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03/22/2013

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Sections

  • Case Law
  • Effectivity of Laws
  • Natural Persons , Art. 41 NCC
  • Human Relations
  • Marriage
  • Marriage as a Social Institution
  • Marriage License
  • Marriage Contract
  • Art. 26, Family Code; Nationality Principle (Lex Nationalii)
  • Divorce Decree Obtained Abroad
  • Legal Capacity to Contract Marriage
  • Article 40, FC; Bigamy
  • Articles 41 and 42, FC
  • Legal Separation
  • Cohabitation
  • Family Members in Articles 150 and 151 of FC
  • The Family Home
  • Paternity and Filiation
  • Adoption
  • Support
  • Custody
  • Change of Name
  • Immovable Property
  • Classification of Property
  • Ownership
  • Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer
  • Right of Retention
  • Accretion
  • Islands
  • Expropriation
  • Co-ownership
  • Conversion
  • Quieting of Title
  • Possession
  • Adverse Possession
  • Usufruct
  • Easements
  • Nuisance
  • Attestation and subscription:
  • Right of representation in Reserva Troncal:
  • Obligations and Contracts
  • Sales
  • Partnership
  • Agency
  • Trusts
  • Credit
  • Q:
  • A:
  • Torts and Damages
  • Land Titles and Deeds
  • Conflict of Laws

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CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER:

Case Law Book 1 Effectivity of Laws After conducting preliminary investigation, a panel composed of state prosecutors from the DOJ charged Sen. Gregorio Honasan, together with others, with a violation of Art. 134-A of the RPC for the offense of coup d'etat. Honasan questions the authority and jurisdiction of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority and jurisdiction to conduct the same, he being a Senator of the Republic with a salary grade of 31, and that ultimately, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over his case, not the DOJ. DOJ asserts that pursuant to OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No., it has jurisdiction to investigate the case against him, concurrent with the Office of the Ombudsman. Honasan counters that said circular is ineffective as it was never published. Q: Is OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 ineffective because it was not published? A: No. OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the two offices which outlines the authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigations. It does not contain any penal provision nor prescribe a mandatory act or prohibit any under pain of penalty. Further, it does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general. As such therefore, it need not be published, consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 453 and Peo. v. Que Po Lay (94 Phil. 640). (Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, 427 SCRA 46) Renvoi Doctrine Edward is an American citizen who was domiciled in the Philippines for quite some time. He met Bernardina, became common law spouses and had 2 daughters with her, Helen and Lucy. They separated before the effectivity of the NCC. Shortly after he executed his will, he went back to America and stayed there until his demise. When Edward’s will was probated, it was opposed because Helen, his illegitimate natural child, was allegedly preterited, leaving only a sum of money in a bank to her while Lucy, his illegitimate acknowledged natural child was given the whole of his estate. Helen claims that under Art. 16 par. 2 of the civil code, where there is succession, the national law of the deceased should govern, that is, the civil code of California. Art. 946 of the civil code of California provides that if a Californian not domiciled in California dies, the law of his domicile must govern. Lucy, on the otherhand, counters that under art. 16 par. 2 of the civil code, the national law of the deceased should apply.
2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members:

Q: Which law should be applied – Philippine law or Californian Law? A: Philippine Law should be applied. Where the testator (Edward) was a citizen of California, and domiciled in the Philippines, the amount of successional rights should be governed by his national law. However, the conflict of law rules of California provides that in cases of citizens who are residents of another country, the law of the country of domicile should apply, hence, Philippine law on legitimes should be applied. This is so because California law itself refers the case back to the Philippines. The Philippine court has no other alternative but to accept the referring back, for to do otherwise, might result again in its referring back to the Philippines, which would give rise to a sort of an “international football”. (Aznar v. Garcia, 61 O.G. No. 46, p. 7303, 1963) Natural Persons , Art. 41 NCC Nita came to know Antonio Geluz. She became pregnant before they were legally married. In order to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, she had herself aborted. After her marriage with the Antonio, she again became pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the same person who had her aborted before. Less than 2 years later, she again became pregnant and again repaired to the same clinic. Nita was again aborted of a 2-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of P50. It is this third and last abortion that constitutes Antonio’s basis in filing this action and award of damages. Trial court and Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the NCC. Q: May Antonio recover damages from the physician who caused the abortion of Nita? A: No. Fixing an award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed w/ personality. Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages from the physician who caused the same. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

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2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee

However, this is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affection. (Geluz v. CA, 2 S 801, 1961) Human Relations Using the wire services of RCPI, Grace Verchez sent a telegram to her siblings that read; "Send check money Mommy hospital." It took twenty five days however for the telegram to reach them due to the negligence of RCPI' s employees. The mother died eventually, although there was no showing that RCPI's negligence contributed to it. RCPI was sued for damages. Q: Is RCPI liable for damages although there was no showing that its employees’ negligence contributed to the death of respondents’ mother? A: RCPI's tort liability is clear under Art. 2219, par. 10 thereof, in relation to Art. 26. Under the latter provision, every person shall respect, among others, the peace of mind of his fellowmen. RCPI's negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind of the Verchezes. It disrupted the "filial tranquility" among them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to the emergency." (RCPI v. Verchez, et al., GR No. 164349, 31 Jan. 2006) Roberto was in Nikko Hotel when he bumped into a friend who was then on her way to a wedding reception being held in said hotel. Roberto alleged that he was then invited by his friend to join her at the wedding reception and carried the basket full of fruits which she was bringing to the affair. At the reception, the wedding coordinator of the hotel noticed him and asked him, allegedly in a loud voice, to leave as he was not in the guest list. He retorted that he had been invited to the affair by his friend, who however denied doing so. Deeply embarrassed by the incident, Roberto then sued the hotel for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Q: Will Roberto’s action prosper? A: No. It was held that the version of the hotel coordinator was more credible considering that she has been in the hotel business for 20 years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated. Consequently, the employer hotel is not liable for damages. Art. 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The elements for this principle to apply are:

1) There is an act which is legal; 2) But it is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and 3) It is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. In this case, there was no showing at all that the wedding coordinator had acted with ill-motives. Without such evidence, her act cannot amount to abuse of rights. (Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya" , 452 SCRA 532 ) GF Equity, Inc., which maintains Alaska Basketball Team in the PBA engaged the services of Arturo Valenzona as coach of its team for a period of two years, with the stipulation that “If at anytime during the contract, the Coach, in the sole opinion of the Corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the corporation may terminate this contract.” After Alaska placed third in two conferences during the 1988 season, Valenzona received a notice from GF Equity terminating his services as coach. Six years later, he filed a complaint for damages praying for payment of his compensation arising from the alleged arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. Q: Is GF Equity liable for damages arising from the unilateral termination of Valenzona’s employment despite said stipulation in his contract? A: Yes. The stipulation clearly transgressed the principle of mutuality of contracts under Art. 1308 of the CC. It leaves the determination and judgment of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. This constitutes an unbridled prerogative to preterminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion. Since the pretermination of the agreement was predicated on an illegal ground, hence contrary to law, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona and entitling him to damages under Art. 19, in relation to Art. 20. (GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, GR No. 156841, 30 June 2005) HSBC failed to pay the value of the checks issued in Catalan’s favor even after the drawer had repeatedly directed the bank to pay the value thereof. Catalan filed a complaint for damages under Art. 19 of the CC against HSBC. The bank invokes the defense that under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, which is supposed to be not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies the check. Q: Will Catalan’s action for damages under Art. 19 prosper? A: Yes. HSBC is liable for damages on account of the unreasonable manner in which it dealt with Catalan. When a right is exercised in a manner

University of Santo Tomas

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CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER:

which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Art. 19 of the CC and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. (HSBC International Trustee, Ltd. v. Catalan, 440 SCRA 498) Marriage This is an action for support by G (wife) against R (husband). After 1 month of marriage, R repeatedly demanded from G to perform "unchaste and lascivious acts on R's genitals." Because of G's refusal, R maltreated G by word and deed, inflicting bodily injuries on G. To escape R's lewd designs and avoid further harm, G left the conjugal home and took refuge in her parent's house. G filed an action for support w/ the trial court which was dismissed on the ground that R could not be compelled to give support if G lived outside of the conjugal home, unless there was legal separation. G appealed. Q: Was the trial court correct in dismissing her action for support? A: No. The law provides that R, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit R to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of the R’s own wrongful acts. In this case, where G was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of R, she may claim support from him for separate maintenance even outside of the conjugal home. (Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil 252) Marriage as a Social Institution Jaime filed a petition for nullity of his marriage to Carmelita on the ground of lack or absence of a marriage license. To support his claim, he presented a certification issued by the local civil registrar to the effect that "they failed to locate the book wherein marriage license 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." Q: Is their marriage void ab initio for failure of the local civil registrar to locate the book wherein their marriage license is registered hence their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license? A: No. It is a policy in our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitor
2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members:

pro matrimonio - Always presume marriage. Moreover, in order for a certification by the civil registrar to be given probative value, it must categorically state that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in the register. In this latter instance, such certification would then be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, their marriage is valid. (Sevilla v. CA , GR No. 167684, 31 July 2006 ) Soledad, a court interpreter, was administratively charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct for living with a man not her husband, and for having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. It happened that the man with whom she cohabited was also married to another woman. She interposed a defense that said arrangement is in conformity with her and her partner's religious beliefs as members of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower Bible Society. Both she and her partner had individually executed a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." For Jehovah's Witnesses, this declaration allows members of their congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations, and it makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Q: Is their cohabitation valid? A: Yes. No disgraceful and immoral conduct may be attributed to Soledad given her religious beliefs. In resolving claims involving religious freedom, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality or accommodation approach. Under the benevolent neutrality approach, the "wall of separation" between church and state is meant to protect the state from the church. It recognizes that religion plays an important role in the lives of individuals. Thus, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance; What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its "burdensome effects," whether by the legislature or the courts. The Supreme Court recognized that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such interest exists, as in this case, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. (Estrada v. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, 22 June 2006) During his lifetime and while he was married to Epifania de la Cruz, Joseph Goyanko acquired a piece of land which he then subsequently conveyed, by way of a purported deed of sale, to

Jr. On the charge regarding illegal marriages. **The clear legislative intent in the case of par. but as to whether they married each other is disputed. 26. one of whom thereafter is naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry. After Joseph died. (Cosca v. (Ching v. De la Rosa. inter alia. the omission of which does not render the marriage a nullity. 10 Nov. Always presume marriage. et al. Romillo. while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Q: Is the sale of the piece of land by Joseph to his mistress proper? A: No. It was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act and to prevent fraud. 237 SCRA 249) Marriage Contract The signing of the marriage contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value. the FC pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage. No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite . Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. Family Code. et al. Clerk of Court of the MTC despite the absence of a marriage license. the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly. all of his legitimate children learned about the sale to his mistress and they thus sought its reconveyance in their favor. De Damian. the said provision does not University of Santo Tomas . it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that. Palaypayon. 2 of the FC to apply is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of their marriage but their citizenship at the time that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to re-marry. The reckoning point for Art. Indubitably. Lady Miros then left for the US and there. Q: Is Cipriano capacitated to re-marry by virtue of the divorce decree obtained by his Filipino spouse who was later naturalized as an American citizen? A: Yes. This is borne out by the fact that no record of the marriage existed in the civil registry. after obtaining a divorce. 2. respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. 26 of the FC. several couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to Baroy. Q: Is Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado? A: They are presumed to be married. 2. 165879. which we believe it is. as in this case. This is the usual order of things in society and.. In addition. their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license. 1490 applies even to common law relationships. CA. In this jurisdiction. He then filed a petition for authority to remarry.. she obtained American citizenship. on its face. Nationality Principle (Lex Nationalii) Cipriano and Lady Miros married each other. 480 SCRA 334) Marriage License Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. On the other hand. Cipriano later learned all about this including the fact that Lady Miros had divorced him in America and that she had remarried there. As a consequence. criminally and administratively liable. Although said provision only provides for divorce obtained abroad by the foreign spouse in a valid mixed marriage. Art. The proscription against the sale of property between spouses under Art. Felix. invoking par. Complementarily. Thus. the legislative intent would be rendered nugatory if this provision would not be applied to a situation where there is a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens. after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their support. The sale was regarded by the court as subversive of the stability of the family. This is so notwithstanding that. Q: Is there a need for a marriage license? A: Yes. Art. the Supreme Court nullified a sale made by a husband in favor of a concubine. a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. In an earlier ruling.. the marriage contracts were not filed w/ the local civil registrar. 26 par. they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. the proof by which it may be established is quite another. 104 Phil 1) Art. (Delgado Vda.not the formal requirement of evidentiary value. 2006) Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. 26 (the origin of which can be traced to Van Dorn v. Maria Ching. It was averred that the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. it was maintained that the two in fact married each other and lived as husband and wife for more than half a century and this was known by their relatives and friends. v. for being contrary to morals and public policy. The fact of marriage is one thing. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married.4 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee his other woman. Jr. (Loria v. GR No. if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be. Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage. is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. 139 SCRA 139) of the FC is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. its absence is not always proof that no marriage took place.

claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo. Cabasal. were married in the Philippines. they established their residence in the Philippines and begot 2 children. Still in the U. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. GR No. She obtained a final judgment of divorce. Dandan claims to be the surviving spouse of Arturo. both Filipinos. For instance. as well as the divorce decree obtained by him or her. To maintain that under our laws. They were not however blessed with children.5 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. The foreign law under which the divorce was obtained must likewise be proven as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. In 1972 Arturo died leaving no will.A. 08 October 1985) Q: Does Richard have the right to exercise control over conjugal assets despite the fact that his marriage with Alice was terminated by a divorce decree obtained abroad? 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: A: No. After the marriage. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be observed. she married for the third time. Q: Was there a valid divorce between Fe and Arturo? A: We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioners citizenship at the time of their divorce. 13. 139 SCRA 139) Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan... the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law. They were married in HongKong. Alice has to be considered still married to him and still subject to a wife's obligations under the NCC cannot be just. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alice’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. when thus severed as to one party. However.S. While it is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. Romillo. which was later replaced by Castillon. In 1983. the same being contrary to local law and public policy. the divorce in Nevada released Richard Upton from the marriage based on American law under w/c divorce dissolves the marriage. Divorce Decree Obtained Abroad Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a US citizen. Upton is no longer the husband of Alice. They were divorced in Nevada and Alice remarried. as her husband in any State of the Union. that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus re-marry. and to free them both from the bond. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction. the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife. It was also in the case of Quita v. 472 SCRA 114) NOTE: The naturalization of one of the parties. (Van Dorn v. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. However. Orbecido III. which may be recognized in the Philippines. ceases to bind either. The decree is binding on Alice as an American citizen. under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Once proven hat she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their . CA and Dandan where the court hinted by way of obiter dictum. only Phil. L-68470. (Republic v. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. intervened. The marriage tie. Eventually Fe sought for a divorce decree in U. Q: Is the divorce decree in Nevada recognizable here in the Philippines? A: Yes. Blandina and the Pad Ian children submitted certified photocopies of the private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Thus. A husband without a wife. (Van Dorn v. Later Ruperto Padlan. NCC. provided they are valid according to their national law. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the U. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. stating that her business in Ermita. to a certain Wernimont. Manila is conjugal property and asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of that business. pursuant to his national law.A.S. Romillo.S. Petitioner Fe Quita moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. and the surviving children of Arturo. is unknown to the law. The trial curt must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. In this case. which may be recognized in the Philippines. In this case. 16 of the NCC. or a wife without a husband. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. must be proven as a fact under our rules on Evidence. Alice cannot sue Richard. Upton filed a suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay. opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Upton should not continue to be one of her heirs w/ possible rights to conjugal property. Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Jr. and that Upton be declared as having the right to manage the conjugal property. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. provided they are valid according to their national law.

Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks. among others. Armida testified that indeed Brix was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. However. GR. (Quita v. particularly when she noticed calls from other women to him. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and AM No. Recio.a Filipina -. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution. was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12. After all. he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. No. his "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever the couple quarreled. had he duly presented it in court. we cannot conclude that respondent. as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 36. According to Fely. she was still a Filipino citizen. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. 48 of the FC.respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. . Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy.and Recio were married in Cabanatuan City." Afterwards.6 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee divorce. Shortly thereafter she requested Crasus to sign divorce papers but which the latter ignored. the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. on the ground of bigamy -. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson. While the two were still in Australia. 22 December 1998) Crasus and Fely Iyoy were married. it may turn out that under Australian law. Brix’s alleged mixed personality disorder. No. 1994. Petitioner Garcia then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the Philippine court. Family Inacapacity Code re: Psychological In her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage. Recio became an Australian citizen. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. epilepsy. In their application for a marriage license. a Filipino. Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Q: Is Brix psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations thus rendering their marriage void ab initio? A: No. 124862. 36 of the FC requires that the psychological incapacity must refer to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. who was then a naturalized Australian citizen. Consequently. Art. Armida alleged that her husband. appearance is not sufficient. however. 02 October 2001) Art. their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. and would become violent during bouts of the illness. 26 (2) of the FC cannot be applied to the case of Crasus and Fely because at the time that Fely obtained her divorce in the USA. (Republic v. Legal Capacity to Contract Marriage Recio. was married to Samson. sexual infidelity. is nonetheless recognized under EO No. a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond that one is about to assume and not a mere University of Santo Tomas . 02-1110-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages) which became effective on 15 March 2003. Significantly. Brix spent most of his time with his band mates and that he began to withdraw from her. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. The psychiatrist presented by Ma. Crasus L. in Malabon. purportedly dissolving the marriage. Iyoy. Art. she married an American citizen and acquired American citizenship." Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent. compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence (§24 and §25 of Rule 132) must be demonstrated. Petitioner Garcia-. did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce. She also alleged that Brix suffered from. Q: Is the divorce decree obtained by Fely valid? A: No. 138322. By its plain and literal interpretation. GR. 21 of the FC. the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. 470 SCRA 508) Note: The authority of the Solicitor General to intervene in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage. were not shown to be rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential marital obligations. would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent. respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. was issued by an Australian family court. a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Then a decree of divorce. Q: Is the respondent legally capacitated to marry the petitioner? A: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. Fely left for the USA. leaving behind Crasus and their five children. and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. an Australian citizen. after she secured a divorce decree. Ma. etc. Based on the above records. while not expressly conferred by Art. respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino. CA. (Garcia v. The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in Art. Petitioner.

Ferraris. 486 SCRA 177 ) Leonilo commenced a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Ivonne due to her supposed psychological incapacity. (Republic v. habitual alcoholism. including parenting. Leonilo alleged that the Ivonne lied to him about her personal circumstances. it was held that the alleged personality disorder amounting to psychological incapacity must have been characterized by: a) Gravity. the totality of the evidence presented by Norma was completely insufficient to sustain the finding that Eulogio was indeed psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of her incapacity was medically or 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: clinically identified and was shown as incurable. Such acts must be shown to be manifestations of a disordered personality within the contemplation of Art. maltreatment. attorney's fees and expenses of litigation plus costs. (Perez-Ferraris v. the trial court decreed the nullity of their marriage. and c) Incurability. Leonilo left her for good. the latter was already suffering from a psychological defect which deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage.. Her testimony failed to establish the fact that at the time of her marriage to Eulogio. inherent laziness and abandonment of family on her husband's part as the reason.” The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. but not necessarily with respect to all. b) Juridical antecedence. 484 SCRA 353 ) Psychological incapacity was defined by the Supreme Court as “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. much less its psychic meaning and the corresponding obligations to marriage." It is only relative. the findings of the physician are insufficient in establishing the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation correct? A: By declaring petitioner as psychologically . her incapacity was established as already existing prior to and at the time of the celebration of the marriage. NOTE: Significantly. Further. habitual alcoholism. since there is no such thing as "absolute psychological incapacity. There is no showing that Brix's so-called defects were already present at the inception of the marriage. CA and Molina. Reyes. in the sense that one may be incapacitated with respect to one partner. Q: Is Marie Ivonne psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage thus rendering their marriage void ab initio? A: Yes. extremely jealousy. may nonetheless remarry. A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond. 36 of the FC. The physicians’ conclusion was that Ivonne was indeed psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. Q: Is the trial court’s decision correct? A: No. or that those were incurable. 162368. CA. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitment. This is one of the guidelines in determining the propriety of a petition for nullity based on Art. The lies attributed to her indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth from fiction or at least abide by the truth. Trial court decreed the nullity of their marriage and further ordered Noel to pay Isabel moral as well as exemplary damages. its presentation would have helped Norma's petition for nullity. The evidence consisted solely of Norma's testimony. (Antonio v. (Antonio v. Reyes. (Santos v. Although Ma. Isabel. CA. Thereafter. Norma attributed immaturity. as well as the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal and the Roman Rota of the Vatican binding upon our courts? A: No. On account of these. This means that a person deemed psychologically incapacitated and whose marriage is thus dissolved on account thereof. et al. GR No. 240 SCRA 20. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines. 36 of the FC laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v. She even concealed from him the fact that she had previously given birth to an illegitimate child and exhibited extreme insecurities and fits of jealousy. are not controlling. While medical or clinical evidence is not a condition sine qua non in nullity cases. 17 July 2006) Norma sought the nullity of her marriage to Eulogio on the ground of his psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The totality of the evidence presented by Leonilo had sufficiently overcome the burden of proving psychological incapacity of the Ivonne. 484 SCRA 353 ) Q: Is the annulment of their marriage by the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila. the judgment of the Roman Rota of the Vatican appended a restrictive clause in its sentence of nullity prohibiting Ivonne from contracting another marriage without the tribunal's consent. 240 SCRA 20) Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. BUT should be given weight and respect by the courts. In Santos v.7 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: refusal to do so. In sum. etc. The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of Eulogio's immaturity. Armida presented a psychiatrist to bolster her case. Q: Is the award of moral and exemplary damages. Melgar. Norma alone testified in support of her petition.

The evidence adduced by David showed that Sharon had illicit relations with a number of men. and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages. In 1991. the marriage with Leticia was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. One such consequence or effect is the incurring of criminal liability for bigamy. not only of the civil marriage of the parties but also of the Church-sanctioned marriage which had joined them in the Holy Sacrament of matrimony. He eventually abandoned them and so she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of Hamano. Veronico invokes the defense that effects of the nullity of his marriage with Leticia retroacts to the date when it was contracted. CA. 454 SCRA 261) Lolita married a Japanese national. the crime of bigamy had already been consummated as the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the valid first marriage. CA. which should have been proved by specific evidence that it was done deliberately. 343 SCRA 755). Here. 423 SCRA 272) David and Sharon got married twice. (Republic v. in a church wedding. she did not adduce any other evidence to buttress her allegation of psychological incapacity. while as a rule there was no need for an actual medical examination. since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified. Quintero-Hamano. Verenico divulged to Leticia about his first marriage and that he was going back to his first wife. the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. Q: Is the CA correct in its declaration? A: No. it must be noted that the marriage is not without legal consequences or effects. Finally. the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. On account of abandonment. Although his act of abandonment was doubtless irresponsible. (Buenaventura v. She failed in this regard. although the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified. The totality of the evidence presented by the wife fell far short of the proof required to establish psychological incapacity of her husband. Except for her testimony. the first in a civil wedding and the second. 36 of the FC. Juridical Antecedence & Incurability) do not apply in this case because their marriage is a mixed one. The sole evidence presented by her is her testimony. as soon as the second marriage to Leticia was celebrated. Veronico married Hilda.8 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee incapacitated. there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Four years later. 428 SCRA 735) Court of Appeals held that the three requirements (Gravity. that of the existence of a valid previous marriage. Quintero-Hamano. v. temperate. hence. there was no allegation that it was due to a psychological illness. Article 349 of the RPC penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous valid marriage. care for and support the family. liquidated or compensatory damages. Hamano. immaturity and irresponsible behavior of his wife. CA and Molina earlier mandated in Santos v. Q: Will her action prosper? A: No. this time to Leticia with whom he then lived. University of Santo Tomas . Thereafter. this time with Nilda. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person alleged to have psychological incapacity. The psychiatrist presented by the David testified that the wife suffered from an anti-social personality disorder which amounted to psychological incapacity on her part. the possibility of awarding moral damages was negated. he married a second time. Courts should not be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. NOTE: Although the judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the parties is concerned. Hamano failed in his duty to live with. The appellate court's holding that the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the case a “mixed marriage” is erroneous. alleged sexual infidelity. CA incorporate three basic requirements. The trial court granted the prayer for nullity and issued the corresponding decree of nullity. Hamano being a Japanese national and Lolita being a Filipino citizen. Marcos. After the marriage celebration. To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory the State's penal laws on bigamy as it would allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner. Thus. In proving psychological incapacity. Hilda. Veronico married a third time. Q: Is Veronico correct in invoking the nullity of his marriage with Leticia as his defense in the bigamy case? A: No. (Tenebro v. the petition would have been helped by evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness and this could have consisted of the testimony of an expert witness. Leticia learned about this and commenced a criminal case for bigamy against Veronico. 2) juridical antecedence." As long as the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. David filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. Hence. as the grant of moral damages was not proper. then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to (Marcos v. She left him for a foreigner. it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral. namely: 1) gravity. Thus. he is not guilty of bigamy for want of an essential element. (Republic v. 428 SCRA 735) NOTE: The guidelines in Rep. and 3) incurability.

343 SCRA 755). Tan. her abandonment. The authority to do so in this case is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. for purposes of remarriage. whom he had not seen in more than twenty years. CA (1995). She now charges Eduardo with bigamy. the crime had already been consummated (Mercado v. (Dedel v. 356 SCRAS 425). which is lacking in the case at bar. Lucio married his first wife without a marriage ceremony taking place. hence. Tan). Eduardo remarried. Bigamy is consummated when a person marries another during the subsistence of a previous valid marriage. there must first be a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. CA. v. In other words. 349 of the RPC. Such a judicial declaration would have established good faith on his part. Upon being charged with bigamy. Q: Is Salvador’s contention that an action for declaration of nullity a prejudicial question to a charge of bigamy? A: No. Charged with bigamy. it is not a prejudicial question. he is not liable for bigamy. What transpired was the mere signing of the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. by the latter. the Supreme Court said that the disorder should refer to no less than a mental (not) physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties. (Manuel v. 356 SCRA 425). it is ipso facto void without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. It must also be shown that her promiscuity existed prior to or at the inception of the marriage. Vitug: The general rule is that if the marriage is void ab initio. the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner are grounds for legal separation (Marcos v. The exception is found in Art. he or she runs the risk of being charged with bigamy as the marital bond or vinculum in the first nuptial subsists (Mercado v. CA). before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of the first marriage. There was no showing that these acts were manifestations of a disordered personality which made her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations (Hernandez v. Q: Will this make him liable for bigamy? A: Yes. he raised the defense that he had obtained a decree of nullity of his first marriage when he entered into the second marriage. GR No. 41 of the FC. At best. If a party fails to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage. People of the Philippines. Te v. and his lack of criminal intent therefore negated any criminal liability on his part. One of the elements of bigamy is the subsistence of a previous valid marriage. Lucio remarried although the first marriage was nullified on the ground of lack of marriage ceremony only after the celebration of his second marriage. 40 of the FC. He was then divorced by his wife in Canada. he is not liable for bigamy. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Salvador contracted a second marriage. Bigamy On the belief that his first wife. The trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of the parties. the nullity of the first marriage must first be decreed in a final judgment. Moreover.9 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Q: Was the trial court correct in declaring the marriage as null and void? A: No. (Abunado v. Eduardo should have adduced a decree of presumptive death of his first wife. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he contracted the second marriage. People of the Philippines. the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity. Eduardo is liable for bigamy. could have given a valid assumption thereof (Rep. Eduardo did not secure a decree of presumptive death relative to his first wife before he remarried. 426 SCRA 562) NOTE: Under Art. 2005) During the subsistence of his first marriage. Justice Jose C. Q: Is Lucio liable for bigamy? A: No. was already dead. 320 SCRA 76). Lucio invokes good faith in contracting the second marriage. the wife's sexual infidelity does not amount to a mental or psychological illness such that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming. CA. 4 of the FC. Marcos. Dagdag. 29 Nov. In this case. 421 SCRA 461) Q: May the trial court dissolve their second marriage which was Church-sanctioned? A: No. A falling out between him and his second wife led to the discovery. Eduardo invokes good faith. (Dedel v. 165842. this renders their marriage as void ab initio pursuant to Art. CA. In this case. hence the second marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the previous one. Moreover. CA). in relation to Art. of her husband's first marriage. FC. In Santos v. 421 SCRA 461) Article 40. Since Lucio’s first marriage was only done by their signing a marriage contract. he argued that the action for annulment or declaration of nullity of his marriage was a prejudicial question to the charge of bigamy. . two formal elements of marriage are absent namely: a solemnizing officer and a marriage ceremony. as required by Art. Pesca. 40 of the FC wherein. immaturity and irresponsible behavior cannot be equated with psychological incapacity (Pesca v. unfortunately in this case there is no showing that it existed prior to the marriage as required. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of the petitioner's first marriage has no bearing to the determination of his innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy since all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time that the second marriage was contracted (Te v. or knowing them.

In Art. Q: Was the trial court correct in granting Nolasco’s action for the declaration of presumptive death of Janet? A: No. it must be distinguished therefrom. De Bailon. no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage contracted under Art. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. the Social Security Commission issued an order decreeing the nullity of the second marriage of the decedent for being bigamous. FC *The declaration of presumptive death under Art. According to this daughter. if the disappearance occurred where there is a danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Art. Nolasco. Trial court granted the petition. 41 is necessary. there is no showing that Nolasco conducted a search for his missing wife w/ such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. That the absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years. claiming that all his efforts to look for her proved fruitless. That the spouse present wishes to remarry 3. During one of the calls of his ship to England. it appeared that the first wife was still alive and that the decedent had supposedly secured the decree of presumptive death through fraud. While working overseas. That the spouse present has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead. Janet went with him in returning home to San Jose. it found that the decedent had secured a decree of presumptive death of his first wife for being absent for fifteen years. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid or ostensibly valid marriage and thus needs no judicial declaration of nullity. and this was to Teresita. 42 of the FC. Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet had already given birth to his son and that she left after giving birth. The law does not give the SSC discretion to trifle with the orders of regular courts in the exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS. De Bailon. This is so because in such a case. 220 SCRA 20) Teresita filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS when her husband died. there was at least a first marriage which appeared to have been entered into. In interfering with and passing upon the CFI decree. People of the Philippines. Tan (337 SCRA 122). he met Janet Monica Parker. 41. even if it is void. 5 years after the disappearance of Janet. (SSS v. Art. FC is available only for the purpose of remarriage. De University of Santo Tomas . 42 does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. In Mercado. Nolasco then married Janet. even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage. and henceforth withdrew the pension that it had earlier granted to the respondent. The four requisites not having concurred. 485 SCRA 376) Q: Does the mere reappearance of the absent spouse terminate the subsequent marriage? A: No. Articles 41 and 42. a British subject. will not terminate such marriage. such absentee's mere reappearance. leaving his pregnant wife with his parents. but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage. If the absentee reappears. but twice: first before a judge. the SSC acted as an appellate court. Also. (SSS v. When the SSS investigated the matter. However. such that a person can be charged and convicted of bigamy if he contracts a subsequent marriage without first securing a declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 2. or 2 consecutive yrs. and the second before a priest in religious rites. 391. it is a legal impediment to marry. either by affidavit or by court action. FC Declaration of Presumptive Death. He then married a second time. On the basis of its findings. much less reverse decisions rendered by regular courts of law as it did in this case. he obtained another employment contract as a seaman. it cannot review. This was granted by the SSS but later had it withdrawn when an alleged daughter of the deceased wrote the SSS to protest the release of the death benefits to the Teresita. Although the SSC is empowered to settle disputes involving claims under said law. 41 of the FC? A: No. (Morigo v. there is no marriage to speak of. 422 SCRA 376) NOTE: While this case is analogous to Mercado v. a petition to declare an absent spouse presumptively dead may not be granted in the absence of any allegation that the spouse present will remarry. 485 SCRA 376) Q: Is a judicial proceeding required to annul the subsequent marriage contracted under Art. Jarque Vda. In this case. 41. When Nolasco's contract expired. his action for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife should be denied. 41 of the FC. 41: 1. the deceased contracted three marriages during his lifetime and that she is the product of decedent's third union. the first marriage in said case was in fact solemnized not once. Q: Does the SSC have the authority to issue an order decreeing the nullity of the second marriage for being bigamous? A: No. There are 4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Art. the termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided for in Art. Jarque Vda. What Art. Ostensibly therefore. After the marriage. 4.10 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee In this case. Gregorio Nolasco was a seaman. (Republic v. However. Antique. Also. albeit later declared void ab initio. 40 of the Family Code contemplates as a void marriage which must first be judicially nullified before a party can remarry is one which must exist although it is void. the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage had been celebrated. Jarque Vda. Nolasco filed an action for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet under Art. (SSS v.

83 of the CC. the courts can take cognizance thereof. Buccat. 85. FC] Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud. 1827) Lucita left the conjugal dwelling and filed a petition for legal separation due to the physical violence. NOTE: The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to the 3 cases therein may be deduced from the fact that. the child was born less than 3 months after the celebration of the marriage. a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances therein. His sole testimony is his basis as RC refuses to participate in the case. since she is not being charged of any crime. the husband.G. FC] JJ. the husband was guilty of commission of the same offense by living with another woman. 85. Canizares. The presumption is in favor of potency. 72 Phil 19) Aurora prayed for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on the ground of fraud in obtaining her consent after having learned that several months prior to their marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead. for anyway. A physical examination in this case is not self. 485 SCRA 376) Q: Is Teresita the rightful claimant to the SSS benefits? A: Yes. Q: May their marriage be annulled solely on the basis of JJ’s testimony as to RC’s supposed incapacity? A: No. as found by the CFI. 36 SCRA 97) Legal Separation In an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery filed by the husband.11 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Bailon. she is the rightful claimant to the SSS benefits. This judicial declaration was not even a requirement for purposes of remarriage under the Civil Code. It bears noting that the marriage under any of the exceptional circumstances therein is deemed valid unless declared void by a competent court. such presumption continues in spite of the spouse's physical reappearance. her husband. the marriage cannot be annulled. De Bailon. 85.incriminating. Teresita enjoys the presumption of validity of her marriage to the decedent. filed a complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of physical incapacity of his wife. as vice of consent. RC. because actions seeking a decree of legal separation or annulment of marriage. threats. that is. he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in Art. Jarque Vda. William denied heaping the abuses alleged by the wife and that her real motive in filing the petition is that so she would gain control of the . In the case at bar. Congress would have stopped at Art. fraud in general is already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record. Also. comes under Art. hence. (Anaya v. Here. which may be a cause for its annulment. her genitals being too small for penetration. (Jimenez v. RC should submit to a physical examination. This fraud. even though the defendant wife did not interpose the defense of prescription. Palaroan. No. Q: Is the concealment by the husband of a premarital relationship with another woman a ground for annulment of marriage? A: No. nevertheless. In this case. 86. of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Art. and by fiction of law. The sole testimony of the husband as to the incapacity of his wife is not sufficient basis for annulment. 4 of the NCC. The non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman is not a ground for annulment of marriage. (SSS v. 54 O. According to her the "non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret" constituted fraud in obtaining her consent w/in the contemplation of no. the first wife had been absent for fifteen years and thus it granted the decree of presumptive death which was sought by the decedent. (Brown v. Hence. NOTE: Under Art. fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise. intimidation and grossly abusive conduct she had suffered at the hands of Wiliam. 45 and 46. when the husband at the time of the marriage knew that the wife was pregnant. (Buccat V. 85. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage. This is an exception to the Rules of Court provision that defenses not raised in the pleadings will not be considered since provisions on marriage are substantive in nature. 45 (5). Fernando had premarital relationship with a close relative of his. Yambao. Supreme Court refused to annul the marriage for the reason that the woman was at an advance stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage and such condition must have been 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: patent to the husband. 4 of Art. for copulation. 485 SCRA 376) Physical Incapacity as ground for annulment of marriage [Art. NCC. 109 Phil 273) Annulment of Marriage on the Ground of Fraud [Art. involve public interest.

Lorenza. A wife. 124 of the FC. 578). following Art. 353 Phil. 23 Oct. would have applied if there was a finding of lack of the wife's consent. and not void. Being personal in character. (2) by providing that the spouses can. The settled rule is that the sale or encumbrance of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife (Guiang vs CA. does not persuade. it was denied by the Register of Deeds on account of lack of the wife's consent to the sale. without the wife's consent. these rights do not come into existence as a result of the death of a party. 459 SCRA 475) NOTE: In this case. (Arroyo v. he claims that since it was Lucita who had left the conjugal abode. Even if property rights are involved. with the conjugal property as security therein. Art. Upon failure to redeem. Such act does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The loan was thereafter obtained. Q: Should Legal Separation be denied on the basis of William’s claim of Mutual Guilt? A: No. Eufemio. The wife then sought to nullify the mortgage and sale as void invoking Art. However. 453 SCRA 283) David conveyed to Melki. Because of such. Francisco and Erminda’s marriage was nullified by the trial court due Francisco’s psychological incapacity. Supreme Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale or encumbrance null and void.a. Q: Will the wife’s action prosper? A: Yes. Arroyo. Dailo. (Pelayo v. the ownership to the property was consolidated under the name of the mortgagee Homeowners Savings. by their reconciliation. Q: Was the Register of Deeds correct in denying registration of the sale? A: No. all of which were acquired due to his efforts. stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already granted. the mortgage on the property was foreclosed and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of the winning bidder. Since this is so. the courts can impose economic sanctions or such unjustified departure from the conjugal dwelling. 153206. Also under the Rules of court. When the loan was not satisfied. is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. executed a special power of attorney in favor of a third person in order to secure a loan with the use of a conjugal property as security. then the decree of legal separation should not be granted. The consent need not always be explicit or set forth in any particular document so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was in fact given. He did not contest the decree of nullity but he assailed the division in the properties between the spouses which was contained in the decree. In this case. But the great weight of authorities. 42 Phil 54) The courts can make a judicial declaration of abandonment without sufficient justification but it cannot compel cohabitation. a piece of land that he and his wife owned.56 (4) of the FC which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. Under said provisions. 124 of the FC. Art. an action for legal separation or annulment of marriage is not one which survives the death of spouse. 43 SCRA 177) Cohabitation Defendant is under obligation both moral and legal. because these rights are mere effects of the decree of legal separation. including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. NOTE: Neither would the conjugal partnership be liable for the loan on the ground that it redounded to the benefit of the family. 2006) Q: What is the effect of the death of plaintiffspouse before a decree of legal separation? A: The death of plaintiff before a decree of legal separation abates such action. When the buyer sought to register the sale. by way of a deed of absolute sale. being rights in expectation. there is no mutual guilt between them as there is only one erring spouse. the sale would have been merely voidable. however. NOTE: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than bed-and board separation of the spouses is purely personal. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct. it will be noted that the sale was entered into prior to the effectivity of the FC. He asserted that the properties were University of Santo Tomas . by affixing her signature to a deed of sale on the space provided for witnesses. it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona. 56 (4) of the FC does not apply since the abandonment that is a ground for legal separation is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.k. William Ong v. GR No. Moreover. however signed on the page reserved for witnesses to the deed. is strongly convincing that it is not within the province of the courts to compel anyone of the spouses to cohabit with and render conjugal rights to the other. 42 SCRA 54) Marital Property Relations The husband. CA. The Civil Code recognizes this (1) by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation. without however adducing adequate proof. (Arroyo v.12 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee numerous properties that the couple had acquired during the marriage. consortium being a purely personal right. David’s wife. Vasque. 166 of the Civil Code. Perez. The sweeping conclusion that the loan was obtained by the husband in order to finance the construction of housing units. (Ong Eng Kiam a. to return to the common home and cohabit with plaintiff. In applying Art. in relation to Art. (Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. 173. who witnessed the sale. (Lapuz v.

Erminda is rightfully entitled to a joint share in their properties. Under this article. CA. unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. 160 of the NCC. Here. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition thereof shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if his or her efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. 144 of the Civil Code. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature in the absence of strong. and not an acknowledgment. according to her. NOTE: In this case. NOTE: The fact that the document contains a jurat. The use of the jurat. there is a presumption that the properties which they acquired during their cohabitation were acquired through their joint efforts. should not affect its genuineness or that of the related document of conveyance itself. all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Inc. (Go v. instead of an acknowledgment. In this regime. 478 SCRA 327) Through an absolute deed of sale. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: Is the property conjugal or paraphernal? A: Conjugal. Neither did she present any witness to prove that they first occupied the property during their marriage and that they both. However. The property relation between the parties is governed by Art. CA. his late wife. Q: Is the conveyance valid? A: It depends. However. She now asserts that since her marriage to Eduardo is void. Although the titles to the lots were issued in the names of the spouses. Josefina. and then appended to the deed of sale itself. she did not prove that she acquired the properties using her personal funds and prior to . This was granted. Dolores alleges that she and her husband. a jurat suffices as the document only embodies the manifestation of the spouse's consent. In this instance. she should not be entitled to a joint share in their properties. Under Art. This document was then sworn to before the same notary public who notarized the deed of sale. acquired a piece of agricultural land. does not elevate the Marital Consent into the level of a public document but instead consigns it to the status of a private writing hence it is still subject to proof under rules of evidence. hence. their property relations is to be governed by the rules on co-ownership under Art. spouses Josehine and Henry were the successful bidders. The wife then filed an action for nullity of the sale. 147 of the FC. the presumption that it is conjugal property stands. the dorsal portions thereof contained an entry showing that Eduardo had waived any right over the properties as they were bought out of the savings of Josefina. the Deed of Absolute Sale. Anno. Q: Is Francisco’s contention correct? A: No. 480 SCRA 419) Eduardo’s spouse. The rule is all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. In this case.13 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: acquired through his efforts and that Erminda had no contribution whatsoever in their acquisition and maintenance. At the auction. a mere appendage to the main document. Francisco himself testified that his wife was not a plain housewife but one who helped him in managing the family's business. It appeared that the wife signed a document entitled "Marital Consent" contained in a jurat days before the sale giving her assent to the conveyance. (Gonzales v. the husband sold a piece of land belonging to the conjugal partnership to a third person. there was no proof that the property had been acquired exclusively by Yamane's late wife. The lots were eventually levied upon when a complaint for a sum of money was filed against Eduardo and prospered. 489 SCRA 107) During their marriage. (Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co. worked on the land. her own funds. Hence.. She avers that her husband conveyed this property to Patenio without her consent. Q: Is the piece of agricultural land part of their conjugal properties? A: No. (Pintiano-Anno v. Albert. She did not identify when she and her husband first occupied and possessed the land. Eduardo has no share at all in the properties since no proof was adduced by him as regards his participation in their purchase. 482 SCRA 164) A piece of land which Yamane asserted belonged to the conjugal partnership of him and his late wife was levied upon by the sheriff as a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by the lawyer of Yamane's departed wife. The purchase took place prior to the advent of the Family Code. the party who invokes it must first prove that it was acquired during the marriage. Even though Josefina had filed a thirdparty claim with the sheriff. clear and convincing evidence that it was acquired using the exclusive funds of said spouse. The trial court acted apparently on the belief that the property was the paraphernal property of Yamane's wife since the appearance of his (Yamane) name on the title was deemed to be merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. work or industry. Gonzales. purchased two parcels of land using. 148 of the FC and not by Art. In this case the provisions of the Civil Code would apply for the purchase took place before the FC took effect. She now seeks its recovery on the ground that it formed part of their conjugal properties and presented as evidence their marriage contract and the initial tax declaration over the property. the properties were sold at auction. v. She also commenced a petition for nullity of her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a previous marriage. Hence. Dolores's evidence consisted of her marriage contract and the initial tax declaration over the property. for this presumption to apply.

and maltreatment by Helmut of Elena. Juliet managed the store after her return from working abroad. Rizal. no complaint involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon shall be instituted or filed directly in court for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties and no settlement was reached. GR No. in the absence of proof to the contrary. drinking. When the two had a serious falling out. NOTE: Art. John demanded that she vacate the structure housing the store but which she ignored. CA. Register of Deeds. are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain under Sec. which provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before it took effect. (In re: Petition for Separation of Property. got married to Helmut. Thus. Their property relationship in such a case is essentially governed by the rules on coownership. during which time. He used the proceeds of the sale in purchasing a piece of land in Antipolo. for instance. they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 146294. wherein John agreed to leave the house subject to payment by Juliet of his entire share in their properties. applies in this case. Further. it should be presumed and considered as belonging to the conjugal partnership. Q: Is there a violation of Art. no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. 412 (a) of Rep. As a co-owner. Under Art. Thus. John cannot seek the ejectment of Juliet therefrom. Since Josefina failed to prove that she acquired the properties with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo. (Abing v. a Filipina. She failed to pay all of John's share in their properties. to allow reimbursement would in effect permit Helmut to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. There was no evidence adduced by Josefina showing that she had acquired a vested right in this regard. Save for hereditary succession. The house was later renovated and a sari-sari store was put up as annex thereat. 149615. Helmut inherited his parents' house and had it sold. University of Santo Tomas . the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Rodolfo also pointed out that the dispute had not been referred to the barangay before the complaint was filed. John sued her for ejectment which the court granted. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws. whether individuals or corporations. The marriage of the spouses however deteriorated due to incompatibility and the womanizing. Rizal (the title to which was placed in the name of Elena) and in constructing a house thereon. There was in fact substantial compliance with Art. that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement among the parties had been exerted but that none was reached. 148 of the FC does not apply since. 79 Phil. Zone 8. Q: Was the court correct in granting the same? A: No. Hence. 451 SCRA 494) John and Juliet lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. XII of the Constitution. as it appears that the properties were acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Josefina and Eduardo. Thus. one party has a pre-existing valid marriage. property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. in said article. 7160. Q: Is her contention correct? A: No. the property is co-owned by the parties. Helmut Muller. Under said provision. It bears stressing that under Sec. The couple eventually decided to relocate to the Philippines. XII of the Constitution. Art. Tondo. 151 of the FC? A: No. Manila xxx". 147 of the FC. 151 of the Family Code since the spouses alleged in the complaint for ejectment that the case "xxx passed through the Barangay and no settlement was forged between the plaintiffs and defendant as a result of which Certification to File Action was issued by Barangay 97. any property acquired by common-law spouses during their cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. the couple acquired a two-story residential house. Helmut himself was well aware of this constitutional prohibition when he had the title to the Antipolo property placed under Elena's name. provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money. The primary purpose of this constitutional proscription is the conservation of the national patrimony (Krivenko v. Said complaint was filed after a demand letter to vacate from the said spouses was rebuffed by Rodolfo. she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as him. 2006) Family Members in Articles 150 and 151 of FC Spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez filed a complaint for ejectment against Rodolfo. brother of Manolo. Master Iron Works Construction Corp. 461). 105 of the FC. Art. they executed a memorandum of agreement. Elena Buenaventura Muller v. District I. Q: Was the court correct in holding so? A: Yes. Helmut's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. (Francisco v. 29 Aug. a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where. Aliens. The latter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent. During their cohabitation. a German national and the two then lived in Germany in the house of Helmut's parents. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed for where the purchase is made in violation of a law and in evasion of its express provision. 7.. 7. which is. Art.14 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee her cohabitation with Eduardo. Helmut then filed in court a petition for separation of properties which was granted. GR No. Act No. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement from Elena of the funds that he used in buying the lot and constructing the house considering that the land was purchased in violation of Sec. 31 July 2006) Elena. under normal circumstances. Partition was henceforth ordered but the court held that with respect to the property in Antipolo.

Q: Was the SSS correct in withdrawing the death benefits? A: No. (Martinez. As a result. The property was subsequently sold at a public auction. who was born in 1991. Art. she should therefore have presented evidence of her adoption in view of the contents of her birth certificate. Since the birth certificate was not signed by Aleli's alleged parents but was merely signed by the attending physician. Under prevailing jurisprudence. trial court failed to see that in said birth certificate. 1988. and contains as well the word "married" to reflect the union between the two. Pablo. opposed the petition and questioned the legitimate filiation of Aleli to the decedent. and in the proper cases under Art. (Gomez-Salcedo. Pablo affixed his signature and he did not impugn Jeylynn’s legitimacy during his lifetime. (SSS v. and this is the birth certificate where he affixed his signature. 151 must be strictly construed. Belen. there is adequate evidence to show that the child was in fact his child. or attachment except for. she was listed therein as “adopted”. The SSS granted her claim but this was withdrawn after investigation.. Being an exception to the general rule. Sta. under Section 23.15 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Moreover. In this case. a complaint for damages was filed against her. Martinez. although a public record of a private document is. 36 SCRA 104). Under Art. in order to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition. forced sale. et al. Heirs of Romulado Villanueva. as surviving spouse. 141501. Belen asserted that the birth certificate of Aleli was not signed by Francisco and that she had not presented the marriage contract between her alleged parents which would have supported her claim. et al. Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. v. Ines. It is wellsettled that a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. 165546. a house and lot that she owned was levied upon to satisfy the damages awarded. 27 February 2006) In a petition for issuance of letters of administration. Q: Was the trial court correct in dismissing the action for partition? A: No. there is no showing that she undertook such. She indicated in her claim that the decedent is also survived by their minor child. et al. GR No. (Gayon v. 155 of the FC. the phrase "members of the same family" found in Art. Gayon. there is no showing that the house and lot was constituted as a family home. filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS upon the death of her husband. since she was listed therein as “adopted”. NOTE: A sister-in-law or a brother-in-law is not covered by these two provisions. who certified to having attended to the birth of a child. among other things. In said birth certificate. In this case. A birth certificate. Jeylynn. which is. However. the trial court dismissed it on the ground that the respondent. the action to impugn would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. to the exclusion of petitioners. the debts were incurred before the constitution of the family home. This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access under Art. when a sister of the decedent informed the system that Pablo could not have sired a child during his lifetime because he was infertile. 473 SCRA 25) Paternity and Filiation In an action for partition of estate.. it was not signed by Francisco and Genoveva. Aguas. which prospered. it is deemed constituted as such by operation of law only upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3. of the FC. Hinahon is now assailing the levy and sale of the property on the ground that the same was her family home and therefore exempt from execution. GR No. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. et al. it was indicated that her birth was recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. at the time that the debtor incurred her debts. the family home shall be exempt from execution. was in fact the illegitimate child of the deceased and therefore the latter's sole heir. the fact of birth of a child. 461 SCRA 562) The Family Home Hinahon incurred debts arising from her failure to account for the produce of a piece of agricultural land which she was tasked to manage. on the basis of her birth certificate. or by the mother alone if the father . there is no showing that Pablo. However. (Rivera. such a certificate. who has the right to impugn the legitimacy of Jeylynn. 170. and subsequently. Q: Is the property exempt from execution? A: No. 164 of the FC. 21 July 2006) 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Rosanna. Q: Does the presumption of legitimacy apply to Aleli? A: No. The trial court erred in relying upon the said birth certificate in pronouncing the filiation of the respondent. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. 151 of the Family Code must be construed in relation to Art. Furthermore. Aleli alleged that she is the sole legitimate daughter of decedent. evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution. whether judicially or extra-judicially. must be signed by the father and mother jointly. Under Art. However. However in Jeylynn’s birth certificate. children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. In the case at bar. v. thus. v. 171. 150 thereof. It was merely signed by the attending physician. challenged her status during his lifetime. et al. the decedent's second wife. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. upon the expiration of the periods for impugning legitimacy under Art. 166. Further.

