1. 2. 3. 4.
KENNETH M. WILKINSON RECORD RACKETEERING & EXTORTION $24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT ISSUED AS MANDATES JUNE 11, 2009 The publicly recorded $24.30 money judgment “issued as mandate June 11, 2009”. See Doc. ## 365 (p. 1), 386-3 (p. 1). $24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT UNDER FRAP 39, COSTS The $24.30 money judgment was awarded pursuant to Rule 39, Fed.R.App.P. COPY OF $24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT, DOC. # 386-3 A copy of the final $24.30 money judgment issued as mandate was included in Defendant Appellee’s facially fraudulent “motion for issuance of a writ of execution”, Doc. # 386. See pages 10 and 24. Of the $29.70 requested in Racketeer Wilkinson’s Bill of Costs, Doc. # 386, the 11th Circuit allowed $24.30 for Costs under FRAP 39:
$24.30 WERE THE ALLOWED ACTUAL AND NECESSARY COSTS 5. Here, $24.30 were the allowed actual and necessary costs. $24.30 MONEY JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL ON JUNE 15, 2009 6. Pursuant to Doc. ## 365 (p. 1), 386-3 (p. 1), the U.S. District Court received and filed the $24.30 money judgment on June 15, 2009:
RACKETEERING: EXTORTION OF MONEY: “FRIVOLOUS APPEAL” MOTION WAS ADMITTEDLY NEVER FILED 7. Defendant Racketeer Wilkinson extorted money, Doc. # 386, by fraudulently pretending a Rule 38 motion, which Wilkinson knew he had never filed: “The Judgment 4. On August 22, 2008, Wilkinson filed a Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 27-4 …” Said Rule 27-4 motion could not have possibly been for a “frivolous appeal”.
THE 11th CIRCUIT HAD CLOSED CASE ON 06/11/2009 8. The 11th Circuit had CLOSED THE CASE on 06/11/2009:
BRIBERY 9. Here, Defendant Appellee K. M. Wilkinson and his Attorney had no right to bribe the 11th Circuit and illegally cause the 11th Circuit to fraudulently alter the recorded final $24.30 mandate after the CASE HAD BEEN CLOSED and the 11th Circuit had LOST JURISDICTION. DEFENDANT’S APPELLEE’S RACKETEETING AND EXTORTION WERE ILLEGAL 10. Def. Wilkinson’s record racketeering and extortion were illegal and unauthorized by law. RACKETEERING & EXTORTION IN VIOLATION OF: FED.R.CIV.P. 54; LOCAL RULE 4.18; 28 U.S.C. 1921-1924; FRAP 39 11. The $24.30 money judgment pursuant to Rule 39, Fed.R.App.P., became final on June 15, 2009. “LOCAL RULE 4.18 APPLICATIONS FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY'S FEES (a) In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, all claims for costs or attorney's fees preserved by appropriate pleading or pretrial stipulation shall be asserted by separate motion or petition filed not later than fourteen (14) days following the entry of judgment. The pendency of an appeal from the judgment shall not postpone the filing of a timely application pursuant to this rule.” DEF. WILKINSON VIOLATED REQUIREMENTS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920-1924 The $24.30 money judgment was unauthorized by law. Itemization was for $24.30. No documentation for $24.30. The record unauthorized Bill of Costs was for $24.30. Bill of Costs must be verified as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1924. No known affidavit. Plaintiff(s) objected to the unauthorized $24.30 money judgment. The unauthorized $24.30 money judgment was procured through, e.g., publicly recorded racketeering and extortion by illegal and criminal means of fraud and extortion scheme “O.R. 569/875”, and facially forged “land parcels” “00A0” and “00001”. See RICO Complaint in U.S. District Court. RACKETEERING & EXTORTION IN VIOLATION OF: FRAP 39 [FED.R.APP.P. 39] 12. A copy of Rule 39, Fed.R.App.P., is attached. “(d) Bill of Costs: Objections; Insertion in Mandate. (1) A party who wants costs taxed must — within 14 days after entry of judgment — file with the circuit clerk, with proof of service, an itemized and verified bill of costs.” 13. Here, the “judgment”, No. 2008-13170-BB had been “entered: March 5, 2009”, Doc. ## 365, 386. Defendant Appellee Wilkinson had filed with the circuit clerk a $24.30 Bill of Costs. “Date signed” was “3-17-2009”, which was “issued on: Jun 11 2009”, Doc. ## 365, 386, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. 2
14. No “proof of service” existed on the record. 15. The “14 days after entry of judgment” on “March 5, 2009” had expired on March 19, 2009. APPEAL BECAME FINAL ON JUN 15, 2009 16. An appeal becomes final on the date the mandate is issued. Here, the judgment entered March 5, 2009 was issued as mandate Jun 11 2009. 17. Since the clerk had responsibilities for entering a judgment, Fed.R.App.P. 36, and for taxation of costs, Fed.R.App.P. 39(d), the duty to issue the mandate contemplated by Rule 41 was the responsibility of the clerk. 18. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the action becomes final on the date the district court receives the appellate court's mandate. See U.S. v. Lasteed, 832 F.2d 1240-43 (11th Cir. 1987). The District Court received and filed the Appellate Court’s June 11, 2009 mandate on JUN 15 2009 when the Appeal, No. 2008-13170-BB, became final. Thereafter, the 11th Circuit had no jurisdiction as a matter of law. Here, there have been publicly recorded racketeering and extortion by Government Agents. NO 11th CIRCUIT JURISDICTION AFTER JUN 15, 2009 19. Jurisdiction followed the mandate. “The effect of the mandate is to bring the proceedings in a case on appeal in our Court to a close and to remove it from the jurisdiction of this Court, returning it to the forum whence it came.” It was the date on which the $24.30 mandate was received and filed, Jun 15, 2009, which determined when the district court reacquired jurisdiction for further proceedings. 20. Issuance of the $24.30 mandate on June 11, 2009, and the District Court’s receipt and filing on June 15, 2009 was an event of considerable institutional significance. A mandate could NOT possibly “simply” "issue", because it should have been issued, or because the panel may have intended it to issue, or because the statute commands it to issue. See Fed.R.App.P. 27, 41. ADOPTION BY REFERENCE OF FEDERAL LAWSUIT, CIVIL RICO… 21. The Plaintiffs hereby adopt by reference their Federal action in this published Government Racketeering and Corruption Notice. WILKINSON’S RACKETEERING, RETALIATION, AND COERCION 22. Defendant Racketeer Wilkinson retaliated on or around August 20, 2008, Doc. # 386-2: “In order to discourage the Appellant from engaging in the same practices …” 23. Wilkinson coerced Plaintiff Appellant to refrain from rightful prosecution for prima facie criminal and illegal purposes of concealing crimes and covering up. CRIMINAL AND ILLEGAL FALSIFICATIONS 24. Just like Defendant Racketeer Wilkinson had falsified fake “land parcels”, and a fake “real property transaction”, “O.R. 569/875”, Defendant Forger Wilkinson falsified a fake “judgment”; “July 29, 2009 in Docket 08-13170-BB against Appellant JORG BUSSE in the amount of $5,048.60.” See, e.g., INSTR 4371834, O.R. 4517 PG 1914, Collier County Circuit Court. 25. Here, Defendant Racketeer Wilkinson could not have possibly held that which had never existed. Here, said $24.30 money judgment had been the final mandate, and the facially null and void “writ of execution”, Doc. # 425, was a prima facie racketeering and extortions scheme just like the fake “regulation”, fake “legislative act” and/or “O.R. 569/875” that had never legally existed and never been legally recorded.
APPLICATIONS FOR COSTS OR ATTORNEY'S FEES
(a) In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, all claims for costs or attorney's fees preserved by appropriate pleading or pretrial stipulation shall be asserted by separate motion or petition filed not later than fourteen (14) days following the entry of judgment. The pendency of an appeal from the judgment shall not postpone the filing of a timely application pursuant to this rule.
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TITLE 28 > PART V > C HAPTER 123 > § 1924
§ 1924. Verification of bill of costs
Before any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit, made by himself or by his duly authorized attorney or agent having knowledge of the facts, that such item is correct and has been necessarily incurred in the case and that the services for which fees have been charged were actually and necessarily performed. Ask A Lawyer Online.
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Judgments; Costs (a) Definition; Form.
