P. 1
A CIA 1968 Study of Yugoslav Youth

A CIA 1968 Study of Yugoslav Youth

|Views: 412|Likes:
Published by Rob
This is a CIA 1968 study of Yugoslav youth that was revealed to exist as part of the release of the CIA's infamous Crown Jewels collection.
This is a CIA 1968 study of Yugoslav youth that was revealed to exist as part of the release of the CIA's infamous Crown Jewels collection.

More info:

Categories:Types, Letters
Published by: Rob on Aug 28, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

Availability:

Read on Scribd mobile: iPhone, iPad and Android.
download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
See more
See less

09/17/2010

pdf

text

original

ffT+FfEENFF++I

-

YUGos LAV I A

lLnn4rt,i

A decade of apathy on the part of the youth of Yugosl,avia ended 1n June of chrs year, ,,rhetBelgfade University studentg rioted and a v,eek-long univer,sity sit-i,n followed. Alrhough Farrj. alLy - inspi red by the exanple of riotinq students tn poland, France, Czecho6lovakia and other European countries, the Belgrade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June, larqelv domastlc Ln orlgin. The regine's slow reactj.on t6 adeterlorating economj-c and tocial situation and. its sluggishness in dealing with youth and educational problems had been at fault. High party officials have realrzed for some tlme that a large portron of yugoslav youth was becomrng increasrngly alienated. from the economic and political system wrthin which it llveal, gensing the lncreasrng tensionr their spokesman, Veljko Vlaf,ovi-c, attempted to identify rhe students with the regine, but probably helped stir them Lo acEion, by remlnd!ng. them. nine days before the riot,s, that they must fLght for ch anges - - " revolution does not toLerate weeping," ha said, "it demands acLion.',
Ttre student unrest emerged at a time when the regine is embarked on a difficult reforn meant !o decentrallze and liberaltze economic and political Ilfe while retalning control by the party: The program haE f,ac€d determlned oppositlon from conservatLves and those who stand to- lose status and income froft the reforms. Although the regime hopes to use the students' enthusiasm to speed up its prograrn, Tito is weII aware that his opponenls may atlempt to use the riots to stop the regime,s efiorts at
cnaDge .

Siud.enLs Ve?auB the Reoi.ne The June ri-ots started with a lrrvial clash bet\,reen young peopie at a muslcal performance on 2 June. The disturbances soon took on a political character srhen student anger at polrce tactics and

pent-up frustration ove! the lack of job opportun!tie6 ]€d to sweeping demands for change. An ad hoc

€eltFl-E++fiFfirf
APPROVED FOR RELEASE

uAtt:

-fiIFrDENrrxr
student actlon coruni poi-nt prosi;-;;il'';H:r3euicklv rornurated a rour__Remova.i.

of jiJl".':ff i;;J';";'.: al: 'Sl:ilr'ili,'Eiii.r"-

-

-;$o:";3,i:ff

__Grenter democ!

t:" "?:i"i:ITEl.., iloni:sx;i3,

.

p"riii".i"iii;iiiii:::1,.: i::""ff l:i"iH^. !iiii;'3}* ?$;I:i""':I*i,,?iii iiiii.,r
Ehe

--lt5:';:::i.l'ii:i-"t
,r.lnn:!i, ..?lX,""lil:i" j.:-

lli*Fi#:l:ii:,,rlu:iiji:fu:r:i
conc_i

universrtv. t

rl""

i.";:i ::, :i,

:l:

ff li:., ::;"
o

rr a t j on ;:: j

con

bine with

:*,

:

;.';

i:,.::'...:;

serbian "^_- 9:"::ur

trllill,litt

ii{f ffi

qi, jfr

"'

t'!;ii,Tiii"

j**;g*H**sflffi,
;il ;:i,l" il:'.:l; nr:x"f'rii.'pl!fii;:: s:ii:'iilii f ifl . *",::$ i:il"" rorm pr-srams
.

