics, objective sketches, imagery, target-list
worksheet, air-ground integration smart card, and the communication plan. Additionally, friendly
marking techniques, clearance of fires, type of control (eyes on target; eyes on area); 9-line
close air support check-in briefing; aviation ROE, route clearance, and downed aviator/aircraft
issues create additional situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals,
preferably with the aviators present.
b. While attack and reconnaissance helicopters are the primary air asset used during
cordon and search operations, fixed-wing aircraft and utility helicopters may also be employed.
The first step in successful integration of fixed-wing aircraft begins with the ground maneuver
unit’s air liaison officer/JTAC. For fixed-wing assets to be available, they must be requested,
allocated, and published on an air tasking order. Procedures to request immediate air support
are located in Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close
Air Support (CAS), and in the Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower
[FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/AFTTP (I) 3-2.6].
c. Weapons effects and employment are also important planning factors in cordon and
search operations. Refer to Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation
Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/ MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.09/AFTTP (I) 3-2.29] for more specific
information.

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d. Airspace control measures and fire support coordinating measures are critical to mission
success. The airspace control order will identify no-fire areas (NFAs), restricted fire areas
(RFAs), coordinating altitudes, and special instructions (SPINS).
e. Unmanned aerial systems offer unique and essential capabilities to cordon and search.
However, integration and deconfliction of UAS must be coordinated during planning with ground
command and control (C2) elements and all aviation assets. In addition to intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities encompassed in unarmed UAS, armed UAS
have the ability to engage confirmed targets within the battlespace.
f. Aircraft such as the joint surveillance target attack and radar system (JSTARS) and
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) could be part of a cordon and search operation.
They can aid in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and could be used during the
execution phase by updating the common operational picture (COP) and providing command,
control, and communications (C3).

7. Special Operations Forces (SOF)


SOF provides numerous capabilities to the conventional commander for cordon and search
operations. SOF units are uniquely suited to facilitate intelligence collection in an asymmetric
environment. SOF elements have the ability to move throughout the battlefield with relative
ease, influence the will of the local populace, and develop relationships beneficial to US
interests. When applicable, conventional commanders should take advantage of SOF
capabilities before, during, and after cordon and search operations. SOF elements are
continually developing information that can be used by conventional forces and can refine
intelligence developed by conventional forces during the cordon and search. SOF capabilities
significantly decrease the possibility of compromise and further enhances the conventional
unit's ability to maintain the element of surprise. During the execution of a cordon and search
operation, specially trained SOF personnel can facilitate sensitive site exploitation (SSE) of an
objective. SSE may also provide further intelligence required for follow-on operations. Chapter
V covers SOF capabilities and contributions to the cordon and search mission in further detail.

8. Logistical and Support Considerations


A cordon and search mission is no different than any other mission with regards to logistics.
Poor logistical planning and resourcing may lead to mission failure. There are a few unique
aspects about logistics that must be planned and carefully considered for a cordon and search
operation. These aspects include things such as specific needs for blocking positions and
various support requirements for HNSF. Also, the logistical movement of detainees from the
battlefield is a requirement. Detailed logistical considerations are provided in chapter VI.

9. Information Operations (IO)


IO have specific implications associated with and are derived from cordon and search
operations. Refer to appendix D for details. Key planning considerations to IO are:
(1) What is the message joint forces want to address to the local populace?
(2) What do we want the enemy/sympathizers to think about us?
(3) What is the perception management plan?

10. Public Affairs (PA)

Commanders must plan for media being present throughout their operational area and
possibly embedded with the unit during cordon and search operations. News reporting provides

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-13


instant coverage of military operations and can turn minor tactical events into international
events with strategic implications. National and international media coverage can profoundly
influence external public support, and impact the behavior of all audiences—military and
civilian—inside and outside the cordon and search area. Effectively planned, resourced and
executed Pubic Affairs activities can be a force multiplier, leveraging operational support and
enhancing the command’s credibility. Media operations also can be a disaster if they are not
coordinated, resourced or executed properly. For this reason, Public Affairs planners must be
included and involved in all phases of the operational planning. Engaging the media serves the
best interests of the unit and the Soldiers conducting the mission. Public Affairs is a related
activity to IO and therefore PA and IO plans must be mutually coordinated and synchronized to
ensure they are complementary and support the overall operational mission. A checklist for PA
considerations is included in appendix B.

11. Communications
a. Well organized and understood communication lines tie the various elements of a
cordon and search mission together. Communication planning must not only define the
methods to communicate between elements but also the form of that communication. Visual
means such as hand and arms signals, laser pointers and/or designators, infra-red spotlights,
chemical lights, and wolf-tails must be understood by all elements as to their purpose and
meaning. Planning for voice communication must identify the designated radio frequencies for
the various elements (i.e., medical evacuation [MEDVAC]/casualty evacuation [CASEVAC],
indirect fire, close air support [CAS]) and to use brevity codes, key phrases, and report formats.
b. As most cordon and search missions will occur in urban or built up areas, particular
attention must be given to those conditions that will inhibit or prevent communication. The
presence of high power lines, generators, structures, and battlefield haze or smoke are
considerations when identifying the means of communication between the elements of the
mission. Backup and redundant communication means are necessary to ensure reliable C2 of
the mission. In some cases it may be necessary to have designated runner/courier teams to
carry messages between elements.
c. When HNSF are integrated into the cordon and search mission it will be necessary to
integrate their communication means. The designation of interpreters and their training to
operate radios or other equipment will be essential if the HNSF are operating as a separate
element. In some cases this may involve using commercial cell phones or nonsecure radios
which will make it necessary to develop code word and brevity phrases that will transmit
command and control instructions with some degree of security.

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Chapter II
INTELLIGENCE AND URBAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. General
a. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) includes information about terrain and
weather and civil considerations as well as the enemy. (The six factors of METT-TC—mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations—make up the major subject categories relevant information is grouped for
military operations.) In cordon and search operations, civilian considerations are prominent in
IPB analysis.
b. The successful conduct of cordon and search operations relies on the willing support
and cooperation of the populations directly involved. Cultural awareness is needed to
understand the motivations of the parties involved in the conflict and the population as a whole.
This requires a detailed understanding of the civil considerations of the area in which US forces
operate and thereby places a heavy reliance on the use of HUMINT.
c. The objective area in cordon and search operations includes three primary components:
the physical, military, and civilian considerations of the area. These components provide a
structure for intelligence personnel to focus and organize to provide support to cordon and
search operations. These entities are interdependent, not separate, and enable the
commanders to gain an in-depth understanding of their objective area during cordon and search
operations and to provide a focus for the intelligence analyst.
d. Expect terrain in cordon and search operations to be complex. Some of the factors that
ought to be considered are the density of construction and population within the objective area,
the street patterns within the urban areas, and compartmentalization of areas within the
objective area (such as areas separated by waterways or highways). Also functional zones
should be considered (for example, the functions different areas serve within the objective area,
such as residential, commercial, and government areas) as well as the potential for significant
differences in receptiveness/cooperative nature of the populace within subsections of the
objective area and areas surrounding the objective area to cordon forces.

2. Civilian Considerations
a. Civilian considerations comprise the manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an objective
area that influence the conduct of military operations. Factors of interest include the gender and
mix of the populace; the cultural, religious, and socio-economic beliefs and thinking; and the
beliefs, attitudes, and actions of groups and individuals.
b. US leaders should identify and meet with key local leaders early in the operation. These
key personnel can provide valuable information needed for successful completion of the
operations, to include local infrastructure, a common picture of cultural norms, suspected enemy
strengths, and probable means of support and locations for enemy forces. Support from local
leaders usually means support from the populace. US leaders can assess the support of the
populace by actions of the local leaders to them during meetings.
c. Commanders must realize that the local populace will behave in their perceived self-
interest. They are keenly aware of five sets of interests at work: those of the US forces, the
insurgent/hostile elements, the local opportunists, the legitimate government, and the general

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 II-1


population. The populace assesses these interests constantly in order to ascertain their own
stakes, risks, and advantages.
d. The enemy knows it is difficult for US forces to accurately identify friend from foe. Local
combat situations can change rapidly, as a noncombatant exhibits a hostile act or hostile intent.

In Chechnya, Chechen rebels and Hezbollah terrorists effectively used the cover of
refugees to attack occupying forces. The Chechens counted on the ferocious nature of
the Russian counterattack to cause heavy civilian casualties in order to gain support from
the indigenous population for the Chechen separatist cause.
In Fallujah, Iraqi enemy forces pretended to surrender in order to maneuver into
positions of advantage.

e. Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often key to understanding the
population. Identifying local personnel in positions of authority is important. These local officials,
tribal leaders, or village elders are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the
actions of the population at large. In many societies nominal titles do not equal power, influence
does. Many “leaders” are mere figureheads, and the true authority lies elsewhere.
f. The ability of a mission planner and an intelligence analyst to identify and understand
trends and patterns of activity is essential in providing commanders with information they need.
Every local area has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of heaviest
activity along a line of communication is one case in point. Trade and business transactions,
market sales, religious practices, governmental functions, and criminal activity are other
examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies. Disruptions or irregularities
in these patterns serve as a warning of insurgent activity or potential attack on US forces.
g. It is important to remember that while certain general patterns do exist, most areas are
normally composed of a multitude of different peoples, each with their own standards of
conduct. Treating the local population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions,
cultural misunderstandings, and a poor understanding of the current situation. Individuals
normally act independently and in their own best interest. Their behavior will not always
coincide with friendly courses of action. Do not ignore the presence or actions of the different
population components within an objective area when developing assessments.

3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Considerations


a. This section contains a list of considerations for developing cordon and search IPB.
These considerations are presented to help orient analysts and operators by providing relevant
questions, which may need to be answered. This list is not meant to be all encompassing or
exhaustive. For additional information regarding IPB refer to FM 34-130/FMFRP 3-23-2,
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
b. Step 1: Define the Battlespace Environment for a Cordon and Search Operation. Stay
focused on cordon and search IPB. The goal of defining the battlespace environment is to
determine intelligence gaps and define parameters. Characteristics of the battlespace
environment influence the commander's decisions or affect the COAs available to friendly forces
or the adversary. Establishing an area of interest (AI) that exceeds the limits of the objective
area and the command's battlespace, allows the command to anticipate significant
developments. Defining the battlespace environment helps to focus IPB effort to:

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(1) Determine points of entry, infiltration, and exfiltration routes; C2 structures for
operations; and agricultural areas.
(2) Recognize that cities vary in ways other than size: a city may be the only large urban
area in a nation or one of many; its physical layout may be orderly or chaotic; it may be modern
or built around an ancient core; it may contain towering buildings or none over three stories. A
city will certainly have a significant influence beyond its boundaries on the region or even the
nation in which it exists.
(3) Gain knowledge of street patterns and widths to give commanders and leaders a
good idea of whether or not mounted mobility corridors in different zones can permit wheeled or
tracked vehicles and facilitate C2.
c. Step 2: Describe the Battlespace Effects. The goal of describing the battlespace
effects is to understand how aspects of the battlespace affect enemy COAs and friendly COAs.
Step 2 includes examining the following influences on the battlespace:
(1) How weather effects the mobility of targeted individuals and systems and their
associated logistic efforts.
(2) How political and religious affiliation and practices influence the people’s attitudes
towards both enemy and friendly operations.
(3) How efforts to create or increase unrest and dissension affect the population.
(4) How effective the targets of the cordon and search operation are at conducting IO
against existing or proposed HN policies and programs.
(5) How economics and money affect the insurgents’ ability to conduct offensive
operations. Insurgents can influence the populace’s active support for or against the targets of
the cordon and search operation.
d. Step 3: Evaluate the Threat: Determination of the adversary’s capabilities and the
tactics, techniques, and procedures the threat forces prefer to employ are the primary focus of
evaluating the threat. This is accomplished by developing threat models which accurately
portray how threat forces normally execute operations and how they have reacted to similar
situations in the past. Knowing what the threat is capable of, given the current situation, is
critical to friendly mission success. In evaluating the threat for a cordon and search mission,
planners should accomplish the following:
(1) Identify which friendly, enemy, and neutral groups are present, thought to be present,
or have access to the objective area.
(2) Determine if the target(s) are linked to a racial, religious, ethnic, or regional base.
(3) Determine the types of weapons that the targeted group have at their disposal.
Sophisticated weaponry may be an indicator of external support as well as the targeted group's
ability to attack important and possibly well-defended targets.
(4) Consider the insurgent organization.
(a) Does it have a high degree of command and control?
(b) What is the level of planning and training within the organization?
(c) What are their movement patterns? Movements may coincide with operational
or logistical activities.
(d) What are their trends and patterns? Use this analysis to template, predict, and
prioritize target group's activities to include:
• Movement around potential objectives, such as infiltration or exfiltration
routes.

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• Assembly points, rally points, and staging areas.
• Surveillance positions.
• Centers of anti-US populations. Include an evaluation of individual
villages and large political divisions, such as states and provinces.
• Areas of antigovernment influence and residences of target group's
leadership or key sympathizers.
• Cache sites, water sources, agricultural areas, and fuel storage and
production areas.
• Potential ambush sites.
(e) What are the enemy COAs? Enemy courses of action might include the
following:
• Ambushes of command-detonated mines or booby traps directed against
cordon positions or other forces.
• Attacks on the population.
• Attempts to escape from the target area.
• Attempts to reinforce the target area.
• Baited ambush of search force.
(5) Determine the presence of organized crime in the area.
(a) Determine crime conducive conditions within the urban environment.
(b) Determine the current law enforcement mechanisms and gaps that exist within
the environment.
(6) Consider that the insurgents may receive support. Support to insurgents can be
willing or coerced. The following can be sources of insurgent support:
(a) Moral. A significant leadership or cultural figure may make statements in
support of an organization, activity, or action. This may have the effect of influencing
international policy or increasing the success of recruitment efforts.
(b) Physical. Physical support includes safe passage, safe houses,
documentation, weapons, and training at sites inside the country.
(c) Financial. Charities, banks, informal transfer of currency by traveler or courier,
and collection of taxes and levies on the local population.
(d) Transportation. Insurgents may be driven by locals or be provided the use of
their vehicles in order to have an apparent legitimate means of transportation.
(e) Religious, Political, and Ethnic Affiliations. Commonalities and differences are
significant in terms of estimating potential support or opposition an insurgent organization may
receive in a given area. However, in some cultures, such as the Muslim culture, the philosophy
that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” may cause strange and unprecedented relationships
to form.
e. Step 4: Develop Threat Courses of Action.
(1) The goal of this step is to identify HPTs and to determine intelligence collection
requirements. It integrates the three previous steps by:
(a) Identifying the full set of COAs available to the enemy.
(b) Evaluating and prioritizing each COA.
(c) Developing situational and event templates based on previous analysis efforts.
(d) Determining named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs).
(e) Identifying intelligence collection requirements.

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(2) Representative questions for determining adversary COA options are based on
previous analysis (to include terrain, weather, capabilities, doctrine, tactics, infrastructure, etc.)
and include:
(a) What is the most likely enemy COA? What is the most dangerous?
(b) What are enemy vulnerabilities and decisive points? Of the high value targets
(HVTs), which ones are HPTs?
(3) Representative questions for determining employment of collection assets include
the SOF personnel analysis: Within each likely operating area, what are the best locations for
placement of SOF teams (e.g., high points with good concealment and line of sight to multiple
avenues)?

4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Planning


a. Developing the ISR plan for cordon and search operations is different from developing
the plan supporting conventional operations. Due to the unconventional nature of the urban
environment, the ISR effort is significantly more complex in combining and integrating HUMINT
collectors and surveillance assets with the capabilities and tasks of limited ISR. Techniques
must be modified for every mission to accomplish ISR requirements—each cordon and search
mission is unique.
b. The key to successful ISR efforts is the integration of all ISR-assets throughout the
entire mission process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The coordinated actions of the
entire staff to develop the threat and environment portion of the common operational picture are
key to providing successful ISR support to the commander.

Note: Imagery can assist in planning and execution with HN forces who may not be familiar
with reading maps.

c. Imagery intelligence is derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by


photography, infrared, lasers, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically,
electronically, and digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media.
(1) Imagery can provide several key advantages to the commander. UAS imagery may
be one of the fastest, least risky methods to conduct reconnaissance of specific areas and to
update and verify current maps of that area by showing clear routes, obstacles such as
damaged and destroyed buildings, and intact and destroyed bridges. The topographical team
can use this imagery to create updated mapping products for planning and operational uses.
(a) UAS have the ability to provide valuable intelligence of the intended target area
before and during the operation. These systems have day and night capabilities and, depending
on the type, are able to loiter over the target area for extended periods of time. Larger UAS,
Hunter and Predator, that operate at higher altitudes are nearly impossible to see or hear from
the ground while smaller UAS, such as Shadow and Raven, may compromise the operation and
force the target to displace. If the outer cordon is not set, the UAS could assist in observing for
“leakers/runners” moving away from the target building. UAS can be used over a period of days
to establish traffic/pedestrian patterns prior to commencing the operation. UAS route selection
can be very challenging in a urban environment and needs to be thoroughly planned.
(b) Several UAS and manned ISR platforms have a real-time downlink capability to
the supported commander on the ground. This allows the commander to focus ISR assets
when and where they are needed.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 II-5


(2) Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the
reconnaissance and debriefing process and allow the intelligence staff personnel to make their
own judgments about items of interest that the patrol reports. Gun-camera images from aircraft
that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight into enemy
TTPs.
d. Additional assets that can perform ISR functions:
(1) Aviations Assets (for more detail see chapter IV).
(a) Fixed Wing (AC-130, AV-8 with lightning pod, etc.)—After the cordon is set,
fixed-wing aircraft could assist similar to UAS. However, it has the capability of engaging
confirmed targets within the battlespace.
(b) Rotary Wing—All attack and reconnaissance rotary wing aircraft have forward-
looking infrared (FLIR) and day optics to perform ISR and most have the ability to record sensor
data on video tape. Video can be used to establish local area atmospherics.
(2) Conventional Sniper/Recon Teams. These teams can provide 24-48 hours of
observation. However, the potential exists in an urban environment for their mission to be
compromised by local observation. Locals move freely and may easily identify things out of the
ordinary. Additionally, insertion and extraction into a built up area may be difficult.
e. Human Intelligence. HUMINT is the collection of information from a trained HUMINT
collector of foreign information and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition,
strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. HUMINT uses human
sources and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to
satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements. Possible sources of data that can become
HUMINT are:
(1) Using scout/reconnaissance teams and company level operations.
(2) Using sniper employment (weighed based on compromise).
(3) Using route recon to target area.
(4) Using standard patrols for leaders recon.
(5) Using be-on-the-look-out (BOLO) lists.
(6) Using children for information.
(7) Making false arrests of informants for intelligence collection.
(8) Bringing informants to provide positive identification of locations and/or personnel
identified as HPTs. (They can be placed in a US uniform, have their face covered, and placed
in a US vehicle or other secure area where they can pinpoint the target.)
f. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Collecting unencrypted threat signals can provide key
indicators for threat courses of action. Patterns in the amount of known enemy encrypted
signals provide indications of specific threat courses of action. Because of signal bounce within
urban areas, direction-finding capabilities for all SIGINT collection systems are significantly
impaired.
(1) Battalions currently derive most of their intelligence from HUMINT and SIGINT. The
greatest source of HUMINT is not civilian tipsters but the observations of Service members on
patrol. Reliable “walk-in” tips are relatively rare. Signals intelligence attachments, however,
have been extremely successful in producing intelligence by employing methods that cannot be
detailed in an unclassified report. Battalions have had considerable success by tying signals
interception with certain operations on the ground that are designed to increase the enemy’s
electronic traffic. In turn this traffic often produces intelligence that can be acted upon
immediately by units on the ground. Something as simple as establishing an anonymous tip line

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has proven successful in giving the local populace a way of providing information without fear of
retribution.
(2) The urban environment has a significant effect on intelligence collected from signals,
both friendly and threat. Structures and infrastructure can affect such things as signal strength
and direction. In terms of collecting SIGINT, this means that comprehensive electronic
preparation of the battlespace must be developed during the MDMP.
g. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). MASINT will likely be the second
most important type of intelligence gathered in the urban environment at the tactical level.
Ground surveillance radars (GSRs) will have limited uses in the urban environment because of
the lack of wide-open spaces in which they best operate, but can be used along the periphery of
cordoned areas to detect infiltration and exfiltration of threat forces. The remotely monitored
battlefield sensor system (REMBASS) and the platoon early warning device (PEWD) will play a
primary role in monitoring many of the numerous routes that cannot be covered by human
observers due to manpower constraints. REMBASS can monitor such avenues as
subterranean passageways (and/or entrances and exits to such passageways), entrances and
exits on buildings, fire escapes on buildings, perimeters, and traffic flow along routes (especially
foot trails that may be used to infiltrate and exfiltrate personnel and equipment between urban
and rural areas).
h. Special Operations (SO) Intelligence Requirements. The currency, level of detail, and
scope of SO intelligence requirements place unusual demands on theater and national
intelligence systems. SO often require more intelligence collection, research, and analysis than
most conventional missions. HUMINT is especially important to SO mission planning because it
provides detailed information not usually available through technical means. HUMINT collection
requirements flow from the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) joint intelligence support
element (JISE) through the HUMINT operations cell. Graphics and imagery are important to SO
planning. Detailed information from theater and national sources must be tailored so that it can
be displayed, understood, and used by the tactical SOF element that will plan and conduct the
mission. Detailed and current (less than 24 hours old) imagery of the objective area is normally
needed. Some missions may require replicas, models, diagrams, and nonstandard geospatial
information and services (GI&S) products. The scope of SO intelligence requirements also may
include the social, economic, informational, and political dynamics of the operational area. The
commander, joint special operations task force's (COMJSOTF) information requirements
compete for limited collection resources and all requirements may not be satisfied. COMJSOTF
intelligence requirements linked to theater priority intelligence requirements (PIR) will have the
best prospects for timely support.

5. Urban Planning Considerations


a. Urban areas present the most complex physical terrain that exists. This physical terrain
consists of manmade structures of varying types, sizes, materials, and construction arranged
sometimes orderly and sometimes randomly. Urban areas are frequently defined according to
size, from villages of fewer than 3,000 inhabitants to large cities with populations of over
100,000. Large cities vary enormously in size, ranging in population from 100,000 to over 20
million and in area from several to hundreds of square miles. Cities vary in ways other than
size: a city may be the only large urban area in a nation or one of many; its physical layout may
be orderly or chaotic; it may be modern or built around an ancient core; it may contain towering
buildings or none over three stories. A city will certainly have a significant influence beyond its
boundaries on the region or even the nation in which it exists.

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b. Regardless of variations, all urban areas share four main characteristics that are
generally interrelated and virtually inseparable.
(1) A complex manmade physical terrain is superimposed on existing natural terrain and
consists of structures and facilities of various types.
(2) A population of significant size and density inhabits, works in, and uses the manmade
and natural terrain.
(3) An infrastructure upon which the area depends may also occupy manmade terrain
and provides human services and cultural and political structure for the urban area and often
beyond, perhaps for the entire nation.
(4) Societal differences found in most mid to large cities are different than those found in
more rural areas and can cause obstacles to cordon and search operations. People have
societal and cultural driven patterns of behavior in mid to large urban areas that need to be
considered.
c. These four characteristics interact to make each urban area a complex and dynamic
cluster of systems, with a unique physical, political, economic, social, and cultural identity.
Considered in isolation from the other elements of the urban triad, the physical terrain of urban
areas presents significant challenges to military operations. However, physical terrain, both
natural and manmade, is only the foundation upon which the population and infrastructure of the
urban area are superimposed. Rather than terrain considerations, it is the impact of military
operations on the urban population and vice versa that fundamentally distinguishes joint urban
operations (JUOs).
d. Cities vary immensely depending on their location, history, economic development,
climate, available building materials, the natural terrain on which they are built, the culture or
cultures of their inhabitants, and many other factors. A single city may incorporate high-rise
business or administrative sections, suburbs, shantytowns, industrial areas, extensive parklands
or other open areas, waterways, and various patterns of street grids and other transportation
infrastructure. City patterns may consist of a central hub surrounded by satellite areas to form
complex networks, or they may be linear, or shaped by dominating natural terrain features.
They may contain street patterns that are rectangular, radial, concentric, or irregular. The city
itself probably consists of a city core surrounded by various commercial ribbons, peripheral and
industrial areas, residential areas, and perhaps poverty belts of shantytowns. The myriad ways
that features can be combined make it necessary to approach each urban area as a unique
problem.
e. Understanding the physical characteristics of urban areas requires a different way of
thinking about terrain. It requires the comprehension of the multidimensional nature of urban
terrain, its general forms and functions, and size. The total size of the surfaces and spaces of
an urban area is usually many times that of a similarly sized piece of natural terrain because of
the complex blend of horizontal, vertical, interior, exterior, and subterranean forms
superimposed on the natural landscape. Like other terrain, urban areas consist of airspace and
surface areas. But in addition to those are manmade ‘supersurface’ and ‘subsurface’ areas.
(1) Airspace. This is the area above the ground usable by aircraft and aerial munitions.
In urban areas, airspace is broken up at low levels by manmade structures of different heights
and densities in addition to the irregularities in natural terrain. This produces an “urban canyon”
effect that can adversely impact operations.
(2) Surface Areas. Surface areas are the exterior ground-level areas of streets and
roads, parks and fields, and any other exterior space. These surface areas follow the natural

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terrain and are themselves broken up by manmade features. In the case of bridges and
culverts, vehicle weight classifications should be considered along movement routes. Routes
for armored vehicles may be restricted because of bridge limitations.
(3) Supersurface Areas. Supersurface areas are the roofs and upper floors of buildings,
stadiums, towers, or other structures that can be used for movement, maneuver, firing positions,
or for other advantage.
(4) Subsurface Areas. Subsurface areas are below ground level that consist of sewer
and drainage systems, subway tunnels, utility corridors, or other subterranean spaces. These
areas can be used for cover and concealment, movement, and engagement, but their use
requires intimate knowledge of the area.

Figure II-1. Urban Terrain

f. Urban areas will contain varying degrees of physical infrastructure. This infrastructure
will at a minimum include a transportation network, utilities, government buildings, hospitals,
schools, food processing and distribution centers, and communications facilities. The
infrastructure may be relatively simple or it may be highly complex and sophisticated. For
example, transportation infrastructure in one city may be a simple network of streets; in another
city it may consist of sophisticated port facilities, rail networks, airports, large highways,
subways, and other modes of public transportation. In the latter case, such a city would be the
transportation hub for the region in which it is located.
g. In addition to the physical infrastructure of power plants, transportation networks, and
the like, cities also have a service infrastructure: police, fire, and other government services;
food and water availability and distribution; medical services; fuel and electricity; the news
media and information flow; and others. This sort of infrastructure may be quite sophisticated
and an integral part of the city’s life, it may be virtually nonexistent, or it may exist in a state of
ineffectiveness.
h. Within urban areas and urban zones.
(1) City Core. The city core is the heart of the urban area—the downtown or central
business district. It is relatively small and compact, but contains a larger percentage of the

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 II-9


urban area’s shops, offices, and public institutions. It normally contains the highest density of
multistory buildings and subterranean areas. In most cities, the core and periphery were
developed and “grew” at different times. It is possible to encounter very old and ultra-modern
buildings next to each other as you transition between the two. As a result, the two regions are
often quite different. Typical city cores of today are made up of buildings that vary greatly in
height.

Figure II-2. City Core

(2) Core Periphery. The core periphery is located at the edges of the city core. The core
periphery consists of streets 12 to 20 meters wide with continuous fronts of brick or concrete
buildings. The building heights are fairly uniform—two or three stories in small towns, five to ten
stories in large cities. Dense random and close orderly block are two common construction
patterns that can be found within the city core and core periphery zones.

Figure II-3. Core Periphery

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(3) Dense Random Construction. This construction is a typical old inner city pattern with
narrow winding streets radiating from a central area in an irregular manner. Buildings are
closely located and frequently close to the edge of a roadway.

Figure II-4. Dense Random Construction

(4) Close Orderly Block Construction. Wider streets generally form rectangular patterns
in this area. Buildings frequently form a continuous front along the blocks. Inner-block
courtyards are common.

Figure II-5. Close Orderly Block Construction

(5) Dispersed Residential Area. This type of area is similar to close-orderly block areas
in Europe. The pattern consists of row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens,
trees, and walls. Street patterns are normally rectangular or curving.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 II-11


Figure II-6. Dispersed Residential Area

(6) High-Rise Area. Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns, this area
consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide
streets are laid out in rectangular patterns. These areas are often contiguous to industrial or
transportation areas or interspersed with close-orderly block areas.

Figure II-7. High-Rise Area

(7) Industrial-Transportation Area. Industrial-transportation areas are generally located


on or along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes. Older complexes may be
located within dense, random construction or close-orderly block areas. New construction
normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. High-rise areas providing
worker housing is normally located adjacent to these areas and are prominent in Asian cities.
Identification of transportation facilities within these areas is critical because these facilities,
especially rail facilities, pose significant obstacles to military movement.

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Figure II-8. Industrial-Transportation Area

(8) Permanent or Fixed Fortifications. These include any of several different types and
may be considered isolated forts, such as the Hue Citadel in Vietnam and the German
fortifications that surrounded Metz, or as part of a fortified line (Siegfried and Maginot Lines).
While most of these fortifications are found in Western Europe, many can be found in the
Balkans, Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Those in the United States are mostly of
the coastal defense type. Permanent fortifications can be made of earth, wood, rock, brick,
concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of the above. Some of the latest
variants are built underground and employ heavy tank or warship armor, major caliber and other
weapons, internal communications, service facilities, and chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) overpressure systems.

Figure II-9. Permanent or Fixed Fortifications

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 II-13


(9) Shantytowns. Shantytowns do not necessarily follow any of the above patterns and
may be found in many different zones within urban areas. Many underdeveloped countries are
composed of small towns and villages and very few large cities. Most of the structures in the
small towns and villages may be constructed from materials ranging from cardboard to concrete
block. Some countries in arid regions depend on adobe for construction. Even the larger cities
can have shantytowns that consist of cardboard or tin shacks.
(a) These less structurally sound buildings have no common floor pattern and are
more likely to have only one room. These types of structures present the problem of collateral
damage. Weapons fired in one structure may penetrate the walls of one or more buildings.
This penetration becomes a hazard for friendly forces as well as noncombatants. In order for
buildings not to be structurally damaged or completely destroyed, explosive charges must be
reduced or not used at all. Fires are also more likely to develop and spread in shantytowns.
(b) During a cordon and search operation, the temporary nature of the structures
can mean that mobility can be either more or less restricted than other sections of an urban
area. A unit with armored vehicles may easily knock down and traverse structures without
affecting mobility at all. However, their destruction may cause unacceptable civilian casualties,
in which case mobility becomes more restrictive as the narrow paths often do not accommodate
vehicles. Regardless, commanders must carefully consider the effects of their operations in this
area, to include vehicles and weapons, as the weak structures afford little protection increasing
the risk of fratricide, civilian casualties, and large, rapidly spreading fires.

Figure II-10. Shantytowns

(10) Street Patterns and Effects. Knowledge of street patterns and widths gives
commanders and leaders a good idea of whether or not mobility corridors in different zones can
permit wheeled or tracked vehicles and facilitate command and control. For example, a
rectangular, radial, radial ring, or combined pattern facilitates movement and control better than
irregular patterns. See figure II-10 for a description of common street patterns within the AI and
AO.