“Judgment” as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from whic h an appeal lies. A judgment should not inc lude recitals of pleadings, a master's report, or a rec ord of prior proceedings. Notes Law About ... Civil Procedure
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(b) Judgment on Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.
When an action presents more than one claim for relief — whether as a claim, counterclaim, c rossclaim, or third-party claim — or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
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(c) Demand for Judgment; Relief to Be Granted.
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A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.
(d) Costs; Attorney’s Fees.
(1) Costs Other than Attorneys’ Fees.
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Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than attorney's fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party. But costs against the United States, its officers, and its agencies may be imposed only to the extent allowed by law. The clerk may tax costs on 14 days' notice. On motion served within the next 7 days, the court may review the clerk's action. (2) Attorneys’ Fees. (A) Claim to Be by Motion. A claim for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages. (B) Timing and Contents of the Motion. Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise, the motion must: (i) be filed no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment; (ii) specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or other grounds entitling the movant to the award; (iii) state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it; and (iv) disclose, if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about fees for the services for which the claim is made.
FindACase™ | United States v. Lasteed
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United States v. Lasteed U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Docket Number available at www.versuslaw.com Citation Number available at www.versuslaw.com November 24, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RONALD ALBERT LASTEED, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. F. Lee Bailey, Daniel Patrick Leonard Bailey & Fishman, for Appellant. Leon B. Kellner, U.S. Attorney, Samuel Rosenthal, Chief, Criminal Appellate Section, Department of Justice, Joel M. Gershowitz, Department of Justice, for Appellee. Hill and Vance, Circuit Judges, and Propst,*fn* District Judge. Author: Vance Vance, Circuit Judge: This case presents an intricate timing issue involving a retrial, an interlocutory appeal followed by an intercircuit transfer, and an uncertain period of excludable delay under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The question is whether the 70 day period following a mistrial within which a defendant must be tried again begins to run when the court of appeals issues its mandate, or when the district court receives the mandate. We affirm the district court's ruling in this case that the clock begins to run against the government upon the district court's receipt of the mandate. I. Appellant Ronald Lasteed was indicted along with Joseph Peeples for mail and wire fraud, inducing interstate travel in execution of a fraudulent scheme, and conspiracy to commit these offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1343, 2314, and 371. Appellant was tried originally in October, 1984 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. On October 10, 1984 the district court declared a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct. In August, 1985 the district court in Texas denied defendant's motion to dismiss,*fn1 but granted defendant's motion to change venue to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Defendant took an interlocutory appeal of the Texas district court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, refusing to dismiss the indictment. The Fifth Circuit issued its mandate on March 13, 1986. Appellant contends that the Speedy Trial Act's 70 day period commenced on that date. The district court in Florida did not receive the Fifth Circuit's mandate until May 19, 1986, more than two months after it was issued.*fn2 The government contends that the Speedy Trial Act's 70 day period commenced on that date. On June 6 defendant filed a motion to dismiss on Speedy Trial Act grounds, which the district court denied on June 23. At the second trial, there was evidence that appellant had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to obtain money from investors by falsely representing that he had invented a process for transforming water into combustible fuel.*fn3 Appellant called the product of this process "Ionagen," and claimed it was a gasoline substitute.*fn4 There was evidence that appellant made numerous other false statements and misrepresentations relating to his education, background, other investors in the Ionagen process, and governmental interest in his work. The prosecution also produced various wire transmissions and recordings of meetings between appellant and Al Hill, Jr., a potential investor in the scheme. II.
Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 425
Filed 02/02/10 Page 1 of 1
2JS 44 (Rev. 12/07)
CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE REVERSE OF THE FORM.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSS
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES COURTS, UNITED STATES CUSTOM & IMMIGRATION SERVICE, TONY WEST, BEVERLY B. MARTIN, JOHN EDWIN STEELE, RYAN BAR WASHINGTON, D.C. County of Residence of First Listed Defendant
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY) NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE LAND INVOLVED.
