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IN SEARCH OF A COMMON TRANSATLANTIC “WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT” APPROACH TO PEACE-BUILDING PROCESSES IN AFRICA (The Case of Sudan)
TIMOTHy OTHIENO AND VITA SEBEk1
© 2010 The German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E email@example.com This publication can be downloaded for free at www.gmfus.org/publications. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to firstname.lastname@example.org. GMF Paper Series The GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staff, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to email@example.com. About GMF The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a non-partisan American public policy and grant-making institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest. About GMF’s Economic Policy Program The Economic Policy Program is an initiative of GMF dedicated to promoting cooperation between the United States and Europe on domestic and international economic policies as vital instruments of global prosperity, especially for the poor and those affected by shifts in the global economy. The United States and Europe account for more than 40 percent of world economic activity, close to $20 trillion in goods and services on an annual basis. Given the size and importance of this relationship, GMF’s Economic Policy Program seeks to ensure that the benefits of globalization are distributed equitably and fairly. Through in-depth research, targeted grantmaking, strategic convening, and outreach to key policymakers and the media, the program supports transatlantic leadership at the critical nexus of economic policy, trade, development assistance, and management of domestic sectors such as agriculture.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government” Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa (the Case of Sudan)
Timothy Othieno and Vita Sebek1
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 Transatlantic Donors and their “Whole-of-Government” Approaches to Peace-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 .1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 .2 The United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 .3 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2 .4 The European Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 Transatlantic Donor Policies Toward an Enhanced Inter-Government Cooperation . . . 19 4 From Policy to Practice: The Application of “The Whole-of-Government” Approach in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4 .1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4 .2 The U .S . Involvement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4 .3 The U .K . Engagement in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 .4 The EU’s Sudan Engagement Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4 .5 Joint Involvement of Transatlantic Donors in Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 7 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
AFRICOM AGOA APF AU CFSP CHASE
United States Africa Command African Growth and Opportunity Act Africa Peace Facility African Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department
JDO JAM JHA JMA MDGs MDTFs MOD NATO NGO NIF NSC NSS OECD PBP PEPFAR PMI PSA RRM S/CRS SPLA SPLM U.K. UN UNAMID UNDP UNITAF U.S. USAID WOG
Joint Donor Office Joint Assessment Mission Justice and Home Affairs Joint Monitoring Commission Millennium Development Goals Multi Donor Trust Funds Ministry of Defense North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nongovernmental Organization National Islamic Front National Security Council National Security Strategy Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Peace-Building Partnership President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief President’s Malaria Initiative Public Service Agreement Rapid Reaction Mechanism Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development Sudan People’s Liberation Army Sudan People’ Liberation Movement United Kingdom United Nations African Union/United Nations Mission in Darfur United Nations Development Program Unified Task Force United States U .S . Agency for International Development Whole of Government
CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa CPA CPP CRC DAC DED DFID DG DOD DPA EEAS ESDP ESFP EU FCO ICAF IGAD JMST GoSS IPF JAM Comprehensive Peace Agreement Conflict Prevention Pool Civilian Response Corps Development Assistance Committee Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Agency) U .K . Department for International Development Directorate General Department of Defense Darfur Peace Agreement European External Action Service European Security and Defense Policy European Security and Foreign Policy European Union Foreign and Commonwealth Office Inter-agency Conflict Assessment Framework Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Joint Mediation Support Team Government of Southern Sudan IGAD Partners Forum Joint Assessment Mission
The rationale for this paper emerges from understanding the vital importance of peace-building processes, which provide a new start for many fragile and conflict-ridden African states, and from the need for coherent donor engagement strategies, which would help effectively address pressing issues in these states . However, the broadening of the peace-building agenda during the past two decades made such engagements increasingly challenging in terms of their complex and medium- to long-term nature, and the necessary levels of financial and other assistance, which exposed the need for greater intra-government cooperation (e .g ., Whole-ofGovernment (WOG) approach) on one hand and enhanced donor cooperation on the other . Since the transatlantic donors (e .g ., the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU) are seen as the most active and influential supporters of peace-building processes on the African continent, their endeavors to pursue the WOG approach in this regard represent a particular focus of this paper . Consequently, two main research questions are addressed in this paper: To what extent has the WOG approach been mainstreamed in peacebuilding policies of transatlantic donors? And, what impact have moves toward the increased intra-government coordination had on transatlantic donor cooperation in terms of challenges and opportunities? Based on the review of policy documents and relevant literature, with some additional insights from interviews conducted in 2009, this paper argues that transatlantic donors have taken steps toward developing a comprehensive WOG approach to peace-building that fits into their particular political and institutional contexts, although with varying speeds, and that the development and application of this approach remains a work in progress . The remaining challenges are numerous, the most crucial probably being the absence of a comprehensive national policy framework .
The lack of these comprehensive national policy frameworks means transatlantic donors have insufficient coordination, which makes it difficult to jointly implement their peace-building agendas in practice . Tensions between donors can arise not only on account of different goals and priorities, whether perceived or real, but also due to undefined objectives and unbalanced/incoherent national approaches . Nevertheless, transatlantic donors appear to have been committed to improving their cooperation record during their involvement in Sudan peace processes . To this end, they all expressed support for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and for the Darfur peacebuilding process . Moreover, they have made an attempt to put their development assistance under one umbrella (the Multi-Donor Trust Funds), and to use various joint mechanisms, such as joint programming and joint donor offices, to further their objectives in Sudan . These attempts at enhanced donor coordination have underlined the relevance of a focused approach to peace-building through outlining developmental and other priorities for donors and recipient states, and have revealed donor preference for a bilateral approach when joint initiatives could not address their national interests in Sudan at the same time . By recognizing this and other related challenges, this paper puts forward some recommendations on possible future directions for transatlantic donor cooperation . Such cooperation should be rooted in a comprehensive national peace-building policy framework to offer a clear vision for all national actors, and to provide guidance on possible areas of cooperation for partner states . After reaching agreement on joint interests and objectives, transatlantic donors could explore complementarity as a principle of engagement in Africa’s peace-building
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government” Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
processes . Successful cooperation on a case-by-case basis could be translated into a more permanent arrangement, which should be flexible enough to adapt to various challenges posed by fragile
situations . To this effect, transatlantic donors could also consider working within the UN system as a possible option .
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The history of independent African states has been characterized by tragic realities of violent conflicts and civil wars, which have also been fueled by Cold War dynamics . These types of violent conflicts subsided with the demise of the Soviet Union, but new conflicts broke out as a result, which have been largely attributed to the fragility of post-colonial African states with their many faces, causes, and consequences . As they stopped functioning as credible states, African countries attracted considerable attention from the international community as a potential source of threats to human security and regional and international peace . Consequently, peacebuilding2 has received growing international attention, especially over the past decade, as a “shifting constellation of international and regional organizations, national governments, and nongovernmental organizations has conducted a series of complex ‘peace-building’ operations aimed at stabilizing countries just emerging from periods of internal war .”3 With some successes (Sierra Leone) and many failures (Somalia), peace-building processes have seen many trials and errors and have provided continuous lessons for all parties involved . At the same time, peace-building as a discourse and practice has been evolving over the past two decades with two notable developments . The first one relates to the broadening of peace-building as a concept and the consequent practical implication for peace-building activities in terms of scope and duration of donor engagement . The second one relates to the intensified attempts at deepening inter-donor cooperation to better deal with the challenging tasks of peace-building processes . First, the definition and understanding of peacebuilding as a concept introduced by the UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace4 has gradually expanded over
time . Initially, peace-building was seen as a series of activities aimed at strengthening and solidifying peace in the aftermath of civil strife, such as disarming the warring parties, restoring order, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting political participation . However, when applied in practice, the concept proved to be too narrow and has consequently gained some “weight” to encompass measures in the context of emerging, current, or post-conflict situations for the explicit purpose of preventing violent conflict and promoting lasting and sustainable peace . As such, peace-building has roughly three mutually reinforcing dimensions: 1 . Security: includes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; humanitarian and mine action; improvement of control over small arms and light weapons; and security sector reform . 2 . Governance and political: entails the support for political and administrative authorities and structures; support for the peace-oriented elements of civil society, including the media; reconciliation and the promotion of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms at all levels of society; promotion of good governance, democracy, and human rights; and legal action and truth commissions . 3 . Social, economic, and environmental: involves the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons; (re)building of infrastructure and important government functions; long-term development programs for high-quality and accessible education and health services; technical and financial assistance; and measures to stimulate productive sector development, employment, trade, and investment .5
Peace-building has received growing international attention, especially over the past decade, as a “shifting constellation of international and regional organizations, national governments, and non-governmental organizations has conducted a series of complex ‘peace-building’ operations aimed at stabilizing countries just emerging from periods of internal war.”
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government” Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
Many donorsupported peacebuilding processes in Africa have been fraught with challenges and complexities, including lack of donor cooperation, and have consequently “lost their way.”
Rocha Menocal6 addresses this broadening of the peace-building agenda by observing: “At its most ambitious, peace-building has shifted from the relatively minimalist focus of the ‘negative peace’ toward the maximalist goal of transforming society by strengthening human security and addressing fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities, and other root causes of conflict . Thus interpreted, peace-building is a multifaceted endeavor that includes building democratic governance, protecting human rights, strengthening rule of law, and promoting sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and environmental security .” Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult to separate peace-building from the more ambitious state-building agenda, and deal with the related multiplicity of tasks and processes . The broadening of peace-building as a concept and practice has at least two important consequences for donor governments and international organizations alike . First, donors have begun to re-evaluate their engagement policies and strategies, and consider a wider array of peace-building activities . At the same time, mid- and long-term planning has become necessary, especially in terms of budgeting . “Quick fix” approaches characteristic for the 1990s, such as holding elections and concluding peace agreements in countries emerging from conflict, were “upgraded” to cover such activities as rebuilding of social ties, providing entrepreneurial opportunities, and multi-faceted building of institutions .7 Second, the challenges of peace-building processes, especially in African states, and the levels of assistance needed from donors in terms of financial and other resources to support these processes brought about an understanding that donors cannot effectively engage with failed states in isolation, and that enhanced donor cooperation is necessary . As a result, donors have been collaborating in various ways, such as allocating financial resources through
Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), supporting African regional and sub-regional peace-making and peace-keeping initiatives, and supporting military operations to bring about peace and security, providing humanitarian assistance, and the like . In their aspiration to halt the scourge of conflict in Africa, the world’s leading democracies, which are major international donors at the same time, therefore adhered to various approaches and strategies to support peace-building processes on the continent . The United States, the United Kingdom, and other European Union member states (also referred to as transatlantic donors),8 recognized the need for and made many subsequent steps toward “reconciling” security, political, developmental, and other considerations on their engagement agendas to successfully deal with fragile environments . However, many donor-supported peace-building processes in Africa have been fraught with challenges and complexities, including lack of donor cooperation, and have consequently “lost their way .” The rationale for this paper therefore emerges out of the recognition that peace-building processes represent a new start for many fragile states in terms of rebuilding the state and its institutions, and society as a whole . It is therefore important for donors to engage in these processes with coherent strategies and sufficient funding, reflecting the realities on the ground, and improving the efficiency of their assistance . This is especially important since peace-building consists of numerous civilian and military activities that range from peace-keeping to development assistance, which need to be coordinated to effectively support peace-building in a country . This coordination needs to be undertaken within a donor’s national government (e .g ., within and between various government departments); internationally between donors — the states and international organizations; and between donors and recipient governments .9
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The transatlantic donors have long recognized this need and have made efforts to improve government-wide coherence in their approaches to peace-building (e .g ., intra-government coordination, which is also referred to as “the Whole of Government” (WOG) approach), as well as in terms of creating opportunities for donor cooperation in peace-building processes (e .g ., inter-government cooperation) . In this regard, this paper aims to address two research questions: • To what extent is the WOG approach reflected in the policies and institutional arrangements of the transatlantic donors to reflect the complex and multidimensional nature of peace-building process in Africa’s fragile situations? • What impact have moves toward intragovernmental coordination had on intergovernmental cooperation between the transatlantic donors in terms of opportunities and challenges? Based on the review of policy documents and relevant literature, with some additional insights from
interviews conducted in October and November 2009, this paper argues that transatlantic donors are gradually moving toward developing a comprehensive WOG approach to peace-building that fits into their national political and institutional settings, so the application of the WOG approach remains a work in progress . This also has an impact on the relations between transatlantic donors in terms of insufficient coordination of their peace-building efforts, which makes it difficult to jointly implement their agendas . To address the above issues, this paper begins with an analysis of the peace-building policies of the transatlantic donors, and the challenges linked to the application of the WOG approach .10 The paper continues with an analysis of on-going peace-building and state-building processes in Sudan, where all three transatlantic donors under review have been extensively involved . In analyzing peace-building processes in Sudan, an assessment is made as to what extent the WOG approach has been applied by individual donors, and to what extent donor cooperation and coordination was reflected in their engagement in Sudan peace processes .
