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Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-7

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EXHIBITS SUPPORTING PUBLIC RECORD EVIDENCE EXTOU I Jtifel, FRAUD, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, RETALIATION, B R f f i m K S S A. FACIALLY FRAUDULENT^ AFFIDAVIT [ DI I S\C KTN. PEll-RSON. K. M.

WILKINSON] INSTR 4371834. O.R. 4517 PC 1914, Collier County Public Records B. PRIMA FACIE NULL & VOID "writ of execution", Case No. 2:07-cv-00228 C. PRIMA FACIE NULL & VOID "O.R. 569/875" AND LAND EXTORTION SCHEME D. 07/21/2010 letter b\ Dcf. Racketeer JACK N. PETERSON E. Def. CHARLIE GREEN'S recording instructions

F. RACKETEERING AND EXTORTION record evidence. Doc. # 429, Case 2:07-cv-228 G. Docket as CERTIFIED b\ Dcf. Diane Nipper on 07/16/2010, Case No. 2:07-cv-00228 Conclusively evidencing record absence of fictitious and fabricated appeal "09-13196" H. FALSIFICATION of "appeal no 09-13196" b\ Def. Beverly B. Martin pursuant to and the

CERTIFIED docket at B.. which evidenced the lack ol any such "appear

yr/vo/Z/y^racketeering-and-evtortion-schcnie of record. "JUl 19 2010" CASE FIXING & "DISMISSAL AS FRIVOLOUS" I. DOC. # 434. 07/22/2010. b\ Def. .KM IN I . S fLRI I CASI< NO. 2:2(l07-CV-00228

J. Third Amended Complaint. Case No. 2:2007-cv-()O22,S. Doc. # 288. 282 (I 1 pages), PRIMA FACIE NULL AND VOID "legislalive act" and/or "law '". Lake "O.R. 569/875", FACIALLY FALSIFIED "regulalion" and/or "reso/ulion" attached as Page 9 of 11; ETHICS COMPLAIN 1 against Del. Crooked Lee C oimi\ Official JACK N. PETERSON Attached as Page 10 of I I

191

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Filed 07/29/10 Page 2 of 6

K. PRIMA FACIE FRAUDULENT and FRIVOLOUS motion by Defendant Racketeer and "land parceT Forger K. M. Wilkinson: "Appellee Properly Appraiser's Motion for

Sanctions for Filing of a frivolous Motion". "Rule 2~-4". Case No. 2:2()07-cv-00228, Doc. # 386-2, pp 1-3. Doc. # 386-3. p. 15 L. BINDING PRECEDENT and RECORD EVIDENCE of OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL RETALIATION, and EXTORTION under color of fake "judgment" & "vwV", WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO. v. PALM BEACH COUNTY. 41 F.3d 1490(11* Cir.1995); Murrell v. United States. 269 F.2d 458 (5"' Cir.1959) M. Lee County. FU INSTRUMENT # 2010000171344. WARRANTY DEED Lot 15A, "Cayo Costa. Lee County Plat Book 3. Page 25 (1912) (2 pages) N. RECORD RACKETEERING EVIDENCE: "Motion for Issuance of writ of execution ...", RECORDED EVIDENCE of EXTORTION. FRAUD & FALSIFICATION of un-recorded judgment. Doc. # 386. Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. by Def. Racketeer Jack N. Peterson; PERVERSION of recorded "S24.30 judgment" into fake ••$5.()4X.60 debt" O. Lee County Tax Collector's Office. Statement of Paid Properly faxes. Lot 15A. Cayo Costa (2 pages) P. DENIAL of "Appellee Wilkerson 's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment", FALSIFICATION of-Rule 3<S motion", record evidence. Doc. # 386-5

FALSIFICATION of "Rule 3<S /udgi/ienf". record c\ idence. Doc. H 386-5 FALSIFICATION of "Rule 3<S bill of costs", record evidence. Doc. # 386-5 FALSIFICATION of unsubstantiated "$5,000 in attorneys fees". Doc. # 386-5

By Defendant Racketeers Dubina. Chief Judge. Tjollat. and Birch. Circuit Judges Facially forged and pasted "certification". Doc. it 386-5. p. 2, right lower corner

192

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Filed 07/29/10 Page 3 of 6

Q. MEMORANDUM OF NO DEDICATION Of 1 HP C \ Y O COS I A ROADS TO PUBLIC, From The Office of Lee Count). Florida. Attorney. Dec. 29. 2000. Joan C. Henry. Esq. R. 1912 Plat of undedieated private "Caxo Costa" Subdivision in Lee County Plat Book 3, P. 25 S. Recorded Survey of riparian I ot I5A. Cayo Costa. PB 3 I'Ci 25 (1912) on the Gulf of Mexico T. Fraudulent Lee County Inventory C 'antral File. FALSIFIED parcel 12-44-20-01 -00000.00A0 O.R. 1651 / 2488, O.R. 2967 / 1084 - 1090, BLUE SHEET 980206, 03/24/1998(6 pages) U. Falsified "Parcel 12-44-20-01-0000(1 00A0" by Def. Racketeer Kenneth M. Wilkinson (2 p) V. Falsified "resolution", "legislalive ael". and/or "law " by Def. Racketeer John Edwin Steele, Doc. ## 288. 282, Case No. 2:2()07-c\ -00228 W. "Judgment Issued as Mandate June 11 2009". in the amount of $24.30. FRAP 39 (1 p) RACKETEERING/EXTORTION EVIDENCE: March 5. 2009 "opinion"', 11th Circuit X. Bill of Costs Issued as Mandate June 11 2009. in the amount of $24.30. FRAP 39 (1 p) Y. Fraudulent "Conclusion" and Case Fixing by Defendant U.S. Circuit Judges, Doc. # 365, Case No. 2:2007-c\-00228: Doe. a 386. Z. STATE Court Docket. Plaintiffs" Case No. 2006-CA-003185. BUSSE v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Defendant Judge CrHRAI I). LYNN. Jr.. Filed 07/3 1/2006. REMOVED to U.S. District Court by Def. Judges John I . Steele and S. Polstcr Chappell AA. EXTORTION & PUBLIC CORRUPTION NO 1 ICE to Def. Drew Heathcoat, U.S.

Clerk (2 pages) BB. CC. Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent in Charge. Steven E. Ibison DESTRUCTION of official records as evidenced by search of "2007-00228", 11th

Circuit DD. DESTRUCTION of Docket No. 201010963. U.S. Court of Appeals. 1 l,h Circuit

193

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EE.CASE FIXING. OBSTRUCTION O F JUSTICE. AND RETALIATION by Def. Judges Black, Carnes. and Martin, dated "JUl 19 2010"" (2 pages) FF.NOTICE O F C O R R U P T I O N \ M ) LETTER DEMANDING AUTHENTICATION,

Def. JOHN LEY, U.S. Circuit Clerk. 1 l"' U.S. Appellate Circuit (2 pages) GG. Motion to Stay Prima Facie Illegal Execution as a Matter of Law. Case No. 2:10-cv00390 (5 pages) HH. Section 838.022, Florida Statutes. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT Chaptei 838. Fla. Slat.. BRIBERY. MISUSE O F PUBLIC O F F I C E II. Case No. 2:2010-cv-00089. Doc. # 29. pp. 4. 7. Def. U.S. /Mlorney. Tony West, Matthew L. Fesak, affirming U.S. jurisdiction under "c/V/7 RICO" JJ. FACIALLY FALSIFIED "writ of execution". Case No 2:2()07-cv-00228. Doc. # 425 KK. Section 55.10. Florida Statutes. Judgments. Chapter 55 Judgments. Florida Statutes LL. Defendant Racketeer K. M. Wilkinson's Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of .

Interrogatories ,, under oath. 10/22/2007; in particular, asserting under oath the RECORD ABSENCE of "public Cayo Costa easements". Answer 4 24 MM. Florida 19"' Statewide Grand J u r y on Public Corruption (09/30/2009 Petition),

Florida Statewide Prosecution Office. Office of the Attorney General of Florida. NN. FALSIFIED "Plat" of "Cayo Costa Subdivision" as falsified and filed by Defendant

Racketeer K. M. Wilkinson as "Exhibit A", Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228 OO. Publicly recorded Case Fixing and Obstruction of Justice by Defendant Judges Gerald

B. Tjoflat, Susan Birch, and Joel F. Dubina. Chief Judge. U.S. Court of Appeals, 11 th Circuit, Doc. # 365, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228

194

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Filed 07/29/10 Page 5 of 6

PP. Fraudulent Order. Case No. 2:2(K)7-cv-00228. Doc. tf 422. pp. 17-18. by Defendant Racketeer John E. Steele, evidencing extortion, obstruction of justice, obstruction of court access, and retaliation under fraudulent pretenses of. e.g.. "writ of execution", "lack of jurisdiction", and office. QQ. RR. Steele SS.FBI Complaint against Dcf. U.S. Circuit Judge Beverly B. Martin. Including "JUL 19 2010" CASE FIXING FOR BRIBES and RACKETEERING TT.Record Evidence of Destruction of Plaintiffs" Appeal Records. ## "10-10963. UU. VV. Steele WW. XX. YY. ZZ. March 08, 2010 Letter by Dcf. John Ley. U.S. Circuit Clerk DESTRUCTION AND ALTERATION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS. EVIDENCE FRAUDULENT 04/06/2(110 ()rder by Def. ( looked Circuit Judge Beverly B. Martin Supreme Court Justice Dav id Souler Communications, including binding precedent of WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO. v. PALM BEACH COUNTY AAA. OTHER; OTHER PUBLIC RECORDS 10-10967' FBI Complaint against Def. Lee County Commissioner John Manning Concealment of fake unl. Doc. # 434. Case No. 2:20()7-ev-00228, by Def. J. E. "ripeness recpnrements". "frivolity", "sanciions". and under color of authority

GOVERNMENTAL FORGERIES. "O.R. 569/875". FORENSIC EVIDENCE Facially Fraudulent Order. Doc. U 338. Case 2:2007-cv-00228. by Def. John E.

195

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Filed 07/29/10 Page 6 of 6

CC:

Federal Bureau of Investigation U.S. Department of Justice Eric Holder, Attorney General Barack Hussein Obama, The White House Florida Department of Law Enforcement The Florida Bar Real Property Probate and I rust Lawyer Section. The Florida Bar

196

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8 9:28 07/29/10 *** INSTR 4371834 OR 4517 PG 1914 RECORDED 12/10/2009 FiledAM PAGES 1 Page *** DWIGKT E. BROCK, COLLIER COUNTY CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT REC S10.00

1 of 23

»
INSTR n 2009000303382. Pages 1 Doc Type AFF. Recorded 11 • 18.2009 at 10.11 AM. Charlie Green, Lee County CterV of Circuit Court Rec. Fee $10 00 Deputy Clerk DMERC1ER #1

AFFIDAVIT STATE OF FLORIDA COUNTY OF LEE ) ) )

BEFORE ME the undersigned authority, personally appeared JACK N. PETERSON, who being first duly sworn, says: 1. KENNETH M. WILKINSON, as Property Appraiser of Lee County, Florida, is the

holder of a judgment issued by the United StatesjCourt of Appeals in and for the Eleventh Circuit on July 29, 2009 in Docket $5,048.60. 2. The judgment hj Kenneth M. Wi 2480 Thompson1 Fort Myers, FL AFFIANT FURTHER 'irnty, Florida JORG BUSSE in the amount of

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me this N. PETERSON, who is personally known to me.

of November, 2009 by JACK '0-.

^nature ot Notafy ruDUc; (Printed Name) My Commission Expires:
IJESUEAJ WCOMMSSIONtDD 589573

EXPIRES: 0*c«rtm», 2010 lenrtllnNotorMfcUUiMlM

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Document 425

Filed 07/29/10 Page 2 of 23
Filed 02/02/10

Page 1 of 1

•FH FO
DC 11 Rav. 1/00

's

1

WRIT OF EXECUTION

United States District Court
TO THE MARSHAL OF:

m^«mSfF&Jt1'^
MiuyLtuibiHiurontiwioA F 0 R T MYERS F l 0 R , 0 A
• -

UT. imimtmm

United States District Court, Middle District of Florida

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements in your district belonging to: NAME

Jorg Busse Building 2, Unit 4 1575 Curlew Avenue Naples. FL 34112-5038

you cause to be made and levied as well a certain debt of:
DOLLAR AMOUNT DOLLAR AMOUNT AND

Five Thousand Forty-Eight

Sixty Cents
, before the

in the United States District Court for the Middle District of P'0"*3 Judge of the said Court by the consideration of the same Judge lately recovered against the said,

Jorg Busse

and also the costs that may accrue under this writ. And that you have above listed moneys that the place and date listed below; and that you bring this writ with you.
PLACE

2115 Second Street, 6th Floor

DISTRICT M

j d d | e

Djstrjct o f

p^^g

CITY

Fort Myers

DATE

Witness the Honorable United States Judge
DATE CLERK 01

StISryl L. Loesch

This writ was received and executed. U.S. MARSHAL (BY) DEPUTY MARSHAL

2-/2 iS

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Filed 07/29/10 Page 3 of 23

.VUTO-l

* 559^575

RESOUyTIOK PCRTAIRIiW T O PUBLIC U N M

IN,Sm gglfl^ WHPIviyig
NHOtCAS, there' appears in the Public Records of Lee County, Florida, In Plat Book 3 at page 25 the Second Revised Mat of Cayo Coeta Subdivision: and WHEREAS, there tppeara upon snid plat certain designated lot and block areas aitd other undesignated areas t and WHEREAS, there appears upon said plat certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying East of tho Easterly tier of Moeka in said subdivision and West of tho Westerly tier of blocks in said subdivision: and TEREAS, tho County claims s t i d lands as public lands together with all accretions thereto. NO*. THEREFORE, HE IT RESOLVED B THE B A D Of COWTY Y OR COWUMIONERS OF LEE COUNTY. FLORIDA does by this Resolution claim a l l of raid lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public purposes. DONE AND ADOPTED this /? day of Js . ci. ».U-*-U. 1969.

V

3 All

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Filed 07/29/10 Page 4 of 23

m LEE COUNTY
iswn. j - r j - r j - r -^ ^, ^ a. ^

533-2236
V y

SOUTHWEST
Vacant District One

FLORIDA

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS July 21, 2010
A. Bnan Bigclow District Two Rayjudah District Three

Facsimile (239)485-2118

S

fcH

^ " Z
coZ'^r
David M. Owen County Attorney Diana M. Parker Examiner

Jorg R. Busse P.O. Box 11124 Naples, Florida 34101 -11124
Re: TELEPHONE/COMMUNICATIONS

Sir: I understand from my administrative assistant, Wendy Wise, that you telephoned yesterday and spoke with her in my absence. I have asked you before to confine any communication to writing. You have chosen to simply ignore my request. Since this last call was nothing more than an opportunity for you to annoy and harass our staff, I again ask you to limit your communication to writing delivered by regular U.S. Mail. I have directed staff to henceforth, if I am not available, to note the time of your call and simply hang up. Sincerely,

county Hearing

JackfN. Peterson Assistant County Attorney

JNP/wlw

P.O. Box 398. Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0398 (239) 533-21 I I Internet address http.'V/www.lee-county.com
A N EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AFFIRMATIVE A C T I O N EMPLOYER

<f

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8 Filed 07/29/10 Page 5 of 23 IN ORDER TO RECORD A DEED IN LEE COUNTY THE FOLLOWING MUST BE MET:

. \J^y

"Prepared by" statement (name and address of the "natural" person preparing the Deed) Grantor(s) (Sellers-Party Giving Title) names legibly printed in the body of the Deed Grantor(s) mailing address Grantee(s) (Buyer-Party Receiving Title) names legibly printed in the body of the Deed Grantee(s) mailing address Signatures of Grantors Names printed under Grantors' signatures 2 witnesses for each signature, the names printed under witnesses' signatures Complete Notary acknowledgment o Names being acknowledged o Date acknowledgment taken o Signature of Notary t/\ 0 Name printed under signature o Commission expiration date o Ink Seal • The consideration, sale price, or outstanding mortgage must be on the document or listed in a cover letter for recording • Three-inch square white space on the top right-hand comer of the first page of each document and a oneinch by three-inch square white space on the top right-hand corner of each subsequent page of the document. These are RECORDING REQUIREMENTS for Deeds (F.S. 695.26). There may be other statutory requirements for making a conveyance valid, which are not within the scope of the recording office to dictate. For example, the Lee County Property Appraiser requires that the legal description be included on the deed document. LEGAL ADVICE CANNOT BE PROVIDED: The Lee County Clerk's Office staff cannot help you complete legal forms or provide legal advice of any type. If you have questions about completing forms or the proper method of transferring property, you should consult an attorney or legal advisor. FLORIDA DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX: Each document transferring an interest in real property may be subject to Florida's Documentary Stamp Tax (documentary stamps on deeds (rounded up to nearest hundred) $0.70 per $100.00) Please contact the Department of Revenue for guidance at (800) 352-3671. Documentary stamps are paid on the total consideration paid, given, or to be paid, for the transfer; see Department of Revenue reference sheet for details.

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8
/

Filed 07/29/10 Page 6 of 23

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC U.S...Department of Justice HJnited States Marshals Service
MJUNTIFF

See Instwctions for "Service of Process by the U.S. Marshal" on the reverse of this form.
COURT CASE NUMBER

Jorg Busse
DEFENDANT

07-00228-CV-Fm-29-SPC
TYPE OF PROCESS

Lee County, Florida* e t c . , et a l .

Writ of ISxecoti&S

SERVE

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL, COMPANY, CORPORATION. ETC.. TO SERVE OR DESCRIPTION OF P R O P E R T Y T ^ E I S D R eOftTCEMft ,

Property to be Seized: serve:

ADDRESS (Street or RFD. Apartment No.. City, State tnd ZIP Code)

AT sH^Ng!ncE_wa^T^cpPYj221^^1^^Ii^l^^^£^SL5l!^L
FJai ack N. Peterson, Esquire
I An. Assistant

Lot 15A,Cayo Casta, Parcel No. 12-44-20-OT-0®15S$J&A. 4 • ^, ~ r ^ u Jorg Busse» Building 2, Unit 4, 1575 Curlew Avenue, NapSaJ, f t 3' 5038
Number of process to be served with this Form - 285 Number of parties to be served in this case Check for service on U.S.A.

- * «/»"!

-rt

il

</>

tf

County Attorney 2115 Second Street, 6th Floor Fort Hyers, FL 33901

-o-

-no._

t*
AMenes, All

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR OTHER INFORMATION THAT WILL ASSIST IN EXPEDITINO SERVICE (Include Bi Tkkphoae fhmbets. tad Estmutcd Times Available Bar Service): KU

rfo;

Subject property i s located as shown on maps contained in t h ^ f s B s i t a of thejS Lee County Property Appraiser, Parcel No. 12-44-20-01-00015.^i^R(w«g.leepa^g).

I heieby ceitify and return that I D have personally served. D have legal evidence of service.Mhave executed as shown in "Remaiks", the pracess described on the mdividial, company, corporation, etc., at the address shown above or on the individual; company, corporation, etc., shownta the address inseited below D I heieby ceitify and return that I am unable to locale the individual, company, corporation, c i c . named above (See remarks below) Name and title of individual served (if nor shown above) LJ Address (complett only ifdinerent than shown above; A person of suitable age and disaction then residing in the defendant's usual place of abode. Time am pm

Date of Service

4-5-10
Stgnaiuie tftU.S. Marshal or Deputy Service Fee 9D Tbtal Mileage Charges (iochidjm gulcaYors) Jding Forwarding Fee Total Charges Advance Deposits Amount owed to U S . Marsh:

11,5

#50. H

+67,90

REMARKS:

moREDmoNs WSBEVSED

1. CLERK OF THE COURT

n»M usRugs OIK mem

£

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8 Filed 07/29/10 Page 7 of 23 Electronic Case Filing | U.S. District Court - Middle District of Florida Page 1 of 57

APPEAL U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida (Ft. Myers) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Internal Use Only

Busse v. Lee County, Florida ct al Assigned to: Judge John E. Steele Referred to: Magistrate Judge Sheri Polster Chappell Case in other court: 08-13170B 09-12372-B 09-13517F 09-13519F 09-13522F 09-1428IF 09-14282F 09-14284F 09-14285F 09-162J1F 09-16212F 09-16213F 09-16214F 09-16335F 10-10963-1 10-10967-1 10-11884-1 Cause: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Civil Rights Violation Plaintiff Jorg Busse

Date Filed'04/10/2007 Date Terminated: 05/06/2008 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 440 Civil Rights: Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

I CERTIFY THE FORB AND CORRECT COP SHERYLLL" UNltEQSTAtfe MIDDLEDlSTr

represented by Jorg Busse P.O.Box 1126 Naples, Fl 34106-1126 239/595-7074 PROSE represented by Kelly Lina Rooth Rooth Law Group, PA Suite 322 4399 35th St N St Petersbsurg, FL 33714 727/824-6212 Fax: 727/822-8048 Email: krooth@roothlawgroup.com LEAD ATTORNEY

Plaintiff Kenneth M. Roesch, Jr. TERMINATED: 09/21/2007

https://ecf.flmd.circl 1 .dcn/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?737110522490912-L_770_0-1

7/16/2010

J

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Filed 07/29/10 Page 8 of 23

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Filed 07/29/10 Page 9 of 23

filing fee, the new appeals were to be reviewed and a frivolity determination as to each appeal made. Consistent with that Order, on April 6, 2010, Appellant was ordered to show cause why these appeals should not be dismissed as frivolous. Appellant filed documents with the Court on April 19, 2010, which we construe as his responses to the Order to Show Cause. Our review of these documents establishes that Appellant has failed to show that these appeals are not frivolous. Therefore, on the Court's own motion, these appeals are hereby DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. Given the frivolity of these appeals and the nature of Appellant's responses to the Order to Show Cause, we hereby SUSPEND any rule which would allow Appellant to seek reconsideration of this Order. The Clerk is directed to accept no ftirther filings in this closed appeal. The Clerk may discard any future documents received by Appellant.

•1

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8

Filed 07/29/10 Page 10 of 23

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8 Filed 07/29/10 Page 11 of 23 Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434 Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JORG BUSSE Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendants.

ORDER This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant's Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. No response has been filed and the time to respond has expired. Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff. Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant's motion. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

H

Case 1:10-cv-00321-JL Document 1-8 Filed 07/29/10 Page 12 of 23 Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434 F l d 07/22/10 Page 2 o 2 ie f

Plaintiff may file one response to defendant's Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is

received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of a response and without further notice. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this July, 2010.
x

22nd

day of

L

m J0| E. STEELE United States District Judge

JIMa.

Copies: Plaintiff Counsel of record

12.

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6. Pursuant to Title 28, Part 4, Ch. 87, S. 1391, Plaintiffs claims arise out of acts undertaken and injuries suffered in the Middle District of Florida. Pursuant to the sealed Survey before this Court, Plaintiff owns and possesses the approx. more than 2.5 Acres of lot 15A with an estimated fair market value of more than $2,000,000. JURISDICTION UNDER CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, 42 U.S.C. 1983,28 U.S.C. 1343, CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES 3 & 4, AMENDMENTS 5 & 14, DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES, AND BILL OF RIGHTS 7. Pursuant to Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. 1983,28 U.S.C. 1343,1331, this Court has original jurisdiction to redress Defendant State Officials' deprivations of Plaintiffs equal rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiff seeks invalidation and rescission of unconstitutional 'OR 569/875', 'OR 2967/1084-1090', 'Blue Sheet 980206', injunctive, declaratory, and equitable relief, compensatory and possibly punitive damages. JURISDICTION UNDER 1899 RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION ACT, 33 U.S.C. 403, COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 3 8. Pursuant to the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 403, and Commerce Clause, this Court has jurisdiction over the Army Corps of Engineers' authority over Plaintiffs naturally created lagoon property. Under the Commerce Clause, this Court has jurisdiction over dominant federal interests in navigation and the navigability of Plaintiffs lagoon in interstate and foreign commerce. The Federal Government has power to control navigable waters, and navigable servitude extends to navigable waters. Therefore, the Constitution conferred jurisdiction to this Court over the regulation of commerce on the lagoon of Plaintiffs lot 15A pursuant to Article 3, s. 2. JURISDICTION UNDER THE 1862 HOMESTEAD ACT 9. 14lh Amendment provisions cover all instrumentarities by which Defendant State and Officials act. Defendant County, positioned under State Government, deprived Plaintiff of protected 14th Amendment rights against deprivations by the State under color of 'OR 569/875', 'lot A', and 'block 1'. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over effect and extent of the 1895 Federal Land Patent grant from the United States to A. C. Roesch and to Plaintiff and the navigable waters along platted shorelines pursuant to the 1862 Homestead Act. JURISDICTION UNDER FEDERAL COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF ACCRETION AND EROSION 10. Federal common law, settled for centuries, vests title to accretions onto Federally patented oceanfront property in

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Plaintiff upland owner of lot 15A. Pursuant to determinate U.S. Supreme Court rulings, Federal law governs title to accretions on Plaintiffsripariangulf front lot. JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO FEDERAL APPRAISAL STANDARDS, UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL PRACTICE, AND 12 U.S.C. 3331-3351 11. This Court has jurisdiction over deprivations of Plaintiffs civil rights caused by Defendant Property Appraiser's violations of Federal Appraisal Standards in Federallyrelatedproperty transactions under color of State law. JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT, 28 U.S.C. 2201 12. Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, this Court has jurisdiction to declare Plaintiffsrights,legal relations, and boundaries in light of equity principles. In support of his factual allegations, Plaintiff adopts byreferencein this Complaint all evidentiary materials before the Court and alleges: COUNT 1:42 U.S.C. 1983 DEPRIVATIONS UNDER UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'OR 569/875' 13. Under color of alleged resolution draft 'OR 569/875' (Exhibit 'A'), Defendant State, park staff, County, Commissioners, Attorneys, and Appraiser subjected Plaintiff citizen to deprivations of his riparianrights,private easements, disputed accreted property, and privileges secured by the U.S. Constitution. Defendant County and Commissioners had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision and accordingly, never signed or executed 'OR 569/875'. Therefore, 'OR 569/875' was unenforceable, and said Defendants violated constitutional Articles 3 & 4(s. 2) and Amendments 5 & 14(s. 1,5) and are liable to Plaintiff. 14. Therefore, under color of unauthorized 'OR 569/875' and 'OR 2967/1084-90', said Defendants confiscated Plaintiffs valuable private accreted property, i.e. more than approx. 2.5 Acres, without compensation in violation of the 5th Amendment Takings Clause and 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 15. Pursuant to Ch. 177, F.S., alleged lot A and block 1 cannot be legally described or surveyed, because they were not on the referenced Subdivision Plat. Therefore, Defendant Officials temporarily took a total of more than approx. 200 Acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa under color of 'OR 569/875', 'OR 2967/1084-90', and 'Blue Sheet 980206', without just compensationforwhich Defendant State and County must make restitution.

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16. Defendant State Actors claimed riparian rights for lots 38A and 41A (Property I.D. 12-44-20-01-00042.038A), which they denied to Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendant Officials discriminated against and harmed Plaintiff. Plaintiff is entitledtothe equal rights of Defendant State owner and invalidation of unconstitutional 'OR 569/875' and lot A. COUNT 2: UNAUTHORIZED UNCONSTITUTIONAL TEMPORARY TAKINGS UNDER COLOR OF 'OR 569/875' 17. In December 1969, Defendant County and Commissioners allegedly drafted a so-called 'resolution' to claim all accretions within the undedicated private Cayo Costa Subdivision. Said preliminary draft, 'OR 569/875' was never signed, executed, or acknowledged and did not meet resolution and recording requirements. Therefore, draft 'OR 569/875' was not entitled to be recorded and must be stricken from the public record. 18. Defendant County Appraiser and Attorney admitted that the Cayo Costa Subdivision was never dedicated to the public and as a result was outside the scope of Defendant County's home rule powers. Therefore, Defendant State and County had no powerstogovern and adopt resolutions or ordinances. In conclusion, draft '569/875' was unenforceable and ineffectual, and Defendant County exercised powers not conferred by law with the intent to capriciously grab the disputed private accreted land and easements. 19. Therefore, Defendant State, County, and Commissioners took Plaintiffs accretions onto riparian gulf front lot ISA and the Subdivision without authority, justification, due process of law, public notice, hearing, vote count, and compensation under color of '569/875', which violated Articles 3 & 4 and Amendments 5 & 14. In conclusion, Defendants' unauthorized unconstitutional takings injured Plaintiff and destroyed his property value. COUNT 3: TRESPASS 20. Since 1969, Defendant State, County, Commissioners, Attorneys, and Appraiser asserted, disseminated, and published that Lee County was the owner of all private Cayo Costa accretions. Therefore pursuant to 810.08 and 810.09, F.S., Defendant Officials induced and caused the public to intrude onto private Cayo Costa beaches, streets, platted designated common use areas, and Plaintiffs property, which injured Plaintiff. 21. Under color of official right and '569/875', Defendant Governmental Officials invited the public to visit the private accreted Subdivision, which Defendant State's Division of Recreation and Parks manages and operates as State park. In summary, Defendant offenders defied Plaintiffs orders to leave and committed misdemeanors of the 1 "

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degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 and induced public trespass onto the undedicated Subdivision. 22. Pursuant to Florida Cabinet Meeting Transcripts, Defendant State of Florida, Board of Trustees, D.E.P., and Division of Recreation and Parks, pursued their legislative objective to destroy private Cayo Costa easements and property and ingress/egress for State park purposes. Therefore, Defendant Officials' objective must be stricken as unconstitutional. Defendant State Agents must be enjoined from exercising power within the Subdivision east of the Mean High Water mark [MHW] of the Gulf of Mexico, and west of the MHW of Charlotte Harbor. COUNT 4: CONSPIRACY TO FABRICATE UNPLATTED LOT A, BLOCK 1 & PARK; FRAUD; MALFEASANCE 23. Defendant Property Appraiser claimed and published that draft '569/875' entitled Lee County to claim ownership of un-platted lot A, and block 1. Under oath, Defendant Appraiser admitted that Cayo Costa was unencumbered by public easements and not dedicated. Therefore, Defendant admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt said resolution. On its face, 'OR 569/875' did not meetrecordingandresolutionrequirements, and lot A, and block 1 did not exist. Therefore, Defendant Appraiser had a professional duty and burden to verify the validity of sham '569/875' under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 24. Without title evidence in the public Grantor/Grantee Index, Defendant conspired to concoct un-platted lot A (Property I.D. 12-44-20-01-O000O.00A0), block 1 (Property I.D. 07-44-21-01-00001.0000), and park. With malicious purpose, Defendant assisted the plan to deceive with materially altered plat, maps, and records to obtain benefits for State and County. Said acts and omissions were in willful disregard of property. Defendant denied agricultural classification of Plaintiffs accreted lot, all of which had had been formed by accretions since approx. 1910. Therefore, Defendant destroyed most of Plaintiffs property value, deprived him of private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection of the laws in a land grab scheme pursuant to Ch. 768. 25. A reasonable appraiser, surveyor or title agent cannot locate lot A or block 1 on the Plat and must presume invalidity of 'OR 569/875', lot A, and block 1 as a matter of established real property law, standards, and tenets. Therefore, Defendant's agreement to assist the unconstitutional confiscation of the disputed accretions could reasonably be inferred, because Defendant contradicted the recorded historic legal precedents since 1910. 26. Defendant asserted that the general public and professional realty communities rely on Defendant Appraiser's

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data. Therefore, Defendant couldreasonablyexpect harm from his incompetent valuationreports.Comparable sales data controverted Defendant Appraiser's valuations. However, Defendant did not cease and desist his deceptive publications and slander of Plaintiffs perfect title. As aresult,Plaintiff received purchase offersforbelow market value. Defendant violated Federal Appraisal Standards and deprived the public of taxrevenuesfrom the accreted lands and easements in controversy. Therefore, Defendant Appraiser is liable and his malfeasance and abuse of position under State Government harmed Plaintiff, who is entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and cost. 27. Federal jurisdiction arose e.g. from Appraiser's denial of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment Defendant assertedriparianrightsforDefendant State's lots 38A and 41 A, but denied equalrightsto Plaintiff. Under color of 'OR 569/875', lot A, block 1, and 'OR 2967/1084-1090', a 'wild' so-called 'County Deed', Defendant conspired to fabricate valuationreportsand unjustly discriminated against Plaintiff and lot owners to benefit others and/or himself. Therefore, Defendant Appraiser damaged Plaintiff, who is entitled to compensation. COUNT 5: CONSPIRACY TO MATERIALLY MISREPRESENT AND DEFRAUD 28. Federal conveyances of lots 4 and 5 in Section 12 and lot 1 in Section 13 to A. 0 Roesch and subsequent grantees were described inreferenceto Cayo Costa Plats of Survey. Lot A and block 1 could not be located on the Subdivision Plats and ground. Therefore, Defendant County was not the legal owner of lot A and block 1, and Defendant Officials'representationsof lot A and block 1 were unwarranted under law and feci 29. All disputed accretions were within boundaries described by original surveys, plats, and Subdivision and lot descriptions contained in Federal, State, and/or County public records. All grants, grantors, and grantees are published in the public Grantor/Grantee Index, and Lee County is neither the published record owner of the disputed accretions nor riparian upland owner. However, quit claim deed 'OR 1651/2488' alleged the grant of accretions to Lee County. Therefore, Lee County did not hold title to the disputed accretions onto Cayo Costa and Plaintiffs lot 15A, because there was no voluntary and no involuntary alienation such as eminent domain or adverse possession. In conclusion, Lee County's alleged controversial ownership claims of private Cayo Costa accretions were not supported by the unauthorized and improperly recorded resolution draft '569/875' and