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Figure II-11. Street Patterns and Effects

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Chapter III
CORDON AND SEARCH EXECUTION PROCEDURES

1. Cordon and Search Methods for Success


a. The conduct of a cordon and search operation requires, at a minimum, four elements to
perform the major tasks: a headquarters for command and control, a security element, a
search/assault element, and a support element. The security element sets up the cordon, which
usually involves two groups: an outer cordon "ring" for vehicular avenues of approach and an
inner cordon "ring" for personnel avenues of approach. Generally, the outer cordon ring unit
may consist of antitank or heavy weapons vehicles (tube launched, optically tracked, wire
guided (missile) [TOWs], high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles [HMMWVs], M-1 tanks,
Bradley fighting vehicles, light armored vehicles, Stryker vehicles, or helicopters). Each of these
vehicles obviously affords mobility, the ability to provide accurate long range fires and
observation, and stopping and blocking power with respect to “get-away vehicles.” The inner
cordon "ring" may be infantry squads and sniper teams positioned to prevent the escape of
dismounted personnel from the facility or building being searched. The search/assault element
will clear and search suspected buildings in order to capture or destroy insurgents and/or
contraband and is the main effort. The support element may be tasked to be the reserve,
provide support by fire, and to be prepared to perform the other elements tasks.
b. The outer cordon’s composition and capabilities should be based on METT-T. The
mission of the outer cordon is to provide a containment in order to prevent a high value target
(HVT) from escaping the objective area. The outer cordon may have to accomplish this task by
being more terrain oriented to focus on the most probable avenues of approach into and out of
the objective area. The outer cordon can be tasked to block specific locations in order to
prevent escape from inside and interference from outside of the objective area.
c. The mission of the inner cordon is to contain the immediate vicinity of the target to
prevent escape and provide security to the search/assault element. If the cordon and search is
opposed by a hostile force, the inner cordon provides support by fire. The inner cordon will
provide direct fires to suppress the enemy force and allow maneuver of the search/assault
element to the objective. Due to the congested nature of the urban environment, direct fire
control measures can be complicated. One proven TTP is for the unit to number buildings,
letter building corners, and number floors. This way a request for immediate direct fire
suppression can be specific and the risk of both collateral damage and fratricide reduced. The
fire command can be, “Immediate suppression, two personnel with weapons, building 23, side
A-B, second floor, 2nd window, fire when ready.” See appendix I for examples. Generally,
because of the condensed and compressed nature of the physical area, fires must be precise
and accurate as opposed to high volume.
d. As with the security element the commander may further task organize the
search/assault element into sub units to accomplish specific tasks. This further sub
organization may be designated and rehearsed before the operation begins or can be left up to
the search/assault element leader to accomplish as the situation dictates. The search/assault
element often involves one or two squads that form into specific teams, to clear the building of
combatants and search for targeted personnel and or contraband. Also, it will need to
designate personnel to maintain security as the search is being conducted. The search/assault
element may also have to provide its own support by fire and have teams with specific
capabilities such as demolitions, mine clearing MWD, etc., attached to it. The search/assault
element must have a breach capability for fences, doors, and walls, and enough combat power

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-1


to adequately clear the target building or facility using standard entry and building clearing battle
drills and close quarters combat techniques. Bolt cutters, quickie saws, door rams, and
hooligan tools can be used for breaching in lieu of demolitions. Based on the structures on the
objective (doors, walls, fences, gates), a demolitions team may be necessary to effect the
breach.
e. Key tips for cordon and search success:
(1) Position key leaders so that they can see and control all subordinate elements. Do
not let them get preoccupied with subordinate leader responsibilities.
(2) Position key assets such as crew-served weapons and interpreters at the critical
locations.
(3) Be prepared to move leadership and support assets from one location to another
during mission execution or as necessary.
(4) When executing searches, position vehicles and personnel to be searched so that the
security element’s sectors of fire face to the outside of the friendly element and away from
noncombatants.
(5) Keep the bulk of the forces within the perimeter so that if the situation escalates they
are essentially in a battle or support by fire position.
(6) Ensure that all personnel understand the direct fire plan as well as any contingency
plans. For example:
(a) What actions to take in the event a vehicle penetrates a traffic control point
(TCP) from outside the established perimeter.
(b) Who engages and with what weapons systems.
(c) Engage crew-served weapons or should they use only M-16s/M-4s.
(d) When to cease fire, and what signal to use for cease fire.

2. Command Element
a. The command element is the headquarters that provides C2 for the cordon and search
mission and may have several combat multipliers attached. Frequently, a commander is given
a variety of assets to assist him in accomplishing his mission. Ideally, the commander will task
organize his assets in order to maintain control of no more than three to five elements.
b. The location of the command element must provide the ability to control the subordinate
teams and supporting assets of the cordon and search mission. The ability to observe the
search/assault element will generally cause the command element to collocate with the inner
cordon. Visibility and communication capability will be deciding factors in identifying the best
location for the command element during the actual mission.
c. The composition of the command element may be as small as the commander and a
radio operator or may include security vehicles, interpreters, HN officials and/or local authorities.
The command element must remain mobile and able to move to any point within the cordon and
search operation to ensure coordination of all elements and supporting assets. When HN
forces or authorities are involved in the operation, the command element coordinates with them
and integrates them as identified during the planning phase of the operation. Operation and
communication security must be guiding principles when conducting integrated operations with
HN forces.
d. The command element is the single point of coordination for supporting assets and for
status reporting to higher headquarters. As a critical component of the cordon and search

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operation, the command element designates a backup team in the event it becomes combat
ineffective. The command element ensures that all actions are documented as required and
that the rules of evidence are followed where necessary. In the event a person is detained, the
command element monitors the documentation, security, and transport of the detainee. The
command element also ensures that damage caused during the cordon and search operation is
documented to identify legitimate future claims by the occupants of the target.

3. Security Element
a. Primary Task. Total isolation of the target area is the objective of the security element.
The security element limits enemy or civilian influence in the objective area and prevents targets
from escaping the cordon. They may have to use multiple avenues of approach and operate
decentralized to accomplish their mission. They may have to establish multiple blocking
positions and observation posts (OPs) and conduct patrols in order to isolate the target area.
The security element may include:
(1) Vehicle-mounted sections or platoons
(2) Interpreter(s)
(3) Detainee teams
(4) Crowd control teams
(5) OPs
(6) TCPs or blocking positions
(7) HNSF (military or police)
(8) Integrated aviation assets
(9) Dismounted squads or platoons
(10) Female search teams
b. The Outer Cordon. The conduct of the outer cordon is an integral part of the security
element in any cordon and search operation. The outer cordon isolates the objective area and
prevents enemy or civilian influence. As such it requires detailed planning, effective
coordination, and meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined arms
effects, lethal and nonlethal, required for mission execution.
(1) Some considerations for the outer cordon include:
(a) Vehicles for TCPs and/or blocking positions
(b) Battlespace geometry—fire planning and coordination
(c) Overwatch positions
(d) Aviation assets to observe target area and inform outer cordon if vehicles or
persons leave the target area. Constant communication between the aviation element and the
outer cordon will better facilitate the isolation of the target area.
(e) An initial detainee collection point for the receipt and temporary holding of
detainees.
(f) An initial material collection point for consolidation of captured material.
(2) Each subordinate outer cordon element (TCP, blocking position) must have a
designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for outer cordon
positions are tracked and wheeled vehicles with weapons systems, crew-served weapons,
javelin with the command launch unit (CLU), and snipers or designated marksman.
(3) The leader of the outer cordon element must develop and maintain situational
awareness (SA) of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the inner cordon and the
search elements. This will enable him to anticipate threat activity, control direct and indirect
fires, and facilitate the achievement of the outer cordon’s task and purpose. Aviation assets,
communications systems, and reporting procedures must be implemented to facilitate SA for the
entire element.

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(4) Armor can provide a strong show of force and can serve as an intimidating
psychological weapon. It is the most survivable ground platform that can be used to
block/control main avenues of approach. Armor-protected firepower allows for long-range
engagements. Armor helps clear danger areas for other units to follow. It is also a significant
building breaching assets using multipurpose antitank (MPAT) or high explosive antitank
(HEAT) rounds for infantry. Tank thermals can also be used for counter-sniper and target
location/surveillance.
(5) Methods to consider when establishing outer cordon positions:
(a) Hasty TCP. One method of executing the outer cordon is by the employment of
hasty TCP, which will allow personnel and/or vehicles to depart or enter the outer cordon at the
commander’s discretion. TCPs will typically be used in long duration cordon and search
operations. Subordinate elements use Class IV materials to construct a TCP to facilitate
personnel and vehicle searches IAW the cordon and search commander’s intent. This method
is used when cleared traffic will be allowed through. Construction of vehicle, personnel, and
material holding areas will aid in security and improve overall operations. See the tactical
control measures section of this chapter for detailed information.
(b) Blocking Position. Another method of executing the outer cordon is the
blocking position. Differing from the TCP, the blocking position does not allow for the passage
of personnel or vehicular traffic. When planning cordon and search operations consider the
ramifications of not allowing any traffic through the outer cordon. This impact may be minimal
during low traffic hours, but may cause a riot if conducted when people are attempting to get to
work.
(c) Screening Forces. The outer cordon area may be too large to be covered
entirely by blocking positions or TCPs. The use of mounted or dismounted patrols, listening
posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs), and snipers may augment the outer cordon. If employed,
ensure that each element knows the routes and positions of the screening forces. The
elements can be used to provide observation of fleeing personnel or deter infiltration along
secondary routes. Ensure that screening forces have adequate combat power.
(6) Figure III-1 depicts an outer cordon element arrayed around an objective to block
enemy or insurgent forces. The element employs a combination of blocking positions and
screening forces.

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Figure III-1. Outer Cordon
(7) The outer cordon is NOT an independent operation. Rather it is an integral part of
the cordon and search. The outer cordon secures the objective area and in doing so contains
the enemy and is the initial barrier to enemy reinforcements. The keys to success for the outer
cordon are detailed planning and rehearsals at all levels and maintaining situational awareness
at all times. Creativity in the employment of the Security Element will assist with preventing the
enemy from escaping.
c. The Inner Cordon.
(1) The inner cordon is the other integral part of the security element in any cordon and
search operation. The inner cordon isolates the target in order to protect the search/assault
element from threat activity such as direct fire, grenades, explosives, or civil disturbances and
prevents escape from the immediate area. As such it requires detailed planning and effective
coordination, as well as meticulous integration and synchronization to achieve the combined
arms effects, lethal and nonlethal, sought by the commander. (See figure III-2.) Inner cordon
tasks include the following:
(a) Serves as overwatch/support by fire/security for the search/assault element.
(b) Serves as an immediate reserve for civil disturbances and for the
search/assault element.
(c) May establish multiple inner cordons for multiple targets.
(d) Maintains communication with the search element and coordinating fires within
the inner cordon element.
(e) Insures the marking system and the control measures are understood by all
elements (see appendix H) as well as the signals (infrared (IR) strobe, glint tape, etc.) for air-to-
ground identification.
(f) Uses supporting structures in built up areas. This may require forces to clear
and secure surrounding buildings to provide overwatch to the target/building.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-5


(2) The unit performing the inner cordon (SBF, overwatch positions) must have a
designated leader and a clear task and purpose. Weapon systems to consider for inner cordon
positions include, but are not limited to, medium or light crew-served weapons and small arms,
light antitank weapons (LAWs), and grenades.
(3) The leader of the unit conducting the inner cordon must develop and maintain
situational awareness of his area of responsibility as well as the areas of the outer cordon and
the search/assault element. Close coordination with the search/assault element is essential.
This will enable him to anticipate threat activity, control direct fires, and facilitate the
achievement of the inner cordon’s task and purpose. Aviation assets may be able to assist the
inner cordon force in locating and tracking escaping personnel, but typically the inner cordon
commander does not control the air assets. The mission command element will direct the air
assets and relay information to either the inner or outer cordon as necessary.
(4) The inner cordon is typically established by emplacing SBF or overwatch positions
where they can best isolate the target area with overlapping sectors of observation and fires.
Depending on the size or complexity of the target area, multiple inner cordons may be required.

Figure III-2. Inner Cordon


(5) The inner cordon is also not an independent operation. Rather it is an integral part of
the cordon and search. The inner cordon isolates the target area, provides security for the
search/assault element and prevents potential enemy forces from escaping. The keys to
success for the inner cordon are detailed planning and rehearsals at all levels, and close
coordination with the other elements.

4. Search/Assault Element
a. The search/assault element’s mission is to assault, clear, and search the target to
capture kill or destroy the targeted individuals and/or materials. The search/assault element
initiates action once the outer and inner cordons are in place. The element accomplishes its
mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target to clear all enemy and noncombatant

III-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


personnel, and by conducting a systematic search of the target. These areas may be searched
selectively (only specific rooms/buildings/blocks) or systematically (everything within a given
area). Due to the split second decisions that have to be made, it is imperative that this element
not only understands but can comply with rules of engagement (ROE) in a dynamic
environment.
b. To accomplish its mission the search/assault element has three primary tasks: securing,
clearing, and searching the target. The search/assault element may be task organized into four
teams—assault, search, security, and support—in order to facilitate accomplishing its mission.
All of these teams must understand and be prepared to assume the role of the other teams in
the search/assault element. (See figure III-3.) The search/assault element teams may conduct
the following tasks:
(1) Assault Team(s). The assault team(s) are responsible for entering, clearing, and
searching buildings in order to capture or destroy enemy forces or equipment. The assault
team conducts the initial assault into the target and uses speed and violence of action to move
through the target to completely clear and seize control of it. In most circumstances, the target
must be cleared of enemy forces, noncombatants, and/or booby traps before the search begins.
The assault team can transition into the search team once the target is cleared (i.e., the assault
team clears a house from bottom to top, transitions into the search team, and conducts a search
from top to bottom).
(2) Search Team(s). Once the target is cleared of combatants and secure, the search
team will conduct its primary task of searching the target to capture or destroy the targeted
individuals and/or materials.
(3) Security Team(s). The security team provides immediate overwatch inside the target
to the unit conducting the search. The security team also provides immediate security of
detainees and noncombatants.
(4) Support Team. The support team maintains a strongpoint position and base of
operations at the target and is responsible for establishing overwatch to allow the assault and
search and security teams successful entry into target buildings and rooms. The support team
should not be confused with the security element if it performs the task of an inner cordon. The
support team can secure the occupants of the building(s) or captured equipment, once found
and initially secured by the other teams. (Detailed descriptions and records of captured
weapons, ammunition, and other material need to be IAW the commander's guidance and
ROE.) Once the assault and search teams clear the target, the support team establishes a
command post (typically a large room in a single house search or a centrally located house in a
village search). The support team provides overwatch of detainees or occupants of the house
while the search is conducted to collect all contraband and evidence. The support team may be
designated as the reserve.
c. The following assets are recommended to conduct an effective search:
(1) Detainee Team. The detainee team should consist of at least two individuals and be
attached to the support team. The detainee team maintains the detainee/enemy prisoner of war
(EPW) kits (IAW the unit SOP, see chapter VI for an example) and is responsible for all
detainee/EPW handling.
(2) Field Interview Team. The field interview team is responsible for tactical questioning
of detainees and local populace in and around the objective area. The field interview team
should be attached to the support team but can be attached to the search team. The field
interview team should be located at the detainee/EPW collection point and should include an

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-7


interpreter and a tactical HUMINT team. During a field interview, emphasis should be placed on
tactical questioning.
(3) Documentation Team. The documentation team is responsible for video and written
documentation obtained on the target, local residents, and evidence found. The documentation
team is typically attached to the search team and should be equipped with a digital
camera/camcorder and evidence logs. The documentation team should take pictures to
document the contents of each house and the condition of each house. If evidence/contraband
is found, the documentation team should take pictures and if possible include detainees in the
picture with the evidence/contraband to establish ownership. The documentation team should
also document all residents of the house/village to establish residency in the objective area.
(4) Demolition Team. The primary demolition team is attached to the search team and
the alternate demolition team is typically attached to the assault team and is used to breach
obstacles that are preventing the assault team from achieving their mission.
(5) Mine Detection Team. The mine detection team is attached to the search team and
is used primarily for mine/improvised explosive device (IED) detection in and around the target
area. The mine detection team can also be tasked to search for weapons caches once the
target area is cleared and secured.
(6) Tunnel Reconnaissance Team. The tunnel reconnaissance team is attached to the
assault team and is used to clear all tunnels and subterranean levels in the target area.

Figure III-3. Search Assault Element

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5. Support Element
a. The support element reinforces, and is capable of accomplishing, the task and purpose
of the unit’s main effort. In addition, the commander may direct the support element to
accomplish priority planning tasks. This means that the support element leader must be
intimately familiar with all aspects of the cordon and search mission from planning through its
completion.
b. The commander must identify the tasks the support element may be required to execute.
These tasks must be prioritized and given to the support element leader so he can plan and
rehearse these actions IAW the commander’s plan. Probable tasks assigned to the support
element during a cordon and search operation are (but are not limited to):
(1) Reinforce outer/inner cordon
(2) Clear buildings
(3) Search buildings
(4) Secure, safeguard, and escort civilians or detainees
(5) Secure and safeguard captured material or equipment
c. Commitment criteria is a guide to assist the commander on when to commit the support
element but is not intended to be a trigger for employment. Possible commitment criteria are as
follows:
(1) Hostile crowd forming around inner cordon
(2) Loss of main effort
(3) Numerous rooms in building being searched
(4) More than a specified number of detainees
(5) Enemy engages inner cordon

6. Movement to the Target


a. Techniques of Movement. Movement techniques to and from the target will be dictated
by METT-TC. Commanders and staffs should make every effort to have subordinate units
travel along different but converging avenues of approach, thus aiding in security, speed, and
surprise. Commanders must develop primary and alternate routes and be prepared to react to
any contingency while traveling to the target (i.e., small arms, IED , vehicle damage/breakdown,
etc.).
b. Order of March. The order of march (OOM) will be dictated by the commander’s overall
plan and scheme of maneuver formed during COA development.
c. Method of Movement. There are two primary methods of movement to the target: single
point ingress and multidirectional ingress.
(1) Single Point Ingress. Movement to the target in a column along a single path
facilitates easier command and control. All units approach the target and assume their position
as a single unit and break off from the main body at predetermined release points. This
technique reduces problems with command and control, timing, and deconfliction of fires.
However, this movement technique produces a much larger signature and is slower to seal off a
cordon area. See figure III-4 for an example of a single point ingress to the target.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-9


Figure III-4. Single Point of Ingress
(2) Multidirectional Ingress. Ideally, a cordon and search force moves to the target from
multiple directions. Movement to the target through multiple directions provides a lower
signature with fewer vehicles collocated during approach. This technique can be more effective
by sealing off multiple avenues of egress simultaneously. Drawbacks to this technique include
difficulty with command and control, division of forces, and deconfliction of fires. The
multidirectional approach will require units to depart from the same assembly area at different
times or from multiple assembly areas. See figure III-5 for an example of a multidirectional
approach to the target.

III-10 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure III-5. Multidirectional Ingress

7. Tactical Control Measures


The use of standard tactical control measures is essential to effective command and control
over forces approaching and conducting cordon and search operations.
(1) Assembly Areas. Due to the relative safety, size, and location, forward operating
bases (FOBs) or combat outposts are the most convenient areas for staging a cordon and
search operation. However, commanders must assume that all friendly positions are under
constant observation. If possible, position assembly areas in remote or separate areas or use
multiple assembly areas in order to minimize any enemy surveillance efforts.
(2) Checkpoints. Checkpoints leading to the target and in the objective area are
essential in ensuring that all units arrive at the target in the proper order and on time.
(3) Rally Points. Rally points to and from the objective area allow for cordon and search
elements to reorganize if units become engaged, lost, have vehicle trouble, or lose
communications during ingress and egress from the target.
(4) Phase Lines. Phase lines are helpful in controlling cordon and search elements that
are approaching the target from different directions or at different times.

8. Deception Techniques
Deception can be an effective tool to avoid mission compromise when approaching a target.
Any technique that makes the cordon and search force appear to have a different mission or
objective will aid in success. Several techniques that have been tried successfully include:

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-11


(1) Moving the inner cordon force into the objective area as a local dismounted patrol.
(2) Changing vehicle identification markings to resemble another unit, no markings or
identifiable equipment denies the enemy the ability to associate certain vehicles with certain
missions.
(3) Increasing the number and size of local patrols in the days prior to a cordon and
search operation to acclimatize the change in operational tempo.
(4) Masking a cordon and search force inside another regularly scheduled convoy. (The
cordon and search force should be at the end of the convoy to avoid problems with command
and control of the other elements of the convoy.)

9. Driving Considerations
a. Night Driving. Ambient light from urban areas and civilian traffic severely affects night
optics; which in turn affects visibility and the driver’s ability to react as well as see long
distances. For night driving it is essential that all drivers have and are experienced with the use
of night vision goggles (NVGs)/night optical devices (NODs). While night optics increase
capability at night, they are not fool proof. Visibility can be enhanced by placing IR
chemlights/IR beacons on the antennas, front, and rear of vehicles, allowing safe travel and
dispersion between vehicles. IR headlights are an essential element for successful tactical
driving at night.

Note: An effective technique to reduce attacks during vehicle movements at night is to


drive under black out conditions when possible and switch to white lights if other
traffic is encountered.

b. Day Driving. Daily traffic patterns will impact the ingress and egress from an objective
area. Commanders must expect and address civilian traffic jams that will inevitably be caused
by roadblocks; planned alternate routes of ingress and egress are essential. Attempts should
be made to take advantage of cultural traffic patterns that lessen the amount of traffic on the
roads. Times of religious observance, nonworkdays, night time, and time periods of extreme
heat (siesta) or foul weather are ideal times for conducting cordon and search operations from a
traffic perspective.
c. Terrain and Weather Considerations. Terrain conditions on roads must be addressed
prior to commencing any operation. Dust from poorly repaired or country roads can slow the
cordon forces approach to the target. Moreover, poor road conditions can hinder movement
into/off the target. Weather considerations must also be used for planning. Extreme wind, heat,
and storms can hinder approach and C2. However, extreme weather conditions can mask the
noise/visual signature of approaching units as well as reduce local traffic. Cordon and search
elements must also be aware of driving hazards and terrain features such as canals, ditches, or
pipelines that significantly restrict movement.

10. Helicopter Insertion


a. Route Support. Helicopter assets are useful in observing routes of ingress and egress,
ensuring that enemy forces do not interfere with operations. However, cordon and search
planners must recognize that helicopter operations create a loud noise and a large visual
signature that may alert enemy forces in the area.
b. Helicopter Assaults. Using helicopters for insertion of cordon forces is an effective
means of quickly establishing a cordon force.

III-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


11. Emplacement Techniques and Timing of the Cordon and Search Elements
a. Techniques. There are two techniques for emplacement of the cordon and search
elements: simultaneously or sequentially. Careful consideration must be given to both as there
are advantages and disadvantages to each technique.
b. Simultaneous Occupation.
(1) This occurs when the cordon and search elements occupy multiple positions at the
same time. (See figure III-6.)
(a) Security elements may occupy the outer cordon simultaneously to completely
isolate the objective area at one time. This requires precise timing and control.
(b) Security elements (both inner and outer cordons), search elements, and
support elements can occupy their initial positions simultaneously.
(2) Simultaneous occupation facilitates the element of surprise, with rapid, synchronized
emplacement of the inner cordon and search elements. It maximizes the unit’s ability to ensure
that targeted individuals/materials do not escape.

(3) Some disadvantages of this technique are that it requires multiple routes, control
measures/battle tracking (i.e., phase lines or check points to ensure that the positions are
emplaced simultaneously), makes control a little more difficult for the commander, potentially
makes CASEVAC more difficult, and spreads out the elements' combat power. It may also
increase the probability of the outer cordon elements coming into contact with IEDs or direct fire
engagements. Vehicles and the HN populace may get trapped between the inner and outer
cordon and cause unnecessary panic and control issues. In summary, disadvantages include:

(a) Difficult to control.

(b) Multiple routes required.

(c) Additional control measures required.

(d) CASEVAC is more difficult.

(e) Combat power is spread out.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-13


Figure III-6. Simultaneous Occupation

c. Sequential Occupation. This occurs when the elements occupy multiple positions in
sequence. (See figures III-7, III-8, and III-9.)
(1) The outer cordon is established first to isolate the objective.
(2) The inner cordon is the next step to further isolate specific target areas and entry
points.
(3) The support element should be positioned where it can best support the other
elements based upon established planning priorities.
(4) The search/assault element should move in and begin executing when conditions
have been set by the other elements.
(5) Advantages
(a) Ease of control.
(b) Simplicity for planning and execution.
(6) Disadvantages
(a) Less effective at timely isolation of the objective area and the target.
(b) Allows the enemy initial freedom to reposition or hide personnel and materials.

III-14 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure III-7. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 1 Outer Cordon)

Figure III-8. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon)

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-15


Figure III-9. Sequential Occupation (Sequence 3 Search Element)

d. Sequential emplacement of the outer cordon elements, or using one route in, and having
outer cordon elements pass through the objective area is another technique. This technique
facilitates C2, keeps combat power massed, facilitates CASEVAC, requires less planning, and
the need for additional control measures and battle tracking to ensure synchronization.
However, the elements approaching the objective from one side may be observed by the enemy
and the targeted individual(s) may be able to escape, hide, prepare a counter attack, or
emplace an IED.

12. Withdrawal from the Objective


a. Methods of Egress
(1) Simultaneous. The simultaneous egress method is least preferred. It lacks overwatch
as units leave the area. Moreover, the major element of surprise is lost. If this method is
employed, care should be taken to use different egress and ingress routes whenever possible to
avoid ambush. (See figure III-10.)

III-16 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure III-10. Simultaneous Egress
(2) Sequential. A sequential withdrawal from a cordon and search objective area will
provide greater security for forces leaving the cordon area. (See figures III-11, III-12, and III-13.)

Figure III-11. Sequential Egress (Sequence 1 Search Element)

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-17


Figure III-12. Sequential Egress (Sequence 2 Inner Cordon)

Figure III-13. Sequential Egress (Sequence 3 Outer Cordon)

III-18 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


b. Egress Route Selection
(1) Single Point. (See figure III-14.) Single point egress provides simplicity in movement
from the objective area to a predesignated rally point. However, a single assigned point of
egress may not be the simplest route off target for all elements of the cordon and search force
as elements may have to move through the cordon site itself to reach the designated egress
route. Depending on the terrain surrounding the target area a single point egress may be the
only option. Care must be taken to ensure that the route is properly secured to avoid the
possibility of enemy attack.
(a) Advantage. C2 of all cordon and search force elements will generally be easier
with this type of movement, as well as, ability to mass fire power if attacked.
(b) Disadvantage. Single point egress canalizes the cordon and search force with
the possibility of the egress route being blocked or overrun by insurgents entrapping them.

Figure III-14. Single Point Egress


(2) Multidirectional. (See figure III-15.) Multidirectional egress requires greater
coordination for each cordon and search element. Accountability of personnel, detainees and
equipment is essential. Well established rally points are essential for multidirectional egress.

(a) Advantages
• Flexibility
• Security
• Speed

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-19


(b) Disadvantages
• Accountability
• Control
• Requires greater communication assets
• Ability to reinforce

Figure III-15. Multidirectional Egress


c. Egress Considerations
(1) Detainees. Units assigned to handle detainees must be specifically tasked and
equipped. Specific vehicles must be assigned/identified for the detainee transport mission, and
specific units must be tasked to provide security if the detainee transportation unit is separating
from the main body. Property accountability and proper tagging of detainees are critical during
the transportation and movement to a detainee collection point.
(2) Enemy Contraband. Depending on the expected contraband, appropriate sized
vehicles must be assigned to remove the contraband. It is important to transport enemy
weapons and equipment in different vehicles from detainees. If transportation of contraband is
impossible, steps must be taken to demilitarize/destroy contraband with explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD)/Engineering assets.
d. Casualties. During mission planning, a CASEVAC plan must address the possibility of
injury to military personnel, civilians, and detainees. Each must have separate evacuation plans
addressing casualty collection points (CCPs), casualty collection teams, casualty transportation
teams, and security for transportation teams. Securing detainees who have been injured is
important to ensure their safety and the safety of military personnel.

III-20 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


e. Route Security. Constant observation of egress routes during execution is essential. Air
assets and sniper/recon units are good choices to overwatch routes. Military police units are
well suited to conduct patrols along expected routes of egress as well. Tanks are excellent for
route security because they are mobile, very survivable, and have multiple weapons
engagement options against threats (i.e., vehicle borne improvised explosive device [VBIED],
snipers, antitank guided missile [ATGM] teams). Enemy action can include detonation of
roadside bombs, mortar attack, and preplanned coordinated ambushes. Overwatch units can
give advanced warning or interdiction of enemy activity allowing a commander to choose an
alternate route of egress.
f. Vehicle Break Down. Planning must include addressing the issue of disabled vehicles.
Planning for disabled vehicles must include logistical considerations (i.e., tow bars, tow straps,
spare tires), rehearsals of vehicle repair, vehicle towing, a bump/cross leveling plan, and a
timeline for each contingency.
g. Stay Behind Forces. Sniper/recon units may be employed to cover withdrawal as well
as conduct observation on enemy forces that the cordon and search operation missed.
Insertion of stay behind forces may be accomplished during the cordon and search mission
execution or sniper teams inserted prior to the mission can remain on station until the egress is
complete. Special consideration must be made for use of these units to avoid fratricide (link up
points and recognition signals and all personnel understanding their locations).
h. Overwatch. Commanders must take care during infiltration to maintain overwatch upon
elements exiting the objective area/target. Generally, the cordon unit nearest the infiltration
route should be the last to move.

13. Road Blocks


a. Purpose. The purpose of road blocks is to facilitate the complete isolation of an
objective area by stopping all vehicle and foot movement into and out of the target area. No
civilians should be allowed through a road block for any reason. Special circumstances can be
made for civilians escorted by military personnel. Coordination with adjacent units is critical to
ensure that they do not interfere with the cordon and search operation by traveling through the
area. Service members executing a road block must have as much information about targeted
enemy personnel as possible to increase their chances of detection and apprehension.
Targeted enemy personnel may inadvertently attempt to enter the objective area during the
cordon and search. Since roadblocks cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, ensure
that the civilian population understands the roadblocks are a preventive and not a punitive
measure.
b. Deliberate or Hasty. Local security must be provided and should include either
deliberate or hasty barriers depending on the size and complexity of the cordon and search
operation. The deliberate roadblock is a relatively fixed position in a town or in the open
country, often on a main road. It acts as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement. The hasty
roadblock is highly mobile and is quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. Its actual
location is designed to achieve surprise. Generally in a cordon and search situation a variant of
the hasty roadblock will be most appropriate due to limited time on target. Armored vehicles
make effective mobile roadblocks. A roadblock for cordon and search purposes should not be
positioned to surprise drivers who may not have enough time to stop safely.
c. Security. A roadblock requires adequate personnel to provide security. A security force
is concealed an appropriate distance from the roadblock. If the roadblock is manned for any
length of time, part of the force is allowed to rest. The rest area is located near overt overwatch
so that personnel can be assembled quickly as a reserve force.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-21


(1) Positioning. Barriers for the isolation of an objective should be far enough in front of
friendly forces to allow adequate standoff to engage any threats. Threats include personnel,
vehicles, car bombs, or any other type of local enemy TTP.
(2) General Technique. Cones and signs should be placed furthest out from friendly
forces. Then place spike strips and/or concertina wires 10-20 meters behind the signs and
cones. A friendly vehicle preferably with a heavy weapons system is placed at approximately
the 100-meter position behind the wire barrier.
d. Terrain Selection. Roadblocks should be placed in a position to dominate an
intersection or roadway. No street intersections will be located within the barrier plan. If
possible, roadblocks should be in an area where civilian traffic approaching the area can easily
turn around. This will help to avoid a civilian traffic jam affecting the cordon and search forces
routes of egress.
e. Troop Positioning. Troops should be positioned behind the barriers to maximize standoff
and survivability; able to move to the front of the barrier plan to interact with the local population
if necessary; and engage enemy approaching the obstacle plan. Further, covert overwatch
positions should be employed to ensure the safety of those manning the roadblock. To assist in
crowd control and direct access to the roadblock place a wire barrier behind the overwatch
vehicle in order to improve security.
f. Signs. Portable signs in the native language and in English must be available. Signs
should denote the speed limit of approach, vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and
female search areas, and dismount point.
(1) Positioning. Signs are generally positioned at the furthest point forward to ensure
that any civilians approaching the roadblock are quickly informed of the roadblocks presence
and purpose.
(2) Employment/Description. Care should be made to ensure that the language and
symbols used on signs are appropriate for the location and dialect. Literacy rates and the
general alertness of the civilian populace should be considered in constructing any signs.
(3) Symbology. Verbiage of signs will vary from culture to culture. Generally, signs
should communicate that military operations are ongoing, a distance to stay back, and that
deadly force will be used for any violation. English translation should be clearly written on the
signs. Trigger lines and actions upon crossing them should not be mentioned in any signs.
g. Lights. Adequate lighting is essential to illuminate the barrier plan in order to avoid
careless drivers hitting the barrier accidentally. Chemlights or vehicle headlights may be
sufficient to give notice of a barriers location.
h. Communication. Radio communication is required between the various locations
supporting the roadblock operation. These include the security position, the rest area, and the
combat support (CS) commander.
i. Barriers. Obstacles across the road should be provided. Clearly marked barbed wire,
buses parked sideways in the road, felled trees, or any other readily available strong object will
work. Obstacles must be strong and big enough to prevent motorists from driving through or
around them. Barriers include:
(1) Medium to large caltrops
(2) Spike strips
(3) Concertina wire
(4) Military vehicles
(5) Field expedient (civilian vehicles, debris, etc.)