The transatlantic donors have long recognized this need and have made efforts to improve government-wide coherence in their approaches to peace-building (e.g. intragovernment coordination, which is also referred to as “the Whole of Government” (WOG) approach), as well as in terms of creating opportunities for donor cooperation in peace-building processes.
In Search of a Common Transatlantic “Whole-Of-Government” Approach to Peace-Building Processes in Africa
Transatlantic Donors and their “Whole-of-Government” Approaches to Peace-Building
for both the donor and the recipient country . For example, the various government institutions dealing with defense, foreign policy, and development may have different conceptions about the right way of achieving peace, which can result in an incoherent government approach to peace-building .11 Third, the inherent “tension” between the defense and all other “civilian” sectors, especially in insecure/conflict environments, undoubtedly contributes to unbalanced approaches to peace-building in Africa . The military-civilian divide is especially difficult to cross in the early stages of donor intervention in conflict situations, when security and political considerations tend to overshadow the development ones . One aspect of this problem is the marked difference in organizational cultures of various government departments, which include attitudes toward authority and decision-making styles .12 This is especially evident when taking account of military and civilian operations . In military settings, decisions are often taken in a hierarchical manner with finite deadlines and relatively clear rules of engagement guiding the military structure . Conversely, civilian operations are usually decentralized within a relatively horizontal structure .13 If these differences are not addressed early in the engagement process, they can lessen the effectiveness of peacebuilding processes . Fourth, the WOG approach demands a high level of coordination between government institutions for an extended period of time . This means that the creation of a more permanent coordinating mechanism/body might prove necessary to deal with the challenges at hand, but a new institution might be perceived as a threat by the existing institutions in terms of competencies and financial resources, and consequently a source of competition and envy rather than cooperation .14
2.1 Introduction The 2007 OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States emphasized that successful engagement in fragile environments depends, at least in part, on well-sequenced and coherent progress across the political, security, economic, administrative, and social domains, thus recognizing the multidimensional and interdependent nature of such engagements . Consequently, working effectively across these domains requires donors to adopt a WOG approach, involving at least departments responsible for security and political affairs, as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian assistance . In this way, the WOG approach comprises at least two aspects: the institutional aspect relating to coordination between various government departments and the policy aspect covering the harmonization of policies of various government institutions and bodies . Both aspects of the WOG approach are relevant for achieving coherence and improving effectiveness in dealing with failed and other fragile states, as well as improving donor coordination . However, there are several factors that can hinder the implementation of a WOG approach . When it comes to intra-governmental cooperation, these factors might include different capabilities of government departments in terms of available financial and human resources . This can result in a more prominent role and influence of one department on the government’s peace-building agenda and thus lead to an imbalanced approach . Second, operating in a fragile or conflict environment without a coherent national/government peace-building strategy may result in competing or even contradictory approaches of individual government departments with undesired outcomes
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In spite of all these challenges, the lessons learned from transatlantic donors’ military interventions in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan — where the U .S . and U .K . forces had been unable to stabilize these countries — supported the emerging consensus in the international community about the need to move toward a WOG approach to peacebuilding . Therefore, this section reviews the policies of the transatlantic donors to assess their respective WOG approaches and the extent to which they have been incorporated in their peace-building agendas . As the analysis will show, changes taking place have been institutional on the one hand, involving the introduction of coordinating mechanisms and bodies, and on the other hand, policy-related when one prevailing peace-building dimension has been infused by other dimensions to reflect the WOG approach . These changes have mainly taken place during the past two decades and reflected their national, regional, and global concerns . The dramatic events of September 11, 2001, have been a highly influential factor in spurring the development of WOG approaches to managing fragile states . 2.2 The United States Several observers of U .S . foreign policy have pointed out that this policy has been largely influenced by U .S . national security concerns, which have not been sufficiently integrated with the U .S . political and long-term developmental goals .15 At the same time, the United States tends to put little emphasis on harmonizing its policies and actions with those of other donors,16 and seems to have a preference for initiating and leading peace-building actions, which is understandable in view of its military, political, and economic power . Even though these observations are to a large extent still valid today, the U .S . government has made several efforts to apply the WOG approach to its dealings with conflict and fragile states in terms of policy coherence and intra-governmental cooperation .
The policy shift toward applying a comprehensive approach to fragile states in U .S . foreign policy has been reflected in a series of national policy documents that have, since 2001, reflected the acknowledged linkages between security, political, and diplomatic objectives, and development/humanitarian objectives . For example, the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS)17 identified weak and failed states as the central threat to global security emanating from the developing world, recognizing the importance of preventative measures and development for ensuring U .S . security interests . This position subsequently resulted in the increased flows of security, developmental, and humanitarian assistance to many African countries, with a stated overriding objective to avert the threat of terrorism .18 Furthermore, the follow-up 2006 U .S . NSS19 set out nine essential tasks for the U .S . government to meet national security challenges . The implementation of these tasks clearly requires a combination of diplomatic, development, and military foreign policy tools . At the same time, the strategy addresses three levels of engagement for dealing with regional conflicts: conflict prevention and resolution, conflict intervention, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction .20 In this way, NSS provides a possible broad policy framework for the application of WOG approach to peace-building . Building on the 2006 NSS, the 2008 National Defense Strategy21 identifies the WOG approach as a way of achieving national defense objectives while stressing that such an approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners . This is based on a recognition that long-term military success includes economic development, institution-building, the rule of law, internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to people, and training and equipping indigenous military and
The U.S. government has made several efforts to apply the WOG approach to its dealings with conflict and fragile states in terms of policy coherence and intra-governmental cooperation.
police forces . Similar positions have been expressed in the 2008 U .S . Army doctrine for operating in fragile states22 and the recent Obama administration 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.23 This move toward greater policy coherence and WOG approach in U .S . foreign policy was reiterated by the then-U .S . Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, who promoted the idea of “Transformational Diplomacy” in her 2006 speech by stating: “In this world, it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts, and our democratic ideas . American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together .”24 Transformational Diplomacy subsequently crystallized around two documents, namely a Strategic Plan prepared jointly by the Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and a USAID Policy Framework .25 Both documents are anchored in the NSS; the Strategic Plan 2007–2012 builds on both 2006 NSS pillars — promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity, and confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies — and puts forward a series of DOS/USAID strategic goals, five of which correspond to the objectives of the Foreign Assistance Framework,26 namely Peace and Security, Governing Justly and Democratically, Investing in People, Economic Growth, and Humanitarian Assistance . It further links its strategic goals to NSS tasks, and indicates potential partners for their implementation, including the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) .27 Although the above-mentioned policy documents cover the main dimensions of peace-building, they do not explicitly refer to U .S . peace-building activities . At the same time, the U .S . government has so far not rallied its policies and resources in support of a single peace-building strategy that would
comprehensively reflect the WOG approach but has instead focused on post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization and support for democracy as the ultimate objectives of the U .S . engagements in fragile states .28 A policy document that closely resembles such a strategy is the USAID 2006 Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid, which covers the strengthening of fragile states as one of its core objectives . This is to be attempted by enhancing stability in political, economic, and social arenas; improving security; advancing reforms that address the drivers of fragility; and developing capacity of essential institutions and basic infrastructure . In this way, it builds on USAID’s Fragile States Strategy from 2005, which aims at improving the U .S . response to this category of states by strengthening effective coordination across the U .S . government approach when engaged in fragile states and (post-)conflict situations . The strategy was an attempt to ensure that development, diplomatic, and security efforts are mutually reinforcing, thus integrating USAID’s assets with those of the DOS and DOD, among others .29 This rebalancing of U .S . foreign policy tools by seeking to enhance the role of development and humanitarian assistance was reflected in some institutional changes in the U .S . government . The second Bush administration sought to reform the U .S . development assistance system through the “F Process .” This process created a new post of the Director of Foreign Assistance within the DOS, who is also the administrator of USAID, overseeing the USAID programs and DOS aid-related work, thus providing a link between the two institutions . The creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the DOS in 2004 is also an indicator of the increased awareness of the relevance of a more coordinated U .S . government response to post-conflict and
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stabilization efforts . Initially, the office had quite an extensive mandate on the basis of the National Security Presidential Directive 44 from December 2005, but it failed to obtain sufficient authority, funding, and respect of the relevant government institutions to carry it out .30 Consequently, its mandate has been scaled down to building inter-agency reconstruction and stabilization capacity, leading integrated strategies on the basis of an Inter-Agency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), and deploying civilian missions to the field, also from a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) . To address the problem of inadequate financial resources, Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act provides funding for improving U .S . capacity and inter-agency coordination for immediate stability, security, or reconstruction assistance programs for unstable countries .31 Other institutional “mechanisms” that seek to improve cross-government coordination in dealing with peace-building activities include several “liaison bodies,” such as the DOS Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs as a link to the DOD, and the DOD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs for liaising with other government institutions . A similar role within USAID is undertaken by its Office of Military Affairs, situated within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance . The interdepartmental and agency policy coordination at the highest level is undertaken within the National Security Council (NSC), which is the U .S . president’s principal advisory body on national security and foreign policy matters, and is composed of his senior national security advisers and cabinet officials . This brief overview highlights the progress of the U .S . government in terms of providing a coherent policy and institutional framework to develop its WOG approach to peace-building . Despite this
notable progress, the challenges remain, the main one being the absence of a truly comprehensive policy framework/strategy to encompass the relevant policies, tools, and actors to mainstream the WOG approach in peace-building activities of the U .S . government . Another challenge at hand is the relatively prominent role of the DOD and national security concerns in U .S . foreign policy that, according to government sources, has created tensions between the DOD, DOS, and USAID, and between the U .S . development, diplomacy, and security objectives at the same time . This role has not only been enhanced due to U .S . national security concerns, but also due to the Pentagon’s frustration over delays in establishing the necessary civilian capabilities for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, for example .32 Therefore, further progress needs to be made in terms of increased coherence between the U .S . security policy and commitment to promoting good governance and democracy, human rights, and poverty-reduction . Special attention needs to be accorded to any reluctance in this regard, since government sources confirm that some senior U .S . military officers do not favor the recent changes in terms of applying of the WOG approach in U .S . foreign policy . In addition, crossing the civilian-military divide is another challenging task at hand . For example, the U .S . defense framework policy documents highlight the need for the WOG approach in policy implementation, and the cooperation with other government departments and agencies, but they hardly elaborate on this need . Some observers have further noted the mismatch between the authorities and resources for DOD on one hand and DOS/USAID on the other for implementing policies . Consequently, DOD has extended its
The challenges remain, the main one being the absence of a truly comprehensive policy framework/ strategy to encompass the relevant policies, tools, and actors to mainstream the WOG approach in peace-building activities of the U.S. government.
domain to compensate for insufficient performance by civilian institutions .33 The other side of this coin is, as some have argued, the erosion of USAID’s budgeting role and its policy planning capacity, and degradation of development in U .S . foreign policy as a result of the “F process,” ironically at a time when U .S . foreign aid was in fact increasing .34 While recognizing the need for multiple U .S . agencies working together on development problems, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) recently expressed concerns about the WOG approach being used to redefine development as a series of technical decisions and devalue the discipline of development .35 Another challenge at hand is fragmentation of U .S . government initiatives and programs related to development and other assistance . Although the Director of Foreign Assistance/Administrator of USAID has authority over all aid programs of USAID and DOS, other foreign assistance programs remain outside the director’s budgetary authority, including those undertaken by DOD .36 However, this situation might improve in the future after the completion of two key initiatives . In September 2009, President Obama signed a Presidential Study Directive on Global Development Policy, which provides the basis for an extensive review of U .S . development efforts, and is currently carried out by numerous government agencies with the National Security Council in the lead . Moreover, the DOS announced a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review in June 2009 to assess diplomatic and developmental efforts of the DOS and USAID . These reviews, together with the expected Obama administration’s first NSS, could provide a good starting point for discussion about the possible ways of improving the U .S . WOG approach to address the acute problems of fragility and underdevelopment of African states,
and underpin a possible future coherent approach to peace-building . Other initiatives that could address the above challenges are President Obama’s proposal to establish a Mediation Unit within the DOS, which would bring together experienced diplomats and other practitioners to develop an inventory of peace-building best practices and lessons learned; and the DOD’s recent proposal on a new model of shared responsibility and pooled resources for cross-cutting security challenges involving DOD and DOS,37 modeled on the U .K .’s Conflict Prevention Pool (see below) . 2.3 The United Kingdom The United Kingdom has long been seen by many policy analysts and donors as one of the models for bilateral donor assistance in applying a relatively coherent WOG approach . The U .K . government’s policy started shifting toward a greater coherence in dealing with failed and fragile states in the late 1990s with the establishment of the Department for International Development (DFID) as a ministry in 1997 to enhance the foreign policy role of development and the fight against poverty, and the publication of the 1998 Strategic Defense Review, which was at the time praised for bringing foreign and defense policy together in a clear, coherent, and affordable fashion .38 As was the case in the United States, the foreign policy of the U .K . Labour government underwent some changes after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 . Prior to the attacks, Whitehall saw its primary security concern residing in Europe and the NATO alliance, and any instability outside Europe was perceived as an indirect threat . Since 2001, the U .K . government has been increasingly focusing on the need to address failed and fragile states,39 also to pursue its counter-terrorism objectives .