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therefore unconstitutional under the S* Amendment Takings Clause. Following multiple notifications by the public, Defendant Officials conspired to continue to deceive, defraud, and deprive the public under color of State law. Therefore, Defendant Government Officials deprived the public of tax revenues from the disputed private accretions and easements. 30. Article 7, s. 10, Fla. Const. Prohibits the use of public fends for private purposes, by precluding the State and County from using its taxing power or credit to aid private individuals or interests, such as legal defense of unauthorized wrongs in violation of the constitution. 31. Platted meander lines and monuments evidenced ownership of the disputed accretions by the record upland owners in the Grantor/Grantee Index. Therefore, Defendant State Officials, Lee County, Commissioners, Attorney, and J. N. Peterson conspired to misrepresent that Plaintiff did not own to the MHW mark of the Gulf of Mexico. 32. Defendant Officials conspired to misrepresent the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers' authority over Plaintiffs lagoon under the Commerce Clause and 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. 403. COUNT 6: OPPRESSION AND SUNDER OF TITLE 33. Defendant Peterson failed to challenge the presumptive validity of the Federal Patent and invalidity of 'OR 569/875', lot A, and block 1. In fact, Peterson himself questioned theresolution'svalidity. Therefore, Peterson, who carried the State's badge oppressed and unduly burdened Plaintiff. Defendant Peterson violated the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, Part 3, Ch. 112, F.S. Plaintiff complained with the Florida Commission on Ethics (Exhibit 'B'). Peterson was required to disclose the material facts and the truth, but harassed Plaintiff. The alleged public records and facts gave rise to Plaintiffs bases for suing Defendant State Actors. Therefore, publicrecordsand factual allegations entitled Plaintiff to obtain invalidation of'OR 569/875', '2967/1084-90', lot A, block 1, 'Blue Sheet 980206', and compensatory damages, and injunctive relief. 34. During pretrial procedures, Peterson and Lee County did not setforthany grounds on which Defendants' claims or defenses could possibly rest There has been noreasonableindication that discovery can reveal any relevant evidence to destroy the presumptive invalidity of 'OR 569/875, lot A, and block 1. Defendant State Actorsfelledto prove validity of 'OR 569/875', lot A, or block 1. Plaintiff is entitled to relief and/or a peremptory ruling, because

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unauthorized and unconstitutional 'OR 569/875' was never adopted and contained no compensation mechanism. 35. All Defendants received fair notice that 'OR 569/875', lot A, and block 1 were immaterial and insufficient claims and defenses. Presentations such as e.g. in doc. # 5 shall be deterred pursuant to F.R.C.P. 11 and 12. During the 11/07/2007 Court hearing, Plaintiff asserted the factual impossibility of Defendant's claims and defenses before the Honorable Magistrate Judge. Therefore, Plaintiffs entitlement to relief is most plausible. The heft of Plaintiffs factual allegations evidenced why Plaintiff is entitled to relief under Federal law and the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffrespectfullydemands judgment granting thefollowingrelief 1. Anorder setting aside and striking 'OR 569/875" and'2967/1084-90'from publicrecords(Counts 1-6); 2. An order invalidating/nullifying lot A, block 1, Blue Sheet 980206, and declaring all land between the meander lines of the Gulf and Charlotte Harbor privately owned Subdivision lands pursuant to PB 3/PG 25 (Counts 1-3); 3. An award of compensatory damages for deprivations, leases, and uncompensated temporary takings of private accreted property and easements for State park purposes in an amount to be set at trial (Counts 1-6); 4. An award of punitive damages and cost to be set at trial (Counts 1 -6); 5. An order declaring the extent of the Army Corps of Engineers' authority over Plaintiffs lagoon (Counts 1 -2); 6. An order declaring Plaintiff the owner of all accretions onto his riparian lot 15A pursuant to 1862 Homestead Act and 1895 Certificate # 11887 (Counts 1 -6) and declaringtitlethereto in Plaintiff (Counts 1 -3); and 7. An order enjoining all Defendant Governmental Officials from claiming ownership of Plaintiffs accretions, lot A and block 1 and operating a park in the private Cayo Costa Subdivision and on lot ISA (Counts 1-3).

Respectfully submitted, IslJora&ffimfcMM, M.BA, Plaintiff; Tel: 239-595-7074; e-mail: irbuOaol.com. MailWg Mdress: P.O.B. 1126, Naples, FL 34106-1126.

EXHIBIT 'A': Unconstitutional and unauthorized 'OR 569/875'. EXHIBIT 'B': Ethics Complaint against Defendant Peterson.

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RSfObVTIOKratTAlBIrtCTO MmUC UMDf IN CMQ COST* *Ummfm WRBimSi there' appears in the Public Records of Lee

County, Florida, in Plat Book ) at page 25 the Second teviaed W*t Of Cayo COftU Subdivision: and WHEREAS, there appears upon snid plat certain designated lot and Mock areas and other undesignated aroMf and WHEREAS, there appears upon said plat certain un-nnmbere and mrtoWorod aron lying East of tho Easterly tier of Mocks in said tnbdiviftion and West of tho Westerly tier of blocks in said subdivision: and "PCftgAff, tho County clfllnt s i i d land* aa puhlic Iwtdt together with e&l accretions thereto. H W THEREFORE, bE IT RESOLVED W THE BOWP Of C U T O , OUT COMMISflONCftS OF LEE COUNDT, FLORIDA does by this Resolution claim a l l of raid lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public purposos. DONE A D ADOPTED this / f M day of A . <^ *U~<.\^. 1969.

-200-

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EXHIBIT 'B': Ethics Complaint against Defendant Peterson
A. Defendant County Attorney Jack N. Peterson contended that more research was necessary to determine if 'OR 569/875' was valid. However in a 2000 Memo by Joan C. Henry, Peterson's Office asserted before the Law. State of Florida court that there was no dedication of Cayo Costa to the public. As a result, the Lay court ruled against Defendant State. Said court determined that Defendant County had no powers, rights-of-way, or interests In the private easements 'as a matter of established real property law. Therefore, Peterson arbitrarily contradicted his own Office in order to obtain benefits for Defendant County, State or himself and undermined ongoing judicial proceedings in State and Federal Court. B. In summary, Peterson's claims and defenses were precluded, because the Lay court's judgment had binding effect and foreclosed Peterson's frivolous contentions. Therefore, Peterson harassed and oppressed Plaintiff and undermined the judicial process with foreclosed claims. C. In February 1999, Peterson's Office wrote to Cayo Costa riparian lot owner T. Pamell that 'Defendant Lee County attorney's Office researched the history of the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and governing case law on accretion and reliction' in response to correspondence to Defendant Attorney. Said Plat conclusively evidenced that the record owners pubfished in the Grantor/Grantee Index, including Plaintiff, own private easements, beaches, and their abutting platted designated common use areas in the undedicated Subdivisionfeesimple. Therefore, Peterson concealed the 1999 and 2000 research by his own Office and oppressed Plaintiff, because he unjustly exercised power never conferred upon him. In conclusion, Peterson abused his public position to improperly transfer property for State park purposes thereby depriving and injuring Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, and expenses. D. Peterson contended that Plaintiff's lot 15A did not touch the water. Plainb'frs Warranty Deed conveyed lot 15A in refierence to said Plat, all calling for the Gulf of Mexico. Said Plat of Survey described Plaintiff's lot ISA as a riparian lot abutting the natural monument of the Gulf. Public policy demands that all land shall have an owner, and all owners of the accretions in controversy were recorded in Defendants' Grantor/Grantee Index. The public Index evidenced that all accretions onto the Subdivision belonged to A. C. Roesch, who subdivided and conveyed them, and all accretions onto lot 15A belonged to Plaintiff. In addition, Peterson was notified that unauthorized unconstitutional draft 'OR 569/875' had multiple errors, violated Defendant's home rule powers law, and was unenforceable. With particularity, Peterson was ordered to cease false claims. However, Peterson defied the order and continued slandering Plaintiffs paramount title. In summary, Plaintiff Is entitled to cancellation of 'OR 569/875', 'OR 2967/1084-90', and 'Agenda Item Summary 980206'. E. Plaintiff ttleholder was entitled to the statutory presumption that the 1895 Federal Patent and mesne conveyances were valid. Therefore, the burden was on Defendant challenger to prove invalidity, and Defendant Officials' averments and claims of 'OR 569/875', lot A, and block 1 were in bad faith and impeded justice. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitledtoinvalidation and nullification of 'OR 569/875', lot A, and block 1, compensatory and punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief.

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Below signaturereflectsaffirmation that the attorney reviewed the Third Amended Complaint:

Attorney

Date: 12/21/2007

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41 F.3d 1490 WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H. Cooper, for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104. Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449. Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L. Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge. PER CURIAM:

1

After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed. The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches) offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976 instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the

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"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in property originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," the County issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferred ownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the County attempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that, according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County. 3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms (and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication; but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees. Defendants appeal. The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their property. But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33 Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests). And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990). The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs' claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in

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district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ... jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper. 8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims." The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation. And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's post-verdict motions. Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
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Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation
1

Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title because title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee. Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
2

"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs' ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
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Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe, we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim. Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
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Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that

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the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest-that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
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REMARKS

ACQUISITION DATE AGENDA DATE GRANTOR BLUE SHEET

ITEM

CCMB INSTRUMENT LEGAL DESC SEARCH TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE PURCHASE PRICE 1 AGENDA DATE 2 AGENDA DATE 3

PRICE/ACRE PRIOR STRAP PCL

BLUE SHEET 2

BLUE SHEET 3

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PURCHASE PRICE 2 ASSESSEDVALUE VALUE DATE CCMB 2

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LEE COUNTY DIVISION OF COUNTY LANDS

i
. REoUESTEDMOTIOl'J

's~ornmrBo~~~Cu~C~~S AGENDAITEMSUMMARY

BLUESHEETNO:~~O~M

ACTIONREOUESTED~ Ap rove conveyance of any interest in land, \?rhich has accreted to ro erty of rivate landowner on Cayo Costa Island, ancfnow bein purchased by the State of Florida for preservation. KutRorize CRairnxm to execute County Deed; authorrze County Lan%s Division to handle and complete conveyance. WHY ACTION IS NECESSARY: To clear title on land which has accreted to property owned by private landowner, which is being conveyed to the State of Florida. WHAT
ACTION

AcCOMPLISHE!$ ,Clears potential cloud on title to property. 17 1 5.REOUIREMENT/PURPOSE in/ /7 3. MEETJNGD-3c;ll+ya a

LDE A TMENTALCATEGORY: COp~ISSIONDISTRIcT#: bAGENDA
Y_CONSENT

,ADMlNlsmTlvE
_ APPEALS -PUBLIC -=REQuIRED:-

.? .

_ ADMIN. CODE

7. BACKGROUND:

I

The State of Florida, Board of Trustees of the Internal Im rovement Trust Fund, is in the recess of purchasing land on A list of %e properties being purchased is Cay0 Costa Island from a private landowner through the 8tate CARL Pro eter&ned that Lee County ma have an interest in ’ attached. From the title search and title commitment issued, it has been r land which has accreted to the lots being conveyed to the State of Florida by Alice MS. Robinson. A 1J69 Resolutron b ook the Board of County Commissioners pertaining to ublic lands in Cayo Costa Subdivision, recorded m Official Record J 569 Pa e 875 created a claim to all accretions to P lyin within the area of the Subdivision now bemg conveyed. As a ots resdlt ofthis Resolution, the State of Florida is requesting &ee County to convey any interest it may have m these accreted , R~~a~ore private property owner, Ahce l$.S. Robmson, m order to clear trtle for its purchase of the propertres from Ms. . Due to the ongoin of ac uisition on Cayo Costa Island by the State of Florida and Lee+Countythrpugh the CARL Matching Funds tI!YTF an8 the ongoing cooperation of the State and County to accomphsh acquisrtron of land on the . .P. elect, Island, staff recommends approval of the requested motion. County funds are not needed to complete this transaction.

8,MANAGEMENTRECOMMENDATIONS:
.

COUNTY LANDS
9. RECOMMENDEDAPPROVAL i .

*
i@\OFFICEELS\CAYCOSTA.LWC’~sf

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'&is ?nstruntent Prepared by: PUBLIC WORKS/COUNTY LAND8 DIVISION Post Office Box 398 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-0398 iSO&
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-2; " TXIS DEED, executed this 21th day of Warch , A.D., 1998, by z: Ltt COtlNTY, PLORZDA, A POLITNAL SWBDIVISIOU OF THE STATB OF FLORIDA, ._ whose address is Post Office Box 398, Fort Myers, Florida 3300.?-0398 first party, LO -Alice M.S. Robinson, whose address is 4&l North z p Seminole Avenue, No. 2516, Tampa, Florida 33601, second party. NITNESSETII : That the said first party, for and in consideration of the sum of Ten~(510.00) Dollars to it in hand paid by the said second party, receipt.whereof is hereby acknowledged, ha@ granted, bargained and sold to the said second party, its heirs and assigns forever, the following fsbac~~lbed land, lying and being in Lee County, Florida: SEE
ATTACRED

BXBZBIT "A* ; '$

This grant conveys only the interest of the Count; and its Board :,s df County Commissioners in the property herein described, and shali not be deemed to warrant the title or to represent any state of facts g concerning the same. I; "\ EN WITNESS NBERBOI the said first party has caused these presents to be executed in its name by its Board of County Commissioners acting by the Chairman or Vi.ce Chairman of said Board, the day and year aforesaid.

(OFFICIAL SEAL) '. ATTEST: CHARLIE GREEN,'GLERK By: LEE
COUNTY, FLORIDA,

BY

ITS

: -'

APPROVED

AS TO

LEGAL FORM:

&,[$' ;.',I $;&,y,,: Office/of' County Attorneys

‘~ ., -. E x h i b i t HAp’

Eage 1 of 2 A l l af t h e f i r s t p a r t y ’ s i n t e r e s t , i f any, i n thOS@ c e r t a i n l a n d s w h i c h ‘ h a v e accreted t o t h e followinq d e s c r i b e d lots6 said l o t s being located Office of the Clerk Of the Circuit Court of Lee County, Florida, in plat Book 3, Page 25, P u b l i c R e c o r d s ,of L e e C o u n t y , F l o r i d a , t o wit:
wifthi~n that Certain Suk$iv.ision knowi as .%cond Rev-is& play of Cay0 Cwta, accordinq t o t h e - - m a p o r p l a t t h e r e o f f i l e d apd r e c o r d e d i n t h e

Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00013.0020 Lot 2, Block 131 CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to ths! map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12-44-20-O I-000 13.0030 Lot 3, Block 13, CAY0 COSTA SUl3DIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as

recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida Tax IDH 12-44~20-01-00014.0010 Lot I, Block 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDlVlSION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00014.0070 Lot 7, Block 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Pa;ge 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12.44-20-Ol-Q0014.014~ Lot 14, Block 14, CAYU COSTA SUBDlVISION, accordiny lo the map or plal thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax IDD# 12-44-20-o l-000 15.0060 Lots 6,7,&p, IO, 1 I, 12, & 14, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plaf Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County. Florida. Tax ID# 12.44-20-OI-0OOl5.0lOk Lot iOA, CAYO,COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00015.0160 Lots 16 and 17, Block 15, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according lo the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12-44-20-01-00015.0180 Lot 18, Block IS. CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according lo the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax IDIt 12.44.20-Oi-00015,OlSA Lot 184 CAYU COSTA SIJBDI~ISION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Ftor*da. Tax IDS 12-44-20-01-00015.0220 Lot 22, Block 15, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according Io the map or plrt thereof
as recorded in Plal Book 3, Pege 2$, Public Records of Lee Cow&y, PlorIda, Tax ID# 12-44.20.Ol-00015.034A . Lots 34A and 354 Block IS, CAY0 COSTA WBDIVISION, according to the map or _ plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee Count); Florida.

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-

Tax iD# 12-44~20-OJ-OOO16.0030 LOO 3 and 6, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida, Tax ?D# J Z-44-20-0 I-000 16.0070 Lots 7,8 sod Jo, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUJ3DIVISlON, according to the map or pJat thereof at recorded in PJat Book 3, Page 25, P&Iii Records of Lee County, Florida. II >2, “-Z‘.
;. F.

Tax I‘D# 12-M-20-01~oroO16.0120 Lots 12,13,15 and 16, Block 16, CAY0 CUSTA SUBDJVISION, according to the map or pfat thereof as worded is PJat Book 3, Page 2S, Public Records of Lee Cwnty, Florida. Tax IDI 12-44-20-01~OOQ16.0140 Lot 14, Block 16, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or piat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lea County, Florida. Tut IDar t2-44.20-01.06016.0178 Lots 17 and 20, Hock 16, CAY0 COSTA WElDIVISIDN, according to the map or pfat thcweof as recorded in Plat Book 3, P%gs 25, PubJlc Records of Lee County, FIorJda, Tax ID# f2-44-20-01-00016.02~0 Lots 2 1 and 24, Block 16, CASO COSTA SUBDIViSION, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records oFLee County, Florida. Tax ID# 1%44*20-01=00016.022Q ,Lot 22, Bfock It?, CAYU COSTA SUBDIVISION, according to the map or pJat thereof as recorded ia Plat Book 3, Page 25, Public Records of Lee County, Florida. Tax ID# 12-44-2f!-O1-00042.03$A Lots 38A and 4 J A, CAY0 COSTA SUBDIVISJON, according to the map or plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 3. Paac 211. Pubtic Records of Lee Countv. Flnridr m
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71

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JORG BUSSE Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M. WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER’S OFFICE; STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT] TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AND DIVISION OF RECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTY ATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON, Defendants. ___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: (1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File (Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2) defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of

Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc. #291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)

defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney and will be liberally construed. 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). I. On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee County, Florida adopted the “Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands in Cayo Costa Subdivision”, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution). The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The

Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and west of the tier of blocks as “public lands together with all accretions thereto” and “does by this Resolution claim all of said lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public purposes.” (Doc. #288, p. 9.)

Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and

-2-

accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

Plaintiff describes Lot

15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million. (Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his

property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both federal and state law. Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights, private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution was unenforceable and in violation of the United States

Constitution. (Doc. #288, ¶13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more

than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at ¶15.) Further,

plaintiff asserts that “Defendant State Actors” claimed riparian rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled to equal rights as the State property owner.
-3-

(Id. at ¶¶ 16, 27.)

Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be recorded and must be stricken from the public record. ¶17.) (Id. at

Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision

was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances, and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and the County capriciously (Id. at ¶18.) onto the grabbed private accreted land and

easements. his

Plaintiff asserts that defendants took riparian due gulf front of law, Lot 15A without notice,

accretions

authority,

justification,

process

public

hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized unconstitutional property value. taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his

(Id. at ¶19.) Plaintiff

Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass.

alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiff’s property. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise

power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at ¶22.)
-4-

Count malfeasance.

4

alleges

a

conspiracy

to

fabricate,

fraud

and

Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property

Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution. (Id. at ¶23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face

did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block and park for the benefit of the State and County. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant (Id.) denied (Id. at ¶24.) agricultural

classification to his accreted lot.

Plaintiff asserts that

defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection in a land grab scheme. being to assist the (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as confiscation of the

unconstitutional

accretions. Appraiser

(Id. at ¶25.) made

Plaintiff also asserts that the County valuation reports which were

incompetent

controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander plaintiff’s perfect title. (Id. at ¶26.) As a result, plaintiff

received purchase offers far below market value and the County Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position.
-5-

(Id.)

Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to

the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession. (Id. at ¶29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee County’s claims of

ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax revenues which could have been received from the private accretions and easements. to (Id.) the Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired extent of the Army Corps of Engineers’

misrepresent

authority over his lagoon.

(Id. at ¶32.)

Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)

The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343, Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments 4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403)(id. at ¶8), the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion (id. at ¶10), the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
-6-

III. The Court will first address the federal claims, since these claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended Complaint liberally. A. Takings Clause Claims: A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiff’s counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo Costa island.1 The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude

plaintiff’s takings claim. Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New (1978). The Third Amended

through the Fourteenth Amendment. York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23

Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause. State law defines the parameters of a plaintiff’s property interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.

See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning history of the island since 1978.
-7-

1

v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996).

Under Florida law

a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987); Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These

rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key

Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “By now it is beyond question that a

permanent physical occupation of private property by the state constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.” New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)). Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his property, “a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just Compensation to Clause just until the owner has unsuccessfully the procedures

attempted

obtain

compensation

through

provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule

that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
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takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe until the state has denied the would-be plaintiff’s compensation for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state court proceeding.” F.3d Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., Without having

, 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008).

pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at

195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162 Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least

1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,

563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have

pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA . STAT . § 86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute. Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested

that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
-9-

Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without prejudice. B. Substantive Due Process Claim: A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is

no independent substantive due process taking cause of action. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14 (11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects

only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the Greenbriar

Constitution, and do not include property rights.

Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003). Merely asserting that the government’s actions were

arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the protection of the substantive due process provision. Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. in the Third due Amended process Greenbriar

Therefore, those portions of counts which claim attempt or to assert will a be

Complaint takings

substantive dismissed.

conspiracy

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C.

Procedural Due Process Claim: Plaintiff’s counts may also attempt to state a procedural due

process claim.

For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had

no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking was without authority, justification, due process, public notice, hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at ¶19). “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.” Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural due process claim. The County’s action in passing the Resolution

constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade Plaintiff

County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).

asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200 acres other than his 2.5 acres. a legislative act. Equalization, 239 This is sufficient to constitute

See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is

impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a

legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist

-11-

merely because state mandated procedures were not followed.

First

Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla., 20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the

allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution

attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining

claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation

remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on

procedural due process will be dismissed. D. Equal Protection Claim: Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal protection rights. “To properly plead an equal protection claim,

a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately.” Boyd v. Peet, 249 Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any

similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The
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Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200 acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres. The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be Therefore,

compared to a public owner such as a government unit.

no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be dismissed without prejudice. E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction: Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of federal jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the

discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal

courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate Therefore

Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000).

Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Article IV of

the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address the jurisdiction of a federal court. Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
-13-

courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 Since none of plaintiff’s

Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007).

federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343 is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiff’s reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 is misplaced. relates to the creation of an obstruction not

Section 403 authorized by

Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, cannot form Assuming

basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976.

there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The

Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. § 3331-3351, also do not create federal jurisdiction. appraisals utilized 12 this These standards relate to real estate in § connection 1331, and with no federally related was

transactions, involved in

U.S.C. case.

such in

transaction the

Additionally,

Florida

county

property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA . STAT . § 193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by the International Association of Assessing Officers and the

-14-

Appraisal Institute. (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the

Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2

Court

finds

no

other

basis

of

federal

jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint. F. Remaining State Law Claims: The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint are all state law claims. Complaint may be read to Read liberally, the Third Amended allege a claim to invalidate the

Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent, a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and decline claims. to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th

Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been dismissed.) prejudice. Having The dismissal of the state claims will be without Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). found that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining

defendants’ motions to dismiss. Accordingly, it is now
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ORDERED: 1. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 2. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and

Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot. 3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection

and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County

Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Peterson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice as to all defendants and all claims.

The Clerk shall

enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot, and close the case. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this May, 2008. 5th day of

Copies: Parties of record

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT, DR. JORG BUSSE, Plaintiffs, versus Case # 2:10-cv-00390-JES-AEP

CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL; SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL; JOHN EDWIN STEELE; JENNIFER WAUGH CORINIS; A. BRIAN ALBRITTON, Defendants. INDEPENDENT ACTION FOR RELIEF FROM GOVERNMENT CRIMES, CORRUPTION, AND FACIALLY FRAUDULENT WRIT OF EXECUTION ____________________________________________________________________________/ MOTION TO STAY PRIMA FACIE ILLEGAL ‘EXECUTION’ AS A MATTER OF LAW PUBLISHED NOTICE OF ILLEGAL EXECUTION UNDER FLORIDA LAW 1. The purported “execution” issued illegally. See § 56.15, Fla. Stat.; Case No. 2:2007-cv00228. NO $5,048.60 JUDGMENT WAS EVER RECORDED 2. “No execution or other final process shall issue until the judgment on which it is based has been recorded nor within the time for serving a motion for new trial or rehearing.… Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.550. Here, no “judgment in the amount of $5,048.60” was ever “recorded”, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. Here, no evidence of any such judgment ever existed or could have possibly existed as a matter of law.

DEFENDANT CLERKS’ FALSIFICATIONS OF OFFICIAL RECORDS 3. On 07/16/2010, Defendant U.S. District Clerks Drew Heathcoat and Diane Nipper again falsified and altered official documents and records for criminal and unlawful purposes of obstructing justice and Plaintiffs’ court access. 4. In particular, the Clerk obstructed, and conspired with other Defendants to obstruct, electronic court access, court access, and the filing of Plaintiffs’ pleadings, Case No. 2:2007cv-00791; 2:2009-cv-00791. In particular, Defendants Nipper and Heathcoat deliberately deprived the Plaintiffs of their express fundamental rights to redress Government grievances, and file their Motions for new trial and rehearing, and Notices of Appeal. DIRECT INDEPENDENT ATTACKS OF CRIMINAL & ILLEGAL “EXECUTION” 5. Here on the record, the Plaintiffs have been directly attacking the prima facie criminality, illegality, and nullity of the fraudulently procured “execution”, which issued illegally. See § 56.15, Fla. Stat.; Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228; 2:2010-cv-00089; 2:2010-cv-00791. PRIMA FACIE LACK OF RECORD, FED.R.CIV.P. 44 6. On 07/16/2010, Defendant Corrupt U.S. District Clerk Drew Heathcoat obstructed to issue “a written statement that a diligent search of the designated records in Case No. 2:2007-cv00228 revealed no “writ of execution” and no “judgment” awarding “$5,048.60” to Defendant K. M. Wilkinson.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44. PRIMA FACIE ORGANIZED PUBLIC CORRUPTION 7. The fake “writ of execution”, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, is another publicly recorded element of organized Government and judicial corruption with corrupt intent to extort fess and property from the Plaintiff corruption whistleblowers. PRIMA FACIE GROUNDS TO STAY ILLEGAL “EXECUTION” OF RECORD

8. Repeatedly, the Plaintiff public corruption victims stated several grounds as good cause to stay the illegal execution. Grounds for the motion appeared on the face. Here, e.g., no judgment had existed. See Docket Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. The purported basis for the non-existent judgment had never existed, because Def. Forger Wilkinson had never filed any “Rule 38 motion”. See Docket for Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228. RECORD EXTORTION AND FORGERIES BY DEF. APPRAISER WILKINSON 9. Because, e.g., Def. Forger Wilkinson had criminally and illegally forged “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-0000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”, Plaintiffs’ Appellants’ Appeal had been highly meritorious, and no “frivolous appeal” could have possibly existed. RECORD FABRICATION OF “FRIVOLITY” AND “JUDGMENT” 10. No “frivolity” was ever determined in the “judgment”, Doc. # 365, Case ## 2:2007-cv-00228; 2008-13170-BB. Here, no monetary penalty had ever been awarded to Defendant Government Crook Wilkinson. PUBLICLY RECORDED FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS 11. For criminal and unlawful purposes of obstructing justice and court access and perpetrating fraud on the Courts, Defendants John E. Steele, Sheri Polster Chappell, Charlene E. Honeywell, Mark A. Pizzo, and Richard A. Lazzara falsified and altered, and conspired to falsify and alter, public records. 12. Said judicial Crooks knew and fraudulently concealed that no “regulation”, “resolution”, “resolution 569/875”, “law”, “legislative act” had ever existed, and that as a matter of supreme Florida and Federal law, no “law” could have possibly divested the Plaintiffs’ of their unimpeachable record title to Parcel # 12-44-20-01-00015.015A, PB 3, PG 25 (1912).

13. Doc. # 386-2, Case No. # 2:2007-cv-00228, evidenced an illegal “motion” filed on 08/20/2008 under fraudulent pretenses. Here, the deadline for any hypothetical “Rule 38 motion” had terminated on or around 08/08/2008, and Def. Wilkinson had never filed anything prior to said deadline to justify any judgment or monetary punishment. Therefore here, no lawful basis could have possibly existed, and the illegal “execution” has been fraudulent on its face. PRIMA FACIE ILLEGAL “writ of execution” - AFFIDAVIT 14. Here, no lawful writ of execution had ever been issued. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs made an Affidavit that the “execution” is illegal and stated as grounds, e.g., the lack of any supporting judgment, the lack of any falsely alleged “Rule 38 motion” by Defendant K. M. Wilkinson. PLAINTIFFS’ COMMUNICATIONS OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND FELONIES 15. Plaintiffs again contacted Defendant Crooked Attorney Jack N. Peterson for Def. Forger Kenneth M. Wilkinson and reported said publicly recorded public corruption, extortion, coercion, and fraud, Tel. 239-533-2236. 07/19/10 COMMUNICATIONS TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 16. On 07/19/2010, Plaintiff public corruption victim Jennifer Franklin Prescott updated the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the public corruption, extortion, fraud, and fraudulent “writ”. PRIMA FACIE FRAUD ON THE COURT AND EXTORTION 17. Furthermore, the Plaintiff corruption victims move this Court to “set aside“ the non-existent judgment and “writ” in accordance with, e.g., Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b), 1.500, and/or 1.540(a).

18. In the prima facie record absence of any recorded judgment, any writ of execution, and any “Rule 38 motion”, Defendants illegally and fraudulently procured an illegal “writ”. 19. Furthermore here, there were other pending actions affecting the subject matter and conclusively evidencing the prima facie illegality of the fake “writ”, direct attacks upon its criminality, as well as fraud, extortion, and corruption. See also Daytona Enterprises, Inc. v. Wagner, 91 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1956); Childs v. Boats, 112 Fla. 282, 152 So. 214 (1933); McGee v. Ancrum, 33 Fla. 499, 15 So. 231 (1894); Fair v. Tampa Electric Company, 158 Fla. 15, 27 So.2d 514 (1946); Viggio v. Wood, 101 So.2d 922 (3 D.C.A. 1958). WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand 1. An Order enjoining the publicly recorded illegal “execution”-scheme under Florida law; 2. An Order granting the Plaintiffs summary remedies against the record public corruption and non-existent “writ of execution”, and non-existent “Rule 38 motion”; 3. An Order staying the illegal and null & void “writ of execution” and any “execution”; 4. An Order enjoining any further public corruption and the record falsification of “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”; 5. An Order enjoining Defendant Forger K. M. Wilkinson from forging and falsifying official records and documents for criminal and unlawful purposes of, e.g., extorting unrecorded fees and property under facially false pretenses of a non-existent “5,048.60 judgment” and fictitious “writ of execution”. __________________________________ /S/JENNIFER FRANKLIN PRESCOTT Governmental Corruption & Fraud Victim, Plaintiff, pro se P.O. BOX 845, Palm Beach, FL 33480; T: 561-400-3295 ____________________________________ /S/JORG BUSSE, M.D., M.M., M.B.A., C.P.M. Judicial Corruption & Crime Victim; Plaintiff, pro se State Cert. Res. Appraiser, Licensed Real Estate Broker, Mortgage Broker, Appraisal Instructor

7/17/2010

Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes…

Select Year:

2009

Go

The 2009 Florida Statutes
Title XLVI CRIMES Chapter 838 BRIBERY; MISUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE View Entire Chapter

838.022 Official misconduct.-(1) It is unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm to another, to: (a) Falsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document; (b) Conceal, cover up, destroy, mutilate, or alter any official record or official document or cause another person to perform such an act; or (c) Obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to the commission of a felony that directly involves or affects the public agency or public entity served by the public servant. (2) For the purposes of this section: (a) The term "public servant" does not include a candidate who does not otherwise qualify as a public servant. (b) An official record or official document includes only public records. (3) Any person who violates this section commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
History.--s. 5, ch. 2003-158.

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Case 2:10-cv-00089-CEH-TGW Document 29

Filed 06/30/10 Page 4 of 8

B.

Plaintiffs yet again fail to articulate a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted. As this Court noted in the sound and cogent analysis of the

Busse litigation contained in its June 23, 2010, Order [Busse VII, DE-213, at pp. 20-21], Plaintiffs’ allegations, to the extent any sense can be made of them, are essentially criminal in nature. In that same Order, the Court has already analyzed and

explained why Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under the various constitutional provisions upon which they rely. The only

other vehicle for charging essentially criminal conduct in a civil forum is a suit under the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“civil RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).1 Complaints asserting civil RICO claims “must comply not only with the plausibility criteria articulated in Twombly and Iqbal but also with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.” American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, As the Court previously noted, Plaintiffs’

--- (11th Cir. 2010).

repetitious and voluminous pleadings are “convoluted and incomprehensible,” “contain[] incoherent and rambling claims of alleged wrongdoing,” and consist of “conclusory” statements

The case of Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 Fed. Appx. 231 (11th Cir. 2008), a matter to which the Busse cases have frequently been analogized [see, e.g., Busse V, DE-17], was a civil RICO case filed against every judge and other governmental official (totaling 129 defendants) that plaintiff “imagine[d to] have done him wrong.” Id. at 235. 4

1

Case 2:10-cv-00089-CEH-TGW Document 29

Filed 06/30/10 Page 7 of 8

to the performance of his duty to serve Busse with the writ of execution. [Busse I, DE-429.] Accordingly, Deputy Jessup would

be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, and the claim arising out of his acts should likewise be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the United States respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint. Date: June 30, 2010 Respectfully submitted, TONY WEST ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

/s/ Matthew L. Fesak MATTHEW L. FESAK Special Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney Civil Division 310 New Bern Avenue, Suite 800 Raleigh, NC 27601-1461 Telephone: (919) 856-4530 Facsimile: (919) 856-4821 E-Mail: matthew.fesak@usdoj.gov N.C. Bar No. 35276

7

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 425

Filed 02/02/10 Page 1 of 1

7/14/2010

Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes…

Select Year:

2009

Go

The 2009 Florida Statutes
Title VI CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Chapter 55 JUDGMENTS View Entire Chapter

55.10 Judgments, orders, and decrees; lien of all, generally; extension of liens; transfer of liens to other security.-(1) A judgment, order, or decree becomes a lien on real property in any county when a certified copy of it is recorded in the official records or judgment lien record of the county, whichever is maintained at the time of recordation, provided that the judgment, order, or decree contains the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree or a separate affidavit is recorded simultaneously with the judgment, order, or decree stating the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree. A judgment, order, or decree does not become a lien on real property unless the address of the person who has a lien as a result of such judgment, order, or decree is contained in the judgment, order, or decree or an affidavit with such address is simultaneously recorded with the judgment, order, or decree. If the certified copy was first recorded in a county in accordance with this subsection between July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period of 7 years from the date of the recording. If the certified copy is first recorded in accordance with this subsection on or after July 1, 1994, then the judgment, order, or decree shall be a lien in that county for an initial period of 10 years from the date of the recording. (2) The lien provided for in subsection (1) or an extension of that lien as provided by this subsection may be extended for an additional period of 10 years, subject to the limitation in subsection (3), by rerecording a certified copy of the judgment, order, or decree prior to the expiration of the lien or the expiration of the extended lien and by simultaneously recording an affidavit with the current address of the person who has a lien as a result of the judgment, order, or decree. The extension shall be effective from the date the certified copy of the judgment, order, or decree is rerecorded. The lien or extended lien will not be extended unless the affidavit with the current address is simultaneously recorded. (3) In no event shall the lien upon real property created by this section be extended beyond the period provided for in s. 55.081 or beyond the point at which the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first. (4) This act shall apply to all judgments, orders, and decrees of record which constitute a lien on real property; except that any judgment, order, or decree recorded prior to July 1, 1987, shall remain a lien on real property until the period provided for in s. 55.081 expires or until the lien is satisfied, whichever occurs first. (5) Any lien claimed under this section may be transferred, by any person having an interest in the real property upon which the lien is imposed or the contract under which the lien is claimed, from such real property to other security by either depositing in the clerk's office a sum of money or filing in the clerk's office a bond executed as surety by a surety insurer licensed to do business in this state. Such deposit or bond shall
www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm… 1/2

