Additional Cases for Art 7 Consti | United States Constitution | Judiciaries

RINGER V. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 277 U. S. 189 (1928) Case Preview Full Text of Case U.S.

Supreme Court Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928) Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands Nos. 564 and 573 Argued April 10, 1928 Decided May 14, 1928 277 U.S. 189 Syllabus 1. Acts of the Philippine Legislature creating a coal company and a bank, the stock of which is largely owned by the Philippine government, provide that the power to vote the stock shall be vested in a "Committee," in the one case, and in a "Board of Control," in the other, each consisting of the GovernorGeneral, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Held, that the voting of the stock in the election of directors and managing agents of the corporations is an executive function, and that the attempt to repose it in the legislative officers named violates the Philippine Organic Act. P. 277 U. S. 199. 2. In the Philippine Organic Act, which divides the government into three departments -- legislative, executive, and judicial -- the principle is implicit, as it is in state and federal constitutions, that these three powers shall be forever separate and distinct from each other. P. 201.. 3. This separation, and the consequent exclusive character of the powers conferred upon each of the three departments of the government, is basic and vital -- not merely a matter of governmental mechanism. Id. 4. It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power, the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power, and the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. Id. Page 277 U. S. 190 5. Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or to appoint the agents charged with the duty of enforcing them. The latter are executive functions. P. 277 U. S. 202. 6. Not having the power of appointment unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection. Id. 7. The appointment of managers (in this instance, corporate directors) of property or a business in which the government is interested is essentially an executive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform, directly or through its members. P. 277 U. S. 203. 8. Whether or not the members of the "board" or "committee" are public officers in the strict sense, they are at least public agents charged with executive functions, and therefore beyond the appointing power of the legislature. Id. 9. The instances in which Congress has devolved on persons not executive officers the power to vote in nonstock corporations created for governmental purposes lend no support to a construction of the Constitution which would justify Congressional legislation like that here involved, considering the limited number of such instances, the peculiar character of the institutions there dealt with, and the contrary attitude of Congress towards governmentally owned or controlled stock corporations. P. 277 U. S. 204. 10. The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Governor-General by the Organic Act -- viz., by the provision vesting in him the supreme executive power, with general supervision and control over all the departments and bureaus of the government; the provision placing on him the responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws, and the provision that all executive functions of the government must be directly under him or within one of the executive departments under his supervision and control. P. 277 U. S. 205. 11. Where a statute contains a grant of power enumerating certain things which may be done, and also a general grant of power which, standing alone, would include those things and more, the general grant may be given full effect if the context shows that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive. P. 277 U. S. 206. 12. In § 22 of the Organic Act, the clause in the form of a proviso placing all the executive functions directly under the Governor-General or in one of the executive departments under his direction Page 277 U. S. 191 and control, and the proviso preceding it which grant certain powers to the legislature, are both to be construed as independent and substantive provisions. P. 277 U. S. 207.

13. An inference that Congress has approved an Act of the Philippine Legislature reported to it under § 10 of the Organic Act cannot be drawn from the failure of Congress to exercise its power to annul, reserved in that section, where the Act reported contravenes the Organic Act, and is therefore clearly void. P. 277 U. S. 208. Affirmed. Certiorari, 275 U.S. 519, to two judgments of ouster rendered by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto, which were brought in that court by the Philippine government against the present petitioners to test their right to be directors in certain corporations described in the opinion. Art 7 Sec 16(C) Flores et al. vs Drilon and Gordon G.R. 104732 June 22 1993 Note: The petitioners herein are Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, Rogelio Palo, Domingo Jadloc, Carlito Cruz and Manuel Reyes who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines. Drilon is then the Executive Secretary and Gordon is the Mayor of the City of Olongapo. Facts: The petitioners filed for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order on Mayor Gordon for having been appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Sec 13, par (d) of R.A. 7227 or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992. Petitioners also question the constitutionality of the proviso in the said paragraph, which states: Provided, however, That for the first year of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Issue: W/N the proviso in Sec 13, par (d) of RA 7227 infringes on the ff constitutional and statutory provisions: 1. Sec 7 of the first paragraph of Art 9-B of the Constitution (noneligibility of elective officials for appointment or designation to any public office during his tenure)



Sec 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall appoint all other officers of the Government… (The Case book focused on this issue)  W/N the Congress abused their authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify in the appointments made by the President. Sec 261 par (g) of the Omnibus Election Code (No appointments, etc must be made 45 days before a regular election otherwise there is an election offense.)

Note: Issues 1 and 3 came from the original case and were not discussed in the case book, thereby the discussions of which will only be discussed in brief. Held: The proviso is declared unconstitutional. Mayor Gordon’s appointment is declared Null and Void. However, he may be considered a de facto officer and thus any emoluments which may have been received by Gordon if he was the Chief Executive of SBMA may be retained by him (as in the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union). Rationale:


Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, the basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents. The first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his