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Despite this security concern, the U .K . government tried to mainstream the WOG approach in its foreign policy across its relevant departments . The Ministry of Defense (MOD) issued a Strategic Defense Review: A New Chapter in 2002,40 which reflected cross-government thinking and initiatives at the time . Mainly focusing on the threat of terrorism, the paper states, among other things, that: “The counter-terrorist strategy that is most likely to prove successful over the long term is one that addresses the symptoms and causes of terrorism in a holistic way, using political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement, as well as military measures .”41 In the same year, the International Development Act ring-fenced development from other U .K . foreign policy priorities, which meant that development assistance could not be used to fund programs whose primary aim was to address security threats to the United Kingdom,42 but could support programs that enhance the human security of people in developing countries .43 The U .K . government’s policy on peace-building is rooted in a series of so-called Public Service Agreements (PSAs), which were introduced in 1998 . The current set outlines Whitehall’s key priorities in the 2008-2011 period . Two of them are particularly relevant for the U .K .’s engagement in fragile and conflict situations, namely PSA 29 on reducing poverty through the achievement of MDGs,44 and PSA 30 on reducing the impact of conflicts .45 Among other things, these two PSAs: 1 . outline the strategic approach regarding the U .K .’s engagement in conflict situations, covering conflict prevention, conflict management, stabilization, and consolidation of peace; 2 . establish links between this approach and the United Kingdom’s efforts to help build longterm, sustainable development;
3 . outline the actions the U .K . government is planning to undertake to help poor and fragile states, such as by providing humanitarian aid, helping address the causes of fragility, and improve governance and access to quality basic services; 4 . make an explicit commitment to developing a WOG approach to conflict, and strengthening the U .K . government’s policy coherence . Therefore, these PSAs provide the policy framework for the three main U .K . government’s departments that have been involved in peace-building activities, namely the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DFID, and MOD . As the lead department responsible for the delivery of PSA 30 commitments, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) adopted its own Strategic Framework and Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) for the period 2008/09 to 2010/11 . The policy goal of preventing and resolving conflicts (DSO 6) covers a series of steps to achieve better early warning and early action to prevent conflicts; better integrated national approach to peace operations, stabilization, and post-conflict peace-building; improved capability to tackle the root causes of conflicts, etc . With regard to the development dimension of peace-building, DFID’s most recent policy document entitled Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future from 200946 addresses the link between various dimensions of peace-building . Among other things, the document stresses prevention as the best way to stem conflicts and create the conditions for sustained growth . This is done by building states that are capable of delivering basic services in an effective and fair manner, and are accountable and responsive to its citizens . By bringing together development, defense, and diplomacy and working more effectively across
DFID’s most recent policy document entitled Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future from 200946 addresses the link between various dimensions of peace-building. Among other things, the document stresses prevention as the best way to stem conflicts and create the conditions for sustained growth.
The United Kingdom’s WOG approach to peace-building is further underlined by two interdepartmental financing instruments, namely the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and the Stabilization Aid Fund.
government departments, the U .K . government aims at forging a comprehensive approach toward peace(-building) and helping build peaceful states and societies, making a foundation for sustainable development .47 In this regard, the United Kingdom plans to prioritize support for inclusive political settlements, help address the underlying causes of conflict and fragility, enable states to carry out core functions essential for state survival, and respond to public expectations .48 The U .K . WOG approach was also reflected in the government’s first U .K . National Security Strategy,49 released in 2008, which basically reflects the evolution and prioritization of this approach in dealing with security threats, including failed and fragile states . Among other things, the U .K . NSS states that the most effective way of reducing threats posed by failed states is to strengthen their governance, development, and security capabilities, while at the same time improve the capacity of the international community to stop states such as Afghanistan and Somalia from degenerating further . At the institutional level, a number of initiatives have been introduced to ensure greater intragovernment coordination regarding peace-building activities . To outline the institutional setup for policy coordination, the PSA 30 identifies the Cabinet Office as providing leadership in applying the strategic approach to conflict and insecure environments, while relevant Cabinet Committees can help resolve inter-department disputes when they arise . While the FCO is the lead government department for implementing PSA 30, DFID serves as the main link between the latter PSA and the PSA on International Poverty Reduction, while MOD as a “delivery partner” is entrusted with developing military forces that can deploy quickly and effectively in a range of situations where conflicts have already broken out .
The MOD is also instrumental in clarifying the roles and tasks played by U .K . military and civilian resources in the various stages of conflict . In doing that, the MOD works with the Stabilization Unit, which succeeded the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, jointly established in 2004 by DFID, FCO, and MOD . Initial expectations about the Unit’s role in crisis situations of outlining a strategy and running operations were replaced by a less-ambitious mandate of developing a stability assessment framework and a joint civilian-military doctrine as well as helping to create a pool of civilian experts for postconflict reconstruction and stabilization missions . Two achievements can be mentioned in relation to the Stabilization Unit’s activities, namely the improvement in staffing coherence of post-conflict civilian missions and in bridging the civil-military divide in policy implementation .50 To better support the coordination between the above-mentioned government institutions, each of them has established one or more liaison sections within their respective departments that cover specific areas . For example, DFID’s Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE) has often provided leadership on peace-building with the inputs of conflict advisers .51 Similar tasks are undertaken by FCO’s Conflict Issues Group, which manages the department’s involvement with the Conflict Prevention Pool and other programs with FCO funds, but also serves as a liaison with DFID, MOD, and the Stabilization Unit .52 The United Kingdom’s WOG approach to peacebuilding is further underlined by two interdepartmental financing instruments, namely the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) and the Stabilization Aid Fund . The first is focused mainly on conflict-prevention activities and the latter on funding civil conflict stabilization activities in insecure environments . The Stabilization Aid Fund is managed by the Stabilization Unit on behalf of FCO, DFID, and MOD .
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Two CPPs were established in 2001 as a mechanism to increase cooperation between DFID, the FCO, and the MOD, and to help reduce and prevent conflicts, especially in sub-Saharan Africa . Initially, the Africa CPP was established as a separate instrument, but later it became a program within the Global CPP . The CPP is seen as an instrument for long-term conflict prevention through joint analysis, financing, and coordination in areas where involvement of the three departments can add value to U .K . peace-building . The CPP is viewed by analysts and political strategists alike as a successful concept for policy coherence, in part because the joint resources are substantial enough to induce cooperation, but not large enough to represent competition for the existing institutions .53 At the same time, as some observers have pointed out, the CPP has so far failed in creating joint strategies and programming to improve the use of scarce available funds since these are being used for the implementation of departmental plans and components .54 Although the U .K . government is often praised for making significant progress toward a WOG approach to peace-building, there is still room for improvement . Senior officials in FCO, MOD, and DFID seem to agree that a common approach is the most sensible route to adopt — both quality- and time-wise . However, there seems to be insufficient consensus among the government departments on national objectives and the means to achieving them . Furthermore, properly identifying and designing policies and approaches on the basis of departments’ priorities, as well as the operationalization and implementation of these policies, remains a challenge . In this regard, it has been suggested by government officials that external expertise might be useful to conceive appropriate and well-informed strategies since the departments often work under country expertise/knowledge and time constraints .
Furthermore, as the U .K . government has a solid foundation to build on in terms of peace-building policy framework, it needs to adapt and adjust the framework in line with lessons learned in the field and ensure the continuous support for the WOG approach in this area . More work is also needed on aligning the FCO, DFID, and MOD’s understandings of fragile states and national security interests with the goal of supporting sustainable development in fragile states, and their analytical frameworks .55 The Cabinet Office could increase its efforts to help solving these and other problems through joint analysis or assessment framework, centrally held funding for joint projects, defining joint outcomes, and the like . 2.4 The European Union The development of EU policies and structures related to peace-building can be traced to the early 1990s, when the Maastricht Treaty came into force . This treaty established the so-called threepillar system of the EU, representing the European Communities (pillar one, covering economic integration policies), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (pillar two), and cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)56 (pillar three) . While the first pillar applied the so-called Community method of decisionmaking,57 the second and third pillars followed the inter-governmental decision-making processes, where consensus between the member states is necessary to reach an agreement . As a result, the EU’s foreign and security policy decision-making faced challenges not unlike those revealed in other international governmental organizations . The three-pillar structure of the EU, which was later abolished with the Lisbon Treaty (2007/2009), gave the EU a single legal personality and had important implications for the EU’s WOG approach to peace-building, some of which
More work is also needed on aligning the FCO, DFID, and MOD’s understandings of fragile states and national security interests with the goal of supporting sustainable development in fragile states, and their analytical frameworks.55
are still relevant today . This is true both in terms of policy coordination and cooperation between various EU institutions . First, development policy is considered to be a “shared competency” of the EU and its members, and is thus subject to majority voting in the Council . However, CFSP is subject to specific rules and procedures, including unanimous decision-making in the European Council (Heads of States and Governments) and the Council (Ministers) . Moreover, the implementation of the CFSP is entrusted with EU member states and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a function established by the Lisbon Treaty . Unlike development policy, CFSP is not subject to regulation by legislative acts,58 although member states need to comply with EU actions in this area once decisions are made . Second, apart from its legislative and policyinitiating function to attain the EU objectives, the European Commission has also “co-responsibility” for putting the EU’s common policies into practice and managing the EU budget and programs . This responsibility is considerably reduced when it comes to CFSP, although the Commission’s work covers certain areas of the EU’s external action related to peace-building . It involves at least three Commission Directorate Generals (DGs) dealing with development, external relations, and the delivery of aid .59 This EU institutional set-up means that coordination of EU policies aimed at peace-building requires at least coordination within the Commission (intra-institutional coordination), and between the Commission and inter-governmental EU institutions such as the European Council (inter-institutional coordination) . In addition, since none of the policies related to peace-building (development, foreign policy, and security) are considered to be the exclusive competency of the EU, these policies need to be coordinated with policies and strategies
of the member states to ensure harmonization, or at least complementarity, of approaches . Regarding the challenges of the EU intra- and interinstitutional coordination, some observers have noted that within the Commission, career considerations and jealousy between DGs, as well as turf battles between the Commissioners and their cabinets on the one hand, and competency battles between European Commission and the Council on the other, contribute to a considerable loss of policy synergies .60 Moreover, EU member states themselves have in the past expressed concerns about insufficient coordination between long-term developmental assistance programs and actions taken under CFSP . The Lisbon Treaty seems to aim at overcoming the distinction between the Community and the inter-governmental dimension of EU foreign policy, and at providing greater foreign and defense policy coherence . In this regard the so-called “doublehatting” of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who combines the functions of the former High Representative for CFSP, and of the Vice-President of the Commission in charge of External Relations, seems a promising development .61 Nevertheless, some observers have pointed out that the relations between this new position and the President of the Commission have not been regulated in detail, which allows for some flexibility but potentially can also lead to tension .62 In terms of policy coherence, the challenges faced at the EU level reflect the challenges of inter-institutional cooperation in member states . While conflict prevention and post-conflict transition phases of peace-building have been mainly dealt with in Development DG, the actions related to crisis management and restoration of peace have been undertaken under CFSP . To deal with policy coherence
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issues, which also relate to peace-building activities, several documents have been adopted at the EU level to address the need for complementarity of development and security agendas, with the common aim of creating a secure environment and breaking the vicious cycles of poverty, war, environmental degradation, and failing economic, social, and political structures,63 and for an integrated approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as to other security threats, by using a mixture of civilian and military instruments .64 More recently, the European Commission examined the EU progress in achieving policy coherence and made some suggestions on how to improve “the whole-of-the-Union” approach to development .65 It has noted, first, the progress being made toward achieving better policy coherence by strengthening the links between development and other policies that impact development objectives, and second, the remaining challenges, such as the fact that difficulties encountered at the national level spill over and compound at the EU level, diverging interests that often obstruct consistent positions, and the inconsistency in the EU’s performance in various policy areas . To improve this situation, member states and the European Commission intend to use existing tools to improve policy coherence, including inter-service groups and consultations and impact assessments . The EU’s approach to peace-building is essentially based on an understanding of the complex nature of the threats to security and stability that cannot be tackled by military means only, but can provoke violent or armed responses nevertheless, and about the role of development cooperation in addressing many root causes of conflict directly through the reduction of poverty . This thinking is also reflected in the main EU partnership agreement with developing states — the Cotonou Agreement (2000/2003)66 — valid for the period 2000-2020,
which aims to establish a comprehensive partnership with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states based on development, economic, and trade cooperation . It includes an important political dimension covering diverse issues such as good governance, arms trade, migration, the respect for human rights, rule of law and democratic principles, and peace-building . Despite its developmental focus, the Cotonou Agreement provides for enough flexibility in the allocation of EU resources to be used for the promotion of peace and the managing and settling of conflicts, including post-conflict support . The main financial instrument for the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement is the European Development Fund (EDF). While the EU has a strong preference for multilateral cooperation in undertaking various peacebuilding activities, especially in terms of military involvement, it has made considerable efforts to develop its permanent political and military structures to deal with crises and conflict management . This transformation was also encouraged by the EU’s concerns about terrorist activities around the world in view of the September 11, 2001, events . The evolution of the security component in the EU peace-building approach was undertaken in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), a component of the CFSP . With the Amsterdam Treaty (1997/1999) several tasks were incorporated into this policy, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peace-making . The latest reforms introduced with the Lisbon Treaty regarding ESDP include renaming this policy as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), providing the EU with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets and using the capabilities provided by EU members, and the expansion of ESDP tasks to include joint disarmament operations, military
The EU’s approach to peace-building is essentially based on an understanding of the complex nature of the threats to security and stability that cannot be tackled by military means only.
