Economic Policy Paper Series 2010

IN SEARCH OF A COMMON TRANSATLANTIC

“WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT” APPROACH
TO PEACE-BUILDING PROCESSES IN AFRICA
(The Case of Sudan)

Timothy Othieno and Vita Sebek1

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 In Search of a Common Transatlantic
“Whole-Of-Government” Approach
to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
(the Case of Sudan)
August 2010

Timothy Othieno and Vita Sebek1

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Transatlantic Donors and their “Whole-of-Government” Approaches
to Peace-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Transatlantic Donor Policies Toward an Enhanced Inter-Government Cooperation . . . .19
4 From Policy to Practice: The Application of “The Whole-of-Government”
Approach in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2 The U.S. Involvement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3 The U.K. Engagement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4 The EU’s Sudan Engagement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5 Joint Involvement of Transatlantic Donors in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
6 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
7 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Abbreviations

AFRICOM United States Africa Command JDO Joint Donor Office

AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act JAM Joint Assessment Mission
APF Africa Peace Facility JHA Justice and Home Affairs
AU African Union JMA Joint Monitoring Commission
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy MDGs Millennium Development Goals
CHASE Conflict, Humanitarian and Security MDTFs Multi Donor Trust Funds
Department MOD Ministry of Defense
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Africa
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
NIF National Islamic Front
CPP Conflict Prevention Pool
NSC National Security Council
CRC Civilian Response Corps
NSS National Security Strategy
DAC Development Assistance Committee
OECD Organization for Economic
DED Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst Cooperation and Development
(German Development Agency)
PBP Peace-Building Partnership
DFID U.K. Department for International
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Development
Relief
DG Directorate General
PMI President’s Malaria Initiative
DOD Department of Defense
PSA Public Service Agreement
DPA Darfur Peace Agreement
RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism
EEAS European External Action Service
S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for
ESDP European Security and Defense Reconstruction and Development
Policy
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army
ESFP European Security and Foreign
SPLM Sudan People’ Liberation Movement
Policy
U.K. United Kingdom
EU European Union
UN United Nations
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
UNAMID African Union/United Nations
ICAF Inter-agency Conflict Assessment
Mission in Darfur
Framework
UNDP United Nations Development
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on
Program
Development
UNITAF Unified Task Force
JMST Joint Mediation Support Team
U.S. United States
GoSS Government of Southern Sudan
USAID U.S. Agency for International
IPF IGAD Partners Forum
Development
JAM Joint Assessment Mission
WOG Whole of Government
Executive Summary
The rationale for this paper emerges from under-
standing the vital importance of peace-building
processes, which provide a new start for many
fragile and conflict-ridden African states, and from
the need for coherent donor engagement strategies,
which would help effectively address pressing issues
in these states. However, the broadening of the
peace-building agenda during the past two decades
made such engagements increasingly challenging in
terms of their complex and medium- to long-term
nature, and the necessary levels of financial and
other assistance, which exposed the need for greater
intra-government cooperation (e.g., Whole-of-
Government (WOG) approach) on one hand and
enhanced donor cooperation on the other. Since
the transatlantic donors (e.g., the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the EU) are seen as the most
active and influential supporters of peace-building
processes on the African continent, their endeavors
to pursue the WOG approach in this regard repre-
sent a particular focus of this paper.
Consequently, two main research questions are
addressed in this paper: To what extent has the
WOG approach been mainstreamed in peace-
building policies of transatlantic donors? And,
what impact have moves toward the increased
intra-government coordination had on transatlan-
tic donor cooperation in terms of challenges and
opportunities? Based on the review of policy docu-
ments and relevant literature, with some additional
insights from interviews conducted in 2009, this
paper argues that transatlantic donors have taken
steps toward developing a comprehensive WOG
approach to peace-building that fits into their par-
ticular political and institutional contexts, although
with varying speeds, and that the development
and application of this approach remains a work in
progress. The remaining challenges are numerous,
the most crucial probably being the absence of a
comprehensive national policy framework.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
The lack of these comprehensive national policy
frameworks means transatlantic donors have
insufficient coordination, which makes it difficult
to jointly implement their peace-building agendas
in practice. Tensions between donors can arise
not only on account of different goals and pri-
orities, whether perceived or real, but also due to
undefined objectives and unbalanced/incoherent
national approaches.
Nevertheless, transatlantic donors appear to have
been committed to improving their cooperation
record during their involvement in Sudan peace
processes. To this end, they all expressed support
for the implementation of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) and for the Darfur peace-
building process. Moreover, they have made an
attempt to put their development assistance under
one umbrella (the Multi-Donor Trust Funds), and
to use various joint mechanisms, such as joint pro-
gramming and joint donor offices, to further their
objectives in Sudan. These attempts at enhanced
donor coordination have underlined the relevance
of a focused approach to peace-building through
outlining developmental and other priorities for
donors and recipient states, and have revealed
donor preference for a bilateral approach when
joint initiatives could not address their national
interests in Sudan at the same time.
By recognizing this and other related challenges,
this paper puts forward some recommendations on
possible future directions for transatlantic donor
cooperation. Such cooperation should be rooted
in a comprehensive national peace-building policy
framework to offer a clear vision for all national
actors, and to provide guidance on possible areas
of cooperation for partner states. After reaching
agreement on joint interests and objectives, trans-
atlantic donors could explore complementarity as a
principle of engagement in Africa’s peace-building
3
processes. Successful cooperation on a case-by-case situations. To this effect, transatlantic donors could
basis could be translated into a more permanent also consider working within the UN system as a
arrangement, which should be flexible enough possible option.
to adapt to various challenges posed by fragile

4 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010

1 Introduction
The history of independent African states has been
characterized by tragic realities of violent conflicts
and civil wars, which have also been fueled by Cold
War dynamics. These types of violent conflicts
subsided with the demise of the Soviet Union, but
new conflicts broke out as a result, which have
been largely attributed to the fragility of post-colo-
nial African states with their many faces, causes,
and consequences.
As they stopped functioning as credible states,
African countries attracted considerable attention
from the international community as a potential
source of threats to human security and regional
and international peace. Consequently, peace-
building2 has received growing international
attention, especially over the past decade, as a
“shifting constellation of international and regional
organizations, national governments, and non-
governmental organizations has conducted a series
of complex ‘peace-building’ operations aimed at
stabilizing countries just emerging from periods of
internal war.”3 With some successes (Sierra Leone)
and many failures (Somalia), peace-building pro-
cesses have seen many trials and errors and have
provided continuous lessons for all parties involved.
At the same time, peace-building as a discourse
and practice has been evolving over the past two
decades with two notable developments. The first
one relates to the broadening of peace-building as
a concept and the consequent practical implica-
tion for peace-building activities in terms of scope
and duration of donor engagement. The second
one relates to the intensified attempts at deepen-
ing inter-donor cooperation to better deal with the
challenging tasks of peace-building processes.
First, the definition and understanding of peace-
building as a concept introduced by the UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 An
Agenda for Peace4 has gradually expanded over
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
time. Initially, peace-building was seen as a series of
activities aimed at strengthening and solidifying peace
in the aftermath of civil strife, such as disarming the
warring parties, restoring order, destroying weapons,
repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, advancing
efforts to protect human rights, strengthening govern-
mental institutions, and promoting political participa-
tion. However, when applied in practice, the concept Peace-building has
proved to be too narrow and has consequently gained received growing
some “weight” to encompass measures in the context international
of emerging, current, or post-conflict situations for
attention,
the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and
especially over
promoting lasting and sustainable peace.
the past decade,
As such, peace-building has roughly three mutually as a “shifting
reinforcing dimensions: constellation
of international
1. Security: includes disarmament, demobilization,
and regional
and reintegration of ex-combatants;
organizations,
humanitarian and mine action; improvement of
control over small arms and light weapons; and
national
governments, and
security sector reform.
non-governmental
2. Governance and political: entails the support organizations
for political and administrative authorities
has conducted a
and structures; support for the peace-oriented series of complex
elements of civil society, including the media; ‘peace-building’
reconciliation and the promotion of non-violent
operations aimed
conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels
at stabilizing
of society; promotion of good governance,
democracy, and human rights; and legal action
countries just
emerging from
and truth commissions.
periods of
3. Social, economic, and environmental: involves internal war.”
the repatriation and reintegration of refugees
and internally displaced persons; (re)building
of infrastructure and important government
functions; long-term development programs
for high-quality and accessible education
and health services; technical and financial
assistance; and measures to stimulate productive
sector development, employment, trade,
and investment.5
5
 Rocha Menocal6 addresses this broadening of the
peace-building agenda by observing: “At its most
ambitious, peace-building has shifted from the
relatively minimalist focus of the ‘negative peace’
toward the maximalist goal of transforming society
by strengthening human security and addressing
fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities,
Many donor- and other root causes of conflict. Thus interpreted,
supported peace- peace-building is a multifaceted endeavor that
includes building democratic governance, protect-
building processes
ing human rights, strengthening rule of law, and
in Africa have
promoting sustainable development, equitable
been fraught
access to resources, and environmental security.”
with challenges
Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult
and complexities,
to separate peace-building from the more ambitious
including lack of
state-building agenda, and deal with the related
donor cooperation,
multiplicity of tasks and processes.
and have
consequently The broadening of peace-building as a concept and
“lost their way.” practice has at least two important consequences
for donor governments and international organiza-
tions alike. First, donors have begun to re-evaluate
their engagement policies and strategies, and
consider a wider array of peace-building activities.
At the same time, mid- and long-term planning has
become necessary, especially in terms of budgeting.
“Quick fix” approaches characteristic for the 1990s,
such as holding elections and concluding peace
agreements in countries emerging from conflict,
were “upgraded” to cover such activities as rebuild-
ing of social ties, providing entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities, and multi-faceted building of institutions.7
Second, the challenges of peace-building processes,
especially in African states, and the levels of assis-
tance needed from donors in terms of financial and
other resources to support these processes brought
about an understanding that donors cannot effec-
tively engage with failed states in isolation, and
that enhanced donor cooperation is necessary. As
a result, donors have been collaborating in various
ways, such as allocating financial resources through
6 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), supporting
African regional and sub-regional peace-making and
peace-keeping initiatives, and supporting military
operations to bring about peace and security, provid-
ing humanitarian assistance, and the like.
In their aspiration to halt the scourge of conflict in
Africa, the world’s leading democracies, which are
major international donors at the same time, there-
fore adhered to various approaches and strategies to
support peace-building processes on the continent.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and other
European Union member states (also referred to
as transatlantic donors),8 recognized the need for
and made many subsequent steps toward “reconcil-
ing” security, political, developmental, and other
considerations on their engagement agendas to suc-
cessfully deal with fragile environments. However,
many donor-supported peace-building processes
in Africa have been fraught with challenges and
complexities, including lack of donor cooperation,
and have consequently “lost their way.”
The rationale for this paper therefore emerges out
of the recognition that peace-building processes
represent a new start for many fragile states in
terms of rebuilding the state and its institutions,
and society as a whole. It is therefore important for
donors to engage in these processes with coherent
strategies and sufficient funding, reflecting the real-
ities on the ground, and improving the efficiency of
their assistance. This is especially important since
peace-building consists of numerous civilian and
military activities that range from peace-keeping to
development assistance, which need to be coor-
dinated to effectively support peace-building in a
country. This coordination needs to be undertaken
within a donor’s national government (e.g., within
and between various government departments);
internationally between donors — the states and
international organizations; and between donors
and recipient governments.9
The transatlantic donors have long recognized interviews conducted in October and November
this need and have made efforts to improve 2009, this paper argues that transatlantic donors are
government-wide coherence in their approaches gradually moving toward developing a comprehen-
to peace-building (e.g., intra-government coor- sive WOG approach to peace-building that fits into
dination, which is also referred to as “the Whole their national political and institutional settings,
of Government” (WOG) approach), as well as in so the application of the WOG approach remains
terms of creating opportunities for donor coopera- a work in progress. This also has an impact on the
tion in peace-building processes (e.g., inter-govern- relations between transatlantic donors in terms of The transatlantic
ment cooperation). In this regard, this paper aims insufficient coordination of their peace-building donors have long
to address two research questions: efforts, which makes it difficult to jointly imple- recognized this
ment their agendas. need and have
• To what extent is the WOG approach reflected
in the policies and institutional arrangements of To address the above issues, this paper begins with made efforts
the transatlantic donors to reflect the complex an analysis of the peace-building policies of the to improve
and multidimensional nature of peace-building transatlantic donors, and the challenges linked to government-wide
process in Africa’s fragile situations? the application of the WOG approach.10 The paper coherence in their
continues with an analysis of on-going peace-build- approaches to
• What impact have moves toward intra- ing and state-building processes in Sudan, where all peace-building
governmental coordination had on inter- three transatlantic donors under review have been (e.g. intra-
governmental cooperation between the extensively involved. In analyzing peace-building
transatlantic donors in terms of opportunities
government
processes in Sudan, an assessment is made as to coordination,
and challenges? what extent the WOG approach has been applied
which is also
by individual donors, and to what extent donor
Based on the review of policy documents and rel- referred to as
cooperation and coordination was reflected in their
evant literature, with some additional insights from “the Whole of
engagement in Sudan peace processes.
