People of the Philippines v. Hon. Judge Palma and Romulo Intia y Morada
Case No. 219 G.R. No. L-44113 (March 31, 1977) Chapter I, Page 2, Footnote No.3

Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta
Case No. 244 G.R. No. L-26702 (October 18, 1979) Chapter I, Page 4, Footnote No.14

FACTS: Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the ground that her court “has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case” without prejudice to the re-filing thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful offenders as those over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense. ISSUE: W/N the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. HELD: The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over “criminal cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case”. The subsequent issuance of PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offender as “one who is over 9 years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense” did not by such definition transfer jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court. LATIN MAXIM: 35

FACTS: Petitioner, while driving his car in the jurisdiction of Urdaneta, was charged with violation of Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, “particularly, for overtaking a truck”. Petitioner initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance and prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction for restraining Respondent from enforcing the said ordinance. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 3, Series of 1964, by the Municipality of Urdaneta, Pangasinan is valid. HELD: No. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be patterned after and based on Section 53 of Act No. 3992. However, Act No. 3992 has been explicitly repealed by RA No. 4136 (The Land and Transportation Code). By this express repeal, the general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Also, an essential requisite for a valid ordinance is that it “must not contravene … the statute” for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. LATIN MAXIM: 4, 6c, 49

3 Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
Case No. 48 G.R. No. L-17931 (February 28, 1963) Chapter I, Page 9, Footnote No.31

Astorga v. Villegas
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-23475 (April 30, 1974) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.37

FACTS: Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609. The pertinent portion of this statute reads: “The margin established by the Monetary Board … shall be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: “XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.” ISSUE: W/N “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

FACTS: House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid. HELD: Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.” LATIN MAXIM: b2

HELD: The term “urea formaldehyde” used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from “urea and formaldehyde” which are separate chemicals used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are raw materials. Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee. LATIN MAXIM: 2a, 6c, 25a

4 Ichong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento
Case No. 133 G.R. No. L-7995 (May 31, 1957) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines
Case No. 181 G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966) Chapter I, Page 11, Footnote No.42

FACTS: Petitioner is a Chinese merchant who questions the constitutionality of RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” on the following grounds: a) It is a violation of the Equal Protection of the Law Clause, denies them of their liberty, property and due process of law 2) It is a violation of the constitutional requirement that a bill’s title must reflect the subject matter of the same because “regulate” does not really mean “nationalize” and “prohibit” 3) the Act violates International treaties and Laws ISSUE: W/N RA 1180 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1180 is constitutional. In the abovementioned case, what has been pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject as expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. Constitution precludes the encroaching of one department to the responsibilities of the other departments. The legislature is primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness, and expediency of the law, and the courts have no jurisdiction to question this. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, d

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the Plaintiff’s complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant on the ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional. Defendant Company refused to pay taxes accruing from its sales because according to them the taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the said Municipality. According to the Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2) grant of taxing power to the local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund. ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional. HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title “Road and Bridge Fund.” Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what is pointed out is the constitutional requirement that “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title.” This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able to apprise legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law. LATIN MAXIM: 12a, 37, d

Republic Act 3043 is an amendatory act. The constitutional requirement as to the title of the bill must be liberally construed. 121” does not embrace. Footnote No. 37. ISSUE: W/N Section 3 is a subject which the bill title “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. L-24396 (July 29. 3043 is entitled “An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act No. in any franchise contract for the supply of electric power constituting 50% of the electric power and energy of that franchisee.46 FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. 203 G. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic. ISSUE: W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code.” HELD: Section 3 is constitutional. 25c. which may be enacted into law. Constitutional provision is satisfied if title is comprehensive enough to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every ends and means necessary for its accomplishment. expressed in its title. cannot embrace more than one subject. to realize a net profit of not more than 12% annually of its investments plus 2-month operating expenses. d . Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. “A bill shall embrace only one subject. National Power Corporation Case No. It is sufficient that the title makes reference to the legislation to be amended (in this case Commonwealth Act 121). HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject. Page 12. Respondent is empowered. d FACTS: Republic Act No. No.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. which shall be expressed in its title.R. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. Buenviaje Case No. scope. 1925) Chapter I.R. and consequences of the law. 7a. and lastly. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 37.” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature. Title doesn’t need to be a complete index of the contents of the act.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. 1968) Chapter I.5 People of the Philippines v. it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. 8 G. Page 12. No. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble.46 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Alalayan v. thus making it a rider because it is violative of the constitutional provision requiring that “a bill. L-22945 (March 3. 121”. When there is doubt as to its validity. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine. and NPC is allowed to renew all existing franchise contracts so that the provisions of the act could be given effect. In Section 3 of the same act.

2263 is unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Footnote No. Footnote No.” Section 19 of the amendatory act says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of Department of Labor.A. fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.R.R. otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article VIII. Abalos Case No. 7675. and the amendatory provisions no matter how diverse they may be. d FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. No. 81 G. Page 12. 37. 1994) Chapter I.47 FACTS: Republic Act No. ISSUE: W/N the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of R. No. a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Juan/ Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts. Section 20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy Mediation Commission. Cabatuando Case No.6 Cordero v. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment. L-114783 (December 8. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 1199. language of such precision as to mirror. Hon. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. LATIN MAXIM: 20a. 7675. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. Page 12. 291 G. L-14542 (October 31.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tobias v. 2263: “An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. No. d . ISSUE: W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city Moreover. HELD: RA 7675 is constitutional.” HELD: Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general subject. which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. 1962) Chapter I. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion. Act No. will be regarded as valid.

section 5 of the Philippine Bill which provided “that no private or local bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” makes the title misleading and deceptive. It does not violate Paragraph 17. No. 11 G. now section 2323 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is valid. “An Act amending the Administrative Code.” It does not violate Paragraph 17. in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. section 3 of the Jones Law.7 Ayson and Ignacio v. 14019 (July 26. payable every three months. with nets denominated ‘cuakit’ and ‘pantukos. it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.51 FACTS: The municipal council of Navotas. prompted by the upcoming elections. now Section 2324 of the Administrative Code of 1917.” This question was initially presented to the Respondents. section 2 of which provided that “all owners and proprietors of the industry known as fishing.R. which is entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur” as unconstitutional on the ground that it includes barrios located in another province. Footnote No. L-28089 (October 25. Provincial Board of Rizal Case No. The Administrative Code of 1917 has for its title. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Petitioner challenged Republic Act 4790. which is Cotabato.R. 1919) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lidasan v. violating the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. LATIN MAXIM: d . 13. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790. HELD: Republic Act 4790 is null and void. No. Page 13. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. and the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and provinces and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. The title did not inform the members of the Congress as to the full impact of the law.” The authority for the enactment of the ordinance was from section 2270 of the Administrative Code. 148 G. which provided “that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1967) Chapter I. The title “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton. Commission on Elections Case No.’ before engaging in fishing in the bay of this jurisdiction within three leagues from the shore-line of this municipality. which adopted a resolution in favor of RA 4790. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill” because the Administrative Code is neither a private nor a local bill. after payment of a fee of P50 annually. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act 4790 is constitutional.” because it was merely a revision of the provisions of the Administrative Code enacted for the purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act. ISSUE: W/N Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. is invalid. Rizal adopted its Ordinance No. are obliged to provide themselves with a license issued by this municipal government. HELD: Section 2270 of the Administrative Code of 1916. it did not apprise the people in the towns of Cotabato that were affected by the law.

He failed to pay some of the installments. becomes or remains a member” of the CPP or any other organization “subversive” in nature. 1972) Chapter I. The proper approach in cases of this character should be to resolve all presumptions in favor of the validity of an act in the absence of a clear conflict between it and the Constitution. Reyes Case No.R. Petitioner proceeded to foreclose its chattel mortgage. 51d . It is a valid title if it indicates in clear terms the nature. The Anti-Subversion act fully satisfies these requirements. 4122. 169 G. ISSUE: W/N Act No. L-32613-14 (December 27. 1935) Chapter I. The title of the bill need not be a catalogue or an index of its contents. entitled “An Act to amend the Civil Code by inserting between Sections fourteen hundred and fifty-four and fourteen hundred and fifty-five thereof a new section.8 Manila Trading & Supply Co. HELD: Yes. The mortgaged property was sold at a public auction by the sheriff of the City of Manila. to which the Government appealed. RA 1700 outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and other “subversive associations” and punishes any person who “knowingly. and the statute will be read fairly and reasonably in order not to thwart the legislative intent. The lower court declared the statute void on the grounds that it was a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1700. The general rule is adopted in this jurisdiction to the effect that a title which declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated. with interest. 4122. A narrow and technical construction is to be avoided. He pleaded as a defense that the company. 9d. Ferrer Case No. 37 FACTS: Private Respondents were respectively charged with a violation of Republic Act No. Tayag filed a motion challenging the validity of the statute due to its constitutional violations. No. had no further action against him for the recovery of the unpaid balance owed by him. The company instituted an action for recovery when he failed to pay the deficiency of the debt. 43263 (October 31. Page 13. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.50 FACTS: Respondent executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Petitioner. After applying this sum. Footnote No.R. ISSUE: W/N the title of the act satisfies the constitutional provision on bill titles. as provided by Act No. and liquidated damages to Respondent’s indebtedness. Footnote No. The cases were dismissed. HELD: Act No. 208 G. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v.47 with interest. v. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with. Page 13. the latter owed the company a balance of P275. otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act. costs. scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. to be known as section fourteen hundred and fifty-four-A. 4122 is valid and enforceable. No. having chosen to foreclose its chattel mortgage. The controlling purpose of Act No. 4122 is revealed to be to close the door to abuses committed in connection with the foreclosure of chattel mortgages when sales were payable in installments.” is valid. and need not recite the details of the Act.

2 and 4 likewise categorically state in their titles that the Constitutional Convention called for therein is “to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. and both Resolutions No. pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution. 36a. and transfer of firearms. and to bills to be enacted into a law and not to law that was already in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect. W/N Act No. 230 G. HELD: No. No. 1 of both Resolutions. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people. Carbonell. Case No. 1780 by concealment of a bolo. HELD: No. 50 .9 Del Rosario v. The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implied in the call for the convention itself. No. which was “an Act to regulate the importation. All the details provided for in RA 6132 are germane to and are comprehended by its title.” ISSUE: W/N RA 6132 is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject. acquisition. The inclusion of the title is superfluous and therefore unnecessary because the title expressly indicates that the act implements Resolutions on both Houses Nos. 51d FACTS: Defendant was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of Section 26 of Act No. 33 G. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground that the title of the act. W/N it was inconsistent with the Constitution. Page 14. possession. 55 FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA 6132. whose raison d’etre is to revise the present Constitution. L-32476 (October 20.” ISSUES: 1.” did not include weapons other than firearms. L-9659 (May 29. and that Section 26 violated the constitutional provision that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 9d. 2 and 4 respectively of 1967 and 1969. It is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in matters of detail.R. et al. 1907. 1957) Chapter I. Repealing for the Purpose Republic Act Four Thousand Nine Hundred Fourteen. use. and for Other Purposes. At the time of the enactment of Act No. Providing for Proportional Representation Therein and Other Details Relating to the Election of Delegates to and the Holding of the Constitutional Convention. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. the one subject-one title rule referred to private and local bills only. 1780 on October 12. 46a. Valeriano Valensoy y Masa Case No. The said Act purportedly encompasses more than one subject for the title of the Act allegedly fails to include the phrase “TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.R. and to prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act.” The statute plainly reads: “An Act Implementing Resolution to Both Houses Numbered Two as Amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines Calling for a Constitutional Convention. 1780 violated the one subject-one title rule 2.” which phrase is reiterated in Sec. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. The provision of Section 26 germane to the subject expressed in the title of the Act remained operative because it was not inconsistent with the Constitution.

The People’s Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment. (2) a provision which adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for their substitution. 37–1 would be inoperative in so far as it exceeded the period of five years for any single period of time. 4003. Section 2 of said order prohibits trawl fishing in certain areas in Samar. Although FAO No. Appellant attacked the constitutionality of the People’s Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title. (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail. 37–1 was invalid. 4003 (Fisheries Act) issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. Footnote No.10 People of the Philippines v. challenged its legality on the ground that FAO No. 38a . the basic law prevails because the rule cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the law. ISSUE: W/N the People’s Court Act was unconstitutional.83 FACTS: The People’s Court found the Appellant. Leoncio Lim. Page 19.” ISSUE: W/N Section 2 of FAO No. Page 16. 204 G. Apolonio Carlos Case No.63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Footnote No. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title. The provisions mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People’s Court Act. the former having no fixed period and thus establishing a ban for all time while the latter stating that prohibition “was for any single period of time not exceeding five years’ duration. 210 G.R. L-239 (June 30. 37–1 was valid. such as: (1) a provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. it was ruled that in case of discrepancy between a basic law and a rule issued to implement it. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the authority granted him by Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. HELD: Section 2 of FAO No. 37–1. 37–1 was defective because it failed to specify a period for the ban. 1960) Chapter I. trial and judgment of treason cases.R. FAO No. 37 was subsequently amended with FAO No. 37. 37–1 was contrary to Act No. guilty of treason. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. L-14432 (July 26. 1947) Chapter I. FAO No. No. the accused in violation of said order. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: In March 1954. No. but it was not necessarily rendered void by the omission. Leoncio Lim Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 37. HELD: No. and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Central Bank Case No. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. ISSUES: 1. 6125 entitled “An act imposing STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR OTHER PURPOSES” Petitioners expected to pay 4% of the aggregate value from July 1. Case No. ISSUE: W/N Central bank acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution No.11 KMU Labor Center v. The rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms of the basic law. PBOAP. No.R. LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No.June 30. 2. as provided in the Act. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: Congress approved RA No. 1995 which states that: For exports of bananas shipped during the period from January 1. availed of the deregulatory policy and announced 20% increase in existing fares. 115381 (December 23.R. Inc. Garcia Jr. 1988) FACTS: DOTC Memorandum Order No. The Central bank released Monetary Resolution No. 1972. LTFRB did not have authority to delegate its powers to PBOAP. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 6%. v. For exports of bananas shipped during the period from July 1. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hijo Plantation. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 2%. 1973. the basic law prevails. 1972 to June 30. 1974. 1972. 1973. 2. SC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent PBOAP from implementing fare increase.92-009 allowing for a range of plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fares. HELD: 1. Petitioner filed a petition opposing the increase in fares.June 30. 1995. No. 90-395 was filed asking the LTFRB to allow provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and below the LTFRB official rate for a period of one year. the stabilization tax shall be at the rate of 4%. 57 G. without a public hearing and permission from LTFRB. W/N PBOAP proved that there was a public necessity for the increase thus violating the Public Service Act and Rules of the Court. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rule or regulation issued to implement the said law. 68 G. L-34526 (August 9.June 30. 1973. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . HELD: Central Bank acted with grave abuse of discretion. PBOAP was not able to prove and provide such public necessity as reason for the fare increase. 1972. W/N authority given by LTFRB to PBOAP to increase prices at 20% instead of 15% is unconstitutional on the ground that there was no filing for a petition of purpose in the said increase.

1989 the court ruled on the side of So Ching. the Rule was promulgated more than 2 years after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the main case. 2. Petitioner sought for reconsideration and elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: 1.12 China Banking Corp. and its president. CA Case No. No. W/N Petitioner can extra-judicially foreclose the properties. HELD: Petition was dismissed. ordered Petitioners to pay the award plus P500 as attorney’s fees for failure to comply. It is an elementary principle that a stature is superior to an administrative directive.R. No. HELD: 1. Respondent. instead of Administrative Order No. in a civil case filed by the mother of the decedent. Petitioners pray that the decision be annulled or modified based on Section 1 Rule 11 the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and prays further that the P500 in atty’s fees exceeded the allowed fees according to Sec. 35. Act No. After 5 years. W/N Administrative Order No. W/N the court committed a grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 in attorney’s fees. The Commission. 3135 is the governing law. The properties were to be sold/auctioned on April 3. 1996) Chapter I. Furthermore. Administrative Order No. plus burial expenses not exceeding P200. in return for promissory notes to pay the loans. LATIN MAXIM: 30. 2.494.40. of which Petitioners are manager and proprietor.6 Rule 26 of the said Rules. Page 19. 3 should govern the extra judicial foreclosure. therefore the sale of the two mortgaged properties was stopped. Petitioner can foreclose the properties. the statute cannot be repealed or amended by the administrative directive. ISSUE: 1.R. cannot amend an act of Congress. Honorable Estenzo Case No. 2.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v. Two extra mortgages were additionally executed by So Ching and his wife on July and August 1989. 772 and as a result deprived the court of its jurisdiction over the case. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded the decedent’s widow the amount of P3. 3135 was the governing rule in their case. This caused Petitioner to file for extra judicial foreclosures of the two mortgaged properties. The loans matured but So Ching was not able to repay the said loans. 3 cannot prevail over Act 3135. 1960) FACTS: Petitioner extended loans to Native West Corp. 2. 46a . Footnote No. L-14740 (September 26. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: The decedent is a driver for People’s Land Transportation Company. or any of its rules. 59 G. 121158 (December 5. v.A. The court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in awarding the P500 since the said rule only applies to the Commission and not the Court. 1. 1993. On April 28. The issuance of the preliminary injunction was granted. They were appealing that Act No. 140 G. No. W/N the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission amended R. 3 as So Ching was contending. Thus. So Ching.

” LATIN MAXIM: 15a. referring only to an appointive position. HELD: Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code should not be applied retroactively.” “meat inspection fees. exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction provided by Commonwealth Act 655. in the issuance of Ordinance No. 37 . 1997) Chapter I. this does not fall under the scope of the term. Commission on Elections Case No. who is also asking for the suspension of his proclamation. The fact that the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively. No.” One of the rules of statutory construction is that “certain sections or parts of sections of an ordinance may be held invalid without affecting the validity of what remains.” “corral fees. Since Respondent was reelected. L-15807 (April 22. 46c rd FACTS: Respondent issued Ordinance No. The term to be looked at in the issue is REINSTATEMENT. it overstepped the limits of its statutory grant. Petitioners questioned the validity or said Ordinance. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Incidentally. Petitioner further argues that the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively. No.” “and internal organ fees. 24 charging slaughterhouses in the municipality certain fees including “slaughterhouse fees. When Respondent ordained the payment of other said fees. It is understood that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings. The Commonwealth Act only allowed Respondent to charge slaughterhouse fees. 24. if the parts are not so interblended and dependent that the vice of one necessarily vitiates the others. 1981. 125955 (June 19. 655. The only other fees that would be acceptable were veterinary or sanitary inspection fees since it was mentioned in the statute. 1963) FACTS: One of the Respondents was elected for his 3 and final term as councilor of the 2nd District of Manila. ISSUE: W/N or not the Section 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively due to its wording.R.13 Grego v.98 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v.R. 141 G. unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. HELD: Respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in the issuance of the said ordinance. Petitioner argues that Respondent should be disqualified under Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. which has a technical meaning. Page 23. the court ordered Respondent to refund the fees with the exception of “slaughterhouse fees. His qualifications are being questioned by herein Petitioner. Municipal of Caloocan Case No. Petitioner brings into consideration the fact that Respondent was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in an administrative case held on October 31.” pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. Footnote No. 120 G. ISSUE: W/N Respondent.

and hence. 1990) FACTS: Private Respondents owned a parcel of land of 25. LATIN MAXIM: 37 FACTS: Private Respondent entered into a contract of lease with Petitioner for a period of 3 years.14 National Housing Authority v. 87047 (October 31. that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the price. Respondents claimed they should be paid the assessed value of P6. whichever is lower. On the second issue. and hence. the lease is not for perpetual renewals unless the language employed indicates that it was the intention of the parties. x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x x x. The Petitioner filed another ejectment suit. Reyes Case No. After it expired. 49439 (June 29. He cited PD 464 which provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner in the amount of P1. The petition for Certiorari is granted. W/N the action for ejectment is barred by compromise agreement on res judicata? HELD: This is untenable because the continuance of lease is not dependent upon the will of the lessee. .00. On the compromise agreement.R. and the lease continued from 1979 to 1982. No.400. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation cases. the compromise agreement does not apply because the present case requires a different set of evidence. ISSUE: 1.000 sq/rn. HELD: Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative enactments. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that (1) the lease contract has not expired.600. Private Respondent refused to vacate the premises. No. W/N the continuance of lease is made to depend upon the will of the lessee? 2. Petitioner appealed to the RTC of Manila and then to the CA which also affirmed the decision of the trial court. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6.R. 11a. but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor. The compromise agreement does not foreclose any cause of action arising from a violation of the terms thereof. 26. CA and Benito Villavicencio Dy Case No. Petitioner opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. then from 1982 to 1985. 73 G.00. ISSUE: W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just compensation. res judicata does not apply.00 pursuant to PD 42. the filing of an ejectment suit against the Respondent. The case was terminated by a compromise agreement. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 85 G. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Francisco Lao Lim v.600. and (2) the compromise agreement entered into constitutes res judicata. subject of an expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor NHA.

0. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling issued by local governments. 1995) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Victoriano v. 7065 authorizing the mayor to allow the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) to operate a JAI-ALAI. W/N RA 3350 is constitutional? 3. L-25246 (September 12. Pacquing. as well as Section 7 of Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate JaiAlai from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). ISSUE: 1. W/N the ADC is correct in assailing that P.R. Felipe G.O. No. 74 G.R. 2. W/N RA 3350 violates right to form or join association? 2. Then President Marcos issued a PD 771 revoking all powers and authority of local governments to grant franchise. license or permit. HELD: The right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization. 392 removes the power of local governments to issue license and permit. 1974) FACTS: Executive Order No. which wrote a formal letter to the Company asking to separate the Petitioner from service.” Petitioner resigned from Respondent Union. but the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked P. 37. All laws are presumed valid and constitutional. ADC tried to operate a Jai-Alai. 771 is violative of equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. was a member of the Respondent Union which had with their Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision allowed under R. 115044 (January 27. 40b .A. LATIN MAXIM: 5a.D. W/N the franchise granted by the City of Manila to ADC is valid in view of E. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Section 1 960 of Art III of the 1935 Constitution. 392 which transferred from local governments to the GAB the power to regulate Jai-Alai. In 1998. It did not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the said decree had revoked all franchises issued by the local governments without exceptions. 6c. No. 169 G. an “Iglesia ni Cristo”.D. HELD: R. 810 which revokes and cancels the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded “when the defendant’s act has compelled the Plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest” and “in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered”. No. provide that the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Then President Aquino issued an E. 169 expressly repealing PD. 875: “Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement “ RA 3350 amended RA 875: “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. 409 provides that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power “to franchise” the operation of Jai-Alai. 44.15 Hon. to Jai-Alai and other forms of gambling. ISSUE: 1. And E. Alfredo S. PD 771 was not repealed or amended by any subsequent law.A. 50 FACTS: Petitioner. No. W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when ruling that the Union should pay 500 and attorney’s fee. No. The City of Manila passed an Ordinance No. Case No. Lim v.O.

the day from which the time is reckoned is to be excluded and the date of performance included. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. according to which “month” now means the civil month and not the regular-30-day month. HELD: No. it was not so when it was “otherwise provided” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. The court.R. and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the Official Gazette immediately. the time when the Plaintiffs tendered it. ISSUE: W/N the clause “otherwise provided” in Article 2 of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of publication. No. 287 G. L-63915 (December 29. ISSUE: W/N the stipulated period elapsed on the time of tendering. 13 of the Administrative Code. declares that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published shall have no force and effect. August 13. The above issue depends upon the kind of month agreed upon by the parties.R. Carpio Case No.16 Tañada v. which cannot in any event be omitted. there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia Legis non excusat”. Without such notice or publication. with reference to the performance of an act required by law or contract to be done within a certain limit of time. There is nothing in the agreement providing otherwise. 1928. the clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication per se. 39a . therefore. 9a FACTS: The Litigants here compromised a civil case on July 13. the stipulated or fixed period had already elapsed. Article 7 of the Civil Code had been modified by Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.159 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gutierrez v. No. 31025 (August 15. 1928. and on the day from which it should be counted. Publication in full should be indispensable. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule. But when the Plaintiffs duly tendered the amount. 55 G. In computing any fixed period of time. The repurchase of the land was made within the stipulated period. agreeing that if within a month from the date thereof the Plaintiffs failed to repurchase a certain land. the Defendants appealed that by that time. unless otherwise provided. Tuvera Case No. Page 37. Footnote No. 1986) Chapter I. 1929) FACTS: Due process was invoked by the Petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. the ownership would vest in the Defendants.

1912. or to deposit in court. the court ordered that the Defendant’s bond be forfeited and the execution issued against the principal and the sureties for the amount thereof. the principal was arrested. HELD: Sec. The court ordered the immediate execution of the judgment.” This section is only applicable if there is a computation needed to be done. 56 G. the sale was postponed from time to time. and that an alias warrant be issued for the arrest of the Defendant. 88 of the CCP. No. On Feb 28.S. and ordered the sheriff to annul the sale. the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. on application of the sureties.17 Guzman v. 161 G. 1912. The unsuccessful Defendants having appealed in both cases on Dec. in case they desire to avoid the immediate execution of the judgment pending the appeal. 1921 was one day late. ISSUE: W/N the execution sale occurred on the date directed by the court. Judgment was rendered against the principal on February 7. Paniaga Case No.R. setting aside the forfeiture of a bail bond. By various orders of the court. Lichauco Case No. 1914) FACTS: Plaintiff filed two actions of unlawful detainer to recover possession of certain properties in Manila. with government as the purchaser. 25c . as amended by Act No. set aside the order of forfeiting the bond. On July 10. “on or before the TENTH day of each Calendar month”. and the sureties were notified on the same day to produce the thereof their principal.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c HELD: The payment made on August 11. the Plaintiff moved the court to execute the judgments. The Defendants made such dilatory payments however they failed to make such payments on or before the tenth day of the month. The term “month” must now be understood to refer to calendar month. On July 13. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “unless otherwise specially provided. 1920 to the Court of First Instance of Manila. and finally occurred on July 8. if the last be a Sunday or a legal holiday. v. 1912. 9. 8223 (March 4. The sale here of the property must stand. it shall be excluded. As a result. 2588. 1921) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. FACTS: This is an appeal by the government from an order of the court. No. The trial court decided in favor of the Plaintiff. the sums of money fixed by the Justice of the Peace as the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the property held by them. it is their duty to conform with the provisions of Sec. to pay the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. in this case. However. ISSUE: W/N the payments were made on or before the Tenth day of each month. there is no necessity for such computation for the date is fixed for when the act be performed. L-17986 (October 21. inasmuch as Sec 13 of the Administrative Code has modified Art. the court. It is also directed that the sale should take place on a named future date. 7 of the civil code in so far as the latter fixes the length of a month at thirty days.

195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Hidalgo v. while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and Saturday. The policy of the State is to establish owner cultivatorship. Hidalgo Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Page 52. 1969 issues of the newspaper Daily Record”. Agrarian Court dismissed petitions. 9c. The Defendant-Appellee bank failed to comply with the legal requirement of publication. L-25327 (May 29. 1970) Chapter II. injustice and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days. 36a.R. No. In Concepcion v.R. stating that the right of redemption granted by Sec. claiming that share tenancy and leasehold tenancy are within the jurisdiction of the code – that the code expressly grants said right to leaseholders only and nobody else.19 FACTS: To secure payments of his loans. ISSUE: W/N not the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of the Agrarian Reform Code addresses only leaseholders and not share tenants.18 PNB v. 40a Maxims invoked by lower court: 6c. For failure to pay the obligation. 11a. The notices of sale of Appellant’s foreclosed properties were published on March 28. Page 47. April 11 and April 12. Moreover. CA Case No.R. 12 of the same code is only for leasehold tenants and not for share tenants. 37. the court held that if the intention of Congress was to extend the right of redemption to share tenants through judicial legislation. 9a. HELD: It must be conceded that that Article 13 is completely silent as to the definition of what is “week”. 13 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code before the registration of the deed of sale. Adherence to the letter would result in absurdity. No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks”. Then. 12a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Andueta. 30b. L-25326 (May 29. HELD: Agrarian Court fell into several erroneous assumptions and premises. Footnote No. a final deed of sale was registered in the Buacan Registry of Property in favor of the Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The purpose of the Agricultural Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. 9b FACTS: Petitioners pray to Agrarian Court to be entitled as share tenants to redeem parcel of land they are working from the purchasers where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor of the latter’s intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Sec. 98382 (May 17. Footnote No. 238 G. No. 124 G. 1970) and G. Private Respondent mortgages two lots to Petitioner bank. respectively. 1969 falls on a Friday. the section would have expressly said so. 43 . reducing “agricultural lessee” to only “leasehold tenants”. The date March 28. Section 3 of Act No. 1993) Chapter I. Petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder at the auction sale.

Officer-in-Charge of Bureau of Labor Relations. 37 . No. Another section of the statute disqualifies people who are delinquent in the payment of public taxes assessed since Aug. Footnote No. 1898. 28. 20a. and of the statute as a whole. 13. ISSUE: W/N the said statute’s true test of property qualification to vote is the actual/market value of the property owned or the assessed value thereof. 149 G. L-41106 (September 22. suggesting an intimate relation between the two in the mind of the legislator. LATIN MAXIM: 10. HELD: Article 226 of the Labor Code addresses this. ISSUE: W/N there is a statute authorizing Respondents and giving them jurisdiction. it would be highly improbable to enforce the statute within a reasonable time because it will be difficult to determine. except for Daniel Navarro and Genaro Calixtro. In the statute.R.19 U.22 FACTS: They made an oath before an election officer in the municipality of Piddig (in proceedings in connection with the general election held on Nov. Petition denied. 300 G.R. Evidence showed that the Appellants.S. FACTS: Respondent. Petitioners contended that there was no statutory authorization for the Respondent to require referendum election and that Respondent and the Bureau were beyond jurisdiction. from voting. property qualification is an alternative to qualification based upon an annual payment. 1977) Chapter II. did not own property of the assessed value of P500. 1911) Chapter II. 9c. This provision was directed to the case of delinquency in the payment of land taxes as well as all other taxes. 11a. v. 2. required referendum election among Petitioners to ascertain their wishes as to their affiliation with Federation of Free Workers. 36a. 24a HELD: It was the intention of the legislator as proved from an examination of the immediate context of provisions of the statute defining “property qualifications” of a voter. The statute as a whole (as an election law) is intended to secure purity of the ballot box. Footnote No. Article 226 of Labor Code is very clear concerning executive department’s “original and exclusive authority to act”. Page 53. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1909) that they owned real property with the value of P500. Eduvala Case No. 12a. Page 52. Respondent and the Bureau were within jurisdiction. Navarro Case No. No. 6160 (March 21. Both qualifications are under a single head.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Litex Employees Association v. If the property qualification is actual/market value.

E. 3899 which provided for the age retirement among justices was approved.20 Regalado v.R. v. On December 17. A few years later. HELD: PD 2016 is a valid ground for De Jesus in invoking her rights as a tenant. which aims to protect tenants from unjust eviction. said provision still aims to protect the tenants from unscrupulous landowners from demanding a steep price for the land. In her defense. Esteban T. 46a FACTS: On March 3. Villar was appointed as Justice of Peace to take the place of Petitioner. No. 3899). Albay. Villar assumed office. 80223 (February 5. ISSUE: W/N under the provisions of Section 203 of the Administrative Code. PD 1517. L-42293 (February 13. 1935) Chapter II. 1993) Chapter II. 1931. 3899). as further amended by Act No. Petitioner instituted an action in the RTC of Valenzuela against Private Respondent De Jesus for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in said area. San Diego Inc. Footnote No. 3899. HELD: Justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act will not be affected by said amendment (Act No. 27 FACTS: Petitioner was Justice of Peace of Malinao. 1934. as well as unjust eviction. No. Yulo Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. Petitioner became 65 years of age (age retirement as provided by Sec. 203 of the Administrative Code. De Jesus argued that the land in question was covered by PD 2016 (a complementary provision of PD 1517. Shortly thereafter.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION B. Footnote No. 26 G. amended further by Act. No. 1986.R. 25a . Act No. the Justices of Peace and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65. CA Case No. Page 55. 255 G. LATIN MAXIM: 1. On November 16. While it may depart from its source. Page 56.) ISSUE: W/N PD 2016 is a valid defense of De Jesus in upholding her rights as a lessee.

said proclamations were also terminated. Through the separation of powers. 671 (Emergency Powers Act). ISSUE: W/N RA 590 unconstitutional. Page 56. 24a .33 FACTS: Executive Orders. No. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 9a FACTS: RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be considered exempt from income tax. Dinglasan Case No. 84 G. David Case No. 1. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. No. 1942. 6c. That when Congress convened again on Jan. payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. in pursuance of Commonwealth Act No. were questioned for its validity until the National Assembly Convention of 1942 ISSUE: W/N the proclamations are valid. 1953) Chapter II. L-2044 (August 26. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Endencia and Jugo v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: These Executive Orders are valid because they have been enacted during the time of the inability of the Congress to function. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive compensation as fixed by law.R. 1949) Chapter II.21 Araneta v. which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Page 56. Footnote No. L-6355-56 (August 31. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590. such a task must be done by the Judiciary. 8.R. by the Legislature. HELD: No. 7a. While Art. 98 G. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his own benefit but for the public. Footnote No.

22 Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Case No. 84 G.R. No. L-34568 (March 28, 1988) Chapter II, Page 61, Footnote No.50

CIR v. Limpan Investment Corporation
Case No. 77 G.R. No. L-28571 and L-28644 (July 31, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.55

FACTS: Prior to this case, Petitioners contested the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy, stating that under Art. 335 of the Civil Code, that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the Agonoys already had a daughter of the Estrella Agonoy, who is the deceased mother of the Petitioners, and that the Agonoys also have the Petitioners as grandchildren. Furthermore, the Petitioners argued that the adopting would introduce a foreign element into the family unit, and would result in the reduction of their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The Respondent Court ruled in favor for Agonoy. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Court erred in their decision. HELD: No, the court was correct. In enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in Art. 335, the children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, do not include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that, what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 30a

FACTS: In 1959 and 1960, Respondent Corporation filed income tax returns which later were bases for deficiency due to disallowance by the BIR. Brought to the Court of Tax Appeals, the deficiencies on both cases were decided upon at P26,137 and P7,240.48, resolved at September 20, 1967 (L-28571) and December 11, 1967 (L-28644) respectively. ISSUE: W/N the CTA committed an error in its fixed date of the payment of surcharges and interests. HELD: The CTA’s decision on the date of payment of surcharges and interests are in error. Section 51 of the NIRC provides the following- On Tax shown on the return, in failure to pay the required amount on or before the date prescribed, interest upon such unpaid amount shall be collected as part of the tax, at the rate of one per centum a month, from the date prescribed for the payment until paid, provided that the maximum amount for the interest doesn’t exceed the amount corresponding to a period of 3 years. The same goes with deficiencies, except that the additional tax must be paid within 30 days of the notice, else the same interests apply. With regard to surcharge, if the amount in the notice isn’t paid within 30 days, a surcharge of 5 per centum of the amount of tax unpaid. In L-28571, the interest shall be computed from September 7, 1962 to September 6, 1965, at 1% for 3 years, plus the surcharge of 5% on failure to pay the deficiency tax. In L-28644, from April 4, 1963 to April 3, 1966, the interest shall be at 1% a month for 3 years, plus the 5% surcharge. LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a, 26

23 Cebu Portland Cement v. Municipality of Naga, Cebu
Case No. 53 G.R. Nos. 24116-17 (August 22, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.56

Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General
Case No. 260 G.R. No. L-17888 (October 29, 1968) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.57

FACTS: Efforts of defendant Treasurer to collect from Plaintiff municipal license tax from 1960, 1961, as well as penalties, amounting to a total sum of P204,300, have all been met with rebuff. Municipal tax imposed by Amended Ordinance No. 21. Finally on June 26, 1961, defendant Treasurer decides to avail of Civil remedies as provided for under Sec. 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code; he gives Plaintiff a period of ten (10) days within which to settle the account from receipt thereof. On July 6, 1961, defendant Treasurer notified the Plant Manager of the Plaintiff that he was distraining 100,000 bags of Apo Cement in satisfaction of Plaintiff’s delinquency in municipal license tax; notice was received by Plant Officer-in-Charge Vicente T. Garagay, who acknowledged the distraint. Said articles (the cement bags) will be sold by public auction to the highest bidder on July 27, 1961, proceeds thereof will in part be utilized to settle the account. Despite notice of sale, it did not take place on July 27, 1961 but on January 30, 1962 ISSUE: W/N the distraint and public auction were valid.

FACTS: Petitioner seeks a refund from Respondent Central Bank on the claim that it was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of “UREA AND FORMALDEHYDE”, as separate units used for the production of synthetic glue. The specific language of the Act speaks of “UREA FORMALDEHYDE”, a finished product which is distinct and different from “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE”. Petitioner argues his view, citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof (referring to the Journal). Petitioner would assail as devoid of support in law the action taken by the Respondent Auditor General in an endorsement to Central Bank causing it to overrule its previous resolution and to adopt the view in such endorsement to the effect that the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, did not come within the purview of the statutory language that granted such exemption. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s allegations are valid. HELD: The Act clearly states “UREA FORMALDEHYDE” as a finished product and not “UREA” and “FORMALDEHYDE” as separate units. Individual statements made by Senators do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the view of the House of Representatives. If there was any mistake in the printing of the bill, it should be corrected by legislation and not by judicial decree. The Auditor General was just doing his duty, following what was written in the statute. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

HELD: Both actions are valid. According to the Revised Administrative Code: “The remedy by distraint shall proceed as follows: Upon failure of the person owing any municipal tax or revenue to pay the same, at the time required, the municipal treasurer may seize and distraint any personal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien, in sufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question, together with any increment thereto incident to delinquency and the expenses of the distraint.” The clear and explicit language of the law leaves no room for doubt. Also, this being a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff must be deemed to have accepted as conclusive the findings of the lower court which upheld the validity of the auction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

24 Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines
Case No. 248 G.R. No. L-26419 (October 16, 1970) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.58

KMMRC Credit Union v. Manila Railroad Company
Case No. 66 G.R. No. L-25316 (February 28, 1979)

FACTS: Petitioners filed an application for an urban estate loan with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor-in-intent of Respondent. They mortgaged real estate properties to secure the loan; loan was approved on April 30, 1953. Mortgage contract was executed by Petitioners in favor of DBP on March 23, 1954. As of July 31, 1965, outstanding obligation of the Petitioners with DBP was P13, 983.59. Petitioner wrote Respondent offering to pay P14, 000 for his outstanding obligation out of his back pay pursuant to RA 897 (Back Pay Law). Respondent advised Petitioners of the non-acceptance of this offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20, 1953, when RA 897 was approved. Respondent filed on October 14, 1965 an application for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage executed by the Petitioners; Respondent Sheriff scheduled the public auction after advising Petitioner of the application for foreclosure filed by DBP. ISSUE: W/N the obligation of the Petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897, the Amendatory Act of June 20, 1953, to RA 304, the original Back Pay Law. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the loan of the Petitioners was not subsisting when RA 897 was enacted on June 20, 1953. HELD: RA 897 has clear provisions that expressly require that the obligations for which back pay certificates may be accepted as payments must be subsisting at the time RA 897 was approved (June 20, 1953). While Petitioner’s loan was approved on April 30, 1953, they only availed of it much later on March 23, 1954. The obligation therefore attaches only on March 23, 1954. It cannot be said that there was an obligation subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

FACTS: The Petitioner filed a case for mandamus which the lower court has denied. Petitioner seeks to overturn the ruling relying on a right that, according to the Petitioner, RA 2023 grants to them. Paragraphs 1 & 2 of section 62 of RA 2023 compels employers to deduct from the salaries or wages of members of credit unions the debts of the employees and pay it to said credit union. The lower court has already granted there is no such right granting first priority to the loan to credit unions in the payroll collection. ISSUE: W/N RA 2023 converts KMMRC credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The RA Petitioner relies on clearly does not state the loans shall be granted first priority in the salary collections. According to Justice Recto in a subsequent opinion, “it is well established that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and the writ not issue in cases where the right is doubtful”. Justice Barrera adds: ”… the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

25 Davao Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-28739 (March 29, 1972)

Alfredo Ramos v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 252 G.R. No. L-41295 (December 4, 1989) Chapter II, Page 62, Footnote No.60

FACTS: Petitioner is the grantee of a legislative franchise to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power plant in the municipality of Davao. On two different occasions it imported materials and equipment for installation in its facilities. Petitioner is arguing that the taxes levied against its imports should be waived by the collector of customs in Cebu (the materials were delivered at the port of Cebu) pursuant to section 17 of (pre-commonwealth) Act 3636 (Standard Electric Power and Light Franchise Law) which states that if any competing company should be granted franchise more favorable than the one previously granted to another company, the latter shall enjoy the same advantages given in the other franchise. ISSUE: W/N section 17 of act 3636 applies to the case of Petitioner. HELD: No. Firstly, the provision cited by Petitioner states that the franchise must be granted to a ‘competing party’. NPC, to which the contract with tax exemptions was given, is not a competing party to Petitioner. Secondly, Petitioner cannot rely on RA 358 as amended by RA 987 to support its tax exemption. Exemption from taxation is never presumed, it is always explicitly stated. LATIN MAXIM: 6c

FACTS: The municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan sued Ramos et al for the recovery of its 74 hectare fishpond. Atty. Angel Cruz, a private lawyer and head of the Cruz, Durian and Academia law firm, volunteered himself and his firm to serve as counsel for the municipality. He stipulated in the complaint that the municipality is obliged to pay them not less than 20% of the amount to be recovered. Petitioners move to disqualify said private law firm as counsel on the ground that it is illegal for the municipality to hire a private counsel. ISSUE: W/N it is legal for the municipality to hire a private counsel in filing a case. HELD: No. Under section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code, the provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal thereof in any court. Furthermore, under section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act, the municipal attorney shall act as legal counsel for the municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as may be assigned to them by the council. The municipality’s interest would be best protected if the municipal attorney handles its litigation. These laws are implemented as well so as not to burden the municipality with the expense of hiring a private lawyer. LATIN MAXIM: 7a

charges against Petitioners in the information should be understood as that of simple rebellion under the RPC. L. Hernandez remains as the binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. An injured party cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. No.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1. if they are awarded a greater amount in the regular courts. in light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Workmen’s Compensation Act. the amount received from this Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery. LATIN MAXIM: 1. HELD: Petitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. In allowing Petitioners to sue in regular courts. 47 G. However. a later report on the accident showed there was negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation.30642 (April 30. 17. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have the right to choose between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages. Salazar Case No.26 Floresca v. then the principle of non-retroactivity would be violated. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Enrile v. 1990. No. Justice Feliciano states that if the court ruled that the charges of murder could be prosecuted separately from rebellion. HELD: The doctrine in the case People v. The charges of murder and multiple frustrated murders are absorbed in the crime of simple rebellion. Petitioners contend that they are being charged for a criminal offense that does not exist in the statute books because technically. 92163 (June 5. applied and gave effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice. Therefore. However. with the exception of Floresca. 48 . 1990) FACTS: Petitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation who died as a result of a cave-in while working in underground mining operations. Furthermore. the Court stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather. 40 G. Philex Mining Corporation Case No. in a concurring opinion. ISSUE: W/N case of Petitioners falls under the Hernandez doctrine. Thereafter. 40a FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders allegedly committed during a failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10. Petitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation’s reckless and wanton negligence. Petitioners. recovered damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.R. 46a.

Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction.D. Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the Zone.2 Series 1952 of the municipal council. L-10662 (December 14. 35 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Chief of Police in Sibonga.74 FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling. The committee came up with an adverse decision subsequently signed by the members of the council. The fact that the decision of the Municipal Council was issued before the decision of the Supreme Court cannot validate the action of the police committee. RA No. 278 G.65 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Senarillos v. 7a. 3a. ISSUE: W/N Sibonga had jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos.27 Manikad v.D.557 the investigation of police officers must be conducted by council itself and not by a mere committee thereof. No. Page 67. 1984) Chapter II. especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and administered by the Authority…” ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P. Page 63. the decision against him was invalid. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Under RA No. Cebu. Senarillos was suspended by Municipal Mayor of Sibonga and investigated by a “police committee” composed of 3 councilors created by Resolution No. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone. Hence. LATIN MAXIM: 1.D. 1956) Chapter II.557 has eliminated the provision authorizing investigation by a committee council. Sibonga therefore had no jurisdiction to investigate the Chief of Police Senarillos. The initial proceeding was illegal ab initio and the subsequent reaffirmation of the decision of the municipal council by the civil service authorities could not validate the proceeding. 162 G. HELD: No. HELD: No. theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the Respondent.R. 6b. even if concurred in by the rest of the councilors. 65097 (February 20.R. Upon the charges filed by Petitioner. 7a . Section 7 of P. 1716-A refers to police authority. This was appealed to and affirmed by the Commissioner of Civil Service and by the Civil Service Board of Appeals. Footnote No. the use of “sole” in P. Footnote No. Tanodbayan Case No. No. Hermosisimo Case No.

35.R. Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. No. 1967) Chapter II. 1959) Chapter II. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent tasked to assist in the maintenance of peace and order falls among those authorized to possess firearms. No. He was granted this appointment for having shown good faith by previously surrendering to the office of the Governor a firearm. The law does not contain any exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. The Court’s ruling overturned that of People v. 211 G.89 FACTS: Defendant was accused and convicted of illegal possession of firearms in Lanao. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-12088 (December 23. He sought to be acquitted as the case of People v. It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides the “peace officers” are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. Footnote No. 7a. Page 69.28 People of the Philippines v. The appointment sufficiently put him in the category of “peace officer” equivalent even to a Municipal Police expressly covered by section 879. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N a Secret Agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms. 6c. 46c . invokes as his legal excuse the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent shown in the Governor’s letter which he presented as and evidence. 30a. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. He has then been appointed as SECRET AGENT to assist on the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and is authorized to hold and carry in his possession 1 Riot shotgun. Moro Macarandang Case No. Macarandang. Macarandang used the same defense providing evidences of his appointment. admitting the ownership and possession of the firearm and ammunitions. Page 69. 24a FACTS: Defendant was accused of illegal possession of firearms.87 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Wherefore the decision appealed from is reversed and the Defendant acquitted. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 213 G. Defendant. L-22301 (August 30. He invokes in his defense that he was an appointed Secret Agent of the provincial Governor of Batangas.R. Mapa Case No. HELD: No. Footnote No.

According to them. L-2934 (November 29.91 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sy Kiong v. 1983. the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. 2a.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner. 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank.R. 46a FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. 150 G. The decision in Que should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice. should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is criminally liable. 7a. 65 G. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Sometime in September 1948. No. 1951) FACTS: Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1. in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter. Footnote No. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into bread and to be resold to the public. an official promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail dealers for purposes of resale. 24a. Page 69. the Treasurer of the City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.29 Co v. 37. It was dishonored two days later. postdated November 30. People should not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial rulings and the operative fact doctrine. the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense. 1984. 43 . No. The check was deposited on January 3. At the time of the issuance of the check. CA Case No. 1993) Chapter II. Que v. 100776 (October 28. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. Sarmiento Case No.

No. Commission on Elections Case No. the minority inspector in the second congressional district of the said province. Respondent shall have the discretion to choose the minority inspector. ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Respondent granted the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos the exclusive right to propose the minority election inspector in the first congressional district of Pampanga. the right to minority representation in the board of election inspectors to which such coalition is entitled. 1920) Chapter III. HELD: The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. No. in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned. 1941.8 FACTS: On September 15. and binding to all future owners of the same. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No. which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land. Page 79. ISSUE: W/N said Act no. and for other purposes. 149 G. The land involved is a private agricultural land. and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill. Eleven days later.” LATIN MAXIM: d . Footnote No. 2874.30 Sumulong v.R. d FACTS: Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands.” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. cannot be claimed by any of the component parties which have thereafter separated. L-16197 (March 12. LATIN MAXIM: 36a. 1941) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Capiz v. 48634 (October 8. 37. Ramirez Case No. “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain. 56 G. a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation.R. Respondent modified its ruling and awarded the minority inspector to the Popular Front Party of Abad Santos. and to the Popular Front Party of Petitioner. HELD: Where the minimum number of votes required by law was polled by a mere coalition or alliance of minority parties.

31 Eugenio v.D. but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law. it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein. “The intent of the statute is the law. Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of nondevelopment on the property. No. 9. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities. b2 . Applying P. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. 1978) Chapter III. viz. 221 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Purisima Case No. 104 G. Drilon Case No.D.16 FACTS: Private Respondent purchased on installment basis from Petitioner.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed. Page 76. or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of.D. the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to complete the development. P. 957 “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”. ISSUE: W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he decided P.D. 9. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse of discretion and P. HELD: The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. No. Respondent prayed for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Footnote No. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P. two lots. Sec.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. Petitioner claims that the Exec. No. organized lawlessness or public disorder. Nos.20 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. Petitioners argued that a perusal of P. 957 saying it should have not been given retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the non-payment of the amortizations. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety.R. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. erred in applying P. ISSUE: W/N P. pointed.R. No.D.D. L-42050-66 (November 20. Page 81. It failed to state one essential element of the crime. 957 is to given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. 109404 (January 22. 1996) Chapter III.D. HELD: No. insurrection.D. or rebellion. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spouses Relevo and the title was registered under their name. connected with or related to subversion. 957 will be given retroactive effect. Footnote No. 9. reinstate Private Respondent’s purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him of the payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses.