7/14/2010

Statutes & Constitution :View Statutes… be in an amount equal to the amount demanded in such claim of lien plus interest thereon at the legal rate for

3 years plus $500 to apply on any court costs which may be taxed in any proceeding to enforce said lien. Such deposit or bond shall be conditioned to pay any judgment, order, or decree which may be rendered for the satisfaction of the lien for which such claim of lien was recorded and costs plus $500 for court costs. Upon such deposit being made or such bond being filed, the clerk shall make and record a certificate showing the transfer of the lien from the real property to the security and mail a copy thereof by registered or certified mail to the lienor named in the claim of lien so transferred, at the address stated therein. Upon the filing of the certificate of transfer, the real property shall thereupon be released from the lien claimed, and such lien shall be transferred to said security. The clerk shall be entitled to a service charge of up to $15 for making and serving the certificate. If the transaction involves the transfer of multiple liens, an additional service charge of up to $7.50 for each additional lien shall be charged. Any number of liens may be transferred to one such security. (6) Any excess of the security over the aggregate amount of any judgments, orders, or decrees rendered, plus costs actually taxed, shall be repaid to the party filing the security or his or her successor in interest. Any deposit of money shall be considered as paid into court and shall be subject to the provisions of law relative to payments of money into court and the disposition of these payments. (7) Any party having an interest in such security or the property from which the lien was transferred may at any time, and any number of times, file a complaint in chancery in the circuit court of the county where such security is deposited for an order: (a) To require additional security; (b) To require reduction of security; (c) To require change or substitution of sureties; (d) To require payment or discharge thereof; or (e) Relating to any other matter affecting said security.
History.--s. 1, ch. 10166, 1925; s. 1, ch. 14749, 1931; ss. 1-3, ch. 17998, 1937; s. 2, ch. 19270, 1939; C GL 1940 Supp. 4865(3); s. 9, ch. 67-254; s. 1, ch. 71-56; s. 1, ch. 77-462; s. 2, ch. 87-67; s. 7, ch. 87-145; s. 12, ch. 91-45; s. 10, ch. 93-250; s. 15, ch. 94-348; s. 1357, ch. 95-147; s. 7, ch. 2000-258; s. 1, ch. 2001-130; s. 68, ch. 2003-402; s. 47, ch. 2004-265.

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7/23/2010

Statewide Grand Jury on Public Corrup…

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FAQs

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Press Releases

Additional Resources

Annual Reports

Search:
The links below provide information regarding the Grand Jury. Supreme Court Order Previous Grand Jury Reports Grand Jury Handbook

This Site

Web Enter search criteria

Report Corruption

On November 30, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist filed a petition requesting that a Statewide Grand Jury be convened in order to “examine and evaluate public policy issues regarding public corruption and develop specific recommendations regarding improving current laws.” On December 2, 2009, the Florida Supreme Court issued an Order to convene the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury for the purpose of investigating crimes, returning indictments, and making presentments. In Florida, the responsibility to conduct statewide grand juries is given to the Statewide Prosecutor. The Statewide Prosecutor designates Assistant Statewide Prosecutors to ensure a statewide grand jury is selected and that a grand jury is presented with testimony and evidence. Starting in February of 2010, the Nineteenth Grand Jury will be convened in Ft. Lauderdale and shall initially run for twelve months. The Grand Jury’s investigation of public corruption is not limited to any particular region of the State, however, any criminal offenses investigated shall be multi-circuit in nature. The Office of Statewide Prosecution has established a public corruption hotline for anyone who believes they have information concerning a criminal offense involving public corruption or wishes to suggest issues the Statewide Grand Jury should investigate regarding public corruption. A link to the Petition for a Statewide Grand Jury and the Florida Supreme Court Order Directing Impanelment of a Statewide Grand Jury has also been provided under the section titled The Grand Jury.

Please report information to help in the fight against public coruption.

File a Complaint On-line Press Releases
February 1, 2010 Attorney General: Statewide Grand Jury will Help Restore Trust in Government December 2, 2009 Statement from Attorney General on Supreme Court's Order to Convene a Statewide Grand Jury October 14, 2009 Attorney General’s Statement on Call for Statewide Grand Jury

address: Statewide Prosecution Office The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399 phone: 1-800-646-0444 website: www.myfloridalegal.com news: Weekly Newsletter

© 2009 Office of the Attorney General of Florida

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1/1

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 422

Filed 01/26/10 Page 17 of 18

(Doc. #418) on January 11, 2010.

The one page document is

essentially a Notice of Filing and will be construed as such and denied. The attached Motion has the case number 2:09-cv-791-FTM-

36SPC, which case is currently pending in the Fort Myers Division. Any motions seeking relief in that case should be filed in that case only. (31) Plaintiff filed a virtually identical one page document as Document #418 which attaches a filing for case number 2:09-cv791-FTM-36SPC. (Doc. #419.) Any motions seeking relief in that This document is construed

case should be filed in that case only. as a Notice of Filing and denied.

(32) Plaintiff filed a virtually identical one page document as Documents #418 and #419 which attaches a filing for case number 2:09-cv-791-FTM-36SPC. (Doc. #420.) Any motions seeking relief in that case should be filed in that case only. construed as a Notice of Filing and denied. It is accordingly FURTHER ORDERED: 1. Until further Order, the Clerk shall no longer accept any This document is

further filings, related or unrelated to this specific case, by Ms. Prescott or Mr. Busse, for filing in this closed case, except for a single Notice of Appeal from this Order. 2. The Emergency Motions for Relief From Extrinsic Fraud,

Fraud on Courts, and Fraudulent Judgment & Execution Emergency

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Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 422

Filed 01/26/10 Page 18 of 18

Motion to Enjoin Fraudulent Judgments and Execution of Fraudulent Judgments Pursuant to Independent Action(s) for Relief Such as Case 9:09-cv-82359-KLR, FLSD Notice of No Authority to Enforce

Fraudulent Judgment” (Doc. #389) is construed as response to the pending Motion for Writ of Execution. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this January, 2010. 26th day of

Copies: Parties of record

-18-

7/23/2010

Statewide Grand Jury on Public Corrup…

Home

FAQs

The Law

Press Releases

Additional Resources

Annual Reports

Search:
The links below provide information regarding the Grand Jury. Supreme Court Order Previous Grand Jury Reports Grand Jury Handbook

This Site

Web Enter search criteria

Report Corruption

On November 30, 2009, Governor Charlie Crist filed a petition requesting that a Statewide Grand Jury be convened in order to “examine and evaluate public policy issues regarding public corruption and develop specific recommendations regarding improving current laws.” On December 2, 2009, the Florida Supreme Court issued an Order to convene the Nineteenth Statewide Grand Jury for the purpose of investigating crimes, returning indictments, and making presentments. In Florida, the responsibility to conduct statewide grand juries is given to the Statewide Prosecutor. The Statewide Prosecutor designates Assistant Statewide Prosecutors to ensure a statewide grand jury is selected and that a grand jury is presented with testimony and evidence. Starting in February of 2010, the Nineteenth Grand Jury will be convened in Ft. Lauderdale and shall initially run for twelve months. The Grand Jury’s investigation of public corruption is not limited to any particular region of the State, however, any criminal offenses investigated shall be multi-circuit in nature. The Office of Statewide Prosecution has established a public corruption hotline for anyone who believes they have information concerning a criminal offense involving public corruption or wishes to suggest issues the Statewide Grand Jury should investigate regarding public corruption. A link to the Petition for a Statewide Grand Jury and the Florida Supreme Court Order Directing Impanelment of a Statewide Grand Jury has also been provided under the section titled The Grand Jury.

Please report information to help in the fight against public coruption.

File a Complaint On-line Press Releases
February 1, 2010 Attorney General: Statewide Grand Jury will Help Restore Trust in Government December 2, 2009 Statement from Attorney General on Supreme Court's Order to Convene a Statewide Grand Jury October 14, 2009 Attorney General’s Statement on Call for Statewide Grand Jury

address: Statewide Prosecution Office The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, FL 32399 phone: 1-800-646-0444 website: www.myfloridalegal.com news: Weekly Newsletter

© 2009 Office of the Attorney General of Florida

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LEE COUNTY COMMISSION – PUBLIC CORRUPTION DEFENDANT JOHN E. MANNING

DEF. LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONER JOHN E. MANNING

LEE COUNTY PUBLIC CORRUPTION

“SIX COMMISSIONERS FACED CRIMINAL CHARGES” NEWS-PRESS, July 9, 2010, www.news-press.com By Gabriella Souza, gsouza@news-press.com “Manning comes with …”

“At the time, the board [of Lee County Commissioners] was in turmoil. Commissioners and county staff came under fire for illegal dealings and between 1983 and 2000; six commissioners faced criminal charges. "It was a revolving door of county commissioners and county managers," Manning said. Manning, who had decided not to run for re-election, was prosecuted in 2000. He said he wanted to end his time as a commissioner so he could go back to the private sector.” LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONER JOHN E. MANNING CHARGED IN RECORDS CASE
NEWS-PRESS, May 11, 2000, www.news-press.com Failure to disclose meetings alleged …

By Lee Melsek

“Prosecutors filed criminal charges against Lee County Commissioner John Manning on Wednesday for failing to disclose years of private meetings with lobbyists seeking such things as land-use changes, roads and multimilliondollar county contracts. Manning, who voted to approve the county law he's accused of violating, claims he misinterpreted the law. He is charged with a second-degree misdemeanor …” LEE COUNTY COMMISSION – PUBLIC CORRUPTION
NEWS-PRESS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR July 10, 2010, www.news-press.com

“The News-Press exposed his failure to obey that law, local prosecutors then charged him with violating the disclosure law and the courts fined him after he pleaded no contest.”

LEE MELSEK Fort Myers Beach

LEE COUNTY PUBLIC CORRUPTION

LEE COUNTY PUBLIC CORRUPTION

LEE COUNTY COMMISSION – PUBLIC CORRUPTION

14

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DEFENDANT CORRUPT LEE COUNTY COMMISSION
NEWS-PRESS, LETTERS TO THE EDITOR July 10, 2010, www.news-press.com

Recall Past Actions “Don’t you just love the integrity of politics? John Manning back as commissioner because he has experience? John Manning is the commissioner who wrote an ordinance, then broke his own ordinance, and his attorney then called Manning’s ordinance a stinky little law or something to that effect. I wonder if Charlie Crist was aware of this when he appointed Manning back to the Lee County Commission?”

RON SMILEY Fort Myers

LEE COUNTY COMMISSION – PUBLIC CORRUPTION
NEWS-PRESS, July 13, 2010, www.news-press.com

TRANSPARENCY ABOVE ALL ELSE: EDITORIAL “We expect our elected officials to be law-abiding citizens who seek to uphold the rules they create. When they don’t, we question their integrity and ability to serve. Recently, criticism has surfaced about newly appointed interim Lee County Commissioner John Manning’s decade-old no contest plea and $1,000 fine for violating the county’s lobbyist disclosure ordinance. He had a been a three-term county commissioner at that point and helped craft the ordinance. That no contest plea has come back to haunt him in letters to the editor, for example, as he was appointed to the post and is seeking election to it. At least one of his opponents, former Cape Coral Economic Development Director Mike Jackson, sees it as old news, and after 10 years, it likely is. Manning’s also facing former Cape Coral Councilman Chris Berardi and former Lee County School Board Member Bob Chilmonik. This issue should still matter, however. Voters have a right to take into consideration the whole record of a candidate. In a questionnaire for The News-Press Editorial Board, Manning affirmed his support for the Sunshine Law — open records and open meetings laws — opposing exemptions to it and looking to expand it further. That’s a good sign, and redemption certainly is an American value. Manning has a chance to correct his past

error by striving to be the most transparent public official in our community. Anything less than that should be grounds to vote for one of his opponents in the Aug. 24 primary election.” Sunshine Dimmed “Re: “Manning comes with polished reputation,” July 9. Only a single sentence in an otherwise fawning profile of Manning hinted that something was not quite right during his earlier time on the commission. Alas, there was no attempt whatsoever to detail to readers and voters the betrayal of the public trust Mr. Manning committed while a commissioner in the late ‘90s. Only this vague reference to the fact “he pleaded no contest for not following the county’s lobbyist disclosure law and paid $1,000 in fines and court costs.” The law, which Manning voted to adopt in the early ‘90s, is an important Lee County addendum to the state’s open government requirements. The Lee County law requires commissioners to keep logs of their private meetings with lobbyists. They must disclose the names of the lobbyists, the dates of the meetings, the issues they discussed and the people and companies those lobbyists represent. It’s a noble attempt to prevent government in the shadows much like other counties have adopted. It lets the public know who is influencing, or attempting to influence, our elected commission behind closed doors. While the other four commissioners were dutifully obeying that law and filing their disclosure logs every three months with the Clerk’s Office Minutes Department, John Manning chose to ignore it for the entire four years of his last term

in office. He chose government in the shadows as he met with companies and their high-priced lawyers and lobbyists seeking votes and favors in the privacy of his office or theirs.”

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434

Filed 07/22/10 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JORG BUSSE Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER; STATE OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Defendants. ___________________________________ ORDER This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) filed on May 21, 2010. the time to respond has expired. Upon review, the Court desires a response from plaintiff. Recognizing that a Pre-Filing Injunction (Case No. 2:09-cv-791-FTM36SPC, Doc. #245) was issued on July 20, 2010, prohibiting any further filings without leave of Court, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to file a single responsive document to defendant’s motion. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED: No response has been filed and

Case 2:07-cv-00228-JES-SPC Document 434

Filed 07/22/10 Page 2 of 2

Plaintiff may file one response to defendant’s Motion for Entry of Order Directing Public Sale of Real Property (Doc. #432) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Order. If no response is

received, the Court will rule on the motion without the benefit of a response and without further notice. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this July, 2010. 22nd day of

Copies: Plaintiff Counsel of record

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PUBLIC CORRUPTION COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT BEVERLY B. MARTIN CORRUPT U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE CERTIFIED DELIVERY Federal Bureau of Investigation 5525 West Gray Street Tampa, FL 33609 Phone: (813) 253-1000 DEFENDANT BEVERLY B. MARTIN RECORD LACK OF IMMUNITY - PERPETRATION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS 1. The Plaintiff public corruption victims are suing Defendant Beverly B. Martin (“Martin”) in her private individual capacity and official capacity as U.S. Circuit Judge. Defendant Martin’s unlawful and criminal acts on record were outside any immunity and official capacity. FELONIES OUTSIDE ANY “official” CAPACITY 2. Under color of undocketed and/or falsified Cases ## 2010-10963 and 2010-10967, Def. Martin falsified official records and documents and caused others to falsify for criminal and illegal purposes of extorting money and property under fraudulent pretenses of “frivolity”. 3. Def. Martin knew and concealed that the only paid judgment of record had been in the amount of $24.30. When the Plaintiffs conclusively proved the prima facie criminality, illegality, and nullity of a falsified “$5,048.60 judgment”, which could nowhere be found, Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Def. Martin retaliated with further case fixing on “Jul 19 2010”. COERCION, EXTORTION UNDER FALSE PRETENSES, AND COVER-UP 4. Def. Martin coerced the Plaintiff corruption victims to refrain from redressing their grievances of a facially falsified and un-recorded “$5,048.60 judgment”, fake “writ of execution”, Doc. # 425, and forged “land parcels”. No court had ever reviewed the record forgeries of said fake “land parcels”, and Def. Martin conspired with other Offenders to keep it that way and keep Plaintiffs out of Court. Just like a Government whore, Def. Martin procured her order through brazen fraud on the Court, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540; see also 1.550. CONTEMPT OF FLORIDA LAW, CHAPTERS 55, 56, 71, 73, 74, 95, 712, FLA. STAT. 5. Def. Martin concealed that here nothing could have possibly become a lien on Plaintiffs’ property under Ch. 55, 56, 71, Fla. Stat. MARTIN’S KNOWLEDGE OF CRIMES AND UNLAWFUL ACTS 6. Defendant Corrupt Martin had knowledge of the actual commission of felonies such as, e.g., the falsifications of a. a “$5,048.60 judgment”; b. an appeal [see Case ## 2010-10967, and/or 2010-10963]; c. a “writ of execution” [Case No. 2:2007-cv-00228, Doc. # 425]; d. “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”; e. a “regulation”, “resolution 569/875”, “legislative act”, and/or “O.R. 569/875”. However, Def. Martin concealed and conspired to conceal said record falsifications. Here even though Def. Martin had knowledge of, e.g., judicial Co-Defendant Polster Chappell’s,