III-22 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


j. Firepower. Service members must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or
to halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the roadblock. Generally, a crew-served
weapons system should be located at all roadblocks.
k. Linguist/Interpreter. Personnel familiar with the native language are essential on all
roadblocks.
l. Escalation of Force at Roadblocks.
(1) Trigger Lines. Personnel must be well briefed as to the rules for escalation of force
that apply to a roadblock. A clearly defined trigger line provides all personnel the confidence to
engage only when necessary. Personnel must also clearly understand the means of engaging
vehicles that cross the trigger line. Vehicles that cross the trigger line must be treated as a
direct threat to the roadblock and fire placed to immediately stop its approach. Generally,
trigger lines should coincide with the layout of the barrier plan. However trigger lines should not
be explained to civilians.
(2) Signal Devices. There are several signal devices that can be used at roadblocks to
warn oncoming traffic and as a precursor to employing lethal force to stop a vehicle. Care
should be taken to ensure that all personnel understand that these munitions may cause serious
injury and death. Examples of signal devices include:
(a) M203 flare/illume
(b) Hand held pop up (star clusters/parachutes) flares/clusters
(c) Smoke grenades
(d) Flash bangs

14. Control of the Populace in the Target Area


a. Central Location. Assemble inhabitants in a central location. This method provides the
most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies the belligerents an opportunity to conceal
evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. The disadvantages of this method are that it
takes inhabitants away from their dwellings thus encouraging looting which engenders ill
feelings and it increases the probability of false claims of theft and damage from the local
populace.
b. Home Restriction. Restrict the inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of
civilians, allows them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The disadvantages of
this method are that it makes control and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to
conceal evidence in their homes.
c. Control Heads of Households. The head of each household is told to remain in the front
of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a location separate from the search
area(s). During the search, the head of the household can move with the search team, this
person can be used to open doors and containers to facilitate the search. Often, this is the best
method for controlling the occupants during a search.

15. Breaching Techniques

Note: Doors should be checked before they are breached. They may be unlocked.

a. Ballistic (Shotgun) Breach. Ballistic breaching is a means of gaining entry into a


structure through an existing locked doorway. In certain situations, however, the use of ballistic
breaching as an initial entry method may be necessary. The contents of the structure, a misfire

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-23


of an explosive charge, or compromise of the assault force during its approach to the target may
necessitate the use of ballistic breaching as a means of initial entry into the structure.
(1) The order of movement for a shotgun breach has the gunner up front, followed by the
No. 1 man, No. 2 man, and then the No. 3 man.
(2) Door breaching. When using the shotgun as an alternate breaching method to gain
entry, shooters must consider the following target points on the door:
(a) Door knob
(b) Locking mechanism
(c) Hinges
(3) After the door is breached, the gunner moves to the rear of the lineup and assumes
the position of the No. 4 man.

Note: Understand the limitations of using a shotgun for room clearing because of its limited
magazine capacity and the difficulty of reloading the weapon. Various shotgun
rounds can be used for ballistic breaching. The assault teams need to be familiar
with the advantages as well as the disadvantages of each type of round. Leaders
must take in consideration over penetration through walls and floors.

b. Explosive (Demolition) Breach. The order of movement for an explosive breach without
engineer support is:
(1) No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, and then No. 4. The No. 1 man provides security at the doorway.
(2) The No. 2 man carries the demolition charge and places it.
(3) The No. 3 man provides security overhead, and the No. 4 man provides rear security.
(4) After the demolition charge is placed, the team moves to covered positions and
prepares to enter in the standard 1, 2, 3, 4 order. Refer to FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms
Operations in Urban Terrain, chapter 8, sections 9 to 11, for breaching reinforced and non-
reinforced exterior walls, interior walls and partitions, and door-breaching charges. The Marine
Corps also has published MCIP 3-35.01, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reduction of
Urban Area Strongpoints. It contains valuable information about breaching techniques.
c. Mechanical Breach. A suggested order of movement for a mechanical breach is the
initial assault team in order, followed by the breach man or element. At the breach point, the
assault team leader brings the breach team forward while the assault team provides local
security. After the breach is conducted, the breach team moves aside and provides local
security as the assault team enters the breach.

16. Room Clearing


a. Clearing Room by Room. Regardless of intensity, ROE, or target, personnel will have to
clear buildings room by room to neutralize possible threats. The degree of force used will vary
according to the perceived threat and the actions of the occupants. Room clearing is rapidly
and methodically seizing control of a room, or multiple rooms, and all of its inhabitants (both
hostile and other) by eliminating the threat, dominating the room, and controlling the situation.
b. Quick Access. Gaining quick access to the targeted rooms is integral to room clearing.
Breaching techniques vary based on the type of construction encountered and the types of
munitions available to the breaching element. Techniques range from simple mechanical and
ballistic breaching to complex demolition breaching. (See paragraph 15 above, for breaching
techniques.)

III-24 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


c. Movement to the Target. The movement technique used for approaching a target
building is dictated by several factors. Among these are the mission, cover and concealment,
lighting conditions, type of breach to be used, and terrain. Personnel should move close to, but
not touch, the building exterior. Staying close to the building makes personnel harder to see
from inside the building. However, each person should avoid contact with the building,
especially banging against the walls with a weapon or other piece of equipment.
(1) Personnel should be trained to maintain muzzle awareness at all times. They should
never get into the stack with a weapon muzzle pointing at another person. This is why weapons
must be carried at a low or high carry and with fingers outside the trigger well.
(2) The assault team should, whenever possible, line up on the side of the door that
provides the path of least resistance upon entering. The swinging door is an obstacle that can
best be avoided by lining up on the correct side. If the door opens inward, the team should line
up on the hinge side. If the door opens outward, the team should line up on the doorknob side.
Lining up on the correct side will result in the fastest and smoothest entry possible.
d. Pass Signals. There are many different ways to pass the signal that everyone is ready.
If a stealthy approach to the target building is possible, the “thumb back/squeeze back”
technique works well.
(1) The No. 1 man assumes his position on the breach point first. His eyes and weapon
are oriented on the breach point. When he feels comfortable with his position, he will signal the
No. 2 man by nodding his head.
(2) The No. 2 man will acknowledge receipt by squeezing the No. 1 man’s shoulder.
After he has received and acknowledged the nod of the No. 1 man, the No. 2 man will pass the
“thumb up” signal back to the No. 3 man.
(3) The No. 3 man will acknowledge by squeezing the No. 2 man’s thumb, and will then
pass a “thumb up” back to the man behind him. This will continue until the “thumb up” signal
has been passed back to the last man on the initial entry team.
(4) The last man will then squeeze forward, and each subsequent man will send the
signal forward so that all in the team are aware that all others are prepared to enter.
e. Actions Upon Entry. The actions personnel will execute upon entering a room are:
(1) Clear the point of entry or breach point (fatal funnel).
(2) The first action to be taken by the Service member upon entry into a room is to clear
the fatal funnel—that area which surrounds the door threshold. This is the focal point of
attention for anyone in the room. By moving quickly, the assault team members reduce the risk
of being hit by hostile fire directed at the doorway.
f. Move to Point of Domination. Corners are the points of domination in any room. The
next action the assault team takes is to clear those corners and occupy them as points of
domination.
(1) The No. 1 man and the No. 2 man are initially responsible for the corners.
(2) If the No. 1 man and the No. 2 man are unable to clear the corners, the No. 3 man
and the No. 4 man must assume this critical responsibility.
(3) Each Service member has a primary and secondary sector of fire. (See figure III-16.)

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-25


Figure III-16. Sectors of Fire
Note: If one of the Service members has a weapon malfunction, that Service member
should sound off with weapon down, take a knee and work through his malfunction.
The other Service member will scan his sector of fires. This works because all
sectors of fire are interlocking, thereby providing redundant fire-power. The Service
member should not stand up until one of his fellow Service members moves to him
and taps him on the shoulder. This will be his signal to stand up.

g. Controlling the Situation. By dominating the room and eliminating any threat, the assault
team seizes control of the room and the initiative from the enemy. Inaction or slow execution
gives the initiative back to any hostile element in the room. Live noncombatants or friendly
personnel not engaged must also be controlled. The control measures used can be both verbal
and physical. The team leader or a designated team member must immediately begin speaking
to any people in the room in a loud, commanding voice. He must take charge. Verbal control
may be difficult because of the loss of hearing resulting from explosives and firearms use.
Verbiage should be short and to the point, and it should be loud enough to be heard by those
whose hearing may have been damaged by the sound of gunfire and explosives. Physical
control must be firm, but not overly harsh.

17. Searches
a. A search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. It usually involves both
local police and Service members. The commander must decide whether the unit will conduct a
detailed search or a hasty search depending on the intelligence available. Escort parties and
transportation must be arranged before the search of a house. The object of a house search is
to screen residents to determine if there are any targeted individuals and groups, and to look for

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controlled items. A search party assigned to search an occupied building may consist of local
police, protective escorts (usually infantry), and female searchers. Forced entry may be
necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. If a house
containing property is searched while its occupants are away, it should be secured to prevent
looting. Before US forces depart, the commander should arrange for the community to protect
such houses until the occupants return.
b. It is imperative for the unit conducting the search to conduct their search only after the
target has been cleared of enemy forces, noncombatants, and booby traps. Even after the
initial clearing is complete, the unit conducting the search should not assume that the area is
totally clear and be prepared for hidden personnel, equipment, or improvised explosive devices.
c. Units must also ensure that if time permits, they search every inch of the target
building(s) and the surrounding objective area. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have
demonstrated that insurgents are quite adept at hiding and burying contraband items, such as
weapons, explosives, communication equipment, etc. Units should search every conceivable
hiding place in the target building(s) as well as any outlying buildings and the surrounding
ground. Units should search the entire area with mine detectors and dig in any spots where
freshly dug soil appears. Commanders must ensure that the unit returns the objective area to
its original condition, particularly if no enemy forces, contraband, or insurgent activity are found.
d. The occupants from the cordon and search target(s) must be kept under constant
observation not only to prevent talking but also to observe how they interact. Frequently,
strangers will be physically isolated and leaders will become a focus point. These bits of
information are important for both current and future operations.
e. Misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations; thus, the
seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or other minor items during
searches must be conducted and recorded lawfully to be of future legal value. Proper use of
authority during searches gains the respect and support of the people.
f. Search procedures are as follows:
(1) Search Instructions. The search element should have detailed instructions for
handling controlled items. Lists of prohibited or controlled-distribution items should be widely
disseminated and on hand during searches.
(2) Search Again. Searchers can return to a searched area after the initial search to
surprise and eliminate insurgents or their leaders who might have either returned or remained
undetected during the search.
(3) Search Individuals. The fact that anyone in an area to be searched could be an
enemy or a sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However, to avoid making an
enemy or sympathizer out of a suspect, searchers must be tactful. One member of the search
team provides security while another member makes the actual search: tasked organized as a
search and cover team. The search team may utilize the following techniques: 1) keep the
individuals separated at a distance and if possible, keep the individual isolated from the general
population, 2) have the individual raise their arms and conduct a visual inspection, 3) utilize a
metal detection wand, if available, to quickly identify concealed weapons or other devices, 4)
utilize the pat down technique starting from the head and moving systematically to the
individual’s feet (the searcher may need to wear protective gloves), and finally 5) conduct
tactical questioning during the search regarding information of tactical significance, find out
where they are going and what they are planning to do after the search. If the searcher
determines that the individual should be detained it is imperative to move the individual quickly
and quietly to a detainee collection point without creating friction for the other civilians in the

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-27


area. An explanation for the purpose/reason for the search through the use of an interpreter
will mitigate friction between the search team/cover members and the individual subject to the
search. Escalation of posture and the nature of the search should be minimized unless hostile
indicators are present. Suspicious occupants should be tested with explosive detection kits.
(4) Search Females. Threat forces may use females to their advantage by using them to
transport or hide contraband. To counter this, female searchers should be used. The female
searcher could come from any unit, not just a military police (MP) unit. If male Service members
must search females, all possible measures must be taken to prevent perceptions of
inappropriate conduct. A good technique is to use metal detecting wands to establish immediate
need for a more detailed search. Also, have the female raise her arms and conduct a
systematic ‘pat down’ technique of her own. This will enable the searcher to visually inspect for
concealed weapons. The searcher should also visually inspect for physical attributes of a man
(large feet, hands, and Adam’s apple) in case the enemy is attempting to exfiltrate dressed as a
woman. If it is necessary for a male to conduct a more detailed search of the female it is
recommended to use the back side of the hands or ask another female from the same tribe or
village to assist with the search. Cultural differences may make this a particularly sensitive
problem so small unit leadership and supervision is recommended.
(5) Search Vehicles. Searching of vehicles may require equipment such as detection
devices, mirrors, tools, and military working dogs. Occupants should be moved away from
vehicles and individually searched, before the vehicle itself is searched. A TTP is to have the
driver of the vehicle open all doors, the trunk, and the hood himself. Personnel will pull security
on the driver as he conducts this action and immediately bring the occupant to the individual
search area after opening all doors. Personnel then conduct a thorough search of a vehicle.
Look under the vehicle, in the engine compartment, and look for disturbances in the floorboards,
seats, or side panels of the vehicle. A separate vehicle search area should be established to
avoid unnecessary delays and traffic jams. The estimate of the situation will determine if all or a
portion of the vehicles will be searched.
(6) Search Rooms.
(a) Units should develop systematic room searching techniques in order to
prevent overlooking an area after the room has been cleared. The aggressive posture of the
search team is determined based on the hostile indicators. The searchers need to understand
the commander’s intent in order to determine what degree of security is required. The search
team consists of a minimum of three personnel: one person to move/open furniture or doors if
the head of the household is not available; one person as the cover man to observe (booby
traps/contraband, personnel, etc.) and prepare to engage targets; one person to record specific
data.
(b) Room searches have a 3-dimensional focus. Anything can be used to hide
equipment or information. Searches should not be limited to the immediate furniture or doors in
the rooms, but also trap doors, ceilings, ventilation systems, etc. Pay particular attention to
furniture that weighs more than what it looks like, large pieces of furniture in odd positions (i.e.
refrigerator in center of living room), torn fabric on furniture, walls with freshly fixed holes, area
behind large hanging pictures or pieces of furniture, under rugs or carpet that has loose/pulled
up corners. Searchers may have to inspect inside of all pieces of folded clothing or pockets of
hanging clothes. If something looks strange or modified, inspect it thoroughly. If possible, use a
metal detector to assist with locating weapons/ammunition caches.
g. Cordon and search forces should attempt to minimize unnecessary damage to the target
area. In addition to information collection, the search team may use cameras or video recorders
to establish the original condition of the house and the condition of the house after the

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inspection is completed. All sensitive material or equipment found on an objective should be
documented with a camera, if available, before it is removed or collected. The recorder should
make every effort to keep confiscated items separated and tagged with time, location, and
reason for confiscation. Confiscated items should also be marked with the same number as the
detainee who was in possession of the items. In certain theaters of operations, units may be
required to compile search data in a military search report.

18. Exiting the Cleared Building(s)


The last action is to evacuate the target area on command. The commander of the cordon
and search force will make the determination as to when the search/assault element is ready to
evacuate from the target. If personnel or equipment recovery was the purpose of the clearing
operation, the personnel or equipment should be immediately evacuated from the target area
and extracted with the search/assault element. Friendly personnel/adjacent units outside the
target must be notified prior to the assault team’s exiting the target to avoid fratricide. Once the
search/assault leaves the target area, they should be prepared for follow-on missions.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 III-29


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Chapter IV
AVIATION CONSIDERATIONS
1. Overview

The following TTP and lessons learned are important factors for commanders to consider
when planning and executing aviation operations in support of cordon and search operations.
Some of the TTPs in this chapter have been taken from the Center for Army Lessons Learned
(CALL) database on recent operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and from lessons
learned from our allies. Aviation support in the cordon and search operation provides the
ground commander increased SA, reconnaissance, security, flexibility, fires, and C2. In order to
successfully employ airpower, there must be close integration with the aviation assets from the
beginning planning stages, through execution, and after-action reporting. Many of the planning
and execution factors can be found in Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for
Aviation Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP(I)3-2.29].

2. Air-Ground Coordination
a. General Considerations.
(1) Effective integration of air and ground assets begins with detailed mission planning.
(2) The aviation LNO or air officer also plays a critical role in keeping the aviation assets
abreast of current operations. It is also critical that the aviation LNO is an integral part of the
COA development process in order to ensure integration of aviation assets.
(3) Due to the nature of most cordon and search operations, the urban environment
presents unique requirements, threats, and limitations for air-to-ground operations.
(4) Airspace C2 ensures deconfliction of the battlespace.
b. Planning Considerations.
(1) Minimal planning time.
(2) Threats/enemy forces.
(3) Weather.
(4) Ground Commander Scheme of Maneuver and Intent. It is imperative that all
aircrews have a clear understanding of the task and purpose of the mission. Commanders
should also decide when and where to first integrate aviation assets (security versus surprise).
(5) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Requirements. Traditional ISR
platforms (satellite, JSTARS, dedicated UAS, etc.) generally require long lead times for tasking
and analysis. However, many theater airborne platforms can be dynamically tasked/re-roled to
support time-critical/dominant operations. Nontraditional ISR platforms (AC-130, fighters with
targeting pods, rotary wing, FLIR, etc.) can respond faster and provide real-time reconnaissance
of the target.
(6) Asset Availability. Due to limited resources and high demand, aviation assets may
not be available. Planners must know what is available and integrate assets accordingly.
(7) Command, Control, and Communications (C3). A simple communications plan is
essential for effective C2.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-1


(8) Airspace Control. The aviation LNO or equivalent should have a firm grasp of
airspace management requirements, to include the fire support plan and any special use
airspace (ROZ, NFA, etc.)
(9) Maps and Charts. Aviation assets should have the same graphics and overlays that
are being used in the cordon and search operation.
(10) UAS Integration. All UAS, regardless of type and service, must be deconflicted
from each other and rotary/fixed-wing aircraft during planning. The ground commander, JTAC,
and aviation assets must be familiar with this deconfliction plan.

3. CAS Execution with Non-JTAC Personnel


a. Units that have a reasonable expectation to conduct terminal attack control need to have
certified JTACs available. In rare circumstances, the ground commander might require CAS
when no JTAC is available. Non-JTAC controllers must clearly state to attacking aircraft that
they are "non-qualified JTACs." In these instances, qualified JTACs, FAC(A)s, and/or CAS
aircrew should assist these personnel/units to greatest extent possible in order to bring fires to
bear.
b. Due to complexity of CAS, the commander must consider the increased risk of fratricide
when using personnel who are not qualified JTACs and accepts full responsibility for the results
of the attacks. The requester must notify/alert his command element when a JTAC or FAC(A) is
unavailable to conduct Type 1, 2, or 3 controls. If the maneuver commander accepts the risk,
he forwards the request to the CAS controlling agency. This information will alert the CAS
controlling agency (ASOC/DASC or JAOC) that aircrew will be working with non-JTAC-qualified
personnel.
c. Ground personnel will:
(1) Identify themselves as "non-JTAC qualified" on aircraft check-in.
(2) Make every effort to involve a qualified JTAC/FAC(A) in the situation.
(3) Provide as much of the 9-line briefing as possible.
(4) As a minimum, pass target elevation, target location, and restrictions.
d. Aircrew in this situation will:
(1) Make every effort to involve a qualified JTAC/FAC(A) in the situation.
(2) Be prepared to "pull" information to complete the CAS briefing
(3) Exercise vigilance with target identification, weapons effect, and friendly location.

4. Rotary Wing Aviation Integration in the Cordon and Search


a. Rotary Wing Aviation. Attack and reconnaissance aircraft can play a major role in the
cordon and search operation. Fully understanding aircraft capabilities and limitations is
paramount to successful mission accomplishment. Attack/reconnaissance aircraft include: AH-
64A/D, OH-58D, AH-1, and SOF aviation assets.

IV-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table IV-1. Rotary Wing Aircraft Capabilities
Laser Marking Other
Aircraft Service Ordnance Capability Systems
LST LTD
UH-1N USMC 7.62 MG NO NO Rockets NVG
.50 cal MG WP FLIR
2.75" Rockets GPS
AH-1W1 USMC BGM-71 TOW NO YES Rockets FLIR
Hellfire Laser NVG
5" Rockets WP GPS
2.75" Rockets CCDTV
20mm Cannon DVO
LUU-2 Flares
AH-64A USA Hellfire YES YES2 Laser, Rockets FLIR, NVG,
2.75" Rockets GPS, DTV/
30mm Cannon DVO
AH-64D USA Hellfire YES YES2 Laser, FLIR, NVG,
including (Laser or RF) Rockets, WP DTV/DVO,
Longbow
2.75" Rockets MMW,
30mm Cannon Radar, IDM,
INS/GPS
OH-58D USA Hellfire NO YES Laser, Rockets FLIR TVS
(Kiowa 2.75" Rockets NVG IDM
Warrior)
.50 cal MG
MH-60/ USN Hellfire YES YES Laser NVG
HH-60 .50 cal MG GPS
GAU-17 FLIR
GAU-16
1
The AH-1W can designate codes 1111-1788, but has max effectiveness from 1111-1148. The
AH-1F is no longer in service in the US Army, but is widely used in other nations.
2
The AH-64 is compatible with the NATO tri-service laser coding system from 1111-1688.
Additionally, the AH-64 laser tracker is compatible on codes 1711-1788. All Apache laser
operations should be limited to codes 1111-1688 and ideally limited to 1488 in order to optimize
standoff.

b. Utility Rotary Wing Aviation Assets in the Cordon and Search. Utility aircraft can provide
reconnaissance, air assault/movement of fighting forces and supplies, airborne C2 as well as
limited enemy suppression.
c. General Rotary Wing Capabilities in the Cordon and Search.
(1) Command and Control. Rotary wing assets provide excellent C2 platforms due to
their ability to fly at slower speeds and see the battlespace as a whole. Utility aircraft are best
utilized for this purpose, however, attack and reconnaissance aircraft can provide limited C2 ISR
functions by providing situational awareness.
(2) Security and Reconnaissance.
(3) Aircraft can provide security and reconnaissance over specified areas, zones, routes,
and rooftops.
(4) Close Combat Attacks (CCA)(USA) Rotary Wing CAS (USMC). Rotary wing aircraft
can be used to conduct attacks with a wide variety of weapons systems and ordnance. Due to

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-3


their close proximity and situational understanding of the ground commander’s operation, rotary
wing assets can deliver ordnance in minimal amounts of time and with great accuracy.
(5) Speed and Flexibility. The speed of rotary wing aircraft is fast enough to be
responsive to mission changes and slow enough to be controlled during the close fight. Aircraft
can engage during running or hovering fire. However, aircraft security is paramount during
hovering engagements and is not the preferred method.
(6) Sensors. Rotary wing aircraft employ a wide variety of sensors that may be
employed during the cordon and search operation. These sensors provide for increased SA by
allowing the aircrew and commander to mark and track targets, to see friendly and enemy
forces during night and certain limited visibility situations, and to engage targets utilizing
maximum standoff ranges and cover and concealment. Many sensors provide for the ability to
record engagements or the target area.
(7) Flight Profiles. Lower altitudes can provide greater SA. This includes more rapid
identification, friend or foe (IFF); target acquisition; positive identification (PID); etc. compared to
fixed wing, which must use limited field-of-regard of targeting systems to accomplish the same
task. Acoustical signature of helicopters can serve as deterrent to enemy action. The lower
flight profile also allows for more accurate employment of non-precision ballistic munitions, such
as rockets/cannon.
d. General Rotary Wing Limitations in the Cordon and Search Operation.
(1) Small Arms Fire. Aircraft operating in close proximity to ground combat are
vulnerable to enemy and friendly small arms fire. Small arms fire may force the aircraft to
operate at higher altitudes or higher speeds thus effecting their ability to conduct
reconnaissance and attack operations. The static nature of the cordon and search operation
causes aircraft to operate in relatively small areas where predictability of flight paths increases
risk from small arms and surface-to-air fires.
(2) Fire Control Methods. Due to the close proximity to ground forces, adjusting indirect
fires and fire control planning is paramount to safely integrating rotary wing into the cordon and
search operation. Commands and signals must be known, trained, and rehearsed by all
operators conducting the cordon and search operation.
(3) Weather. Periods of limited visibility, low ceilings, and battlefield effects can cause
rotary wing aircraft to be ineffective or unusable. Due to the unpredictability of weather and
battlefield effects, contingencies must be planned for weather conditions. Weather can also
reduce sensor and laser effectiveness.
(4) Urban Limitations. Towers and wires are obstacles to rotary wing aircraft and may
force aircraft to operate at higher altitudes, increasing their risk from surface to air missiles and
reducing sensor effectiveness. The high volume of lights can reduce night vision device
effectiveness.
(5) Collateral Damage. Close proximity to friendly forces and urban sprawl increase the
possibility of collateral damage from weapons effects.
(6) Limited Assets and Station Time. Due to the increased demand of rotary wing
assets, careful planning must take place for their utilization. Rotary wing aviation must be
integrated into the decisive point or time of the cordon and search operation and off station
refuel times must be planned for and taken into consideration.
e. Rotary Wing Aviation Use by Phase in the Cordon and Search Operation. The initial
aircraft check-in with ground elements sets the tone for success on any mission. Aviators must
transmit the minimal essential information to the ground executors: call signs, total number of

IV-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


aircraft, current location and station time remaining. Ground forces should immediately return a
current situation report (SITREP) along with any critical updates or changes to the initial plan.
These requirements may increase based on the level of air-ground integration during the
planning process (operation may be hasty).
(1) Phase 1, Reconnaissance. During the reconnaissance phase, aircraft can be used to
provide security and reconnaissance. Utility aircraft may be used to insert scouts and snipers.
Digital pictures, sensor/video reconnaissance, and general information on the cordon and
search site can be gained. Care must be used if surprise is to be maintained; rotary wing
aircraft should operate in the area as usual to not alert the public to the forthcoming operation.
(2) Phase 2, Movement to the Objective. Rotary wing aircraft may be used in the same
manner as the reconnaissance phase. Zone, area, and route reconnaissance may be
conducted, as well as convoy security to include security of building rooftops.
(3) Phase 3, Isolation/Establishment of the Inner and Outer Cordons. During this phase,
rotary wing may be used to establish the outer cordon and conduct reconnaissance of the high-
speed avenues of approach into and out of the cordon. If surprise is needed, then this may be
the first time that aviation is integrated into the operation. The primary task for aviation in this
phase may be to search for leakers and provide security for the ground forces.
(4) Phase 4, Search. During this phase, aircraft operate in the same manner as phase 3.
CCA/rotary wing CAS and air-ground integration are key elements during this phase. The
commander may decide to move rotary wing to the outer cordon to reduce the noise and stress
associated with rotary wing aircraft operating in close proximity to civilians. Rotary wing aircraft
may also be used to secure the forces manning the outer cordon.
(5) Phase 5, Withdrawal. During this phase, aircraft may be used to conduct route, area,
and zone reconnaissance, monitoring the search and cordon area, convoy security, and
transportation of EPWs/detainees and captured equipment.
f. Marking Targets and Friendly Positions in the Cordon and Search Operation. Aircrews
require positive identification of the target and friendly positions prior to releasing ordnance.
The methods to mark friendly and enemy positions are limited only by the creativity of the
ground forces and aircrews. It is important that ground forces and aircrews have a common
understanding of the markings being used. Methods and techniques employed must be
adapted to the conditions prevalent at the time. Some proven techniques for signaling or
marking friendly positions include:
(1) Spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows.
(2) Traditional but simple signaling devices, such as flares, strobes, and signaling
mirrors.
(3) Use of glint tape, combat identification panels (CIPs), and infrared beacons.
(4) Smoke grenades, laser designators IR pointers, tracers, or smoke from indirect fires.
(5) Aircraft expect detailed and continuous directions, including reference points to the
target, range, and bearing.
(6) Aircrews and terminal guidance controllers must become familiar with the roof outline
of buildings. Flat roofs, pitched roofs, domed roofs, and roofs with towers or air conditioning
units will aid in acquisition.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-5


5. Fixed-wing Aviation Considerations
a. Fixed-wing Aviation. Fixed-wing aircraft may require more planning and coordination to
support cordon and search operations. Unit commanders should request the fixed-wing assets
through normal request channels as early as possible. Once the request is allocated and
published on the air tasking order, the asset will be available to support the ground unit. Fixed-
wing assets give the ground commander increased SA of the battlespace and the ability to
provide fires if the situation dictates. While their reaction time is quicker, fixed-wing assets bring
with them, in general, more limitations. While, they do have the ability to work a larger area of
the battlespace, the cost of higher altitude, lower fidelity observation is incurred. This can be
mitigated by their ISR capabilities on board the aircraft.

Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities


Laser Marking Beacon Other
Aircraft Ordnance LST LTD Capability Option Systems
AV-8B Harrier II LGB YES NO Rockets None CCD TV
MAVERICK 25mm HEI NVG
GP Bombs IR Marker GPS
CBU LUU-2 Flares ((N) FLIR
Aerial Mines
LITENING Pod1 YES1 YES1 Laser1 (T) FLIR1
IR Pointer1 CCD1
Harrier II Plus 2 SIDEARM NO2 NO2 SAR Radar2,3
A-10 / OA-10A LGB YES YES1 WP Rockets None NVG
AGM-65 30mm HEI GPS
GP Bombs IR Pointer FLIR1
CBUs LUU-1/-2/- CCD1
Aerial Mines 5/- 6/-19
2.75" Rockets Laser1
30mm Cannon M-257/-278
Illum Rockets
AC-130H 105mm Howitzer NO YES 105mm PPN-19 FLIR
(176 Rounds) (1688 only) 40mm SST-181 LLLTV
40mm Cannon IZLID Radar4
(512 Rounds)
ATI GPS, PLS
AC-130U 105mm Howitzer NO YES 105mm PPN-19 FLIR
(100 Rounds) 40mm SST-181 ALLTV
40mm Cannon 25mm SAR Radar3
(256 Rounds)
LIA GPS
25mm Cannon
(3000 Rounds)
B-1B JDAM NO NO None PPN-19 SAR Radar3
GP Bombs SMP-1000 GPS
CBUs + WCMD NVG
B-2 JDAM, JSOW NO NO None X Band SAR Radar3
GP Bombs KU Band GPS
CBUs
Aerial Mines
B-52H JDAM NO YES None PPN-19 (T)FLIR
GP Bombs PPN-20 LLLTV
CBUs + WCMD SMP- Radar
LGBs 1000 NVG
Aerial Mines GPS

IV-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities
Laser Marking Beacon Other
Aircraft Ordnance LST LTD Capability Option Systems
F-14 LANTIRN JDAM, LGB NO YES Laser None NVG
GP Bombs Rockets (T)FLIR
CBUs LUU-2 Flares GPS
20mm Cannon LINK165
F-15E LANTIRN JDAM, LGB NO YES Laser None SAR Radar3
Maverick GPS
GP Bombs NVG
CBUs + WCMD FLIR
JSOW LINK16
AGM-130
GBU-15 & 24
GBU / EGBU-28
20mm Cannon
F-16 GP None GPS, NVG,
LGB IDM/IDT7,8
CBU SADL6
Aerial Mines LINK-169
LANTIRN8,9 WCMD NO YES Laser
IR only JDAM Rockets
LITENING6 HARM7, YES YES Laser
IR & CCD 2.75” Rockets Rockets
HTS7 20mm Cannon No No None
F/A-18 JDAM / JSOW10 YES YES Laser None (T)FLIR
A/C/D/E/F Maverick WP Rockets GPS
SLAM (+ER) HE Rockets NVG
LGB, HARM LUU-2 Flares SAR Radar3
GP Bombs
CBU, Aerial Mines
2.75" Rocket
20mm Cannon
F-117 LGB, JDAM NO YES None None FLIR
GPS
NVG
S-3B GP Bombs NO NO LUU-2 Flares None FLIR
CBUs Radar
Maverick GPS
Aerial Mines
P-3 Various NO NO None SAR Radar3
MQ-1B NO YES Laser/IR None GPS
Predator Hellfire11 Illuminator FLIR, EO12
Pioneer FLIR
EO

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-7


Table IV-2. Fixed-wing Aircraft Weapons and Capabilities
Laser Marking Beacon Other
Aircraft Ordnance LST LTD Capability Option Systems
1 If equipped with LITENING pod.
2 AV-8B Harrier “II Plus” (with Radar).
3 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) with ground mapping modes.
4Beacon Tracking Radar.
5 F-14D only.
6 Block 25/30/32.
7 Block 50/52.
8 Block 40/42.
9 Some Block 50/52.
10 F/A-18 Lot 10 and above.
11 Predator equipped with Hellfire has no SAR radar capability.
12 Real-time C-band video broadcast.

b. Specific Fixed-wing Mission Planning Considerations.


(1) Visual identification and tracking of friendlies: Glint tape, VSD panels, TIPs, spray
paint, smoke, mirrors, strobes, etc.
(2) Detailed ground scheme of maneuver: Composition and location of friendly forces,
general direction of travel, ingress/egress routes.
(3) Announced versus surprise search: For a surprise search, ensure the aircraft orbit
high and/or far away enough to ensure the element of surprise is not lost.
(4) Common maps: Ensure the aircrew have common maps and know the common grid
reference system, code names, phase lines, major landmarks, etc.
(5) Ground commander expectations of fixed-wing assets: Station time, weapons
effects, when assets are needed for maximum effectiveness, sensor capabilities.
(6) JTAC/forward air controller (airborne)(FAC(A)) control responsibilities: CAS missions
will be controlled IAW JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air
Support (CAS).
(7) Rotary wing aircraft and artillery integration: Cordon and search missions may
provide an ideal opportunity for JAAT operations. Reference JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire
Support, for specific JAAT guidance.
(8) Downed aircraft contingency and downed aircraft recovery team (DART) procedures.
c. AC-130 Gunship Operations. The AC-130’s primary mission is CAS, armed
reconnaissance, and interdiction. The AC-130 is uniquely capable to support cordon and
search missions due to its accuracy, low yield munitions, and extended loiter time. Ground
force situational awareness is enhanced by the gunship’s ability to keep “eyes on” the target
area throughout the orbit with its electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensor systems.
Additionally, the AC-130 has the ability to have an LNO/noncommissioned officer (NCO) on
board to advise the aircrew as to SOPs and TTPs likely to be employed by the cordon and
search force in a crisis. AC-130 crews train intensively to support ground forces in close
proximity to the enemy. The AC-130 systems are designed to enable “friendly-centric” fire
support—continuous monitoring of friendly ground forces while simultaneously sweeping the
inner and outer perimeters for threats to the operation and identification of hiding/fleeing
personnel. For maximum effectiveness, the gunship crew must understand the ground

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movement scheme in order to be proactive in their coverage; arriving overhead an operation
underway without adequate information severely degrades AC-130 situational awareness, as
excessive time is spent “sorting” friendly from unknown/civilians in the vicinity of the target via
radio communication with the JTAC.
(1) Due to its unique employment profile, AC-130s generally operate under the protection
of darkness in higher threat environments. It is critical for commanders and planners to
consider the threat determined in the planning process before tasking the AC-130.
(2) For all practical purposes, the AC-130H and AC-130U have similar enough
capabilities that ground forces need not be concerned with the minor differences. The only
exception is how each variant is affected by instrument meteorological conditions (IMC)
conditions over target. Radar beacons allow both gunship variants to positively ID friendly force
locations “through the weather,” but the AC-130U employs a strike radar system and is capable
of both CAS and interdiction in IMC. Extensive mission planning is critical during IMC
operations, with special consideration given to the potential for collateral damage. Target
reference points (TRPs), grid references, universal transverse mercator, coordinates are
required to identify friendly positions and initiate calls for fire. Reconnaissance in IMC is
extremely degraded due to the ability to only detect (not identification (ID) or classify) radar
significant targets: buildings, lines of communication (LOCs), vehicles, etc., but not enemy
personnel.
(3) Another advantage to employing the AC-130 is the psychological impact it has on the
battlefield. Example: During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) a significant drop in enemy activity
was identified when the AC-130 was simply heard overhead.
d. Fighter/Attack Operations. The following are the most likely fixed-wing missions/roles
that will be accomplished in cordon and search operations:
(1) Armed Reconnaissance. In the armed reconnaissance mission, the tasked aircraft
may take off with no assigned target to attack. Instead, they are given a designated sector by
the controlling agency and conduct reconnaissance in advance of ground forces and during an
operation. This mission is enhanced by the addition of advanced targeting pods (ATPs). With
these ATPs, aircraft can monitor the operation for possible threats, enemy movements, or
fleeing personnel (squirter/leaker). Many aircraft are capable of transmitting full motion video
via targeting pods to a remotely operated video enhancement receiver (ROVER), providing the
ground commander valuable intelligence and SA.
(2) FAC(A). FAC(A)s provide numerous advantages because of their ability to see
across the battlespace and the restricted line of sight (LOS) a JTAC may encounter. The
FAC(A) may be in a better position than the JTAC to mark a target for attacking aircraft. The
FAC(A) also has the same vantage point of the target area as the attacking fixed-wing aircraft.
FAC(A)s can reduce the workload of the JTAC by providing target area updates, target
briefings, and deconfliction procedures to attacking aircraft. FAC(A)s are desirable for situations
in which multiple flights of attacking aircraft have the potential to be working in the same
objective area.
(3) Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne) [TAC(A)]. The TAC(A) is an airborne coordinator
that can manage CAS, FAC(A), and other supporting arms and assets. TAC(A) duties include
coordinating CAS attack briefs and timing, providing CAS aircraft handoff to terminal attack
controllers, relaying threat updates and battle damage assessment (BDA), integrating CAS with
other supporting arms, and coordinating between fixed- and rotary-wing operations.
(4) CAS. CAS aircraft provide timely, accurate ordnance delivery to destroy targets in
close proximity to friendly forces. Translation of the JTAC ground perspective to the CAS

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 IV-9


aircraft’s air perspective during friendly/target acquisition is the most difficult aspect of fixed-
wing CAS. For a detailed discussion of CAS, see JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), and Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Aviation in Urban Operations [FM 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-
01.04/AFTTP(I) 3-2.29].
(5) Show of Force. Fixed-wing aircraft might be tasked to perform a show of force.
Altitudes and airspeeds will be highly dependent on the tactical situation. Threats, weather,
terrain, deconfliction measures, and the ground situation must be taken into account before
descending over an objective area.
e. General Briefing Considerations. If possible, a JTAC or ground commander
representative should provide a telephonic brief to a fixed-wing representative prior to execution
of a cordon and search operation. General briefing considerations are:
(1) JTAC to Aircrew
(a) Mission overview
(b) Other aviation assets available
(c) Number of friendly forces
(d) Type and number of vehicles
(e) General direction of travel, ingress/egress routes
(f) Announced versus surprise search
(g) Enemy forces: expected number and location
(h) ROE review
(i) Maps, global area reference system (GARS), common geographic reference
system (CGRS), overlays and graphics: phase lines, roads, buildings, etc.
(j) Communications plan:
• Frequency, backup
• Secure, nonsecure
• Brevity code words
• Execution checklists
(k) Expected type of CAS control
(l) Preferred weapons
(m) JTAC capabilities
• Laser designator
• NVGs
• Coordinate generation capability
• IR pointer
• Laser spot, search, and track
• Friendly identification and marking methods
(n) Report criteria
(o) Deconfliction plan (altitude, space, time, etc.)
(p) Location of helicopters, UAS, fixed-wing orbits and altitudes
(q) Attack plan
(r) Preferred method of attack for aviation weapons
(s) Tracking plan for fleeing personnel
(t) Egress point and direction
(2) Aircrew to JTAC
(a) Weapons
(b) Station time
(c) Target pod capabilities

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• IR pointer
• Laser designator
• Laser spot, search, and track
• Litening
(d) Preferred altitude and orbit
(e) Communications capabilities
• Back up frequency
• Secure and non-secure communications
• Code/brevity words to be used
(f) ROE review
(g) Preferred method of attack

6. Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operations


a. UAS provide capabilities well suited for supporting cordon and search operations. UAS
provide persistent sensors and some variants may carry precision weapon engagement
capability.
b. Small tactical UAS provide limited range observation at reduced risk. Larger UAS
(Predator, Global Hawk, Hunter, I-GNAT, etc.) are multirole platforms capable of multiple tasks
in the urban environment.
c. Strategic and operational level UAS are allocated and apportioned through normal
channels and tasked through the air tasking order (ATO). Because cordon and search
operations are usually conducted in a small battlespace, deconfliction between aircraft and UAS
is a critical requirement. Effective communication between the UAS operator and ground
commander is essential to successful execution and decisive actions on the target.
d. UAS may be tasked to perform the following roles:
(1) Command and Control. Unmanned assets may be employed as a persistent
communications relay aircraft, establishing prolonged orbits designed to optimize information
flow among multiple users in a jamming environment.

Note: The USMC does not own any organic UAS that have the ability to perform radio relay
or auto-retransmit.

(2) ISR. UAS like Global Hawk and Predator were designed as ISR assets. They
possess data collection capabilities, including EO and IR cameras, synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), and other specialized sensors. Data obtained is normally routed to distributed common
ground station locations for processing, analysis, and exploitation and can be transmitted
directly to the tactical user when required. ROVER video links may increase SA when equipped
ground forces are escorted by the UAS in a direct support role.
(3) Support for CAS Operations. Some UAS are equipped with both laser target
designator and NVG-compatible laser illuminator designator, enabling laser operations and
close coordination with other tactical assets. Long loiter and slow speeds permit methodical
sensor scans of urban canyons. The Predator’s ROVER capability to transmit sensor video
directly to ground parties, including JTACs, has proven effective during combat operations.
Predator employs the AGM-114 Hellfire in three variations: shaped charge (AGM-114K), blast-
fragmentation (AGM-114M, modified AGM-114K), and inert kinetic round. The Army Hunter
UAS has also been equipped to carry the Viper Strike (modified brilliant antitank) round, a
precision low channel designator (CD) weapon.

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7. Airborne Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Considerations
Aircraft such as the JSTARS and AWACS can be part of a cordon and search operation.
They can aid in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and can be used during the
execution phase by updating SA and providing C3. EC-130 and Rivet Joint aircraft can monitor
the objective area for enemy communications and pass this information to AWACS, attack
aviation, or even direct to the ground commanders if they have a communications link
established. Additionally, the USMC direct air support center (airborne) [DASC(A)] (limited
capability within KC-130 F/R/T model aircraft) can provide solid C2 to a cordon and search
operation as an extension of the Marine Air Command and Control System. Its time on station,
altitude capability and radio assets on board with significant line-of-sight capabilities make it an
ideal platform. DASC(A) can also maintain communication with all C2 agencies (direct air
support center [DASC], tactical air operations center [TAPC] [USMC], tactical air command
center [TACC] [USMC], air support operations center [ASOC], control and reporting center
[CRC], JSTARS, AWACS, etc.) as required.

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Chapter V
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTEGRATION

1. SOF Overview
a. More missions are now being conducted by combined SOF and conventional forces
(CF), either in supporting roles or as fully integrated forces. This chapter discusses the basic
principles for effectively integrating and employing forces as a multi-Service warfighting team to
maximize the overall capabilities of the unit at the tactical level during cordon and search
operations. Operations employing SOF and CF, which rely heavily on increased cooperation
and mutual support, make it necessary that United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM),
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the Services change their
current planning and training frameworks to better reflect present and future operational
employment scenarios. Previously, joint SOF and CF planners focused on deconfliction of
operations when needed, but combat operations in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) demonstrated that a degree of SOF/CF integration at all levels are important to mission
success.
b. The capstone manual for employment of SOF is JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations. It serves as the overarching reference for application of SOF capabilities and
provides detailed information on SOF C2, employment, and support at the operational level. As
such, Service and subordinate manuals refer to JP 3-05 when developing added guidance for
SOF employment It is also the reference for theater and joint task force (JTF) commanders and
below for SOF implementation.

2. SOF Core Tasks

SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish nine core tasks: direct
action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare,
counterterrorism, PSYOP, civil affairs operations, counterproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and information operations.

3. SOF Applications in Cordon and Search Operations


a. Overview. During cordon and search operations, SOF is distinguished from CF by
influencing the will of foreign leadership to create conditions favorable to US strategic aims or
objectives. SOF may provide rapid response within extremist forces in any theater and may
provide linkage to national level agencies and intelligence support. Because SOF units are
regionally oriented and in most cases maintain close relationships with HN forces/locals, they
can provide CF commanders with additional information/intelligence for the planning and
conduct of cordon and search operations. SOF produce Military Capabilities Studies (MCS) and
biographies on foreign SOF/CF units throughout the world. These studies and biographies are
continually updated and are used to provide an accurate assessment of the foreign forces
capability and limitations along with biographical data on their leadership. With their in-depth
knowledge and strong relationships with foreign forces, SOF may be utilized to advise the
commander on HN and coalition capabilities in order to support the conduct of a cordon and
search operation. (Although traditionally unique to SOF, CF conduct similar activities involving
HN/coalition forces.)

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b. SOF Applications.
(1) SOF Only. Targets identified as having a strategic value may require the commander
to use SOF alone for a cordon and search mission.
(2) SOF/CF. Through intelligence and conventional forces targeting processes, targets
may be determined to be of a nature that requires SOF participation in conjunction with CF. CF
will usually provide the inner and outer cordon.
(3) SOF Supported by HN. Through SOF/HN relationships and the detailed knowledge
of HN capabilities, HN forces may be effectively used in supporting roles (i.e., to provide the
inner and outer cordon).
(4) HN Supported by SOF. As the political and military situation changes and the HN
training and capabilities are deemed suitable, the HN may conduct cordon and search
operations supported by SOF (i.e., planning, CAS, or external assets/skills not available to the
HN).
(5) HN/Coalition Operations. SOF can facilitate combined HN and coalition forces
operations through assisting, advising, and training for cordon and search operations.
(6) HN Only. SOF may be utilized to assist, advise, and train HN forces to operate
independently during cordon and search operations.
(7) Reconnaissance. SOF units have a superior capability to reconnoiter and develop
intelligence for the conduct of a cordon and search operation and provide information on
insurgents and insurgent activities in a given area of responsibility. SOF personnel typically
have access to local information not readily available to CF. This information may be of
significant value to the commander conducting a cordon and search operation.
(8) Interpreters. SOF units typically have access to superior interpreters and are often
better trained in information gathering. While CF personnel can conduct tactical questioning,
SOF personnel typically are capable of gathering more specific intelligence from persons in a
target building. Often times this on-the-spot interrogation provides the cordon and search force
with real-time information on the location of other potential targets that could be immediately
exploited with a hasty cordon and search at another location.
(9) Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE). Sensitive site exploitation is a systematic search at
a location to exploit intelligence (tactical or strategic) and allows for prosecution of detainees.
Targets may involve chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear sites or certain persons whose
capture is deemed critical. Cordon and search elements may require specialized equipment
and expert personnel to conduct an in-depth search of the target building(s). During SSE, CF
units must plan to maintain their cordon. Additionally, personnel in the inner cordon force may
require specialized equipment not normally carried with them, such as chemical agent monitors
or radiacmeters.

4. Integrated Operations
a. Our national military strategy recognizes today’s uncertain world requires flexible and
interoperable forces that can respond quickly to the multitude of potential crises that may
threaten US vital national interests. To respond to these crises, the nation’s evolving force
structure must be both capable and responsive to implement and enforce the strategy that will
protect our national interests. The exact composition of a given force depends on the nature of
the crisis and the prevailing strategic politico-military environment. Such “adaptive force
packaging” seeks to maximize the capabilities of operational execution. This section focuses on

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the integrated employment of SOF and CF forces available to the joint warfighting community
for the conduct of a cordon and search operations.
b. Practicing SOF and CF integration procedures and addressing interoperability
challenges during training and exercises that may also involve foreign military, police, and
contract forces provides the best means of reducing the number of missed opportunities,
unnecessary delays, and the potential for fratricide during conflict between SOF/CF and foreign
military forces. Commanders and their staffs must recognize and capitalize on the many tools
that can achieve this integrated capability. These include but are not limited to clearly defined
command relationships, delineated battlespace, well developed maneuver control and fire
support coordinating measures, reliable COP, and the exchange of liaison and control elements.
Combined, these capabilities afford all forces their requisite tactical flexibility and furthermore
reduce the potential for fratricide. The key to success is the integration of forces during all
phases of an operation to include planning and rehearsals. The steps mentioned in the
integration of SOF and CF apply to Service forces integrating at the tactical level.

5. Planning Considerations
a. The CF maneuver commander and the SOF unit commander must clearly delineate who
will conduct which portion of the cordon and search operation, ensuring that the capabilities of
each unit are maximized. Depending upon the size and scope of the operation, Joint S-2/S-3
planning cells should be implemented to integrate SOF and conventional units for the conduct of
a cordon and search operation. The staff involved in planning an operation may vary between a
joint level staff to a JTF commander and operational detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader.
b. The CF commander must consider that since SOF normally operate in small elements;
they do not possess sufficient combat power to confront enemy forces for a sustained period.
However, properly used, SOF offer specialized, yet complementary capabilities to the CF
commander.
c. Commanders should not use SOF as a substitute for other forces. Key items for
consideration during planning include:
(1) Conduct a mission analysis to determine if the tasking is appropriate for use of SOF.
(a) The best use of SOF is against key strategic or operational targets that require
SOF-unique skills and capabilities. If the targets are tactical, the use of SOF is not appropriate.
(b) The mission should support the theater geographic combatant commander’s
campaign plan. If the mission does not support the JFC’s campaign plan, more appropriate
missions are probably available for SOF.
(c) The mission should be operationally feasible. During COA analysis, the SOF
commander must realistically evaluate his force. Planners must understand that SOF are not
structured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. They should not assign missions that are
beyond SOF capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities.
(2) Ensure SOF input on how the CF commander’s intent and operational plan can be
supported.
(3) Bring SOF fully and early into the planning and coordination process.
(4) Recognize the characteristics and capabilities/limitations of each other’s forces.
(5) Make force protection arrangements for SOF.
(6) Provide SOF with any non-SOF resources required to successfully execute the
mission.

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(7) Rehearse with full SOF and CF participation.
(8) Plan and provide support for SOF mission termination and redeployment.
(9) Consider the different mobility, survivability, and firepower capabilities of SOF and
CF.
(10) During planning, know the joint standard used for combat identification to enable
the unit to arrive with the proper identification measures installed on vehicles.
(11) Use combat camera (COMCAM) to support PSYOP; print products, and weapon
systems video to counter allegations of collateral damage. Ensure COMCAM understands the
importance of who they can and cannot photograph.
(12) Coordinate to provide any non-CF resources required for CF to successfully
execute the mission (e.g., interpreters, indigenous guides).
(13) Plan for the use of tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) (i.e., with mounted and dismounted
speaker teams, pamphlet, handbills, poster, and pro-host nation document distribution).
d. Operational Security (OPSEC).
(1) In choosing to execute particular OPSEC measures, commanders must decide that
the assumed gain in secrecy outweighs the cost in resources. The OPSEC process requires
decision-makers to directly address how much risk they are willing to assume.
(2) Balance security with integration. Insufficient security may compromise a mission.
Excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail due to inadequate coordination.
(3) Host nation/friendlies may be located within the cordon and search area. Risk to
these areas for compromise need to be considered.
e. Communications.
(1) Ensure the plan is supported from a communications perspective.
(2) Be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of potentially available strategic,
operational, tactical, and commercial communications systems and equipment, whether organic
to a Service, SOF, United States government agency, multinational force, or provided by a host
nation.
(3) Understand that SOF and CF units have the single-channel ground and airborne
radio system (SINCGARS) and what organization develops the frequency hop set used by each
unit.
(4) Know what forces and nets use what communications security (COMSEC) software
and what is the associated cryptographic change over time/period.
(5) Recognize that SOF and CF, as well as multinational forces, will have different levels
of communications system proficiency.
f. Logistics.
(1) The special forces (SF) group depends on both the group support battalion (GSB)
and the theater Army (TA) combat service support (CSS) infrastructure to sustain operations.
(2) In some cases, SF groups or battalions may depend on other Service CSS systems.
When sustained by other Services, the SF commander and logistician must modify Army
doctrine, policy, and procedures to conform to the CSS procedures in theater.

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g. LNO between SOF and CF units:
(1) Recognize there may be a need to send a secure communications capability (voice
and data) with LNOs.
(2) Use the LNO to address communications system issues that require immediate
coordination or action with the supporting unit.
(3) CF should incorporate SOF LNOs in the targeting process.
(4) At brigade and above, SOF interface can be conducted with the special forces liaison
element (SFLE), special operations command and control element (SOCCE), special forces
advanced operating base (SFAOB), or a SOF LNO.
(5) At task force and below, coordination and deconfliction are conducted between the
SOF team leaders and the appropriate commander.
h. SOF integration considerations:
(1) Capable of conducting precision clearing (small imprint, fast execution for HPT).
(2) IO capabilities of SOF.
(3) Integration and synchronization with ground owning units.
(4) ISR capabilities.
(5) National-level intelligence capabilities.
(6) Joint planning development.
(7) All parties recognize and agree to on scene commander.
(8) Units recognize local knowledge and use it.
i. Command relationships:
(1) Identify who is in charge (conventional terrain owner or JSOA activation). Command
relationships must be clearly delineated.
(2) Familiarity with each other's TTP.
(3) Need for LNOs.
(4) Joint rehearsals.
(a) Familiarity with each other's TTP.
(b) Essential for success.
(c) Multiple/full scale infiltration, actions on the objective, exfiltration contingency.
(5) Avoid planning in a vacuum, lateral communication throughout operations planning.
(6) In cordon and search area, friendly personnel may be operating in indigenous
clothing, civilian clothing, and/or foreign military/police uniforms or may be operating in
indigenous vehicles. Conventional and special operations forces must have clearly identified
near- and far-recognition signals for any elements disguised in civilian attire or vehicles that may
have infiltrated the target area ahead of the main force.
j. Capabilities of force selected to conduct cordon and search:
(1) Access to interrogation capabilities.
(2) Access to language capability.
(a) HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET).

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(b) Tactical HUMINT Team (THT).
(3) Ability to ID targets and conduct recon.
(4) Snipers (weigh the advantages/disadvantages of compromise).
(a) 24 hours prior surveillance of objective.
(b) Command must recognize sniper ability and limitations.
(c) Marking routes ingress and egress.
(d) Snipers must be capable of communicating their capabilities and limitations to
commanders (and given an opportunity to during planning).
(5) Military working dogs.
(a) Capabilities.
(b) PSYOP effects.
(c) Cultural effects.
(6) Standard signal plan.
(7) Force must conduct debriefings.
(8) Force must share intelligence to the widest possible audience and down to the lowest
acceptable level.
(9) Access to CA/PSYOP.
(a) Mitigate harmful effects of cordon and search operations.
(b) Dissemination of PSYOP products.
(c) CA assessment of the area.
(10) Ability to conduct sensitive site exploitation.

6. SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Lessons Learned


These lessons learned are from the SOF and CF Integration and Interoperability Handbook,
September 2005.
(1) During mission analysis, consider options to best integrate SOF and CF maneuver
elements for mission accomplishment. Detailed planning and execution coordination is
required.
(2) Use mission-type orders and commander’s intent to permit subordinate flexibility,
initiative, and responsiveness.
(3) Develop a clear and flexible battlespace organization.
(4) Increase awareness of delineated areas and detailed planning during integrated
operations.
(5) Activate and deactivate small areas of operation during rapid decisive operations.
Use kill boxes overlaid on or outside of these defined areas to facilitate more responsive fire
support.
(6) Begin the mission execution approval process early to allow sufficient time for proper
coordination and to prevent delays in execution.
(7) Use collaborative planning techniques early and throughout and determine the
collaborative planning tools/procedures to be used.
(8) Plan for and include liaison and control elements early in the planning process.
(Parallel planning and coordination may require trusted agents for compartmentalized plans.)

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(9) Conduct frequent coordination with other interagency players.
(10) Plan to rapidly disseminate information to ensure appropriate actions in time to
preclude missed opportunities.
(11) Know the differences in the ROE for CF and SOF.
(12) Identify acceptable risk and define clear command lines that empower subordinate
commanders with mission approval authority.
(13) Understand that acceptable levels of risk may differ for CF and SOF. Recognize
how this may affect mission accomplishment when forces are synchronized.
(14) Coordinate communications and information systems requirements and
interoperability and rehearse communications procedures to ensure all forces have a common
and secure means to communicate, as well as a backup method or plan.

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Chapter VI
LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

1. Support to Cordon and Search Operations


a. Cordon and search missions can be complicated operations requiring detailed logistic
and support planning. These considerations are listed below and broken down by the following
categories: transportation and vehicle recovery, mission essential equipment, communications,
medical, detainee operations support, and use of host nation forces. A detailed logistical
estimate should be conducted during the planning process to ensure all required classes (CL) of
supply are available for the mission.
b. Units should plan on executing this mission with a basic load of CL V and any additional
special munitions that may be required based on mission analysis. A detailed CASEVAC plan
should be incorporated and rehearsed to ensure the unit has positioned assets to best support
the mission.

2. Transportation and Vehicle Recovery


Pre-positioned maintenance and vehicle evacuation points may be established. Medical
assets could be collocated at these sites. These could both be collocated with the security
element/outer cordon.
(1) Use like vehicles in pairs for ease of recovery, such as; if you use one 5-ton, bring
another.
(a) For light wheeled vehicles, carry spare tow bars and or straps (minimum of one
per two like vehicles/practice recovery during rehearsals.
(b) Snatch ropes/sling load cables/mechanized vehicle tow cables/chains (good
for towing and pulling down doors, etc.).
(c) It is critical that personnel are trained and well rehearsed on how to recover and
tow a disabled vehicle for maintenance reasons or because of battle damage.
(2) All vehicles should carry spare supplies.
(a) Spare tires. Check serviceability of the spare. Ensure operators are trained to
change flats.
(b) Extra gas, oil, jacks (SL-3/Basic Issue Items [BII] for vehicles).
(3) Identify refuel points, rally points, and maintenance collection points.

3. Detainee Operations
a. International law, military training, ROE, and ethical principles demand that EPWs,
detainees, and civilians be accorded the utmost humane treatment:
(1) Ensure procedures of 5-S’s and T (search, silence, segregate, safety, speed, and
tag) are followed.
(2) Use blindfolds for detainees (IAW ROE). Have available sand/dust goggles, duct
tape, neck gaiters, pressure dressings. Standardize EPW kits.
(3) Gather detainee packets with vehicles or at a collection point.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 VI-1


(4) Evacuate, etc. all detainees to the same location.
(5) Keep personal effects with the detainee. Use Ziploc baggies for this purpose.
(6) Take photos of each detainee and items of intelligence value in possession of the
detainee.
(7) Use zip ties or flex cuffs to secure detainees.
(8) Dedicate vehicles for detainee transportation. This requirement should be separate
from CASEVAC and HNSF transportation requirements.
(9) Plan for blankets or clothing to safeguard detainees when operations are conducted
at night during inclement weather.
(10) Recover shoes for the detainee to wear.
(11) Remember documentation is important. Enemy forces may be released because
of improper documentation.
(12) Use explosive detection kits when available. They should be used immediately to
provide additional evidence for future legal processing.
(13) Provide needle proof gloves if possible to avoid injury to those searching and
handling detainees.

4. Medical
a. Medical providers provide prompt medical treatment consisting of those measures
necessary to locate, recover, resuscitate, stabilize, and prepare patients for evacuation to the
next level of care or to return to duty. To facilitate effective medical support, the medical
provider must coordinate communications, security, and other support requirements with
appropriate local units prior to commencing operations.
(1) Ensure one or two medical providers are located at the CCP and one medical
provider is located with the assault/search element.
(2) Ensure medical providers are equipped to support the type of casualties likely to
occur in an urban environment—blast effects, broken bones, higher number of head wounds
etc. Ensure they are prepared to triage on site.
(3) Establish a CCP and coordinate evacuation plans with local/theater casualty/medical
evacuation assets.
(4) Ensure planning considers that evacuation times in urban operations may be much
longer than normal.
(5) Employ standardized air and ground medical evacuation resources. Use the most
expeditious means possible to evacuate a casualty. Consider the use of air ambulances as the
means of medical evacuation according to METT-TC and the condition of the casualty. Urban
terrain may make this difficult and needs to be planned in advance.
(6) Ensure the required coordinated plan establishing guidance for pre-positioned
ambulance utilization/dispatch is prepared.
(7) Appoint/identify a primary and alternate medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) coordinator.
The MEDEVAC coordinator should not be the unit leader or the aid provider. Ensure both
primary and alternate MEDEVAC coordinators are trained/competent regarding current
MEDEVAC procedures.

VI-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


(8) Store wounded personnel equipment.

Note: Disposal/release of such equipment should be IAW the affected unit’s standard
operating procedures (SOP).

(9) Coordinate with the next level of care to ensure advance preparation to receive
casualties.
(10) Ensure all casualties have a medical information card per the unit SOP (one carried
on gear and one carried on their person) filled out before the operation begins.
(11) Provide armored evacuation and security platforms if possible.
(12) Develop a mass casualty plan.
(13) Ensure, when possible, casualties are not evacuated with deceased military
personnel or with detainees.
(14) Ensure medics organize and control activities within a casualty collection point.
They should be assisted by additional medics or other available personnel. Casualties must be
triaged and segregated based on triage assessment in order to expedite treatment and
evacuation. Security must be maintained at all times at this location.
(15) Use a lightweight casualty evacuation cart. It can greatly assist in moving
casualties away from contact and to a treatment location.
b. To establish a CCP, use the following techniques:
(1) CCP inside of a building/courtyard. Mark each corner with a distinctive color or other
marker.
(a) Use the closest corner to place urgent casualties.
(b) Use the next closest corner to place priority casualties.
(c) Use one of the far corners to place routine casualties.
(d) Use the remaining corner or preferably a separate room for friendly dead.
(e) Use an adjacent room for enemy wounded.
(2) CCP in an open area.
(a) Establish a triangle. Mark each apex with a distinctive color or other marker.
(b) From six o’clock to ten o’clock place urgent casualties.
(c) From ten o’clock to two o’clock place routine casualties.
(d) From two o’clock to six o’clock place priority casualties.
(e) Place friendly dead out of sight and beyond the routine casualties.
(f) Place enemy casualties with security beyond the urgent casualties.
c. Triage is critical and must be conducted early so that medical personnel can properly
treat the most urgent casualties. Ideally for casualty survival arterial bleeding needs to be
stopped within 5 minutes, within 10 minutes patient should be packaged for evacuation, within
30 minutes casualties should be further assessed by a physicians assistant or a medical doctor,
and within 1 hour the casualty should be under a surgeon's care.

5. Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Captured Enemy Ammunition (CEA)


a. CEE and CEA
(1) Consolidate CEE and CEA at the end of the operation. Units must develop a plan to
consolidate, handle, and move CEE and CEA.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 VI-3


(2) Be prepared to secure areas where CEE and CEA are found.
(3) Blow it up in place, if needed. All units should have this capability due to lack of
availability of EOD/engineers. Follow restrictions in ROE or unit directives.
(4) Possess the means to carry contraband (garbage bags, sandbags, etc.) and
backhaul it to a captured enemy equipment or ammunition site.
(5) Handle unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO)/improvised explosive
device(IED)/booby traps IAW unit SOP.
(6) Possess the means to catalog and record CEE and CEA information, including
photographic media.
b. Transportation
(1) Plan sufficient transportation to move the unit in a manner that supports the ground
tactical plan. A technique is to plan ground movement in a manner similar to an air assault
operation with five phases.
(a) Staging plan.
(b) Loading plan.
(c) Movement plan.
(d) Unloading, control, security, and consolidation of vehicles plan (during
execution).
(e) Withdrawal plan.
(2) Be aware that vehicles may not be organic to a unit, so place someone from that unit
to C2 and maintain accountability/liaison with the vehicles. Make every effort to integrate
attached units, assets, and personnel. This includes briefings and inspects of personnel and
vehicles. Ensure understanding of SOPs and contact drills and conduct detailed rehearsals.
(3) HNSF need to be part of any transportation plan. Movement may be by their own
assets or provided to them. In any case if they are part of the operation then they must be
included and accounted for in our transportation plan.
(4) A master manifest should be maintained at unit level that includes sensitive item
inventories and other important information. This list can be used to establish accountability if
vehicles or sensitive items are lost for any reason.
(5) Conduct preventive maintenance (PM)/preventive maintenance checks and services
(PMCS) on vehicles prior to departure.
(6) Cross-level or load vehicles with key leaders, skills, logistics, medical assets, and
weapons systems to preclude the loss of any critical asset with the loss of one vehicle.
(7) Make sure vehicles are marked or possess markers that can be used to identify their
locations to deconflict air and other friendly fires.
(8) To facilitate command and control, vehicles can be marked on the sides and/or back
based on their departure times or elements during movement.
(9) Nontraditional assets such as civilian trucks may be appropriated IAW established
ROE to assist in moving personnel or material to or from the objective.

6. Classes of Supply Considerations


a. Classes of supply that may be needed and should be considered for planning and
execution of cordon and search operations are as follows:

VI-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


(1) Class I—Sufficient food and water (preferably a 48–72 hours supply) must be
planned. Be prepared to push additional Class I if the operation is prolonged or forces are given
a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to remain behind.
(a) HNSF may have to be supplied/resupplied. The HNSF may brief that they have
sufficient Class 1 and then identify additional needs after the mission is executed.
(b) Additional quantities of Class I may be brought to assist in perception
management and interaction with civilian populace when searching areas that were incorrectly
identified. Additional Class 1 may also be used as part of a unit's CMO or IO efforts.

Note: Additional Class I stores may be required if detainees are anticipated. Planning
should address this possibility.

(2) Class II—Planning considerations must be given to what supplies are needed such
as engineer tape, chemlights, 550 cord, duct tape, batteries (at least enough for all equipment to
be powered for 48 hours), and other items that will be required for the mission.
(3) Class III—Fuel, oil, and other petroleum products must be brought in sufficient
quantity to support the operation. Additionally, propane or commercial vehicle fuel may be
brought in or controlled as part of action mitigation following the operation.
(4) Class IV—Barrier materials may be needed for TCPs/blocking positions or detainee
collection points. Consider including traffic cones, spike strips, concertina wire, and signs, if
available.
(5) Class V—Sufficient ammunition must be on hand and available for any anticipated
engagement. One technique is to have ammunition prepositioned forward so that ammunition
can be quickly resupplied in the event of a prolonged engagement. Include ammunition
requirements for HNSF.
(6) Class VI—Sundry packs may be obtained to distribute following the mission as part of
perception management.
(7) Class VIII—Stretchers (preferably one for every two vehicles), a lightweight casualty
evacuation cart, medical bags, and other items must be restocked and positioned where they
can support any friendly, enemy, or civilian casualties.
(8) Class IX—Spare tires, fan belts, and a small parts package may be brought for minor
repairs.

7. Urban Operations Kits


a. Company. A company should maintain four urban operations kits and four breaching
kits. Each platoon (1, 2, 3, and HQ) should maintain their urban operations kit at the platoon
level.
b. Platoon. The platoon military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) kit mirrors a standard
breach kit in many ways. It is recommended that the platoon breach kits be augmented to
create a MOUT kit. By having the MOUT-specific items stored in a separate bag, the breach kit
can be used for standard breaching and MOUT. While the platoon MOUT kit may be
consolidated at the platoon level, some items need to be maintained at the squad (1, 2, 3, wpns)
level. At a minimum, the platoon urban operations kit should include:
(1) Sand table kit geared specifically for urban operations—1.
(2) Wire handling gloves—4 pair.
(3) Grappling hooks—6.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 VI-5


(4) Lightweight, foldable assault ladder—1.
(5) Defense preparation tools: hammers, saws, nails, and bailing wire.
c. Squad. At a minimum, the squad urban operations kit should include:
(1) Protective eyewear—1 per Service member
(2) Wire cutters—1.
(3) Forced entry tool kit: hooligan tool/crowbar, sledge, axe, battering ram, and bolt/lock
cutters—1 ea.
(4) Iron grappling hook with rope (for climbing and moving debris inside buildings in
urban operations)—1.
(5) Nylon rope 120’ and snap links.
(6) Wolf Tails—2 per Service member. See appendix H.
(7) Signal devices for lifting and shifting fires and for safely moving between buildings.
(8) A mirror device for observing around corners and up stairs—1 per fire team.
(9) Marking supplies: Chalk, chemical lights (assorted colors & IR), flashlights, engineer
tape, duct tape, and spray paint.
d. Tools for search:
(1) Shovels
(2) Axes
(3) Mine detectors/ground penetrating radar
(4) Gun shot residue/swipe kits/explosive detection kits
(5) Breaching kits
(6) Bolt cutters
(7) Picket pounders
(8) Hooligan tools
(9) Sledge hammer
(10) Battering rams
(11) Propane/oxygen-acetylene torch
(12) Demo kits
(13) Grappling hooks
(14) Assault ladder
(15) Cameras

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Appendix A
HISTORICAL LESSONS LEARNED

Overview
This appendix contains an overview of lessons learned concerning cordon and search
operations during recent combat operations and includes historical examples in order to
document effective and ineffective TTP across a broad spectrum of environments:
(1) MCIP 3-35.01, TTP for Reduction of Urban Area Strongpoints (USMC OIF Lessons
Learned)
(2) Air-Ground Integration (Center for Army Lessons Learned [CALL] Handbook Cordon
and Search, chapter 11)

1. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area


Strongpoints [MCIP 3-35.01]

Battalion Level Operations


The Enemy
The enemy facing Marines in Iraq since the end of OIF I typically consisted of small groups
(4 to 12) of individuals armed with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) who
generally choose to fight from inside buildings rather than out in the streets.

Although these groups tended to congregate in houses close to one another, they have
fought as individual groups rather than establishing a mutually supporting series of positions.
Although Marines have taken some casualties from rooftop shootings, most of them were
incurred inside buildings where the enemy waited for Marines to come to him. This is contrary
to current doctrine that identifies the streets as “fatal funnels of fire” and warns Marines to enter
buildings rapidly and not stack in the street.

These latest tactics are probably a result of the Marines’ ability to dominate by fire the
streets and rooftops. The Marine Corps center for lessons learned (MCCLL) indicates most
engagements were initiated by the enemy opening fire on Marines as the latter were entering a
house or ascending the stairwell. The insurgents often used PKMs (7.62 machine gun) and
grenades to initiate the engagements and would usually continue to fight until killed. This does
not mean, however, that Marines were fighting an enemy that was universally suicidal. In many
instances, insurgents attempted to escape by throwing down their weapons and either tried to
evade Marine units or approached them pretending to be civilians. However, by all accounts,
the enemy encountered in Fallujah was far more willing to stand and fight to the death than
experiences elsewhere in Anbar province suggested. Lastly, the enemy generally did not
choose to conduct offensive operations at night.

Friendly Methods of Attack


The two major attack options differ as follows:
• “Attack to seize” objectives.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-1


• “Conduct a penetration to destroy enemy in zone” and then to “search and attack in
zone” in the course of seizing designated objectives.
Attack to Seize
This implies two precepts: 1) extend the unit’s (in this case a battalion) culminating point;
and 2) ensure that the battalion’s zone is truly clear of the enemy. During execution, the
battalion advances deliberately with all companies on line from phase line to phase line, clearing
every building in its path. In this case (Fallujah), clearing meant extensive use of preparatory
fires followed by prepared charges or rockets to conduct dynamic breaches. At 1600 each
afternoon, the battalion would come to a halt and the companies would put out observation
posts (OPs) and “go firm” while the commanders met to conduct a chalk talk of the events of the
next day which would include emphasis on the geometry of fires. At night the companies would
establish OPs on their firm bases but would not run dismounted patrols in the streets. The
rationale for this was that even with night vision equipment, a moving force is at a disadvantage
at night in an urban environment. Since the enemy did not appear to be able or willing to launch
night attacks, this afforded the companies the opportunity to post minimal security while allowing
their personnel to rest. At 0700 the next day the companies would begin clearing again, starting
together on the same phase line. The battalion pushed hot food up to the forward units every
night. This was another factor in their effort to “extend their culminating point.”
A task force composed of engineers and security elements from the battalion’s
headquarters and service company followed in trace of the companies. This task force’s
mission was to open routes, destroy caches and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and
provide rear security for the forward companies. The task force used D-9 and D-7 bulldozers
and armored combat excavators to clear rubble and, in some cases, as offensive weapons
against pockets of resistance. This proved to be a very effective technique and one whose
necessity arose from the enemy’s preference to engage dismounted infantry rather than the
tanks that preceded them.
There are many variables in quantifying the success of a particular tactic but it is accurate
to say that this course of action resulted in a lower number of casualties and significantly
reduced problems with enemy infiltration back into previously cleared areas. An interesting
aspect of this tactic was the fact that this approach to the task of securing an area was
methodical, a term Marines normally tend to shy away from as being too closely affiliated to
attrition warfare.

Conduct a Penetration

Some battalions either chose or were compelled by the wording of their original tasking to
push as rapidly as possible to a designated objective. In doing so they accepted risk on their
flanks and to the rear of their forward units, a vulnerability that was frequently TTP for reduction
of urban area strongpoints exploited by the enemy. The lesson is not a new one in urban
warfare: Unless physically occupied by friendly forces, no area of a city is really secure. As an
example, one unit pushed through to seize its objectives ahead of schedule. However, it then
became necessary for the adjacent unit to move into the same area in order to clear it of
insurgents, incurring casualties in the process. This pattern was repeated several times and
nine weeks after the initial attack, units were losing Marines in areas that had been cleared and
then vacated. This problem would have been prevented if units conducting a penetration had
designated the bulk of their force to conduct detailed clearing behind the lead elements. All
battalions reported that they incurred more casualties during back clearing than during the
assault phase.

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Lastly, although units pushed to seize designated objectives it became apparent that the
enemy was not interested in the same terrain. Although it became necessary to seize certain
high buildings and mosques in order to deny the enemy use of these structures as shooting
platforms, for the most part Marines were the enemy’s key terrain. The fact that Marines had
seized numbered objectives did not dislodge the enemy.

The dangers attendant in focusing on conducting an urban penetration without a plan for
detailed back clearing must be balanced against mission requirements and deferring the
clearing battles until a major objective is seized.

Small Unit Tactics

Tank Infantry Integration

During the assault on Fallujah during November 2004, all but one of the infantry battalions
had tanks attached. These tank units were attached a few weeks prior to the operation and the
TTP continued to be refined throughout the operation. A tank section would typically be placed
in direct support of a company and would lead the way down streets with infantry clearing
adjacent buildings. The infantry companies dedicated dismounted squads to provide security to
each tank section since the tanks were "buttoned up” and had no other means to cover their
dead space.

Tankers preferred to keep their sections together. Tanks would fire into confirmed or
suspected enemy positions, typically using the 120mm high explosive antitank (HEAT) round
which limited collateral damage, while the tanks provided overwatch. The infantry would use
the “grunt phone” attached to the hull of the tank to communicate with the tank commander and
M203 smoke and smoke grenades to designate targets. Commanders and small unit leaders
paid great attention to geometry of fires since six battalions were operating in a relatively small
area. When using grids to designate targets, only 10 digit grids were used. One battalion used
a grid system of numbers and letters that worked well as a reference but was not exact enough
for targeting since a designator such as AB5 would refer to a block of 20 to 25 buildings. In
most cases, this was the first time that these infantry companies had worked with tanks and
most of these TTP were developed in the assembly area and refined during the actual
operation.

After action reports (AARs) from this operation noted that it would be prudent for all units
deploying to Iraq to train in CONUS with tanks and engineers in order to practice TTP such as
those developed in combat. This training should focus on breaching techniques, movement and
overwatch, tank/infantry communications, and relative positioning.

In order to provide background information on the nature of house clearing operations, the
following methods and recommendations on house clearing techniques were drawn primarily
from an AAR produced by K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which was heavily involved in
Operation Al-Fajr.

Top Down Assault

An infantry squad can assault structures using two different methods, each with
advantages and disadvantages. Doctrinally, the top down assault is taught as being the most
ideal method for clearing a structure. Surprising the enemy by moving from the top down may

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-3


throw the enemy off balance. The enemy’s defenses may not be prepared for a top down
assault and the squad could rapidly overwhelm the enemy. The squad has more momentum
when moving down ladder wells. If the squad knows that the enemy is inside, the roof can be
breached in order to drop grenades and explosives on top of the enemy. The enemy’s egress
routes are greatly reduced but the house may not be entirely isolated. Indigenous residences
were sometimes adjoining, like a townhouse, and asymmetrical in construction with rooftops of
varying heights and molding. Alleys and walkways were often inaccessible from the main axis
of approach, and certainly outside of the reach of tanks, tracks, or up-armored high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) gun-trucks. The assaulting platoon (if attacking with
mechanized attachments) was required to simultaneously provide security for up to nine
vehicles (tanks and tracks inclusive) and assault into innumerable, connected houses, most
over three stories tall. Often the enemy’s position was not known until entry was gained, so
each house required time intensive positioning of forces in order to best and most safely bring
supporting heavy fires to bear should the need arise. The pace of the assault demanded that
houses be assaulted without optimal geometries of fire from the supporting elements
established prior to entry. Many times this “shortcut” proved successful, but on occasion,
friendly casualties would precede the platoon’s ability to bring maximum destructive fires to
bear. Tanks, tracks, and vehicle security caused significant manpower problems for the rifle
platoon. All assets require Marine security, but a house cannot be cleared with machine gun
and tank fires alone. Completely isolating a house in Fallujah is near impossible and, due to
geometries, often prevents the use of heavy machine gun, tank, and rocket fires.

Realistically, however, assaulting from the top down may not be the best option for the
infantry squad in every situation. When clearing from the top, once the squad makes entry and
contact is made, pulling out of the structure is extremely difficult. This limits the options for the
squad leader on how to engage the enemy. The structure must be flooded and Marines have to
go overtop of casualties in order to kill the enemy. Additionally, top down is unrealistic unless
an adjacent house is first cleared from bottom up, resulting in a force that can be stretched too
thin by simply providing security for itself.

If the squad decides to break contact they are moving opposite of their momentum and
more casualties will result. Momentum must not be lost. Marine squads may not have enough
Marines to effectively flood the structure. If casualties are taken they are nearly impossible to
pull up the ladder well with all their gear. This is another reason why the structure must be
flooded. The casualties will not receive immediate first aid because the entire squad must be
committed to neutralization of the threat. The swiftness of medical attention may mean the
difference between life and death.

Bottom Up Clearing

On the other hand “bottom up” clearing offers advantages. The squad leader has more
options when contact is made. The structure does not have to be flooded. Momentum can be
maintained in assaulting or breaking contact and the squad leader can switch rapidly from one
to the other relatively quickly. The structure can be cleared with fewer Marines because the
clearing is more controlled and smooth whereas top down is always in high gear. Casualties
can be pulled out faster and easier simply because gravity is working for the squad. But the
squad is moving into the enemy’s defenses. It is easy for the enemy to hold the second deck
and ladder well. The squad is slow moving up the ladder well, which makes it harder to
maintain momentum. The enemy has the ability to escape by using its preplanned routes.

A-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Overall, there should not be a standard assault method. The squad leader should
understand the advantages and disadvantages of each, assess each structure quickly, make a
decision on which method to employ, and then take actions that maximize its advantages while
minimizing its disadvantages. All unit leaders must understand geometries of fires, surface
danger zones of all infantry and tank weapons, and have a thorough understanding of realistic
weapons capabilities and limitations—to include enemy weapons/weapons systems.

Footholds
Footholds are extremely important. By establishing footholds the squad establishes strong
points during the assault that can be used for consolidation, coordination, base of fire positions,
rally points, and casualty collection points. The squad must move from one foothold to another
without stopping until each foothold is attained. The succession of footholds that the squad
establishes will be different when assaulting from either the top down or the bottom up.

Top Down Assault

• All rooftops.
• Inside top deck.
• Each individual lower level to the bottom deck.
• Courtyard (including external outhouses, workshops, and tool sheds).

Bottom Up Assault

• Front courtyard.
• First two seating rooms.
• Central hallway.
• Each successive upper deck with its respective rooftop.
• Uppermost rooftop.

At each individual foothold, the squad can consolidate and coordinate its further clearing of
the structure. If contact is made, the footholds can be used to establish a base of fire in order to
assault or break contact. When breaking contact, they are used as rally points in order for the
squad and fire team leaders to get accountability of all their Marines. The squad will bound
back through each foothold. A foothold can also be used as a casualty collection point.

Breaching Tools and Techniques

During the assault on Fallujah, the use of sledgehammers in the assault breacher’s kit and
shot gun slugs played an important role in giving the assault elements the tools necessary to
decrease collateral damage. Sledgehammers were also useful in the construction of firing ports
inside houses when going firm or for sniper emplacement. Predeployment training, however,
must include instruction on shotgun employment. A leader must not have to stop advancing
during clearing of a house in order to give instruction on the proper procedures for safe and
effective shotgun gunnery. Stun or flash-bang grenades were also particularly useful for
extracting friendly casualties from inside enemy-dominated kill-zones. Flash-bangs would
suppress the enemy without injuring friendly forces, but were in short supply.

These options allowed the units to make dynamic entry without reverting to an explosive
breach. The units that had stun grenades were able to use these in situations to diminish
casualties to friendly personnel and noncombatants.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-5


During the operation, it became readily apparent that the techniques used for breaching the
outer perimeter gates of houses and opening the storage unit’s metal roll doors kept the
Marines exposed to possible enemy fire for an unacceptable time and were also very time and
energy consuming. Mechanical breaching has proved to be a slower method than training in
the United States would indicate since most houses have metal gates and doors with very large
padlocks. However, extreme caution must be taken when explosively breaching overhead, roll-
down metal doors. There could be very large weapons caches stored in storefronts with roll-
down doors to include prefabricated IEDs and piles of mortar rounds of all sizes. Many doors
that were breached with MK19 or tank main gun rounds resulted in secondary explosions. The
unit commander must determine whether the risk of secondary explosions from explosive
breaching outweighs the time/labor involved in mechanical breaching.

The hooligan tools in the breaching kits have tips that are typically too wide for the door
jambs in Iraq. In a high threat situation, explosive breaches become the best course of action.
However, few Marines are trained in how to set a breaching charge, even one as simple as the
use of detonation cord around a doorknob. An assault breacher’s course, of the type formerly
conducted by the special operations training groups, should be mandatory training for all military
occupational specialty 0351s although it would not be practical to add this training to the
curriculum at March Air Reserve Base. As a side note, the outside gates are almost always
constructed of metal and have no outside latch or doorknob. The best means of breaching
these is to ram them with a HMMWV. The amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), when available,
breaks down perimeter walls with ease.

Shotguns have proven to be an invaluable breaching tool for internal doors. However, the
need to be flexible must be emphasized because tactics will be different for every building,
whether it is a mosque, storefront, factory, or house.

Grenades

Grenades by themselves are not always effective in ensuring that the occupants of a
building are disabled prior to entry. In urban fighting in Iraq, it sometimes became necessary to
use grenades as a back up after using some other casualty producing munitions, such as
rockets fired into the building. Additionally, a unit AAR cited the use of M67 fragmentation
grenades during a fire fight in urban terrain to defeat the enemy. A depleted enemy squad was
protected by a series of unfinished concrete cubicles that stopped 5.56 millimeter and 7.62
millimeter rounds. To destroy this enemy, one squad had to close to within 10 meters and
employ hand grenades. The first two grenades thrown were not held for 2 or 3 seconds and
had no effects because the enemy had sufficient time to take cover. The following three
grenades were properly employed with devastating effects. Of a total seven enemy dead, only
two were confirmed as shot by 5.56-millimeter rounds. The platoon commander noted that,
while the Marines were almost completely unafraid of enemy fire, they were timid when it came
to using grenades.

Experience showed that significant improvements could be made in the ways in which
Marines are trained to use fragmentation grenades. The “prepare to throw” position is a
peacetime safety measure that results in negative learning. The position was never used in any
combat engagement. Additionally Marines are trained to hold the grenade in such a manner
that prevents the release of the spoon prior to throwing. This is another safety measure
designed to ensure that the full 5 seconds are available in training to take cover from a
mishandled grenade. One of the major lessons learned during combat was to release the
A-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006
spoon and wait 2 to 3 seconds before throwing to deny the enemy sufficient time to take cover.
The risks involved in the use of this TTP must be considered prior to its use.

Demolitions

Clearing a large, multistory building requires demolitions or other nonmechanical means to


open the hundreds of rooms. Additionally, the sheer magnitude of such a task requires well
thought out SOPs that maximize economy of force while maximizing combat power and
flexibility at the point of attack. Breaking down dozens of doors per floor with hooligan tools,
mule kicks, or other expedient means will rapidly exhaust a maneuver force. Engineers used
charges made solely of detonation cord, time fuse, and fuse igniters to safely and efficiently
breach hundreds of doors during the assault. The use of demolitions preserved strength in what
became an exhausting mission. The geometry of fires on each floor was complicated by the
compartmentalization created by the configurations of office spaces unique to each floor.
Stacking rifle squads in the hallways increased the risk of fratricide because unusually shaped
office spaces and adjoining passageways required multidirectional clearing. The possibility of
firing back towards elements positioned in a hallway and the thin construction material of the
walls required a positioning that removed friendly forces from the potential line of fire.

When clearing a multistory building, task organize the assault platoons with engineers and
prefabricate breaching charges prior to the TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints assault.
A good planning figure is 30 rooms per floor for a 200-meter by 200-meter square building. The
judicious use of demolitions will save the Marines’ energy for the tiring process of room clearing.
If contact is imminent, precede room entry with closed doors with a burst from the SAW or M-16.
The floors should be cleared with a reinforced rifle squad while the remainder of the platoon
remains in an assault position in the stairwell either above or below the floor being cleared. This
will reduce the fratricide risk and isolate the floor. A safe assumption is that each building will
have at least two stairwells. These must be secured as maneuver elements assault each floor.
When clearing at the ground level, the exact number and location of stairwells should be
determined. Note that other stairs may be located further into the building. Many multistory
buildings will have extensive subterranean areas. Always have a plan to attack downward into
the basement or utility floors.

While K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was fighting the battle and clearing their
sector of the AO, the exposure to enemy fire while attempting to breach the outer perimeter of
the houses in their sector proved to be too risky using their current methods. The outer metal
doors surrounding many of the homes had flat locks and bolt cutters could not be used nor
could detonation cords. A burst of 40-millimeter ammunition could be used but the decision not
to waste the ammunition was made. Using the attached AAVs, tanks, or a HMMWV to push
open the doors or knock a section of the wall down proved to be very quick and allowed for a
larger number of Marines to storm the building. The breaching of the metal roll down storage
units was challenging as well. Some of the locks were just too thick for the small bolt cutters to
accommodate. A HMMWV with an attached chain was used to rip open the door and this again
saved the unit time, ammunition, and energy. This method also proved useful for evacuating
injured Marines from rooms with barred/gated windows.

Training

There will be circumstances where detailed clearing of houses will be required. Training in
these techniques must be continued and reinforced. However, deficiencies in current training

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-7


for the conduct of breaching and other tactics in military operations in urban terrain (urban
operations) were mentioned.

K Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines conducted extensive training at Stu Segall Studios,
MOUT (Urban Operations) town (Range 131, Camp Pendleton) and at March Air Reserve Base
(Division Stability and Support Operations Exercise) prior to deploying. Many of the TTP that
were employed during operations were not learned and rehearsed prior to deployment due to
range and training limitations. The limitations of size, building layout, building construction, and
range regulations at both Range 131 and March Air Reserve Base precluded training to the
standards that were required for operations. The training areas were not large enough in size to
facilitate a company’s maneuver with tracked and wheeled assets. Range regulations largely
prohibited the use of explosive breaching. Building construction and a lack of furnishings
(including doors with locking mechanisms and windows) prevented the ability to realistically
prepare for urban operations.

Specifically, units need to have the facilities support to conduct the following additional
platoon-sized urban operations training:

• Wheeled and mechanized asset integration require at least three streets amidst five
building lanes. Walls and buildings need to be constructed for tanks, AAVs, and
HMMWVs to be able to simulate making breaches. Streets should vary in width in
order to provide better training for the wheeled/tracked vehicles to maneuver within
tightly confined spaces. There is a need to “dirty up” urban operations facilities. Add
furniture, curtains, vehicles, and trash. This lets individuals hide and causes
significant problems searching and clearing rooms. Train to identify and to forward
items of intelligence value. Facilities need to have doors and windows with bars
added and Marines should be able to do both mechanical and explosive breaching
against real doors, both wood and reinforced metal doors with deadbolts. Put
furniture in all facilities. Blockade entrances to houses with furniture, forcing the
attacking unit to enter into the defender’s preplanned kill zone or be slowed by the
blockade.
• Marines need to be trained to remove doorknobs, hinges, and locking mechanisms
through explosive means (to include the shotgun). They also need to be trained to
make mouse holes through walls inside and outside of structures. The Fort Knox
urban operations facility provides an excellent facility for this training. Recommend
using this facility as a model for range regulations and for an inexpensive method to
explosively breach mouse holes, walls, loopholes, doors, etc.
• Facility needs to include current open construction at Range 131 (buildings built with
space between each structure), as well as tight construction where there is little to no
gap between buildings. Building type and construction also needs to vary. Again,
platoon-size is needed for both types of construction.
• Buildings need to be fully furnished. Recognize that the furniture will be destroyed.
It should not be set up in a neat and orderly manner.
• A good representation of a day’s work for a platoon tasked to clear in zone is an area
150 meters by 400 meters with three streets and multiple alleys running in a variety
of directions.
• An “urban grenade employment course” should be added to urban operations
training. The course could provide practical application instruction with blue bodies
through windows and doors, rooftops, and inside houses.

A-8 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Organic Infantry Weapons
M-16 Service Rifle

The 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm rounds did not penetrate the concrete and brick walls that
composed most of the city’s buildings. The .50 caliber round, however, proved to be very
effective in penetrating the walls.

The M-4 is more manageable inside tight spaces. Fully automatic AK-47s can quickly gain
fire superiority over single-shot M-16s, and Marines are primarily trained to fire the M-16 in the
single shot vice burst mode. Unit live fire training should address firing in the burst mode for
clearing rooms during pre-employment training. Reportedly, the determined and possibly
drugged enemy, with or without body armor, has sustained up to five shots to the body with 5.56
mm rounds and continued to fight.

Explosives

Most battalions made heavy use of their engineer squads that were attached to infantry
platoons, by employing multiple satchel charges and Bangalore Torpedoes to breach buildings
and kill the occupants. These charges were prepared in great quantities prior to the operation.
It proved to be a critical requirement to have breaching expertise at platoon level and below.

Collapsible Stock Squad Automatic Weapon

This weapon received very favorable reviews since it facilitated the weapon’s use inside
buildings.

Shotguns

Shotguns were used extensively for breaching and room clearing. Each battalion had on
average 20 to 25 of these. By all accounts, one to two per squad, for a total of 70 to 80 per
battalion would have been an allocation better suited to the demand.

Mortars

Both the 81 mm and the 60 mm rounds are perceived at the platoon level to be the most
responsive supporting arm. Mortars were used freely against enemy strongpoints, generating a
high demand for resupply. Unlike artillery that was fired in general support across the
battlespace, mortar fire was confined to directly supporting a battalion sector. Because of this,
demand for mortar rounds varied widely from sector to sector. Since there was no effective way
to redistribute mortar rounds from a less engaged battalion to a more heavily engaged unit,
additional rounds were pushed out. The result was a large turn-in by one unit and a perceived
shortage by another.
Rockets
Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided Missile II

This proved effective as a point destruction tool against enemy forces defending from
buildings. On one occasion, two tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (TOW) missiles

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-9


fired from street-level destroyed defenders on the 10th story of a 12-story office building. They
were effective in penetrating cement walls that 5.56 and 7.62 could not penetrate.
Javelin

Similar effects were achieved with the Javelin fired in the top attack mode on rooftop fighting
positions and “ladder-well pillboxes” standard to most Iraqi houses.
Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon

The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon (SMAW) high explosive (HE) and
antitank (HEAT) round was used for breaching and as a means of destroying the enemy inside
buildings. The shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-novel explosive (SMAW-NE)
(thermobaric) round proved to be especially effective for the latter purpose. The only limitation
was the number of rounds that could be carried. SMAWs were used with such frequency that in
most cases resupply could not keep pace with expenditure. For instance, one company fired
250 SMAW rounds.
SMAW-NE rounds were highly effective only when shot into enclosed spaces (such as a
room) through a window. If the round impacted short or on an external surface and did not
enter a closed space, then the effects were minimal to ineffective. The SMAW is an outstanding
counter weapon to the RPG; however the RPG can be fired from many more positions due to its
significantly smaller back blast.
The M-203 Grenade Launcher was used with good effect but with the same limitation with
regard to the number of rounds that could be carried.

Combat Support
Engineers

D-9 bulldozers received highly favorable reviews. A D-9 cleared a row of buildings
effectively within an extremely short period of time. The infantry company commander seemed
to prefer this asset to others (D-7, armored combat earthmover) as it could reduce the largest
structures and survive most small arms fire engagements. The D-9 proved to be an extremely
capable asset in house clearing. It was instrumental to coining the tactical task of “Recon by
Destruction” wherein the enemy’s location is identified by the destructive removal of his hidden
strongpoints. Many enemy bodies surrounded by weapons were found in rubble left behind by
the D-9.

Communication with the D-7/D-9 was difficult and often required the rifle platoon to sacrifice
one of its personal role radios for responsive and timely communications. When engineers are
attached to rifle platoons, key leaders need to ensure that the engineer is familiar with
established platoon SOPs and his role when in contact.

Due to the unstable nature of the city terrain, the D-9 often became stuck during building
reduction operations and organic assets (another D-9, tank, AAV, AAV-R7, etc.) were not
capable of recovering the D-9. Eventually, the combat service support battalion (CSSB)
dispatched its M-88 to support some D-9 recoveries.

A-10 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Amphibious Assault Vehicles

The AAV up-gunned weapons system provided accurate, high volume fire in support of
building entry. Armor piercing .50 caliber fires from the AAVs were invaluable when providing
suppression through brick and concrete buildings. The AAV was successfully used to
mechanically breech and push down structures such as reinforced doors, brick fences, walls,
etc., thus creating entry points for the infantry. The front left and right corners of the AAV were
used to make physical contact with building structures. It is not recommended that the rear of
the vehicle be used since it may damage the ramp in the closed position or damage the prop
buckets. On almost every occasion, the bow plane made contact with the structures during
breaching attempts. The force caused cracking in the area where the bow plane connects to
the bow plane cylinder. If operating in an urban operations environment and away from
waterborne operations for an extended period of time, it may be beneficial to remove the bow
plane and cylinder to avoid damage. Tracks are an uncomfortable fit in tight urban spaces and
are vulnerable and attractive to RPG attack. Downed power lines proved difficult in urban
maneuvers close to residences with tracks. Additionally, concrete rubble and metal “rebar” was
prevalent in many streets and was a potential hazard for the suspension system of the AAV.