DR. JORG BUSSE AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
(c) Attorney’s (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys (If Known)
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION
U.S. Government Plaintiff
(Place an “X” in One Box Only)
III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES(Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) PTF u 1 Citizen of This State Citizen of Another State DEF u 1 and One Box for Defendant) PTF DEF Incorporated or Principal Place u 4 u 4 of Business In This State Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State Foreign Nation
u 3 Federal Question (U.S. Government Not a Party) u 4 Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)
U.S. Government Defendant
u 2 u 3
u 5 u 6
u 5 u 6
Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT
(Place an “X” in One Box Only) TORTS PERSONAL INJURY 310 Airplane 315 Airplane Product Liability 320 Assault, Libel & Slander 330 Federal Employers’ Liability 340 Marine 345 Marine Product Liability 350 Motor Vehicle 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability 360 Other Personal Injury CIVIL RIGHTS 441 Voting 442 Employment 443 Housing/ Accommodations 444 Welfare 445 Amer. w/Disabilities Employment 446 Amer. w/Disabilities Other 440 Other Civil Rights PERSONAL INJURY u 362 Personal Injury Med. Malpractice u 365 Personal Injury Product Liability u 368 Asbestos Personal Injury Product Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY u 370 Other Fraud u 371 Truth in Lending u 380 Other Personal Property Damage u 385 Property Damage Product Liability PRISONER PETITIONS u 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence Habeas Corpus: u 530 General u 535 Death Penalty u 540 Mandamus & Other u 550 Civil Rights u 555 Prison Condition
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
110 Insurance 120 Marine 130 Miller Act 140 Negotiable Instrument 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment 151 Medicare Act 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excl. Veterans) 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran’s Benefits 160 Stockholders’ Suits 190 Other Contract 195 Contract Product Liability 196 Franchise REAL PROPERTY 210 Land Condemnation 220 Foreclosure 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment 240 Torts to Land 245 Tort Product Liability 290 All Other Real Property
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
u 610 Agriculture u 620 Other Food & Drug u 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881 u 630 Liquor Laws u 640 R.R. & Truck u 650 Airline Regs. u 660 Occupational Safety/Health u 690 Other LABOR u 710 Fair Labor Standards Act u 720 Labor/Mgmt. Relations u 730 Labor/Mgmt.Reporting & Disclosure Act u 740 Railway Labor Act u 790 Other Labor Litigation u 791 Empl. Ret. Inc. Security Act
IMMIGRATION u 462 Naturalization Application u 463 Habeas Corpus Alien Detainee u 465 Other Immigration Actions
u 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 u 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157
PROPERTY RIGHTS u 820 Copyrights u 830 Patent u 840 Trademark
u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u
SOCIAL SECURITY 861 HIA (1395ff) 862 Black Lung (923) 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) 864 SSID Title XVI 865 RSI (405(g)) FEDERAL TAX SUITS u 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant) u 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609
u u u u u
400 State Reapportionment 410 Antitrust 430 Banks and Banking 450 Commerce 460 Deportation 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 480 Consumer Credit 490 Cable/Sat TV 810 Selective Service 850 Securities/Commodities/ Exchange 875 Customer Challenge 12 USC 3410 890 Other Statutory Actions 891 Agricultural Acts 892 Economic Stabilization Act 893 Environmental Matters 894 Energy Allocation Act 895 Freedom of Information Act 900Appeal of Fee Determination Under Equal Access to Justice 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
u 1 Original Proceeding
u 2 Removed from
(Place an “X” in One Box Only)
Appeal to District Appellate Court
u 3 Remanded from
u 4 Reinstated or u 5 Transferred from u 6 Multidistrict another district Reopened Litigation (specify)
u 7 Judge from Magistrate
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
18USC§1964,18USC§§1961-1968,18USC§1341,4th,7th,14th,1st,5th,11th U.S. Const.Amend. Civil Rights Act
CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint: ✔ Yes u u No JURY DEMAND: DOCKET NUMBER
DEMAND $ u CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION VII. REQUESTED IN 19,000,000.00 UNDER F.R.C.P. 23 COMPLAINT: VIII. RELATED CASE(S) (See instructions): JUDGE IF ANY
Racketeering/Civil RICO, Corruption, Obstruction of Justice, Extortion of Property & Money; 4th, 7th, 14th, 1st U.S.
SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY RECEIPT # AMOUNT
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERALS /S/DR. J. BUSSE /S/J. FRANKLIN PRESCOTT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE, JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, STATE OF FLORIDA EX REL. DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE AND JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT AS PRIVATE ATTORNEY(S) GENERAL, Plaintiffs, v. Case No. 1-2010-cv-000_____
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES COURTS, UNITED STATES CUSTOM & IMMIGRATION SERVICE, TONY WEST, BEVERLY B. MARTIN, JOHN EDWIN STEELE, RYAN BARRY, CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL, SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, KENNETH M. WILKINSON, RICHARD A. LAZZARA, JACK N. PETERSON, RYAN BARRY, DREW HEATHCOAT, BETTYE G. SAMUEL, STANLEY F. BIRCH, JR, GERALD B. TJOFLAT, SUSAN H. BLACK, JOEL F. DUBINA, SHERRI L. JOHNSON, EUGENE C. TURNER, LEE COUNTY, FL, COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONERS, ED CARNES, JOHN E. MANNING, U.S. RACKETEERING AGENTS, HUGH D. HAYES, JOHN LEY, RICHARD JESSUP, DIANE NIPPER, LYNN GERALD, JR., KENNETH L. RYSKAMP, CHARLIE CRIST, CHARLES “BARRY” STEVENS, JOHNSON ENGINEERING, INC., MARK ALLAN PIZZO, ANNE CONWAY, CHARLIE GREEN, REAGAN KATHLEEN RUSSELL, RICHARD D. DEBOEST, II, CHENE M. THOMPSON, et al., Defendants. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL AND $19,000,000.00 __________________________________________________________________________/ COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL COMPLAINT OF RACKETEERING, EXTORTION, PUBLIC CORRUPTION IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, 20TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR LEE & COLLIER COUNTIES, FL, AND OF UNLAWFUL AND CRIMINAL ACTS BY GOVERNMENT AGENTS & OFFICIALS IN THEIR PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES OUTSIDE ANY “IMMUNITY” COMPLAINT UNDER CIVIL RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 1961-1968 COMPLAINT OF GOVERNMENTS’ MALICIOUS CIRCULAR ARGUMENT FOR PURPOSES OF RACKETEERING, EXTORTION, AND RETALIATION: ‘THE CONCLUSIVELY PROVEN ALLEGATIONS ARE FRIVOLOUS. THEREFORE THE CASE IS FIXED AS FRIVOLOUS.’ REPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, THE HAGUE [PAGES TOTAL: 196 + 213 (Exhibits)]
FRAP 39. Costs
(a) Against Whom Assessed. The following rules apply unless the law provides or the court orders otherwise: (1) if an appeal is dismissed, costs are taxed against the appellant, unless the parties agree otherwise; (2) if a judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against the appellant; (3) if a judgment is reversed, costs are taxed against the appellee; (4) if a judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified, or vacated, costs are taxed only as the court orders. (b) Costs For and Against the United States. Costs for or against the United States, its agency, or officer will be assessed under Rule 39(a) only if authorized by law. (c) Costs of Copies. Each court of appeals must, by local rule, fix the maximum rate for taxing the cost of producing necessary copies of a brief or appendix, or copies of records authorized by Rule 30(f). The rate must not exceed that generally charged for such work in the area where the clerk’s office is located and should encourage economical methods of copying. (d) Bill of Costs: Objections; Insertion in Mandate. (1) A party who wants costs taxed must — within 14 days after entry of judgment — file with the circuit clerk, with proof of service, an itemized and verified bill of costs. (2) Objections must be filed within 14 days after service of the bill of costs, unless the court extends the time. (3) The clerk must prepare and certify an itemized statement of costs for insertion in the mandate, but issuance of the mandate must not be delayed for taxing costs. If the mandate issues before costs are finally determined, the district clerk must — upon the circuit clerk’s request — add the statement of costs, or any amendment of it, to the mandate. (e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Court. The following costs on appeal are taxable in the district court for the benefit of the party entitled to costs under this rule: (1) the preparation and transmission of the record; (2) the reporter’s transcript, if needed to determine the appeal;
(3) premiums paid for a supersedeas bond or other bond to preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee for filing the notice of appeal. (As amended Apr. 30, 1979, eff. Aug. 1, 1979; Mar. 10, 1986, eff. July 1, 1986; Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1, 1998; Mar. 26, 2009, eff. Dec. 1, 2009.) **** 11th Cir. R. 39-1 Costs. In taxing costs for printing or reproduction and binding pursuant to FRAP 39(c) the clerk shall tax such costs at rates not higher than those determined by the clerk from time to time by reference to the rates generally charged for the most economical methods of printing or reproduction and binding in the principal cities of the circuit, or at actual cost, whichever is less. Unless advance approval for additional copies is secured from the clerk, costs will be taxed only for the number of copies of a brief and record excerpts or appendix required by the rules to be filed and served, plus two copies for each party signing the brief. All costs shall be paid and mailed directly to the party to whom costs have been awarded. Costs should not be mailed to the clerk of the court. 