D.22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. 772 on the basis of Ejusdem Generis (of the same kind or species) since its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture. Hence. both fall within the scope of the power granted.23 FACTS: The issue is whether or not P. Page 82. Page 77. 4 G. No. 207 G. 772. According to Respondent.D. Petitioners assail this construction erroneous in the light of the meaning of “public wharf” as it may have bearing on the right to charge wharfage.R. which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands.D. has the right to charge wharfages from docks which are owned by the National Government. 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. City of Cebu Case No. ISSUE: Whether or not P. 772 applies to agricultural lands HELD: The Supreme Court held the same ruling that the lower court did. 1980) Chapter III. HELD: The term “public” refers to the nature of use of the pier or wharves. the legislature made no distinction between those owned by the City of Cebu and the National Government and that consequently. the power to impose wharfage rests on a different basis and that is ownership. 36b FACTS: The Petitioner contends that the ordinance implemented by Respondent should be declared null and void because the ordinance seeks to generate revenue by collecting wharfage from vessels which dock at the public wharves of piers located in the said City but owned by the National Government. ISSUE: W/N the City of Cebu. The order of dismissal by Echaves was then appealed to the Supreme Court. 25a. through its ordinance. Nos. 1965) Chapter III. L-14526 (March 31. It stated that “the rule of Ejusdem Generis is merely a tool for statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative is uncertain.R. The Court also referred to the previous subsection of the questioned portion of the ordinance pointing out that it implies a distinction with regard to those docks that are owned by the City and those of the National Government.D. 36b . Footnote No.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. declaring that P. Echaves Case No.” But the Supreme Court disagreed to the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the intent of the decree is unmistakable. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. The lower court denied the motion and ruled that agricultural land is not part of P.32 People of the Philippines v. The Court states that only those which are constructed by the City shall be considered as its property. thus bringing the case at hand. L-47757-61 (January 28.

33 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 1992) Chapter III. TMX Sales. provided that he had fulfilled the first two requirements. after plainly and unequivocally requiring that the candidates of other elective offices should possess the age qualification “at the time of the election”. He appealed that the existence of a semi-colon. Footnote No. defeated candidate Petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings. 10201 (September 23. Case No. The Respondent contends. Four days after the proclamation. No. 11e. the law should suddenly change the requirement for the case of municipal officers. not capacity to assume office. Page 83. “Sec. Tarlac. 105 G. Aquino Case No. 80 G. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment). 36d FACTS: Respondent was proclaimed as elected Mayor of Concepcion. Footnote No. converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code. challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that Respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. HELD: The date of filing of the final payment should be considered. No reason is shown why. 1957) Chapter III.R.R. on the other hand. Decision of the lower court is affirmed and the election of Respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. 36b. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but rather at the time of the assumption of office. Inc. No. Aquino claimed that age requirement refers only to the age at assumption of office. Page 83. 11a. 292 of the NIRC should be interpreted in relation to the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect the legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which may lead to inconvenience and absurdity. ISSUE: W/N the election of Aquino is unlawful and illegal. Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. 292 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) which includes a two-year prescription. taking part in the election is meant.25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Feliciano v. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section. The Petitioner claims that the prescriptive period provided in the law for refund of such tax is already expired since it is already more than two years from the date the quarterly income tax was paid.” LATIN MAXIM: 11a.28 FACTS: Respondent Company wants a refund to an erroneously collected tax as provided in Sec. The Supreme Court said that. 9d. ISSUE: W/N the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. HELD: The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do contrary. that the date of filing of the final payment (Final Adjustment Return) is the one that should be considered with respect to the prescriptive period and not the quarterly payment made. 36b . The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 83736 (January 15.

or inserting others when necessary. cannot have the effect of limiting the operative words contained in the body of the text. 636 is applicable only to wills of aliens. 1913) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Estate of Johnson Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 11e. allowed by the law of his own state or country. is covered by Sec. may be proved.S and therefore an alien. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature.34 US. 48 . 26. attention is directed to the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to further fact that the word “state” in the body of the section is not capitalized. Petitioner. ISSUE: W/N the will of Petitioner. 42a. 636. v. Inasmuch as defendant had.” The will of Johnson was probated and allowed in the lower court. The epigraph. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses. a citizen of the U. No. No. but Petitioner contends that Sec. 33 FACTS: Petitioner was a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States but died and left a will in Manila.R. 12767 (November 16. 159 G. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. 636. 37. ISSUE: How should the provision be interpreted? HELD: The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts. allowed and recorded in the Philippine Islands and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands. separated by the comma. The will duly probated. or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. being a US citizen. disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks. and in this connection.38 FACTS: Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. HELD: The fact that the words “state” and “country” are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded from the phrase “another state or country”. separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. defendants are acquitted. or heading. Page 86. and which might be proved. L-8327 (March 28. therefore was not a viable defense. “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses. it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. 519. thus an alien. Footnote No. is covered by Sec. 1918) Chapter III. Hart Case No. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”. which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will. 636 of the Code of the Civil Procedure states “Will made here by an alien—will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 131 G. of a section being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of the provision. LATIN MAXIM: 24a.R. 25a. Sec. it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated.

Footnote No. L-38076 (November 4. They were tried and convicted. Mendoza Case No. When the text of the law is clear and unambiguous. No. LATIN MAXIM: 50. ISSUE: W/N the evidence is sufficient to convict. or from the Spanish caption. 160 of the Revised Penal Code. which are mere catchwords or reference aids. consulted to remove. his conviction for murder is not different because it involved homicide. not create doubts. 160. epigram or head note of a section for interpretation of the text. Yabut Case No. he killed another prisoner.35 People of the Philippines v. Respondent relied on the word “another” appearing in the English translation of the head note of Art. The evidence presented was insufficient to convict that defendants fraudulently deposited the ballots in question.R. HELD: No. heading. and suggests that the law is applicable only when the new crime committed by a person serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Judgment was reversed. After conviction. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in applying Art. The English text of Section 2654 is defective as the head note clearly shows that this section is only applicable when a person fraudulently deposit’s a ballot in the ballot box.43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People of the Philippines v. 85472 (September 27. 1933) FACTS: Defendant was convicted for homicide. 1993) Chapter III. While serving sentence. No such deduction is warranted from the text itself. there is no need to resort to the preamble. Page 87. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. No. He was consequently charged for murder. he was punished with the maximum period for murder. What was presented and admitted was evidence in a previous election case which has no probative value to establish the guilt of the defendants in the criminal case. HELD: No. d . 160. in accordance with Art. According to him. 231 G. 7a FACTS: Respondents were accused for violation of Section 2654 of the Administrative Code for allegedly depositing in the official ballot box 51 official ballots which they prepared without the knowledge and consent of the voters.112 G.

Defendant was convicted but the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on his motion that the court had no jurisdiction over his person or the subject matter. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant was placed in double jeopardy. but it was denied and he was convicted. No. 1761.” HELD: The translation of the Defendant is not accurate.R. Whether or not Defendant was placed in double jeopardy depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. Quintanar Case No. it shall prevail over its translation. Defendants contend that they could not be legally convicted for they rely on the Spanish translation of the Act which provides that it will take effect “despues del primero de Marzo.R. As the first complaint was not signed by the offended party. No. the offended party signed a complaint charging Defendant of rape. Manaba Case No. and defendant was never in jeopardy. Where the Act was originally promulgated in English. 1908”. L-39037 (October 30. Subsequently.36 People of the Philippines v. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . HELD: No. and the judgment of the court was void for lack of jurisdiction over subject matter. The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” is not bound in the Spanish text which is controlling. because the complaint was not signed by the offended party. The complaint was signed by the Chief of Police. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.” (after the first of March) ISSUE: W/N the Defendant should be punished under Act No 1761 which takes effect “despues del primero de Marzo. the “Opium Law”. 334 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to file the complaint. Defendant asked for dismissal on the ground of double jeopardy. v. 1910) FACTS: Defendant was charged for rape. in violation of Sec. After trial. it was not a valid complaint in accordance with law.S. Art. 5654 (August 27. on the night of March 1. 1908 were caught in the act of smoking opium. 1933) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. 36a FACTS: Defendants. 32 of Act No. The English and original text says: “on and after March 1. 110 G. On appeal. 162 G. because it was the Spanish text approved by the legislature.

Even if there was a new judgment. Sec. HELD: The property in question is NOT under the Mortgage law but under Act No. 175 G. The only exceptions. Lichauco Case No. 496.R.666. 21192 so that the contract lease might be noted and entered in the corresponding records. The lien of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by the perfecting of an appeal but simply suspended. 39 G. orders and decrees that were once under Spanish Terminology have been modified under the new Code of Civil Procedure.R. 49 . No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. ISSUE: With these two cases. not destroyed. there was yet another pending appeal where Defendant Lichauco owed his Aunt Clara Lichauco P17. HELD: Preference should be secured to Mata notwithstanding the appeal. But the English enacted by the Legislature. Inc. 1934) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION McMicking v. only real rights can be registered.60. Page 88. China Banking Corporation Case No. However. and under the Civil Code and the Mortgage Law.49 FACTS: Respondent Corporation contends that the order requires it to surrender the register of deeds of the City of Manila which is the duplicate of TCT No.37 Employees’ Club. No. 7896 (March 30. One should look rather to the spirit than the letter of the law. The preference on Mata was based on Art. 51 and 52. who has preference over the funds owed by Lichauco. the judgment. should prevail. it is simply reversed. This act expressly provides that all interests must be registered in order to affect third persons. ISSUE: W/N contract lease under the Mortgage law is not a real right and not be registered. v. 49 FACTS: This is an appeal on a judgment in favor of current Respondent against Defendant Chu Chan Chac. 40188 (July 27. drawn in part from American and English precedents. or the Torrens system. Mata must have immediate recourse to the property of Lichauco based on the first judgment. And likewise. or an express covenant requiring the lease to be registered. One must take into account that classification and the incidents of judgments. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. 496. However. in the duration of Mata’s judgment. are a term exceeding three years. 1914) Chapter III. strictly. rent to corresponding years paid in advance. which includes the interest arising from the contract of lease in favor of the Respondent. there was another case pending in its duration: an appeal in the judgment in favor of Antonio Flor Mata – where judgment execution is. The Spanish text of the law was relied upon by the Petitioner – the Mortgage Law. until the allotment of time for perfecting of a bill is not done yet and the appeal was not taken. They argue that the contract lease cannot be registered in the register of deeds because it is not a real right. which secures preference to sentencias firmes only (judgments which are final in the sense that no appeal lies therefrom). which it does not harbor. 1924 of the new Code of Civil Procedure. is not Sentencia Firme as used in Spanish legal terminology – where it would be explained that the right to share in the distribution of the debtor (Lichauco) could not accrue the judgment creditor (Mata) until he has the right to. Act No.

9c. 11d. which led to his death 16 days later. 17 FACTS: At the time the decedent met the vehicular accident on September 12. 156 G. 1987) Chapter III. Davao Stevedore Terminal Company Case No. ISSUE: W/N the widow and posthumous child are considered dependents under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. the Petitioners claimed that because there was no written notice. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. 2/5 of the lot. ISSUE: 1. The claimant widow gave birth on April 8. the claimant-widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband and wife for the past 3 months. No. HELD: Although there was no written notice. L-27489 (April 30. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale. 11 G. W/N Art. despite their obvious knowledge of it. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them. and unmarried.54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vda. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly. if under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting herself. Although not his wife at the time of the accident but at the time of his death. 1970) Chapter III. Footnote No. According to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. De Macabenta v. the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. 2. 10. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. on the day following the accident.38 Alonzo v. whether or not actually dependent on the deceased are considered dependents. 37 . Page 89. However. Footnote No.R. 11e. W/N there was a valid notice. 8. the Petitioners occupied after the said sales. While Art. a widow living with the deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter. 7a. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. No. L-72873 (May 28. representing the portions bought. 9a. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 12a. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. they were lawfully wedded. not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales. to the posthumous daughter of the deceased. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Racquel. 12a. Page 89.57 FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their deceased parents. there was actual knowledge of the sales satisfying the requirement of the law. By virtue of such agreements.R. are still considered dependents under the Act. 1962. HELD: Yes. 1961. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sale. with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure.

The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company.64 FACTS: Sergio Nicolas applied for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija and was approved in 1917. Footnote No. 34382 (July 20. 20 of the Public Lands Act that the Director of lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own. the insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines. in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction. Conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the Defendants do not comply with the first requirement of Sec. Thus the conveyance made by the heirs of Nicolas was null and void. prove legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to transact in the Philippines. L-7747 (November 29. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 11a. 125 G. ISSUE: W/N the sale or transfer of right of the heirs of Sergio Nicolas over the parcel of land was valid. 37 . ISSUE: W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Home Insurance Company v. 9c. 290 G. said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was contrary to public policy. and that the conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. No. Frances. must. with approval by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. et al.R. In 1943. represented by his widow. Footnote No. but because Sergio Nicolas died. 9b. Otherwise. 48 FACTS: Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered by the cargoes and goods shipped. 1955) Chapter III. 37. he was substituted by his heirs. In this regard. Eastern Shipping Lines Case No. HELD: Yes. and secured the issuance of a homestead patent in their favor. In 1953. heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas wanted to annul the sale of a homestead and to recover the land. HELD: No. In 1947. No. the final proof was approved by the Director of Lands who issued a patent in his favor.39 Tinio. such as Plaintiff Company. Page 90. 8. Therefore. 1983) Chapter III. In the case at bar.R. Case No. Page 91. et al. LATIN MAXIM: 4. together with the fruits of the land as damages. the heirs transferred their rights to the homestead to the Defendants. the lower court dismissed the two cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue. no cause of action accrues in favor of the Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. v. 38b.

They executed a promissory note stipulating that Respondent Hermanos will pay back the loan within three months. the principal loan was forfeited together with the interest. 19864 and 19685 (October 17.40 Luzon Stevedoring Company v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Engaging in a stevedoring business.000 for the principal and refused to pay for the remaining P15. Therefore. the Internal Revenue Collector. HELD: A contractor is defined as one who renders service in the course of an independent occupation. However. 36a. 37 .81. which was cashed. Page 91.800 to Petitioner. Again. Therefore. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 9c. 1922) Chapter III. 2711. Footnote No. consisting of loading and unloading of cargo from vessels in ports.800. Respondent Hermanos signed another promissory note and sent a check of P1. doing business in the City of Manila. representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work.R. Thus.000. As a rule of construction. since only the interest is forfeited. one may consult the history of the law and its preamble to ascertain the framers intent.000 to Respondent. ISSUE: W/N the Plaintiff is considered a "contractor" provided by Sec. Under the provisions of Sec. he must give back P11. which had been paid under protest. 281. 154 G. Plaintiff is not a "contractor" based on Sec. 1923) Chapter III. Page 93. He now executed a new promissory note. 1462 of Act No. Martinez Case No. The current law also does not expressly mention that the principal is also forfeited.000.800. the tax paid by the Plaintiff was illegally collected and should be repaid. again due within the next three months. 2711. Trinidad Case No. he could not pay so they executed another promissory note and sent another check worth P1. the intent of the framers is clear. 1462 of Act No. 2711. 28 FACTS: Petitioner made a loan of P40. 18316 (September 23.R.71 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Go Chioco v. with the third cycle's promissory note bring due only a month later and with a check for only P600.422. the current law RA 2655 provides for stricter rules and alternative punishments for violations. After three months. The trial court ruled that the interest rate of 18% was in violation of the Usury Law (Act 2655 as amended by Act No. with its gross receipts from the said business amounting to P242. at certain rates of charge per unit of cargo. In a previous law RA 2073. 9c.850 from the interest and forfeits the remaining P15. Plaintiff Company hopes to recover from Defendant. the Plaintiff was engaged in business as a contractor.33. HELD: No. Respondent Hermanos was unable to pay the principal. when the intent of a law is ambiguous. 2992). 11a. the sum of P2.93 FACTS: Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands. 4. On the same day. and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. No. unlike the previous law. 1462 of Act No. 5b. This cycle was repeated a total of 7 times. ISSUE: W/N the charging of a usurious interest of 18% forfeits the principal loaned together with the interest. Petitioner filed a complaint. Footnote No. No. Then Respondent Hermanos paid P25. Taking into consideration the history of the Usury Law. the percentage tax amount was levied and assessed toward the stevedoring business. 113 G. and with this note. Respondent Hermanos sent a check for P1. Defendant alleged that during the first quarter of 1921.

95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basiana v. 30a. Petitioner however. 19 and 20 are constitutional. De Guzman Case No. a junction of known rivers or creeks. 297 G. L-34135-36 (February 24. or other government agencies. Bureau of Cost and Geodetic Survey. 1981) Chapter III. 137) provides: “For the purpose of this section. Realizing that there was something wrong with the declaration of location records. HELD: Sec. 93 were recorded for him with the rest going to Luna. a kilometer post of public road. a corner of approved public. Luna cancelled the registration and created their own groups of claims overlapping Petitioner’s claims. Luna amended the declarations with the intention of clearing claim names and tie points. Army Corps of engineers. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.A. Defendant was discharged before he pleaded on the condition that he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the Government against his co-accused. There is no provision for perjury should the Defendant fail to comply with the agreement with the State. a clear disregard of their agreement. Luna Case no. 1915) Chapter III. HELD: Sec. 22a. and were merely abandoned for failure to pay occupation fees. Petitioner alleges that his claims were valid. private or mineral land survey. a known public or private structure. 36b . was convicted of asesinato (murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment. 33. disclaimed such consent. along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling. Nos. 31 G. 47 par. a permanent and prominent object used as a tie point MAY be an intersection of known roads. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. b2 FACTS: Petitioner entered into a private agreement with Cipriano Luna to prospect with Luna getting 60% and Petitioner receiving the rest. nevertheless. Finally. Footnote No. 2 of the Mining Law (C.41 US v. No. L-9144 (March 27. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s mining claims are valid. or location monument or triangulation station established by the Bureau of Lands. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.102 FACTS: Defendant. Defendant denied all knowledge of the murder. Page 94.” An initial post is not enumerated as a valid tie point. looking at the legislative history of the statute. Footnote No. He denied ever saying anything that implicated his co-accused and swore that statements made by him were made in fear of the police officers.R. However. ISSUE: W/N Defendant should be discharged. Page 95. the law provides for his dismissal and expressly bars a future prosecution. discharge cannot be an acquittal since it was made prior to his trial. Petitioner prospected 183 claims. The Solicitor-General asks for the discharge of the Respondent though it may result in a palpable miscarriage of justice. Consequently. it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. No.R. Petitioner’s contention that the word MAY suggests non-exclusivity is untenable since it goes against the legislator’s intent to eliminate claim jumping and overlapping claims. Bureau of Mines. Upon reaching the witness stand.

24b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. 1991) Chapter III. 399 of the New Civil Code thus terminating the guardianship. PNB Case No. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore. RA 390 provides that a guardianship can only be terminated upon reaching the age of majority. RA 390 Sec. Footnote No. and is therefore.103 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Villa v. Footnote No. the Court revealed that the records of Batasan. Inserting provisions of the Civil Code would result in discordance with intent. 17. Vol. 26. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. Petitioner alleges that she has married and has become emancipated under Art. ISSUE: W/N Art. b2 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. It was the clear intent of the legislator to create a uniform law for material aid. the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court.42 Baga v. 88 G. b2 . not covered by the said law. 23 applies notwithstanding any other provisions of law relating to judicial restoration and discharge of guardians. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction.R. 399 of the Civil Code shall prevail over RA 390. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Page 96. 87416 (April 8. he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank. No. Thus. CA Case No. Page 95. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. HELD: No. No. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. L-9695 (September 10.110 FACTS: Petitioner was the recipient of benefits with Respondent as the guardian under RA 390 or the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act which was passed with the intention of being modeled after the US version. 43. With regard to Petitioner’s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22. 1956) Chapter III. The Civil Code does not prevail. 50. RA 390 is a special law and thus must be taken to constitute an exception to the general law which is the Civil Code.R. However. 27 G.

1994) Chapter III. Jr. 38b. citing the provisions of RA 1405 which prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits to any person except upon written permission of the depositor. 12b. He refused to disclose the sought information. 89 of the same law (which temporarily extended the age of retirement). 185 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. The discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Footnote No. 43. 21 G. 30b. It was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. 89 includes the members of the PC.R. ISSUE: W/N the legislative intent was to classify the INP as applicable only to the local police force. The trial court declared the said corporation in default.110 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION China Banking Corporation v.” laid down the compulsory retirement age of PNP officers. b2 . otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the PNP Under a Reorganized Dept. Tan Kim Liong. In other words. The use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. 89 insofar as the retirement age is concerned. RA 1405 also imposes criminal liability on any official or employee of a banking institution who breaks the confidential nature of this law. Respondents wanted to be extended the same privileges as the local police. 106724 (February 9. Had it been otherwise. Furthermore. Indeed. No. HELD: The intent was to classify the INP in such manner that Sec. 89 of RA 6975 is applicable only to the local police force. the law distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. The legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 1973) FACTS: RA 6975. HELD: No. L-34964 (January 31. No. by invoking RA 1405. the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole PNP for retirement purposes and not just the INP. Case No. Ortega Case No. b2 FACTS: A complaint was filed against B&B Forest Development Corporation for the collection of a sum of money.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Respondents argue that the age of retirement (56) of said law cannot be applied to them since they are covered by Sec. Page 96. they contend that the term “INP” includes both the former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated National Police (INP). The Plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B&B Forest with current Petitioner Bank. 12a. 11e. 35. of the Interior and Local Government.43 National Police Commission v. a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff and served on Petitioner Bank through its cashier. De Guzman. Hence. 27. 11a. Thus.

Petitioners insist that the PCSO cannot hold and conduct charity sweepstakes. 36b . Petitioner requested for reconsideration and. 1961) Chapter III. It is prohibited from doing so “whether in collaboration. 118910 (November 16. Respondent assessed against Petitioner deficiency advance sales tax on the automobiles. No. ISSUE: W/N under its charter (RA 1169. it recurred to the Court of Tax Appeals.R. et al. association or joint venture” with others or “by itself. controlling in the interpretation of the law. this request having been denied. Courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion expressed in congressional debates regarding the interpretation of a particular legislation. 1 of RA 1169 as amended by BP 42. Hence this appeal. Footnote No. No. Page 96. lotteries and other similar activities. After the hearing. HELD: No. 173 G. The Court has determined that Petitioner has no standing to sue but did not dismiss the case. lotteries and other similar activities in collaboration or joint venture with any other party because of the clause “except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)” in paragraph (B) of Sec. when it should be in paragraph (A) had that been the intention of the lawmaking authority. ISSUE: W/N the opinion of a legislator in the deliberations of a law.111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Kilosbayan. Inc. Guingona. 1995) FACTS: Petitioner Company imported 17 Pontiac automobiles in three different shipments. v.44 Mayon Motors v.R. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: Petitioners seek for reconsideration of Kilosbayan.” What the PCSO is prohibited from doing is from investing in a business engaged in sweepstakes. v. but also the phrase “by itself. as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter in any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery. Acting CIR Case No. Petitioner assails the procedure adopted by the tax court and insists the court’s interpretation of the Tax Code erroneous invoking a statement made by then Congressman Ferdinand Marcos during the deliberations on the amendments for the Tax Code. said court modified Respondent’s decision by requiring Petitioner to pay a sum more than what the acting Commissioner on Internal Revenue assessed and denying its claim for a refund. HELD: No. 15000 (March 29. It is deemed to be a mere personal opinion of the legislator. 67 G. races.” LATIN MAXIM: 34. Petitioner’s interpretation fails to take into account not only the location of the phrase in paragraph (B). Morato Case No.

2. Since the said law limits the berthing taxes to national ports only. Inc.” and may rest completely. Sec. 1993) Chapter III. Luzon Marine Department Union Case No. Footnote No. 72. HELD: The definition of “hours of work” equally applies to seamen and no need for a different criterion. shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted. ISSUE: 1. A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory.A. W/N a different criterion should be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dry land laborer. it is obvious that the private ports are not included. Kiwalan is not a national port in the Custom memorandum circular 33-73 or E.D. 444. four hours overtime). LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can reset completely. Sec. v. 48886-8 (July 21. and this amendment indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from the original.. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. 71 G. it being enough that he “cease to work. as amended by P. Page 101. W/N the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dry land laborers equally applicable to seamen.D.R. 26 FACTS: Iligan Express Corporation maintains a berthing facility at Kiwalan. as amended by P.133 FACTS: Petitioner files a case to review a resolution issued by the Court of Industrial Relations ruling that the 20 minutes’ rest given to employees after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work. Respondent Company availed of such facilities and as thus assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Custom which were paid by the said shipping company under protest. 30a . 1 of C. 1957) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Customs v. shall not be counted” in the eight working hours. No.R. HELD: No. 9265 (April 29. Nos. ISSUE: W/N a vessel berthing at a privately-owned wharf should be charged berthing fees under Sec. given three free meals a day and 20 minutes’ rest after mealtime.O. 25d. 2901 of the Tariff and Custom Code. 77 G. Sec. known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law. 34 speaks of the “national ports” only. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No.45 Luzon Stevedoring Co. 2901 did not distinguish between national ports and private ports until it was amended by the presidential decree. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. 34. Iligan City. Liability does not attach if the port is privately-owned. provides that “when the work is not continuous. Employees of the company are seamen working in tugboats from 6:00 am – 6:00 pm (12 hours of work.

as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases.R. No. 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Case No. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of the rules and Regulations of stock trading. carrying and selling stocks and securities listed in the Makati stock exchange. while Sec. the appellate court used foreign jurisprudence in coming up with this decision. v. ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints. Secretary Flavier Case No. In response. the Petitioner’s amount deposited was completely wiped out without his permission. 47 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. Sec. and how these statutes are interpreted. Respondent now question the appellate court’s ruling on their violation of the SEC rules and securities Act. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges. who were employees of the national center for mental health. CMS Stock Brokerage Inc. HELD: Yes. 1980) Chapter III. No. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. 28 FACTS: Petitioner opened a margin account with Respondent for purchasing. it is the duty of the broker to do so. Page 106. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec.46 Buenaseda v. 106719 (September 21.141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Carolina Industries Inc. Footnote No. Footnote No. 40 G. The courts use of a ruling in foreign case is only right because the prevailing laws are patterned after those of the United States. Within three months. Page 104. 13(8) of Art.146 FACTS: The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 9 . 1993) Chapter III. L-46908 (May 17. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to “suspension” in its punitive sense.R. HELD: If the law renders the customers as incapable of protecting himself. LATIN MAXIM: 27. while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office. Respondent says there was consent but the evidence did not suffice to prove such consent. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive suspension of the Petitioners.

149 FACTS: Mariano Zamora.000. Page 106.959. R. 1916) Chapter III. bought a piece of land located in Manila on May 16. Footnote No. R. representing alleged deficiency income tax and surcharge due from said estate.C.000. The Collector of Internal Revenue found that he failed to file his return of the capital gains derived from the sale of certain real properties and claimed deductions which were not allowable. The Legislature intended that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employer’s Liability Act to be the same as that in the country from which the Act was taken. Gsell Case No. 1944. 9. ISSUE: W/N the CTA erred in computing the taxes due for payment by Mariano Zamora.00 on March 5. 282 G. 1951.00 on Feb. to pay the sum of P235. The CTA ordered the estate of the late Felicidad Zamora. 11-year old son of the Plaintiff. The injury was attributed to the boy’s inexperience in the work which he had been assigned for the first time and without prior instruction. 1944 which they sold for P94. 176 G. HELD: No.00 and sold it for P75.000.47 Zamora v. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. 1951. They also purchased a lot located in Q.00 on January 19. for P132. Mariano Zamora and his deceased sister Felicidad Zamora. for P68. HELD: Yes. 1963) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tamayo v. LATIN MAXIM: b2 . being of American origin. Esperanza Zamora appealed and alleged that the CTA erred. ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages under the Employer’s Liability Act. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: This is an action for damages against the Defendant for personal injuries suffered by Braulio Tamayo. No 10765 (December 22. No L-15290 (May 31. filed his income tax returns for the years 1951 and 1952. The appraisal is correct and the court found no plausible reason to disturb the same.00. owner of the Bay View Hotel and Farmacia Zamora Manila.

Cruz Timber Co.246. L-31088 (December 3.125 and P1. not upon the value or demand in each single case of action contained in the complaint.72. but upon the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Campos Rueda Corp. No. and the other against his wife on her paraphernal property. No. v. returning the sum of P56.203. 1956) FACTS: Plaintiff and appellant filed for the recovery from the Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P56. on the ground that the amount of two notes. LATIN MAXIM: b2 FACTS: The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the case of Petitioner against Respondent to recover the value of two promissory notes for the amounts of P1. ISSUE: W/N the paraphernal property of the Plaintiff’s wife constitutes her “separate estate” within the scope and meaning of this phrase for the purposes of the additional income tax. was in excess of its jurisdiction. 7a . 17 G. the additional income tax for the income from her paraphernal property. collected from the Plaintiff in excess of what he should have collected by way of income tax. 93 G.48 Ossorio v. HELD: No. which the Defendant. according to the complaint.R. L-6884 (March 21. holding that the two notes constitute two separate causes of action involving less than P2. Sta.075. It is ordered that the Defendant make two separate assessments of the additional income tax. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Posadas Case No.R. The jurisdiction of a court depends. one against the Plaintiff. ISSUE: W/N the Municipal Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of appellant’s complaint. for lack of jurisdiction. which Petitioner now consolidated under a single cause of action. without prejudice to his levying against and collecting from said Plaintiff’s wife upon her own separate individual declaration.000.59 to said plaintiff. HELD: Yes. in accordance with law. and Felix Case No. The Municipal Court likewise dismissed the case of Petitioner Corporation against Respondents for collection of the same promissory notes object of the former action.

9th. No.R. 1930) FACTS: Petitioner’s warehouse was destroyed by fire while the policy taken out with Respondent for the amount of P10. the sheriff on January 30.000 was in force. The Provision of our Code of Civil Procedure having been adopted from Sec. Case No. No. ISSUE: W/N a rider as forming part of the contract of insurance is null and void because it does not comply with the Philippine Insurance Act. 1929. 1931) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pando v. 7a. LATIN MAXIM: b2 .” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 65 of the Philippine Insurance Act as it was taken verbatim from Sec. b2 FACTS: This is a foreclosure of mortgage. Notice of the sale was sent to the newspaper La Opinion for publication. 33637 (December 31. 32124 (March 27.49 Ang Giok Chio vs.R. posted notices of the sale of the land in said writ in 3 public places. and 15th of February. is valid and sufficient under Sec. the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question have been substantially complied with. 692 of the California Code. Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Co. ISSUE: W/N the posted notices of the sale in 3 public places and publication in La Opinion once a week for 3 consecutive weeks satisfied the requirements of the law regarding the notice of the sale in question. “The section as it now reads is in harmony with the rule that a warranty may be contained in another instrument than the policy when expressly referred to in the policy as forming a part thereof. In pursuant thereof. upon the land itself. The Respondent Company has appealed claiming that Petitioner violated a rider on the insurance contract. Kette and Sellner Case No. A rider attached to the face of the insurance policy and referred to in the contract of insurance. at the market. more particularly on the 2nd. HELD: Yes. 99 G. 8 G. to wit. HELD: Yes. 1929 and the sale took place on February 19. and on the municipal building of Pasay. 2605 of the Civil Code of California which states. and the editor certified that he published it once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. 1929.

However. in the absence of any special reason justifying departure from the policy or practice. Plaintiff would just have to make out two promissory notes in favour of the mortgage. Northcott to pay said amount of P12.R. Therefore. 235 G. Plaintiff Guerrero said that he could not do so for the lack of money to operate the machine. These are also in line with Sec. and deducted from the bank’s clearing account the said amount. 30587 (December 4.50 Reyes v. 1922. Co. 4604 of the Code of Iowa. Rader and J. 1971) Chapter III. neither the said amount nor any part thereof was delivered to Plaintiff Guerrero. 135 G. L-22405 (June 30. Petitioner requested to reconsider the action but was denied. LATIN MAXIM: 1. No. HELD: There was evidence on the part of the promissory notes in question. The prohibition contained in said law against a witness’ testifying upon any transaction or communication between himself and a deceased person. the former endorsed the mortgage deed. in the same way the bank of America debited Petitioner’s account with the same amount. 9a. Wells Case No. Northcott. v. 1929) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. Page 107. US held that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments. These are generally constructed and construed in accordance with construction of US’s own postal statutes. Soriano Case No. b2 . b2 FACTS: Montinola sought to purchase money orders from Manila Post Office. is substantially the same as that contained in Sec.R. HELD: Postal statutes are patterned after similar statutes enforced in the US. Footnote No. Respondent. Educ. He managed to leave the building without knowledge of the teller. the Plaintiff sustained damages for default in the payment of the instalments due. However. as amended by Act No.156 FACTS: Defendants offered to sell to Plaintiffs an installed maguey stripping machine and an International truck in a shed lot for P23. Due to the failure of J. and on June 29. LATIN MAXIM: 2b. 383(7) of our Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE: W/N the postal money order in question is a negotiable instrument. Respondent Rader promised to furnish said Plaintiff with the amount he would need. No. 2252.000. ISSUE: W/N the promissory notes in question which have not been paid. Chief of the Money Order Division of the Manila Post Office notified the Bank of irregularity. are not supported by the evidence in relation to the competence of the testimony of Guerrero. we believe that the construction placed upon it by the court in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar. Defendant Rader and Plaintiff Guerrero went to J. E.000. or to any of his co-Plaintiffs. Palomar received one money order as part of their sales receipt and subsequently deposited it in the Bank of America.

Pahati Case No. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v. with legal interest from the date of the decision. provincial or municipal government” in Sec. the P3.00 received under RA 610 should be deducted from the full grant received under the WCC.R. It was found out that Belizo falsified a letter that enabled him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit.900. Furthermore.000.R. 28 G. It was clear that the Plaintiff was unlawfully deprived because of the scheme of Belizo even if both the Plaintiff and Bulahan acted in good faith. 132 G. he returned the automobile to Bulahan who in then surrendered the check for cancellation. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 39. The court rendered judgment declaring Defendant Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question and ordered the Plaintiff to return it to said Defendant and. L-8257 (April 13.00 plus attorney’s fee of P600. generally. without deducting the P3.00 as death benefit which they had been previously paid by virtue of the provisions of RA 610.900 which he paid in check. No. Bulahan claims that he bought the automobile from Belizo without having any knowledge of any defect in the title. 9 of RA 610 and Sec.51 Cruz v.900 and pay the sum of P5. He set up a counterclaim for attorney's fees. L-29019 (May 18. ISSUE: Who has a better right of the two over the car. 40b . 7a FACTS: Petitioners seek full compensation of P6. It is difficult to construe that the legislature intended to double the compensations received. HELD: Plaintiff has a better right to the car than Bulahan and therefore can recover the said car.00 under the WCC. for P4. to pay him the sum of P4.000. 19b. 5 of WCC bar payment under other laws. No.000 as moral damages. The counterclaim of Defendant was denied for lack of evidence. He cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the check upon impoundment and as a result. upon his failure to do so.000. 29. Sec. 1972) FACTS: Defendant bought an automobile from Bulahan. 38b. of the national. HELD: The resolution of the WCC is modified. The claim for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan was denied. Defendant Belizo was however ordered to indemnify the Plaintiff in the amount of P4. It was also contended that the phrase “or any other law granting similar benefits to officers or employees. ISSUE: W/N the beneficiaries of military personnel who have received the death gratuity under RA 610 should still be paid the death compensation under the WCC. considering that at the times said laws were approved the finances of the government could not have conceivably permitted the outlays needed for the purpose. 9 is highly indicative of the legislative intent to prevent further recovery of compensation benefits under other laws. LATIN MAXIM: 17. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No.

19b. Hipolito et al. 1903. considering when the law was adopted. L-1449 (November 30. Petitioner contended that margin fees are taxes and cited the background and the legislative history of the Margin Fee Law showing that RA 2609 was nothing less than a revival of the 17% excise tax on foreign exchange imposed by RA 601. which was denied on July 23. 27. 143 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the parties to consent to or for the judge to order an extension of the 10-day period. at least two cases had been decided in which it was held that margin fee is not a tax. it seems impossible that the Commission intended to deprive the court and the parties of the power to extend the term. entitled “An Act to Authorize the Central Bank of the Philippines to Establish a Margin over Banks’ Selling Rates of Foreign Exchange”. not for the purpose of creating it.R. 1903) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. 53 G. it cannot be extended. there may be no resort to the legislative history of the enactment of a statute. The right of the parties to the appeal was already fixed by the notice of the intention to prepare a bill of exceptions entered of record in the clerk’s office. v.234. the Plaintiffs presented their proposed bill of exceptions. Moreover. since such legislative history may only be resorted to for the purpose of solving doubt. The term of the court in which the case was tried expired on May 30. and in order to balance.00 for 1959 and P434. HELD: The period of 10 days and the subsequent period of 5 days have to do with the mechanical part of the appeal—the preparation of the papers for transmission to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Case NO. Moreover. 41 G.92 for 1960. which on August 5 was allowed and signed by the court. Garcia to Congress as part of.R. the budget for 1959-1960. v. ISSUE: W/N RA 2609. No. is a police measure or a revenue measure. No. Two days after. The Plaintiffs were notified thereof on May 21. As a matter of fact. This was a revenue measure formally proposed by President Carlos P. The CTA stated that it is a well-settled jurisprudence that only in extremely doubtful matters of interpretation does the legislative history of an act of Congress become important.246. HELD: RA 2609 is a police measure as it is applied in order to strengthen our country’s international reserve. If the period corresponds to the appeal or for suing out a writ of error found in most other laws of American origin. 48 FACTS: The case is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the Petitioner’s claims for refund of the margin fees P102. LATIN MAXIM: 1. But that period is entirely different from the 10 days for allowing the preparation of papers. they excepted to the judgment and presented a motion for a new trial. 70037 (July 7. 7a . given the physical impossibility to comply with it in many cases. 1989) FACTS: Judgment was rendered for the Defendants on May 1. it cannot be said that an extension of this time is an extension of the time to appeal. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No.52 Garcia et al. On July 28. the language of which is plain and unambiguous. Therefore. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. after the right to remove the case has been secured.

validity and operation. to give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land which Petitioner is not. a petition for the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid on the ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and the taxes thereon since 1947. 141). HELD: Petitioner took exception to the finding of the CTA that "The language of RA 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that the law intends that the phrase 'Special Import Tax' is taken to include customs duties". 102 C. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 100 G. and that the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from the payment of customs duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax provided in RA 1394. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. HELD: No. Antagonism between the Acts to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided.A.R.53 Commissioner of Customs v. No. until the consent of the occupant or settler is first had. 141. either expressly or by implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer. 33. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. namely. 38a. No. b2 FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondents. and of facts which affect their derivation. L-15816 (February 29. 26 G. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. or the Special Import Tax Law. Director of Lands Case No. or until such claim shall be legally extinguished (Sec. C. L-28329 (August 17. The Court examined the six statuettes repealed by RA 1394. ISSUE: W/N the exemption enjoyed by Respondent from customs duties granted by RA 387 should include the special import tax imposed by RA 1394.A. unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. To the contrary. Thus. No. in cases of lease the law requires that no lease shall be permitted to interfere with any prior claim by settlement or by occupation. The policy in the disposition and concession of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual occupant. In the present case. in violation of the terms and conditions of the lease. that the same are clearly erroneous and unfounded. it should be the actual occupants who have presented several petitions for the subdivision or and sale of the land to them. 1964) FACTS: Petitioner contends that the special import tax under RA 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code. it appears that the trial court reversed not only the decision of Respondent and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President. It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by administrative officials to a law they are bound to enforce or implement deserves great weight.R. they appear to be in consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by Petitioner. 1975) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. without the record disclosing in our opinion. ISSUE: W/N the ruling of the trial court upholding Petitioner’s claim to a right of entry was correct. Case No. and on the further ground that he and his successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced improvements thereon. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. No. 36b. If anyone should be given prior right of entry at all. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

54 Orencia v. 42b . 2659 of the Administrative code and was found guilty and was deprived the right to suffrage and public office. who is only a high school graduate with second grade civil service eligibility. LATIN MAXIM: 2a FACTS: Respondent ran for governor in Camarines Norte and assumed office on October 16. has an ambiguous aspect. Nos. 1931. one which admittedly. is more qualified than Petitioner. The Insular Auditor permitted Respondent to receive his salary as governor. L-39840 and L-39841 (December 23. and praying that the petition be dismissed ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner should be recognized as the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. 1933) FACTS: Petitioner is alleging that he is the deputy clerk of court of the Clerks of Court Division of the Land Registration Commission. Delinquency of payment of taxes is no longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. Two or three days before Respondent assumed office. this does not incapacitate him from assuming office. one moreover dictated by the soundest constitutional postulate. ISSUE: W/N Sec. being a lawyer. Hence. was implemented where he was left out while co-assistant chief of the nine other divisions of the Land Registration Commission were so recognized and extended increased compensation. and after usual admissions and denials. Sec. Under these circumstances. and being a new position created under RA 4040. should be followed unless clearly erroneous. such a contemporaneous construction. However. to follow the approach of counsel for Petitioner. he was a delinquent in the payment of P2. HELD: For Respondent officials. and he has been performing functions of Assistant Chief of said division and has been considered and recognized as such until RA 4040. At this time. increasing the salaries of Assistant Chiefs of Divisions.R. And in this case. while not conclusive. is entitled to the highest respect from the judiciary. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION m i k iPeople of the Philippines v. Enrile Case No. they chose to follow the principle that a public office is a public trust. By September. 32. Since there was a new legal provision to be construed. the municipal treasurer demanded him to pay said taxes but he failed to do so. 107 G. HELD: No. No. in April 1932. among others. taxes had been paid for. 1932. we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs. Certainly. L-28997 (February 22.000 for land taxes to the government. The Chief of Executive Bureau and Attorney General agreed with Insular Auditor. 2659 refers to a person who assumes office to which he had been elected without possessing the necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. on the condition that it would be used to pay off the delinquent taxes. Hernandez Case No. interposed a defense that Petitioner is unqualified for the position of Assistant Chief. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 92 G. the same can only be filed by a qualified person. Rafferty: long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law. even though Respondent did not pay his land taxes.R. 2659 can be applied to refrain Respondent from taking office as Governor in Camarines Norte. the answer was not in doubt. Respondents filed their answer. he was charged for violating Sec. it was not. that Respondent.

Manila was designated as the sole gateway for communications in the Philippines. In the case at bar. This can be seen in Sec. BOC gave Petitioners authority to establish a station in Cebu. Moreover. 73603 (June 22. and operate. L-60548 (November 10. Petitioner’s rights should be well-defined. 36b . No. In accordance with RA 3208. 1 of RA 3802. The opinion of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice which affirmed the authorization of other stations is material and must be considered in favor of the Petitioners. Respondents filed a joint motion for reconsideration of said decision. In 1971. 9a FACTS: In 1976.. apart from its principal station in Makati. which was in violation of RA 3802.55 Sagun v. Footnote No. The Petitioners first leased these units for business purposes. In January 1979. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation Case No.R. v. LCH Project 3. For mandamus to lie. Page 112.181 FACTS: Respondent Corporation was created to provide decent. Quezon City were meant to be used for this purpose. However. Relova Case No. low cost housing for those who are unable to provide themselves with this. clear and certain. other stations or branches within the Philippines for purposes of its international communications operations. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Corporation can be compelled by mandamus to sell these lots for not more than P10/sq m. Petitioners decided that they wanted to buy these lots from Respondent Corporation but filed a petition for mandamus alleging that Respondent Corporation was selling the lots at P50/sq m. before converting these store units into their dwelling homes. Thus. subject to that as soon as domestic carriers have upgraded their facilities. maintain. which ruled in favor of the Respondents claiming that Petitioner does not have the authority to establish other stations aside from the station in Makati. This is a petition seeking to set aside the ruling rendered. to its registered tenants or their successors in interest. HELD: No. Inc. No. an application for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu for the purpose of rendering international telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside the Philippines where it is authorized to operate. 1988) Chapter III. 3 and 4 wherein other stations may be established as long as it is approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. there is no obligation of Respondent Corporation. Footnote No.180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Global Communications. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is authorized under RA 4617 to establish stations in places or points outside Metro Manila? HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. The action of Respondent Corporation neither conflicts with the law nor does it demonstrate any abuse of discretion to warrant its reversal. now NTC. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the Petitioners first used the lots for store purposes. 266 G. the price of P50 is not excessive or unreasonable considering that the market value for the lots is at least P120. 236 G. 1986) Chapter III. In 1977.R. there is no showing of a clear and certain right to compel Respondent Corporation to sell them the units for a price lower than what is being offered. under RA 3802. applicant shall cease its operations. aside from the fact that the determination of the selling price requires exercise of discretion on their part. RA 4617 clearly authorizes Petitioner to construct. the lots located in Block 330. Page 112. in reference to Sec. Petitioner filed with the Board of Communication.

The first gives him the privilege of importing. and it would have defeated the construction of the Government wharf at Pulapandan. The 1-year period mentioned in the Philippine Tariff Act contains no express mention of any extension or of any grounds for it to be extended.56 Asturias Sugar Central v. 43 FACTS: Petitioner acts as agency and attorney-in-fact of Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. The Government can be allowed to collect because not to do so “would overthrow and destroy the whole system of the Government. Page 112. The second contemplates a case where import duties are first paid subject to refund to the extent of 99% of the amount paid. 11d . 4. wharves not owned nor operated by government cannot be taxed or levied upon. in and by which millions of pesos have been levied and collected and expended in the construction of Government wharves. ISSUE: W/N the Defendant can collect wharfage dues on wharves not owned by government.” Dissenting Opinion: Historically. Wharf was built and maintained solely by the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. offer two options to an importer. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.42 which the Petitioner paid under protest in the concept of customs duties and special import tax. Commissioner of Customs Case No. Under the law in effect at that time. the Petitioner is entitled to recovery of taxes and duties paid for importation of containers provided importer re-exports said containers within a 1year period. free from import duties. the containers mentioned therein as long as he exports them within one year from the date of acceptance of the import entry. 106(b) of the Customs and Tariff Act.186 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for review of the unfavorable decision of the CTA which denied the recovery of the sum of P28. Collector of Customs Case No.416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar to United States in a wharf on Pulapandan. Sugar Central Agency v. The provisions invoked by the Petitioner to sustain his claim for refund. HELD: Yes. 6 1927) Chapter III. HELD: No. 5b. it is non-extendible. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to recovery of import taxes and duties.629. Footnote No. L-19337 (September 30 1969) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. 24 No. 4. provided the articles mentioned are exported within three years from importation. shipped 5. Page 113. Footnote No. Occidental Negros on steamship Hannover. 37.183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. Defendant collected wharfage dues on petitioner’s wharf. 38b.124. 27761 (Dec. Also Asturias contends that they are entitled to an alternative recovery of the said amount minus 1% under Sec. 241 No.

LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 115. 11a. RCA is not liable to the abovementioned obligation. 6g. and corn. HELD: No. a governmental machinery to carry out a declared government policy to stabilize the price of palay. Page 114.190 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramos v. ISSUE: W/N RCA should be held answerable – when NARIC ceased to exist and RCA was created – for the said obligation. under law. v. 38b FACTS: The present case had its incipiency in a petition filed by the then National Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC) workers for an obligation created by agreement confirmed by the Court of Industrial Relations directing NARIC to pay 25% for additional compensation for overtime work. 164 No. night work and work rendered on Sundays and legal holidays by its laborers and employees. L-22753 (December 18. and not for profit. HELD: While executive construction is not necessarily binding upon courts. it is clear that the text is permissive and is not mandatory. it is entitled to great weight and consideration. Footnote No. 37. be granted to RCA workers and employees for overtime work and work on Sundays and holidays. Thus. The reason for this is that such construction comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the particular law involved. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has a right to the unreserved days. No. CA Case No. There has been consistent administrative interpretation by the Office of the President as to what may. which was possessed with a distinct and separate corporate existence.57 Manila Jockey Club Inc. Not a matter of right. as amended by RA 983. they are merely an office directly under the President. 38b . LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Petitioner relies on the strength of Sec.193 FACTS: The Petitioner states that they are entitled to certain Sundays unreserved for any event and that reducing the number of said days is an infringement of their right. RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriation yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. 1967) Chapter III. Footnote No. The words of members of Congress are not representative of the entire House of Representatives or Senate. From the wording of the RA 309 and RA 983. RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races to 12 but without specifying the days on which they are to be run. that the unreserved Sundays may be used by private individuals or groups duly licensed by the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). L-12727 (February 29. Games and Amusement Board Case No. To carry out this function. rice. 253 G. Also. Petitioner’s claim that the intent of the legislature was to allow the races and sweepstakes to be run on the same day are untenable. The private individuals and entities are not entitled to the use of such days. Petitioner’s claim that to allow the PCSO to use their equipment and property is deprivation of property is also untenable because they have a rental agreement with the PCSO. unless the President specifically appropriates the 25% compensation. Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) claims that unlike NARIC. 1960) Chapter III. the GAB reduced the number of racing days assigned to private individuals and entities by six. 4 of RA 309. by law of the Commonwealth Act otherwise known as the Budget Act. such compensation was given upon authority of the Budgetary Act.R.