Fe alleged that Arnel is the biological father of Martin and that he had signed the birth certificate of the child as the latter's father. in itself. held that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with the plaintiff-minor's mother. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth. such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. or in any authentic writing is. CA. (Cabatania v. then there is rebuttable presumption of paternity. Furthermore. 138). A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. (Eceta v. As proof. Q: Was the trial court correct in holding such? A: No. (Angeles v. a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child. DNA testing that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of nonpaternity. This only shows the very high standard of proof that a child must present in order to establish filiation. so much more so may a party in a civil case. Q: Is the proof presented by Ma. CA. 460 SCRA 315) NOTE: It is not enough to state that the child's DNA profile matches that of the putative father. Thereafter. and no further court action is required. In this age of genetic profiling and DNA analysis. Thus. A complete match between the child's and alleged father's DNA profiles does not necessarily establish paternity. can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified therein but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity (Macadangdang v. 350 Phil. The rule is. Eceta. 15 June 2005) On the basis of the physical presentation of the plaintiff-minor before it and the fact that the alleged father had admitted having sexual intercourse with the child's mother. 100 SCRA 73). the trial court. 460 SCRA 315) Q: Did the order of the court convert the claim for support into a petition for recognition? A: No. DNA testing and its results is now acceptable as object evidence without running afoul self-incrimination rights of a person. Q: Can DNA testing be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating Arnel's constitutional right to privacy against self-incrimination? A: Yes. CA. CA. Fe Angela moved for an order from the trial court directing the parties to submit themselves to DNA testing. any authentic writing is treated not just as a ground for compulsory recognition. In Tayag v. it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Angeles-Maglaya. and therefore entitled to a share in the estate left behind by the latter. If the value of W is less than 99. Ma. an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing. the Supreme Court held that the Ma. (Agustin v.. it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizure and in the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. in a criminal case. a statement before a court of record. the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before courts of law. Alba. et al. the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. Estate of Juan Dizon. while considered a public document. 469 SCRA 363) Arnel was named as defendant in an action for support that was filed by Fe Angela. the presumption of legitimacy under the law did not therefore arise in her favor. GR No. (Agustin v. Theresa was able to establish that Vicente was in fact her father. certificates issued by the local civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same (Jison v. Citing the earlier case of De Jesus v. she presented her birth certificate which Vicente himself signed thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. If the value of W is 99. (366 SCRA 499). CA. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 665). In People v. Yatar (428 SCRA 504). Trial courts should require at least 99. in an action to prove filiation with support.9%. 441 SCRA 96) In a complaint for partition and accounting with damages. be likewise compelled. the Supreme Court allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one's inheritance. Similarly. (Herrera v. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards. It is therefore not a competent piece of evidence on paternity.9% or higher. But even if the order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support. Theresa sufficient to prove her claim that she is an illegitimate child of Vicente? A: Yes. the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to the action for support. the Supreme Court had already upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. If. Moreover. a baptismal certificate. There having been no convincing proof of respondent's supposed legitimate relations with respect to the decedent. University of Santo Tomas . NOTE: The birth certificate that was presented by the plaintiff-minor appears to have been prepared without the knowledge or consent of the putative father. The assailed order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed Fe Angela to prove their cause of action.16 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee refuses. The local civil registrar in this case has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.9% as a minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity suit. a will. 428 SCRA 782) Gerardo filed a complaint for bigamy against Ma. Arnel however asserted that his signature was a forgery. Theresa alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Vicente. representing her minor son Martin Jose. 148220. who does not face such dire consequences. Arnel's case involves neither.

thus necessitating the dismissal of her petition for adoption. Amelia. to use. 8552. Theresa had a previous subsisting marriage when she married him. the children were left to the care of their paternal grandmother. The minors gave their written consent to the adoption and so did all of her own grown-up children. who went to Italy. (Concepcion v." which is her mother's surname and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig. This is so under Sec. then the corresponding change of name of the child must be undertaken in an appropriate separate proceeding. Q: Was the trial court correct in granting the decree of adoption? A: No. but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. the admission of the parties that the child was their son was in the nature of a compromise. CA. 468 SCRA 438) Adoption Diwata filed a petition for adoption of the three minor children of her late brother. the intention of the law to lean towards the legitimacy of children. The rule is. However. As she had become a legitimate child on account of her adoption. Moreover. CA. This grandmother died however." which is his surname. it follows that Stephanie is entitled to utilize the surname of her father. NOTE: The Supreme Court. alleging that Stephanie's mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. In this case. in granting the petition. Theresa was void and non-existent. Theresa and her first husband. Act No. the child must bear their surnames. This proscription is in consonance with. 493 SCRA 415) Honorato filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie. 167 of the Family Code.an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate . The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child. (Concepcion v. The name of an individual has two parts the given name or proper name and the surname of family name. Republic. The trial court nullified their marriage and declared that the son who was born during their marriage and was registered as their son as illegitimate. Diwata failed in this respect. should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The trial court denied.is the very declaration that is proscribed by Art. adoption statutes must be liberally construed in order to give spirit to their humane and salutary purpose which is to uplift the lives of unfortunate. Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father. An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind. that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname. This is so because the child's best interest should be the primordial consideration in this case. including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother. the discretion to approve adoption proceedings on the part of the courts should not to be anchored solely on those principles. Act No. the child should be regarded as a legitimate child out of the first marriage. needy or orphaned children. 468 SCRA 438) Q: Considering the child’s status. Gemma Garcia. (In the Matter of the Adoption . The rule is that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. predicated its ruling upon the statutory principle that adoption statutes. Manuel. her consent should have been secured instead in view of the absence of the biological mother. whereas that between Gerardo and Ma. 176 of the FC. and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent He prayed that Stephanie's middle name be changed from "Astorga" to "Garcia. The Civil Code (Arts. the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and vested in the adoptive parents. 364 to 380) is silent as to the use of a middle name. and so she filed the petition for adoption. being humane and salutary. Indeed. Since he was registered as the son of Gerardo and Ma. 468 SCRA 438) Q: What is the effect of Ma. Q: What is the status of the child? A: The first marriage being found to be valid and subsisting.17 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Theresa. whose surname should he bear? A: Being the legitimate son of Ma. (Concepcion v. since the minors' paternal grandmother had taken custody of them. The trial court granted the decree of adoption even though the written consent of the biological mother of the children was not adduced by Diwata. She alleged that when her brother died. among others. Honorato Catindig. Q: Was the trial court correct in denying Honorato’s request for Stephanie’s use of her mother’s surname as her middle name? A: No. as middle name her mother's surname. and that of her mother. but also as an act which endows a child with legitimate status. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation. Even Art. as amended by Rep. like Stepnanie. This declaration . 9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. 164 of the FC is clear that a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. Art. 9 (b) of Rep. CA. Theresa’s claim that the child is her illegitimate child with her second husband to the status of the child? A: None. the High Court found no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. Theresa. (Landingin v. He alleged that Ma. but with 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: due regard likewise to the natural rights of the parents over the child. otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.

in behalf of her minor children. “Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support. their alleged father. This provision reads that "[W]hen the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter. et al. the daughters. GR No.. However. the mother of the girls had made the requisite demand for material support although this was not in the standard form of a formal written demand." The resulting juridical relationship between the Edward and Noel is a quasi-contract. The supplication for custody was based on the alleged immorality of the mother who. Q: Was the trial court correcting in denying Crisanto’s prayer for temporary custody? A: Yes. Q: Is Edward’s contention correct? A: No. awarded custody of the child in favor of the mother. the husband asserted. he should be given joint custody over their son. 213. and Francisco. then Francisco. NOTE: The second option in Art. the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the errant spouse from exercising proper parental care. The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. 207 of the FC. par (2) of the FC.. 199 of the FC. parental authority over an illegitimate child is vested solely in the mother. (Lacson v. citing Art. Gualberto.to deprive the wife of custody. instituted a petition for declaration of legitimacy and support against Federico. 494 SCRA 1) The petition for declaration of nullity filed by Crisanto against his wife included a prayer for custody pendente Lite of their four-year old son. an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another. 2006) Belen. The mother of the girls. Loreta. et al. Edward could not possibly expect his daughters to demand support from him considering their tender years at the time that he abandoned them. (Mangonon. judicial or extra-judicial. 28 Aug. There appears to be no dispute that the children are indeed the daughters of Federico by Belen. Edward now assails the grant of the support in arrears as erroneous since under Art. Noel can rightfully exact reimbursement from Edward. 150644. any third person may furnish support to the needy individual. through their mother finally sued him for support. 204 of the FC. there was never any demand. Here. There was no compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. 150644. After 19 years from the time Edward left them. Joey sought custody of his minor son from his former live-in partner. 213 of the FC. 'Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence . Lea. Although Edward extended support to the girls. father of Federico. 461 SCRA 450) Custody In a petition for habeas corpus which he filed before the Court of Appeals. Lacson. the trial court. the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the following order herein provided: 1) The spouse. However. 3) The ascendants in the nearest degree: and 4) The brothers and sisters. as the girls’ grandfather. Pursuant to Art. Q: May Francisco be ordered to give support? A: Yes. personal status and minors in conflict with the law. Joey alleged that the child's mother was abroad most of the time and thus. 213 of the FC. Under Art. these came far and few and meager. et al. Federico. support. guardianship. The CA however denied the petition.. Noel. had no means to support them. (Lacson v. denied Crisanto's prayer for temporary custody of his son.18 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. NOTE: The general rule that children less than seven years of age shall not be separated from the mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of minor children for their mother's loving care. Lacson. This is predicated on the "best interest of the child" principle which pervades not only child custody cases but also those involving adoption. v. Asking one to give support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand just because it came by way of a request or a plea. In any event. from whom may he do so? A: Yes. from the respondents for him to give support. CA. Q: Was the CA correct in denying Joey’s petition for habeas corpus for the custody of his minor son? A: Yes. (Pablo-Gualberto v. since it has been shown that the girls' father. 176 of the FC. and on the basis of Art. GR No. 454 SCRA 541) Support Maowee and Maonaa are the legitimate daughters of Edward whom he abandoned when they were minors. that of taking in the family dwelling the recipient. had to support them into adulthood largely through her own efforts and the financial help of a brother. Under Art. 2) The descendants in the nearest degree. It appears that the marriage of the two was annulled due to the minority of Federico. is unavailing in this case since the filing of the case has evidently made the relations among the parties bitter and unpleasant. 2006) Q: May Noel seek reimbursement of his contributions? If yes. was a lesbian. The petitioner failed to overcome the socalled "tender-age presumption" rule under Art. et al. 28 Aug. The court granted it and ordered him to pay them more than P2 Million by way of support in arrears. the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. 203 of the FC. there having been no compelling reason to so order it. and this is true notwithstanding that University of Santo Tomas . with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. should then extend the support needed by them.

(Reyes-Tabujara v. Miguel. While the petitioners can raise it as a counter argument in the custody suit. "Carulasan. middle names or the mother's surname are not carried in a person's name. the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions. should be deleted therefrom. Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Since in this case. 250 SCRA 82). and would not warrant a favorable ruling. which is difficult to pronounce in light of Singapore's Mandarin language which does not have the letter "R" but if there is.the law conferring upon family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such cases. then the latter acquired jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The primordial consideration always is the welfare and best interest of the child. NOTE: However.. and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right. Art. both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. Singaporeans pronounce it as "L.19 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: the child has been recognized by the father as his offspring. At most. In an earlier ruling. They therefore anticipate that Julian may be subjected to discrimination on account of his middle name. the petition was first filed before the RTC of Quezon City. it may not however be invoked by them to prevent the father from seeing the child. There is also no showing that Joey was able to show proof of any compelling reason to wrest from the mother parental authority over their minor child. the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. GR No. v. the regional trial courts. the child's parents were never married. The trial court then granted temporary custody over the 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: child to Ernesto. This lack of recourse could not have been the legislative intent.. 20 July 2006) Change of Name The petition filed by the parents in behalf of their minor son Julian Lin Carulasan Wang sought the dropping of the latter's middle name. thru the appropriately designated family court branches. Court of Appeals. 440 SCRA 455) In a petition for habeas corpus that was filed by Loran against his estranged wife. Q: Who has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases? A: The RTC. 213 of the FC which lays down the Maternal Preference Rule. was characterized by the Supreme Court as amorphous. GR No. This provision applies only when the parents of the child are married to each other but are separated either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are leaving separately de facto. Q: Does trial court's order run counter to Art. et al. to choose which parent to live. such that before a person can be allowed to change the name given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry. as well as against his parents-in-law whom he alleged were unlawfully restraining him from having custody of his child. although the couple is separated de facto. he must show proper or reasonable . 29 Aug. Act No." The parents averred that their plan for Julian to study in Singapore and adjust to its culture necessitates the drop since in that country. such recognition by the father would be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might issue conflicting orders. it is best that the matter be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches legal age. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody. Hence. 213 of the FC? A: No. and thus RA No." Q: Should the petition for the dropping of his middle name be granted? A: No. Under Art. 162734. (Salientes. et al. the child (David v. As Julian is only a minor and has yet to understand and appreciate the value of any change in his name. The assailed order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but was merely a procedural directive addressed to the petitioners for them to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. 8369 did not effectively divest the High Court and Court of Appeals of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors. 6. the trial court issued an order directing the aforesaid persons to appear in court and produce the child in question and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint. In this case. 172813. et al. Custody over the minor in this case was therefore awarded correctly to the mother. 211 of the FC. Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals still retain jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving minors despite the passage of Rep. As it stands then. the Supreme Court held that it would be difficult for persons seeking the whereabouts of minors to seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Abanilla. Further. and this is all the more so in view of Art. the portion of the CA decision allowing the child. the CA erred in applying Sec. but not custody of. Petitioners’ justification for seeking the change in the name of their child. upon reaching the age of ten. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) . both parents in this case have joint parental authority over their child and consequently joint custody over him. to say the least. that of convenience. (Briones v. Moreover. et al. NOTE: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. 2006) The tug of war over custody of their minor son resulted in Ivy's filing of a petition for habeas corpus against Ernesto before the RTC. CA. 213 of the FC deals with the adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of-custody by the court.

7610.20 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee cause. Alexander Mangitngit. 9262. in which case. the names of the victims were substituted with initials. 171270. In the case of these children. while illegitimate children. The confidentiality or nondisclosure rule covers the withholding of information relating to the personal circumstances of the victim which tend to establish or compromise their identities. 9262 and Rep. (People v. Act No. Art. all in good faith and without prejudicing anyone. Act No. the request would be denied. GR No. "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse. NOTE: A middle name has practical or legal significance as it serves to identify the maternal pedigree or filiation of a person and distinguishes him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004. dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce. from the court records in order to respect their dignity and protect their privacy. 2006. Act No. 19 Sept. 167693. unless their father recognizes their filiation. GR No. (In re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. shall use the surname of their mother. as amended. Art. Otherwise. 9255. These rulings give effect to the provisions of Rep. they may bear the father's surname. as amended by Rep. as in legitimation. Act No. c) when the change will avoid confusion. In the aforesaid cases. Exploitation and Discrimination Act" The Supreme Court decided to withhold the names and identities of women and child victims. b) when the change results as a legal consequence. 2006) University of Santo Tomas . 176. 174 of the Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and mother. their registration in the civil registry requires that their middle names be indicated therein. 364 of the Civil Code states that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of their father. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: a) when the name is ridiculous. 9262. d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage. or any compelling reason which may justify such change. as well as those of their immediate family or household members. under Art. NOTE: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. 454 SCRA 155) Rep. 20 Sept. apart of course from their given names and surnames. Act No." Rep. People v. e) sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage. Melchor Cabalquinto.

Strong Machinery Company. Every time heavy rains occur. such is not a regular daily occurrence in lakes. The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was installed was real property. The indebtedness not having been paid when it fell due. The CA held correctly that the fact that water lilies thrive in that strip of land can only mean that there is a permanent stream of water or creek there. At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of SM. and had it registered in the land registry. levied execution upon the building. the Polinar spouses may utilize the rip-rapped portion of the creek to prevent the erosion of their property. but on the ground of prior possession. CA. AF executed another mortgage to LY upon the building. Samela and Usero. believing themselves to be the owners of the strip of land. The lake bed is the highest depth of the water during the dry season. The Polinars. Frustrated by their predicament. Rather. Situated between their lots is a low-level strip of land. it appearing that it first took possession of the property. Although lakes are subject to the same gravitational forces which cause formation of tides in seas and oceans. (Leung Yee v. 502. without any reference to the land on which it stood. not subject of registration. Thus. Neither the purchase of the building by LY nor his inscription of the sale in his favor was made in good faith. The Director of Lands opposed alleging that since a portion of the land sought to be registered is covered with water 4-5 months a year. Q: Does the strip of land belong to Samela and Usero? A: No. It is property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private ownership. The submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains and not due to the flux and reflux of tides. Upon failure to pay. Neither can it be foreshore land. demanded that the Polinars stop the construction. 26 January 2005) Q: May a house be the subject of a chattel mortgage? A: Yes. which is a strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The latter thus should be considered its highest ordinary depth. CA. the same is part of the lake bed of Laguna or is at least a foreshore land which brings it under Art. It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed. 152115. The strip of land is a creek and belongs to no one but the State. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: Should the land be registered in favor of John? A: Yes. LY secured judgment for that amount. a property of public dominion and hence. and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price. Accordingly. it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real property. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person. and further. the parties failed to settle their differences. (Republic v. GR No. The annotation of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry of real property. Despite the offer. (Leung Yee v. it may be the subject . The mortgage and the sale of the property to SM in satisfaction of the mortgage were registered in the chattel mortgage registry. however. (Usero v. the Polinars erected a concrete wall on the bank of the lowlevel strip of land about 3 meters from their house and rip-rapped the soil on that portion of the strip of land. nor the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property. 37 Phil 644) Classification of Property John filed an application for registration of a parcel of land situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay. 420 includes a creek which is a recess or an arm of a river. had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned. The phrase “others of similar character” in Art. Strong Machinery Company. and that SM must be held to be the owner of the property. It is evidenced by a barangay certification that a creek exists in the disputed strip of land. that the building and the land were sold to it long prior to the date of sale to LY. 37 Phil 644) Q: Who has a better right to the building? A: SM. Neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein. the alternation of high tides and low tides could hardly account for the rise in the water level of Laguna de Bay. Q: Can the annotation made by SM be given legal effect? A: No. with a stagnant body of water filled with floating water lilies. 131 SCRA 532) Spouses Polinar are the registered owners of a parcel of land behind the lots of Samela and Usero. a creek cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. Being public water. the water in said strip of land rises and the strong current passing through it causes considerable damage to the house of the Polinars. the mortgaged property was sold by the sheriff and was bought by SM. Water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period than the level of water at which the land is completely dry.21 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Book II Immovable Property AF Company bought a considerable quantity of rice-cleaning machinery from SM Company. offered to pay for the strip of land. bought it at the sheriff’s sale.

Upon the latter’s death and while they were absent from the said lot. (Laurel v. (Rudy Lao v. who conducted her business in the building which stood on a portion of the property leased from Alava. 16 May 2000) Herrera filed ejectment complaints to order the defendants to vacate the premises. GR No. 14 January 2005) Alava was the owner of a parcel of land. Although the lease contract was not filed with the RD. and in an action by the mortgagee for foreclosure. 9 SCRA 631) Q: What is needed to turn public property to patrimonial? A: A legislature or executive declaration is necessary. (Sampayan v. GR No. CA. GR No. (Navarro v. Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. David Jr. However. 149599. The complaint in this case makes such an averment. and hence. Q: Does Peralta-Labrador have a cause of action for forcible entry against Bugarin? A: No. petitioner’s complaint should have been filed with the proper RTC. not mere non-use thereof. (Peralta-Labrador v. Bugarin. it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Q: Should the complaint be dismissed? A: Yes. in effect became a part of the contract of sale. Sometime in 1994. Jaime Lao. threats. allegedly built a house on the lot. ie.22 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee matter of a chattel mortgage as personal or movable property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage. In 1990. 149599. through strategy and stealth. (Sampayan v. After the lapse of the one year period. a suit for the recovery of the right to possess. The MCTC dismissed the complaint since Sampayan Q: Would the complaint prosper? A: Yes. 187 SCRA 797) Ownership Accion Reinvindicatoria/ Accion Publiciana Peralta-Labrador was the owner of a parcel of land. she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership before the MTC. It is clear that petitioner’s allegations make out a case for forcible entry because she averred prior physical possession of the lot and the forcible entry thereon by Bugarin. In Lopez v. in 1996. For the MCTC to acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case. Sampayan allegedly refused to vacate the said lot. Garcia. 14 January 2005) Q: Did the Sampayan have prior physical possession? A: Yes. the DPWH constructed a road which traversed her lot and separated 108 sq. alleging that the latter had occupied a portion of his property without any lease agreement and without paying any rentals. GR No. The lease. Likewise. which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession. 16 May 2000) Q: Who is the real party-in-interest as defendant in the action? A: Anita Lao. from it. (Rudy Lao v. their mother Cristita being the owner and actual possessor thereof. After repeated demands. nevertheless. but as the manager of his mother. A contract of lease was executed by Alava and Anita Lao. hence. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action. intimidation. Rudy admitted having knowledge of the lease of the subject property. The petitioners confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful University of Santo Tomas . a lessee of another portion of the same property. the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage. Rudy Lao. not by mere tolerance or generosity of Rudy. that the plaintiff had prior physical possession and that he was deprived thereof by the defendant through force. The cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Rudy had no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Anita because of the subsisting contract of lease. Jaime’s possession was in behalf of his mother. and prayed that an order be rendered directing Jaime to vacate the premises. lot and refused to vacate the same. Rudy then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Jaime Lao. not annotated on Alava’s TCT. Therefore. the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana. Hence. strategy and stealth. It was argued that the complaint will not prosper because there was no withholding of possession since Herrera was not in prior possession of the lot. son Anita. 25 August 2005) Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer Crispulo and Florencia asserted that they were coowners pro-indiviso of the said lot. Rudy was bound by the terms and conditions of said contract. CA. the MTC improperly assumed jurisdiction. eventually purchased the entire property from Alava. The records in this case show that the respondent has been in possession of the property in question. This lease was however not filed with the Register of Deeds. to their exclusion. 165177. Thus.. Jaime Lao. he could not file the complaint against her. and not in his own right. Sampayan. 156360. Q: Is prior physical possession by the plaintiff necessary for a complaint for unlawful detainer to prosper? A: No. Pineda. m. m. 156360. Thus. the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion reinvindicatoria. GR No. it is enough that the complaint avers the jurisdictional facts. The MCTC Judge found during his ocular inspection of the premises that Sampayan’s predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements on the land in question. they filed an action for unlawful detainer.

P built the road in good faith and as such it may be argued that P is entitled to have possession of the road until after it has been reimbursed of the expenses it has incurred. it lost its right of retention under Art. the question of possession is primordial. Filipinas failed to pay the amount. It also provided that other grantees of lumber concessions may use said road only with P’s permission. Q: Should the Ignacios be ordered to remove the structures? A: No..23 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: detainer. the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. He cannot refuse either to pay or sell and compel the owner of the building to remove it form the land where it is erected. that should Filipinas fail to pay. the Provincial Board revoked the earlier resolution and issued a new one declaring the said road a toll road. In unlawful detainer cases. Filipinas was also ordered to pay Blas the value of the buildings. Community Sawmill Co. it loses its right to the land and the Timbangs will become the owners. Upon the recommendation of the Director of Public Works. 456 and the Timbangs. only sought to recover physical possession of the subject property. an ejectment case was filed against the spouses Q: Is the case considered as one for accion reinvindicatoria. it shall donate the said road to the province. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. the builder might be made to pay rental only. Q: Does the road in question belong to P as its private property? A: No. and accion interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. Indeed. Thus. Sower Hilario and Dres were declared as the owners of a parcel of land and the Ignacios as the owners of the houses and granaries built by them on said lot with the rights of possessor in GF. They sold them to Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. The fact that the completion of the road was done at the expense of P does not convert said road into a private one in the absence of proof that said land upon which the road was constructed was owned by P. Ong. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Inc. has failed to pay the price of the land. proceeds of which are to be paid to P as reimbursement of expenses it incurred in finishing the road. prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. The owner has the option of paying the value of the building or selling the land. The CA declared that Filipinas has acquired the rights of the Timbangs to the lot and had to pay value of the land. P was granted sole right to use the said road provided that after 20 years. (Ganila v. P brought action to prohibit the other lumber concessionaires from using said road on the ground that the questioned road is its private property. 448 and Art. The Timbangs contend that since Filipinas. GR No. By virtue of a 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Provincial Board Resolution. The spouses filed an action to annul the sale and transfer of property to Mandaue. Thereafter. GR No. so the Timbangs. while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. automatically became the owners of the building. Blas built a school building on said lot. In the meantime. 11 SCRA 346) The Timbang spouses own the lot. There is nothing in Art. v. In unlawful detainer. in all their pleadings. Planter. the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Art. Sps. Thus. leave things as they . Q: Is there merit in the contention of the Timbangs? A: Without merit. in exercising their option. However. as landowners. CA. guidance may be had from these decisions: (1) In Miranda v. Hilario and Dres filed a motion praying that since they chose neither to pay the building nor to sell the land. the other party fails to pay for the same. 16 August 2005) Builder. Notwithstanding said resolution. as builder in good faith. 132197. 28 June 2005) Spouses Ong are the owners of parcels of land. The issue involved in accion reinvindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property.76 Phil 606) P undertook the completion and construction of a provincial road in Calapan. Actual and prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. and thus the jurisdiction would lie with the RTC? A: No. 150755. Fadullon. This differs from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure. Hilario. the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. chose to compel Filipinas to acquire the land. He is entitled to such removal only when. which then sold it to Ross Rica Sales Center. So what is the recourse left to the parties where the builder fails to pay the value of the land? While the Code is silent on this point. on the ground that said road is a public road. after having chosen to sell the land. 546 which would justify the conclusion that upon failure of the builder to pay the value of the land. 445. when such is demanded by the landowner. (Ignacio v. Petitioners. (Calapan Lumber Co. (Ross Rica Sales Center v. the Ignacios should be ordered to remove the structures and restore them in the possession of the lot. the Timbangs must exercise their option under article 448 to appropriate the building or compel Filipinas to acquire the land. provisions governing the rights of builder in good faith on private land cannot be applied here because public interest is involved. and Filipinas Colleges purchased the building from Blas. In an action for unlawful detainer.

The right of retention is accessory in character. the lot was sold at public auction to Nepomuceno. 546 provides that a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred. De Guzman. The right of retention is accessory to a principal obligation. Bataclan. Q: Is Pecson entitled to the rentals? A: Yes.24 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee are. A possessor in good faith has the right of retention of the property until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property. Its object is to guarantee the reimbursement for the expenses. who in turn sold it to the spouses Nuguid. and the excess if any. or (3) In Bernardo v. the possessor in good faith is entitled to retain the property until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and useful expenses made by him on the property. Since the petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves when they applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building. 448. The civil fruits of the property belong to the possessor in good faith before the possession is legally interrupted. Ortiz's ward who died later. The right of retention is considered as one of the measures to protect builders in good faith. based on the current market value of the property. 92 SCRA 146) Accretion Rui filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to his fishpond alleging that said lots belong to him due to accretion. While Art. he has the right to use the proceeds of such fruits to pay the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains in possession. The court upheld the validity of the sale but also held that the apartment building was not included in the sale. or those incurred for cultivation. to be delivered to the owner of the house in payment thereof. either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity OR to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Pecson filed a motion to restore possession pending determination of the value of the apartment. It permits the actual possessor to remain in possession while he has not been reimbursed by the person who defeated him in the possession for those necessary expenses and useful improvements made by him on the thing possessed. The right of retention is analogous to a contract of antichresis or of pledge. By virtue of the said ruling. This was opposed by the Republic. accessory to the principal obligation. Dolorico named his uncle. without however filing any application to acquire title thereon. or those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expended. Eleuterio filed his sales applications. they could not benefit from the lot’s improvement until they reimbursed the improver in full. (2) In Ignacio v. It is analogous to a contract of antichresis and lasts only for the period necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed from the fruits for the necessary and useful expenses. etc. or for the enhancement of its utility or productivity. Under Art. so that Martin executed an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of Eleuterio and requested the Director of Lands to cancel the homestead application which was granted. production. it guards against unjust enrichment insofar as the good-faith builder’s improvements are concerned.106 SCRA 247) Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door two-storey apartment building. (Ortiz v. When the Nuguids became the uncontested owner of the lot. In the Homestead Application. (Mendoza v. The construction of the apartment was undertaken at the time when Pecson was still the owner of the lot. the apartment was already in existence and occupied by tenants. However. applying the proceeds first to the payments of the value of the land. Q: Is Ortiz entitled to right of retention? A: Yes. the land and the improvement may be sold in a public auction. 52 Phil 171) Right of Retention The lot in controversy was formerly the subject of a Homestead Application of Dolorico. (Spouses Nuguid v. Martin as his heir and successor in interest. the spouses became the uncontested owners of the lot. (Filipinas College Inc. For failure to pay realty taxes. or those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost. GR No. Kayanan. Since then it was Ortiz who continued the cultivation and possession of the property. owner of the land may have the improvement removed. such as those for the preservation of the property. 151815. While the law aims to concentrate in one person the ownership of the land and the improvements thereon in view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced coownership. A builder in good faith cannot be compelled to pay rentals during the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by ordering him to vacate. upkeep. and to the owner or lawful possessor thereafter. CA. Timbang. v. as a means of obtaining compensation for the debt. 23 February 2005) Q: What are necessary expenses? A: Those made for the preservation of the thing. This ruling was affirmed by the CA and the SC. Q: Should the lands be registered in favor Rui? University of Santo Tomas . it also gives him right of retention until full reimbursement is made. The spouses subsequently moved for the delivery of possession of the said lot and apartment. the landowner is given the option. contending that what actually happened was that Rui merely transferred his dikes further down the river bed such that whatever accretion may have taken place was man-made and not natural. The right of the possessor to receive the fruits terminates when his good faith ceases. Pecson challenged the validity of the sale. and assume the relation of lessor and lessee. Hilario.

Thereafter. 147245. Diaz sought compensation from NIA for the land affected by the canals. the airport was ordered closed by President Aquino as the MCIAA had commenced operations. Dodong however later denied Eduave’s claim of ownership so the latter filed action to quiet title over the property. Gopuco failed to adduce evidence showing that he and the expropriator actually entered into any such compromise agreement. evidence showed that the alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the river current but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. Dodong’s possession cannot be considered to be in good faith. Nor did it vest in the latter the right to demand reconveyance of the said property. Later. if the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title. But here. This rule holds true when the property is taken before the filing of an expropriation suit. Gopuco refused to enter in such an arrangement but was finally forced to convey his property by virtue of a court decision. then the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator. There is no accretion.132 SCRA 514) Islands Eduave is the owner of land forming part of an island in a non-navigable river. then when such purpose is ended the former owner reacquires the property. NIA 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: completed the canals without instituting expropriation proceedings or indemnifying the property’s owners. fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. (ATO and MCIAA v. Clearly. The fact of abandonment of the airport cannot by itself result in the reversion of the property back to the Gopuco. GR No. Here. does not imply fairness to the property alone. However. GR No. Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion of the 10 hectares. What the respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river by reclamation. CA. The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. the land in question is an island that appears in a non-floatable and nonnavigable river. The property owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses. Q: Who has a better right to the island? A: Eduave. the area was increased. Gopuco then filed a complaint for the recovery of his property. the island belongs to the owner of the parcel of land nearer the margin. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. the property shall return to its former owner. If however. the entire area became prone to flooding 2 months out of every year because of the side-burrow method NIA used in the construction of the canals. The land is not even dry but under two meters of water. (Republic v. 158563. Compensation must also be just to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation. and it is not disputed that Eduave is the owner of the parcel of land along the margin of the river and opposite the island. 465. the award is reduced to P30k. Q: Is the award of 4M as just compensation correct? A: No. Applying Art. The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. 194 SCRA 607) Expropriation Diaz owned a tenanted agricultural land devoted to the planting of palay. Eduave allowed Dodong to introduce improvements thereon and live there as a caretaker. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) bulldozed 10 hectares of the property to build 2 irrigation canals. The trial court held that Diaz was entitled to compensation in the sum of four million pesos. and in that case non-usage does not have the effect of defeating title acquired through expropriation. The concept of just compensation. because the island is longer than the property of Eduave. Q: Does cessation of public purpose warrant recovery of property? A: It depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator. Dodong thus may acquire said land by acquisitive prescription. and one who desires to sell. his son was appointed administrator of the property. with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned. When real property has been acquired for public use . CA. This excludes those caused by human intervention. so 30 years of possession is needed. he is deemed ipso jure to be the owner of that portion which corresponds to the length of his property along the margin of the river. Due to the movements of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded. Just compensation for the Canal Sites must be computed as of the time of taking and not as of the time the trial court made its order of expropriation. the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof. After his death. Said land was eroded due to a typhoon. destroying the bigger portion and improvements thereon. and what he loses is only the actual value of the property at the time of the taking. 30 June 2005) Q: May Gopuco validly recover his expropriated property? A: No. 31 March 2005) Lots surrounding the Lahug Airport were purchased by the government on the assurance that lot owners could repurchase their properties once the airport was abandoned. as indeed even accretion to land titled under the Torrens system must itself still be registered.25 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: A: NO. Gopuco. however. Where the expropriation is explicitly for a particular purpose and that alone. the same may yield to the adverse possession of the third parties. Thus. and even if it is the property owner who brings the action for compensation. (Jagualing v. CA. More accurately. (Republic v. Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives.

GR No. the same applies only to a possessor in good faith. Q: Did the title to the lots vest with the Republic? A: No. (Borbajo v. 428 is explicit that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing. Lim. 28 Marc 2005) Cleofas was the registered owner of a parcel of land. leaving 8 children. such as D. Lumayno alleges that Fortunato entered into a contract of sale of his share in the said lot. Art. fruendi. 29 June 2005) Q: Does Lim have a right of possession over the property? A: Yes. A mortgage is inseparable from the property and adheres to it no matter who may be the owner. The corresponding subdivision plan included 3 road lots. Art. 486.26 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee unconditionally. in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings. While Art. 161656. 29 June 2005) Co-ownership A. 31 January 2005) Borromeo is the co-owner and overseer of certain parcels of land. 161656. sold the 3 road lots to D. the compensation remained unpaid so the Denzons’ successors-in-interest filed for the recovery of the lots in question. The co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation.. CA. In his desire to expand and extend the facilities of the resort that he established on the subject properties. A co-owner. the community ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. Lim. 128338. GR No. At the instance of A. GR No. Hidden View Homeowners. the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. Therefore. one of whom is Fortunato. disponendi. His eldest child. Flores then died. once the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners. 128338. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance. Even an oral agreement of partition is valid and binding upon the parties. 487 is a categorical and an unqualified authority in favor of Borromeo to evict Resuena from the portion occupied. persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. ie. Fortunato died. (Vda. (ATO and MCIAA v. the property passed on to his wife and children. (Republic v. the heirs of Flores’s sisters together with his surviving sisters filed a University of Santo Tomas . without other limitations than those established by law. refused to vacate his home. Gopuco. records reveal that although the lot had not yet been formally subdivided. (Resuena v. with the consent of the others. GR No. are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand. It is evident that the partition of the lot had already been effected by the heirs of Cleofas. Q: May the widow exercise right of redemption? A: No. without any contract between them. CA. 152440. GR No. The Republic and its military arm has no better right to it as in fact it has no title over it. C were the registered owners of a parcel of agricultural land. 133638. (Resuena v. the abandonment or non-use of the real property does not ipso facto give to the previous owners of said property any right to recover the same. CA. is entitled to use the property owned in common under Art. one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. His widow contends that Fortunato never sold his share and that she had the right of redemption over the shares previously sold to Lumayno because the co-owners have not formally subdivided the property. still. Just compensation not only connotes a reasonable amount of payment but also a reasonable time for it. de Ape v. Years later however. Flores. however. Resuena resided in the upper portion of the lot. 546 allows full reimbursement of useful expenses and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. When he died. In this case. 30 June 2005) The Republic of the Philippines instituted an action for the expropriation of several lots belonging to the Denzons. Verily. While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots. abutendi. Thereafter. the property was surveyed to convert it into a subdivision. The exercise of this right presupposes the existence of a co-ownership at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and when it is demanded by the other co-owners. vindicandi. the other co-owners cannot close the road lots to prevent D from using the same. Borromeo claims that Resuena has occupied a portion of the property by virtue of his own liberality. Resuena. 28 Marc 2005) Q: Is Resuena entitled to reimbursement for necessary expenses? A: No. Q: Is D entitled to the use of the lots? A: As a registered co-owner of the road lots. 158563. GR No. A. It appears that one of the lots had been mortgaged to Lim who foreclosed the same for failure to pay. he demanded that Resuena vacate the property. (Republic v. B. the particular portions belonging to the heirs of Cleofas had already been ascertained and they in fact took possession of their respective parts. 15 April 2005) Emilio died intestate. Borromeo’s action for ejectment against Resuena is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since Resuena was not able to prove that he is authorized to occupy the same. Q: Is Borromeo entitled to eject Resuena from the property? A: Yes. D is entitled to avail of all the attributes of ownershipjus utendi. GR No. either by eminent domain or by purchase. caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in Emilio’s name covering a parcel of land and the issuance of another in his name. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership.

(Bucton v. 1973) Conversion Q: What is conversion? A: It refers to the act of using or disposing of another’s property without lawful authority to do so in a manner different from that with which a property is held by the trustees to whom the owner had entrusted the same. However. he could still continue occupying the site but with rent. Carballo. He mortgaged it to RSBank. 29 June 2007) Alteration 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: What does the term “alteration” in Art. Ibrahim instituted an action against NAPOCOR for recovery of possession of land and payment of damages. introducing improvements. RC and EI offered to buy the lot. respondents were also deemed to have become aware of the adverse claim. No reimbursement for EI for the current value of the useful improvements because they have been . she was the only buyer at that time. Since EI is in BF. A TCT with RC's adverse claim was issued to EI. JP and EI executed a formal deed of sale. 546 and 547. therefore. RC was to assume the mortgage. secured a tax declaration in his name and may. (Heirs of Flores Restar v. the date of valuation should be computed from the time when Ibrahim discovered the construction and not from the date NAPOCOR actually constructed the said tunnels. In this case.27 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: complaint against the heirs of Flores for partition of the lot and declaration of nullity of the documents. On said date. Ibrahim still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the construction of a deep well. JP offered to sell the lot to RC. a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription. prior registration in GF is a pre-condition to superior title.tilling and cultivating the land. Q: Who has a better right to the land? A: RC. who had neither title nor good faith. the respondents never possessed the lot. 55 SCRA 499) Possession JP owned a lot with improvements. Landowners cannot be deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. It is not limited to material charges. RC's prior purchase of the land was made in GF. include? A: It includes the act by virtue of which a co-owner changes the thing from the state in which the others believe it should remain. GR No. NAPOCOR could have. Lucman Ibrahim. and enjoying the produce thereof. RC went to JP to execute the formal deed of sale. If there is an inscription. Flores took possession of the lot after Emilio’s death and exercised acts of dominion thereon. 480. The imprescriptibility of an action to quiet title is a general principle from American jurisprudence. EI took possession of the lot. he could not find a place where to move his house. be said to have adversely claimed ownership of the lot. Flores’s possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 30 years. 161720. Q: Did the heirs of Flores acquire ownership over the lot by extraordinary acquisitive prescription? A: Yes. much less asserted their claim thereto until 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition. (NAPOCOR v. December 19. 22 November 2005) NAPOCOR constructed underground tunnels on the sub-terrain area of the land owned by Ibrahim without the latter’s consent. The manner in which the easement was created by NAPOCOR violates the due process rights of Ibrahim as it was without notice and indemnity to him and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings. The statutory period of prescription commenced in 1960 when Flores. Heirs of Dolores Cichon. but JP said they could not continue with the sale because he sold the lot to EI. In contrast. Quinto. To merit the protection of Art. Later. it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in GF in registering his deed of sale. 35226-R. 1544 (2). The basis of the SC is Art. 17136-CR. 17 November 1976) Quieting of Title Q: Is an action to quiet title imprescriptible? A: Even though the Civil Code does not include an action to quiet title as one of those actions which are imprescriptible. 4 days later EI registered her deed of sale. RC registered her adverse claim. The landowner’s right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment. where there exists a clear repudiation of the coownership. It is not necessary that the use for which the property is given be directly to the advantage of the person misappropriating or converting the property of another. at any time. the SC in this case held that such action is imprescriptible. and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. GR No. (Viterbo v. Civil Code. validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over the property as this power encompasses not only the appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. They executed a private document which states that JP can start living on the lot without rent and if after 1 yr. While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe. and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected by law. 491. their rights to the improvements they introduced are governed by Arts. 168732. Q: Is Ibrahim entitled to receive just compensation from NAPOCOR? A: No. Yes. Gabar. (People v. Her GF did not cease after JP told her of the 2nd sale to EI. These provisions seem to imply that the possessor in BF has neither the right of retention of useful improvements nor the right to demand refund for useful expenses.

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. the annotation is not sufficient cause to require Michael to investigate Chayong’s title because the latter’s ownership over the property remained unimpaired despite such encumbrance. which provides that the owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another. but it must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Non-user for ten years. The noise continuously emitted by a Meralco substation. unless when the use becomes possible. and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto. Q: Are the spouses entitled to a right of way? A: No. 40 SCRA 342) Q: What is the doctrine of attractive nuisance? A: It states that one who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities of appliances of a character likely to attract children in play. lease it to another. Based on the foregoing. it is the owner. even by a gratuitous title. (Carbonell v. CFI of Misamis Occidental. Art 649 provides that the easement of right of way is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor’s own acts. 97 SCRA 872) Usufruct Chayong owned a parcel of land which she mortgaged to Michael. and 2. 69 SCRA 99) Adverse Possession Q: What does the law require for one who asserts ownership by adverse possession? A: To prove the presence of the essential elements which in ordinary acquisitive prescription of real estate are good faith. by requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the plaintiff’s house. when either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used. with respect to discontinuous easements. under Art. Such annotation does not impose upon Michael the obligation to investigate the validity of Chayong’s title. and the lapse of time fixed by law. or of holding property. The spouses failed to show that they entered into an agreement with Ramiscal to use the pathway. although he cannot alter the property’s form or do anything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary. may alienate it. get on or use it. 4 February 2005) Q: How are easements extinguished? A: 1. but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct. and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children. transform. or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other persons. and even destroy the same. is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby. or alienate his right of usufruct. CA. 649. the spouses fell short of proving that they are the owners of the supposed dominant estate. The spouses had enclosed the same with a gate. Q: Is Michael a mortgagee in good faith despite such annotation? A: Yes. industrial and civil fruits of the property and may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct. Here. (Velasco v. constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled to relief. The subject property is a long strip of land owned by Ramiscal which is being used by the spouses as their pathway to and from the nearest public highway from their property. day and night. or in the acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it. Ramiscal. Spouses dela Cruz are occupants of a parcel of land located at the back of Ramiscal’s property. It does not generally University of Santo Tomas . but it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its use. GR No. Also. (Hemedes v. in accordance with the provisions of the preceding number. fence. in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds. and roof. encumber. CA. sufficient time for prescription has elapsed. 25 SCRA 145) Nuisance Q: Does noise constitute an actionable nuisance? A: Yes. Manila Electric Company. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. CA. Ramiscal demanded that the spouses demolish the same. (Morales v. The reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance although its danger is apparent to those of age is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach. The owner of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate. 137882. this period shall be computed from the day on which they ceased to be used. from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place. even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. and. There should be no other adequate outlet to a public highway. The spouses refused. (Benedicto v. who is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. (Spouses dela Cruz v. 316 SCRA 347) Easements Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land. This right is embodied in the Civil Code. of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural. Upon the OCT was an annotation of usufructuary rights in favor of Cheddy.28 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee enjoying such for 2 decades without rents. a just title. The test whether rights of property. with respect to the continuous easements. Only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. There is no voluntary nor legal easement established.

91 Phil 488) 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . artificial features other than the water and its location. (Hidalgo Enterprises. Inc.29 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: apply to a body of waters. Balandan. v.

filed a contingent claim against the Estate of Pedro based on 20 different indemnity agreements. 479. therefore. (Estate of Hemady v. each subscribed by a distinct principal and Pedro. or by stipulation or by provision of law. The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement is not disputed. when it accepted the latter as a solidary guarantor expects nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that it might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. Upon Francisco's death. The trial court dismissed the claims of ABC Co and held the same are not chargeable to Pedro’s estate because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor. found no merit in Rosario’s claim because rights which are declared for the first time can only be given retroactive effect when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.. therefore. 1950. Inc. a compromise agreement was entered into by and between Jose. are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights." Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311. their assigns and heirs. in which Tasiana agreed to convey any and all her individual share and interest in the estate of Francisco. even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. it is evident that when Faustino died in 1945 the five parcels of land passed from the moment of his death to his only heir. his common-law wife Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death. therefore. file contingent claim against the estate of Pedro? A: Under the Article 1311. (Uson v. nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves. there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death. In order to put an end to all these litigations. However. The contracts. The solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death. Maria then filed an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the lands in question against Rosario and her four children. they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation. give rise to contingent claims provable against the estate. In assailing the validity of the agreement. (son of Francisco and Josefa) and Tasiana. The right of ownership of Maria over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death. NCC. his widow Maria n. 28 November 1956) Maria was the lawful wife of Faustino who upon his death in 1945 left the 5 parcels of land in question. et al.30 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Book III ABC Co. Q: Who is the owner of the properties in question? A: Faustino died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the New Civil Code. Luzon Surety Co. the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the New Code. nevertheless. Faustino left no other heir except his widow Maria. SC. The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot.. GRN L-8437. the rights of inheritance of Maria over the lands in question became vested. Tasiana cited the case of Guevara vs. but its validity is. Of course. nor by provision of law. GRN L-4963. From that moment.. after the death of his wife Josefa. Maria claims that when Faustino died in 1945. contracted a second marriage with Tasiana. 29 January 1953) Francisco. attacked by Tasiana on the ground that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco. 74 Phil. Pedro’s eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. Rosario contends that the illegitimate children of the late Faustino under the New Civil Code which became in force in June. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. Del Rosario. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings and she was appointed special administratrix. Q: Can ABC Co. Guevara. “Contracts take effect only as between the parties. The lower court ordered Rosario to restore to Maria the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute. except in the case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature. Q: Can the heirs enter into a compromise agreement without the will having first passed probate? A: The doctrine of Guevara vs. however. The creditor ABC Co. the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the University of Santo Tomas . is against the law and public policy.. The contracts of suretyship not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking. be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute. is not applicable to the case at bar. in exchange for an X amount of money. wherein the SC held that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will. However. Guevara. as solidary guarantor in all of them. the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share and interest in the estate of Francisco. With this background.

S. During the pendency of the action. cannot be hidden. (Vitug v. But. and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. Q: Is the court correct in its ruling? A: Article 777 provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. GRN L-41715. nor numbered by letters. GRN 82027. thereby changing the testator's dispositions. For instance.12 November 1919) The testatrix Leoncia died at the age of 92. GRN 13431.A." From the moment of the death of the decedent. the term being death. her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. the heirs become the absolute owners of his property. 18 June 1976) Dolores died in New York. subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent. therefore. and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor …. The agreement provides: xxxxx “We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK that all money now or hereafter deposited xxx xxx with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. (Bonilla v. Abangan. 29 March 1990) Ana Abangan's will consists of two sheets. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Fortunata is dead and. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses.31 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: transaction. the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. has no legal capacity to sue. and hence. Q: Can the will be probated? Is there a compliance with formalities required by law? A: The purpose of the law in requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other is to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets. when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Dolores having predeceased her husband. U. In requiring this signature on the margin. although unnumbered. GRN L-28040 18 August 1972) Fortunata instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra. et al. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. and these omissions. it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.xxxxx Q: What is the nature of the survivorship agreement? A: The survivorship agreement is a mere obligation with a term. et al. de Borja. duly signed at the bottom by Martin (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation. The court immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.The will in question was prepared by Attorney Almario in the house of the testatrix Leoncia after she had expressed to said attorney her desire to make a will and bequeath her property to the Victorio in compensation according to her. undoubtedly. (De Borja. Romarico (widower of Dolores) was named co-administrator of the estate. Romarico filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate. CA. which he claimed were personal funds. But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may be violative of the law. Rowena opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the said funds were conjugal properties and part of the estate. or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir. Romarico insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank. the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet. The testatrix requested Attorney Almario to write her name where she had to sign by means of her thumbmark in view of the fact that her fingers no longer had the necessary strength to hold a pen. Rowena was the named executrix in her will. pending probate. Barcena. the first of which contains all of the dispositions of the testatrix. Vda. Fortunata passed away. v.. When Fortunata died. for his diligent and faithful services rendered to her. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. (Abangan v. Later. no ground for reimbursement. Being the separate property of Romarico. Romarico the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account in question. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses.. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. to transfer property in fraud of creditors. the statute took into consideration.

Cagro. a thumbmark is a sufficient signature because it can always be verified anytime. he would have to avow assent. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. et al. GRN L-5826. followed below by "A ruego del testador" and the name of Florentino Javier. deceased. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. Cabacungan. Atty. since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will. which is to minimize fraud. The petition for intestate proceedings consolidated and the probate proceeding were consolidated Petitioners asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills made by her. GRN 6285. Thereafter. is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado. That is all the statute requires. and he was so appointed by the probate court. 05 September 1936) This case involves the probate of the will of Antero Mercado. 54 SCRA 31) Benoni Cabrera. among them that a later will had been executed by the deceased. Q: Is it required that the person signing in behalf of the testatrix also signs his name? A: No. (Cruz v. if the third witness were the notary public himself. (Payad v. (Barut v. The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives of the deceased on various grounds. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. (Cagro v. the function of a notary public is. although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. Q: Is such fact as argued by the petitioners. such is a fatal defect which renders the will void. it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. and it must necessarily bear their signatures. Villasor. herein petitioners. Q: Can the will be allowed? Can the notary public before the will was supposed to be acknowledged also act as one of the instrumental witnesses? A: The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. written in the Ilocano dialect. one of them. Tolentino. 29 April 1953) The case involves the probate of the last will and testament of Valente Z. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. GRN 42258. Q: May the will be probated? Is a cross a sufficient signature? A: The cross appearing on the will is neither the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor even one of the ways by which he signed his name.. It would place him in an inconsistent position and the very purpose of the acknowledgment. instituted a second petition for the settlement of the intestate estate. 29 November 1951) Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the last will and testament of Maria Salomon. et al. Furthermore. to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. With respect to the validity of the will. GRN L-4067.32 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Q: May a thumbmark be treated as the signature of the testatrix? A: Yes. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses. The probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate on the ground that the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be. the same had been read to her by two other persons and that she had instructed Severo.. one of the witnesses. would be thwarted. Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto. To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity. claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator. Jr. or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. Angel H. one of the legatees named in the will. She also stated in said will that being unable to read or write. Consequently. Teves. (Garcia v. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. sought his appointment as special administrator of the testator's estate. Lacuesta. 15 February 1912) The case involves the probate of the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro. to sign her name to it as testatrix. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other. fatal defect? A: Yes. Q: Is the will fatally defective because of the unsigned attestation clause although signed on the left margin? A: The will is fatally defective because of the unsigned attestation clause although signed on the left margin. Antero Mercado wrote a cross immediately after his name. The attestation clause provides strong University of Santo Tomas . Cruz. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses. among others.

28 May 1993) 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Felicidad Yap died of heart failure in the UST Hospital. since it could at any time. subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Gan v. The only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself. To attest a will is to know that it was published as such. unlike ordinary wills. it certainly cannot be conclusively inferred therefrom that the said witnesses affixed their respective signatures in the presence of the testator and of each other since. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.e. The oppositors moved to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. Attestation is the act of the senses (mental act) while subscription is the act of the hand (mechanical act). it would result in the invalidation of the will. 809. a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original citing the case of Gan vs. since they need no witnesses. that they are. the three must testify. Q: Can extrinsic evidence be adduced to establish the contents and due execution of an allegedly lost holographic will? A: Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirement to be fulfilled when a notarial will is submitted to the courts for allowance. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution through the oral testimonies of witnesses who allegedly seen the same. But. " The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. (Caneda v. be demonstrated to be-or not to be-in the hands of the testator himself. so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting witnesses. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. The absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. While it may be true that the attestation clause is indeed subscribed at the end thereof and at the left margin of each page by the three attesting witnesses. or other casualty. the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament. and as its own safeguard. a photocopy thereof. 30 August 1958) Marcela Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of holographic will of Ricardio B. Where it is left unsigned. Bonilla. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient. On the other hand. From the testimony of such witnesses. it is reasonable to suppose. Bulacan. Yap. was not presented. however. The aforestated defect in the attestation clause cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule under Art. a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because . As it appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator. If there is. if there is no opposition. CA. Attestation and subscription: "Attestation" and "subscription" differ in meaning. The court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. dated. The presence of said signatures only establishes the fact that it was indeed signed. and the circumstances of its due execution. provided however. but to subscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. but it does not prove that the attesting witnesses did subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other." The law. which is contained in the holographic will. leaving properties in Pulilan. in the matter of holographic wills. regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded. there would be no means of ascertaining by a physical examination of the will whether the witnesses had indeed signed in the presence of the testator and of each other. "entirely written. the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. and in the City of Manila. They argued that lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence. such facts may still be proved. i. GRN 103554. The holographic will itself. and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a permanent form a record of the fact that attended the execution of a particular will. Now. for the sole purpose of identification.33 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: legal guaranties for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses. Bonilla on the ground that once the original copy of the holographic will is lost. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased. Q: Is the court correct in its ruling? A: If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available. Yap. As attesting involves a mental act. if available. it need be signed only by them. GRN L-12190. it gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. and signed by the hand of the testator himself.