lgl:;;j,il;1,i.:";;x,i::$^iii;":;i,.t.Sjo"l"l. ;:*:'I"S' ji;:3liii;r':ir::*oe ari nv'wiIii";;,1ifl o,"oI:;.1"::"";;1.:ii"::_

,_

The sit_in

at

Bel.o

i:!, the econonic,"r","'l*riu!irSi*:l;";",,:il8#T:1F",

YugoslavLa

cGfflBNIIAl-_
go deaL lrith domestJ-c prcb.l.er:s--rndicating that they would be final, theleby givlng :he students no aIternative accepuance. AlthougL, TJ'to rmplied that if he and the regi ot the leade:shj.p could not solve Yugoslavia's probl.ems, they should resign. he gave no hint that he wouid bow co the siudenrs' ilemand that thoge responsible fcr police brutality be sacked.
The economic Auidelines, !n preparation since 20 May, were published five days J"ater. In part an elaboration of the !hemes in Tirors speech, they called for economlc .refotm and leorganjzation of the palty. They also echoed student demanqs for limits on income acquired in a "nonsocialisL,, vray (leaslng of villas, for example) and a realuction of d,ifferences in lrages. They allowed for educational reform and more student participation in the management of the unrversities.

Again there was a note of fLrmness, The !esignation of incompetent officjals was r-mp1ied, but there was a clear warnJ.ng that "enemy forces, " guch as antiregime em1gre groups, antireform conservatlves, and ultraliberals, were seekrng to undernine Yugoslavla. Emphasis was put on usrng and lmproving the existing Yugoslav system, albej.t h'ith a major effor! to make roon for more young people. The guldelines f,eemphasized the pa!!yrs determinatton to oppose the creatron of the multiparty systen propo6ed by some libelal intellectuals. Student unrest had. occurred at a trying time in the regimers 3-year-oid drive for economj.c reform. Although the students exhibited no separalist tendanci€a, the regj.me in meeting the students' demands must take into account the currently tense nationality situation, Republj.c econohrc rivalries have incteased, Many Serba believe that they have suffered by the reform, while the croacs generally believe that the process must be speeded up. For the frrst time rn many years Tito is under pressure from both the conservative and liberal nings of the party to go slow and to move ahead iaste! on the reform, respectively.
Economrc reform has brought lncreasing unemployment and labor unrest. wreh workers lesorling to

short strik€s to push their grievances, Both the Belgrade students and many workers are angry at the high salaries and large bonuses paid factory adminLstrators while wolkers in some enterprises are poorly paid or paid only afcer Long de1ay.
,:

he Ge4e?aticri

Cap

The student'6 demand for a job after graduation reflects more than a narrow-ninded setf-interest. There is a profound dr-fference in outlook bet\.veen the young and old and the regine must cope with a widening generation gap. The bulk of the Ieadershrp at all levels j.n Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years. Despile the purges of cominformists rn the veire rnunediately following t94g and the ouster oi niitas (1954) and Tit.o's former heir apparent Rankovii (1966), the hard core of the party stilL has great nurnbers of older ex-parti.sans and prewar nrembers. The upper levels of the party hierarchy are particularly laden with this older generatlon. ,'Older generation" here, is rel-ative: Most of theBe ',older,, people are in thejr fifties, some stiI1 j-n their late forties. Tito at. 76 is by fa! the oLdest of the hief,archy. The legime has attenpted with only lirnited succeaE since 1953 to enforce a pol-rcy of ,'rot.ation" in off,ice ]n order to bring up youhger rien. WhiIe the average age of the party leadership has decLined slightly, the oLd guard has departed only slo\,rLy

in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs, Thus the party reorganizatr.on af October Lg66 resulted in an executive commlttee (politburo) of relatj"vely younger and less politically infLuential men, whi).e almost the vrhole old-Line leadershj.p was shifted into the poticy-making presidium,

What has be6n lrue of the top leadership has bean even more evident at Ehe lower ievels of the eqonomic and poljtical l-adder. Many factory djrectors and lower J.eve} bureaucrats owe therr positions to their prewar-party and wartlme partisan service. Many are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with lhe sophisticased socialist market economy which the

Yugoslavia -

4

-CT]Nfi'EN.FTAL

reqime hopes to create. Undelstandably, they do ;;e-;rth-i; git. up the income and status they feel tha! they deserve.