Memorandum Circular No. 1978) Chapter III. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can eject Petitioner from the lot. 6c. Petitioners in the original case sought to restrain herein Respondent from dismissing them and to declare as a matter of legal right that they should not be dismissed from the Philippine General Hospital by herein Respondent but by the Civil Service Commissioner. 38b FACTS: With the filing of Petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila.O.” Construction by Executive Branch of Government of a particular law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction comes from that branch called upon to implement the law. L-45642 (February 28.193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION University of the Philippines v. Page 115. 20c. independently of the Commissioner of the Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals. 94. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. Footnote No. Footnote No. the City Court ordered Petitioner to vacate the leased premises. particularly if the only cause of action thereon is personal use of the property by the owners or their families. including those of the Philippine General Hospital. HELD: No. possess full and final authority in disciplining. No. suspension. the President transferred them under herein Respondent. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Mendiola against Petitioner Salaria. Thus.195 FACTS: Petitioner has been staying on the land of Cailao when the latter sold the said land to Private Respondent Mendiola.P. CA Case No. A formal letter of demand to vacate the premises was sent by Respondent Mendiola to Petitioner. Buenviaje Case No. No. On appeal.58 Salaria v. 267 G. L-28153 (January 28. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of original Petitioners in the case by the Board of Regents is final. HELD: The management of Philippine General hospital was initially under the Office of the President of the Philippines. 30a. 9b. The ground relied upon by the lessor in this case. and removal of the civil service employees of the University. personal use of property by the owner or lessors or their families is not one of the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees. or requires further action by the Civil Service Commission. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 1971) Chapter III. Thus. namely. Under RA 51 and E.R. a petition for review on Certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court. Page 115. 38b . the CFI through Respondent Judge Buenviaje affirmed the decision of the inferior court. 305 G. 970 was issued by the President stating that “except for the causes for judicial ejectment of lessees … bona fide tenants of dwelling places covered by said decree are not subject to eviction. the Supreme Court ruled that the President and Board of Regents of the U.R. After the trial.

39a FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were partners who owned and managed Queen’s Theater during the first Quarter of 1937.) Petitioner contends that the spoiled should be considered as in the ruling in a previous case. contemporaneous construction is given weight. HELD: There was no grave abuse of discretion made by Respondent since the basis of the ruling in the Allied Workers case has been superseded by the present Labor Code. W/N the collection to said tax is in accordance with law. 128). The partnership charged admission fees of P0. Bautista Case No. HELD: Yes to both. which is 432. the Collector of Internal Revenue issued Regulations No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1&3 of C. LATIN MAXIM: 2a .R. Respondent answered that the ruling in the previous case was based on the Industrial Peace Act. During the first Quarter of 1937. 1458. imposition tax is at 5% of the gross receipts of theaters. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion by not allowing the spoiled ballots to be considered as in the previous case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines vs.40 per seat and at other times charged more than P0. The parties failed to pay the tax on time and therefore subject to Sec. 43 G. which has been superseded by the present Labor Code and as such cannot apply to the case at bar. which they refused to pay. The law does not say how tax should be imposed in cases where the daily receipts are not made at the same rate. No. etc. 1458 of the Administrative Code states that penalty for late payment will be at 25% of the tax imposed. The interpretation given to a law by an officer charged by reason of his office to carry out its provisions should be respected. the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code has been already been made known to public and as such has the enforcing power in the case at bar. which states that the daily receipts of prices charged differently will be jointly taken into account for computation purposes. 1939) FACTS: Petitioner lost to National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) in the certification elections for the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in Philippine Blooming Mills. whose admission price exceeds P0. 120 G.40 but not more than P0. 881. Company. 2a. 2. L-43760 (August 21. No.70 per seat.A. cinematographs. Inc.59 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v.R. At that time.41.40 (Sec. 1976) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Everett v. Sec. Tallied votes are as follows: NAFLU 429 PAFLU 414 Spoiled Ballots 17 (not counted) Abstained 4 Total Ballots 864 (Note: NAFLU didn’t obtain the majority vote. Bureau of Labor Relations Case No. It has also been held that where there is ambiguity in the language of the law. 94 is in accordance with law.50. No. As such. CIR. their receipts were P15. W/N Regulations No. Also. ISSUE: 1. 94. 46505 (November 7. They were asked to pay P992.

ISSUE: 1. IBAA then appealed to NLRC and NLRC dismissed the appeal.00 increase in monthly wage of workers that will retroact from April 1. Moreover. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 119 G. 1123 granted a P60. The Petition was granted and IBAA paid for the holiday wage. IBAA waived its right to appeal by paying the holiday wage and is therefore deemed to have accepted the judgment as correct. PAI only had to pay the difference of P38. 9 are valid. It was unlawful and beyond the scope of law.D. there has been an agreement to a P22. In the case at bar.60 Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’ Union (IBAAEU) v. 2. 40c FACTS: A collective bargaining agreement was made between Petitioners and Management of Philippine Apparel Inc. provided that those who were granted an increase of less that P60. the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor was based on a wrong premise and misinterpretation by PAI Management. HELD: A judgment in a labor case that has become executory cannot be revoked after finality of judgment. 1977. IBAA stopped paying the holiday wage in compliance to the issuance of Sec. 2 and Policy Instruction No.00 increase in living allowance which will take effect from January 1. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari charging Respondent of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 9 are both null and void since they amended the provisions of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N the case falls under the exception of P. 1988) FACTS: Petitioner first filed a complaint to the lower Court against Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) for not paying the holiday pay. IBAA filed a motion for reconsideration to Respondent. 62 G. Labor contends that increase does not fall within the exemption since the CBA was signed on September after P. Moreover. the same must be declared null and void. LATIN MAXIM: 2a . 1123 has been passed. on May of the same year. 17. 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and the Policy Instruction No. Petitioner filed for a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decision of paying the holiday wages and the motion was granted. Inciong Case No. No.D. 9 issued by Respondent (then Secretary of DOLE).00. It has been held that where the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Management argues that since on April 2. HELD: No. 1977 and was signed on September 7.D.R. L-52415 (October 23.00 will be given the difference. NLRC Case No. (PAI) on April 2. 1123. P. if a contemporaneous construction is so erroneous.00 increase. W/N the decision of the Labor Arbiter can be set aside by Respondent considering that it has become final and had been partially executed. 1977. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs.R. At this point. CBA stipulated a P22. No. And also. PAI was able to get the opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor supporting the PAI Management. 1977. There was no formal agreement on April 2. L-50320 (March 30. W/N Sec. Later. Sec. 37. Respondent granted IBAA’s motion for reconsideration. However. 1977 regarding the increase. 2 of Implementing Rules and Policy Instruction No.

1969) Chapter III. 6b. No. 7a. Assembly was alleged to be unqualified for the position on the ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. and death. ISSUE: W/N Respondent erred in ruling that it has no authority under the Social Security Act to condone. L-26712-16 (December 27. It would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who was not eligible to vote in his own municipality. HELD: Respondent has no such authority. 30187 (November 15. “qualified elector” meant that he has all the qualifications provided by the law to be a voter and need not be register. 316 G. 1928) Chapter III. 26 FACTS: Respondent was running for office in Bulacan. one of the qualifications is that he/she who is running should be a “duly qualified elector therein”. Footnote No.206 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Yra v. they paid their premium remittances but refused to pay the incredible penalty fees since they did not know that they had to pay the aforementioned premium remittances. Guerrero a candidate for representative to the Phil. HELD: Yes. or relinquish the penalty for late premium remittances mandatorily imposed under the SS Act. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain. Abaño Case No. No. In a previous case contested in the Philippine Assembly. Nevertheless. it is not least to disregard the forcible argument advanced that when the law make use of the phrases. therefore the assessed penalties are imposed on them.R. Page 118. 431 and none of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 293 G. Laurel. 3a. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is an eligible to run as a local official of Bulacan. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. “qualified electors” and “qualified voter” the law means what it says. 11a . old age. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. he is a registered voter in Manila and to be a candidate. Footnote No. waive. However. sickness. Social Security Commission Case No. The reason of the law is “to develop. Respondent said that their organization is embraced in the Social Security Act. It is sufficient that he possess the qualifications stated in Sec.214 FACTS: Petitioner is a volunteer group that did not know that they had to pay tax for their operations. there is no room for interpretation. Petition is dismissed on the ground that in the absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting Respondent the power to condone penalties. his hometown. claiming that the assessed penalties were inequitable. 6c. waive or relinquish the penalty prescribed by law for late payment of remittances. He is qualified to run for local office. However. The conclusion to which was.R. The same was the case and decision of the Executive Bureau on the qualifications of Senator Jose P. it has no legal authority to condone. upon knowledge thereof. Page 206. establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of the people… to provide employees against the hazards of disability.61 United Christian Missionary Society vs. Fernando Ma.” Good faith and bad faith are irrelevant since the law makes no distinction. 432 of the Election Law. 9a.

filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. Sec. 1924.R. HELD: The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction because according to both the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the Constitution the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases involving the legality of any tax. 134 G. 129 G. When the National Internal Revenue Code was approved on February 18. 4. CIR Case No. 2113 and Sec. 9a . Pursuant to Sec.223 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in transporting passengers and freight by means of TPU buses in Misamis Occidental and Northern Zamboanga. W/N the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case. 79 of the Revised Administrative Code. the agent assumed that the value of the goods was more than P5.62 Interprovincial Autobus Co. Inc. 69 of the Administrative Code. L-13862 (April 15. The legislature will be presumed to know the effect which such statutes originally had.R. impost. 121 and 127 of the Revised Documentary Stamp Tax Regulations of the Department of Finance. No. b. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.” In the interpretation of reenacted statutes. or any penalty in relation thereto. the court will follow the construction which they received when previously in force. the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press. and by reenactment to intend that they should again have the same effect. “When the provisions of Act No. 4 FACTS: Petitioner. The stubs and the daily reports of the conductor did not state the value of the goods transported. Page 120. No. assessment or tolls. 3a. 1956) Chapter III. 2113 were enacted and ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Administrative Code and again ‘continued in force’ by the enactment of the Jones Law the construction theretofore placed upon it by this court became an integral part of these statutes having the force and the effect of a legislative command. there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. Page 120-121. ISSUE: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Governor-General has the power under Act No.. Petitioner asked for a refund and the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental rendered a judgment in their favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The decision of the Court of Appeals however was not erroneous: a. Before the Governor-General gave his order. bills of landing and receipts were re-enacted. Footnote No. HELD: Yes. 69 of the Administrative Code to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. The provincial revenue agent for Misamis Occidental examined the stubs of the freight receipts that had been issued by Petitioner. The regulation (Sec. 1918) Chapter III. LATIN MAXIM: 1.222 & 227 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: McCulloch Dick Case No. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation. 121) is valid also because of the principle of legislative approval be re-enactment. 2. The regulations were approved on September 16. the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings. Footnote No. 121 falls within the scope of administrative power of the Secretary of Finance as authorized in Sec. 1939. W/N the Court of Appeals’ decision is erroneous. the same provisions of stamp tax. v. L-6741 (January 31.

A special provision overrides a general one. the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted. 4 FACTS: The Mayor of Pampanga was suspended. the incorporation of Sec. Page 121. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is the right person to assume office. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code applies to the office of mayor in particular. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code. by virtue of Sec. Footnote No. (CIC). 50 . No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. applies to municipal officers in general while Sec. This principle is not applicable for the aforementioned sections were never re-enacted.222 and 224 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Laxamana v. By virtue of Sec. 1952) Chapter III. Baltazar Case No. paid income tax on the premiums. 21 of the Revised Election Code. 4.63 Howden & Co. such action is confirmatory to an extent that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose. 2180. It cannot be assumed that the legislature knew of these rulings. 2180 in Sec. the premiums remitted were to indemnify CIC against liability. HELD: No. Respondent should assume the vacated position. LATIN MAXIM: 1. the legislature is presumed to be acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Only the tax rate was amended. Hence. The administrative rulings invoked by the CIR were only contained in unpublished letters. stating that it was exempted from withholding tax reinsurance premiums received from domestic insurance companies by foreign insurance companies not authorized to do business in the Philippines. L-19392 (April 14. This took place within the Philippines. which was taken from Sec. 21 of the Revised Election Code. CIC remitted to Plaintiff reinsurance premiums and. No. v. Also. entered into reinsurance contracts with 32 British companies not engaged in business in the Philippines represented by herein Plaintiff. Respondent Vice Mayor assumed the office. HELD: Yes.225 FACTS: Commonwealth Insurance Co. 1965) Chapter III. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the mayor. a domestic corporation. the Provincial Governor. upon re-enacting Sec. The principle of legislative enactment states that where a statute is susceptible of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency charged with its enforcement and the legislature thereafter re-enacts the provisions without substantial changes. 1291 and 2343. L-5955 (September 19. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. said rulings should be given the force of law under the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment. 53 and 54 were “substantially re-enacted” by RA 1065. thus subject to income tax. the vice-mayor shall assume office. Page 120. 9 G. Ltd.R. However. Plaintiff filed a claim for a refund of the paid tax.R.. 144 G. Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but merely supplements it. Collector of Internal Revenue Case No. on behalf of Plaintiff. Finally. Plaintiffs stated that since Sec. appointed herein Petitioner as the mayor. ISSUE: W/N the tax should be withheld. Footnote No. 38b.

5a. 1936) Chapter III. Page 122. No. but when two co-equal branches of government have adopted and accepted the construction of statutes. that the Albay case was already superceded by the Maceda vs. Furthermore. 9a. since the Petitioner was never delinquent in paying RPT. 5b. Furthermore. Also. 37. Secretary of Justice Case No. 12 that the Legislature intended this Act to be an appropriation measure and that it anticipated the possibility of a future veto by the Chief Executive. 2b. 3a. Pangasinan. In the present case. L-42821 (January 18.232 FACTS: Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen. the Respondent cannot assess deficiency RPT against the Petitioner. the FIRB Resolutions reinstating the status were properly approved by the Minister of Finance. Province of Lanao del Sur Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. 7 of the Retirement Gratuity Law which entitled justices of the peace to gratuities. 38a. Petitioner contends that its status was never revoked but merely suspended. 7 was valid. Page 121. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. HELD: The Petitioner never lost its tax exempt status. Hence. 32 G.R. With the Resolutions issued by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB). W/N Respondent Province and provincial officials can validly and lawfully assess RPT against. the Governor can constitutionally veto certain items on this bill. 96700 (November 19. 20a. Footnote No. including its exemption from payment of RPT. 1996) Chapter III. Note however. was not subject to item-veto.D. 2. The executive department sustained the validity of the veto as well. the properties were auctioned with the Respondent as the sole bidder. 6c FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was assessed real property taxes by Respondent since its tax exempt status was revoked by P.226 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION NPC v. they must be given great respect. ISSUE: W/N the veto of the Governor-General of Sec. Petitioner was contesting the validity of the veto of the Governor-General by claiming that the Act was not an appropriation bill and hence. Because of the Petitioner’s failure to pay. the legislature accepted the veto and made no attempt to override it.64 Bengzon v. and thereafter sell at public auction the subject properties of the Petitioner to effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the payment of such taxes. but its privileges were only suspended. the tax exemption privileges of the Petitioners were restored. However. Footnote No. No. 3899. Respondent contends that the Resolutions issued by the said Board was void relying on an earlier case between the Petitioner and the Province of Albay stating that FIRB does not have power to restore tax exemptions and that the said Board can only recommend to the President or the Minister of Finance which subsidiary of the Government can be given exemptions. 1931. It is clear from reading Sec. 49 . He relinquished his office after he had reached the age of 65 because of the provisions of Act No. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: 1. Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the benefits under the vetoed Sec. this practice of vetoing the separate items in a bill by the Chief Executive has long been allowed and to rule against it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality. Contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts. Macaraig case stating that the FIRB Resolution is in accordance with the requirements of the law if it was properly approved by the Minister of Finance. the subsequent auction and sale of the Petitioner’s assets is also considered void. 187 G. W/N Petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges. Thus.

7 FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares.R.M. Alcantara vs. 135 G. HELD: OCT No. ISSUE: W/N RA 2616 is unconstitutional. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. Tuason & Co. 735 is valid. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. prescription. Under Art. 40c . 9c. 735. It has a broader scope. The Constitution clearly states that “land” not “landed estates” can be expropriated. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. 8. Mariano & Aquial & Cordova Case No. 1970) Chapter XI. L-21064 (February 18. Page 434. HELD: No. improper venue. 37. 1914 in Case No. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. Tuason.65 J. 5b FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a land called Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. No. upon payment of just compensation. “The Congress may authorize.M. 24a. the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals” Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because the provision in the Constitution refers to “lands” not landed estates. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. v. Tuason v. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. No. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. They seek to nullify RA 2616 which directs the expropriation of two lots inside the estate. Land Tenure Administration Case No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. Tuason and Pili vs. 4 of the Constitution. The question is one of constitutional construction. 26. laches and prior judgment. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1978) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION J. The Tuason’s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case. L-33140 (October 23. as long as there is a need to address a growing social problem such as inequality. The law does not distinguish between different types regardless of how big or small it may be. Footnote No. Tuason. allowing the legislature to expropriate more types of land.R. 64 G.

Because such amendments regardless of how many are to be submitted to the people for their ratification in an election. In this case. 4052. no fixed frame of reference is given to the voter. by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. 15 of the Constitution calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. Petitioner. 1937) FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention seeks to amend Sec. 1 of Art. HELD: There was a violation. What it gives the Respondent is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government. 5 of the Constitution reducing the voting age from 21 to 18 years old. seeks prohibition of such because it violates Sec.” ISSUE: W/N there is a limitation or condition in Sec. who is the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church. The amendments being proposed by the convention in must be seen in relation to the whole. L-34150 (October 16.R. No. “An election” only means one. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution would be modified. ISSUE: W/N the sale of such stamps is in violation of the constitutional mandate of religious freedom. Act. 1 of Art. No.R. No. Commission on Elections Case No.66 Tolentino v. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. 6 of the Constitution. Art. 4052 grants the Respondent discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government. Ruiz Case No. who is the Director of Post.” LATIN MAXIM: 9a. announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps to commemorate the celebration of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress in accordance with Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Also. This proposal was to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite coinciding with the November 1971 elections relying on Sec. 45459 (March 13. 15 of the Constitution: “The Congress in a joint session assembled. 36a. 1. 37 . Art. the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling. 7a FACTS: Respondent. 13. HELD: Act No. 154 G. 1971) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aglipay v. 4 G. 1.

O. ISSUE: W/N Ifugao being the only one which voted for the creation of CAR can alone. X.A.12 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ordillo v. 11g. As known. Ang Tang Ho Case No 295 G. E. cities. Footnote No. it can be derived that the term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. 15 of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “there shall be created autonomous regions… consisting of provinces. That power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. Resolutions and memorandum from the COMELEC and the Secretary of Justice states that only provinces voting favorably in the plebiscite shall constitute the region. v.R. Defendant will not be charged. Page 435. the law is dealing with private property and private rights. 7a. HELD: Art. No. only Ifugao managed to get a majority vote. No. 17122 (February 27. 6766 also show that the Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the Autonomous Region. In fixing the price. 192 G. 2868 is unconstitutional for undue delegation of legislative power. 53 (which fixes the ceiling price at which rice may be sold) when he sold rice at a price greater than that fixed by law. ISSUE: W/N Act No. Abra and the city of Baguio. The provisions of R.67 U. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 28 . No. Kalinga-Apayao. legally and validly constitute a region.A. HELD: The act is unconstitutional. Ifugao. municipalities and geographical areas…” From this. Sec. 2868 which penalizes monopoly and hoarding of products under extraordinary circumstances. Footnote No. Page 437. 1990) Chapter XI. Out of the provinces.O. COMELEC Case No. 53 follows Act No. 25a. This power is exclusive to the legislative. which are sacred under the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: None FACTS: A plebiscite was held pursuant to R. no nation living under republican form of government can enact a law delegating the power to fix the price at which rice should be sold.24 FACTS: Respondent was charged for violating E. Without leaving the discretion to say which extraordinary circumstances to the Governor General are. 1922) Chapter XI. Mountain Province. permanent and substantial. The Constitution is something solid. 93054 (December 4. 6766 (Organic Act creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region) with the votes of the people in the provinces of Benguet.S.R. Respondent contends that the Legislature has not defined any basis for the order but has left it to the discretion of the Governor General.

Vice-President. he can not be removed against his will and without cause. Reading Art.A. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art. and their deputies and assistants shall not. ISSUE: W/N the position of City Engineer is an unclassified service. The Court therefore held that Petitioner De los Santos is entitled to remain in office as the City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments. 9a. 7. 7. As a contemporaneous construction. The two provisions are repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. 51 and 71 FACTS: This case questions the legality of the Petitioner’s removal from the same office which would be the effect of Respondent’s appointment. 1950) Chapter XI. par. 83896 (February 22. rights and privileges.33 and 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Civil Liberties Union vs. one of who is the city engineer.O. citing Sec. According to Lacson vs. Romero. until he resigns or is removed for cause. b2 . Page 440 and 450. Vice-President. 64 G. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision. 177. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. Executive Secretary Case No. Sec. Furthermore. 7 cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. Sec. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature”. the rules of construction inform us that the words used in construction are to be given the sense they have in common use. L-3045-6 (August 31. The position of city engineer is neither of the above-stated. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President. 89 G. 9-B. 13. No. Nos.R. 7. Sec. No. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition in Art. 450 and 454. 2545 of the Revised Administration Code authorizes the President to remove at pleasure any of the officers enumerated therein. Art. 9-B of the 1987 Constitution. their deputies and assistants. HELD: No. all officers or employees in the unclassified service are protected by the above provision. Art. 284 is therefore declared null and void. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 39 FACTS: Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which. members of the Cabinet. Mallare Case No. allows members of the Cabinet. Pages 443. hold any other office or employment during their tenure. Footnote No. Art. This is confirmed by the enactment of C. 12. HELD: No. rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. 7. Footnotes No. 4. Petitioner contends that under the Constitution. This runs counter to Art. the Members of the Cabinet. 1 of the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. particularly during the Marcos era. 12 of the Constitution which reads: “No officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by law. their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. Sec. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. it is clear that Sec.R. The qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 1991) Chapter XI. in effect. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President. and that Respondent’s appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments. 41. but notes that there is a difference between this case and the Lacson case.68 De los Santos vs.” Respondent admits that the position of City Engineer “belongs to the unclassified service”. E. Sec. 4 protects those appointed into the service that do not fall as any of the following: “policydetermining. unless otherwise provided by the Constitution.

the minimum and the medium. have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning of Sec.” ISSUE: W/N this Court would adhere to the Masangkay ruling that the abolition of the death penalty limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods. The salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax. No. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. as the alter ego of the people. Concepcion. 217 G. Meer. 1987) Chapter XI. Art. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. income taxes are part of the diminution of judges’ salaries because “the independence of judges is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries”. Meer. 8 of the Constitution mandating that “during their continuance in office. that is. to make the salaries of the members of the judiciary taxable. which does not follow the Masangkay ruling. their salary shall not be decreased”. ISSUE: W/N the salary of the members of the judiciary is subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Endencia vs. No. 20a FACTS: Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments and compensations as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries. Footnote No.R. Footnote No. b1 . David confirmed Perfecto vs. HELD: Yes. 8 of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: No.e. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution providing that “…any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion temporal. 1989) Chapter XI. L-38969 (February 9. contrary to the provision of Sec. However both decisions must be discarded because the framers of the fundamental law (i. Muñoz Case No. 6c. 190 G. Page 447.R. 10 Art. According to Perfecto vs. 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death but this was modified by Art. 3.42 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Nitafan v. and Bernas). In the case at bar. even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned by the Constitution. Fox. 78780 (July 23. the Court found that the applicable sentence would be the medium period of penalty prescribed in Art. Page 446. Sec.46 FACTS: The Defendant was convicted of three counts of murder.69 People of the Philippines vs. The penalty for murder under Art. 10. LATIN MAXIM: 3. LATIN MAXIMS: 1. and that would be reclusion perpetua. to wit.

errors of judgment that were based on substantial evidence are not reviewable in certiorari. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. the other Senators must be nominated by the Citizens Party. Petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of SET. Page No. ISSUE: W/N the election of Respondents as members of the Electoral Tribunal was valid or lawful. Page 452. 286 G. Footnote No. “if the judgment of the court. Lopez. Respondent’s decisions may only be brought up on ground of certiorari alone. et al Case No. even in a doubtful case. 9a. The word “shall” is imperative in nature relative to the number of members of the Electoral Tribunal and this is borne in the opinion of the Secretary of Justice.R. L-10016 (February 28. 11a FACTS: Two petitions were filed against the Respondent claiming that it failed to address irregularities in the Central Mindanao elections for the Interim Batasang Pambansa. is mandatory. Then.70 Tañada v. and Primicias. L-49705-09 (February 8.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a.” Hence. and Primicias of the Nacionalista Party as members of the SET. No. Respondents alleged. 1979) Chapter XI. contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Petitioners maintain that after the nomination and election of Senator Laurel. 1957) Chapter XI. it may be rejected. “The application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted … except as to matters committed by the Constitution itself to the discretion of some other department. Consequently. 6b. COMELEC Case No. Lopez. that six members of the Electoral Tribunal “shall be members of the Senate or the House of Representatives”. the Supreme Court may review Respondents decisions on either review or certiorari. however. ISSUE: W/N the Supreme Court has the power to review decisions made by the Respondent in handling the pre-proclamation controversies cited by the Petitioners.R. No. HELD: No. 25a . The Supreme Court cited differences in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with regard to the Supreme Court’s power over COMELEC decisions – in 1935. such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy. The Supreme Court may only review actions carried out with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 9b. Cuenco. 451. HELD: No. Upon nomination of the Citizens Party.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aratuc v. 1973. the Senate chose Respondents as members of the same SET. Footnote No. as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).62 FACTS: The Senate upon nomination of the Nacionalista Party chose Senator Laurel. This highlights the 1973 Constitution’s intent to strengthen Respondent’s independence. 19 G.

LATIN MAXIM: 12a. 1972 is admissible as evidence. There are two conflicting provisions in the 1987 Constitution. the former validating this action and the latter proscribing it. 17. 50. The general rule is that the President must fill in vacancies in the Judiciary within 90 days. The prohibition is for public policy purposes. to prevent “midnight appointments” – which is more compelling than temporary vacancies in the judiciary. ISSUE: W/N the appointments were valid. 8. L-37201-02 (March 3. Nos. who has not been informed of his right to counsel. Page 457. Art. the appointments were void. 15. On the other hand. 9a. W/N Sec. The provision reads: “… Any person under investigation…shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. During the trial. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Conversely. Art. such confession is inadmissible if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution.79 FACTS: Judges were appointed to the RTC by the President on May 12 1998. HELD: 1. On the one hand. 2. 1972 was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. his extrajudicial confession dated Nov. Footnote No. 1973. No. within 2 months before the election. 36b.71 In Re: Appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta Case No. W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession dated on Nov. b FACTS: The present cases involve the interpretation of Sec. 98-5-01-SC (November 9. except for temporary appointments to executive positions when public interest is at stake. 4 requires that all vacancies in the judiciary be filled within 90 days of such vacancy. 20. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtoto v. 2. 1973. 4 of the New Constitution can be applied retroactively. Petitioner’s confession is admissible. No. Art. and to be informed of such right…. 46a . The court ruled that a confession obtained from a person under investigation. 4 of the New Constitution which took effect on Jan. ISSUE: 1. Yes. 23. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. Sec. 159 G. Sec. 15 prohibits the President from making any appointments two months before Presidential elections. 20 Art. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible. Temporary appointments to executive positions are the only exception. but this does not apply in the special circumstance of Presidential elections. 59 A. since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.R.” Petitioner was accused in two criminal cases of murder in two informations both dated Feb. Manguera Case No. 15. is admissible in evidence if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution. HELD: No. which occurs only once every six years. 35. 7. 38a. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. 1975) Chapter XI.M.

Yes.82 FACTS: Petitioners were held guilty by Respondent Court for the crime of robbery of a postal delivery van. 1991) Chapter XI. Footnote No. Accordingly. No. 42a . W/N the Petitioner’s extra-judicial confession is admissible even without the presence of a counsel. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution.72 Filoteo v. Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver is applicable to him retroactively. elected representative of Northern Samar. children born of Filipino mothers before January 17. They need not perform any act of “election” granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino citizen by 1957. No. he was pointed out as the mastermind. Petitioner executed sworn statements (confessing what had happened). 1948 (during which the 1935 Constitution was operative). Nos. 2. as a natural born Filipino citizen. 106 G. On May 30. W/N the said provisions of 1987 Constitution can be applied retroactively. The provision in question must be applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935 Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were not. 2. be admissible.R. Page 457. 66 G. Page 457. without the presence of a counsel. When Petitioner was captured. Jose Ong. who was born on June 19. ISSUE: 1. House of Representatives Case No. he admitted involvement in the crime and pointed his other confederates. 4 Sec. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30. 1996) Chapter XI. Upon the capture of his co-accused. 79543 (October 16. even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983. 1982. The 1987 Constitution provides that the right to counsel of the accused cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel.80 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Co v. 5a. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 9a.R.. 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. HELD: 1. ISSUE: 1. when he was only 9 years old. Electoral Tribunal. 46a FACTS: Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens. Footnote No. waivers of the right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987 Constitution. Sandiganbayan Case No. it is admissible under the 1973 Constitution. The specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of a counsel may not be applied to him retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of the said constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. Jr. 2. by such argumentation. Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao. HELD: Yes. Under of Art. is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to a Chinese father.

112371 (October 7. 7 provides for officers other than the first group to be appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.R. Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position “heads of bureaus” from CA confirmation with the intent of reconciling the 1935 Constitution which turned the Commission into a venue for “horse-trading”.73 Sarmiento v. ambassadors. Page 458. officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Sec. 24a . 7 only provides for the appointment. The Court favored the Respondent based on express provisions of the 1987 Constitution.R. 277 G. ISSUE: W/N a commutable transportation allowance may still be claimed by a government official provided with a government vehicle. 24b. Respondent sent a communication to the Petitioner informing her that post-audit reports on the DSWD disbursement accounts showed that officials provided with government vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances when they should not be. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution” with the requirement of CA approval. Nos. ISSUE: W/N Sec. b FACTS: Petitioner was endorsed with several government vehicles for the use of the personnel of the entire Region V of DSWD. 7a. Mison Case No. 1987) Chapter XI. other public ministers and consuls. 1998) FACTS: Petitioners question the validity of appointment of Respondent as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that it was not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. 7 must not be construed as to suppose that officers in the second sentence shall be appointed “in a like manner” as that of the first group. Art. 16 Art. 32. and that of the 1973 Constitution which placed absolute power of appointment in the President. HELD: The General Appropriations Act of 1988. The word “also” in the second sentence of Sec. 39a. 37 G. 1990 and 1991 clearly provides that transportation allowance will not be granted to officials who are assigned a government vehicles except as approved by the President. 16. by the President of “heads of executive departments. she was entitled to transportation allowance on the days she did not use a government vehicle. Commission on Audit Case No. Petitioner asserted that even if she was assigned a government vehicle.84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Domingo v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 80519-21 (December 17. 16 Art. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Footnote No. HELD: No. for the days the official did not actually use the vehicle.

76 G. the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. Footnote No.3 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Luzon Brokerage Co v. Respondent has no jurisdiction over Petitioner. 2. 1932. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may be characterized as such. 112 G. she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar’s questionable activities. Also. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. there were no alterations made in the basic provisions of the other sections. 3316. HELD: The omission from Sec. ISSUE: W/N the amendments introduced into Sec. 13 of the Public Service Law. 1992) Chapter IV. Petitioner merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with Saldivar. 1932) FACTS: Petitioner placed Respondent Salazar under preventive suspension because it appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that Delfin Saldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. 3316 conferred jurisdiction on the Respondents over the Petitioner’s business. On May 9. 82511 (March 3. On appeal. Page 124. The insertion of the phrase “for hire or compensation” does not show the intent either.R. No. 13 of Act No. thereby. although it is not a common carrier. NLRC and Salazar Case No. This is a stock phrase found in most definitions of a common carrier and a public utility. notwithstanding the changes in the wording of the definition of the term “public service” introduced by Act No. Moreover. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. An exception to this is when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to strained relations between the employer and the employee. No. Respondent required the Petitioner to file with the commission within a period of thirty days an application for a certificate of public convenience for the operation of his trucks since they were said to be devoted to the transportation of cargo with compensation as provided in Sec. 36b . ISSUE: 1. justify her dismissal.R. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Petitioner has been operating a fleet of trucks utilized exclusively for the carriage of goods or cargo of its particular customers. L-37661 (November 16. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. Public service is a service for public use. Public Service Commission Case No. 3108 by Act No.74 Globe-Mackay v. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. 13 of the phrase “for public use” in the definition of a public service does not mean that the Legislature meant to extend the jurisdiction of the PSC to private enterprises not devoted to public use.


6c FACTS: Respondent killed Diosdado Iroy using an unlicensed firearm. R. 13 appointing Petitioner as General Manager of NARRA. The word ‘term’ describes the period that an office may hold office and upon expiration of such term. 1962. the Board approved Resolution No. etc. 1160 expressly gives the Board the power to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager. 1960. He was convicted of 2 offenses. It does not use the clause “as a result” or “on the occasion of ”to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime.D.A. 248 of the RPC 2) Illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form under PD 1866 Par 2 of Sec 1 of P. Petitioner’s term of office is deemed expired. 1984) Chapter IV. People v. Page 124.R. Footnote No. 1962. In this case. his rights. 24 constitutes removal of Petitioner without cause. “If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Barros. 115008 (July 24. HELD: 1) The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. L-30057 (January 31. the term of office is not fixed by law. 24 wherein the President expressed his desire to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to March 31. 2) 2nd par of Sec 1 of P. People v. Nos. the penalty of death shall be imposed. duties. 15 G. 1160 created the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). G. Tac-an. but rather it uses the clause “with the use of”. but by the Board. 1996) FACTS: R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c . the Board approved Resolution No. and authority must cease. 1866 does not support a conclusion that intended to treat said two offenses as a single and integrated offense of “illegal possession with homicide or murder”.A. On March 15. Tiozon. ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. Said law also empowered its Board of Directors to appoint and fix the term of office of the General Manager subject to approval of the President. Quijada Case No. Caling. HELD: No.76 Aparri v.R. No.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. On January 15. OR to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People v.4 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. Court of Appeals Case No. 2) W/N the 2nd par of Sec 1 of PD1866 integrated illegal possession of firearm and the resultant killing into a single integrated offense.” ISSUE: 1) W/N the trial court’s judgment should be sustained in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People v. 1866 states that. which were separately filed: 1) Murder under Art.

If the instrument cannot be registered. 1994) FACTS: Both parties claim that they own a parcel of land. Dept.R. “It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration …. Thus. HELD: No. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son. after discovering that private respondent’s TCT was fraudulently acquired. ordered a writ of possession against them and issued a resolution denying with finality a motion for reconsideration filed by Private Respondents. 4517. 1529 which provides: Cancellation of lis pendens – “Before the final judgment. Gustillo Case No. stating the ground therefore. on appeal to the CA. Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: RA 7309.R. a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the Court after proper showing that … it is necessary to protect the rights of those who caused it to be registered. No. 109445 (November 7. 30 G. 11a. …” 2. No. L-81163 (September 26. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.77 Baranda v.5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Basbacio v. W/N the pendency of the appeal in subsequent civil case with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from canceling the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of titles of petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this Court. Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul the notice of lis pendens in a Torrens Certificate of Title? HELD: 1. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. Page 125. convicted. G. he is not. among other things. whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. ISSUE: 1. 1988) Chapter IV. of Justice Case No. Respondent Judge abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand. he does not fall under RA 7309. For one to be “unjustly accused” one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning. Sec 10 of PD 1529 states that. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. provides for compensation of persons unjustly accused. 25a . However. due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. 2. Footnote No. The Court. and advising him of his rights to appeal by consulta.D. He forgot the 1st par of Sec. Another group filed a separate civil case against Petitioners and applied for lis pendens on the TCT of said lot. he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presenter of such denial in writing. Office of the Secretary. and imprisoned. In the case at bar. which the court found out to be privies of the Private Respondents tasked to delay the implementation of the final decisions of the Court. Lot No. 77 of P.

The project was eventually cancelled. Footnote No. No.R. Sandiganbayan. 288 No. Sandiganbayan. 2. Page 127. Therefore. Socrates v. Gen. Urban Consolidated Constructors. Hence. Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. The lowest bidder. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect. Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. assigned to Alabat. extending undue advantage to Joint Venture through manifest partiality. 1933. et al. regardless of stage of execution and mode of participation. ISSUE: 1. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35. Jurisprudence is clear that upon determination of the validity of the information. with the consent by the Philippine Commission. HELD: No. 1934. ISSUE: W/N it is mandatory or discretionary for Sandiganbayan to place under preventive suspension public officers who stand accused before it. petitioners were suspended from office. Tayabas. were “downgraded” thereby ineligible as bidders. v. Tayabas. acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice. Yulo Case No. he was transferred to Perez. not thereafter. Mariano.” For this. LATIN MAXIM: 1. G. it is mandatory. 5a. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. one accused of any offense involving fraud upon government public funds or property whether the crime is simple or complex. Later in his service. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1. Petitioners were charged under RA 3019 for in “one way or the other. The judge of First instance. 124067 (March 27. evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. 1935) Chapter IV. Sandiganbayan Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. subsequent to the approval of Act No. shall be suspended from office. Joint Venture was disqualified after the PCAB verified that Joint Venture as well as the 2nd lowest bidder. directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. his transfer is not a new appointment.78 Segovia v. but for reasons not on record. 7a .11 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioners were designated as members of the Contracts Committee for NPC’s Mindanao project. 3899. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission. NPC Board approved. Since all other bids exceeded the allowable government estimate on the project. the committee declared a failure of bidding and directed a re-bidding. no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment. HELD: Yes. Luciano. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Tanada v. Under the act. a court must issue a suspension order as held in Gonzaga v. 7a Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. 43575 (May 31.

radio companies did not need a certificate of public convenience to operate. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sec. 7a. 30. After which. 32 of Public Service Act allows the Commission to delegate to any of their attorneys the right to receive evidence or take testimony. Petitioner did not avail of it when they should have.R. recognized by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Respondent. Atty. owner of another ice plant already in the same area. though the law makes it inconvenient or cumbersome for the Commission to handle contested cases. after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by Kayumanggi. HELD: Yes. Belen Cabrera Case No. No. ISSUE: W/N delegation to Atty. 3 of the same act provides that in (1) all contested cases and (2) cases involving fixing of rates. Com. 146 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radio Communications of the Philippines v. 6c. Aspillera to hear the case is lawful. the delegation is unlawful. Mindoro. 49 . L-68729 (May 29. in applying the law. the Respondent. which replaced the PSC. the reception of evidence may only be delegated to one of the Commissioners. authorized Kayumanggi to set up radio systems in Mindoro and Samar too. or interpret the law any other way. claiming that public convenience did not need another ice plant. 1951) FACTS: Respondent filed an application with the Public Service Commission for a certificate of public convenience. Petitioner. Plus. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. P. 8a. thereafter the Commission en banc rendered a decision that Respondent was allowed to operate the ice plant.D. 1 abolished the Public Service Commission and EO 546 created the Respondent Commission. Respondent must issue a certificate of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems. HELD: No. the Commission nor the Court may not disregard. 46a. ordered Petitioner to stop operating. Case No. No. and Samar. 129 G. Although Sec. because it didn’t have a certificate of public convenience. Petitioner claimed that under the law. you have to look at the entire Act. to be able to operate an ice plant in the City of Lipa. L-3629 (March 19. which is necessary under EO 546 for any public service to operate. In 1980. Under EO 546. National Telecom. 36b FACTS: Petitioner was awarded legislative franchise in 1957 by RA 2036 to operate a radio communications system. Thus. circumvent. opposed Respondent’s application. Aspillera was delegated by the Commissioner to receive testimony and conduct hearing of the contest. Petitioner then established services in Sorsogon. Petitioner was created under RA 2036. where the law is clear. they need such certificates to validly operate. and not just specific provisions. no one except the Commissioner may hear contested cases. governed by the Public Service Commission.79 Eliseo Silva v. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate. 1987) G. Under it.R. However.

Page 127. 84 G. the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual.D. No. can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased. IAC. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. which states that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. 6c. adopted or spurious children. 1691 amended Sec.80 National Federation of Labor v. 1992) Chapter IV. 7a. legitimate. They may have a natural tie of blood. Additionally. Eisma Case No. respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to act on the case. But again P. this Court ruled that “Art. 7a FACTS: Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual. they blocked the roads and prevented customers and suppliers from entering the premises. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction. full blood brother of their father. ISSUE: W/N courts may be labor arbiters that can pass on a suit for damages filed by an employer or is it the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC? HELD: Yes. No. vesting courts of first instance with original jurisdiction to award damages for illegal dismissal. 198 G. 36b . L-61236 (January 31. Hon. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. who died intestate without any issue. Sec.D.R. acknowledged natural. 84240 (March 25. 1984) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pascual v. but without changing original jurisdiction of LA over money claims arising from employer-employee relations. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child”. 992. 217 to return the jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. Footnote No. BP 130 amended the same section. ISSUE: W/N Art. 7b. P. HELD: In Diaz v. 217 vested Labor Arbiters with original jurisdiction. 217. Thereafter.” Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners contended that jurisdiction over this case belongs to Labor Arbiter and not for courts to decide. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In the Labor Code. Thus the law is clear. Pascual-Bautista Case No. Respondent filed in court for damages for obstruction of private property. However. In the process.16 FACTS: Zambowood Union went on strike because of the illegal termination of their union leader and underpayment of their monthly allowance. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual. 1367 amended Sec.

19 (1). exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto. 1996) Chapter IV. No. Macarandang wherein it was held that the appointment of a civilian as “secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879”. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of RA 7659. which apparently authorizes him to carry and possess firearms.81 People v. Muñoz. the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 1976) FACTS: The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. L-22291 (November 15. At the time of appellant’s apprehension. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. the death penalty had been abolished and hence. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. HELD: Yes. 116719 (January 18. ISSUE: W/N the appointment of the Appellant as a special agent of the CIS. and to pay the costs. Page 127. 7b FACTS: Accused was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from one year and one day to two years. Santayana Case No.” LATIN MAXIM: 5a. HELD: In People vs. the doctrine then prevailing was enunciated in the case of People vs. and sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 19 (1). 201 G. LATIN MAXIM: 46a . 115 No. the Court held that “A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. Footnote No.R. Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty. Amigo Case No. Art.

13 of our Civil Code.. the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.. The complaint was dismissed as having prescribed. 1965. ISSUE: W/N the date on which ten years from December 21. Page 127. et al. 1965. 1969) Chapter 4. 1960. No. Petitioners filed a special civil action for prohibition based on the argument that the constitutional provision on people’s initiative can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has been passed. 17 of the 1987 Constitution. 1996. defendants were ordered by the Court of First Instance of Manila to pay PRATRA. Commission on Elections. and on local legislation. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III). it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution. On 21 December 1965. No. considering that in the order of things. it could have provided for a subtitle therefore. 127325 (March 19. 1997) Chapter IV. HELD: NO. 184 G. Footnote No.R. 90 G. 7b FACTS: On December 6. or an aggregate of 3.R. If Congress intended R. on statutes. the month of February in both had 29 days. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Defendants moved to dismiss the said complaint. unlike in the other modes of initiative.200 plus 7% interest until the amount was fully paid until May 25. from December 21. it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. expired on December 19.82 National Marketing Corp. (NAMARCO) v. 1955. Footnote No. or hierarchy of values. Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. Tecson Case No. 1960 and 1964 being leap years. the primacy of interest.26 FACTS: On 14 November 1955. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Private Respondents filed with Respondent Commission a petition to amend the Constitution through a system of initiative Sec. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Page 129.650 days.A. However. 43 . Miguel D. L-29131 (August 27.18 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santiago v. which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. Art. No. RA 6735 provides for three systems of initiative: initiative on the Constitution. ISSUE: W/N RA 6735 is an adequate statute to implement Section 2. "When the laws speak of years . 1955 expired was considered to be December 21. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the same defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered in the initial case. the sum of P7. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. so that ten (10) years of 365 days each. HELD: NO. Case No.

39c FACTS: On July 15. Melchor v. Consequently. which was approved by the Minister of Education. 170 No. HELD: No. but eventually gave up the project to save itself from losses. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical defects. it was highly inequitable for the Court to compel the Petitioner. and that assuming it was effective.35 FACTS: On January 25. 12a . The school accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost but failed to sign as a witness to the contract. who had substantially complied with the mandate of LOI 968. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have guided Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and substitution of other persons as candidates. Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1991) Chapter IV. 177 G. W/N the contract was null and void. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality. even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent Commission. the contractor sought additional charges due to labor cost increase. COMELEC Case No. 1980. his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day. The contract was also valid and enforceable because it already bore the approval of the Minister of Education. HELD: No. to shoulder the construction cost of the building. as school administrator of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Leyte. Page 133. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect. which should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Commission on Audit Case No. L – 54718 (December 4. Petitioner. For this reason the petitioner was made personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. which was being utilized by the school when he was not reaping benefits from it. W/N the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid to the contractor. 9a. 95398 (August 16.83 Villanueva v. Also. No. the matter was referred to Respondent Commission who disallowed the payment in postaudit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the chief accountant of the school as witness to it. entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction of one of the school buildings. 1983. During construction. ISSUE: 1. 9a. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. Also. 1986) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mario R. Petitioner won in the election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Respondent. The chief accountant’s issuance of a certificate of fund availability served as substantial compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract. 2. Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4.R.

9a. CAR denied the motion holding that its decision dated Oct. the original owner incorrectly declared the size of the land. Petitioner bought from an original owner a piece of land in Manila which was under the Torrens system.R.R. the original owner was paying lesser taxes than he should have and same for Petitioner from 1907 – 1910. on Oct. 1956 when the decision in question became final and executory. 11d. From this period. 43.49 for the unpaid balance of the years 1901-1910. 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period of five years has already elapsed from the said date. He also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution. Upon finding out that he was not paying the correct amount of taxes. only 3 years. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the reglementary period. Page 134. Consequently. the Court issued two more writs on May 6. 50 HELD: No. 1914) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner should still pay the taxes which were not assessed before. a period of 6 years. L – 26754 (October 16. 86 G. Hence Private Respondent’s motion for execution was not time-barred.82. FACTS: In 1907. 6. 1963 and another on Feb. 1958 and April 14. ISSUE: W/N the motion for execution which was filed beyond the reglementary period was time-barred. The Court granted the motion for suspension but the civil case was dismissed when it reached Respondent Court. from 1901 – 1907. Instead of obeying the writs. 26. Footnote No. No. 38b. fees. 11. 11. 649. 50 G. and Exequiel Magsaysay Case No. the Petitioner filed a case before the Court of First Instance of Zambales. HELD: Petitioner should only pay the taxes when he was the owner of the property. No. Petitioner contends that the supposed taxes from before 1910 were not actually taxes because they had not yet been assessed.38 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Jesus v.41 FACTS: Petitioner was ordered. to Dec. 9c. Magsaysay filed a motion for execution of the writ dated Dec. the time during which the writs of execution could not be served. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 17. Apparently. 1959. Thus. 1963. L-9337 (December 24. or a period of 3 years. 1964. 11e . Taxes may not be due and payable until they are assessed. 11a. For this reason. 1956. the date when Private Respondent’s motion for execution was filed. City of Manila Case No. asking Private Respondent to pay him the value of his house in addition to damages. Soon after. Petitioner refused to comply.84 Mateo Casela v. Petitioner was awarded P1. Court of Appeals. 9 months and 25 days must be subtracted. to vacate the premises and remove his house. 11 months and 24 days elapsed. and interest of P2. 1970) Chapter IV. Page 134. 096. Petitioner paid the taxes. 26. he protested and filed an action to recover the same amount. So. From Dec. Footnote No.

W/N the petitioners were in a financial position to pay the additional emergency allowance. On September 27. LATIN MAXIM: 8. Inciong Case No. Respondent Judge granted the registration of the land to the two claimants. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Petitioner brought the present action to the Supreme Court praying that the decision of Respondent Judge be set aside and a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. 45 G. 6 stated that Employers may apply for exemption with the Secretary of Labor within 30 days from the effectivity of these rules. The law takes into consideration that there is a possibility that some employers are not financially capable to pay such wages and such incapability may happen anytime within the year. Moreover. No. HELD: Supreme Court cannot open a new trial. The Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to reopen judgments under Sec. amounting to loss of jurisdiction by approving both applications. Petitioner still has a pending Motion for Reconsideration case with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. 513 if there are other adequate remedies available. 513 if the Code of Civil Procedure.R. 2. ISSUE: 1. The increase was set at May 1. In absence of any grave abuse of discretion. PD 1123 was promulgated requiring all employers in the private sector to pay their employees an extra P60/month as emergency allowance. No. The purpose of the PD is to protect wages and income. therefore.R. Respondent approved both applications granting exemptions for the company. LATIN MAXIM: 9c . Petitioners argue that Respondent committed grave abuse of discretion. as well as the rules issued on the same day. L-48848 (May 11. 1988) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Morales v. Paredes Case No. 83 G. 1930) FACTS: In April 1977. the application was not a strict rule. that action should be finished first. only the Department of Labor and Wage Commission can decide if the petitioner was in a financial position to pay. 9a. Sec. HELD: No. 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. their recommendations will be respected by the courts. While the Motion was still pending. W/N the first application was filed beyond the 30-day reglementary period. The Department is in a better position to assess the matter. 42 FACTS: Petitioner claimed to own a parcel of land in Pangasinan wherein two other people have already registered such land as their own. ISSUE: W/N a new trial should be granted in accordance with Sec. the company filed with the Wage Commission its application for exemption from paying the increase. 1977. No. the company was able prove their financial situation by giving financial statements. 1977. L-34428 (December 29.85 Federation of Free Workers v.