Celedonia. a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. nephews or nieces. for Esteban. and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)-the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants. Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano opposed the registration. by inheritance from another ascendant. However." Clearly. The holographic Will. his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them. to state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But. otherwise. Pedro died unmarried and without issue. if any. the property of the deceased. but the descendant of his mother. whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court." (Rodelas v. Q: Which will should be probated. ascendants. who at his father's death inherited the two said parcels. claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied. the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision. Relova. making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (Solivio v. Q: Are the questioned properties subject to reserve troncal? A: Marcelina. et al.. Hon. when as in this case.. The propositus-the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue. Ordinarily. Having acquired them by operation of law. it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code. died a bachelor. His only surviving relatives are: his maternal aunt. GRN L40207. but which alteration did not carry the requisite of authentication by the full signature of the testator. (Kalaw v. Yap. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy. the first unaltered will or the altered will not bearing the full signature of the testatrix? A: Neither. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus). ROSA opposed probate alleging that the holographic will contained alterations. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant. Jr. who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line from which the lands come from. sisters. she is obligated to reserve them intact for the claimants. CA. it shall produce no effect. is not reservable property. the Court ruled "the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. brothers. Salustia from whom he inherited the properties in question. . Hence.34 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. or by other similar means. Celedonia and Concordia. Upon Pedro’s death. Aranza. the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel. or that if granted to her. The registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan. 07 December 1982) KALAW. Q: Are the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celadonia. Celedonia argued that the properties left by the decedent are subject to reserve troncal because said properties had come from her sister. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. Marcelina was married to Victoriano.. sister of his deceased father. Esteban Sr. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired without a valuable consideration-that is. the surviving relatives of the decedent. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: 1. Celedonia and Concordia are now in the tug-of-war as to who between them should inherit the property left by the decedent. corrected or interlined. 12 February 1990) Marcelina applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land. Hence. Esteban Jr. The trial court's ruling that they partake of the nature of property required by law to University of Santo Tomas . corrections. The will itself must be presented. Therefore. corrections. claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole. etc. et al.. without descendants. 3. was not an ascendant. in Footnote 8 of said decision. named ROSA. ascendant of Pedro. which was altered by substituting the original heir with another. Natividad filed a petition for the probate of her holographic will. the hereditary title whereupon is based the application for registration of her ownership. as first written." But. Marcelina. In this marriage they had a son named Pedro. but at most only as respects the particular words erased. his father Victoriano. who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to his mother. Salustia. GRN 58509. A: No. the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. In the case of Gan vs. when a number of erasures. 2. 28 September 1984) Esteban Jr. the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891. GRN 83484. he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt. and belonging to the line from which the property came..

All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumous son. and Mercedes. held before the reservatarios received same. the surviving half-sisters of Francisco. acquired the property. Mercedes. all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the common ancestor. As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by representation. single and without any descendant. Thereafter. the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime. Florentino. 13 September 1913) Apolonio II married the first time Antonia. Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property. the surrender OCT which was in their possession-the latter refused. Just because she has a forced heiress. When Antonia died. Florentino. 15 November 1919) The subject lot originally belonged to Saturnino. does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of the legitime of the heiress Mercedes. (Florentino v. nevertheless. Apolonio III. called reservatarios. afterwards. within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved. while there are living. Sablan.35 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law. He is. Apolonio II died who was survived by his second wife Severina and the ten children and his eleventh son. his mother administered the property for him. (Florentino v. Mercedes took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother and among same is included the property which Severina inherited from her deceased son. Andrea. all of the relatives. Teresa. (Edroso v. all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages. nor did same lose the character of reservable property. is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. Apolonio III. GRN 6878. If Pedro had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property. to wit. Apolonio III. When Constancio Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso. Q: Are the properties inherited by Severina from his son Apolonio III subject to reserve troncal? A: Yes. however. declared it in her name for taxation purposes. by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his father. as reservable property. But if. of the descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property. GRN 14856. she was duty bound to reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives. The properties left by Saturnino upon his death were left to his children. with a right to her inheritance. Severina died leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter. Because Francisco was a minor at the time. With his first wife. all he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved. OCT was issued in the name of Francisco. and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. within the third degree. the posthumos ApoIonio III and his widow Severina. Apolonio III died in 1891. These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree. 15 November 1919) Right of representation in Reserva Troncal: There is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree. and who as such had declared the property in their name. Mercedes and Apolonio III. he married the second time Severina with whom he had two children. sold the property in question to Constancio Sienes. GRN 14856. Francisco died at the age of 20. his daughter by a second marriage. the subject properties are subject to reserve troncal. within the third degree. During the marriage he begot nine children. declared it in their name for tax purposes and . His mother. his posthumous son. As such heir. by operation of law. pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives. left in a will by Severina to her only daughter Mercedes. who thereafter. Severina. that he declared. his three children of his first marriage. inherited several properties. who are represented by their own twelve children respectively. he had an only son named Francisco. who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: property came. succeeded to all his property. Apolonio III. Q: Was the disposition in a will of the reservable properties extinguished the reserve troncal? A: No. The said property was inherited by her mother. Apolonio executed a will instituting as his universal heirs his ten children. Severina. but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant. does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received from her deceased son. the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. relatives of the latter. of the line from which such property came. Although said property was inherited by his mother. while with his second wife. executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes who. as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. Apolonio II. the said property becomes free property. he had four children. within the third degree. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso. The reservable property. because it is what by operation of law would fall to the mother from her son's inheritance. in turn. There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio II. his other three children (predeceased). in one of the paragraphs of said will.

so long as a reservatorio within the third degree from the propositus and belonging to the line whence the property came. therefore. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with Article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will.. The reservista cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservista. GRN L-34395. without determining the identity of the reservatario or where several reservatarios dispute the property among themselves. and it is nowhere claimed that there are other reservatarios of equal or nearer degree. (Gonzales v. Cipriana. 24 March 1961) Q: Can the reservista convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree. Hence. unmarried and without descendants. sons of Maria. Andrea. the reservatario nearest to the propositus becomes. The rights of the reservataria Eustaquia have been expressly recognized. as the reservatario entitled to the reservable property. to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of the reservista. namely. To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and.. heirs of the reservista Maria Cano. She could not select the reserves to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein. Q: Is the land in question subject to reserve troncal? A: The land in question was reservable property. et al. for the reason that the death of the reservista vested the ownership of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatario. et al. subject to reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia. its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of estate proceedings. Q: Is it necessary in order for the reservatario to acquire ownership of the reserved property that there be further proceedings declaring him as the owner of the reserved property. by his mother. Eustaquia filed a motion for the cancellation of the OCT and the issuance of a new one in her name. The said properties did not form part of the reservista’s estate. Of course. CFI of Manila (Br. the owner of the reservable property. v. the testatrix’s niece. half-sister of Saturnino was still alive. (Cano v. are to be declared. is in existence when the reservista dies. Inasmuch as when Andrea died. 19 May 1981) Maria Cano applied for the registration of a parcel of land in her name and which was granted. The reserva creates two resolutory conditions. where the registration decree merely specifies the reservable character of the property. and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. The motion was opposed by Jose and Teotimo. at the time of his death. further proceedings would be unavoidable. The oppositors. (Sienes. duly appealed from the order. in turn. Esparcia. the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by Andrea in favor of Constantino became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed. insisting that the ownership of the reservatario can not be decreed in a mere proceeding but requires a judicial administration proceedings. who contended that the application and operation of the reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary contentious proceeding. The reservees inherit the reservable properties from the propositus. GRN L-10701 16 January 1959) Maria died leaving properties. only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. and upon Francisco's death. her three daughters and three sons.36 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee thereafter secured the issuance in their name of TCT. A: The reservista could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. GRN L-12957. of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came Q: What is the status the sale of the reserved property made by Andrea? A: The sale made by Andrea in favor of Constantino was. et al. She left a will. Upon the death of the reservista. A: No. The reserved property is no part of the estate of the reservista. by virtue of the alienation. V). it was inherited. (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival. The lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate. not from the reservor. It is equally well settled that the reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors mortis causa. et al. since the basic requisites therefor appear on record. University of Santo Tomas . wherein the rights of appellee. But this is not the case. therefore. under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. The substantial portion of the estate was left to Josefina. Director of Lands. Upon the death of Maria.. consequently. if any survived her. automatically and by operation of law. The latter was. Francisco inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino. subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership. and that the Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the motion.

Juana was not a legal heir of Teodoro because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. like the deceased Francisca. Even if it is true that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero. Tomas has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the some manner from the illegitimate child. filed a complaint for ownership of properties. the family is in turn. the law does no more than recognize this truth. sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin. Paz (3) Amelia. The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment Following the rule in Article 992. filed an opposition to the probate of the will. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father.” The iron-bar rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate family is. the former. Ana del Val. Q: Who are the legal heirs of Simona -her niece Felisa or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo)? A: Under Art. Teotico v. himself a legitimate child. Cresenciano would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. By reason of that same rule. Sotero died in 1944. Cresenciano. The natural daughter 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle. “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Article 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. hated by the illegitimate child. Tomas filed an action for the recovery of the supposed intestate share of his mother. palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life. a legal heir of the testatrix considering that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of the testatrix’s brother. the latter considers the privileged condition of the former. Pablo and (4) Juana. (Article 992) (Leonardo v. Juana in the estate of Teodoro.37 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: A petition for the probate of the will was filed. 17 June 1987) . the children of his half brother. an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab inrestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. Q: Is Ana. Pablo. Juana died in thereafter. Corpus. as a legal heir. at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and his six minor natural children. claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that he was born outside wedlock. Article 992 provides that “An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother. the natural children of Pablo cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona because of the barrier provided for under Art. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. 992. 992. a legitimate brother of her natural mother. Juana. Sotero. was survived by two) daughters. 23 October 1978) Francisca died intestate. Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita was the legitimate child of Jose. Q: Can an illegitimate child inherit from the legitimate relatives of his parents? A: No. His will was probated.R. sum of money and accounting seeking judgment to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca. nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. by right of representation. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family.” (Vicente B. Ana wants the will to be disallowed so that the estate would be distributed in accordance to intestate succession. (Corpus v. by avoiding further grounds of resentment. while Silvestra died in 1949 without any issue. even if it be true. Luis (2) his half sister. a deceased brother of the testatrix. claiming an acknowledged natural child of Jose. hated by the illegitimate child. a deceased brother of the deceased but such claim cannot give her any comfort for. still he cannot. the daughter of his half brother Jose. 992. claiming to be the son of the late Sotero. it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. GRN L22469. the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent. Maria and Silvestra and a grandson. IAC. Under Article 992. Ana. in the event that that the will is denied probate? A: It is true that Ana claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose. in turn. Jose and Ramon. it is necessary to ascertain Teodoro’s filiation. L-18753. 28 February 1983) Felisa is a niece of Simona. his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother. Judgment affirmed. Q: Has Tomas a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Teodoro’s estate? A: To answer that question. Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona. Thus. In other words. (Diaz v. GRN 51263. At most. They may have a natural tie of blood. and the resources of which it is thereby deprived. GRN L-66574. in Teodoro's estate. the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of Maria. In 1964. in turn. 26 March 1965) Teodoro died at the age of 77. G. CA. At the time of his death.. Teodoro had no forced heirs. No. et al.

38 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee University of Santo Tomas .

The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. The mere difficulty to 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.” (Agcaoili v. Nakpil & Sons. Despite the completion of the condominium project. The very measures adopted by it prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object. neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him.. to be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God. Repeated demands were made but it did not pay. or which. when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge. it smashed the posts and caused the bridge to tilt. Agcaoili left and ask a homeless friend to stay in the premises. GSIS refused and opted to cancel the award and demand the vacation by Agcaoili of the premises.. Q: Is the incident a fortuitous event? A: No. he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. and the Nakpils was established. as owner and contractor. Thus. Caso fortuito or force majeure are events that could not be foreseen. It is. at that time was swollen and there is a current swift. The negligence United Construction Co. 165 SCRA 1) A barge. it is subject to the condition that he should immediately occupy the house. the amount of P962. Q: Is the imposition of 2% interest valid? . it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge. and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in. Thus. “In reciprocal obligations. 144 SCRA 596) Arwood and Consunji. and was not willing to put the house in habitable state. the parties acquired the right to reciprocally demand performance. was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and to have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision. For this reason they cannot claim exemption from liability. Inc. but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. But he could not because the house was uninhabitable. Because the house was nothing more than a shell. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation. the defects in the construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of. The construction was undertaken by the United Construction. He paid the first installment and other fees but refused to make further payment until GSIS had made the house habitable.78 remained unpaid by Arwood. for a breach of an obligation due to an act of God. respectively. on account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces. it was demolished. owned by the Luzon Stevedoring was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats also belonging to the corporation. Inc.39 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Book IV Obligations and Contracts GSIS approved the application of Agcaoili for the purchase of a house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project. while the Nakpils were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. There is no dispute that an earthquake is a fortuitous event or an act of God. Q: Can GSIS cancel the contract? A: No. were inevitable (Art. and the plans and specifications for the building were prepared by Juan F. 1174). There was a perfected contract of sale between the parties. there had been a meeting of the minds upon the purchase by Agcaoili of a determinate house and lot at a definite price and from that moment. (Republic v. Based on their contact. Agcaoili lost no time in occupying the house. Then. as is commonly believed. Q: Does an act of God which caused the failure of the building exempt the parties from liability? A: No. Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation. CA. but actually foreseen. (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. United Construction Co. an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and its environs and the building sustained major damaged. As correctly assessed by the lower courts. exclusively controlled by the corporation. such a thing does not happen if proper care is used. and was not a fortuitous event. the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor. rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of its negligence. GSIS. it cannot invoke Agcaoili's suspension of payment of amortizations as cause to cancel the contract between them. it can only be understood as imposing on GSIS an obligation to deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably habitable dwelling in return for his undertaking to pay the stipulated price.434. two more earthquakes caused further damage to the property. though foreseen. therefore. not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated. (Nakpil&Sons v. (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable. 21 SCRA 279) Philippine Bar Association decided to construct an office building. The river. Inc. Thereafter. in such a state of incompleteness that civilized occupation was not possible. entered into an agreement for the construction of Arwood's Westwood Condominium. For in the ordinary course of events.

Moreover. 13 July 1926) The late Don Lopez. they consolidated all their previous unpaid loans and sought from Gonzales another loan. The rate cannot be considered as "usurious" because Circular No. 905 of the Central Bank has expressly removed the interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is now "legally inexistent". However..5% per month usurious? A: No. executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of land with the following conditions: 1. the prevailing rate of dollar to peso at the time the obligation was incurred or that prevailing at the time of its payment? A: RA 529. the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the right is deemed acquired. (c) foreign exchange transactions entered into between banks or between banks and individuals or juridical persons. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of right. contrary to morals. Nevertheless. In their agreement. The obligation was incurred after the enactment of RA529. L43830. they failed to pay. for the land would have continued to belong to the donor so long as the condition imposed was not complied with. thus. G. under certain conditions that a public school be erected and a public park be made within 6 months from the date of the ratification of the donation by the parties as specified in the public document. brought an action against the Province of Tarlac. who was then a member of the Board of Trustees of CPU. they failed to pay. G. v. it cannot ignore the existence of such provision providing for a penalty for every month's delay. such condition cannot be a condition precedent. provides that an agreement to pay an obligation in a currency other than Philippine currency is null and void as contrary to public policy. Inc. (d) import-export and other international banking. Then the municipality of Tarlac transferred the parcel to the Province of Tarlac which applied for and obtained the registration. if not against the law. Sr. The courts shall reduce equitably liquidated damages. (b) transactions affecting high priority economic projects for agricultural. No. the owners of parcel of land donated it to the municipality of Tarlac. the rate prevailing at the time of payment must be applied. Province of Tarlac. alleging that the conditions of the donation had not been complied with and invoking the sale of the land made by Cirer and Hill in his favor. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum University of Santo Tomas . No. even assuming that there was a default of stipulation or agreement on interest. Sec. financial investment and industrial transactions With regard to obligations incurred prior to the effectivity of RA 529. G. It was later registered in the name of the donee. interest at 12% per annum. 27 November 1998) Q: What should be applied. it is specifically provided that the same shall be discharged in Philippine currency measured at the prevailing of exchange at the time the obligation was incurred except in case of a loan made in a foreign currency stipulated to be payable in the same currency in which case the rate of exchange prevailing at the stipulated date of payment.R. CA.R. No. as having emanated from the sources enumerated above. it provided that Consunji has two options in case of delay in monthly payment: a) suspend work on the project until payment is remitted by the owner or b) continue the work but the owner shall be required to pay interest at a rate of 2% per month or a fraction thereof. The donation was accepted by the municipal president. by foreign governments. (Parks v. or 66% per annum is iniquitous or unconscionable. whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. and an additional 1% a month penalty charge as liquidated damages may be more reasonable. as the condominium project was in fact already completed.M. 142277. their agencies and instrumentalities and international financial and banking institutions so long as the funds are identifiable. (Medel v. Evidently.5% per month. Q: Is the condition imposed suspensive? A: No. G. Under the circumstances. and.R. The donee could not do any work on the donated land if the donation had not really been effected. 22 January 1990) Cirer and Hill. CA.. Consunji. Q: Is the stipulated rate of interest at 5. Upon maturity. hence. Then.40 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee A: Yes. the interest at 5. The delay of Arwood is undisputed. No.5% per month. Since the agreement stands as the law between the parties. Consunji chose the latter option. L-24190. Inc. Parks. which is Article 2209 of the Civil Code. 1. They executed a promissory note which provides that the interest rate is 5. 11 December 2002) Franco and Medel obtained loans from Gonzales in various dates with a 6% interest per month in which Gonzales retain a portion of the loan as advance payment of the interest for 1 month. Cirer and Hill sold the land to Parks. Arwood should pay the 2% interest every month for the delay. The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with or is not deemed complied with. It is subject to exceptions: (a) transactions where the funds involved are the proceeds of loans or investments made directly or indirectly through bona fide intermediaries or agents. Consunji may still recover on the basis of the general provision of law. 131622. (San Buenaventura v. when a condition is imposed. Consequently. The stipulation is void. again.R. industrial and power development as may be determined by the National Economic Council which are financed by or through foreign funds. D.The condition imposed could not be complied with except after giving effect to the donation. (Arwood Industries. because it would be an invasion of another's title. On the maturity of the promissory notes issued by Franco and Medel.

now acting as timber license holders by virtue of the deed of assignment entered into a Forest Consolidation Agreement with other ordinary timber license holders. He executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the Javiers. Tiro had a pending application. the Javiers.R. The donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the condition. Where the parties to a contract have given it a practical construction by their conduct as by acts in partial performance. as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired. When Don Lopez donated the land to CPU. and the said college shall be under obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name. A contract with a false consideration is not null and void per se. It is settled that the previous and simultaneous and subsequent acts of the parties are properly cognizable indicia of their true intention. Under Art. filed an annulment of the donation. CA. under the second paragraph of Article 1461 of the Civil Code. Q: Are the deeds of assignment null and void. The said college shall not sell. heirs of Don Lopez. In case of insolvency on our part. No. it would be invading the property rights of the donor. on conditional obligations. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition. otherwise. one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself. the condition imposed is suspensive..R. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS". the condition imposed was not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one. (Javier v. when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school. the donation must be for an onerous consideration. Moreover. The first deed of assignment of is a relatively simulated contract which states a false cause or consideration. The efficacy of said deed of assignment is subject to the condition that the application of Tiro for an additional area for forest concession be approved by the Bureau of Forestry. We will pay to Da. public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement. the efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that the thing will come into existence. It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became effective. Tiro filed an action against them. 2. and if the said property upon appraisal at the time of the maturity of this obligation should not be of sufficient value to cover the total amount of this indebtedness. Afterwards. a relatively simulated contract. G. they entered into another agreement. also mortgage to the said lady my four parcels of land. the agreement executed therefor. Sr. good customs. he imposed an obligation to establish a medical college. CA. Marcela Mariño the indebtedness incurred in favor of that lady by our testator. the acquisition of rights. 1181 of the Civil Code. Any net income from the land or any of its parks shall be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of said campus and erection of a building thereon. 15 March 1990) The Alanos executed a document in favor of Mariño the following tenor: 1. To secure the payment of this debt we mortgage to her the house and lot bequeathed to us by the deceased. Hence. transfer or convey to any third party nor in any way encumber said land 3. I. L-48194. thus. for an additional forest concession. Thus. before the donee could become the owner of the land. However. for total absence of consideration and non-fulfillment 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: of the conditions? Is the condition imposed in the second agreement resolutory or suspensive? A: The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of Tiro and the Javiers reveal that the cause stated in the first deed of assignment is false. No part of the interest or of the principal due upon this undertaking has been paid. G. 3. to secure the balance. determining its meaning and ascertaining the mutual intention of the parties at the time of contracting. As to the second agreement. 112127. No. the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished. such construction may be considered by the court in construing the contract. Under Article 1346 of the Civil Code. Since Tiro did not obtain that approval. Q: Are the defendants solidarily or jointly and severally liable? . that is. At the time the said deed of assignment was executed. we cede by virtue of these presents the said house and lot to her. For failure of the Javiers to pay the balance due under the two deeds of assignment. when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law. said deed produces no effect. and damages against CPU alleging not complied with the conditions of Q: Was the donation onerous? Are the conditions imposed resolutory or suspensive? A: The donation was onerous. if any. Anastasio Alano.41 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: 2. which had for its object the transfer of said right to the Javiers. morals. never became effective or enforceable. Since Tiro never acquired any right over the additional area. (Central Philippine University v. the action for reconveyance that CPU had the donation. shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. The Javiers cannot be held liable thereon. or one where the parties conceal their true agreement. 17 July 1995) Tiro is a holder of an ordinary timber license issued by the Bureau of Forestry.

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A: One of the effects of the rule established by the code that the debt is to be regarded as "divided into as many parts as there are debtors" is that "the interruption of prescription by the claim of a creditor addressed to a single debtor or by an acknowledgment made by one of the debtors in favor of one or more of the creditors is not to be understood as prejudicial to or in favor of the other debtors or creditors. The obligation appears to be one, when as a matter of fact it is an aggregate of as many separate and independent obligations as there are creditors and debtors. Each creditor cannot demand more than his part; each debtor cannot be required to pay more than his share. Prescription, novation, merger, and any other cause of modification or extinction does not extinguish or modify the obligation except with respect to the creditor or debtor affected, without extending its operation to any other part of the debt or of the credit. The obligation is, in a word, pro rata, or in partes viriles. (Agoncillo v. Javier, 38 SCRA 431) Adamos and Feria purchased two lots from Porciuncula. Sometime thereafter, the successorsin-interest of the latter filed for annulment of the sale. In the meantime, during the pendency of the above-mentioned case, Adamos and Feria sold to Ayson Simon. Due to the failure of Adamos and Feria to comply with their commitment to have the subdivision plan of the lots approved and to deliver the titles and possession to Ayson Simson, she filed a suit for specific performance. However, since execution of the order was rendered impossible because of the judgment which earlier declared the sale of the lots in question by Porciuncula to be null and void, Ayson Simson filed, another suit for rescission of the sale with damages. Q: Are actions for specifc performance and rescission alternative remedies and not accumulative? A: The rule that the injured party can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment. If, as in this case, the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 allows the injured party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment. (Ayson-Simon v. Adamos, G.R. No. L-39378, 28 August 1984) De Luna donated a lot to Luzonian Colleges. The donation, embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos was subject to certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation accepted the donation subject to all the terms and conditions stated in the donation. Q: Is judicial intervention necessary for rescinding a contract? A: No. It is the finding of the trial court that the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause

are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts. Under Article 1306 of the NCC, the parties to a contract have the right to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of noncompliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. (De Luna v. Abrigo, G.R. No. L-57455, 18 January 1990) Villamor used to borrow money from Borromeo. On one occasion, the Villamor borrowed a large amount from the Borromeo, for which he mortgaged his land and house. The deed of mortgage cannot be registered to the due to improper forms, consequently he pressed Villamor for settlement. The latter instead offered to execute a document promising to pay his debt even after 10 years as soon as he is able. Villamor futher stipulates that he waives his right to prescription established by law. Q: Is the stipulation to pay after the lapse of 10 years a waiver of prescription? A: The terms of the contract are not clear on the period of redemption. But the intent of the parties thereto is the law between them and should be enforced. (Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-22962, 28 September 1972) De Leon is doing business under the name of Mark Industrial Sales, he sold and delivered to Silahis various items of merchandise. Allegedly due to Silahis's failure to pay its account upon maturity despite repeated demands, De Leon filed a complaint for the collection of the said accounts. Silahis presented as affirmative defense that a debit memo for P 22,200.00 as unrealized profit for a supposed commission that Silahis should have received from De Leon for the sale of sprockets made directly to Dole Philippines. Q: Was there a legal compensation? A: When all the requisites mentioned in Art. 1279 of the Civil Code are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, even without the consent or knowledge of the creditors and debtors. Article 1279 requires, among others, that in order that legal compensation shall take place, "the two debts be due" and "they be liquidated and demandable." Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set-off against the other is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot extend to unliquidated, disputed claim existing from breach of contract. Silahis admits the validity of its outstanding accounts with De Leon. But whether De Leon is liable to pay Silahis a commission on the subject sale to Dole is disputed. This circumstance

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CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER:

prevents legal compensation from taking place. (Silahis Marketing Corporation v. IAC, G. R. No. L-74027, 07 December 1989) Atty. Laquihon, in behalf of Pacweld filed a pleading addressed to MPCC entitled motion to direct payment of attorney's fee”, invoking a decision wherein MPCC was adjudged to pay Pacweld the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. MPCC filed an opposition stating that the said amount is set-off by a like sum of P10,000.00, collectible in its favor from Pacweld also by way of attorney's fees which MPCC recovered from the same CFI of Manila in another civil case. Q: Was there legal compensation? A: MPCC and Pacweld were creditors and debtors of each other, their debts to each other consisting in final and executory judgments of the CFI in two separate cases. The two obligations, therefore, respectively offset each other, compensation having taken effect by operation of law and extinguished both debts to the concurrent amount of P10,000.00, pursuant to the provisions of Arts. 1278, 1279 and 1290 of the Civil Code, since all the requisites provided in Art. 1279 of the said Code for automatic compensation "even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation" were present. (Mindanao Portland Cement Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-62169, 28 February 1983) Echevarria, as legal representative of the firm, "Viuda e Hijos de F. Suarez," filed an action against Zapanta for the purpose of recovering a sum of money. After trial, the court rendered a judgment against Zapanta. Then, they entered into an agreement or contract for the payment of said sum. However, Zapanta failed to punctually comply with the provisions of the agreement. Q: Was there novation? A: A final judgment is one of the most solemn obligations incurred by parties known to the law. And in Article 1156 of the Civil Code, it provides the method by which all civil obligations may be extinguished. One of the methods is by novation. In order, however, that an obligation shall be extinguished by novation, the law requires that the novation or extinguishment shall be expressly declared or that the old and new obligations shall be absolutely incompatible. The contract was not a new and independent obligation expressly extinguishing the judgment; neither were its terms incompatible with the obligations of the judgment. It was simply another method of satisfying the judgment. The judgment was not extinguished. The judgment was not satisfied and the obligation existing thereunder still subsisted until the terms of the agreement had been fully complied with. Zapanta was bound to perform the conditions mentioned in said contract punctually. (Zapanta v. De Rotaeche, G.R. No. L6910, 09 January 1912) Lopez obtained a loan in the amount of P20,000.00 from the Prudential Bank. He
2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members:

executed a Surety Bond in which he, as principal, and PHILAMGEN as surety, bound themselves jointly and severally for the payment of the sum. And he also executed a deed of assignment of 4,000 shares of the Baguio Military Institution in favor of PHILAMGEN. Q: Is the stock assignment made by Lopez dation in payment or pledge? Was there novation? A: The stock assignment constitutes a pledge and not a dacion en pago. The requirements of a contract of pledge have been satisfied: (1) that it be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (2) that the pledgor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged; and (3) that the person constituting the pledge has the free disposal of the property, and in the absence thereof, that he be legally authorized for the purpose. (Article 2085, NCC). According to Article 1245 of the NCC, dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales. Dation in payment is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. Lopez’s loan has not yet matured when he "alienated" his 4,000 shares of stock to Philamgen. Lopez's obligation would arise only when he would default in the payment of the principal obligation which is the loan and Philamgen had to pay for it. Since it is contrary to the nature and concept of dation in payment, the same could not have been constituted when the stock assignment was executed. Moreover, there is no express provision in the terms of the stock assignment that the loan is immediately extinguished by reason of such assignment. In case of doubt as to whether a transaction is a pledge or a dation in payment, the presumption is in favor of pledge, the latter being the lesser transmission of rights and interests. No, there is no novation. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the place of the original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. In substituting the person of the debtor, it is necessary that the old debtor be released from the obligation and the third person or new debtor takes his place in the relation. Without such release, there is no novation, the third person who has assumed the obligation of the debtor merely becomes a codebtor or a surety. The undertaking of Abello and Pedrosa that they would buy the shares of stock does not necessarily imply the extinguishment of the liability of Lopez. Since it was not established nor shown that Lopez would be released from responsibility, the same does not constitute novation and hence, Philamgen may still enforce the obligation. The representation of Abello & Pedrosa was a purely private arrangement between them, not an agreement between Philamgen and Lopez. Thus, there was no novation of the obligation by substitution of debtor. (Lopez v. CA, G.R. No. L-33157, 29 June 1982)

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Corpus was charged administratively. Pending the investigation, he was suspended from office. The investigating committee found the charges to be without merit. However on a resolution made by the Monetary Board upon recommendation of Cuaderno, Sr. Corpus was considered resigned. Corpus thru Atty. Alvarez, filed an action against Cuaderno, Sr., the Central Bank and Marcos who was appointed to his position. David helped Corpus in the case to which Corpus sent David a check but returned it pending resolution of the case. When the case was remanded for further proceedings, the decision rendered was in favor of Corpuz declaring illegal the resolution of the Monetary Board and ordering the defendant's reinstatement and the payment of his back salaries and allowances. Then, David’s law office made a formal de command upon Corpuz for collection of 50% of the amount recovered by Corpus. Corpus refused, thus, David filed an action against Corpus. Q: Was there a contract to pay attorney’s fees? A: Corpus' act of giving the check through his letter David indicates Corpus' commitment to pay the former attorney's fees, which is stressed by expressing that "I wish I could give more but as you know we were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimbursing my back salaries. This last sentiment constitutes a promise to pay more upon his reinstatement and payment of his back salaries. Moreover, David's letter-reply confirms such promise. Said reply states that David decided to be his counsel in the case because of the value to him of their intimate relationship over the years and "not, primarily, for a professional fee." David agreed to render professional services to Corpus secondarily for a professional fee. In addition, the payment of attorney's fees may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." Innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people. While there was no express contract between the parties for the payment of attorney's fees, David rendered legal services to Corpus and therefore is entitled to compensation under the innominate contract of facio ut des. (Corpus v. CA, G.R. No. L-40424, 30 June 1980) Fieldmen's Insurance Company, Inc. issued, in favor of the Manila Yellow Taxicab, Inc. a common carrier accident insurance policy. While the policy was in force, a taxicab of the insured, driven by Carlito Coquia, met a vehicular accident, in consequence of which he died. The insured filed therefor a claim for P5,000.00 to which the company replied with an offer to pay P2,000.00, by way of compromise.

The Insured rejected the same and made a counter-offer for P4,000.00, but the Company did not accept it. Hence, the insured and Carlito's parents, (the Coquia’s) filed a complaint against the company to collect the proceeds of the policy. In its answer, the Company admitted the existence thereof, but pleaded lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. Q: Do the Coquias have a contractual relation with the company? A: Second paragraph of Article 1311 of the Civil Code states that if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. A mere incidental benefit or interest of a person is not sufficient. The contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately conferred a favor upon a third person. This is a the restatement of a well-known principle concerning contracts pour autrui, the enforcement of which may be demanded by a third party for whose benefit it was made, although not a party to the contract, before the stipulation in his favor has been revoked by the contracting parties. Pursuant to the stipulations, the company "will indemnify any authorized Driver who is driving the Motor Vehicle" of the insured and, in the event of death of said driver, the company shall, likewise, "indemnify his personal representatives." In fact, the company "may, at its option, make indemnity payable directly to the claimants or heirs of claimants ... it being the true intention of this Policy to protect ... the liabilities of the Insured towards the passengers of the motor vehicle and the public", in other words, third parties. Thus, the policy is typical contract pour autrui, this character being made more manifest by the fact that the deceased driver paid 50% of the corresponding premiums, which were deducted from his weekly commissions. The Coquias who are the sole heirs of the deceased have a direct cause of action against the company. (Coquia v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. L23276, 29 November 1968) De Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at Mandarin’s restaurant. After dinner, the waiter handed to him the bill. De Jesus offered to pay the bill through his credit card issued by BANKARD. This card was accepted by the waiter card verification. However, the waiter returned and informed De Jesus that his credit card had expired. De Jesus argued that said credit card had yet to expire as embossed on its face. Again, the credit card passed over the verification computer but the same information CARD EXPIRED was produced. De Jesus left the restaurant and got his BPI Express Credit Card and offered it to pay the bill. This was accepted and honored by the cashier after verification. Then, De Jesus filed an action against Manadarin and BANKARD. Q: Is Mandarin bound to accept payment by means of credit card?

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Although Mandarin is not a party to the said agreement.R. Union Bank formally sent a letter to odyssey rescinding and/or cancelling the contract to sell and demanding Odyssey to vacate the premises. Then. Mandarin posted a logo inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village stating that "Bankard is accepted here. On December 23. when the offerer gives to the offeree a certain period to accept. even after he has chosen fulfillment. but this general rule must be interpreted as modified by the provision of article 1479 which applies to "a promise to buy and sell" specifically. Several tenders of payment of the sum of Pl. 1191. Odyssey paid the amount of P100.510. even though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration. the offer may be withdrawn any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal." whereby Rigos "agreed. He may also seek rescission. Inc. . Odyssey wrote Bancom stating that it acknowledges receipt of a copy of the letterprotest from the Europa Condominium Villas. 22 days after the execution of the contract. Araneta. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation. however. Q: Was there a perfected contract? A: ART. CA. an "Agreement" entered into by De Jesus and BANKARD. if the latter should become impossible. a parcel of land situated in Nueva Ecija.00. 119850. in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. Exhibit E. no signs of tampering. No. "the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance" except when the option is founded upon consideration. which is not binding until accepted. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. 1981. Sanchez deposited said amount with the CFI and filed an action against Rigos for specific performance and damages. Inc. After accepting the promise and before he 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: exercises his option.510. suspended and canceled PCCCI credit cards and. transferred and conveyed in favor of Union Bank all the rights. the general rule regarding offer and acceptance is that. Rigos. This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing. (Sanchez v. De Jesus' offer to pay by means of his BANKARD credit card constitutes not only an acceptance of the said stipulation but also an explicit communication of his acceptance to the obligor. provides that: The MERCHANT shall honor validly issued PCCCI credit cards presented by their corresponding holders in the purchase of goods and/or services supplied by it provided that the card expiration date has not elapsed and the card number does not appear on the latest cancellation bulletin of lost. otherwise the contract to sell would be cancelled and rescinded.000. If. 1324. it is a mere offer of a contract of sale. wrote Europa Condominium that the Europa Center and the parcel of land on which it is built are not part of the Europa Condominium . Under Article 1324 of the new Civil Code. v. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept. such stipulation conferred a favor upon De Jesus. This stipulation is a stipulation pour autri and under Article 1311 of the Civil Code De Jesus may demand its fulfillment provided he communicated his acceptance to Mandarin before its revocation. an option is unilateral: a promise to sell at the price fixed whenever the offeree should decide to exercise his option within the specified time. acceptance is made before a withdrawal. Inc. inclusive of interest and service charges. Thus. entered into a Contract to Sell whereby Bancom agreed to sell to Odyssey the parcel of land situated in Baguio City and the structure constructed thereon as the Europa Clubhouse.00 was made by Sanchez within said period but were rejected by Rigos. wrotes defendant-appellee Union Bank. stating that the Europa Center was reported to prospective buyers as well as government authorities as part of common areas and amenities under the condominium concept of selling to the public and for that reason wants to make it of record that Europa Condominium Villas. The Court shall decree the rescission claimed. As already stated." if "Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property" within the stipulated period.. Later.00 and other payments beyond the stipulated period. 14 June 1972) Bancom Development Corporation and Odyssey Park. Furthermore. title and interest it has over the property.R. in a document entitled "Separate Deed of Conveyance" Bancom confirmed and acknowledged that it has ceded. except when the option is founded upon consideration as something paid or promised. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones.720. Union Bank wrote Odyssey demanding payment of the overdue account of P2. in which Europa Center was reported to prospective buyers. Subsequently. In fact. No.193. within two 2 years from said date with the understanding that said option shall be deemed "terminated and elapsed. the holder of the option is not bound to buy. to sell" to Sanchez the sum of P1. alterations or irregularities appear on the face of the credit card. 20 June 1996) Sanchez and Rigos executed an instrument entitled "Option to Purchase... Moreover. in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. Mr. a letter. questions the propriety of the contract to sell. President of Europa Condominium Villas. this rule requires that a promise to sell to be valid must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price. unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.45 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: A: Mandarin is affiliated with BANKARD. promised and committed . If the option is given without a consideration. Q: Is rescission proper? A: Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code: Art. L-25494. G. Inc. (Mandarin Villa. with the payment of damages in either case.91. G. Bancom. it constitutes a binding contract of sale.. Vicente A.

the SC held in a number of cases that the rate of exchange for the conversion in the peso equivalent should be the prevailing rate at the time of payment. 897 was registered in the name of her grandfather. such that obligations or transactions may now be paid in the currency agreed upon by the parties. (Victoriano v. 529 regarding the rate of conversion remains applicable. Northwest Airlines.. No.. CF Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales. shall be discharged in the currency which is the legal tender in the Philippines. however. G. Thus. 87550. She secured an extrajudicial partition from all the heirs of Tamio. Inc. No. No. undisturbed in their possession of the land for more than 50 years. Inc. No. 529. Performance of the contract. Unable to execute the decision in Japan. Sharp & Co. No.A. casual or serious. The rule that the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment finds application only when there is an official pronouncement or declaration of the existence of an extraordinary inflation or deflation. Thus.158. 18 April 2002) Q: Is Article 1250 of the New Civil Code applicable? A: No. Inc. however. No. No. the failure of petitioner to even complete the down payment stipulated in the contract to sell puts Odyssey far from good stead in urging that there has been substantial compliance with the contract to sell within the meaning of Article 1191 of the Code. 529 is based equally holds true with R. The heirs of Arcilla. National Labor Relations Commission. Inc.A. Victoriano thereafter secured a title to said lot in her name. All that she and her heirs could present were a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" wherein the children of Tamio authorized their mother to sell Lot 897 to Arcilla. But since R. Thus. 133498. v. 107992.A. 8183. 8183. The breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the Code is the obligor's failure to comply with an obligation already extant. (C. the failure of which is not a breach. In any event. 529 does not provide for the rate of exchange for the payment of foreign currency obligations incurred after its enactment. And Masigla pointed out the circumstances to show performance: possession of the owner's copy of the title. Masigla could not. 897. entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement with CF Sharp. No. The Arcillas also paid tax declarations but the receipts were lost. The repeal of R. v.F. not to contracts either totally or partially performed. expenses incurres for the resurvey of the land.A. Inc. in Asia World Recruitment.195 Yen and damages for the delay at the rate of 6% per annum. The wisdom on which the jurisprudence interpreting R. SC.A. who thus waived their shares in the lot in her favor. 529 by R. sustained the ruling of the NLRC that obligations in foreign currency may be discharged in Philippine currency based on the prevailing rate at the time of payment. where a contract of sale is alleged to be consummated. tax declarations and the the immediate heirs of Tamio never contested to the Arcillas’ possession of the land. No. Sharp & Co. 8183 has the effect of removing the prohibition on the stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency. G. but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. Northwest Airlines filed a case to enforce said foreign judgment with the RTC of Manila. it matters not that neither the receipt for the consideration nor the sale itself was in writing. 18 April 2002) Q: What is the rate of interest that should be applied? University of Santo Tomas . it is just and fair to preserve the real value of the foreign exchange.A. No.R. authorizing the latter to sell its air transport tickets. Northwest Airlines.R. claiming that their father Arcilla. CA. G. that the jurisprudence established in R. 11 February 1991) Northwest Airlines. 133498. CA. the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Victoriano discovered that title to Lot No. Q: Is the Statute of Frauds applicable? A: The Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory contracts. It follows. real property tax receipts and tax declarations were in the name of Tamio. No. it being of record that the land has been in their possession since 1927. not a failure of a condition to render binding that obligation. had bought the lot from Tamio and that they had been in possession thereof since 1927.. (Odyssey Park.. No. because oral evidence of the alleged consummated sale is not forbidden by the Statute of Frauds and may not be excluded in court. subject to certain exceptions. stipulations on the satisfaction of obligations in foreign currency are void. In a contract to sell. represented by Masigla. necessarily must be duly proved. v. thus. filed a complaint in court for reconveyance of Lot No. Payments of monetary obligations.R.F. Q: What is the rate of exchange that should be applied for the payment of the amount? A: Under Philippine law. 08 October 1997) Masigla was in possession of Lot 897 in Cavite. applying R. through its Japan Branch. Northwest airlines filed a collection suit before the Tokyo District Court which rendered judgment ordering CF Sharp to pay "83. Inc.A. Verily. the new law does not provide for the applicable rate of exchange for the conversion of foreign currencyincurred obligations in their peso equivalent. therefore. present a deed of sale evidencing the transfer of the property from Tamio to Arcilla. (C.46 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Article 1191 cannot be applied.R. whether total or partial. v. Just like R.incurred obligation to the date of its payment. the testimony of the Arcillas is admissible to prove the existence of the sale. G.A. While the owner's duplicate of the title to the property. takes it out of the operation of the statute This performance. possession of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay".

Court of Appeals. 133498. is 12% per annum. which can be express or implied. Article 1318 of the Civil Code states that no contract exists unless there is a concurrence of consent of the parties. violence. to prepare a consolidated plan of the estate. Peñero. From the result of the survey.R. 1475 of the Civil Code provides: The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Art. Inc. there is no showing that Pastor returned the payments or made an offer to do so. Pastor was agreeable to the contracts. No. No. tried to negotiate with Francisco to increase the purchase price. intimidation. Sr. In the present case." Since the lot subsequently sold to Rodriguez is said to adjoin the "previously paid lot" on three sides thereof. Sharp & Co.. 21 November 2002) Juan San Andres was the registered owner of a lot in Naga City. G. There is no dispute that Rodriguez purchased a portion of the lot consisting of 345 square meters. (Francisco v. An annullable contract may be rendered perfectly valid by ratification. these are contracts that are valid and binding unless annulled through a proper action filed in court seasonably. by virtue of which the late Juan San Andres undertook to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing for a price certain in money. 1349. it is as if it has never been entered into and cannot be validated either by the passage of time or by ratification. only he wanted to get more. Thus. Peñero also prepared a sketch plan of the lot sold to Rodriguez. the legal rate of interest in obligations which consists in the payment of a sum of money.F. However. they filed a complaint for annulment of the sale. as in the present case. The fact that the exact area of these adjoining residential lots is subject to the result of a survey does not detract from the fact that they are determinate or determinable. Francisco bought the first parcel and paid in installments. Sr. error. As Art. Inc. The fact that the quantity is not determinable shall not be an obstacle to the existence of a contract. CF Sharp is liable to pay the amount adjudged in the foreign judgment. which has a total area of 854 square meters. the father of Pastor. Sr. but that the former’s capacity to consent was vitiated by senile dementia.. . Ramon sent a letter to Rodriguez demanding to vacate the portion allegedly encroached by him. Ramon San Andres was appointed judicial administrator of the decedent's estate. undue influence. the children of Eligio. and (2) those declared to be so under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. Further. that there was a meeting of the minds between the parties. He sold a portion thereof to Rodriguez as evidenced by a deed of sale. v. object certain as subject matter. entered into an agreement with Francisco. Hence. Herrera. When Francisco refused. Implied ratification may take the form of accepting and retaining the benefits of a contract. Q: Is the object of the contract determinable A: Art. The object of every contract must be determinate as to its kind. the contracts are not void or inexistent per se. Later. or deceit. v.. a voidable or annullable contract is one in which the essential requisites for validity under Article 1318 are present. it was held that absent any stipulation. Indeed there was ratification. the subject lot is capable of being determined without the need of any new contract. but vitiated by want of capacity.e. rather.. This is what happened in this case. 139982. and is clearly what was referred to in the receipt as the "previously paid lot. Upon the death of Juan San Andres. Article 1327 provides that insane or demented persons cannot give consent to a contract. Q: Are the contracts of sale void or merely voidable and hence capable of being ratified? A: A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning. was the owner of 2 parcels of land located at Cainta. with "interest thereon at the legal rate [12% per annum] from the filing of the complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied. if an insane or demented person does enter into a contract. she bought the second parcel. Thus. The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into. 1460. This portion is located in the middle of Lot 1914-B2. There are two types of void contracts: (1) those where one of the essential requisites of a valid contract as provided for by Article 131810 of the Civil Code is totally wanting. and cause of the obligation established. Northwest Airlines. the legal effect is that the contract is voidable or annullable as specifically provided in Article 1390. the thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new and further agreement between the parties. it was found that Rodriguez had enlarged the area which he purchased. Clearly. Contending that the contract price for the 2 parcels of land was grossly inadequate. Hence. But.R. provided it is possible to determine the same without the need of a new contract between the parties. Upon learning of the sale. Ramon then filed an action for recovery of possession of the disputed lot. It was only when he failed to convince Francisco to increase the price that they instituted the complaint for reconveyance of the properties. Ramon engaged the services of a geodetic engineer. Pastor negotiated for the increase of the purchase price while receiving the installment 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: payments. i.. Rodriguez refused. Rizal.47 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: A: In Eastern Shipping Lines. (C. 18 April 2002) Eligio Herrera. By contrast. Inc. it was established that Eligio. G. all of the essential elements of a contract of sale are present.

Despite the agreement of Camacho and Tuazon that Tuazon would voluntarily surrender the land. 23 February 2004) Camacho was the owner of a parcel of land situated in Balanga. The 2 brothers executed the assailed deed of exchange. and. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. however. Videlicet. Q: Is the deed of exchange null and void? A: The deed was entered into on July 6. Camacho filed a manifestation the civil case declaring that she had terminated the services of Atty. the purchase price was not yet due and payable. Bataan. and (3) the cause of the obligation which is established. 135634. Then. While Tuazon had been an agricultural tenant in the lot since World War II. inherited 64. Banzon? A: Yes. the provisions of the Civil Code. No. a subdivision plan was completed for the 64. Villaranda. Years later. After. Banzon entered into a contract for legal services in which Camacho bind himself to pay 5000 of the said lot. 31 May 2000) Q: Is there a valid consignation? A: Under Art. In general. Rodriguez. however. Honorio took possession of the lot and constructed a building thereon. Banzon filed a complaint-in-intervention. G. while the Family Code took effect only on August 3. through Atty.R. 31 May 2000) Q: Is the contract of sale a conditional one? A: It is evident from the stipulations in the receipt that Juan San Andres sold the residential lot in to Rodriguez and undertook to transfer the ownership without any qualification. (Heirs of San Andres v. No. with respect to the other. Rodriguez. Tuazon plowed a portion of the lot and planted palay without Camacho’s consent. the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. that it would be unsafe. Hence. then brought an action for specific performance to compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the deed of exchange. consignation is proper only in cases where an existing obligation is due. no formal deed of sale had yet been executed by the parties. 31 May 2000) A parcel of land located at Cagayan de Oro City was left to the 2 brothers and 8 other siblings by their parents.22 square-meter share of Vicente which was issued in his name. 135634. In short. Banzon. Vicente agreed to convey his 64. Camacho and the municipality. reservation or condition. 1. the contracting parties agreed that full payment of purchase price shall be due and payable within 5 years from the execution of a formal deed of sale.9 Honorio and his wife. when parties have expressed the terms University of Santo Tomas . Q: Is there a perfected contract between Camacho and Atty. It merely provides the manner by which the full consideration is to be computed and the time within which the same is to be paid. but merely voidable. Camacho and Atty.R. 1257 of this Civil Code. Consent of the contracting parties Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the agreement. the deed is valid until and unless annulled. the lack of consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void. therefore.035. (2) an object certain which is the subject of the contract.R. 1998.22 square meters of the property that had not been leased to Honorio. in exchange for a 500-square-meter property. Vicente Villaranda.R. Laws should be applied prospectively only. The stipulation that the "payment of the full consideration based on a survey shall be due and payable in 5 years from the execution of a formal deed of sale" is not a condition which affects the efficacy of the contract of sale. Thus. The other heirs were issued their own title certificates for their respective shares. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. Rodriguez. Banzon the authority to execute and sign for her behalf a deed of donation transferring a 17. Hence. unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. No. not the Family Code are applicable. there are three (3) essential requisites for a valid contract: (1) consent of the contracting parties.000-sq-m portion of the lot to the municipal government which was then executed and accepted by the local government. Banzon. must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code. Camacho executed a special power of attorney giving Atty. the 5-year period during which the purchase price should be paid had not commenced. Estate Administrator Luminarias leased 124 square meters of the property to Honorio Villaranda. Banzon is evidenced by a written document signed by both parties denominated as Contract of Attorney’s Fee.00 in the court. however. G. (Heirs of San Andres v. to give something or to render some service." Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into.48 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee (Heirs of San Andres v. on the other hand. they filed a complaint for forcible entry. 135634. (Villaranda v. Article 1305 of the NCC defines a contract as a "meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself. But it does not affect in any manner the effectivity of the contract. G. Atty. and Tuazon entered into an agreement to stay court order. Under this instrument. The contract between Camacho and Atty. At the time Rodriguez deposited the amount of P7. In this case. According to Article 166 of the Civil Code. It is an established rule that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only. This provision. 1976. G. No. 153447.22-square-meter portion to Honorio.

UCPB sent petitioners a demand letter to pay within 5 days the principal amount with the interest. 3. Banzon was obliged to negotiate with the municipal government of Balanga for the transfer of the proposed new public market to Camacho’s property. They were likewise required to execute a promissory note in favor of UCPB every time they availed of the credit facility. petitioners obtained from UCPB an increase in their credit facility. Apparently unsatisfied. Their nonpayment is defined as an "event of default" in the parties’ credit agreement.473. 1998. good customs. They executed another promissory note. 2. Considering that the contract is the law between the parties. There was thus nothing wrong with the services which respondent undertook to perform under the contract. No. the object of the contract is the 5. morals.200 square meters right at the market site. petitioners executed real estate mortgages over several parcels of land and over several condominium units in Makati.199. expressly states that petitioners had an obligation to pay monthly interest on the principal obligation. public order or public policy. In need of further business capital. Since Camacho bound herself to deliver a portion of Lot 261 to Atty. it is clear that petitioners failed to meet those monthly payments since May 30. Balanga Cadastre. in case of a default by petitioners. the thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. The failure of the parties to state its exact location in the contract is of no moment. penalty and other charges due.96 as partial payment of the accrued interests. the obligation is demandable and liquidated. UCPB is justified in invoking the acceleration clause declaring the entire obligation immediately due and payable. In response. it must be lawful such that it is not contrary to law. In fact. or any sum due" shall constitute an event of default. petitioners paid UCPB the amount of P10. Q: Is the debt liquidated? A: A debt is liquidated when the amount is known or is determinable by inspection of the terms and conditions of the relevant promissory notes and related documentation. UCPB applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged properties. and to take charge of the legal phases incidental to the transaction which include the ejectment of persons unlawfully occupying the property and the execution of the deed of donation and other papers necessary to consummate the transaction. 127520. G. 09 February 2007) Selegna Management and spouses Angeles were granted a credit facility by UCPB. third. Under the terms of the contract. Failure to furnish a debtor 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . (Camacho v. by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor. In this case. From respondent’s demand letter. to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger. mortgage contracts and promissory notes that UCPB was authorized to foreclose on the mortgages. second. In all these transactions. Object certain which is the subject of the contract Articles 1349 and 1460 of the Civil Code provide the guidelines in determining whether or not the object of the contract is certain. which does not indicate the absence of the principal object as to render the contract void. the execution of the Deed of Donation where Atty. 1998. Mora solvendi. Q: Are Selegna Management and spouses Angeles in default? A: It is a settled rule of law that foreclosure is proper when the debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation.000sq-m portion of Lot 261. Banzon represented Camacho pursuant to the Contract of Attorney’s Fee.49 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: of their contract in writing. Banzon was authorized to sign the same on behalf of Camacho. and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them. morals. As security for this credit facility. The parties stipulated in their credit agreement that failure to pay "any availment of the accommodation or interest. the parties stipulated in their credit agreements. which shall consequently allow UCPB to "declare as immediately due and payable all outstanding availments.R. the date fixed by UCPB. 1999. the moment a party affixes her signature thereon. good customs. Camacho’s consent to the contract was further manifested in the following events: the execution of the agreement with voluntary surrender signed by Tuazon. There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. the description of the property subject of the contract is sufficient to validate the same. UCPB sent another letter of demand. and the sale of 1200 sq. the debtor delays performance. CA. the cause is the why the contract or the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract. They are not contrary to law. Atty. the promissory note executed on March 29. to sell 1. That clause obliged petitioners to pay the entire loan on January 29. First. the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor�s performance. Cause of the obligation which is established In general. Atty. this is a mere error occasioned by the parties’ failure to describe with particularity the subject property. m. portion of the property right at the market site. Moreover. is defined as a delay in the fulfillment of an obligation. For the cause to be valid. public order or public policy. The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into. In the present case. or debtor’s default. he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is open to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach. Banzon. Then.