Tanks

The M1A1 tank was used very effectively to create breaching points into buildings by
physically pushing down structures. Marine tankers would traverse the main gun to the side
and utilize TTP for the reduction of urban area strongpoints with the tank hull to create breach
points. Care must be taken to prevent gun tube damage and minimize rubble from covering the
driver’s vision blocks. Use of the rear of the tank to create breach points is not recommended
as it causes damage to the grille doors and tank/infantry phone. Tanks in mechanical breaching
must also exercise caution to ensure the front of the hull is used at a 90-degree angle or else
risk damaging the fenders.

Tankers utilized the front slope and rear hull of the M-1A1 tank to knock down buildings and
walls. These techniques caused significant damage to the front headlights, fenders, rear grille
doors, tank/infantry phone, and number 7 skirts. As a result, a Marine welder designed, welded,
and mounted an M-1A1 tank-breaching beam that mounts to the front of the tank. No
modifications to the tank were required to mount this system. The breaching beam was tested
on a building with outstanding results. No damage was sustained to the tank and it successfully
destroyed the building. Additionally, the tank driver reported no obscuration of his view from the
driver’s hole. All material was taken from destroyed Iraqi infrastructure in Fallujah.

Mine plows were a nonfactor, as only one was available at the start of the offensive (two
more arrived later but were designed for the M-1A2). The tank that had the mine plow mounted
ended up setting the plow down after the second day of operation as it severely restricted
maneuver in an already restricted environment. The tank company commander stated that
Pearson Blades would have been useful, as tanks were asked to knock down walls many times,
especially when the D-9 was down or not available.

Marine infantrymen working with tank sections utilized various methods to talk tankers onto
enemy targets inside buildings. Infantrymen utilized organic weapons systems to shoot at
positions they wanted destroyed with the tank main gun. This required the tankers to observe
the impacts, which at times was difficult when fully buttoned-up in the tank. The most common
method was for tankers to engage a building with a coaxially mounted M-240G and have the
infantrymen call for adjustments from the impacts. Once targets were identified with the

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-11


coaxially mounted M-240G, they were engaged with tank main gun. An additional method
utilized to some success was for the infantry to direct tankers onto targets based on the
orientation of the gun tube in relation to the tank hull. Refinements were made utilizing the
aforementioned technique.

Tank-infantry phones were often destroyed or inoperable, making communications with the
tank Marines inside very difficult and communications were centralized to the platoon
commander only.

Marine tankers developed techniques to maximize the effects of the tank’s organic
weapons. When engaging fortified enemy positions less than 1 kilometer away, tankers would
initially engage with tank main gun and then immediately suppress the target with machine
guns. The machine gun suppression ensured that the enemy could not attempt to leave a
building or an area once a main gun round was fired. If a main gun round was fired at the first
floor the suppression was shifted to the second floor to engage insurgents.

In addition, infantry units utilized their attached tank assets to clear buildings of IEDs and
snipers. M-1A1 tank main gun rounds were effective at detonating buildings booby trapped and
rigged with TTP for reduction of urban area strongpoints

The high explosive power and over pressurization created by the tank main gun destroyed
IEDs or caused secondary detonations. During Operation Al-Fajr, enemy insurgents utilized
mosques and minaret towers to engage assaulting US forces. The ability of Marine tank crews
to acquire and accurately engage snipers holed-up in minarets and multi-level buildings
neutralized this threat on numerous occasions. Frequently minarets required multiple tank main
gun impacts to achieve desired results. The materials and masonry utilized in the construction
of mosques and minarets was far superior to that of the civilian building infrastructure. As such,
tank crews utilized as many as 10 or more tank main gun rounds to achieve desired effects on
the mosques and minarets.

Note: The efficient employment of the M-1A1 main gun in urban terrain can be both
devastating and problematic. It is important for both tank and infantry commanders
to understand the effects generated by various M-1A1 main gun employment
techniques and ammunition types. Often, what is an appropriate M1A1 main gun
employment technique or ammunition type for one situation may not be as
successful in a different situation.

The following examples demonstrate different effects:

For 120-millimeter tank main gun ammunition, the overall assessment from the majority of
the tank commanders was that the HEAT round was the most potent and versatile round for the
urban environment. High explosive obstacle reduction (HE-OR) by design is an obstacle-
reducing round made specifically for the urban environment. However, in terms of breaching
power, HEAT was by far the round of choice compared to the others. Because most of Fallujah
is constructed from cement, the shaped charge of the HEAT round provided more explosive
punch and overpressure than the steel-nosed HE-OR. HEAT also had better effects on
reducing obstacles such as concrete barriers. In view of the minimum arming distance of the
HEAT round and the nature of the close engagements (due to terrain, most tank engagements
were closer than that minimum arming distance), the canister round would have been even
more useful in engaging enemy hunkered inside buildings. This round has over 1,000 tungsten
steel balls and is designed to take out entire squads of enemy formations with one round.
A-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006
Compared to the other 120-millimeter rounds (multipurpose antitank [MPAT], high explosive
obstacle reduction with tracer [HE-OR-T], and HEAT), this round is armed as soon as it leaves
the gun tube. It is essentially a 120-millimeter shotgun shell. MPAT rounds provided effective
results for breaching if it was employed utilizing certain techniques. Based on ammunition
availability, tankers utilized the MPAT round during urban combat operations in Fallujah. Tank
crews quickly identified that due to the smaller high velocity warhead of the MPAT, when
compared to the HEAT, it was passing through multiple structures creating limited fragmentation
effect and breach holes only 12 inches in diameter. Crews experimented with different
techniques and found that when the MPAT was fired in ground mode at infrastructure less than
the minimum required arming distance, it created larger breach holes capable of allowing
infantrymen to enter. Additionally, when the MPAT was fired at a building in the air mode at less
than the required arming distance, it achieved similar results.

Tanks fired approximately 3,000 main gun rounds, over 150,000 7.62 mm, and over 77,000
.50 caliber rounds. Marine tankers discovered that the effects of 120-millimeter tank main gun
ammunition were greater when it was shot at the sides of windows in buildings containing
insurgents. The detonation of tank rounds on the “window frames” provided an additional brick
and mortar fragmentation into the room increasing the effects of the round. Tank rounds that
were fired directly through windows often passed through the rear walls limiting the effects of
fragmentation. When shooting the corners of buildings in order to engage insurgents seeking
cover in these vicinities, similar success at creating effects with secondary fragmentation was
discovered. Insurgents adjusted their tactics against Marine tank crews by taking positions in
fortified buildings and infrastructure.

Insurgents discovered that M-1A1 tank ammunition easily penetrated buildings made of
brick. Buildings constructed of concrete masonry, provided greater protection so insurgents
quickly utilized this infrastructure to establish strongpoints. Insurgents adjusted tactics by
engaging Marine tanks and then retreating into the inner rooms of buildings to avoid the effects
of main gun over pressurization and fragmentation. Tank ammunition effects were minimized
by the initial impact on the buildings’ outside walls. Tankers countered this tactic by firing the
main gun directly into door openings and windows to maximize ammunition penetration into the
inner rooms and causeways of infrastructure. Occasionally tank crews found it difficult to
penetrate deep into some buildings without expending significant quantities of 120-millimeter
tank main gun ammunition. Tankers discovered that creating fires inside hardened buildings by
using coaxially mounted M-240 and .50 caliber weapons systems smoked out the enemy or
suffocated them in place. The tank .50 caliber needs a thermal sight; this weapon is very
accurate out to 1,800 meters but, due to a lack of a night sight, it is difficult to employ at night.

Marine tank commanders report the importance of utilizing open terrain in the urban
operations environment because it allowed tank platoons and sections to maximize firepower on
enemy strongpoints. During Operation Al-Fajr certain districts within the city had open terrain to
support this TTP. This included parks, industrial areas, riverside property, and traffic circles.
Marine tankers report that platoon and section volleys with tank main gun produces the most
effective results on enemy positions and strongpoints in urban combat. Additionally, platoon
and section volleys ensured that obscuration time did not affect other tank crews trying to
engage targets since all tanks simultaneously fired. Massed fires provided highly successful
killing effects due to increased explosive energy, over pressure, fragmentation, and shock
power.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-13


Artillery

Many expressed surprise that artillery proved useful in an urban environment. Artillery was
responsive, routinely answering adjust fire missions in less than 5 minutes. Danger close
missions were conducted in an urban setting several times with no trepidation of the maneuver
commander. On several occasions, a forward observer (FO) called for fire on a single building,
quickly received those fires, and had effects on that building with minimal collateral damage.
During a preparation in the attack on Salman Pak, the battalion fire support coordinator fired
unobserved fires on enemy buildings, deriving the target information from maps and satellite
imagery. Upon survey of the effects after the battle, the fire support coordinator noted damaged
and destroyed buildings at the desired locations. The only collateral damage were shrapnel
effects on buildings 370 meters away. Confidence in the artillery in support of infantry
maneuver was bolstered significantly.

During Operation Al-Fajr, the companies needed the ability to engage specific buildings in
close proximity to friendly positions. Air was the preferred method as they could use laser-
guided weapons, however, it could take up to 45 minutes to have air on station engaging
targets. Because artillery was readily available, the company fire support teams began adapting
their artillery calls for fire. Generally the FOs were able to get their adjusting rounds to hit the
target building after two or three adjustments. They found that after one 155-millimeter round
fuzed on delay hit the building, the enemy inside either withdrew or was incapacitated to the
point that the company could then attack the building.

When engaged by riflemen in numerous buildings, the FOs found that they could get
adjusting rounds on their target building and then, using additional adjusting rounds, destroy
specific buildings. The FOs would not begin another mission, but would walk their adjustments
from building to building. At times the battery would interpret these as random corrections on
the same mission. Once the fire support coordination center explained how the FOs were
working, the battery began to dedicate one tube to that company, freeing the rest of the battery
to fire other missions. If the FO called a “fire for effect,” they would still use just one tube to fire
(generally four rounds) in order to minimize the error of the rounds. This allowed the FOs to
engage point targets with artillery in close proximity to friendlies without the time associated with
directing close air support (CAS) on target.

Marine Corps Order 8010, Class V(W) Planning Factors for Fleet. Marine Corps Combat
Operations, does not address the expenditure of ammunition in urban operations. The division
used the recent battle in Najaf as a starting point and estimated firing a maximum of 1,500 HE
rounds. The actual expenditure was over 6,000 HE rounds.

Actions in Najaf covered a 27-day period, with most offensive


operations over 21 days.

Close Air Support

Prior to the operation, a building numbering system was created, with a phase-line network,
and target reference points throughout the city. All elements of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines and its
attachments from other Services were given these references to use during the operation. All
squadrons were given the references, and 10 digit grids for them. An aircraft could check in,
receive a modified nine-line brief in which the target description was “Building 615E” and he

A-14 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


already had a 10-digit grid and a map reference. Or, during the direction of aircraft, a forward
air controller (FAC) could pass: “Northwest of the intersection of phase lines Fran and Henry
there is a three-story building." Call "contact” and hear the aircrew respond with “Contact” and
99 percent of the direction of aircraft was complete. This type of standardization was a critical
factor in the success of an operation conducted in a complicated urban environment with a wide
variety of friendly forces. However, large parts of the city of Fallujah were not covered in as
much detail (building numbers per block) as the parts of the city that were of interest in the initial
phases of the offensive. This caused a decrease in battle efficiency several days into the attack
as well as during follow on stability and support operations.

Effects of air were tremendous, often causing catastrophic destruction to target buildings,
but occasionally CAS was slow. In an urban environment it could take 15 to 30 minutes to talk
CAS onto the target, and then an additional 15 to 30 minutes to receive clearance due to
geometry issues with adjacent units. Despite the time requirement, air is a tremendous asset
and should be utilized at all opportunities. It may take an hour to get a bomb on target, but it
would often reduce the target, whereas an infantry assault would have taken several hours to
accomplish the same goal and would have sustained casualties. It is often the better policy to
pull back troops, isolate, and drop bombs than to charge into enemy strongpoints.

During Operation Al-Fajr a need was identified for a helicopter precision-guided munition
that could destroy a target in a building without destroying the entire structure. The AGM-114
Hellfire is the weapon of choice in this endeavor. There are currently three warhead options
available to the Hellfire: shaped charge, blast fragment, and metal augmented charge. During
Operation Al-Fajr, Hellfires were employed on many instances against specific portions of
buildings (i.e., upper left window) to destroy a suspected enemy position in a particular room of
a building. Rather than sending a GBU-12 or GBU- 38 against the building, the ground combat
element elected to utilize a lower collateral damage Hellfire missile with precise and destructive
effects. Targets that were engaged were either buildings themselves or the enemy hiding in
buildings. Buildings were generally concrete/masonry with mild reinforcement and were
extremely sturdy by Western standards. To completely destroy a normal-sized residential target
building and everyone/everything inside it, at least a 500-pound bomb with a delay fuze was
required. Anything smaller than that would only damage the structure; and while it might have
effects on the enemy hiding inside, it would by no means guarantee destruction. However,
when GBU-12s and GBU-38s were used to engage such targets (even two and three story
buildings), success rate for destroying the structures and everything inside was nearly 100
percent when they had accurate hits. Proper fuzing is critical. Instantaneously fuzed weapons
on structures caused far less damage to the structure itself, and the explosion would also send
much more shrapnel and debris flying much further out (increasing the potential for fratricide for
close strikes). Marines under cover (inside fortified concrete buildings) were safe during CAS
strikes from 125 to 250 meters from the target—a technique, but not the preferred method.
However, when the same type building was engaged with a 500-pound delay fuzed weapon, the
bulk of the explosion was concentrated inside the building and the destructive force was
maximized within the structure. Occasionally this effect occurred to such a degree that a FAC
thought the weapons had actually failed (heard the bombs whistle in to the target and impact but
no audible explosion was detected). After closer inspection, the FAC realized that the lack of
the usual “explosion” sound and flying debris was due to the fact that the bomb focused all its
destructive power within the structure itself, and the effects were dramatic. If a GBU-12 hit its
precise target, collateral damage to surrounding structures was minimal. Some missions
required larger bombs (i.e., 2,000 pounds), but the ordnance was not available or not approved
for the drop.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-15


2. Air-Ground Integration: Recent Trends Integrating Army Aviation into the
Cordon and Search Operations [CALL Handbook Cordon and Search, chapter 11]

Army aviation provides a critical element that is integral to the success of combined arms
operations. Attack and cavalry helicopters, the AH-64 Apache and the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior,
are vital to any ground maneuver commander involved in cordon and search operations. Their
capabilities, when fully integrated within the planning process, enhance the ground
commander’s ability to succeed.

The following observations highlight several of the trends observed during these recent
situational training exercise (STX) lanes. The comments focus specifically on air-ground
integration to assist ground maneuver commanders in preparation for cordon and search
operations or any mission in which air-ground integration is critical.

Maneuver Element
The first step in any air-ground integration is to recognize that cavalry and attack helicopter
elements primarily serve as an additional maneuver element rather than just a fires platform.
This recognition dictates additional, integrated planning requirements, as well as the
establishment of a command and control (C2) structure capable of handling both air and ground
assets. Additionally, aviation is adaptable and capable of changing “on the fly” as the mission
responds to enemy actions.

As applied to the cordon and search mission in the STX lanes, cavalry and attack
helicopters provide the ground commander essential capabilities for the conduct of this
operation. The aircraft normally conduct route reconnaissance in support of ground movement
to the objective with an initial observation and assessment of the situation within each objective.
The best results occur when ground commanders focus initial observations according to specific
intelligence requirements. These observations might be the situation around the target building,
the location of a specific vehicle, or detection of anything attempting to exit the objective prior to
the establishment of the outer cordon. Cavalry and attack helicopters utilize sensors/video
capabilities to gather requested information without alerting or heightening tensions of the
people within the village. Once the cordon is set, the initial plans call for aviation to provide area
security outside the inner cordon and mostly beyond the outer cordon. This task keeps the
aviation element focused “out,” away from the objective searching for elements attempting to
influence the ground commander’s mission (focus out). The typical scenario uses an opposing
forces (OPFOR) technical vehicle and mortar team forcing a CCA opportunity during execution.
Finally, aviation assets accomplish an egress route recon once the ground element completes
its mission within the objective or the helicopter’s fuel situation dictates an early departure.

Plan for Success


The maneuver mindset dictates additional planning requirements for both air and ground.
For any operation to be successful, all players must execute from the same page. This remains
true for air-ground integration especially during cordon and search operations. To enhance the
ground commander’s success, aviators must completely understand the ground maneuver plan.
Air assets require the same mission planning products as any ground platoon: maneuver
graphics, objective sketches, imagery, target-list worksheet, no-fire areas (NFAs)/restricted fire
areas (RFAs), the C2 plan, etc. Additionally, friendly marking techniques, clearance of fires,
aviation rules of engagement (ROE), and downed aviator/aircraft issues create additional
situations that must be covered during planning and rehearsals, preferably with the aviators
present. Many of these issues can be addressed without a designated mission and can be
drilled at company-level.
A-16 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006
The C2 plan varied among the companies on the cordon and search lane. Most company
C2 plans placed air assets on the company command net (frequency modulation(FM) frequency
hop) while some chose to inject an intermediary control element placing air on an alternate net
such as the fires net. While the latter can succeed and may be required based on the
competing tasks facing the ground commander, only the companies that rehearsed and
practiced this plan truly made it work. Using the command net provides the greatest amount of
situational awareness (SA) to all assets. Army aviation enhanced that SA immediately through
situation reports of important activity. This proved crucial as numerous civilian vehicles
approached the objectives along various avenues of approach. Alternate nets require additional
time transmitting such key information to the critical players. Moreover, alternate nets create
additional problems and issues since typically only the ground “commander” has the authority to
clear fires, not the third party controlling the air assets.

The communications plan serves as a vital item within the planning process; the
communications plan either enhanced or drastically hindered the overall mission. Items such as
crypto net variables and time-of-day as well as competing terminology, such as “unsecure” and
“plain text”, affected actual execution. Those spending adequate time during planning to
establish primary and contingency frequencies and to ensure all personnel were trained on
radio operations saw the benefits in the actual lane execution. Often, aviators provided the
ground personnel a single-channel unsecure (plain text) frequency as an initial communications
“link-up” net and a worse case contingency for communication.

Cordon and Search Execution


The initial aircraft check-in with ground elements sets the tone for success on any mission.
Aviators must transmit the minimal essential information to the ground executors: call signs,
total number of aircraft, current location, and estimated time of arrival (ETA), ordnance
available, and available time on-station (how long will fuel permit air to stay in the area—
possibly the most crucial piece of information). Ground forces should immediately return a
current situation report (SITREP) along with any critical updates or changes to the initial plan.
These requirements may increase based on the level of air-ground integration during the
planning process (operation may be hasty).

The STX lanes reinforce this process as units ready to receive air assets proved ready to
adapt to the cordon and search environment. The air tasks prior to the establishment of the
outer cordon never changed, though some refined the observation tasks seeking more specific
information. Within the objective, several ground units altered the air tasks based on enemy
actions inside the towns. Making use of the air’s observation capabilities, some ground
maneuver commanders accepted risk beyond the outer cordon refocusing air in search of
snipers or other observation tasks inside the town (focus in). Once each situation reached
resolution, the ground commanders returned air assets to the initial area security mission (focus
out). This quick shift between "focus out" versus "focus in" only worked for those companies
who tracked aviation much like one of their own maneuver platoons. Those companies capable
of developing and refining both the ground and air tasks during the cordon and search proved
most successful on the STX lanes.

Lastly, nearly every ground maneuver element found it relatively easy to communicate with
air assets. Those who prepared the most during the planning process used products such as
town sketches to vector air throughout the operation. Their terminology appeared the same as
with any maneuver platoon element.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 A-17


Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the basic element for any mission success is the ability to place all elements
affecting the company-level mission on a common operating picture. This includes Army
aviation assets, a crucial combat multiplier to any commander. Mission planning serves as the
starting point to achieve this end. However, Army aviation, especially attack and cavalry
platforms such as the Apaches and Kiowa Warriors, are ready to adjust and adapt to the
battlefield environment just like any maneuver element. The Joint Readiness Training Center
(JRTC) STX lanes provide a unique opportunity for many ground maneuver commanders to
execute the cordon and search mission with all the crucial assets typically found in a combat
theater. The opportunity challenges both air and ground to their fullest. The training value
proves immense; the lessons learned are great.

A-18 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix B
PLANNING CHECKLISTS

Table B-1. Urban Priority Intelligence Requirements


Urban PIR
Who are the key town council, tribal, religious leaders in the AO?
What are the perceptions of these key community leaders?
How do these key leaders make their decisions and how can those decisions be
influenced?
Who are hostile in the AO? Who determines the scope of the noncombatants?
What political, cultural, and religious sensitivities will have an impact on the non-
combatants?
Who or what are the key information providers in the AO?
What effort is the enemy making to influence the target audiences?
What tools are they using (radio, TV, leaflets, disinformation, intimidation)?
Who are the supporters and what are their actions?
Who are the nongovernmental/international organizations operating in the AO?
Who are their key personnel?
Are there any anti-coalition forces (ACF) affiliated religious sites in the AO?
Where are the ACF safe havens/safe houses in the AO?
Are there any ACF weapons caches within the AO?
Are there any weapons markets in operation in the AO?
What infrastructure needs to be repaired in the AO?

Table B-2. Urban Intelligence Requirements


Urban IR
Where are the indigenous security forces (ISF) operating in the AO?
How are the ISF reacting to ACF activity in the AO?
How are ISF reacting to coalition activity in the AO?
What are the significant characteristics of ISF units in the AO?
What are the rat-lines on the AO?
What ACF cells are operating in the AO?
Who are the ACF leaders in the AO?
What are the local infrastructure priorities for infrastructure repair in the AO?
What rivalries exist between leadership in the AO?
Where are all the crossing points (foot and vehicle) for the canals in the AO?
Is the indigenous police force corrupt?
How is the indigenous police force received by the community?
Can the indigenous police force be relied upon as an asset to assist US and joint
forces?
If the indigenous police force is reliable, what equipment, communications, and
other capabilities do they have?
How many prison structures exist in the AO and are they operable?
How many police stations exist in the AO and are they operable?

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 B-1


Table B-3. ROE/Escalation Procedures
Know the theater-specific ROE.
Rehearse using vignettes.
Know the unit-specific escalation procedures.
Identify protected sites.
Recognize the enemy uniform when applicable.
Know the medical ROE for enemy or civilians wounded.
Locate indigenous forces that can assist where ROE is restrictive.
Know the identification/engagement criteria of protected sites.
Identify and locate noncombatants (Red Cross, etc.).

Table B-4. Controlling Civilian Populace


Have interpreters for each moving element (2 x TCPs = 2 interpreters) or
preposition the interpreters at the most likely positions needed.
Use concertina wire to create space in between locals/crowd and coalition forces.
Use a megaphone.
Use IO messages.
Have PSYOP.
Have CA.
Have FSO
Have sniper/designated marksman located in overwatch.
Have release authority for nonlethal munitions.
Use local police/army to assist with crowd control.
Consider morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR)

Table B-5. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)/Reserve


Establish planning priorities.
Be aware that task organization and equipment can assume any mission or task.
Know the commitment criteria during each phase of the operation.
Complete a time and distance analysis.
Know the graphical control measures.
Know the recognition signals for link up.
Prepare a black/white/grey be on the look out (BOLO) list.

Table B-6. Command, Control, Communications (C3) and Locations


Inner Cordon
Outer Cordon
Support Element
Recon/Sniper Teams
QRF
Adjacent Units
Aviation Assets
Air Space Control
Coalition Units
Indirect Fire Support Agencies
Available MEDEVAC Assets

B-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table B-7. Direct Fire Planning
Direct Fire Control Plan
Direct Fire Munitions Effects Table
Graphic Control Measures
Direct Fire Control Measures
Overwatch/Support by Fire Location and Orientation
Known Breach Location
Objectives
Indirect Fire Targets (Consider Munition Effects)
Phase Lines
No Fire Areas (OP/Sniper Location)
Outer Cordon Location and Orientation
Direct Fire Planning Considerations
How does the fire plan help achieve success at the decisive point?
What is the company mission and the desired effect of their fires?
Is the fire plan consistent with the ROE?
Where are combat vehicles or other dangerous weapons systems?
Which is the most probable enemy course of action? Most likely most dangerous?
What are the PIR that indicate the enemy’s actions?
Where is the element going to kill or suppress the enemy?
From where will the element engage the enemy?
Which enemy weapons will the element engage first?
How will the element initiate fires with each weapon system?
Which weapons will fire first? What will each engage? What are the engagement
criteria?
What is the desired effect of fires from each unit in the support element?
How will the element distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy
3-dimensionally?
What will the support element focus their fires on? (How will the support element
units know where to engage? Will they be able to see and understand the control
measures?)
How will the element mass fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and achieve
the desired volume of fire?
Where will the element leaders be positioned to control fires? How will the element
focus fires on new targets?
How will the element deal with likely enemy reactions to their fires?
Does the plan avoid overkill; use each weapon system in its best role; concentrate
on combat vehicles; take the best shots; expose only those friendly weapons
needed; and destroy the most dangerous targets first? (Engagement Priorities)
Have the element's fires been massed to achieve suppression, obscuration, and
security needs of the breach?
Will the fires be masked by buildings or assault element movement?

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 B-3


Table B-8. Air Considerations (Rotary and Fixed-wing)
CAS 9-Line Briefing. Refer to FM 3-09.32/MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/ AFTTP(I)
3-2.6, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE) or
Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close
Air Support (CAS).
Task and purpose for aviation assets.
AC-130 Call for Fire. Refer to multi-Service JFIRE or JP 3-09.3.
For tactical strike requests, refer to multi-Service JFIRE or JP 3-09.3.
CAS Execution with Non-joint tactical air controller (JTAC) Personnel. Refer to
multi-Service JFIRE.
UAS, airspace control, and fire support coordinating measures.
General reference use FM 3-100.2/MCRP 3-25D/NTTP 3-52.1(A)/AFTTP(I) 3-2.16,
Multi-Service Procedures for Integrated Combat Airspace Command and Control
(ICAC2) (Appendix F and G) and JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a
Combat Zone.
Work request through chain of command to the air operations center.
Planned restricted operating zones.
Coordinating altitudes (UAS, rotary, fixed).
Flight corridors (ingress and egress routes).
No fire areas.
Restricted fire areas.
Deconfliction with indirect fires.

Table B-9. Consolidation, Reorganization, and Withdrawal


Establish EPW, captured material, and casualty collection points. Mark IAW unit
SOP (can be facilitated by support element).
Evacuate prisoner/detainees with basic subsistence (clothes, ID, shoes, medicine).
Plan for employment of tactical HUMINT teams (THTs).
Plan for use of camera/video for documentation.
Plan for use of PSYOP for crowd control (megaphones).
If necessary, identify stay behind force.
Report completion to C2.
Mark building exterior IAW TACSOP.
Plan for additional security/commitment of reserve/QRF if search extends beyond
plan.
If available, plan to integrate aircraft for overwatch during withdrawal.
Designate task and purpose for each element during consolidation and
reorganization.
Identify sectors and responsibilities for each element.

B-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table B-10. Perception Management (IO and CA Operations)
IO
IO pre-assessment of environment conducted.
IO operations conducted in order to shape the environment prior to decisive
operations.
Company IO officer conducts collection and analysis of the environment and
collaborates with the higher headquarters IO campaign plan: Before! During!
After!
Press releases scheduled following decisive operations. Joint press releases.
Media available to exploit unit’s successes.
PSYOP
Specific talking points and messages developed with emphasis placed on fair and
impartial coalition forces, empowering local authorities, and rule of law.
PSYOP products articulating resolve for upholding the rule of law.
CA
Proactive in establishing link to involve local or special police forces to assist.
Claim forms/immediate settlement capability.
Post meeting with local leaders.
General
Post assessment planned and executed following decisive operations using
feedback from CA/PSYOP/maneuver forces.

Table B-11 Media Facilitation and Public Affairs Checklists


PA estimates and plans developed, coordinated and reviewed.
DOD-approved Public Affairs guidance.
Information clearance and release authority.
Imagery clearance and release procedures.
Security-at-the-source considerations.
Plans for live EOM broadcast/interviews in the AO.
Media pool and non-pool media engagement plans in the AO.

Table B-12. Sniper Employment


Weigh the disadvantages of compromise.
Location.
Communications.
Reinforcement plan.
Resupply
Medical evacuation.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 B-5


Table B-13. Traffic Control Point/Blocking Positions
Black/White/Grey List
Concertina Wire
Signs Written in Both Languages
Interpreter
Megaphone/with Extra Batteries
Engagement Criteria
What are the actions in the event a vehicle penetrates the blocking position/TCP?
Trigger Lines
Who engages and with what weapons systems?
When do they cease fire and what is the signal for cease fire?
Do crew-served weapons continue to engage or are they only to use M-16s/M-4s?
Detainee/Captured Material
Detainee packets.
Detainee kit (blindfold, zip ties, etc.)
Detainee/captured material holding area.
Plan for transportation of detainees or captured material.
Civilians on the battlefield (COB) holding area.

Table B-14. Patrol Checklist


Movement
Deception plan when moving from forward operating bases (FOBs).
Plan multiple routes for ingress/egress.
Avoid ingress and egress on same route.
Plan QRF and reserve routes.
Avoid movement during peak traffic hours or through congested areas.
Manifests for vehicles.
Outer Cordon
Establish the vicinity objective area. Position to block, fix, interdict, or turn,
enemy/neutral/friendly forces.
Use checkpoints and road blocks covered by direct fire.
Inner Cordon
Position to place suppressive fires on objective.
Establish and prepare to attack by fire, support by fire, suppress, neutralize, fix, or
destroy enemy forces.
May be used to search perimeter area.
Breach
Be prepared for multiple means: knock, blow, or bash.
As required, prepare demo: linear, silhouette.
Inspect breach equipment.

B-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table B-14. Patrol Checklist
Clear Search
Methods:
Central assembly: best for population control, most intrusive (perception of theft).
Restriction to homes: prohibits movement, but gives residents chance to hide
items.
Control heads of households: Prevents looting, simplifies search.
Secure search area prior to search.
Establish by-pass criteria.
As required, organize into breach, assault, clearing, search, and EPW teams.
Plan to clear rooms: first man provides security, second man checks for hidden
persons and weapons, announce room clear to search team leader.
Conduct room search in three dimensions, focus search for specified items.
Monitor entry and exit points of search rooms and buildings at all times.
Prepare to search perimeter area if security element compromised.
Establish signal intelligence (SIGINT) box in search area to identify phone calls
and facilitate follow on operations.
METT-TC: Announce authority to conduct search and request compliance. If compliance is not granted, increase
use of force.