30 G. Par (d) Sec. Article 338 would be of no useful purpose. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan for municipalities outside Metro Manila.86 Prasnik v. members of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. 11a. b2 . 37. An acknowledged natural child is a natural child also and following the words of the law. No. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children.R. 1992) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four children which he claims to be his and Paz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Guia v. they should be allowed adoption. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural child to be adopted by his father refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the 1992 elections. ISSUE: W/N par (d) Sec. 8a. Republic of the Philippines Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 9. The court realized that the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. The trend when it comes to adoption of children tends to go toward the liberal. 335. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. 36a. LATIN MAXIM: 2.R. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged natural children of the father or mother. 3 of RA 7166. 36b. 125 G. 9c. 104712 (May 6. The Solicitor General opposed this stating that Art. COMELEC Case No. 26. The rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimated child. It maintains that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or mother there should not be an acknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will go against Art. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should necessarily be elected by districts. 39b FACTS: Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 37. The law does not prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child which when compared to a natural child is equitable. No. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the Sangguniang Panlulungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large. L-8639 (March 23. 12. Contending that this is unnecessary would deny the illegitimate children the chance to acquire these rights. HELD: No.

Castillo Case No. the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2. was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by Respondent.87 Salenillas v. Page 135. of RA No. Angeles. the elected Mayor of Barobo. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension by Respondent pursuant to Sec. Footnote No. For failure to pay their loan. 6d. The distinction made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 5185. 36b. 5. 276 G. 48 FACTS: On December 4. l969) Chapter IV.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. 68 G. Held: The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. Surigao del Sur. The Provincial Governor may no longer have the power of preventive suspension over a Municipal Mayor. W/N the prescription period had already prescribed. 6c. Page 136. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is vested with power to order such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of l967. 1989) Chapter IV. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 42a FACTS: Petitioner. For foreclosure sales. With regard to prescription. the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different. 26. 27. Court of Appeals Case No. constituting the alleged dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in the alleged connivance of Petitioner with certain private individuals in the cutting and selling of timber or logs for their own use and benefit. the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed. vs. And on the basis of such administrative complaint. the Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. otherwise known as the “Decentralization Act of l967”. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private Respondent. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. The act.R. HELD: The new law explicitly stated that the power of suspension was vested on the Provincial Board. Respondent also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on Monge et al. Footnote No. 1973.500. No. No. to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the government. 9a. 7a.47 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sarcos v. The purpose of this was to prevent partisan considerations by vesting the power on a board where no one person may have monopoly over the power of suspension. ISSUE: 1. Petitioners’ contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.R. 9b. L-29755 (January 31. 78687 (January 31. 49 .

W/N the failure of Petitioner to allow Private Respondents from resuming their work constitutes dismissal from the service? 2. Inc. 93177 (August 2. Footnote No. 10 . 14 to deny the right of petitioners to invoke a peremptory challenge. 61 FACTS: Respondents were both employees of Petitioner and holding position as line leaders. tasked to supervise 36 sewers each. 6c. Despite their explanation. On May 10. Page 138. ISSUE: 1. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 3. 122165 (February 17. all the line leaders did not report for work. a new doctrine allowed the awarding of “full” backwages and also prevented the company from deducting the earnings of the illegally dismissed employees elsewhere during the pendency of their case.R. W/N there was a legal basis for the Regional Trial Courts to grant bail and order for the release of petitioners. l993. W/N there was a legal basis for the GCM No. the right to peremptory challenge was effectively revived. a Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial was formed. Private Respondents tendered their explanation letters. W/N the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three 3 years? HELD: Under the old doctrine. 7a. l997) Chapter IV. the right was suspended due to the creation of military tribunals to try cases of military personnel and other cases that may be referred to them. W/N there was substantial compliance in the conduct of pre-trial investigation. No. But other line leaders were allowed to resume their work despite their absence on May 5 and 6. the right to peremptory challenge was revived. 1991) Chapter IV. v. NLRC Case No. On May 6. HELD: The right to peremptory challenge was suspended when Martial Law was declared. 69 G. 9a. petitioners invoked their right to peremptory challenge. l993. 53 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Comendador v. The reason being.88 Ala Mode Garments. The Labor Arbiter was wrong in awarding backwages for a period of not exceeding three years. l993. Page 142. they were not allowed to resume their work and were advised to await the decision of the management whether or not the real reason for their absence was intended to sabotage the operations of Petitioner. 5a. During their trial. 49 FACTS: The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their participation in the failed coup d’etat on December l to 9. Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. 7 G. so when martial law was lifted and the tribunals were abolished. No. 6a. l989. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the backwages that can be awarded to illegally dismissed employees was not to exceed a period of three years. 2. R. However. De Villa Case No. On May 5 and 6. In connection with their prosecution. and then required to submit written explanations as to their absence. Renato S. Private Respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of the Petitioner. But when the same was lifted. l993.

It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. 172 G. Footnote No. his sister. HELD: Yes. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Collector of Customs. but the spirit of the law and the intent of the legislature that is important. Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land. the court did not engage in judicial legislation. After the death of Felix Matabuena. 9c FACTS: Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. 7 and 11 of same RA. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised Administrative Code. The duties were paid and the shipment released. The Supreme Court concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in Sec. Page 143.133 of the Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. v. Provision says that “the Court has jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. 11 of same Act. During this period.76 FACTS: Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. 16c. it is not the letter. 1957) Chapter IV. It merely rectified an apparent clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the Legislature. there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other. 151 G. Petitioner. 9a.” The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating. L-28771 (March 31. Page 144. In this ruling. the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties. To support this. Footnote No. Later the two were married. ISSUE: W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.69 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez & Sons. No. Thereafter. the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when brought by persons affected thereby. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. 36a . Inc. there is indeed a disparity between Sec.R. said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by marriage. the Supreme Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction citing Sec. however. However. Cervantes Case No. 1971) Chapter IV.89 Matabuena v. L-9274 (February 1. The court. Under the rule of statutory construction. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice.R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ‘the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he has supervision and control. 16a. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. sought the nullification of the donation citing Art. No. under Sec.

12a. 033 was already in the hands of the government as of July. 1961 to April 18. 1989) FACTS: Petitioner contends that he had rendered a proper account of all the funds of the government which came to his possession as a superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony and that all of his accounts are balanced. HELD: There appears to be a typographical error in the wording of Sec. 36f. L-7806 (July 12. 222 of Act No. 1964. It protested the computation of interest. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law. Respondent paid under protest the amount alleged to be due. claiming that it should only be required to pay interest for the amount of the difference between the deficiency tax and Respondent’s overpayment. 143 G. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. Spanish translation of said Sec. a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. the said section in the California Code reads “course of law” instead of “courts of law”. 12a. 11d. ESSO Case No. the sum belonged to Respondent and the government had the obligation to return such amount.” ISSUE: W/N the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction to cases where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary “courts” of law.78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Com. 994 with interest. L-28502-03 (April 18. ISSUE: 1. However. it was contended that the action for mandamus cannot prosper since there is no showing that. W/N Respondent is entitled to a refund. 11d. 12b . 11e. Thus. No. the other remedy is not limited to the ordinary “courts of law”. 033 representing the excess payment of Respondent. No. arguing that it was more than what was properly due. 9d.” The phrase “courts of law” should read as “course of law”. which. “there is no plain. Copied verbatim from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. 36d. Having been paid and received by mistake. such as will effectuate the legislative intent and to avoid injustice or an absurd conclusion. 222 more clearly indicates what the legislature intended. 1964. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law. 1960.R. as provided by law. Page 144. W/N Respondent shall pay the deficiency tax of P367. Since the amount of P221. On August 10. 37 FACTS: Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax. such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion. Petitioner thus filed an action for mandamus to compel the acting auditor of the Philippines to issue a clearance. Petitioner demanded payment of the deficiency tax together with interest for the period of April 18. if uncorrected. … it may if there is no other plain. Nothing is better settled than the rule that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd and unreasonable consequences. It was accordingly granted a tax credit by Petitioner on August 5. 11a. It is well established that to interpret words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply cannot and should not be countenanced. 190 which reads in part: “When the complaint in an action in a court of First Instance alleges that any inferior tribunal. of Internal Revenue v. However. 36a. HELD: The government already had in its hands the sum of P221. 11a. It is therefore the duty of the court to give the statute a sensible construction.R. 8b. which arises from the moment that payment is made. Respondent’s payment for 1960 was found to be short. would render the law nonsensical. 2. 36b. 1964. Footnote No. 1912) Chapter 4. Statutes should receive a sensible construction. this evident typographical error. and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. whatever obligation Respondent might subsequently incur in favor of the government would have to be reduced by that sum. Phipps Case No. Moreover. 27 G. in respect of which no interest could be charged. In Spanish.90 Lamb v. On its face.

636 fine for the damage to property committed. since such fine cannot be less than the amount of the damage. LATIN MAXIM: 9. Page 149. Villanueva Case No. The Justice of Peace. It must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention and avoid absurd results. L-15014 (April 29. if given jurisdiction. 1961) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. since the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction if the only offense were the damage of property. Duque Case No. POEA. 12. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction. The case was considered beyond the court’s jurisdiction because of the fine imposable upon the accused. a literal reading suggests that the prescriptive period would never begin to run. which also declared itself without jurisdiction because the penalty for the more serious offense of physical injuries through reckless imprudence is only arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Moreover.91 People v. 1992) Chapter IV. 11 .362 through reckless imprudence in the Justice of the Peace Court of Batangas. 2 but Accused does not benefit from a literal reading. there is the possibility that the prosecution will fail to prove the physical injuries aspect of the case and establish only the damage to property. and if the same be not known at the time. There is absurdity in Sec. ISSUE: What is the prescription of the criminal offense of the Accused? HELD: Prescription began from the time the activities of the Accused were ascertained by the complainants and by the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. 15. Jose. it would be absurd to say that the graver offense of serious and less serious physical injuries combined with damage to property through reckless imprudence is in jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. R. a similar case. It should remain within the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. Sec. 2 of Act No. Footnote No. R. would find itself without jurisdiction to impose the P2. Angeles et al vs. 106 G. 100285 (August 13. According to Accused. and even applied to its maximum degree. from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment”. 11d. 11a. The case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance.97 FACTS: Defendant was accused of crime of serious and less serious physical injuries with damage to property in amount of P2. 3326 provides that “prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law. FACTS: Accused was charged with illegal recruitment because he was not licensed nor authorized by the proper government agency. The Labor Code provides that the offense shall prescribe in 3 years but does not contain any provision of how to compute it. “Institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment” may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word “until”. Also. LATIN MAXIM: 5. 116 G. 38 HELD: Yes. held that jurisdiction was with the Court of First Instance and not the municipal court.

9e. They dismissed the petition. 112170 (April 10. 11a. R. had to attend some personal matters. The Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute. 11h. At the Office of the Ombudsman. Sec. 306 G. which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 12a. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First Instance may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court. ISSUE: W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of judicial decision. L-38161 (March 29. Court of Appeals Case No. it held that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”. 142. The court may consider the spirit of the statute where the literal meaning would lead to injustice and absurdity. 36.112 FACTS: Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance.92 Bello v. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. 8b FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Cesario Ursua v. No. He was requested by his lawyer to personally procure the complaint from the Ombudsman because the law firm’s messenger. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The provision should also be taken within the context and spirit of Rule 50.A. Court of Appeals Case No. 142 is a penal statute that should be construed strictly against the state. ISSUE: W/N the acts committed by the petitioner were among the evils sought to be remedied by C. No. 12. Oscar Perez. HELD: Yes. 41a . and in favor of the accused. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal. 15 G. Likewise. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. He was charged and convicted for violation of C. 142 HELD: Petitioner was acquitted.R. 9d. 11a.A. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50. No.” Petitioner’s real identity was eventually discovered by the employees of the Ombudsman.A. Page 152. C. defeating its purpose and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to avoid such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. he wrote his name at the logbook as “Oscar Perez. Footnote No. Sec. Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. 11g. 1996) Chapter 4. No. The Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and justice to be bound by the same rule. 3 as an analogous provision. 9c. 3) directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court.

He insists that only the Court can do so. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. suppress the mischief. 1948) Chapter 4.R. 95 G. Court of Appeals Case No. page 156 FACTS: Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal logging operations. No. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. 245 G. No. Republic Case No. 68 of P.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. and that the Petitioner having failed to enroll all of his children in school.16. citing Section 68 of PD 705 as amended by EO 277 which reads “The court shall further the order of confiscation in favor of the Government…as well as the machinery. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec.114. equipment… which are illegally used…” ISSUE: W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. and secure the benefits intended. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pritchard v. HELD: No. Issue: W/N the Petitioner should be allowed to avail of the exemption by invoking the aforementioned provision.D. 19a . HELD: The provision of law invoked by appellant must be interpreted in the sense that the enrollment required by law must be made at any time during the entire period of the residence of the applicant. 68a. The drafters of the law could not have intended to create an absurd or impossible situation. Footnote No. L-1715 (July 17. 36a FACTS: The Solicitor General opposed the claim of the Petitioner for exemption from filing a declaration of intention on the ground that under the requirement for exemption. it is imperative that Petitioner’s children should be enrolled during the entire period of residence. 111107 (January 10. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to be suppressed.93 Paat v. 705. he failed to comply with one of the conditions required to entitle him to exemption from filing a declaration of intention.

91 G. 35. considering that they were reelectionists. No. justice would be undermined. some time has already passed since the crisis that enacted RA 6424.R.94 Salvacion v.” The Supreme Court ruled that “and shall have qualified” is devoid of meaning. 1967) Chapter 4. The law states “any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit. where foreign investments were minimal. L-28396 (December 29. 14. No. the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. 43.114. 26 . the Deputy Sheriff of Makati sent a notice of garnishment to China Bank in order to draw from the American’s bank account to pay the fees. there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular. As. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct 7.16. Comelec Case No. Footnote No. ISSUES: 1. 39 FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. HELD: RA 4970 reads “the first mayor. stating that if Circular 960 is to be followed. the Court ruled that it is unthinkable that the guilty would be acquitted at the expense of the innocent. a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. such is the law and stood firm on the policy. 1997) Chapter 4. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. In order to pay for moral damages. which states that “foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment. garnishment or any other process of any court. 94723 (August. LATIN MAXIM: 2. 10 of the Civil Code. ISSUES: W/N Section 13 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Section 8 of RA 6427.” Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and illegal canvass and proclamation. HELD: Central Bank contends that the reason for the exemption is to encourage the deposit of foreign currency. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. RA 6424 was enacted during a period of economic crisis. Galido then asked for reconsideration. Footnote 126. despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. page 156 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Demafiles v. In light of this. Central Bank of the Philippines Case No. since there is a possibility of fraud. China Bank responded by invoking Sec. page 159 FACTS: An American tourist raped 12 year old girl. 245 G. 113 of Circular 960 of Central Bank. 3. stating Art. as amended by PD 1246 should be made applicable to a foreigner.R. Respondent Bank states that though the law is harsh. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. LATIN MAXIM: 15. the economy has now somewhat recovered from the financial drought. 21.18. shall be incompetent to act on the said body. No. Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. However. in case of doubt as to the interpretation or application of laws. 2. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1 st day of January following their election. Hence.

despite past decisions. cannot be treated as a separate offense and only serves to qualify the carnapping. HELD: The words “is killed” make no distinction between homicide and murder.” ISSUE: 1. No. Frustrated homicide (or murder) is not treated as a separate offense as it is deemed to fall under the clause of Sec. Nos. Juco Case No. 38a. Respondent Court however. 38b FACTS: Sec. The phrase “is killed” refers only to consummated murder. irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken. or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 1985) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. P. ISSUE: W/N employees of Petitioner are covered by the Labor Code or by the laws and regulations governing the civil service. If the crime was frustrated murder. Mejia Case No. when the owner. 807 Sec. 48 .R. W/N frustrated homicide would be treated as a separate offense. be punished by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years. 14 “by means of violence or in intimidation of persons”. including every government owned or controlled corporation. 26. whether it is homicide or murder. decided in favor of the Private Respondent.R. subdivision and instrumentality of the government. The 1935 constitution’s section 1 article 12 states that “A civil service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the government shall be provided by law. 86 G. 56 implements the said provision.” Clearly. 1997) FACTS: For being declared guilty of stealing scrap iron owned by Petitioner. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping shall. He filed a complaint with Respondent Court and Petitioner replied stating that the Respondent Court is without jurisdiction as Petitioner Corporation is a government owned corporation and the grounds for dismissal were for valid reasons. 14. W/N the phrase “is killed” covers both homicide and murder. when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or in intimidation of persons or force upon things. the Labor Code states that the mentioned corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law. 119407 (July 7.95 National Housing Corporation v. The killing. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 6. 7a. 26. agency. 24. HELD: Petitioner is government owned as it never had any private stockholders. No. 43. and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Whether it is one or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof” makes no difference in so far as the penalty is concerned. Private Respondent was terminated. 118940-41 and G. 111 G. driver. and not frustrated murder. Furthermore. 7. 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act reads: • “Sec. would the penalty be life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death? 3. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. L-64313 (January 17. In addition to this. the inclusion of government owned or controlled corporation carries out a message that the coverage is broad and all-embracing.D.R.” While the amendments in section 1 article 12b of the 1973 constitution states that “The civil service embraces every branch.

– This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government.96 City of Manila v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance. Coverage. Section 2 covers those who are qualified: • Sec. filed an application on January 30. that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447).146 FACTS: The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18. 11e. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. 1969. which. casual and emergency employees. effective beginning the third quarter of 1972. HELD: The petition is granted. temporary. 60 G. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. which took effect on Jan.R. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. ISSUE: W/N the tax ordinance is valid. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. No. Inferentially. 20a. Footnote No. While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent. It fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent. 12a. denied the same. Judge Gomez and Esso Philippines Case No. who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program. 88979 (February 7. 1981) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chua v. 2. imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. 1989 with Respondent Administration. regardless of age. 49 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. 38b. With the three percent maximum limit set by RA 5447. L-37251 (August 31. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. 20a. Civil Service Commission Case No. but protested the Ordinance. 1992) Chapter IV. The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. 23 G. Page 164. Respondent Corporation paid the tax. HELD: The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila’s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that “the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum”. 1. and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax. 20b. R. 1949. 43. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular. however. 37 . No. 7125.

1989) Chapter IV. Petitioner contends that the case should have been heard by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and not the RTC. Page 169. 8. 1980. 38b . Before such order was promulgated. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Upon knowledge of this. FDA approved Respondent’s request to exchange the locations of the two drugstores (which were 5m apart and in the same building). On May 7. the authority rested on the Mayor (local jurisdiction). W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. 1988) Chapter IV. gave rise to the closure ordered by the FDA. 50 FACTS: Respondent Yambao owns a San Sebastian Drugstore and an Olongapo City Drugstore.R. Page 170. 2. Teresita Payawal Case No. 20c.171 FACTS: The Court of Appeals sustained that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the case filed by the Respondent against Petitioner for failure to deliver a land title after payment of the agreed amount. ISSUE: 1. In the case of Olongapo City Drugstore however. Footnote No. No. the Mayor however did not. LATIN MAXIM: 20c. L-55230 (Nov. 280 G.164 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Richard Gordon v.R. a signboard was posted by the Vice-Mayor at the drugstore announcing its permanent closure. Footnote No.97 Solid Homes Inc. A ‘test buy’ operation at San Sebastian Drugstore. wherein agents were sold 200 tablets of Valium without a doctor’s prescription. W/N the applicable law is the general law (BP 129) or the special law (PD 1344) HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since the respondent’s argument relies on the general statute where in fact it is the special statute that should prevail. 116 G. 29. Petitioner then revoked the Mayor’s Permit issued to Olongapo City Drugstore. RULING: The FDA had the authority to order the closure of San Sebastian Drugstore. the Mayor revoked the Mayor’s Permits issued to San Sebastian Drugstore and subsequently. v. 84811 (Aug. No. Regino Veridiano II Case No. ISSUE: The conflict between the FDA’s and the mayor’s power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drugstores.

19190 (November 29. directly or indirectly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. petitioner contends that the stamp of approval of the Secretary of Finance is needed in abolishing his position. it is not void. Page 176. grant loans to any of the members of the Board of Directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks. Petitioner came to the court on mandamus.202 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte reverted the ’60-’61 salary appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Assessor to the general fund. 31. such repeal does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the Courts of jurisdiction to try. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. 38b .98 Eufronio Llanto v. Footnote No. No. Footnote No. Defendant was found guilty of violating Sec. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo Case No. 49 FACTS: Defendant authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno Y Concepcion. Is it void? RULING: There is no need for a hearing and no. 35 of Act No. 6b. 1921. The position. then held by the Petitioner. 2747 provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any provisions of the Act. done away with by the Local Autonomy Act (Sec. Further. was abolished. The Court holds that where an act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense. The motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. 20a.178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. S.R. Defendant’s wife was a director of this co-partnership. 2938 has served to take away basis for criminal prosecution. 2938. the primary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. The legal issue was fully discussed in the motion and opposition thereto. L-21905 (Mar. 1966) Chapter IV. wherein the Respondent’s motion to dismiss was granted hence the current action. which can be determined by reference to the facts in the averred pleading. 2938 approved on January 30. which were repealed by Act No. en C. No. 37.R. 2747 which says that “The National Bank shall not. 32. convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law. 205 G. Oral arguments are then reduced to unnecessary ceremonies. 2747.” This Section was in effect in 1919 but was repealed in Act No. however. 155 G. HELD: In the interpretation and construction. Page 171. ISSUE: W/N Defendant can be convicted of violating Sections of Act No. Concepcion Case No. 1922) Chapter IV. Was the dismissal order issued without hearing on the motion to dismiss? 2. Such action was. a co-partnership. 3a of RA2264). The question raised is purely one of law. Defendant contends that the repeal of these Sections by Act No. ISSUE: 1. 37. 25 of Act No. Section 49 in relation to Sec. 9a.

99 Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo
Case No. 285 G. R. No. 96422 (February 28, 1994) Chapter IV, Page 176, Footnote No.205

Alpha Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 111722 (May 27, 1997) Chapter V, Page 177, Footnote No.2

FACTS: The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits. Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to 1985, from all money, property, and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted his resignation and sought a second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the findings of the audit. ISSUE: W/N Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits may be withheld. HELD: No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.” Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s well-being. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 9b, 9d, 11f, 11g, 11h, 11i, 38b, 42a

FACTS: Petitioner provides security services. One of its clients is Don Mariano Marcos State University (DMMSU). Security guards working in DMMSU filed before the Regional Office of the DOLE a complaint against Petitioner for noncompliance with the current minimum wage order. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding Petitioner and DMMSU solidarily liable for the salary differential owed to the security guards. Petitioner alleges that payment of the wage increase should be borne by DMMSU. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be held jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for nonpayment of minimum wage. HELD: Yes, Petitioner is jointly and severally liable with DMMSU for the payment of wage increases. Section 6 of RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization Act) provides that in case of wage increases resulting in a salary differential, the liability of the principal and contractor shall be joint and several. The same liability attaches under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that the matter involved in the case at bar hinges on wage differentials and wage increases, as prescribed in Section 6 of RA 6727, and not wages in general as provided by the Labor Code. This interpretation is not acceptable. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used, a careful review of the whole law, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. LATIN MAXIM: 9c, 25a, 36a, 36c, 38b

100 Alfon v. Republic Espino v. Cleofe
Case No. 102 G.R. No. L-33410 (July 13, 1973) Chapter V, Page 182, Footnote No.25


Case No. 6 G.R. No. L-51201 (May 29, 1980)

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to have her named changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon. The reasons she gave on why she was petitioning to have her name changed are the following: 1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon from infancy. 2. She has been enrolled from Grade school to College in the same name. 3. All acquaintances know her as Estrella Alfon. 4. She exercised her right to suffrage under the same name. ISSUE: W/N legitimate and legitimated children are required to use the surname of their father. HELD: No. The word "principally" as used in Article 364 is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which he or she is equally entitled. Petitioner is therefore allowed to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Alfon Duterte to Estrella Alfon LATIN MAXIM: 1, 17, 42a

FACTS: Petitioners appeal a decision involving a petition for declaratory relief filed by 18 Respondents for a judicial declaration of their rights under RA 1862 as amended by RA 4902 in the matter of conversion lump sum gratuity to annual retirement pension. ISSUE: W/N the provision applies to military personnel who retire even after its June 17, 1967. HELD: No. Looking at the legislative intent through the explanatory note the persons referred to are those who had retired and received the gratuity in lump sum after June 22, 1957 but prior to the approval of the act on June 17, 1967. A contrary interpretation which would allow or authorize retired military personnel present or future to convert lump sum gratuity to annual pension would virtually abolish the essential distinction between the two types of retirement benefits and render the ‘option’ under the law meaningless and nugatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 9a, 25a

101 Republic Flour Mills, Inc v. Commissioner of Customs
Case No: 258 G. R. No. L-28463 (May 31, 1971) Chapter V, Page 184, Footnote No.39

Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue
Case No. 10 G.R. No. 12687 (August 27, 1918) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.47

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in which they found in Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Petitioner was assessed wharfage dues for the exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) under Sec. 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code which states: “There shall be levied collected and paid on products of the Philippines… exported from the Philippines, a charge of 2 pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage” ISSUE: W/N the words “products of the Philippines” excludes bran and pollard on the ground that they are from wheat grain, which is imported into the Philippines. HELD: No. Even without undue scrutiny it does appear quite obvious that as long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the above section. The law is clear; it must be obeyed. The Term “product of the Philippines” should be taken in its usual signification to mean any product produced in the country; hence, bran(ipa) and pollard(darak) produced from wheat imported into the country are “products of the Philippines. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 6d, 7a, 24a, 24b

FACTS: The Defendant, under threat of penalty, compelled the Plaintiff to pay the Internal Revenue Tax provided for under Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432 upon all such oils which the plaintiff had on hand on the 1st day of January, 1915. The tax was paid under protest. The Plaintiff contends that the tax collected was illegal. Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432 provides that “no tax (imposed by this law) shall be collected on such articles which, before the taking effect of this Act, shall have been disposed of to consumers or persons other than manufacturers or wholesale dealers.” Said Act took effect upon the 1st day of January, 1915. ISSUE: W/N a dealer is required to pay the Internal Revenue Tax, provided for under Sec. 17 Par 72a of Act No. 2432, upon mineral oils, composed of kerosene and gasoline which had been sold, but not delivered, prior to the 1st day of January 1915. HELD: No. The Legislature evidently intended, by said phrase, to mean that merchandise “dispose of” had been sold. The Legislature, by Act No. 2445, fully recognized that the phrase “disposed of” meant nothing more or less than a contract whereby the vendor was bound to furnish an article, because in said Act it provided that the purchaser, and not the vendor, was subject to pay such tax in the absence of stipulations to the contrary. The phrase “disposed of” as used in Sec. 17 of Act No. 2432, should be given its commercial sense and not a technical interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 3, 6c, 25a, 43

102 Wil Wilhemsen, Inc v. Baluyut
Case No. 173 G.R. Nos. L-27350-51 (May 11, 1978)

Calder & Co v. The United States
Case No. 44 G.R. No. 2839 (August 15, 1907) Chapter V, Page 187, Footnote No.46

FACTS: Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others. After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial court held that the transfer of Appellants’ empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs Administrative Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges. ISSUE: W/N the decision of the trial court is legally valid. HELD: Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so far as both operate under the flexible cargo system. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 25a, 32, 35, 38a, 50

FACTS: The following were imported into the Philippines "One steam turbine, condensing machinery, hot well and pumps, complete with parts and accessories" the steam turbine was classified under Par 257b as other machinery and detached parts not otherwise provided for". The trial court reversed the classification made by customs authorities and classified it under Par 250 as "Dynamos, generators, exciters, and all other machinery for the generation of power." ISSUE: W/N the machinery in question should be classified under Par 257b or Par 250. HELD: A turbine engine and generator, although intended for use as a powergenerating device, does not constitute a complete power generation machine. Component parts must still be added for that purpose to be achieved it should be classified as "other machinery" under Par 257b. LATIN MAXIM: 6b, 9c, 25a, 43

he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he failed to receive during suspension”. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. managing editor and reporter.000. the right to intervene. HELD: No. 12263. and Printers. 11531. 11531. Petitioner sought payment of his salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides. 36b FACTS: A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). should do was intervene in Case No. Salico (84 Phil. the Plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50. Dismissal of the case is not equal to acquittal of the accused. Lising et. He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency. Inc. commenced a joint suit against the sheriff. He held that what Manila Herald Publishing Co. Inc. Footnote No. The Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. a daily newspaper. 7a.. Inc. was "unnecessary. In People vs. unlike the right to bring a new action. 722).000 damages. editor. against Aproniano G. and while the case was pending. Respondent Quirino and Respondent Corporation. Inc. No. Manila Herald Publishing Co. L-56028 (July 30. " Acquittal is always based on the merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. of the Daily Record. and Printers. superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. asking damages aggregating P90. docketed as Civil Case No. al Case No. L-4268 (January 18. With the filing of this suit.. 1951) Chapter V. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. HELD: Yes. 25a. 163 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Malanyaon v. Footnote No. Page 188. is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. R. 36a..1981) Chapter V.000 bond. Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor.103 Manila Herald Publishing Co v. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court. The case was dismissed due to his death. 30. respectively. Page 188.52 G. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge has authority to dismiss Case No.. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. in case No. Borres. 12263. 25a . but if he is acquitted. Respondent Judge declared that the suit. 160 GR No. “Should he be convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law. Ramos Case No.51 FACTS: Respondent filed a libel suit. in which the former sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties above mentioned and (2) P45.

7a. He is eligible for probation under such circumstances. 1985) Chapter 5. tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed on different dates. L-69810-14 (June 19. for under the Constitution. the result would not be in line with the conservative spirit of the Constitution. L-360 (November 15. ISSUE: W/N “residential land” falls under the phrase “agricultural lands” as stated in Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. Page 190. Footnote No. No. 25a. the National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed C. Although he was guilty of five counts of estafa. Soon after. Only a single decision was rendered.104 Rura v. only agricultural lands may be alienated. which includes residential lands. he was guilty on each of those dates. he sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. when Petitioner applied for Probation he had not yet had a final judgment of conviction on his record. 1947) Chapter 5. No. 141 which permits the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to corporations controlled by such citizens. 139 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Krivenko v. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila which ruled in favor of sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds. Such revision is equivalent to a declaration that residential lots are considered as agricultural lands. bought a residential lot but its registration was interrupted by the war. In 1945. The fiscal invoked Sec. b . It may safely be presumed that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing. 30a. which disqualifies persons who have previously been convicted by final judgment from applying for probation. he has not yet been previously convicted. ISSUE: How should the word “previously” be construed? HELD: The word “previously” refers to the date of the conviction and not to the dates of the crimes involved. HELD: Under the Constitution. they were tried jointly and only one decision was handed down.A. R. 5a. Hence. Page 189. the interpretation given by the Secretary of Justice (1939) also supports the claim that “residential land” is part of “public agricultural lands”. Footnote No. 9 of the Probation Law. If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including lands not strictly agricultural. The Petitioner then applied for probation but was denied by the fiscal on the ground that he had been previously convicted by final judgment of an offense. 2a. The trial court denied his application on the belief that since the crimes were committed on different dates. 139 G. The counts were consolidated and tried jointly. Lopena Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Petitioner however contends that since there is only one decision. an alien. No. aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands. In addition. 48 FACTS: Petitioner. 9a.60 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. Register of Deeds Case No. It is clear that the three branches of the Government have always maintained that “residential lots” are included in “agricultural lands”.53 FACTS: Petitioner was accused.

192 FACTS: Petitioners were admitted to the Philippines on pre-arranged employment as immigrants under C. other than a nonimmigrant. Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. It contends through the Office of the Solicitor General that under the Local Government Code of 1991. 9c. they should have been admitted for permanent residence in this country because the word “immigrant” is defined to be a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. A review of the whole law would disclose no such intention which denotes that the purpose of the law is to give broad power to the Commissioner of Immigration on matters pertaining to the admission of immigrants into the Philippines. v.R. etc. Page No. the court holds that the definition does not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. 50 .A. 9a. An amendatory law was then passed which changes the classification of pre-arranged employees from immigrants to non-immigrants.67. 7227.R. Serye 1993. Resolutions are still proper subjects of an initiative according to the Constitution and RA 6735. 19 G. et al. the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. L-7785 (November 25. includes resolutions as among the subjects of initiative. No. 32 of Art. Gianzon. No. Case No. VI of the Constitution). 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Garcia v. 109 G. a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. 111511 (October 5.105 Chang Yung Fa. The same is being asserted by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong. Footnote No. the law providing for a system on initiative and referendum. 10. ISSUE: W/N a local resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum. No." The law gives no definition to the term "nonimmigrant" from which we may imply that the term "immigrant" is merely intended to include any alien coming to this country for permanent residence as now contended by appellants. 613 with the express condition that their stay shall be limited to two years. Although the Local Government Code does not include the word resolution in its definition. Respondent Commission issued two resolutions denying the petition for initiative and referendum on the ground that its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance. Petitioners contend that having been classified as “non-quota immigrants”. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. and De la Cruz. COMELEC Case No. 1993) Chapter V. HELD: The petition to review and set aside the issued COMELEC resolutions is granted because resolutions are appropriate subjects for initiative and referendum (Sec. ISSUE: W/N the word “immigrant” only refers to a person who comes into a country for a permanent residence. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. RA 6735. HELD: The only definition given by our law to the term "immigrant" is: "any alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines. etc. 36b FACTS: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. Also. 11a.

LATIN MAXIM: 2a.00 per hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum.R. order. As the actual operator of the fishponds. Footnote No. Quezon. order. should provide otherwise. W/N the Court of Appeals can grant a stay in the execution of the decision. 31. No. after hearing. The propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award. HELD: Yes. 1988) Chapter V. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with vagueness. Footnote No. 2. Page No. ISSUE: 1. 37 . logical that Accused alone shoulders the burden of the taxes under the ordinance. 195 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 6c. It is unmistakable from the above provision that the Accused falls within the coverage. decision or judgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court.81.R. Accordingly. Page No. The Court however held that it had no jurisdiction according to RA 5434 which reads: Appeal shall not stay the award. Nazario Case No. HELD: No. an interpretation which leads to patent inconsistency must be rejected as not in accordance with the legislative intent. No. 1974. The resolution was then amended authorizing the issuance of unissued shares of stock on a two is to one basis to its stockholders payable on Aug.” He admits to the non-payment of the taxes but contends that the ordinance is unconstitutional.73. 36a FACTS: Accused was charged with violating a municipal ordinance requiring him to pay municipal taxes worth P362. ISSUE: 1. W/N the ordinance is null and void because it is ambiguous and uncertain. he comes within the term “manager”. on motion. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Sec. 1 Ordinance No. or the court on motion. L-45302 (July 24.52 as a fishpond operator in spite of repeated demands. W/N the word “court” refers to a trial court and not the Court of Appeals 2. The Corporation issued a resolution authorizing the issuance of unissued stocks on a one is to one basis to its stockholders.” The exception is given where the officer or body rendering the same. ruling. 12a. 4 Series of 1995 provides: “Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao. award. 218 G. the word owner cannot be construed to include the Government because of the ancient principle that the government is immune from taxes. shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3. its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associate words. And obviously. decision or ruling may be raised only by motion in the main case. the Government never shared in the profits they generated. the ordinance is constitutional. after hearing should provide otherwise. L-44143 (August 31. decision or judgment may be raised only by motion in the main case. 1990) Chapter V. order. More importantly where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. the word court refers to the trial court. and on such terms as it may deem just. Petitioner sought issuance of a preliminary injunction by the Court of Appeals to stop the enforcement of the SEC decision pending resolution of the appeal. “The law unequivocally stated its declared objection that appeal shall not stay the appealed decision. While it appears that the National Government is the owner of the fishpond. 180 G. dela Paz Case No. It is therefore.106 Motoomull v. order. ruling. W/N the ordinance applies to Accused. or assuming its constitutionality that it does not apply to him as he is a lessee not an owner or manager. 197 FACTS: The Petitioners and the Respondents were the initial directors of the Sarkara Trading Corporation. The law provides further that the propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award.

” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction. Private Respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.” Clearly. 24b. No.107 People v. after PD 1990 had taken effect. There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction.R.R. 1992. its operation extends to “clearing checks and other clearing items. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N PCHC had jurisdiction over checks which are non-negotiable. 1996) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. 74917 (January 20. he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer’s recommendation and granted Private Respondent’s application on April 23. 84332-33 (May 8. 106 G. Private Respondent filed his application for probation on December 28.982.23 as a consequence of six crossed Manager’s checks which turned out to have forged and/or unauthorized endorsements appearing at the back of each check. (PCHC) ordered Petitioner Bank to pay the said amount. HELD: Yes. the term “checks” refer to checks in general use in commercial and business activities. Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of Private respondent’s application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial. 26 . 26. 25b. Petitioner Bank appealed saying that PCHC had no jurisdiction because the checks involved were non-negotiable checks. As provided in the articles of incorporation of PCHC. No. However. Equitable Banking Corporation Case No. 12 G. Philippine Clearing House Corp. Evangelista Case No. It is thus covered by the prohibition that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. 1988) FACTS: Private Respondent was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. 49 FACTS: Respondent Bank filed a case against Petitioner Bank for reimbursement of P45. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. 1993. No doubt non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of PCHC’s jurisdiction. including nonnegotiable checks. 25a. Private Respondent filed a petition for probation. ISSUE: W/N the Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation. LATIN MAXIM: 6. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

HELD: Yes.. most importantly that the hour is not stated. 7a . month.” (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities aren’t met. (art 687) It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to repeal the entire system established by the code. 1958) Chapter V. 26 FACTS: Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan. Footnote No. L-12560 (September 30. 1895. mine and sell ores from said properties upon payment of certain royalties. including mineral lands.R. Lopez Case No. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Justice of Peace was without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case for unlawful detainer involving mineral land. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the same. we should not distinguish. Book III. No. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds. Case No. 905 (February 12. et. day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud. Upon violation of the terms of agreement.108 Robles v. in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter have not been observed. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish. residential or mineral.90 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Velasco v. leaving a last will and testament. 1903) FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent Company entered into a contract by virtue of which the latter delivered the possession of certain mining properties over which it had control to Petitioner who was to extract. the company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. 308 G. 261 G. shall be void. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. whether agricultural. Title II. ISSUE: W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated. stating the place. Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said wills without necessary formalities will be void: “The testator shall express his last will to the notary and to the witnesses. Zambales Chromite Mining Co. No. Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all kinds of land. Chapter I.R.” (art 695) “Any will. al. Page 199. La Union on December 4. year. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court includes any kind of land. 1. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6d.

Page 200.R. cattle. 191 G. b. In July 30. No. it was also provided that: “Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost. No. the plaintiff may use its provision of five (5) years. 119 of C.A. Inc v. 1961) Chapter V. Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act and the specific law is the Republic Act. The “stabilizers and flavors” the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food products. the Court had already decided that Sec. 5 of RA 720. 119 of C. 29. but five (5) years after the title was sold because he was a holder of a free patent and torrens title. However. Lamadrid Case No. No redemption was made within that time. poultry feed. Page 199. LATIN MAXIM: 26. Plaintiff offered to repurchase. Footnote No. claiming that under C.R. the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer. Importation of materials including “stabilizers and flavors” is among those Petitioner imports. HELD: No. No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class. vitamin concentrate.” The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of “dental cream stabilizers and flavors” are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. the property was foreclosed and sold to Respondent.A. is not included in those enumerated in RA 601 and therefore not subject to the two (2) year allotment for redemption. Footnote No. Therefore. 141 of Sec. L-23196 (October 31. 67 G. Feb. the Exchange Tax Law. No. Petitioner. the law must be seen in its entire context. not the parts and categorizations posited by the respondent. L-14787 (January 28. 39a. Gimenez Case No. transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of … stabilizer and flavors … shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. 50. and should abide by the conditions of the times. it is not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption Petitioner’s arguments effected the grant of the refund: RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. the land could be redeemed two (2) years after the sale. For every importation. Having defaulted in the payment of the loan. transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601.A. 141 is applicable to foreclosure sales of lands covered by a homestead or a free patent. 1969) Chapter V. Because such items will be used for toothpaste. 38a. b2 . therefore.109 Colgate-Palmolive Phil. namely: food products. ISSUE: W/N the period of redemption is governed by Sec. 1951. books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. Under such law. 30a.96 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. On May 31 1963. not two (2). 141. he was entitled to repurchase the land. they should be unified. under RA 720. Petitioner pays the Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost. as a former owner of land with a homestead patent and a torrens title. Though “stabilizers and flavors” are preceded by items that might fall under food products. LATIN MAXIM: 1. 36 FACTS: Plaintiff was the owner of a parcel of land which he mortgaged as security for the payment of a loan. HELD: No. No. 4 1963.95 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Oliva v. and industrial starch.

No. Page 200. 5. Welfare and Retirement Plan. 38b FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc. is that the counter bond to life attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. Page 200. Case No. they cannot claim benefits under the Social Security Act as these are exclusive to those not receiving any leave privileges at all from the employer. No. However.97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine British Assurance v. filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. would be to enable the employer to defeat the purpose of the law. 1962) Chapter V. the employees claimed for sickness benefit allowances under the Social Security Act contending that their receipt of sick leave pay of less than the full wage does not preclude them from claiming for the allowances provided in the law. 2b. The Social Security Act. L-72005 (May 29. They were given sick leave pay pursuant to its Health. the employee cannot avail of the privileges under the Social Security Act. Respondent Corporation countered that having already received sick leave pay. The rule therefore. Despite receipt of the sick leave pay from Respondent Corporation. The only logical conclusion is that an execution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. San Miguel Brewery. which was granted. having been enacted for the welfare of the employees. LATIN MAXIM: 26. 234 G. During the pendency. LATIN MAXIM: 24a. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners were entitled to additional sickness benefit allowance under the Social Security Act. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment of pending appeal. Footnote No.R. HELD: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. Footnote No. Inc. Respondent attached some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. cannot be given an interpretation that would defeat such purpose. the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. 100 G. fell ill.110 Escosura v. ISSUE: W/N the counter bond issued was valid. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. 36a .R. 1987) Chapter 5. 3a. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted.99 FACTS: Petitioners are employees of San Respondent Corporation who at various times during employment. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian. HELD: To uphold the theory that as long as the employee receives any amount as sick leave pay by a private benefit plan. 26. Intermediate Appelate Court Case No.

he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. As a result. HELD: Yes. The act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal. 11a. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". in a confrontation in the latter’s office allegedly vexed. Three days later. 9a. 1962) Chapter 5.000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.100 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilar v. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy”. 14 of RA 7166 states that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. one does not distinguish. 37. 1995) Chapter 5. the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign. Page 201. 7a.R. Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. insulted and humiliated him. having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. Thus. Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event to support her claim.100 FACTS: A civil case was filed by Petitioner alleging that Private Respondent. ISSUE: W/N the facts charged against him constituted an offense. respondent and filed a criminal case. Commission on Elections Case No. 1992. b2 . As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same. B2 FACTS: On March 22. Footnote No. HELD: The law makes it illegal for any person.111 Ramirez v. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the political contest. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10. Sec. not authorized by all the parties in any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. 24a. Page 201 . L-16696 & L-16702 (January 31. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a “non-candidate”. and should have either won or lost. R. 13 of Resolution No. 242 G. Where the law makes no distinctions. 251 G. 115245 (July 11. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. 26. 7a. Footnote No. Court of Appeals Case No. Sec. No.

he is deemed to have ipso facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 1984 Batasan elections.18. No. 1984 elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao alliance. Petitioner failed to pay and prays that the latter be directed to pay the amount with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint. he was elected President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the said Association. HELD: No. Petitioner then Petitioner then filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14.112 Sanciangco v. Orders and Regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Court of Appeals Case No. 36b FACTS: Davao Pilots Association elevated a complaint against Petitioner for a sum of money and attorney’s fees alleging that DPA had rendered the pilotage services to Petitioner between January 14. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Inc. He was not successful in the said elections. No. 9a. 1985) Chapter 5.290. 273 G. 9c. Court of Appeals. should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon filing of his certificate of candidacy. ISSUE: W/N an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. In Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. Page 203 . the court upheld the validity of EO 1088 and it shall not depart from this ruling. Since he is unquestionably an appointive member. R. 1987 to July 22. attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation. 1998) FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain. who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14. 1984. 116356 (June 29. Despite repeated demands. 5a. 13(2) of BP 697 is clear that even appointive Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. Administrative or Executive Acts. 68709 (July 19. R. 1989 with total unpaid fees of P703. Roño Case No. 37 49 . v. Footnote No. HELD: The legislative intent of Sec. 28. 38 G. 7a. The Court’s holding clearly debunks Petitioner’s insistence on paying the pilotage fees based on the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA. ISSUE: W/N EO 1088 is unconstitutional. Later.106 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Eastern Shipping Lines.

placed the Petitioners under preventive suspension for 6 months.R. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N the deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to sign the order for preventive suspension. Barbers Case No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of First Instance of La Union. 15b . The items purchased were “reconditioned” instead of brand new and included other irregularities. Footnote No. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.110 FACTS: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor alleging irregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and Provincial Engineer. Gonzales III. Each act possesses its own distinctive. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. L-33487 (May 31.113 Castillo-Co v. 7a FACTS: Respondents were charged with violating Sec. There is nothing in RA 7975 which may suggest that the Ombudsman and only the Ombudsman may sign an order preventively suspending officials occupying positions classified as grade 27 or above. 129952 (June 16. No. and disparate meaning. 7a. Page 204. and Jesus Guerrero. Director. specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. No. G. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. No. They are two separate offenses. Martin Case No. No. Petitioners contest that the Deputy Ombudsman has no power to sign the order of preventive suspension. different. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The words in the information suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. The deputy Ombudsman possessed the authority to preventively suspend the Petitioners. ISSUE: W/N the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring. The word “or” is clearly disjunctive in this case signifying dissociation from one thing from the other. The word OR in C. 613 cannot be given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. 1971) Chapter 5. 46 of C.A. HELD: Yes. 37. Emilio A.A. 214 G. C. The Court dismissed the charges on the ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no jurisdiction.A.R.

the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos by passing ordinances to protect the general welfare of their citizens from the harmful effects of gambling. Amusements and Gaming Corp. created by P.D. 1896. Various civic organizations. ISSUE: Whether the NTC is a collegial body or under the direct and sole control of Commissioner Kintanar. Executive Order 146 creating the NTC clearly shows that the NTC shall be composed of a head commissioner and 2 deputy commissioners suggesting its collegial nature. must be prevented or suppressed.. 1869 and the LGC. Pryce Properties Corp. this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree.R.D.” Since the world “gambling” should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which. local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress “gambling and other prohibited games of chance. 15a. On the assumption of a conflict between P. 24a FACTS: PAGCOR. 38. The Sangguniang Panlungsod swiftly enacted two ordinances disallowing the building of the planned casino.114 GMCR v.. 7a. Casino gambling is authorized by P. 9c. the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Therefore the acts of Chairman Kintanar are void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. Inc. 1997) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Magtajas v. 28. 37. No. 11e. 130 FACTS: NTC Commissioner Kintanar denied the request of Bell Telecommunications for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation of telecommunications equipment pursuant to its congressional franchise to operate. like the other prohibited games of chance. Page 208. Footnote No. 126496 (April 30. 111097 (July 20. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. and even the local officials angrily denounced the project. Case No. HELD: The two local ordinances are not valid. HELD: The NTC is a collegial body and its decisions should be reached by a majority vote. No. Petitioners argue that by virtue of the Local Government Code (LGC).D. 50 .R. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez. 1994) Chapter V. 49 G. 158 G. Under the LGC. women’s and youth groups. The denial was promulgated despite the approval of the CCAD of its feasibility and the endorsement of Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. leased a building belonging to Pryce in order to prepare to open a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. 1869. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N the two ordinances as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro are valid. In Basco v. Bell Telecommunications Inc. Case No. religious elements. Phil.

The Tax Court held that the term industry should be understood in its ordinary and general definition. In granting the exemption.. and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. RA 1394 provides a tax exemption for the importation of machinery and/or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with RA 901. 1971) Chapter V." The accused delivered false. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. namely. their permanent nature as a means of publication. 1962) Chapter V. imported a custom-built LPG tank which is used to contain LPG from the refinery in Batangas and to transport it to the company’s plant in Manila. 224 G. No. 11d. and not to all ventures and trades falling under the ordinary and general definition. The obvious legislative intent is to confine the meaning of the term “industries” to activities that tend to produce or create or manufacture. Santiago Case No. under Art.115 Commissioner of Customs v. ISSUE: Whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation. 72 G. 353. Footnote No. b2 . No. Page 210. 43 FACTS: The information alleges that Santiago has committed the crime of "libel. It has also been held in the United States that slanderous statements forming part of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel. The word "radio" should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated. HELD: Philippine Acetylene is not exempt from the special import tax. under Art. malicious. 28.R. and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Lacson through an amplifier system before a crowd of around a hundred persons. ISSUE: W/N the Philippine Acetylene Co. 9c. Footnote No. while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system is not thru "electromagnetic waves" but thru the use of "conducting wires" intervening between the transmitter and the receiver. L-17663 (May 30. HELD: The facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation. Page 136. Radio as a means of publication is the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires intervening between transmitter and receiver. Inc. 6 of RA 1394 and therefore exempt from the payment of the special import tax with respect to the gas tank in question. or libel. manager of Respondent Company. of the same Code. which is any enterprise employing relatively large amounts of capital and/or labor. Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is not libel but oral defamation. 211 FACTS: Charles Butler. Philippine Acetylene Company Case No. 25a. it would have been illogical for Congress to specify importations needed by new and necessary industries as the term is defined by law and in the same breath allowed a similar exemption to all other industries in general. Tax exemptions are held strictly against the taxpayer. L-22443 (May 29. 11a. in relation to Art. 135 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. 28. all of which have a common characteristic. may be considered engaged in an industry as contemplated in Sec. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.R. LATIN MAXIM: 11h. 355.