The main obstacle to a greater EU policy coherence still lies in the fundamental separation between intergovernmental nature of CFSP and the European Commission’s collaborative perception of development work.
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilization .67 At the same time, the EU set out on a course of developing its military capabilities in 1999, reaching full operational capability to conduct two concurrent rapid-response operations of the size of a “Battlegroup” (1,500 men) in 2007, along with civilian capabilities for crisis management as a tool of ESDP in four priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law and civilian administration, and civil protection . Despite the above-mentioned developments in terms of combining the diplomacy, development, and security agendas and policy commitments, the
main obstacle to a greater EU policy coherence still lies in the fundamental separation between intergovernmental nature of CFSP and the European Commission’s collaborative perception of development work .68 In addition to its “bureaucratic complexity,” the European Commission would benefit from further strengthening of inter-DG coordination on competing policies in order to effectively deal with the differences .69 Another challenge the EU faces is the absence of a single approach to peace-building, which would combine the existing instruments of diplomacy, security, and development to achieve the synergies of such an approach .
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Transatlantic Donor Policies Toward an Enhanced Inter-Government Cooperation
from counter-terrorism to governance, conflict prevention and peace-building, trade promotion or development cooperation . Likewise, donors’ constitutional and institutional contexts influence the manner and level of involvement in fragile states . For example, the type of political leadership, the position of departments and agencies within the government system, their different rules and regulations, and the overall political and institutional set-up in donor countries can influence the potential for cooperation . In spite of the above challenges, transatlantic donors have highlighted cooperation with other donors and international organizations as key to achieving their foreign policy objectives and have made some attempts at better coordination of their peace-building policies . For example, they have applied some of the coordinating mechanisms suggested by the OECD Principles for Good International Engagements in Fragile States and Situations70 to support their engagement in peacebuilding processes . The European Consensus on Development has stressed a better donor coordination and complementarity through joint multi-year programs and common implementation mechanisms as one of the EU’s commitments in an attempt to prevent duplication of efforts and to maximize the impact and effectiveness of global aid .71 Similarly, the European Security Strategy recognizes that the EU cannot deal with security threats in isolation, so it needs to pursue its objectives through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors . The EU sees the transatlantic, balanced, and effective partnership with the United States as instrumental in this regard . In March 2008, the EU and the U .S . government established a foundation for cooperation in civilian aspects of crisis management and
Based on the analysis of the WOG approaches to peace-building that have evolved in all three donors under review over the past decade or so, a general conclusion can be made that these approaches remain works in progress . The broadening of transatlantic donors’ peace-building agendas has had an important implication for their engagement in fragile environments in terms of duration and scope of engagement . First, the broadening of peace-building in fragile states to include objectives such as security sector reform, rule of law, improved governance, democratization, sustainable development, basic service delivery, and the like implies the application of a wide range of tools, mechanisms, and policies that can pose a serious challenge for a single donor in terms of financial and human resources . Second, the application of a WOG approach to peacebuilding includes a combination of immediate, short-term, and medium- to long-term measures that could again pose a significant challenge for one donor to face . In this way, the broadening of the peace-building agenda, and the coinciding need for a WOG approach encourages donors to re-evaluate their cooperation strategies and find allies to undertake the growing number of peace-building tasks, share the financial and personnel “burden” of engagement, and avoid wastage due to duplication of efforts . The steps toward mainstreaming the WOG approach in peace-building activities and accompanying challenges have therefore created some opportunities for increased donor cooperation, although the remaining obstacles are still too high to encourage any relevant coordination of engagement policies between transatlantic donors . The reasons for that are numerous and only a few will be pointed out here . For example, donors may approach work in fragile states from very different perspectives, ranging
Transatlantic donors have highlighted cooperation with other donors and international organizations as key to achieving their foreign policy objectives and have made some attempts at better coordination of their peacebuilding policies.
As an EU member, the United Kingdom is also committed to supporting international institutions and a rules-based approach to international affairs and peacebuilding issues while actively supporting a wide range of reforms to build effective global institutions equipped with the capabilities they need to perform their function.
conflict prevention through a joint Work Plan . This cooperation consists of senior-level consultations, the sharing of information and experiences, cross-training of civilian personnel, and promoting development of shared international concepts and terminology, among other things . What seems to be especially relevant for the cooperation in this field is the planned coordination of civilian responses to ongoing crises through detailed consultations and the identification of priority areas on which the bilateral efforts should focus .72 As an EU member, the United Kingdom is also committed to supporting international institutions and a rules-based approach to international affairs and peace-building issues while actively supporting a wide range of reforms to build effective global institutions equipped with the capabilities they need to perform their function . In addition, the United Kingdom continues to rely on and build upon close bilateral relationships with key countries; its partnership with the United States is its most important bilateral relationship, central to U .K . national security .73 As co-legislator and co-decision-maker, the United Kingdom is at the same time in a position to influence the EU peace-building policy . The U .K . government is working toward better coherence among and the employment of available EU tools for peace-building efforts . It is also supporting the effective crisis response and preparedness through the Instrument for Stability (IfS), and through more conflict-sensitive country programming, for example, and deployment of ESDP missions where they can have maximum impact .74 Despite the U .K . government’s support for the EU’s actions, it often acts bilaterally to engage in peace-building activities, as do many other EU member states .
Despite this general inclination to cooperate, there are differences between donors as to how they see this cooperation taking place . For example, the White House, guided by U .S . national security considerations, prefers to take the lead in joint initiatives in support of its foreign policy objectives, or act unilaterally altogether, while EU actions in the field of security are linked to the UN objectives . Furthermore, the United States still sees NATO as the link to “the old continent’s” security architecture, and cooperation with reliable partners, such as the United Kingdom, as a priority . Although observers have noted that there have been some successful cases of U .S .-EU collaboration in the Balkans, and that some degree of cooperation exists in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it is difficult to find signs of genuine collaboration despite little differences in the stated general objectives of both transatlantic donors .75 This can be partially explained by the U .S . government’s problems in applying the WOG approach to peace-building on one hand, and on the other hand, the EU’s challenging task of double coordination — between its members, since many of them are important bilateral donors, and with other donors, states, and international organizations . In addition, the Europeans have a distinctive approach to foreign and security policy that may at times seem at odds with an American approach .76 What follows is an illustration of how the transatlantic donors’ WOG approaches played out in peace-building processes in Sudan . Furthermore, some joint peace initiatives of the transatlantic donors are briefly outlined to highlight some of the successes and challenges of donor cooperation in that country .
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From Policy to Practice: The Application of “The Whole-ofGovernment” Approach in Sudan
seemed promising since underdevelopment and poverty are frequently cited as a root cause of many African conflicts . Although U .S . policy in Africa is often criticized for lacking an integrated engagement strategy, and for having numerous institutionally fragmented initiatives, it has consistently supported the strengthening of African states’ capabilities to successfully deal with traditional/military security threats stemming from fragile environments, including the threat of terrorism . The eradication of terrorism seemed to have been one of the main concerns in relation to the U .S . involvement in Sudan since the early 1990s, when the nature of the Sudanese regime at the time, dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF) with extremist views, led the U .S . government to view Sudan as a potential source of terrorist threats . However, during the Clinton administration, U .S . foreign policy toward Sudan endured contrasting pressures from within the government, especially after 1995 . As a result, the U .S . foreign policy in Sudan between 1995 and 2000 was one of conflict management, combined with development assistance, hard conditionality, and unilateral anti-terrorist measures .77 After 2001, U .S . peace-building efforts in Sudan included mediation, which successfully resulted in the 2005 Naivasha Agreement between the Arab Sudanese government on the one hand and the Christian/animist Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)/Army (SPLA) on the other . Despite some concerns about the United States’ partiality on the part of the Sudanese government, Washington continued to strengthen its commitment to the solution of the Sudan question, including deploying a U .S . Special Envoy to Sudan . Apart from diplomatic initiatives, the U .S . government used development assistance to further U .S .
4.1 Introduction Perhaps more than any other country in subSaharan Africa, Sudan has been the focus of greater transatlantic cooperation and effort in recent years . The United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU, among others, have all devoted considerable policy and resource attention on both the NorthSouth and the Darfur peace-building processes . This section therefore examines to what extent the WOG approach is reflected in transatlantic donors’ Africa strategies, and Sudan strategies in particular, and which government institutions and financial mechanisms are relevant for their implementation . Furthermore, the recent dynamics of the United States’, the United Kingdom’s, and the EU’s individual or joint involvement in Sudan will be examined, focusing on the common features of engagement approaches on one hand, and barriers to the partners’ cooperation on the other . This section will hopefully demonstrate that despite differences in their approaches, the transatlantic donors seem to be in the process of aligning their efforts on the basis of their experiences with peace processes in African states, and Sudan in particular, although the main features seem to remain unchanged . 4.2 The U.S. Involvement in Sudan “In Africa, the promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty . This situation threatens both the core value of the U .S . government — preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority — combating global terror .” This statement from the 2002 NSS basically sums up the U .S . policy toward Africa since 2001 . In this period, two notable developments are worth mentioning . First, the tackling of the African fragile states’ problems received greater attention, thus reinforcing the strategic significance of Africa in U .S . foreign policy; and, second, an increased U .S . interest in development as a foreign policy tool
Since 2005, the U.S. government had provided more than $6 billion in assistance, addressing humanitarian needs (including food), economic growth, (re) building of infrastructure, and delivery of services such as health and education, financed through USAID.
policy objectives in Sudan . As the importance of a multidimensional approach to peace-building was increasingly recognized in the post-September 11 period, development assistance was offered to countries in sub-Saharan Africa with suspected terrorist cells as a means to deter terrorism .78 As a result, the United States increased its aid allocation to Sudan by almost 150 percent between 2001 and 2003 . Since 2005, the U .S . government had provided more than $6 billion in assistance, addressing humanitarian needs (including food), economic growth, (re-)building of infrastructure, and delivery of services such as health and education, financed through USAID . Other projects, jointly funded by USAID and DOS, included support for peace and security by strengthening the capacity of various local actors to address root causes of conflict and engage in peace-building activities . The bulk of these funds have been directed to the South, Darfur, border areas, and Eastern Sudan . Despite the increased levels of development assistance to Sudan over the past decade, security concerns remain the dominant feature of the U .S . administrations . In October 2009, the present U .S . administration unveiled its new Sudan strategy79 that focuses on reinvigorating international support, critical to building peace and security in Sudan . The strategy is the first White House policy on Sudan that recognizes the links between the Darfur question and the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the south . In line with the security situation in Sudan, the U .S . government has put forward three broad strategic objectives, which are a reflection of U .S . security and political concerns: • elping to achieve a definitive end to conflict, h gross human rights abuses, and genocide in Darfur by promoting a negotiated solution that would address the underlying causes of the conflict, strengthen initiatives for ending violent conflict, and improve the humanitarian situation;
• supporting the implementation of the CPA — including the holding of a 2011 referendum — through addressing the unimplemented elements of the Agreement, reinvigorating international engagement, and promoting the development of a post-2011 wealth-sharing agreement; and • ensuring that Sudan does not provide a safe haven for terrorists . While the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan plays the leading role in pursuing the U .S . Sudan strategy, its implementation is also pursued through cooperation with partner states and other international actors, such as the UN and the African Union (AU) .80 In implementing its Sudan strategy, the Obama administration will build on the initiatives of previous administrations, such as the creation of DOD’s U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). This unified combatant command, which was established in 2007, seeks to promote U .S . national security objectives in Africa through working with African states and (sub-)regional organizations to strengthen stability . In this way, it supports the implementation of the first priority of Obama’s foreign policy in Africa, namely providing security assistance to achieve a peaceful African continent, based on support for African conflict resolution mechanisms, conflict-mitigation capacities, and capabilities to carry out peace support operations .81 At the same time, AFRICOM’s stated aim is to promote the National Defense Strategy’s vision of a WOG approach by working with other partners in the U .S . government as well as international partners . While AFRICOM is headed by a military commander, the staff structure reflects this vision, therefore including officials from DOD, DOS, USAID, and other government agencies . AFRICOM clearly highlights the importance of security assistance for the pursuit of U .S . foreign policy objectives and an increased role of
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non-military activities in DOD-sponsored initiatives, such as conflict-prevention and sustained stability, humanitarian assistance, and the fight against infectious diseases, among other things .82 In Sudan, AFRICOM is involved in helping the U .S . government to lead an international effort to undertake security-sector reform in southern Sudan by professionalizing the SPLM army and increasing their defense capabilities in view of the full implementation of the CPA . At the same time, the U .S . Air Force AFRICOM component continues to provide transport support to peacekeeping forces destined for Darfur . Despite these positive attempts at helping to resolve Sudan’s impasse, Washington continues to face several challenges that might affect its Sudan policy . A former U .S . government official confirms that the contradictions arising from U .S . foreign policy in Sudan limit U .S . options for negotiating . If the United States aspires to support the CPA to halt the violence in Sudan while pursuing its counterterrorism agenda at the same time, this is bound to create tensions with the Sudanese government as the U .S . counter-terrorist stance is likely to be perceived as anti-Muslim . Sources within the U .S . government have also indicated that there are some tensions between the Special Envoy to Sudan and the DOS regarding how to engage with Khartoum . On the one hand, DOS would like to see regime-change take place in Sudan, since the Sudanese leadership has already been indicted for crimes against humanity in Darfur, whereas on the other hand the Office of the Special Envoy to Sudan would like to negotiate with the regime to achieve the cessation of violence and make progress toward peace . 4.3 The U.K. Engagement in Sudan The U .K .’s involvement in Sudan has been characterized by strategic cooperation between DFID, the MOD, and the FCO . There has been a fair
amount of interaction, coordination, information sharing, and joint analysis . It can be argued that the United Kingdom reinvigorated its engagement in Sudan in early 2002, with the appointment of a Special Representative in Sudan, and with the establishment of the joint FCO/DFID Sudan Unit, located within the FCO, with the support, but not involvement, of the MOD . The Sudan Unit was therefore formed to revive the U .K .’s engagement in Sudan and give it a stronger inter-departmental underpinning . The Sudan Unit recommended the use of the Africa CPP to fund the U .K . involvement in Sudan — including the IGAD-led peace process and AU deployment in Darfur — since it provided rapid and flexible funding . The Sudan Unit has been the main point of contact between the different government departments, ensuring a close connection between political priority assessments and spending decisions . It complemented the role of the Africa Greater Horn Department (the structure of DFID has since changed; there are now two directorates: East and Central Africa; and West and Southern Africa), which concentrated on humanitarian assistance, and the Department for Overseas Military Aid/Defense Policy Directorate at the MOD . This has led to a well-defined policy and implementation structure .83 In 2005, when DFID issued an engagement strategy for Sudan, the U .K . government goals in Sudan mainly covered reaching a just and lasting peace, and laying foundations for achieving sustained poverty reduction to reach Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) . To this end, the U .K . government was planning to help: • eet humanitarian, recovery, and reintegration m needs to benefit the poor; • provide assistance to implement the peace agreement by supporting demobilization and reintegration of combatants and the like;
• support the development of effective governance; and • support the development and implementation of pro-poor policies .84 Since then, these objectives were fine-tuned and elaborated to include the support for the implementation of formal peace agreements — the CPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) . This included the provision of the CPA on national elections that took place in April 2010, broader peace-building, security sector reform (strengthening the police and judiciary to promote the rule of law), especially the transformation of SPLA into a professional army operating under civilian control, and the promotion of conflict-sensitive recovery and development . At the same time, the U .K . government is trying to exert pressure on all parties in the Darfur conflict to stop fighting and to work on establishing effective peace-keeping . To achieve the above ends, the U .K . government provided $667 million in aid to Sudan between 2002 and 2007, and another $220 million in 200809 . This assistance was mainly delivered through pooled international funding, such as MDTFs, UN Common Humanitarian Fund, and the like . The Africa CPP (now known only as the CPP) was also used to fund programs in Sudan and the Horn of Africa as a whole (around £7 .5 million) .85 The Stabilization Unit has also been involved with Sudan in the past few years, supporting the Darfur Dialogue and Consultations, with an aim to engage civil society in a bottom-up peace-building process through dialogue with local groups . Despite the achieved levels of coordination between the relevant government departments, there are some recuring challenges that require reconciliation of different positions, mainly between the FCO and DFID, at the Cabinet level . According to U .K . government officials, the main problem seems to
The EU’s current approach to conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa is reflected in its EU Strategy for Africa from 2005,86 as well as in the Council Common Position on conflict prevention, management, and resolution from 2005.
be the nature of Sudan engagement strategy . While DFID advocates apolitical engagement in Sudan, FCO seems to be reluctant to deal with a regime headed by a politician indicted by the International Court of Justice . Furthermore, U .K . government sources have indicated that the Sudan Unit, as the driver of the U .K . Sudan policy, has faced challenges of coordination when engaging with other transatlantic donors . These were at least two-fold: there was no similar counterpart in the U .S . government or in the EU institutional structure, and there was an absence of unified position or strategy regarding the engagement in Sudan . 4.4 The EU’s Sudan Engagement Policy The EU’s current approach to conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa is reflected in its EU Strategy for Africa from 2005,86 as well as in the Council Common Position on conflict prevention, management, and resolution from 2005 .87 The EU Strategy for Africa outlines its response strategy to Africa’s challenges, targeting three broad areas: 1 . Peace, security and good governance, where the EU aims to employ a wide range of actions, such as the support for African peace operations and a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, by addressing the root causes of violent conflict . Moreover, the EU plans to work toward building effective and credible central government institutions, reinforcing respect for human rights and democracy, developing local capacity, and encouraging the decentralization process . 2 . Economic growth to contribute to the effective reduction of poverty across Africa by supporting macroeconomic stability and assisting in the creation of integrated regional markets . 3 . Social cohesion and environment, by contributing to the establishment of social safety
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nets for the most vulnerable through supporting the delivery of essential services for the poor, and by supporting the effective management of environmental diversity, the improvement of sustainable land management to halt desertification, and the like . The 2005 Council Common Position88 reflects the above strategy by prioritizing conflict prevention and its mainstreaming within the EU’s Africa development and trade policies, and by focusing on supporting African regional and sub-regional peace-building arrangements and capabilities . At the same time, it also allows for the potential deployment of EU and member-states’ means for conflict prevention and crisis management, following decision on a case-bycase basis . The Common Position further reiterates the complementarity of EU actions under CFSP, EU Community instruments, and bilateral actions of EU member states while highlighting the need for better coordination between the EU and member states in this field . It calls for better cooperation with the UN, the AU, and African sub-regional organizations, and with interested partner states, the United States included . This broad EU policy framework was applied in the 2006 EU regional political partnership for peace, security, and development in the Horn of Africa .89 The main objective of this policy is to help reduce instability in the Horn of Africa, which includes Sudan, as a prerequisite for reaching the MDGs . The document sets out the EU’s approach to conflict prevention in the region, tackling in the short and medium term the root causes of instability at both country and regional level, and strengthening regional cooperation . It was adopted as a guide for EU external action in the region and for the formulation of Country and Regional Strategy Papers based on the Cotonou Agreement .90 Based on the above policy documents, the EU’s conflict-prevention and developmental approach
to peace-building in Sudan is mainly undertaken within the development cooperation framework of the Cotonou Agreement . The EU’s main priorities in Sudan are: • disbursing aid for recovery and rehabilitation across Sudan’s war-affected areas; • supporting the implementation of the CPA to prevent further conflict and promote democratization; • supporting international mediation efforts to resolve outstanding issues between North and South, and between the parties in the Darfur conflict; and • maintaining dialogue with Khartoum, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and other interested parties on issues of mutual concern . The EU has committed over €500 million for development assistance to Sudan since 2005, covering post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation, and development activities, and €640 million for humanitarian assistance since 2003 . At present, Sudan is not eligible to use the EDF funds allocated for the period 2008-2013 of around €300 million, pledged at the May 2008 Sudan Consortium, as the Sudanese Government decided not to ratify the revised Cotonou Agreement .91 In the meantime, the country is still eligible to receive humanitarian assistance and funds through other EU financial instruments . EDF, however, is instrumental in funding the African Peace Facility (APF), established in 2004 to fund African peace-building efforts in terms of capacity-building, peace support operations, and an early response to crisis . In this way, the APF provided financial support for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), making it the biggest African-led peace support operation financed by the APF, amounting to €350 million . Another EC financial instrument — Instrument for Stability
The EU has committed over €500 million for development assistance to Sudan since 2005, covering post-conflict recovery, rehabilitation, and development activities, and €640 million for humanitarian assistance since 2003.
Since lack of sufficient coordination among the activities of member states and the European Commission was highlighted as a challenge the EU needs to deal with in the near future.
(IfS) — was used to support peace-building activities in Darfur through the UN-administered Trust Fund for the African Union-United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) for Darfur . This Fund was set up to support the joint efforts of the AU and UN to revitalize the peace process in Darfur, and to provide direct support to the negotiations and related preparatory measures . Apart from using development assistance/ Community pillar mechanisms to advance its policy on Sudan, the EU applied diplomatic/political and military means for Sudan conflict management . These were applied under CFSP, as well as under Community pillar policies . Since the 1990s, the European Commission refused to constructively engage with the Sudanese government because of its disreputable human rights records, although it continued to provide humanitarian aid to the country . For example, in 1994 the EU supported the UN limited arms embargo on Sudan, in line with the CFSP common position at the time . The EU imposed further measures in January 2004 and May 2005 to impose a comprehensive arms embargo, which was also in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1591 . Other EU actions undertaken within the confines of the CFSP in support of the EU’s approach to Sudan question were the appointment of an EU Special Representative for Sudan in 2005, the EU military observer mission in Darfur in 2004, and a civilian-military ESDP operation in support of AMIS from July 2005 to December 2007, when AMIS ceased operating with the handover to joint AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) . Furthermore, the European Commission deployed the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM),92 a “predecessor” of IfS, for landmine clearing in the Nuba Mountains in 2002, but as a Community and not a CFSP action .
As the EU looks to redefine its role in Sudan, possibly incorporating peace-building as a focus, it intends to increase the coordination among its member states to achieve a more coherent approach to the Sudan problem,93 since lack of sufficient coordination among the activities of member states and the European Commission was highlighted as a challenge the EU needs to deal with in the near future . Apart from improving coordination within, the EU also faces the challenges of how to apply the agreed policies in practice, especially regarding its co-engagement in peace-building activities with transatlantic donors . While the EU is striving to adhere to the OECD-DAC principles of engagement in fragile states, in practice coherence between the EU’s approach and those of its partners has not yet been achieved . 4.5 Joint Involvement of Transatlantic Donors in Sudan The transatlantic donors have pursued joint initiatives with other actors to engage in peace-building activities in Sudan . The policy documents of all three transatlantic donors indicate cooperation with other multilateral or bilateral donors as a way to achieve strategic partnership for realization of their objectives on the African continent, and in Sudan in particular . The United Kingdom is specifically well-positioned to develop a productive donor-to-donor relationship due to its traditionally good ties with the United States on the one hand, and its membership in the EU on the other . All three donors under review have put a particular emphasis on helping to resolve the conflict in Sudan by appointing a special representative for this country . At the same time, they realized the importance of a regional approach to resolving the conflict in Sudan by developing an engagement strategy for the East and Horn of Africa region, especially the EU and the United Kingdom .
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The transatlantic donors have also supported the efforts of regional and sub-regional organizations to achieve peace in Sudan, namely AU and IGAD . This approach reflected their thinking about the importance of strong African institutions and forces that would be able to effectively engage in mediation, peace operations, and post-conflict stabilization on the continent . The main common objective regarding the transatlantic donors’ involvement in Sudan is undoubtedly supporting the full implementation of the CPA, bringing peace and stability to Darfur, as well as strengthening the institutions of the GoSS and supporting security sector reform in southern Sudan . Below are some examples of the past and present joint peace-building initiatives and coordinating mechanisms in Sudan in which transatlantic donors have taken part . Since 2000 the United Kingdom, the United States, and Norway worked together to support the IGAD-led peace process and to encourage the two principal parties — the Government of Sudan and the SPLM — to reach a ceasefire and work toward a lasting solution to Africa’s longest-running war . In the same vein, the peace talks on Darfur were supported by numerous international actors, the transatlantic donors included . To support implementation of the CPA, the U .S . Special Envoy to Sudan has already organized a Forum for Supporters of the CPA, and reinvigorated the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway acting as CPA guarantors) to coordinate international efforts . More recently, the United States, the EU, and the United Kingdom have teamed up with China, France, and Russia (the so-called E6 group) to pursue a joint peace initiative to help resolve the crisis in Sudan . This is done mainly through political support of the UN/AU efforts to engage with rebel factions
and Darfur, as part of a broader effort to restart peace talks in Sudan, and a commitment to the implementation of CPA in terms of reaching an agreement as regards the 2011 referendum on the South’s independence . The E6 have also been active in pointing out the remaining challenges of the Sudanese peace process and in calling for the actions needed to address these challenges .94 In terms of post-CPA planning, several donorcoordinating mechanisms have been tried . First, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the EU have teamed up with other donors such as the Netherlands and Norway to provide a coherent and coordinated support for the UN and the World Bank’s multilateral national peace and development framework . In this regard, the UN and the World Bank have undertaken a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to determine the needs of Sudan over the pre-interim and interim periods (six and a half years from the day the CPA was signed) . This process has resulted in the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and Poverty Eradication, which will be supported by domestic efforts and resources, as well as development partners, in addressing underlying structural causes of conflict and underdevelopment in Sudan, and has led to a much stronger coordination between donors at the sectoral level and between parties of the peace talks at a strategic level . Apart from JAM, two MDTFs were created on the basis of the CPA provisions, one for the Khartoum government, and the other for the GoSS . Although both MDTFs together managed to raise funds at the Oslo Donor Conference in 2005 of more than $4 .5 billion, they have been widely criticized for slow progress, mainly on account of limited institutional capability of recipients and the World Bank’s requirements in terms of financial control and accountability mechanisms .95
The main common objective regarding the transatlantic donors’ involvement in Sudan is undoubtedly supporting the full implementation of the CPA, bringing peace and stability to Darfur, as well as strengthening the institutions of the GoSS and supporting security sector reform in southern Sudan.
Another relatively innovative mechanism of donor coordination worth mentioning was established in 2006, although with the involvement of only the United Kingdom and other bilateral donors: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden . They established the Joint Donor Office in Juba to coordinate and pool development assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan through its MDTF . The results of this mechanism have been mixed so far . Although the office’s team has made a fair contribution to strengthening donor alignment to the GoSS policies, there are several challenges that prevent the full implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding, including no common Sudan engagement strategy, varying approaches of the donors involved in terms of resources, regional interests, nature of their engagement policy with governments in Sudan, staff shortages, and an increase in participating donors’ bilateral programs, to mention a few .96
The Joint Donor Office experience has therefore exposed several challenges to donor cooperation in Sudan . Other challenges that have been mentioned in relation to donor cooperation in that country include: the differences between donors in terms of their policies and objectives (some donors support the Khartoum and South Sudan governments while the United States engages more intensively with the latter); the sensitive nature of security-related issues (no actor is assuming the responsibility for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration); explicit division of labor between political and developmental arms of donor governments (Development DG vs . DG External Relations; DOS vs . USAID); and the complexities of the Sudan question (treating the whole of Sudan as one problem or as a set of separate peace processes) .97
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This paper has tried to provide a brief analysis of policy and institutional changes undertaken by transatlantic donors to improve intra- and inter-government coordination for dealing with the complex tasks of peace-building processes in African fragile states . As the implementation of such coordination requires adopting a practical, multidimensional, and integrated approach, the transatlantic donors recognized the relevance of applying the WOG approach to peace-building in African states . The record of all three transatlantic donors in terms of mainstreaming the WOG approach to peacebuilding has been mixed at best . Although some similarities pointed out below can be observed, donors seem to be progressing with “varying speeds,” and preserving the main features of their “traditional” approach to peace-building . This situation also has an impact on inter-donor cooperation, which is still the subject of diverging national interests and priorities . Below are some of the findings of this paper . 1 . All transatlantic donors have changed their conceptions of peace-building in line with their experiences on the ground . Both the United Kingdom and the United States have recognized that a military approach does not necessarily bring security and stability to a country, while the EU has realized that its development partnerships will not work without peace and reasonable levels of security . However, while the EU is still mainly advancing “policy coherence for development” by focusing on conflictprevention, the United States seems to prefer “policy coherence for national security” and focuses mainly on post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction with democracy as the ultimate goal of U .S . engagement . The United Kingdom’s policy is somewhere in between, although its approach of supporting effective state-building and economic development resembles the
EU’s preventative approach .98 Since any major shifts in these policies are not likely to occur, at least in the near future, the main challenge for transatlantic donors remains how to transcend their policy differences in pursuit of enhanced donor cooperation . 2 . Although there seems to be a consensus at least at the highest level about the benefits of a WOG approach to engagement in fragile states, this consensus has so far failed to materialize in a comprehensive policy framework . Nevertheless, such a document might ultimately crystallize on the basis of and through refining the national security, development, and foreign policy documents . This problem is exacerbated by the fact that none of the transatlantic donors currently possesses a strong central coordinating authority over individual departments, agencies, or institutions, although mechanisms exist in the U .K . Cabinet Office and U .S . executive branch that could be used to that effect . A coherent peace-building strategy with an oversight of a strong central authority is more likely to result in effective transatlantic cooperation with other donors and aid recipients alike . 3 . All transatlantic donors have realized the importance of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction as an inherently civilian-military operation, thus establishing mechanisms to deal with these challenges . However, in the United Kingdom, and even more in the United States, these mechanisms were slow to gather enough political and financial backing to be fully operational . However, the postconflict reconstruction and development could be a possible future area of successful donor cooperation . 4 . In both the United Kingdom and the United States, the government departments dealing with foreign policy — the FCO and DOS, respectively
— have faced some erosion of their traditional leadership in foreign affairs . In the United States, this happened after the Pentagon assumed some responsibilities traditionally entrusted with civilian departments, such as dispensing development assistance, while in the United Kingdom, DFID has taken over as a leading department for the peace-building/fragile states agenda . These differences are also indicative of the different approaches both transatlantic donors have taken toward fragile states, and are reflected in their institutional settings . For example, while DFID has a status of a ministry, USAID is an independent U .S . government agency with the USAID Administrator under direct authority and policy guidance of the Secretary of State . Although different institutional contexts may pose some challenges for transatlantic donor cooperation regarding their engagement in fragile states, a clear designation of contact points within individual departments and/or the national coordinating body would make inter-donor liaising less challenging . 5 . All transatlantic donors are facing the challenges of intra-governmental and institutional communication and cooperation for many reasons, one of them being the lens through which each government department views engagement in fragile countries, reflecting its unique institutional mandate and policy as a defense, diplomatic, or development actor .99 This situation can represent a continuous source of inter-departmental tensions . But on a
positive note, it can be constructive in devising a quality policy framework and in incorporating perspectives of the various departments, thus supporting the mainstreaming of the WOG approach in their peace-building policies . “Enriched” in this way, these policies would be better equipped to rally support and commitment of various governmental departments and would consequently more likely provide a good basis for cooperation with partner states at the same time . 6 . Africa’s “hot spots,” such as Sudan, provided transatlantic donors with testing grounds and lesson-learning for their policies and instruments to help advance the peace-building processes, such as the United Kingdom’s CPP, the EU’s financial instruments, or the United States’ S/SRC . At the same time, the donors seemed to have recognized that security, political, and developmental challenges in African fragile states are closely embedded into wider regional problems, such as in Sudan, and that the magnitude of these problems compels donors to undertake joint efforts and initiatives . In Sudan, as some observers have noted, the donor community was relatively successful in joining to support JAM and MDTFs, as well as in trying some innovative cooperation mechanisms, such as Joint Donor Offices . However, at the same time, some traditional problems of donor cooperation, such as trying to implement their own agenda, have obstructed the timely and efficient delivery of assistance .