Moerover. subject to an interest rate of 21. It insists that the expiration of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement.909. operate and provide an earth station within Cubi Point for the exclusive use of the USDCA. Thus. therefore.82. the concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1) the event must be independent of the human will. On the contrary. We cannot impair respondent�s right to foreclose the properties on the basis of their unsubstantiated allegation of a violation of due process. G. Philcomsat and Globe entered into an agreement whereby Philcomsat obligated itself to establish. Q: Are the non-ratification of the treaty and the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement fortuitous events? A: Yes. Pursuant to the parties’ credit agreement. they are not ipso facto deemed to have abandoned their prior demand for full payment. the concept of a fortuitous event under Article 1174. and (3) the obligor must be free of participation in.R. the injury to the creditor. 03 May 2006) Q: Does UCPB abandon their demand for full payment when it accepted the partial payment? A: When creditors receive partial payment. A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be an "act of God. (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner. or expands. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. Globe Telecom." such as riots. which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure. (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. or an "act of man. The events made impossible the continuation of the agreement without fault on the part of either party. the force and effect of law between the parties. There is nothing in the enumeration that runs contrary to. an event must be unforeseen in order to exempt a party from complying with its obligations. it does not prohibit them from accepting such payments. Philcomsat contends that under Article 1174 of the Civil Code. expressing its decision not to concur in the ratification of the treaty to extend the term of the use by the US of Subic Naval Base. No. Globe notified Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue the use of the earth station. 165662. Thus. There are no circumstances that would indicate a renunciation of the right of UCPB to foreclose the mortgaged properties extrajudicially. Thus. refers not only to events that are unforeseeable.R. No. In order that Globe may be exempt from noncompliance with its obligation to pay rentals. or foreseeable but beyond the control of the parties. Philcomsat sent Globe a letter demanding payment of its outstanding obligations under the agreement. Under Section 25. It has. Neither did the parties have control over the subsequent withdrawal of the US military forces and personnel from Cubi Point. Such fortuitous events rendered Globe exempt from payment of rentals for the remainder of the term of the agreement.. Petitioners executed a promissory note. troops or facilities. foreign military bases. (Selegna Management and Development Corporation and Spouses Angeles v. Philcomsat filed a complaint against Globe. their acceptance must be made under circumstances that indicate their intention to consider the performance complete and to renounce their claim arising from the defect. While Article 1248 of the Civil Code states that creditors cannot be compelled to accept partial payments. it did not intend to give petitioners more time to meet their obligation. but inevitable. At the time of the execution of the agreement. on the basis of petitioners’ continuing default. or aggravation of. UCPB. and such new treaty is recognized as such by the US Government.75 percent per annum. strikes or wars. Philcomsat and Globe agreed in Section 8 of their agreement that enumerated certain events constituting force majeure which are either unforeseeable. The term of the contract was for 5 years. both parties knew that the RP-US Military Bases Agreement was to expire in 1991. there is no basis for their allegation that a statement of account was necessary for the petitioners to know their obligation. No. However. Philcomsat and Globe had no control over the non-renewal of the term of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement when the same expired in 1991.50 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee a detailed statement of account does not ipso facto result in an unliquidated obligation. Under Article 1174. Globe promised to pay Philcomsat monthly rentals for each leased circuit involved. Globe refused. Zambales. because the prerogative to ratify the treaty belonged to the Senate. Inc. the non-ratification of the treaty and the withdrawal of US military forces were not unforeseeable. Hence. petitioners likewise know that any delay in the payment of the principal obligation will subject them to a penalty charge of one percent per month. UCPB. shall not be allowed in the Philippines unless a new treaty is duly concurred in by the Senate and ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum when the Congress so requires. G. After the US military forces left Subic Naval Base. computed from the due date until the obligation is paid in full.710. In turn." or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons. Clearly. 25 May 2004) University of Santo Tomas . 165662. to imply that creditors accept partial payment as complete performance of their obligation. The Senate passed and adopted a resolution. The requisites are present in the instant case. G. but also to those which are foreseeable. it asserted its right by filing an application for extrajudicial foreclosure after receiving the partial payment. 147324. (Selegna Management and Development Corporation and Spouses Angeles v. in which they stated that their principal obligation was in the amount of P103. 03 May 2006) Globe had been engaged in the coordination of the provision of various communication facilities for the military bases of US in Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in Cubi Point.R.

it received partial payments. Generally favored in law. Thus." the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for nonperformance. to be based on real claims. unrelenting ashfall blanketed NAIA. JAL informed them that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their stay in Narita. a compromise agreement is merely required by law. Pinatubo eruption. No. whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred. they went to the airport to take their flight to Manila. However. 118664. Thus. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed their hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15. G. rendering it inaccessible to airline traffic. the consequences of which 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: the passenger must assume or expect. Each of the parties entered into a compromise agreement freely and voluntarily. 1991. Then. ALA filed a motion for execution to enforce its claim. MIAA unilaterally rescinded the contract on the ground that ALA failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date. both parties executed a compromise agreement with a stipulation that failure of MIAA to pay the amount to ALA within the period stipulated shall entitle the ALA to a writ of execution from the RTC to enforce all its claims pleaded in the complaint. Thus. However. it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. 1991. Q: Does JAL as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. The claims of the parties are valid. public order. when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due to the effects of Mt. 147349. To be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating experience for the Aganas. Francisco and Miranda at hotel Nikko Narita. (MIAA v. even if the delay were caused by force majeure? A: There is no dispute that the Mt. MIAA failed to pay within the period stipulated.R. Furthermore. 07 August 1998) MIAA conducted a public bidding for a contract involving the structural repair and waterproofing of the buildings of NAIA. JL 061. and public policy. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers and also paid for the hotel expenses for their unexpected overnight stay. The contract was awarded to ALA when it agreed to reduce the price. JL 001 in San Francisco bound for Manila. adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel. Provided it is not contrary to law. The difficulties in processing claims during that period are not "acts of God" that would excuse noncompliance with judicially approved obligations. Then. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions to resolve their differences. is inevitable. due to the Mt. Hence. public order or public policy. both flights were to make an overnight stopover at Narita. 1991. they were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from their personal funds from June 16 to June 21. thus avoiding litigation or putting an end to one that has already commenced. Francisco and Miranda. the flight to Manila was again cancelled due to NAIA's indefinite closure. ALA objected to the rescission and filed a complaint. Both conditions are present in this case. To be valid. such agreement is a bilateral act or transaction that is binding on the contracting parties and is expressly acknowledged by the Civil Code as a juridical agreement between them. MIAA advised ALA of a committee formed to determine the extent of the work done but ALA. in the absence of bad faith or negligence. At this point. morals. the court approved it. thereafter proceeding to Manila the following day. Q: Is the compromise agreement valid? A: Yes. To accommodate the needs of its stranded passengers. Pinatubo eruption prevented JAL from proceeding to Manila on schedule.R. G. Likewise. During trial. After the stay of the Agnas. (Japan Airlines v. Indeed. Corollary. and the agreement done without any fraud or vice of consent. but their predicament was not due to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. 13 February 2004) Q: Is the delay of payment a fortuitous event? A: Foreseeable difficulties that occur during the Christmas season and cause a delay do not constitute a fortuitous event. Since NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22. It has the following characteristics: . Such event can be considered as "force majeure" since the delayed arrival in Manila was not imputable to JAL. CA.51 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Miranda boarded JAL flight No. Japan. MIAA filed a comment and attributed the delays to its being a government agency. still was not fully paid. though foreseen. they filed an action for damages against JAL. the Aganas and Francisco left Los Angeles for Manila via JAL flight No. common carriers are not the insurer of all risks. ALA made the necessary repairs and waterproofing. first. They underwent distress and anxiety during their unanticipated stay in Narita. As an incentive for traveling on the said airline. good customs. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure. However. cannot be charged to JAL. After submission of its progress billing. A fortuitous event is one that cannot be foreseen or. at the airlines' expense. good customs. Ala Industries Corporation. JAL cannot be liable for the amenities of its stranded passengers by reason of a fortuitous event. No. Pinatubo eruption. Finding the compromise agreement not to be contrary to law. it is immediately executory. to be actually agreed upon in good faith. After all. morals. second. their trip to Manila was cancelled indefinitely.

In other words. Ong promised to replace the checks but failed to do so. or which. Belo filed a complaint for damages. out of the loan of the spouses with BPI. as well as the selection and supervision of her employees and that Real's negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. 1996. (MIAA v. and that it thereby incurred a delay in the performance of its contractual obligation under the judicial compromise. Belo. (Real v. First. or if it can be foreseen." Moreover. Thus. Since the delay in payment in the present case was partly a result of human participation -. Ong did not pay wholly. 147349. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire. the occurrence of the Christmas season did not at all render impossible the normal fulfillment of the obligation.R. and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.R. University of Santo Tomas . When presented for payment. 26 January 2007) Q: Is Real as owner of the food stall liable? A: Yes. MIAA cannot argue that it is free from any participation in the delay. Belo. it should have explained to ALA the process involved for the payment of AL’s claim. Thus. or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligations. Subsequently. so. Ala Industries Corporation. or if it can be foreseen. It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls. Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of January 25. The spouses. None of these elements appears in this case. G. To answer for Ong’s balance. Third.91 by depositing it with the UCPB. While Belo owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall. it must be impossible to avoid. sent Ong a demand letter asking for the return of the properties. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees. (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito. through counsel. must be independent of human will. a fire broke at Real's Wasabe Fastfood stall. though foreseen. was inevitable. processing claims against the government are certainly not only foreseeable and expectable. and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. In this case. 26 January 2007) Ong and spouses Robles executed an "Agreement of Purchase and Sale" of 2 parcels of land. but also dependent upon the human will. 13 February 2004) Real owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the PWU.the whole occurrence was humanized and was therefore outside the ambit of a caso fortuito. also located at the food center of PWU. the checks were dishonored. 146224. he issued 4 postdated Metro Bank checks payable to the spouses. the spouses sold 3 transformers of the rice mill included in the parcels of land. (Real v. Worse. No. there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen. there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of its employees. (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito.499. An investigation revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank at Real's stall. G.52 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee "(a) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence.whether from active intervention or neglect -. NO. In sum. Ong paid the spouses the sum of P103. Belo demanded compensation but Real refused. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area. It should have laid out on the compromise table the problems that would be caused by a deadline falling during the Christmas season. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee. 146224. however. the act-of-God doctrine requires all human agencies to be excluded from creating the cause of the mischief. the Christmas season is not a caso fortuito. Fourth. they filed a complaint for rescission of contract and recovery of properties with damages. it must be impossible to avoid. MIAA was negligent.Belo alleged that Real failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments. Furthermore. an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. it was not a fortuitous event. Hence. NO.R. Real had been negligent. Second. Ong deposited sums of money with the BPI in accordance with their stipulation that Ong pay the loan of the spouse with BPI. Q: Is the fire a fortuitous event? A: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will. Pursuant to the contract they executed. Real not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. Their demand was left unanswered. but a regularly occurring event. including Belo's stall. Such doctrine cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of loss or injury. G.

the agreement of purchase and sale shows that it is in the nature of a contract to sell. but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. the sale would become irrevocable without necessity of a final deed to consolidate ownership over the property in the name of the Lawilao spouses. (Ong v. (2) there must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract. Although both presuppose contracts validly entered into and subsisting and both require mutual restitution when proper. which even if initially valid. Moreover. However. but not because of a breach on the part of Ong for failure to complete payment of the purchase price.” Resolution is a principal action which is based on breach of a party. Q: Is there a valid tender of payment and consignation by spouses Lawilao of the balance of the contract price? . On the same day. even if this should be valid. The contract entered into by the parties in the case at bar does not fall under any of those mentioned by Article 1381. The breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the NCC is the obligor’s failure to comply with an obligation. 06 July 1999) 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: Is the contract between Ong and the spouses novated as to the manner and time of payment? A: Under Article 1292 of the New Civil Code. It is true that Ong paid the spouses small sums of money in contravention of the manner of payment stipulated in their contract. and (4) there must be the validity of the new contract. while rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the NCC. instead of paying the loan to the bank. The non-fulfillment of the condition of full payment rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without force and effect. Article 1383 is inapplicable. It implies a contract. Ong failed to complete payment of the purchase price.53 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Q: Is the contract entered into by Ong and the spouse be validly rescinded? A: Rescission. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. of the NCC. Janice Lawilao restructured it twice. 97347. Rather. otherwise. Article 1191 of the NCC refers to rescission applicable to reciprocal obligations. G. a son of the Benos spouses paid the bank. While Article 1191 uses the term “rescission. Under the contract. the agreement of the parties in this may be set aside. G. the payment of the purchase price is a positive suspensive condition. Ong’s failure to pay is not even a breach but merely an event which prevents the vendor’s obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force. the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable: (1) there must be a previous valid obligation. there must be an express intention to novate. such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. Furthermore. it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the parties or by implication derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between the old and the new obligation. and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other. or that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other.” the original term which was used in the old Civil Code. but the bank refused to accept the payment. Subsequently. as contemplated in Articles 1380. the Lawilao spouses filed with the MCTC a complaint for consolidation of ownership. however. which expressly enumerates the rescissible contracts. Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the NCC should be distinguished from rescission of contracts under Article 1383. novation is never presumed. (3) there must be the extinguishment of the old contract. On the other hand. the Lawilao spouses also went to the bank and offered to pay the loan. After paying the P150. The requisites are not found in the case. CA. In sum. to secure the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract. Again. CA. No. Eventually. Records showed that the parties never even intended to novate their previous agreement. casual or serious. "In order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitutes the same. was “resolution.000." Novation is never presumed. the Lawilao spouses immediately took possession of the property and leased out the building thereon. produces a lesion or a pecuniary damage to someone.00. the Benos spouses could redeem the property within 18 months from date of execution by returning the contract price. objected to by the spouses. 1/2 of which was to be paid in cash and the other half to be paid to the bank to pay off the loan of the Benos spouses. the failure of which is not a breach. in order for novation to take place. from which the article was based. 97347. No. his failure to do so brought about a situation which prevented the obligation of the spouses to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. (Ong v.000. These installments were. The subsequent acts of the parties hardly demonstrate their intent to dissolve the old obligation as a consideration for the emergence of the new one. Consequently. it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms.00. the loan became due and demandable. Thus. 06 July 1999) The Benos spouses and Lawilao spouses executed a Pacto de Retro Sale where the Benos spouses sold their lot and the building erected thereon for P300. The Lawilao spouses then filed with the MCTC for consignation. is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons.R. by restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to the celebration of the contract. In a contract to sell.R. they are not entirely identical. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause.

The trial court ruled in favor of Philam which was affirmed by the CA. petitioners simply: undertook the third measure and filed an action for annulment of sale. 05 December 2006) Khe Hong Cheng. the insurer. However. Thus. While the case was still pending. and (3) seek rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana). has been an accomplice in the fraud. the general rule. 2) That the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person. Moreover. G. The Philippine Agricultural Trading Corporation (PATC) shipped on board a vessel owned by petitioner Khe Hong Cheng. alias Felix Khe. Spouses Lawilao. they discovered that Khe Hong Cheng no longer had any property and that he had conveyed the subject properties to his children. If the creditor refuses the tender of payment without just cause. the following successive measures must be taken by a creditor before he may bring an action for rescission of an allegedly fraudulent sale: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor through levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor. i. 172259. when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise. is the owner of Butuan Shipping Lines." Since this provision of law is silent as to when the prescriptive period would commence. Hence. The said shipment of copra was covered by a marine insurance policy issued by Philam. spouses Lawilao spouses filed the petition for consignation against the bank without notifying the Benos spouses. from the moment the cause of action accrues. paid the value of the copra. This cannot be done. sank resulting in the total loss of the shipment. if by onerous title. The date of the decision of the trial court against the debtor is immaterial. the spouses Lawilao failed to prove the payment of the balance of the purchase price and consignation. the decision of the trial court against the debtor will retroact to the time when the debtor became indebted to the creditor. Spouses Lawilao. accompanied by counsel of Philam. No. the following requisites must concur: 1) That the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to. although demandable later. Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount to the judicial authority. (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor. the principle that it is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the prescriptive period for the action It is thus apparent that an action to rescind or an accion pauliana must be of last resort. exhausting the properties of the debtor or subrogating themselves in Francisco Bareg's transmissible rights and actions. No. the debtors are discharged from the obligation by the consignation of the sum due.R. save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria).R. that such judgment would not be satisfied. Philam had no idea. The vessel.400 bags of copra. G.. Since spouses Lawilao seriously breached the contract. Then. i. even if the spouses Benos did not rescind the contract through a notarial act. In the instant case. availed of only after all other legal remedies have been exhausted and have been proven futile. 5) That the third person who received the property conveyed. Philam filed a complaint for the rescission of the deeds of donation. Because of the loss. "The action to claim rescission must be commenced within four years. Compliance with these requisites is mandatory. 172259. the alienation. but would benefit by rescission of the conveyance to the third person. however. (Spouses Benos v. 1150. except such as are exempt from execution. What is important is that the credit of Philam antedates that of the fraudulent alienation by the debtor of his property. Indeed. In fact. 05 December 2006) Q: Does spouses Benos have the right to rescind the contract? A: The pacto de retro sale does not contain a provision authorizing its extrajudicial rescission in case one of the parties fails to comply with what is incumbent upon him. went to Butuan City to enforce the alias writ of execution. Philam only learned about the unlawful conveyances made by Khe Hong Cheng in January 1997 when its counsel accompanied the sheriff to Butuan City to attach the properties of University of Santo Tomas . at the time that the trial court’s judgment would be in its favor and further. before whom the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. Having been subrogated into the rights of PATC. they nevertheless rescinded the same in their answer with counterclaim. When the sheriff. 3. Philam filed an action to recover the money paid based on breach of contract of carriage. 4) That the act being impugned is fraudulent. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions. petitioner Khe Hong Cheng executed deeds of donations of parcels of land in favor of his children. Article 1150 of the Civil Code is particularly instructive: Art. shall be counted from the day they may be brought. the trial court rendered judgment against Khe Hong Cheng. Even if Philam was aware that Khe Hong Cheng had executed the deeds of donation in favor of his children. the complaint against Butuan Shipping Lines and/or petitioner Khe Hong Cheng was still pending.54 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee A: Tender of payment is the manifestation by debtors of their desire to comply with or to pay their obligation. applies. Q: Does the 4 year prescriptive period as provided for in Article 1389 of the Civil Code bar Philam to file its action for rescission of the subject deeds of donation? A: Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provides that.. the spouses Lawilao spouses never notified the Benos spouses of their offer to pay. Without availing of the first and second remedies. therefore. For an accion pauliana to accrue. Spouses Benos cannot unilaterally rescind the contract without the intervention of the court. All interested parties are to be notified of the consignation. After all. the same is rescinded in favor of spouses Benos. (Spouses Benos v. therefore. 3) That the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim.e.e. even before the filing of the consignation case.

CA. wrote Que informing him that it could not go through with the purchase of the property. Logarta also demanded the refund of the earnest money given by Goldenrod to Barreto Realty. that is. (Khe Hong Cheng v. may the seller of real estate keep the earnest money to answer for damages in the event the sale fails due to the fault of the prospective buyer? A: No. it was just. a seller necessarily offers to return what he has received from the buyer. in the more recent case of Adelfa Properties. Q: Does Reyes have the obligation to deposit the P10 million downpayment in the court? A: Yes. SC held further. Keng and Harrison Lumber. Goldenrod enclosed an earnest money of P1 million to form part of the purchase price. There they found that he no longer had any properties in his name. The obligation of the corporation with remained unpaid resulting to foreclosure. By seeking rescission. Under article 1385 of the Civil Code. It was an advance payment which must be deducted from the total price. Reyes as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract to sell of a parcel of land.55 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Khe Hong Cheng. Q: In the absence of a specific stipulation. In University of the Philippines v. Lim learned that Reyes had already sold the property to Line One Foods Corporation. barely a month from its discovery that Khe Hong Cheng had no other property to satisfy the judgment award against him. (Reyes v.R. Lim rejected Reyes’ offer. especially in the absence of a clear and express agreement thereon. whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale. Reyes offered to return the P10 million downpayment to Lim because Reyes was having problems in removing the lessee from the property. the trial court ruled that an action for rescission could prosper only if the party demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore should the court grant the rescission. There is also no plausible or justifiable reason for Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million down payment in court. G. Reyes was directed to deposit the P10 million downpayment with the clerk of court. No. Then. 11 August 2003) Barreto and Sons owned 43 parcels of land which were mortgaged with UCPB. which acted as agent and broker of Goldenrod. Goldenrod resorted to extrajudicial rescission of its agreement with Barretto Realty. 134241. rescission creates the obligation to return the things that are the object of the contract. as he has not received anything under the contract to sell. rescission creates the obligation to return the . that rescission of reciprocal contracts may be extrajudicially rescinded unless successfully impugned in court. 28 March 2000) Reyes filed before the trial court a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against Lim and Keng and Harrison Lumber. its action for rescission of the subject deeds clearly had not yet prescribed. it shall be considered as part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. Inc. Goldenrod did not pay UCPB. Moreover. all its assets and liabilities including the parcels of land were transferred to Barreto Realty. on the other hand. its silence thereon suggests an admission of the veracity and validity of the rescinding party's claim. has nothing to refund. Under Art. The principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another is embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. Such a seller may not 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: take back his offer if the court deems it equitable. Inc. Goldenrod's offer to buy the property resulted in its agreement with Barreto Realty that Goldenrod would pay the outstanding obligations of Barreto Realty with UCPB. It requested for an extension but it refused. It was only then that Philam's action for rescission of the deeds of donation accrued because then it could be said that Philam had exhausted all legal means to satisfy the trial court's judgment in its favor. G. But Reyes refused. Since Philam filed its complaint for accion pauliana on February 25. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution. Harrison Lumber occupied the property as lessee. 144169. to prevent unjust enrichment and ensure restitution. No. Rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. Lim. and it fails to reply or protest against it. Logarta. Lim requested a meeting with Reyes but Reyes kept postponing it. Depositing the P10 million down payment in court ensure restitution of the P10 million to its rightful owner. Goldenrod and Barretto Realty did not intend that the earnest money or advance payment would be forfeited when the buyer should fail to pay the balance of the price. the right to rescind contracts is not absolute and is subject to scrutiny and review by the proper court. If the party does not oppose the declaration of rescission of the other party. This principle applies not only to substantive rights but also to procedural remedies. to put the money in judicial deposit. thus. Goldenrod offered to buy the property from Barreto & Sons which it accepted. de los Angeles. When the term of existence of Barreto & Sons expired.R. Lim. In this case. And under Article 1385 of the Civil Code. Barreto Realty refused. the parties are restored to the status quo ante. Because of the denial of UCPB for extension to pay the obligation. equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim. Both Lim and Reyes are seeking for rescission of the contract. Goldenrod file a complaint against Barreto Realty. Lim filed his answer stating that he was ready and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. The contract to sell can no longer be enforced because Reyes himself subsequently sold the property. specifying the grounds therefor. The complaint alleged that. 1482 of the CC. v.. 1997. Court of Appeals.

A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Under Article 1216 of the Civil Code. Therefore. Bacusmo. LENDING CORPORATION may demand payment of the above loan from me in case the principal maker. G. to resort to and exhaust his remedies against the principal. However. as the Co-maker of the above-quoted loan. it is not necessary for the creditor to proceed against a principal in order to hold the surety liable. And no payments were made after the last payment.B. (Goldenrod." alleging that the alias writ of execution altered and changed the tenor of the decision by changing the liability of the respondents from joint to solidary. Consequently. if the surety is dissatisfied with the degree of activity displayed by the creditor in the pursuit of his principal. I am fully aware that I shall be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the above principal maker of this note. 126812. Lo Kuan Chin. Nemenzo. Dariogo. and INIMACO should pay to pay complainants in various amounts. the surety is likewise in default. The labor arbiter held that Filipinas Carbon Mining Corporation. he may pay the debt himself and become subrogated to all the rights and remedies of the creditor. 126490. Niere. generally. it left an unpaid balance. which in turn. she cannot now be heard to claim otherwise. Estrella Palmares. No.R. She that she voluntarily affixed her signature thereto. et al. The terms of the contract are clear. by virtue of the extrajudicial rescission of the contract to sell by Goldenrod without opposition from Barretto Realty. the corporation filed a Palmares as the lone party-defendant. No. At any rate. or of a guarantor who warrants the solvency of the debtor? A: Palmares is primarily liable as a surety. and may be sued immediately and before any proceedings are had against the principal. Mrs. and Alegarbes filed a complaint with the DOLE against Filipinas Carbon Mining Corporation. on the basis of Palmares’ solidary liability under the promissory note. It would be most inequitable if Barretto Realty would be allowed to retain the money at the same time appropriate the proceeds of the second sale made to another. Barretto Realty. v. Mahinay. the decision became final and executory. Pegarido. require the creditor or obligee. (Palmares v. That in fact. Gonzales. therefore. Bacus. where. the surety cannot at law. After the Azarraga spouses paid partially. then soon as the principal is in default. Palmares expressly bound herself to be jointly and severally or solidarily liable with the principal maker of the note. for payment of separation pay and unpaid wages. unless permitted by statute and in the absence of any agreement limiting the application of the security. Q: Is the liability of INIMACO pursuant to the decision of the labor arbiter solidary or not? A: INIMACO's liability is not solidary but merely joint. G. Since.B. the creditor has the right to proceed even against the surety alone. The basis of Palmares' liability under the promissory note is: ATTENTION TO CO-MAKERS: PLEASE READ WELL I. In the absence of statute or agreement otherwise. CA. had the obligation to return the earnest money which formed part of the purchase price plus legal interest from the date it received notice of rescission. Q: Should the corporation proceed first against the principal debtor before suing the surety? A: A creditor's right to proceed against the surety exists independently of his right to proceed against the principal. the creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. thus. Gonzales. sold the property to other persons. together with Palmares. Inc. is that if the obligation is joint and several. before proceeding against the surety. 24 November 1998) Pursuant to a promissory note M. Sicat.R. to the exclusion of the principal debtors. the obligation of the surety is the same that of the principal. particularly where both principal and surety are equally bound.56 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee things which were the object of the contract together with their fruits and interest. CA. is such undertaking of Palmares deemed to be that of a surety as an insurer of the debt. Lo Kuan Chin. is a rule that there is nothing to prevent the creditor from proceeding against the principal at any time." But it was denied. Palmares contends that although the second paragraph says that she is liable as a surety. a surety is primarily liable. by the insertion of the words "AND/OR" between "Antonio Gonzales/Industrial Management Development Corporation and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation. Chiu Chin Gin. the third paragraph defines the nature of her liability as that of a guarantor. and with the rule that his proper remedy is to pay the debt and pursue the principal for reimbursement. Moreover. explicit and unequivocal that Palmares' liability is that of a surety. I hereby agree that M. No appeal was filed within the reglementary period thus. Mrs. and INIMACO. University of Santo Tomas . 31 March 1998) Sulit. INIMACO filed a "Motion to Quash Alias Writ of Execution and Set Aside Decision. Merlyn Azarraga defaults in the payment of the note subject to the same conditions above-contained. The terms "jointly and severally or solidarily liable" contained in the contract which Palmares claims that are technical and legal terms which could not be easily understood by an ordinary layman like her is contrary to her manifestation in the contract that she "fully understood the contents" of the promissory note and that she is "fully aware" of her solidary liability with the principal maker. Lending Corporation extended a loan to the spouses Azarraga. Sicat. have fully understood the contents of this Promissory Note for ShortTerm Loan: That as Co-maker. allegedly by reason of the insolvency of the latter. Q: Where Palmares signs a promissory note as a co-maker and binds herself to be jointly and severally liable with the principal debtor in case the latter defaults in the payment of the loan. The rule. Chiu Chin Gin.

600 were damaged by tearing at the sides of the container bags and the contents partly empty. Chua secured the services of a cargo surveyor who reported that out of the 1. whereby the former . Bell. 110668. (Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. Such agent. No settlement of the claim having been made. Their contract expired without the rate adjustment called for the wage orders being implemented. of the obligation.R. In Eagle Security. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. as a representative of the foreign insurance company. PTSI should be held solidarily liable with EAGLE. or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Inc. Another wage order was issued. increasing said 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: minimum wage. Q: Does Commando. No. and Co. and Co. G. whose services have already been terminated by the contractor. (INIMACO v. vs. is tasked only to receive legal processes on behalf of its principal and not to answer personally for any insurance claims. Bell. a wage order was issued increasing the minimum wage in which Lapanday complied with. Inc." The cargo arrived at the Port of Manila and the entire cargo was discharged with a number of the cargo in apparent bad order condition. G. 31 January 2000) Espina is the registered owner of a Condominium Unit. In the dispositive portion of the labor arbiter. Commando provided security guards in defendant's banana plantation. the SC ruled that under the Labor Code. and Co. informed Chua that its principal offered only 50% of the claim which was rejected by Chua. NLRC. No.250 bags of the imported material. Commando filed a complaint against Lapanday. stamped at the lower left side of the policy as "Claim Agent.. Should EAGLE pay. 06 February 1997) Commando. NLRC and Spartan Security and Detective Agency.. when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires. It is clear also from such that it is only when the contractor pays the increases mandated that it can claim an adjustment from the principal to cover the increases payable to the security guards.R. G. thus their liability should merely be joint. In a joint obligation each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights. is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. Payment. the right of reimbursement from a co-debtor is recognized in favor of the one who paid. Espina as seller and Diaz as buyer. Commando has not actually paid the security guards the wage increases. Neither is it alleged that there is an extant claim for such wage adjustments from the security guards concerned. Bell. CA. in any other manner. NLRC. Smith. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states. Inc. which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance. for its own benefit. 112139.57 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation. Sicat. namely: Filipinas Carbon Mining Corporation. Then. The liability of Lapanday to reimburse Commando only arises if and when Commando actually pays its employees the increases granted by the wage orders. again. Nor can it be inferred therefrom that the liability of the 6 respondents in the case below is solidary. and INIMACO. Inc. Chiu Chin Gin. Commando demanded that its contract with Lapanday be upgraded in compliance with the wage orders but Lapanday refused. Otherwise. Thus. executed a Provisional Deed of Sale.. 101723. CA. Inc. Q: Is a local claim or settling agent like personally and/or solidarily liable upon a marine insurance policy issued by its disclosed foreign principal? A: Article 1207 of the Civil Code clearly provides that "there is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states. the principal (Lapanday) and the contractor (Commando) are jointly and severally liable to the employees for their wages to assure compliance with the provisions therein including the minimum wage. "against all risks" at port of departure under a marine policy with Smith. Commando has no cause of action against Lapanday to recover the wage increases. as security agency which did not pay the wage increases of the security guards can recover said wage increases from Lapanday after the expiration of the contract between them and the termination of the security guards’ services? A: As mandated by the Labor Code. 11 May 2000) Chua bought and imported to the Philippines dicalcium phosphate. Bell & Co. Thus. in case the agency fails to pay them the amounts claimed. Lo Kuan Chin. Gonzales.R. (Smith. the contractor would be unduly enriching itself by recovering wage increases. Pursuant to the above provision. The shipment was insured by First Insurance Co. The Insurance Code is quite clear as to the purpose and role of a resident agent. a formal statement of claim for the loss. vs. The increases in wages are intended for the benefit of the laborers and the contractor may not assert a claim against the principal for salary wage adjustments that it has not actually paid. The said fallo expressly states the following respondents therein as liable. v. Thus. Chau filed with Smith. the word "solidary" does not appear. and Lapanday entered into a guard service contract." The well-entrenched rule is that solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred. Chua then filed an action. The conclusion is in line with Article 1217. it can claim an adjustment from PTSI for an increase in consideration to cover the increases payable to the security guards. It must be positively and clearly expressed.

CA. DBP advertised in the SUNDAY PUNCH the public bidding and that DBP thereafter executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of Caperal.000. CA. Without foreclosure proceedings. otherwise. The novation must be clearly proved since its existence is not presumed.00 to be paid upon the execution of the contract and the balance to be paid through PCI Bank postdated checks. In other words. the said assignment merely complemented or supplemented the notes.00 through an Interbank check. FEBTC purchased the credit of Diaz & Company in favor of PaBC.000. with the conformity of mortgagee PaBC. but it was only after 2 years that Diaz was informed about it. executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold Rights in favor of Cuba over the same fishpond. The next day Espina sent petitioner a "Notice of Cancellation" of the Provisional Deed of Sale. Significantly. Diaz informed Espina that his checking account with PCI Bank has been closed and a new checking account with the same drawee bank is opened for practical purposes.R. No. Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the Deed of Conditional Sale. DBP appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question. being in its essence a mortgage. the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one. Allied Banking Corporation rented an office space in the building constructed on the properties covered by the mortgage contract. the obligation to pay a sum of money remained. cession or dation? A: No. Where there is no clear agreement to create a new contract in place of the existing one. Contrary to DBP's submission. That after defendant DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question. the latter accepted payment from Diaz. Cuba. despite the Notice of Cancellation from private respondent. penalties and surcharges University of Santo Tomas . accepting the offer to repurchase. "In this light. 22 June 2000) Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease Agreement from the Government. which reads: "Dation in payment. No. unless the terms of the new contract are fully incompatible with the former agreement on every point. was but a security and not a satisfaction of indebtedness. After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in favor. After Cuba failed to pay the amortization as stated in Deed of Conditional Sale. G. in turn. and the assignment merely served as security for the loans covered by the promissory notes. In the negotiation for repurchase. Nor did the assignment constitute dation in payment under Article 1245 of the civil Code. 118342. DBP's contention that the assignment novated the promissory notes in that the obligation to pay a sum of money the loans (under the promissory notes) was substituted by the assignment of the rights over the fishpond (under the deed of assignment) cannot be upheld. Diaz tendered to FEBTC the amount of P1." Novation takes place only if the parties expressly so provide.450." It bears stressing that the assignment. Q: Is the provisional deed of sale novated the existing contract of lease? A: No. Article 1255 contemplates the existence of two or more creditors and involves the assignment of all the debtor's property. acknowledged by him as partial payment for the condominium unit subject of this controversy. Allied Bank paid the monthly rentals to PaBC. novation is never presumed. Cuba failed to pay her loan. DBP. 05 January 1998) Diaz and Company got a loan from the former PaBC [Pacific Banking Corporation]. Cuba addressed two letters to the Manager DBP. whereby the parties agreed that the monthly rentals shall be paid directly to the mortgagee for the lessor's account. The former was only an accessory to the latter. After the Notice of Rescission. wife of Diaz. In the provisional deed of sale in this case. Subsequently. However. Cuba promised to make certain payments as stated in temporary Arrangement. DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission which was received by Cuba. G. in order to prevent the imposition of additional interests. Ms. it must be proven as a fact either by express stipulation of the parties or by implication derived from an irreconcilable incompatibility between old and new obligations or contracts. Neither did the assignment amount to payment by cession under Article 1255 of the Civil Code for the plain and simple reason that there was only one creditor. As security for said loans. the original contract remains in force. respondent's checks in payment of six installments all bounced and were dishonored upon presentment for the reason that the bank account was closed. (Espina v. both the deeds of assignment and the promissory notes were executed on the same dates the loans were granted. she entered with the DBP a temporary arrangement whereby in consideration for the deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional Sale. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land owned by the plaintiff Diaz Realty. Cuba executed two Deeds of Assignment of her Leasehold Rights. both could stand together.58 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee sold to the latter the aforesaid condominium unit for the amount of P100. Socorro Diaz. Cuba obtained loans from DBP under the terms stated in the Promissory Notes. (DBP v. After DBP has appropriated the Leasehold Rights of Cuba over the fishpond in question. a deed of cession of the right to repurchase a piece of land does not supersede a contract of lease over the same property. novation cannot be presumed to take place. 116805. Thus. Q: Does the assignment made by DBP amounts to novation. after the initial down payment. the DBP. As correctly pointed out by CUBA.R. whereby property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.00.000. DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of the fishpond in question. Diaz) asked the defendant to make an accounting of the monthly rental payments made by Allied Bank. shall be governed by the law on sales. paid Espina P200. either to partly or fully pay off the aforesaid mortgage indebtedness.

. G. Q: Is the amicable settlement valid? A: The deed to transfer of rights cannot be ratified. Diaz Realty Inc. intimidation. as well as the late Eduvigis and Dominador. G. No. that instead. Article 1390. that this dictum does not prevent a creditor from accepting a check as payment. violence. the SDIC issued to Danilo a Diners Card. On the basis of the completed and signed Application Form and Surety Undertaking. Security Diners International Corporation. even by an amicable settlement. the novation did not serve to release petitioner from her surety obligations because in the Surety Undertaking she expressly waived discharge in case of change or novation in the agreement governing the use of the first credit card. Thus. a void contract cannot be ratified. To be valid. as a mode of extinguishing obligations. both the objective and subjective aspects of the case which is the intellectual capacity of the person who committed the mistake. No. Danilo A. Gilda’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. and that a creditor may validly refuse it. (Molino 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: v. Danilo wrote SDIC a letter requesting it to upgrade his Regular Diners Club Card to a Diamond (Edition) one. (Spouses Guiang v. Q: Is the consent given by Leonardo to the extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily? A: No. More important. Leonardo filed an action to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. FEBTC received from Diaz a check. he sold the remaining one-half of their lot to Guiang under a deed of transfer of rights. Alto applied for a Regular (Local) Card with SDIC. ability and capability to make good such offer. The amicable settlement entered into by Corpuz and the spouses Guiang is a contract.R. 136780. 2 of the NCC.e. the parties signed an amicable settlement in which Gilda and her children will voluntarily leave the house. For staying in spouses Guiang’s house sold by Judie. Novation. Danilo signed the printed application form and Jeanette signed the Surety Undertaking. In other words. (FEBTC v. Such a contract is also void. Danilo secured from Jeanette her approval and the latter obliged. and spontaneity by fraud. they complained before the barangay authorities for trespassing. intimidation or undue influence. said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the FC. Victor. No. 16 August 2001) After the departure of Gilda Corpuz for Middel East. Q: Was the upgrading a novation of the original agreement governing the use of Danilo Alto's first credit card. He defaulted in the payment of this obligation. The check was subsequently cleared and honored by Interbank. together with the demand that the creditor accept the same. In sum. Danilo's request was granted and he was issued a Diamond (Edition) Diners Club Card. Q: Was there a valid tender of payment? A: No. refers to contracts visited by vices of consent. However. basically since it was committed with the intent of canceling and replacing the said card. consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent. 26 June 1998) Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late spouses Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo. the deed to transfer of rights and the amicable settlement are null and void. As a requirement of SDIC. however. the creditor has the option and the discretion of refusing or accepting it. It must be emphasized. as shown by the Certification.. tender of pament is the definitive act of offering the creditor what is due him or her. In general. that FEBTC did not accept it as payment. Thus. CA. Judie’s wife. Q: Is the deed of transfer of rights executed by Judie Corpuz and the spouses Guiang void or voidable? A: It is void. Gilda returned home and found that only Junie was staying in their house. contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake. 125172. In other words. 138588. as to extinguish that obligation? A: Yes. there must be a fusion of intent. undue influence or fraud. 23 August 2001) SDIC operates a credit card system under the name of Diners Club through which it extends credit accommodation to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and payment of services from its member establishments to be reimbursed later on by the cardholder upon proper billing. He got as his surety his own sister-in-law Jeanette Molino Alto. or by material incompatibility.59 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: on its loan. Danilo had incurred credit charged plus appropriate interest and service charge. which must be absolute and must cover the amount due. are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino Leonardo. Diaz was asked to deposit the amount with the defendant's Davao City Branch Office.R. a check does not constitute legal tender. i. Then. Teodoro. or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers. G. (b) it should be free and (c) it should be spontaneous. all surnamed Sebastian. Clearly. Piedad. To determine the effect of an alleged error. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error. She claims that her consent was vitiated because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement. . Corazon. par. freedom by violence. There is no doubt that the upgrading was a novation of the original agreement covering the first credit card issued to Danilo Alto. The latter used this card and initially paid his obligations to SDIC.R. may be done in two ways: by explicit declaration.

The extrajudicial partition between the Sebastians and Leonardo should be annulled and set aside on the ground of mistake. 1990. the consent of Leonardo was invalidated by a substantial mistake or error. CA. ignorance. Their claim is anchored on a 1-page typewritten document entitled "Pagpapatunay. made subject to final approval by the board. Litonjua offered to buy the shares. Thus. in order to invalidate consent should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract. Not having been subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. spouses Apacionado allege that they are the owners which is unregistered purchased by them from its previous owner. 1990. STORA. The private conveyance of the house and lot is therefore valid between Aparato and the spouses.R. in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged. Spouses Apacionado. intimidation. Art. the "Pagpapatunay" is not a public document. explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect." executed by Aparato. Aparato. It contemplates a situation wherein a contract is entered into but the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud committed by the other. the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. Art. contracts are obligatory. G. of the Civil Code requires certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by University of Santo Tomas . Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence. mental weakness or some other handicap. ALS should submit its final offer in US dollar terms not later than June 30. Moreover. it is enforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Litonjua stressed that the bid amount could be adjusted. decided to sell the latter’s worldwide match. which was in English. There was an exchange of correspondence between SMAB and ALS and Litonjua regarding the projected sale of the Phimco shares. Q: Is the “Pagpapatunay” entered into by Bonifacio and spouse Apacionado valid and enforceable? A: It is valid but unenforceable. Prior to the deadline for submission of the final bid. Although a conveyance of land is not made in a public document. with the resulting transaction. Enriquez. Leonardo.R. 19 November 1999) SMAB is a Swedish corporation with 3 subsidiary corporations in the Phimco. VP of Swedish Match Sociedad Anonimas was commissioned and granted full powers by SMNV to negotiate. the requirement of a public document in Article 1358 is not for the validity of the instrument but for its efficacy. Enriquez came to the Philippines and informed the Philippine financial and business circles that the Phimco shares were for sale. in whatever form such contracts may have been entered into. Then. No. The "Pagpapatunay" is in writing and subscribed by Aparato. 1332 of the Civil Code states that "when one of the parties is unable to read. which per another letter was increased to US$36 million. On the other hand. The Sebastians failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language known to Leonardo. The sale of real property should be in writing and subscribed by the party charged for it to be enforceable. Inc. that requirement must be complied with. SMAB made it clear that at the completion of the due diligence process. the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former. the law requires that a contract be in some form for it to be valid or enforceable.60 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Mistake. (SMNV). intelligence. 125485. or if the contract is in a language not understood by him. excluding the lighter division for US$30. Q: Is the contract of sale between SMAB and ALS unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds? A: Yes.6 million. or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. SMNV adopted a two-pronged strategy. who only finished Grade 3. lighter and shaving products operation to Match NV of Netherlands. Litonjua advised SMAB that they would be unable to submit the final offer. No. rendering the agreement voidable. the existence of which impairs the freedom. par (2). (Leonardo vs. (Cenido v. Then. and therefore does not comply with Article 1358. hence. SMNV initiated steps to sell the worldwide match and lighter businesses. These circumstances are defects of the will. Later. spontaneity and voluntariness of the party in giving consent to the agreement. When. however. and mistake or fraud is alleged. voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document." The provision was intended to protect a party to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy. 132474. par 1. filed a complaint for ejectment against spouses Apacionado. was not in a position to give her free. however. G. The presumption of mistake or error on the part of Leonardo was not sufficiently rebutted by the Sebastians. they signed a conditional contract with a local group for the disposal of Phimco. The Statute of Frauds embodied in Article 1403. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. Enriquez was held under strict instructions that the sale of Phimco shares should be executed on or before June 30. the then parent company of SMAB. 13 September 2004) Cenido. it does not affect the validity of such conveyance. as an heir of Aparato and claiming to be the owner of a house and lot. on the other hand. She did not understand English. SMAB replied informing Litonjua that ALS should undertake a due diligence process or preacquisition audit and review of the draft contract for the match and forestry activities of Phimco. Therefore. undue influence or fraud are voidable. However. 1358 is an exception. Generally. the first being to sell its shares in Phimco Industries. however. Litonjua in a letter expressed disappointment at the apparent change in SMAB’s approach to the bidding process.

It is not complete in itself. its offer was automatically withdrawn after said date and that Insular Life had not requested for an extension. object certain. MBTC had no knowledge of the stipulation in the lease contract.61 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: some note or memorandum in order to be enforceable. the letter does not state the mode of payment of the price. In fact. but merely regulates the formalities of the contract necessary to render it enforceable.R. without resorting to parol evidence. Insular Life awarded the general construction contract of the proposed building to Asselt Builders. the transfer of the building in favor of MBTC was properly held valid and binding. dollar terms. The purpose of the Statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses. president of Cebu Asiancars Inc. 04 October 2002) Insular Life invited companies/corporations to participate in the bidding of its proposed building in Lucena City. by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged. Although the same lease was registered and duly annotated. with four 4 other bidders submitted their respective bid proposals. After valuation. G. among the bidders. No. be it sale or novation. Meeting financial difficulties and incurring an outstanding balance on the loan. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale. AB v. the project manager submitted a report that Asset Builders’ bid was the lowest. Evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of its contents. G. it does not indicate at what price the shares were being sold." Q: Is dacion en pago by Asiancars in favor of MBTC valid and binding despite the stipulation in the lease contract that ownership of the building will vest on the Jaymes at the termination of the lease? 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: A: Yes. and a description of the property sufficient to render it capable of identification. for a note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute. payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s debt. 128669. In any case. MBTC was charged with constructive knowledge only of the fact of lease of the land and not of the specific provision stipulating transfer of ownership of the building to the Jaymes upon termination of the lease. upon the termination of the lease or the voluntary surrender of the leased premises before the expiration of the contract. Asset Builders sent a letter to Insular stating that it never received any written notice of award and since its bid offer had a lifetime of 60 days. it must be complete in itself and cannot rest partly in writing and partly in parol. CA. 128120. Litonjua was supposed to indicate in his final offer how and where payment for the shares was planned to be made. or some other writing to which it refers or within which it is connected. No. while the debt is considered as the purchase price. respondents were supposed to submit their final offer in U. to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation. The term "Statute of Frauds" is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale. However. provided that the proceeds of the loan shall be used solely for the construction of a building which. The Statute does not deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved. Asiancars obtained a loan from MBTC with the lot as 1 of the collaterals. CA. under the law. Insular Life filed a complaint for damages.R. and cause or consideration must be present. (Jayme v. 20 October 2004) Spouses Jayme entered into a contract of lease of their lot with Neri. Asiancars conveyed ownership of the building on the leased premises to MBTC. Asset Builders still had the freedom and the right to withdraw the offer by . The note or memorandum must contain the names of the parties. While the alienation was in violation of the stipulation in the lease contract between the Jaymes and Asiancars. Postqualifications proceedings of the bidders were made. Therefore. Then. Such note or memorandum must contain the essential elements of the contract expressed with certainty that may be ascertained from the note or memorandum itself. Asset Builders. thereby perfecting the contract? A: No. First. Thus. Q: Is there acceptance by petitioner of the offer made by respondent and was it communicated to the latter. The period given to Asset Builders within which to accept the offer was not itself founded upon or supported by any consideration. As such. (Swedish Match. the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor. by letter. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. In its modern concept. the essential elements of a contract of sale.S. Thus. However. Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. that is. valid for sixty 60 days. It was stipulated that Asiancars may use the leased premises as a collateral to secure payment of a loan which Asiancars may obtain from any bank. the terms and conditions of the contract. namely. shall automatically become the property of the Jayme spouses. The exchange of correspondence between the parties do not constitutes the note or memorandum within the context of Article 1403 of the Civil Code. MBTC’s own rights could not be prejudiced by Asiancars’ actions unknown to MBTC. common consent is an essential prerequisite. by way of "dacion en pago. consent. MBTC was a purchaser in good faith. Second.

before the acceptance came to be known by Asset Builders.000. (Lao v. Then. No. As Guansing defaulted in the payment of his loan. 01 February 2000) GSIS is the registered owner of 3 parcels of land. (Insular Life Assurance Company. Years after. there was only an offer and a counteroffer that did not sum up to any final arrangement containing the elements of a contract. the OGCC was allowed to continue occupying the second to the fifth floors of the building at an annual rental. the obligation to return what was given does not become legally demandable. The trial court rendered a decision restoring the father’s previous title. Art. Thus. payable in equal yearly amortizationlease rentals for a period of 15 years. v. It appears. 160719.62 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee communicating such withdrawal before Insular Life’s acceptance of the offer. 05 February 2004) Guansing obtained a loan from CDB. Besides. There was indeed no acceptance of the offer made by Asset Builders In sum. As of that date. In the meantime. since the filing of the action for damages against CDB and FEBTC amounted to a demand by the spouses for the return of their money. It did send a formal letter expressing and explaining its withdrawal. Asset Builders Corporation. 23 January 2006) University of Santo Tomas . GSIS and petitioner executed a "lease-purchase" agreement (second contract). with a down payment and the balance payable within a period of 15 years at 12% interest per annum. Spouses Lim. Indeed. GSIS agreed to sell the same property to petitioner for P2.R. Lao offered to purchase the property. filed an action for specific performance and damages against CDB and its mother company FEBTC. Moreover.5 million. gave petitioner unwarranted benefits and was grossly disadvantageous to the government.in fact belies the perfection of any contract arising from the first. GSIS obligated itself to construct for the OGCC a three-storey building on the Manila Bay reclaimed area or to make available another property acceptable to the OGCC. Under the second contract. the respondents) needs only to establish its case by a preponderance of evidence. 1412(2) which provides that the non-guilty party "may demand the return of what he has given" clearly implies that without such prior demand. Lim paid CDB P30. Lim. (Cavite Development Bank v. 147410. Ltd. Asset Builders had no knowledge of such acceptance when it communicated its withdrawal to Insular Life. or. he mortgaged a parcel of land. Republic of the Philippines. The foregoing clearly shows that the second contract caused undue injury to the government. Spouse Lim are thus entitled to recover the option money paid by them.000. joined by her husband. the party with the burden of proof (in this case. if the offer has been accepted. Lim discovered that the property was originally registered in the name of Guansing’s father. to secure the payment. G. Lolita Chan Lim offered to purchase the property from CDB. the subsequent acts between the parties did not even serve as a confirmation of that decision. compounded yearly. entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement (first contract). to be conveyed to the Republic under the same or mutually acceptable terms and conditions as those of the first contract. Under Article 1409(7) of the CC. through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). Then President Ferdinand E.00 as option money. The second contract was null and void ab initio for being in contravention of Section 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. that the father instituted an action for the cancellation of his son's title. Q: Is the second contract valid? A: No. G. The existence of a second proposal – Insular Life's request for an adjustment of the bid to accommodate the wage increase -. otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act". G. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the second contract gave petitioner unwarranted benefits and was grossly disadvantageous to the government. No.R. The disquisition of the CA is sufficiently exhaustive and convincing considering that in civil cases like this one.R. the contract was null and void from the beginning. GSIS agreed to transfer the property to the OGCC for a consideration of P1. No. However. interest thereon at the legal rate is awarded.000. Q: Can CDB and FEBTC refuse to return the option money paid by spouses Lim? A: No. Marcos approved the second contract by scribbling on the right upper hand corner and the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the same. CDB foreclosed the mortgage. 131679. the decision to award the contract had not been made according to the terms of the instruction to bidders. GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines.