19650 (September 29. v. Footnote No.116 Caltex (Phil. 1-5 is that they refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. The word “lottery” is defined as a game of chance where the elements of which are (1) consideration. No. 36e . par. 138 FACTS: Petitioner conceived the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” where participants have to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a specific period of time. Caltex requested clearance for Respondent Postmaster General but was denied citing said contest is a “gift enterprise” deemed as a non-mailable matter under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. par. The scope of par. 2 (terms and conditions of employment). 3 is clarified by its associated paragraphs wherein money claims falling within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC are those which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. 217 of the Labor Code which includes in par. 28 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program which rewarded cash to SMC employees who will submit ideas and suggestions beneficial to the corporation. 45 G. Foreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications.” it is not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims has been absorbed into the jurisdiction of the NLRC. 3 “all money claims of workers. ISSUE: W/N the money claim of Vega falls within the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the NLRC. 1966) Chapter V. overtime compensation. enterprise. Rustico Vega submitted his proposal entitled “Modified Grande Pasteurization Process” and claimed entitlement to the cash award. v.R. nor any purchase of any Caltex products to be made in order to join the contest. said money claim falls outside the jurisdiction of said agencies. Page 137. LATIN MAXIM: 28. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid. 5 (prohibited activities). Hence. 3 should not be read in isolation with the context formed by par. Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory relief. 211 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Miguel Corp. the spirit of the law is preserved. SMC denied utilizing such proposal but Vega alleged otherwise and filed a complaint with the NLRC which arbitrated against the Petitioner. 1 (unfair labor practices). Footnote No. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. Inc. There being no element of consideration in said contest. The jurisdiction of the NLRC is outlined in Art. The unifying element of pars. 272 G. (2) chance. ISSUE: W/N the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” falls under the term “gift enterprise” which is banned by the Postal Law. Par. or drawing of any kind” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element. 1988) Chapter V. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 36b. The intent of the prohibition is to suppress the tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. HELD: No. said contest is not a gift enterprise. gift. 3 refers to “all money claims of workers. 80774 (May 31. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement…” While par. The term “gift enterprise” and “scheme” in the provision of the Postal Law making unmailable “any lottery.R.). chance. 4 (household services). or scheme for the distribution of money or any real or personal property by lot. No. Palomar Case No. NLRC Case No. Page 211. par. HELD: No. and (3) prize.

and misfortunes” are to be interpreted as covering risks which are of like kind with the particular risks which are enumerated in the preceding part of the clause in the contract. 114 G. What the law intend here is to be all embracing to the jurisdictional power of Respondent Commission so anything not mentioned are not or cannot be presumed or indicated. The words “all other perils. 1919) Chapter V. Footnote No. HELD: No. A detailed reading of the entire OIC Act will say that there has not been an express provision providing for disputes involving the gasoline dealer and the oil company. and misfortunes…” The trial court ruled that the ship was unseaworthy and Defendant is not liable. Sec 6 of R. pirates. or from the negligent failure of the ship’s owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment to convey the cargo under the ordinary condition is not a “peril of the sea. results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea. losses. 1986) FACTS: The Gotiaco Brothers transported a cargo of rice from Saigon to Cebu. 30. Thus. No. L-41315 (November 13. No. It was appropriately held that the ship was not seaworthy. men of war. Union Ins. fire.A. The phrase. not against perils of the ship. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation was contending that Respondent Commission had no jurisdiction over the contractual disputes between them and a gasoline dealer in the name of Manuel Yap.R. 6173 restricts the extent and scope the OIC prerogative of jurisdiction in sub paragraph a to f. Soc. the owners of the damaged rice must look to the shipowner for redress and not to the insurer. Page 213. Oil Industry Commission Case No. 122 G. It only pertains to rule making power and not adjudication. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission had jurisdiction over the contractual disputes. losses. ISSUE: W/N the insurer is liable for the loss. from the ordinary wear and tear of the ship. Plaintiffs sought recovery from Defendant under maritime insurance that purports to insure the cargo from: “Perils… of the seas. 13983 (September 1. HELD: The contention of the Petitioner is well founded. A loss which. Plaintiffs appealed hence this action. It was found that the cargo was improperly stowed and that the owners of the ship were chargeable with negligence for failure to protect the pipe by putting a case over it. The rice was damaged due to the inflow of seawater into the ship during the voyage because of a defect in one of its drain pipes. the jurisdictional power should be restricted to mere regulatory and supervisory power and not judicial. Of Camilon Case No.… barratry of the master and mariners. rovers. 31. 36 .R. and of all other perils. ”to set the conditions” means the right to prescribe rules and conduct. 141 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.” The insurer undertakes to insure against perils of the sea and similar perils. in the ordinary course of events. 7(4d) LATIN MAXIM: 25.117 Gotiaco v. thieves. Such limitation is included in the provision in Sec. enemies. jettisons.

dummy. is not prohibited by law. business associate. 38 . both retired and in active service. which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income. white flint bottles it has been using for its gin popularly known as “Ginebra San Miguel”. similar to the immediate family member. 26. Beverage is defined as a liquor or liquid for drinking. together with his supporting evidence. the 350 c.R. pursuant to RA 6231. vs. Migrinio and Tecson Case No.158 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Rep.c. 36b. relative. hence. 29 FACTS: Acting on information received. was unable to produce his supporting evidence. for violation of RA 3019 and 1379. the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private Respondent to submit his explanation or comment. HELD: The words “other lawful beverages” is used in its general sense. and in violation of Sec. it is within the purview and coverage of RA 623. or nominee in EO 2. Inc. Hon. Page 217. of the Philippines vs.. The anti-graft Board was created by the PCGG to “investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel. because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. Footnote No. Inc. 1997) Chapter V. although regulated. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 123248 (October 16. and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative. ISSUE: W/N La Tondeña was part of the protected beverages of RA 623 amended by RA 5700. LATIN MAXIM: 28. as amended. 43 G. HELD: No. Court of Appeals Case No.” and “Ginebra San Miguel” stamped or blown-in therein by filling the same with Petitioner’s liquor product bearing the label “Sonny Boy” for commercial sale and distribution. agent. 2 of RA 623 as amended by RA 5700.” ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board. To limit the coverage of the law only to those enumerated or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned will defeat the very purpose of the law. referring to all beverages not prohibited by law. Applying the rule in statutory construction. white flint bottles with the mark “La Tondeña. an agency of the PCGG. No. 257 FACTS: La Tondeña registered with the Philippine Patent Office. Private Respondent. 30.118 Cagayan Valley Enterprises. without La Tondeña’s written consent. Thereafter. a case was initiated against Petitioner for using the 350 c. the term “subordinate” as used in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife.c. colonel. Hard liquor. despite several postponements. a retired lt.

The trial court ruled that. the proviso provides that unlicensed revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed weapons. using the principle of ejusdem generis. Footnote No. Nino Case No. Footnote No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is only resorted to in determining the legislative intent. among the prohibited importations enumerated in Sec. 29 . HELD: Yes. 1993) Chapter III. In this case.119 Commissioner of Customs vs. Nos. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.R. ISSUE: W/N the imported foodstuffs in question are not contraband. Page 101. 302 Chapter V. the law will only apply to bladed weapons ISSUE: W/N the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis. 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code therefore these foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in Sec. 2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. provide that this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the provision of this Act. and are not as stated by Respondent Court. 2301 of the same code. kris or other deadly weapons. 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. the rule must give way. 1780. Court of Tax Appeals Case No. He was prosecuted under Act No. which stated that “it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his person any bowie knife. The imported foodstuffs are considered prohibited importation under Sec. such that if the intent is clear. Sto. 71 G.172 FACTS: Petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 29 FACTS: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon. Page 220. HELD: No. dirk dagger.133 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION United States vs. The foodstuffs in question being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond. 48886-88 (July 21.

30. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdem generis can be applied in this case. HELD: No. RA 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined in the law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--.175 Rep.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. business. The definition of the term “employer” is sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit. 7a. otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. 32 . 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre as public land. L – 35376 (September 11. wholly or partially. the job of the judiciary is to apply laws. Estenzo Case No. Page 221.” because the phrase “activity of any kind” in the definition is preceded by the words “any trade.be limited to those who carry on “undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain. HELD: No. operated by the Roman Archbishop of Manila” be exempted from compulsory coverage of RA 1161. L-15045 (January 20. and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations. 1961) Chapter V. or which are pursued for profit or gain.120 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. G. No. Social Security Commission Case No. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.R. Petitioners filed an instant petition alleging that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for reopening the cadastral proceedings. The Respondent judge was wrong in interpreting that RA 6236 is applicable. The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. Footnote No. 1980) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Petitioner filed with Respondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities. industry. undertaking. not interpret it. No. 29 FACTS: Private Respondents filed a petition to reopen a decision by the Cadastral Court to declare Lot No. v. 263 G. which are directly or indirectly. ISSUE: W/N RA 6236 applies to the reopening of cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands. LATIN MAXIM: 6d.

45a . HELD: Yes.121 In re estate of Enriquez and Reyes Case No. The liabilities claimed by Petitioner were not listed in the obligations acknowledged by the Partition Agreement. 68. 130 G. 180 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Empire Insurance Co. Petra and Pascuala. 1915) Chapter V. Aurea. Petra had 2 legitimate children. ISSUE: W/N Vicente was an acknowledged natural child. Since Vicente was born in 1905 after the said law was enacted. 49 FACTS: Vicente A. Almost 1 year later. LATIN MAXIM: 30a. repealed the law that priesthood was a ground for declaring a marriage void. 18. 30a. which was promulgated on December. A Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed by the Petitioner on the decision of the trial court claiming that what was previously filed was not a money claim against the estate of the decedent. Pascuala. Rufino died intestate and was survived by his widow and 7 children. 35. 1979) Chapter V. HELD: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Footnote No. 97 G. he is considered an acknowledged natural child. The lower court held that Vicente was the owner of all the separate property of Aurea and half of the estate of Francisca.R. Footnote No. and Aurea have since died. Pascuala had 1 legitimate child. and had begotten a natural child by a priest. Page 223. LATIN MAXIM: 29. No. E. Rafael and Josefa. but a claim on the estates of the Respondents. Page 223. Rufino Case No. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. The trial court dismissed this claim stating the Petitioner did not file within the time limited in the notice to creditors in the intestate proceedings. Petitioner filed a Civil Case claiming liabilities and obligations from the Rufino estate. L – 38268 (May 31. 9351 (January 6. No. G. Petra. 1899. Vicente. They then executed a Partition Agreement agreeing to pay for all liabilities or obligations of the decedent. v. 181 FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate and was survived by his 2 legitimate daughters.R.

(3) since a legitimate child follows the nationality of the adopter. Art. Art. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag. Furthermore. No. it would have plainly said so in the law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. G. 199. He and his wife later petitioned to the Court of First Instance in Rizal for the adoption of his five children who were all minors and Chinese nationals. (2) adoption gave the adopted children the same rights and duties as if they were the legitimate children of the adopter. not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. ISSUE: W/N citizenship can be acquired by a child through adoption. 1905) Chapter V. 341 of the Civil Code does not include acquisition of citizenship. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced by the Plaintiff that he. the right to bring such action. The petition was later granted. was entitled to the office of Municipal President of Laoag. R. R. Petitioner then requested the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel the alien certificate of registration of their children based on the following grounds: (1) by virtue of their naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 30a .122 Ching Leng v. Also. Ilocos Norte. or for any other reason. L-11931 (October 27. as a result of said election. Art. If the legislative had intended to give all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office. 254 of the Civil Code enumerates the rights of the legitimate child and acquisition is not a part of the said enumeration. 1958) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acosta v. However. 49 of a special law that provides the character of naturalization enumerates the means of acquiring citizenship and adoption is not part of it. 5 G. the children are now considered as Filipino citizens. 200. Page 224. the children are considered Filipino Citizens. 2122 (September 13. Galang Case No. HELD: Citizenship is not a right but a mere privilege. Art. and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals. now held by Defendant. Flor Case No. No. 187 FACTS: Petitioner obtained judgment granting his petition for naturalization. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and unlawfully held the same. ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of said office? HELD: No. as the case may be.

L-25811 (April 3. Footnote No. asked for its alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio. amending the charter of Davao City. L-2783 (November 29. No. Respondent refused to release the share on the ground that the amount pertaining to the said barrio. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: On August 29. Auditor and Mayor with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao. the City of Davao passed Resolution No. barrio Poblacion. 3 of RA 3590. Thus.” The sufficiency and probative value of a testimony. No. Attys. which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case. which did not include the Petitioner. A non-existent barrio or a barrio not situated in Davao City cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a share in taxes under RA 3590. Thus. pursuant to RA 2370. Subsequently. Among these were barrios Agdao. declaring as officially and legally existing several barrios of the city. declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance. is not included in the enumeration. the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. 146 G. R. Bucana and Poblacion. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Central Barrio v. 1962. 55 G. Lerum and Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance of a divorce decree. Sec. the assailed order is affirmed. City Treasurer of Davao Case No. Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. which dismissed the case on the ground that the issue had been rendered academic by the passage of RA 4354. 193 FACTS: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. as provided in Sec.123 Lerum v. Page 225. there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City. also called barrio Central. Cruz Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 30 . 1968) Chapter V. HELD: The dismissal was affirmed. The Petitioner thus filed a case against Davao City’s Treasurer. 732. or who is interested “under a deed. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal order was correct. 1950) Chapter V. 2 of RA 4354 enumerated the barrios comprising the City of Davao. ISSUE: Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency and probative value of (former) Judge Cruz’s testimony? HELD: No. Under Sec 1.R. contract or other written instrument. will. Page 225. in relation to barrios Agdao and Bucana. cannot be determined because the respective boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law. Council. Footnote No.

before the inheritance has been passed to the heirs. 315 of the Tax Code states that payment of income tax shall be a lien in favor of the government from the time the assessment was made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue until paid with interests. 30. even without its having been presented under Sec. Does it violate the uniformity of taxation? HELD: The judgment is reversed. The lower court had in mind the constitutional provision that “no person shall be imprisoned for a debt or non-payment of a poll tax”. 5. L-26521 (December 28. Yes. The Petitioners. 2. Branch V in relation to the intestate estate of Luis D. 55 G. 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.L-31364 (March 30. such as taxes which is entirely different from the claims enumerated therein. Taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing authority. Thus. Par. 312 G. 42 . ISSUE: W/N the statute of non-claims under Sec. RA 2264 confers on local governments’ broad taxing authority. 44 FACTS: The case is an appeal questioning the lower court’s judgment declaring Ordinance No. Page 225. A perusal of the aforequoted provision shows that it makes no mention of claims for monetary obligations of the decedent created by law. 4. Tongoy. No. 5. Footnote No. 1979) Chapter V. 1968) Chapter V. etc. 20c. LATIN MAXIM: 27. the city was able to collect P5.124 Vera v. 30. HELD: The order appealed from is reversed. The same tax may be imposed by the national government as well as by the local government. ISSUE: 1. It is clear that the intention of the ordinance is to impose a tenement or apartment tax. the unpaid taxes due the decedent may be collected. 35. which is not among the exceptions listed in Sec. Is the City of Iloilo empowered by the Local Autonomy Act to impose tenement taxes? 3. The cases were for the claim and payment of deficiency income taxes in the total sum of P3. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Petitioners were denied the said claim and payment as they were barred under Sec. 197 FACTS: This case is an appeal with regard to two orders promulgated by the CFI of Negros Occidental. City of Iloilo Case No. No. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court bars claim of the government for unpaid taxes.R. the ordinance is valid.824 from the spouses for the years 1960-1964. are owners of 5 tenement houses containing 43 apartments. penalties. the tax in question is neither a debt nor a poll tax.R. Is Ordinace 11 illegal because it imposes double taxation? 2. which should not apply. No. 11 as illegal. Fernandez Case No. No.254. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 1. Footnote No. 3. Is it oppressive and unreasonable because it carries a penal clause? 4. By virtue of the ordinance.80 with 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest. No. Page 226. Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva. 193 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villanueva v. as provided in the Tax Code.

30 . except those declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service and those which are policydetermining. Talens. He appealed to the Court of Appeals.R. L-43182 (November 25. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 968) Sec. which reduced his sentence to the penalty of prision correctional. 200 FACTS: Petitioner Santo To was convicted of estafa for a bouncing check and was sentenced with a penalty of prision mayor. Talens’ termination was illegal. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Liwag. L-55130 (January 17. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Talens. Footnote No. He then filed a petition for probation but was denied by the Respondent judge. 1986) Chapter V.R. ISSUE: Was the termination of Talens illegal? HELD: Yes. Mr. he can only be removed for a cause and after due process. terminated the services of Respondent. No. Cruz-Paño Case No. Page 226. 1983) Chapter V. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Samson v. to said position.125 Santo To v. ISSUE: Can Petitioner To avail himself of probation? HELD: Yes. the Solicitor General recommended the grant because the Petitioner was not among the offenders disqualified to avail probation.D. the mayor of Caloocan. The Court of Appeals also affirmed said decision. Hon. co-Petitioner. the legislature is presumed to have intended to exclude those not enumerated. No. In addition. despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office. as enumerated in the probation law (P. primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. RA 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959) Sec 5(f) declares that the position of secretaries to city mayors as non-competitive. and that Santo To was not a penitent offender. The law gives more importance to the offender than the crime. on the ground that granting it would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. 270 G. being permanently appointed. In a motion for reconsideration. 275 G. 9. Page 226. 3. Footnote No. as Assistant Secretary. the clear intent is to allow the benefits of probation to those not included in the enumeration. Where the law provides that positions in the government belong to the competitive service. where the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified to avail of its benefits. declaring the order null and void. He is a first-time offender and his offense has relative lightness. through Administrative Order No. Cruz-Paño. Court of Appeals Case No. Besides. for otherwise. The nature of functions attached to a position determines whether such position is highly confidential. his position is not among those expressly declared by law as highly confidential. 36b FACTS: Petitioner Samson. Talens asserts his position was not covered by the said act and. the Respondent judge cannot assume that To had not shown repentance. it would have included them in the enumeration. because of lack and loss of confidence. and appointed Mr.

500. saying that murder and assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance policy. approached Judge Angeles. No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters. Since P. Court of Appeals Case No.R. President of Tikay. Footnote No.” ISSUE: W/N the phrase “charitable purposes” in P.126 Finman General Assurance Corp. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. After a written notice of claim by the beneficiaries to the insurance company. The 1987 Constitution treats the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently from each other. The fact remains that the death of Surposa was pure accident on the part of the victim. and the latter solicited P 1. Failure to include death through murder or assault meant it had not been intended to be exempt from liabilities resulting from such. Page 228.D. However. 203 FACTS: Carlie Surposa was insured with the Petitioner and had several relatives as his beneficiaries.D. 25. this means that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Page 228. Villalon-Pornillos Case No. Martin Centeno. 1564 merely states that charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit from DSWD. by interpretation or construction. this solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD and as a result. No 100970 (September 2. The term “charitable” should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for “religious” purposes. 30. 1564. vs. the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan. HELD: No. penal law must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. which states “Any person to solicit or receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the Department of Social services and Development. the latter denied the claim. chairman of the group. 54 G. it may not. ISSUE: Did the CA make a mistake in using the said principle? HELD: No. On October 18. 1988. 107 G. 11g. 113092 (September 1.D. The insurance company was found liable by the Insurance Commission to pay P15.R. 1992) Chapter V. 11i. 48 . 202 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Centano v. 1564 is meant to include religious purposes.000. Moreover. Carlie Surposa died of a stab wound. 27. since this is a criminal case. be extended to others. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Furthermore. 1994) Chapter V. it was contended that Centeno violated P. the personal accident insurance policy specifically enumerated only 10 circumstances where no liability attaches to the insurance company. 30 FACTS: In 1985. and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Footnote No. Petitioner contends that the CA was wrong in using “expressio unius exclusio alterius” in a personal accident insurance policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly excluded therefrom.

HELD: Yes. De Aquino Case No. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an amendment made for Art 360. or Sept 24. ISSUE: Whether the Court of First Issuance is invested with the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city. 9c. 1953) Chapter V.R. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. No. 12a .74 plus interest for usury.261. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotobato is the only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation. 1951. L-5558 (April 29. Page 229. Footnote No.127 Escribano v. 37 FACTS: Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1. when they were actually received by the court.R. wherein the couple failed to appear in court and present evidence in the hearing. 2. when they were deposited by registered mail. Rule 27 Sec. pursuant of RA 4363 and Art. Notified of the decision on September 7. Footnote No. Thus. filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong before the Court of First Instance (now the RTC) to Judge David Avila. 11d. ISSUE: 1. Thus. they filed for an appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that same year. 1978) Chapter V. HELD: Yes. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Petitioners filed their appeal just in time. L-30375 (September 12. the Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was late and dismissed it. 11e. 161 G. However. the papers were actually received by the court on September 24. 12. The enumeration in the law of the public officers and the courts that may conduct preliminary investigations was designed to divest the ordinary municipal court of that power but not to deprive the Court of First Instance of that same power. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify procedure. 101 G. Avila Case No. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days. Escribano questioned Judge Avila’s authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. The power of the CFT to conduct a preliminary investigation is derived from the constitutional grant of power for a judge to hold a preliminary examination and to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants. LATIN MAXIM: 3a. 205 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manabat v. 208 FACTS: Congressman Salipada Pendatun of Cotobato. No. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which will result to the date of deposit in the post office by registered mail of court papers as the date of filing. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on September 22. The Court of First Issuance may conduct preliminary investigations because this power is not lodged exclusively in the city attorney. Page 229. What is important to remember is that preliminary investigations by the CFT is the exception to the rule and not the general rule.

128 Gomez v. The subsequent Opium Laws cannot be held to have impliedly repealed prior ones as these did not conflict or remove said prior laws. “balisong” or clubs was in effect which thereafter resulted in his arrest. Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet. Petitioner claims that his administration of opium to patients was not a grounds for unprofessional conduct because it has been repealed by subsequent Opium Laws. HELD: No. Footnote No. the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. The Opium Laws are in fact in force and the ill-defined term of unprofessional conduct can include improper administration of opium to patients. HELD: No. the bladed weapon he was carrying. 115 No. March 29. 1989 FACTS: FACTS: Plaintiff had his license revoked on unprofessional conduct due to the administration of opium. 48468-69. which is less lethal than a bayonet. CA Case No. Nos. Ventura and Board of Medical Examiners Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. November 22. 1930 Chapter V. Page 229. 32441.209 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Primero v. Petitioners defense of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. Plaintiff should not have his license restored. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff should have his license restored. 126 G.R. was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons. 38b Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9. the prohibition against fan knives. would be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not. It would make no sense if possession of a fan knife. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 30a . ISSUE: W/N a bayonet is not a bladed or blunt weapon that falls under the purview of PD 9.

229 FACTS: Petitioners inquired as to whether or not past presidents can run as board members or are merely ex-officio board members. 262 G. 1939) Chapter V. The CA resolutions denying the motions of the Solicitor-General rely principally upon the decision rendered in the case of Mujer vs. the rule in the interpretation applied is in fact the general rule in the interpretation of qualifying or conditional phrases found in a law. 142 Oct. LATN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Respondents were charged of murder. which held that the phrase “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” only refers to its proximate antecedent and to “all other auxiliary writs and process. but this rule is subject to the exception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all the antecedents embraced in the provision. Case No. 23. the Petitioner. CFI of Laguna. 1987 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Roldan v Villaroman Case No. There is nothing in the rules and regulations of the association or the BIR that past presidents of the association may not run again for board membership even as they are automatically made ex officio members of the board. 9c. Judge Roldan. The court also compelled the counsel of the accused to present evidence and their witnesses and ordered to arrest the accused.” This ruling is in conjunction with the rule of interpretation that a qualifying phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. impugning the decision of the judge for proceeding with the case in the absence of Cuevas. During the trial. 36b. LATIN MAXIM: 1.R. No. Moreover. 33. 6d. b2 . HELD: No. ISSUE: W/N past presidents of the association can run again as members of the board or are automatically ex officio members. Respondent Cuevas became ill and had to be confined to a hospital. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Judge Roldan from continuing with the trial. Page 234. Respondents then instituted a certiorari proceeding in the Court of Appeals against the Petitioner. Footnote No. 46825 (October 18. denied the Respondents for postponement of the trial on the ground of illness of Cuevas.129 SEC Legal Opinion re BIR Employees Association Inc. the same should be made extensive to the whole. HELD: Past Presidents may run again for positions in the board. ISSUE: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case.

Footnote No. 122 G. but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. 170 G. Director of Prisons Case No. No. and. Footnote No.R. 286 wherein she was specifically charged with (a) “active collaboration with the Japanese.D.” When she. 38b. 1989) Chapter V. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities. 7a.130 Herras Teehankee v. is to make the Act offensive not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the Constitution. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled. along with her co-detainees and coPetitioners in that case. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case No. and since the language used in this court in construing the Constitution and other statutes on the matter of bail is substantially the same as the language used by the People’s Court Act on the same subject. and infrastructures”. Since the People’s Court Act and the Constitution and other statutes in this jurisdiction should be read as one law. she has remained in custody of the Commonwealth Government. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots.D. 42a FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. the most natural and logical conclusion to follow in cases of capital offenses before conviction is that discretion refers only to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The word “and” is not meant to separate words. 11g. 1946) Chapter V. except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government. except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioner contends that P.” and (b) “previous association with the enemy. within 3 years from the date of the contract. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P. 6d. 1944. but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. and infrastructures for the lots. HELD: No. making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. Page 234. Page 234. 78585 (July 5. The constitutional mandate laid down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable. And under the same charge during all the time referred to. was delivered by the US Army to the Commonwealth Government pursuant to the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of December 29.R. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. 35. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. To hold that the People’s Court has uncontrolled discretion in such cases and to deny bail even where the evidence of guilt is not strong or there is absolutely no evidence at all. No. other than those provided in Clause 20. 230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jose Antonio Mapa v. HELD: Yes. L-278 (July 18. improvements.D. Hon. improvements. 37. 26. The words “which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities. 33 . which is contrary to the most elementary rules of statutory construction. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 12a. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved. 231 FACTS: Petitioner was apprehended by the US Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment under Security Commitment Order No. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is constitutionally entitled bail. no further written commitment was made by the developer. she was detained by said Government under that charge. P. and other forms of development” if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.

he only had a day left from the receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. The concluding part of Sec. 7a. HELD: Yes. 1963. should mean “the nomination or designation of an individual”. Page 236. while “notice” should be construed as referring to “order”. his counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1. 7a.R. Page 234. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court which states that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.131 People of the Philippines v. 9c. Judges of First Instance are appointed Judges of the Courts of First Instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. although it did not start with the usual introductory word. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 155 of the Administrative Code. L-22161 (January 21. 1974) Chapter V.” ISSUE: W/N Borromeo has the right to sit as the Judge of the 24th Judicial District. 1963 through the counsel’s wife. the only way to remove Borromeo from power is by impeachment. On February. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 38 G. 1963. and thus. appointee’s consent is needed and he has power to refuse an appointment. The Attorney-General assails the validity of the later appointment by arguing on the basis of Sec. not 47. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District. 1920. 240 FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower court on February 14.R. ISSUE: W/N the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of promulgation of the decision. 24a. Tamani’s appeal is therefore 58 days late. and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. effective July 1. Hence. They invoked Sec. 1914. the word “promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”. L-16808 (January 3. 9a. the court decided to act upon the appeal at hand “to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice”. No. he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District. No. which states that “nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district. 34 FACTS: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twentyfourth Judicial District. In upholding the independence of the judiciary and the state’s separation of powers. Upon receipt of a copy of this order. Teodoro Tamani Case No. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was forty-eight days late. The power to appoint lies on the appointing officer. L-22160 and G. retire or are removed through impeachment proceedings. Footnote No. 232 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Andres Borromeo v. 155 of the Administrative Code used by the Attorney-General should be construed as a proviso. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10. No. 37 . which is the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. but the power to accept lies solely on the appointee. The lower court sent a copy of the order of denial to the counsel by registered mail on July 13. Nonetheless. 8a 11g. 6. 227 G. 1963. Fermin Mariano Case No. 25. 12a. which was denied. Using the rule of reddendo singula singulis. The word “appointed” in the proviso should be given its meaning in the ordinary sense. forty-eight days from July 24th.R. HELD: Yes. They hold these positions of Judges of First Instance of definite districts until they resign. as Appellees contend. 1921) Chapter V. The provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. “provided”. Footnote No.

L-34024 (April 5. Page 240.48. Footnote No. 1978) Chapter V. HELD: No. the latter provision. the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art.) In Mercado. and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 2 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. should be strictly but reasonably construed. 1. is given preference because it is the latest expression of the intent of the legislation. exceptions. the proviso in par. the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. ISSUE: W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12. b2 . The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached. 33 FACTS: RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of P18.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. Sr. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees. Once that “project” is done. No. whether a proviso or not. 6. 251 FACTS: Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program.R. 33. Pangasinan Case No. as the NSC and NLRC ruled. and not to other sections thereof. 280 of the Labor Code. HELD: Looking at the Senate deliberations. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is necessary for the business. and that would have been more than enough to consider them as regular employees. LATIN MAXIM: 1. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers. 1994) Chapter V. NLRC Case No. 43. as a general rule. their services will no longer be needed.132 ALU-TUCP v. Moreover. NLRC. P350 of which was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city government. No. but more so because provisos are negatively written and gives off a more mandatory tone. The provision calls for casual employees. Footnote No. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. 250 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Arenas v. this provision does not apply to them. Page 240.00. 20 G.000 to P18. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000. 109328 (August 16.000. City of San Carlos.000. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but the Respondent City refused. Since Petitioners were considered project employees.R. 2 of Art. they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants. vs. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision.

126 30 Phil." in Art. the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause. however. Isabel’s remedy for this was to furnish certain securities and obligations to the Defendant Corporation. she emancipated her sons and mortgaged their properties with her consent.e. 1630 as urgent and the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but also that of reading the bill on three separate days. The Code of Civil Procedure impliedly repealed some parts of the old Spanish code. Joaqin was already of legal age and so his mortgage remained valid. an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Aldecoa & Company. HELD: We must look at the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (American) relating to guardianship and upon certain provisions of the Civil Code (Spanish) relating to the control of the parents over the person and property of their minor children. has been constitutionally passed. because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. No. LATIN MAXIM: 49 . 1994) Chapter V.R.133 Tolentino v. while Zoilo’s mortgage was not valid even if he signed it with his mother because he was a minor when he executed the mortgage. confer upon them the capacity to execute a valid mortgage on their real property with her consent. (March 23. 266 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ALDECOA v. 1915) Chapter V. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Sec 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. and in so doing. ISSUE: W/N Isabel Palet can legally emancipate the Plaintiffs under the law in force in this country in 1903. Page 245. there is no longer a need to be formally emancipated by the parents after attaining the age of majority. printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. Footnote No. 292 G. In other words. HELD: There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. No. and to mortgage certain real properties of her sons. 272 FACTS: Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Case No. Secretary of Finance Case No. According to the Code of Civil Procedure. was a general partner in the firm. The Petitioners now seek to cancel the instruments of mortgage executed by them. No. was heavily indebted to the Defendant corporation. ISSUE: W/N RA 7716. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i. At the time of the furnishing of the mortgage emancipation documents. etc. Isabel Palet.. The said firm. 115852 (August 25. Footnote No. 228. LATIN MAXIM: 33 FACTS: The mother of the Plaintiffs. Page 243. 1630 did not pass three reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third readings were done on the same day. VI. In order to mortgage these properties. The President had certified S.

ISSUE: W/N the receipt of compensation is an essential element for violation of Sec. and that she did not receive any compensation. 37 . 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 1969).R. 1 would give harmony to the aforementioned 3 paragraphs of Sec. On March 17. and commission of a felony.R. 26 may not be interpreted to mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100 days. Bello. 2 of the same section. 6d FACTS: Petitioner Mrs. grave abuse of authority. The minors were then convicted for violation of said ordinance. 1974) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aisporna v. L-39419 (April 12. Sec.134 Ocampo v. and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Sec. the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the ordinance was to attend a birthday. According to Commission v. 2 to the agent in par. The power of local officials to investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. 36d. 6 G. 36c. however. a kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment. Roberto Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct. Buenaventura Case No. 189 is defined in par. 6c. Page 248. Footnote No. HELD: Receipt of compensation is essential to be considered an insurance agent. Every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. No. and not separately and independently. 9c. maintained that she was not liable because she only assisted her husband. Aisporna. Court of Appeals and People Case No. Every part of a statute must be considered together with the other parts. Hon. HELD: The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. 88 G. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act (September 8. The Mayor issued an ordinance exonerating the policemen. 1 of Sec. which is considered as a wholesome assemblage. Mrs. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in par. 189. 189. 36b. On appeal. 1969 a complaint was lodged with the Police Commission for the same grounds. Aisporna was charged with violation of Sec. 1982) Chapter VI. LATIN MAXIM: 1. L-32293 (January 24. No. 228 which fixed curfew hours. ISSUE: W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving police service and personnel. 8 FACTS: On September 11. The term “agent” used in par. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 28. 189 of the Insurance Act for allegedly acting as an insurance agent without first securing a certificate of authority to act as such from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. A statute must be construed so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions wherever possible.

1 RA 4200. instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. b2 FACTS: The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and Teresita Gatmaytan was issued on March 4. v. 36a. 11g. although not exclusive to that enumerated therein. However. No. Page 252.R. Also. Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils. That same day. 11 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Radiola-Toshiba Phils.R. but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions. contended that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby. Footnote No. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature. 36c. 36d. ISSUE: W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Footnote No. 1980 by the Court of First Instance of Pasig. Under the circumstances. L-69809 (October 16. Inc. 108 G. the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said attachment. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Indeterminate Appellate Court Case No. 75222 (July 18. held that the phrase “device or arrangement” in Sec. Furthermore. Intermediate Appellate Case No. No. Rufino. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device. Laconico requested Appellant Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone call through the extension phone. there is no conflict between Sec. 79. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as the devices enumerated in Sec. When complainant Pintor called up. Sec. that is. Edgardo Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. 30a. 249 G. 1986) Chapter VI. 29.135 Gaanan v. Page 249. should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same nature. Laconico called the Appellant. HELD: Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period – one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Pintor called Leonardo Laconico to discuss the terms of the withdrawal of his complaint for direct assault against Laconico in the City Fiscal of Cebu. 48. 20 FACTS: Atty. Atty. 37 . ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is one of the prohibited devices covered by Sec. the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. 1 of RA 4200. HELD: No. 1 of RA 4200. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1991) Chapter VI. 32 and Sec.

136 G. HELD: No. 1925) Chapter VI.136 Lopez v. From the very context of the law. but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof. They contended that the court erred in holding that the word “void”. as required by Art. It was only with respect to the usurious interest. 37 FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30. in whose favor the loan was made. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as required by Art. A reading of the POEA Rules shows that. 152 G. Lopez and Javelona. was intended to make the entire transaction a nullity. considering it has already posted a cash bond and surety bond. When JMM Promotions appealed to NLRC regarding a decision rendered by POEA. 25a. No. Footnote No. in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money. as compared with the whole. No. did not intend that the transaction should be a complete nullity. an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. 7a. El Hogar Filipino Case No. NLRC Case No. as used in the Usury Law. as used in the Usury Law. ISSUE: Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond. LATIN MAXIM: 9b. in using the word “void”. 12a. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. 109835 (November 22. as required by the POEA Rules.R.R. 36a. 16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION JMM Promotions v. Page 251. ISSUE: W/N the meaning of the word “void”.000. Page 251. sought to have the contract of loan and mortgage annulled on the ground that the agreement was usurious. 000 and a surety bond of P50. 21 FACTS: Pursuant to a contract of loan and mortgage. 37 . 6d. Footnote No. Every part of the act should be read with the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature. 1993) Chapter VI. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained. El Hogar Filipino caused the mortgaged properties to be sold publicly in an extra-judicial sale. 223 of the Labor Code. as required by the POEA? HELD: Yes. not from the consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law. 000 and posted a cash bond of P100. L-22678 (January 12. 223 of the Labor Code. the legislature.

27. Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure the custody of their three minor children. 23 FACTS: The husband filed a case for legal separation against his wife on the ground of adultery. 38b. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1762. 36d. It now desires to import from Pnom-Pehn a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. After the issues were joined. Sec. A recital of grievances in court may fan their grievances against one another. 1762. 1762 of the Administrative Code. that the case was filed after 6 months of the filing of the legal separation case. being a special law having special contingency not dealt within Sec. and P2. (July 31. HELD: No. has been repealed by the implication in Sec. 50 . 3052 – Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands ISSUE: W/N Sec. it would violate the intent of the law regarding the 6-month cooling period contained in Art.000 for herself and said children. The judge refused to reconsider the order. L-9667.000 as attorney’s fees. 36a. as amended by Act No. However. 1762. the Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle. No. as amended.137 Araneta v. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 1762 of the Administrative Code – prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign country Sec. except upon the condition stated in Administrative Order No. however. 1956) Chapter VI. provided it did not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. Note. 1922) Chapter VI. L-19628 (December 4. Sec. and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the action. 36c. 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect. 24 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lichauco vs. The judge rendered his decision regarding the omnibus petition and granted the custody of the children to Defendant. 36a.R. Apostol Case No. 147 G. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn. while Sec. the determination of the custody and alimony must have been given force and effect. a monthly support of P5. 1762. the legislature’s intent is to give them opportunity for dispassionate reflection. 1770 therefore is not considered as inconsistent with Sec. 1770 of the Administrative Code – Bringing of diseased animal into islands forbidden Sec. Page 252. 3052. 1770. 37 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals. which extends merely to the importation of draft animals for purposes of manufacturing serum.R. Footnote No. a monthly allowance of P2. ISSUE: W/N the parties are required to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.300 for support for her and the children. As such. Sec. P300 for a house. is of a general nature. 1762 and it must be considered as a special qualification of Sec. Legislations involved in the case: Sec. 17 G. Concepcion Case No. If the parties are allowed to present evidences regarding the omnibus petition. 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in Sec. and the return of her passport. Page 252. 103 of the Civil Code. 1762 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. No. HELD: No. to enjoin Plaintiff from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. Footnote No.

R. 220 G. No. 1 day – 6 yrs) before the CFI of Capiz. LATIN MAXIM: 36c. 4 mos. 35 FACTS: Plaintiffs mortgaged two parcels of land to PNB for P600. the solicitor general contended that CFI has jurisdiction. known as the Public Land act. L-2860 (May 11. Page 257.3540 (July 30. 1951) Chapter VI. PNB relied on RA 2938 and RA 3135. 87 of RA 296. Plaintiffs offered to repurchase the land but PNB turned down the offer. which provided that every conveyance of land acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant for a period of 5 years from date of conveyance ISSUE: Which of the conflicting statues should prevail? HELD: When two or more conflicting statues exist. 51 G. thus it is an exception to the coverage of RA 2938 and 3135. However. 37 . 31 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v.138 Cassion v. the latter is paramount to the former and a particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it regardless of to the respective dates of passage. Footnote No.R. 87 of the same act also confers original jurisdiction on the justice of the peace and the judges of municipal courts over all criminal cases relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged upon the trial. 40b. 36d. which created the PNB and authorizes it to have extra judicial foreclosure of mortgage respectively. the judge motu proprio dismissed the case on the ground that under Sec. the CFI and justice of the peace courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Which court has jurisdiction to try the case? HELD: Sec 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confers original jurisdiction on the CFI over all criminal case in which the penalty provided is imprisonment for more than 6 months. Sec. Page 256. as when general and special provisions are inconsistent. 38b. Before the arraignment of the accused. the crime falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. 50 FACTS: Palmon was charged with serious physical injuries (prision correctional in med and max period – 2 yrs. Palmon Case No. Footnote No. After 1 year but before the expiration of 5 years. L. RA 2874 specially relates to specific property. 1950) Chapter VI. LATIN MAXIM: 9. Banco Filipino Case No. Hence. while Plaintiffs relied on RA 2874. 38a. Plaintiffs defaulted and PNB extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold it to Cabatigan. No.

57 G. 7 expressly authorized the President to suspend when there is imminent danger. Pres. 36e.” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 2. LATIN MAXIM: 9. Moreover. 210 is erroneous since it included sedition. Maximino’s father then submitted an application for writ seeking the release of his son. Quirino issued Proclamation No. Three days after.139 Chartered Bank v. as posed by Prof. No.R. 17222 (March 15. during the Constitutional Convention. the PNB had obtained a writ by virtue of which the sheriff also seized certain goods owned by the insolvent. insurrection or rebellion. 37. 60 as stated in the other provision of the same law. Sec.R. provision and clause of a statue must be expounded in reference to every other. 179 G. 1921) Chapter VI. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Montenegro v. Page 257. 60 of the insolvency law. Imperial and National Bank Case No. HELD: There is no doubt that it was erroneous to include “sedition. which is “imminent danger of invasion. Footnote No. while Art. No. Castañeda and Balao Case No. 1952) Chapter VI. rebellion or imminent danger as grounds for suspension. W/N the Bill of Rights prohibited the suspension of the privilege of the writ. “Sedition” should be deemed as a mistake or surplusage that does not taint the decree as a whole. 39 FACTS: Umberto de Poli was declared to be in a state of insolvency at the instance of Plaintiff. ISSUE: Which provision is controlling upon the case? HELD: To ascertain the meaning of the various provisions of the insolvency law. insurrection. 7 only provides invasion. 20b. the Bill of Rights impliedly denied suspension in case of imminent danger. and as such the PNB falls under the exception to Sec. Page 258. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. all civil proceedings against him should have been suspended according to the last portion of Sec. In an earlier case. Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. 36c. W/N Proclamation No. Plaintiff asserted that since the insolvent had been declared as such. b2 . 36d. insurrection or sedition. 36f. Also. which is not under the Constitution. Thus. b2 FACTS: Maximino Montenegro was arrested in Manila by agents of the Military Intelligence Service of the AFP for complicity with a communistic organization in the commission of acts of rebellion. 15a. Aruego. the debates voted down an amendment to add another cause. 60 should be understood in reference with the other provisions of the same law. and the sheriff was ordered to take possession of all property of said Defendant. L-4221 (August 30.” Art. every section.

2 of RA No. No. rather than the letter of a law. 37. L-37684 (September 10. lubricating oils. there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes. in excluding gasoline. 36b. 1996) Chapter VI. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. The evident intent of Sec. HELD: No. 7160. The spirit. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. In interpreting a statute. 50 FACTS: The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. v. no recall may be instituted. with the exception of gasoline. the Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 11e. diesel fuel oils. distributor of gas. is entitled to a refund. but also because the phraseology of the provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. CFI of Zamboanga Case No. 2264. inoperative or nugatory.R. Thus. to a refund. oil and other petroleum products. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006. Arabay Inc. 196 G. It is evident from the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent upon to the volume of sales. 25b. 27. 74 of RA No. Since Sec. (b). (a) and par. interpreting the phrase “regular local election” to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. HELD: The ordinance levied a sales tax not only because of the character of the ordinance as a sales tax ordinance. contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a municipality to levy under Sec. No. which provides that municipalities may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline. 20a FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term.R. Page 259. The reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that Congress. and petroleumbased products. 1975) Chapter VI Page 259.140 Arabay Inc. COMELEC Case No. 11d. and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. 38 . ISSUE: W/N Arabay Inc. determines its construction. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner’s opposition that under Sec. Footnote No. 14. 12a. 123169 (November 4. meaningless.. Footnote No. as provided in par. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the municipality from imposing sales and specific tax. 19 that charged tax for the selling and distribution of gasoline. 16 G. 43 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Paras v. who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.

40c FACTS: Petitioner is a Civil Service eligible and was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by the City Mayor pursuant to the provisions of Sec. which consists of store spaces and of permanent and movable stalls leased to vendors. Said market has served the general population of the City of Bago for more than twenty (20) years already when it was denied the payment of Petitioner for a municipal license for the 3rd quarter of 1968 on the ground that Ordinance No. 2. 9711. b2 . 21 of RA 4858 (the City Charter). L-33169 July 30. W/N appointing authority for the post of city engineer belongs to the city Mayor or not.55 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Niere v. which became RA 4585. under Sec. NO.R. Petitioner refused to turn over office and claimed that he was the one legally appointed as city engineer under RA 4858. 2a. it could have easily re-phrased Sec. 188 G. The Petitioner himself so declared when he testified that his market is engaged in servicing the public. Bago City. 1982 Chapter VI. 138 G. but during the period of amendment in the Senate. Branch II Case No. 21 of RA 4585 an amendment purely of form only or not. HELD: The test of a public market is its dedication to the service of the general public and not its ownership.60 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner of a market (building and lot) in Crossing Bago. it is a substantial amendment. No. No. whereas the appellees say that is one that serves the general public. ISSUE: W/N the marketplace owned by Petitioner is a public market. W/N deletion of the position of city engineer in Sec. 38b. entity. originally expressly included city engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Sec.141 Javellana v. After the enactment of the Decentralization Act. L-30324 November 29. this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines. Page 262. 21. House Bill No. 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. who. 21 of said RA. ISSUE: 1. HELD: 1. or corporation other than the local government. 32. Since the city mayor under Sec. 6d. shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on Appointments “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for…” LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Private Respondent was appointed by the President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Page 262. Footnote No. Appellant claims that a public market is one that is not owned privately. Footnote No. 29. A scrutiny of the charter provision will readily show that by public market. it is meant one that is intended to serve the general public. 2. CFI of Negros Occidental. Kintanar Case No. 30a. 1973 Chapter VI. not only in Bago City. Nothing could be more substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city engineer. the position of said engineer was deleted in the final draft of Sec.R. Such section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees of city department. 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer. but also those coming from other municipalities. 150 had been enacted prohibiting the establishment. NO. maintenance or operation of a public market in the City of Bago by any person. 21 of the City Charter to that effect.

Page 264. Footnote No. of Chinese parents in Dumaguete. HELD: The petitions were denied for lack of merit. he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he did not return to the Philippines until October 13. 1306 which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. 25a. Residence indicates permanency of occupation. he went to the United States to further his studies from the year 1947-1950. 473 requires applicant for naturalization to “reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. 1950. and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same. 63 FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born.L-41001 and G. The court found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1951. No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 43 .61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Lodge No. had to be postponed.142 Uytengsu vs. 2. 6c. 1954) Chapter VI.R. 37 FACTS: The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 307 G. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. is required. In the case at bar. each has. Negros Oriental n October 6. No.A. 9a. 1927. 37. The act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the City of Manila. not legal residence or domicile. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines. which resulted in an unfair advantage to the grantee. notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. if included. HELD: 1. he filed for naturalization. 1976) Chapter VI. Section 7 of C. L-6379 (September 29. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted. Court of Appeals Case No.R. 1360. 36b. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. in strict legal parlance. the area reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila. 7. distinct from lodging or boarding. ISSUE: W/N the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of Manila. 11a. the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area to Petitioner. ISSUE: 1. No. Such grants have always been strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous donation of public money or resources. No. together with all the improvements. in order to unravel the legislative intent. Republic of the Philippines Case No. The grant made by Act No. or temporary occupation. No. 165 G.L-41012 (September 30. Later. the letter of the statute should be narrowed to exclude matters which. No. the original date of hearing the case. 2. 1951. Although the words “residence” and “domicile” are often used interchangeably. Hence.R. as amended. Hence. to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC). After finishing primary and secondary education here in the Philippines. Then Petitioner sold the land. would defeat the policy of legislation. Forthwith. originally scheduled to take place on July 12. Domicile is residence with intention to stay. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous. Page 263. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila is a grant of a “public” nature. On July 15. a meaning distinct and different from that of the other. 176 v.