Partly as justtfication for its Privileged pogition, itt" oia"t generation has exploiled -htartime and glory ior years. The varues of many lu"iiti"i ;;-;h;;;-"taer-peoile ar-e an admixture of unsoPhlsticotn*""i sm, miaate class aspirations, pride in ".t"a*}r"i ttt"y have acconPlished, and in some a residual local nationali-sm. Meanwhile universities have been turning out thousands of beiter educated young technicians'elders impartent t^rith the bungling of their It""""t. thl barriers to jobs ancl influence whj'ch ""1'*ittr the latter have created' Tj-to himself has Publicly id",rlt.J-*ttiy ti*." that the Yugoslav economy badly nieas thousa;ds of bette! trained men, but that many enterprises refuse to hire them. The slogan "Dovrn Wlth the Red Bourgeoisie" which aPpea!6d at netgrade univelsity 1n June underlines thl younger generation's disenchantment' lheir or wish for an end to privilege built on ParEy.has parsimPly rhii denan6 is not new--it ii"i"-"it"1.". Uec"m" foua.r. In the months after the ouster of n.n:.."i" the Yugoslav press burgeoned fotth. with reports of lllegal bullding of -virlas. and tne accumulatlon of ait treasurel and private wealth by party functionaries. The restl€ssness of YugosLav youth reflects the succeBs of the regime in j-ts liberalizatlonsecret The curtailnent of the Power of the "iooi.*. roff""j.ng Rankovic's fall, the enhancem€nt i"ii." ;f parlianen!, mole oPen elections, and curtailment -controL of the economy--all oi "alte.t government nive fosteied a more permissl.ve atmosPhere-' Many oi'ln"-"t"a"nts' demaids are inspi'red by the hopes ."""na"i"a bv the llberalized Yugoslav constitution and b! promises implied rn the currentparty pro"i-fse: conve-rie1y, the regime's compromises. in the o"aa. ly coniervatives who still hoLd i"."'"r-"ppo"itiLi in-intr"eiriial positions, and the obje.ctive dif-fj-culties of the economic reform Probably- seem lnlofJralfe obstacles. when the chief of the Belgrade

@

Yugoslavra -

5

party organization, Veljko Vlahovic. a leading ldaoLosue and pre s i d rum -memb;;; -; a;;rit!i-iJ""p"u,r t.o -lhe riorrng students last m6nth n"'*J" t,J"f.a oovtn by the cry of "Enough words__action is needed.,,
Fatheys and
San $

narrt, -__ It can be assurned in sone children officiars were invoLvedthatttre iiotl]--;ii"; of ;;;:1 ence did nor inhibit the polj.ce, l"t ' :t. -*Jl-f.5ii"""_ plain the regime's forbearance in the face of the sit-in at the university *' students arrested eartilr and the release of-ufl ttu duri;; ;h;-;i;.;:
?he youth
-O?gqni sqt.ion6

and a haven for young party hacks-, to chanqe j-ts - The party's an at role from that ofdecision in 1965 ai.""tii-riir"9 l-powerf"r organization to one of ideological r"aa.rlnlJ-rea to confusion about rhe rore people vranted the Federationoi rh; aoJ:--;;;i 1.ounq ro reflect fhe iriews and interests of its membershrp, not tiros.-oi-trr" party. _ The SOJ, hohrever, was nog orqanlzed to respond to pxessure from bel-ow. rt""i"iJ"i"tip, moreove!. was aII over 30 years of age, rrhich ]ed. to charges of ove rpro fe s si6nali zatroi

- The student unreat revealed the ineffectiveness of the tr.i'o main regine-sponsored youth oioanizations -.-the !'ederarion oi youri: ;i-t;;";i;;;r"iB6lji'.na the Federation of Students (SSJ'. - Both federations originally perforn as "rransmission 6ertsii' were created, to f;;-;.;;y;i;ectives and propaganda. Numerlcalry ar f,east, the SO,J has been a success--its membergirrp (Z,o:a,si:-ii-iu.u*lu. 1965) i_ncludes about r\,,o thi.rd; ;i'.ti';;;.-"ja"v" Ue_ treen 14 and 25" ResenLnent over the Federatlon,s "transmission belt,' rol"e has grown the years, and much of the or9ani.uti"";i -in.il" ";";;i;;-;;". rs pro forma, The soJ became-a uv".ia r..'..illiiJil """,

In the aftermath of the fal.l. Rankovic the youth federation secretariat was diofsoi"u a ' s ir,i"""r_ b-er 1966) for r.ncompetence and t.a"y lunAeAn.Js, 'rne tederatron was put into a form of ,,recei vership,,

Yugoslavla - 6 r,1?1sFiD+r++I*g

r

c.lNEIDENTIAI

in order to plepare fo! its reorganization, wh j- ch !:?I_plo": over a year larer at ii," righli;'siji co"_ gfress in Sebruary L96g.
__-, .Tito,s speech,opening the Congress offered palti cularly new. l:cn.rng rqeo.Loglcal guidanceIt was i call for Bore er Ene . the young had already cone to.dislike. Indeed, inBteaa of-i""o"utf"", Tlto pointed with alarm to the need for moie-iaeo_

losicat pottticat lrork by trr" tualsf among whom he deticted sriJ-imoii iiiJri.._ apathy ;;d-;;Ii;n concepts . "

actiiis! itudents, tfr" pariv-risf" rrehr regime conlioil-rl5ii'']i,, re6urts in further allenalion of tle iuiuie'iiturrf_ gon6j.a and technocrats and an organization steepea ln apathy . Reglme control of the studenta through the SO,J and the ssJ broke do\,rn at the rime ot iire'ieiqraae -;;p;;;Ei"g, riots, when rhe -wr,irJ-";;;:;;;." post facto, the drouDs were reauced l. itudint a"rnana" demonstrations and viotenca. Effective f.ia"i"nip had passed to the student acrion ."rn flt""J-iit r" tbe party's sway. . The,regime's concern with stldent f,ederation successfutlythe abilj.ty of the to ;hil;;i iiuaent !9llii!"t activiry in the face-orfurther rs mlrrored in a debate.over the ",i"i,-'.i"",p!iilion of these action corTunittees. Most -"-"., ^i.. "ii"t"".. cials are asainsr u.'" 5ilf;"nilii".

large nurnbare of 1o81ns contror..

To restore the SOJ'S effectiveness, a rew statute. was enacted de centrali zing - uJ*i.,ii Jtrli,-"" presumably to nake the r€qerat,ton more responsive , to.It.s membershrp. t0hat emerged ,us u .o*FiJiisu Derween the o1d strongly. cantrallzed organizatlon desired by the conser.;atlveg and the loose coordinat_ ll:.1:d-I-:ltled for by the-ultraliber;i;:- i;; "eu rrmtts ware widened to tncLude 14 to a 2?-year-old wag elected presidentl 2?_year_oldi, .^...T!".conaiderably gmaller (11O,ooO members r>oo, !.ecelatton of Students suffers from much rn the eame :nalady aB the youth rederation. - i i- 'tiie=-i"9f*" grants the SS,t the autonomy neceE6ary lo attracr