Court of Appeals GR no.00 in favor of respondent Benito Ngo. petitioners and private respondents have not hurdled the negotiation phase of a contract. is a contract by which "one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver a determinate thing. Thus the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the contract to sell. not 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . Ngo vehemently denied having entered into such agreement. 500." Under Article 1475. became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. They paid Gatus an amount for which Gatus issued them receipts in her own name.R. thereby negating the existence of the meeting of the minds of the parties on the sale. As it were. X in his capacity as an heir entered into a contract to sell said parcel of land to Z during the probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased. 1458. from whom she received initial payment of P300. (Opulencia v. because petitioner entered into the contract to sell in her capacity as an heiress. Q: Is there a perfected contract of sale between the parties? A: None. As this Court sees it. Phil-Ville advised them to seek other sources of financing. 123908. 239 SCRA 385) Spouses-petitioners negotiated with Gatus concerning the possibility of buying his rights to certain units at a subdivision developed by respondent Phil-Ville for parties qualified to obtain loans from GSIS. they were allowed to remain in the subject premises. which is the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest on the contract to the time the contract comes into existence the perfection stage upon the concurrence of the essential X is a devisee of a certain parcel of land. especially on the price thereof. Petitioner’s testimonial and documentary evidence did not establish any definitive agreement or meeting of the minds between the parties concerning the price or term of payment. Based thereon. they looked for members who could act as accommodation parties. 09 February 1998) as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. From that moment the parties may reciprocally demand performance subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. In fine. and the other to pay therefrom a price certain in money or its equivalent. Finally. a complaint-in-intervention was filed by Co alleging that it was agreed that the subject lot would go to him after paying respondent Ngo for such lot. These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into contract of sell. much less having received any amount since he refused and even destroyed the checks given by Co. she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of land. the GSIS disapproved their loan applications. "the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. there being no meeting of the minds as to terms. (Co v. there was no contract of sale perfected between the private parties over the said property. 125835. Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable. The contention of petitioner that the agreement of sale between him and private respondent was forged during the arbitration meeting of 11 March 1979 is contradicted by the Minutes of such meeting.63 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Sales A settlement over a land dispute was executed between Ngo and Ong but before the court could approve it. Petitioner. At best. therefore. G. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations. supposedly as partial payment of the purchase price. In the contract. the evidence of petitioner does not indicate a perfection of the purported contract of sale which. Court of Appeals. In the meantime. The admission of petitioner himself that when he issued the checks amounting to P19. Q: Is the contract to sell entered into by X and Z valid even w/o the approval of the probate court? A: As correctly ruled by the Court f Appeals. there was nothing whatsoever that transpired to indicate that the sale occurred between the parties. under Art. After receiving the downpayment. No. X backed out from the contract claiming that the probate court did not approve the contract. Q: Do petitioners and respondents have a perfected and enforceable contract of sale or at least an agreement to sell over the disputed housing units? A: None. the latter destroyed the checks. to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them. We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s death. Jurisprudence teaches us that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise and undesirable contract he or she entered into w/ all the required formalities and w/ full awareness of its consequences. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and consequent “need of cash”. As they were not GSIS members." A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.000. only a proposed contract to sell obtained which did not even ripen into a perfected contract due at the first instance to private respondents' inability to secure approval of their GSIS housing loans. the petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representation in her valid contract to sell w/ private respondents. because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. However.

Abecia. The question to be determined should not be whether there was an agreed price. the sheriff sold at public auction a parcel of land belonging to one of the defendants. Upon failure of the defendant to redeem the land. In 1978. w/c is the fitness to be subject to legal relations. Inc filed a joint motion asking the court to issue a resolution to direct the Register of Deeds to register the memorandum of agreement that they executed on the property covered by TCT No. For indeed. was lost through death. in sales w/ assumption of mortgage. His heirs. The sellers could not render invalid a perfected contract of sale by merely contradicting the buyer’s obligation regarding the price. 313 SCRA 63) Y obtained a loan from the GSIS.” Accordingly. was executed covering vast tract of land. To satisfy the judgment. shall depend upon the happening of the event w/c constitutes the condition. then took over the contract to sell. (Sps. Y then negotiated for the sale of the foreclosed property to P who advanced the redemption price to Y. GSIS’s conditional approval of the sale of the property and assumption of mortgage never be became effective. Q: Will the action prosper? A: No. University of Santo Tomas . no sale is perfected (Ramos v. upon full payment of the purchase price? A: Indeed. but what that agreed price was. (Dawson v. ordering the defendants to pay damages.800 as down payment. (David v. 128016. redemption and sale and reconveyance. The “Deed of Absolute Sale w/ Assumption of Mortgage” itself was not perfected since assumption of the mortgage by petitioners was a condition precedent for the sale of the property to them. attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. petitioners necessarily become the lawful owners of the said lot in whose favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by vendor XYZ Development Corp. and being the ones who continued to pay the installments of the selling price from their own funds. the assumption of mortgage is a condition to the seller’s consent so that w/o approval by the mortgagee. contradicted the testimony of X. As a result. A died w/o having completed the installment on the property. Judgment was rendered in favor of complainant as plaintiff in the ejectment case. Y constituted a mortgage over his property. with P385 monthly installment thereafter. executed a contract to sell over a parcel of land. 279 SCRA 118) An agreement to sell between Talisay-Silay and DAE Sugar Milling Corp. Court of Appeals. 115609. DAE became one of the respondents in a case for damages. and subsequently raising the lack of agreement as to the price. could not have transferred the title over the lot through a Deed of Sale to A who had died seven years earlier. Levy on execution was then issued against DAE. B filed an action against Y and P for annulment of foreclosure proceeding. plaintiff X alleged that there was an agreement to purchase the lot of defendant Y for P15. Y executed a contract to sell w/ assumption of mortgage in favor of B. Mitra v. Article 1181 of the New Civil Code. 17 September 1998) A and XYZ Development Corp. To guarantee the payment of the loan. to his attorney as long as the property was not subject of the litigation.64 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee elements thereof. 115609 valid? A: No.. CA. Because of B’s failure to update their account and execute a promissory note. 000 payable as follows: P3. The GSIS conditionally approved the sale provided that B will execute the promissory note on the obligation to be assumed and paid directly to the GSIS. No. Thereafter. For this reason. XYZ Development Corp. The receipt issued by Y however. who then redeemed the property from the GSIS. In other words. the receipts failed to state the total purchase price or prove that full payment was made. Q: Was there a perfected contract of sale? A: Yes. Necessarily. the prohibition w/ respect to attorneys in the case extends only to property and rights w/c maybe the object of any litigation in w/c they may take part by virtue of their profession (Daroy v. Tiongson. Q: To whom should the final Deed of Absolute Sale be executed by XYZ Development Corp. partition is not the remedy to determine the ownership thereof.R. because DAE Sugar did not own the property covered by TCT No. Y and B failed to pay their obligation w/ the GSIS. 295 SCRA 733) Respondent Abecia was counsel of complainant Daroy in a case for forcible entry. Q: Was the levy over TCT No. as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired. the said property did not become part of the estate of A. assumed his obligations by paying the selling price of the lot from their own funds. The agreement to sell between Talisay-Silay and Dae Sugar did not transfer the property to DAE since the agreement was to sell and not one of sale. Q: Can complainant Daroy sell the lot to his counsel Abecia? A: The prohibition in Article 1491 does not apply to the sale of land acquired by a client to (1) satisfy a judgment in his favor. while judges. His juridical capacity. herein petitioners. prosecuting attorneys and others connected in the administration of justice are prohibited from acquiring “property or rights in litigation or levied upon in execution. 298 SCRA 239) In an action for specific performance with damages. Raet & Sps. 115609. the deceased had no more civil personality or juridical capacity. and completed the payment in 1978. Register of Deeds of Quezon City. it was contended that there was no meeting of their minds and there was no perfected contract of sale. provides that “ In conditional obligations. its ownership was consolidated in the name of Daroy. Having stepped into the shoes of the deceased w/ respect to the said contract. on March 1978. Petitioner and DAE Sugar Milling Co. the mortgage property was extra judicially foreclosed w/ the GSIS as the highest bidder. G. Complainant Daroy was the highest bidder. the acquisition of rights.

No. PUP moved to intervene arguing that the Memorandum issued by then Pres. (Union Motor Corp. whether constructive or actual. We have ruled that the issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. The court observed that NDC could not excuse itself from its obligation to offer first the property to Firestone. such can be strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription. should be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. . Therefore. G. it is a certain Eugenio. it was held that if the sellers cannot deliver the object of the sale to the buyers. In fact. Firestone instituted an action for specific performance to compel NDC to sell the property in its favor. morals. ownership is. to insist that Dominador should pay the price under such circumstances would result in Severina’s heirs’ unjust enrichment. No. Q: Were Severina and her heirs justified in not delivering the owner’s copy of the certificate of title because Dominador has not yet paid the stipulated amount? A: No. which in turn would convey it in favor of PUP. good customs. They executed a deed of sale. Court of Appeals. failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. is insufficient. Under the facts of the case. in a contract of sale. the vendor must possess title and must be able to transfer title at the time of delivery. In all forms of delivery. such contract may be deemed to be inoperative. the signing of the said documents was qualified by the fact that it was a requirement of petitioner for the sale and financing contract to be approved. the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded. To effectuate the sale as well as the assignment of the promissory note and chattel mortgage. or upon delivery of the thing sold. (Severina San Miguel v. Though tax declarations do not prove ownership. it is necessary that the act of delivery. title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. G.65 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Thus. et al. the subject motor vehicle) the thing sold remained at the seller’s risk. et al. reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Dominador discovered that the tax declaration of the land is under the name of another person. with the delivery of TCT. G. Although the Spouses have not yet physically possessed the vehicle. title only passes to the vendee upon full payment of the stipulated consideration. Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides “the contracting parties may establish such stipulations. Without passing on the question of who actually owned the land. CA. 109559. Union Motor’s agent required them to sign the receipt as a condition for the delivery of the vehicle. (Abesamis v.R. Severina’s heirs are not in a position to transfer title. 05 September 2001) NDC and Firestone entered into a contract of lease wherein it is stipulated that Firestone has the right of first refusal to purchase the leased property "should lessor NDC decide to sell the same”.” In a contract of sale. in a contract to sell. et al.R. The registration certificate signed by the respondent spouses does not conclusively prove that constructive delivery was made nor that ownership has been transferred to the respondent spouses. In Nool v CA. The essence of a sale is the transfer of title or an agreement to transfer it for a price actually paid or promised. the vendor need not possess title to the thing sold at the perfection of the contract. Severina’s heirs anchor their claim on the “kasunduan” stressing on their freedom to stipulate and the binding effects of contracts. Inasmuch as there was neither physical nor constructive delivery of a determinate thing. Aquino ordered the transfer of the whole NDC compound to the Government. They then executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel mortgage in favor of Union Motor w/c in turn assigned the same with Jardine Finance. Severina’s heir refused to release the certificate of title contending that Dominador. Court of Appeals. Like the receipt and the invoice. In a contract of sale. Severina’s heirs have nothing to counter the document. However. 20 July 2001) Severina’s heirs entered into a compromise with 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Dominador. This argument is misplaced. clauses. In the latter contract. 117187. the spouses were required to sign documents one of which was a sales invoice. The petitioner should therefore bear the loss of the subject motor vehicle after Sosmeña allegedly stole the same. We rule in favor of the respondent Bernal spouses.R. So he asked that the title be first released. In a contract of sale. Q: Was there a transfer of ownership of the subject vehicle? A: No. 19 July 2001) Respondent spouses purchased a jeepney from Union Motor to be paid in installments. whereas in a contract to sell. a deed of sale or some other contract was necessary to consummate the sale. 136054. without the intention. After the rumor that NDC will transfer the lot to PUP. It was discovered that the said agent stole the vehicle even prior to its delivery to the spouses. public order or public policy. the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery to the thing sold. v. No. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to law. in w/c Severina’s heirs will sell the subject lots to Dominador. by agreement. an invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature. (in this case. have not paid the stipulated amount. quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. It should be noted that there is no proof of ownership in favor of the Severina’s heirs. Otherwise stated. The act. who holds a tax declaration over the said land in his name.

Villaba paid Soliva for the occupation of the house. In determining the question of who is first in possession. in view of the total amount of its investments in the property. Since Cruz refused to vacate the premises. subsequently. to respondent on April 24. the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession. the possession mentioned in Article 1544 includes not only material but also symbolic possession. indeed. certain basic parameters have been established by jurisprudence. (PUP v. G. No. provided there is good faith. Q: Was there a perfected contract of sale between the Spouses Firme and Bukal Enterprises? A: None. The Spouses Firme found the terms and conditions unacceptable and told Aviles that they would not sell the property. Bukal Enterprises filed a complaint for specific performance alleging that the Firmes did not make good of their promise to sell their property. Firme was consistent in his testimony that he and his wife rejected the provisions of the Third Draft presented by Aviles during their second meeting on 6 February 1995. G. the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to sell to anybody at any price until after he has made an offer to sell to the latter at a certain price and the lessee has failed to accept it. 151212. "Should there be no inscription. When shown a copy of the First Draft. The vice president of Bukal Enterprises authorized his friend. However. When Villaba died. Fourth. and promised to buy the house and lot. the property — which was public land — had not been registered in the name of Galino. As shown. On the other hand. The option in this case was incorporated in the contracts of lease by NDC for the benefit of FIRESTONE which. hence. possessors in good faith are those who are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of acquisition. 146608. v.R. 143513. G. 1998. Ten Forty filed an ejectment case against the former. First. to negotiate with the Spouses for the purchase of the property. Aviles showed them only one draft deed of sale (Third Draft) during their second and last meeting on 6 February 1995. it has not been able to establish that its Deed of Sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Olongapo City. It admits that.R. Dr. Only if FIRESTONE failed to exercise its right of first priority could NDC lawfully sell the property to petitioner PUP. upon those who allege bad faith on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof. Earlier. the law gives preferential right to the buyer who in good faith is first in possession.60 hectares to FIRESTONE prior to the sale in favor of PUP. Consistent with their agreement. Firme v. good faith is always presumed. Cruz. It is a settled principle in civil law that when a lease contract contains a right of first refusal. Witness Dr. (Ten Forty Realty & Dev’t. respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. a broker. wanted to be assured that it would be given the first opportunity to buy the property at a price for which it would be offered. there was no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioner's right of ownership. Corp. his wife. therefore. it did not acquire possession either materially or symbolically. Galino was in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession.R. took possession of the University of Santo Tomas . Firme testified that it was not the deed of sale shown to them by Aviles during their second meeting 26 and that the Third Draft was completely different from the First Draft. Third. to the person who presents the oldest title. which reads as follows: "Should it be immovable property. the records indubitably show that there was no consent on the part of the Spouses Firme." Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5. Court of Appeals. buyers of real property that is in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary — they must investigate the rights of the possessors. the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. It is alleged by Ten Forty that Galino sold the same property to respondent Cruz and that Cruz immediately took possession of the said property. The lessee has a right that the lessor's first offer shall be in his favor. (Sps. Petitioner thus argues that being the first buyer. In the absence of the required inscription. Bukal Enterprises. the former's name appeared on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. Q: Who has a better right between petitioner Ten Forty and Cruz? A: The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at different times is governed by Article 1544. No. 10 September 2003) Spouses Firme are the registered owners of a parcel of land. in the absence thereof. it has a better right to own the realty. the Spouses denied that they had perfected contract of sale since they rejected the drafts offered by Bukal Enterprises. 14 November 2001) Ten Forty Realty purchased from Galino the disputed parcel of land. Second. As between the two buyers. 1996 and. the sale has not been recorded in the Registry of Deeds.66 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Q: Can Firestone exercise its right of first refusal? A: Yes. Thus. First. it was then implicit for NDC to have first offered the leased premises of 2. 23 October 2003) Villaba w/ Soliva’s permission occupied the latter’s house. Ten Forty contended it merely tolerated Cruz’s occupation of the disputed property. thus. and. No. we ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to petitioner. At the time. respondent was first in actual possession of the property. Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. Witness Aviles did not present any draft deed of sale during his first meeting with the Spouses Firme on 30 January 1995. Its claim of an unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute Sale is not equivalent to registration.

000. 08 December 2003) Parcels of land became the subject of Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by Hilario in favor of the respondents. it cannot be said that Agricom violated the contract of lease. acts. such as the relative situations of the parties at that time. (Sps Austria v. GR No. Agricom had the duty to maintain Chua Tee Dee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises. However. G. The duty "to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the duration of the contract" mentioned in No. The remedy of the unpaid seller is to sue for collection or.1654 of the Civil Code. when she filed her complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of the property. Chua Tee Dee had not been disturbed in her legal possession of the property in derogation of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code. Q: Does the transaction involve an absolute sale or an equitable mortgage of real property? A: It is an absolute sale. As lessor. then. the attitudes. Upon the facts found by the trial and the appellate courts. is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. To determine whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage in reality. petitioner did not exercise her right either to seek specific performance or to rescind the verbal contract of sale until May 1982. the Villaba’s wife refused to vacate the said property. Thus.00 for the 3 lots was executed and notarized. no case was filed by any of the said claimants against her or her lessor during the time she occupied the premises. "The Court shall decree the rescission claimed. No. in case of a substantial breach. Intestate Estate of Villaba. Pioneer sent a letter to Agricom complaining of facts and events which disrupted its operations in the plantation. The nonpayment of the full consideration did not invalidate the contract of sale. A new deed of absolute sale indicating a selling price of P50. In the present petition for review. the court is not limited to the 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: written memorials of the transaction. 154017.00 as the price purportedly to lessen the taxes and fees that they will be paying. documentary and parol evidence may be submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties. the titles of said lots were transferred to the respondents. and generally. on the other hand. respondents insisted that petitioner Hilario sold to them the lots in question.R. Villaba’s wife came to know that her late husband had already paid the certain amount out of the purchase price for the house and lot and that Soliva’s claim of ownership has already prescribed. Even if it had not been so. In their answer. Under settled doctrine. Q: Did the failure of respondent to fully pay the purchase price render the contract invalid? A: No. nonpayment is a resolutory condition that extinguishes the transaction existing for a time and discharges the obligations created there under. and not physical. Some of them went to its office and even presented tax declarations to prove their claims. the lessor is still duty-bound under Art. Patently.67 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: property. Dee and Pioneer. The transaction embodied in a deed of absolute sale was for the price of P240. destroyed the house and built a new one. Shortly thereafter. The rescission of a sale of immovables. Sps Gonzales. the negotiations between them leading to the deed. In the case at bar. The severed employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against Agricom. Q: Did Agricom fail to maintain Dee in a quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises? A: NO. 000. As such. Decisive for the proper determination of the true nature of the transaction between the parties is the intent of the parties. and declarations of the parties. before the properties were registered. When Chua Tee Dee's representative saw that a portion of the leased premises was being fenced by the claimants. . 147321. (Soliva v. This is so because the decisive factor in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties. True. possession. These alternative remedies of specific performance and rescission are provided under Article 1191. all pertinent facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design and understanding. 21 January 2004) A contract of lease was entered into by Agricom and Dee doing business under the name and style “Pioneer” Thereafter. conduct. the petitioner did not file any suit against any of the claimants. as shown not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the surrounding circumstances. Despite repeated demands. 000. Such duty was made as part of the contract of lease entered into by the parties. Soliva argues that the oral contract of sale was invalid because respondent failed to comply with obligation to pay in full the purchase price of the house and lot. However. However. 3 of the article is merely a warranty that the lessee shall not be disturbed in his legal. petitioner Hilario asked for the execution of another deed of absolute sale indicating P50. Chua Tee Dee also failed to prove that she suffered any loss from the labor case that was filed against her enterprise and her husband. she had all the right to sue the intruders who had disturbed her physical possession as provided for in Article 1654. But petitioners claimed that the transactions entered into were not actually sales but merely loans. Pioneer claimed that it was dragged into labor disputes not of its own making and complained of being pestered by some individuals who claimed portions of the plantation as their own property. Agricom sent letters to its employees of their termination by virtue of the lease contract by Dee of the company’s premises. Chua Tee Dee claims that several people presented tax declarations to her and claimed some portions of the leased premises. unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.00. to rescind the contract. There is no conclusive test to determine whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation secured by a mortgage. Soliva filed complaint for recovery of ownership and possession.

forms and words. suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract is an University of Santo Tomas . yielding as it does to clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 155856. thereby merely altering the relationship of the parties from seller and buyer. Ceballos defaulted. Concededly. 1602. Intestate Estate of the Late Emigdio Mercado.00 but the latter's wife refused since the same was already transferred in their names by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. while the subject property is not transferred but subjected to a lien in favor of the latter. Even as the Deeds of Sale indicate the name of Dalisay.R. (Ceballos v. Jr. during the interregnum. RTC and CA both ruled in favor of respondent. Respondent as special administratrix of the estate of Dalisay Sr.may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated under Art. the owner of the property and thus. a 'Deed of Absolute Sale' was executed by Ceballos and her husband whereby the mortgaged property was sold to Mercado for the price of P16. neither possessed nor exercised attributes of ownership over the lands. as vendee of the parcels of land. Jr. Dalisay. the existence of any one of the conditions under Article 1602 of the New Civil Code. can validly sell such property? A: No. 1602 of the Civil Code. to mortgagor and mortgagee. As a consequence. We find no cogent reason to reverse their factual finding. appellant regularly paid the monthly rentals for the years 1985 to 1989.000 while employed as “biyahero” by Eulalia. not a concurrence. To reiterate. Thereafter. filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance. strongly indicating that the labor case has not dampened her peaceful and adequate possession of the leased premises. Instead. The instances when a contract — regardless of its nomenclature — may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage are enumerated in Art. Petitioner had the burden of proving that she did not intend to sell the property. however. De Dalisay. It was after the labor case has been resolved that appellant started to fail to pay her rentals. 158762. Ceballos offered to buy back the property from Mercado for the price of P30. The agreement between Dominador and Eulalia was not avoided in its entirety so as to prevent it from producing any legal effect at all. duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. 000. Sr.R. Sr. during the length of time from the execution of the Deeds of Sale on 15 June 1973 and until such time when he sold the subject parcels of land to his co-petitioners. G. Petitioner failed to pay the loan. We find no basis for disturbing the CA's finding that she had failed to discharge this burden. remained the owner thereof. Court of Appeal. she executed a 'Deed of Real Estate Mortgage' over the subject property.68 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee the labor case was instituted during the effectivity of the lease contract until the case was finally resolved on August 22. which superseded the loan document. Jr. (Dee v.R. Gaje and Mellonida. G. 1986.”) she required them to surrender TCT of their properties and to execute the corresponding Deeds of Sale in her favor. consequently. Vda. (Gaje v.although lacking in some formality. to the exclusion of all his other heirs. the parties entered into another agreement — the assailed.nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge a real property as security for a debt and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. It is telling why Dalisay. No. 27 May 2004) Ceballos was able to borrow from Mercado certain sum of money and as security. In this case. The instances when a contract regardless of its nomenclature . Q: Is Dalisay Jr. To assert their right. that Emigdio Mercado did not intend to buy it. Ceballos filed the case contending that the Contract should be declared as an equitable mortgage. as the buyer in the Deed of Sale. the original transaction was a loan. Q: Was the CA correct in rejecting Ceballos’s contention that the Deed of Absolute sale was one of equitable mortgage? A: Yes. the said transaction is an equitable mortgage. An equitable mortgage is one that . No. In executing the said deed of sale. Foremost. G. No. Domeng and Eulalia never intended the transfer of ownership of the subject property but to burden the same with an encumbrance to secure the indebtedness incurred by Domeng on the occasion of his employment with Eulalia. Surprisingly. or other requisites demanded by a statute . and that the new agreement did not embody the true intention of the parties. he was required to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of Eulalia. the presumption of truthfulness engendered by notarized documents is rebuttable.. it was established by strong evidence that Dalisay. 500. Dalisay Jr. both the trial and the appellate courts found none of the above-enumerated circumstances. 04 April 2007) Eulalia was engaged in the business of buying and selling large cattle. bought parcels of land but indicated Dalisay Jr. remained in possession over the properties from the time they were bought. 28 May 2004) Dalisay Sr. sold the parcels of land to Gaje. Domeng Bandong was not required to post any security but when Eulalia discovered that he incurred shortage in cattle procurement operation. Q: Was the deed of sale between Domeng and Eulalia a contract of sale or an equitable mortgage? A: It is an equitable mortgage. or an overwhelming number of such circumstances. She sold the property to her grandniece Jocelyn who thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against the Spouses Bandong. Spouses Bandong filed an action for annulment of sale against Eulalia and Jocelyn alleging that there was no sale intended but only equitable mortgage for the purpose of securing the shortage incurred by Domeng in the amount of P70. In order to secure the financial capital she advanced for her employees (“biyaheros.00. The said mortgage was not registered. and had no intention of transferring the ownership of the parcels of land exclusively to Dalisay. 135721.

both essential to fishing. 171250. such partner is guilty of estafa. Court of Appeals.R. The fishing nets and the floats. Philippine Fishing Gear Industries. Sps. but reaped benefits from that contract. The two made periodic visits to complainant to report the progress of the transactions. Lim Tong Lim denied his liability as a general partner.. These boats. Furthermore. Liwanag contended that she is not guilty of estafa because the three of them were partners. but also to 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: that of the nets and the floats. They failed to pay the fishing nets hence. they subsequently revealed their intention to pay the loan with the proceeds of the sale of the boats. Q: Is Liwanag guilty of estafa even assuming that she is a partner? A: Yes. Raymundo. Respondent failed to pay hence the partnership appropriated for itself the mortgaged property. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money. who however was not a signatory to the agreement. 320 SCRA 428) Respondent and A. The contribution to such fund need not be cash or fixed assets. it is clear that the partnership extended not only to the purchase of the boat. 04 July 2007) Partnership Liwanag. was to be used for the development of the subdivision. Tabligan and complainant entered into an agreement. even if it is shown that they have not contributed any capital of their own to a "common fund. with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Court of Appeals. In their Compromise Agreement. not necessarily cash or fixed assets. From the factual findings of both lower courts. which they started by buying boats. without which the business could not have proceeded. A partnership may be deemed to exist among parties who agree to borrow money to pursue a business and to divide the profits or losses that may arise therefrom. were obviously acquired in furtherance of their business. No. A reading of the terms embodied in their Agreement indubitably shows the existence of a partnership pursuant to Article 1767 of the Civil Code. property. Co.C. Manuel obtained a loan which. in addition to his industry. It would have been inconceivable for Lim to involve himself so much in buying the boat but not in the acquisition of the aforesaid equipment. v. petitioners would contribute property to the partnership in the form of land which was to be developed into a subdivision. with a corresponding commission to her if the goods are sold. Complainant filed a case of estafa against Liwanag. Bandong. (Torres v. under the Joint Venture Agreement. a partnership engaged in lending activities entered into an equitable mortgage w/ pactum commissorium clause which is clearly prohibited by law. Even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between the parties. They claimed that they were engaged in a business venture with Lim Tong Lim. suddenly stopped.69 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: equitable mortgage. it could be an intangible like credit or industry. the income from the said project would be divided according to the stipulated percentage. (Liwanag v. property. 1767.” Under the Agreement. This is pursuant to Article 1767 which provides: By the contract of partnership. The visits however. The project did not push through. we have ruled that when money or property have been received by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he later misappropriated it. Pursuant to the contract. or industry to a common fund. By mortgaging the property. (Sps. fell under the term "common fund" under Article 1767. Q: Was there partnership among the three? A: Yes. two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money. the contract manifested the intention of the parties to form a partnership. Respondent filed an action for the . Clearly. wherein complainant would give the money needed to buy the cigarettes while Liwanag and Tabligan would act as her agents. which provides: “ART. All 3 of them also agreed to share the proceeds from the sale of the subdivided lots. Inc. the purchase and the repair of which were financed with borrowed money. they are all liable for debts incurred by or on behalf of the partnership.. 317 SCRA 728) Sisters entered into a “joint venture agreement” with Manuel for the development of a parcel of land into a subdivision. the amount needed for general expenses and other costs. That the parties agreed that any loss or profit from the sale and operation of the boats would be divided equally among them also shows that they had indeed formed a partnership. and to divide equally among them the excess or loss. while respondent would give. it is clear that the three had decided to engage in a fishing business. G. otherwise the money would be returned to complainant. financed by a loan. 281 SCRA 1225) Two persons entered into a Contract for the purchase of fishing nets from respondent company. Being partners. Aguila & Sons. Moreover. The two sisters filed a complaint against Manuel to recover damages. Q: Was there a contract of partnership formed? A: Yes. with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. or industry to a common fund. (Lim Tong Lim v." Their contribution may be in the form of credit or industry. The liability for a contract entered into on behalf of an unincorporated association or ostensible corporation may lie in a person who may not have directly transacted on its behalf. they executed a Deed of Sale covering the said land in favor of Manuel. and the land was subsequently foreclosed by the bank. et al. respondent company filed a collection suit against the three in their capacities as general partners.

a partnership “has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners. 316 SCRA 246) Upon the death of Kee. appraisal. Lay. (Safic Alcan & Cie v. the principal can not be held liable for the acts of the agent. Court of Appeals. In the light of the aforequoted legal provision. 2001) University of Santo Tomas . w/o securing the Board's approval. IVO bound itself to pay to Safic the difference between the said prevailing price and the contract price. winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership.70 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee annulment of the contract impleading Alfredo being the partnership’s manager as adverse party. (Heirs of Tan Eng Kee v. The mother and daughter tandem contended that there was no partnership since there was no written agreement to that effect. Kee. if any. Aguila & Co. Upon Jacinto's death. For business convenience. his wife and daughter took over the operations of the partnership w/o Chua’s consent. the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money. with petitioner getting the lion's share. IVO. Later. It also bears emphasizing that when the third person knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority. received. so long as the contract has the essential requisites. 143340. liquidation and winding up of the alleged partnership Benguet Lumber. v. During Kee’s lifetime. 25 Oct. The venture was launched with the understanding that petitioner would receive 70% of the profits while respondents would earn 15% each. Alfredo now contends that he is not the real party in interest but A. Despite repeated demands for accounting. thru its president for the delivery of crude coconut oil. Q: Is the manager of the partnership the right party to sue or the partnership itself? A: The partnership is the real party in interest. Court of Appeals. Petitioners failed to show how much their father. Chua and Jacinto contributed funds with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. however. Q: Was the parties' relationship one of partnership or of employer-employee? A: Partnership. GR No. because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties. 355 SCRA 559) Chua alleged that he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Gas (LPG). Q: Were Kee and Lay partners in Benguet Lumber? A: No. The most prudent thing petitioner should have done was to ascertain the extent of the authority of IVO’s president. which is one of the essential features of a partnership. they registered the business name of the partnership under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. as his share in the profits of Benguet Lumber Company for any particular period. 2000) Safic Alcan & Cie ordered from IVO. Q: Was there a partnership formed between Chua and Jacinto? A: Yes. The "Articles of Agreement" stipulated that the signatories shall share the profits of the business in a 70-15-15 manner. inventory.. GR No. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority. Imperial Vegetable Oil Co. 1678 provides that a partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to register. they executed the 'Article of Agreement' which formalized their earlier verbal agreement. offered a "wash out" settlement. This stipulation clearly proved the establishment of a partnership. (Santos v. 15 Aug 2001) To form a lending business. October 3.. 341 SCRA 740. or illegal purposes. Also. 1768. Being remiss in this regard. against which the case should have been brought. a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership. Q: Did the trial court err in holding that IVO’s president entered into contracts w/c were ultra vires and w/c would not bind IVO? A: NO. In their answer.135813. IVO still failed to pay this amount despite repeated demands. failed to deliver instead. Spouses Reyes. (Sunga-Chan v.. and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract. he is to blame. It appeared that IVO’s president entered into such speculative contracts with Safic. Under Art. his heirs filed a complaint for accounting. he appeared never to have made any such demand for accounting from his brother. Under Article 1898.” The partners cannot be held liable for the obligations of the partnership unless it is shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical personality is being used for fraudulent. unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification. Chua. and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent. respondents asserted that they were partners and not mere employees of petitioner. Kee’s brother denied the existence of partnership between him and his brother. By the contract of partnership. petitioners failed to comply. it was verbally agreed that petitioner would act as financier while respondents would take charge of solicitation of members and collection of loan payments. with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Hence. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents for recovery of sum of money and damages for misappropriating the funds allegedly in their capacities as employees of petitioner. not a partner. we conclude that Kee was only an employee. Inc. petitioner can not seek relief on the basis of a supposed agency. property or industry to a common fund. Thus.C. The failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same as among the partners. Art. (Aguila Jr. they failed to prove that Kee and Lay intended to divide the profits of the business between themselves. unfair.

Article 184 provides: The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner. whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes available for the . Q: Are the petitioners liable to respondents for the latter's share in the partnership? A: No. 126334. They decided to dissolve their partnership in 1986. No. Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809. Except as managers of the partnership. Q: Can Dizon validly bind the owners in the absence of a written power of attorney? A: No. Hence. (Dizon v. continues to exist and its legal personality is retained. For as long as the partnership exists. any of the partners may demand an accounting of the partnership’s business. either to conduct the general business of the principal or to execute a binding contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did execute. division of assets and damages. including the partitioning and distribution of the net partnership assets to the partners. petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership. A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. GR No. When a final accounting is made. filed against petitioner an action for accounting. no such construction shall be given the document. The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution. Q: Is the action to demand accounting already barred by prescription? A: No.” Since the capital was contributed to the partnership. 122544. together with the rest of the capital of the partnership. and (3) termination. not to petitioners. 28 Jan. Tabanao’s heirs. When the sale of a piece of land or any interest thereon is through an agent. which consists of all its assets.. Respondents filed a Complaint for the collection of a sum of money from petitioners. In the case at bar. in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. R. Consequently. Tabanao and Divinagracia were partners in a business. and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. For the principal to confer the right upon an agent to sell real estate. despite formal demand for payment thereof. In other words. Without prior knowledge of respondents. G. However. Thus the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in writing and must give him specific authority. and rightly so. and even after Tabanao's untimely demise. (2) winding-up. the above-cited provision states that the right to demand an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is done. petitioners closed down the restaurant. a power of attorney must so express the powers of the agent in clear and unmistakable language. 23 Nov. When there is any reasonable doubt that the language so used conveys such power.71 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Petitioner Emnace. arguing that respondents' action prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. no final accounting has been made. the said action is not barred by prescription. 2003) A partnership was formed for the operation of a restaurant and catering business. at which time it completes the winding up of its affairs. The buyer now contends that there is a perfected contract of sale since they have already paid partial payment which the owner already appropriated. Throughout the existence of the partnership. which also deal with the duty to account. The express mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to sell must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of the act mentioned. it can only pay out what it has in its coffers. or his legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership continuing the business. (Emnace v. Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents' right to inquire into the business affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments. and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their action before the trial court. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership. the sale shall be void. although dissolved. prescribing four (4) years thereafter. since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnership's business and assets. as a separate and distinct entity that must refund the shares of the partners. the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. Court of Appeals. 2001) A land was sold by Dizon who had no power of attorney to sell such property. the authority of the latter shall be in writing. The partnership. at the date of dissolution. We hold that respondents have no right to demand from petitioners the return of their equity share. prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a final accounting. Petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. CA. Since it is the partnership. it is the partnership that must refund the equity of the retiring partners. otherwise. payment of shares. The receipt made 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: out in the name of the owner was only signed by Dizon. Petitioners contended that respondents had no right to demand a return of their equity because their share. had been spent as a result of irreversible business losses. the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. it is only then that prescription begins to run. After all the creditors have been paid. petitioners did not personally hold its equity or assets. before the partners can be paid their shares. respondents herein. "The partnership has a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners.

its agent or sub-contractor. Mahtani had to take a connecting flight. as its subcontractor or agent. if indeed extant. Gemar to prepare his travel plan. In anticipation. being the principal.Parenthetically. Since British Airways had no ticket flights from Manila to Bombay. the deceased sold and conveyed to him all the shares over the properties in question. Q: Can the petitioners as mere agents in a contract of sale maintain an action against the other party? A: No. an action to compel the trustee to convey property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe unless the trustee repudiates the trust. An agent who is not a promisee cannot maintain an action at law against a purchaser merely because he is entitled to have his compensation or advances paid out of the purchase price before payment to the principal. Petitioners who are mere agents filed a Complaint for Damages against NHA and its General Manager. in fact. would have been in contravention of. the fundamental law. not suitable for development into a housing project. 14 July 2003) Agency Mahtani decided to visit his relative in India. The trial court ruled that title over the lot was not in reality transferred in the name of Ruperto for the reason that the parties to the deed of sale merely intended to create an express trust. in transporting Mahtani from Manila to Hongkong acted as the agent of BA. Then Section 5. only five were paid for by the NHA because of the report that the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and therefore. petitioners offered to sell the lands to NHA to be utilized and developed as a housing project. he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. he was disqualified to acquire such land in the Philippines. either in an action on the contract or otherwise. 144214. Q: Can the agent be held liable by the Principal if the agent has been negligent as such? A: Yes. 314 SCRA 69) Trusts The respondent heirs demanded Ruperto. he obtained the services of a certain Mr. 285 SCRA 450) Uy and Roxas are agents authorized to sell eight parcels of land by the owners thereof. As agents. who was in possession of the properties. Lorenzo’s heirs now demanded the return of the subject property Q: Can a Chinese enter into a Trust Agreement over a land in the Philippines? A: No. An agent entitled to receive a commission from his principal upon the performance of a contract which he has made on his principal's account does not. Unfortunately. confident that upon reaching Hong Kong. of the 1935 Constitution has provided that – “Save in cases of hereditary succession. however. Of the eight parcels of land. it is worth observing that the contract of air transportation was exclusively between Mahtani and BA. 309 SCRA 529) Lorenzo executed a Trust Agreement with his brother Ramon over a parcel of land since he knew that being a Chinese. The fact that an agent who makes a contract for his principal will gain or suffer loss by the performance or nonperformance of the contract by the principal or by the other party thereto does not entitle him to maintain an action on his own behalf against the other party for its breach. when Mahtani arrived in Bombay. the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay. CA. BA finally advised him to file a claim. After plaintiff waiting for his luggage for one week. or University of Santo Tomas . it is undisputed that PAL. The trust agreement between Ramon and Lorenzo. they only render some service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. G. Prescriptive period for an action of reconveyance of real property based on implied or constructive trust which is counted from the date of registration of property applies when the plaintiff is not in possession of the contested property. (Uy v. By virtue of such authority. have any claim against the other party for breach of the contract. no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals. to partition the same among them but he refused claiming that during their lifetime. Q: Is the action of reconveyance already barred by prescription? A: No. In resolving this issue. corporations. Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their principals and NHA. the Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. had no cause of action against PAL. Prior to his departure. In fact. Hence. Ramirez. Mahtani checked in the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothing and personal effects. the latter merely endorsing the Manila to Hongkong leg of the former’s journey to PAL. the fourth paragraph of the “Conditions of Contracts” of the ticket issued by BA to Mahtani confirms that the contract was one of continuous air transportation from Manila to Bombay.72 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee payment of the partners' shares. (Viloria v. Prescinding from the above discussion. Court of Appeals. NHA issued Resolution cancelling the sale over the remaining parcels of land. They are mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. Moreover.R. CA. the Court of Appeals erred when it opined that BA. Ruperto now claims that the action of reconveyance instituted by the heirs has already prescribed. The rendering of such service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. from this fact alone. (Villareal v. he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives. (British Airways v. No. Article XIII.

is a trust by operation of law which arises contrary to intention and in invitum. The RFC passed a resolution approving the loan to be secured by a mortgage. ordinarily such a trust arises and will be declared only on wrongful acquisitions or retentions of property of which equity. which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. an involuntary trust. (Heirs of Miguel Franco v. against one who. Q: Was there a constructive trust in this case? A: Yes. concealment. a constructive trust does not arise on every moral wrong in acquiring or holding property or on every abuse of confidence in business or other affairs. 06 March 2002) Remedios asserts that Consolacion acquired the additional 1. is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied trust. 312 SCRA 603) Sps. or by any form of unconscionable conduct. . in the guise of a resulting trust." (Arlegui v. 11 December 2003) Credit Saura applied an industrial loan from Rehabilitation Finance Corp. (Heirs of L. by commission of wrong. Court of Appeals. Q: Is Miguel the real owner of the subject property or does he merely hold it in trust for the benefit of Quintin? A: Miguel only holds it in trust for the benefit of Quintin. (Pascual v. for instance.73 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. by duress or abuse of confidence. hold and enjoy. Remedios filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. namely: that two or more persons agree to purchase a property. 115925. they discovered that the apartment they were occupying was already sold to Arlegui who then demanded them to vacate the premises. in accordance with its fundamental principles and the traditional exercise of its jurisdiction or in accordance with statutory provision. and that they consent that one should take the title in his name for everyone’s benefit. courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party. CA. After discovering that there was a change of owner and fearing that they will be ejected. After 9 years. A receiver. It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake. in equity and good conscience. although in business or social relations. actual or constructive. G.335 square meters through mistake or fraud and thus Consolacion should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the owner of the lots. a trust de son tort. which has been acquired by fraud. Court of Appeals. "A constructive trust is substantially an appropriate remedy against unjust enrichment. is utterly disabled from acquiring from his own benefit the property committed to his custody. trustee. it is against equity that it should be retained by the person holding it. the tenants formed an association in order to protect their interests. Q: Is Remedios already barred from recovering the property subject of an implied trust? A: Yes. either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not. G. 126437. It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice. The Genguyons filed a case for the annulment of the sale. Saura however informed RFC that it will have to rely on the importation of jute since raw materials will be insufficient. Quintin died intestate. A constructive trust. Unquestionably. A condition of the RFC was for Saura to use local raw materials. They appointed Arlequi as an officer who will negotiate w/ the new owner. rendering an acquisition or retention of property by one person unconscionable against another. agent. It is raised by 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: equity in respect of property. Saura sued RFC for damages. Miguel obtained a TCT. by fraud. No. The heirs of Quintin filed a complaint w/ the RTC for the cancellation of the TCT. No. Court of Appeals. Article 1452 presupposes the concurrence of two requisites before a trust can be created. R. Then. giving rise to an implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. or questionable means. Miguel claimed that one-half of the estate was transferred to him by Quintin by virtue of “General Power of Administration”. artifice. or an implied trust. However. No fraud in fact need be shown and no excuse will be heard the trustee. Genguyon were tenants of the Barretto Apartment. It has been broadly ruled that a breach of confidence. Because of that.R. It likewise must follow that what the parties are not allowed to do expressly is one that they also may not do impliedly as. In the intestate court. GR No. If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment. or who in any way against equity and good conscience. attorney. takes cognizance. or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property of persons. Remedios filed her complaint more than 19 years after Consolacion registered her title over the lots. a trust ex delicto. or where. negotiations were in a stand still and Saura requested the cancellation of the mortgage.” A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortuous act. Yap v. otherwise known as a trust ex maleficio. 15 August 2003) An OCT covering subject property was issued in Quintin’s name. 123924. raises a constructive trust. although acquired originally without fraud. She filed the case 19 years after the trustee in an implied trust has registered the lots in question.

The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature of “mutual desistance’ – w/c is a mode of extinguishing obligations. Maneja assigned and conveyed to Serrano her time deposit. the legal rate of interest is increased from 6% to 12%. Failure of the respondent OBM to honor the time deposits is failure to pay its obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from a depositary’s failure to return the subject matter of the deposit. as surety. GR No. hence. GR No. v. rate allowed in judgments The judgments spoken of and referred to are judgments in litigations involving loans or forbearances of money. 24968. Saura obviously cannot comply w/ the conditions and instead of doing the condition and insisting on the loan be released. When the execution of the judgment was effected. 27 April 1972) Petitioner Serrano made a time deposit with OBM. Development Bank of the Phil. with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until paid. (Saura v. When the negotiation was in the stand still. are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. Central Bank. goods or credits.. regardless of who owns the land. 28030. whether fixed. 59096. or credits 3. the sheriff returned the writs unsatisfied. GR No. For the dissolution of the attachment. they are to execute a University of Santo Tomas . Bayanihan will automatically be the owner of the apartment. Act 2655 deals with interest on: 1. The bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. the rule cannot apply to a counter bond where the surety bound itself “jointly and severally” with the defendant as in the present case. 14 Feb 1980) Reyes obtained a writ of preliminary attachment and accordingly levied upon all the properties of the defendant Felicisimo Reyes. It is a concept that derives from the principle that since mutual agreement can create a contract. (The Imperial Insurance Inc v. (Reformina v. They are really loans because they earn interest.74 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Q: Can Saura ask for the cancellation of the mortgage? A: Yes. Q: May the machinery in question be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage? A: Yes. mutual disagreement by the parties can cause its extinguishment. and not a depositor. However. Any other kind of monetary judgments w/c has nothing to do with. OBM refused to honor the time deposits. It was agreed that if the spouses should fail to pay their obligation. De los Angeles. All kinds of bank deposits. The judgment provided that in case the spouses failed to pay the obligation w/in 30 days from notice. Q: How much by way of legal interest should a judgment debtor pay the judgment creditor? A: Under CB 416. savings or current. Q: Is OBM liable to Serrano despite the fact the CB declared that OBM could no longer operate due to its chronic reserve deficiencies? A: Yes. Tomol Jr. 16 May 1983) Judgment was rendered ordering the Spouses Reformina to pay the value of the boat. the Imperial Insurance Inc. the chattel mortgage binds only the contracting parties and cannot prejudice innocent third parties. loan 2. 11 October 1985) Spouses Uy Tong and Kho Po Giok used to be the owners of an apartment in the Ligaya Building w/ the leasehold rights for 99 years over the land on w/c the building stands. failed to pay the balance. legally choose to go directly after the surety in a counter bond w/o prior exhaustion of the defendants properties? A: Yes. Although the counter bond contemplated in Sec17 Rule 57 of the RC is an ordinary guaranty where the sureties assume a subsidiary liability. Saura instead asked for the cancellation of the mortgage. GR No. When the Sheriff failed to effect the seizure of the machinery. it executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as machinery. Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. The law applicable to this case is Art 2209. posted a counter bond. nor involving loans or forbearance of any money goods or credits does not fall w/in the coverage of said law. 58469. Bayanihan filed an action for specific performance against the spouses. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned. goods.. Where chattel mortgage is constituted on machinery permanently attached to the ground that machinery is to be considered as personal property and the chattel mortgage constituted thereon is not null and void. (Serrano v. The spouses after paying the downpayment. Current and savings deposits are loans to a bank because it can use the same. Makati Leasing filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties. Makati Leasing filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the CFI where it ordered the execution of the writ of replevin. The sheriff returned to the premises of Wearever and removed the main drive motor of the subject machinery. the plaintiffs filed a motion for recovery on the surety bonds. Wearever Textile Mills discounted and assigned receivables with the former. excussion shall not take place if he has bound himself solidarily w/ the debtor. minus the value of the insurance recovered and the amount of estimated monthly loss suffered by defendant. Consequently. Petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interest w/ OBM was in reality a creditor of the respondent bank. (Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. Maneja also made a time deposit w/ OBM. In accordance with Art 2059. Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits. Q: May the plaintiff who obtained judgment against the defendant. 18 July 1982) To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing. and Felicisimo Reyes as principal. GR No. 30511. Wearever Textile Mills. forbearances of money. Upon Wearever’s default. Spouses purchased 7 motor vehicles from Bayanihan Investment payable in installments. The decision became final and executory.

08 May 1992) Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Japan via SS Eastern Comet. computed from the date of filing of the complaint. YES. Allied Brokerage received the shipment from Metro Port. this applies only to interest for the use of money.a on the amounts due and unpaid at the expiration of the periods respectively provided in the contracts. (Medida v. hence void? A: The questioned agreement evinces no basis for the application of pactum commissorium. is imposed as follows: . With regard to an award or interest in the concept of actual or compensatory damages. For all intents and purposes. the mortgagor was divested of his ownership. The loan of P20k was fully paid. (Mojica v. 98334. Santos has the right to recover damages resulting from the default of OBM and the measure of such damages is interest at the legal rate of 6% p. Court of Appeals. Is OBM liable for damages? A: 1. Is the liability of IRC deemed paid by virtue of the deed of assignment? 2. the plaintiff caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. Bayanihan sought the intervention of the court by filing an action for specific performance. Integrated Realty Corp v. 2. Since the mortgagor remains as the absolute owner of the property during the redemption period and the free disposal of his property. Q: 1. the rate of interest. A 12% interest. PNB. PNB then demanded payment from Santos and IRC. To secure the loan. GR No. Upon arrival in Manila. The spouses defaulted. It is illogical to hold that during that same period of 12mos. one drum opened and w/o seal. unless there was an express agreement on the part of the creditor to receive it as such. in lieu of 6% shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment thereof. (Uy Tong v. the contravenor can be held liable for damages. regardless of its source is breached. Q: Was the 2nd mortgage invalid? A: Yes. The loan was secured by a REM over a parcel of land. The bank extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage. When PNB tried to collect from OBM. was handed over by a debtor to his creditor. 11 Sept 1991) Respondent spouses alarmed of losing their right of redemption at the foreclosure sale of a prior mortgage. 94247. 28 June 1989) Petitioner obtained a loan of P20K from defendant Rural Bank of Kawit. Allied then delivered the shipment to the consignee w/c excepted one drum that contained spillages while the rest of the contents were adulterated/fake. Hence there was no automatic appropriation of the property. The land was sold and the Bank was the highest bidder. A mortgage given to secure advancement is a continuing security and is not discharged by repayment of the amount named in the mortgage. the latter did not pay the CTDs. GR No 77465. The mortgage contract states that the mortgage will cover the payment of the loan of P20K and such other loans or other advances already obtained or to be obtained by the mortgagors from the bank. (Integrated Realty Corp v. GR No. loaned money from the plaintiff Bank secured by mortgage over the same property subject of the prior mortgage. When the spouses defaulted. GR No. as well as the accrual thereof. Q: Is the stipulation a pactum commissorium. Santos executed a Deed of Assignment of the time deposits in favor of PNB. payable at a future time. it was not payment. CA. PNB. While it is true that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. There is no contract of pledge or mortgage entered into by the parties. if from the four corners of the instrument the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be gathered. IRC. that the amounts named as consideration in said contract do not limit the amount for w/c the mortgage may stand as security. The spouses then filed an action assailing the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. ownership was consolidated to the Bank. *When an obligation. the deed of assignment in this case is actually a pledge. there would be compliance w/ the requisites of Art 2085 for the constitution of another mortgage on the property. Q: Is the applicable rate of interest 12% or 6%? A: The interest to be paid is 6% on the amount due. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale merely acquired an inchoate right to the property w/c could ripen into ownership only upon the lapse of the redemption period w/o his credit having been discharged. through its president Santos. 60705. CA. Where a CTD in a bank. Q: Was the foreclosure sale based on a valid and subsisting mortgage? 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: A: It has long been settled that mortgages given to secure future advancements are valid and legal contracts. it was discharged into the custody of Metro Port Services w/c said that one drum is in bad order. No redemption having been effected. until the full amount of the advancements is paid. secured by the same mortgage. Thereafter they again obtained a loan of P18K. applied for a loan with PNB. but the latter refused payment alleging that the obligation was deemed paid with the irrevocable assignment of the CTDs. 21 May 1988) Santos made time deposits with OBM.75 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Deed of Absolute Sale over the apartment and/or leasehold rights. It does not comprehend interest paid as damages. NO.

A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property originally mortgaged. As a result. or antichresis may exceptionally secure afterincurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described. Are the after-acquired properties by the mortgagor deemed to be included in the Chattel Mortgage agreement? 2. be on the amount finally adjudged. whether the case falls under number or number 2. the Bank applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. 1996) Ever Textile Mills obtained loans from the bank. Evertex declared insolvency and all its assets were taken into the custody of the Insolvency court. In the absence of stipulation. GR No. affixing her signature under the word "guarantor. not constituting a loan or forbearance of money. (Tsai v. Petitioner Baylon signed the promissory note. this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 2. the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made. agreed to lend Luanzon money. above. does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel mortgage agreement covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by conducting a fresh chattel mortgage or amending the old contract. CA. the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. a chattel mortgage. can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted. the rate of legal interest. A provision in the deed is that the chattel mortgage will also stand as security for future obligations. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same. persuaded by the assurances of Baylon. real estate mortgage. she received the letter of respondent’s counsel. She replied thereto on March 9. Luanzon issued and signed a promissory note acknowledging receipt from Tomacruz and obliging herself to pay the former the amount. the applicable rate is 6% per annum as provided in Article 2209 of the NCC. and so is the subsequent loan. The 1st loan was secured by a Deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where Evertex stands and the chattels located therein. the security itself. Furthermore. Manager of ACME executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Bank as security for the corporate loan. Q: 1. and not the rate of 12% per annum as provided in (CB) Cir. Despite her knowledge of respondent’s claim. The court found that she was not a purchaser in good faith. however. Although a promise expressed in a chattel mortgage to include debts that are yet to be contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon. ACME however failed to pay that loan at maturity. 97412. in any case.76 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee 1. When the obligation is breached. anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding. is breached. the latter extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages and appeared as the highest bidder. Since the disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the 1975 or 1976 chattel mortgages. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. apprising her of respondent’s claim. it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages. the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extra-judicially but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made. shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction." University of Santo Tomas . Then. the president and Gen. however. she proceeded to buy the contested units of machinery on May 3. When an obligation. from judicial or extra-judicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Art 1169 of the CC. As borne out by the records. No interest. After the execution of the second mortgage. While a pledge. 366 SCRA 324) Tomacruz. 3. (ACME v. an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. Can petitioner Tsai be considered as purchaser in good faith? A: 1. CA. the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default. the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. No. Evertex purchased various machineries and equipments. When Evertex failed to pay the loans to PBCom. Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty. The 2nd loan was secured by Chattel Mortgage over personal properties. When an obligation arises from a contract of purchase and sale and not from a contract of loan or mutuum. 1988. at the time of purchase. 12 July 1994) Petitioner Chua Pac. The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall. The original loan was paid. dated February 27. 416. ACME contracted a 3rd loan in the amount. 103576. 2. however. and it consists in the payment of a sum of money (loan or forbearance of money). PBCom sold the chattels including those that were not included in the list s of 1st and 2nd mortgage. 1987. 22 Aug. CA. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory. Q: Would it be valid and effective to have a clause in a chattel mortgage that purports to likewise extend its coverage to obligations yet to be contracted or incurred? A: NO. 1987. GR No.