3 G. which found Petitioner guilty as charged. the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the Municipal Board of said City. increase or modification of substantive rights. 49. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Petitioners’ motion to dismiss. 37 . the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge. particularly a procedural rule. 1947).143 Almeda v. does likewise. 12 of RA 183. Such interpretation. 14 that “the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the members thereof…” On June 18.5 of the 1973 Constitution. 67 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abellana v.L-23800 (December 21. 12a. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. Lastly. 5.A 183. 12 of the Pasay City Charter. HELD: Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Footnote No. At this stage. 10 G. the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21. 2 of Sec. there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right. alter. 1965) Chapter VI. in the case at bar. the Board refused to recognize Petitioner as its secretary and. Page 265. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal. par. give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive right in accordance to Art.L-27760 (May 29. 1974) Chapter VI. ISSUE: Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the Municipal Board of Pasay City? HELD: The petition was dismissed. ISSUE: W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. X.R. Repeals by implication are not favored. Thus. 71 FACTS: RA183. 50 FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. a separate and independent civil action for damages. Page 266. appointed Respondent Florentino to the position. 7 of Rule 123. No. provides in its Sec. Sec. 33 of the Civil Code. 14 of R. or modify in any way the provisions of Sec. unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. RA 2709 amended Sec. 14 of the City Charter. The very next day. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City. 1960. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI.R. as amended. No. purportedly under Sec. the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution.2 As stated in Art. it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. On the strength of Par. 37. Footnote No. in turn. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm. Marave Case No. literal construction of the law is not favored. Florentino Case No.

pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code (Sec. Yu Cong Eng. Respondent taxpayers insisted on paying the new taxes the following year. 63 G. There is a presumption against implied repeal. No. 83 FACTS: Act 2972 prohibited record books of Merchants from being written in a language other than English. Class legislation is thus allowed if it is for the public good. L-36049 (May 31. claimed that under the Local Autonomy Act (RA 2264). was penalized for keeping books written in Chinese. This decision is consistent with the ruling in Kwong Sing v. it may be interpreted as a directory measure that records pertaining to taxes must be written or annotated in English. Spanish. this allegedly impliedly repealed Sec. L-20479 (February 6. 1925) Chapter VI. 317 G. City of Manila. 38a.R. Spanish. Footnote No. It stated that tax enactments changing the current system prior to December 15 should take effect the following year. 11e. The Naga City government. or have a duplicate in any of these languages. This liberal interpretation is reasonable and it upholds constitutionality. or a local dialect. FACTS: The City of Naga changed its tax system from graduated tax to percentage tax. 6d. No. 38b ISSUE: Is Act 2972 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. it did not. RA 2264 only applies for entirely new tax provisions. The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud in book keeping and evasion of taxes for the protection of the public good. where laundrymen were prohibited from issuing receipts written in Chinese. He and other Chinese merchants challenged the constitutionality of the law. tax ordinances take effect 15 days after publication. 1976) Chapter VI. If two laws can be harmonized. LATIN MAXIM: 1a. 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code? HELD: No. Trinidad Case No. on the other hand. LATIN MAXIM: 37. a Chinese merchant. 78 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION City of Naga v. Page 267. 37 . 9c. then the Courts shall do so. Sec.R. or a local dialect.144 Yu Cong Eng v. ISSUE: Did RA 2264 repeal Sec. Instead of interpreting the Act as a blanket prohibition against keeping books in Chinese. a subsequent provision only repeals a prior provision clearly contradictory to it. Agna Case No. 2309 of the Admin Code. 2309 of the Revised Admin Code applies in this case because the new tax changed a prior tax system. Footnote No. Page 268. 2309).

Footnote No. Petitioner claimed that the Governor-General has no legislative authority and that this legislation was not for the public good. No.145 Tan v. including the parent province. and not just the new areas. LATIN MAXIM: 12a. 112093 (October 4. 118 G. 37 . ISSUE: Is BP 885 unconstitutional? HELD: It is unconstitutional. but the final bill only limited it to the latter. Every act of legislation is presumed to be constitutional and for the public good. facts need not be stated to prove it. 1916) Chapter VI. and not just the areas constituting the new province.R. which will get also affected. The draft bill provided that the plebiscite be conducted in all units. were not included in the plebiscite. The parent provinces. LATIN MAXIM: 12a FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Cardona challenged the constitutionality of EO 66 by the Governor-General granting Binangonan municipal authority over 7 additional barrios.R. 84 FACTS: BP 885 is an act creating the new province of Negros del Norte. ISSUE: Is EO 66 constitutional? HELD: It is constitutional. 152 G. 1994) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Government v. L-10202 (March 29. The plebiscite for the approval of the act was only conducted in the municipalities prospectively composing the new province. Page 268. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite must be held in all units affected. COMELEC Case No. No. Municipality of Binangonan Case No.

and a 149-sq. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed on May 28. His estate consisted of 3 parcels of land (Lots 25. Art. Art. Thus. an appeal against the dismissal is made to the Supreme Court. 1144 of the CC prevails. resort must be had to Art. however. or from the day following that in which it was committed. & 27). 1144 of the same Code? 2. Which prescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail. There was no double sale. Hence. 1955) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salvatierra v. and Macario. ISSUE: 1.R. W/N the term “month” in the RPC should be understood to be a month of 30 days. Del Rosario Case No. 91 of the RPC. Whether the prescriptive period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed. that Anselmo already obtained an OCT covering the whole of Lot No. the term month used in Art. 1953. Venancio.R. 2. instead of the civil/calendar month. out of the 749 sq. 7a . LATIN MAXIM: 6c.146 People v. Anselmo. HELD: 1. It turned out. 105 G. 1996) FACTS: On July 27. 46a FACTS: Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and was survived by his legitimate brothers. 18 of the CC directs that any deficiency in any special law must be supplied by its provisions. L-7234 (May 21. 2. done with evident bad faith. Eventually. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. which consisted of the aforementioned lots. 1391 of the new CC or Art. a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month. the literal and plain meaning thereof should be observed. as held in previous cases. No. m. As the RPC is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed. HELD: 1. Venancio sold Lot No. an “extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale” was executed by and among the surviving legal heirs of Enrique. Hence. mts. mts. Art. 2. total area of Lot 26 to his son. the Court held that the offense charged had not yet prescribed because July is the 60th day from May 29. There is no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. 26. The complaints for reconveyance were filed 5 years after the issuance of such OCT to Anselmo. Tomas. 6c. What Anselmo bought from his father was only 405 sq. 107797 (August 26. 38b. 26. Thereafter. and a sister. Both parties did not dispute the contents of the extrajudicial partition. The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. the law has always directed that the first be excluded and the last included (Art. The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Art. W/N there was a double sale. Bartolome. Court of Appeals Case No. 90 of the RPC should be understood to mean the regular 30-day month and not the solar or civil month. By express provision of Article 13 on the new Civil Code. The registration of the whole Lot 26 in the name of Anselmo was. information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay charging Paz M. 1953. 7 (which belonged to him by virtue of the said partition). G. therefore. In accordance therewith. ISSUE: 1. m of Lot 26. 13. the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed. 90 and Art. No. 13 of the CC. In computation of the period of time within which an act is to be done. The prescriptive period for such actions is 10 years. Marcela. Macario sold the 405 sq. Hence. Civil Code). portion of Lot 26 to spouses Longalongs.

31581 (February 3. filed three corresponding supplemental complaints on each of the aforesaid waterworks projects contending that NAWASA violated Sec. Two laws are being considered in this case: C. Page 273. and the PNB asked the sheriff to proceed with the sale of the parcels of land. Footnote No. The special administrator failed to comply with the conditions of the mortgage.R. L-27275 (November 18. one of those who participated in the bidding but eventually lost. Government-owned or controlled corporations are not exempted from RA 912.147 Pasno v. 38b FACTS: NAWASA conducted three separate bids for the three different waterworks projects in Manila. 1967) Chapter VI. Since Act 3135 fails to make provision regarding the sale of the mortgaged property which is in custodia legis. works or projects of the Government (referring to Filipino-First policy).A. 36. a petition was presented for the probate of her last will and testament. The said law also provides that this nationalistic policy of preferring for locally produced materials is in relation to the “construction or repair work undertaken by the Government. W/N the will is valid 2. ISSUE: 1. Both relate to the same subject matter and have the same nationalistic purpose or object which is to give preference to locally produced materials in purchases. Ravina and Ravina Case No. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. Accordingly. a special administrator of the estate of the deceased was appointed by the court. 35. mortgaged 3 parcels of land to the PNB. 38b . 138 and RA 912. The PNB had the right to foreclose the said mortgaged property. However. 199 G. During the pendency of the case. it would be logical to suppose Sec. and in the construction of their works or purchase of materials thereof. practicable and usable. Act 3115 must be presumed to have been acquainted with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. When Labitoria died. C & C Commercial Corporation.” NAWASA alleged that it should not be included within the meaning of the term “Government” as used in the said law. 104 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION C & C Commercial v. Davao and Iloilo. 38a. 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure would govern latter contingency. local material should be given preference whenever available. 107 FACTS: Labitoria.R. 1930) Chapter VI. No. 37. Footnote No. HELD: 1. The law does not require that the will shall be dated. practicable and usable. Page 274. 1 of RA 912. 2. W/N the PNB had the right to foreclose in its favor the mortgage which was executed by Labitoria now that the mortgaged property is in custodia legis. The CFI ruled in favor of the special administrator requiring the sheriff to abstain from selling the said lands. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 42 G. during her lifetime. HELD: Yes. NAWASA Case No. No. which should give preference to local materials that are available. The NAWASA should be deemed embraced within the term “government” found in RA 312. an erroneous date will not defeat a will. ISSUE: W/N NAWASA falls under the term “government” under RA 912. Yes. The mortgagee should foreclose the mortgage in accordance with Sec.

the earlier special and the latter general – and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special – the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law of the land. the inclusion of the franchise business of the Butuan Sawmill. HELD: No. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manila Railroad Co. v. heat. A special law (including private charters) having the character of a private contract. Neither could the latter’s power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the franchise. unless the intent to modify or alter is manifest. questioned the validity of the taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of property without due process of law. d FACTS: The Defendant assessed and collected against Manila Railroad internal revenue taxes upon oil and coal materials imported into the Philippine by virtue of an act of Congress in 1913. the consideration of such being embodied in the special law. together with the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission. Butuan Sawmill. while the other as the law of a particular case. 14205 (September 30. ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the franchise business of Petitioners falls within the coverage of the taxing ordinances pursuant to the city’s power of taxation. No. Rafferty asserts that the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. Agusan. Rafferty Case No. Where there are two statutes.R. the City of Butuan issued Ordinances numbered 11. the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms. LATIN MAXIM: 37. The latter contended that the taxes had been illegally collected pursuant to a private charter granted by the legislature in 1906. by the City of Butuan is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city under its charter. Where the general act is later. unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. v. Inc. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner was granted a legislative franchise under RA 399 for an electric light. Inc. No. Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was granted in 1950. 50. 1966) Chapter VI. 50 . On the other hand. considering the absence of an express or specific grant of power to do so.R. ISSUE: W/N the 1913 Act of Congress repealed the 1906 private charter. and power system in Butuan and Cabadbaran. HELD: No. 168 G. 41 G. City of Butuan Case No. supposes that the legislators intended to attend to the special facts and circumstances. L-21516 (April 29. 131 and 148 imposing a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in the city. 1919) Chapter VI.148 Butuan Sawmill. Footnote No. On the other hand. However. LATIN MAXIM: 25. Page 279. Inc. Page 277. Footnote No. A general law subsequently enacted by the legislature cannot be taken to have modified or altered the charter.

” while Sec 182 of the 1978 Election Code vested the Commission with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and subsequently prosecute all election offenses punishable under the same Code. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6. Sec 184 of the Election Code. 87 G. At the same time. COMELEC registrar of Casiguran. must be favored over provisions of P. officer. 38. HELD: No. The legislative intent in granting COMELEC the said power is to insure the free. 157 G. He permitted Tawas Tahan to land in the Philippine Islands from the steamship at a place and time other than that designated by the immigration officers. Almond Case No. orderly and honest conduct of elections. prosecute and try the offense charged against him is lodged with the COMELEC. 9. 18 imposes upon one who has brought immigrant aliens into a United States port the duty of adopting due precautions to prevent the landing of any such alien at any time or place other than that designated by the immigration officers and fixes a penalty for permitting an alien so to land. ISSUE: W/N a conviction can be sustained when it appears that there was no consent. which deals specifically with election offenses. it was made without the Defendant’s knowledge or consent. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION US v. Page 277. 1606 which speaks generally of other crimes or offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office.R. was charged by the Tanodbayan before the Sandiganbayan with the violation of the 1978 Election Code. Almond. 2517 (June 2. L-61998 (February 22. He filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the jurisdiction to investigate. and. 41a. 50 FACTS: The complaint alleges that R. is an alien of East India who is afflicted with trachoma. The word “permit” implies that the landing of the alien must be with the express or tacit consent of the owner. ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over election offenses with respect to public officers. People of the Philippines Case No. HELD: Sec. to the landing of the alien. 48 . R. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. To divest the COMELEC of its authority would seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving the aforementioned constitutional mandate. and that if the landing was made.D. No. The former cannot be construed as impliedly repealed by the latter thereby continuing to be an exception granted the more specific legislative intent it evinces. 1983) Chapter VI. coincidentally. 1906) FACTS: The Petitioner. XII [C] of the 1973 Constitution granted COMELEC the power “to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. 37. either tacit or express. the Court of First Instance (now RTC). master and in charge of the steamship Rubi brought Tawas Tahan. No.149 De Jesus v. Footnote No. agent or person in charge of the vessel. 2 of Art.W. The evidence showed that Defendant adopted due precautions to prevent the landing of Tawas Tahan. 11e.

12891 (October 19. LATIN MAXIM: 41a. HELD: The term “cockpit” as used in the statute has a limited meaning so it cannot be construed to mean or include a clearing such as had been used by the Defendants. 1917) Chapter VII. v. in violation of Sec. 298 G. Penal provisions of a statute are to be construed strictly and particular words used in the law should be construed in relation to the context. 480. 28 FACTS: A case was filed against Defendants for having engaged in cockfighting. ISSUE: W/N the Appellant is guilty of violating the Internal Revenue Law. 294 G. including the entries required to be made by the Collector of Internal Revenue. unless the law clearly so provides. 1915 indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. He had employed a bookkeeper with the expectation that the latter would perform all the duties pertaining to his position. 48 . No. Page 289. Page 290.R.150 US v. 1 of Act.S. Abad Santos Case No. The Defendants held a cockfight on a clearing near a grove of buri palms. LATIN MAXIM: 25. No. 48 FACTS: The Appellant was accused of violating the provisions of the Internal Revenue Law by failing to make an entry for the January 5. Footnote No. HELD: The Appellant must be acquitted since it is undisputed that he took no part in the keeping of the book in question and that he never personally made an entry in it as he left everything to his bookkeeper. Estapia Case No. The prosecution argued that the term “cockpit” should be construed to mean any place in which a cockfight takes place. 12262 (February 10. Courts will not hold one person criminally responsible for acts of another done without his knowledge or consent. ISSUE: W/N the clearing where the cockfight was held by the Defendants is a cockpit within the contemplation of the law. No. 23 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION U. Footnote No. 1917) Chapter VII. 37.R.


No. 138. 108 gives unmistakable notice of the legislative intent and purpose of punishing all acts of evasion of the laws of the nationalization of certain rights. a German citizen. 29 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. No. is guilty of violation of C. Private complainant Regina Guafin. Nos. is the granddaughter of Trinidad Mejos.A. Any citizen of the Philippines or of the United States who knowingly allows his name or citizenship to be used so that a person not so qualified may enjoy the privilege granted to domestic entities by C. and to death for the third. W/N the trial court erred in appreciating the nighttime and relationship as aggravating the penalty imposable for the rape allegedly committed. The scope of the relationship under Art. whenever existing at the time of the passage of said Act or promulgated thereafter. descendant. Atop Case No. No. No. 1941) Chapter VII. Sec. Nocturnity must have been deliberately sought by the Appellant to facilitate the crime or prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. The offended party’s straightforward and unequivocal statements show indelible badges of truth. holding that his common-law relationship with the victim’s grandmother aggravated the penalty. however. 12 years old. The trial court sentenced him to 2 terms of reclusion perpetua for the first two counts. Padilla Case No. that notwithstanding the infringement of Sec. legitimate. 4 of C. 9a . voluntarily. 138. illegally. of Act No. W/N the trial court erred in finding Appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Neither can we appreciate relationship as aggravating. no other relationship between the offender and the victim may aggravate the imposable penalty for the crime committed. 138 may be prosecuted under C.R. 113 G. It is contended. 1998) Chapter VII. and criminally evaded the provisions of Art. 4. any legal provision. which requires Philippine or U. natural or adopted brother or sister. 202 G. 2.R. franchise or privilege.A. and relative by affinity in the same degrees. Footnote No. the common-law wife of the Appellant. Page 291. and Von Arend. acting jointly and conniving with each other. Footnote No. ISSUE: 1. The Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 15 of the RPC encompasses only “the spouse.S. franchises or privileges. No. 6c. 1 of the same Act applies punishment provided therein to “all cases in which any constitutional or legal provision requires Philippine or United States citizenship as a requirement for the exercise or enjoyment of a right.152 People v. Page 290. 2. ISSUE: W/N a violation of C. as well as any alien profiting thereby. 108. The very title of Act No. HELD: 1. 4 of Act No. The trial court erred.” Outside these enumerations and consistent with the doctrine that criminal laws must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. the Appellants cannot be punished therefore since the said Act imposes no penal sanction whatsoever. LATIN MAXIM: 6a.” HELD: Yes.A. 138. 108. 124303-05 (February 10. franchise or privileges.A. 108. entitled “An Act to punish acts of evasion of the laws on the nationalization or certain rights. 30 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of 3 counts of rape. No. ascendant. 138.A. 47027 (February 4. LATIN MAXIM: 30a FACTS: Appellants Padilla.” Under Act No. citizenship before the exercise or enjoyment of the privilege established in said article. would fall within its scope. a Filipino citizen. One of such legal provision is Art.

The Appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in sentencing him to suffer the aforementioned penalty on the ground of lack of malice in the commission of the crime. did willfully. 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery. When he entered the plea of guilty.” instead of being convicted and sentenced to prison. 2.77. 1950) Chapter VII. in that. The Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended par. but also all the material facts alleged in the information. Page 293. Footnote No. the sum of P13. Upon arraignment. accountable for the funds collected and received by him. We find no irreconcilable conflict between Art. as it now stands and Art. His plea of guilt carried with it the acknowledgement or admission that the willful acts charged were done with malice. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. he did not apply the missing funds to his personal use and benefit but lost the same while he was drunk. that he “willfully. L-2873 (February 28. 80 as amended. 68 of the RPC. he thereby admitted. the sum of P13. embezzle. 209 No. The Appellant being the then Deputy Provincial and Municipal Treasurer. from said funds. being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. HELD: Yes. L-13371 (September 24. unless forced upon the court by an unambiguous language. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. namely. All parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof. 11e. 41 FACTS: The Appellant was charged with the crime of malversation of public funds. HELD: No. Garcia Case No. “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 2 of the RPC. and as such. misappropriate. misapply. from said funds.” thus clearly indicating malice or evil intent on his part. ignoring the Appellant’s minority. 2 of Art. the Appellant pleaded not guilty. Footnote No.R.” ISSUE: W/N the Appellant.153 People v. 80 of the RPC by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which the Appellant has to “be committed to the custody or care of a public or private. 1959) Chapter VII.897. 41a. and to pay the costs. 68. but always in the proper period. which he later withdrew and changed to guilty. not only his guilt. 223 G. Page 292. 43 FACTS: The lower court. to indemnify the Government without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. par. par. to pay a fine. 36 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. which provides that when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age. He was sentenced to be imprisoned. to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification. and that conflicting interest in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded. misappropriate. benevolent or charitable institution. and convert to his own personal use and benefit. 68. has given rise to the controversy.77. 38b . LATIN MAXIM: 37. ISSUE: W/N the penalties imposed by the lower court were excessive given the contention of Appellant. Salazar Case No. sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years. There is no incompatibility between granting Appellant of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. RA 47 which amended Art. There is nothing in the record that supports the claim that missing funds were lost while the Appellant was drunk. feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence. No. was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of Art.897. LATIN MAXIM: 7b.

154 People v. Terrada, et. al.
Case No. 229 G.R. No. L-23625 (November 25, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 293, Footnote No. 42

US v. Toribo
Case No. 304 G.R. No. 5060 (January 26, 1910) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 48

FACTS: On November 1951 and May 1952, Appellees Obo, Gundran, and Terrado applied for and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of land situated in Camarines Sur. These parcels of land were forest land and as such are not disposable. On March 1962, three separate informations for falsification of public document were filed against the Appellees for having conspired with one another through false and fraudulent misrepresentations alleging that they had all the qualifications and had complied with all legal requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. Appellees claim that the crime has already prescribed according to the RPC, but the State argues that the crime has not prescribed under Act No. 3585 where the crime of perjury prescribes in 8 years. ISSUE: W/N the prescriptive period to be applied should be 10 years under the RPC or 8 years under Act No. 3585. HELD: The 8 year prescriptive period should be applied. Penal statutes must be strictly applied. Where a crime is punishable by both a special law and the RPC but with different prescriptive periods, the one favorable to the accused or the shorter prescriptive period should be applied. LATIN MAXIM: 43, 48

FACTS: Evidence suggests that Appellant slaughtered the carabao for human consumption, which is in violation of Act No. 1147, “An Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, Slaughter of Large Cattle.” It appears that in the town of Carmen in Bohol, there aren’t any slaughterhouses. Appellant suggests that under such circumstances, the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not penalize slaughter of large cattle without permit. Appellant also alleges that it is an infringement on his right over his property (carabao). ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 applies only when there is a municipal slaughterhouse, and the slaughter of a carabao is made therein. HELD: No. As long as the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption is done without a permit secured first from the municipal treasurer, the penalty under the Act applies. The Act primarily seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippine Islands, against theft and to make recovery and return of the same easy. More importantly, it is to protect the very life and existence of the inhabitants of the Philippines, imperiled by the continued destruction of large cattle by disease, making it reasonable for the legislative to prohibit and penalize a perfectly legal act utilizing personal properties of citizens (cattle) if not for the extraordinary conditions/threat present. Well settled is the doctrine of the State’s legitimate exercise of the right of eminent domain laid down in jurisprudence. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of many interpretations, that which stays true with the intent of the law must be observed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 9a, 37

155 US v. Go Chico
Case No. 299 G.R. No. 4963 (September 15, 1909) Chapter VII, Page 295, Footnote No. 49

Arriete v. Director of Public Works
Case no. 22 G.R. No. 37125 (September 30, 1933) Chapter VII, Page 296, Footnote No. 52

FACTS: Appellant is charged with the violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 or the Flag Law, displaying in his store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late armed insurrection in the Philippine Islands against the U.S. Appellant claims that he is ignorant of the law and consequently, had no corrupt intention to violate the law. He claims acquittal on the ground that his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the law was referring to “identical” banners, emblem, flag, etc. ISSUE: 1. W/N to be in violation of the Flag Law, Appellant must have acted with criminal intent. 2. W/N the wording of the law exempts the articles displayed by the Defendant. HELD: 1. No, criminal intent isn’t necessary for violation of the Flag Law. 2. The medallions, though not exactly identical, comes within the purview of the class of articles referred to by the law. Jurisprudence has held that in crimes made by statutory requirement, criminal intent is not necessary. Intention of the perpetrator is entirely immaterial because to hold otherwise would render the statute substantially worthless, and its execution impossible. The statute did not include intent as an element of a crime, and it is clear so no interpretation is required. Clearly therefore, ignorance of the law is not a valid defense for violation thereof. The description in the law refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. LATIN MAXIM: 5a, 7a, 9a, 9c, 11a, 43, a

FACTS: Appellant Arriete, as legal guardian on behalf of minor Carmen Jagunap, sought to recover the title and possession of three lots which were sold by the sheriff in a public auction to Appellee Ledesma (and thereafter sold to Fermin Caram) to satisfy the judgment of a lien for nonpayment of taxes, under the Irrigation Act No. 2152. However, it was found that the delinquent taxpayer was not the owner of said lots, but Carmen Jagunap was. ISSUE: W/N Appellee Ledesma has any rights over the lots acquired in good faith under the final deed of sale of the provincial sheriff. HELD: No, she acquired no right at all. Act No. 2152 provided that regarding expropriation of land, the list of lands filed by the Director of Public Lands must be published, and notice should be given to the owners to file answer or appear in the civil case. No such publication or notice was evident in this case. It is not sufficient that they had “actual” knowledge. Statutes in the derogation of rights are construed strictly. This is because people in a republican state like ours enjoy inherent rights guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by law, like the right against undue deprivation of property. Thus, whenever there are statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land or property, these statutes are construed strictly. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 43

156 Provincial Chapter of Laguna v. COMELEC
Case No. 246 G.R. No. L-53460 (May 27, 1983) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

Genaro B. Reyes Construction Inc. v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 51 G.R. No. 108718 (July 14, 1994) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 57

FACTS: Nacionalista Party (NP) filed a petition against Respondent San Luis of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for turncoatism. When Respondent San Luis ran as Governor of Laguna under Liberal Party (LP) in 1972, he won. The normal expiry for the term was 1975, but it was extended lawfully by the President. Now (1980) he is running for Governor again under KBL. Under the law, “No elective public officer may change his political party affiliation during his term of office…or within six months immediately preceding or following an election.” ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in dismissing petition which contended that Respondent San Luis should be disqualified from running due to turncoatism. HELD: No, he cannot be disqualified. He did not change affiliations during his term. He was expelled from the LP in 1978 and this can’t be construed as a willful change of affiliation. At that time, no one even knew when the next elections were, so Respondent could not have changed affiliations simply to anticipate the next election. The constitutional prohibition cannot be applied to the period beyond the frame-up (1971-1975) term to which public officials were elected in 1971 because this would unduly impinge on freedom of association guaranteed to all. Between two constructions, one of which would diminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted. LATIN MAXIM: 11a, 37, 48

FACTS: Petitioners filed petition to stop Respondent DPWH from implementing the notice of pre-termination in their contract for construction of the flood control facilities and land improvement works in Butuan City. Petitioners won in a public bidding held for this purpose. Respondents claimed that with a 9.86% negative slippage (delay in the infrastructure project), the government was either authorized to take over the project or let another contractor finish it. Petitioners however claimed that not only were the delays caused significantly by DPWH, but also termination of contract is only appropriate if the negative slippage reaches 15%. ISSUE: W/N termination of contract with Petitioners is valid. HELD: No, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other bidders. The discretion of Respondent DPWH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15% or more, according to P.D. 1870 and DPWH Circular No. 102. The intent of the law in allowing the government to take over delayed construction projects with negative slippage of 15% or more is primarily “to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial projections and/or cash flow of the government.” Terminating the contract and awarding it to Hanil, a previously disqualified bidder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 9a, 12a

157 Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co.
Case No. 289 G.R. No. L-6690 (March 29, 1912) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 62

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.
Case No. 61 G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919) Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64

FACTS: Defendant company took possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the express consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, alleging that the land is a part of certain lands described in condemnation proceedings. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespass on his land on the ground that it was his duty to seek redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted by Defendant company. HELD: As a general rule, the steps prescribed by the statute must be followed or the proceedings will be void. Since these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common-law modes of procedure, they must be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must be at least substantially or ‘fully and fairly’ complied with. In the absence of proof of a substantial compliance with the provisions of law touching such proceedings, the Plaintiff was clearly entitled to institute any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthorized and unlawful seizure and occupation of her property. The theory on which the trial judge correctly proceeded was that Defendant company having unlawfully taken possession of a part of the tract of land in question, and by its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to abandon the entire tract, and recover damages for its full value. LATIN MAXIM: 21a, 43

FACTS: Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes. ISSUE: W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions (of necessity). It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. LATIN MAXIM: 9a, 24a, 43

158 Velasco v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 165 G.R. No. L-14214 (May 25, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

FACTS: Petition for naturalization of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the requirements of the law. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturalization. HELD: No. Considering that “naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant”, we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 43

FACTS: Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement. The law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is born in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. HELD: No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but betrays the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that in spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

159 Co v. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960) Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
Case No. 157 G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996) Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law. HELD: Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register his family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return. Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization. LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7b, 43

FACTS: Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from the payment of realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person. HELD: Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person” under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Sec. 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefore is the exception. LATIN MAXIM: 43

160 The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines v. A. W. Hastings, Assessor and Collector of the City of Manila, and the City of Manila
Case No. 136 G.R. No. 1974 (March 15, 1906) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 79

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Ateneo de Manila University
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997) Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS: In 1901, Appellant imposed a tax upon the residence of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was exempt from taxation as provided by Sec. 48 of Act No. 183 of the Philippine Commission. The Appellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not adjacent to the cathedral, being 80 to 100 meters distant from the church, and that the exemption privilege was already exhausted by its allowance to the parsonage of the adjoining chapel. ISSUE: W/N the house of the archbishop of Manila should be exempted from tax. HELD: In enacting its exemption laws, the Commission had in view not only the conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman Catholic parishes in the Islands, but their intent was to extend the exemption to the parsonages appurtenant to all churches. And it is a general rule that statutes exempting charitable and religious property from taxation should be construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. Although separated from the cathedral by an intervening block, and although a parsonage within the area was already exempt, the residence of the archbishop should still be exempted from taxation as a parsonage adjacent to the cathedral. LATIN MAXIM: 8a, 9b, 43

FACTS: Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences studies of Philippine society and culture. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution’s tax liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an “independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3% contractor’s tax. ISSUE: W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code. HELD: No. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business of selling such research with profit in mind. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a strict interpretation of the tax laws. LATIN MAXIM: 43

ISSUE: Whether dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways. 141 of Sec. ISSUE: W/N Respondent spouses were properly given tax amnesty. 197. 8-72 was null and void.08. A reinvestigation of their debt was made and the amount was changed to P17. 50 FACTS: Respondent spouses Antonio and Clara Pastor owed the Government P1. 621. If Revenue Regulation No. 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909. Footnote No. On the other hand. then such provision is null and void for being contrary to the Presidential Decree.R. because Revenue Regulation No. Insular Collector of Customs Case No. under par. Page 301.” Upon appeal. 30264 (March 12. 197 of same law. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation No. They applied for tax amnesty under P. however. 213. 8-72 which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the BIR. 213 did not contain any exemption wherein one should not be allowed to amnesty. 256 G. they should be construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citizen. Due to this. 43.117. Appellant Insular Collector of Customs classified dust shields as “manufactures of wool.D. And when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former. No. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used.63 for taxes from the years 1955-1959. 213 and 370. 8-72 provided an exception to the coverage of P. Footnote No. 23. HELD: Dust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par.D. They paid such debt to the Government and had receipts as proofs of such.D. their debt even decreased to about P12.283. and the general one must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. not otherwise provided for. manufactures of wool. 84 FACTS: Appellee Manila Railroad Company used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the axle box which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lubricant of the bearings of the wheel. vehicles for use on railways and tramways. 26 .D. and detached parts thereof are subject to 10% ad valorem.000. 1929) Chapter VII. not otherwise provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem. 167 G. HELD: Yes. 213 because of Revenue Regulation No. Under par. LATIN MAXIM: 38a. L-69344 (April 26. 8-72 was null because P. the CFI overruled the decision and classified dust shields as “detached parts” of vehicles for use on railways. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential Decree. The Government contended that the spouses could not avail of the tax amnesty under P. LATIN MAXIM: 8. 1991) Chapter VII. In case of doubt. the particular enactment must be operative. 84 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic v.R. Page 301. No.161 Manila Railroad Company v.

the sale of agricultural NON-food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. copra per se is not intended for human consumption. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 103(a). and 80% of the coconut plant is edible. 3 G. 108524 (November 10. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. HELD: No. although copra is from coconut. ISSUE: W/N copra is an agricultural food product which is exempt from VAT and thus not under the purview of RMC 47-91.R. 85 FACTS: FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation whose members are engaged in buying and selling copra. including distribution. L-23623 (June 30. hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimi juris. Department of Finance Secretary Case No. b RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. 103(b). HELD: No. The law frowns on exemption from taxation. Brady. 103(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code and therefore exempt from tax in all stages. ISSUE: W/N insulating oil is an insulator making Respondent exempt from paying its taxes. 85 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Acting Commissioner of Customs v. The Supreme Court looked into the definition of “insulating oils” under Materials Handbook by George J. Under Sec. Under Sec. 42a. thus it is not exempt from VAT. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. v. 1977) Chapter VII. No. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. insulating oil is different from insulators. RMC 47-91 then reclassified copra as a non-food product. Prior to Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91. No. 8th Edition. Footnote No. copra was classified as a food product under Sec. 82 G. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s interpretation is entitled to great respect because it is the government agency charged with the interpretation and implementation of tax laws. Page 301. Page 301. In fact. 1994) Chapter VII. Footnote No.R. Inc. it is not an agricultural food product. the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is exempt from VAT in all stages.162 Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders. 43. Manila Electric Company Case No. b .

Page 306. or the operator. ISSUE: W/N Respondent is entitled to the benefits of tax amnesty under the P. 25a. 370 refers not to a criminal information filed in court by a fiscal or special prosecutor. 27 FACTS: Respondents were charged of 8 criminal cases for violating the National Internal Revenue Code for manufacturing alcoholic products subject to specific tax without having paid the annual privilege tax therefore. Footnote No. 370 took effect. Case No.R. Castañeda Jr. the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already been discovered by the BIR when P.R. 1956) Chapter VII.D. This clause is plain demonstration that the “gross receipts” refer to the collections on days when the race track is open to the general public and admission fees are or are not charged. singly and not all at one and the same time. 370 which declares tax amnesty. the PCSO. This necessarily excludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. 1988) Chapter VII. the lessee. In the instant case. 97 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. It is necessary to note that the "valid information under RA 2338" referred to in Sec. Case No. the claimant is not entitled to the benefits expressly excluded from the coverage of P. L-8755 (March 23.163 Collector of Internal Revenue v. No. Footnote No. of the amusement place liable for the amusement tax.D. and Philippine Racing Club Inc. 104 G. 370. are corporations organized primarily for holding horse races. but rather to the sworn information or complaint filed by an informer with the BIR under RA 2338 in the hope of earning an informer's reward. 370. or operator.D.D. HELD: The law refers to “gross receipts” and not “gross income”. the three tax payers being connected by the disjunctive conjunction “or”. 1(a)(4) of P. 43 . HELD: To be entitled to the extinction of liability provided by P. L-46881 (September 15. 102 FACTS: Respondents Manila Jockey Club Inc. The lease by the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are subject to the 20% amusement tax in the National Internal Revenue Code. Page 304. thereby positively implying that the tax should be paid by either the proprietor. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. lessee. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.D. Where the disclosure was not voluntary. the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society are subject to the 20% amusement tax. It is to be remembered that the law makes the proprietor. Manila Jockey Club Inc. 68 G.D. ISSUE: W/N rentals received by the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers. the White Cross. as the case may be. 7a. the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously untaxed income or wealth and paid the required 15% tax on such previously untaxed income or wealth. Respondents argued that they are exempt from taxes because they are entitled to the benefits available under P.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales tax. Respondent Commissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency tax of P23. It is a remedial statute. Footnote No. Page 306. HELD: While the distinction does not appear to have been consciously made in Act No. it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. No.17 because materials purchased from tax-exempt industries were not acquired from one enjoying taxexemption privilege under our laws. Petitioner imported a quantity of wheat grains. 103 FACTS: Act No. 1907) Chapter VII.55. in the determination of the value of such finished article.170.R. 9f. 27. Footnote No. and are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Flour Mills. but the cost of wheat left over was treated as deductible item from gross sales in 1959. 82 and 551. Sec. 123. 175 G. No. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Case No. the law must be taken as it is. 43 . b2 FACTS: In 1957. 259 G. and the plain principles of justice suggest that the act under consideration should be construed with some liberality. so that there is no occasion for the court’s seeking the legislative intent. 3433 (March 2. 186-A of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a tax-free product is utilized in the manufacture or production of any article. the value of such tax-free product shall be deducted. City of Manila Case No. While It is true that tax exemptions (and deductions) are not favored in the law. In 1958. While some of the Acts of the Commission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification. Petitioner was granted tax-exemption privileges pursuant to RA 901.164 Zamora v. nevertheless such use has not been uniform and the deviations therefrom have been so frequent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 9d. providing for a refund of taxes which have been collected unjustly and upon an unfair and inequitable valuation of land. This rule is not without its exceptions and limitations. LATIN MAXIM: 6c.25602 31 (February 18.R. The surplus of wheat grains were finally utilized into flour and sold in 1959. it is disregarded in Act Nos. 1970) Chapter VII. Petitioner paid sales tax of P37. Inc. 7a. Petitioner prays that the word “land” in the title and body of the statute be interpreted to mean “land including buildings and improvements thereon”. 975 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an excessive assessment on taxes prior to the creation of the Board of Tax revision. The rule of strict construction of statutes granting exemptions from taxation is not applicable in this case. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. ISSUE: W/N the word “land” should be interpreted liberally to mean land with the buildings and improvements thereon.275. v. Page 306. L. part of which was not used in the business that year.

requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses. LATIN MAXIM: 1. said Decision was reversed by the CA for its failure to comply with Art. On appeal. This requirement is mandatory. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.R. 618 of Act No. but not its probate. Thus. L-14322 (February 25. 9a FACTS: In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu. 1960) Chapter VII. HELD: No. otherwise it is entirely void. 117 G. cancellations or insertions. 618 of Act No. 814. which requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause. A holographic will can still be admitted to probate. notwithstanding noncompliance with Art. The CA. Footnote No. citing Sec. however. 6c. for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. All these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed. No. which she shares with her father’s other heirs. the will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the testatrix failed to sign the left margin of the first page. It was also opposed by Dr. 7a. In case of alterations.165 Ajero v. and courts cannot supply the defective execution of the will. the lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. as amended. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. cannot be admitted to probate. 1994) Chapter VII. but not its entirety. we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore. Footnote No. 190. 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code. Page 309. 117 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for probate of holographic will left by the late Annie Sand. The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in accordance with law.R. it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. 7a . correctly held that Annie Sand could not dispose the other property including the house and lot. 5 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy Case No.” Accordingly. ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct that the will did not comply with the law. 813 of the New Civil Code affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will. 106720 (September 15. 190. Jose Ajero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. Sec. They alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind. 61 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. ISSUE: W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will. and was capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Page 309. No. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements. as amended. HELD: Yes. The trial court granted and/or admitted the decedent’s holographic will to probate. Court of Appeals Case No. Art.

626 but was denied by the GSIS. His regular tour of duty is from 2pm to 10pm.” and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs justify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages.166 A. Pending this. W/N the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction. 123 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lazo v. For injuries sustained. 626 was valid. On June 18. HELD: 1. v. W/N the scope of the term “action” falls under RA 1994. and damages. 2. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. the Petitioner rendered full duty. and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement. Footnote No. No. it can be seen that Petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off. HELD: No. Page 310. 2. 1962) Chapter VII. 70 G. The statute under consideration is undoubtedly a labor statute and as such must be liberally construed in favor of the laborer concerned. regular homeward route. Borja Case No. ISSUE: W/N the denial of compensation under P. ISSUE: 1. 1 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office. Ammen Transportation Company. With this limited and narrow interpretation.R. the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the next day. 78617 (June 18. LATIN MAXIM: 9a . he claimed for disability benefits under P. he met an accident and as a result. 1990) Chapter VII. L-17750 (August 31. On his way home.R. But. because the reliever did not come on time. While presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code. Page 310.L. There is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual. he sustained injuries. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. No.D. Footnote No. The Petitioner contends that the phrase “action already commenced” employed in the statute should be construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of justice. 123 FACTS: Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the CFI of Albay to recover compensation for overtime work rendered.D. Defendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff. 1986. The allegation in the complaint filed by the Respondent employee that he was “separated automatically from the said employment with Defendants. Respondent filed the present proceedings on the Court of Industrial Relations. In the case at bar. This was within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. we cannot agree. it is significant that the liberality of the law in general favor of the workingman still subsists. Inc.

All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code. During the existence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. the worker’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. as amended. which she opted to do. 313 G. Page 310. Upon expiration of the leasehold rights. 284 of the Labor Code. for another ten years. The prohibition is general. Without such law. The court held such contention untenable as the issue had already been adjudicated in the case of Anucension v. 1987) Chapter VII. Footnote No. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Abella v. and that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor. HELD: Yes. 9a. She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P. LATIN MAXIM: 5a.167 Villavert v. Footnote No. who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic.R. with the GSIS. Neither is there a showing that he used drugs. Hacienda Danao–Ramona. 2 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9a FACTS: Petitioner leased a farm land. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. ISSUE: W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner. The applicable law on the case is Art. It is renewable at her instance.” The court further stated that the purpose of Art. No. it is well settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code. 124 FACTS: The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert. it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the duties he performed as coder verifier. ISSUE: W/N the Respondents are entitled to separation pays. It was stated in the said case that “the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. HELD: From the foregoing facts of record. 71813 (July 20.D. 1981) Chapter VII. Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. Moreover. 626. No. 284 is for the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment. Page 310. computer operator and clerk typist of the Philippine Constabulary. NLRC. 9d . in Negros Occidental for a period of ten years. employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. Notwithstanding the contention of the Petitioner that the aforementioned provision violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts. L-48605 (December 14. because when she leased the farm land. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to the workers upon the expiration of the lease. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died.R. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC which affirmed the denial. including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor. employees like the Respondents will lose the benefits to which they are entitled.

he was treated for Epigastric pain. 221 of the Labor Code. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. GSIS denied such claim. herein Respondents. This was supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. 9d. the widow of the deceased. L-64204 (May 31. Bernabe. Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. Again she was denied by the GSIS. Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of Enteric Fever. the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be applied. the case should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents. Jr. 9d. “in any proceeding before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters. Page 310. it was still paid.R. HELD: Yes. 40b . Page 310. 79 G. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband was due to his occupation. The claimant. 9a. According to Art. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. The latter allowed the appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the appeal was made. Claimant filed for a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his employment.. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late. it is well settled that in case of doubt. 124 FACTS: Petitioner. Footnote No. However. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Manahan v. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment.” The lack of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even though the payment was late.168 Del Rosario & Sons v. 1981) Chapter VII. L-44899 (April 22.and ulcer-like symptoms. No. a logging company. thus the presumption of compensability should be in favor of the claimant. The Labor Arbiter found the security agency to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging company. ISSUE: W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should invalidate the appeal. The security guards. ISSUE: W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits. entered into a contract of services with Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a teacher in the Las Piñas Municipal High School. 36 No. Footnote No. She then appealed her case to the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim. filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. 1985) Chapter VII. HELD: No. ECC. the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice. Moreover. 40b FACTS: Nazario Manahan. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

However. and one of them happens to be insolvent. it should be construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. who was killed in the line of duty by criminals.R. Workmen’s Compensation Commission Case No. are similar to those expressly mentioned. In declaring certain stipulations to be against public policy. 9c. The Tenancy Act is a remedial legislation intended to better the lot of the share-cropper by giving him a more equitable participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. Petitioner claimed that the contract is not among those expressly declared to be against public policy in Sec. the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which. 36. owner of first class agricultural land. It was taken to the Court of Industrial Relations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. which he argues to be an exhaustive list. 7 of the Tenancy Law. The purpose of the law might easily be defeated otherwise. They hired Roque Balderama as a security guard. Page 310. Footnote No. HELD: No.169 Liwanag v. 1959) Chapter VII. Petitioner was to furnish the work animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all expenses of planting and cultivation.40 to the claimant in lump sum. the liability of business partners should be solidary. The WCA should be construed fairly. 9d. 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code and Sec. the award would only be partially satisfied. they claim that because the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not give an express provision declaring solidary obligations of business partners. 40 . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Altar Case No. ISSUE: W/N the contract is against public policy as contemplated in Sec. reasonably and liberally for the employee and dependents. Appellants did not question the right of Appellees to compensation nor the amount awarded. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. the tenant shall receive 50% only. 279 G. the compensation should be divisible. though not specified. Being a remedial statute. 38. which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. L-12164 (May 2.494. 7 of the Tenancy Law. which declared the contract illegal as against public policy as contemplated in Sec. The contract was disapproved by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice because the division contravenes with a provision of the Tenancy Law. entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. L-1916 (April 30. 12a. If the responsibility were to be merely jointly. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sibulo v. other provisions of law show how their liability is solidary. ISSUE: W/N the Commission erred in ordering the Appellants to pay jointly and severally. 2 of the WCA reasonably indicate that in compensation cases. 36. No. HELD: No. 125 FACTS: Appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Suppy.R. Although the WCA does not contain any provision expressly declaring that the obligation arising from compensation is solidary. 1949) Chapter VII. 75 G. Page 310. Art. 9c. Footnote No. for the reason that instead of receiving 60% of his total share. The net produce was to be divided equally. His widow and children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. which was granted in an award that ordered the Appellants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P3. 7 of the Tenancy Law.

the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the Agricultural Tenancy Act. Page 310. No. he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to “income benefits” under the GSIS retirement program. The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.170 Guerrero v. He shared 1/3 of the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. The application was supported by a physician’s certification that Petitioner was classified as under “permanent total disability. Footnote No. 12. Afterwards. which affirmed the Court of Agrarian Reform’s decision. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries and requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. the rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. which ordered his reinstatement. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the suit was a share tenancy agreement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA. No. L-44570 (May 30. 11b.” The significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income benefits. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations. Later the Petitioners ordered Benitez out. the Petitioners and Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant. 12a . The Court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers. 85024 (January 23. 1991) Chapter VII. especially the humble rank and file. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. 127 G. GSIS contended that Petitioner was only “permanent partial disability”. 168 G. But assuming that they were. ISSUE: Whether Petitioner was under permanent total disability or permanent partial disability. HELD: No. At the course of his employment. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform.1986) Chapter VII. 126 FACTS: Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. the Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Page 310. 54 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Vicente v. 32. So at the age of forty-five. Footnote No. HELD: Petitioner was under permanent total disability. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation.R.R. ISSUE: W/N share tenancy ended. Pending appeal. The ECC affirmed the GSIS decision. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law. the decisions lost their validity. 38 FACTS: Petitioner was an employed nursing attendant. Court of Appeals Case No.

Her husband. approved on June 15. The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma’s uterus developed before or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the body. it can only be given effect from the date of its approval. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner could avail the compensation benefit. 131 FACTS: 265 employees of Appellee Manila Hotel Co. 283 G. et al. 86020 (August 5. Page 311. 15 days before they were separated from the company. But said agency denied. On her 4th pregnancy. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to be due them under the same section of the Administrative Code. Employee’s Compensation Commission Case No. 83 G. brought the present action to recover from the Appellee Manila Hotel Co. 1954. As RA 1081 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a “hilot”. L-8975 (June 29. Art. 128 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Corporal v. She underwent hysterectomy but she died afterwards. While as a rule that labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: No. No. she suffered complete abortion. filed a claim for compensation benefit with GSIS. that is to say. Footnote No.171 Tamayo. who had to be dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under Sec. as amended by RA 611.. LATIN MAXIM: 46a FACTS: Norma Corporal was an employed public school teacher. Footnote No. 1954. when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June 30. 266 of the Administrative Code. An hour later.R. Page 311. 1957) Chapter VII. During the course of her work. Manila Hotel Company Case No. HELD: No. herein Petitioner. she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. The matter was elevated to ECC but the petition was also dismissed because the cause of his wife’s death was non-work-related. ISSUE: W/N Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued benefits.R. there is also a rule that such liberal construction cannot be applied if the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code are clear. as later amended by RA 1081. On her 5th pregnancy. No. 43 . she had several pregnancies. v. 1994) Chapter VII.

the SC contends that Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. 22 should still apply to special laws. it makes no exception. 48 FACTS: On June 1983. Page 320. When the decision was published. 1922. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 167 People v. the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mizaph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. Moran Case No. Hence with regard to Art.172 People v. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed. which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9. Nos. pursuant to Sec. The court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones. LATIN MAXIM: 48 . Furthermore. always susceptible possible challenges. 37. Footnote No.R. 3030. as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. 1923) Chapter VII. Under this. 222 G. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Footnote No. 168 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION FACTS: Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. 1961. Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed. it was increased to 6 months. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory. it is also presumed that the purchaser has examined the instruments of the record. 71 of Act No.R. HELD: The SC ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court. 1989) Chapter VII. 17905 (January 27. Also. a liberal reading that is most favorable to the accused is the one to be adopted. Furthermore. the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. LATIN MAXIM: 26. should the circumstances warrant. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. 216 G. When the statute makes no distinction. in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes. However as the deed was registered on May 26. Rights should not be left on a precarious balance. Moran. HELD: Act No. No. 74226-227 (July 27. ISSUE: W/N Act No. as stated in People v. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period. This should also apply to criminal cases. 46a. Reyes Case No. 7. Page 320.

be construed in relation to C. 145 No. Petitioner expressed his desire to be laid-off under the provisions of RA 3844. 1955 at P50 plus P10 per month for each minor. on June 22. Later. Executive Secretary and Agrarian Reforms Case No.A. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision. for P100 a month and an additional P10 per minor. ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent Gasilao’s pension. L-36153 (November 28. as amended by RA 6389. and RA 3844. To pay the difference of P100 plus P30 per month and P20 per month for each minor from June 22. 1971. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to both gratuity benefits under C. as amended by RA 6389. Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 1968.A. The laws on veteran pension must be liberally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. 1971 up to December 31. Respondent Gasilao only received a 25% increase and only after January 15. Bautista Case No. as amended by RA 6389. a veteran. one under its provisions and another pursuant to C.R. Footnote No. the difference of P75 plus P22. No. Footnote No. 38b . RA 5753 was approved. No. effective December 18. sent a letter to the Respondent Secretary of the Department. GSIS approved his retirement gratuity under C. and that in the absence of an express repeal or amendment therein. 1971. as amended by RA 1616 but denied his claim for gratuity under RA 3844. as amended by RA 1616. 186. However. 1968. 1969. and P20 per minor from January 16. After finally complying with all the necessities. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. in case of ambiguity. No. 186 prohibiting an employer from paying double retirement benefits to an employee. The difference from June 22. starting from December 18. HELD: No. he was awarded with the full benefits of RA 65. No. 1957 to August 7. L-37867 (February 22. No.A.A. 186 and in the light of its provisions.A. There is nothing in RA 3844. increased to P100 from June 22. 186. Page 321. an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms. No. 170 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Legaspi v. Page 322. 1957 up to August 7. The lower court granted Respondent Gasilao his pension. on the condition that he would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under C. 1982) Chapter VII. But. HELD: Respondent Gasilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. 40b FACTS: Petitioner. 9 and RA 1920. due to the lack of funds. Conrado Estrella. 186. which should all be construed together. as amended by RA 1616. 1975) Chapter VII. as amended by RA 6389. 1971. 173 FACTS: Respondent Gasilao.173 Board of Administrators of the PVA v. from June 22. all other laws extending retirement benefits to government employees should. 1969 up to January 15. 1955 at the rate of P50. the judgment of the lower courts is modified as. 1969 to January 14. and then P100 plus P10 per minor. 37 G. 186. as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds. Granting such pensions the earliest possible time is more in tune with the spirit of RA 65. 1972 is subject to the release of funds by the government. No.50 per month for his wife. it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.A. Being the law governing the retirement of government employees. This interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law embodied in C. the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes. that would suggest that an employee who is laid-off or prefers to be laid-off can receive two pension benefits. failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension.

M. HELD: He belongs to the second category of Sec. as amended by P. 1. resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office. 1 of RA 910.174 Re: Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. Since 1978 however. No. No. requiring all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the members of the Supreme Court. No. However. more so. Footnote No. No. not being a voluntary resignation (as held in Ortiz v. in the same manner as it has done since 1978. 74 of the Official Gazette. 41 provided that the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement is equivalent to the monthly salary he was receiving on the date of his retirement. 74 of the Official Gazette. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security. and 27 days were served in the Judiciary. 174 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Re: Application For Retirement Under R. No. Britanico of the IAC Case No. GSIS computed the monthly pension as follows: 1) highest salary.D. P. should have rendered “at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both. As provided in Sec.” They fall into three categories: XXX 2. BP 129). 30. The acceptance of his courtesy resignation. those who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of their office and had rendered at least 20 years service in the judiciary or in any other branch of the government or both XXX ISSUE: Which category Justice Britanico belongs to. 74 of the Official Gazette. which did not provide how to compute the monthly pension starting from the sixth year of retirement. plus 2) highest representation and transportation allowances (RATA). This is definitely more in keeping with and gives substance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that.23 years.M. 1986. Justice Britanico served the government for 36. 1989) Chapter VII. Retirement laws should be liberally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.D. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 30. retirement laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. 40b FACTS: Justice Britanico requested that he be granted retirement benefits under RA 910 in addition to or in lieu of benefits he received under RA 1616 upon termination of his service in the Judiciary by the acceptance of his courtesy resignation by President Aquino. 128 A. of which 10 years. the judges or justices who may enjoy retirement benefits with their lifetime annuity. COMELEC). 60 A.A. 1438 which was published in Vol. in Vol. Page 323. HELD: The Court directed GSIS to continue implementing RA 910. 1 dated February 25. 1990) Chapter VII. 177 FACTS: This matter was brought about due to two separate publications in the Official Gazette of the same amendment to RA 910 (Special Retirement Law of Judges and Justices). LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Footnote No. for those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. 1438. which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 70 years. pursuant to Proclamation No. 1438 was published in Vol. being remedial in character.D. Page 322. ISSUE: Which version of P. The basis was the copy of P. (May 15. 6484-Ret. 43c . 40b. 2 months. 1438 must be followed. 09-9-019-SC (October 4. plus 3) longevity pay (which was considered part of the salary starting in 1983 pursuant to Sec. 42. No. not only for those who have retained their vigor but. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.D.

LATIN MAXIM: 9c. ISSUE: W/N they should be granted benefits under RA 910 pursuant to the Plana or Britanico ruling. the Rules of Court also state that the appeal needs only one surety. HELD: No. When the court allows exemptions to fix rules for certain judges. Footnote No. HELD: Yes. 9e. A close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the judges is necessary to determine their qualification to receive benefits under RA 910. 132 A. 181 FACTS: These are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed by six retired judges. So long as the surety is solvent and acceptable to the court. According to the Rules of Court. Defendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal bond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. The court only allows the use of the Plana or Britanico ruling if the career of the judge was marked by competence. the defect in the appeal bond. They want to take advantage of the Plana and Britanico ruling. Page 325. The bond would have been filed on time if it had not been for the defect. 178 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ramirez v. The crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. 1962) Chapter VII.D. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the SC saying that the CFI committed a grave abuse of discretion. it would suffice that the court approves such.M. 29. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the next day.175 Re: Gregorio G. Arrieta Case No. The clerk of court suggested that the document first be completed by the Plaintiff before filing it.R. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1990) Chapter VII. 42a FACTS: Petitioner filed an action against Apolinar Serina seeking the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. even if indeed 2 sureties were needed. Pineda Case No. 6789-RET (Jul 13. Most of the judges however retired bowing to policy considerations. Paredes and Gerochi. 37. id est courtesy resignations. in addition to or in lieu of the benefits under RA 1616 or P. the court would not have been deprived of jurisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. 1146. Moreover. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining a just determination of their cases. The CFI dismissed the complaint. de Lara. No. Page 323. ISSUE: W/N the CFI committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal bond. The judge disapproved the bond and rendered the judgment final and executory. The rule is that retirement laws are construed liberally in favor of the retiring employee. there are ample reasons behind each grant. 130 G. The De La Llana ruling is an essential factor in determining whether or not the judges should be granted the benefits they ask for. It stated that if a judge was not recommended for reappointment following their courtesy resignations then the relevant factors were considered and they were found wanting. a personal appeal bond need not necessarily be subscribed by 2 sureties. Footnote No. The action of the CFI is harsh and improvident according to the SC. Furthermore. Montesclaros. it did. asking that they be granted gratuity and/or retirement benefits under RA 910. No. namely Pineda. Montecillo. as amended. 9d. 9e. The Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. it should suffice. The end of the 30 day period fell on a Sunday hence it was moved to the following Monday but one of the two bondsmen was unable to sign the appeal bond. 11b . L-19183 (Nov. integrity and dedication to the public service.

Private Respondent made a money market placement. 9d. 1290 of the Civil Code. mandate a liberal construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. This prevents legal compensation from taking place under Art. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money market investment which was subsequently granted by the court. The filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutely and unconditionally the injunction issued. Hamoy Case No. Compensation cannot extend to unliquidated disputed claim arising from breach of contract. Private Respondent filed an ex parte motion praying that five branches of the bank pay her the total amount of the money market interest. Had Respondent Judge been less technical and more sensible. Thus. the Respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint “for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre-trial conference. Footnote No.R.81M of private Respondent to Petitioner is however in doubt. ISSUE: W/N there can be legal compensation in the case at bar. she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the bank refused to pay the interest earned by the placement.176 International Corporate Bank v. Page 326. Meanwhile. The Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Court themselves. The supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred by erasures. fortified by jurisprudence. 1988) Chapter VII. HELD: Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the setoff against the other is neither clear nor liquidated. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. 30. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Del Rosario v. and/or additions. By such rigidity. 9d. The debt of P6. No. Page 326. 18b . He could have easily required counsel for Plaintiff to buy the documentary stamp and affix it to the special power of attorney and it would not have taken ten minutes. 11b FACTS: For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial purposes. the present proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court would have been avoided. alterations. 35 No. 18a. The mortgaged properties were auctioned. The amount approved for release was used to pay for her other obligations to Petitioner. 63 G. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. L-6970 (Jan. Footnote No. 181 FACTS: Private Respondent secured a loan from Petitioner’s predecessor in interest by mortgaging her properties. HELD: Yes. in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff. L-77154 (June 30. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made by the insurance company itself since there were no ready-made forms available. 1987) Chapter VII. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. The court issued a writ of execution against Petitioner’s property. Respondent denied the Petitioner substantial justice. which was granted. applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. Petitioner is indebted to private Respondent in the amount of the money market interest.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case because the document did not have the required one-peso documentary stamp. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. The decision of the CA is affirmed. Such bond was therefore rendered without force and effect.

1984) Chapter VII. Footnote No. thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days extension to file a petition for review.D. It is an administrative agency. 6 of P. may properly be filed with and granted by the IAC (now the Court of Appeals). a decision was promulgated by the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended and declared the case terminated. 1986) Chapter VII. 22 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act and Sec. The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. 69 No. 39 of BP 129 expressly refers to “courts”. that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review under Sec. Sec. HELD: No. the organic law of the SEC. 181 FACTS: A decision was rendered against Petitioner by the RTC. 37. 181 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gimenez v.D. save in exceptionally meritorious cases. Footnote No. However. ISSUE: W/N Respondent court erred in terminating the case. Repeals by implication are not favored. 39 of BP 129 applies to the SEC. L-73146-53 (August 26. 902-A. is still in force. 902-A was modified by Sec. 7a. HELD: Yes. The Court rules. awards of decisions of any court. 39 of the Judiciary Revamp Law (BP 129) which provides for a period of 15 days for appealing from final order.177 Lacsamana v. The SEC is not a court. Securities and Exchange Commission Case No. 24a. The Respondent court cited a Supreme Court decision where the issue was regarding an extension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the question of granting a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. LATIN MAXIM: 2a. L-68568 (December 26. an extension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may be granted by the CA. for the guidance of Bench and Bar. The SEC denied their motion for reconsideration for being filed out of time. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 22(b) of the Interim Rules. Page 326. The SEC ruled that the 30-day period provided for in Sec. resolutions. 27 FACTS: Gimenez Stockbrokerage filed a motion for reconsideration before the Commissioners of the SEC 27 days after receiving their decision. ISSUE: W/N Sec. The 30-day period fixed by P. 38b . Page 326. 52 No. The Court further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as follows: … (6) Period of extension of time to file petition for review: Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. 5b.

76 of Act No. the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the requirements. 6d. 7a FACTS: Herein Defendants were to pay a counterbond to which they had complied with. The non-presentation of this certificate was not due to the Petitioner’s failure or omission but to the refusal of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by the Petitioner. 36 G. There was substantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the Sheriff’s office the Defendant’s counterbond. the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office.178 Blanco v. 1946) Chapter VII. LATIN MAXIM 6d. HELD: Under Sec. 187 FACTS: To comply with the requirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P16 to the Collector of Internal Revenue. 1936) Chapter VII. ISSUE: W/N the requisites were complied with and W/N the court should grant the remedy prayed for by the Petitioners.R. Page 326. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. However the Collector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to be its depositary. No. Due to unfortunate circumstances the Sheriff failed to deliver a copy of such counterbond to the counsel to formalize the act of furnishing a copy.R. 190 on how appeals are perfected. The sole purpose of the counterbond is to enable the Plaintiff to see that the bond is in the prescribed form and for the right amount. ISSUE: W/N the Defendants complied with the requirement of filing a counterbond and W/N the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. 9d . HELD: Yes to both issues. No. Page 327. 9a. “… The bond to be given shall be filed with the justice of peace …. On the occasion when the Sheriff received the copy of such. Footnote No. Negligence or unavoidable circumstances should not adversely affect the Defendant under the circumstance of this case. L-44970 (March 31. 183 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case and Nantz v. They furnished the Sheriff with a copy of the said counterbond to comply with the requirement. Footnote No. 49 G. The Sheriff is then tasked to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. Jugo Case No. In lieu of such bond the Appellant may file with the justice a certificate of the proper official that the Appellant has deposited P25 with the municipal treasurer (In Manila with the Collector of Internal Revenue). Bernabe and Lawyers Cooperatuve Publishing Co. The Petitioners therefore have complied with said requirements. The fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not been issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. L-832 (October 14. With such. He asked the latter if there were objections to the said counterbond and the counsel replied none.

91 G. to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible.R. 14881 (February 5. was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation. LATIN MAXIM: 9d FACTS: A redemption of property from an execution sale. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law. Raymundo Case No. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. 1920) Chapter VII.R. or assignee as such. ISSUE: W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief. Footnote No. Viuda de Ordoveza v. L-45155 (July 31. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. 192 FACTS: Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her brief. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. No. Any ordinary creditor. 189 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Javellana v.179 C. on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal. having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. Under the Rules of Court “the court may. 41 . Page 328. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. No. which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana). 1936) Chapter VII. HELD: A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property. Page 327. 65 G.

There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy.180 Del Rosario v. and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. intracranial.000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. ISSUE: How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1.R. therefore. Case No. 30a . have not acquired any technical meaning. causing Eduardo to fall. and Casualty Co. which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Footnote No. caused by his participation in a boxing contest. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured. independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. No. LATIN MAXIM: 3. HELD: The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. 1961) Chapter VII. Part I of the provisions of the policy. 156 G. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death. binding itself to pay the sum of P1. was not accidental and. filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy.. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional. Equitable Ins. L-16138 (April 29. 192 FACTS: Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head. & Surety Co. Simon de la Cruz..R. Case No. father of the insured. as used in insurance contracts.” HELD: The terms “accident” and “accidental”. filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. 38 FACTS: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co. 34 G. 1. as indemnity for the death of the insured.000.000 to P3. unexpected. with his head hitting the rope of the ring. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De la Cruz v. 1963) Chapter VII. Page 328. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario. not covered by insurance. No. Footnote No. L-16215 (June 29. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured. Capital Ins. the father of the insured.000. Petitioner. Page 328. 25a. The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1. left. ISSUE: W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means.000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2. Inc.000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. Inc. LATIN MAXIM: 11a. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3.

7a. permission or possibility. As the terms of the policies are clear. Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. No.R. L-28742 (April 30. On December 24. 46 G. No. the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy. 1961) Chapter VII. an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. 156 G. a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. 2(b). entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant. the term "may be" connotes possibility. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty. Inc. First National Surety & Assurance Co. Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Hence. express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue. All that was found by the trial court. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. Case No. HELD: The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. which issued to him personal accident policies. among which being the eight above named Defendants. or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides. Ocampo Case No. 192 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Capati v. b . HELD: No. it does not connote certainty.. at the election of the Plaintiff.R. which is not disputed on appeal. 1953. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand. a resident of Pampanga. Fighting his way out of the factory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 328. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies. a resident of Naga City. 9c FACTS: Plaintiff.181 Ty Vs. 25a. opportunity. However. was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand. L-16138 (April 29. 8 FACTS: Plaintiff Diosdado C." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Page 330. the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. Footnote No. Footnote No." In addition. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. 1982) Chapter VIII. ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct. which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found. Under ordinary circumstances. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid.

the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information. 2709 states that. 36a.R. No.” A perusal of Act No. the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. and two new accused were included. unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier. Page 331. the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular: "Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders. must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila. 121 G. 25a . 58 G. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 9a." effective October 1.R. except in the cases determined in Sec. L-6481 (May 17. Figueroa Case No. 36b undated memorandum of FACTS: In the trial of People v. 1954) Chapter VIII. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein. 1968. regardless of location. HELD: Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons. Page 333. 17 FACTS: Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. HELD: Yes. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full. 1 is mandatory. not merely directory. ISSUE: W/N the unnumbered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature. 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Guiao v. Sec. “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. No. 1968. 1987) Chapter VIII. they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. On 1968. L-38513 (March 31. an amended information was filed. National Government Auditing Office Case No. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks. Footnote No. Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano.182 Chartered Bank v. namely. Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. Gopez. After the reinvestigation. 9a. 2 of this Act. LATIN MAXIM: 7a.

9a .R. 1997) Chapter VIII. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. However. 36a. No. During the pendency of the said petition. Page 334. he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. No. Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. 25a.183 Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association. as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision. Inc. 153 G. b FACTS: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. 23 FACTS: The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction.R. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. 1997) Chapter VIII. 102858 (July 28. Page 334. Court of Appeals Case No. 22 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Director of Lands v. Hence. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Court of Appeals Case No. it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. Later. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”. Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution. Footnote No. 38b. 117188 (August 7. it was found that the applicant had been in open. continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. 95 G. LATIN MAXIM: 9c. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. HELD: No. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. Thus. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. v. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. HELD: It is mandatory. Footnote No. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it. an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8. Agana Sr.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption. L-35910 (July 21. LATIN MAXIM: 6c FACTS: Private Respondents filed in court a quo. 133 G. the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. R. 1978) Chapter VIII. and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. 7a. Case No. No. 1997) FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner.” After receipt. 51765 (March 3. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" denotes discretion. 25 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Republic Planers Bank v. 6b.184 Bersabal v. the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same. in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency. Footnote No. Furthermore. Respondent Judge. “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. HELD: The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. ISSUE: W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. No. ISSUE: W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents’ preferred shares HELD: Yes. 30b. stated that.000.R. Salvador Case No. the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional".00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. 36a . the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". 34 G. Page 335.

121 G. “The Department of Public Works.D. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable.D.R. illegal and baseless. The basic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning. Considering the multi-million profits of the company. HELD: Yes. 217 which provides. 9f. 39c . Thus. 1983) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Phil. No. 11b. the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility.” ISSUE: W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion. v. ISSUE: W/N the previous decision rendered making it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Case No. 12a FACTS: Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. Consumers Foundation . unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. the consumers and the government itself. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P. but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent. L-63318 (August 18.. the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. 24. 217 deals with matters so alien.. because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec.185 Phil.R. LATIN MAXIM: 8b. Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated . Inc. HELD: Yes. which construction is not supported by the actual phraseology of said Section 2. 217 to the then Department of Public Works. NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. Consumers Foundation.D. L-63318 (November 25. Transportation and Communications as mandatory. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 2 of P. 9d. the phrase "may be promulgated" should not be construed to mean "shall" or "must". 217 should be reconsidered. 6d. therefore. 94 G. 36. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and. Hence. 1984) FACTS: Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. v. No.D. 30b. Inc. P.

67(b) of the LGC. a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists between the two. with the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan. which provides that “investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or controlled by the government shall subject to availability of loanable funds … accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate” for certain specified purposes.O. Respondent company contended however that the word “shall” used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. 34 FACTS: Petitioner. “at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years. 25a. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory. depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. 50 HELD: No.O. the word “shall” is imperative. 93 G. The modifier.” It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay execution. In the absence of an express repeal. 33 G. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Case No. 18 was repealed by RA 7160. et. RA 7160 did not expressly repeal Sec. There is none in this case. Page 337.O. No. Sec. and accordingly. citing Sec. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can use his back pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company. The lower court sustained Respondent company. 26. FACTS: Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of Tiwi. 6. 26 . But as to when the discounting or acceptance shall be made. 2 of RA 304. 1995) Chapter VIII. 6 of A. Footnote No.A. Guingona. No. 112099 (February 21. for whose benefit the same have been issued. the interest to be charged. 18. No. sought to compel Respondent company to accept his back pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. 68 provides that “an appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. Albay for 1) abuse of authority. 32 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Berces v. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to be “subject” to the condition of the availability of loanable funds.186 Diokno v. The Office of the President stayed execution.R. it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall be allowed on the condition that there are “available loanable funds. Footnote No. A. Case No. suspended in both cases.” In other words. 530(f).”. No. Page 336. It is true that in its ordinary signification. the context and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. 18. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws on executive orders that are intended to be repealed.R. can be carried out by fixing a maximum limit for discounts. 68 of RA 7160 and Sec.O. 7160 repealed A. it was by implication which is not favored. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. and 2) dishonesty. that the verbphrase is mandatory because not only the law uses “at not more” but the legislative purpose and intent. If there was any repeal. ISSUE: W/N R. the rule is not absolute. L-4712 (July 11. HELD: No. According to Petitioner. His basis was Sec. the holder of a back pay certificate of indebtedness issued under RA 304. al. The first sentence of Sec. No. The term “shall” may be read mandatory or directory. Respondent mayor appealed to the Office of the President and prayed for stay of execution under Sec. Petitioner further contends that A. Respondent mayor was convicted. 1952) Chapter VIII. However. acceptance or discount is to be permitted only if there are loanable funds. No. the governing law is RA 7160. to conserve the value of the back pay certificate for the benefit of the holders. it may be construed as “may” when required by the context or by the intention of the statute.

v. and on appeal. Therefore. in its language. 48 G. Court of Appeals Case No. The Labor Arbiter found the shutdown with cause but without the required notice. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the posting of bond is to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. 37 FACTS: Petitioner hired Respondent workers as piece rate workers. Despite the reduction granted. He was convicted by the trial court. the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. “No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel”. Petitioner still failed to post bond within 10 days. Footnote No. HELD: The CA erred. 1998) Chapter VIII. et al. 1988) Chapter VIII. the rule is mandatory. Sec. and ordered Petitioner to pay indemnity and separation pay.187 Mers Shoes Manufacturing. Under Art. 26 FACTS: Petitioner. Also. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. 81 G. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed. The workers challenged the legality of Petitioner’s stoppage of operations. Inc.R. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. ISSUE: W/N Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.R. 223 of the Labor Code. Because of the word “shall”. HELD: No. Perfection of appeal is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Instead. an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. Petitioner appealed to Respondent NLRC but sought a reduction of the cash or surety bond. Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. resulting to the dismissal of appeal for failure to perfect it. thus in violation of BP 22. issued and made out check No. the Appellate Court. 35 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fule v. Page 337. prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Petitioner barred its workers from entering the company to work. LATIN MAXIM: 9d . No. L-79094 (June 22. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon posting of cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. 123669 (February 27. Alleging serious business decline. National Labor Relations Commission. Footnote No. Page 337. No.

R. Footnote No. However. this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation.188 McGee v. 338 which states that “a step-child. While Art. In addition. 1954) Chapter VIII. 335. 335 of the old Civil Code which states that “those who have legitimate. acknowledged natural children. which led to further investigations and. ISSUE: W/N the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Fil Co. Inc. 335 and Art. 1983) Chapter VIII. 101 G. 28 of the BIR was filed by the Petitioners. Art. Page 338. statues offering rewards must be liberally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. Petitioner and Leonarda have one legitimate child. recovery of collection. However. Republic Case No. L-44004 (March 25. ISSUE: W/N a husband having a legitimate child may adopt a step-child.” LATIN MAXIM: 15a FACTS: Confidential Information No. One of these was Pan Fil Co.00 to US $1. but also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings. the information given by him must lead to or be instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation … and results in the recovery of collection of revenues …. In jurisprudence. Further.00 – defrauding the Philippine Government of millions of pesos in taxes. 335 is phrased in a negative manner: cannot adopt. Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the Confidential Information. 338 is positive: the following may be adopted. an American citizen married to Leonarda Crisostomo. 40 FACTS: Petitioner. 4 of RA 2338. it must be noted that Art. invoking Art. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had been falsely declaring their gross earnings – on the basis of a parity rate of P2. or natural children by legal fiction” cannot adopt. No. Therefore. 338 should be considered in relation to each other. 338 meaningless and a surplusage.R. a company which is not included in the Confidential Information. Despite Art. 9d . No. HELD: No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. by the step-father or step-mother” can be adopted. 335 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to qualify as an adopter. HELD: Yes. Footnote No. L-5387 (April 29. One strong argument presented by the trial court in upholding the adoption is that to hold otherwise would render Art.” Not only did the BIR rely on the Confidential Information submitted by the Petitioners for their investigation. According to Sec. under the laws of statutory construction. legitimated. Now the Petitioners seek their 25% reward taken from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies – as provided by RA 2338. “In order to entitle an informer to a reward. consequently. wants to adopt her children by her first husband. 174 G. That a parent can adopt a step-child is limited by Art. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. the trial court ruled in favor of the adoption. he is barred from doing so under Art. One principle behind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. Page 337. 37 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Penid v. Virata Case No. Inc.

Respondent Tabalba was proclaimed Mayor. 124 G. ISSUE: W/N Appellant can claim as votes in his favor ballots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. HELD: No. Appellant claimed that his name was only misplaced but the intention to elect him as mayor was apparent. A name can be counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the ballot for the vote for such office. Page 342. ISSUE: 1. No. Camiguin. and is assumed to be received in the regular course of the mail. Considering that in 59 ballots claimed by Appellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor. But the Clerk of Court said that his office did not receive any “notice of appeal” from Petitioner. it is indispensable that his name be written by the voter in the ballot and cannot be mistaken by a person who. The trial court dismissed the election protest for non-payment on time of the required fees for filing an initiatory pleading. 7b. It is impossible to count a ballot as vote for a candidate for mayor. The notice of appeal can be validly substituted by an appeal brief. Petitioner filed a “verified appeal” brief. 43 . LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Petitioner’s appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescribed period. member of the provincial board or councilor. HELD: 1. 1994) Chapter VIII. Footnote No. 1949) Chapter VIII. Footnote No. Page 342. The filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. 9d. 110170 (February 21. 9c. is able to read. Within the 5-day period to appeal. For any ballot to be counted for a candidate for mayor.R. et al. Statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. L-2327 (January 11. filed as of the date of mailing. 63 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pimentel v. The docket fee was paid although insufficient. Tabalba. 2. 64 FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of Guinsiliban. Case No. Festejo Case No. as provided by the Constitution. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the docket fees he paid were insufficient. 40b FACTS: Festejo was proclaimed Mayor of Santa Lucia with Appellant protesting. 2. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in not crediting to him the 59 ballots which would have made him win. No. W/N the “verified appeal” was validly dismissed. The RTC was sent copies by registered mail within the prescribed period. No. when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. LATIN MAXIM: 6d. W/N the trial judge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non-payment on time of the required fees.R. No. Appellant’s name in the 59 ballots were written on different lines such as those corresponding to vice-mayor.189 Pahilan v. he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. 96 G.

Baltazar sold the property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central. 1839 was issued by said office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. His attempted notification on December 25. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. 75 FACTS: Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. No. Said office refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by another certificate of title. HELD: No. the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of Casamayor. In the latter part of 1913. The assessor cannot make a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. 1915. the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal. The city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed. Footnote No. 43 . Court of Appeals Case No. In 1951. 264 G. Casamayor sold the land in favor of Nemesia Baltazar. and not Sec. OCT No. Furthermore. 1839 was lost during the war and upon the petition of Baltazar. Negros Occidental. under Homestead Patent No. OCT No. in the name of Petitioner. 14-R. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. which prohibits the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. L-12182 (March 27. consisting of 21. It was finished in all respects on February 15.R. 19 FACTS: A parcel of land. LATIN MAXIM: 37b.A. applying Sec. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the taxes. Page 345. was not given during the time fixed by statute. 145 G. 28985. thus there was no legal assessment of the Roxas Building for the year 1915. Suit was begun in the CFI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment. Page 345. 1987) Chapter VIII. HELD: No. under the date of December 1. under protest. ISSUE: W/N the assessment was legal. ISSUE: W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question was null and void from the beginning. 75 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Serfino v. TCT No. On the same day. requiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1915. Upon registration of said patent.000. 141. 1914.R. No. 118 of C. 1918) Chapter VIII. Apparently. sent Plaintiffs notice. 44139. which amounted to P3. 1914. In 1945. received by them on December 25. 40858 (September 15. 121 which governs sale to corporations. the construction of a reinforced concrete building was begun. The city assessor and collector of Manila.1676 hectares situated in Sagay. was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. 1914. Footnote No. Rafferty Case No. The law requires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during November.190 Roxas v. TCT No. which did not present the documents for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. No. Since the grant was more than 5 years before. the city assessor and collector were under the obligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list.

110 of the Civil Code.000 for his outstanding obligation. Tacloban was her domicile of origin by operation of law. Leyte. Commission on Elections Case No. G. Residency qualification pertains to domicile. As a minor. for election purposes. No. what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. petitioner was obliged. ISSUE: W/N petitioner was a resident. The loan was to be released in installments. In spite of the being born in Manila. The outstanding obligation of the petitioners with respondent.59. 1 FACTS: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 25a. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P14. of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the 1995 elections. when such backpay certificates are offered in payment to a government-owned corporation of obligation thereto which was not subsisting at the time of the enactment of said Act on June 20. 1953. 119976 (September 18. 1970) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Romualdez-Marcos v. 1995) Chapter VIII. 39a . filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with respondent COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. to follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. Page 347. Development Bank of the Philippines Case No. when she married then Congressman Marcos. Therefore. LATIN MAXIM: 28. out of the proceeds of his back pay pursuant to RA No. Although Mr. 37. once acquired. it is retained until a new one is gained. 7a. petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in Tacloban. 897 (RA 897). The Court cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the provision of law. Hence. amounted to P13. Marcos has different places of residence. Parenthetically. by virtue of Art. Private respondent Montejo. she did not lose her domicile of origin. 6c. HELD: Yes. HELD: No. 1953 when RA 897 was approved. 26419 (October 16.R. the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position. such corporation may not legally be compelled to accept the certificates. ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s obligation is subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. As domicile. No. R.84 FACTS: Petitioner filed an urban estate loan with respondent which was approved.191 Quijano v.983. Respondent advised petitioners of the non-acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred before or subsisting on June 20. 137 G. The provision expressly provides that the obligations must be subsisting at the time of the approval of RA 897. including interests. and even if he had designated one.

1928. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court. Footnote No. Appellee Portillo. filed an election protest on July 9. 14 FACTS: Appellant Salvani won the elections in 1928 for the office of provincial governor of Antique. his nearest opponent. lost and filed an appeal thereafter. Court of Appeals Case No. 243 G. 178 of the Election Code provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should be decided within three months after filing. 247 G. No. Salvani should be abandoned. However.192 Portillo v. 2. ISSUE: W/N the decision by the trial judge declaring appellee Portillo is valid. 1930) Chapter III. One year having already elapsed. 1948) Chapter VIII. 39b . b2 FACTS: Petitioner defeated Felipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. the proceeding is deemed terminated and the court loses jurisdiction rendering any subsequent decision void for want of jurisdiction. 130 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Querubin v. 5b. 9a. Salvani Case No. Decision was rendered on August 15. 1929 declaring appellee Portillo the winner. L-32181 (March 10. 18b. The doctrine in Portillo v. LATIN MAXIM: 1. this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. The appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost jurisdiction.R. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: No. Legislative history of the said legislation reveals that the shift of the tenor of the statute from silence to mild admonition to stronger suggestion and finally to an emphatic and explicit provision suggests the legislative intent to make the provision mandatory. Page 332.R. ISSUE: W/N the CA had lost their jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Page 101. The Election Law provides that all proceedings in an electoral contest shall be terminated within one year. 45. Sec. HELD: The decision is void for want of jurisdiction. 43. The dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. 7a. No. 7b. L-2581 (December 2.

No. Furthermore. 10 of the Reorganization Act No. The legislation involves social justice. 1951) FACTS: Private respondent Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at Bulacan with an area of 2 hectares. By virtue of this law. because the provisions of said Act are inconsistent with those of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 138 G. 4007. Court of Appeals Case No. or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage. Carpio and Carreon Case No. Court of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception. 189 G. imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past. to abolish all the pre-existing Boards of Examiners existing after the time of the enactment thereof. however the landowners being holders of only small parcels of land should also be entitled to social justice. 9c. 1984) Chapter III. 1 thereof amended Sec. It is obvious that it is the intention of Congress to do so.R. 46b FACTS: Petitioners were appointed members of the Board of Dental Examiners. ISSUE: W/N it was the intention of Congress. 1971 removing “personal cultivation” from the grounds for ejectment.193 Nilo v. HELD: Appointment of the respondents is valid. HELD: No. RA 546 was approved and Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation. whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. to rule against the small landowners would be thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self-reliant farmers. L-4495 (June 6. Footnote No. In the case of Camacho vs. Private respondent then filed for ejection citing “personal cultivation” on March 7. L-34586 (April 2.R. 46. 59 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Salcedo and Ignacio v. but that status is not made retrospective because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. 49 . Page 89. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 46a. 4007. a Board of Dental Examiners was appointed by the President. 1968. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that RA 3844 was amended on September 10. ISSUE: W/N the amendment of RA 6389 has retroactive effect. in enacting RA 546. Art. No. 4 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is explicitly provided. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system.

4 of the New Civil Code. 259 of the Tax Code was never intended to have a universal application. 1988) Chapter IX. The newer law. 46e . but made it “in lieu of any and all taxes. L-23771 (August 4. 50 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly gave retroactive application to Sec. all laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Upon appeal. R.194 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 9c.R. Case No.” thus leaving no room for doubt regarding the legislative intent. 7 of RA 6389. Inc. Pending the case.. 14 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Gallardo v. 78 G. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Page 355. RA 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. it may not apply to ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts. RA 3843 did not only fix and specify a franchise tax of 2% on its gross receipts. heat. 46. 49 FACTS: Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he (plaintiff) may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government job as a letter carrier.R. The Legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of a particular case. HELD: No. Sec. Borromeo Case No. instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Since Congress failed to express an intention to make said RA retroactive. They do not constitute a part of the machinery of the general government. 6389 eliminated this ground. Footnote No. HELD: It is valid. No. and power. 1988) FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges applying the franchise tax rate of 5% as prescribed in Sec. No. This law lowered the franchise tax rate to 2%. ISSUE: W/N RA 3843 is unconstitutional for being violative of the “uniformity and equality of taxation” clause of the Constitution. Charters or special laws granted and enacted by the Legislature are in the nature of private contracts. the CA applying Sec. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co. 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code. In applying Art.A. granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light. RA 3843 specifically provided for the retroactive effect of the law. 7 of RA 6389. RA 3843 was passed. held that the landowner’s desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. L-36007 (May 25. The applicable law when petitioner filed his complaint was RA 3844 which provided a ground for the ejectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding.

20563 (October 29. petitioner had been protesting the imposition of the sales tax on its APO Portland cement. While the purpose of the amendment. 1968) Chapter IX. ISSUE: Whether RA 1229 applies prospectively or retroactively. 46c. considering that RA 1612.” it certainly could not have been the intention of the lawmakers to unsettle previously consummated transactions between the taxpayer and the Government. Page 134. Footnote No. 76 G. expressly provides that said Act shall take effect upon its approval. which imposes the new and higher taxes. As a rule. 1960) Chapter IV. Respondent appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. ISSUE: W/N RA 1612 should be applied retroactively. laws have no retroactive effect. 46e . 52 G. this took effect on August of 1956. Petitioner contends that the percentage taxes collected by respondent are refundable since under RA 1229 (effective June 1955). HELD: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively. 14880 (April 29. No. the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled otherwise. as mentioned in the explanatory note to the bill. Petitioner claimed for refund and brought its case to the Court of Tax Appeals. RA 1612 amended the National Internal Revenue Code and provided for a scale of graduated rates.R. CIR Case No. producers of cement are exempt from the payment of said tax. and ad valorem tax paid from April 1955 to September 1956 from the sale of APO Portland cement produced by petitioner. an insurance company. Footnote No. No. 46c. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. 41 FACTS: The case involves petitioner’s claim for refund of sales tax paid from November 1954 to March 1955. Since 1952. and on January 1953. Petitioner assessed against the respondent taxes (to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1956) for the year 1956 based on RA 1612. 15 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. In every case of doubt. however. unless the contrary is provided. Filipinas Compaňia de Seguros Case No.R. The rule applies with greater force to the case at bar. Page 355. 46e FACTS: Respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 46a. unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. was not only to “accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem taxes but also clarify the doubt of the tax-paying public on the interpretative scope of the two terms. it also protested the payment of the ad valorem taxes.195 Cebu Portland Cement v. was engaged in business as a real estate dealer. HELD: No.

29 G. The crime took effect before the effectivity of the RPC. 36(1) of RA 3844. Ana. 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided by law. 1932) Chapter IX. and was accordingly relieved from criminal prosecution. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no binding effect until it is enacted. LATIN MAXIM: 48 FACTS: Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. 344 of the RPC. Footnote No. 36886 (February 1. The petitioner continued to serve his sentence but now prays for the Court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus. Santos Case No. No. 1 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Balatbat v.490 square meters of land owned by Garcia. otherwise nothing should be understood which is not embodied in the law. L-36378 (January 27. Conscience and good law justify this exception. LATIN MAXIM: 20. Court of Appeals and Passion Case No. However. However. Footnote No. Pampanga containing 18. 140 G. 46b. petitioner maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. Lachica married the victim. 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect. 73 FACTS: Petitioner committed rape along with Nicolas Lachica. The principle granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused applies. Page 351. Magdalena de Ocampo. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. 1992) Chapter IX. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity. thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look forward in the future. No. Art.R. ISSUE: W/N Sec. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 7 of RA 6389 since. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: W/N the last paragraph of Art. Page 363. HELD: No. 46e . in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land. 126.R. The petition for habeas corpus was granted. pleading that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer based on the last sentence of Art.196 Laceste v. 344 of the RPC has retroactive effect.

There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Zeta Case No. 1946 to March 14. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. 1955) Chapter VI. The lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. RA 671 is made to condone only the unpaid interest.R. Page 266. 72 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION San Jose v. Page 369. The basis of the suit was RA 671 amending RA 401. Footnote No. L-7140 (December 22. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. LATIN MAXIM: 11b. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. but it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so by the terms of the amendment. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C. 1955) Chapter IX. Furthermore. No. 271 G. L-7766 (November 29. the former law condoning the pre-war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1. 46e FACTS: Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre-war loan with defendant. 46e . Case No. HELD: Yes.197 People v.R. 104 FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. ISSUE: W/N the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff by the defendant. No. Where a statute was amended and reenacted. 232 G. Footnote No.A. HELD: No. No. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. 20. 1951. LATIN MAXIM: 20. the amendment should be construed as if it had been included in the original act. Rehabilitation Finance Corp.

LATIN MAXIM: 46e . 764 [19461. a copy of the resolution of the Court denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitioner’s attorney. "[t]he reorganization having been declared to have been completed.] " LATIN MAXIM: 5a. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. both the CA and the SC affirmed the sentence of the lower court.R. Intermediate Appellate Court Case No. Page 371. Being procedural in nature. No. L-68043 (October 31. HELD: No. However. Camilon. ISSUE: W/N the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should be granted. those provision s may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners. L-49187 (December 18. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11. as principal defendants. Sumilang Case No. Sumilang. 111 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Palomo Building Tenants Association v. HELD: Yes. and the five (5) judges of the then City Court of Manila in the injunction aspect of the case. Footnote No. 46e FACTS: The petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 4 months and 21 days of prision correctional to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor. ISSUE: W/N the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) erred in sustaining the order of respondent. 1984) FACTS: Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction before the then Court of First Instance of Manila against respondents Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Capitol Hills. 1983. Respondent judge granted private respondents' motion to dismiss. 129 is now in full force and effect. denying petitioner's motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them.198 People v. BP Big. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. Based on the records. the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice because then he was already hiding in the mountains of Laguna as a guerilla officer of the Markings guerilla. Respondent GSIS and Capitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending between the same parties for the same cause. No. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. The attorney prays that the reading of the sentence be suspended and that petitioner be allowed to file whatever pleading that may be allowed by this Honorable Tribunal necessary for the protection of the rights of the petitioner. 97 G. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. On appeal. 1946) Chapter IX. 226 G. as appellants. Ruled in Alday vs. 77 Phil. Petitioners invoke Section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent IAC erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent' (People vs.R.

1989) FACTS: The petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages. intimidation. Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. petitioner waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and in effect submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (b) he succeeded in occupying or possessing the property through force. LATIN MAXIM: 45a. ISSUE: W/N the petition has merit. HELD: Yes. or threat or by taking such advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner.199 MRCA. 89 G. Sec. exemplary damages. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Court of Appeals Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: Petitioner began construction of his house without permit from the owner. No. W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of squatting. v. 78 G. Court of Appeals Case No. 772. Inc. 772.R. 1 of P.D. attorney’s fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered by it from the defendants but left them to the discretion of the Honorable Court. 1989) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ocampo v. 46b . 7960 (December 8. 86675 (December 19. while being informed of P. No. Sec. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. (c) such occupation of the property is without the consent or against the will of the owner. otherwise known as the Anti– Squatting Law has three elements: (a) accused is not the owner of the land. W/N a motion to dismiss bars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.R.” ISSUE: 1. 15. 2. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.D. By moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that “after prosecution has rested its case. HELD: Yes on both counts.

cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art.R. Court of Appeals Case No. Page 372. HELD: Yes on both counts. 21 G. 33 of the Civil Code. 12 of RA 6715 to Art. Under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules are constitutional. and Transitory Provisions of the said Interim Rules on the basis of being in violation of due process and non retroactivity of laws. 90501 (August 5. and the contested provision “is then a police legislation”. HELD: Yes. 91856 (October 5. Page 372. The provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state. 117 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Aris (Phil. ISSUE: W/N a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action. 46e . v. Footnote No. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. respectively.R. 1991) Chapter IX. 12 of RA 6716 to Art. the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action. LATIN MAXIM: 8a. 119 FACTS: Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence.) Inc. The questioned Interim Rules can be given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character. 223 of the Labor Code. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: W/N amendments introduced by Sec. 1990) Chapter IX. being without malice. 315 G. Footnote No.200 Yakult Philippines v. No. reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 46e FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. No.

HELD: P. 926 authorizes the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against private owners or whether it is not confined exclusively to public lands. 1281. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application.D. a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. 61 of Act No. 1281.R. No. ISSUE: W/N P. L-54305 (February 14.201 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. The title of the Public Land Act contains no mention of compulsory registration proceedings. 2259 was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of existing legislation on the same subject. 61 of Act No. Pangasinan on two parcels of land. 124 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Government of the Philippine Islands v.D. 9 mining claims overlap. 61 of Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: This is a registration proceedings instituted by the Director of Lands under Sec.D. Cebu.D. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. 25 G. 1990) Chapter IX. Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER. 926 does not permit of similar proceedings. Cadastral Act (No. Cebu. 61 of Act No. CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. 926 is not applicable to any other than public lands. During the pendency of this appeal. Municipality of Binalonan Case No. 12 of P. 926 does not necessarily rebut this conclusion. No reference is made in Act No. 926. 117 G. the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 1281 prevails.R. of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. v. 926. 61 of Act No. Footnote No. Act No. 2259) authorizes the Director of Lands to institute compulsory registration proceedings against all owners and claimants of property within any area which has been regularly surveyed and platted under the procedure prescribed in the Act. Court of Appeals Case No. Page 12. seeking to compel the registration of all private property within a prescribed area in the municipality of Binalonan. 2259 to the repeal or amendment of Sec. The fact that the new Act does not expressly state that it amends or repeals Sec. HELD: Act No. However. entered into a compromise agreement. L-8243 (December 24. Footnote No. at most. lands claimed by the Government. Due to the promulgation of P. 44 FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City. 1915) Chapter I. No. The Act does not touch upon the compulsory registration of private titles. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission. LATIN MAXIM: 46e . or. Page 373. subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City. ISSUE: Whether Sec.

by amending Sec. Page 175. E. 92 G. 13. were segregated and a separate certificate of title was issued for the segregated portion in the name of PHHC wherein there was no annotation whatsoever to the title.909. without the knowledge of the DBP.30. 38b. However. ECOLA. 111 amending Art. and dela Cruz. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision subject of the amendment.202 Development Bank of the Phil. This was clear from the proviso: “The provisions of Art. 136 FACTS: The Board of Governors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing project for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for 20 years. Footnote No. among which was Sec. which NLRC dismissed on the strength of E. 111 therefore has retroactive effect.R. the area sold was then part of a bigger parcel of land and because the subdivision plan for the area was still pending approval by the Bureau of Lands. ISSUE: W/N the jurisdiction over money claims is exclusive to the Labor Arbiters. 13 of RA 85. amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter (RA 85). Case No. a curative statute to render valid the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC. One of the purposes of Congress when it enacted RA 3147. 13 of RA 85. legal holiday pay. therefore. 128(b) of the Labor Code. 30b. Hon. a portion of the property including the 159 lots sold to the DBP. LATIN MAXIM: 6a. dela Serna. 9. v. 199 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Briad Agro Development Corp. In its appeal to the NLRC. DBP expressed its doubts as to whether it could acquire the property in question for the intended purpose of a housing project in the light of the then Sec. 39 G. Respondent failed to submit controverting evidence despite due notice. v. 1980) Chapter IV. 217 of this Code notwithstanding…” The intended effect was clearly to make the Secretary of Labor and the various Regional Directors have concurrent jurisdiction. HELD: The Court held that E. Footnote No. It is. was to erase any doubts regarding the legality of the acquisition by the DBP of the 159 lots from the PHHC for the housing project which it intended to establish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. night shift differential pay. 13 of RA 85. the sales agreement between the DBP and the PHHC was not presented immediately for registration by the DBP. L-28774 (February 28. by force of Art. Page 376. Briad Agro questioned the Regional Director’s authority to entertain the pecuniary claim of workers. However. Director Balbin thus ruled in favor of the employees and ordered respondent to pay P5.O. 83225 (June 29. 46e . HELD: Yes. which granted to Regional Directors jurisdiction over monetary claims. by RA 3147. LATIN MAXIM: 46e FACTS: The case arose out of a complaint filed by Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services WFTU Local Chapter No.R. 1989) Chapter IX. No.369. 217 of the Labor Code. No. 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay.O. RA 3147 was enacted. Court of Appeals Case No. Then. overtime pay.O. ROI-005 against respondent agricultural firm for alleged underpayment/non-payment of minimum wage. ISSUE: W/N there is retroactivity of the amendment of Sec. et al.

ISSUE: Whether Santos and Aguilar. HELD: No. The trial court pronounced the document as a pacto de retro sale and ruled in favor of Santos. 1965) Chapter IX. LATIN MAXIM: 35. 1602 was designed primarily to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase. 21. 140 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Santos v.D. 104215 (May 8. 46a. E. 1996) Chapter IX. the daughter of the Duata spouses. in this case. 46e FACTS: Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land which subsequently became a quarter part of Lot No. Said article is remedial in nature and can thus be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. No. 134 FACTS: Private respondent was recruited to work in Saudi Arabia as a service contract driver. private respondent Duata. 274 G. The Labor Arbiter still proceeded with the case and rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent. LATIN MAXIM: 8c. and in order to secure the payment of the loan. Art. Laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessitated. 1602 of the New Civil Code and set aside the decision of the trial court. a contract purporting to be a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. 37. the title was issued in Santos’s name. Gaanan and Aguilar. Footnote No. Footnote No. claiming that the land had been sold to her by Aguilar in a private document.R. No. Upon appeal. Jr. 46e . 37. v. 1955. Santos denied the spouses’ ownership.O. Hon. creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). L-20901 (August 31. 17. and Burgos Case No. instituted an action for reconveyance of ¼ of Lot No. ISSUE: W/N E. HELD: It is a mortgage. plus his contractual bonus. 797 should be given retroactive effect and thus divest the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction. 797 was passed. 1691 and 1391. Duata and the Court of Appeals Case No. Furthermore. Months after.O. On August 3. For convenience.O. Page 376. No.203 Erectors. Inc. he invoked his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference between his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him. 797 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the exception to the rule on prospectivity. in executing the said private document. the CA ruled that the transaction was actually an equitable mortgage under Art. it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned. The lot was purchased by Santos. National Labor Relations Commission. Andres. intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. the jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. When private respondent returned to the Philippines. Page 377.R. 99 G. Private respondent filed the complaint with the Labor Arbiter but E. another contract was executed which changed his position into that of a helper/laborer. these were P. vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims between employers and employees abroad. 46c.

L-24670 (December 14.O. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Sr. 46e . Page 381. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres. Quezon. 5 and 6. the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality by operation of Sec. good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. 1994) Chapter IX. Even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant as vendee of Lots Nos. 27 was passed in the valid exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health. Resolution No. among others. 442(d) of RA 7160. to be devoted to banking purposes. ISSUE: W/N the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 353. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality. 103702 (December 6. No. Quezon v. which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.O. Mendez. issued by President D.R. they contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law. Page 312. Footnote No. 2 of RA 1515. Appellant demanded that appellee stop the construction of the commercial building on the said lots. It was then attacked of its validity. Then by virtue of E. 5 and 6. Case No. 174. Sec. safety. Garcia. 27. prevailed over the building restrictions imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question and if Resolution No. defendant having filed building and planning permit applications with the Municipality of Mandaluyong. 5 and 6.O. creating the municipality of San Andres was cured by Sec. is also curative statute. HELD: Yes. 6c FACTS: Appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a building on Lots Nos. The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must be conceded.R. issued E.204 Municipality of San Narciso. ISSUE: W/N the E. as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislative power. as part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality. Macapagal. 442 of RA 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 1979) Chapter VIII. and held that the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant. 182 G. and any attempt to apply Sec. contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning regulations. The latter refused to comply. in the deeds of sale and in the TCTs the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail over Municipal Resolution No. It upheld the classification by the Municipal Council of the area along EDSA Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone. No. HELD: The trial court held that the subject restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. Feati Bank & Trust Case No. petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification of E.O. 27. 193 G. peace. LATIN MAXIM: 46e. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991. Footnote No. 150 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ortigas & Co. 133 FACTS: President C. v. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power.

By May. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Barredo and cannot be brought against other surviving debtors. Manuel Barredo passed away. the Rules of Court may not prevail over Art. HELD: No. 35 G.R. as amended by RA 1993. 46e FACTS: On January 1963. No. Page 387. 6. L-46095 (November 23. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process. Rule 86 of the Rules of Court that the claim of PNB should be filed with the estate proceedings of M. provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. No. or some. No. HELD: It would have applied. claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. Court of Industrial Relations Case No. Asuncion Case No. the choice is left up to PNB to decide. As the statute shortened the period of action accrued. 7-A of C. increase of modify substantive rights. Moreover. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. otherwise it shall be barred forever. To require PNB to go against the estate would deprive PNB of his substantive rights provided by Art. it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual.A. the 1987 Constitution states that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court should not diminish. 144. as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued. 1977) Chapter X. 9c .205 Billones v. Page 372. 1216 of the New Civil Code gives the creditor the right to “proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors. ISSUE: W/N the Courts interpretation of Sec. 3 FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. Philippine National Bank (PNB) granted Fabar Incorporated a loan secured by joint signatures of Jose Barredo. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. Footnote No. 1977 the outstanding balance was over P8 million. Rule 86 prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors is accurate. Art. or all”. Thus. 144. Footnote No. 1216. However. 119 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. Sec. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. 1216 because substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Carmen and Tomas Borromeo and Manuel Barredo. 7-A of C. 6. PNB filed a case against all 4 signatories. 6 of Rule 86 simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased debtor.A. before the case was decided.R. 1965) Chapter IX. ISSUE: W/N Sec. L-17566 (July 30. No. In this case. 237 G. The case was dismissed pursuant to Sec.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in disapproving Amandy’s petition for probation. Because he pleaded guilty in his trial. The law clearly declares who are entitled to probation and who aren’t.D. Act 4054 was amended by RA 34.D.” LATIN MAXIM: 2a. 49 .D. Petitioner then filed for probation alleging P. 968. ISSUE: W/N RA 34 is remedial in nature and should be given retroactive effect. the petition was denied because P. Because of this. it must be taken as it is. the former prevails. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Moreover. devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. Ongsiako insists that RA 34 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot be given retroactive effect. 1990 was promulgated after P. 90 G. Gamboa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55-45 basis in favor of the tenants. it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning RA 34 that “this bill seeks to amend the Rice Share Tenancy Act in such a way to make the division of the crops more equitable to the tenants… The principal feature of this bill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating. No.R. 1988) FACTS: In 1946. 7b. In the past. 9a.D. L-1867 (April 8. the original contract starting an equal sharing of profits should be followed. However. 43. 8 of Act 4054.D.206 Ongsiako v. later that same year. 7 G. 6b. 49 FACTS: Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.6 grams of marijuana. This act provided that the palay would be divided equally by the 2 parties.R. People Case No. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled because those who have been “sentenced to serve a maximum term of more than six years” are excluded from the benefits of the Probation Law. 1990 had repealed P. 79010 (May 23. 7a. No. he was given a sentence of six years and 1 day (the minimum time for his offense). Where the law is clear and unambiguous. producing retroactive effect. no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligible for probation. Ongsiako (landowner) and Gamboa (tenant) entered into a contract pursuant of Sec. Gamboa Case No. 22a. 36a. However. 25a. HELD: Yes. 1950) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Amandy v. laws concerning this issue have been amended with the intent of being remedial and therefore. Because P. 968. 968. During liquidation. HELD: No.

16 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Diu v. LATIN MAXIM: 4. otherwise known as the "Katarungang Pambarangay Law". 28 FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office.862. Private respondents in their Answer. 38b FACTS: On several occasions. 410(b) and 412 respectively. while admitting indebtedness. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the LGC of 1991.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case. 1960) Chapter X.R. 114 of Act 496. of the latter law. 1508. 5b.227. the sum of P57. 36b . pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300. 4 and 6 of the former law have been substantially reproduced in Sec. Sec. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.207 Parras v. 197 G. otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year. 9a.D. LATIN MAXIM: 11. W/N petitioner can be exempted. but private respondents failed to appear. It must be noted that P. Nevertheless. private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store all valued at P7. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N parties did not meet in presence of a Pangkat as required by law. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 32. ISSUE: 1.D. 2. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the trial court before the effectivity of the LGC. No. Page 391. HELD: Petition was granted without prejudice to the re-filing of the case by petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication.55. Footnote No. and (2) another for P12.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to petitioners. 1995) Chapter X. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. Petitioners brought the matter before the Barangay Chairman and the latter set the case for hearing. Land Registration Commission Case No.00 representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated. L-16011 (July 26. they failed to reach an amicable settlement. interposed two counterclaims: (1) for P6.R. Page 390. No. 115213 (December 19.0000. Court of Appeals Case No. 96 G. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. When the parties met. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay.

173 of the Labor Code. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. 119 G. 38b FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec.208 Government v. 4 of Act No. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. 2. No. 1927) Chapter I. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7. Footnote No. 1990. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. HELD: Yes. as purports to vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The National Coal Company was formed by the Philippine Government. 2705. as amended by P. three members of the government appeared. HELD: Petition was granted. However. 45 FACTS: The National Coal Company elected its board of directors via vote in accordance with its by-laws. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC). Springer Case No. the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. Page 395. L-26979 (April 1. Sec. 30a. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected by the proper shareholders. 9a. ISSUE: W/N the executive is the sole administrator of the Philippine Government.” LATIN MAXIM: 30a. on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. 32. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. 1921. Footnote No. 103982 (December 11. 2822. The second sentence of Art. 1992) Chapter X. W/N Sec. and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. as amended by Sec. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal. 49 . The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. Commission on Audit Case No. ISSUE: 1. is unconstitutional and void.R. it ended up occupying almost 90% of the stock.D. two from the legislative and one from the executive. No. 38b. The Government intended to retain a majority stake in the said company. Page 38.R. 37. expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. However. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 176 G. as amended. 699 of the RAC … whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. 2 of Act No. 166 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Mecano v. During the election of directors. however. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

The Philippine Legislature could not have intended to repeal said Act within less than three weeks after its passage and substitute in its place absolutely nothing except the uncontrolled judgment of the Insular Collector of Customs.R. one Chan Sam.209 Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee v. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. No. In issuing the order of release the respondent judge relied upon Art. sought to prohibit the Insular Collector of Customs from enforcing the requirement. none is presumed to be intended. when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. The powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary with each other. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. On the other hand. 174 G. a company engaged in the coastwise shipping business. 2614 and paragraph (e) of Sec. any person confined in any asylum by order of the court in accordance with Art. ISSUE: W/N there is a conflict between Act No. 2614. 33281 (March 31. of the Penal Code. 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by Sec. 49. 1048 of the Administrative Code. Art. 49 FACTS: The petitioner. Sec. was acquitted of murder but was ordered to be committed to an asylum. 4. 1048 of the Administrative Code confers on the Director of Health the authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum. 8. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ynchausti & Co v. par. which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. ISSUE: W/N the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person subsequently to leave the asylum without the approval of the Director of Health. Concepcion and Lee Voo Case No. 2614 being specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels. 1312 of the Administrative Code. 1917) FACTS: The accused. this should be done. 50 . The petitioner relied upon the ground that Act No. Act No. No 12330 (January 25. HELD: There is no express repeal of Act No. Likewise. Thus. The converse proposition equally holds true. 2614 was not and could not have been repealed by the Administrative Code. 20 G. HELD: It is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express repeal. The court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctor’s reports. 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody without the acquiescence of the Director of Health. Stanley Case No.R. 9c.

four schools prayed for the lifting of the TRO on the ground that their tuition fee increase has already been approved pursuant to P. and thereafter. Whether or not an Act is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be ascertained by an examination of both statutes. relative to Student Fees for School Year 1985-1986. there was a repeal. which was granted to them. 451 provides that 60% of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of members of the faculty and other employees of the school. R. No. purpose. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that Act No. 25 valid. 451 which thereby makes MECS Order No. 3(a) of P. Laya Case No. where Sec. 1916) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Fabros. v. 451. and in the light of the reason. ISSUE: What the effect of said Act was upon local legislation dealing with the subject of opium. entitled Rules and Regulations to Implement the Provisions of BP 232. 49 FACTS: This is a consolidated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authorized tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in Sec. under the Education Act of 1982 (BP 232). 451. the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges by private schools is lodged with the Secretary of Education and Culture. However.D. and object of both. Under P. 25. which the Court thereby lifted.D. HELD: Yes. et al.S. The Education Act of 1982. Laya promulgated the disputed MECS Order No. The Government appealed. 164 G. Then Minister of Education Jaime C. 70832 (December 18.D.210 U.D. v. The United States Congress never intended to relax the stringent provisions relating to the smoking of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. 451. 44 G.R. Tantoco Case No. ISSUE: W/N BP 232 has repealed P. 2381 and all other laws had been repealed by the Act of the United States Congress. Hence. 11338 (August 15. 42 of BP 232 liberalized the procedure by empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. while BP 232 provides that the increment shall be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the MECS. No. 39b .D. P. HELD: That the United States Congress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the subject of opium appears from the law itself. LATIN MAXIM: 4. 1987) FACTS: The defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. Petitioners prayed for temporary restraining order on the Rules and Regulations. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

16 G. the President may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. the Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration. The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. Construing the Insolvency Law together with the Land Registration Act. HELD: The Insolvency Law and the Land Registration Act compliment each other and are both intended to protect the rights and interests of creditors. she appointed her son to manage. the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law. No. and this is certified by the National Economic Council. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. is legal and valid. 39a . series of 1964. we reach the conclusion that in order that the assignment of the insolvent debtor's real property made by the clerk of the proper court to the assignee may operate to vest in said assignee all of said estate from the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. Footnote No. wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice. sell and encumber her properties situated in the Philippines. 70. 30756 (September 22. ISSUE: W/N RA 2207 was repealed by RA 3452.R. thereby prohibiting any government agency from doing so. hence there was no repeal. Feliciano Case No. although with a common objective. according the latter a means for securing their insolvent debtor's property.R. It was approved. pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. Page 399. refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances. ISSUE: W/N the mortgage given by respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has been made. Case No. Defendant-appellant executed a mortgage deed of a parcel of land to petitioner so as to secure a loan. LATIN MAXIM: 38b. At this. RA 2207 provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. thru a government agency which the President may designate. The assignee filed his appointment for the purpose of transferring the property to him. 61 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Brias de Coya v. Tan Lua.211 Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association. 127 G. The President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation pursuant to which Chairman Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding date. both such proceedings and the assignment must have been recorded in the registry of deeds. A certain Vicente Nepomuceno was appointed assignee of the involuntary insolvency. Inc. In order to effect a repeal by implication. the former from their commencement. 1931) FACTS: Private respondent Feliciano. against which they may enforce their credits. et al. The two laws. L-24022 (March 3. 1965) Chapter X. HELD: The importation may be illegal on the ground that such importation belong exclusively to private parties. No. v. 39a FACTS: Defendant-appellant Tan Lua was declared an insolvent in the Philippines while she was in China. Petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith and therefore the mortgage upon the land given to him by the latter. which was registered with a Torrens title.

series of 1968. Libel is one of those offenses included in such category. 1971) Chapter X. 87 of which would confer concurrent jurisdiction on municipal judges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both. and not by Sec. 9. 1963. Page 411. HELD: No. basing his action. He would thus conclude that as the amendatory act came into effect on June 22. Endaya Case No. 62 FACTS: The Secretary of Finance authorized Jose R. Petitioner. Respondent. L-31711. RA 5185. general in character as to its terms and application. L-23894. as noted. There was. During the hearing of the libel case Cruz. Respondent still tried the case. A subsequent statute. 49 . through counsel manifested in open court that under Art. In an Administrative Order. No.212 Villegas vs. 1974) Chapter X. saying that Romualdez is not empowered to make such designation. 137 G. 4 of the Decentralization Law. is not to be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment. Petitioner. 2088a of the Revised Administrative Code. Sec. (the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense). appointed Manuel D. 360 as last amended by RA 1289 conferring exclusive jurisdiction on courts of first instance. (September 30. on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. (January 24. Mayor of the City of Manila. was thus repealed by implication. disapproved the appointment. 50 FACTS: Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel against a Serafin Cruz in the Municipal Court of Batangas presided over by the Respondent Judge. unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. Footnote No. a 1908 decision. Reyes. No. Respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. he did base his action on what for him was the consequence of the Judiciary Act as amended by RA 3828.R. Subido Case No. 9. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer. As is clear from his well-written memorandum. LATIN MAXIM: 1. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Law should govern. 314 G. ISSUE: W/N Municipal Court of Batangas has jurisdiction over case at hand.R. a negative response. 360 of the Revised Penal Code. to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Sec. LATIN MAXIM: 1. Footnote No. directed Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer.96 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Jalandoni vs. the provisions of Art. It has been the constant holding of this court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. Lapid as Assistant City Treasurer. HELD: No.

The Court of Tax Appeals decided that Respondent Corporation can no longer claim this due to P. It is inevitable that.D.R. Given the present concept of the general fund and its wide application. ISSUE: W/N Act No. L-14957 (March 16. 2710 should be applied. The respondent has never been convicted of the offense of adultery. We find that the disputed proviso found in Sec. representing 25% of the specific taxes collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils. 2710. sooner or later. Page 388. 2710 should be applied in the case. when there is a plain and unavoidable repugnancy between two laws. 5 of RA 1435 has truly become an anachronism. 1991 Chapter X. HELD: Yes. then the proviso in Sec. No. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation. Case No. 111 G. Nos. HELD: Act No.64 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Valdez v. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce based on prevailing laws before the enactment of Act No. 436 and 711.978. ISSUE: W/N Republic Act No. LATIN MAXIM: 49 FACTS: This is a petition for divorce filed by petitioner against his respondent wife. motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utilized in its operations as a mining concessionaire. the miners will stand to benefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer be correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific taxes to augment the general fund for government undertakings is "unfair" to the miners because they are not directly convenienced. 1920) Chapter X. 231. 2710 states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concubinage cannot be granted except upon conviction. Even if the said Act has no repealing clause.33. While we generally do not favor repeal by implication. 49 . 9 FACTS: Respondent Corporation filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P974.303. The situation in this case does not require the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation. 1435 (An Act To Provide Means of Increasing the Highway Special Fund) or certain provisions thereof have been repealed by subsequent statutes. Page 400. Footnote No. the later must be given effect. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. 79 G. 5 of RA 1435 was drafted to favor a particular group of taxpayers-the miners and the lumbermen-because it was "unfair" to subject them to the increased rates and in effect make them subsidize the construction of highways from which they did not directly benefit.R. Tuazon Case No. Negative statutes are mandatory. Act No. Footnote No.50 and P424. for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmistakable. it cannot be denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative but to concede the point that an earlier law has been impliedly repealed or revoked by a later law because of an obvious inconsistency.213 CIR vs. and must be presumed to have been intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. 83583-84 September 30. using RA 1435 as basis. respectively.

1932) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Torrente v. 2. 2.R. LATIN MAXIM: 1 FACTS: This case is an appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding. 58. On the last sale. wherever he may be in the Philippines. but it is not conclusive on the courts. L-34581 (March 31. LATIN MAXIM: 4. were illegal and void. Serra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. Castro. ISSUE: 1. Concepcion Case No. 13 of G. so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the railroad. The contention of the petitioner that Act No. L-2340 (December 21.R. much less the archipelago. 155 G. Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. Due to contrary provisions. Sec. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. W/N enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission. In 1920.O. HELD: Under the provision of Sec. 42 G. Grove Case No. In December of the same year. 49 . HELD: 1. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction to issue the order directing the making of an arrest outside the Province of Cebu. 59 is a proof that the Civil Commission deemed it necessary to make an express grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the publication of the said law the processes of the justices of the peace did not run throughout the province. a justice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest. 1905) FACTS: In 1919. The court however said that the opinion of the law making authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is. Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and Whitaker. Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers of railroad in Occidental Negros. According to Standard Oil Co. No. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property. No. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties. vs. it is entitled to respectful consideration. only part of the price was paid. the general order has impliedly repealed the Spanish law. W/N a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. ISSUE: W/N the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may be in the Philippines.214 Estate of Mota v. discharging the petitioner from detention. No. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner.

49 Minor Five: 6c. No such repugnance is discernible. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. 7a. 2175 has neither been repealed nor superseded. 2175 was no longer operative. allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. the supreme law. filed for Gonzaga’s disqualification based on Sec. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing.R. 1978) Chapter I. Though the five were a minority. al. 39 of the ATL. No. 37. 10. 49 . Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution. Sec. The accused. therefore there can be none. tenants of Fernando. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. 61 FACTS: Respondent Fr. Teleron Case No. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. L-34854 (November 20. 148 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION People v. The ALRC suspended the ATL. 30a. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). A subsequent statute. there was no longer any law punishing the act. HELD: Sec. 32. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. 195 G. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant’s act of prethreshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. Footnote No. 43 FACTS: Almuete. 1976) Chapter IV. Sec. No. Page 142. et. LATIN MAXIM: Dissenting Seven: 9a. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. Five believed that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. L-26551 (February 27. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office. 200 G.215 Pamil v. revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of political rights. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque. Footnote No. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. HELD: The vote was indecisive. ISSUE: W/N an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected.R. The petitioner. Bohol. Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute repugnance between the two. were charged with the violation of Sec. Almuete Case No. 47. the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective. Also. Page 33. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. The section also admitted no exception. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. 7c. Seven believed Sec. himself an aspirant for the office. hence it was presumed valid.

Municipality of Zamboanga Case No. Civil Aeronautics Board Case No. No. joint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers but is subject to the maximum rates on freights and passengers that may be set by the PSC under RA 2677. LATIN MAXIM: 37. ISSUE: W/N Act No.216 Smith Bell & Co. 3422 repealed Sec. 226. If the legislature intended its repeal. The defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the tax in question under Sec. Under RA 776. On the other hand. HELD: Authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in both the CAB and the PSC. No. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such tax and that the ordinance in question is null and void. No. LATIN MAXIM: 37. jurisdiction to control rates of airships was taken away from the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and re-vested in the Public Service Commission (PSC) since RA 2677 impliedly repealed RA 776 which conferred to the CAB the power of control over air rates and fares.A. 1930) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lechoco v. 1972) FACTS: Municipality of Zamboanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the baling of hemp in accordance with Ordinance No. 148 G. under both statutes. HELD: Repeals by implication are not favored. A general affirmative act will not be construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest. 146. 71 G. 2625(d) the Administrative Code. 13(a) and 14 of C.R. 3422. v. implied repeal of statutes is not favored. 38b . respondents argue that jurisdiction over air fares and rates were. 2625(d) of the Administrative Code but it does have such power under a subsequent enactment of Act No. 50 FACTS: Petitioner contends that by the enactment of RA 2677 amending Sec. 2407 of the Administrative Code. ISSUE: Whether the authority to fix air carrier’s rates is vested in the CAB or in the PSC. L-33318 (December 20. exercisable concurrently by the CAB and the PSC. the CAB can fix and determine reasonable individual.R. it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in expressly repealing Sec. Furthermore. L-32979-81 (February 29.

217 Villegas v. No. Furthermore. 172 G. 171 G. ISSUE: W/N the Decentralization Act impliedly repealed the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila. instead of to the President. RA 557 and 409 subsists side-by-side with RA 2260 and are not impliedly repealed by the latter which is a general law. 22 of RA 409 so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service the exclusive and original jurisdiction to remove. RA 2260 contemplates appeal from the decision of the City Mayor to the Commissioner of Civil Service. Enrile Case No. petitioner ignored the provision that the City Fiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the Decentralization Act. the construction will be against such repeal. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.24040 (August 9. then the authority to appoint a City Fiscal is not lodged in respondent Secretary of Justice but in him as Mayor of the City of Manila. 5a. RA 557 and 409 are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the City of Manila. 37 FACTS: The Commissioner of Civil Service claims that RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557and 409 providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other body. Repeal by implication is not favored and if two laws can be reconciled. L-29827 (March 31. ISSUE W/N RA 2260 impliedly repeal RA 557 and Sec. No. RA 2260 states that the removal and suspension by the City Mayor can be passed upon or reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in the competitive service. Subido. 50 . The issue in this case was already decided in previous jurisprudence in the case of Villegas v. Subido Case No. HELD: No. The defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the Charter of the City of Manila.R. 1965) FACTS: It is the contention of the petitioner that if Sec.R. The City Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and submit to the Commissioner of Civil Service all pending disciplinary cases. 1973) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Villegas v. L-24012 & L. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 4 of the Decentralization Act be given effect. 38b. which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner. HELD: No.

then Sec. Act No. Act No. leaving issues… such issue shall take the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done… unless a different disposition is required by law. 1911) Chapter X. He posits that Act No. Page 411. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. ISSUE: W/N the heirs of Felisa Hernandez become the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will.” The executor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein. 100 FACTS: Respondent was accused of violating Sec. having died before the testator so as to pass to the heirs. No. 82. 11 . The petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon Sec. 82 when he willfully omitted from the tax lists real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable. Palacio Case No. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy. 87 of Act No. 2238 provides no penalty thus. 11002 (January 17. 2238 had done nothing but to change the method and procedure provided in Act No. but the testatrix did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee.” ISSUE: W/N Act No. 82 because of the clause in Sec. Nacianceno Case No. 301 G. 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that “When a devise or a legacy is made to a child… and the devisee or legatee dies before the testator. 87 of Act No. No. Footnote No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 82.S. 1916) Chapter X. 758 would have no value and might as well have never been written which is an absurd interpretation. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. The construction by the respondent would repeal or annul the section absolutely. 82 continues in force. 5939 (March 29. 2238 repeals by implication Act No. 38b FACTS: Felisa Hernandez died before the testatrix. 18 that states “all acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed.R. unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature.R. HELD: Yes. Page 406. HELD: No. Footnote No. 77 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Marin v. 171 G. v. Repeals by implication are not favored. 2238 had repealed the penal effect of Act No.218 U. Sec.

49 W/N Marges could recover the fishing boat. Averia Case No. the Acting Collector of Customs. No. Marges. L-71855 (January 20. the widow of Lozano then filed for a criminal case where it was found that there exists a prima facie evidence that petitioner.O.D. HELD: Yes. 105 FACTS: Petitioner as patrolman and member of the Integrated National police (INP) apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. 102 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Pacis v. 1040 & 1012. Anacorita. It is axiomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. He went beyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the boat owner giving impression that his interest in the subject is more than just the interest of a public official. Page 412. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 309 G. 1988) Chapter X. The allegation that P. Footnote No. No. Petitioner contends that General Court Martial has no jurisdiction since P. It has also caught the Supreme Court’s notice that respondent sheriff has practically taken the cudgels for the boat owner. HELD: 1. 20c. 27. 1040. 20c. 37 FACTS: Petitioner. On the same day. 2. W/N Provincial Sheriff may be held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ.219 Velunta v. 1966) Chapter X. commenced a seizure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the Tariff and Customs Code referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for boat loaded with untaxed cigarettes. Yes.O. An altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver Lozano. The writ was received by respondent Sheriff. Averia. 1040 is inaccurate. 4. the alleged boat owner. 1850 was repealed by E. “with deliberate intent and with intent to kill.O. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1850 has been expressly repealed by clear and precise provision of E. It is specifically stated under E. The jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs is provided for in RA 1937 which took effect much later than the Judiciary Act. Under E. Page 413. L-22526 (November 29. .R. it is the exercise of “administrative control and supervision” over units of the INP that was transferred to the President. 194 G. The fishing boat therein was transferred to the Provincial Sheriff.O. Footnote No.R.D. No. ISSUE: W/N the Court Martial has jurisdiction. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. filed a Civil Case for replevin alleging that the boat was stolen. and later on to Marges as commanded by respondent Hon. ISSUE: 3. 1012 that it is only the “operational supervision and direction” over all units of the INP that was transferred from the Constabulary to the city/municipal government. Philippine Constabulary Case No. Chief.” shot Lozano during the performance of duty.

it mentions that whenever a party has. 110 of the Labor Code is to be construed as not favoring the unpaid workers because of the order of preference provided in Art. Hence. The said Arbiter awarded backwages and separation pay. 49 FACTS: Aggregate Mining Exponents (AMEX) suffered huge financial losses and was unable to pay its remaining employees.) agreed to merge. 110 of the Labor Code provides for “worker preference in case of bankruptcy”. this instant petition by the PNB on the grounds that Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create lien in favor of the workers for unpaid wages upon the properties of the employer. Cruz.” LATIN MAXIM: 6a. it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should be offered the post of manager of the traffic department. The Code of Civil Procedures must prevail because it is a later expression of legislative will than Art. 108 FACTS: Two Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio business (Far Eastern Radio Inc. San Andres Development Corporation. AMEX did not appeal but PNB. and Radio Corp. In Sec. HELD: No. act or omission. Footnote No. 1815 of the Civil Code also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. Two years after. he cannot be permitted to falsify it. Sec. HELD: Yes. Page 414. ISSUE: W/N Herman’s claim for salary has been expressly waived in the final agreement. and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent. his workers shall enjoy FIRST preference as regards to their unpaid wages. AMEX entered into an operation contract agreement with T. as mortgage-creditor.R. No. 26802 (July 15. 239 G. The NLRC denied the appeal of PNB.M. 49 . Footnote No. 333 of the Code of Civil Procedures. thus enabling the latter to acquire on lease the equipment of AMEX. The petitioner herein has been largely interested in the respondent corporation. et al. 123 G. by his own declaration. It specifically states that “In the event of bankruptcy… of an employer’s business. Art. Radio Corporation of the Philippines Case No. 2241 to 2245 of the Civil Code. No. 1927) Chapter X. The unpaid workers filed for monetary compensation before the Labor Arbiter. 1989) Chapter X. intentionally or deliberately led another to believe a particular thing is true and to act upon such belief. any provision of law to the contrary not withstanding… such unpaid wages shall be paid in FULL before claims of the government and other creditors may be paid. Page 414.220 Herman v. appealed and alleged that the workers should be given their unpaid wages only and not the termination pay.R. 107 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine National Bank v. Case No. 80593 (December 18. ISSUE: W/N Art. 1815 of the Civil Code. LATIN MAXIM: 9a.

LATIN MAXIM: 1. 1959 is a general law. it can’t repeal a specific provision impliedly. No. R. 5a. Court of Appeals Case No. HELD: Yes. 8 of the Constitution. 49 FACTS: This is a petition to reverse the Decision ordering the refund of the GCL Retirement Plan representing the withholding tax on income. Sec. Subido. The deletion in P.D. Furthermore. 6679. including all the retirement benefits given to officials and employees of private firms. R. which shall be determined by law. P.D. 1992) Chapter VII. Commission on Elections Case No. W/N there was a violation of Art. the Supreme Court in Paras v. 2. Also in Villegas v. 7160 or the Local Government Code which mandates barangay elections every 3 years. 85 G. the same having been scheduled in May 1997”. 1959. from income tax. 6679 provides that barangay elections should be held every 5 years. 9a. Page 413. and that GCL Plan is subject to the final withholding tax.D. RA 4917 exempted the GCL Retirement Plan. 127116 (April 8. such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act. HELD: 1. Soon after. P. 50 . 10. ISSUE: 1. 8 of the Constitution. 1959 of the provisions regarding tax exemption under the old law can’t be deemed to be applicable to the employees’ trusts. 2. 1959 impliedly repealed the provisions of RA 4917 and RA 1983.221 David v. Footnote No. What the term of office of barangay officials is. Footnote No.R. The COMELEC’s basis is R. 10. Art. 1997) Chapter X.D.D. 10.A. 43. except barangay officials. Page 300.R. 8 of the Constitution provides that.D. The GCL Plan is one of those exempted from income tax under RA 4917. hence. LATIN MAXIM: 1. shall be three years…” It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.A. Petitioner contends that P. COMELEC had the opportunity to mention when the next barangay election should be when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away. ISSUE: W/N GCL Retirement Plan retains its tax exemption after the promulgation of P. ‘The term of office of elective local officials. 81 FACTS: Barangay Chairman Alex David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. No. Petitioner David contends that an earlier law. Sec. 1959 was promulgated abolishing the exemption from withholding tax of interest on bank deposits previously given by P. 1739 if the recipient of the interest is exempt from income taxation. 95022 (March 23. should be the one followed. 105 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails.A. It is known in statutory construction that a subsequent statute that is general in character can’t be construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. 73 G. 20a. Sec. No.

At the time the order was issued by respondent judge. Neither has this court declared its unconstitutionality. 108 G. Jr.D. PAL issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged but nonetheless reinstated the latter. 34 of RA 265.” ISSUE: W/N responded judge acted in grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the subject criminal case. 1998) FACTS: The Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P. Unless otherwise repealed by a subsequent law or adjudged unconstitutional by this court.R. the respondent judge dismissed the case again. No. Three years and six months after his suspension. Respondent was apprehended by government authorities while about to board a flight en route to Hongkong in violation of Central Bank (CB) Circular 265. Leachon. the employee shall be entitled to his salaries and other benefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. which provide that. Upon his reinstatement. Almost a year after the prosecution has rested. P. a law will always be presumed valid. v.R. 9 and 10 of Art.222 People v. The rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not exceed a maximum period of 30 days. 118 G. If the suspension is otherwise extended. 772 is obsolete and deemed repealed by Sec. 50 FACTS: Private respondent Edilberto Castro was hired as manifesting clerk by petitioner PAL. LATIN MAXIM: 37. 13b . the prosecution rested the cases. LATIN MAXIM: 7a. after which period. 114307 (July 8. The Anti-Squatting law enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. “urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. After presenting the evidence. PAL placed Castro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. ISSUE: W/N Castro is entitled to backwages and salary increases granted under the CBA during his period of suspension. notwithstanding the social justice provision of the Constitution. National Labor Relations Commission Case No. the CA ordered the continuation of trial of the subject case. respondent filed a claim against PAL for backwages and salary increases granted under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of his suspension. HELD: Yes. as amended by CB Circular 383.D. also known as Anti-Squatting Law before the RTC presided over by respondent judge. as amended. HELD: Yes. the employee must be reinstated to his former position. 1998) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Airlines Inc. Thereafter. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. 772. 772 was still effective. in relation to Sec. opining that P. The said resolution likewise required respondent to affix his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action taken by PAL. No. respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case motu proporio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 108725-26 (September 25.D. A month after. Case No.

19. 1967) FACTS: Respondent CEPALCO was granted a franchise under RA 3247. the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by Ernerose were different from those declared. heat and power system in Cagayan de Oro City and its suburbs including the municipalities of Tagoloan. The Provincial treasurer of Misamis Oriental. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws. In case of conflict. Lantin Case No. LATIN MAXIM: 2a.D. Inc. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company. the Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 127 G. 3570 and 6020. 3570. No. Case No. 231 expressly or impliedly amends or repeals RA 3247. on the other hand. the Secretary of Finance made it clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code may only be imposed on companies with franchise that do not contain exempting clause.R. operate and maintain an electric light. Also. 31 G. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . However. Opol. Villanueva. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION De Joya v. whereas the Judiciary Act is a general law. and 6020 to install. L-24037 (April 27.D. The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% tax on its gross earnings. Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the goods. and Jasaan. A special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms. No provision in P. provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broad enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.R. No. 231) and pursuant thereto. however. 45355 (January 12. HELD: No. vest exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs. demanded payment of the provincial franchise tax from CEPALCO in accordance with the Local Tax Code (P.223 Province of Misamis Oriental v. ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the shipment. ISSUE: W/N CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax. HELD: The Bureau of Customs does. 50 FACTS: Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose Commercial. Customs took custody of the shipment. special laws prevail over general ones. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction – on the basis of the Judiciary Act – and not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125.

The special law must prevail. demolished the houses of the six petitioners in this class suit. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition.224 Arayata v. The court then sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and distribution. the latter prevails. Because the number of lands he can hold is limited. HELD: Act 1120 prevails. 701 and 702. the health officer under the Civil Code or the city engineer under RA 409. the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. 1956) FACTS: Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots. The Civil Code is a general law. has jurisdiction. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . Cecilio died before fully paying the Government for the lands. LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: Respondent Aquino. 1928) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Sitchon. No. and transmission of friar lands. His widow. Sec. was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. When a general and a special law are in conflict. Joya Case No. because their houses were “public nuisances” built on public streets and river beds. ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the widow. et al. 16. HELD: The City Engineer.R. v. while Act 1120 is a special law. disposition. Joya as administrator. 147 G. grants the power to remove public nuisances to the City Engineer. the City Engineer of Manila. argues that RA 409. the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with requirements of the law. and he started paying the Government for such. Art. Aquino Case No. it is the district health officer who should remove public nuisances. under RA 409. ISSUE: Whose job it is to determine and demolish public nuisances. which are contrary to the Civil Code. 9 G. L-28067 (March 10.R. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120. Petitioners contend that under the Civil Code. L-8500 (February 27. The Civil Code is a general law applicable throughout the Philippines. No. Respondent. on the other hand. he conveyed some of the lots to respondent F. herein petitioner. whereas RA 409 is a special law that pertains solely to the City of Manila.

16. Macuan Case No. which was later granted by the Court. her undivided half of the conjugal property. which still subsists. W/N the defendant may be compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wife’s property. She is not entitled to include half of the legal conjugal partnership. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. the CFI of Manila denied such oppositions. 14 G. ISSUE: Whether Texas Law or the Philippine Law must apply in intestate and testamentary succession. and 2) the Civil Code. It must have been the purpose of the Congress to make Art. and Art. L-23678 (June 6. HELD: 1. all surnamed Bellis. LATIN MAXIM: 50 . et. 2 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. Thus. v. said half of the conjugal property. cannot be compelled to include in the inventory of the same. 32280 (March 24. which is claimed to be conjugal property. HELD: Texas Law should apply.. which is more specific.R. Civil Code takes precedence over the Code of Civil Procedure. It is thus evident that Congress has not intended to extend our system of legitimes to the succession of foreign nationals. filed a motion. in intestate or testamentary successions. ISSUE: 1. 1039 provides that the capacity to succeed is governed by the national of the decedent. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children.R. par 2. was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. No. a citizen of Texas USA. praying that the guardian be instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property belonging to his ward. Art.. A special guardian. 1967) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Philippine Trust Co. Art. referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. which was executed in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated. 16. the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate children. Philippine Trust Co. 2. Subsequently. died. No. 1930) FACTS: Amos Bellis. in the inventory of her property. who became mentally incapacitated. Relying on Art.225 Bellis v. 16 of the New Civil Code which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply (Texas Law). Bellis Case No. The Court relied on 1) the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Defendant filed a petition to the Court asking that he be appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife. 9c FACTS: Defendant Macuan married F. al. Tormo. which is general in character. 123 G. As further indication of this intent. being the guardian. W/N a married woman judicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is conjugal. M. He had 7 legitimate and 3 illegimate children. After the execution of the decedent’s will. The defendant. par. No. 1039 of the Civil Code render applicable the national law of the decedent. Tormo. which did not provide for legitimes. the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements.

the Corporation Law and the Public Service Act. Relying on the ruling in previous cases.00. Footnote No. 75 G. 153 G. for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1935 Constitution.755. the former being a special act while the latter is a law of general application. ISSUE: W/N the action for damages had already prescribed. it has already prescribed. LATIN MAXIM: 5a. 1956) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. with interest from the damages allegedly suffered by plaintiff due to the wrongful and unauthorized delay and careless handling in the transportation of a cargo of eggs undertaken by defendant for plaintiff from the port of New York. claimed by the defendant to have already prescribed in accordance with the prescription given by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. No. 190 as to goods transported in foreign trade. The legislative franchise was valid. The suit was brought more than a year from the receipt of the goods. American President Lines. The CIR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income tax maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with Sec. barred the appellant to receive compensation for damages. As a charter is in the nature of a private contract. Case No.R. Ltd. a British-owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise. The Court of Tax Appeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitioner’s assessment without effect having been made beyond the prescribed period stipulated in the Tax Code. HELD: Yes. the Court held that the prescriptive period of 1 year established by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act modified pro tanto the provisions of Act No. Court of Tax Appeal Case No.226 Tan Liao v. No. LATIN MAXIM: 9a. 1991) Chapter X. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act provides that loss or damage suit must be brought within one year after the delivery of the goods. 8. L-7280 (January 20. and thus. 44007 (March 20. ISSUE: W/N the provision in the franchise requiring the payment of only 5% of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all taxes is unenforceable and without legal effect. 14 of the 1935 Constitution which limits the grant of franchise to Filipino-owned corporations.R. HELD: No. RA 808 as a special statute must be deemed an exemption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditions and circumstances. Art. 50 FACTS: Private respondent. 115 FACTS: This is an action filed by plaintiff-appellant Tan Liao for the recovery of P92. USA to the port of Manila. pursuant to RA 808. Page 415. the imposition of another franchise tax on the corporation by the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract between the government and the corporation. and thereby. which included a tax exemption from the payment of all taxes except a franchise tax of 5% on the gross earnings and tax on its real property. 50 .

v.D. 72477 (October 16. cities and municipalities thereby justifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. LATIN MAXIM: 37. XXV Case No. Regardless of their date of passage. Page 415. 116 FACTS: The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Footnote No.D. 242 which provides that disputes between agencies of the government including GOCC’s shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice. Jr. P. the City Budget of Manila questioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may be paid out of city funds on the basis of the appointments signed by the Vice Mayor. conflict between the statutes should be very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other. 464 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces. No. a special law (RA 409) providing specifically for the organization of the Government of the City of Manila prevails over a general law. No.R. Presiding Judge RTC Br. 38b. Special laws ought to be upheld and construed as exceptions to the general law in the absence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion LATIN MAXIM: 50 FACTS: The Vice-mayor of Manila submitted to the Civil Service Commission the appointment of 19 officers in the Executive Staff of the Office of the Presiding Officer pursuant to the provisions of RA 409. ISSUE: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction over the civil action. since repeals by implication are not favored. claims and controversies between or among government agencies and instrumentalities. HELD: Yes. Also. 87119 (April 16. 87 G.D. 1991) Chapter X. 242 must yield to P.R. Civil Service Commission Case No. 1990) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Lopez. HELD: No. On the other hand respondent invokes P. However.D. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property taxes whereas P. 242 is a general law that deals with a broad coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes.D. ISSUE: W/N the Charter of the City of Manila has been repealed by RA 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out by city funds and BP 337 empowering local executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city. 464 on the matter of which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. RA 5185 and BP 337 as general laws were not meant to deprive the City Council of Manila of its appointing power.227 NPVC v. Branch XXV against NAPOCOR for the collection of real property tax covering the period 1978 to 1984. The City Legal Officer then rendered an opinion that the proper appointing officer is the City Mayor and not the City Council. 50 . Petitioner contends that the court has no jurisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the case pursuant to P. 150 G.

et al. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondent’s acceptance of the case for the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.R. No. No. Municipal Trial. which is a law of special nature. the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of Article 360 of the RPC. His reason was RA 1551 has repealed Sec. 9a. 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the two laws may be reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. 80 G. Also. which is claimed to have repealed Sec. was appointed by the Justice of Peace as clerk of the municipality of San Jose. and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not exceed 6 years. 75 of the Judiciary Act provides that justices of peace may have clerks of court at the expense of the municipalities and shall be appointed by respective justices. LATIN MAXIM: 6b. L-16950 (December 22. 1998) FACTS: A criminal complaint for libel was filed in the sala of herein petitioner. who initially recognized that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.R. Lastly. RA 1551 however. Pascual. 50 HELD: The judge ruled that said RA 1551 did not expressly repeal Sec. 1961) Chapter VI. Valera Garcia v.A. b2 ISSUE: W/N Sec. a junior typist civil service eligible. 7691it must be maintained that a special law cannot be repealed. Sec. Page 277. . the power to appoint should not be considered lodged in the said mayor. FACTS: Petitioner. the intent of the law in placing the appointment of the clerks in the justice of the peace is to prevent the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics. 36d. 75 of RA 296 provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall be appointed by the mayor. amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. 118 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Case No. Granted that there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases from the provisions of R. 110 G. 75 of RA 926.228 Manzano v. 32. there being no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court. When vouchers were submitted to the mayor. However. LATIN MAXIM: 37. the latter opined that the MTC should take cognizance of the case based on Republic Act 7691 which expanded the jurisdiction of Metropolitan. ISSUE: W/N the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints for libel. he did not want to approve them. The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). HELD: No. otherwise known as the Judiciary Act. Footnote No. 122068 (July 8. Case No. 38. Although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trial Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts. 75 of RA 926 has been repealed by RA 1551. 50. Nueva Ecija.

HELD: The fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to be considered an exception to the general. In regard therefore. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated. fees or other charges” in particular. 49. 7a. entitled “An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila.D.R. No. 7522. 83 FACTS: Petitioner operates 15 auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. No.R. The Municipal of Manila repealed RA 409 and enacted Ordinance No. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. the Local Tax Code controls. the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic.229 Lagman v. 548 and the Public Service Law. HELD: No. 1976) Chapter VI. Footnote No. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of “ordinance” in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes. RA 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts. 49. 50 . Page 420. Page 268. Footnote No. so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter acts. L-23305 (June 30. RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than C. 40b. the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code. ISSUE: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. 4986 is FACTS: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. and d) the ordinance would violate P. ultra vires. L-41631 (December 17. and null and void. 28 G. 126 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Bagatsing v. Case No.” Respondent were seeking the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance for the reason that a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with. 4986. LATIN MAXIM: 6c. Moreover. 7 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products. “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. 141 G. No. 17. c) Sec. 11a. 1966) Chapter X. 11a. illegal. b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment. et al. and For Other Purposes. 50 of Ordinance No.A. City of Manila. Ramirez Case No.” ISSUE: W/N the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional.

Ratio legis est anima legis. It is exceedingly hard. sed ita lex scripta est. Index animi sermo est. Custom is the best interpreter of a statute. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. Maledicta et exposition quae corrumpit textum. Aequum et bonum est lex legume. Contemporary construction is strongest in law. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION 2. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute acquires the force of law. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL INTERPRETATION 6. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Regula pro lege.230 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Latin Maxims Chapter II – CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION B. but so the law is written. no explanation is required. Optimus interpres rerum usus. It is bad construction which corrupts the text. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. In default of the law. Dura lex sed lex. si deficit lex. Legis interpretation legis vim obtinet. Littera scripta manet. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. 5. OR DEPARTURE FROM. Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur. The interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation. B. When the language of the law is clear. Clausula rebus sic stantibus. That which was originally void. Chapter IV – ADHERENCE TO. Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege. From the words of the statute there should be no departure. 7. The law may be harsh but it is the law. The intention of the party is the soul. Jus ars boni et aequi. Speech is the index of intention. Animus hominis est anima scripti. Optima est legum interpres consuetudo. The reason of the law is the soul of the law. The written word endures. Chapter III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION C. Hoc quidem perquam durum est. Equity never acts in contravention of the law. Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit. 4. Things thus standing. The best interpreter of the law is usage. Common error sometimes passes as current law. Law is the art of equity. 9. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION 8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis. Verba legis non est recedendum. . 3. Communis error facit jus. What is good and equal is the law of laws. POWER TO CONSTRUE 1. does not by lapse of time become valid. the maxim rules. Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate.

Argumentum ab inconvenient plurimum valet in lege. That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain. 15. An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law. It is better that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate absurdly. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Ubi eadem est ratio. debent inservice. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. and not the intent to the words. It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice that a stranger should reap the pecuniary produce of another man’s work. Quando verba statute sunt speciali. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. Like reason doth make like law. Benignus leges interpretandae sunt. 14. 11. the judgment is the same. prevails in law. Nemo est supra legis. De similibus idem est judicium.231 Littera necat spiritus vivificate. When the words used in a statute are special. Surplusage does not vitiate a statute. When the reason of the law ceases. Ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus. Verba nihil operari melius est quam absurde. but the purpose of the law is general. ratio autem generalia. though the heavens fall. statum generaliter est intelligendum. Surplusagium non nocet. Concerning similars. Nil facit error nominis cum de corpora vel persona constat. 10. quod voluntas eraum conservetur. inest haec exception. Words ought to be more subservient to the intent. 13. The letter kills but the spirit gives life. non e contra. Nobody is above the law. . That interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice. The construction of the law will not be such as to work injury or injustice. Lex injusta non est lex. Falsa demostratio non nocet. Laws are to be construed liberally. cessat et ipsa lex. the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and absurdity is to be adopted. ) 16. Let right be done. so that their spirit and reason be preserved. cum de corpore constat. An unjust law is not a law. No power must be above the law. Qui haret in littera haret in cortice. ibi est eadem legis disposition. Nulla potential supra legis esse debet. that nothing shall be contrary to law and right. Legis construction non facit injuriam. si non aliquid sit contras jus basque. The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful. Jurae naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem. He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning. the law itself ceases. there is the same law 12. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. Cessante rationi legis. 17. exemption from rigid application of law is implied. Where there is ambiguity. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. An argument drawn from a similar case. Lex simper intendit quod convenit rationi. ruat coelum . False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute. Where anything is granted generally. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur. Verba intentioni. Error in name does not make an instrument inoperative when the description is sufficiently clear. The law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. it should be read as the general expression. Where there is the same reason. or analogy. Fiat justitia. Ea est accipienda interpretation quae vitio caret.

Equivocal words or those with double meaning are to be understood according to their common and ordinary sense. Extreme law is often extreme wrong. Lex non intendit aliquid impossible. ibi jus nullum. Verba accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam. Nullius commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 23. Where there is a right. talis intellectus preferendus est. When jurisdiction is given. A general statement is understood in its general sense. A thing is known by its associates. Words of art should be explained from their usage in the art to which they belong. General words should be confined according to the subject-matter or persons to which they relate. A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used.232 18. B. be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Ex necessitate legis. 25. Generis dictum generaliter est interpretandum. ea quoque concessa esse videntur sine quibus jurisdiction explicari non potuit. summa injuria. by law. Verba mere aequivoca. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. 27. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. summa est militia. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. Ubi jus. the rule is dissimilar. IMPLICATIONS 20. Where the parties are equally at fault. Summum jus. Noscitur a sociis. Chapter V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES A. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The law does not intend the impossible. Where the law does not distinguish. The rigor of the law would be the highest injustice. Where the law is uncertain. . By the necessary implication of law. No one may derive advantage from his own unlawful act. In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis. there is a remedy for violation thereof. prohibetur et per obliquum. simper inest et minus. Of the same kind or specie. the position of the defending party is the better one. IN GENERAL 24. Ejesdem generis. C. there is no right. si per communem usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur. Ubi lex non distinguit necnon distinguere debemus. Cui jurisdiction data est. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo. all powers and means essential to its exercise are also given. 29. General words should be understood in their general sense. Of things dissimilar. The law does not require an impossibility. ASSOCIATED WORDS 28. The greater includes the lesser. 19. In eo quod plus sit. 26. Impossibilum nulla obigatio est. ibi remedium. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personam. Ubi jus incertum. Ex dolo malo non oritur action. Jus summum saepe. the courts should not distinguish. 21. 22. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. An action does not arise from fraud. What cannot. Verba artis ex arte. There is no obligation to do an impossible thing.

What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. C. A person. 37. Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est. The sense and meaning of the law is collected by viewing all the parts together as one whole and not of one part only by itself. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE 36. Every statute myst be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of law. 34. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. A law should be interpreted with a view of upholding rather than destroying it. . It is unjust to decide or to respond as to any particular part of a law without examining the whole of the law. With the necessary changes. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES 38. Ex antecendentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretation. The exposition of a statute should be made from all its parts put together. 32. The express mention of one person. object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Of the same matter. 39. Reddendo singular singulis. EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSES 35. The best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself. nisi tota lege inspecta. Verba posterima propter certitudinem addita ad priora quae certitudine indigent sunt referenda. B. . Pari materia. 31. PROVISOS. A qualifying word or phrase should be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent. A passage will be best interpreted by reference to that which precedes and follows it. de una aliqua ejus particula proposita indicare vel respondere. A thing not being expected must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.Times have changed and laws have changed with them. Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentential. Argumentum a contrario. thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. .233 30. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. 33. Ex tota materia emergat resolution. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.Tempora mutantur et leges mutantur in illis. or let each be put in its proper place. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. Distingue tempora et concordabis jura. Distinguish times and you will harmonize law. Mutatis mutandis. Optima statute interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Referring each to each. Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum interum atque interim perlegit. or referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object. Negative-Opposite Doctrine: what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful. Chapter VI – STATUTE CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES A. Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Injustum est.

The private interests of the individual must give way to the accommodation of the public. He who is first in time is preferred in right. there is no penalty without a law. not the past. Lex prospicit. Nullum tempus occurit regi. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt. Laws should be construed as prospective. There is no crime without a penalty. nulla poena sine lege. Statutes enacted for the publc good are to be construed liberally. Renunciation cannot be presumed. There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. IN GENERAL 40. nisi nominatim et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit. for Janus has really no place in the laws. . The law aids the vigilant.Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis. 42. Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. . unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED 41. Leges quae retrospciunt. Nullum crimen sine poena. Salus populi est suprema lex. Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them. non respicit. non ad facta praeterita revocari. Privilegia recipiunt largam interpretationem voluntate consonem concedentis. Follow the law strictly. Lex de futuro. Renunciatio non praesumitur. odiosa restringenda. Strictissimi juris. potior est in jure. The law provides for the future. not retrospective. B. 43. Favorabilia sunt amplianda.A new statute should affect the future. IN GENERAL 46. Potior est in tempore. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Chapter VIII – MANDATORY AND DIRECTIONAL STATUTES A. Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur. . Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. et magna cum cautione sunt adhibendae neque enim janus locatur in legibus. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. judex de praeterito. not those who slumber on their rights.234 Chapter VII – STRICT OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION A. 44. not backward. Leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis. The voice of the people is the supreme law. Chapter IX – PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES A. the judge for the past. 48. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT 47. An act done by me against my will is not my act. Laws which are retrospective are rarely and cautiously received. The law looks forward. The act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus. MANDATORY STATUTES 45. B.

REVISION. Quod semel aut bis existit praetereunt legislatores. Nigrum Nunquam Excedere Debet Rubrum.235 Chapter X – AMENDMENT. Jus constitui oportet in his quae ut plurimum accidunt non quae ex inordinato. PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE AND HARDSHIP C. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. The law does not concern itself with trifling matters. LANGUAGE OF STATUTE WHEN AMBIGUOUS B. Ambiguitas verborum patens nulla verificatione excluditur. In obscuris inspici solere quod versimilius est. A patent ambiguity cannot be cleared up by extrinsic evidence. aut quod plerumque fieri solet. Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto. BINDING FORCE OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION A. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. 50. De minimis non curat lex. Ad ea quae frequentibus accidunt jura adaptatur. Generalia specialibus non derogant. Laws ought to be made with a view to those cases which happen most frequently. When matters are obscure. . STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TITLE OF THE ACT (INTRINSIC AID) D. Legislators pass over what happens only once or twice. REPEAL 49. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. it is customary to take what appears to be more likely or what usually often happens. and not to those which are of rare or accidental occurrence. The black (body of the act printed in black) should never go beyond the red (title or rubric of the statute printed in red). Laws are understood to be adapted to those cases which most frequently occur. A general law does not nullify a specific or special law. CODIFICATION AND REPEAL A.

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