Steele’s, Pizzo’s, and Lazzara’s obstruction of justice and fraudulent concealment of facially forged “land parcels”, a falsified “writ of execution”, falsified “$5,048.60 judgment”, Corrupt Martin did not make the same known to some judge or person in authority, but covered up for said Offenders in exchange for bribes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT 7. Defendant Crook Martin knew that Defendant principal Offenders Steele, Chappell, Pizzo, and Lazzara had committed record offenses and assisted said Offenders, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4. In particular, Martin assisted said Offenders with a facially fraudulent “writ of execution” and the falsification and/or destruction of official records. DELIBERATE DEPRIVATIONS UNDER COLOR OF FAKE “writ” AND “resolution” 8. Defendant Martin deliberately deprived the Plaintiffs, e.g., under color of a fake “writ of execution”, “resolution 569/875”, and “frivolous appeal”, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. RECORD RETALIATION UNDER COLOR OF WRIT OF EXECUTION & SANCTIONS 9. With the intent to retaliate, Corrupt Martin knowingly took actions harmful to the Plaintiff public corruption victims, which included interference with Plaintiffs’ livelihood and record land ownership, because the Plaintiff landowners had provided truthful information relating to the commission of Federal offenses to law enforcement, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513. EXTORTION ASSISTANCE UNDER COLOR OF “FRIVOLOUS APPEAL” 10. Knowingly, Def. Martin assisted the extortion of Plaintiffs’ property and/or threatened to do so, with corrupt intent to retaliate against the Plaintiffs because the Plaintiffs had blown the whistle on public corruption; in particular, because the Plaintiffs had produced records and testimony conclusively evidencing Government corruption and fraud, and information about the commission of Federal offenses by Government Officials. Here, Plaintiff Government crime and corruption victims had the right to be reasonably protected from the Government Offenders and Judges of record, 18 U.S.C. § 3771. CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE AND COURT ACCESS 11. Def. Martin conspired with other Defendants and Officials to “restrict Appellant’s ability to pursue future appeals” for, e.g., criminal and unlawful purposes of concealing: a. Facially forged “land parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-0100001.0000”; b. Falsification of [a recorded “$24.30 judgment” into] an un-recorded“$5,048.60”extortion-and-execution scheme; c. Falsification of a “writ of execution” in the absence of a recorded “$5,048.60” “judgment”; d. Destruction and falsification of official Court records. EXACTION OF MONEY BY THREAT OF, E.G., ARREST AND CIVIL CONTEMPT 12. Def. Martin conspired to exact money from Plaintiffs under color of, e.g., “frivolous appeal” even though Martin knew that no legal basis for and justification of “frivolity” had ever or could have possibly ever existed. CONSPIRACY TO ASSIST EXTORTION AND BLACKMAIL 13. In particular, Def. Martin conspired and assisted to extort $5,048.60 and property in the absence of any recorded authentic judgment and justification. Martin caused other Government Officials to falsify, alter, and destroy official records for criminal and illegal purposes of concealing other Defendant Officials’ extortion, coercion, obstruction of justice and other crimes of record.

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14. Def. Martin made unlawful communications and threatened Plaintiff public corruption whistleblowers with obstruction of court access and deliberate deprivations of Plaintiffs’ express fundamental rights to redress Government grievances, own property, and exclude Governments. MISCONDUCT AND EXTENSION OF RECORD CRIMES AND FALSIFIED “WRIT” 15. Under prima facie fraudulent pretenses of “frivolous appeal”, Def. Martin recklessly extended the record Government crimes, and FIXED and “DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS”. Def. Martin assisted and conspired the reckless perversion and falsification of a recorded “Judgment” and “Bill of Costs” in the amount of $24.30 “issued as mandate on 06/11/2009” for criminal and illegal purposes of extortion, coercion, and retaliation against the Plaintiff corruption whistle blowers. In order for the record fraud under said fake “land parcels” to continue and for illegal purposes of silencing the Plaintiff landowners, Def. Martin “SUSPENDED” and perverted the Rules and caused the Clerk to “discard” more documents. FALSIFICATION OF APPEAL NUMBERS 16. The payment records regarding Plaintiffs’ multiple appeals conclusively proved the falsifications and fabrications of “Appeal Number 10-10963 and/or 10-10967”. See U.S. District Court payment records and receipts. The U.S. Clerk refused to certify and authenticate the payment record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44. 17. Def. Martin pulled “frivolity” out of her ass without any explanation and/or justification whatsoever. Review of the recorded judgment patently clearly evidenced that the District and Circuit had fabricated “lack of jurisdiction” for illegal purposes of concealment and coverup. Plaintiffs were entitled to defend their unimpeachable, unencumbered, and marketable record title against Government extortion and fraud, which of course had invoked Federal jurisdiction directly under the express guarantees of the Federal and Florida Constitutions. 18. Here with wanton disregard for the law, and including Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540, 1.550, Ch. 55, 56, 71, 73, 74, 95, 712, Fla. Stat., Def. Martin conspired to oppress Plaintiffs with prima facie non-existent and/or illegal orders, judgments, and/or mandates… /s/Jorg Busse, M.D., M.M., M.B.A. c/o International Court of Justice Peace Palace The Hague, Netherlands /s/Jennifer Franklin Prescott c/o International Court of Justice Peace Palace The Hague, Netherlands CC Florida Department of Law Enforcement U.S. Department of Justice The Florida Bar Real Property Probate and Trust Lawyer Section, The Florida Bar Barack Hussein Obama Eric Holder

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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 335-6100

Cases for Jorg Busse, Dr.
Docket Number 09-16202 09-16201 09-14715 09-14714 09-14713 09-14712 09-14326 09-14325 09-14324 09-14323 09-14321 09-14320 09-14319 09-14318 09-14317 09-14316 09-14315 09-14314 09-14313 09-14312 09-14310 09-14309 09-14308 09-14307 09-14306 Short Style Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Party Type Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Date Withdrawn From Case

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09-14305 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Appellant 09-14304 Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Appellant

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 335-6100

Cases for Jorg Busse, Dr.
Docket Number 09-14303 09-14302 09-14301 09-14300 09-14299 09-14298 09-14297 09-14296 09-14295 09-14294 09-14293 09-14292 09-14291 09-14290 09-14289 09-14288 09-14285 09-14284 09-14282 09-14281 09-13525 09-13523 Short Style Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of FL Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of FL Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of FL Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of FL Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Party Type Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Date Withdrawn From Case

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09-13522 09-13519 09-13517 09-13378 09-13376

Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida

Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 335-6100

Cases for Jorg Busse, Dr.
Docket Number 09-13308 09-13189 09-13188 09-13187 09-13186 09-12372 09-12329 09-12224 09-11305 09-10752 09-10747 09-10746 09-10745 09-10464 08-15140 08-14846 08-13170 Short Style Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Gerald B. Tjoflat Jorg Busse v. Lee County, Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazarra Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Richard A. Lazzara Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Dr. Jorg Busse v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jorg Busse v. Lee County Florida Party Type Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellee Appellant Appellant Date Withdrawn From Case

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56 Forsyth Street, NW Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 335-6100

Cases for Jorg Busse
Docket Number 09-16215 09-16209 09-16208 09-16207 09-16206 09-16205 09-16204 09-16203 Short Style Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Susan H. Black Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. State of Florida Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Jennifer Franklin Prescott v. Roger Alejo Party Type Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Appellant Date Withdrawn From Case

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE CORRUPT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ____________________________ No. 10-10963-I ____________________________ D.C. Docket No. 2:07-00228-CV-FtM-JES-SPC DR. JORG BUSSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, KENNETH M. ROESCH, J.R., et al., Plaintiffs, versus LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER, STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, KIENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ___________________________________ Not Docketed in Violation of Law Nazi-style Mock U.S. Proceedings Without any Due Process ___________________________________ APPELLANT(S)’ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM VEXATIOUS NAZI STYLE 04/06/10 “ORDER” (April 14, 2009)

PETITION FOR AND JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 1. Hereby, Plaintiff(s)-Appellant(s) petition for a Writ of Certiorari and supervisory review of the fraud on the Court by U.S. Judges since 2007 on the record(s). 2. “A petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination in this Court. See 28 U. S. C. § 2101(e); Rule 11, Certiorari to a United States Court of Appeals before Judgment. NAZI STYLE JUDICIAL CRIMES ON THE RECORD 3. Here, the Nazi-style crimes by U.S. District and Circuit Judges and their fraudulent concealment of Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were shown and conclusively proven to be “of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate determination” in the U.S. Supreme Court. In particular, the (extra)judicial crimes in these Case(s) & Appeal(s) destabilized real property ownership in America and any confidence in the American judicial system, where on the record, Federal Judges corruptly fabricated that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were purportedly “law” and/or “authorized” Government to criminally seize and confiscate private property without any due process and equal protection of the law. Here just like Nazi Officials, U.S. Judges extended record facial forgeries “O.R. 569/875” and facially forged “land” “parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0” and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”, which never legally existed, Lee County Plat Book 3, Page 25 (1912). COMPELLING REASONS SUCH AS MASSIVE JUDICIAL CORRUPTION 4. Here, said U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, entered facially idiotic decisions in conflict with its own decisions, other U.S. Appellate Court, and Supreme Court decisions on the same important matters. Here, judicially fabricated condemnation, eminent domain, and/or involuntary alienation by forged “resolution”, “legislative act”, “legislative” “claim” and/or Governmental forgeries such as, e.g., “O.R. 569/875” were criminal acts prohibited by law and violative of Constitutional checks and balances. Here, U.S. Judges criminally retaliated and conspired to criminally “deter”, “sanction”, and “punish” pro se Plaintiff(s) with an illegal “writ of execution” and criminal seizure of Plaintiff(s) riparian Gulf-front property, Parcel # 12-44-20-01-00015.015A”, Accreted Gulffront Lot 15A, as legally described in reference to the 1912 “Cayo Costa” Subdivision Plat of Survey in Lee County Plat Book 3, Page 25. CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION OF MEANINGFUL “JUDICIAL REVIEW” 5. Just like Nazi Government Officials, the corrupt Judges in the Eleventh Circuit obstructed justice and court access by fabricating a “resolution”:
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“On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida (“the Board”) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the Cayo Costa subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9.” See corrupt March 5, 2009 Appellate “Opinion”, No. 08-13170, District Court Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC, p. 2. RECORD JUDICIAL CRIMES & FRAUD ON THE COURT(S) 6. Here, U.S. Judges perpetrated fraud on the Court(s), procured another unlawful “order” through trickery & malice, and fabricated a “resolution”. Here, no evidentiary support of a “resolution” had ever existed, and the Governmental concoctions of condemnation by Governmental facial forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were record crimes. RECORD PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL LIES OF “RESOLUTION” & “CLAIM” 7. Here, no “resolution” had ever legally existed, and Defendant “Board” never “adopted” Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. Here, no name of any “Board” member appeared on Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. Here, no “resolution” had ever been legally recorded. Here, no original of any “resolution” ever existed. Here, there was rampant judicial corruption and fraud on the Court. Therefore, any and all Federal “opinions” and “orders” since 2006 were null and void from the outset. PERVERSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS OF “CLAIM” 8. Florida and Federal Constitutions expressly prohibited confiscating and/or “claiming” “land” by “adoption” of a “resolution” and/or any “law”. Here, the Nazi-style Judges in the 11th Court lied and criminally perverted said Constitutions’ checks and balances. Here, the law did not recognize criminal confiscation and seizure by any “resolution”, “law”, and/or Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. 9. Here, said outlaw Judges were out of control when they brazenly concocted a “resolution” and/or “legislative act” and then punished the pro se Plaintiff(s) merely for “redressing their Governmental grievances” and opposing the psychopathological judicial lies and Governmental crimes on the record. 10. Just like Nazi Judges fabricated that Nazi Government could “claim” the property of Jews and Nazi opponents, here criminal Judges idiotically concocted that Defendant Governments could “claim” Plaintiff(s) “raid lands” Nazi style and by criminal means of forged “O.R. 569/875”. THE JUDICIAL CROOKS COULD NOT ANSWER PLAIN QUESTIONS: 11. When asked plain and short: Who adopted what, where, when, and how, the criminal Judges in this corrupt Court imposed” “sanctions” just like Nazi Judges did when asked why Jews and Nazi opponents were murdered in Nazi concentration camps. THE NAZI STYLE CRIMES OF “SICK” FEDERAL JUDGES
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12. When the pro se Plaintiffs demanded to see the original of the forged “resolution” and/or authenticated copies, the crooked Judges “deterred”, “sanctioned”, and “punished” the Plaintiff(s) just like Nazi Judges “deterred” Nazi opponents in death camps and pedophile priests “punished” raped children when they reported the priests’ rape. PREMEDITATED JUDICIAL FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD 13. Here, U.S. Judges fraudulently concealed that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were “paste-ups”. Here, the illegible fake “recording” stamp(s) on said Governmental forgeries were pasted by Governmental con men. Here for years, U.S. Judges conspired with the Defendants to fraudulently conceal the criminality of Nazi style forged “claims” of “raid lands”, Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”. FRAUDULENT JUDICIAL PRETENSES OF “REVIEW” & “FRIVOLITY” 14. Here in the absence of a docket, criminal Judges “faked” “judicial review” and “frivolity”: “these appeals have been reviewed and determined to be frivolous.” See fraudulent “04/06/2010” 11th Circuit “order”. Here, the Case Docket(s) disappeared just like Nazi court records disappeared at the hands of Nazi judges. Here, sick Judges criminally concocted a “resolution” and “frivolity”. NAZI-STYLE “RESTRICTIONS” ON JUSTICE & FRAUD ON THE COURT 15. In their criminal “order”, post stamped “04/06/2010”, the objectively corrupt and partial Judge(s) in this Court again “imposed” Nazi-style “restrictions”: “As part of its Order, the Court imposed restrictions on Appellant’s ability…” POLICY & CUSTOM OF NAZI-STYLE “RESTRICTIONS” & TERROR 16. Just like Nazi Government Officials maliciously “restricted” the “abilities” of Jews and Nazi opponents, the crooked Judge(s) in this Court premeditated obstruction of justice, “deterrence”, “punishment”, and “judicial concentration camp” for the pro se Plaintiff(s), because the pro se Plaintiff(s) opposed, e.g., Governmental forgeries and scam “O.R. 569/875” and forged “Lee County” “land” “parcels” “12-44-20-01-00000.00A0”, and “07-44-21-01-00001.0000”. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE & FRAUD ON THE COURTS, DOC. # 338 17. Here for years, the vexatious U.S. judicial policy and custom on the record was obstruction of justice of the adjudication of the pro se Plaintiff(s)’ “claims”: “The copy of the Resolution [Governmental Forgeries “O.R. 569/875”] attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise.” See vexatious and facially fraudulent “Opinion and Order”, Doc. # 338, p. 12, Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-JES-SPC, by crooked District Judge John Edwin Steele.
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NAZI-STYLE ANARCHY INSTEAD OF ADJUDICATION 18. Even though the Defendants had ADMITTED that Lee County, Florida, and/or its Commissioners had never “signed” and/or “executed” Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” as conclusively evidenced by the true and correct copies of said fake “claims” on record, the Federal Judges conspired to uphold lawlessness and judicial corruption. JUDICIAL FAILURE TO “SHOW CAUSE” – FRIVOLITY FRAUD SCHEME 19. Here, the conspiring U.S. Judges in this Court never “showed any cause” for the “punishment” and “sanctions” of the pro se Plaintiff(s) under fraudulent pretenses of “frivolity” just like Nazi Official never “showed any cause” why they murdered Jews and Nazi opponents. 20. Just like Nazi Officials made the crime records of Nazi killings disappear, here the criminal Judges in this Court made dockets and records of oppression disappear. See Case Dockets. Here, crooked U.S. Judges covered up for other outlaw Judges in said U.S. Judicial Gang just like Nazis covered up for Nazis, and Catholic bishops for priests. NO AUTHENTICATION OF JUDICIALLY FABRICATED “RESOLUTION” 21. Even though the vexatious Judges in this Nazi-style Appellate Court had been “unable” to authenticate any “resolution”, “legislative act”, “land use regulation”, and/or “law”, they criminally continued to fraudulently pretend a “resolution” and torture, terrorize, punish, and oppress the pro se Plaintiffs just like Nazi Officials terrorized and oppressed Jews and Nazi opponents. 22. Just like Nazi Officials used forged papers to confiscate property of Jews in concentration camps, here U.S. Judges used prima facie forgeries “O.R. 569/875” to criminally confiscate pro se Plaintiff(s)’ riparian property. FACIALLY IDIOTIC JUDICIAL “ARGUMENTS” ON THE RECORD 23. Here, prima facie Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were not any “resolution”, because no “lawmaker” had ever “signed” and/or “executed” said scam. Just like Nazi Government Officials seized the property of Jews and Nazi opponents by criminal means of forged Nazi “claims”, here U.S. Judges fabricated a “resolution” and/or “legislative act”. Here, District and Circuit Judges agreed and conspired to “cover up” for crooked Judge Steele and conceal the idiotic criminal fabrication that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were purportedly “law”. The law did not recognize said Nazi-style “claim”. SCIENCE & FORENSICS CONTROVERTED OUTLAW JUDGES: FORENSICS vs. NAZI-STYLE “FRIVOLITY” “CLAIM” 24. Here on the record, the Defendants themselves had CONTROVERTED the outlaw Judges’ fabrications of a “legislative act” and/or “resolution”. Furthermore, forensic examinations had conclusively proven that Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” were not any “legislative act” and/or “resolution”. Here, U.S. Judges
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kept lying, concealing, and covering up for crooked Judge Steele, his oppressive Nazi style, Doc. # 338, and judicial crimes. VEXATIOUS JUDICIAL FARCE & MOCKERY OF “ORDER” (“04/06/2010”) 25. Here, said 04/06/2010 “order to show cause” was a facial farce and mockery. On their faces, Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875” patently clearly portrayed the facts and evidence of Governmental fraud, extortion, and crimes. Here, the law expressly prohibited Governmental scam “claim all of raid lands”. 26. Here, only Nazi-style Judges needed “cause shown”. Just like Nazi Judges did not comprehend the criminality of murdering Nazi opponents in concentration camps, here these Nazi-type Judges did not “get” the patently clear criminality of Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”, but needed “cause shown”. Just like the Pope needed “cause shown” for the prosecution of rapist priests, the Nazi-type Judges in the Eleventh Circuit needed “cause shown” why “disallowing” the pro se Plaintiffs to “assert” Governmental fraud & corruption and concealing the criminality of said Governmental forgeries was not criminal. 27. Just like Nazi Judges staged fake “proceedings” for Jews and Nazi opponents, and were utterly unable to “show” any Nazi wrongdoing and/or “cause” for prosecution for murder of innocent Nazi opponents in concentration camps, this “order” is a criminal charade. TIME FOR “NUREMBERG TRIALS” OF “JUDICIAL TERRORISTS” 28. Here, the time for “Nuremberg Trials” has come. Here under public policy, said “judicial terrorists” in Atlanta are on trial for fraudulently concealing Governmental forgeries “O.R. 569/875”, fraud, and eminent domain extortion…