Looyuko and Uy. As a rule. G. Therefore. The liability of a guarantor is only subsidiary. The subject property was sold at public auction with Looyuko. as “mortgagors” and respondent Bank as “mortgagee”. Mike then had arrears in the rentals and he stopped paying the electric and water consumption. the creditor is given the right to retain his debtor’s movable property in his possession. without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case. (Sps.R. the implementation of such writ by the sheriff is likewise ministerial. Regardless of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself. Tomacruz filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Luanzon and Baylon. obtained a money judgment against the Mendozas before the RTC of Manila. the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the principal debtor. Pablo’s son. Although the principal debtor was impleaded as defendant. there is nothing in the records to show that summons was served upon her. Q: Is Calibo obliged to return the tractor? A: Yes. Prohibition does not lie to enjoin the implementation of a writ of possession. which is allegedly secured by such guarantee. In a contract of pledge. until the debt is paid. (Baylon v. 3135 as amended by Act 4118. The RD issued a new TCT in the name of Looyuko Real estate mortgage was entered into by the petitioners. Pablo left his tractor with his son for safekeeping. Private respondent must first obtain a judgment against the principal debtor before assuming to run after the alleged guarantor. 08 June 2000) Private respondent Pablo purchased a tractor. Because of that Mike offered the tractor of his father to Calibo as security. is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession of the mortgaged property pending proceedings assailing the issuance of the writ of possession. Petitioners-mortgagors filed with the CA a petition to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession. or in that of a 3rd person to whom it has been delivered. Calibo however refused. CA. CA. Q: Can the creditor run after the guarantor w/o first exhausting the properties of the debtor? A: No. the bank extra judicially foreclosed the mortgage under the provisions of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118. Hence. “for obviously the exhaustion of the principal’s property cannot even begin to take place before judgment has been obtained. 120528. no judgment was first obtained against the principal debtor. Upon failure to pay the loan. Petitioners alleged that there is a pending case for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage and argued that the implementation of the writ of possession would render nugatory the judgment of the trial court in the said case. No. Ong v. the tractor was left with him in the concept of deposit and he may validly hold on to it until Mike pays his obligation. All the properties of the principal debtor must first be exhausted before his own is levied upon. Tomacruz made a written demand upon Baylon for payment. The judge issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. he demanded its return. a person receives an object belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. Thereafter. It is useless to speak of a guarantor when no debtor has been held liable for the obligation. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . the issuance of the writ of possession being ministerial in character. The creditor may hold the guarantor liable only after the judgment has been obtained against the principal debtor and the latter is unable to pay. The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. Q: Is it proper for the petitioners to file for the issuance of writ of prohibition to enjoin the issuance of a writ of possession? A: No. an injunction to prohibit the issuance of writ of possession is entirely out of place. In a contract of deposit.77 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Upon default. The rationale for the mandate is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay. and in the alternative. such possession being founded on his right of ownership. et al as the highest bidders. If the trial court later finds merit in the petition to set aside the writ of possession. GR No. any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. it shall dispose in favor of the mortgagor the bond furnished by the purchaser. When Pablo came back and learned that the tractor was in the custody of Calibo. There is likewise no valid deposit in this case. either party may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with Section 14 of Act 496. Thus. Once the writ of possession has been issued. In the present case. The mortgagee-bank was the highest bidder and during the one-year redemption period. 121494. (Calibo Jr. the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession. it filed a petition for and was granted the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner states that he received the tractor not to safely keep it but as a form of security for the payment of Mike Abella’s obligation. There is no valid pledge because Mike is not the absolute owner of the property pledged. 29 January 2001) In 1986. the Court has ruled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial function. Mike rented the house of plaintiff Calibo. 312 SCRA 502) In several cases. Act No. Calibo alleged that the tractor was pledged to him. v. which petitioner did not heed. the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay. CA. There is no deposit where the principal purpose for receiving the object is not safekeeping.

levying upon the property itself is distinguishable from levying on the judgment debtor’s interest in it. the alleged assignee of FGU and Looyuko et al. It is the equity of redemption that the subordinate lien holders had acquired by the levy on execution and that was sold in the public auction. 15 Nov. In 1991. Supervision Agreement and the Consultancy Agreement mere cloaks to cover usurious interest? A: The Underwriting and Consultancy Agreements. Registration may be granted in the name of the mortgagee but subject to the subordinate lien holders’ equity of redemption. and their rights are strictly subordinate to the lien of the mortgagee. FMIC then instituted collection of the deficiency against Este Del Sol. As provided for by the Loan Agreement. Merrit suffered serious injuries to his body including his brain. however. et al. When a contract between 2 parties is evidenced by a written instrument. It merely gives remedy to enforce pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court. subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. No. The driver of the ambulance was held negligent by the trial court. was bumped by an ambulance of the General Hospital. In 1987. Act 2457 did not create liability or cause of action against the State where none existed before. It must be conceded that the State can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its University of Santo Tomas . the Mendozas executed a mortgage over the subject property in favor of FGU Insurance. 102696. Act 2457 was enacted authorizing Merrit to bring suit against the government. FGU foreclosed the property. The requirement for joinder of the person claiming an interest subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed. preventing him from working efficiently. Subordinate lien holders like the Gutangs and Looyuko et al. Courts only need to rely on the face of the written contracts to determine the intention of the parties. ordering him to pay Merrit damages. and not the property itself. Q: Is Government of the Philippines liable to pay damages to Merrit for the negligence of the ambulance driver? A: No. 141811. for the law will not permit a usurious loan to hide itself behind a legal form. 2001) Torts and Damages Merrit. The mortgage was registered. is not mandatory in character but merely directory. The effect of the failure on the part of the mortgagee to make the subordinate lien holder a defendant is that the decree entered in the foreclosure proceeding would not deprive the subordinate lien holder of his right of redemption. Q: Can Looyuko. Such equity of redemption does not constitute a bar to the registration of the property in the name of the mortgagee.. Gutang obtained a money judgment against Mendoza before the RTC of Iloilo. in the sense that failure to comply therewith will not invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. filed a motion for leave to intervene in the LRC. GR No.. When the Mendozas defaulted. the Rizal RTC issued a new title in her name. FGU was the highest bidder and the certificate of sale w/c was issued was subsequently confirmed by the RTC in 1989. RTC ordered the cancellation and issuance of a new title in favor of FGU. A decree of foreclosure in a suit to which the holders of a second lien are not parties leaves the equity of redemption in favor of such lien holders unforeclosed and unaffected. In 1976. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court requires all persons having or claiming an interest in the premises subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage be made defendants in the action for foreclosure. such document is ordinarily the best evidence of the terms of the contract. or extend the liability to any cause not previously recognized. By consenting to be sued. et al and the Gutangs exercise the equity of redemption? A: Yes. Such interest can be levied upon by means of a writ of execution. by the circumstances and several facts taken altogether were simply cloaks or devices to cover an illegal scheme employed by petitioner FMIC to conceal and collect excessive usurious interest.R. When Este Del Sol failed to meet the payments of the amortizations. a state simply waives its immunity from suit. G. (First Metro Investment Corp v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve Inc. FMIC extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties. There’s also a Supervision Agreement for a period of 4yrs and a Consultancy Agreement executed for a fee for a period of 4yrs. Court of Appeals. but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Looyuko v. which should be exercised within 90 days from the date the decision becomes final. and Spouses Gutang filed their respective motion for intervention and to set aside the judgment of the RTC. riding on a motorcycle. however. the form of the contract is not conclusive. an Underwriting Agreement was executed wherein FMIC shall undertake best effort basis to sell 120K stocks of Este Del Sol. In 1984. However. The subject property was sold at public auction to Gutang. 12 July 2001) FMIC granted respondent a loan to finance the construction and development of the Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve a sports/resort complex project. Accordingly. Q: Were the Underwriting Agreement. Moreover. Section 1. a creditor who levies his execution upon property that the judgment debtor has mortgaged to another can sell only the equity of redemption belonging to the mortgagor. Parol evidence is admissible to show that a written document though legal in form was in fact a device to cover usury. Looyuko.78 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee and Uy. Before the new TCT could be issued. acquire only a lien upon the equity of redemption vested in the mortgagor. The loan was secured by a mortgage of 2 parcels of land. It does not thereby concede its liability to Merrit or create any cause of action in his favor.

if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles. and employees where they act as special agents. and employees. Picart saw the automobile and heard the warning. duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charge with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. equipment. it stopped to receive passengers. to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Q: Is the owner of the gasoline liable? A: Yes. Caltex. Its left hind leg was hit by the car. making it necessary for him to use an artificial foot to be able to walk. the State is only liable for the acts of its agents. The gasoline station. Notwithstanding the lack of proof to show the cause and origin of the fire. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want/lack of care. In a damages case. it affords reasonable evidence. The plaintiff’s fall was due entirely to the car having been suddenly set in motion at the moment that the plaintiff was about to board it. (Africa v. As he moved toward the center of the bridge. Smith. The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Q: Was Smith negligent and therefore liable for damages? A: Yes. negligent in the eye of the law. blew his horn to warn Picart. and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative and technical office. The subsequent loss of his left foot was due to the . negligence can still be attributed to the defendants by the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. thinking that he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. L-12219. was under the control of the defendants. Q: Is Manila Electric liable for damages? Is Borromeo entitled for additional award of damages? A: Yes.. But in view of the known nature of horses.79 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: agents or servants only by some positive statute assuming such liability. He filed an action for damages. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started where the defendants and their employees but they gave no explanation.H. Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse (Application of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance). he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. Instead of doing this. Manila. officers and employees when they act as special agents and that the driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent. The automobile passed by the animal in such close proximity that the animal was frightened and turned its body with its head toward the railing. 311) Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge. there was an appreciable risk that. However. and from this moment it was no longer within the power of Picart to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. It started while a gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck to its underground storage. 15 March 1918) A fire broke out at a Caltex Station. 16 SCRA 448) An electric car of Manila Electric was running along M. blameworthy. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of the things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. Government. When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was. with all its appliances. he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. In the nature of things. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. that the accident arose from want of care. we think. (Meritt v. The children boarded first and while he was about to board. The owners of the burned houses filed an action for recovery of damages against the station’s owner and agent in charge of operation. (Picart v. G. he fell off and was dragged by the car. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. officers. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge. his left foot was amputated. in our opinion. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. 34 Phil. and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: the same situation? If not. del Pilar St. As a result of the accident. deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.R. Therefore. this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith. The law considers what would be reckless. The fire spread and burned several houses and the properties therein. He was. Upon arriving at Pearl St. the responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. who was driving an automobile from the opposite direction. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. then he is guilty of negligence. Smith. Borromeo approached the car with his two children. he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late or the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. No.

And if an independent negligent act (act of the deceased in turning around and swinging with the galvanized iron sheet with his hand in the 3rd story without any protective equipment) sets into operation which result in injury. 05 December 1922) Afialda was employed by the Hisole as caretaker of the carabaos. (Borromeo v. Yes. therefore his heirs cannot recover. merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger. lakes and pools which attract children. he is not liable because of having created an attractive nuisance. Dante was not under his control. such act or condition is the proximate cause. He sank to the bottom of the tank and died drowning. the act of the deceased in turning around and swinging with the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate cause of the electrocution. But in this case. Magno received from his son through that window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Afialda’s sister filed an action for damages against the spouses.R. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody". A civil action was filed against the father and son. However. the Supreme Court ruled for additional damages of P2. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger. jointly and severally with his son. surrounded by fence. The obligation to indemnify for injury caused by negligence under Art. The father set up the defense that if anyone should be held liable. June 13. No. Neither the head of the school of Dante. successive. Court of Appeals. 1952) Magno went to the 3-story house of his stepbrother to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. Q: Can the Manila Electric Company be held liable for damages for the electrocution suffered by Efren Magno? A: No. Standing in the said media agua.R. G. However. The tanks. it should be Dante because at the time of the accident. the principle of remote and proximate cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury. While tending the carabaos. 44 PHIL 165. when he turned around. 29 November 1949) Hidalgo Enterprises is an owner of an ice-plant factory. L-3422. thus causing his death by electrocution. (Hidalgo Enterprises v. unrelated. Afialda. including himself. its location. supervision and custody. Obviously. such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate cause of the accident. No. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause. 18 May 1956) Dante Capuno. in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and. medicine and physician’s fees on account of this accident. it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone. profession as a marine engineer (which he can no longer practice because of the amputation) and salary (P375 a month). (Afialda v. damages for the loss actually suffered and for the profit which the injured may have failed to realize. Nature has created streams. a distinct. 1902 includes two kinds of damages. 000. Bemoquillo. was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. The “media agua” was below the window in the third floor. was accused and found guilty of double homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of two persons which resulted from his reckless driving of a jeep. It has two tanks full of water for purposes of cooling its engine. Q: Is the water tank an attractive nuisance? A: No. were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers and its edges were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. an 8 year old boy entered the factory premises to take a bath in one of the tanks. Where it is shown that the death of the deceased was primarily caused by his own negligence. the company could not be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. His widow Sotera and heirs filed suit to recover damages from the company. Q: Is the owner of the animal liable when damage is caused to its caretaker? A: No. artificial as well as natural. Afialda was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries. such condition was not the proximate cause. G. could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante University of Santo Tomas . L-2075. Furthermore. for the death caused by the negligent act of his son Dante? A: It is true that under the law above quoted. the trial court has not allowed the plaintiff anything for the loss of his foot. Hisole. and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property. Taking into the account the age of the plaintiff (45). The animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker. Mario. 53 OG 1429.80 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee carelessness and negligence of the defendant’s employees in charge of the car. To hold the latter liable in damages for the death of the deceased. on the other hand.. Q: Can Delfin be held liable. son of Delfin. (Manila Electric Company v. who was paid for his work as such. the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company. nor the city school's supervisor. and efficient cause of the injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. The sum awarded by the trial court as damages is made up of the expense incurred for hospital. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning.

is quite different. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. if there be seduction (as defined in Articles 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code). The defendant Alfonso Pe is a married man and was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco. L-10134. decided to get married and set September 4. and petitioner Hermosisima. But Velez never returned and was never heard from again. L-14628. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity. The only way by which parents can relieve themselves of the liability under Article 2180 Par 2 is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. on the other hand. keeping them in their company. . (Wassmer v. 29 June 1957) Complainant. 1954 as the big day. there can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of promise to marry. G. good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. 26 December 1964) A PAL plane crashed resulting in the death of passengers and crew. However. However. Q: Are the plaintiffs entitled to such damages? A: Yes. Lolita went away with Alfonso. When the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents. L-17396. Velez filed a petition for relief from orders. (Exconde v. Hence. CA. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter’s family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family. he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals. moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219. Velez. No. used to go around together and were regarded as engaged. succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. (Pe v. but that it was the woman who virtually seduced the man by surrendering herself to him because she was overwhelmed by her love for him. 000. for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them. They had sexual intercourse. a teacher. But the next day. No. 30 September 1960) Plaintiffs are the parents and siblings of one Lolita Pe.R. Defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: pray the rosary. the plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages. the amount ofP6. who died in the crash. L-20089. who was almost ten years younger than her. is obvious. defendant married another woman. (Hermosisima v. following their mutual promise of love. the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted secret love affairs. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. whereupon he promised to marry her. The omission in the Civil Code of the proposed chapter on Breach of Promise suits is a clear manifestation of legislative intent not to sanction such suits for breach of promise to marry. a collateral relative of Lolita’s father.3 of the Civil Code. not only because he was ten years younger than the complainant. They are appealing the award of damages by the lower court: (1) For the death of Pedro T. although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. where intimacy developed between her and the petitioner. Verily. Two days before the wedding Velez left a note for his brideto-be stating that the wedding will have to be postponed because his mother opposes. seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy. Under the Civil Code. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who. Q: Are moral damages recoverable for breach of promise to marry? A: No. par. he sent her a telegram telling her that the wedding will push thru and he will be returning very soon. However. She gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter. Davila Jr. defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Indeed. only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized. there maybe a grant of moral damages. thru an ingenious scheme or trickery. Velez was declared in default and judgment was rendered against him. otherwise many innocent men may become the victims of designing and unscrupulous females. educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means". in this case. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father. judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Capuno. but through clever strategy.81 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law. as such. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them. The Court implied that if there be moral seduction as distinguished from criminal seduction. Q: Is the plaintiff entitled to damages? A: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Complainant told him that she was pregnant. which the defendants failed to prove. while. and. No. Appellants here are parents of Davila. in case of his death or incapacity. No. gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction. Pe. the mother. no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately. Beatriz filed an action for damages. 30 May 1962) Velez and Wassmer.

000 a year. for purposes of this case. the: amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earnings. The cause of the damages was not force majeure because the defendant by its allegations forsee the event. less the necessary expense for his own living. knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen stream and its swift current. rejected the defense and found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver. The heirs of Quintos brought an action against Villa Rey Transit for breach of the contract of carriage to recover damages. Villa Rey appealed the amount arguing that the lower court erred in adopting said formula and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. thus entitling the parents of Davila to a larger amount? A: Yes. 000. From farming. LSC. It therefore assured the risk and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precaution it adopted turned out to be insufficient. However. 200 a year seems reasonable. Q: Was it fortuitous event that caused of the damage thereby relieving LSC from liability? A: NO.90 years. namely. Considering the fact that the deceased was getting his income from three (3) different sources. and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents should be fixed. the deceased was employed as a manager of a radio station. not gross earnings. although the deceased was in relatively good health. Pedro Davila Jr. (LSC). Q: Is the computation of loss of earning capacity wrong. It is reasonable to make an allowance for these circumstances and consider. CA on the basis of the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality." Stated otherwise. according to the formula (2/3 x [80 .400 a year. 49 SCRA 497) A barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Co. a passenger of the bus. G.30]) adopted by this Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit Inc. PAL. and had a life expectancy of 28. rammed one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bridge. 800. Several Quintos Jr.R. Surro in which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis. his medical history shows that he had complained of and. 600. As a result. which was multiplied to his annual income. while referring to "damages for death caused by crime or quasi-delict. At that age. therefore. 000 per annum for five years in the amount ofP60. The Nagtahan Bridge was an immovable and stationary object and the hitting of the bridge by the barge. a reduction of his life expectancy to 25 years. 29 September 1967) A passenger bus owned by Villa Rey and driven by Casim hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. v. one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years. is the amount which should be awarded to the plaintiffs. The case cited by University of Santo Tomas ." This article. as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money. All in all. This amount. the end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload hit the right side of the windshield of the bus penetrating through the glass windshield and landed on the face of Quintos. raises the presumption of negligence on the part of SLC or its employees in manning the barge or the tugboat that towed it. died at the hospital despite medical assistance. including attorney's fees. or P7. that is the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. causing the bridge to tilt. while being towed by its tugboats. despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years old. voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger. which was exclusively controlled by SLC. he had an annual income of P3.82 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee (2) For the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased at the rate ofP12. leaving a net yearly income of P7. "The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. Together with his living expenses. the deceased had gross earning ofP15. from managing a radio station. only net earnings. at the time of his death. from law practice.00 as damages using the (2/3 x [80-29) formula in determining his life expectancy. L-21749. for whom Villa Rey was liable under its contract of carriage with the deceases. and occasional feelings of tiredness." is expressly made applicable by Article 1764 "to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier. had been treated for such ailments as backaches.. No. a deduction of P600 a month.earning capacity. According to Article 2206 (1) of the Civil Code. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. 000. The Republic sued LSC. chest pains. In the same case of Villa Rey Transit." The deceased. consisting of a monthly salary of P600 and allowance of P100. 000.750. are to be considered. (Davila v. (Republic v. In other words. or P195. he was getting an average of P3. was single and 30 years of age when he died. multiplied by 25 years. affirmed by the CA. Villa Rey contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event. but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. The court awarded P63. from which he was earning P8. namely: (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed. they interposed the defense that the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure because the river was swollen due to the heavy downpour of rain. the expenses incidental to the generation of such income were necessarily more than if he had only one source. the court stated: ". Q: Did the trial court err in adopting the (2/3 x [8029) formula and using the life expectancy as basis for the award of damages A: The determination of the amount of said damages depends. As a lawyer and a junior partner of his father in the law office. Luzon Stevedoring. and from farming. In its defense. mainly upon two (2) factors. The trial court.

71049. He was hospitalized and confined for 20 days. Life expectancy is. The market master is an employee of the City. Q: Is the civil case for the annulment of the contract of sale a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for estafa? A: Petitioners in seeking the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation are in effect saying that said deed is voidable due to vitiated consent. A deed of absolute sale was executed for such purpose notwithstanding that the purchase price has not yet been fully paid. No. The resolution. more specifically. they issued four checks. IAC. In the Alcantra case. In Fixing the amount of that support. Ana remained under the control of the City. Thereafter. Specific Provision prevails over a general provision. the City of Manila employed a 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: market master for the Sta. the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is offset by the fact that. or municipality. continued to subsist. the deed of sale was binding upon the parties. No. and other public works under their control and not RA 409 shall apply. Jimenez sued the City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp. 21 June 1990) Famoso while riding with a co-employee in the caboose of a cargo train of petitioner Ma-ao. Thereafter. The City of Manila argued that the management of the market was being performed by Asiatic Integrated Corporation by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract and it cannot be held under RA 409. It is not necessary the defective public works belong to the province. the ''necessary expenses of his own living. not only relevant. Undeniably. L63198. in the case at bar. Just the same. Hence. the liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at a rate. No. Inc v." should be deducted from his earnings. 18 February 1970) Jimenez. G. Although it is not the sole element determinative of said amount.R. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and control of that particular market. But the train fell on its side. And even if the civil case were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled. petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the damages awarded therein will have to be paid now. jumped off the train to escape injury when it was suddenly derailed. L-25499. In fact.83 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Villa Rey is not controlling in the one at bar. petitioners' obligation to pay the spouses pursuant to the deed of sale. such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. bridges. This argument is basically true.R. an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private respondents herein. (Jimenez v. at the time of said dishonor. G. the fiscal filed an information was subsequently filed. At the time the acts complained of in the criminal case were committed. which specifically governs liability of local governments due to injuries and damages by reason of defective conditions of roads. such as a four-year rule. They are susceptible of ratification. street. no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. petitioners are answerable under the law for the consequences of their said acts. The injury prevented him from walking properly for 15 days and from engaging his job. caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. The case was dismissed. OROSEA secured a loan from the Philippine Veterans Bank using the property as security. not gross earning. The claims for death . (Umali v. Both parties appealed. For this purpose. also. Despite the management and Control Contract. Only net earnings. officers of OROSEA. no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption. (Villa Rey Transit. by virtue of which. purchased a lot from the spouses Edano payable in installments. With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed. to check the safety of the place for the public. Sta. The Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. public buildings. which was renewed twice was dishonored by the bank. Jimenez could not be faulted for going to the market on a stormy day where the streets are covered in floods. Voidable contracts are binding. The second check. What is required is that the local government has either control or supervision over the public works in question. Q: Can the City of Manila be held liable? A: Article 2189 of the Civil Code. The City failed to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family in not taking ordinary precautions which could have been taken during good weather to minimize the danger to life and limb under those difficult circumstances. City of Manila. city. unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. of the issues in the civil case are not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in the criminal case. whereas most of those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. on his way home from the Market on a rainy day where streets were covered with flood. but. CA. Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income was not considered. of a purely arbitrary standard. none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of damages. therefore. stepped on an uncovered opening in which a dirty and rusted nail penetrated his leg. resulting to his death. that is. are to be considered. OROSEA filed an action for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale. but only as regards the amount thereof. although payment of the award in the case at bar will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein. And because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds. 29 May 1987) Petitioners. G.R. the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.

The fish plates (what keeps the rails aligned) were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special tools. and he had a valid defense against malicious prosecution. Joseph Lumber from whom Espiritu made his purchases of construction materials and who. and that this responsibility was not discharged. He executed it as an employee.the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which. Lao was not motivated by malice in making the affidavit upon which the fiscal based the filing of the Information against Espiritu. mere ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments. There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. which was in the custody of petitioner. Indeed. was the responsibility of Ma-ao. 11 July 1991) The Tagbilaran Friendly Bazaar was a victim of robbery in the sums ofUS$300 and P200. Lao had a valid defense to the action for malicious prosecution because it was his employer that was the complainant in the estafa case against Espiritu. as found and certified by the investigating fiscal himself.Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant. it affords reasonable evidence. The absence of the fish plates. The CA sustained the rulings of the TC except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions. which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code.R. Although the prosecution of Espiritu for estafa did not prosper. The TC ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent’s contributory negligence. therefore. Obviously. who was one of the robbers. as the petitioner suggests. According to its own witness. CA. there was probable cause for the charge of estafa against Espiritu. it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. the SC allowed the action for annulment of judgment] (Lao v. What is important is that Ma-ao should act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. No. Q: May Lao be held liable for malicious prosecution? A: NO. Lao was only a witness. Parilla. Court of Appeals. Q: Was Ma-ao guilty of negligence? Was Famoso was guilty of contributory negligence? A: 1. is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. 2. was allegedly shot and killed with the use of a firearm by Degoma. The case was filed by the prosecutor but was later dismissed. Ma-ao should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence. But since Lao was deprived of due process due to the negligence of the lawyer. During such robbery. in the absence of an explanation by the defendant. Espiritu filed a case for malicious prosecution against Lao. The lower court found the accused guilty and also ordered them to jointly and severally University of Santo Tomas . the unsuccessful prosecution may not be labeled as malicious. The maintenance of the rails. G. that the accident arose from want of care. 27 August 1990) Lao was presented as a witness in a case filed by his employer against Espiritu. 83491. 82808. the security guard of the store. Famoso CANNOT be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. *Contributory negligence . (Res ipsa loquitur) The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the CC.R. it should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of Ma-ao to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place. which was why he lost the case. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. The claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms is not impressive. for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments. had personal knowledge of the transaction. his wife Herminia filed a suit. the cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened every hour. Moreover. is the proximate cause of the injury.84 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner. It is pure speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose. It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury. a salesman of the St. [Note: In this case. whatever the cause or reason. *Res Ipsa Loquitur . not the prosecutor in the estafa case. Yes. concurring with the defendant's negligence. The Court cannot agree. contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care. the decision of the CA finding Lao guilty of malicious prosecution had already become final and executory. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been removed long before." (MA-AO Sugar Central v. No. G.

R. Subsequently. leaving the amount of P3. have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death. (Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents to secure their approval to the marriage. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective. G. CA. the award of actual damages in the amount ofP87. 15 April 1988) Two drums of riboflavin were shipped from Japan for delivery on board the vessel “SS Eastern . P200. (Amadora v.000 for his death. Marilou alleged that petitioner courted and proposed to marry her. the Court can only give credence to those supported by a receipt and which appear to. indemnify the heirs of the guard in the sum of P36. The court cannot see reasons for different degrees of vigilance exercised by the school authority on the basis of the nature of their respective schools. 97336. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. nor can it rely on speculation or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.000 for attorney's fees for counsel of Parilla. or burial of the victim. During a confrontation in the barangay. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right.85. The court cannot take account of receipts showing the following expenses: Having these guidelines. The responsibility includes school sanctioned activities because the school is in control or exercises influence over the pupil. To seek recovery for actual damages.00 and the equivalent exchange rate prevailing for US$300. Of the expenses allegedly incurred. Courts cannot simply assume that damages were sustained by the injured party. premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party the actual amount of loss. the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. The Court off-sets the amount of P6. Q: Can the academic institution be held liable for negligent acts of tits student committed within their premises but when the semester had already ended? A: The general rule is that when the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature. even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school. The custody requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities. it does signify that the students should be within the control and under the influence of the school or within the school premises at the time of the occurrence of the injury whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. in the exercise of a legitimate student right. Indeed. 22 May 1992) Respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. No. CA. 000 in line with present jurisprudence. The Court increases the amount of indemnity for the death of Parilla to P50.400. Nos. wake.R.000 for moral damages.85 as the actual amount of loss sustained by the immediate heirs of the victim.94 for actual expenses. Degoma G. No. the Court puts the gross expenses proved by the immediate heirs of the victim at P10. P87. Where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty. good customs or public policy. he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. In case of establishment of arts and trades. In this case. G. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. In delict. and P5.947. 19 February 1993) Amadora was shot to dead by his classmate Daffon during their commencement execise in their school auditorium. representing the alms received by the heirs of the victim against the amount of PI0. It is essential. 2180 of the Civil Code against Collegio de San Jose Recoletos. however. and some its official and teacher. petitioner maltreated and threatened to kill her.775. and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege. She was a virgin before she began living with him. proof that he had. 947. Q: Does Article 21 apply to the case? A: Yes.R.175. The trial court held that the school cannot be held liable because it was not a school of arts and trade but an academic institution of learning and that the students was not in the custody of the school as the semester had already ended. petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and stated that he is already married to a girl. it is the head of the establishment thereof and he only shall be liable. Amadora’s parents filed an action for damages under Art.85 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: indemnify the owners of the Tagbilaran Bazaar the sum of P200. in reality. responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attached to the teacher in charge of the student. 89404-05. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. 175. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. Q: Was the award for damages correct? A: The award for actual damages should be reduced. (People v.85. the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. Then petitioner forced her to live with him.94 is not sustained by a review of the evidence of record. L-47745.

97412. shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction. 3. When the shipment arrived in Manila. With regard to an award or interest in the concept of actual or compensatory damages. When an obligation arises from a contract of purchase and sale and not from a contract of loan or mutuum.. however. driven by defendant Tano. the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. The stirred cloud of dust made visibility extremely bad. or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. A 12% interest. claiming that under the marine insurance policy. There indeed was contributory negligence on the victim's part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioners liability for damages. At about the same time. at times. computed from the date of filing of the complaint. that could have afforded the victim a last clear opportunity to avoid the collision. hastily executed a left turn without first waiting for the dust to settle. As a result of the alleged fault and negligence of Eastern Shipping Lines.R. the contravenor can be held liable for damages. he saw two vehicles racing against each other from the opposite direction. The interest to be paid is 6% on the amount due. When the obligation is breached. was coming from the opposite direction on its way to the Bislig Airport. Q: Was Tano’s negligence the proximate cause of the accident? A: Yes. be on the amount finally adjudged. in lieu of 6% shall be imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment thereof. When he was about to reach the center of the right lane. Surigao del Sur. *When an obligation. and it consists in the payment of a sum of money (loan or forbearance of money). the Metro Port Service. Tano stopped his vehicle and waited for the two racing vehicles to pass by. from judicial or extra-judicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Art 1169 of the CC. above. No. In the absence of stipulation. is imposed as follows: 1. 416. is to the effect that where both parties are negligent. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory. as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril") The doctrine. It was this negligent act of Tano. The incident occurred in an instant. but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other. the rate of interest. not constituting a loan or forbearance of money. Jr. The victim was traveling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be. the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extra-judicially but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable to relieve Tano from liability. in any case. No appreciable time had elapsed. However. Tano started to make a sharp left turn towards the airport road. which had placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction that almost instantaneously caused the collision to occur. the rate of legal interest. regardless of its source is breached. and the Allied Brokerage Corporation. * Doctrine of Last Clear Chance (also referred to. this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. CA. the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. despite extremely poor visibility. No interest. shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. When an obligation. from the moment Tano swerved to his left to the actual impact. the applicable rate is 6% per annum as provided in Article 2209 of the NCC. it became subrogated to all the rights of action of the consignee against the defendants. No. the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default. the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. is breached. When Tano was approaching the vicinity of the airport road entrance on his left. G. Furthermore. and not the rate of 12% per annum as provided in (CB) Cir. as well as the accrual thereof. Instead of waiting for the dust to settled. the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the right side of the LBC van. Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty. Simple prudence required him not to attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe from and clear of any oncoming vehicle. Monterola died from the severe injuries he sustained. the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who. The CA ordered the defendants to jointly and severally pay the insurer with legal interest at 12% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the University of Santo Tomas . whether the case falls under number or number 2. Q: Should the interest commence from the date of the filing of the complaint or from the date of the decision of the trial court? Was the proper rate of interest is 12% per annum or 6% per annum? A: The CA is wrong. an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. The shipment was insured by Mercantile Insurance Company. a cargo van of the LBC Cargo.86 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Comet” owned by Eastern Shipping Lines. the insurance company had to pay the consignee of the shipment for the damaged cargo. 2. The insurance company then filed an action against the three. The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall. 12 July 1994) Monterola was traveling on board his motorcycle towards Mangagoy on the right lane along a dusty national road in Bislig. one drum was found to be in bad order. in essence. the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made.

CA. petitioner FGU Insurance. was at the center lane. its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. the following requisites must concur: (a) Damage suffered by the plaintiff. 23 February 1995) Two vehicles. It was found out that the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. could have by the use of due diligence. paid the latter. is obliged to pay for the damage done. could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. or bar a defense against the liability sought by. and driven by Dahl-Jensen as lessee. cruising northward along EDSA. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it be from active intervention. No. The liability imposed by Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: "In motor vehicle mishap. 2180 with Art. 5 of Art.87 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: consequences thereof. (LBC Air Cargo v. within legal contemplation. 101683. because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established. Inc. the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of. We agree with respondent court that FGU failed to prove the existence of the second requisite. Art. the former not being an employer of the latter. who was in the vehicle. petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict. another if the latter. (b) Fault or negligence of the defendant. the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. G. (FGU Insurance Corporation v. landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaanos’ house. and. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Q: For damages suffered by a third party. (c) Connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of masterdriver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Stated differently. this provision of Art. the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. or neglect. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen. fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. Q: Was damage on the roof of the building of the Dimaanos resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building’s roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon “Saling”. As such. in view of its insurance contract with Soriano. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another. if the former. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. At that time DahlJensen. is called a quasi-delict. 23 March 1998) The Dimaano’s are owners of a house while petitioner South Eastern owns a four-storey school building along the same road. it sued DahlJensen and FILCAR. We now correlate par. prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle. An ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers. did not possess a Philippine driver's license. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane.R. Yet. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. owned by respondent FILCAR Transport. a Danish tourist. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. No. (FILCAR). 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: part of the persons made responsible thereunder. FORTUNE as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict.e. not that of FILCAR. derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. By way of subrogation. Powerful typhoon “Saling” hit Metro Manila. As a consequence. The roof of petitioner’s school building was partly ripped off and blown away.. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. left of the other vehicle. there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. as correctly observed by respondent court. CA. The pertinent provision is Art. while the other car. 118889. or . i. Such fault or negligence. The car owned by Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by Jacildone. there being fault or negligence. who had the last fair chance. logically. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street. may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle? A: We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of FGU’s complaint. G. Clearly. FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to DahlJensen. due to fortuitous event? Is South Eastern liable for damages? A: In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.R." Obviously." To sustain a claim based thereon. figured in a traffic accident.

merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school building after the typhoon. is in order. it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. they were compelled to stay in the airport the whole day of June 22. JAL is not liable for the expenses incurred by the passengers. Pinatubo eruption. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. What is visual to the eye though. (Southeastern College. Unfortunately. In other words. However. Upon arrival in Japan. Q: Were the actual damages adequately established by the evidence presented? A: No. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. JAL rebooked them on flights due to depart. The following day. they learned that Mt. specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. other than the said ocular inspection.88 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee failure to act – the whole occurrence is hereby humanized. The testimony of the general manager as to the valuation of the ship is not reliable because he is an interested party and because it was not within his competence to determine the value of the property. which flew at about 9 am the next day. one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person. JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport the passengers on the first available connecting flight to Manila. The passengers filed an action for damages against JAL. a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight. Private respondents.R. diligence or care. 10 July 1998) Miranda boarded a JAL flight from San Francisco to Manila along with others. JAL is liable for nominal damages. To assure themselves of a seat on an available flight. Pinatubo erupted. Inc.L. CA. the passengers were billeted in Hotel Nikko for the night.000 as nominal damages. and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. In the present case. G. however. CA. and all flights to Manila were cancelled indefinitely. an award ofP100. actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of Maria Efigenia's general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence. in favor of each passenger. and it was only at 8 pm of that day that they were advised that they could be accommodated in said flight. precaution. Because of JAL's failure to make the necessary arrangements to transport the passengers on its first available flight to Manila. there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. (J. et al. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care. claiming that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their subsequent hotel expenses. the flight was also cancelled. in establishing the culpability of petitioner. JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when it declassified them from "transit passengers" to "new passengers. No. or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man. As an incentive for traveling with JAL. no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner’s school building. 118664. It must be noted that the passengers bought tickets from the US with Manila as their final destination. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby. he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof on the best evidence available. For instance.. is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. 126389. In this case. is not always reflective of the real cause behind. since the reason why JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila was due to the effects of the Mt. the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. the University of Santo Tomas . guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs. To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages. There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. Private respondents did not even show that the plans. which was a fortuitous event.A. v. Pinatubo? A: No." as a result of which they were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila. such that if it were not. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. No. not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact. we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent. an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. JAL informed the stranded passengers that it would no longer shoulder their expenses. Q: Is JAL liable for the expenses incurred by its stranded passengers brought about by the unexpected eruption of Mt. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. From these premises. They were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. the flights made an overnight stopover in Japan at the airline's expense. 07 August 1998) The plaintiff tried to prove actual damages by presenting his general manager who testified as to the value of the property damaged and also by presenting documentary evidence in the form of brochures quoting the prices of similar equipment. cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. As the term imparts. On the other hand. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. Negligence. JAL paid for their unexpected overnight stay. While JAL was no longer required to defray the passengers' living expenses during their stay in Japan on account of the fortuitous event. GR. JAL. as commonly understood. v. the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? At the outset. and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. would do. is not completely absolved from liability.

(Medel v. plus an additional 1 % monthly penalty charge. in another case involving MMTC. MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. Medel then filed certiorari with the SC. G. while in the custody of the International School & its officers. RTC awarded damages. She fell to the ground upon impact. due to the iniquitousness of the stipulated interest. In the selection of prospective employees. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability. An eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus. testimonial evidence of identical content. rolled between the two front wheels of the bus. the lender and borrower could agree on any interest that may be charged on the loan. [Though. Although Circular No. and of his service were not presented. It is noteworthy that. 16 November 1998) Franco and Medel obtained several loans from Gonzales at 6% interest per month. and exorbitant.the damage was proved. they should have been called temperate damages . Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center but efforts to revive her proved futile. they cannot be admitted in evidence.5% per month or 66% per annum is iniquitous or unconscionable. No. Court of Appeals. Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees within the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that "they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. of the results of his examinations. Since the persons who prepared them were not presented in court. G. The awards for moral & exemplary damages CANNOT be the subject of execution pending appeal. The Torralbas moved for execution of judgment pending appeal on grounds that the appeal is merely dilatory and filing of a bond is another good reason for execution.No proof was presented that Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Q: Were Musa and his employer MMTC liable for negligence? A: Yes. They do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule since they are not commercial lists. Reason that an appeal is dilatory does NOT justify execution pending appeal. v. GR. justify the same. including documentary evidence. and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. and executed a promissory note to cover said amount with an interest of 5. appealed. RATIONALE: The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. then bound for the south. Q: Was the execution of judgment pending appeal improper? A: Yes. Due to their failure to pay the loans upon maturity. and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. a complaint for collection of money was filed against them by Gonzales. arguing that the interest charged by Gonzales was iniquitous. Q: Was the interest stipulation in this case valid? A: No. if they are iniquitous and unconscionable. monitor their implementation. Nominal damages were awarded instead. or credit" which was 12% per annum. whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty. Unlike actual . NO. In this case. the records of his interview. 08 October 1998) MMTC Bus. 116617. ever presented. allegedly conducted by supervisors. the interest in this case of 5. without anything more. unconscionable.5% per month plus 2% service charge per annum. hit her. Although testimonies were offered that in the case of Musa all these precautions were followed. 905 of the Central Bank expressly repealed the usury law.S. which MMTC presented to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the negligent acts of its employees.] (PNOC Shipping v. both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. CA. The CA however upheld the validity of the aforementioned stipulated interest and held that since the usury law was repealed. employers must submit concrete proof.R. The lower court held that although the usury law was repealed." For this purpose. (Metro Manila Transit Corp. On the other hand. Such a stipulation of interest is void and the courts in such a case shall equitably reduce liquidated damages.89 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: documentary evidence in the form of brochures are not admissible for being hearsay evidence. 107518. IS could not be faulted for its withdrawal of its supersedeas bond inasmuch as the lower court granted the execution pending appeal and rejected its offer of supersedeas bond. In this case. experience. with respect to the supervision of employees. CA. and hence contrary to law and morals. 131622. NO. 27 November 1998) Sps Torralba filed a complaint for damages against International School for the death of their only son. procedures. Due to Franco and Medel's failure to pay upon maturity. and service records. was held to be insufficient to overcome the presumption of 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: negligence against it. they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such diligence. which was driven by its employee Musa. goods. employers should formulate standard operating. the two consolidated all said loans bringing their indebtedness to a total of P500K. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. the interest charged by Gonzales was unconscionable and was therefore invalid. the SC imposed the "legal rate of interest for loan or forbearance of money. employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications. Nor were records of daily inspections.R. I. but the amount was not. in reality. hit Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue. neither does the filing of a bond.

a combination of Savings Account and Current Account in her business name "Pujol Trading" under which checks drawn against her checking account could be charged against her savings account should the funds in her current account be insufficient to cover the value of her checks. Hosaka be held liable for damages as the surgeon in charge? Can the hospital be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of its doctors during an operation? How is the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur applied in the case? A: Yes. However. When issued and presented for payment. but the latter taking advantage of said information and in bad faith. (International School v. after all. (PNB v. No.R.R. Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. In the course of the business. furnish independent and distinct proof thereof. Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant.90 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee damages for which petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage. and something went wrong w/ the intubation of the patient. Realizing its mistake as to the 2nd check. No. which fact JII allegedly made known to SEACOM. The award of moral damages and attorney's fees affirmed. By appointing JII as a dealer of its agricultural equipment SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment. Court of Appeals. JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz. 25 November 1999) Plaintiff Ramos was a vigorous woman. (Sea Commercial Company v. JII denied the obligation and interposed a counterclaim for damages representing unrealized profits. went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold 21 units of said tractors. besmirched reputation. While PNB's negligence in this case may not have been attended with malice and bad faith. It entered into a dealership agreement with JII. It is possible that the petitioners. liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the CA and SC. 126152. Q: Is PNB liable to Lily for moral damages due to the mental anguish embarrassment. from the nature of the case. to the exclusion of other places. otherwise. Court of Appeals. She issued two checks. SEACOM brought an action to recover a balance for unpaid deliveries incurred by JII. placing itself in direct competition with its own dealer. G. In the case of Leopold Araneta v. filed with the RTC a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against PNB for dishonoring her checks despite sufficiency of her funds. considering the" reputation and social standing of Lily. No. Hosaka arrived very late. and there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis. whereby the latter will be its exclusive dealer in Iloilo. G. Under the captain of the ship doctrine. while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral & exemplary damages. it opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in article 19 of the Civil Code. at the day of the operation. G. the surgeon is liked to a ship captain who must not University of Santo Tomas . on appeal. 131109. JII was to act as a middleman to sell SEACOM’s products in its areas of operations. 122823. Q: Did SEACOM act in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries to FSDC? A: Clearly. Or in some cases elevated to the SC. The yardstick should be that it is not palpably and scandalously excessive. thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit. After being discharged from the hospital. Unfortunately.R. PNB subsequently accepted and honored it. Hosaka. Bank of America it was held that it can hardly be possible that a customer's check can be wrongfully refused payment without some impeachment of his credit which must in fact be an actual injury. they contracted to sell 24 units of power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed with by Farm System Development Corporation (FSDC) corporation. In this case. however. nevertheless. SEACOM may not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith. Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Under the dealership agreement. CA. she has been staying in their residence. although he cannot. both were dishonored allegedly for insufficiency of funds. upon professional advice she sought to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. Dr. Lily. still needing constant medical attention. she suffered? A: Yes. embarrassment and humiliation to Lily for which she is entitled to recover reasonable moral damages. the awards may be reduced. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the petitioner's act will have to be determined in the light of error:. 29 June 1999) Pujol opened with PNB an account denominated as "Combo Account". Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. the bad faith of SEACOM was established. After being informed of the demonstrations JII had conducted. it caused serious anxiety. the award of damages is reasonable. however. to send its men to Manila for training and to comply with other requirements to benefit the dealership. there were sufficient funds in her savings account. Q: Should Dr. SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price. 28 September 1999) SEACOM is engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery and products. She and her husband met for the first time Dr. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.

However. He had to drop from the review course and deferred from taking the bar exams. respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. 124354. The head surgeon is made responsible for everything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating room.R. we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases. an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. the control test is determining. In this case. the penalty of death is thus imposed and the civil liability therefore should be increased from P50 K to P75K. 26 January 2000) The Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate as to who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. While “consultants” are not. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. the burden shifts to the respondents (parent. 29 December 1999) Fuentes. when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury – that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them. Yes. Accordingly. (Ramos v. G. hire. Upon automatic review by the SC. The plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation. The plaintiff attended the investiture. Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs. once negligence is shown. G. the latter's nieces. CA. teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. he learned that he had deficiencies in his subjects.R. for without the latter. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. as to damages. that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education. failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. In other words. hence he should only be held liable for acts of lasciviousness and not rape. a 6 year old. the control exercised. a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition. apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists. respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda’s condition. The conscious . At trial. the former are useless Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. and the rights to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship. No. Q: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? A: Yes. with the exception of the payment of wages. or proof of a similar nature. that their fellowmen. Criselle eventually told her parents about the 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: incident who reported the same to the police. Having failed to do this. 335 RPC for which the penalty of death is imposed. In other words. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are under his physical control but also those wherein he has extension of control. In neglecting to offer such proof. private hospitals. In the instant case. This being the case. In civilized society. He was also ordered to pay P50K as civil damages.91 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the vessel. more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Balgos. Considering further. Balgos tried to rape Criselle but could not penetrate the latter's vagina as it was too small. went to Balgos' house to play with her two friends. it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. Q: What should be the amount of damages? A: The crime of rape is consummated by the mere "touching" of the penis and the labia. the civil liability for the victim shall be fixed at not less than P75K. the court a quo found Balgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and was sentenced to death. fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. Balgos asked his nieces to go out and buy some snacks. More importantly. 126115. if the commission of rape is qualified by any of the circumstances under Art. since the rape is qualified by the fact that the victim was less than 7 years old at the time of the crime. (People v. While they were playing. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. technically employees. guardian. on the basis of the foregoing. the hiring. respondent hospital. No. While they were gone. hence actual penetration is not necessary. Balgos argued that he was not able to penetrate Criselle's vagina. the question now arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition. Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them.

All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present. (Prudential Bank v. As explained earlier. v. provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. The bank's negligence was the result of lack of due care and caution required of managers and employees of a firm engaged in so sensitive and demanding a business as banking. already married to Oliva on 1976. 17 February 2000) A check issued by Valenzuela bounced even if she had enough money in her account. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. however. 132344. the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent. a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein.R. the fact remains that the bank committed a serious mistake. No. the second requisite is also present. When the party breaching the contract is a bank. fell 14 floors from the building resulting to his death. or bad faith. Investigation disclosed that while victim together other workers were working at the elevator core of the building on board a platform made of channel beam (with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block. Q: Is Valenzuela entitled to moral damages? A: Yes. graduate. and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. Later. Accordingly. the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. moral damages are proper only "when there was fraud. 16 March 2000) A construction worker of D. Inc. malice. (University of the East v. Romeo A. Tan filed an action for bigamy against Mercado. it was found that the check bounced because the bank had made a mistake in crediting her deposits to another account. More than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutor’s Office. Mercado argued as a defense that his previous marriage had been judicially declared null and void. 125536. when suddenly. got loose xxx causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim to death. Police filed a report that the worker was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician. Court of Appeals. thus. in the exercise of its fiduciary capacity. Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available. thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Inc.B. Q: Can the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur be applied in this case? A: Yes. (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence.R. Mercado filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva and a Decision was rendered declaring the marriage between Mercado and Oliva null and void.M. 20 April 2001) Mercado and Tan got married on 1991. No. In the criminal proceeding. GR. the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the platform. 137873. On the other hand. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband thus the last requisite is also present. CA. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It has a safety engineer. * This is the exception to the general rule that in breach of contract. There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project.” (D. Mercado was. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. Consunji.92 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Consunji. Jader. G. The trial court rendered a judgment convicting Mercado for the University of Santo Tomas . Even if malice or bad faith was not sufficiently proved in this case. the award of moral damages was proper. No. As a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions. G.M. the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant thus. there is no need for bad faith order for the moral damages to be awarded. resulting to his death. It failed to act seasonably. but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it “proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband. a project superintendent. This is untenable. Valenzuela is entitled to moral damages. Prudential claims that Valenzuela is not entitled to moral damages because it acted in good faith and committed an honest mistake. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.