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Based on the overview of transatlantic donors’ policies toward Africa in general, and their engagement in Sudan in particular, some of the recommendations for advancing the WOG approach in transatlantic donor engagement in peace-building process — and their cooperation in these processes — are put forward as the basis for further discussions . In advancing the WOG approach in their peacebuilding strategies, R1 . The governments of transatlantic donors should be encouraged to adopt a national policy framework, which would provide a clear vision and unified strategy, covering various stages of peace-building in failed and fragile states . Such a strategy would be relevant for at least two reasons: first it would provide a basis for intra-government cooperation and peace-building efforts, and indicate the priority areas in terms of action and the allocation of financial and human resources . Second, such policy frameworks would offer other donor/ partner states some information and guidance as to which potential areas of cooperation and common engagement in peace-building processes are worth pursuing . R2 . Such policy frameworks should be comprehensive enough to cover all the basic entry points of engagement (security, political and diplomatic, developmental) in peace-building processes in line with the WOG approach, as well as flexible enough to adapt to various possible situations in African fragile states, and to absorb the lessons learned on the ground . R3 . At the same time, common policy frameworks could address several dilemmas for national governments regarding WOG approach to peace-building: • balancing national interests versus fragile states’ needs;
• taking an incremental approach or an ambitious redesign to improve intra-governmental coordination; • institutionalizing a WOG approach or relying on ad hoc/periodic intra-government cooperation on a need-to-need basis; • coordinating policies at the highest level or mostly relying on government departments themselves to pursue the WOG approach; and • pooling financial resources or using individual thematic budget lines . R4 . Donors should be encouraged to work toward providing sufficient incentives for the adoption of an integrated approach to peace-building in fragile states in order to avoid competition and tensions between the relevant government departments . Better coordination between government departments could be achieved by each department embedding its activities within other departments in the donor’s overall peace-building framework, which could lead to better operational effectiveness . In addition, the roles of actors involved need to be clarified and differences in organizational culture among the relevant institutions taken into account . At the same time, crossstaffing (inter-departmental “secondments”) could help improve understanding between various departments . Regarding the improvement in transatlantic donor coordination to increase the effectiveness of their support for peace-building processes in African states, it can be suggested that: R5 . The efficient and continuous coordination between transatlantic donors is more likely to succeed if undertaken within a permanent common framework or international organization such as the UN . The latter has the
necessary experience with conflict and postconflict situations, and can provide a forum for discussions between donors on one the hand, and donors and aid recipients/fragile states on the other . In this regard, it would also be relevant for donors to tie some of their foreign policy objectives and priorities to UN peacebuilding processes, for example, and press for needed institutional and other reforms . R6 . The transatlantic donors could move toward a greater convergence of their peace-building strategies by aligning their assistance with development and other strategies of the recipient states . Apart from increasing the “local” ownership of peace-building and development efforts, national development strategies of recipient states could provide a common focus for all the donors in the absence of joint donor engagement strategies. R7 . At the same time, continuity in the cooperation of transatlantic donors can be achieved through the long-term support for regional or sub-regional African organizations involved
in peace-building, which are in desperate need of financial and other assistance . R8 . In the absence of a common peace-building framework, ad-hoc cooperation between transatlantic donors, as well as donors’ support for UN and regional peace-building efforts, is a more likely option at present . Such cooperation could include modest initiatives such as cross-lesson learning, or more elaborate operations based on the “lead donor and delegated cooperation” principle .100 Successful cooperation between transatlantic donors can gradually result in a multilateral permanent arrangement entrusted with the coordination of donor peace-building efforts . R9 . Given the different capabilities and priorities of individual donors in terms of dealing with various dimensions of peace-building in fragile environments, donor peace-building activities would not only benefit from joint initiatives, but also from exploring and engaging in complementary initiatives/programs .101
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1 At the time this paper was written, Timothy Othieno was an independent consultant . He is currently a Conflict and Peacebuilding Adviser at the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom . Vita Sebek is an independent consultant whose area of expertise is Africa’s security architecture and political economy . 2 In this paper, peace-building refers to all those activities and measures that are aimed at preventing and resolving conflicts, and sustaining peace, such as unilateral or multilateral diplomatic initiatives, military interventions, developmental and humanitarian assistance, and the like . For more, see section 2 .2 . 3 Roland Paris and Timothy D . Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008) . 4 United Nations, An Agenda for Peace — Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992), http://www .un .org/Docs/SG/agpeace .html (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 5 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate — the Development Assistance Committee, Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention: Peacebuilding Overview, Issues Briefs (Paris: OECD DAC, 2005), http:/www .oecd .org/13/28/ 35034360 .pdf (accessed 14 .10 .2009) . See also OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, The Development Assistance Committee, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Paris: OECD DAC, April 2007), http://www .oecd .org/ dataoecd/ 61/45/38368714 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 6 Alina Rocha Menocal, “State-Building for Peace — A New Paradigm for International Engagement in Post-Conflict Fragile States?” Paper prepared for Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms Workshop, the European Report on Development, Florence, Italy 16-17 April 2009 . 7 Roland Paris and Timothy D . Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding — Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge Press, 2008) . 8 These donors have been selected as a focus of this paper since they represent the most active and influential supporters of peace-building processes in Africa in terms of security, political, and developmental assistance . 9 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs . “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence .” In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 17 .
10 This paper mainly covers the analysis of relevant policy documents; however, this does not suggest the WOG approach should not be mainstreamed in the policy implementation and evaluation as well . At the same time, the paper does not cover the coordination between institutions in the capital and diplomatic and other representations abroad, the latter representing a valuable “asset” in terms of policy input, implementation, and feedback . 11 An example of an incoherent approach to peace-building would be concomitant implementation of arms exports policy and conflict resolution efforts in aid-recipient states . 12 Further differences between various government departments might include incompatible goals and different operational language, methods, approaches, and the like . According to U .S . government sources, these differences are especially notable when comparing DOD on one hand, and DOS and USAID on the other . For example, the DOD has understandably a different point of engagement in fragile states than the DOS and USAID, and a shorter timeline in terms of expectations and requirements . 13 See Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis,” International Journal of Peace Studies 7, no . 2 (Autumn-Winter 2002), 35-56; and Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 198 . 14 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs, “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,” in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 49 . 15 William M . Bellamy “Making Better Sense of U .S . Security Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration, ed . Jennifer G . Cooke, and Stephen J . Morrison (Washington DC, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 10 . See also Nancy Birdsall, “Righting the Three-Legged Stool: Why Global Development Matters for Americans and What the Next President Should Do About It,” in The White House and the World — A Global Development Agenda for the Next U.S. President, ed . Nancy Birdsall (Washington: Center for Global Development, 2008), 1–42 . 16 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 32 .
17 United States — The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), http://merln .ndu .edu/whitepapers/USnss2002 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 18 The aid to sub-Saharan Africa reportedly tripled from $2 .3 billion in 2000 to $6 .6 billion in 2006 . See Princeton N . Lyman, “U .S . Foreign Assistance and Trade Policies in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration, ed . Jennifer G . Cooke and Stephen J . Morrison (Washington DC, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 111 . Also see William M . Bellamy, “Making Better Sense of U .S . Security Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration, ed . Jennifer G . Cooke, and Stephen J . Morrison (Washington DC, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 15-16 . 19 U .S . — The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006), http://www . strategicstudiesinstitute .army .mil/pdffiles/nss .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010), 15 . 20 These levels of engagement cover only certain U .S . peacebuilding activities (diplomatic-political and military), and exclude development as an instrumental peace-building tool . 21 U .S . Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy . Washington DC, June 2008 . http://www .defense .gov/ news/ 2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy .pdf (accessed 02 .02 .2010) . 22 Essentially, this doctrine expands the traditional role of the army to include the promotion of participation in government, spurring economic development, and addressing the root causes of conflict as tools for achieving peace . At the same time, the doctrine strongly emphasizes the WOG approach as instrumental for achieving sustainable peace . See U .S . Department of the Army, Headquarters, Stability Operations — Field Manual No. 03-07 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), http://usacac .army .mil/CAC2/ Repository/ FM307/FM3-07 .pdf (accessed 24 .01 .2010) . 23 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review sees the prevention of conflicts as one of the main objectives of the U .S . defense strategy, adding that: “Preventing the rise of threats to U .S . interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability .” See U .S . Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington DC, February 2010), http://www .defense .gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20 of%2029JAN10%201600 .pdf (accessed 03 .02 .2010) .
24 Diana Cammack et al ., Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice — Report submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (London: ODI, March 2006), http://www .odi .org .uk/resources/ download/1317 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 25 This USAID framework has five core strategic goals, namely: promoting transformational development, strengthening of fragile states, supporting strategic states, providing humanitarian relief, and addressing global issues and other special concerns . However, this document seems to be in need of revision in view of the Foreign Assistance Framework and Strategic Plan 2007-2012 . See U .S . Agency for International Development, Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid — Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through Development (USAID, January 2006), http://www .usaid .gov/policy/policy_ framework_jan06 .pdf (accessed 03 .02 .2010) . 26 This framework was designed as an analytical tool with an overarching goal of helping to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system . It provides a single point of reference for USAID and DOS to coordinate their efforts in terms of foreign assistance . Based on this framework, a set of common definitions, program areas, and associated activities was adopted in the form of the Standardized Program Structure and Definitions as a tool for inter-agency use and for categorization of DOS/USAID managed assistance . 27 MCC was established in 2004 by U .S . Congress as an independent foreign assistance agency, tasked with helping “well-performing countries,” that are committed to good governance, economic freedom, and investments in their citizens, to reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth in the form of grants . 28 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 32, 37 . 29 U .S . Agency for International Development, Fragile States Strategy (USAID, January 2005), http://www .usaid .gov/ policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy .pdf (accessed 03 .02 .2010) . 30 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 38–41 . 31 For example, while new S/CRS inter-agency authorities were under consideration, the DOD-issued Directive 3000 .05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations in November 2005, designating stability operations as a core U .S . military mission
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that the DOD will be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations . 32 Steward Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 42 . 33 Ibid . 34 J . Brian Atwood, M . Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, “Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool,” in Foreign Affairs, 87:6 (November/December 2008) . http://www .stimson .org/budgeting/pdf/Foreign_AffairsAtwood_Natsios_McPherson .pdf (accessed 02 .03 .2010) . 35 Foreign Assistance and Development in a New Era, speech by Senator Richard G . Lugar at Society for International Development Annual Gala Dinner, January 28, 2010 . http:// lugar .senate .gov/press/record .cfm?id=321891 (accessed 02 .03 .2010) . 36 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, the Development Assistance Committee, United States Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review (Paris: OECD, 2006), http://www .oecd .org/dataoecd/61/57/37885999 .pdf (accessed 02 .02 .2010) . 37 U .S . Department of Defense — The Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretary of State — Options for Remodeling Security Sector Assistance Authorities (Washington DC, December 15 2009), http://www . washingtonpost .com/wp-srv/ nation/documents/Gates_to_Clinton_121509 .pdf (accessed 24 .01 .2010) . 38 Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, “Blair’s Wars and Brown’s Budget: from Strategic Defense Review to Strategic Decay in Less than a Decade,” International Affairs, 85:2 (2009), http://www .chathamhouse .org .uk/files/13546_85_2cornish_ dorman .pdf (accessed 07 .02 .2010), 247-261 . 39 Diana Cammack et al ., Donors and the ‘Fragile States’ Agenda: A Survey of Current Thinking and Practice — Report submitted to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (London: ODI, March 2006), http://www .odi .org .uk/resources/ download/1317 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010), 41 40 In July 2009, the U .K . government announced, that a new strategic defense review was in preparation . A Green Paper is due to be released in early 2010, examining defense policy as a whole — its purpose, the way it works, what the services expect, its technological priorities . At the same time it will look at how the MOD works with other government departments, and the contribution the armed forces can make to international diplomacy and the projection of “soft power” to prevent conflicts .