""i.ii"".i.i",lr
7

€er+Frps*e*-

Yugoslavia -

Cj-NFIDT+ITJAJ. fhe conunitteeE, however, have ins.isted that thev wi}l continue to operate. Speakirg before the Lpeaing segsion of the yugoslav tlade union congress on 26 ,June, Tito undoubtedly had the acrion coirn.irc."s in mind when he sai.d there was no room for the qreation of a special movemeni wlthin the universities.
Iouth and the pa*ty The alienation of youth from the league of codununlsts of yugoslavia (Lcy) has been viewed by i,ts leadorship with gro\ring a1arm. Ilis torl. cal Iy-, the partyrs large and effective youth component contributed such Leaders as Djil;s and na-nkovic, Recently, holrevar, the nutnber of those 25 or under in the,party has dropped from 23.6 percent in L95B to 11 .5 psrcent in 1965, Compared !o the 1951 fiqure of 38.5 percent, the decline has been precipiious. The decline has occurred over the s arne period that ha8 a€en overall party membership top ti:e mi1lton mark. In Lhe proceBs, the composition of the party ltaB been altered signlficantly. Accordi-ng te Yugoslav figures, the ner,r menberl are rnainlv whlte collar administrators, factory directorsl and bureaucrats. The percentage of workers, women, and peasants in the rcy also has declined. Manv of the younger generation probably regard this tre-nd as a further sign of the partyrs enbourg e ai sement , Public opinior eurveys in the last tr.ro or three years have pointed out that nany young people lrould not join the party if askea, and many l-ca1 party organlzations have admltted practically no young members in recent yeats. The legime,s answer to its accel.erated aging process has been a driva to recruit young peopLe. So far no figures are availabLe on the success of this effort. However, many liberals evidently are hoping that a successful r-crui.tlng drive vril-l he.l-p consolldate the leformists' hold on the partv and the party congress in December 1968, fhe Studente a.nd the SohooLe !ar1y in 1968 the youth periodical Mladost revealed that out of .f.3 nillion employee s -ii--YE-gos lavi. a, about 200 r000 have had no schooling, over 1..2 mlllion
Yugoslavia -

B

EE}IFIDELLI]IrA.L

have never finrshed the er-ght-year elementary school' and onl.y SOO,OOO have an efementary school educatlon' tii" ai"i-out :ate for el'ementary schools is about so perc-ent. The illrceracy rate remains high, about 20 iercent, wrth about 50 Percent of the rlflterates undlr 50 years of age. In Part, the problem stems from timi'ted financial Under iegislation passed rn 1966, local r""ooi..i, conmunltj.es are responsible foi financing most basic education. Local enterPrises are encourageo-to loans and scholarships' Decentralized "otrtaiUotahas resulted !n uneven quality in the Prifinancing marv and secondary school systems' Poorer areas nati:rally have rnlerior schools, particularly in the vill;ges. ?easant youth are at a-dieadvantage if they wish to pursue university stu'lies' university education is tuition free' cost students of living granls are availabLe and manyperiod after ie"elv" ioitt", tep.yubLe :.n a ten-year those craduation. ine aeut is reduced for finish with their records and those !,ho io"a icaaemic itudies ear1y. Although university entrance exam1966/67 inations werE institut;d for thesepten$exschool 1958' will be abolj-shed in u"ii, ' ituv irooi ptepit.tion and personal financiar problems ;;;;Jit" are the rnain- reasons so manv students take extra Years to earn a degree ' The increased cost of living since 1965 has been another factor barring the way to higher educaliott f"t the children of workers and Peasants' In 1965 the average stipend for students at Zagreb University, in compai ative Iy wealthy croatia, vtas 15,000 ol-d dinars 1OD) per month' At the dolfar' -currenf .iift.ttq. rate of 1r250 old di'nars to one this aiounts to $12. Lrvlnq exPenses, however, rn reached the level of 29.000 oD (about $23)' pace past three years stLpends have not kept the *iln" tn" cost oi rrvrng. The average worker's waqe (not includinq seif-employed peasants '. the the rural populatron) in January 1966 was l"ix "r Sz,Ool oo (about $46). Moreover, ihe highest average northern repubEaiaries were !n the more developedtransforming economic rnequality rs Ilcs. This Vugoslavia's unl-versiLies j-nto preserves tor tne