The application was approved and a trust receipt agreement was executed.whether by active intervention. G. (Mercado v. Ephraim Morillo. (Mindex Resources Development v. G. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting. No. . The defendants failed to comply with their undertaking. his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases. neglect or failure to act -. it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. Article 1667 of the Civil Code holds lessees responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased. the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will. it must be impossible to avoid.00.93 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: crime of bigamy. “It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. and (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. which the CA affirmed.R. he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. there must be an exclusion of human intervention from the cause of injury or loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another. otherwise.the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. he committed bigamy. and Apostol filed an application for an irrevocable domestic letter of credit with Associated Banking Corporation in favor of LS Parts Hardware. thereby rendering it void ab initio. (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner. Sarmiento also signed a surety/guarantor of the agreement. Such declaration is necessary before one can contract a second marriage. petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. After failing in the series of negotiations. As with a voidable marriage. No. there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. To constitute a fortuitous event. Jr. the second marriage will also be void.750. Morillo offered to sell the truck to MINDEX but the latter refused. 137110. Morillo pulled out the truck from the repair shop of MINDEX and had it repaired 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: elsewhere for which he spent the total amount of P132. but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. The negligence of MINDEX makes it responsible for the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss. Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event that could not be foreseen or. nonetheless. Mercado argued that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability. He argued that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Before the SC. we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy. Instead. MINDEX had been paying the rentals until April 1991. Q: Was the burning of the truck caused by fortuitous event. it replaced the vehicle’s burned tires and had it towed to a shop for repair and overhauling. 12 March 2002) Limpin. Morillo sued MINDEX for damages. On appeal. CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or. though foreseen. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s participation -. In the instant case. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation. Lower Court rendered a judgment in favor of the bank. hence there is no first marriage to speak of. even if such is the fact. 01 August 2000) A verbal agreement was entered into between Morillo and Mindex for the lease of Morillo’s cargo truck for use in MINDEX’s mining operations. thereby exempting MINDEX from liability? A: No. In other words. In fact. unless they prove that it took place without their fault. showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. if it can be foreseen. Upon learning that the truck was burned by unidentified persons while it was parked unattended due to mechanical trouble. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial the crime had already been consummated by then. Absent that declaration. was inevitable. Q: Will pendency of an action for declaration of nullity of marriage be a prejudicial question to a criminal action for bigamy? A: Article 40 of the FC expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage and that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again. Moreover. This prompted the bank to file an action against them.R. 138123. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void. Tan.

so that the purpose of the law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned by his employment. (Cathay Pacific v. G. While a reading of Section 1. Sps. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because. Thus. GR 150843. The result indicated that she has a Hepa-B. Inc. Therefore. She decided to have another medical exam which then yielded a negative result. 2200. the broadcasts are libelous per se. 141994. 14 March 2003) Because of the attacks made by the two broadcasters of Filipinas Broadcasting against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (“AMEC”) and its administrators in their radio program “Expose” saying that AMEC is a dumping ground. as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to the reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate civil action. There was no bad faith here. But there was recognition of a breach of contract of carriage. Consequently. unlike a natural person. 13 March 2007) Salvador underwent a medical exam as prerequisite for regular employment. precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. mental anguish or moral shock. The airline had overbooked the business class. slander or any other form of defamation. v. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure shows that the offended party is required to make a reservation of his right to institute a separate civil action. In this case. a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. favorable or unfavorable. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao Lumber Co. a P5. v.[23] in computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded to the claimant under Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. (Sarmiento Jr.. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery of some damages. Ago Medical. 000 award for nominal damages is enough. However. We deem it best to adopt the formula for loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v. The trial court awarded them a whopping sum with moral and exemplary damages to boot. if besmirched. to justify the award of moral damages. et al. Vasquez. Moral damages were awarded to AMEC. evidence of an honest mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages. No. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Nevertheless. The whopping 1M lump sum was deleted. garbage of moral and physical misfits. Q: Are the petitioners liable for damages based on the issuance of incorrect medical results? A: Yes. 163212. whereby such other person suffers injury. In holding FBNI liable for libel. AMEC charged the two broadcasters as well as the company for defamation. Q: Is the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art194 of the Labor Code applicable in determining the compensation claimed by the heir of deceased employee under Art 1711 of NCC? A: The pertinent provisions of the NCC are Articles 1711. the Court’s statement in Mambulao that “a corporation may have a good reputation which. v. failure of the trial court to make any pronouncement. This was allegedly against their will. as envisioned by the Article 1711 of the same code may be realized. (Candano Shipping v. may also be a ground for the award of moral damages” is an obiter dictum. For health care providers. Furthermore. thus. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care. His wife filed an action before the RTC for damages based on Art. Moreover. (Filipinas Broadcasting Network. No. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel. Court of Appeals. the trial court found that FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. the law implies damages. 17 January 2005) Melquiades Sugata-on was employed by Candano Shipping as Marine Engineer. They felt bad because their kompadres were in business. PNB. serious anxiety. In such a case. Sugata-on. Court of Appeals. the test of the existence of negligence University of Santo Tomas . He was one of those missing after Candano’s vessel sank. AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. 2199. is it entitled to moral damages? A: Yes. it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings. where the broadcast is libelous per se.94 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Q: Does the right of the bank to institute separate civil action for the recovery of civil liability already barred on the ground that same was not expressly reserved in the criminal action earlier filed? A: No. Q: Considering the fact that AMEC is a juridical person. she was terminated from employment and her father (Ramon) suffered a heart attack. AMEC is entitled to moral damages. The trial court held that the broadcasts are libelous per se and rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. 394 SCRA 315) Couple was booked for business class tickets. they must be transformed into a more tangible and practical mathematical form. GR. jurisprudence instructs that such reservation may not necessarily be express but may be inferred not only from the acts of the offended party but also from acts other than those of the latter. Q: Does an involuntary upgrade with no added costs to plaintiffs warrant an award of damages? A: No. so they were asked to sit in first class section. They filed for damages against the airline. Salvador sued petitioners for damages.R.1711 of the NCC and eventually got a favorable judgment using the standard in Art194 of the Labor Code. In order to give breath to the aforestated provisions on damages of the New Civil Code.

then he is guilty of negligence. He alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about 5 to 10 kph and was making a left turn when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60-70 kph. and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them. if yes.R. G. while the case was pending. decapitated the heads of some of these icons. Sps. Hence. No. v. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the “captain of the ship” doctrine. 160889. petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of petitioner’s negligence. Angala then filed an action for quasi-delict. even the chapel was destroyed. Jr. v. G. Religious icons were stolen and as an extreme act of sacrilege. it can be logically inferred that petitioner. He stated that he did not apply the brakes because he knew the collision was unavoidable. Third. Based on the foregoing. damages and attorney’s fees against LADECO. 3) injury. Q: Can the petitioners independently institute an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the dispossession by respondent of the premises during the pendency of the complaints for forcible entry. 170916.. Jr. could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. the gaping wound on Nora’s arm is certainly not an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby. have contributed to her own injury. He alleged that he tried to avoid the pick-up but he was unable to avoid the collision. and 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: -The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Hence. whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. 168512. The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done. As to the first requirement. (Cantre v. Treyes. Second. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon’s control. No. (Garcia Jr. 4 years after. Salvador.& his armed men forcibly entered the leased properties of CGR. their claim for damages has no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s exclusive control. provided that the following requisites concur: -The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence. In the complaint for damages of petitioners. It had to do with respondent's alleged harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds. (CGR Corp. by any stretch of the imagination. after the act of dispossession had occurred. under the law. the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty. and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Such injury could not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere. 20 March 2007) Treyes. 27 April 2007) Respondents sued petitioner as the attending physician for the burns in the left arm that Nora Go suffered when she gave birth. the gaping wound on Nora’s left arm. petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against respondent praying for the payment of actual. In this particular case.R. G.All the elements are present in the case at bar. by its very nature and considering her condition. the presumption that petitioner was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. Go. 27 April 2007) The LADECO crewcab bumped into the car driven by Borres and owned by Angala. defendant's men took away the remaining fish. RTC found the crewcab running very fast while following the pick-up and the crewcab’s speed was the proximate cause of the accident and that Deocampo had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. Petitioners filed with the MTC complaints for Forcible Entry and Damages. ransacking and destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation.R. The pick-up was running along the outer lane and was about 10 meters away when it made a U-turn towards the left. and 4) proximate causation. Nora could not. Deocampo alleged that the pick-up and the crewcab he was driving were both running at about 40 kph. far removed as the arm is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. The following days. 2) breach. The court rendered judgment ordering . -It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants. No. Clearly. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. He admitted that he stepped on the brakes only after the collision. Q: Are the petitioners liable for damages? A: In cases involving medical negligence. moral & exemplary damages. exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. A: The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and attorney's fees and costs. set up a barbed wire fence and harvested tons of fish and fingerlings. the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Nora’s baby.95 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done. Thus.

and insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that the civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action. (People v. and Quirimit. cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with petitioner. No premium should be placed on the right to litigate. While petitioner has proven that Concepcion did not furnish an accurate weight of the pay loader. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Q: Is Compania Maritima liable? A: Yes. as if no criminal case had been instituted against him. Consequently. Court of Appeals. for embezzlement of road and bridge fund. While the act of Concepcion in not disclosing the correct weight of the loader constitutes a contributory negligence. Pending appeal of his conviction. Court of Appeals. 164 SCRA 685) Bayotas was charged with Rape before RTC and eventually convicted thereof. the SolGen expressed his view that the death of accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. In this case. Bayotas died due to cardio respiratory arrest. as to the personal penalties. 153076.000 – actual damages 10. and as to pecuniary penalties. extinguished criminal liability but the civil liability survives. there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned. In his comment. the pay loader fell and was damaged. No. If the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered. 81 SCRA 120) Concepcion shipped his construction equipment aboard the M/V Cebu of Compania Maritima. sums: 23. Corp v. the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan. Section 1. (Hermosisima v. It used a lifting apparatus to lift and unload a visibly heavy pay loader. the action survives. relying on the case of People v. the provincial auditor. Sendaydiego died. L-14628. serious anxiety and fright which entitle to him to moral damages. Hence. (Compania Maritima v. It University of Santo Tomas . liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Q: Does the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? A: Yes. G. After trial. SC construed the term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. civil liability ex delicto. extinguish both the criminal and civil liability of the accused-appellant? A: No. were careless in their methods of ascertaining the weight of heavy cargoes offered for shipment before loading and unloading them. CFI Pangasinan acquitted Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to the SC. moreover.000 – moral damages 10. Sendaydiego. SC resolved to continue exercising civil appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for money claims arising from the alleged criminal acts. (Lapanday Agricultural and Devt. On the other hand. the award of attorney’s fees is deleted. Q: Will Death. She sought to claim damages contending that petitioner as her superior seduced her into making love. We sustain the TC and the CA in ruling that respondent sufficiently showed that he suffered shock. The other equipments were safely unloaded within few hours after arrival in Cagayan de Oro City. however.96 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee the defendants LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the plaintiffs the ff. G. 21 June 2007) Human Relations Respondent filed a complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite alleging that petitioner was the father of her baby.000 – attorney’s fees Cost of suit Q: Is respondent entitled to the damages awarded? A: Respondent is entitled to Moral damages. Whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action. the claim for civil liability survived Sendaydiego for his death occurred after final judgment was rendered. 30 September 1960) Three cases of malversation through falsification were filed Sendaydiego. after final judgment but before it has become final and executory due to pendency of an appeal.R. ANGALA. after final judgment but before it has become final and executory. diversion or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant’s culpable action. Both the TC and CA failed to give any justification for the award of attorney’s fees.R. Moral damages are awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain means. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter: Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. Its crew. Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. the Supreme Court in its Resolution dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. Death of an accused-appellant. Besides. Galvan. Sendaydiego. is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. No. Q: Will the action for damages prosper? A: We. petitioner is nonetheless liable for the damage caused to the machinery since they could have avoided the incident by the exercise of reasonable skill and attention in overseeing the unloading of such heavy equipment. Award of attorney’s fees must be based on findings of fact and law and stated in the decision of the TC. such will only mitigate the liability for damages.

on the other hand. Court of Appeals. the heirs are not barred from recovery of damages. excessive tire pressure. On its way. 17 October 1997) Singson and Tiongson bought from Cathay Pacific two tickets for their vacation in US. Owing to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier and its obligation to exercise the utmost diligence. the bus fell into a ravine caused by the bursting of one of its tires. The omission of the CA to review the evidence in this case and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal case disregarded the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that heirs took no part in the criminal prosecution. as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. Moreover. 07 March 1997) Spouses Tumboy and two minor children boarded a Yubido liner. This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its decision. (Heirs of Guaring Jr. Tito Tumboy died while others suffered physical injuries. it is upon the defendants to prove that the cause of the blow-out is a fortuitous event. even if based on a finding that he is not guilty. the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime.e. 236 SCRA 239. Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused. 21. Tiongson got a booking for the flight. as one filed under Article 30. such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accusedappellant pending appeal thereof. 113033. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict. SC held that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of. It is unfair to bind the heirs to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein. Corollarily. On the other hand. They showed that the bus hit the rear portion of the Lancer. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused. if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.. it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. The heirs of Guaring. Court of Appeals. and a bus resulted to the death of Guaring Jr and a passenger of the Cressida. Rabbit. Instead. brought an action for damages based on quasi-delict. GR No. presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring. is not an unavoidable event. The fact that the cause of the blow-out is not known does not relieve the carrier from liability. The ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. To summarize: 1. which could make the blow-out caso fortuito. the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused. G. a Cressida. Q: Did the acquittal in the criminal case of the bus driver extinguish his civil liability and his employer? A: No. the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished. No. v. acquitted the bus driver. what was . Since the cause of action of the heirs of Guaring is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction. acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt. (Yubido v. 2. (People v. Jr. This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. RTC of Pampanga. does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Bayotas. 108395. there may have been adverse conditions on the road that were present. the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. in the criminal case. Phil. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. i. 5 corresponding to the San Francisco-Hong Kong trip. Q: Is explosion of a newly-installed tire of a passenger vehicle a fortuitous event that exempt the carrier from liability for the death of passengers? A: The cause of the blow-out. the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. rape. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the cause of the blow-out is not a caso fortuito. and the fact that 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: it can be inferred from the criminal case that the accused driver was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses. they decided to go back to the Philippines. the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action. The notion that an action for quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside. It allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal. said civil action cannot survive. improper mounting. grounded as it is on the criminal.97 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: means that as long as a judgment has not become executory.R. 02 September 1994) A vehicular accident between a Guaring’s Lancer. A complaint for damages was filed but the defendants raised the defense of fortuitous event. if due to a factory defect. causing it to swerve to the other bound lane and collide with the Cressida. After staying for about three weeks. It was discovered that his ticket booklet did not have flight coupon No.

In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be attached thereto.98 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee left was coupon No. (Singson v. 3 which was supposed to have been used and removed from the booklet. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. to a point of suppression. there was no contract of carriage yet existing. To comply with their obligations.. For the purpose of reporting the same in the issue of People’s Journal. The round ticket issued by the carrier was in itself a complete written contract. In fact. So. Journalists Inc. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation. Q: Did the CA err in holding that the publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages. a reporter. Under the circumstances. for forcible abduction with attempted rape. the contract was already partially executed when it transported petitioner to US. spouses decided to move back to their building with a promise that they would vacate as soon as its demolition would be undertaken. Spouses denied the non-delivery and sought for rescission of contract for non-payment. However. Phil. depends upon the scope. No. He contended that it was the airline’s agent committed the mistake in tearing off the wrong flight coupon. 18 November 1997) Aguilar entered into a lease agreement with Spouses Juguilon. but we do not consider that the respondents. the whole item. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. Cathay denied the allegations and answered that since the petitioner is holding an “opendated” ticket. explain. Singson filed an action for damages against Cathay Pacific. Petitioner instituted a complaint against respondents for damages arising “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting of the news item” prepared by respondent Morales. His contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached since the ticket was open-dated was untenable. GR No. In the preparation of stories. it cut off the theater’s water service connection. press reporters and [editors] usually have to race with their deadlines. spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. after few hours. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. Spouses vacated the second floor of the building to be demolished and filed an action for unlawful detainer against their tenants occupying the ground floor. As a consequence thereof. (Arafiles v. A: No. Court of Appeals. However. whimsical. pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the RPC governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. Act Theater filed a civil case for damages against MWSS alleging that the latter’s arbitrary. was at a police headquarter. newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion. Cathay Pacific undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner’s flight reservation back home on account of his missing coupon. Whether or not it is libelous. G. The subjects of the lease contract were the two adjacent parcels of land owned by the spouses. but it is not per se illegal. he tried to contact Arafiles at the NIAS office to verify the story but he failed. and its meaning and signification thus determined. 11995. he personally interviewed the woman. explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. capricious act in cutting off its water supply without prior notice University of Santo Tomas . It would be unjust enrichment for the lessors to demand rent for the entire leased premises when they themselves are at the same time occupying a portion thereof. or restrict or be enlarged. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational manner. After the interview. should be read and construed together. a woman filed a complaint against petitioner Arafiles. 150256. under the circumstances of this case. Q: Is Cathay liable for damages? A: Yes. SC ruled that a modification of the decision of the trial court as to the payment of the accrued rentals be ordered. including display lines. Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. 335 SCRA 308) While respondent Morales. CA. In actions for damages for libel. Spouses subsequently sent a letter to Aguilar pertaining to the payments of the lease rentals. Aguilar instituted an action for specific performance against the Spouses praying that the entire property be delivered to him pursuant to the contract. (Aguilar v. He then wrote an account about the woman’s complaint w/c then appeared as headline on People’s Journal. as they may enlarge. A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. which meant that he was not booked on a specific flight on a particular date. Q: Is it just to allow the lessors to recover the whole rental payments agreed upon? A: No. it is but fair that the spouses be made to pay a fair rental value for the use and occupation of a portion of the leased premises from the time they have returned to said building.R. 25 March 2004) Four employees of Act Theater were apprehended by the police for allegedly tampering a water meter and were charged accordingly in the proper court. MWSS sent a notice to Act Theater. had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. they should not be held to account. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution.

His conviction or acquittal is not. After payment. otherwise. Q: Was the Court of Appeals correct in awarding damages to respondent on the basis of Article 19 NCC? A: Yes. Po Cham had a meeting with Pizarro at the latter’s house where Pizarro categorically represented to Po Cham that the property was alienable and disposable. Zabala. injurious and prejudicial to the respondent. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: Can Reyes claim damages from Lim and the Hotel? A: Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code both requires that the act complained of must be intentional. the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent's water service connection. The burden of proof for these types of cases differs. Po Cham took possession of the property. no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioner's act was arbitrary. (MWSS v. the exercise of rights is not without limitations. “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon. the plaintiff-appellee was denied due process when it was deprived of the water services. as the owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including the respondent. 147076. 154259. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum of P200. Upon receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter. however. a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. Inc.99 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: cause adverse effect to the health and sanitation of its patrons. A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay damages under Article 19 and 21. Soon after. to the MWSS office but he was treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act. As a consequence thereof. Act's water services were cut at midnight of the day following the apprehension of the employees. Concededly. statute or decisional law. or immunity guaranteed under a constitution. However. Jr. Banzon. or recognized as a result of long usage. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. The manner by which Lim asked him to leave was acceptable and humane under the circumstances. GR No. and Navarro offered for sale to Po Cham a parcel of land. Cañete. however. constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against the other. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised. this Court will be rendered helpless from . Deed of Absolute Sale over the property was executed in favor of Po Cham. Filart invited him to the party and that he was getting his food from the buffet table when he was stopped in a loud voice by Lim to his great shock. upon which information for estafa was subsequently filed. alleged that she asked other people to ask Reyes to leave in order not to make a scene but she failed so she asked him herself to leave but not in the manner alleged by Reyes.R. Thus. essential insofar as the present administrative case against him is concerned. respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension. this was done only a few hours before the actual disconnection. Lim. Q: Does a prejudicial question exist in this case? A: The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent. Act sent its assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid.000 for the restoration of their water services. had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. 17 June 2004) Reyes filed an action for damages against Lim and Hotel Nikko alleging that Lim humiliated him when Lim asked him to leave a party taking place at the penthouse of the hotel for the birthday of its former manager. In this case. Despite repeated demands. privilege. Po Cham filed an administrative case against Pizarro alleging that the latter has violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the property which property he represented to be disposable and alienable. Conversely. While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latter's water services. Alipio and Navarro arising from the questioned sale of rights. It was found that Po Cham also filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. No. a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. Reyes had not shown that Lim was driven by animosity against him. A right is a power.. Reyes. and shame. justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code. G. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another. respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights over the property. Alipio. Po Cham discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership. 28 February 2005) Cañete. Reyes claimed that his friend Dr. proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary. Act Theater. (Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number of days. the petitioner. on the other hand. Clearly. thus. In a criminal case. embarrassment. There is.

misrepresentation and bad faith to Ines in using a forged affidavit to obtain title over the disputed property despite full knowledge that she owned only 1/5 portion thereof. reconveyance being clearly the proper remedy in the present case. After the sale. found some persons occupying the lot. It appears from the record that Juan. was erroneous. Mariano and Josefa were notified of the application for free patent of Ines. CA. The occupants objected to the fencing of the subject property but were ignored by B on the principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title. in TCT 10101. they never really took serious efforts in establishing such allegation by preponderant evidence.e. 955). Upon default. G. In 1957. When a re-appraisal of the property was conducted by DBP’s representatives. No. 26 August 1999) Mumar originally owned a parcel of land since 1917 as evidenced by Tax Declaration. 295 SCRA 556) Petitioners claimed that the disputed property was part of the land in the actual physical possession of their grandfather Sixto Brusas since 1924. it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant’s possessory rights. Cajes occupied and cultivated the said land. Intentional acts to deceive and deprive another of his right. the true and actual owner thereof. 5499. which they failed to do.” (Mathay v. In 1969. Q: Is the contention of B correct? A: No. On appeal. as in this case. in concept of an owner. whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueno. an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard that a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. 126875. As held in Vital v. and the property was subdivided among the five children of their grandfather. B however. This could only mean that they either agreed with the order or decided to abandon their claims. Alvarez never occupied nor introduced improvements on said land. An action for reconveyance was instituted imputing fraud. mortgaged the land to the bank.100 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. it is of course. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who. the land in question must be reconveyed in favor of Cajes. declaring him the owner of the land erroneously included in TCT. must be specifically alleged and proved. it s also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances w/c would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him. as security. Pizarro. In 1950. subsequently.. As is the common practice in the real estate industry. he sold it to Cajes who was issued Tax Declaration. Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond it certificate of title. Ines applied for a free patent which was approved and the corresponding certificate of title issued in 1967. A. it was then discovered that Cajes was occupying a portion of said land Cajes was asked to vacate but he refused to do so. is not in actual possession. or in some manner injure him. 16 August 2005) Land Titles and Deeds A sold to B parcel of land with a clean TCT. Q: Did Ines commit fraud in causing the registration of the disputed property under her name thus entitling the petitioners to the reconveyance of their shares therein? A: Petitioners failed to prove the fact of fraud in the case at bar. Tarcela. denied that the disputed property were owned and possessed by their grandfather Sixto Brusas during his lifetime. They were duly afforded the opportunity to object to the registration and to substantiate their claims. they failed to prove fraud in the execution of the affidavit used by Ines to obtain title to the disputed property. petitioners never contested the order of the Bureau of Lands disregarding their claims. Q: May Cajes seek the reconveyance of the land? Is the question on the validity of TCT in the present case for recovery of possession a collateral attack against the indefeasibility of Torrens titles? A: 1. the Court of Appeals reversed and gave judgment for Cajes. They asserted that Ines was the absolute owner having entered the property as early as 1924. Accordingly. The burden of proof that the affidavit of waiver is indeed spurious rests on petitioners. such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon. It is not for private respondents to deny forgery. Yet. Amore (90 Phil. Moreover. even as they insist on forgery. the mortgage on the property was foreclosed. The ownership of the land presently occupied by Cajes was already vested in him and that its inclusion in OCT 546 and. i. R. unknown to Cajes. Alvarez succeeded in obtaining the registration of subject land for which he was issued OCT 546. expected from the purchaser of valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of the possession of the occupants. CA. Alvarez sold the land to the spouses Beduya to whom TCT was issued.C. No. The Beduyas obtained a loan from the DBP and. The failure of the prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a “purchaser in good faith. No evidence was adduced by them to substantiate their allegation that their signatures therein were forged. (Brusas v. (Po Chan v. B started fencing the property. having inherited the same from their great grandfather. The lower court declared DBP the lawful owner of the entire land covered by TCT on the ground that the decree of registration was binding upon the land. DBP filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against him. Private respondents on the other hand. “The true owner may bring an action to have the ownership or title to the land judicially settled and University of Santo Tomas . Mere allegations of fraud are not enough. Further.

expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants. GR 129471. although generally. This contradicts what respondent Chua's claim that prior to the sale. 2. Herein. only spouses Editha and Erlindo Celestial occupied the land in question and nobody else. As enumerated in Mathay v. an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. only this time. Hence. The Court reasoned that since all the facts of the case are before it. In response to respondent Chua’s demand. It is alleged by petitioners that respondent Chua was not a buyer in good faith because at the time of the execution of the sale. However. evidence as to conduct and outward acts are usually resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable determination of the inward motive or intention. Thus. Chua knew that an old wooden house and a semi-bungalow house were already erected in the disputed property. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Gregorio v. notice that some other person had a right to or interest on the property in question prior to her purchase from Editha. She also testified that the brothers and sisters of Amado resided with them in the old wooden house. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller. i. a witness for the petitioners. it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him. These facts alone should have put respondent Chua on guard that there were possible defects in the title of the vendor. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: Q: Was Chua a buyer in good faith? A: No. without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent. Thereafter. The trial court correctly found that respondent Chua had knowledge or. OCT was cancelled and TCTs were issued covering the three subdivided lots. admitted residing with Amado and Florencia as their tenant on the land in question since 1963. Editha sold the lots to Respondent Chua. 28 April 2000) The disputed land was originally owned by Amado Celestial by virtue of a Miscellaneous Sales Patent issued in his name.101 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. the Court ruled on the validity of a certificate of title despite the fact that the original action instituted before the lower court was a case for recovery of possession. not an original action filed by the latter to question the validity of TCT 10101 on which DBP bases its right. viz: Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title. Court of Appeals.” Further. We answer in the negative.” In an analogous case. due to the circumstances obtaining. it should not be overlooked that Cajes filed a counterclaim against DBP.. prescribes in 10 years from the date of issuance of decree of registration. respondent Chua failed to make the necessary inquiry as to the possessory rights . As good faith primarily refers to a state of mind and is always a question of intention. it is of course.e. the ruling in Heirs of Severa P. there were erected on the land in question an old wooden house and a semi-bungalow house which were occupied by the father of Amado Celestial. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a 'purchaser in good faith'. there is no obstacle to the determination of the validity of TCT 10101 in the present case. to direct the party to institute cancellation proceedings would be needlessly circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy which has already dragged on for 20 years. such as the present case. such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon. herein petitioners filed with the proper court a complaint for judicial declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale executed by Amado and likewise all the Deeds of Sale executed by Editha in favor of Chua. To rule on the issue of validity oF TCT 10101 in the present case for recovery of possession. is not tantamount to a collateral attack. “A counterclaim is considered a complaint. whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño. Court of Appeals is instructive: A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. It is alleged that Amado executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the disputed land in favor of Editha who then caused the disputed property to be subdivided into three lots. an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust. such rule does not apply when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the land. the registered owner to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof. the original complaint is for recovery of possession filed by DBP against Cajes. at the very least. may direct the defendants. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. The records show that respondent Chua knew for a fact that prior to 1962 and prior to the sale. Chua notified herein petitioners who were still occupying the disputed land to vacate the same. it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. As is the common practice in the real estate industry. Carmencita Paradena. In the case at bar. For a buyer to be deemed a purchaser in good Faith. in concept of owner. It is true that the indefeasibility of Torrens titles cannot be collaterally attacked. Erlindo Celestial and their other relatives. Court of Appeals. claiming ownership over the land and seeking damages. the Court herein could rule on the question of the validity of TCT 10101 for the counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the same.

whether spanning decades or centuries. being good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. It is not a conclusive evidence of ownership. Mapili et al. there were grounds for opposition to respondent’s application University of Santo Tomas . the Tax Declarations in the name of Petitioner Aquila may strengthen her bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. After the death of Filomena. The records show that respondent Chua failed to inquire on the respective rights of petitioner Florencia and Carmencita Paradena. 18899. one will not pay taxes on a property not in one's actual or constructive possession. 34 4027 and 03-640-C. does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. the court a quo followed the rule that evidence not formally offered should not be considered. Likewise. 05 December 2003) Yu filed a petition for the registration of a parcel of land. however. was not able to establish a clear title over the subject land notwithstanding the reconstitution of title. 142691. The RTC noted in its Decision that beginning 1968. Tax Declaration No. Heirs of Editha Celestial." "Tax Declaration No. No amount of good faith can therefore be appreciated in favor of respondent Chua's acquisition of the land in question. Torrens certificate pertaining to the disputed property “does not create or vest title. Hipolito Mapili. Petitioners. OSG received a letter from the Regional Director of the DENR alleging that after due investigation by its officers (the Catalan Report). A reconstituted title. the property had already been registered in the name of Aquila. Filomena Larena. Q: Is petitioner correct in claiming ownership over the property on the basis of the Torrens certificate and tax declarations? A: No. He died and was survived by his only son Magno. Inc." No. Q: Was ownership acquired by Cebu Country Club through prescription? Does reconstitution determine ownership of land covered by lost or destroyed title? A: No. or of the other brothers and sisters of Erlindo Celestial. like the original certificate of title. have not been able to present the evidence needed to tack the date of possession on the property in question. al v.102 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee of the relatives of Editha and Erlindo Celestial. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. respondent Cebu Country Club. the father of herein private respondents. In light of the aforementioned ruling. can not ipso facto ripen into ownership. (Alonso et. as can be seen from Tax Declaration Nos. Hence. Neither does the existence of tax declarations change our mind. the RTC considered their prolonged failure to offer it in evidence as a waiver of their right to offer exhibits. Except for the opposition filed the by the Solicitor General. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government. In so ruling. who were in actual possession of the land in question. the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent cannot be counted in its favor. On its part. G. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the property’s conversion to private property. 1419 for the year 1949 was registered in the name of the original owner. Cebu Country Club invoked prescription and further argued that reconstitution of its title was sufficient to prove ownership over the land. The disputed property is part of the “Friar Lands” over which the Government holds title and is not public land but private or patrimonial property of the Government w/c can be alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. who also resided on the questioned land." Land registration under the Torrens system was never intended to be a means of acquiring ownership. On the basis of the certification by the different government agencies. Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which. by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby. 130876. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. GR No. both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration. GR No. but a "proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. In its Order dated October 1.R. The decision became final and executory. as the subject property being a friar land. Moreover.. 07 August 2003) In a decision by the Court. No. herein petitioner took possession of the property alleging that she bought the same from her deceased aunt. (Larena v. is founded on "the great principle of public policy. the court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent Yu. 1993. remained part of the patrimonial property of the Government. It is an iron clad rule that prescription can never lie against the Government. A year later. Private respondents thereafter sued the petitioner. (Heirs of Amado Celestial v. 05 August 2003) Hipolito Mapili was the original owner of a parcel of unregistered land. no one else appeared to oppose the petition. 146341. the Original Certificate of Title was never formally offered by petitioners. Moreover. husband of Editha. claimed that she bought the abovementioned property from Hipolito. unless therein expressly provided. the ownership of the subject property was vested to the Government since it was declared that neither petitioner Tomas Alonso nor his son Francisco or the latter’s heirs were the lawful owners of Lot NO. Normally. the rule that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. 9839 was registered in the name of Petitioner Aquila's aunt. applicable to all governments alike. Cebu Country Club Inc. by itself." but is merely an "evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.. Petitioner now maintains that she is the lawful owner of the disputed property by virtue of the issuance of the Torrens certificate in her name and that the same have been declared for tax purposes in her name. 727.

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because the subject property was found to be a reclaimed foreshore area. With this, the Republic filed a petition for annulment of judgment which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Q: Can the subject land be registered in Yu’s name? A: No. Foreshore land is that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tide. It is that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of tides. It is part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. Foreshore land remains part of the public domain and is outside the commerce of man. It is not capable of private appropriation. It is for this reason that the petitioner persists in its action to revert the subject land to the State. Thus, even if the decision of the RTC has become final and executory, we find that the respondent court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed before it which is impressed with public interest. There are valid and meritorious grounds to justify such action. The State has to protect its interests and can not be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more, non-suited as a result thereof. (Republic v. CA, GR. No. 126316, 25 June 2004) Cezar et al. are the actual occupants and residents of a portion of land with the improvements thereon. They are miscellaneous sales patent applicants of their respective portions of the lot occupied by them and have been religiously paying taxes on the property. The same lot was titled under OCT issued by the then Land Registration Commission in the name of Salcedo, pursuant to a decision of the Cadastral Court. Subsequently, TCTs were issued to Tankiko after the he purchased Lots of the subdivision plan from the Heirs of Salcedo. Cezar, et .al. filed an action for reconveyance. Q: Does an applicant for sales patent have a capacity to sue as such? A: Not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, Cezar, et al. have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit. The circumstances of this case do not justify the exercise of equity jurisdiction that would allow a suit to be filed by one who is not a real party in interest. Herein, Cezar, et al. have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land in question is merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for sales patents on the land, they are not and they do not even claim to be owners thereof. In fact, there is no certainty that their applications would even be ruled upon favorably, considering that some of the applications have been pending for more than 10 years already. Further, it is evident that Cezar, et. al. are not the real parties in interest. Because they admit that they are not the owners of the land
2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members:

but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, it is very clear that the land is public in character and that it should revert to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the government may institute an action to recover ownership of a public land. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. It further defines a “real party in interest” as one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land. (Sps. Tankiko v. Cezar, GR No. 131277, 02 February 1999) Conflict of Laws Foreign Ship’s Internal Affairs and the Narrow Clear Statement Rule The Cruise Line, a Bermuda Corporation with a principal place of business in Florida, operates cruise ships that depart from, and return to, ports in the United States. They provide passengers with staterooms or cabins, food, and entertainment. The cruise ships stop at different ports of call where passengers may disembark. Most of the passengers on these cruises are United States residents; under the terms and conditions of the tickets, disputes between passengers and NCL are to be governed by United States law; and NCL relies upon extensive advertising in the United States to promote its cruises and increase its revenues. The two NCL cruise ships that are the subject of the present litigation, the Norwegian Sea and the Norwegian Star, are both registered in the Bahamas. The petitioners are disabled individuals and their companions who purchased tickets for round-trip cruises on the Norwegian Sea or the Norwegian Star, with departures from Texas. Naming NCL as the defendant, the petitioners filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on behalf of all persons similarly situated. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. The petitioners asserted that cruise ships are covered both by Title III's prohibition on discrimination in places of "public accommodation," §12182(a), and by its prohibition on discrimination in "specified public transportation services," §12184(a). Q: Does the Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) apply to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters? A: In Benz and McCulloch, the Court held that, in some circumstances, a general statute will not apply to certain aspects of the internal operations of foreign vessels temporarily in US waters, absent a clear statement. Here, the question of jurisdiction is not anchored on whether or not the courts have jurisdiction over NCL or any other ships for that matter, but is anchored on whether

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or not there is a clear congressional intent to cover a foreign ship’s internal affairs. Obviously, when a ship sails within the territorial waters of the United States, it will be and it is already subjected to the jurisdiction of its courts. The US Supreme Court has determined that the “physical barriers” complained of is only a matter of internal affairs. Thus, applying the narrow clear statement rule, US Courts under Title III1 does not have jurisdiction over foreign ships on matters involving its internal affairs because it was not specifically provided for therein. The Court held that it is reasonable to presume that Congress intends no interference with matters that are primarily of concern only to the ship and the foreign state in which it is registered. It is also reasonable, however, to presume Congress does intend its statutes to apply to entities in US territory that serve, employ, or otherwise affect American citizens, or that affect the peace and tranquility of the United States, even if those entities happen to be foreign-flag ships. Cruise ships flying foreign flags of convenience but departing from and returning to US ports accommodate and transport over 7 million US residents annually, including large numbers of disabled individuals. To hold that there is no Title III protection for the disabled would be a harsh and unexpected interpretation of a statute designed to provide broad protection for them. Title III does not require structural modifications that conflict with international legal obligations or pose any real threat to the safety of the crew or other passengers. It may well follow that it does not require any permanent and significant structural modifications that interfere with cruise ship’s internal affairs. Having said so, the recourse to the narrow clear statement rule becomes unnecessary. Cases may arise, however, where it is prudent for a court to invoke that rule without determining whether Title III actually imposes a particular barrier-removal requirement entailing a permanent and significant structural modification interfering with a foreign ship’s internal affairs. Conversely, where it is not obvious that a particular physical modification relates to a vessel’s basic architecture and construction, but it is clear the modification would conflict with an international legal obligation, the court may simply hold the modification not readily achievable, without resort to the clear statement rule. (Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 06 June 2005) Judgment Coram Non Judice Against Nonresidents This action was brought by Neff against Pennoyer for the recovery of a tract of land situated in Multnomah County, Oregon. Pennoyer, in his answer, denied Neff's title and right to possession, and set up a title in himself. By consent of parties,
1

and in pursuance of their written stipulation filed in the case, the cause was tried by the court, and a special verdict given, upon which judgment was rendered in favor of Neff; whereupon Pennoyer sued out this writ of error. The parties respectively claimed title as follows: Neff, under a patent issued to him by the United States, March 19, [95 U.S. 714, 716] 1866; and Pennoyer, by virtue of a sale made by the sheriff of said county, under an execution sued out upon a judgment against Neff, rendered Feb. 19, 1866, by the Circuit Court for said county, in an action wherein he was defendant, and J. H. Mitchell was plaintiff. Neff was then a non-resident of Oregon. Q: Is jurisdiction acquired under the circumstances? A: As for any other purpose than to subject the property of a non-resident to valid claims against him in the State, due process of law would require appearance or personal service before the defendant could be personally bound by any judgment rendered. Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: first, as against the person of the defendant by the service of process; or, secondly, by a procedure against the property of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court. In the latte case, the defendant is not personally bound by the judgment beyond the property in question. And it is immaterial whether the proceeding against the property be by an attachment or bill in chancery. It must be substantially a proceeding in rem. Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be subjected to its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against him. Where he is not within such territory, and is not personally subject to its law, if, on account of his supposed or actual property being within the territory, process by the local laws may, by attachment, go to compel his appearance, and for his default to appear judgment may be pronounced against him, such a judgment must, upon general principles, be deemed only to bind him to the extent of such property, and cannot have the effect of a conclusive judgment in personam, for the plain reason, that, except so far as the property is concerned, it is a judgment coram non judice. To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it is proper to observe that the Court does not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-resident, which would be binding within the State, though made without service of process or personal notice to the nonresident. Likewise, it is not contrary to natural justice that a man who has agreed to receive a particular mode of notification of legal proceedings should be bound by a judgment in which that particular mode of notification has been followed, even though he may not have actual notice of them. In the present case, however, there is no feature of this latter kind, and consequently, no consideration of what would be the effect of such legislation in enforcing the contract of a nonresident can arise. (Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 1877)

Title III of the American Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of public accommodation and in specified public transportation services and requires covered entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices or procedures to accommodate disabled persons and to remove architectural and communication barriers that are structural in nature where such removal is readily achievable. University of Santo Tomas

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Extraterritorial Service of Notice Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. Defendant admits the existence of the questioned judgment but not necessarily the authenticity or validity thereof, that plaintiff is not doing business and is not licensed to do business in the Philippines; and that the residence of defendant is New Manila, Quezon City. Defendant presented two witnesses, namely, Fortunata dela Vega (personal secretary) and Russel Warren Lousich (expert on the laws of Hongkong). Ms. dela Vega's testimony is to the effect that no writ of summons or copy of a statement of claim of Asiavest Limited was ever served in the office of the Navegante Shipping Agency Limited and/or for Mr. Antonio Heras, and that no service of the writ of summons was either served on the defendant at his residence in New Manila, Quezon City. Mr. Lousich testified that the defendant was sued on the basis of his personal guarantee of the obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A. There is no record that a writ of summons was served on the person of the defendant in Hong Kong, or that any such attempt at service was made. Likewise, there is no record that a copy of the judgment of the High Court was furnished or served on the defendant; anyway, it is not a legal requirement to do so under Hong Kong laws. Q: Was the judgment of the Hong Kong Court repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact, such as to overcome the presumption established in Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in favor of foreign judgments? A: An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. 19 An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may he resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; 21 (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication also with leave of court; 22 or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members:

However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was laid down in Gemperle v. Schenker 26 wherein a non-resident was served with summons through his wife, who was a resident of the Philippines and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case filed by him; moreover, the second case was a mere offshoot of the first case. On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or () any other manner the court may deem sufficient. (Asiavest Limited v. CA and Antonio Heras, G.R. No. 128803, 25 September 1998) Processual Presumption Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST) sought to enforce in the RTC a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese Court against private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine laws. Northwest and Sharp, through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales. A writ of summons was issued by the Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its office in Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful because the bailiff was advised by a person in the office that Mr. Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to receive court processes was in Manila. Bailiff returned to the defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to accept

Sections 24 and 25. the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment against defendant. Sharon returned to New York. or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. While Sharon waived any claim for her own support or maintenance. Accordingly. Darwin. Following the separation. or. She then returned to California. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. custody. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it. and summer vacations with their mother. the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked. was born. At the time of this marriage. the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese Court must stand. Alternatively. the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. Sharon flew to New York City in order to sign this agreement. the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or principal office. hence. The Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 112573.106 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee the same claiming that he was no longer an employee of the defendant. Thus. A written separation agreement was drawn up in New York. Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons. inter alia. during appellant's three-day stopover in California en route from a military base in Texas to a tour of duty in Korea. Defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. (Northwest Orient Airlines. was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving process. as did appellant after his tour of duty. The Kulkos and their two children resided together as a family in New York City continuously until March 1972. until the contrary is shown. University of Santo Tomas . service may be made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose. Immediately following the marriage. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. service shall be made on the government official designated by law. Applying it. SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan. it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on SHARP. she told her father that she wanted to remain in California after her vacation. and Ilsa left. Immediately after execution of the separation agreement. The children resided with appellant during the school year and with their mother on vacations. 1 the divorce decree incorporated the terms of the agreement. when the Kulkos separated. In January 1976. Sharp & Company. Sharon flew to Haiti and procured a divorce there. It did not. Defendant not having appealed the judgment. Whenever service of process is so made. As to what this law is a question of fact. Where the corporation has no such agent. defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Section 14. At this time. Inc. until December 1973. on the government official designated by law to that effect. Despite receipt of the same. If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons. Their first child. that the children would remain with their father during the school year but would spend their Christmas. (2) if there is no such resident agent. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. as provided by the separation agreement. and control. was born to the Kulkos in New York. the designation is exclusive. The agreement provided. The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service. Q: Can the Japanese Court acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed? A: A foreign Judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes. GR No. the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. as such.F. then in the light of the processual presumption. not of law. Ilsa.000 per year in child support for the periods when the children were in her care. Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed. and. taking her clothing with her. CA and C. just before Ilsa was to leave New York to spend Christmas vacation with her mother. Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan. and a year later their second child. Ezra agreed to pay his wife $3. both parties were domiciled in and residents of New York State. Easter. In this case. Ilsa then commenced living in California with her mother during the school year and spending vacations with her father. 09 February 1995) Unilateral Activity is Not Minimum Contact Kulko married appellee Sharon Kulko. the same became final and executory. v. also in New York. Appellant bought his daughter a one-way plane ticket. in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication on or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. where she remarried and took the name Horn. and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him. Sharon moved to California.

326 U. either to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liability by default." We cannot accept the proposition that appellant's acquiescence in Ilsa's desire to live with her mother conferred jurisdiction over appellant in the California courts in this action. We therefore believe that the state courts in the instant case failed to heed our admonition that "the flexible standard of International Shoe" does not "herald the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.S. The constitutional standard for determining whether the State may enter a binding judgment against appellant is that a defendant "has certain minimum contacts with the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 84. 310. appellee Sharon commenced this action against appellant in the California Superior Court." in which to require appellant.S. 2 Appellant appeared specially and moved to quash service of the summons on the ground that he was not a resident of California and lacked sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State under International Shoe Co. a New Jersey resident. rejecting his contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited California courts from asserting jurisdiction over him because he lacked "minimum contacts" with the State. "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident.107 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: appellant's other child. She sought to establish the Haitian divorce decree as a California judgment. while appellant's liability for support payments remained unchanged. petitioner Burnham. (Kulko v. in the interests of family harmony and his children's preferences. to warrant the State's assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State. It cannot be disputed that California has substantial interests in protecting resident children and in facilitating child-support actions on behalf of those children. which he used to fly to California where he took up residence with his mother and sister. The existence of personal jurisdiction." The mere act of sending a child to California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain or expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the assertion of that State's judicial jurisdiction. and the State Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief. But any diminution in appellant's household costs resulted. Unbeknownst to appellant. not from the child's presence in California. who derives no personal or commercial benefit from his child's presence in California and who lacks any other relevant contact with the State. depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense of the action in the forum. 436 U. To find personal jurisdiction in a State merely because the mother was residing there. and to increase appellant's child-support obligations. Nor can we agree with the assertion of the court below that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction here was warranted by the financial benefit appellant derived from his daughter's presence in California for nine months of the year. Darwin. Less than one month after Darwin's arrival in California. Moreover. It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. 316 (1945). it could arbitrarily subject one parent to suit in any State of the Union where the other parent chose to spend time while having custody of their offspring pursuant to a separation agreement. in turn. in the action for child support. But these interests simply do not make California a "fair forum.'" An essential criterion in all cases is whether the "quality and nature" of the defendant's activity is such that it is "reasonable" and "fair" to require him to conduct his defense in that State. v. This argument rests on the premise that. appellee Horn sent a plane ticket to her son. was served with a California court summons and his estranged wife's divorce petition. The latter court held it to be a valid predicate for in personam jurisdiction that he was personally served while present in the forum State. but rather from her absence from appellant's home. A father who agrees. called his mother from New York and advised her that he wanted to live with her in California. would discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation agreements. California Superior Court. non-domiciliary parent of minor children domiciled within the State? A: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment operates as a limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident defendants. Q: May the California state courts. 1978) Presence is Antithesis to the Application of Minimum Contacts During a trip to California to conduct business and visit his children. to allow them to spend more time in California than was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have "purposefully availed himself" of the "benefits and protections" of California's laws. his yearly expenses for supporting the child in New York decreased. The "purposeful act" that the California Supreme Court believed did warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellant in California 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: was his "actively and fully consenting to Ilsa living in California for the school year and sending her to California for that purpose. Washington. The California Superior Court denied his motion to quash the service of process. to modify the judgment so as to award her full custody of the children. .

and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by properly serving him with process. Petitioners carry on no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. are really one and the same and must be treated alike . not that all bases for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction (including. moreover.. and solicit no business there either through salespersons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach that State. the Oklahoma trial court may not exercise in personam jurisdiction over petitioners. (a) A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. at 319. but rather that quasi in rem jurisdiction.108 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Q: Did the State's courts acquire jurisdiction over a nonresident. avail [444 U.. Pp. Nor does the record show that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma residents or that they indirectly. in other words. in-state service. The trial court rejected petitioners' claims. a writ of prohibition in the Oklahoma Supreme Court to restrain respondent trial judge from exercising in personam jurisdiction over them. or relations." id. that form of in personam jurisdiction based upon a "property ownership" contact and by definition unaccompanied by personal. 286. "By the common law. personal actions. ties. 287] themselves of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law. and it is unreasonable to read Shaffer as casually obliterating that distinction. in-state service) must be treated alike and subjected to the "minimum contacts" analysis of International Shoe. claiming that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them would offend limitations on the State's jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. v. at 316. regardless of whether a separate Latin label is attached to one particular basis of contact ." Id. i. Washington. at 317. and they then sought. International Shoe confined its "minimum contacts" requirement to situations in which the defendant "be not present within the territory of the forum. 604." and in personam jurisdiction. e. being transitory. International Shoe Co. As we have demonstrated at length. Most States. when the defendants' only connection with Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an accident in Oklahoma? A: Consistently with the Due Process Clause. 495 U. Q: May an Oklahoma court exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor in a products-liability action.S. without regard to whether the defendant was only briefly in the State or whether the cause of action was related to his activities there. to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Decisions in the courts of many States in the 19th and early 20th centuries held that personal service upon a physically present defendant sufficed to confer jurisdiction. 326 U.which places all suits against absent nonresidents on the same constitutional footing.S. . (b) Here. where the party defendant may be found. the State could retain jurisdiction to enter judgment against him. Shaffer was saying." for "every nation may rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all persons within its domains. The Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts. The defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. but were denied. our tradition has treated the two classes of defendants quite differently. Marin County. 1990) Foreseeability Alone Personal Jurisdiction is Insufficient for automobile that had been purchased by them in New York while they were New York residents and that was being driven through Oklahoma at the time of the accident. (Burnham v.leading to the conclusion that quasi in rem jurisdiction. no matter how fleeting his visit. 310 . serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market.. had statutes or common-law rules that exempted from service of process individuals who were brought into the forum by force or fraud or who were there as a party or witness in unrelated judicial proceedings. New York corporations that did no business in Oklahoma.does not compel the conclusion that physically present defendants must be treated identically to absent ones. The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. id. who was personally served with process while temporarily in that State? A: Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State. Petitioners entered special appearances. and the relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable . . must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International Shoe. there is a total absence in the record of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction. that fictional "ancient form. may be brought in any place. The defendants included the automobile retailer and its wholesaler (petitioners). The logic of Shaffer's holding . Superior Court of California. "foreseeability" alone is not a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Although it is foreseeable that automobiles sold by petitioners would travel to Oklahoma and that the automobile here might cause injury in Oklahoma. presumably. but rather is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled A products-liability action was instituted in an Oklahoma state court by respondents husband and wife to recover for personal injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident involving an University of Santo Tomas ." and nothing in Shaffer expands that requirement beyond that. they close no sales and perform no services there. 291294. through others. The view developed early that each State had the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within its borders..S.

but the State Supreme Court reversed. or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State. which amounted to at least 100. Although the main suit was eventually settled and dismissed. 1980) Foreseeability Must Additional Conduct be Coupled with Petitioner manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells them to several tire manufacturers. designing the product for the market in the forum State. Other courts.109 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: into court there. Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State. The "substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. In the present case. The sales to Cheng Shin. and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. the Superior Court denied petitioner's motion to quash the summons issued against it. Q: Would the state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over petitioner be unreasonable and unfair in violation of the Due Process Clause? A: Applying the principle that minimum contacts must be based on an act of the defendant.S. coupled with its awareness that some of them would eventually reach California. Affidavits indicated that petitioner was aware that tires incorporating its assemblies would end up in California. however. But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State. on the other hand. In the present case. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice The strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that would offend "`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. for example. and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi are slight. The Court disclaimed. to allow "mere foreseeability that the product will enter the forum state to be enough by itself to establish jurisdiction over the distributor and retailer. took place in Taiwan. 295299.000 assemblies annually from 1978 to 1982. which in turn filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from petitioner. The Court rejected this concept of foreseeability as an insufficient basis for jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. where 20 percent of its sales take place in California. that it never contemplated that its sales to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in California. which it sells throughout the world. the idea that "foreseeability is wholly irrelevant" to personal jurisdiction." We now find this latter position to be consonant with the requirements of due process. is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. A court must consider the burden on the defendant. The State Court of Appeal then ordered that the summons be quashed. concluding that "the forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. v. Pp. a product liability suit was brought in California Superior Court arising from a motorcycle accident allegedly caused by defects in a tire manufactured by Cheng Shin. often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant. the interests of the forum State. finding that petitioner's intentional act of placing its assemblies into the stream of commerce by delivering them to Cheng Shin in Taiwan. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies." The Supreme Court of California's position was consistent with those courts that have held that mere foreseeability or awareness was a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: jurisdiction if the defendant's product made its way into the forum State while still in the stream of commerce. advertising in the forum State. establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State. including Cheng Shin. were sufficient to support state court jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause." When minimum contacts have been established. without more. Woodson. including the United States. 286. for example. have understood the Due Process Clause to require something more than that the defendant was aware of its product's entry into the forum State through the stream of commerce in order for the State to exert jurisdiction over the defendant. Cheng Shin incorporates the assemblies into its finished tires. Nevertheless. as interpreted by World-Wide Volkswagen. 444 U. the Court rejected the assertion that a consumer's unilateral act of bringing the defendant's product into the forum State was a sufficient constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant. but. however.'" We have previously explained that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. in 1979. Nor can jurisdiction be supported on the theory that petitioners earn substantial revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. The placement of a product into the stream of commerce. however. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. . to which the assemblies were shipped from Japan. the State Court of Appeals did not read the Due Process Clause.