Government”
(WOG) approach),
as well as in
terms of creating
opportunities for
donor cooperation
in peace-building
processes.

In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government” 7

Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
2 Transatlantic Donors and their
“Whole-of-Government” Approaches to
Peace-Building
2.1 Introduction
The 2007 OECD Principles for Good
International Engagement in Fragile States
emphasized that successful engagement in frag-
ile environments depends, at least in part, on
well-sequenced and coherent progress across the
political, security, economic, administrative, and
social domains, thus recognizing the multidimen-
sional and interdependent nature of such engage-
ments. Consequently, working effectively across
these domains requires donors to adopt a WOG
approach, involving at least departments respon-
sible for security and political affairs, as well as
those responsible for development and humanitar-
ian assistance.
In this way, the WOG approach comprises at
least two aspects: the institutional aspect relat-
ing to coordination between various government
departments and the policy aspect covering the
harmonization of policies of various government
institutions and bodies. Both aspects of the WOG
approach are relevant for achieving coherence and
improving effectiveness in dealing with failed and
other fragile states, as well as improving donor
coordination.
However, there are several factors that can hinder
the implementation of a WOG approach. When it
comes to intra-governmental cooperation, these
factors might include different capabilities of gov-
ernment departments in terms of available financial
and human resources. This can result in a more
prominent role and influence of one department on
the government’s peace-building agenda and thus
lead to an imbalanced approach.
Second, operating in a fragile or conflict environ-
ment without a coherent national/government
peace-building strategy may result in competing
or even contradictory approaches of individual
government departments with undesired outcomes
8 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
for both the donor and the recipient country. For
example, the various government institutions deal-
ing with defense, foreign policy, and development
may have different conceptions about the right way
of achieving peace, which can result in an incoher-
ent government approach to peace-building.11
Third, the inherent “tension” between the defense
and all other “civilian” sectors, especially in inse-
cure/conflict environments, undoubtedly contrib-
utes to unbalanced approaches to peace-building
in Africa. The military-civilian divide is especially
difficult to cross in the early stages of donor inter-
vention in conflict situations, when security and
political considerations tend to overshadow the
development ones.
One aspect of this problem is the marked differ-
ence in organizational cultures of various govern-
ment departments, which include attitudes toward
authority and decision-making styles.12 This is
especially evident when taking account of military
and civilian operations. In military settings, deci-
sions are often taken in a hierarchical manner with
finite deadlines and relatively clear rules of engage-
ment guiding the military structure. Conversely,
civilian operations are usually decentralized within
a relatively horizontal structure.13 If these differ-
ences are not addressed early in the engagement
process, they can lessen the effectiveness of peace-
building processes.
Fourth, the WOG approach demands a high level
of coordination between government institutions
for an extended period of time. This means that the
creation of a more permanent coordinating mecha-
nism/body might prove necessary to deal with the
challenges at hand, but a new institution might be
perceived as a threat by the existing institutions
in terms of competencies and financial resources,
and consequently a source of competition and envy
rather than cooperation.14
In spite of all these challenges, the lessons learned
from transatlantic donors’ military interventions
in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan — where
the U.S. and U.K. forces had been unable to stabilize
these countries — supported the emerging con-
sensus in the international community about the
need to move toward a WOG approach to peace-
building. Therefore, this section reviews the policies
of the transatlantic donors to assess their respective
WOG approaches and the extent to which they have
been incorporated in their peace-building agendas.
As the analysis will show, changes taking place
have been institutional on the one hand, involv-
ing the introduction of coordinating mechanisms
and bodies, and on the other hand, policy-related
when one prevailing peace-building dimension
has been infused by other dimensions to reflect the
WOG approach. These changes have mainly taken
place during the past two decades and reflected
their national, regional, and global concerns. The
dramatic events of September 11, 2001, have been a
highly influential factor in spurring the development
of WOG approaches to managing fragile states.
2.2 The United States
Several observers of U.S. foreign policy have
pointed out that this policy has been largely influ-
enced by U.S. national security concerns, which
have not been sufficiently integrated with the U.S.
political and long-term developmental goals.15 At
the same time, the United States tends to put little
emphasis on harmonizing its policies and actions
with those of other donors,16 and seems to have a
preference for initiating and leading peace-building
actions, which is understandable in view of its mili-
tary, political, and economic power. Even though
these observations are to a large extent still valid
today, the U.S. government has made several efforts
to apply the WOG approach to its dealings with
conflict and fragile states in terms of policy coher-
ence and intra-governmental cooperation.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
The policy shift toward applying a comprehensive
approach to fragile states in U.S. foreign policy has
been reflected in a series of national policy docu-
ments that have, since 2001, reflected the acknowl-
edged linkages between security, political, and
diplomatic objectives, and development/humani-
tarian objectives. For example, the 2002 National
Security Strategy (NSS)17 identified weak and The U.S.
failed states as the central threat to global security government has
emanating from the developing world, recogniz- made several
ing the importance of preventative measures and efforts to apply
development for ensuring U.S. security interests.
the WOG approach
This position subsequently resulted in the increased
to its dealings
flows of security, developmental, and humanitar-
ian assistance to many African countries, with a
with conflict and
stated overriding objective to avert the threat of fragile states in
terrorism.18 terms of policy
coherence and
Furthermore, the follow-up 2006 U.S. NSS19 set out intra-governmental
nine essential tasks for the U.S. government to meet cooperation.
national security challenges. The implementation
of these tasks clearly requires a combination of dip-
lomatic, development, and military foreign policy
tools. At the same time, the strategy addresses three
levels of engagement for dealing with regional con-
flicts: conflict prevention and resolution, conflict
intervention, and post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction.20 In this way, NSS provides a pos-
sible broad policy framework for the application of
WOG approach to peace-building.
Building on the 2006 NSS, the 2008 National
Defense Strategy21 identifies the WOG approach
as a way of achieving national defense objectives
while stressing that such an approach is only possible
when every government department and agency
understands the core competencies, roles, missions,
and capabilities of its partners. This is based on a
recognition that long-term military success includes
economic development, institution-building, the
rule of law, internal reconciliation, good gover-
nance, providing basic services to people, and
training and equipping indigenous military and
9
police forces. Similar positions have been expressed
in the 2008 U.S. Army doctrine for operating in
fragile states22 and the recent Obama administration
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.23
This move toward greater policy coherence and
WOG approach in U.S. foreign policy was reiterated
by the then-U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza
Rice, who promoted the idea of “Transformational
Diplomacy” in her 2006 speech by stating: “In
this world, it is impossible to draw neat, clear
lines between our security interests, our develop-
ment efforts, and our democratic ideas. American
diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these
goals together.”24 Transformational Diplomacy
subsequently crystallized around two documents,
namely a Strategic Plan prepared jointly by the
Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and a
USAID Policy Framework.25
Both documents are anchored in the NSS; the
Strategic Plan 2007–2012 builds on both 2006 NSS
pillars — promoting freedom, justice, and human
dignity, and confronting the challenges of our time
by leading a growing community of democra-
cies — and puts forward a series of DOS/USAID
strategic goals, five of which correspond to the
objectives of the Foreign Assistance Framework,26
namely Peace and Security, Governing Justly and
Democratically, Investing in People, Economic
Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance. It further
links its strategic goals to NSS tasks, and indicates
potential partners for their implementation, includ-
ing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).27
Although the above-mentioned policy documents
cover the main dimensions of peace-building, they
do not explicitly refer to U.S. peace-building activi-
ties. At the same time, the U.S. government has so
far not rallied its policies and resources in sup-
port of a single peace-building strategy that would
10 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
comprehensively reflect the WOG approach but
has instead focused on post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and stabilization and support for democracy as
the ultimate objectives of the U.S. engagements in
fragile states.28
A policy document that closely resembles such a
strategy is the USAID 2006 Policy Framework for
Bilateral Foreign Aid, which covers the strength-
ening of fragile states as one of its core objectives.
This is to be attempted by enhancing stability in
political, economic, and social arenas; improving
security; advancing reforms that address the drivers
of fragility; and developing capacity of essential
institutions and basic infrastructure. In this way,
it builds on USAID’s Fragile States Strategy from
2005, which aims at improving the U.S. response
to this category of states by strengthening effective
coordination across the U.S. government approach
when engaged in fragile states and (post-)conflict
situations. The strategy was an attempt to ensure
that development, diplomatic, and security efforts
are mutually reinforcing, thus integrating USAID’s
assets with those of the DOS and DOD, among
others.29
This rebalancing of U.S. foreign policy tools by
seeking to enhance the role of development and
humanitarian assistance was reflected in some
institutional changes in the U.S. government. The
second Bush administration sought to reform the
U.S. development assistance system through the
“F Process.” This process created a new post of the
Director of Foreign Assistance within the DOS,
who is also the administrator of USAID, overseeing
the USAID programs and DOS aid-related work,
thus providing a link between the two institutions.
The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the
DOS in 2004 is also an indicator of the increased
awareness of the relevance of a more coordinated
U.S. government response to post-conflict and
stabilization efforts. Initially, the office had quite
an extensive mandate on the basis of the National
Security Presidential Directive 44 from December
2005, but it failed to obtain sufficient authority,
funding, and respect of the relevant government
institutions to carry it out.30 Consequently, its man-
date has been scaled down to building inter-agency
reconstruction and stabilization capacity, leading
integrated strategies on the basis of an Inter-Agency
Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), and
deploying civilian missions to the field, also from
a Civilian Response Corps (CRC). To address the
problem of inadequate financial resources, Section
1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act
provides funding for improving U.S. capacity and
inter-agency coordination for immediate stability,
security, or reconstruction assistance programs for
unstable countries.31
Other institutional “mechanisms” that seek to
improve cross-government coordination in dealing
with peace-building activities include several “liai-
son bodies,” such as the DOS Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs as a link to the DOD, and the
DOD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs for liaising with
other government institutions. A similar role within
USAID is undertaken by its Office of Military
Affairs, situated within the Bureau for Democracy,
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance. The inter-
departmental and agency policy coordination at
the highest level is undertaken within the National
Security Council (NSC), which is the U.S. presi-
dent’s principal advisory body on national security
and foreign policy matters, and is composed of
his senior national security advisers and cabinet
officials.
This brief overview highlights the progress of the
U.S. government in terms of providing a coherent
policy and institutional framework to develop its
WOG approach to peace-building. Despite this
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
notable progress, the challenges remain, the main
one being the absence of a truly comprehensive
policy framework/strategy to encompass the rel-
evant policies, tools, and actors to mainstream the
WOG approach in peace-building activities of the
U.S. government.
Another challenge at hand is the relatively
The challenges
prominent role of the DOD and national security
remain, the main
concerns in U.S. foreign policy that, according to
government sources, has created tensions between
one being the
absence of a truly
the DOD, DOS, and USAID, and between the
U.S. development, diplomacy, and security objec- comprehensive
tives at the same time. This role has not only been policy framework/
enhanced due to U.S. national security concerns, strategy to
but also due to the Pentagon’s frustration over encompass the
delays in establishing the necessary civilian capa- relevant policies,
bilities for post-conflict reconstruction and stabili- tools, and actors
zation, for example.32 to mainstream the
WOG approach
Therefore, further progress needs to be made in
terms of increased coherence between the U.S. in peace-building
security policy and commitment to promoting activities of the
good governance and democracy, human rights, U.S. government.
and poverty-reduction. Special attention needs to
be accorded to any reluctance in this regard, since
government sources confirm that some senior U.S.
military officers do not favor the recent changes
in terms of applying of the WOG approach in U.S.
foreign policy.
In addition, crossing the civilian-military divide
is another challenging task at hand. For example,
the U.S. defense framework policy documents
highlight the need for the WOG approach in
policy implementation, and the cooperation with
other government departments and agencies, but
they hardly elaborate on this need. Some observ-
ers have further noted the mismatch between the
authorities and resources for DOD on one hand
and DOS/USAID on the other for implementing
policies. Consequently, DOD has extended its
11
domain to compensate for insufficient perfor-
mance by civilian institutions.33
The other side of this coin is, as some have argued,
the erosion of USAID’s budgeting role and its
policy planning capacity, and degradation of
development in U.S. foreign policy as a result of the
“F process,” ironically at a time when U.S. foreign
aid was in fact increasing.34 While recognizing the
need for multiple U.S. agencies working together
on development problems, Senator Richard Lugar
(R-IN) recently expressed concerns about the WOG
approach being used to redefine development as a
series of technical decisions and devalue the disci-
pline of development.35
Another challenge at hand is fragmentation of
U.S. government initiatives and programs related
to development and other assistance. Although
the Director of Foreign Assistance/Administrator
of USAID has authority over all aid programs of
USAID and DOS, other foreign assistance pro-
grams remain outside the director’s budgetary
authority, including those undertaken by DOD.36
However, this situation might improve in the
future after the completion of two key initia-
tives. In September 2009, President Obama
signed a Presidential Study Directive on Global
Development Policy, which provides the basis for
an extensive review of U.S. development efforts, and
is currently carried out by numerous government
agencies with the National Security Council in the
lead. Moreover, the DOS announced a Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review in June 2009
to assess diplomatic and developmental efforts of
the DOS and USAID. These reviews, together with
the expected Obama administration’s first NSS,
could provide a good starting point for discus-
sion about the possible ways of improving the U.S.
WOG approach to address the acute problems of
fragility and underdevelopment of African states,
12 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
and underpin a possible future coherent approach
to peace-building.
Other initiatives that could address the above chal-
lenges are President Obama’s proposal to establish a
Mediation Unit within the DOS, which would bring
together experienced diplomats and other practitio-
ners to develop an inventory of peace-building best
practices and lessons learned; and the DOD’s recent
proposal on a new model of shared responsibil-
ity and pooled resources for cross-cutting security
challenges involving DOD and DOS,37 modeled on
the U.K.’s Conflict Prevention Pool (see below).
2.3 The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has long been seen by many
policy analysts and donors as one of the models for
bilateral donor assistance in applying a relatively
coherent WOG approach. The U.K. government’s
policy started shifting toward a greater coherence
in dealing with failed and fragile states in the late
1990s with the establishment of the Department
for International Development (DFID) as a min-
istry in 1997 to enhance the foreign policy role of
development and the fight against poverty, and the
publication of the 1998 Strategic Defense Review,
which was at the time praised for bringing foreign
and defense policy together in a clear, coherent, and
affordable fashion.38
As was the case in the United States, the foreign
policy of the U.K. Labour government under-
went some changes after the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001. Prior to the attacks,
Whitehall saw its primary security concern
residing in Europe and the NATO alliance, and
any instability outside Europe was perceived as
an indirect threat. Since 2001, the U.K. govern-
ment has been increasingly focusing on the
need to address failed and fragile states,39 also
to pursue its counter-terrorism objectives.
Despite this security concern, the U.K. govern-
ment tried to mainstream the WOG approach in its
foreign policy across its relevant departments. The
Ministry of Defense (MOD) issued a Strategic
Defense Review: A New Chapter in 2002,40 which
reflected cross-government thinking and initiatives
at the time. Mainly focusing on the threat of ter-
rorism, the paper states, among other things, that:
“The counter-terrorist strategy that is most likely
to prove successful over the long term is one that
addresses the symptoms and causes of terrorism in
a holistic way, using political, diplomatic, humani-
tarian, economic, financial, intelligence, and law
enforcement, as well as military measures.”41 In the
same year, the International Development Act
ring-fenced development from other U.K. foreign
policy priorities, which meant that development
assistance could not be used to fund programs
whose primary aim was to address security threats
to the United Kingdom,42 but could support pro-
grams that enhance the human security of people
in developing countries.43
The U.K. government’s policy on peace-building
is rooted in a series of so-called Public Service
Agreements (PSAs), which were introduced in
1998. The current set outlines Whitehall’s key
priorities in the 2008-2011 period. Two of them
are particularly relevant for the U.K.’s engagement
in fragile and conflict situations, namely PSA 29
on reducing poverty through the achievement of
MDGs,44 and PSA 30 on reducing the impact of
conflicts.45 Among other things, these two PSAs:
1. outline the strategic approach regarding the
U.K.’s engagement in conflict situations, covering
conflict prevention, conflict management,
stabilization, and consolidation of peace;
2. establish links between this approach and the
United Kingdom’s efforts to help build long-
term, sustainable development;
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
3. outline the actions the U.K. government is
planning to undertake to help poor and fragile
states, such as by providing humanitarian aid,
helping address the causes of fragility, and
improve governance and access to quality basic
services;
4. make an explicit commitment to developing a
DFID’s most
WOG approach to conflict, and strengthening
recent policy
the U.K. government’s policy coherence.
document entitled
Therefore, these PSAs provide the policy frame- Eliminating
work for the three main U.K. government’s depart- World Poverty:
ments that have been involved in peace-building Building our
activities, namely the Foreign and Commonwealth
Common Future
Office, DFID, and MOD. from 200946
As the lead department responsible for the deliv- addresses the link
ery of PSA 30 commitments, the Foreign and between various
Commonwealth Office (FCO) adopted its own dimensions of
Strategic Framework and Departmental Strategic peace-building.
Objectives (DSOs) for the period 2008/09 to Among other
2010/11. The policy goal of preventing and resolv- things, the
ing conflicts (DSO 6) covers a series of steps to document
achieve better early warning and early action
stresses
to prevent conflicts; better integrated national prevention as
approach to peace operations, stabilization, and
the best way to
post-conflict peace-building; improved capability to
stem conflicts
tackle the root causes of conflicts, etc.
and create the
With regard to the development dimension conditions for
of peace-building, DFID’s most recent policy sustained growth.
document entitled Eliminating World Poverty:
Building our Common Future from 200946
addresses the link between various dimensions of
peace-building. Among other things, the document
stresses prevention as the best way to stem conflicts
and create the conditions for sustained growth. This
is done by building states that are capable of deliv-
ering basic services in an effective and fair manner,
and are accountable and responsive to its citizens.
By bringing together development, defense, and
diplomacy and working more effectively across
13
 government departments, the U.K. government
aims at forging a comprehensive approach toward
peace(-building) and helping build peaceful states
and societies, making a foundation for sustainable
development.47 In this regard, the United Kingdom
plans to prioritize support for inclusive political
settlements, help address the underlying causes of
The United conflict and fragility, enable states to carry out core
Kingdom’s WOG functions essential for state survival, and respond to
approach to public expectations.48
peace-building is
The U.K. WOG approach was also reflected in
further underlined
the government’s first U.K. National Security
by two inter- Strategy,49 released in 2008, which basically reflects
departmental the evolution and prioritization of this approach
financing in dealing with security threats, including failed
instruments, and fragile states. Among other things, the U.K.
namely the NSS states that the most effective way of reducing
Conflict threats posed by failed states is to strengthen their
Prevention Pool governance, development, and security capabili-
(CPP) and the ties, while at the same time improve the capacity
Stabilization of the international community to stop states such
Aid Fund. as Afghanistan and Somalia from degenerating
further.
At the institutional level, a number of initiatives
have been introduced to ensure greater intra-
government coordination regarding peace-building
activities. To outline the institutional setup for pol-
icy coordination, the PSA 30 identifies the Cabinet
Office as providing leadership in applying the
strategic approach to conflict and insecure environ-
ments, while relevant Cabinet Committees can help
resolve inter-department disputes when they arise.
While the FCO is the lead government depart-
ment for implementing PSA 30, DFID serves as the
main link between the latter PSA and the PSA on
International Poverty Reduction, while MOD as
a “delivery partner” is entrusted with developing
military forces that can deploy quickly and effec-
tively in a range of situations where conflicts have
already broken out.
14 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
The MOD is also instrumental in clarifying the
roles and tasks played by U.K. military and civilian
resources in the various stages of conflict. In doing
that, the MOD works with the Stabilization Unit,
which succeeded the Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Unit, jointly established in 2004 by DFID, FCO, and
MOD. Initial expectations about the Unit’s role in
crisis situations of outlining a strategy and running
operations were replaced by a less-ambitious man-
date of developing a stability assessment framework
and a joint civilian-military doctrine as well as
helping to create a pool of civilian experts for post-
conflict reconstruction and stabilization missions.
Two achievements can be mentioned in relation
to the Stabilization Unit’s activities, namely the
improvement in staffing coherence of post-conflict
civilian missions and in bridging the civil-military
divide in policy implementation.50
To better support the coordination between the
above-mentioned government institutions, each
of them has established one or more liaison sec-
tions within their respective departments that
cover specific areas. For example, DFID’s Conflict,
Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE)
has often provided leadership on peace-building
with the inputs of conflict advisers.51 Similar tasks
are undertaken by FCO’s Conflict Issues Group,
which manages the department’s involvement with
the Conflict Prevention Pool and other programs
with FCO funds, but also serves as a liaison with
DFID, MOD, and the Stabilization Unit.52
The United Kingdom’s WOG approach to peace-
building is further underlined by two inter-
departmental financing instruments, namely
the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and the
Stabilization Aid Fund. The first is focused mainly
on conflict-prevention activities and the lat-
ter on funding civil conflict stabilization activi-
ties in insecure environments. The Stabilization
Aid Fund is managed by the Stabilization
Unit on behalf of FCO, DFID, and MOD.
Two CPPs were established in 2001 as a mechanism
to increase cooperation between DFID, the FCO,
and the MOD, and to help reduce and prevent
conflicts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Initially,
the Africa CPP was established as a separate
instrument, but later it became a program within
the Global CPP. The CPP is seen as an instrument
for long-term conflict prevention through joint
analysis, financing, and coordination in areas where
involvement of the three departments can add
value to U.K. peace-building. The CPP is viewed by
analysts and political strategists alike as a success-
ful concept for policy coherence, in part because
the joint resources are substantial enough to induce
cooperation, but not large enough to represent
competition for the existing institutions.53 At the
same time, as some observers have pointed out, the
CPP has so far failed in creating joint strategies and
programming to improve the use of scarce available
funds since these are being used for the implemen-
tation of departmental plans and components.54
Although the U.K. government is often praised
for making significant progress toward a WOG
approach to peace-building, there is still room for
improvement. Senior officials in FCO, MOD, and
DFID seem to agree that a common approach is the
most sensible route to adopt — both quality- and
time-wise. However, there seems to be insufficient
consensus among the government departments
on national objectives and the means to achiev-
ing them. Furthermore, properly identifying and
designing policies and approaches on the basis of
departments’ priorities, as well as the operation-
alization and implementation of these policies,
remains a challenge. In this regard, it has been
suggested by government officials that external
expertise might be useful to conceive appropriate
and well-informed strategies since the departments
often work under country expertise/knowledge and
time constraints.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
Furthermore, as the U.K. government has a solid
foundation to build on in terms of peace-building
policy framework, it needs to adapt and adjust the
framework in line with lessons learned in the field
and ensure the continuous support for the WOG
approach in this area. More work is also needed
on aligning the FCO, DFID, and MOD’s under-
standings of fragile states and national security More work is
interests with the goal of supporting sustainable also needed on
development in fragile states, and their analytical aligning the FCO,
frameworks.55 The Cabinet Office could increase DFID, and MOD’s
its efforts to help solving these and other problems
understandings of
through joint analysis or assessment framework,
fragile states and
centrally held funding for joint projects, defining
joint outcomes, and the like.
national security
interests with the
2.4 The European Union goal of supporting
sustainable
The development of EU policies and structures
development in
related to peace-building can be traced to the early
fragile states, and
1990s, when the Maastricht Treaty came into
their analytical
force. This treaty established the so-called three-
pillar system of the EU, representing the European frameworks.55
Communities (pillar one, covering economic
integration policies), the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) (pillar two), and coop-
eration in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA)56 (pillar three). While the first pillar applied
the so-called Community method of decision-
making,57 the second and third pillars followed the
inter-governmental decision-making processes,
where consensus between the member states is
necessary to reach an agreement. As a result, the
EU’s foreign and security policy decision-making
faced challenges not unlike those revealed in other
international governmental organizations.
The three-pillar structure of the EU, which
was later abolished with the Lisbon Treaty
(2007/2009), gave the EU a single legal personal-
ity and had important implications for the EU’s
WOG approach to peace-building, some of which
15
are still relevant today. This is true both in terms
of policy coordination and cooperation between
various EU institutions. First, development policy
is considered to be a “shared competency” of the
EU and its members, and is thus subject to majority
voting in the Council. However, CFSP is subject to
specific rules and procedures, including unanimous
decision-making in the European Council (Heads
of States and Governments) and the Council
(Ministers). Moreover, the implementation of the
CFSP is entrusted with EU member states and
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, a function established
by the Lisbon Treaty. Unlike development policy,
CFSP is not subject to regulation by legislative
acts,58 although member states need to comply with
EU actions in this area once decisions are made.
Second, apart from its legislative and policy-
initiating function to attain the EU objectives, the
European Commission has also “co-responsibility”
for putting the EU’s common policies into prac-
tice and managing the EU budget and programs.
This responsibility is considerably reduced when it
comes to CFSP, although the Commission’s work
covers certain areas of the EU’s external action
related to peace-building. It involves at least three
Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) deal-
ing with development, external relations, and the
delivery of aid.59
This EU institutional set-up means that coordina-
tion of EU policies aimed at peace-building requires
at least coordination within the Commission
(intra-institutional coordination), and between the
Commission and inter-governmental EU institu-
tions such as the European Council (inter-institu-
tional coordination). In addition, since none of the
policies related to peace-building (development,
foreign policy, and security) are considered to be
the exclusive competency of the EU, these policies
need to be coordinated with policies and strategies
16 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
of the member states to ensure harmonization, or at
least complementarity, of approaches.
Regarding the challenges of the EU intra- and inter-
institutional coordination, some observers have
noted that within the Commission, career con-
siderations and jealousy between DGs, as well as
turf battles between the Commissioners and their
cabinets on the one hand, and competency battles
between European Commission and the Council
on the other, contribute to a considerable loss of
policy synergies.60 Moreover, EU member states
themselves have in the past expressed concerns
about insufficient coordination between long-term
developmental assistance programs and actions
taken under CFSP.
The Lisbon Treaty seems to aim at overcoming
the distinction between the Community and the
inter-governmental dimension of EU foreign policy,
and at providing greater foreign and defense policy
coherence. In this regard the so-called “double-
hatting” of the new High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
who combines the functions of the former High
Representative for CFSP, and of the Vice-President
of the Commission in charge of External Relations,
seems a promising development.61 Nevertheless,
some observers have pointed out that the relations
between this new position and the President of
the Commission have not been regulated in detail,
which allows for some flexibility but potentially can
also lead to tension.62
In terms of policy coherence, the challenges faced
at the EU level reflect the challenges of inter-insti-
tutional cooperation in member states. While con-
flict prevention and post-conflict transition phases
of peace-building have been mainly dealt with in
Development DG, the actions related to crisis man-
agement and restoration of peace have been under-
taken under CFSP. To deal with policy coherence
issues, which also relate to peace-building activi-
ties, several documents have been adopted at the
EU level to address the need for complementarity
of development and security agendas, with the
common aim of creating a secure environment and
breaking the vicious cycles of poverty, war, environ-
mental degradation, and failing economic, social,
and political structures,63 and for an integrated
approach to conflict prevention and crisis manage-
ment, as well as to other security threats, by using a
mixture of civilian and military instruments.64
More recently, the European Commission exam-
ined the EU progress in achieving policy coherence
and made some suggestions on how to improve “the
whole-of-the-Union” approach to development.65
It has noted, first, the progress being made toward
achieving better policy coherence by strengthening
the links between development and other policies
that impact development objectives, and second,
the remaining challenges, such as the fact that dif-
ficulties encountered at the national level spill over
and compound at the EU level, diverging interests
that often obstruct consistent positions, and the
inconsistency in the EU’s performance in various
policy areas. To improve this situation, member
states and the European Commission intend to use
existing tools to improve policy coherence, includ-
ing inter-service groups and consultations and
impact assessments.
The EU’s approach to peace-building is essentially
based on an understanding of the complex nature
of the threats to security and stability that cannot
be tackled by military means only, but can provoke
violent or armed responses nevertheless, and about
the role of development cooperation in address-
ing many root causes of conflict directly through
the reduction of poverty. This thinking is also
reflected in the main EU partnership agreement
with developing states — the Cotonou Agreement
(2000/2003)66 — valid for the period 2000-2020,
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
which aims to establish a comprehensive partner-
ship with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP)
states based on development, economic, and trade
cooperation. It includes an important political
dimension covering diverse issues such as good
governance, arms trade, migration, the respect for
human rights, rule of law and democratic princi-
ples, and peace-building. Despite its developmental The EU’s approach
focus, the Cotonou Agreement provides for enough to peace-building
flexibility in the allocation of EU resources to be is essentially
used for the promotion of peace and the managing based on an
and settling of conflicts, including post-conflict
understanding
support. The main financial instrument for the
of the complex
implementation of the Cotonou Agreement is the
European Development Fund (EDF).
nature of the
threats to security
While the EU has a strong preference for multi- and stability
lateral cooperation in undertaking various peace- that cannot be
building activities, especially in terms of military tackled by military
involvement, it has made considerable efforts to means only.
develop its permanent political and military struc-
tures to deal with crises and conflict management.
This transformation was also encouraged by the
EU’s concerns about terrorist activities around the
world in view of the September 11, 2001, events.
The evolution of the security component in the EU
peace-building approach was undertaken in the
framework of the European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP), a component of the CFSP. With the
Amsterdam Treaty (1997/1999) several tasks were
incorporated into this policy, including humani-
tarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and
combat-force tasks in crisis management, includ-
ing peace-making. The latest reforms introduced
with the Lisbon Treaty regarding ESDP include
renaming this policy as the Common Security and
Defense Policy (CSDP), providing the EU with an
operational capacity drawing on civil and military
assets and using the capabilities provided by EU
members, and the expansion of ESDP tasks to
include joint disarmament operations, military
17
 advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, and main obstacle to a greater EU policy coherence still
post-conflict stabilization.67 At the same time, the lies in the fundamental separation between inter-
EU set out on a course of developing its military governmental nature of CFSP and the European
capabilities in 1999, reaching full operational capa- Commission’s collaborative perception of develop-
bility to conduct two concurrent rapid-response ment work.68 In addition to its “bureaucratic com-
operations of the size of a “Battlegroup” (1,500 plexity,” the European Commission would benefit
men) in 2007, along with civilian capabilities for from further strengthening of inter-DG coordina-
The main obstacle crisis management as a tool of ESDP in four prior- tion on competing policies in order to effectively
to a greater EU ity areas: police, strengthening the rule of law and deal with the differences.69 Another challenge the
policy coherence civilian administration, and civil protection. EU faces is the absence of a single approach to
still lies in the peace-building, which would combine the existing
Despite the above-mentioned developments in instruments of diplomacy, security, and develop-
fundamental
terms of combining the diplomacy, development, ment to achieve the synergies of such an approach.
separation and security agendas and policy commitments, the
between inter-
governmental
nature of CFSP
and the European
Commission’s
collaborative
perception of
development work.

18 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010

3 Transatlantic Donor Policies
Toward an Enhanced Inter-Government
Cooperation
Based on the analysis of the WOG approaches to
peace-building that have evolved in all three donors
under review over the past decade or so, a general
conclusion can be made that these approaches
remain works in progress. The broadening of
transatlantic donors’ peace-building agendas has
had an important implication for their engagement
in fragile environments in terms of duration and
scope of engagement.
First, the broadening of peace-building in fragile
states to include objectives such as security sector
reform, rule of law, improved governance, democ-
ratization, sustainable development, basic service
delivery, and the like implies the application of a
wide range of tools, mechanisms, and policies that
can pose a serious challenge for a single donor in
terms of financial and human resources. Second,
the application of a WOG approach to peace-
building includes a combination of immediate,
short-term, and medium- to long-term measures
that could again pose a significant challenge for one
donor to face. In this way, the broadening of the
peace-building agenda, and the coinciding need for
a WOG approach encourages donors to re-evaluate
their cooperation strategies and find allies to
undertake the growing number of peace-building
tasks, share the financial and personnel “burden” of
engagement, and avoid wastage due to duplication
of efforts.
The steps toward mainstreaming the WOG
approach in peace-building activities and accom-
panying challenges have therefore created some
opportunities for increased donor cooperation,
although the remaining obstacles are still too high
to encourage any relevant coordination of engage-
ment policies between transatlantic donors. The
reasons for that are numerous and only a few will
be pointed out here.
For example, donors may approach work in fragile
states from very different perspectives, ranging
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
from counter-terrorism to governance, conflict
prevention and peace-building, trade promotion or
development cooperation.
Likewise, donors’ constitutional and institutional
contexts influence the manner and level of involve-
ment in fragile states. For example, the type of
political leadership, the position of departments
Transatlantic
and agencies within the government system, their
donors have
different rules and regulations, and the overall
political and institutional set-up in donor countries
highlighted
can influence the potential for cooperation. cooperation with
other donors
In spite of the above challenges, transatlantic and international
donors have highlighted cooperation with other organizations as
donors and international organizations as key to key to achieving
achieving their foreign policy objectives and have their foreign policy
made some attempts at better coordination of
objectives and
their peace-building policies. For example, they
have made some
have applied some of the coordinating mecha-
nisms suggested by the OECD Principles for Good
attempts at better
coordination
International Engagements in Fragile States and
Situations70 to support their engagement in peace- of their peace-
building processes. building policies.
The European Consensus on Development has
stressed a better donor coordination and comple-
mentarity through joint multi-year programs and
common implementation mechanisms as one of the
EU’s commitments in an attempt to prevent dupli-
cation of efforts and to maximize the impact and
effectiveness of global aid.71 Similarly, the European
Security Strategy recognizes that the EU cannot deal
with security threats in isolation, so it needs to pur-
sue its objectives through multilateral cooperation
in international organizations and through partner-
ships with key actors. The EU sees the transatlantic,
balanced, and effective partnership with the United
States as instrumental in this regard.
In March 2008, the EU and the U.S. govern-
ment established a foundation for cooperation
in civilian aspects of crisis management and
19
 conflict prevention through a joint Work Plan.
This cooperation consists of senior-level consulta-
tions, the sharing of information and experiences,
cross-training of civilian personnel, and promoting
development of shared international concepts and
terminology, among other things. What seems to be
especially relevant for the cooperation in this field
As an EU member, is the planned coordination of civilian responses to
the United ongoing crises through detailed consultations and
Kingdom is the identification of priority areas on which the
also committed bilateral efforts should focus.72
to supporting
As an EU member, the United Kingdom is also
international committed to supporting international institutions
institutions and and a rules-based approach to international affairs
a rules-based and peace-building issues while actively support-
approach to ing a wide range of reforms to build effective global
international institutions equipped with the capabilities they
affairs and peace- need to perform their function. In addition, the
building issues United Kingdom continues to rely on and build
while actively upon close bilateral relationships with key coun-
supporting a wide tries; its partnership with the United States is its
range of reforms most important bilateral relationship, central to
U.K. national security.73
to build effective
global institutions As co-legislator and co-decision-maker, the United
equipped with the Kingdom is at the same time in a position to
capabilities they influence the EU peace-building policy. The U.K.
need to perform government is working toward better coherence
their function. among and the employment of available EU tools
for peace-building efforts. It is also supporting the
effective crisis response and preparedness through
the Instrument for Stability (IfS), and through
more conflict-sensitive country programming, for
example, and deployment of ESDP missions where
they can have maximum impact.74 Despite the U.K.
government’s support for the EU’s actions, it often
acts bilaterally to engage in peace-building activi-
ties, as do many other EU member states.
20 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
Despite this general inclination to cooperate, there
are differences between donors as to how they see
this cooperation taking place. For example, the
White House, guided by U.S. national security
considerations, prefers to take the lead in joint
initiatives in support of its foreign policy objectives,
or act unilaterally altogether, while EU actions in
the field of security are linked to the UN objectives.
Furthermore, the United States still sees NATO as
the link to “the old continent’s” security architec-
ture, and cooperation with reliable partners, such
as the United Kingdom, as a priority. Although
observers have noted that there have been some
successful cases of U.S.-EU collaboration in the
Balkans, and that some degree of cooperation exists
in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
it is difficult to find signs of genuine collaboration
despite little differences in the stated general objec-
tives of both transatlantic donors.75
This can be partially explained by the U.S. govern-
ment’s problems in applying the WOG approach
to peace-building on one hand, and on the other
hand, the EU’s challenging task of double coordina-
tion — between its members, since many of them
are important bilateral donors, and with other
donors, states, and international organizations. In
addition, the Europeans have a distinctive approach
to foreign and security policy that may at times
seem at odds with an American approach.76
What follows is an illustration of how the trans-
atlantic donors’ WOG approaches played out in
peace-building processes in Sudan. Furthermore,
some joint peace initiatives of the transatlantic
donors are briefly outlined to highlight some of the
successes and challenges of donor cooperation in
that country.
4 From Policy to Practice: The
Application of “The Whole-of-
Government” Approach in Sudan
4.1 Introduction
Perhaps more than any other country in sub-
Saharan Africa, Sudan has been the focus of greater
transatlantic cooperation and effort in recent years.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the
EU, among others, have all devoted considerable
policy and resource attention on both the North-
South and the Darfur peace-building processes.
This section therefore examines to what extent the
WOG approach is reflected in transatlantic donors’
Africa strategies, and Sudan strategies in particular,
and which government institutions and financial
mechanisms are relevant for their implementation.
Furthermore, the recent dynamics of the United
States’, the United Kingdom’s, and the EU’s individual
or joint involvement in Sudan will be examined,
focusing on the common features of engagement
approaches on one hand, and barriers to the part-
ners’ cooperation on the other. This section will
hopefully demonstrate that despite differences in
their approaches, the transatlantic donors seem to
be in the process of aligning their efforts on the basis
of their experiences with peace processes in African
states, and Sudan in particular, although the main
features seem to remain unchanged.
4.2 The U.S. Involvement in Sudan
“In Africa, the promise and opportunity sit side by
side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This
situation threatens both the core value of the U.S.
government — preserving human dignity — and
our strategic priority — combating global terror.”
This statement from the 2002 NSS basically sums
up the U.S. policy toward Africa since 2001. In
this period, two notable developments are worth
mentioning. First, the tackling of the African fragile
states’ problems received greater attention, thus
reinforcing the strategic significance of Africa in
U.S. foreign policy; and, second, an increased U.S.
interest in development as a foreign policy tool
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
seemed promising since underdevelopment and
poverty are frequently cited as a root cause of many
African conflicts.
Although U.S. policy in Africa is often criticized for
lacking an integrated engagement strategy, and for
having numerous institutionally fragmented initia-
tives, it has consistently supported the strengthen-
ing of African states’ capabilities to successfully deal
with traditional/military security threats stemming
from fragile environments, including the threat of
terrorism.
The eradication of terrorism seemed to have been
one of the main concerns in relation to the U.S.
involvement in Sudan since the early 1990s, when
the nature of the Sudanese regime at the time,
dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF)
with extremist views, led the U.S. government to
view Sudan as a potential source of terrorist threats.
However, during the Clinton administration, U.S.
foreign policy toward Sudan endured contrasting
pressures from within the government, especially
after 1995. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy in
Sudan between 1995 and 2000 was one of conflict
management, combined with development assis-
tance, hard conditionality, and unilateral anti-ter-
rorist measures.77
After 2001, U.S. peace-building efforts in Sudan
included mediation, which successfully resulted in
the 2005 Naivasha Agreement between the Arab
Sudanese government on the one hand and the
Christian/animist Sudanese People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM)/Army (SPLA) on the other.
Despite some concerns about the United States’
partiality on the part of the Sudanese government,
Washington continued to strengthen its commit-
ment to the solution of the Sudan question, includ-
ing deploying a U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan.
Apart from diplomatic initiatives, the U.S. govern-
ment used development assistance to further U.S.
21
 policy objectives in Sudan. As the importance of
a multidimensional approach to peace-building
was increasingly recognized in the post-September
11 period, development assistance was offered to
countries in sub-Saharan Africa with suspected
terrorist cells as a means to deter terrorism.78 As a
result, the United States increased its aid allocation
Since 2005, the to Sudan by almost 150 percent between 2001 and
U.S. government 2003. Since 2005, the U.S. government had pro-
had provided more vided more than $6 billion in assistance, addressing
than $6 billion humanitarian needs (including food), economic
in assistance, growth, (re-)building of infrastructure, and delivery
addressing of services such as health and education, financed
through USAID. Other projects, jointly funded by
humanitarian
USAID and DOS, included support for peace and
needs (including
security by strengthening the capacity of vari-
food), economic
ous local actors to address root causes of conflict
growth, (re) and engage in peace-building activities. The bulk
building of of these funds have been directed to the South,
infrastructure, Darfur, border areas, and Eastern Sudan.
and delivery of
services such Despite the increased levels of development
as health and assistance to Sudan over the past decade, security
concerns remain the dominant feature of the U.S.
education,
administrations. In October 2009, the present U.S.
financed through
administration unveiled its new Sudan strategy79
USAID.
that focuses on reinvigorating international sup-
port, critical to building peace and security in
Sudan. The strategy is the first White House policy
on Sudan that recognizes the links between the
Darfur question and the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the
south. In line with the security situation in Sudan,
the U.S. government has put forward three broad
strategic objectives, which are a reflection of U.S.
security and political concerns:
• helping to achieve a definitive end to conflict,
gross human rights abuses, and genocide in
Darfur by promoting a negotiated solution that
would address the underlying causes of the
conflict, strengthen initiatives for ending violent
conflict, and improve the humanitarian situation;
22 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
• supporting the implementation of the CPA —
including the holding of a 2011 referendum —
through addressing the unimplemented elements
of the Agreement, reinvigorating international
engagement, and promoting the development of
a post-2011 wealth-sharing agreement; and
• ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe
haven for terrorists.
While the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan plays the
leading role in pursuing the U.S. Sudan strategy, its
implementation is also pursued through coopera-
tion with partner states and other international
actors, such as the UN and the African Union
(AU).80
In implementing its Sudan strategy, the Obama
administration will build on the initiatives of previ-
ous administrations, such as the creation of DOD’s
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). This unified
combatant command, which was established in
2007, seeks to promote U.S. national security objec-
tives in Africa through working with African states
and (sub-)regional organizations to strengthen
stability. In this way, it supports the implementa-
tion of the first priority of Obama’s foreign policy
in Africa, namely providing security assistance to
achieve a peaceful African continent, based on sup-
port for African conflict resolution mechanisms,
conflict-mitigation capacities, and capabilities to
carry out peace support operations.81
At the same time, AFRICOM’s stated aim is to
promote the National Defense Strategy’s vision of
a WOG approach by working with other partners
in the U.S. government as well as international
partners. While AFRICOM is headed by a mili-
tary commander, the staff structure reflects this
vision, therefore including officials from DOD,
DOS, USAID, and other government agencies.
AFRICOM clearly highlights the importance of
security assistance for the pursuit of U.S. for-
eign policy objectives and an increased role of
non-military activities in DOD-sponsored initia-
tives, such as conflict-prevention and sustained sta-
bility, humanitarian assistance, and the fight against
infectious diseases, among other things.82
In Sudan, AFRICOM is involved in helping the
U.S. government to lead an international effort
to undertake security-sector reform in southern
Sudan by professionalizing the SPLM army and
increasing their defense capabilities in view of the
full implementation of the CPA. At the same time,
the U.S. Air Force AFRICOM component continues
to provide transport support to peacekeeping forces
destined for Darfur.
Despite these positive attempts at helping to resolve
Sudan’s impasse, Washington continues to face
several challenges that might affect its Sudan policy.
A former U.S. government official confirms that
the contradictions arising from U.S. foreign policy
in Sudan limit U.S. options for negotiating. If the
United States aspires to support the CPA to halt
the violence in Sudan while pursuing its counter-
terrorism agenda at the same time, this is bound to
create tensions with the Sudanese government as the
U.S. counter-terrorist stance is likely to be perceived
as anti-Muslim. Sources within the U.S. government
have also indicated that there are some tensions
between the Special Envoy to Sudan and the DOS
regarding how to engage with Khartoum. On the
one hand, DOS would like to see regime-change take
place in Sudan, since the Sudanese leadership has
already been indicted for crimes against humanity in
Darfur, whereas on the other hand the Office of the
Special Envoy to Sudan would like to negotiate with
the regime to achieve the cessation of violence and
make progress toward peace.
4.3 The U.K. Engagement in Sudan
The U.K.’s involvement in Sudan has been char-
acterized by strategic cooperation between DFID,
the MOD, and the FCO. There has been a fair
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
amount of interaction, coordination, information
sharing, and joint analysis. It can be argued that
the United Kingdom reinvigorated its engagement
in Sudan in early 2002, with the appointment of
a Special Representative in Sudan, and with the
establishment of the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit,
located within the FCO, with the support, but not
involvement, of the MOD. The Sudan Unit was
therefore formed to revive the U.K.’s engagement
in Sudan and give it a stronger inter-departmental
underpinning.
The Sudan Unit recommended the use of the
Africa CPP to fund the U.K. involvement in Sudan
— including the IGAD-led peace process and AU
deployment in Darfur — since it provided rapid
and flexible funding. The Sudan Unit has been the
main point of contact between the different govern-
ment departments, ensuring a close connection
between political priority assessments and spending
decisions. It complemented the role of the Africa
Greater Horn Department (the structure of DFID
has since changed; there are now two directorates:
East and Central Africa; and West and Southern
Africa), which concentrated on humanitarian assis-
tance, and the Department for Overseas Military
Aid/Defense Policy Directorate at the MOD. This
has led to a well-defined policy and implementa-
tion structure.83
In 2005, when DFID issued an engagement strat-
egy for Sudan, the U.K. government goals in Sudan
mainly covered reaching a just and lasting peace,
and laying foundations for achieving sustained
poverty reduction to reach Millenium Development
Goals (MDGs). To this end, the U.K. government
was planning to help:
• meet humanitarian, recovery, and reintegration
needs to benefit the poor;
• provide assistance to implement the peace
agreement by supporting demobilization and
reintegration of combatants and the like;
23
 • support the development of effective governance;
and
• support the development and implementation of
pro-poor policies.84
Since then, these objectives were fine-tuned and
elaborated to include the support for the implemen-
The EU’s current
tation of formal peace agreements — the CPA and
approach to
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). This included
conflict prevention,
the provision of the CPA on national elections that
management,
took place in April 2010, broader peace-building,
and resolution in
security sector reform (strengthening the police
Africa is reflected
and judiciary to promote the rule of law), especially
in its EU Strategy the transformation of SPLA into a professional
for Africa from army operating under civilian control, and the
2005,86 as well promotion of conflict-sensitive recovery and devel-
as in the Council opment. At the same time, the U.K. government is
Common Position trying to exert pressure on all parties in the Darfur
conflict to stop fighting and to work on establishing
on conflict
effective peace-keeping.
prevention,
management, To achieve the above ends, the U.K. government
and resolution provided $667 million in aid to Sudan between
from 2005. 2002 and 2007, and another $220 million in 2008-
09. This assistance was mainly delivered through
pooled international funding, such as MDTFs,
UN Common Humanitarian Fund, and the like.
The Africa CPP (now known only as the CPP)
was also used to fund programs in Sudan and the
Horn of Africa as a whole (around £7.5 million).85
The Stabilization Unit has also been involved with
Sudan in the past few years, supporting the Darfur
Dialogue and Consultations, with an aim to engage
civil society in a bottom-up peace-building process
through dialogue with local groups.
Despite the achieved levels of coordination between
the relevant government departments, there are
some recuring challenges that require reconcilia-
tion of different positions, mainly between the FCO
and DFID, at the Cabinet level. According to U.K.
government officials, the main problem seems to
24 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
be the nature of Sudan engagement strategy. While
DFID advocates apolitical engagement in Sudan,
FCO seems to be reluctant to deal with a regime
headed by a politician indicted by the International
Court of Justice. Furthermore, U.K. government
sources have indicated that the Sudan Unit, as the
driver of the U.K. Sudan policy, has faced chal-
lenges of coordination when engaging with other
transatlantic donors. These were at least two-fold:
there was no similar counterpart in the U.S. govern-
ment or in the EU institutional structure, and there
was an absence of unified position or strategy
regarding the engagement in Sudan.
4.4 The EU’s Sudan Engagement Policy
The EU’s current approach to conflict prevention,
management, and resolution in Africa is reflected in
its EU Strategy for Africa from 2005,86 as well as in
the Council Common Position on conflict preven-
tion, management, and resolution from 2005.87 The
EU Strategy for Africa outlines its response strategy
to Africa’s challenges, targeting three broad areas:
1. Peace, security and good governance, where
the EU aims to employ a wide range of actions,
such as the support for African peace operations
and a comprehensive approach to conflict
prevention, by addressing the root causes of
violent conflict. Moreover, the EU plans to
work toward building effective and credible
central government institutions, reinforcing
respect for human rights and democracy,
developing local capacity, and encouraging
the decentralization process.
2. Economic growth to contribute to the effective
reduction of poverty across Africa by supporting
macroeconomic stability and assisting in the
creation of integrated regional markets.
3. Social cohesion and environment, by
contributing to the establishment of social safety
 nets for the most vulnerable through supporting
the delivery of essential services for the poor,
and by supporting the effective management
of environmental diversity, the improvement
of sustainable land management to halt
desertification, and the like.
The 2005 Council Common Position88 reflects the
above strategy by prioritizing conflict prevention and
its mainstreaming within the EU’s Africa develop-
ment and trade policies, and by focusing on support-
ing African regional and sub-regional peace-building
arrangements and capabilities. At the same time, it
also allows for the potential deployment of EU and
member-states’ means for conflict prevention and
crisis management, following decision on a case-by-
case basis. The Common Position further reiterates
the complementarity of EU actions under CFSP, EU
Community instruments, and bilateral actions of EU
member states while highlighting the need for better
coordination between the EU and member states
in this field. It calls for better cooperation with the
UN, the AU, and African sub-regional organizations,
and with interested partner states, the United States
included.
This broad EU policy framework was applied in
the 2006 EU regional political partnership for
peace, security, and development in the Horn
of Africa.89 The main objective of this policy is to
help reduce instability in the Horn of Africa, which
includes Sudan, as a prerequisite for reaching the
MDGs. The document sets out the EU’s approach
to conflict prevention in the region, tackling in the
short and medium term the root causes of instabil-
ity at both country and regional level, and strength-
ening regional cooperation. It was adopted as a
guide for EU external action in the region and for
the formulation of Country and Regional Strategy
Papers based on the Cotonou Agreement.90
Based on the above policy documents, the EU’s
conflict-prevention and developmental approach
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
to peace-building in Sudan is mainly undertaken
within the development cooperation framework of
the Cotonou Agreement. The EU’s main priorities
in Sudan are:
• disbursing aid for recovery and rehabilitation
across Sudan’s war-affected areas;
• supporting the implementation of the CPA The EU has
to prevent further conflict and promote committed over
democratization; €500 million for
development
• supporting international mediation efforts to assistance to
resolve outstanding issues between North and
Sudan since
South, and between the parties in the Darfur
2005, covering
conflict; and
post-conflict
• maintaining dialogue with Khartoum, the recovery,
Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and other rehabilitation,
interested parties on issues of mutual concern. and development
activities, and
The EU has committed over €500 million for devel-
opment assistance to Sudan since 2005, covering
€640 million for
post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation, and develop- humanitarian
ment activities, and €640 million for humanitarian assistance
assistance since 2003. At present, Sudan is not eli- since 2003.
gible to use the EDF funds allocated for the period
2008-2013 of around €300 million, pledged at the
May 2008 Sudan Consortium, as the Sudanese
Government decided not to ratify the revised
Cotonou Agreement.91 In the meantime, the coun-
try is still eligible to receive humanitarian assistance
and funds through other EU financial instruments.
EDF, however, is instrumental in funding the
African Peace Facility (APF), established in 2004
to fund African peace-building efforts in terms of
capacity-building, peace support operations, and
an early response to crisis. In this way, the APF
provided financial support for the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), making it the biggest
African-led peace support operation financed by
the APF, amounting to €350 million. Another EC
financial instrument — Instrument for Stability
25
 (IfS) — was used to support peace-building activi-
ties in Darfur through the UN-administered Trust
Fund for the African Union-United Nations Joint
Mediation Support Team (JMST) for Darfur. This
Fund was set up to support the joint efforts of
the AU and UN to revitalize the peace process in
Darfur, and to provide direct support to the nego-
Since lack tiations and related preparatory measures.
of sufficient
Apart from using development assistance/
coordination
Community pillar mechanisms to advance its
among the
policy on Sudan, the EU applied diplomatic/politi-
activities of
cal and military means for Sudan conflict manage-
member states ment. These were applied under CFSP, as well as
and the European under Community pillar policies.
Commission was
highlighted as a Since the 1990s, the European Commission refused
challenge the EU to constructively engage with the Sudanese gov-
needs to deal with ernment because of its disreputable human rights
records, although it continued to provide humani-
in the near future.
tarian aid to the country. For example, in 1994 the
EU supported the UN limited arms embargo on
Sudan, in line with the CFSP common position
at the time. The EU imposed further measures in
January 2004 and May 2005 to impose a compre-
hensive arms embargo, which was also in line with
UN Security Council Resolution 1591.
Other EU actions undertaken within the confines
of the CFSP in support of the EU’s approach to
Sudan question were the appointment of an EU
Special Representative for Sudan in 2005, the
EU military observer mission in Darfur in 2004,
and a civilian-military ESDP operation in sup-
port of AMIS from July 2005 to December 2007,
when AMIS ceased operating with the handover
to joint AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
Furthermore, the European Commission deployed
the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),92 a “pre-
decessor” of IfS, for landmine clearing in the Nuba
Mountains in 2002, but as a Community and not a
CFSP action.
26 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
As the EU looks to redefine its role in Sudan,
possibly incorporating peace-building as a focus,
it intends to increase the coordination among its
member states to achieve a more coherent approach
to the Sudan problem,93 since lack of sufficient
coordination among the activities of member states
and the European Commission was highlighted as
a challenge the EU needs to deal with in the near
future. Apart from improving coordination within,
the EU also faces the challenges of how to apply
the agreed policies in practice, especially regard-
ing its co-engagement in peace-building activities
with transatlantic donors. While the EU is striv-
ing to adhere to the OECD-DAC principles of
engagement in fragile states, in practice coherence
between the EU’s approach and those of its partners
has not yet been achieved.
4.5 Joint Involvement of Transatlantic
Donors in Sudan
The transatlantic donors have pursued joint initia-
tives with other actors to engage in peace-building
activities in Sudan. The policy documents of all
three transatlantic donors indicate cooperation
with other multilateral or bilateral donors as a way
to achieve strategic partnership for realization of
their objectives on the African continent, and in
Sudan in particular. The United Kingdom is spe-
cifically well-positioned to develop a productive
donor-to-donor relationship due to its tradition-
ally good ties with the United States on the one
hand, and its membership in the EU on the other.
All three donors under review have put a particu-
lar emphasis on helping to resolve the conflict in
Sudan by appointing a special representative for
this country. At the same time, they realized the
importance of a regional approach to resolving the
conflict in Sudan by developing an engagement
strategy for the East and Horn of Africa region,
especially the EU and the United Kingdom.
The transatlantic donors have also supported the
efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations
to achieve peace in Sudan, namely AU and IGAD.
This approach reflected their thinking about the
importance of strong African institutions and
forces that would be able to effectively engage in
mediation, peace operations, and post-conflict
stabilization on the continent.
The main common objective regarding the transat-
lantic donors’ involvement in Sudan is undoubtedly
supporting the full implementation of the CPA,
bringing peace and stability to Darfur, as well as
strengthening the institutions of the GoSS and sup-
porting security sector reform in southern Sudan.
Below are some examples of the past and present
joint peace-building initiatives and coordinating
mechanisms in Sudan in which transatlantic donors
have taken part.
Since 2000 the United Kingdom, the United States,
and Norway worked together to support the
IGAD-led peace process and to encourage the two
principal parties — the Government of Sudan and
the SPLM — to reach a ceasefire and work toward
a lasting solution to Africa’s longest-running war.
In the same vein, the peace talks on Darfur were
supported by numerous international actors, the
transatlantic donors included.
To support implementation of the CPA, the U.S.
Special Envoy to Sudan has already organized a
Forum for Supporters of the CPA, and reinvigo-
rated the Troika (the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Norway acting as CPA guaran-
tors) to coordinate international efforts. More
recently, the United States, the EU, and the United
Kingdom have teamed up with China, France, and
Russia (the so-called E6 group) to pursue a joint
peace initiative to help resolve the crisis in Sudan.
This is done mainly through political support of
the UN/AU efforts to engage with rebel factions
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
and Darfur, as part of a broader effort to restart
peace talks in Sudan, and a commitment to the
implementation of CPA in terms of reaching an
agreement as regards the 2011 referendum on
the South’s independence. The E6 have also been
active in pointing out the remaining challenges of
the Sudanese peace process and in calling for the
actions needed to address these challenges.94 The main common
objective regarding
In terms of post-CPA planning, several donor-
coordinating mechanisms have been tried. First,
the transatlantic
the United States, the United Kingdom, and the donors’ involvement
EU have teamed up with other donors such as the in Sudan is
Netherlands and Norway to provide a coherent undoubtedly
and coordinated support for the UN and the World supporting the full
Bank’s multilateral national peace and development implementation of
framework. In this regard, the UN and the World the CPA, bringing
Bank have undertaken a Joint Assessment Mission peace and stability
(JAM) to determine the needs of Sudan over the to Darfur, as well
pre-interim and interim periods (six and a half as strengthening
years from the day the CPA was signed). This pro-
the institutions
cess has resulted in the Framework for Sustained
of the GoSS
Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication,
and supporting
which will be supported by domestic efforts and
resources, as well as development partners, in
security sector
addressing underlying structural causes of conflict reform in
and underdevelopment in Sudan, and has led to a southern Sudan.
much stronger coordination between donors at the
sectoral level and between parties of the peace talks
at a strategic level.
Apart from JAM, two MDTFs were created on the
basis of the CPA provisions, one for the Khartoum
government, and the other for the GoSS. Although
both MDTFs together managed to raise funds at
the Oslo Donor Conference in 2005 of more than
$4.5 billion, they have been widely criticized for
slow progress, mainly on account of limited institu-
tional capability of recipients and the World Bank’s
requirements in terms of financial control and
accountability mechanisms.95
27
Another relatively innovative mechanism of donor
coordination worth mentioning was established
in 2006, although with the involvement of only
the United Kingdom and other bilateral donors:
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden. They established the Joint Donor
Office in Juba to coordinate and pool development
assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan
through its MDTF. The results of this mechanism
have been mixed so far. Although the office’s team
has made a fair contribution to strengthening
donor alignment to the GoSS policies, there are sev-
eral challenges that prevent the full implementation
of the Memorandum of Understanding, including
no common Sudan engagement strategy, vary-
ing approaches of the donors involved in terms of
resources, regional interests, nature of their engage-
ment policy with governments in Sudan, staff
shortages, and an increase in participating donors’
bilateral programs, to mention a few.96
28 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
The Joint Donor Office experience has therefore
exposed several challenges to donor cooperation in
Sudan. Other challenges that have been mentioned
in relation to donor cooperation in that country
include: the differences between donors in terms of
their policies and objectives (some donors support
the Khartoum and South Sudan governments while
the United States engages more intensively with
the latter); the sensitive nature of security-related
issues (no actor is assuming the responsibility
for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-
tion); explicit division of labor between political
and developmental arms of donor governments
(Development DG vs. DG External Relations; DOS
vs. USAID); and the complexities of the Sudan
question (treating the whole of Sudan as one prob-
lem or as a set of separate peace processes).97
5 Conclusion
This paper has tried to provide a brief analysis
of policy and institutional changes undertaken
by transatlantic donors to improve intra- and
inter-government coordination for dealing with
the complex tasks of peace-building processes in
African fragile states. As the implementation of
such coordination requires adopting a practical,
multidimensional, and integrated approach, the
transatlantic donors recognized the relevance of
applying the WOG approach to peace-building in
African states.
The record of all three transatlantic donors in terms
of mainstreaming the WOG approach to peace-
building has been mixed at best. Although some
similarities pointed out below can be observed,
donors seem to be progressing with “varying
speeds,” and preserving the main features of their
“traditional” approach to peace-building. This situ-
ation also has an impact on inter-donor coopera-
tion, which is still the subject of diverging national
interests and priorities. Below are some of the
findings of this paper.
1. All transatlantic donors have changed their
conceptions of peace-building in line with their
experiences on the ground. Both the United
Kingdom and the United States have recognized
that a military approach does not necessarily
bring security and stability to a country, while
the EU has realized that its development
partnerships will not work without peace and
reasonable levels of security. However, while the
EU is still mainly advancing “policy coherence
for development” by focusing on conflict-
prevention, the United States seems to prefer
“policy coherence for national security” and
focuses mainly on post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction with democracy as the ultimate
goal of U.S. engagement. The United Kingdom’s
policy is somewhere in between, although its
approach of supporting effective state-building
and economic development resembles the
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
EU’s preventative approach.98 Since any major
shifts in these policies are not likely to occur, at
least in the near future, the main challenge for
transatlantic donors remains how to transcend
their policy differences in pursuit of enhanced
donor cooperation.
2. Although there seems to be a consensus at least
at the highest level about the benefits of a WOG
approach to engagement in fragile states, this
consensus has so far failed to materialize in a
comprehensive policy framework. Nevertheless,
such a document might ultimately crystallize on
the basis of and through refining the national
security, development, and foreign policy
documents. This problem is exacerbated by
the fact that none of the transatlantic donors
currently possesses a strong central coordinating
authority over individual departments, agencies,
or institutions, although mechanisms exist in the
U.K. Cabinet Office and U.S. executive branch
that could be used to that effect. A coherent
peace-building strategy with an oversight of a
strong central authority is more likely to result
in effective transatlantic cooperation with other
donors and aid recipients alike.
3. All transatlantic donors have realized the
importance of post-conflict stabilization and
reconstruction as an inherently civilian-military
operation, thus establishing mechanisms
to deal with these challenges. However, in
the United Kingdom, and even more in the
United States, these mechanisms were slow to
gather enough political and financial backing
to be fully operational. However, the post-
conflict reconstruction and development
could be a possible future area of successful
donor cooperation.
4. In both the United Kingdom and the United
States, the government departments dealing with
foreign policy — the FCO and DOS, respectively
29
 — have faced some erosion of their traditional
leadership in foreign affairs. In the United States,
this happened after the Pentagon assumed
some responsibilities traditionally entrusted
with civilian departments, such as dispensing
development assistance, while in the United
Kingdom, DFID has taken over as a leading
department for the peace-building/fragile states
agenda. These differences are also indicative
of the different approaches both transatlantic
donors have taken toward fragile states, and
are reflected in their institutional settings. For
example, while DFID has a status of a ministry,
USAID is an independent U.S. government
agency with the USAID Administrator
under direct authority and policy guidance
of the Secretary of State. Although different
institutional contexts may pose some challenges
for transatlantic donor cooperation regarding
their engagement in fragile states, a clear
designation of contact points within individual
departments and/or the national coordinating
body would make inter-donor liaising less
challenging.
5. All transatlantic donors are facing the challenges
of intra-governmental and institutional
communication and cooperation for many
reasons, one of them being the lens through
which each government department views
engagement in fragile countries, reflecting its
unique institutional mandate and policy as a
defense, diplomatic, or development actor.99
This situation can represent a continuous
source of inter-departmental tensions. But on a
30 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
positive note, it can be constructive in devising
a quality policy framework and in incorporating
perspectives of the various departments,
thus supporting the mainstreaming of the
WOG approach in their peace-building
policies. “Enriched” in this way, these policies
would be better equipped to rally support
and commitment of various governmental
departments and would consequently more
likely provide a good basis for cooperation with
partner states at the same time.
6. Africa’s “hot spots,” such as Sudan, provided
transatlantic donors with testing grounds
and lesson-learning for their policies and
instruments to help advance the peace-building
processes, such as the United Kingdom’s CPP,
the EU’s financial instruments, or the United
States’ S/SRC. At the same time, the donors
seemed to have recognized that security,
political, and developmental challenges in
African fragile states are closely embedded into
wider regional problems, such as in Sudan, and
that the magnitude of these problems compels
donors to undertake joint efforts and initiatives.
In Sudan, as some observers have noted, the
donor community was relatively successful
in joining to support JAM and MDTFs, as
well as in trying some innovative cooperation
mechanisms, such as Joint Donor Offices.
However, at the same time, some traditional
problems of donor cooperation, such as trying
to implement their own agenda, have obstructed
the timely and efficient delivery of assistance.
6 Recommendations
Based on the overview of transatlantic donors’ poli-
cies toward Africa in general, and their engagement
in Sudan in particular, some of the recommenda-
tions for advancing the WOG approach in transat-
lantic donor engagement in peace-building process
— and their cooperation in these processes — are
put forward as the basis for further discussions.
In advancing the WOG approach in their peace-
building strategies,
R1. The governments of transatlantic donors
should be encouraged to adopt a national
policy framework, which would provide a clear
vision and unified strategy, covering various
stages of peace-building in failed and fragile
states. Such a strategy would be relevant for
at least two reasons: first it would provide a
basis for intra-government cooperation and
peace-building efforts, and indicate the priority
areas in terms of action and the allocation of
financial and human resources. Second, such
policy frameworks would offer other donor/
partner states some information and guidance
as to which potential areas of cooperation
and common engagement in peace-building
processes are worth pursuing.
R2. Such policy frameworks should be compre-
hensive enough to cover all the basic entry
points of engagement (security, political and
diplomatic, developmental) in peace-building
processes in line with the WOG approach, as
well as flexible enough to adapt to various pos-
sible situations in African fragile states, and to
absorb the lessons learned on the ground.
R3. At the same time, common policy frameworks
could address several dilemmas for national
governments regarding WOG approach to
peace-building:
• balancing national interests versus fragile
states’ needs;
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
• taking an incremental approach or an ambi-
tious redesign to improve intra-governmental
coordination;
• institutionalizing a WOG approach or relying
on ad hoc/periodic intra-government coop-
eration on a need-to-need basis;
• coordinating policies at the highest level or
mostly relying on government departments
themselves to pursue the WOG approach; and
• pooling financial resources or using indi-
vidual thematic budget lines.
R4. Donors should be encouraged to work
toward providing sufficient incentives for
the adoption of an integrated approach to
peace-building in fragile states in order to
avoid competition and tensions between the
relevant government departments. Better
coordination between government departments
could be achieved by each department embed-
ding its activities within other departments in
the donor’s overall peace-building framework,
which could lead to better operational effective-
ness. In addition, the roles of actors involved
need to be clarified and differences in organi-
zational culture among the relevant institutions
taken into account. At the same time, cross-
staffing (inter-departmental “secondments”)
could help improve understanding between
various departments.
Regarding the improvement in transatlantic donor
coordination to increase the effectiveness of their
support for peace-building processes in African
states, it can be suggested that:
R5. The efficient and continuous coordination
between transatlantic donors is more likely to
succeed if undertaken within a permanent
common framework or international orga-
nization such as the UN. The latter has the
31
 necessary experience with conflict and post-
conflict situations, and can provide a forum for
discussions between donors on one the hand,
and donors and aid recipients/fragile states
on the other. In this regard, it would also be
relevant for donors to tie some of their foreign
policy objectives and priorities to UN peace-
building processes, for example, and press for
needed institutional and other reforms.
R6. The transatlantic donors could move toward
a greater convergence of their peace-building
strategies by aligning their assistance with
development and other strategies of the recipi-
ent states. Apart from increasing the “local”
ownership of peace-building and development
efforts, national development strategies of
recipient states could provide a common
focus for all the donors in the absence of joint
donor engagement strategies.
R7. At the same time, continuity in the coopera-
tion of transatlantic donors can be achieved
through the long-term support for regional or
sub-regional African organizations involved
32 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
in peace-building, which are in desperate need
of financial and other assistance.
R8. In the absence of a common peace-building
framework, ad-hoc cooperation between
transatlantic donors, as well as donors’ support
for UN and regional peace-building efforts, is
a more likely option at present. Such coopera-
tion could include modest initiatives such as
cross-lesson learning, or more elaborate opera-
tions based on the “lead donor and delegated
cooperation” principle.100 Successful coopera-
tion between transatlantic donors can gradually
result in a multilateral permanent arrangement
entrusted with the coordination of donor
peace-building efforts.
R9. Given the different capabilities and priorities
of individual donors in terms of dealing with
various dimensions of peace-building in fragile
environments, donor peace-building activi-
ties would not only benefit from joint initia-
tives, but also from exploring and engaging in
complementary initiatives/programs.101
7 Endnotes
1 At the time this paper was written, Timothy Othieno was
an independent consultant. He is currently a Conflict and
Peacebuilding Adviser at the Department for International
Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom. Vita Sebek is
an independent consultant whose area of expertise is Africa’s
security architecture and political economy.
2 In this paper, peace-building refers to all those activities
and measures that are aimed at preventing and resolving
conflicts, and sustaining peace, such as unilateral or multilateral
diplomatic initiatives, military interventions, developmental and
humanitarian assistance, and the like. For more, see section 2.2.
3 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of
Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008).
4 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace — Preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111,
17 June 1992), http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html
(accessed 20.01.2010).
5 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate — the
Development Assistance Committee, Mainstreaming Conflict
Prevention: Peacebuilding Overview, Issues Briefs (Paris: OECD
DAC, 2005), http:/www.oecd.org/13/28/ 35034360.pdf (accessed
14.10.2009). See also OECD, Development Cooperation
Directorate, The Development Assistance Committee, Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and
Situations (Paris: OECD DAC, April 2007), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/ 61/45/38368714.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010).
6 Alina Rocha Menocal, “State-Building for Peace — A New
Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile
States?” Paper prepared for Transforming Political Structures:
Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms
Workshop, the European Report on Development, Florence,
Italy 16-17 April 2009.
7 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of
Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace
Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008).
8 These donors have been selected as a focus of this paper
since they represent the most active and influential supporters of
peace-building processes in Africa in terms of security, political,
and developmental assistance.
9 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs.
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence.”
In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 17.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
10 This paper mainly covers the analysis of relevant policy
documents; however, this does not suggest the WOG approach
should not be mainstreamed in the policy implementation
and evaluation as well. At the same time, the paper does not
cover the coordination between institutions in the capital
and diplomatic and other representations abroad, the latter
representing a valuable “asset” in terms of policy input,
implementation, and feedback.
11 An example of an incoherent approach to peace-building
would be concomitant implementation of arms exports policy
and conflict resolution efforts in aid-recipient states.
12 Further differences between various government
departments might include incompatible goals and different
operational language, methods, approaches, and the like.
According to U.S. government sources, these differences are
especially notable when comparing DOD on one hand, and
DOS and USAID on the other. For example, the DOD has
understandably a different point of engagement in fragile states
than the DOS and USAID, and a shorter timeline in terms of
expectations and requirements.
13 See Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the
Military in Humanitarian Crisis,” International Journal of Peace
Studies 7, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 2002), 35-56; and Ho-Won
Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies, (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 198.
14 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs,
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,”
in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 49.
15 William M. Bellamy “Making Better Sense of U.S. Security
Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush
Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration,
ed. Jennifer G. Cooke, and Stephen J. Morrison (Washington
DC, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 10. See
also Nancy Birdsall, “Righting the Three-Legged Stool: Why
Global Development Matters for Americans and What the
Next President Should Do About It,” in The White House and
the World — A Global Development Agenda for the Next U.S.
President, ed. Nancy Birdsall (Washington: Center for Global
Development, 2008), 1–42.
16 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the
Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches
to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy,
2007), 32.
33
17 United States — The White House, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002),
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf (accessed
20.01.2010).
18 The aid to sub-Saharan Africa reportedly tripled from $2.3
billion in 2000 to $6.6 billion in 2006. See Princeton N. Lyman,
“U.S. Foreign Assistance and Trade Policies in Africa,” in U.S.
Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the
Obama Administration, ed. Jennifer G. Cooke and Stephen J.
Morrison (Washington DC, Center for Strategic International
Studies, 2009), 111. Also see William M. Bellamy, “Making
Better Sense of U.S. Security Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S.
Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the
Obama Administration, ed. Jennifer G. Cooke, and Stephen J.
Morrison (Washington DC, Center for Strategic International
Studies, 2009), 15-16.
19 U.S. — The White House, The National Security Strategy
of the United States of America (March 2006), http://www.
strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/nss.pdf (accessed
20.01.2010), 15.
20 These levels of engagement cover only certain U.S. peace-
building activities (diplomatic-political and military), and
exclude development as an instrumental peace-building tool.
21 U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy.
Washington DC, June 2008. http://www.defense.gov/ news/
2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf (accessed
02.02.2010).
22 Essentially, this doctrine expands the traditional role of the
army to include the promotion of participation in government,
spurring economic development, and addressing the root
causes of conflict as tools for achieving peace. At the same
time, the doctrine strongly emphasizes the WOG approach
as instrumental for achieving sustainable peace. See U.S.
Department of the Army, Headquarters, Stability Operations
— Field Manual No. 03-07 (Washington DC: Department of
the Army, 6 October 2008), http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/
Repository/ FM307/FM3-07.pdf (accessed 24.01.2010).
23 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review sees the prevention
of conflicts as one of the main objectives of the U.S. defense
strategy, adding that: “Preventing the rise of threats to U.S.
interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development,
and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and
economic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of
partners to maintain and promote stability.” See U.S. Department
of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC,
February 2010), http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20
of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf (accessed 03.02.2010).
34 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
24 Diana Cammack et al., Donors and the ‘Fragile States’
Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice — Report
submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(London: ODI, March 2006), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/
download/1317.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010).
25 This USAID framework has five core strategic goals,
namely: promoting transformational development,
strengthening of fragile states, supporting strategic states,
providing humanitarian relief, and addressing global issues and
other special concerns. However, this document seems to be in
need of revision in view of the Foreign Assistance Framework
and Strategic Plan 2007-2012. See U.S. Agency for International
Development, Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid —
Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through Development
(USAID, January 2006), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/policy_
framework_jan06.pdf (accessed 03.02.2010).
26 This framework was designed as an analytical tool with an
overarching goal of helping to build and sustain democratic,
well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people,
reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly
in the international system. It provides a single point of reference
for USAID and DOS to coordinate their efforts in terms of
foreign assistance. Based on this framework, a set of common
definitions, program areas, and associated activities was
adopted in the form of the Standardized Program Structure and
Definitions as a tool for inter-agency use and for categorization
of DOS/USAID managed assistance.
27 MCC was established in 2004 by U.S. Congress as an
independent foreign assistance agency, tasked with helping
“well-performing countries,” that are committed to good
governance, economic freedom, and investments in their
citizens, to reduce poverty through sustainable economic
growth in the form of grants.
28 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 32, 37.
29 U.S. Agency for International Development, Fragile
States Strategy (USAID, January 2005), http://www.usaid.gov/
policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf (accessed 03.02.2010).
30 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 38–41.
31 For example, while new S/CRS inter-agency authorities
were under consideration, the DOD-issued Directive 3000.05
on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations in November 2005,
designating stability operations as a core U.S. military mission
that the DOD will be prepared to conduct with proficiency
equivalent to combat operations.
32 Steward Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 42.
33 Ibid.
34 J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew
Natsios, “Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More
Effective Tool,” in Foreign Affairs, 87:6 (November/December
2008). http://www.stimson.org/budgeting/pdf/Foreign_Affairs-
Atwood_Natsios_McPherson.pdf (accessed 02.03.2010).
35 Foreign Assistance and Development in a New Era, speech
by Senator Richard G. Lugar at Society for International
Development Annual Gala Dinner, January 28, 2010. http://
lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=321891 (accessed
02.03.2010).
36 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, the
Development Assistance Committee, United States Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review (Paris: OECD, 2006),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999.pdf (accessed
02.02.2010).
37 U.S. Department of Defense — The Secretary of Defense,
Memorandum for Secretary of State — Options for Remodeling
Security Sector Assistance Authorities (Washington DC,
December 15 2009), http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
nation/documents/Gates_to_Clinton_121509.pdf (accessed
24.01.2010).
38 Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, “Blair’s Wars and
Brown’s Budget: from Strategic Defense Review to Strategic
Decay in Less than a Decade,” International Affairs, 85:2 (2009),
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13546_85_2cornish_
dorman.pdf (accessed 07.02.2010), 247-261.
39 Diana Cammack et al., Donors and the ‘Fragile States’
Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice — Report
submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency
(London: ODI, March 2006), http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/
download/1317.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010), 41
40 In July 2009, the U.K. government announced, that a
new strategic defense review was in preparation. A Green
Paper is due to be released in early 2010, examining defense
policy as a whole — its purpose, the way it works, what the
services expect, its technological priorities. At the same time
it will look at how the MOD works with other government
departments, and the contribution the armed forces can make
to international diplomacy and the projection of “soft power”
to prevent conflicts.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
41 U.K. Ministry of Defense, The Strategic Defense Review: A
New Chapter (July 2002), http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/
DD89DBE6-CEAA-4995-9E01-52EF6D19FC73/0/sdr_a_
new_chapter_%20% 20% 20%20cm5566_vol2.pdf (accessed
24.01.2010).
42 Simon Burall, Jonathan M. White, and Andrew Blick, “The
Impact of U.S. and U.K. Legislatures on Aid Delivery,” Economic
Policy Paper Series 09 (Washington: German Marshall Fund of
the United States, 2009), 17.
43 DFID’s White Papers have regularly highlighted the
links between development and security. For example, see
U.K. Department of International Development, Eliminating
st
World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21 Century (White Paper
on International Development) (London: Department for
International Development, 1997), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/
Documents/publications/whitepaper1997.pdf (accessed
20.01.2010).