Table B-15. Mission Equipment Checklist


Megaphone/with extra batteries
Breach equipment (hooligan tools, etc.)
Bolt cutters
Ladders
Flashlights/with extra batteries
Metal detectors/wands
Mine detectors
Mirrors
Creepers
Class IV; i.e., concertina wire
Zip ties/flex cuffs
Video cameras, still cameras, tape recorders
Signs in both languages for checkpoints
IO products
Pre-packaged HA supplies

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 B-7


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Appendix C
SMART CARDS

Table C-1. CAS Terminal Attack Control Attributes


JTAC
Results of Risk Observes Timely and Accurate Target
Type
Assessment Target and Data Provided
A/C
Commander assesses a
high risk of fratricide to By JTAC. (Inherent to Type 1
1 friendlies or non-
Required
Control)
combatants
Lower risk to friendlies or
non-combatants but By Observer or through other
2 JTAC maintains control of
Not Required
JTAC sensors1
individual attacks
Commander assesses
the lowest risk of
fratricide to friendlies or By JTAC or Observer or by
3 non-combatants. Not Required Aircrew if targets comply with
prescribed guidance2
JTAC may provide
blanket clearance
1
Observer: Scout, COLT, FIST, UAV, SOF, or assets that provide real-time targeting
information
2
Supported commander delegates weapons release authority to the JTAC for all types of
control. JTAC will provide “cleared hot” as appropriate for each attack in type 1 and 2
control and “cleared to engage” for type 3

Table C-2. CAS Battle Drill


Aircraft 30 minutes from check-in with JTAC
ALO/JTAC – Initiates battle drill, verifies deconfliction (ACA) plan, alert JTACs
XO/S3 – Initiate tactical risk assessment (verify friendly locations) based on
commander’s guidance
S2 – Verify enemy size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment (SALUTE)
FSO – Alert SEAD/marking battery, alert observers for targeting
ADO – Inform AD community of inbound friendly air
Aircraft 15 minutes from check-in with JTAC
ALO/JTAC – Brief aircraft/ordnance and deconfliction (ACA) plan,
XO/S3 – Approve/disapprove mission based on tactical risk assessment
S2 – Brief enemy SALUTE
FSO – Report location of SEAD/marking battery and status of observers
ADO – Report ADA status
Aircraft conducting check-in with JTAC
ALO/JTAC – Verify aircraft/ordnance, deconfliction (ACA) plan, confirm timing
XO/S3 – Monitor the mission
S2 – Continue to monitor enemy SALUTE
FSO – Activate ACA plan, pass SEAD/marking CFF, coordinate TTT/TOT
ADO - Disseminate “White Hold”
Aircraft depart (Post Attack)
ALO/JTAC – Collect and disseminate BDA and pilot reports (PIREPS)
XO/S3 – Assess mission effectiveness and next course of action
S2 – Collect and process BDA and PIREPS
FSO – Deactivate ACAs, terminate SEAD/marking missions
ADO – Inform AD friendly air is off-station and adjust ADA status

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 C-1


Table C-3. CAS Briefing (9-Line)
Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard unless briefed. Lines 4, 6, and
restrictions are mandatory readback (*). JTAC may request additional readback:
JTAC: " , this is "
(Aircraft Call Sign) (JTAC)
“Type________ (1, 2, or 3) Control”
1. IP/BP: " "

2. Heading: " "


(Deg Magnetic) (IP/BP to Target)
Offset: " "
(Left/Right) (When required)
3. Distance: " "
(IP-to-Target in nautical miles/BP-to-Target in meters)
4.* Target Elevation: " "
(in feet/MSL)
5. Target Description: " "
6.* Target Location: " "
(Lat/Long, grid coords to include map datum
[e.g., WGS-84], offsets or visual description)
7. Type Mark: " " Code: " "
(WP, Laser, IR, Beacon) (Actual Code)
8. Location of Friendlies: " "
(from target, cardinal directions and distance in meters)
Position marked by: " "
9. Egress: " "
Remarks (as appropriate): " "
(Restrictions*, Ordnance Delivery, Threats, FAH, Hazards, ACAs, Weather, Tgt
Info, SEAD, LTL ,GTL {degrees magnetic north}, Night Vision, Danger Close [plus
commander's initials])
Time on Target (TOT): " " or
Time to Target (TTT): " "
"Standby plus , Hack."
(minutes) (seconds)
NOTE: When identifying position coordinates for joint ops, include map data.
Grid coordinates must include 100,000 meter grid identification

C-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure C-1. Cordon and Search Smart Card
[page 1]

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 C-3


Figure C-1. Cordon and Search Smart Card
[page 2]

C-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure C-1. Cordon and Search Smart Card
[page 3]

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 C-5


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Appendix D
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. Information Operations (IO)


a. As standard portions of a cordon and search operation are planned, similar IO
considerations as nonlethal effects should factor into that planning. Take for instance, the inner
and outer cordons. In an area with an ongoing IO plan attempting to calm an area and make
the inhabitants more willing to cooperate, the commander must relate the current success of
that IO plan with what he plans to do in establishing his inner and outer cordons. An openly
hostile area is a clear challenge to both IO goals and the success of a cordon and search
operation. In such cases, IO planning must be integrated and synchronized with the cordon and
search operations. One way would be to embed CA and TPT with the inner and outer cordons
to explain the intent of the operations.
b. Another consideration is the IO aspects of special teams, indigenous forces, and local
leaders (political, legal, or religious). Part of the METT-TC evaluation includes the
determination of what impact additional teams may have on the IO plan. Indigenous forces
whether military or police may play a role in a cordon and search operation as they will
undoubtedly speak to the locals in the process of screening prisoners or other tasks, The
cordon and search commander should consider what IO themes they might address. Similar
thinking applies to using local leaders; if an IO has succeeded in establishing relationships with
a local mayor or police chief or a cleric, a commander planning a cordon and search in their
area should use those contacts as part of his IO planning.
c. The following IO products may assist units during cordon and search operations:
(1) Hand bills (leaflets with messages) and posters.
(2) Local media interviews to help exploit successes.
(3) Pre-taped recordings broadcast by PSYOP.

2. Media (Local and Embedded)


a. Units should establish a point of contact for local media that may arrive on the objective
or even be embedded with them. To maintain control of the media during operations, position
or escort the media to locations where they will not hinder operations. After the completion of
the operation, the media may be escorted forward to observe actions that are consistent with
promoting friendly IO messages and themes (US Service members treating civilians, discovered
caches, etc.)
b. Immediate example of IO messages specific to cordon and search operations
(Perception Management):
(1) For structural damages: Point out how indiscriminate the enemy is when he attacks
with mortars or direct fire.
(2) For Small Arms Engagements: Unit’s response to the enemy demonstrates positive
influence. It shows that the unit is willing to protect the village.
(3) For caches: Seizing caches demonstrates the unit’s ability to protect innocent civilians
from indiscriminate enemy actions.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 D-1


3. IO Battle Drills

Information operations battle drills are designed to serve as the basis for planning during
activation of the crisis action team. The drills are only a planning aid. The information
contained in the drills must not be taken as a final and complete plan. The battle drills contain
only generic tasks and purposes that must be refined to develop an IO concept that best
addresses the situation at hand.

Table D-1. Cordon and Search


IO Concept: IO deters interference and limits adverse reaction by local populace to cordon and search
operations. Be prepared to exploit illegal arms/contraband seizure. On order exploit unit assistance provided to the
local populace.
Element Task Purpose Target Audience
TF Cmd Group N/A N/A N/A
PSYOP Provide one TPT direct Facilitate crowd control Demonstrators/protestors
support to maneuver forces
Conduct face-to-face Reduce civilian interference Local populace
operations with local
populace in and around the
cordon and search
operation.
Prepare and disseminate Inform populace of activities Local populace
leaflets to populace in and associated with the cordon and
around the cordon and search operation
search operation Exploit success of the operation and Local populace
gain future assistance from the
populace
Develop and broadcast Provide factual information about the Local populace
messages on radio stations operation
Exploit success of the operation Local populace
CA Assess local leader and Gauge public opinion / response to Civil leaders
populace attitudes after entry of coalition troops and seizure Local populace
conclusion of the operation of illegal material
PA BPT conduct press Generate positive and factual media Political leaders
conference upon coverage of operation and coalition Civil leaders
completion of operation effort to maintain a safe and secure Local populace
environment
Issue press release upon Generate positive and factual media Political leaders
completion of operation coverage of operation and coalition Civil leaders
effort Local populace
Maneuver Disseminate PSYOP Reduce civilian interference Local populace
leaflets in and around
cordon and search
operation
IO Endstate: Suspected cache site(s) cleared, weapons and illegal goods confiscated with minimal
interference, and documented with the public informed of progress towards a safe and secure environment. Unit IO
postured to assist the local populace.

D-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table D-2. Employment of QRF
IO Concept: IO supports deployment of the QRF by displaying coalition capabilities and resolve and by
supporting operations to return the sector to a stable, peaceful environment.
Element Task Purpose Target Audience
TF Cmd Group N/A N/A N/A
PSYOP Develop and broadcast Highlight coalition capabilities and Local leaders
messages on radio stations resolve to maintain a safe and secure Local populace
environment
Ensure populace do not interfere in Local populace
QRF operations
CA N/A N/A N/A
PA Issue press release upon Focus media attention on the Local populace
completion of operation capabilities of the QRF Local media
Maneuver Engage local populace in Ensure populace do not interfere in Local populace
area where QRF deploys QRF operations
IO Endstate: Units capabilities and readiness are demonstrated. Unit returns to steady state operations within
the sector.

Table D-3. Insurgent-Related Violence


IO Concept: IO limits populace support for insurgent forces.
Element Task Purpose Target Audience
TF Cmd Group Engage key regional and Reduce support for insurgency forces Political leaders
local leaders Civil leaders
Hard-liners/extremists
PSYOP Disseminate PSYOP print Reduce populace support for Local populace
products to villages in and insurgent forces and activities
around insurgent area
CA Assess local leader and Gauge public opinion / response to Civil leaders
populace attitudes insurgency activity Local populace
PA BPT issue press releases Disseminate factual information to Political leaders
counter-misinformation and Civil leaders
propaganda Local populace
BPT conduct press Inform populace that the coalition Local populace
conference does not support any insurgent
groups or activities
Maneuver Engage key regional and Reduce support for insurgency forces Political leaders
local leaders Civil leaders
Hard-liners/extremists
Disseminate PSYOP print Influence attitudes towards Local populace
products insurgency activities
IO Endstate: Popular support for insurgent activities and violence are neutralized.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 D-3


Table D-4. Violent Demonstration
IO Concept: Coalition forces influence local leaders and populace to discontinue their violent protests /
demonstrations, setting the conditions for return to a safe and secure environment.
Element Task Purpose Target Audience
TF Cmd Group N/A N/A N/A
PSYOP Provide one TPT direct Facilitate crowd control Demonstrators/
support to maneuver protestors
forces
Broadcast radio Warn of possible sanctions to be Local leaders
messages imposed against the populace Local populace
CA Engage local leaders Elicit and maintain support in dissuading Political leaders
violence and identifying instigators and Civil leaders
dissuading violent activity
Inform of possible sanctions against Political leaders
opština Civil leaders
Engage demonstration Mediate a resolution to the problem Demonstration leaders
leaders
Engage local leaders or Gain support for possible sanctions Local leaders
administrator against populace Local populace
Assess local leader and Gauge public attitudes toward coalition Civil leaders
populace attitudes after forces Local populace
demonstrations end
PA BPT issue press Disseminate factual information to Political leaders
releases counter-misinformation and propaganda Civil leaders
Local populace
Maneuver Engage demonstration Mediate a resolution to the problem Demonstration leaders
leaders
Disseminate PSYOP Influence populace to cease violent Local populace
print products and activity
conduct face-to-face
operations
IO Endstate: The local populace does not engage in violent activities that interfere with or degrade unit efforts to
maintain a safe and secure environment.

D-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix E
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO)/CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

1. Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA) Forces


a. By its very nature, cordon and search operations involve close interaction with the
civilian population whether they are conducted in urban or rural environments. CMO, no matter
what scale, must be incorporated into the deliberate planning process. Commanders must take
into account the affect that cordon and search operations will have on the civilian populace.
CMO is a commander’s responsibility. Past operations have clearly indicated the need for CMO
planning, perception management, and relations improvement. Where CA forces are not
available, commanders rely on the judgment and maturity of small unit leaders and their level of
cultural awareness when dealing with indigenous populations. Although these leaders clearly
demonstrate a high level of adaptability, one negative act or poor decision can have incredible
implications at the strategic and/or national level. With the right tools to deal with civilians,
commanders can conduct these complex operations successfully, with minimum risk to their
Service members and Marines while ensuring the safety of innocent civilians.
b. Army and Marine Corps civil affairs forces are designed to assist the commander in
planning CMO and in conducting civil affairs operations (CAO) and activities. If used properly,
civil affairs forces can help to mitigate the negative effects of the shear intrusive nature of
cordon and search operations on the general civilian populace. Reducing or eliminating the
negative effects of cordon and search operations can potentially result in significant gains in
information, intelligence, and cooperation for future missions. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-
Military Operations, states “These forces [civil affairs forces] are designed to secure support
from the civilian population, fulfill important civil requirements consistent with military missions,
and create as positive an effect as possible on friends, allies, and governing authorities.”
c. CMO plans must include measures to reduce capability gaps when civil affairs forces are
not available. An effective technique to bridge this gap is to create spheres of influence (SOI).
SOI is a non-doctrinal term that the American Heritage Dictionary defines as a territorial area
over which political or economic influence is wielded by one nation.
d. As part of the CMO concept of the operation, SOI methodology is designed to separate
the responsibilities for liaison with civil authorities between company, battalion, and brigade
levels of command and to retain command and authority at the lowest level in order to make
decisions regarding civil and host nation military matters. In effect, each commander from
brigade down to company level is assigned liaison responsibilities with the appropriate level of
civil authority. Examples include the following: District advisory councils (DACs), senior police
chiefs, key city clerics, business leaders, and local media at the brigade command level;
neighborhood advisory councils (NACs), police desk sergeants, religious leaders, and
nongovernmental organizations/governmental organizations (NGO/GO) representatives at the
battalion command level; and individuals and contacts at the company command level.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 E-1


2. Civil Affairs Team Task Organization
Over 90% of Army civil affairs forces come from the reserve component. These teams are
normally composed of four to six personnel. Many Army CA teams are staffed with female
soldiers, which are invaluable when dealing with the indigenous female population. Civil affairs
teams operate with two tactical vehicles and one or two squad automatic weapons (SAW). One
or more CA teams may be task organized to support a maneuver battalion. The team is capable
of limited self-defense; however, it must be allocated or travel with a security element while
conducting CA activities. Marine CA forces will come from a reserve component Marine civil
affairs group (CAG). However, Army CA forces may be attached to Marine units when CAG
personnel are not available.

3. CA During Planning
Civil affairs forces can be utilized during all phases of cordon and search operations. Civil
affairs planning teams (CAPTs) augment staffs and assist commanders at brigade and higher
level with CMO planning. CA teams in direct support of maneuver battalion commanders are
also capable of conducting CMO planning. Civil affairs planners and operators at all levels are
the direct link between ground forces and local authorities, to include nongovernmental and
governmental organizations and agencies. In many cases, maneuver units may fall in on and
receive attachment of CA forces that are already operating in the AO. CA forces may have
already established productive relationships with local authorities and tribal leaders and can
advise the commander on the atmospherics of the area to include cultural nuances,
identification of key leaders, personalities, and tribal alliances. CA forces routinely conduct
village and urban infrastructure assessments and may already have detailed databases
developed to support planning and execution of operations from combat to stability and
reconstruction.

4. Movement to the Objective


During deliberate cordon and search operations and if operations security (OPSEC) permits,
CA forces can communicate intentions of maneuver commanders, the reason for the operation,
gain cooperation, and set the conditions for successful cordon and knock type operations
immediately prior to or during the establishment of outer cordons and successive inner cordons.
CA forces can also coordinate and operate with tactical PSYOP loudspeaker teams to address
larger audiences and assist in controlling crowds. As with CA teams, PYSOP teams should be
augmented or travel with a security element if available.

5. During Search Operations


If available, civil affairs operators can play a role in search operations. CA forces will almost
always have local national interpreters assigned to them and in many cases will have a CAT II
or CAT III interpreter assigned. CA forces that have operated in an area for extended periods
will have established a solid relationship with these interpreters. Civil affairs team members can
function as the primary point of contact during “administrative or soft type” searches, acting to
calm fears, increase cooperation and understanding, as well as distracting the occupants from
the search. This frees platoon, company, and battalion level commanders to do their jobs of
commanding and controlling the cordon and search operation. As mentioned earlier, Army CA
teams may be staffed with female CA operators that are fully capable of conducting a full range
of civil affairs related activities. These activities will include general interaction with females and

E-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


liaison with key female local government representatives. This is especially important when
dealing with the sensitive cultural issues of women in many countries. If other female Service
members or female MPs are not available, female CA operators can assist in searching local
female household members and female detainees as long as they are properly trained in search
techniques. CA forces can also coordinate assistance from local law enforcement or tribal
leadership to ensure there is a “local face” on the operation.

6. Post Operation
One of the keys to successful CMO is the prevention or mitigation of negative activities on
the part of friendly forces. Destruction of property is probably the most prevalent negative result
of cordon and search operations but it is usually the easiest to remedy. Damage cannot be
avoided during dynamic entries. Civil affairs teams can assist in identifying and documenting
damaged items, assist in the claims process, and direct complainants to the proper authorities
by coordinating with the local staff judge advocate (SJA). Civil affairs teams are also familiar
with the funding sources used to compensate victims. One of these sources is the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program or CERP fund. It is imperative that CA operators
have access to these funds to help in mitigating property damage and to fund immediate impact
projects such as wells. One technique is to develop pre-packages of humanitarian assistance
(HA) supplies that can be distributed after the cordon and search operations. CA teams can
coordinate the distribution of these supplies based on previous needs assessments. HA
supplies may include rations (wheat, rice, etc.), building materials and tools, or clothing items.
Along with remedying property damage and distributing HA supplies, CA forces may be involved
in claims procedures for non-combatant loss of life. Civil affairs forces may disburse payments
through a civil-military operations center (CMOC) or may use local nationals to disperse
payments through a civilian coordination center. The key to the remedy process is to never
promise anything you can’t deliver.

7. Cooperative Medical Assistance (CMA)


CMA or medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs) are high payoff events that can sway a
population or group in a positive direction. Most war torn areas are in dire need of even the
most rudimentary level of health care. Civil affairs teams routinely assess public health systems
as a core capability. Where there is a lack of host nation medical and veterinary capabilities,
CA forces can coordinate and temporarily supplement these activities using reachback medical
capabilities within the CA battalion, CA brigade, or at the JTF level. Commanders must decide
when these operations can be safely conducted and when they can be most beneficial.
Veterinary services should not be ignored especially in agrarian societies. Rural populations
have very close ties with their livestock. Well planned veterinary civic action programs
(VETCAPs) can be used to leverage cooperation and information from these sources. It is
important to note that these activities must be tied to a central relief plan and coordinated with
the appropriate civilian agencies to reduce duplication of effort and minimize dependence on the
military.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 E-3


8. Conclusion
Tactical level civil affairs teams can be an invaluable asset to the maneuver commander
during cordon and search operations. CA activities related to cordon and search operations
include populace and resource control, host nation support, and some measure of humanitarian
and civic assistance (HCA). Civil affairs teams are an important tool for the commander in
mitigating the negative effects of intrusive cordon and search operations and are the link to
transitioning to stability operations. Commanders should leverage these assets while planning
and conducting CMO support to cordon and search operations.

E-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix F
REHEARSALS

1. Rehearsal Overview
Rehearsals are used to prepare for upcoming missions. Generic rehearsals are worthwhile,
but rehearsals should include mission-specific rehearsals. They are not a discussion of what is
supposed to happen. They should test subordinates understanding of the plan. Rehearsals
should also include vignette training to reinforce understanding of ROE when practical. The
commander uses well planned, efficiently run rehearsals to accomplish the following:
(1) Reinforce training and increase proficiency on critical tasks.
(2) Reveal weakness or problems in the plan, leading to further refinement of the plan or
development of additional branch plans.
(3) Integrate the actions of subordinate elements.
(4) Confirm coordination requirements between the company team and adjacent units.
(5) Improve each Service member's understanding of the concept of the operation, the
direct fire plan, anticipated contingencies, and possible actions and reactions for various
situations that may arise during the operation.
(6) Ensure that seconds-in-command are prepared to execute in their leaders absence.

2. Rehearsal Principals
a. Determine attendees, location, and uniform.
b. Prioritize events to rehearse.
c. Start with generic rehearsals, then conduct mission-specific rehearsals after the
operation order (OPORD) is given.
d. Attempt to rehearse as many phases of the mission as possible using different rehearsal
techniques.
e. Rehearse on terrain/under conditions similar to execution.
f. Rehearse the plan initially, then continue to rehearse contingencies based on the seven
forms of contact.

3. Rehearsal Types
a. Confirmation Brief: involves entire unit.
(1) Confirms that everyone understands the plan.
(2) Conducted immediately prior to departure from friendly lines.
b. Reduced Force: involves only selected leaders.
c. Full Force: involves entire unit.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 F-1


d. Communications Rehearsals. Key leaders practice combat reporting procedures to
include:
(1) Contact Reports
(2) CASEVAC Requests
(3) Accountability Reports
(4) SITREPs to Higher Headquarters

4. Rehearsal Techniques
a. Talk through:
(1) Oral: cover SOPs and mission expectations.
(2) Map: use a map/overlay to brief the plan.
(3) Radio: review sequence of events using FM radio net.
(4) Terrain model: graphically depict terrain/control measures.
b. Walk through:
(1) Rock Drill: subordinates move rock to simulate actions.
(2) Key Leader: use key leaders to physically rehearse.
(3) Full Dress: entire unit, similar conditions as execution.

F-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table F-1. Rehearsal Checklist
General
Determine Attendees/Role Call
Intelligence/Reconnaissance Update
Movement Plan from FOB to Staging Area or Release Point:
actions on contact en route
CP Location
Net Structure—communications exercise—Ground Communications (FM,
handheld), Ground-to-air Communications
Execution Matrix
Interpreter Plan
Go No Go Criteria
Outer Cordon
Task/Purpose
Order of March
Roll-over Drills
Establishment of TCP
Civil Disturbance
Detainee Plan
Actions on Contact
Signals
Bypass Criteria
Direct Fire Plan
Compromise Plan
Withdrawal
Inner Cordon
Task/Purpose
Order of March
Roll-over Drills
Occupation
Civil Disturbance
Actions on Contact
Engagement Priorities
Signals
Bypass Criteria
Direct Fire Plan
Compromise Plan
Withdrawal

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 F-3


Table F-1. Rehearsal Checklist
Search
Task/Purpose
Order of March
Roll-over Drills
Occupation
Civil Disturbance
Special Teams
Actions on Contact
Engagement Priorities
Casualty Collection and Evacuation
Demo Misfire
Signals
Bypass Criteria
Direct Fire Plan
Compromise Plan
Withdrawal
Detainee Plan
Transportation for Detainees
Captured Material Plan
Transportation of Captured Material
QRF/Reserve Plan
Commitment Criteria
Staging Plan
Movement Plan
Roll-over Drills
Link up Plan
Contingencies for Each Phase of the Operation
Aviation
Communication frequency
JTAC/FAC present and location
Media Plan
Security and Location
CASEVAC Plan
Occupation of casualty collection points (CCPs)
For Each Separate Element to the CCP
CCP to Higher Headquarters (Air or Ground Evacuation Plan)

F-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix G
INTERPRETER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Interpreter Considerations
a. Enablers. Enable communication between a provider and a client who do not speak the
same language.
(1) Enable communication as if no language barrier existed.
(2) Culture mediation.
(3) Recognize cultural barriers that impede effective communication.
• Social Values
• Time
• Authority
(4) Styles of communication.
(5) Determine in advance any specialized vocabulary to be used.
(6) Maintain a professional relationship with both parties in order to appear unbiased.
(7) Strive to remain objective without display of personal emotion.
(8) Perform duties as unobtrusively as possible.
b. Interpreter's Role.
(1) Accurate interpretation of what is said, without embellishments, omissions, or editing.
Including vulgar or embarrassing comments.
(2) Maintain the tone and style of the speaker.
(3) Never correct facts presented by a speaker.
(4) Conduct communication in the first person.
Note: The interviewer speaks directly to the subject, not through the interpreter. Example:
Use the phrase “What is your name?” NOT “Ask him what his name is.”
c. Modes of Interpreting.
(1) Consecutive. Recommended. Speaker completes a phrase or thought followed by
the interpreter's re-stating in the target language.
(2) Simultaneous. NOT recommended. Interpreter speaks almost contemporaneously
with the speaker.
(3) Summary. NOT recommended.
• Interpreter listens to the speech of a speaker then summarizes and condenses
the thoughts.
• Opportunity is great for omission of necessary information.
(4) Intervention. An interpreter may at times need to intervene, or interrupt, during an
interpreted session. For instance when:
• They did not hear correctly or completely.
• They need to clarify a technical term.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 G-1


• They were interrupted by other parties.
• They state the interpretation is not yet complete.
Note: The speaker needs to be aware not to exceed the interpreter's retention limits and to
stop speaking to allow the interpreter to translate.

d. Pre-mission Guides. The interpreter's introduction to both the unit commander and the
first line leader should include:
(1) Who they are and their role in the communication.
(2) What hand signals they may use if needing to interrupt.
(3) Assures they interpret the exact words and will not change the meaning or intent.
(4) Assures that the military personnel have received the same instructions regarding the
interpreted session.
e. Positioning. The interpreter is most aware of what is actually occurring during the
interpreted session and is responsible for facilitating the best possible communication.
(1) Triangulation, the first line leader and HUMINT source are facing each other with the
interpreter seated or standing equal distance from each party. The interpreter remains out of
reach of the HUMINT source unless culture dictates other positioning.
(2) The first line leader should speak directly to the HUMINT source in first person, not to
the interpreter.
(3) The first line leader should continue to look directly at the HUMINT source as the
interpreter translates the first line leader's comments.
(4) The interpreter should not engage in private conversation with indigenous personnel
in front of the first line leader.
f. Conduct and Ethics.
(1) Will remain impartial.
(2) Will excuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest.
(3) Will not disclose confidential information acquired in the course of official duty.
(4) Will not use their position to secure unwarranted privileges or exemptions for
themselves or others.

Table G-1. Interpreter Checklist


Ensure interpreters have the proper equipment (Kevlar, flak vest, chow, water, etc.).
They can assist with the development of signs or hand bills written in the appropriate language.
Their Allocation and Placement:
• One interpreter per separate element if possible. If not, place at positions where contact with
the locals are most likely (blocking positions, search element, etc.).
• Ensure they speak the right dialect, and have the same religious and ethnic background.
Use Civil Affairs (CA) and/or tactical HUMINT teams (THTs) with interpreter to conduct interviews
and debriefs.
Mission Knowledge and Integration (operational security [OPSEC]): Prepare interpreter for known
meetings.
Control of Interpreters:
Who, What, When, Where and Why

G-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


2. Other Products Available to Facilitate Translation
a. Interpreters are a very limited asset. Utilization of other means or products available to
facilitate communication with other languages and cultures may allow the sparse number of
interpreters to be more strategically placed. Some personnel may have a limited ability of the
host nation language and can be used a “phraselator”. Meaning that they cannot translate but
can get a basic understanding of what the other person may be trying to communicate.
b. Hand-held electronic “phraselators” have been deployed as prototypes in OEF/OIF.
c. DARPA sponsors a pilot program called “Call-a-Translator” service available 24/7 in all
the major world languages.
d. The table below is an example of a smart card used in Iraq. It can be developed for any
language where US forces are stationed.

Table G-2. Example Smart Card Used in Iraq


COMMAND & CONTROL
Stop / Awgfu Do not move / La Tit-har-rak
Lower your hands / Nez-luEid-kum Turn around / Du-ru Li-wa-ra
Drop your weapons / Theb-buu Es-lah-kum Move / It-har-rek
Hands up / Erfa-aauu Eid-kum Move slowly / It-har-ku Ala Kayf-kum
Come here / Ta-aal Ih-na No talking / La Teh-chi
Walk forward / It-qad-damo Li-ged-dam Surrender / Sel-lem Nef-sek
Come with me / Ta-aa-luu We-ya-yeh Calm down / Ala Kay-Fek, Ih-de
Do not resist / Let Qa-wim Form a line / Awg-Fu Bis-si-reh
Stay where you are / lb-quu-Ma-kan-kum One at a time / Wa-hed wa-ra El-tha-ni
Speak slowly / Eh-chi Ala Kay-fek Lie on your stomach / Namu Aal-g-aa
Ala Bat-ton-kum
NUMBERS
1 / Wahed 7 / Sab-a 40 / Aar-ba-aain 100 Mi-yeh
2 / Ithnayn 8 / Thamania 50 / Khamsin 1000 / Alt
3 / Thalatha 9 / Tis-a 60 / Sit-tin More than / Akthar
4 / Ar-ba-a 10 / Ash-rah 70 / Sab-aain Less than / A-qel Min
5 / Khamsa 20 / Aash-rin 80 / Thamanin
6 / Sit-ta 30 / Thalathin 90 / Tis-aain

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 G-3


Table G-2. Example Smart Card Used in Iraq
BASIC PHRASES
QUESTIONS
Is it far? / Hu-wa Ba-aaid? Do you speak English? / Tehchee inglizi?
Who? / Minu? Do you need help? / The-taj Mu-sa-aa-deh?
What? / Shinu? Where are you injured? / Wayn Mi-taa-wer?
Do you need ……? / Tehtaj…..? Do you have …..? / Aa-en-dek….?
Which direction? / Ib-ya-It-ti-jah? Who is in charge? / Minu almes-ul
How many? / Ish-ged? Do you understand? / De-tif-te-him?
When? / Yemte? I do not understand. / A-nee Meda Af-te-him
Where? / Wayn? Do you have _____? / Aan-dek
HELPFUL WORDS / PHRASES
Hello / Marhaba Weapon / Is-lah
Help me / Sa-aaid-ni We are Americans / Ih-na amerikan
Yes / no / E / Laa Good-bye / Ma-aa sa-la-ma, Alah We-ya-kum
North / Shamal Thank you / Shukran
East / Sharq Good / Bad / Zayn / Mu zayn
Food / Ak-kel South / Jenub
Danger / Khatar West / Gharb
Medicine / Du-wa Water / Mai
Mines / Algam

G-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix H
COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communications Planning Checklist

Table H-1. Communications Checklist


Standardize the vehicle/person marking system (ground and air).
Conduct communications exercise to ensure all elements have the ability to
communicate.
Plan for long range communications capabilities.
Ensure heavy (tanks) and light (Infantry) forces have communication integration.
Standardize signals and SOPs.

2. Building Marking for Communications of Ground Maneuver Forces on the


Objective
a. Example 1 of a unit SOP for signals/markings:
(1) Entrance to Buildings
• Day: (primary) White engineer tape, taped onto pole/stake at entrance.
(alternate) Orange VS-17/VS-5 panel taped onto a pole/stake at entrance.
• Night: (primary) Any color chemlight taped onto a pole/stake at the entrance
with the color of the chemlight facing towards friendly forces. (alternate)
Orange VS-17/VS-5 panel taped onto a pole/stake at entrance with the addition
a guide.

(2) Cleared Building


• Day: (primary) VS-17/VS-5 panel, orange trash bag hung outside a window
facing the friendly forces. (alternate) Engineer tape hung outside a window
facing the friendly forces. Mark each floor as it is cleared.
• Night: (primary) VS-17/VS-5 panel hung outside with chemlights exposed
hanging outside the window facing the friendly forces. (alternate) Any colored
chemlight attached to engineer tape and hung outside a window facing friendly
forces. Mark each floor as cleared.
(3) Cleared Rooms
• Day: (primary) Chalk mark in designated design (square, circle, triangle, etc.)
next to door. (alternate) Paint replaces chalk.
• Night: (primary) Chemlight above doorway. (alternate) Chemlight in room,
chemlight at doorway.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 H-1


b. Example 2 of a unit SOP for signals/markings:
(1) Entry Points. Entry points will be marked with two Wolf Tails flanking each side of the
entry point. (See figure H-1 depicting a Wolf Tail marking.)
(2) Cleared Rooms. Rooms cleared will be marked with the Wolf Tails (minus the 9 volt
batteries) at the entrance of each room. Follow-on forces do not have to enter a room to
determine that it has been cleared.
(3) Floor Clear. When a floor is clear it will be marked with a Wolf Tail marking device
with the chemlight activated and the 9-volt batteries making contact shorting them out causing a
heat signature that can be picked up easily by thermal sights. It will be hung from the windows
facing the SBF and other follow on forces. This marking can also be used as a signal to shift
fire from the floor immediately above or below (depending on the order of floors to be cleared) to
the next floor in the clearance sequence.
(4) Building Clear. Using a Modified Wolf Tail, the signaler will first twirl the signal
approximately 6-10 times while in view of a window on the support side of the building. This
ensures that the support element will be able to obtain the visual signal easily. He then secures
the signal to the window frame where it will be in full view outside of the building.