The concepts of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. 49% of which is owned by the Republic of Guinea and 51% is owned by Halco (Mining) Inc. asserting jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.although their argument's strength comes from conceiving of jurisdiction only as subject-matter jurisdiction. was provided by a group of 21 foreign insurance companies. however. the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived. no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus. and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign.S. 102. including an appellate court. has contracted to perform certain administrative services for CBG. Bland Payne issued a cover note indicating the amount of the coverage and specifying the percentage of the coverage that each excess insurer had agreed to insure. In 1973. will raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion. Certain legal consequences directly follow from this. The first half of this coverage was provided by the Insurance Company of North America (INA). to obtain $20 million worth of business interruption insurance to cover CBG's operations in Guinea. 480 U. 698] In December 1975. 5 The issue in this case requires an account of respondent's attempt to use discovery in order to demonstrate the court's personal jurisdiction over the excess insurers. in the exercise of its appellate power. 3 [456 U. and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State.'" In sum.110 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee World-Wide Volkswagen also admonished courts to take into consideration the interests of the "several States. Marsh & McLennan. springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception. "The rule. (Asahi Metal Industry Co. or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. to deny its jurisdiction. which requires this court. 1974. In every case. III as well as a statutory requirement. Once the offering was fully subscribed. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty. Halco. the test for personal jurisdiction requires that "the maintenance of the suit not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. For example. and. The procedural and substantive interests of other nations in a state court's assertion of jurisdiction over an alien defendant will differ from case to case. 697] Marsh & McLennan requested Bland Payne to obtain the excess insurance in the London insurance market.000. The answer of the excess insurers. those interests." Sometime after February 12. the consent of the parties is irrelevant. indicating the part of said $10. No separate policy was issued. These include the procurement of insurance. Q: Is there a violation of Due Process clause? A: The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. effective February 12. [456 U. Similarly.S. 2 14 of which are petitioners in this action (the excess insurers). in the efficient judicial resolution of the dispute and the advancement of substantive policies. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. INA did not challenge personal or subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court. III. Halco instructed an insurance broker.000. a court.000. 1987) Waiver of Requirements of Acquiring Personal Jurisdiction Respondent Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) is a Delaware corporation. 694.000 each was willing to insure. CBG allegedly experienced mechanical problems in its Guinea operation. raised a number of defenses. which operates in Pennsylvania. however. it functions as a restriction on federal power. These characteristics portray it for what it is University of Santo Tomas . CBG's principal place of business is in the Republic of Guinea. Thus. this alleged lack of personal jurisdiction became the basis of a motion for summary judgment filed by the excess insurers. Contending that the loss was covered under its policies. Subsequently. 2 App. as well as the Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations policies. and these different purposes affect the legal character of the two requirements. where it operates bauxite mines and processing facilities.000. will be best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case. that of all other courts of the United States. Petitioners fail to recognize the distinction between the two concepts . but from the Due Process Clause. Whatever the mechanical problems experienced by CBG. Pursuant to normal business practice "[i]n late January and in February. serve different purposes. of its own motion. including lack of in personam jurisdiction. The first count was against INA. the second against the excess insurers. resulting in a business interruption loss in excess of $10 million." in addition to the forum State. however. 1974. and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings. in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record. Superior Court. 694.000." None of this is true with respect to personal jurisdiction. but as a matter of individual liberty. or what is referred to as the "excess" insurance. CBG filed a two-count suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania. 347a. CBG brought suit when the insurers refused to indemnify CBG for the loss. principles of estoppel do not apply. the excess insurers adopted the INA policy "as far as applicable.S. is an Art. The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. [Petitioners] initialed said placing slip. they were perhaps minor compared to the legal difficulties encountered in the courts. The second half. v. in excess of the first $10.speaking instead in general terms of "jurisdiction" . Bland Payne presented to the excess insurer [petitioners] a placing slip in the amount of $10." 4 Finding 27 of the District Court. Subject-matter jurisdiction.

the internal law of the forum state controls.111 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: . the Rule 37 sanction applied to a finding of personal jurisdiction creates no more of a due process problem than the Rule 12 waiver. Respondent attempted to serve the amended complaint on VWAG by serving VWoA as VWAG's agent. Rule 37 contains two standards . it is unlikely that any country will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the . reasoning that VWoA and VWAG are so closely related that VWoA is VWAG's agent for service of process as a matter of law. Such a rule was permissible as an expression of "the undoubted right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from the suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered. then the sanction is nothing more than the invocation of a legal presumption. a German corporation which is the sole owner of VWoA." Hammond Packing case. The Convention implements this purpose by requiring each state to establish a central authority to assist in the service of process.a legal right protecting the individual. The expression of legal rights is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to follow those rules may well result in a curtailment of the rights. second. The service of process in this case is not covered by Article 1 of the Convention." not all rules that establish legal consequences to a party's own behavior are "mere assertions" of power. under state law. notwithstanding VWAG's failure or refusal to appoint VWoA formally as an agent. Compagnie des Bauxites. the sanction must be specifically related to the particular "claim" which was at issue in the order to provide discovery. ruling that the Illinois long-arm statute authorized substituted service on VWoA. respondent amended his complaint to add as a defendant petitioner here (VWAG). The court concluded that. It did not violate due process for a state court to strike the answer and render a default judgment against a defendant who failed to comply with a pretrial discovery order. 694. A sanction consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has precisely the same effect. whether voluntary or not. alleging that defects in the automobile designed and sold by Volkswagen of America. 1982) Domestice Service of Summons to an Agent of a Foreign Corporation 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: After his parents were killed in an automobile accident. is the foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service.S. the finding of a constructive waiver.but this is not the only way in which the personal jurisdiction of the court may arise. certain factual showings will have legal consequences . The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed. The plaintiff's demonstration of certain historical facts may make clear to the court that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant as a matter of law i. as here. Another purpose of the Convention is to assure foreign defendants adequate notice. and nothing in the present decision interferes with that requirement. The preservation of due process was secured by the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense. Since the Convention does not itself prescribe a standard for determining the legal sufficiency of the delivery. any sanction must be "just". which provides that the Convention "shall apply where there is occasion to transmit a judicial document for service abroad. (Insurance Corp. and that respondent had not complied with the Convention's requirements.one general and one specific . If there is no abuse of discretion in the application of the Rule 37 sanction. or what is the same thing. While the latter requirement reflects the rule of Hammond Packing the former represents the general due process restrictions on the court's discretion.that limit a district court's discretion. One purpose of the Convention is to provide means to facilitate service of process abroad. the Convention does not apply. When VWoA's answer denied that it had designed or assembled the vehicle. Thus. respondent filed a wrongful death action in an Illinois court. Although "a court cannot conclude all persons interested by its mere assertion of its own power. as we find to be the case here. Elliott in which the Court held that it did violate due process for a court to take similar action as "punishment" for failure to obey an order to pay into the registry of the court a certain sum of money. This interpretation is consistent with the negotiating history and the general purposes of the Convention. The present decision does not necessarily advance this purpose. Thus. The court denied the motion. (VWoA). The actions of the defendant may amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the court. the Convention did not apply. in which the parents were driving." "Service" means a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action. First. Inc. Rule 37 itself embodies the standard for the due process limits on such rules. This situation was specifically distinguished from that in Hovey v. however. Filing a special and limited appearance. the forum state's law does not define the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad. because it makes application of the Convention depend on the forum's internal law. Q: Is there a proper service of summons? A: The Hague Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which.. where. 456 U. v. e. because service was accomplished in this country. caused or contributed to their deaths. VWAG moved to quash the service on the grounds that it could be served only in accordance with the Hague Service Convention. and that such service did not violate the Convention. As a general proposition. Due process is violated only if the behavior of the defendant will not support the Hammond Packing presumption. the failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes a waiver of the objection.

rather than the obligations created by the treaty. and inexpensive determination" of litigation in our courts.S. and the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' mandamus petition. The text of the Evidence Convention itself does not modify the law of any contracting state. holding. 482 U. Second. and such compliance can be advantageous. Ind. Aero. two corporations owned by France. that when a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant. Q: Are the petitioners entitled to the protective order? A: In arguing their entitlement to a protective order. We cannot accept petitioners' invitation to announce a new rule of law that would require first resort to Convention procedures whenever discovery is sought from a foreign litigant. 694. the Convention might be viewed as establishing a supplemental set of discovery procedures. after considering the situations of the parties before it as well as the interests of the concerned foreign state. but not exclusive. 1987) Depositions: Judicial Assistance is Authorized but not Required This case concerns the authority of federal district courts to assist in the production of evidence for use in a foreign or international tribunal. petitioners filed a motion for a protective order. and that this transmission "for service abroad" rendered the Convention applicable to the case under Article 1.S. use of its procedures. the Hague Convention does "apply" to the production of evidence in a litigant's possession in the sense that it is one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ. Initially. require any contracting state to use the Convention procedures. which prescribes procedures by which a judicial authority in one contracting state may request evidence located in another. either in requesting evidence or in responding to such requests. Fourth. the Convention does not apply even though the information sought may be physically located within the territory of a foreign signatory to the Convention. as here. the inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications. or compel any contracting state to change its own evidencegathering procedures. alleging that the Convention dictated the exclusive procedures that must be followed since petitioners are French and the discovery sought could only be had in France. District Court. strictly optional under treaty law. this decision does not prevent voluntary compliance with the Convention even when the forum's internal law does not so require. 486 U. it appears clear to us that the optional Convention procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence by the means authorized in the Convention. Third. 1988) Hague Convention is not a Rule of First Resort The United States. The text of the Convention draws no distinction between evidence obtained from third parties and that obtained from the litigants themselves. the Hague Convention might be interpreted to require first. service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause without an official transmission of documents abroad. In the University of Santo Tomas . the treaty may be viewed as an undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery to which an American court should resort when it deems that course of action appropriate. 522. Furthermore. Where. We reject the first two of the possible interpretations as inconsistent with the language and negotiating history of the Hague Convention. when plaintiffs served subsequent discovery requests under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although these procedures are not mandatory. and engaged in initial discovery without objection. Two of these interpretations assume that the Hague Convention by its terms dictates the extent to which it supplants normal discovery rules. Two other interpretations assume that international comity. Schlunk. the Hague Convention might be read as requiring its use to the exclusion of any other discovery procedures whenever evidence located abroad is sought for use in an American court. and 15 other countries have acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention.S.112 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service abroad. VWAG's contention that service upon it was not complete until VWoA transmitted the complaint to it in Germany. A Magistrate denied the motion. However. Thus. should guide judicial resort to the Hague Convention. The preamble of the Convention specifies its purpose "to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request" and to "improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters. to which concerns of comity nevertheless require first resort by American courts in all cases. France. is without merit. speedy. A rule of first resort in all cases would therefore be inconsistent with the overriding interest in the "just. (Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. nor does it purport to draw any sharp line between evidence that is "abroad" and evidence that is within the control of a party subject to the jurisdiction of the requesting court. inter alia. First. Petitioners answered the complaints without questioning the court's jurisdiction. (Societe Nat. petitioners correctly assert that both the discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention are the law of the United States. U." The preamble does not speak in mandatory terms which would purport to describe the procedures for all permissible transnational discovery and exclude all other existing practices. v. Plaintiffs brought suits (later consolidated) in Federal District Court for personal injuries resulting from the crash of an aircraft built and sold by petitioners. we note that at least four different interpretations of the relationship between the federal discovery rules and the Hague Convention are possible.

The Litonjuas prayed for the accounting of the revenues derived in the operation of the six . S. AMD filed an antitrust complaint against Intel with the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission.e. a court presented with a §1782(a) request may take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal. including the two vessels originally owned by the private respondents. qualifies as an "interested person" within §1782(a)'s compass. 542 US 241. The statute. i. unduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed. foreclosed and sold at public auction to answer for the obligations incurred for and in behalf of the operation of the vessels. may be unobtainable absent §1782(a) aid. When the person who is to produce the evidence is a party to the foreign proceedings. §1782(a). (2) the Commission is a §1782(a) "tribunal" when it acts as a first-instance decision-maker. federal-court judicial assistance. but does not require. non-participants in the foreign proceeding may be outside the foreign tribunal's jurisdictional reach. AMD applied to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In pursuit of that complaint. To guide the District Court on remand. that §1782(a) authorizes.113 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: matter before us. A district court is not required to grant a §1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so. such as AMD. and can itself order them to produce evidence. but need not be "pending" or "imminent". when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding (as Intel is here)... Inc. Section 1782(a) does not limit the provision 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: of judicial assistance to "pending" adjudicative proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed that determination and remanded the case. a district court could consider whether the §1782(a) request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States. available in the United States. does not categorically bar the assistance AMD seeks: (1) A complainant before the European Commission." "Any interested person" is "intended to include not only litigants before foreign or international tribunals." Concluding that §1782(a) did not authorize the requested discovery. a final administrative action both responsive to the complaint and reviewable in court. a federal district court to provide assistance to a complainant in a European Commission proceeding that leads to a dispositive ruling. Advanced Micro Devices. the need for §1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a non-participant in the matter arising abroad. Q: Can the federal court assist in the production of evidence for foreign tribunals? A: The statute authorizes. we suggest considerations relevant to the disposition of that question. because of the breach of their fiduciary duties. invoking 28 U. the foreign or international tribunal can exercise its own jurisdiction to order production of the evidence. however. hence. the revenues derived from the operation of all the vessels declined drastically. In contrast. the District Court denied AMD's application. upon the application of any interested person. a federal district court to provide judicial assistance to foreign or international tribunals or to "interested person[s]" in proceedings abroad. prompting defendant banks to have all the six vessels. with their business doing well. they owned two vessels. Whether such assistance is appropriate in this case is a question yet unresolved. offering them easy loans to acquire said vessels The Litonjuas claimed that defendant banks as trustees did not fully render an account of all the income derived from the operation of the vessels as well as of the proceeds of the subsequent foreclosure sale. First. v. A complainant "possesses a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial assistance. Second. We caution. but does not require. for an order requiring Intel to produce potentially relevant documents. Also. we reject the categorical limitations Intel would place on the statute's reach. but also foreign and international officials as well as any other person whether he be designated by foreign law or international convention or merely possess a reasonable interest in obtaining the assistance. In accord with the Court of Appeals. the character of the proceedings underway abroad. Accordingly.. and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U. C. A foreign tribunal has jurisdiction over those appearing before it. instructing the District Court to rule on the merits of AMD's application. We note below factors that bear consideration in ruling on a §1782(a) request. we hold that the District Court had authority under §1782(a) to entertain AMD's discovery request. and (4) §1782(a) contains no threshold requirement that evidence sought from a federal district court would be discoverable under the law governing the foreign proceeding. they deposited their revenues from said business together with other funds with the branches of said banks in the United Kingdom and Hongkong up to 1979. 2004) Forum Non Conveniens The Litonjuas filed a Complaint against defendant banks alleging that: they were engaged in the shipping business. Specifically. The complainant who triggers a European Commission investigation has a significant role in the process. we rule. (Intel Corp.. the loans acquired for the purchase of the four additional vessels then matured and remained unpaid. the defendant banks induced them to increase the number of their ships in operation. their evidence. S." and therefore qualifies as an "interested person. (3) the "proceeding" for which discovery is sought under §1782(a) must be in reasonable contemplation. Also. Section 1782(a) provides that a federal district court "may order" a person "resid[ing]" or "found" in the district to give testimony or produce documents "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal .

however. provided. who. The trial court.114 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee vessels and of the proceeds of the sale thereof at the foreclosure proceedings instituted by petitioners. By virtue of such presence. Minnesota has a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence. in Saudi Arabia. the choice of law by the Minnesota Supreme Court does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The accident occurred in Wisconsin near the Minnesota border. Co.000. and was subsequently appointed in that State as personal representative of her husband's estate. When she did. the accident occurred there. When she saw him. such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.000 for each automobile. but the decedent held a policy issued by petitioner covering three automobiles owned by him and containing an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists. may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. the Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts. (1) Respondent's decedent was a member of Minnesota's work force. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. such as respondent's decedent. and (3) respondent became a Minnesota resident prior to institution of the instant litigation. had been employed in Minnesota and had commuted daily to work from Wisconsin. When plaintiff returned to Jeddah. reflects a state concern for the safety and well-being of its work force and the concomitant effect on Minnesota employers. creating state interests. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of the perpetrators. a court. (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. On the other hand. (Allstate Inc.000 uninsured motorist coverage on each of her late husband's three automobiles could be "stacked" to provide total coverage of $45. the Indonesian police came and arrested the perpetrators. Q: Which law should be applied in the case? A: In deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions.Thereafter. A Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so. and. concluded that Minnesota's choice-of-law rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting stacking. with the parties and the occurrence or transaction. that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. but limiting such coverage to $15. one of the Saudi nationals attempted to rape plaintiff. Such residence and subsequent appointment in Minnesota as personal representative of her late husband's estate constitute a Minnesota contact which gives Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery. Petitioner defended on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law. v. CA. As it turned out. as was the decedent. Hague. since the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin.S. with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation. Q: Should the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non-conveniens? A: No. She then brought an action in a Minnesota court seeking a declaration under Minnesota law that the $15. GR No. creating state interests. plaintiff who was a flight attendant of SAUDIA went to a disco dance with fellow crew members both Saudi nationals. he brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see. and. respondent moved to and became a resident of Minnesota. petitioner can hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state courts might apply forum law to litigation in which the company is involved. 31 March 2003) Choice and Ascertainment of Foreign Law Respondent's husband died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck by an automobile. interpreting Wisconsin law to disallow stacking. After the accident. When they were back in the room. whose law was applied. several SAUDIA officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. whether under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In order to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Evidently. 449 U. (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. this Court has traditionally examined the contacts of the State. The State's interest in its commuting nonresident employees. (Bank of America NT&SA v. defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and Allah. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. defendant banks filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action against them. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents. and granted summary judgment for respondent. in conflicts of law cases. she was brought to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. Before the departure of her flight to Manila. Her superiors requested her to see Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident. accordingly. (2) petitioner was at all times present and doing business in Minnesota.. Later. all these requisites are present in the instant case. Neither vehicle operator carried valid insurance. 120135. 1981) While on a lay-over in Indonesia. 302. plaintiff University of Santo Tomas .

The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery. Judging from the foregoing facts. which in our view should be appropriate to apply now. its country manager. 122191. Q: Is Manzano eligible for the office he seeks to be elected? A: To begin with. under §40(d) of the Local Government Code. or the "doctrine of qualification". he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. given the factual context of this case. Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. Q: What law should govern? A: The Philippine law. . Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her. she was denied any assistance. and Al-Balawi." Facing conviction. CA. In other words. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. G. place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws. without her being informed of the cause. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. petitioner SAUDIA. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Unfortunately. private respondent sought the help of her employer. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship. he holds dual citizenship. and (3) socializing with the male crew. the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred. translated to her in English. to pay for her upkeep. With the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commisi. Meanwhile. a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Before a choice can be made." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. Shortly afterwards. modem theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. IV) of our Constitution. and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. (2) going to a disco. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. In his answer.R. together with Thamer and Allah. she worked on the domestic flight of SAUDIA. No. Because she was wrongfully convicted. In its resolution. persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states. it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules fall. if any. between the parties is centered. it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli. the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. for what happened in Jakarta. in contravention of Islamic tradition. (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens. residence. defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again for further investigation. the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and. He was born in the United States. The proclamation of Manzano was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The COMELEC’s Second Division said: What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the 1998 elections. and is considered an American citizen under US Laws. This process is known as "characterization". rendered a decision. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA. sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule. Plaintiff then returned to Manila. to her astonishment and shock. (Saudi Arabian Airlines v. nationality. while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international flights. (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country. It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule. The former arises when. 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: and (d) the place where the relationship. A SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the judge. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability. (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA. 08 October 1998) Nationality & Domicile Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the 1998 elections. as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states. Shortly before her return to Manila.115 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: signed a notice to her to appear before the court. (c) the domicile.

Camarines Norte. In 1949. In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship. refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes. finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship. for candidates with dual citizenship. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for reelection as governor of Davao Oriental in the 1998 elections. in a petition for quo warranto. private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Taojo. and Theresa Marquez. Jr. in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen. received his education. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship. G. at the most. Telesforo Ybasco. On the other hand. who must. a Filipino citizen and native of Daet. on the other hand. 26 May 1999) Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16. 7160. §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance. it should suffice if. reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54." Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. before the COMELEC. the phrase “dual citizenship” in R. as well. an Australian. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. Broome. to the spouses. He was born in Tarlac. It may be that. and her Australian passport. No. "Dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code must be reconciled with Article IV. Her election was contested by her opponent. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration. filed a petition for disqualification. on 1960. Q: Did Lopez lose her Filipino citizenship? A: In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation. one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission. under Commonwealth Act 63. leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance. effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. at the age of fifteen. therefore. is bereft of merit. Her opponent. as far as the laws of this country are concerned. that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation. Moreover. the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood. and taken part in past elections in this country. No. No. 137000. However. that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country. Thus. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen. from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws. private respondent has. they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.R. as well. While dual citizenship is involuntary. loyalty to two or more states. Unlike those with dual allegiance. 09 August 2002) The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case. at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration. persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. practiced his profession as an artist. No. by some positive act. upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Rabat. petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship.” By electing Philippine citizenship. Hence. Manzano. of University of Santo Tomas . She was married to Lopez.A. she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. 1934 in Napier Terrace. and her holding of an Australian passport were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. Commission on Elections. such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition In the 1995 local elections.” Consequently. the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. §40(d) and in R. 7854. As Joaquin G. Bernas. a Filipino citizen. Since then. she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate.. 135083.A. Thus. (Mercado v. G. (Valles v.R. be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status. private respondent had dual citizenship she was an Australian and a Filipino. contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC. the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.116 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. such renunciation must be express. In 1992. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner Valles. Western Australia. pointed out: “[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and. or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. 1973 of Filipino mothers. enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization. naturalization is governed by CA No. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Marine Corps. repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover. and the naturalized citizen.A. (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time. respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. On the other hand. (2) by repatriation. (3) Those born before January 17. (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Section 6 of the Constitution. his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. as amended. 473. repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 07 May 2001) . petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI. To be naturalized. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. and by Republic Act No. the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines. (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II. if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Subsequently. C. Under this law. Q: Is the contention of Bengson III correct? A: The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. 142840. As a consequence. HRET. 63. naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by CA No.117 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Filipino parents. As such. (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen.R. respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. on the other hand. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period. he is perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization. he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth. and (3) by direct act of Congress." On the other hand. he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. 2630. 63. 63. As to persons. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem. Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision. 473. natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. No. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections where he won by a convincing margin of votes over petitioner Bengson III. naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization. which repealed the former Naturalization Law. took an oath of allegiance to the United States. (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules. or return to. On the other hand. No. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship. 530. an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Section 1(4). However. a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by. citizen in connection with his service in the U. (2) has 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession. (Bengson III v. and (5) political and economic necessity. they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.A." Then he was naturalized as a U. among others. otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.S. who was then running for reelection. generally under Commonwealth Act No. a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C. and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. is a natural-born citizen thereof. he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces. As defined in the same Constitution. Moreover. In 1994. 473.S. and (2) by naturalization. Repatriation. G.

In the case of the father. The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a biological parentchild relationship exists. Does Section 18. Immigration and Naturalization Service. rejecting his claim to United States citizenship because he had failed to establish compliance with 8 U. Nguyen and Boulais appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Boulais and Nguyen's mother were not married. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. June 11. The mother's status is documented in most instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given birth. and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4. meaningful relationship. the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at the birth. May Congress. but not a maternal one (in cases of citizenship of a child born overseas where the couple is not married and where one is an American and the other is a foreigner). upon registration. After he and Nguyen's mother ended their relationship. Disqualifications. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines. Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the VicePresident shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress? 3. furthermore. The Immigration Judge found him deportable. By this time.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act: d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country. based on DNA testing. Boulais always has been a citizen of the United States. violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution? 2. revise. Act No. Nguyen was 28 years old. in turn. 5. in the case of the unwed father. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in University of Santo Tomas . while the matter was pending. is justified by two important governmental objectives.118 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee Petitioner Nguyen was born in Vietnam to copetitioner Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. 9189. In the case of the mother. C. unless he/she executes. In the case of a citizen mother and a child born overseas. which sets forth the requirements for one who was born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. Three years later. as a matter of biological inevitability. an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. the relation is verifiable from the birth itself. The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth. He became a lawful permanent resident and was raised in Texas by Boulais. the United States. If he is present. He was sentenced to eight years in prison on each count. but one that consists of the real. through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. . the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth. and he was in Vietnam under the employ of a corporation. §1409(a). Does Section 5(d) of Rep. amend. Article IX-A of the Constitution? A: A. the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen as an alien who had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The second important governmental interest is the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized. S. came to the United States. his father obtained an order of parentage from a state court. he pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's identity. In 1992. Nguyen. it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived. The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. that circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood. There is at least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real. exercise the power to review. as well as an aggravated felony. Nguyen appealed to the Board of Immigration of Appeals and. everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and. The imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship. In 1975. The Board dismissed Nguyen's appeal. Nguyen lived for a time with the family of Boulais' new Vietnamese girlfriend. Q: Is the contention of Nguyen and Boulais correct?? A: For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny. in 1998. when Nguyen was 22. arguing that §1409 violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father. then almost six years of age. as a formal matter. an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship. Act No. Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth. it must be established " `at least that the challenged classification serves "important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines? Section 5(d) provides: Sec. 2001) Q: The petitioner raises three principal questions: 1. (Tuan Anh Nguyen v. by the law. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1.

(4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. to vote. Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines. is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. absentee voting was unknown to. does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1. and the privilege of absentee voting may flow from . No.A. Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself. totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. the Court said: An act of the legislature. Hence. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore. No. In that case. 9189 may indeed give the impression that it contravenes Section 1. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos. He focuses solely on Section 1. one of those disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration under said Act. however. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2.[24] Thus. However. it is necessary to dwell first on the significance of absentee voting. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi v.119 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: another country. and to be a new and different manner of voting from that previously known.A. that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. the common law. Article V of the Constitution. 9189. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. (3) at least eighteen years of age. R. It is viewed thus: The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct from the regular system of voting. approved by the executive. As the essence of R.A. Court of Appeals to support his claim. risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. No. Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole.A. Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. No. Petitioner further argues that Section 1. presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly: To declare a law unconstitutional. on the date of the election. and not recognized at.A. 9189. it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R. for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good. in the absence of restrictions. cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. Under Section 5(d) of R. the statute allows it to be done. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution. COMELEC. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. A simple. Article V of the Constitution. all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta v. To put matters in their right perspective. No. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1. (2) not otherwise disqualified by law. Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R. the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal. and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting. Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Generally. a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: given period. the risk is more apparent than real.[14] He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who. Section 1. 9189. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory. no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election.

5 of R. and the Congress. . 4 . It is the physical presence of a person in a given area. whether permanent or temporary. domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi. the President of the Senate shall. it must operate with equality among all the class to which it is granted. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure. As these concepts have evolved in our election law. a person cannot be at the same time. Residence. B.A. and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and to predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder. Notwithstanding the foregoing. Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18." Based on the foregoing. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president. factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. senators and party-list representatives. in which events." "a place to which. Is Section 18. No. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. ‘domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which. upon determination of the authenticity University of Santo Tomas . one has the intention of returning. but statutes of this nature may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. community or country. which provide in varying terms for the casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on election day from the district or precinct of their residence. and so as to carry out the objects thereof. in its ordinary conception. Article VII of the Constitution? Section 4 of R. In Romualdez-Marcos] the Court enunciated: Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations. Republic." In Ong v. and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. vice-president. an absentee is not a resident and vice versa. for various reasons. quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. Ordinarily. .A. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute. not later than thirty days after the day of the election. factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries. implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4. in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting. he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution: SEC. If a person’s intent be to remain. The statutes should be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration and elections. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President. is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4. what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile. duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city. whenever absent for business or for pleasure. Section 18. if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time. if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. or health. an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. one intends to return. 18.5 of the same Act provides: SEC. Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.5 of R. the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries. 18. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. Residence is not domicile. this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s "permanent home. under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections. a person can only have a single domicile. It is thus. shall be transmitted to the Congress. Republic. both a resident and an absentee. No. they should also be construed in the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted. if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and mandates. the court should look to the whole and every part of the election laws. and reasons and spirit of their adoption. business. unless.A. directed to the President of the Senate. However. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass. Further. the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. the intent of the entire plan. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile. No. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. existing in some jurisdictions. and try to give effect to every portion thereof. However. open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president. but he may have numerous places of residence. when absent. we laid this distinction quite clearly: "There is a difference between domicile and residence. it becomes his domicile. ‘Residence’ is used to indicate a place of abode.120 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee constitutional provisions or be conferred by statutes." For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. or an absolute right. but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. In Uytengsu v. or the intention of returning there permanently.

Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice-president. one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress. . No.A. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R. respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1. canvass the votes. consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and wellsecured. For the May.4 of the law. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body.A. to wit: Section 1. Article IX-A mandating the independence of constitutional commissions. In addition. Thereafter. . 9189 are unconstitutional. No. The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and . Section 4. The COMELEC adds.A. Tabamo. Indeed. 9189 in violation of Section 1. the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vicepresident for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. and c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies. 2004 elections. Immediately upon the completion of the canvass. that another provision. Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. as a constitutional body. the Commission on Elections.121 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law. It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4. is not under the control of 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: either the executive or legislative departments of government. No. are the Civil Service Commission. R. and the Commission on Audit. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected.1. the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile. No.4. including the legislators. as aptly stated by petitioner. amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC. voting separately. the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries. Voting by Mail. voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. C.A.A. which shall be independent.A." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence. however. to wit: SEC. 17. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which. Section 18. Jr. 17. it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party. Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress. and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law. The Constitutional Commissions. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions: a) Where the mailing system is fairly welldeveloped and secure to prevent occasion for fraud.5 of R. proclamation of winning candidates. that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or.5 of R. vis-à-vis its rule-making power. revise. in Section 18. to wit: 18. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo v. the Court notes that Section 18. b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting. the phrase. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency. It is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1. Article IX-A of the Constitution? Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R. subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Like the petitioner. or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission clashes with paragraph 4.[42] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C[43] of the Constitution. electronic mail. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution. to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. . No. No. He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review. but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes.

The legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law .1]. Congress has empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act.The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. review. 9189. amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. and by the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum.free. No. the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus. the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. No. Revision of Codes and Laws. the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted. review. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. so may this court also. aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions. amend. there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner. However. and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies. It is intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. and political questions must be dealt with realistically . its contacts with political strategists. and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17. revise. 25. Thus. Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions. By vesting itself with the powers to approve. The Commission may err. as follows: SEC. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent.A. The Commission on Elections. revise. revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC. Politics is a practical matter. There is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. SEC.[47] Once a law is enacted and approved.1 are unconstitutional. amend and revise the law. orderly and honest elections."[44 In an earlier case. .[46] In the same vein. of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress. and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President. composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments. the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC." Interpreting Section 1. No. because of its fact-finding facilities. and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms. We may not agree fully with its choice of means. the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided. may be performed in aid of its legislation. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion. four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority. and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be an independent COMELEC. That.A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created. in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. R. the Court elucidated: The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created . 9189 created the JCOC. as a constitutional body. orders and rulings. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review.A. this court should not interfere. it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. 19. The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional University of Santo Tomas . . By virtue of Section 19 of R." that is.A. the Court has held that "[w]hatever may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections. the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis-àvis the independence of the COMELEC. Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.122 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee administer election laws with the COMELEC. 25 and portions of Section 17. It shall review.A. amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19].not from the standpoint of pure theory. to review its decisions. but certainly not to approve. The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19. In the discharge of its functions. it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws. R. No. However. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution.

that the parties were divorced in Nevada. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction. private respondent filed suit against petitioner at the RTC. Q: Is the divorce decree in Nevada recognizable here in the Philippines? A: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the U. G. The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD. they established their residence in the Philippines. under which .A. 157013. 16 of the NCC. a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1 of R." c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19. "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17. as her husband in any State of the Union. the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law. No. arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property". Puno as part of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of Sections 17. 10 July 2003) Marriage. is conjugal property of the parties. private respondent (Alice) cannot sue petitioner (Richard). to wit: "The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.5 of R. that they were married in Hongkong. For instance. and the phrase. the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence of the COMELEC. all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. stating that petitioner's business in Manila. During the deliberations.A. amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission. Similarly. that. Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4. provided they are valid according to their national law. Under such a situation. (Atty.R. 19 and 25 of R. 9189. and that petitioner has remarried also in Nevada. Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. to wit: "It shall review. "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. aliens may obtain divorces abroad. Commission on Elections. to wit: "subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: the same law. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.123 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: authority. Divorce and Other Encounters Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States.1.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May. and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business. which may be recognized in the Philippines. (the Galleon Shop. such as COMELEC. for being repugnant to Section 1. 2004 elections. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 9189. However.A. after the marriage. United States. this time to Theodore Van Dorn." and d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25. the same being contrary to local law and public policy. the phrase. to wit: "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. revise. No." and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that "[i]t shall review.S.[48] Otherwise. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.1. No. revise. No. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval. the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.1. Pursuant to Section 30 of R. should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Article VII of the Constitution. that they begot two children born." whereby Congress. The constitutionality of Section 18. and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. No. as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17. only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. Macalintal v. In this case.A. in both provisions." b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17. for short).

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divorce dissolves the marriage, the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage. Thus, Richard would have no standing to sue Alice for accounting with prayer for grant of the right to manage conjugal property in Manila. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Art. 109 cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., GR No. L-68470, 08 October 1985) Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. She obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont. In 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Dandan claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo, and the surviving children of Arturo, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Cabasal, which was later replaced by Castillon. Blandina and the Padlan children submitted certified photocopies of the private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. Petitioner Fe Quita moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. Q: Was there a valid divorce between Fe and Arturo? A: We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioners citizenship at the time of

their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial curt must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proven hat she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year. Petitioner, however, did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. (Quita v. CA, G.R. No. 124862. 22 December 1998) The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely at Cebu City. They had five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the U.S.A., leaving all of their children to the care of Crasus. Barely a year after, Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines. Q: Is there a valid divorce in this case? A: As it is worded, Art. 26, par. 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Fely obtained her divorce in the U.S. in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. Fely admitted that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the NCC, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine

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laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus. (Republic v. Iyoy, GR No. 152577, 21 September 2005) Recio, a Filipino, was married to Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. Then a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian government. Petitioner Garcia-- a Filipina -- and Recio were married in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Afterwards, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Petitioner Garcia then filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the Philippine court, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson. Q: Is the respondent legally capacitated to marry the petitioner? A: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence (§24 and §25 of Rule 132) must be demonstrated. The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. Courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. The certificate of legal capacity mentioned in Art. 21 of the FC, would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. Neither can we grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. (Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 02 October 2001)

Orbecido III married Lady Myros in Ozamis City. They had two children. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Cipriano then learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Stanley. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. Q: Can a Filipino spouse naturalized as foreign citizen obtain a valid divorce abroad? A: The legislative intent behind Art. 26, par. 2 of the FC is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to an alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Thus, taking into consideration said legislative intent, we hold that Art. 26, par. 2 of the FC should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. A statute may be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms so long as they come within its spirit or intent. (Republic v. Orbecido III, GR No. 154380, 05 October 2005) Contracts Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from New York to Los Angeles despite possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an action for damages before the RTC. Advocating petitioners' position, the trial court categorically ruled that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, however, the appellate court found that while there was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the USA it is allowed to overbook flights. Q: Is TWA guilt of bad faith? A: The fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice

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of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking and nothing else. Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passenger a beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. TWA should have incorporated stipulations in overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline. Also, TWA's was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. (Sps. Zalamea v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 104235, 18 November 1993) Private respondent Rapadas held Passenger Ticket and Baggage Claim Check for petitioner's Flight with the route from Guam to Manila. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport, Rapadas was ordered by petitioner's handcarry control agent to check-in his attache case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache case. However, the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him, he acceded to checking it in. He then checked it in but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. Upon arriving in Manila, Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. Q: Is the Warsaw convention applicable in the case? A: The Warsaw Convention, as amended, specifically provides that it is applicable to international carriage. Although the trial court rejected the evidence of the defendant-petitioner of a stipulation particularly specifying what amounts it had bound itself to pay for loss of

luggage, the Notice and paragraph 2 of the "Conditions of Contract" should be sufficient notice showing the applicability of the Warsaw limitations. Nowhere in the Warsaw Convention, as amended, is such a detailed notice of baggage liability limitations required. Nevertheless, it should become a common, safe and practical custom among air carriers to indicate beforehand the precise sums equivalent to those fixed by Article 22 (2) of the Convention. The provisions in the plane ticket sufficient to govern the limitations of liabilities of the airline for loss of luggage. The passenger, upon contracting with the airline and receiving the plane ticket, was expected to be vigilant insofar as his luggage is concerned. If the passenger fails to adduce evidence to overcome the stipulations, he cannot avoid the application of the liability limitations. Private respondent actually refused to register the attache case and chose to take it with him despite having been ordered by the PANAM agent to check it in. In attempting to avoid registering the luggage by going back to the line, private respondent manifested a disregard of airline rules on allowable handcarried baggages. Prudence of a reasonably careful person also dictates that cash and jewelry should be removed from checked-in-luggage and placed in one's pockets or in a handcarried Manila-paper or plastic envelope. We are not by any means suggesting that passengers are always bound to the stipulated amounts printed on a ticket, found in a contract of adhesion, or printed elsewhere but referred to in handouts or forms. We simply recognize that the reasons behind stipulations on liability limitations arise from the difficulty, if not impossibility, of establishing with a clear preponderance of evidence the contents of: lost valise or suitcase. (Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Rapadas, GR No. 60673, 19 May 1992) Uy, a revenue passenger of United Airlines for the San Francisco - Manila route, checked in together with his luggage one piece of which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying that he should have known the maximum weight allowance and that he should have packed his things accordingly. Then, in a loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she told respondent to repack his things and transfer some of them from the overweight luggage to the lighter ones. Upon arrival in Manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents stolen. He particularized his losses to be around US $5,310.00. United Airlines, through Central Baggage Specialist, did not refute any of respondent’s allegations and mailed a check representing the payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US $9.70 per pound. Respondent, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses, as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two (2) more letters to petitioner airline, demanding an out-ofcourt settlement of P1,000,000.00. Petitioner United Airlines did not accede to his demands. Consequently, on 9 June 1992 respondent filed a complaint for damages against United Airlines

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prohibited from maintaining an action to collect payment therefor in Philippine courts? A: The true test in determining whether a corporation is doing business in the Philippines or not. In the case at bar. However. valves and control equipment used for industrial fluid control and PVC pipes and fittings for industrial uses. verily. Whether a foreign corporation is "doing business" does not necessarily depend upon the frequency of its transactions. or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. a transaction or series of transactions set apart from the common business of a foreign enterprise in the sense that there is no intention to engage in a progressive pursuit of the purpose and object of the business organization. Art. answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. much less exempt.00. with a 90-day credit term. we have ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees. or ignored. valves. and contemplates. however. the transaction cannot be considered as an isolated one.127 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Q: Is the Warsaw convention applicable in the case? A: The Warsaw Convention can be applied. and. we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. The phrase "isolated transaction" has a definite and fixed meaning.310. respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later. The private respondent made separate orders at various dates. What is determinative of "doing business" is not really the number or the quantity of the transactions.R. but more upon the nature and character of the transactions. The term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements. Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation. The number and quantity are merely evidence of such intention.O. Note that there were 17 orders and deliveries over a four-month period. PVC pipes and fittings. 127768. The transfers of goods were perfected in Singapore. 19 November 1999) Foreign Corporations Eriks Pte. the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to. . but the latter failed/refused to do so. respondent's failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action. valves and pipes for industrial purposes. Petitioner Corporation filed with the RTC for the recovery of sum of money. Insofar as the first cause of action is concerned. ordered and received from petitioner various elements used in sealing pumps. G. Singapore. to that extent.. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. It does not regulate. The purpose of the law is to subject the foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of our courts. but more importantly. depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. is a non-resident foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of elements used in sealing pumps. i. demands were made by petitioner 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: upon private respondent to settle his account. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that petitioner is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license. It is not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single or isolated acts. contending that petitioner corporation had no legal capacity to sue. (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts. the transactions entered into by the appellant with the appellee are a series of commercial dealings which would signify an intent on the part of the petitioner to do business in the Philippines and could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered an isolated one. Private respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss. thus would fall under the category of doing business. (United Airlines v. pipes and control equipment.e. and in progressive prosecution of. the purpose and object of its organization. Thus. Likewise. Subsequently. beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. F. Ltd. especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established. Jr. for private respondent's account. As regards the second cause of action. Uy. specifically. it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround. The transactions did not consist of separate deliveries for one single order. Enriquez. the intention of an entity to continue the body of its business in the country. but to bar it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without first taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suits in the local courts. seems to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.B. No. doing business under the name and style of Delrene EB Controls Center and/or EB Karmine Commercial. Considering the factual background as laid out above. the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage. Q: Is a foreign corporation which sold its products sixteen times over a five-month period to the same Filipino buyer without first obtaining a license to do business in the Philippines.

including government-owned or controlled corporations involving P2. .. . unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is used to shield unfairness or injustice. petitioner HPPL acquired no clear and unmistakable right as the award announced by the SBMA prior to the President’s revocation thereof was not final and binding.000. 31 August 2000) Property Rights and International Commerce Like many other developing countries. These are: (1) ICTSI.128 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee By this judgment.” Notwithstanding the SBMA Board’s recommendations and action awarding the project to HPPL. G. It is well-established that the discretion to accept or reject any bid. (Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited v. for even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business.. ." The President also saw in the WTO the opening of "new opportunities for the services sector . et al. All three qualified bidders were required to submit their respective formal bid package. . mandatory injunction and damages.R. Three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMA-TEC. for the doctrine of lack of capacity to sue is based on considerations of sound public policy. No. Res judicata does not set in a case dismissed for lack of capacity to sue. 06 February 1997) SBMA advertised in newspapers an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. v. The President may. or even recall the award thereof. limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court." University of Santo Tomas . petitioner HPPL must be held to be incapacitated to bring this petition for injunction before this Court for it is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the requisite license. . In due time. Consequently. domestic materials and locally produced goods. because there has been no determination on the merits. we are not foreclosing petitioner's right to collect payment. 131367.00 and above. after such review and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPL’s Business Plan was “far superior to that of the two other bidders. filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC for specific performance. through the reduction of tariffs on its exports. Ltd. and thus does not submit itself to Philippine laws. then Executive Secretary submitted a memorandum to the Office of the President recommending that another rebidding be conducted. is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department. and (3) HPPL. within his authority.. When the President issued the memorandum setting aside the award previously declared by the SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a rebidding be conducted.[33] Accordingly. (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting . No. 118843. and (the attraction of) more investments into the country. Letter of Instruction No. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. Specifically. G. The services of 3 international consultants recommended by the World Bank for their expertise were hired by SBMA to evaluate the business plans submitted by each of the bidders. within the authority of the President and was a valid exercise of his prerogative. the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . The amount or volume of the business is of no moment.000." Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes. feeling aggrieved by the SBMA’s failure and refusal to commence negotiations and to execute the Concession Agreement despite its earlier pronouncements that HPPL was the winning bidder. especially its major trading partners. CA. agencies and instrumentalities. . the SBMA is always under the direct control of the Office of the President. the same was. ICTSI. The bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s reason for creation or existence. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is required in all contracts of the national government offices. the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal of improving "Philippine access to foreign markets. particularly agricultural and industrial products. If a foreign corporation operates a business in the Philippines without a license. It has often been held that a single act or transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a corporation performs acts for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. this Court has ruled that subsequent acquisition of the license will cure the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contract. awarded through public bidding or negotiation. HPPL. (2) RPSI. Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in business here. (Eriks PTE. overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors for justifiable reasons. All the consultants. it is only just that said foreign corporation be not allowed to invoke them in our courts when the need arises. RPSI and the Office of the President filed separate Answers-in-Intervention to the complaint opposing the reliefs sought by complainant HPPL.R. particularly when contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of money. Q: Is bidding participation an act of “doing business” in the Philippines? A: As a chartered institution. The requirement of a license is not intended to put foreign corporations at a disadvantage. (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor. Moreover.

02 May 1997) Escobar.. the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion" nor "mendicancy in the international community. it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines. Angara. the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Escobar alleged that she had been manufacturing and selling these products under the firm name "L & BM Commercial" since 1970. constitutes an unlawful appropriation of a mark previously used in the Philippines and not abandoned and therefore a statutory violation of Section 4 (d) of Republic Act No. it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy. services and investments into the country.129 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: Q: Do the provisions of the WTO AGREEMENT and its three annexes contravene SEC.. 10 AND 12. et al. Private respondent Barbizon Corporation. frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. And given a free trade environment. justice. 166. Escobar later assigned all her rights and interest over the trademark to petitioner Mirpuri who. the "Bonito Enterprises. 32 In other words. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. 19. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods." The trademark was "for use in "brassieres and lady's underwear garments like panties. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods. Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire." thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade "into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.A. Indeed. No. it does not prohibit them either. goods and services. as a member of the family of nations. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level. and adheres to the policy of peace. Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. ARTICLE XII. U." "national treatment. Furthermore. sponsor of this constitutional policy: "Economic self reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It did not shut out foreign investments. with all nations. G. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity.R." and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. In fact. Director of Patents rendered judgment dismissing the opposition and giving due course to Escobar's application. the constitutional policy of a "selfreliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments. labor and enterprises. equality. rather. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion. And that the respondentapplicant's use of the said mark BARBIZON which resembles the trademark used and owned by opposer. under his firm name then. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.S. it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity. the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Mirpuri. 118295. expressly or impliedly. ARTICLE II. Escobar was issued a certificate of registration for the trademark "Barbizon." As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas. of the Philippine Constitution? Does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? A: The principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions. a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of New York." 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: domestic and foreign markets. (Tañada. opposed the application. v. et al. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies. especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities." was the sole and exclusive . filed an application with the Bureau of Patents for the registration of the trademark "Barbizon" for use in brassieres and ladies undergarments. goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. at the same time." The WTO reliance on "most favored nation. cooperation and amity. freedom. It claimed that: The mark BARBIZON of respondent-applicant is confusingly similar to the trademark BARBIZON which opposer owns and has not abandoned. services. Unquestionably. & SECS.

It also contended that the claim against the estate should be filed before the probate court and that the Philippine government should be accorded first preference in the priority list of the estate's creditors. all agreements concerning industrial property. University of Santo Tomas . where a class action was previously filed against former President Marcos. No. cultural and technological independence. Trademarks deal with the psychological function of symbols and the effect of these symbols on the public at large. Escobar reapplied for registration of the cancelled trademark. and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade. They speed up transfer of technology and industrialization. and thereby bring about social and economic progress. or disappearance. and that. and (2) the extent of damages sustained. For this reason. It moved that Mrs. Members to this Agreement "desire to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. accordingly. Intellectual and industrial property rights cases are not simple property cases. commerce and trade. Petitioner then filed in the probate court a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. and strengthening the multi-lateral trading system to bring about economic.S. Respondent Judge Villarama issued a TRO against the special masters and persons acting in their stead. and serve valuable and interrelated business functions. or the courts of the country in question if the issue comes before a court. however. Estate Succession and Administration of Republic of the Philippines alleged that during his exile the late President Marcos executed his last will and testament in USA. it attracts foreign investments. The TRIPs Agreement seeks to grant adequate protection of intellectual property rights by creating a favorable economic environment to encourage the inflow of foreign investments. 114508. Later however. District Court of Hawaii issued a Reference Order appointing special masters for the purpose of obtaining depositions in the Philippines on the following matters: (1) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture. both nationally and internationally." This competent authority would be either the registering authority if it has the power to decide this. invoke the Paris Convention? A: The essential requirement under Article 6b is of the Paris Convention is that the trademark to be protected must be "well-known" in the country where protection is sought. Petitioner asserted that the Reference Order impinged on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court and disregarded the claim of the Philippine government against the Marcos estate. summary execution. The Code was enacted to strengthen the intellectual and industrial property system in the Philippines as mandated by the country's accession to the Agreement Establishing the WTO. with his wife Imelda and son Ferdinand II as executors. taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights. G. Q: Does the petitioner have a clear and positive right w/c may have been violated by the issuance of the Reference Order by the District Court of Hawaii? A: We fail to comprehend what clear and positive right petitioner has which may be violated by the issuance and implementation of the Reference Order by the District Court of Hawaii. The action sought damages against the latter for human rights violations he allegedly committed during his authoritarian rule. 19 November 1999) Death. the Bureau of Patents cancelled Escobar's certificate of registration. including the availment of local court reporters and interpreters as might be required. Q: Can Barbizon Corp. The power to determine whether a trademark is well-known lies in the "competent authority of the country of registration or use. Petitioner seeks to establish such a "right" by claiming that since the probate court was the first to take cognizance of the settlement of the Marcos estate then pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines declares that "an effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity. Petitioner sent a notice of Commencement of Probate Proceedings in Philippine Court to the United States (U. The Reference Order prescribed the procedure.R. Among those annexed is the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPs.130 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee distributor of Escobar's "Barbizon" products. (Mirpuri v. and ensures market access for our products. These advantages have been acknowledged by the Philippine government itself. Industrial property encourages investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction of human needs. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II filed an Opposition/Comment on the petition. it exercises jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts. Mrs. like those on trademarks and tradenames. he issued the assailed Order lifting the TRO.) District Court of Hawaii. facilitates transfer of technology. Mirpuri filed his own application for registration of Escobar's trademark. Trademarks play a significant role in communication.S. CA. Marcos and Ferdinand II be declared incompetent as executors and prayed that letters of administration be issued in favor of petitioner's nominee. In 1979. It alleged that in the class action the U. Escobar later assigned her application to herein petitioner and this application was opposed by private respondent. are intimately connected with economic development.

(Republic v. The Reference Order cannot be construed as concerning or affecting the Marcos estate within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. if there be any. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official language (like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. Jr. vice consul. Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines. with a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd. Thereafter. The duties of the special masters as defined in the Reference Order were "to prepare written findings for submission to the jury regarding (a) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture. "Sec. In the instant case. The attestation must be under the official seat of the attesting officer. consul general. even on the basis of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances. the foreign principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. private respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language. The argument is like a loose cannon ball way off its target. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. G. still respondent Rances cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. that court has exclusive jurisdiction over said estate and no other special proceedings involving the same subject matter may be filed before any other court. and (b) the extent of the damages sustained. or a specific part thereof." the jurisdiction of the probate court by the issuance of the Reference Order. with a certificate that such officer has the custody. 26. the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation. Section 1 of Rule 73 refers to courts in the Philippines and simply means that once a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is filed in one of such courts. Proof of public or official record. or "impinged on. Judge Villarama. or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal.R. under the seal of such court.131 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: the District Court of Hawaii cannot assert jurisdiction over the assets of said estate.Whenever a copy of a writing is attested for the purpose of evidence. the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. As evidence of this foreign award. Q: Was the Dubai decision properly proved before the POEA? A: Even assuming that the POEA has jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country. in no way then can it be validly maintained that the District Court of Hawaii has encroached upon.. and authenticated by the seal of his office. which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. No. or by his deputy. the attestation must state. summary execution or disappearance. if the record is not kept in the Philippines. 05 September 1997) Foreign Judgments Rances was engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal. not having been properly authenticated. The Dubai Court decision. when admissible for any purpose. may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record. in substance. there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. as the case may be. Petitioner Pascor has expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: . but that translation is legally defective. private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner where he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case." Respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision.-An official record or an entry therein. petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by private respondent could not be considered as evidence. consul. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision." The full texts of the purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal letter are set out in the margin. does not purport on its face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor against the foreign principal of petitioner. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms: "Sec. 117733. and accompanied. that the copy is a correct copy of the original. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. 25. In its answer. or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept. What attestation of copy must state. Since foreign courts are not contemplated in Section 1. The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. After having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehavior and inability to get along with officers and crew members of each of the vessels.

GR No. 06 May 1988) The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation PNCC is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.” Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its witnesses both of whom failed to shed light and amplify its defense or claim for nonenforcement of the foreign judgment against it. at that only if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. the law of Malaysia in this case.. remains a question of fact. the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. is invalid. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. Likewise. the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera’s unethical acts as a lawyer. Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Accordingly. not of law. It did not. Having thus proven. herein private respondent. namely. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment. the assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation. IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 1958. petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent before the High Court of Malaya. as alleged by it. CA. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the University of Santo Tomas . as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it. It appears that sometime in 1983. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is. NLRC. Q: Can the Malaysian judgment be recognized and enforced under the circumstances? A: Yes. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. In this case. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for two years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam in a disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera. Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of a Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP. through the foregoing evidence. Under Section 27. 110263. the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment.132 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee been acquired by the Dubai court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court. G. Ultimately. the presumption of validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand. (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by evident collusion. On 1974. No. due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment. (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the Malaysian Court over the person of private respondent due to alleged improper service of summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear and represent private respondent in the suit. (Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation v. (Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad v. More fundamentally. Q: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction? A: The Guam Superior Court’s judgment ordering Maquera’s suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Needless to stress. the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum i. petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya. 20 July 2001) The District Court of Guam informed the SC of the suspension of Atty. L-76595. matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon the defendant. and (c) not only were the requisites for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the “every decision must state the facts and law on which it is based. then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. fraud and clear mistake of fact or law. said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity. He was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct.e. it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it.R. he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. to prove otherwise. High Court of Malaya rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent.

hence. a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410. raising. Bar Matter No. the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money. Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss. Thus. pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners’ submission. The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court. petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself. On that score. and that arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. but there is an essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. Using the above example. and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos. On the other hand. rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. In response. which obviously had not been paid. it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation. in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory. the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party. to safeguard against the harassment of defendants.25 Billion. allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. Rule 39. Respondent Judge Ranada issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. It alleged that petitioners had only paid P410. in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor. the complainant will have to establish before the court the tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor. However. It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment. as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. The limitation on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. There are distinctions between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts. the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation. For an action in rem. for the violation of the same right through the same manner of action. Not surprisingly. collusion. Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find application. the service of personal notice. As stated in Section 48. even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem actions. notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over US$2. the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing.” If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits.90. or clear mistake of law or fact. while in an action in personam. This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment. in an action to enforce a foreign judgment. collusion. if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently. or mistake of fact or law. among others. The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. Leon G. the matters for proof are different. Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation.133 CIVIL LAW NOTES ADVISER: respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. The defense is also recognized within the . There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment. the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to 2007 UST TEAM BAR-OPS CIVIL LAW COMMITTEE Academics Committee Chairperson: Civil Law Committee Chairperson: Vice-Chairperson: Members: defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right.00) was proper. 793.005. and not the facts from which it prescinds. the non-payment of the correct filing fees. in both cases. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion. and not conclusive.859. to insure that the task of courts not be increased by neverending litigation of the same disputes. who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances.00 as docket and filing fees. and in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment. and to promote the goal of all law: “rest and quietness. 30 July 2004) The petitioners filed Complaint for the enforcement of the Final Judgment awarding the plaintiff class a total of $1. More importantly. Maquera. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand. the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48. Q: Was the dismissal proper? A: Remarkably. the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action. which Judge Ranada denied. fraud. (In re: Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Terrritory of Guam of Atty. and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines.964. fraud. pursuant to Section 50. 7. the foreign judgment is presumptive. the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself. of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

as many civil law nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court. No. in the light of the choice-of-law rules of the recognizing court. G. 12 April 2005) University of Santo Tomas . applied the wrong law to the case. 139325. Ranada. vs Hon. (Mijares.R.134 2007 Team Bar-Ops Civil Law Committee international sphere. The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values. et al.

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