41 U .K . Ministry of Defense, The Strategic Defense Review: A New Chapter (July 2002), http://www .mod .uk/NR/rdonlyres/ DD89DBE6-CEAA-4995-9E01-52EF6D19FC73/0/sdr_a_ new_chapter_%20% 20% 20%20cm5566_vol2 .pdf (accessed 24 .01 .2010) . 42 Simon Burall, Jonathan M . White, and Andrew Blick, “The Impact of U .S . and U .K . Legislatures on Aid Delivery,” Economic Policy Paper Series 09 (Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2009), 17 . 43 DFID’s White Papers have regularly highlighted the links between development and security . For example, see U .K . Department of International Development, Eliminating st World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21 Century (White Paper on International Development) (London: Department for International Development, 1997), http://www .dfid .gov .uk/ Documents/publications/whitepaper1997 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 44 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 29: Reduce poverty in poorer countries through quicker progress toward Millennium Development Goals (HM Government, October 2007), http://www .hm-treasury .gov .uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa29 .pdf (accessed 04 .02 .2010) . 45 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts (HM Government, October 2007), http://www .hm-treasury .gov . uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30 .pdf (accessed 04 .02 .2010) . 46 U .K . Department of International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future (London: Department for International Development, July 2009), http://www .dfid .gov .uk/Documents/whitepaper/buildingour-common-future .pdf (accessed 04 .02 .2010) . 47 Other elements of this approach include treating access to security and justice as a basic service, supporting economic opportunities, and delivering a faster and coordinated international response in the immediate aftermath of conflicts . 48 These priorities sit at the heart of U .K .’s peace-building approach as outlined in DFID peace-building policy paper . See DFID Policy and Practice Paper — Building Peaceful States and Societies (London: Department for International Development, 2010) . 49 U .K . Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of United Kingdom — Security in an interdependent world (March 2008), http://interactive .cabinetoffice .gov .uk/documents/security/ national_security_strategy .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 50 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs, “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,”
in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs, (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 20, 28 . 51 Simon Lawry-White, Review of the U.K. Government Approach to Peace-building and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from U.K. Government Funded Peace-Building Projects 19972001 (London: DFID, August 2003) https://www .dfid .gov . uk/Documents/publications/evaluation/ev646 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 52 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 14 . 53 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs, “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence,” in Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs, (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 28–29 . 54 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007), 23–24 . 55 Ibid ., 12–13 . 56 This pillar was renamed “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters” in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997/1999), while some policies (controls on the external borders, asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation on civil matters) were moved into the first pillar governed by the Community method of decision-making . The Lisbon Treaty deepened the commitments of EU member states in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, also by giving the European Parliament bigger role as co-legislator and extending the qualified majority voting of the Council . 57 In short, this method includes the process by which the European Commission proposes “legislation,” the Council, at times with the European Parliament, adopts the legislation, and the Court of Justice monitors compliance with the Community law . 58 As stipulated by Article 25 of the Treaty on the European Union, the EU conducts CFSP by defining general guidelines; adopting decisions regarding actions and position to be taken by the EU, and their implementation; and strengthening systematic cooperation of member states in the conduct of the policy . 59 EU’s humanitarian assistance is under “jurisdiction” of ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Office), and covers ad hoc assistance and relief aid to victims of natural and manmade disasters . 60 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van
Meurs . “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence .” In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 40–42 . 61 Another institutional development worth mentioning in this regard is the creation of European External Action Service (EEAS) to support the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy . The EEAS will cooperate with diplomatic services of the EU member states and will comprise the officials from Council’s Secretariat, Commission, and officials seconded from diplomatic services of member states . EEAS is planned to be composed of single geographical and thematic desks, which will continue to perform the existing Commission’s and Council’s tasks under the authority of the High Representative . At the same time, enlargement, trade, and development policy will remain under the responsibility of the Commission, while Commission delegations will be part of EEAS structure . For more see Presidency Report to the European Council on European External Action Service, Brussels 23 . October 2009 (14930/09), http://register .consilium .europa .eu/pdf/en/09/st14/ st14930 . en09 .pdf (accessed 28 .02 .2010) . 62 Giovanni Grevi, “EDSP institutions,” in European Security and Defense Policy: the first ten years, ed . Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2009), http://www .iss .europa .eu/ uploads/media/ESDP_10-web .pdf (accessed 25 .01 .2010), 62 . 63 Commission of the European Communities, Policy Coherence for Development — Accelerating progress toward attaining the Millenium Development Goals, COM(2005)134final (Brussels, 12 .4 .2005), http://eur-lex .europa .eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ .do?uri=COM:2005:0134:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 26 .01 .2010) . 64 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World — European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 12 December 2003), http://www .consilium .europa .eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367 .pdf (accessed 26 .01 .2010) . 65 Commission of the European Communities, Policy Coherence for Development — Establishing the policy framework for a whole-of-the-Union approach, COM(2009)458 final (Brussels, 15 .9 .2009), http://ec .europa .eu/development/icenter/ repository/COM_2009_458_part1_en .pdf (accessed 27 .01 .2010) . 66 This is a short name for Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part, which was signed on June 23, 2000, in Cotonou, Benin . 67 Giovanni Grevi, “EDSP institutions,” in European Security
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and Defense Policy: the first ten years, ed . Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 2009), http://www .iss .europa .eu/ uploads/media/ESDP_10-web .pdf (accessed 25 .01 .2010), 61-62 . 68 Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs . “Precarious States Strategies: Toward a Culture of Coherence .” In Diplomacy, Development and Defense: A Paradigm for Policy Coherence, ed . Stefani Weiss, Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Wim van Meurs (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 42 . 69 OECD, Development Cooperation Directorate, the Development Assistance Committee, European Community Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Peer Review (Paris: OECD, 2007), http://www .oecd .org/dataoecd/57/6/38965119 .pdf (accessed 02 .02 .2010) . 70 The suggested possible coordination mechanisms for achieving greater coherence include adopting a harmonization agenda, using common integrated planning tools, undertaking joint assessments, devising shared strategies and MDTFs, or establishing joint donor offices . 71 European Parliament, Council, Commission, “European Consensus on Development,” Official Journal of the European Union, C46/1, 24 .2 .2006, http://ec .europa .eu/development/ icenter/repository/european_ consensus_2005_en .pdf (accessed 26 .01 .2010) . 72 Work Plan — EU-US Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention (March 2008) . http://ec .europa .eu/external_relations/us/docs/eu_us_ crisis_management_work_plan_en .pdf (accessed 10 . 02 . 2010) 73 U .K . Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of United Kingdom — Security in an interdependent world (March 2008) http://interactive .cabinetoffice .gov .uk/documents/ security/national_security_strategy .pdf (accessed 20 .01 . 2010) . 74 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts (HM Government, October 2007) http://www .hm-treasury .gov . uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30 .pdf (accessed 04 .02 .2010) . 75 Daniel Korski, Daniel Serwer and Megan Chabalowski, A New Agenda for US-EU Security Cooperation — Working Paper 92 (Madrid: FRIDE, November 2009), http://www.fride. org/descarga/WP92_US_EU_Security_ENG_ Jan10.pdf (accessed, 10.02.2010), 8. 76 Ibid ., 10 . 77 For example, between 1993 and 1996, USAID increased aid to Sudan by launching the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (1994), aimed at intervening against crises, instability, and
famine . In the period 1997 to 2000, during Clinton’s second term in office, the U .S . Congress reimposed financial sanctions on Sudan . After the 1998 bombings of U .S . embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States pursued unilateral anti-terrorist measures in Sudan through Operation Infinite Reach, which consisted of cruise missile strikes on a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, allegedly involved in the production of ingredients for chemical weapons . 78 William M . Bellamy, “Making Better Sense of U .S . Security Arrangements in Africa,” in U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years — Critical Challenges for the Obama Administration, ed . Jennifer G . Cooke and Stephen J . Morrison (Washington DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, 2009), 14–17 . 79 For the complete text see: U .S . Department of State, Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach, October 19, 2009 http://www .state .gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130672 .htm (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 80 In this regard, the Obama Administration is planning to strengthen its support for UNAMID through the provision of direct funding, as well as diplomatic, logistical, and other support toward the provision of needed equipment . At the same time, the White House is planning to work on improving economic conditions in Sudan through support of the UNDP’s Local Government Reform Program, as well as on implementing the World Bank’s MDTF South Strategy in cooperation with international partners . 81 Other three stated priorities are first, promoting democratic systems and practices, also as a post-conflict transformation . In this regard the U .S . government will continue assisting African states in building democratic institutions, conducting free and fair elections, and governing justly . Second, promoting sustainable and broad-based, market-led economic growth, also through the established mechanisms of MCC, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), debt-cancellation policy, and food assistance . And third, promoting health and social development to fight the leading causes of death in Africa — disease and poverty . The continuous commitment to the United States’ biggest health initiatives — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) — is hoped to help in the fight against these two and other diseases . For more see U.S. Policy in Africa in the 21st Century, presentation of Phillip Carter III, the Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, February 9, 2009, http://www .state .gov/p/af/rls/rm/2009/117326 .htm (accessed 05 .02 .2010) . 82 U .S . Africa Command . Posture Statement 2009 . Statement of General William E . Ward, USA Commander, United States
Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, March 2009 . Stuttgart: U .S . Africa Command, 2009 . http://www .africom .mil/ pdfFiles/ USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement .pdf (accessed 07 .02 .2010) . 83 Emery Brussett, Evaluation of Country Conflict Prevention Pools — Sudan (London: DFID, May 2004), http://www .oecd . org/dataoecd/60/39/35097013 .pdf (accessed 30 .01 .2010) . 84 U .K . Department of International Development, Sudan: Country Engagement Plan (London: Department for International Development, 2005), http://www .dfid .gov .uk/ Documents/publications/sudan-country-engagement-plan0105 . pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 85 U .K . Department for International Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defense, Africa Conflict Prevention Program: Annual Report 2007/08. London: FCO/DFID/MOD, 2008 . http://www .dfid .gov .uk/Documents/ publications/annual-rpt-africa-confl-prev-prog-2007-08 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 86 Commission of the European Communities . EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to accelerate Africa’s development, COM(2005)489 final . Brussels, 12 .10 .2005 . http://eur-lex .europa .eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ . do?uri=COM:2005:0489:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 87 The EU’s earlier approach to conflict prevention in Africa was covered in a Commission’s Communication of 1996 . This approach can be summed up as “structural stability” pursued through an approach of “generalized multilateralism .” It mainly focused on conflict-prevention tools, which included: development cooperation and external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomacy, new crisis management instruments, and cooperation with other international actors . See Commission of the European Communities, The European Union and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention and Beyond, SEC(96)332 final, http://aei .pitt .edu/4280/01/002318_1 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010) . 88 “Council Common Position 2005/304/CFSP of 12 April 2005 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa and repealing Common Position 2004/85/CFSP,” Official Journal of European Communities (L 97, 15 .4 .2005) . 89 Commission of the European Communities, Strategy for Africa: An EU regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa, COM(2006)601 final (Brussels, 20 .10 .2006), http://eur-lex .europa .eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ .do?uri=COM:2006:0601:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 05 .02 .2010) .
90 The document contains a work program for regional action, which includes three broad objectives: encouraging effective regional political and economic cooperation and integration, addressing the key country-level strategic political issues that have regional ramifications, and addressing regional cross-cutting and cross-border concerns in the Horn of Africa . 91 The reasons for non-ratification are the provisions the Cotonou Agreement encouraging the ACP states to ratify and implement the Rome Statute, establishing International Criminal Court . 92 RRM was established in 2001 to allow the EU to respond in a rapid, efficient, and flexible manner to situations of urgency or crisis, or to the emergence of crisis, where such situations are likely to jeopardize the beneficial effects of assistance and cooperation policies and programs, their effectiveness, and/or conditions for their proper implementation . 93 Walter Lotze, Gustavo Barros de Carvalho, and Yvonne Kasumba, “Peacebuilding Coordination in African Countries: Transitioning from Conflict Case Studies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and South Sudan .” Occasional Paper Series 3, no . 1 (2008), http://www .accord .org .za/ downloads/op/op_2008_1 .pdf (accessed 20 .01 .2010), 52 . 94 For example, the E6 have underlined the need for continued efforts to address humanitarian needs in Darfur and other parts of Sudan, and the essential role of the UN and AU, as well as other regional organizations and neighboring states, in supporting the Sudanese parties to work through the remaining challenges to peace . They agreed that special attention should be paid to forthcoming international appointments to ensure stronger and more concerted leadership at all levels, and full coherence and coordination in UN/AU efforts . 95 Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA — Report on the piloting of OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States’ for the Case of Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2007), 17-18 . 96 ITAD et al ., Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, 2009) . 97 Anita Haslie and Axel Borchgrevink, International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA — Report on the piloting of OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States’ for the Case of Sudan (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 2007), 21–22 . 98 Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown . Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States . New York: International Peace Academy, 2007 .
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99 HM Government, PSA Delivery Agreement 30: Reduce impact of conflict through enhanced U.K. and international efforts (HM Government, October 2007), http://www .hm-treasury .gov . uk/d/pbr_csr07_psa30 .pdf (accessed 04 .02 .2010) . 100 Delegated cooperation is a practical arrangement where one donor (a “lead” donor) acts with authority on behalf of one or more other donors (the “delegating” donors or “silent partners”) . The interaction between the donors should be described in the agreement between them, such as a Memorandum of Understanding . 101 The European Commission sees complementarity as a concept of an organizational nature . Complementarity starts with coordination, but goes much further: it implies that each actor is focusing its assistance on areas where it can add most
value, given what others are doing . Hence, complementarity is the optimal division of labor between various actors in order to achieve optimum use of human and financial resources . See Commission of the European Communities, EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labor in Development Policy, COM(2007)072 final (Brussels, 28 .2 .2007), http://eur-lex .europa .eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ .do?uri= COM:2007:0072:FIN:EN:PDF (accessed 10 .02 . 2010) . For example, if the United States has extensive experience with military interventions and peace-keeping operations, and the security dimension of its peace-building approach is relatively well developed, this experience and approach could well complement the EU’s approach to peacebuilding, which tends to be focused on conflict-prevention in terms of securing long-term stability in a country .
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