44 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 29: Reduce
poverty in poorer countries through quicker progress toward
Millennium Development Goals (HM Government, October
2007), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa29.pdf
(accessed 04.02.2010).
45 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce
impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts
(HM Government, October 2007), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30.pdf (accessed 04.02.2010).
46 U.K. Department of International Development,
Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future
(London: Department for International Development, July
2009), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/whitepaper/building-
our-common-future.pdf (accessed 04.02.2010).
47 Other elements of this approach include treating access
to security and justice as a basic service, supporting economic
opportunities, and delivering a faster and coordinated
international response in the immediate aftermath of conflicts.
48 These priorities sit at the heart of U.K.’s peace-building
approach as outlined in DFID peace-building policy paper. See
DFID Policy and Practice Paper — Building Peaceful States and
Societies (London: Department for International Development,
2010).
49 U.K. Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of United
Kingdom — Security in an interdependent world (March 2008),
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/
national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010).
50 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs,
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,”
35
in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
van Meurs, (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 20, 28.
51 Simon Lawry-White, Review of the U.K. Government
Approach to Peace-building and Synthesis of Lessons Learned
from U.K. Government Funded Peace-Building Projects 1997-
2001 (London: DFID, August 2003) https://www.dfid.gov.
uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/ev646.pdf (accessed
20.01.2010).
52 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 14.
53 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs,
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,”
in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
van Meurs, (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 28–29.
54 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 23–24.
55 Ibid., 12–13.
56 This pillar was renamed “Police and Judicial Cooperation
in Criminal Matters” in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997/1999),
while some policies (controls on the external borders, asylum,
immigration, and judicial cooperation on civil matters)
were moved into the first pillar governed by the Community
method of decision-making. The Lisbon Treaty deepened the
commitments of EU member states in the Area of Freedom,
Security, and Justice, also by giving the European Parliament
bigger role as co-legislator and extending the qualified majority
voting of the Council.
57 In short, this method includes the process by which the
European Commission proposes “legislation,” the Council, at
times with the European Parliament, adopts the legislation,
and the Court of Justice monitors compliance with the
Community law.
58 As stipulated by Article 25 of the Treaty on the European
Union, the EU conducts CFSP by defining general guidelines;
adopting decisions regarding actions and position to be taken by
the EU, and their implementation; and strengthening systematic
cooperation of member states in the conduct of the policy.
59 EU’s humanitarian assistance is under “jurisdiction” of
ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office), and covers
ad hoc assistance and relief aid to victims of natural and man-
made disasters.
60 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van
36 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
Meurs. “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of
Coherence.” In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A
Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim
Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009),
40–42.
61 Another institutional development worth mentioning in
this regard is the creation of European External Action Service
(EEAS) to support the High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy. The EEAS will cooperate with diplomatic
services of the EU member states and will comprise the officials
from Council’s Secretariat, Commission, and officials seconded
from diplomatic services of member states. EEAS is planned
to be composed of single geographical and thematic desks,
which will continue to perform the existing Commission’s and
Council’s tasks under the authority of the High Representative.
At the same time, enlargement, trade, and development policy
will remain under the responsibility of the Commission, while
Commission delegations will be part of EEAS structure. For
more see Presidency Report to the European Council on European
External Action Service, Brussels 23. October 2009 (14930/09),
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st14/ st14930.
en09.pdf (accessed 28.02.2010).
62 Giovanni Grevi, “EDSP institutions,” in European Security
and Defense Policy: the first ten years, ed. Giovanni Grevi,
Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies, European Union, 2009), http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed 25.01.2010), 62.
63 Commission of the European Communities, Policy
Coherence for Development — Accelerating progress toward
attaining the Millenium Development Goals, COM(2005)134final
(Brussels, 12.4.2005), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0134:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed
26.01.2010).
64 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World
— European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December 2003),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
(accessed 26.01.2010).
65 Commission of the European Communities, Policy
Coherence for Development — Establishing the policy framework
for a whole-of-the-Union approach, COM(2009)458 final
(Brussels, 15.9.2009), http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/
repository/COM_2009_458_part1_en.pdf (accessed 27.01.2010).
66 This is a short name for Partnership Agreement between the
members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the
one part and the European Community and its Member States of the
other part, which was signed on June 23, 2000, in Cotonou, Benin.
67 Giovanni Grevi, “EDSP institutions,” in European Security
and Defense Policy: the first ten years, ed. Giovanni Grevi,
Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies, European Union, 2009), http://www.iss.europa.eu/
uploads/media/ESDP_10-web.pdf (accessed 25.01.2010), 61-62.
68 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs.
“Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence.”
In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy
Coherence, ed. Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim
van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 42.
69 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, the
Development Assistance Committee, European Community
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review (Paris:
OECD, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/6/38965119.pdf
(accessed 02.02.2010).
70 The suggested possible coordination mechanisms for
achieving greater coherence include adopting a harmonization
agenda, using common integrated planning tools, undertaking
joint assessments, devising shared strategies and MDTFs, or
establishing joint donor offices.
71 European Parliament, Council, Commission, “European
Consensus on Development,” Official Journal of the European
Union, C46/1, 24.2.2006, http://ec.europa.eu/development/
icenter/repository/european_ consensus_2005_en.pdf (accessed
26.01.2010).
72 Work Plan — EU-US Technical Dialogue and Increased
Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention (March
2008). http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/docs/eu_us_
crisis_management_work_plan_en.pdf (accessed 10. 02. 2010)
73 U.K. Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of
United Kingdom — Security in an interdependent world
(March 2008) http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/
security/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed 20.01. 2010).
74 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce
impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts
(HM Government, October 2007) http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30.pdf (accessed 04.02.2010).
75 Daniel Korski, Daniel Serwer and Megan Chabalowski,
A New Agenda for US-EU Security Cooperation — Working
Paper 92 (Madrid: FRIDE, November 2009), http://www.fride.
org/descarga/WP92_US_EU_Security_ENG_ Jan10.pdf (accessed,
10.02.2010), 8.
76 Ibid., 10.
77 For example, between 1993 and 1996, USAID increased
aid to Sudan by launching the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative
(1994), aimed at intervening against crises, instability, and
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
famine. In the period 1997 to 2000, during Clinton’s second
term in office, the U.S. Congress reimposed financial sanctions
on Sudan. After the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, the United States pursued unilateral anti-terrorist
measures in Sudan through Operation Infinite Reach, which
consisted of cruise missile strikes on a pharmaceutical factory
in Sudan, allegedly involved in the production of ingredients for
chemical weapons.
78 William M. Bellamy, “Making Better Sense of U.S. Security
Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush
Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration, ed.
Jennifer G. Cooke and Stephen J. Morrison (Washington DC:
Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 14–17.
79 For the complete text see: U.S. Department of State, Sudan:
A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach, October 19,
2009 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672.htm
(accessed 20.01.2010).
80 In this regard, the Obama Administration is planning to
strengthen its support for UNAMID through the provision
of direct funding, as well as diplomatic, logistical, and other
support toward the provision of needed equipment. At the
same time, the White House is planning to work on improving
economic conditions in Sudan through support of the UNDP’s
Local Government Reform Program, as well as on implementing
the World Bank’s MDTF South Strategy in cooperation with
international partners.
81 Other three stated priorities are first, promoting democratic
systems and practices, also as a post-conflict transformation.
In this regard the U.S. government will continue assisting
African states in building democratic institutions, conducting
free and fair elections, and governing justly. Second, promoting
sustainable and broad-based, market-led economic growth,
also through the established mechanisms of MCC, the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), debt-cancellation policy,
and food assistance. And third, promoting health and social
development to fight the leading causes of death in Africa —
disease and poverty. The continuous commitment to the United
States’ biggest health initiatives — the President’s Emergency
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the President’s Malaria
Initiative (PMI) — is hoped to help in the fight against these
two and other diseases. For more see U.S. Policy in Africa in
the 21st Century, presentation of Phillip Carter III, the Acting
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs at the Africa
Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, February 9, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326.htm (accessed
05.02.2010).
82 U.S. Africa Command. Posture Statement 2009. Statement
of General William E. Ward, USA Commander, United States
37
Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee
and the House Armed Services Committee, March 2009.
Stuttgart: U.S. Africa Command, 2009. http://www.africom.mil/
pdfFiles/ USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf (accessed
07.02.2010).
83 Emery Brussett, Evaluation of Country Conflict Prevention
Pools — Sudan (London: DFID, May 2004), http://www.oecd.
org/dataoecd/60/39/35097013.pdf (accessed 30.01.2010).
84 U.K. Department of International Development,
Sudan: Country Engagement Plan (London: Department for
International Development, 2005), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/
Documents/publications/sudan-country-engagement-plan0105.
pdf (accessed 20.01.2010).
85 U.K. Department for International Development, Foreign
& Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defense, Africa
Conflict Prevention Program: Annual Report 2007/08. London:
FCO/DFID/MOD, 2008. http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/
publications/annual-rpt-africa-confl-prev-prog-2007-08.pdf
(accessed 20.01.2010).
86 Commission of the European Communities. EU
Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate
Africa’s development, COM(2005)489 final. Brussels,
12.10.2005. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2005:0489:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 20.01.2010).
87 The EU’s earlier approach to conflict prevention in Africa
was covered in a Commission’s Communication of 1996. This
approach can be summed up as “structural stability” pursued
through an approach of “generalized multilateralism.” It
mainly focused on conflict-prevention tools, which included:
development cooperation and external assistance, trade policy
instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental
policies, diplomacy, new crisis management instruments, and
cooperation with other international actors. See Commission of
the European Communities, The European Union and the Issue of
Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond,
SEC(96)332 final, http://aei.pitt.edu/4280/01/002318_1.pdf
(accessed 20.01.2010).
88 “Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005
concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in
Africa and repealing Common Position 2004/85/CFSP,” Official
Journal of European Communities (L 97, 15.4.2005).
89 Commission of the European Communities, Strategy for
Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security
and development in the Horn of Africa, COM(2006)601 final
(Brussels, 20.10.2006), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0601:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed
05.02.2010).
38 Economic Policy Paper Series 2010
90 The document contains a work program for regional action,
which includes three broad objectives: encouraging effective
regional political and economic cooperation and integration,
addressing the key country-level strategic political issues that have
regional ramifications, and addressing regional cross-cutting and
cross-border concerns in the Horn of Africa.
91 The reasons for non-ratification are the provisions the Cotonou
Agreement encouraging the ACP states to ratify and implement the
Rome Statute, establishing International Criminal Court.
92 RRM was established in 2001 to allow the EU to respond
in a rapid, efficient, and flexible manner to situations of urgency
or crisis, or to the emergence of crisis, where such situations
are likely to jeopardize the beneficial effects of assistance and
cooperation policies and programs, their effectiveness, and/or
conditions for their proper implementation.
93 Walter Lotze, Gustavo Barros de Carvalho, and Yvonne
Kasumba, “Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries:
Transitioning from Conflict Case Studies of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan.” Occasional
Paper Series 3, no. 1 (2008), http://www.accord.org.za/
downloads/op/op_2008_1.pdf (accessed 20.01.2010), 52.
94 For example, the E6 have underlined the need for continued
efforts to address humanitarian needs in Darfur and other
parts of Sudan, and the essential role of the UN and AU, as
well as other regional organizations and neighboring states, in
supporting the Sudanese parties to work through the remaining
challenges to peace. They agreed that special attention should
be paid to forthcoming international appointments to ensure
stronger and more concerted leadership at all levels, and full
coherence and coordination in UN/AU efforts.
95 Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, International
Engagement in Sudan after the CPA — Report on the piloting of
OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States’ for the Case of Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Institute
for International Affairs, 2007), 17-18.
96 ITAD et al., Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team
in Juba, Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation, 2009).
97 Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, International
Engagement in Sudan after the CPA — Report on the piloting of
OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States’ for the Case of Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Institute
for International Affairs, 2007), 21–22.
98 Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown. Greater Than the Sum of
its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile
States. New York: International Peace Academy, 2007.
99 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce
impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts
(HM Government, October 2007), http://www.hm-treasury.gov.
uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30.pdf (accessed 04.02.2010).
100 Delegated cooperation is a practical arrangement where
one donor (a “lead” donor) acts with authority on behalf
of one or more other donors (the “delegating” donors or
“silent partners”). The interaction between the donors should
be described in the agreement between them, such as a
Memorandum of Understanding.
101 The European Commission sees complementarity as a
concept of an organizational nature. Complementarity starts
with coordination, but goes much further: it implies that each
actor is focusing its assistance on areas where it can add most
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government”
Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
value, given what others are doing. Hence, complementarity is
the optimal division of labor between various actors in order
to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources. See
Commission of the European Communities, EU Code of Conduct
on Division of Labor in Development Policy, COM(2007)072
final (Brussels, 28.2.2007), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri= COM:2007:0072:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed
10.02. 2010). For example, if the United States has extensive
experience with military interventions and peace-keeping
operations, and the security dimension of its peace-building
approach is relatively well developed, this experience and
approach could well complement the EU’s approach to peace-
building, which tends to be focused on conflict-prevention in
terms of securing long-term stability in a country.
39
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