H-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Figure H-1. Wolf Tail

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 H-3


3. Target Marking and Friendly Positions from Aviation Urban Ops
a. When working in close proximity to friendly forces, marking and positively locating
friendly units and targets are critical. Procedures must be clearly understood and all
participants must be issued the appropriate devices. Marks must be visible to ground/air forces,
compatible with fielded systems and all personnel must be familiar with friendly marking
systems. Friendly force marking is limited only by the creativity of the ground forces and
aircrews. Aircrews require positive location of the target and must be able to deconflict
weapons effects from friendly positions before expending ordnance. Positive air-to-ground
communications are essential to coordinate and authenticate markings. Table H-2 lists some
common marking methods and describes their characteristics. All personnel must understand
the strengths and weaknesses of available methods and equipment and how they pertain to
urban conditions. The appropriate method, equipment, or equipment combination must be
chosen for the conditions at hand. The following paragraphs address several factors to
consider when using marking methods and equipment.
b. Visual signaling or marking of positions aids determination of friendly force location.
During building clearing operations, the progress of friendly units (both horizontally and
vertically) may be marked with spray paint or bed sheets hung out of windows. Often, the
simplest methods are the best. Traditional signaling devices, such as flares, strobes, and
signaling mirrors may be effective, as well. Target marking or an orientation on enemy positions
may also be accomplished using signaling procedures. Common techniques include the use of
smoke, laser, IR pointers, or tracers. Devices are available which aid in the recognition of
friendly forces under difficult battlefield conditions. Fluid tactical situations, intermingling of
forces, and urban terrain all contribute to difficulty in identifying friendly troops and equipment.
The use of gated laser intensifier (GLINT) tape, combat ID panels, radar, and IR beacons assist
in the ID of friendly ground forces on urban terrain. Standardized usage of ground lighting,
thermal contrast, and interposition of structures influence the effectiveness of these devices.

Table H-2. Target and Friendly Marking Methods


METHOD* DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY TARGET REMARKS
NIGHT TO MARKS2 MARKS
SMOKE D/N UNAIDED1 GOOD GOOD Easily identifiable, may
obscure target or warn of
fire support employment.
Placement may be difficult
due to structures.
SMOKE (IR) D/N FLIR GOOD GOOD Easily identifiable, may
UNAIDED1 obscure target or warn of
fire support employment.
Placement may be difficult
due to structures. Night
marking is greatly
enhanced by the use of IR
reflective smoke.
1
ILLUMINATION, D/N UNAIDED N/A GOOD Easily identified, may
GROUND BURST NVG wash out NVGs.

H-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Table H-2. Target and Friendly Marking Methods
METHOD* DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY TARGET REMARKS
NIGHT TO MARKS2 MARKS
SIGNAL MIRROR D UNAIDED1 GOOD N/A Dependent on weather
and available light and
may be lost in reflections
from other reflective
surfaces (windshields,
windows, water, etc.).
May be confused with
muzzle flashes.
SPOT LIGHT N UNAIDED1 GOOD MARGINAL Could warn of fire support
NVG employment.
Effectiveness is
dependent upon degree
of urban lighting.
IR SPOT LIGHT N NVG GOOD MARGINAL Less likely to compromise
than overt light.
Effectiveness dependent
upon degree of urban
lighting.
IR POINTER (below N NVG GOOD MARGINAL Effectiveness dependent
.4 watts) upon degree of urban
lighting.
IR POINTER (above N NVG GOOD GOOD Less affected by ambient
.4 watts) light and weather
conditions.
VISIBLE POINTER N UNAIDED1 GOOD MARGINAL Effectiveness dependant
NVG upon degree of urban
lighting.
LASER D/N HELLFIRE N/A GOOD Restrictive laser
DESIGNATOR LASER acquisition cone and
MAV requires LOS to target.
LASER Requires coordination of
SPOT laser codes.
TRACKER
TRACER D/N UNAIDED1 N/A MARGINAL May be difficult to
NVG distinguish mark from
other gunfire. During
daytime use, may be
more effective to kick up
dust surrounding target.
ELECTRONIC D/N SEE GOOD GOOD Good friendly marking
BEACON REMARKS device for AC-130 and
some USAF fixed-wing
(not compatible with Navy
or Marine aircraft). Least
impeded by urban terrain.
Can be used as a TRP for
target identification.
Coordination with
aircrews essential to
ensure equipment and
training compatibility.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 H-5


Table H-2. Target and Friendly Marking Methods
METHOD* DAY/ VISIBLE FRIENDLY TARGET REMARKS
NIGHT TO MARKS2 MARKS
STROBE (OVERT) N UNAIDED1 MARGINAL N/A Effectiveness dependent
NVG upon degree of urban
lighting. May be confused
with muzzle flashes.
STROBE (IR) N NVG GOOD N/A Effectiveness dependent
upon degree of urban
lighting. Coded strobes
aid in acquisition. May be
confused with muzzle
flashes.
HANDHELD D/N UNAIDED1 GOOD N/A Easily identified by
SIGNAL FLARE NVG aircrew.
(OVERT)
HANDHELD N NVG GOOD N/A Easily identified by
SIGNAL FLARE (IR) aircrew.
GLINT TAPE N AC-130 GOOD N/A Not readily detectable by
NVG enemy. Not effective in
highly lit areas.
COMBAT D/N ALL FLIR MARGINAL N/A Provides temperature
IDENTIFICATION contrast on vehicles or
PANEL buildings. May be
obscured by urban terrain.
VS-17 PANEL D UNAIDED1 GOOD3 N/A Only visible during
daylight. Easily obscured
by structures. Not visible
to sensors without color
capability.
CHEMICAL HEAT D/N FLIR POOR N/A Easily masked by urban
SOURCES (i.e., structures and lost in
MRE Heaters) thermal clutter. Difficult to
acquire.
SPINNING CHEM N UNAIDED1 GOOD N/A Provides unique signa-
LIGHT (OVERT) NVG ture. May be obscured by
structures. Provides a
distinct signature easily
recognized. Effectiveness
dependent upon degree
of urban lighting.
FLIR TAPE D/N FLIR GOOD N/A Best at lower slant
ranges.
SPINNING CHEM N NVG GOOD N/A Provides unique
LIGHT (IR) signature. May be
obscured by structures.
Effectiveness dependent
upon degree of urban
lighting.

H-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


Appendix I
URBAN AREA REFERENCE SYSTEM
1. Urban Grids and Reference Techniques

It is essential for all forces to use the same reference system. Ground maneuver elements
generally use a terrain-based reference system during urban operations. Main urban areas can
be overlaid with a simple grid reference. Scale of the grid should relate to distance common to
urban engagements while still making it usable as a quick reference for approximate initial
location of interest. Using the convention of basic alpha/numerical sector techniques becomes
almost second nature so that when a network broadcast such as “Hardrock is taking fire from
building 12” is heard, it cages every air assets eyes in the general vicinity of the activity. After
the grid overlay is laid, make analysis of the major routes through the urban area and label them
with code names (route iron, gold, lead, Detroit, Michigan, Boston, et al.) and use as common
references with air and ground forces (i.e., everyone from the convoy truck drivers to tactical
aircraft). Finally as time and mission objectives allow, add basic named areas of interest (such
as cloverleaves, bridges and other choke points) to the template. Military joint planners can
produce the required detail overlay for an entire area of responsibility (AOR) very quickly prior to
commencement of hostilities (they can easily be conceived as parts of operation plans
[OPLANs] as well). Reference grids allow quick correlation between air assets and ground
assets. Regardless of the system used, an established call for fire procedures must be used.
Aircrew should be prepared to transition to the system in use by the ground element upon
arrival in the objective area. For example, following the initial call for fire format, references to
the objective or target may include local landmarks such as, “The third floor of building 5d.” This
transition should be facilitated by using a “big to small” acquisition technique. Detail can be
added as the situation dictates, up to and including numbering and identification of all structures
within each grid.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-1


2. Building Numbering SOPs
a. All buildings in the objective area are numbered—figure I-1.

Figure I-1. Building Numbering System

b. If the area is large, the numbers should be subdivided by objectives or other means—
figure I-2.

Figure I-2. Building Numbering System With Many Buildings

I-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


c. Other examples—figures I-3 and I-4.

Figure I-3. Urban Area Reference System

Figure I-4. Target Reference Point

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 I-3


d. Walls, Floors, and Apertures: Each wall of a building is then labeled with a color
according to its cardinal orientation. The northern-most wall is GREEN, the eastern most is
RED, the southern most is BLACK and the western most is BLUE. Apertures in each wall are
labeled from the ground floor left to top floor right alphabetically from A and numerically from 1.

I-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


REFERENCES
Joint Publications

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary, May 2005.


JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, December 2003
JP 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task
Force Operations, December 2001.
JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998.
JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)
3 September 2003.
JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, April 2003.
JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, October 1998.
JIISO Handbook, CF and SOF Integration and Interoperability Handbook, June 2005.

Multi-Service

FM 3-06.1/MCRP 3-35.3A/NTTP 3-01.04/AFTTP(I) 3-2.29, Multi-Service Tactics,


Techniques, and Procedures for Aviation Urban Operations, July 2005.
FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.40, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations, October 2003.
FM 3-100/MCRP 3-25D/NTTP 3-52.1A/AFTTP(I) 3-2.16, Multi-Service Procedures for
Integrated Combat airspace Command and Control, June 2000.
FM 4-01.45/MCRP 4-11.3H/NTTP 4-01.3/AFTTP(I) 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations, March 2005.

Army

CALL Handbook Cordon and Search, July 2004.


FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004.
FM 3-06, Urban Operations, June 2003.
FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, April 2004.
FM 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics Techniques and Procedures, August 2002.
FM I 3-07.22, Counter Insurgency Operations, October 2004.
FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms in Urban Terrain, February 2002.
FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, December 1990.
FM 7-21, The Infantry Battalion, April 1992.
FM 3-21.71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon-Squad, August 2002.
FM 3-21.11, SBCT Infantry Rifle Company, January 2003.

Marine Corps

MCRP 3-11.1, A Commanders Tactical Notebook, July 1988.


USMC Small Wars Manual, 1940.
MCIP 3-35.01, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reduction of Urban Area
Strongpoints.

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 References-1


This page is intentionally left blank.
GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS


A
AAR after action report
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
ABF assault by fire
ACF anti-coalition forces
ADA air defense artillery
AFI Air Force Instruction
AI area of interest
AID Agency for International Development
ALO air liaison officer
ALOC air lines of communication
ALSA Air Land Sea Application
AM amplitude modulation
AMC Air Mission Commander
Ammo ammunition
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
AP armor-piercing
APC armored personnel carrier
AR Army regulation
ARFOR Army forces
ARNG Army National Guard
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASOC air support operations center
ASP ammunition supply point
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATO air tasking order
ATP advanced targeting pods
AWACS airborne warning and control system
B
BDA bomb damage assessment
BDE brigade
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BII basic issue items
Bn battalion
BOLO be on the look out
BP battle position
BPT be prepared to
BSA brigade support area
C
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CA civil affairs
CAB civil affairs battalion

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-1


CAG civil affairs group
CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAO civil affairs operations
CAPT civil affairs planning team
CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CAT commercially available technology
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCA close combat attacks
CCDTV charged coupled device television
CCP casualty collection point
CD channel designator
CEA captured enemy ammunition
CEE captured enemy equipment
CERP Commanders Emergency Response Program
CF conventional forces
CG commanding general
CGRS common geographic reference system
CI counterintelligence
CINC Commander in Chief
CIP combat identification panels
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLO chief logistics officer
CLU command launch unit
CMA cooperative medical assistance
CMD command
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CO commanding officer
Co company
COA course of action
COB civilian on the battlefield
COMJSOTF commander, joint special operations task force
com communications
COMSEC communications security
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CP command post
CQC close quarters combat
CRC control and reporting center
CS combat support
CSS combat service support
CSSB combat service support battalion (Marine)
CTA common table of allowance
CUCV commercial utility cargo vehicles
D
DA direct action
DAC district advisory council
DART downed aircraft recovery team
DASC direct air support center (USMC)

Glossary-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


DASC(A) direct air support center (airborne) (USMC)
DOB date of birth
DOCEX document and computer exploitation
doc document
DOS Department of State
DTV day television
DVO direct view optics
E
ECC evacuation control center
ECP entry control point
EO electro-optical
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPW enemy prisoner of war
equip equipment
ESF emergency support function
ETA estimated time of arrival
ext extensive
F
FA field artillery
FAC forward air controller
FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FDC fire direction center
FID foreign internal defense
FIST fire support team
FLIR forward-looking infrared
FLSG force logistic support group
FM field manual
FO forward observer
FOB forward operating base
FOD field operation division
FRACASS flexibility, rehearsals, appearance, control, all-round defense,
speed, and surprise
FRAGO fragmentary order
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
ft foot
FW fixed-wing
G
GI&S geospatial information and services
GARS global area reference system
GME ground maneuver element
GO government organization
GP general purpose
GPS global positioning system
GSA General Services Administration

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-3


GSB group support battalion
GSR ground surveillance radar
H
HA humanitarian assistance
HE high explosive
HEAT high explosive antitank
HE-OR high explosive obstacle reduction
HE-OR-T high explosive obstacle reduction with tracer
HET human exploitation team
HF high frequency
HHD headquarters and headquarters detachment
HMMWV high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HN host nation
HNSF host-nation security forces
HPT high payoff target
HQ headquarters
hr hour
HSS health service support
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high value target
I
IAW in accordance with
ID identification
IDM improved data modem
IDN initial distribution number
IED improvised explosive device
IFF identification, friend or foe
IMC instrument meteorological condition
in inch
INS inertial navigation system
INSCOM United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
insurg insurgents
IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR information requirement; infrared
ISB intermediate staging base
ISF indigenous security force
ISR intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
J, K
JAG Judge Advocate General
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC joint forces air component commander
JFLCC joint forces land component commander
JISE joint intelligence support element
JP joint publication
JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center
JSOA joint special operations area
JSOTF joint special operations task force
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack and radar system
JTAC joint tactical air controller

Glossary-4 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


JTF joint task force
JUO joint urban operations
L
L logistics element
LAV light-armored vehicle
LAW light antitank weapon
LNO liaison officer
LOC line of communication
LOGEEI logistics essential elements of information
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
M
m meter
MAGTF Marine air ground task force
maint maintenance
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCCLL Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
MCO major combat operation
MCPDS Marine Corps Publication Distribution System
MCS military capabilities studies
MDMP military decision making process
MEDCAP medical civic action program
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
METL mission-essential task list
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available—time available [USMC]
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, civil considerations
MG major general
MILES multiple-integrated laser engagement system
mm millimeter
MMW millimeter wave
MOPP mission-oriented protection posture
MOS military occupational specialty
MOUT military operations on urban terrain
MP military police
MPA mission planning agent
MPAT multipurpose antitank
mph miles per hour
MRE meal, ready-to-eat
msn mission
MSR main supply route
MTT mobile training team
MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures
MWR morale, welfare, and recreation
N
NAC neighborhood advisory council
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treat Organization

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-5


NAVFOR Navy forces
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NCA National Command Authority
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NCS National Communications System
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NFA no-fire areas
NG National Guard
NGO nongovernmental organization
NOD night optical device
NSN National Stock Number
NVD night vision device
NVG night vision goggle
NWDC Navy Warfare Development Command
O
O/O on order
OC observer-controller
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment,
obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of
approach
OCONUS outside the continental United States
ODA operational detachment-Alpha
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OIC officer in charge
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OOM order of march
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPFOR opposing forces
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operational security
ORP objective rally point
P
PAO public affairs office
PCN publication control number
pen penetration
PEO peace enforcement operations
pers personnel
PEWD platoon early warning device
PID positive identification
PIR priority intelligence requirement
plt platoon
PM preventive maintenance
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
POC point of contact
POL petroleum, oils, lubricants
POW prisoner of war
psn position

Glossary-6 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


PSS personnel service support
PSYOP psychological operations
PVO private voluntary organization
PZ pickup zone
Q
QRF quick reaction force
R
RATELO radiotelephone operator
RC Reserve Component
RCA riot-control agent
rd round
REMBASS remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
req requirement
RFA restricted fire area
ROE rules of engagement
ROVER remotely operated video enhancement receiver
ROZ restricted operations zone
RP release point; rally point
RPG rocket propelled grenade
RUF rules for the use of force
S
S-1 Adjutant
S-2 Intelligence Officer
S-3 Operations and Training Officer
S-4 Supply Officer
S-5 Civil Affairs Officer (USA)
SA situational awareness
SAAF small-arms alignment fixture
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR synthetic aperture radar
SATCOM satellite communications
SAW squad automatic weapon
SBF support by fire
sec second
SF special forces
SFAOB special forces advance operation base
SFLE special forces liaison element
SIGINT signal intelligence
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SIR special intelligence requests
SITREP situation report
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SMAW shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon
SMAW-NE shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon-novel
explosive
SME subject matter expert
SO special operations
SOC special operations center
SOCCE special operations command and control element

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-7


SOCOORD special operations coordination element
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status-of-forces agreement
SOI spheres of influence
SOP standing operating procedures
SOSO LIC low-intensity conflict (obsolete) (new terminology: stability and
support operations)
SP start point
SPINS special instructions
spt support
SR special reconnaissance
SSE sensitive site exploitation
STANAG standardization agreement
STX situational training exercise
T
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TAC(A) tactical air controller (airborne)
TACC tactical air command center [USMC]]
TACP tactical air control party
TAI target area of interest
TALO tactical air liaison officer
TAPC tactical air operations center [{USMC]
TB technical bulletin
TCP traffic control point
TDTT temporarily disabling techniques/technology
tech technical
TF task force
THT tactical HUMINT team
TLP troop-leading procedures
TM technical manual
tng training
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOR term of reference
TOW tube launched, optically tracked, wire guided (missile)
TPT tactical PSYOP team
TRP target reference point
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
tvl travel
TVS television sensor
U
U unclassified
UAS unmanned aerial systems
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US United States
USA United States Army
USACAPOC United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command
USAF United States Air Force

Glossary-8 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
USPS United States Postal Services
UXO unexploded explosive ordnance
V
VBIED vehicle borne improvised explosive device
veh vehicle
VETCAP veterinary civic action program
VHF very high frequency
VIP very important person
W, X, Y, Z
wpn weapon
XO executive officer

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

battle damage assessment—The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the
application of military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a
predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to
the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and
special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military
operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence
responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators.
Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage
assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system
assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02)
casualty evacuation—The movement of casualties. It includes movement both to and
between medical treatment facilities. Any vehicle may be used to
evacuate casualties. Also called CASEVAC. (JP 1-02)
civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained,
and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support
civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)
civil disturbance—Group acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order. (JP
1-02.)
civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or
exploit relations between military forces, governmental and
nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian
populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to
facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US
objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military
forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local,
regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to,
during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if
directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military
operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military
forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called
CMO. (JP 1-02)
civil-military operations center—An ad hoc organization, normally established by the
geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander,

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-9


to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and
other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental
organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no
established structure, and its size and composition are situation
dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)
classes of supply—There are ten categories into which supplies are grouped in order to
facilitate supply management and planning. I. Rations and gratuitous
issue of health, morale, and welfare items. II. Clothing, individual
equipment, tentage, toolsets, and administrative and housekeeping
supplies and equipment. III. Petroleum, oils, and lubricants. IV.
Construction materiels. V. Ammunition. VI. Personal demand items. VII.
Major end items, including tanks, helicopters, and radios. VIII. Medical.
IX. Repair parts and components for equipment maintenance. X.
Nonstandard items to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture
and economic development.
combat camera—The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of
combat, information, humanitarian, special force, intelligence,
reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations
involving the Military Services. Also called COMCAM. (JP 1-02)
combined—Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or
services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be
identified, e.g., combined navies.) See also joint. (JP 1-02)
critical information—Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally
needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to
guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission
accomplishment. (JP 1-02)
detainee —A term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed
force. (JP 1-02)
force protection —Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of
Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and
critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential
so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the
coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to
enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading
opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to
defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also
called FP. (JP 1-02)
host nation—A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition
partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to
transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)
host-nation support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces
within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based
on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS.
(JP 1-02)
human intelligence—A category of intelligence derived from information collected and
provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02)
humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by
predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and
exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United
States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities.
Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical,

Glossary-10 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2)
construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well
drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary
construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit
training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the
local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)
international organization—An organization with global mandates, generally funded by
contributions from national governments. Examples include the
International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization
for Migration, and United Nations agencies. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)
interoperability—1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept
services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (JP 1-02)
joint—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more
Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)
joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of
Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an
existing joint task force commander. (JP 1-02)
law of war—That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also
called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)
nongovernmental organizations—Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain
a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional
associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with
a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development
and relief). Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)
nonlethal weapons—Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to
incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent
injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the
environment. a. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their
targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons
employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target
from functioning. b. Nonlethal weapons are intended to have one, or
both, of the following characteristics: (1) They have relatively reversible
effects on personnel or materiel. (2) They affect objects differently within
their area of influence. (JP 1-02)
objective—1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military
operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken
(for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is
essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability
without regard to terrain features). See also target. (JP 1-02)
objective area—A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be
captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by
competent authority for purposes of command and control. Also called
OA. (JP 1-02)
operations security—A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a.
identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence
systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might
obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical
information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Glossary-11


measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called
OPSEC. (JP 1-02)
psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators
to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior
favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)
quick reaction force—Any force with a specific mission to respond on very short notice,
typically less than 15 minutes. (FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP(I) 3-
2.40, MTTP for Conducting Peace Operations, Oct 2003)
reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection
methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or
potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (JP 1-02)
rules of engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered. Also called ROE. (JP-102)
security—1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all
acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition
that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective
measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or
influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents
unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is
safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 1-02)
target—1. An are a, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, or behavior
identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives,
guidance, and intent. Targets fall into two general categories: planned
and immediate. Also called TGT. See also objective area. (JP 1-02)
traffic control point —A designated spot on the ground or road network where military forces
control the traffic flow. (FM 3-07.31/MCWP 3-33.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.40,
MTTP for Conducting Peace Operations, Oct 2003)
unexploded explosive ordnance—Explosive ordnance which has been primed, fused, armed
or otherwise prepared for action, and which has been fired, dropped,
launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard
to operations, installations, personnel, or material and remains
unexploded either by malfunction or design or for any other cause. Also
called UXO. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-12 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 25 April 2006


INDEX

A Detainees ......................................................... III-20


digital camera...................................................... II-6
AAR............................................................. A-3, A-6
Dispersed Residential Area............................... II-11
AAV.......................................... A-7, A-8, A-10, A-11
Document and Computer Exploitation (DOCEX).. I-6
AC-130............................................... IV-8, H-5, H-6
Documentation Team......................................... III-8
ACF.................................................................... B-1
Downed aircraft ................................................. IV-8
air liaison officer ................................................. I-12
DVO ...........................................................IV-3, H-7
air officer ........................................................... IV-1
Airspace .............................................................. II-8 E
anti-coalition forces ............................................ B-1 ENEMY ................................................................ I-4
Armor ................................................................. III-4 Enemy Contraband .......................................... III-20
Artillery ..............................................................A-14 Engineers ..........................................................A-10
assault team..................................................... III-25 EO...................................................................... H-7
Assault Team .....................................................III-7 EPW................................................................... B-4
Attack to seize.................................................... A-1 Escalation of Force ..................................I-11, III-23
AWACS............................................................IV-12 Explosives .......................................................... A-9
B F
Block .................................................................... I-8 FAC............................................................ I-6, A-15
blocking position................................................. III-3 FAC(A) .............................................................. IV-9
Blocking Position................................................ III-4 Field Interview Team.......................................... III-7
BOLO .......................................................... II-6, B-2 FIST ..................................................................... I-6
Bottom Up Clearing............................................ A-4 Fix ........................................................................ I-8
Bradley fighting vehicles .................................... III-1 Fixed Wing .......................................................... II-6
Breaching Tools and Techniques....................... A-5 fixed-wing aircraft ............................................... I-12
Building Clear..................................................... H-2 FLIR ............................................ II-6, IV-3, H-4, H-6
C Floor Clear ......................................................... H-2
Footholds ........................................................... A-5
C2 ......................................................................I-13
Forward Treatment Teams................................... I-6
C3 ......................................................................I-13
CA .................................................................I-5, D-2 G
CASEVAC ......................................................... VI-2 GI&S ................................................................... II-7
Casualties ........................................................ III-20 GPS ...........................................................IV-3, H-7
CCD ................................................................... H-7 Grenades ........................................................... A-6
CCP .......................................................... VI-2, VI-3 GSR .................................................................... II-7
CEA................................................................... VI-3 H
CEE................................................................... VI-3
Hasty TCP.......................................................... III-4
City Core ............................................................. II-9
helicopters..................................................I-12, III-1
Civil Affairs ........................................................... I-6
Hellfire............................................................... IV-3
civilians ................................................................ I-5
HET...................................................................... I-6
Clear .................................................................... I-9
High-Rise Area.................................................. II-12
Cleared Rooms .................................................. H-2
HMMWV............................................................. III-1
Close Air Support ..............................................A-14
HNSF ............................................ I-2, I-3, I-14, VI-4
Close Orderly Block Construction ..................... II-11
Host Nation Search ............................................ I-11
CMO..................................................................... I-1
Host Nation Security Forces .................. See HNSF
COA .............................. I-2, II-2, II-4, III-9, IV-1, V-3
HPT...................................................................... I-1
Collateral Damage ............................................ IV-4
HUMINT .............................................................. II-6
Combat Multipliers ............................................... I-6
HVT.................................................................... III-1
Command Element ..............................................I-8
Contingency Plans ...............................................I-2 I
Cordon and Search Methods ............................... I-2 IED ....................................................................A-12
Core Periphery .................................................. II-10 imagery .............................................................. I-12
indigenous police ............................................... B-1
D indigenous security forces.................................. B-1
DART ................................................................ IV-8
Indirect fire .........................................................I-12
Demolition Team ................................................III-8
Industrial-Transportation Area........................... II-12
Demolitions ........................................................ A-7
Informant-assisted Search ................................. I-10
Dense Random Construction ............................ II-11
inner cordon ....................................................... III-1
Destroy................................................................. I-9
Inner cordon ......................................................... I-8
Detainee Team................................................... III-7
Inner Cordon ...................................................... III-5

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Index-1


intelligence ........................................................... I-4 Phases of a Cordon and Search .......................... I-3
Interdict ................................................................ I-8 Planning ............................................................... I-3
Interpreters................................................... I-7, V-2 Principles of Cordon and Search.......................... I-2
IR H-4, H-5, H-6 PSYOP................................................................ D-2
ISF ..................................................................... B-1 R
Isolate .................................................................. I-8
radar................................................................... H-4
Isolation................................................................ I-3
Recon.................................................................. II-6
ISR ............................................................ I-13, IV-1
Reconnaissance........................................... I-3, V-2
J RFA....................................................................I-13
JISE .................................................................... II-7 Rockets .............................................................. A-9
JSOTF................................................................. II-7 ROE ................................................................... V-7
JSTARS .................................................. I-13, IV-12 Rotary Wing ........................................................ II-6
JTAC ............................................................I-6, I-12 Route Security.................................................. III-21
L S
laser ................................................... IV-3, H-4, H-5 SBF ..............................................................I-4, III-6
light armored vehicles ........................................ III-1 Screening Forces ............................................... III-4
LNO.................................................................... V-5 Search............................................................I-4, I-9
LOS.................................................................... H-5 search and attack in zone .................................. A-2
M Search Team......................................................III-7
search/assault element ........................................ I-9
M-1..................................................................... III-1
Secure.................................................................. I-9
M-1A1 ...............................................................A-12
Security Element .................................................. I-8
Maneuver Element ............................................A-16
Security Team ....................................................III-7
Marking Targets ................................................ IV-5
Seize .................................................................... I-9
MASINT .............................................................. II-7
Sensors ............................................................. IV-4
MDMP .................................................................. I-1
Sequential Occupation ..................................... III-14
MEDCAP............................................................ E-3
Shantytowns ..................................................... II-14
MEDEVAC ........................................................ VI-2
Shotguns ............................................................ A-9
METT-TC ............................................... I-1, I-4, D-1
SIGINT ................................................................ II-6
Mine Detection Team ......................................... III-8
Signs ................................................................III-22
Mortars............................................................... A-9
simultaneous egress ........................................ III-16
MOUT ............................................................... VI-5
Simultaneous Occupation ................................ III-13
Movement to the Objective .................................. I-3
Single Point Ingress ........................................... III-9
MRE ................................................................... H-6
SITREP ............................................................. IV-5
MTTP ........................................... i, I-12, IV-1, IV-10
SJA .................................................................... E-3
Multidirectional Ingress .................................... III-10
Sniper............................................................I-7, II-6
N social hierarchy ................................................... II-2
Neutralize ............................................................. I-8 SOF........................................... i, I-13, II-5, II-7, V-1
NFA.................................................................... I-13 Special Operations.............................................. II-7
nonlethal ............................................................ I-12 special teams .......................................................I-9
nonlethal force.................................................... I-11 SSE.................................................................... V-2
number buildings................................................ III-1 Stay Behind Forces.......................................... III-21
NVGs ................................................................. H-4 Street Patterns and Effects ............................... II-14
O Stryker vehicles.................................................. III-1
Objective .............................................................. I-1 Subsurface Areas................................................II-9
objective areaI-4, I-6, I-8, I-11, II-1, II-2, III-1, III-3, III- Supersurface Areas ............................................II-9
11, III-21, IV-9, IV-12, B-6, I-1, I-2 support element ................................................... I-9
Objective Area...................................................... I-1 Support Team ....................................................III-7
Occupant-assisted Search ................................. I-10 Suppress .............................................................. I-9
OPSEC .............................................................. V-4 Surface Areas .....................................................II-8
outer cordon ....................................................... III-1 T
Outer cordon ........................................................I-8 TAC(A) .............................................................. IV-9
Outer Cordon ..................................................... III-3 tactical..................................................................... i
overwatch........................................................... III-5 Tank Infantry Integration .................................... A-3
Overwatch ........................................................ III-21 Tanks ................................................................A-11
P target.......................................I-2, I-4, H-4, H-5, H-7
PA ....................................................................... D-2 Target................................................................... I-1
Pass Signals .................................................... III-25 target area............................................................ I-3
Perception Management .................................... D-1 Target Area .......................................................... I-1
Permanent or Fixed Fortifications ..................... II-13 target location..................................................... I-10
Target Marking ................................................... H-4

Index-2 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 2006 25 April 2006


target surveillance .............................................. I-10 urban environment ..............................................II-7
target-list worksheet ........................................... I-12 US-only Search .................................................. I-10
TCP.................................................................... III-3 V
THT ...................................................................... I-6
Vehicle Break Down......................................... III-21
Top Down Assault .............................................. A-3
VETCAP............................................................. E-3
TOW.......................................................... III-1, IV-3
TPT ...................................................................... I-5 W
Training .............................................................. A-7 Weapons effects ................................................ I-12
TTPi, I-8, III-1, III-22, III-28, IV-1, IV-8, V-5, A-1, A-2, Weather ............................................................ IV-4
A-3, A-8 Withdrawal ........................................................... I-4
Tunnel Reconnaissance Team........................... III-8 Wolf Tail ............................................................. H-2
WP .................................................................... IV-3
U
UAS.................................................. I-13, II-5, IV-11

25 April 2006 FM 3-06.20/MCRP 3-31.4B/NTTP 3-05.8/AFTTP(I) 3-2.62 Index-3


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FM 3-06.20
MCRP 3-31.4B
NTTP 3-05.8
AFTTP(I) 3-2.62

25 April 2006
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official: PETER J. SCHOOMAKER


General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

JOYCE MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0613103

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve: Distribute in accordance
with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115956, requirements for FM 3-06.20.

By Order of the Secretary of the Air Force

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN
Major General, USAF
Commander
Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center

Air Force Distribution: F


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MARINE CORPS PCN: 144 000 162 00 PIN: 083289-000