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CROOKED U.S. JUDGES CONTROVERTED BY SCIENCE WORLDWIDE PUBLICATIONS OF U.S. JUDICIAL CORRUPTION U.S. GOVERNMENTAL FORGERIES “O.R. 569/875”: IDIOTIC GOVERNMENTAL FABRICATIONS OF “LAW”

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION JORG BUSSE Plaintiff, vs. Case No. 2:07-cv-228-FtM-29SPC

LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA; BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; KENNETH M. WILKINSON; LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER’S OFFICE; STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF [PAST & PRESENT] TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, AND DIVISION OF RECREATION AND PARKS; LEE COUNTY ATTORNEY; JACK N. PETERSON, Defendants. ___________________________________

OPINION AND ORDER This matter comes before the Court on the following motions: (1) defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and Close File (Doc. #285), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #302); (2) defendants State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Trustees) and Florida Department of

Environmental Protection’s (DEP) Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc. #291), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #316); (3)

defendant The Lee County Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction (Doc. #303), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #317); and (4) defendant Board of Lee County Commissioners’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #304), to which plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. #318). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney and will be liberally construed. 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). I. On December 10, 1969, the Board of County Commissioners of Lee County, Florida adopted the “Resolution Pertaining to Public Lands in Cayo Costa Subdivision”, Book 569, page 875 (the Resolution). The Resolution stated that the Second Revised Plat of the Cayo Costa Subdivision contained certain designated lot and block areas and other undesignated areas. The Resolution further noted that Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

the plat contained certain un-numbered and unlettered areas lying East of the Easterly tier of blocks in the subdivision and lying West of the Westerly tier of blocks in the subdivision. The

Resolution stated that Lee County claimed the lands to the east and west of the tier of blocks as “public lands together with all accretions thereto” and “does by this Resolution claim all of said lands and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public purposes.” (Doc. #288, p. 9.)

Plaintiff Jorg Busse (plaintiff or Dr. Busse) asserts he is the current owner of Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa Subdivision and

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accretions thereto. (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 1, 2.)

Plaintiff describes Lot

15A as being more than approximately 2.5 acres fronting the Gulf of Mexico with an estimated fair market value of more than $2 million. (Id. at ¶6.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution violates his

property rights in Lot 15A, which includes accretions, under both federal and state law. Count 1 sets forth a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

alleges that the Resolution deprived him of his riparian rights, private easements, accreted property and privileges secured by the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that

Lee County had no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa Subdivision, and therefore the Resolution was unenforceable and in violation of the United States

Constitution. (Doc. #288, ¶13.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants confiscated more than 2.5 acres of his accreted property without compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Id. at ¶14.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants also illegally took more

than 200 acres of private accretions onto Cayo Costa pursuant to the Resolution, all without compensation. (Id. at ¶15.) Further,

plaintiff asserts that “Defendant State Actors” claimed riparian rights to Lots 38A and 41A which they denied to plaintiff, thereby unlawfully discriminating against plaintiff because he is entitled to equal rights as the State property owner.
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(Id. at ¶¶ 16, 27.)

Count 2 alleges an unconstitutional temporary taking under color of the Resolution. Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution was never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution and recording requirements, and was therefore not entitled to be recorded and must be stricken from the public record. ¶17.) (Id. at

Plaintiff further alleges that the Cayo Costa Subdivision

was outside of Lee County’s home rule powers, and therefore the State and County had no powers to adopt resolutions or ordinances, and therefore the Resolution is unenforceable and ineffectual and the County capriciously (Id. at ¶18.) onto the grabbed private accreted land and

easements. his

Plaintiff asserts that defendants took riparian due gulf front of law, Lot 15A without notice,

accretions

authority,

justification,

process

public

hearing, vote count, or compensation, and that this unauthorized unconstitutional property value. taking injured plaintiff and destroyed his

(Id. at ¶19.) Plaintiff

Count 3 sets forth a state law claim for trespass.

alleges that since the 1969 Resolution the defendants have asserted that Lee County is the owner of the Cayo Costa accretions and have induced and caused the public to intrude onto the private beaches and other areas on Cayo Costa, injuring plaintiff’s property. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff asserts that the State cannot exercise

power within the Subdivision east of the mean high water mark of the Gulf of Mexico and west of the mean high water mark of Charlotte Harbor. (Id. at ¶22.)
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Count malfeasance.

4

alleges

a

conspiracy

to

fabricate,

fraud

and

Plaintiff asserts that the Lee County Property

Appraiser claimed that the Resolution entitled Lee County to ownership of the accreted property, but the County Appraiser has admitted that Lee County was not empowered to adopt the Resolution. (Id. at ¶23.) Plaintiff asserts that the Resolution on its face

did not meet recording or resolution requirements, and that the County Appraiser had a professional duty to verify the validity of the sham Resolution under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that without evidence of title, defendants conspired to concoct an un-plated lot, block and park for the benefit of the State and County. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant (Id.) denied (Id. at ¶24.) agricultural

classification to his accreted lot.

Plaintiff asserts that

defendants destroyed most of his property value, deprived him of private easements without compensation, and denied equal protection in a land grab scheme. being to assist the (Id.) Plaintiff describes the agreement as confiscation of the

unconstitutional

accretions. Appraiser

(Id. at ¶25.) made

Plaintiff also asserts that the County valuation reports which were

incompetent

controverted by other comparable sales data and done in violation of Federal Appraisal Standards, but defendant continued to slander plaintiff’s perfect title. (Id. at ¶26.) As a result, plaintiff

received purchase offers far below market value and the County Appraiser has committed malfeasance and abuse of position.
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(Id.)

Count 5 alleges a conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud. Plaintiff asserts that Lee County does not hold title to

the accreted property pursuant to the Resolution, and there has been no proceedings such as eminent domain or adverse possession. (Id. at ¶29.) Plaintiff asserts that Lee County’s claims of

ownership of the accretions therefore violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, and therefore defendants deprived the public of tax revenues which could have been received from the private accretions and easements. to (Id.) the Plaintiff asserts that defendants conspired extent of the Army Corps of Engineers’

misrepresent

authority over his lagoon.

(Id. at ¶32.)

Count 6 alleges oppression and slander of title by defendant Peterson for failing to challenge the invalidity of the Resolution despite his questions about its validity. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-35.)

The Third Amended Complaint asserts the Court has jurisdiction based on the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 U.S.C. § 1343, Articles 3 and 4 of the United States Constitution, and Amendments 4 and 5 of the United States Constitution (Doc. #288, ¶7), the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403)(id. at ¶8), the 1862 Homestead Act (id. at ¶9), the federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion (id. at ¶10), the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (12 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3351), and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201)(id. at ¶12).
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III. The Court will first address the federal claims, since these claims are necessary to provide subject matter jurisdiction. Given plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court reviews the Third Amended Complaint liberally. A. Takings Clause Claims: A consistent theme which runs through several of plaintiff’s counts is that the Resolution constitutes an unconstitutional taking of his property rights in his subdivision Lot 15A on Cayo Costa island.1 The legal principles are well-settled, and preclude

plaintiff’s takings claim. Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which states in pertinent part “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the States Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New (1978). The Third Amended

through the Fourteenth Amendment. York City, 438 U.S. 104, 121-23

Complaint may also be read to allege a conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause. State law defines the parameters of a plaintiff’s property interest, and whether state law has created a property interest is a legal question for the court to decide. Morley’s Auto Body, Inc.

See Lee County v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) for a description of Cayo Costa island and the Lee County zoning history of the island since 1978.
-7-

1

v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209, 1212 (11th Cir. 1996).

Under Florida law

a riparian or littoral owner owns to the line of the ordinary high water mark on navigable waters, and the riparian or littoral property rights include the vested right to receive accretions to the property. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust

Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936-37 (Fla. 1987); Brannon v. Boldt, 958 So. 2d 367, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). These

rights constitute property, and cannot be taken or destroyed by the government without just compensation to the owners. Sand Key

Assoc., 512 So. 2d at 936; Lee County v. Kiesel, 705 So. 2d 1013, 1015 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “By now it is beyond question that a

permanent physical occupation of private property by the state constitutes a taking for which a landowner must be compensated.” New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1996)(citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)). Thus while plaintiff has adequately alleged a taking of his property, “a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just Compensation to Clause just until the owner has unsuccessfully the procedures

attempted

obtain

compensation

through

provided by the State for obtaining such compensation . . .” Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1972). “Williamson County boils down to the rule

that state courts always have a first shot at adjudicating a
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takings dispute because a federal constitutional claim is not ripe until the state has denied the would-be plaintiff’s compensation for a putative taking, including by unfavorable judgment in a state court proceeding.” F.3d Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., Without having

, 2008 WL 1790434 (11th Cir. 2008).

pursued such available state court remedies, a plaintiff’s Takings Clause claim is not ripe and therefore a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at

195; Watson Constr. Co. v. City of Gainsville, 244 Fed. Appx. 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2007); Garbo, Inc. v. City of Key West, Fla., 162 Fed. Appx. 905 (11th Cir. 2006). It has been clear since at least

1990 that Florida law provides a remedy of an inverse or reverse condemnation suit. Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transp.,

563 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1990); Tari v. Collier County, 56 F.3d 1533, 1537 n.12 (11th Cir. 1995); Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, plaintiff could have

pursued an state action for declaratory judgment under FLA . STAT . § 86.011, a suit to quiet title, Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund of State of Florida v. Toffel, 145 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), or a suit in ejectment if the matter is viewed as a boundary dispute. Petryni v. Denton, 807 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that plaintiff pursued any state relief. Indeed, plaintiff has never suggested

that he has taken any action in state court to quiet title or receive damages under an inverse or reverse condemnation claim.
-9-

Since there is no showing of federal jurisdiction as to the Takings Clause claim, the Taking Clause claims and any conspiracy to violate the Takings Clause in any count will be dismissed without prejudice. B. Substantive Due Process Claim: A liberal reading of the Third Amended Complaint might suggest that plaintiff also frames the alleged taking of his property rights as a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit has held, however, that there is

no independent substantive due process taking cause of action. Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 612-14 (11th Cir. 1997). Additionally, substantive due process protects

only fundamental rights, that is, those rights which are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Such rights are created by the Greenbriar

Constitution, and do not include property rights.

Village, LLC v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003). Merely asserting that the government’s actions were

arbitrary and irrational does not bring the matter within the protection of the substantive due process provision. Village, 345 F.3d at 1263-64. in the Third due Amended process Greenbriar

Therefore, those portions of counts which claim attempt or to assert will a be

Complaint takings

substantive dismissed.

conspiracy

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C.

Procedural Due Process Claim: Plaintiff’s counts may also attempt to state a procedural due

process claim.

For example, plaintiff asserts that Lee County had

no home rule powers or jurisdiction over the undedicated Cayo Costa subdivision (Doc. #288, ¶¶ 13, 18, 23), that the Resolution was never signed, executed or acknowledged and did not meet resolution and recording requirements (id. at ¶¶ 17, 23), and that the taking was without authority, justification, due process, public notice, hearing, vote count, or compensation (id. at ¶19). “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.” Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). Not all government actions, however, are subject to a procedural due process claim. The County’s action in passing the Resolution

constituted a legislative act, and therefore plaintiff cannot state a procedural due process claim. 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade Plaintiff

County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).

asserted that the Resolution effecting the taking of more than 200 acres other than his 2.5 acres. a legislative act. Equalization, 239 This is sufficient to constitute

See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of U.S. 441, 445 (1915)(noting that it is

impractical to give every one a voice when a legislative act applies to more than a few people). Additionally, even if not a

legislative act, a procedural due process claims does not exist

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merely because state mandated procedures were not followed.

First

Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Fla., 20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1994). In this regard, some of the

allegations in the Third Amended Complaint are contradicted by the Resolution which is attached to it. The copy of the Resolution

attached to the Third Amended Complaint establishes that it was signed, executed, and duly recorded in the public records, and plaintiff will not be allowed to assert otherwise. The remaining

claimed defects are arguments concerning state law which do not arise to a constitutional level. Finally, plaintiff fails to state a procedural due process claim because he has failed to allege that Florida law provided him with an inadequate post-deprivation

remedy, Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996), and as discussed above it is clear that Florida does provide adequate post-deprivation remedies. Therefore, any claim founded on

procedural due process will be dismissed. D. Equal Protection Claim: Plaintiff also alleges that the Resolution violated his equal protection rights. “To properly plead an equal protection claim,

a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately.” Boyd v. Peet, 249 Fed. Appx. 155, 158 (11th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). See also

Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536, 1552 (11th Cir. 1991). The Third Amended Complaint does not identify any

similarly situated person with whom plaintiff can be compared. The
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Third Amended Complaint states that defendants have taken over 200 acres pursuant to the Resolution, far in excess of his 2.5 acres. The only assertion of disparate treatment is for those lots owned by government, which plaintiff alleges did not have their rights taken. However, a private owner such as plaintiff can not be Therefore,

compared to a public owner such as a government unit.

no equal protection claim is stated, and such claims will be dismissed without prejudice. E. Other Bases of Federal Jurisdiction: Having found no federal claim set forth in the Third Amended Complaint, the Court now examines the other purported bases of federal jurisdiction. Article III of the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of the federal court jurisdiction, but vests Congress with the

discretion to determine whether and to what extent that power may be exercised by lower federal courts. Therefore, lower federal

courts are empowered to hear only cases for which there has been a congressional grant of jurisdiction. Morrison v. Allstate Therefore

Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2000).

Article III does not provide any additional basis of federal jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff’s reliance on Article IV of

the Constitution is misplaced because Article IV does not address the jurisdiction of a federal court. Plaintiff cites 28 U.S.C. § 1343 as a basis for federal jurisdiction. Section 1343 sets forth the jurisdiction of district
-13-

courts for certain civil rights actions, but does not itself create a private right of action. Albra v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 232 Since none of plaintiff’s

Fed. Appx. 885, 892 (11th Cir. 2007).

federal civil rights claims are properly before the court, § 1343 is not a basis for jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Plaintiff’s reliance on the 1899 Rivers and Harbors

Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 is misplaced. relates to the creation of an obstruction not

Section 403 authorized by

Congress, and simply not relevant to any of the claims in this case. The 1862 Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64, cannot form Assuming

basis for jurisdiction because it was repealed in 1976.

there is a federal common law Doctrine of Accretion and Erosion, it cannot provide a jurisdictional basis in federal court. The

Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, 12 U.S.C. § 3331-3351, also do not create federal jurisdiction. appraisals utilized 12 this These standards relate to real estate in § connection 1331, and with no federally related was

transactions, involved in

U.S.C. case.

such in

transaction the

Additionally,

Florida

county

property appraiser is a constitutionally created office whose appraisals are carried out pursuant to state statute, FLA . STAT . § 193.011 as well as professional appraisal standards established by the International Association of Assessing Officers and the

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Appraisal Institute. (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore, the

Parrish v. Nikolits, 86 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.2

Court

finds

no

other

basis

of

federal

jurisdiction has been plead in the Third Amended Complaint. F. Remaining State Law Claims: The remaining possible claims in the Third Amended Complaint are all state law claims. Complaint may be read to Read liberally, the Third Amended allege a claim to invalidate the

Resolution for alleged state-law procedural defects, a state law claim of trespass, a state law claim of conspiracy to misrepresent, a state law claim of fraud, state law claims of malfeasance, a state law claim of oppression, and a state law claim of slander of title. Even assuming these are properly pled, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) the Court would exercise its discretion and decline claims. to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th

Cir. 2004)(encouraging district courts to dismiss state claims where all claims which provided original jurisdiction have been dismissed.) prejudice. Having The dismissal of the state claims will be without Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). found that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, and will not retain supplemental jurisdiction, the Court need not address the issues raised in the remaining

defendants’ motions to dismiss. Accordingly, it is now
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ORDERED: 1. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. #303) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 2. Defendant Property Appraiser’s Motion to Dismiss and

Close File (Doc. #285) is DENIED as moot. 3. State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection

and Division of Recreation and Parks, State of Florida, and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Joint Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Cause of Action (Doc. #291) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 4. Defendants Lee County, Florida, Board of Lee County

Commissioners, Lee County Attorney, Jack N. Peterson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #304) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in paragraph 5 below. 5. The Third Amended Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice as to all defendants and all claims.