11th Cir. R. 39-2 Attorney’s Fees. (a) Time for Filing. Except as otherwise provided herein or by statute or court order, an application for attorney’s fees must be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the time to file a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc expires, or within 14 days after entry of an order disposing of a timely petition for rehearing or denying a timely petition for rehearing en banc, whichever is later. For purposes of this rule, the term “attorney’s fees” includes fees and expenses authorized by statute, but excludes damages and costs sought pursuant to FRAP 38, costs taxed pursuant to FRAP 39, and sanctions sought pursuant to 11th Cir. R. 27-4. (b) Required Documentation. An application for attorney’s fees must be supported by a memorandum showing that the party seeking attorney’s fees is legally entitled to them. The application must also include a summary of work performed, on a form available from the clerk, supported by contemporaneous time records recording all work for which a fee is claimed. An affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the information contained in the application and demonstrating the basis for the hourly rate requested must also accompany the application. Exceptions may be made only to avoid an unconscionable result. If contemporaneous time records are not available, the court may approve only the minimum amount of fees necessary, in the court’s judgment, to adequately compensate the attorney.
(c) Objection to Application. Any party from whom attorney’s fees are sought may file an objection to the application. An objection must be filed with the clerk within 14 days after service of the application. The party seeking attorney’s fees may file a reply to the objection within 10 days after service of the objection. (d) Motion to Transfer. Any party who is or may be eligible for attorney’s fees on appeal may, within the time for filing an application provided by this rule, file a motion to transfer consideration of attorney’s fees on appeal to the district court or administrative agency from which the appeal was taken. (e) Remand for Further Proceedings. When a reversal on appeal, in whole or in part, results in a remand to the district court for trial or other further proceedings (e.g., reversal of order granting summary judgment, or denying a new trial), a party who may be eligible for attorney’s fees on appeal after prevailing on the merits upon remand may, in lieu of filing an application for attorney’s fees in this court, request attorney’s fees for the appeal in a timely application filed with the district court upon disposition of the matter on remand. 11th Cir. R. 39-3 Fee Awards to Prevailing Parties Under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (a) An application to this court for an award of fees and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) must be filed within the time specified in the statute. The application must identify the applicant, show the nature and extent of services rendered, that the applicant has prevailed, and shall identify the position of the United States Government or an agency thereof which the applicant alleges was not substantially justified. (b) An application to the court pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) shall be upon the factual record made before the agency, which shall be filed with this court under the procedures established in FRAP 11 and associated circuit rules. Unless the court establishes a schedule for filing formal briefs upon motion of a party, such proceedings shall be upon the application papers, together with such supporting papers, including memorandum briefs, as the appellant shall submit within 14 days of filing of the record of agency proceedings and upon any response filed by the United States in opposition thereto within the succeeding 14 days. **** I.O.P. 1. Time - Extensions. A bill of costs is timely if filed within 14 days of entry of judgment. Judgment is entered on the opinion filing date. The filing of a petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc does not extend the time for filing a bill of costs. A motion to extend the time to file a bill of costs may be considered by the clerk. 2. Costs for or Against the United States. When costs are sought for or against the United States, the statutory or other authority relied upon for such an award must be set forth as an attachment to the Bill of Costs.
3. Reproduction of Statutes, Rules, and Regulations. Costs will be taxed for the reproduction of statutes, rules, and regulations in conformity with FRAP 28(f). Costs will not be taxed for the reproduction of papers not required or allowed to be filed pursuant to FRAP 28 and 30 and the corresponding circuit rules, even though the brief, appendix, or record excerpts within which said papers are included was accepted for filing by the clerk.
Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434
Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JORG BUSSE Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC
LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendants. ___________________________________ ORDER This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. the time to respond has expired. Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff. Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant’s motion. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: No response has been filed and
Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434
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Plaintiff may file one response to defendant’s Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is
received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of a response and without further notice. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this July, 2010. 22nd day of
Copies: Plaintiff Counsel of record
RESOL~JTIOX PERTAZNIdC TO PUBLIC ws IN CAS’O COSTA SUSO!V3S3$y --p--m -cWHEREAS, there’ appears in the Public
County, Florida, in Plat Book 3 at page 25 the Second Revised
Plat af Cayo Coata Subdivision: and
WHEREAS. there spycar Upon sitid plat certain designated lot and block areas and other undesignated areaa: and WHEREAS, there appears upon said plat certain un-numbered and unlettered iwcas lying East of tho Easterly tier of blocks in said m&division and West of the Westerly tier of blocks in said subdivision: and .
“!‘EREAS, tho County clnims slid lands aa public Iandr
together with all accretions thereto. NOW, THEREFORE, idE IT RESOLVED By THE BOARD OF C0Vm’y COHMISSXONERS OF LEE COUN’IY, FLORIDA does by this Resolution claim all of raid lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public pucposes. , DONE ANR ADOPTED this dday of ,< , u &cL~, 1969.
1 ke~w~yq?&bw &rrr,@w #h$ku!H*,, t c&gy?:$~;~~,, : ,.,, . . ..’ ’ .; I ,.* . ‘. \ . .‘ I : 1 -
WETLANDS SITE INSPECTION
ACQUISITION DATE AGENDA DATE GRANTOR BLUE SHEET
CCMB INSTRUMENT LEGAL DESC SEARCH TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE PURCHASE PRICE 1 AGENDA DATE 2 AGENDA DATE 3
PRICE/ACRE PRIOR STRAP PCL
BLUE SHEET 2
BLUE SHEET 3
PURCHASE PRICE 2 ASSESSEDVALUE VALUE DATE CCMB 2
PURCHASE PRICE 3
LEE COUNTY DIVISION OF COUNTY LANDS
ACTIONREOUESTED~ Ap rove conveyance of any interest in land, \?rhich has accreted to ro erty of rivate landowner on Cayo Costa Island, ancfnow bein purchased by the State of Florida for preservation. KutRorize CRairnxm to execute County Deed; authorrze County Lan%s Division to handle and complete conveyance. WHY ACTION IS NECESSARY: To clear title on land which has accreted to property owned by private landowner, which is being conveyed to the State of Florida. WHAT
AcCOMPLISHE!$ ,Clears potential cloud on title to property. 17 1 5.REOUIREMENT/PURPOSE in/ /7 3. MEETJNGD-3c;ll+ya a
LDE A TMENTALCATEGORY: COp~ISSIONDISTRIcT#: bAGENDA
_ APPEALS -PUBLIC -=REQuIRED:-
_ ADMIN. CODE
The State of Florida, Board of Trustees of the Internal Im rovement Trust Fund, is in the recess of purchasing land on A list of %e properties being purchased is Cay0 Costa Island from a private landowner through the 8tate CARL Pro eter&ned that Lee County ma have an interest in ’ attached. From the title search and title commitment issued, it has been r land which has accreted to the lots being conveyed to the State of Florida by Alice MS. Robinson. A 1J69 Resolutron b ook the Board of County Commissioners pertaining to ublic lands in Cayo Costa Subdivision, recorded m Official Record J 569 Pa e 875 created a claim to all accretions to P lyin within the area of the Subdivision now bemg conveyed. As a ots resdlt ofthis Resolution, the State of Florida is requesting &ee County to convey any interest it may have m these accreted , R~~a~ore private property owner, Ahce l$.S. Robmson, m order to clear trtle for its purchase of the propertres from Ms. . Due to the ongoin of ac uisition on Cayo Costa Island by the State of Florida and Lee+Countythrpugh the CARL Matching Funds tI!YTF an8 the ongoing cooperation of the State and County to accomphsh acquisrtron of land on the . .P. elect, Island, staff recommends approval of the requested motion. County funds are not needed to complete this transaction.
9. RECOMMENDEDAPPROVAL i .
Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes…
The 2009 Florida Statutes
Title VI CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Chapter 55 JUDGMENTS View Entire Chapter
55.10 Judgments, orders, and decrees; lien of all, generally; extension of liens; transfer of liens to other security.-(1) A judgment, order, or decree becomes a lien on real property in any county when a certified copy of it is recorded in the official records or judgment lien record of the county, whichever is maintained at the time of recordation, provided that the judgment, order, or decree contains the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree or a separate affidavit is recorded simultaneously with the judgment, order, or decree stating the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree. A judgment, order, or decree does not become a lien on real property unless the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree is contained in the judgment, order, or decree or an affidavit with such address is simultaneously recorded with the judgment, order, or decree. If the certified copy was first recorded in a county in accordance with this subsection between July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period of 7 years from the date of the recording. If the certified copy is first recorded in accordance with this subsection on or after July 1, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period of 10 years from the date of the recording. (2) The lien provided for in subsection (1) or an extension of that lien as provided by this subsection may be extended for an additional period of 10 years, subject to the limitation in subsection (3), by rerecording a certified copy of the judgment, order, or decree prior to the expiration of the lien or the expiration of the extended lien and by simultaneously recording an affidavit with the current address of the person who has a lien as a result of the judgment, order, or decree. The extension shall be effective from the date the certified copy of the judgment, order, or decree is rerecorded. The lien or extended lien will not be extended unless the affidavit with the current address is simultaneously recorded. (3) In no event shall the lien upon real property created by this section be extended beyond the period provided for in s. 55.081 or beyond the point at which the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first. (4) This act shall apply to all judgments, orders, and decrees of record which constitute a lien on real property; except that any judgment, order, or decree recorded prior to July 1, 1987, shall remain a lien on real property until the period provided for in s. 55.081 expires or until the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first. (5) Any lien claimed under this section may be transferred, by any person having an interest in the real property upon which the lien is imposed or the contract under which the lien is claimed, from such real property to other security by either depositing in the clerk's office a sum of money or filing in the clerk's office a bond executed as surety by a surety insurer licensed to do business in this state. Such deposit or bond shall
Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes… be in an amount equal to the amount demanded in such claim of lien plus interest thereon at the legal rate for
3 years plus $500 to apply on any court costs which may be taxed in any proceeding to enforce said lien. Such deposit or bond shall be conditioned to pay any judgment, order, or decree which may be rendered for the satisfaction of the lien for which such claim of lien was recorded and costs plus $500 for court costs. Upon such deposit being made or such bond being filed, the clerk shall make and record a certificate showing the transfer of the lien from the real property to the security and mail a copy thereof by registered or certified mail to the lienor named in the claim of lien so transferred, at the address stated therein. Upon the filing of the certificate of transfer, the real property shall thereupon be released from the lien claimed, and such lien shall be transferred to said security. The clerk shall be entitled to a service charge of up to $15 for making and serving the certificate. If the transaction involves the transfer of multiple liens, an additional service charge of up to $7.50 for each additional lien shall be charged. Any number of liens may be transferred to one such security. (6) Any excess of the security over the aggregate amount of any judgments, orders, or decrees rendered, plus costs actually taxed, shall be repaid to the party filing the security or his or her successor in interest. Any deposit of money shall be considered as paid into court and shall be subject to the provisions of law relative to payments of money into court and the disposition of these payments. (7) Any party having an interest in such security or the property from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county where such security is deposited for an order: (a) To require additional security; (b) To require reduction of security; (c) To require change or substitution of sureties; (d) To require payment or discharge thereof; or (e) Relating to any other matter affecting said security.
History.--s. 1, ch. 10166, 1925; s. 1, ch. 14749, 1931; ss. 1-3, ch. 17998, 1937; s. 2, ch. 19270, 1939; C GL 1940 Supp. 4865(3); s. 9, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 71-56; s. 1, ch. 77-462; s. 2, ch. 87-67; s. 7, ch. 87-145; s. 12, ch. 91-45; s. 10, ch. 93-250; s. 15, ch. 94-348; s. 1357, ch. 95-147; s. 7, ch. 2000-258; s. 1, ch. 2001-130; s. 68, ch. 2003-402; s. 47, ch. 2004-265.
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