CONEIDEITFFFFF

Yugos

i-avia -

9

;i:iij. lf i. ::il ii;ii" id"iilii:":; :.iirj ;.,iitf i I ;*;" j ;: ::"ii.:j, i::';l;,:i::,::.f; L:n::iil' i
d

u

*

,

;";;i;;'i":i":j,, :li::;:i"I:.*;= Ii, !li.'l' 3ll:"T.:l;':::i*, ;*:;,*", Iii3iol, .".

ll;,i:iiij.i;:*j ,.li:::"il.l"ilol'ln to manase e.,er mcire

::t :f.tiinrjo"'i.ildsrsa

"' i;;;"i'::'ii. l;"i: ; ;i:i-$:::*:';." :::;j jj*.::,:I;,jllj,,1!'rncvic, wtrs elected rec:iiTi:::':";^::ilj:;:;,

*.:ll:itui"'i''::.;:;.i:l

ili,':jiii:"::rii*:;=:,:';:"1;; ii;"n;;;.;1";;o oo i ve r t":l"ji!i:il, : if iii: i:l:!*;:".; :"o iiii;:::i; ffiiJ ff ?,::'::-,;",:h,i f il=,:li1x:ti:m,f,*5"rijl,," jrr j r.r
un

.

.

Studrln L dls,:on re

.

35::i ::Hr"."olr. ", : ";io il.f i"i,ll

j'lliiloloS?..".,

rm,iili!:i:"ii ;i "Tti!r!i".ii ..ili..ii, 3ii ij iij._ ;#it:iiffl;',ifi"lli.'::tT::'',. puifi'nil"uuun
i"i:ii$i:!i,'l;:""xl;";i; i.-iJ-""iJil..:"ut| tf,. teadins role of ;; ff ,xit, j;;::l :, j:.i:$^iii:: ii: i:l fi i'il:;:":::' ;. t..1: ; : ir : ; l: : n i j :'i :. : :. ? :' lu I i i ?:' :.'" :. ;l .; i.
g

ffT:'.:'. iii:; the parry,

*iil::,

n.1

,, j:;:: ri:"iii:.::.,ij:il"ii!li3 ;:i{.:::,"i:*.:i:_ ":l *,i" ;;.::i, i!.i::fl:{:;f ;,ii,r'ii,i*,i' lxii'ii' ;n! ":i.,x:i l:'T;:: iii:1,;lill"ifi"i:.1;:= =ii, =ti:

t-U--!tis-98__SLthe Although the revo.

s t.ud.e r! r,

neuot

t

Yugos.lavl

a

POLICE IIATTLE STUDENTS, JUn"E l96ti

made themsel\,"es into which demanded that

students--among them the children of the elite-a signi-fi-cant political force the regime live up co its promises. They are unlikely to be rnollified by token

Tito faces the difficult decision of further alienating many conservatj-ves and centralists by fulfilling the students I demands, or a possible further student violence if reforns are not forthcoming by fa1l, He is neII a\,rare that antireforrnists may try to make use of the student demands to stem the tide of the regime xeforns. Despite their socialist humanist character, some of the student demands, such as lrrage .Lirnitation, full employment, and reduction of material incentives run counter to rhe methods of the economic reform. Given the unrest among the poorly paid workers, a student-worker coalition against the econorric reform would be a conservative's dream and a liberal's nightmare. For many conservatives j.t would be proof of the failure of the re form drj-ve and proof that rel"axation of party control of society leads to rejection of paxty leadership and economic chaos.

e-or.+{+DJi}tltai<

Yugoslavia -

11

Nout
"'1:;'i,-ry''

I

r

You're Reading a Free Preview

Download
scribd
/*********** DO NOT ALTER ANYTHING BELOW THIS LINE ! ************/ var s_code=s.t();if(s_code)document.write(s_code)//-->