The Clerk shall

enter judgment accordingly, terminate all pending motions as moot, and close the case. DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this May, 2008. 5th day of

Copies: Parties of record

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[DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ________________________ No. 08-13170 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MAR 5, 2009 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK

D. C. Docket No. 07-00228-CV-FTM-29-SPC JORG BUSSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, KENNETH M. ROESCH, JR., et al., Plaintiffs, versus LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, BOARD OF LEE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, THE LEE COUNTY PROPERTY APPRAISER, STATE OF FLORIDA, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, KENNETH M. WILKINSON, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _________________________ (March 5, 2009)

Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jorg Busse, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his third amended complaint in his civil rights action against various state and local governmental entities and officials in Florida, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. The district court dismissed Busse’s federal claims because he had either failed to adequately plead them or had not established federal subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of any viable federal claims, the court declined to retain jurisdiction over Busse’s state law claims. Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we AFFIRM the dismissal. I. BACKGROUND On 10 December 1969, the Board of Commissioners of Lee County, Florida (“the Board”) adopted a resolution claiming certain lands in the Cayo Costa subdivision as public lands (“the Resolution”). R10-288 at 9. In the Resolution, the Board identified the relevant lands by reference to a map of the subdivision which showed that, along with a number of designated land parcels in the subdivision, there were also a number of unidentified areas on the eastern and western edges of the subdivision. Id. The Board laid claim to all of these nondesignated parcels “and accretions thereto for the use and benefit of the public for public purposes.” Id.

Busse asserts that he currently owns Lot 15A of the Cayo Costa subdivision along with all accretions thereto and that the Resolution violates his property rights under both federal and state law. Id. at 1. To vindicate his rights, he brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against an array of state and local parties, including the Lee County Board of Commissioners, the county property appraiser, and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection.1 Id. In his third amended complaint, Busse made six claims: unconstitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; unconstitutional temporary takings; trespass; conspiracy, fraud, and malfeasance regarding the designation of certain unplatted lots; conspiracy to materially misrepresent and defraud; and oppression or slander of title. Id. at 3–8. He asserted that an array of statutory and constitutional provisions supported the exercise of jurisdiction: two civil rights acts — 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343; Articles Three and Four and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act (33 U.S.C. § 403); the 1862 Homestead Act, the federal common law doctrine of

The full list of defendants includes: Lee County, Florida; the Board of Lee County Commissioners, in their official and private capacities; Kenneth M. Wilkinson, the Lee County property appraiser, in his official and private capacity; the State of Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida, in their official and private capacities; the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, the Florida Division of Recreation and Parks, and the Cayo Costa State Park staff, in their individual and private capacities; and Jack N. Peterson, Lee County Attorney, in his official and private capacity. Id.

1

accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Id. at 2–3. The defendants subsequently filed separate motions to dismiss Busse’s third amended complaint, primarily based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. R10-285, 291, 303, 304. The district court granted these motions and dismissed Busse’s third amended complaint. R11-338. In so doing, the court first found that Busse had made out a valid takings claim but that it had no jurisdiction over that claim since he had failed to show that he had pursued all available state remedies before bringing suit. Id. at 7–10. The court then concluded that Busse had not made out a valid claim under any of his other alleged federal bases. Id. at 10–15. Given that the court did not have jurisdiction over any of Busse’s federal claims, it chose to dismiss his state law claims. Id. at 15. Busse now appeals the dismissal of all of the claims in his third amended complaint. II. DISCUSSION We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding subject matter jurisdiction, including the determinations that a claim is not ripe or that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). We also “review a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 826 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006). Since Busse is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Busse argues that the district court erred in dismissing his federal claims. He asserts that his Takings Clause claim was ripe for review and that he had properly stated claims involving violations of his procedural due process, equal protection, and substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 Additionally, we read Busse’s brief liberally to argue that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. We address these arguments in turn. A. Takings Clause Claims
2

Busse’s brief on appeal does not discuss the other jurisdictional bases cited in his third amended complaint — Articles Three and Four of the United States Constitution; the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act; the 1862 Homestead Act; the federal common law doctrine of accretion and erosion; the Federal Appraisal Standards, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, and 12 U.S.C. §§ 3331–3351; and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Generally arguments not raised in a brief on appeal are deemed abandoned. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, we agree with the district court’s analysis of these provisions and find that none of them could serve as a potential jurisdictional basis for Busse’s claims. See, e.g., Arthur v. Haley, 248 F.3d 1302, 1303 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that appellate courts can and should sua sponte inquire into subject matter jurisdiction whenever it appears to be lacking).

Busse contends that the Resolution constituted an unconstitutional taking of his property rights in Lot 15A. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property “for public use, without just compensation” — a condition made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2457 (2001) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Takings Clause applicable to the States). A plaintiff can bring a federal takings claim only if he can show that he did not receive just compensation in return for the taking of his property. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 720 (11th Cir. 1990). As a result, for a takings claim to be ripe, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he unsuccessfully “pursued the available state procedures to obtain just compensation” before bringing his federal claim. Id. at 721. In this case, Busse’s claim would not be ripe because he has not shown that he attempted to obtain or secure relief under established Florida procedures. Since at least 1990, Florida courts have recognized that an inverse-condemnation remedy is available for alleged takings violations. See Reahard v. Lee County, 30 F.3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir. 1994). Busse contends that his claim would still be ripe since that remedy was unavailable in 1969 when the Board of Commissioners enacted the Resolution. However, our past circuit precedent dictates “that a Florida property owner must pursue a reverse condemnation remedy in state court

before his federal takings claim will be ripe, even where that remedy was recognized after the alleged taking occurred.” Id. Accordingly, regardless of whether Busse has a valid property interest in Lot 15A, because he has not alleged that he sought and was denied compensation through available state procedures, his Takings Clause claim would not be ripe for review. We thus conclude that the district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Busse’s Takings Clause claim. B. Procedural Due Process Claims Busse asserts that his procedural due process rights were violated since Lee County had no authority to take his land nor jurisdiction over it and because the Resolution was improperly executed. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. A plaintiff could make a procedural due process claim by challenging the procedures by which a regulation was adopted, including the failure to provide pre-deprivation notice and hearing. See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610, 615 (11th Cir. 1997); Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). For such a claim to be valid, however, the plaintiff would have to allege that state law failed to provide him with an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 382 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

Based on these standards, we find that Busse has failed to state a valid procedural due process claim. Florida provides him an adequate post-deprivation remedy, inverse condemnation, and he makes no argument that this procedure is inadequate. Even if it was inadequate, though, Busse still would not have a valid procedural due process claim. The Resolution constituted a legislative act since it was a general provision that affected a large number of persons and area, 200 acres in all, rather than being specifically targeted at Busse or his immediate neighbors. See 75 Acres, LLC v. Miami-Dade County, Fla., 338 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). Since alleged problems with the adoption of such acts cannot serve as the basis for a procedural due process claim, Busse could not cite them as the basis for his claim. See id. (noting that “if government action is viewed as legislative in nature, property owners generally are not entitled to procedural due process”). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in dismissing Busse’s procedural due process claims. C. Equal Protection Claims Busse also argues that his equal protection rights were violated because the Board, in adopting the Resolution, treated differently privately-owned property and state-owned property.3 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from “deny[ing]
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In his brief on appeal, Busse argues that he experienced different treatment than other landowners in Lee County. However, we need not address this argument since he did not mention this in his third amended complaint and we find that none of the exceptions that would allow us to consider an issue not raised before the district court would apply here. See Narey v.

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “[T]o properly plead an equal protection claim, a plaintiff need only allege that through state action, similarly situated persons have been treated disparately.” Thigpen v. Bibb County, 223 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) abrogated on other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). Under Florida law, counties can exercise eminent domain over any land that is not owned by the state or federal government. See Fla. Stat. § 127.01(1)(a) (2006). Since a state landowner would not be subject to the eminent domain power but Busse, as a private landowner, would be, Busse could not be similarly situated to a state landowner. Busse therefore cannot rely on his disparate eminent domain treatment vis-a-vis state landowners as the basis for an equal protection claim. Since Busse made no other allegations of disparity in his third amended complaint, we find that he has failed to plead a valid equal protection claim and that the district court correctly dismissed this claim. D. Substantive Due Process Claim Busse also appears to allege that the Resolution denied him his substantive due process property rights. Substantive due process protects only those rights that are “fundamental,” a description that applies only to those rights created by the

Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing the exceptions to this general rule).

United States Constitution. See Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Property rights would not be fundamental rights since they are based on state law. See id. Busse thus could not bring a viable substantive due process claim based on the alleged denial of a state-defined property right. See id. Accordingly, we find that the district court properly dismissed his substantive due process claims.4 E. Supplemental Jurisdiction Busse also contends that the court abused its discretion in not hearing his pendent state law claims. “The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Since the district court “had dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it therefore had the discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage district courts to take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed pretrial. See Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

The district court, in addressing Busse’s substantive due process claim, mentions that assertions of irrational and arbitrary government action could not serve as the basis for such a claim. Even under a liberal reading of Busse’s complaint, though, we do not think he made such allegations. In the third amended complaint, he discusses takings violations and procedural problems with the enactment of the Resolution but never questions the rationale for its passage. Accordingly, we need not address whether he has a valid substantive due process claim based on arbitrary and capricious government action.

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its discretion when it chose not to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Busse’s state law claims. III. CONCLUSION Busse contends that the district court incorrectly dismissed his federal claims regarding alleged takings and deprivations of property rights. Since Busse’s takings claim was not ripe because he had not pursued available state remedies and he failed to adequately plead his other federal claims, the district court correctly dismissed all of these claims. As a result, despite Busse’s objections to the contrary, the district court also did not commit an abuse of discretion in not exercising jurisdiction over his state law claims. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Busse’s third amended complaint. AFFIRMED.

David Souter U.S. Supreme Court Justice RE: Lee County [FL] O.R.569/875 – An eminent domain scam of giant proportions Case-fixing in the U.S. Court of Appeals

We are writing to you in the matter of the corruption and case-fixing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit. Common intelligence dictates that residents use designated streets to get to their lots. Unintelligently, the 11th Circuit cannot tell the difference between a designated street and “unidentified areas”. See Plat Book 3, p. 25 at www.leeclerk.org. In West Peninsular Title Co.1, corrupt Chief Circuit Judge Edmondson co-wrote: “And, plaintiffs’ “arbitrary and capricious” due process claim is ripe. Plaintiffs accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action .. Plaintiffs’ claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance … See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.13(11th Cir. 1990).” “But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33 Acres.” For Appellees’ bribes, Edmondson now changed his mind and conspired to pervert a platted designated street into an “unidentified area” in order to fix Appellants’ Cases. Here for bribes, ripeness vanished, and justice is for sale in the 11th Circuit. The Appellant(s) also own property in N.H. and wish you the best for your retirement. /s/ Jennifer Franklin Prescott /s/Dr. Jorg Busse

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41 F.3d 1490 WEST PENINSULAR TITLE CO., Absolute, Inc., Marion H. Cooper, for Estate of Alfred R. Cooper, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, Carol A. Roberts, Chair of Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County, Defendants-Appellants. Nos. 93-4104, 93-4449.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit. Jan. 10, 1995.
Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4104. Sharon M. Pitts, Patti A. Velasquez, Asst. County Atty., West Palm Beach, FL, Robert S. Hackleman, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for appellants in No. 93-4449. Jeffrey A. Aman, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Tampa, FL, Joan E. O'Dell, Gregory L. Williams, Smith, Williams & Bowles, P.A., Washington, DC, for appellees in both cases. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, MELTON* , Senior District Judge. PER CURIAM:

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After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants raise several arguments, hoping mainly to void concessions made in district court in the joint pretrial stipulation. The district court is affirmed. The controversy concerns the ownership of strip parcels (roads and ditches) offered by Palm Beach Farms for dedication to Palm Beach County in 1912. A 1976 instrument entitled "Notice of Withdrawal of Platted Roads, Streets, and Other Unexercised Rights" revoked the offer of dedication. In 1986, pursuant to local Ordinance No. 86-18 (the "Ordinance"), defendant Palm Beach County (the

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"County"), began a practice of selling easement and right of way interests in property originally acquired through dedication. In return for a "privilege fee," the County issued an abandonment resolution, which, when recorded, transferred ownership of the parcel to the payor of the fee. This dispute began when the County attempted to collect fees in exchange for abandonment resolutions for parcels that, according to plaintiffs, had never been accepted by the County. 3 Plaintiffs, claiming that they were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms (and thus owners of the strip parcels), challenged the County's practice as an unconstitutional taking--under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--of their property.1 The County conceded that it never expressly accepted the dedication; but, at trial, the County attempted to show that it had impliedly accepted the dedication by using the strip parcels. The jury found for plaintiffs, deciding that the County had not accepted the 1912 offer of dedication within a reasonable time. The district court entered judgment for plaintiffs: plaintiffs were judged the fee simple owners of the pertinent strip parcels; defendants were enjoined from applying the Ordinance to plaintiffs' property; and plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees. Defendants appeal. The County now contests plaintiffs' standing, arguing that plaintiffs could not possibly own the strip parcels (and thus have no interest at stake). But given plaintiffs' allegations and the County's stipulations in the district court, the record supports both standing and jurisdiction. A "case or controversy" exists in this case because the parties genuinely disputed ownership of the strip parcels in the district court. The County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title, agreeing that plaintiffs were successors in interest to Palm Beach Farms. The controversy was thus limited to a decision about whether the offer of dedication was accepted.2 Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the application of the Ordinance to what they assert is their property. But the County insists that adjoining landowners own the strip parcels, citing Murrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir.1959), as an alternative to 16.33 Acres. This decision is not about standing: what the County is really arguing is that plaintiffs failed to join indispensable parties. Amicus Boywic Farms agrees, arguing that it was harmed by the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Because the district court could only determine who, as between plaintiffs and the County, had the better claim to the strip parcels, amicus is not bound by the district court's order. It was no abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to dismiss this case for failure to join indispensable parties. The County, as movant, had the burden "to show the nature of the unprotected interests of the absent parties," 5A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1359; yet, the County's citation to the record reveals only that it established the existence of adjoining landowners (not the nature of allegedly unprotected interests). And, plaintiffs' "arbitrary and capricious" due process claim is ripe.3 Plaintiffs accused the County of applying an arbitrary and capricious action (asserting ownership to the strip parcels and recording abandonment resolutions which transferred title) to their property. Plaintiffs' claim was ripe as soon as the County applied the ordinance and the petition process (including a $400 nonrefundable application fee) to the undedicated strip parcels. See Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n. 13 (11th Cir.1990). The County argues that no subject matter jurisdiction exists because plaintiffs' claims are so frivolous. But the course of litigation and stance of the County in

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district court undercuts its claim of frivolousness. We also note that the pretrial stipulation plainly reads that "[n]either party contests subject matter ... jurisdiction."4 If the County actually thought plaintiffs' claims were frivolous, it should not have so willingly conceded facts giving rise to jurisdiction in the stipulation. Because the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal claims, the court did not err by including plaintiffs' state claims for declaratory relief--pendent jurisdiction was proper. 8 The County also argues that the district court erred by interpreting the stipulation as a "winner-take-all" proposition. That is, the County says it reserved a right to make several arguments, after the jury's fact finding, by referring to "undisposed of motions" in the stipulation. We disagree. The parties agreed that the jury's conclusion would "be outcome determinative of all of the federal and state claims." The County does not argue that it was unfairly duped into signing the stipulation. And, we owe great deference to the trial judge's interpretation and enforcement of pretrial stipulations. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 (11th Cir.1987); Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371, 1373 n. 8 (11th Cir.1982). In the light of the stipulations, the district court did not err when it refused to entertain the County's post-verdict motions. Defendants raise other arguments, none of which present grounds for reversal. The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
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Honorable Howell W. Melton, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation
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Application of the Ordinance, according to plaintiffs, put a "cloud" on plaintiffs' title because title to the strip parcels was transferred to the payor of the privilege fee. Plaintiffs' property was, in other words, not transferable so long as the County continued to demand fees for the "abandonment" of property it never owned
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"[S]tanding cannot be waived and may be asserted at any stage of litigation." Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n. 4 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). We disagree with the County's argument that plaintiffs' ownership claim is so obviously frivolous that standing could not possibly exist, regardless of stipulated facts pointing to standing. In support of this claim, the County cites the allegedly "remarkably similar" case of United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So.2d 476 (Fla.1977), as binding precedent denying plaintiffs' ownership claim. But 16.33 Acres is distinguishable because in that case the government expressly accepted the offer of dedication. Id. at 479
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Because we conclude that plaintiffs' arbitrary and capricious due process claim was ripe, we say nothing about whether plaintiffs' additional constitutional claims were ripe. We do note, however, that plaintiffs were not granted relief pursuant to a specific claim. Instead, the County stipulated that plaintiffs would be entitled to the remedies requested if plaintiffs prevailed on any of the disputed fact issues
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Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th Cir.1983). And we do not say that jurisdiction was proper because jurisdiction was stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we affirm the district court's conclusion that

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the stipulated facts give rise to jurisdiction. For example, the County argues frivolousness by pointing to purported transfers--by plaintiffs' predecessors in interest-that the County says are null and void. But the County stipulated to plaintiffs' chain of title; and, the County agreed that it was undisputed that "plaintiffs are the successors in interest to the Palm Beach Farms Company." The record was set in district court
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