9. VII. discretionary. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. In Sarmiento vs. Mitra. No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be discriminatory. The reference to paragraph 2. under the Omnibus Election Code Sec 261 par (g). 198 is mention made of the need for petitioner's appointment to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Section 16. ambassadors. the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power 3. the President need not make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16. Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2. deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. The appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections therefore it can be considered. Edgardo J. said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission. who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. Section 16. the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment. the heads of the executive departments. Meanwhile. the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. VII. Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner's appointment. there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which. Section 16. an election offense. Appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16. Thus. Art. just quoted. this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to confirmation process the petitioner's appointment as sectoral representative for the women's sector and as member of Congress. Mison. Art. such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. Art. to which we will hereafter refer from time to time. and the nomination of such sectoral representatives. EO 198 is denominated: "Providing for the Manner of Nomination and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to the House of Representatives. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . These four (4) groups. Angara. petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments. Quinton-Deles as a representative of the women’s sector. ." In a meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2. . their number. Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. to suspend the oath-taking of the four sectoral representatives. the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. the President expressly submitted petitioner's appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.own choice. XI).e. VII as authority for the appointment of petitioner is. However. 7227. Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. Issue: Does an appointment as Sectoral Representative by the President pursuant to Section 7. paragraph 2 and Article XVIII. when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual. without the essential element of choice. the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. Art. 9. and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. Art." Petitioners further contend that nowhere in the Constitution nor in Executive Order No. whether voluntary or compulsory. Art. Petitioner's appointment was furthermore made pursuant to Art. et al. In other words. is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment. x x x Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2. In the case at bar. v. in essence. Art. Under Section 7. The power to appoint is. EO 198 confines itself to specifying the sectors to be represented. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. by express mandate of the Constitution. among others. it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. XVIII of the Constitution. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7. but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.. VII of the Constitution. petitioner appealed to the House of Representatives alleging. appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Quintos-Deles. are: First. Indeed. As a matter of fact. Art." We agree with the submission of respondent Commission that the provisions of Executive Order No. Such supposed power of appointment. it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution. we construed Section 16. VII in the appointment extended to her. while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R. Article XVIII of the Constitution. Art. Art. as follows: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16. Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Hence. Section 16. . The records show that petitioner's appointment was made while Congress was in recess. VII of the Constitution. Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said Section 16. paragraph 2 which provides: The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress. require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec." referred to in the first sentence of Section 16. i. 198 do not deal with the manner of appointment of sectoral representatives. Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others. the appointment of sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise provided by law. . Because of this. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig. that since no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives already sitting to the confirmation process. Hence. Jr. More to the point. Section 5. other public ministers and consuls officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain. Article XVIII of the Constitution require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments? Held: The petition is dismissed. 198." If indeed appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation. the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. limited to three consecutive terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution. the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question. The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7. the recognition by the President as appointing authority that petitioner's appointment requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Nevertheless. transmitted a letter of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives. Section 7 of the Constitution.A. Consequently. appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16. Jr. Ratio: One-half or twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is reserved for sectoral representatives. chaired by Sen. Commission on Appointments Facts: Teresita Quinton-Deles and three others were appointed sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII.

Corporations owned or controlled by the government. 2. they filed in the SC. Their claim was the doctrine of qualified political agency: “…the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments. The RTC granted their petiton. such as NAMARCO. the action of the President to reverse the decision of a subordinate is justified. It only said “as long as finances permit. and the Commission on Audit (COA) upheld this decision in a motion for reconsideration • The COA also said that Mandaue City’s issuing of allowances violated the appropriation laws of Congress.. DADOLE. 2003 Facts: Israel C. Order No. Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Held: YES. 99-14. 1772 grants the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize national government. Cerilles. V COA GR No 125350 3 December 2002 Petitioners – RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City Respondent – Commission on Audit FACTS • The local government of Mandaue City gave P1.” Issues: 1. VII.” G. 99-14 says that “DENR adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional District except in ARMM and NCR. LBC exceeded the supervisory powers of the President o Supervisory powers – the executive can’t interfere with local government autonomy unless there has been a violation of law (can only make sure that laws by the legislative are implemented) o The President’s power of control only applies to executive departments LBC 55 was clear interference because the law it was supposedly based on (RA 7160) did not authorize the setting of a ceiling in allowances. Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process. LBC 55 was VOID. DENR EMPLOYEES . This administrator.R. Issue: Whether or not the president had the authority to reverse the decision of the Board of Directors if NAMARCO. issued by DENR Secretary Antonio H. Ratio: Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency. and the acts of the Secretaries of such depts…are.500 allowance for RTC and MTC judges • The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular 55 (LBC 55).000 only • The City Auditor ordered the judges to return the amount received in excess of P1. or offices. P. This was issued in pursuance to Admin. No..D. DENR filed a Motion for Reconsideration. which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Department. and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ISSUES • W/N LBC 55 was void for exceeding the supervisory powers of the president. Ratio: The President shall have control of all executive department. because there is no provision that allows them to get allowance money from the IRA (Internal Revenue Allocation). Arive held a position in NAMARCO. DAO No.Only internal and interpretative regulations are exempt from publication. The president reinstated Juan T. which capped the allowances given to government officials at a maximum of P1. Section 16. Thus. unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.” Employees of DENR (members of association COURAGE) represented by Baguindanai A. • • LBC 55 was also void for not being published. XVIII. Petition is GRANTED and previous ones were REVERSED. 198 but pursuant to Art. the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. presumptively acts of the Chief Executive. Motion to Dismiss and petition for certiorari in the RTCs and CAs but were always denied and dismissed. Arive. Hence. Gaddi (Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region XII) issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotobato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel). • W/N the allowances given by the Mandaue City local government violated the appropriation laws of Congress. Held: Yes. 149724: August 19. ET AL. to South Cotobato. which is a government owned corporation. is directly under the President. whose rank is like that of a Head of an Executive Department. This decree was not repealed or revoked and is consistent with the Constitution so it remains operative. The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs to implement this policy. • The DBM can’t claim that the Mandaue appropriations violated the general appropriations act because the DBM failed to: o Conduct a formal review of the appropriations o Order a disapproval of the appropriation within 90 days of receipt of the appropriation ordinance. the president can reverse the decision. Arca Facts: Juan T.000. The president of the Philippines then reversed the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors. partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices. Karim filed with the RTC petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction because of lack of legal basis and grave abuse of discretion in regards to the Memorandum issued. NAMARCO v. o DENR vs. HELD • • The SC decided in favor of the petitioner judges. exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law.petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. bureaus. paragraph 2 and Art.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful