INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS (ARRANGED ACCORDING TO TOPIC) STARE DECISIS TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP VS.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK GR 137980 JUNE 20, 2000 FACTS: Respondent has a legal problem with regard to its real estate holdings. The law requires that respondent’s real estate holdings should only be 50% of its net worth. This constituted a bar to the planned expansion of respondent. To solve the predicament of the respondent, it created a separate entity, which is petitioner, wherein the existing branch sites would be unloaded and the said petitioner would also acquire new branch sites for respondent and lease it to the latter. Pursuant to the agreement between the two parties, the petitioner acquired properties from respondent and then leased them to the latter. It was a part of the agreement that petitioner only holds properties for the respondent and that the said properties would be returned to respondent at its pleasure. There came a time when there was a disagreement between the two parties on which of the 2 lease contracts of lease presented by each party governs them. Petitioner contends that it is the 11-year contract while the other presents a 20-year contract. Both contracts have been allegedly notarized and executed on the same date. Using the 11-year contract as basis, the petitioner filed a petition for ejectment against respondent. However, the petitioner lost in all its cases and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA mentioned in its decision that the lower courts erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction, when the issue of possession and issue of validity of contract is intertwined. Nonetheless, it dismissed the petition to maintain judicial consistency and stability as other ejectment cases like the one at bar have already been decided on. Petitioner filed MR and was granted by ordering respondent to pay the unpaid rentals. Subsequently, the respondent filed an MR and the CA reversed its decision, which made petitioner file an appeal to the SC saying that the CA erred in considering the ruling of the court in another case as the law of the case between petitioner and respondent. Respondent Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 1 of 147

then said that only decisions of the SC establish jurisprudence or doctrines. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to the case at bar even if the parties and properties involved are different? HELD: The stare decisis principle should be upheld. There had been previously a decision by the SC involving the same parties but different property, wherein it was upheld and decided that the 20-year lease contract should prevail. It even mentioned in its decision that the 11-year contract was forged and simulated as it was never really notarized nor submitted to the Central Bank, as required by law. In the light of the aforementioned decision, the Court doesn’t have any option but to uphold the 20-year lease contract, following the principle of “stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled)”. It is the policy of the Court to maintain judicial stability in accordance to stare decisis. As in this case, the same questions relating to the same even have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceedings and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. Stare decisis should apply if the facts are substantially the same even if the parties may be different.

Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 2 of 147

INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS JM TUASON AND CO. INC. VS. MARIANO GR 3314O OCTOBER 23, 1978 FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint praying that they be declared owners of a certain parcel of land located in Rizal. They alleged that their father acquired this land with a Spanish title. They alleged that petitioner fraudulently or included the land in an original certificate of title. They also alleged that transfer certificates of title were issued to petitioners irregularly. Given such, they are praying that the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to irregular proceedings. The lower court issued an order requiring the parties to produce documents to support their allegations. With this, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, inter alia, that the lower court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding the case. Before this present complaint, the respondents had already filed a complaint questioning the validity of the titles of petitioner, wherein the lower court and the SC upheld its validity. ISSUE: Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents? HELD: They cannot anymore question. Considering the principle of stare decisis, the respondents cannot anymore continue with their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts of the validity of the titles and no longer open to attack. It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.

Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 3 of 147

MARQUIDA GR 953. wherein in a prior case. using the testimony of many witnesses. 1947 FACTS: The case at bar is an appeal of respondent of the decision rendered by the lower court. SEPTEMBER 18. stare decisis shouldn’t bar the Court from correcting itself. Stare decisis doesn’t work up to the extent of perpetuating an error.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 4 of 147 . 2 were not found to be citizens since during the time of birth. If it is found that in the past there was a mistake. It is alleged that respondent cannot be found of guilty of treason due to the indetermination of his citizenship or nationality. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to the case at bar? HELD: No. Angela Leonor C. Respondent was charged with the crime of treason for allegedly helping out Japanese occupants in arresting and abducting of Filipinos who were thought to be guerrillas. Following the doctrine of stare decisis. He was found guilty by the lower court. finding him guilty of the crime of treason. a limitation on the application of jus soli for citizenship was established. Created by: Ma.

which says that when one is born in a country. In a previous case wherein jus soli was used was based in a prior case. he acquires the citizenship of that country. Angela Leonor C. Furthermore. GR 47623 SEPTEMBER 16. The Solicitor General opposed such decision. which would only be the time when one is considered a citizen.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS JOSE TAN CHONG VS. with regard to cases like this. 1947 LAM SWEE SANG VS. if ever the principle of jus soli was extended. Before this. which mentioned the principle of jus soli but wasn’t actually the issue at hand. which says that all those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its jurisdiction is a citizen of the US. saying that the two are not citizens of the Philippines pursuant to the laws existing during their time of birth. it had its limitations. Otherwise. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 5 of 147 . The law that prevailed then mentioned that if one was born after a certain date and in accordance with other conditions. Such has been said to be the same with the second petitioner. adopted from the US Constitution. Second petitioner’s petition for naturalization was dismissed since he no longer needed to be naturalized. 1947 FACTS: Petitioners in the two cases are both of born of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The Solicitor General mentioned that the principle of jus soli wasn’t extended to the Philippines. SECRETARY OF LABOR GR 47616 SEPTEMBER 16. used the principle of jus soli. following the principle of stare decisis? HELD: Created by: Ma. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILS. ISSUE: Whether or not precedents regarding citizenship should be upheld. The first petitioner was granted writ of habeas corpus since he was declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrine of jus soli. the Court. they are not to be considered citizens.

Angela Leonor C. Principle of stare decisis shouldn’t be applied if there is conflict between law and precedent. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 6 of 147 . if it has been found to be contrary to law. Given that the law enforced during the time of birth of two petitioners doesn’t allow them to be citizens of the Philippines. it should be abandoned or reconsidered. Even if the doctrines laid down have been followed for years.No. Created by: Ma. the principle of stare decisis doesn’t mean being blind adherence to precedents. even if precedence tells that they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines. cannot be declared Filipino citizens.

in a period less than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. ISSUE: Created by: Ma. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar issues. is by Joseph Estrada. together with other associate justices. If the Supreme Court interrupts and inquires about the proceedings. It proceeded due to good form but was later on dismissed due to lack of substance. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political question. it will disturb the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS FRANCISCO VS. Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings as it is the former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment proceedings. as provided by the Constitution. for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution. and other high crimes. 2003 FACTS: The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide. betrayal of public trust. This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the constitutionality of such move by Congress. The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief Justice. Angela Leonor C. Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice. HRET GR 160261 NOVEMBER 11. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the filing of the second proceeding. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 7 of 147 . This was initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other representatives. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings against the same individual.

Under Article XI of our present Constitution. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one year. it is provided that with regard to the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice. no one has the power to interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of constitutionality other than the SC. Given such.Whether or not the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional? Whether or not the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it? HELD: On the first issue. and that the SC has vested interest in the issue. On the second issue. even if the legislative that commences and administers impeachment proceedings. there is a one-year bar provided. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 8 of 147 . it is not a bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if constitutionality is involved. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified by the other members of the House or when it is given to Senate for hearing. it is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will disturb the separation of power. Angela Leonor C. The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary. it is prevalent that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is unconstitutional. It has been vested the duty to check if there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or office of government. Created by: Ma. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of the impeachment proceeding is questioned. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. moreover the SC. the duty to settle controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It starts when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives. check and balance between the branches of government.

ISSUE: Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar? HELD: No. They later on filed with appellee corporation application for the award and sale of such portion of land. They constructed a house and made some improvements on the land. A case was already decided in their favor. are disqualified from purchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land already from appellee corporation together with other properties. Appellants are occupants of one-half of a parcel of land. In defense of the spouses. Angela Leonor C. and there must be. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of the appellants. four requisites must be present: the former judgment must be final. it must have been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over the case. PHHC GR L-39674 JANUARY 31. who according to appellants. Appellants filed a case against the appellee corporation and spouses. subject matter. For the principle of res judicata to apply. between the two cases. they contend that the case should be dismissed due to the ground of res judicata. They contend that appellants are barred by prior judgment. It contended that the prior case had already been final and executory and that there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss the complaint of the appellant.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 9 of 147 . 1978 FACTS: The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of the Court of First Instance dismissing on the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land. using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata. it must be a judgment on the merits. it is not. They later found out that the parcel of land had been unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to appellee spouses. In Created by: Ma. They did this for several times without any action from appellee corporation. and cause of action. identity of parties. wherein the issue was regarding quieting of title.

In the prior judged case. the test normally employed is to consider the identity of the facts or whether the same evidence would sustain both. And with applying such test. then the former would be a bar to any subsequent action. Given such. Cause of action is defined to be an act or omission of second party in violation of the legal rights of the other. Created by: Ma. Given aforementioned circumstances. If the same facts and evidence would sustain both. it questions the validity of appellee corporation’s award and sale of the parcel of land to the spouses. and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff. correlative obligation of the defendant. Angela Leonor C. the two causes of action are different from one another. it is found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of action. Otherwise. In the application of the doctrine of res judicata wherein it is sometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of action. the second cause of action is remanded to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 10 of 147 . the cause of action was not only to ask for the nullification of the award and sale of the parcel of land but also. it is only with regard to cause of action that the parties disagree. the cause of action was for the quieting of title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. While in the case at bar. there wouldn’t be.this case.

However. later on. one of the respondents in this case. They asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the alleged donation inter vivos of their mother. bought the property who then sold it to respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two parcels of land. At the death of the father. Created by: Ma. the mother filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of land. No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed final. mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo. The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. declaring the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land. they filed a case against respondent Pastor. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 11 of 147 . the court allowed petitioners to file evidence ex parte. 2004 FACTS: It appears that the petitioners and respondents’ father. respondents filed an answer but were found to be in default. respondent Pastor entered into an agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using second parcel of land. The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the bank being the highest bidder. As the civil case against respondents was ongoing.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS CAYANA VS. who then mortgaged the land to respondent bank. she issued an affidavit withdrawing such adverse claims. Angela Leonor C. The respondent spouses M. alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son were forgeries. The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners. Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos. with the marital consent of his wife. together with petitioners of this case and respondent Marceliano. CA GR 125607 MARCH 18. sold two parcels of land to their son. Meanwhile. Later on.

or in respect to the personal. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit withdrawing adverse claims over land. the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing. that the sale of parcels of land were not simulated and not done in bad faith. Angela Leonor C. that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so Created by: Ma. part of the decision included the application of res judicata. declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCT’s valid. conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special proceeding.—The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines. political. status or relationship of the person. having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order. CA decided in favor of the respondents. or the administration of the estate of a deceased person. (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest. (b) In other cases. however. and that there was no evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners. or the condition. the will or administration. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case? HELD: Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC. Respondents appealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. It held that res judicata was inapplicable and also. with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto.The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners. Effect of judgments or final orders. or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another. or in respect to the probate of a will. may be as follows: (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 12 of 147 . the judgment or final order is. litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate. 47.

subject matter and cause of action. precluded the CA from further adjudicating the validity of the deeds and titles. Created by: Ma. including the parties and those in privity with them. and. but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have been adjudged in that case. According to the appellate court. the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.adjudged. while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. Angela Leonor C. Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment is not applicable to this case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present. between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be barred. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy. not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand. There is ‘bar by prior judgment’ when. subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies. which was final. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. the first judgment is conclusive in the second case. there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits. there is identity of parties. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 13 of 147 . The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. But where between the first and second cases. in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action. only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action. declaring the deeds of absolute sale null and void. For res judicata to apply. The decision of the trial court. (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto. (3) identity of parties.

It was erroneous on the part of the CA to say that the lower court had no jurisdiction over second case because of litis pendentia—a pending action doesn’t strip a court of its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not there was reversible error on the part of the CA when it dismissed the case of petitioner due to litis pendentia? HELD: Yes there was. Respondent is a private domestic corporation which 100% foreign owned. sum of money with replevin. Petitioner is praying for a writ of replevin or preliminary injunction for the return of equipment and other materials. Petitioner on the other hand. The trial court ordered a writ of replevin and with a motion for reconsideration. and damages. recovery of possession. together with damages. On this complaint. Respondent filed a case against petitioner for specific performance and damages for breach of oral agreement to extend the terms of VAASA. forum shopping and lack of cause of action. INTEGRATED SILICON TECHNOLOGY GR154618 APRIL 14. preliminary mandatory injunction. which can be traced to a 5-year Value-Added Assembly Services Agreement (VAASA). Furthermore. such that the Created by: Ma. litis pendentia. They have a juridical relationship. 2004 FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign corporation which doesn’t have license to do business in the Philippines. Angela Leonor C. respondent immediately appealed to the CA who then set aside the said order and dismissed the case filed by petitioner. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES VS. respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of capacity of petitioner to sue. filed a separate complaint against respondent for specific performance. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 14 of 147 .

the reliefs being founded on the same facts. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 15 of 147 . two different causes of action and reliefs prayed for. amount to res judicata in the other. there wouldn’t be any res judicata since the two causes of action are different from another. Moreover. (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. For litis pendentia to be invoked.second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. Angela Leonor C. Created by: Ma. There are distinct rights being asserted. The identity of the parties in the two cases notwithstanding. there is want of the other 2 requisites for litis pendentia to apply. and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would. regardless of which party is successful. the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions.

in favor of Stronghold. he was defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences. INC. decided in favor of Buaya. which is allegedly his unremitted premium collections owing to the Stronghold. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY. 1993. Buaya. and on March 30. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter order its execution? 2. Stronghold opposed the motion. without the other party. Buaya filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. The lower court therefore set a hearing on December 13. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its previous decision dated. September 17. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 16 of 147 .076. For failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear at the pre-trial. 1987. On July 26. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. He repeated his motion and gave several reasons to postpone the hearings.83. On the basis of Stronghold’s evidence. He files a ‘Petition for Certiorari’ assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of merit. 2000 FACTS: On July 31. annulling the decision and remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings. Inc. Stronghold Insurance Company. On June 28. Buaya appealed to the CA. does the jurisdiction of the trial court merely require the presentation of evidence for Buaya and without anymore requiring the presentation of Stronghold’s evidence for cross-examination by the Buaya? Created by: Ma. 1985. it will be considered a waiver of his right to present evidence. GR 139020 OCTOBER 11. Angela Leonor C. 1990 but Buaya filed a ‘Motion of Postponement’ of the hearing and was granted. but the court granted Buaya’s motion provided that the next time he does it. ISSUES: 1. a manager of their Cebu branch for the collection of the principal amount of P678. 1987. 1991. 1990. the court’s decision has became final and executory and thus denied all other appeals made before it. the court decided on September 17.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS BUAYA V. filed a complaint against Paquito B.

2. then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present evidence. not annulled. Hence. DENIED. the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient ground for this Petition's dismissal. Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes final and executory. it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Created by: Ma. Litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. because his Appeal Brief stated that it had merely been set aside. Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his evidence. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 17 of 147 . Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was not annulled by the CA. the judgment may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal infirmities or errors it may contain.RULING: This petition has no merit. An authentic copy thereof should have been submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court had indeed been annulled by that of the CA. the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right. Angela Leonor C. RATIO: 1. This shows that the trial court's Decision was reversed and set aside. The effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final. a copy of the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would support the petition. Having been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acting within its authority. it is axiomatic that once a decision attains finality. by the appellate court.

In criminal cases. a final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. Her mistake was brought about by the fact that the testimony of the eyewitness was not attached to the records at the time she wrote her decision. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. Ratio: Except to correct errors which are clerical in nature. or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moromoro or mock trial. a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. Angela Leonor C. to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion. Pascua ordered the police to bring Argel to court to inform him of his liabilities arising from the crime. 2001 Facts: Argel alleged in his complaint that Judge Pascua rendered a decision convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by Pascua in her Decision. Argel charged Pascua with gross negligence for not exercising extreme caution in the preparation of her decision by making sure that all the transcripts of stenographic notes were attached to the records before writing the decision. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 18 of 147 . she revised her decision finding Argel guilty of murder. JUDGE PASCUA AM RTJ-94-1131 AUGUST 20. Issue: Is a decision once final no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration? Ruling: Yes. Pascua acquitted Argel of murder because she erroneously thought that there was no witness that could have identified the accused. Argel contends that respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violation his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Created by: Ma. After reviewing.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGEST ARGEL VS.

unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made). the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with the case. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE 301 SCRA 96. For after the judgment Created by: Ma. 1999 Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to be executed by lethal injection (RA 8177) The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order restraining the execution of said party. The suspension was temporary (until June 15. the SC did nothing of the sort. The Court was in recess at the time but a Special Session was called to deliberate on said matters. 1999. What the SC could not do is alter the decision. the Supreme Court has gone beyond its jurisdiction since the case is already final. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 19 of 147 . Even after the judgment has become final. Said execution was set for Jan. 4. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS ECHEGARAY VS. It was alleged that sine it is already final and executory. Congress was a new one with about 130 new members whose views on capital punishment were still unexpressed. By the finality of the judgment. Issue: Whether or not in issuing the temporary restraining order. Furthermore. 1998. modify or alter the same. In the case at hand. Jurisprudence tells us “the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. modify or alter the same. Angela Leonor C. the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. Ruling: It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. JANUARY 19. the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 1999 but the petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on Dec. 28. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment. what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend.

facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 20 of 147 . Created by: Ma.has become final.

The patient had complications alongside her pregnancy but was released during Christmas day to be with her family. A complaint was filed against respondent and latter denied all accusations. Luke’s Hospital where the petitioners are doctors. And not a year has passed. 1993 Facts: This is disbarment complaint against respondent for dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of pages from medical papers. which was material evidence in the complaint of his clients against petitioners. A prior disbarment suit was filed with respondent before due to his alliance with a judge in extortion of businessmen who had cases in the judge’s court.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTSs FERNANDEZ VS. that respondent is charged with another disbarment complaint. respondent borrowed the records from the clerk of court and reaped of pages from the medical record. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 21 of 147 . Issue: Whether or not the acts of respondent are unbecoming of a lawyer as to warrant his disbarment? Ruling: Created by: Ma. His client was the husband of a patient who was a patient in St. He was being followed by one of the court’s staff due to suspicion and got from the driver the torn pages. Angela Leonor C. GRECIA AC 3694 JUNE 17. The next day. He then handed this over to his driver. she was rushed back to the hospital and she died later on together with the unborn child. The driver then disappeared. Respondent was disbarred but given another chance with the promise of mending his ways. During one of the hearings. The husband filed a case against the hospital and the doctors.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar Integrity and good moral character is essential to a lawyer. By stealing the pages of the medical records. . . Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 22 of 147 . respondent showed his moral unfitness to become a lawyer.Yes. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful. he violated Canon 1 and 7 of Professional Responsibility. . dishonest. immoral and deceitful conduct. Angela Leonor C. which was important in the deciding of the case. which states: Canon 1. By stealing papers of the moral record. Canon 7.

personal and business circumstances.. assisted in organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case 0033). 33 (Civil Case No. 1991 . as stockholders etc. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. Jr. entitled "R. acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings (as office practice) 4. 3. e. In turn.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS REGALA ET AL. framework and set-up of the corporations in question.respondent PCGG’s "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco from complaint in PCGG Case No... et al. 1996 FACTS : Clients consulted the petitioners. 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan of PCGG vs. P. Eduardo M. i. 105938. Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm). (1) stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the client's name. Abello. Angela Leonor C. VS. August 20. or simply.then partners of the law firm Angara. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 23 of 147 . (principal defendant) et al.e. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Roco) . Cojuangco. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners (plus private respondent Raul S." 2.. SEPTEMBER 20. 0033). Cojuangco. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of clients. the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of. and (2) a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. i. the deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings. 33 because of his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for Created by: Ma. where its members acted as incorporators. July 31. Concepcion.e. shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG Case No. 1. in their capacity as lawyers. Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought. i. v. regarding the financial and corporate structure. among others. delivered documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings.

744 shares as of February. CIC. through the use of the coconut levy funds. Edgardo J. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 24 of 147 . 1984 of UCPB 8. Angara . (b) documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate business purposes and already transferred shares 9. COCOLIFE. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation. 33. and more than 20 other coconut levy funded corporations. (b) Affidavit as Attachment. including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation shares 6. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8. namely (PCGG’s Comment): (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini . a wholly-owned investment arm 7. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that is only in legitimate lawyering. (c) Letter of the Roco.000 shareholders). Angela Leonor C. ACCRA Investments Corporation . 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders of UCPB (about 1.whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case No. said Avelino V. UCPB. 11.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants conspired in helping set up.became the holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly 3. and (c) deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients covering shares 12. UNICOM. and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting the Created by: Ma.holding approximately 3.denied being onvolved in the alleged illgotten wealth 10. 5. COCOMARK. Bunag. 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded Roco.400. became holders of shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of stock. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners.

respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated Resolution herein questioned. grounds: strict application of the law of agency. 1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client. favoritism and undue preference. the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal identity of the client. unreasonable or unjust ISSUE: Privileged Information Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients. because the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. not holding that. Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Due process considerations Created by: Ma. 3. or had undertaken to reveal. 1992 .reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of PCGG against Roco 13. 14. nor undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 25 of 147 . March 18. denying the exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with the conditions by PCGG 15. petition for certiorari. Sandiganbayan resolution annulled and set aside. 2. Roco had revealed. Angela Leonor C. absolutely no evidence that Mr. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction for equal protection clause. under the facts of this case. Reasons: 1. Hence. Petitioners excluded from complaint. 4. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorneyclient relationship has been established.

and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. such that disclosure would then reveal client confidences 1. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients) 4.. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) . BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the client's name itself has an independent significance. Created by: Ma. et al. know his adversary. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 26 of 147 . Their services may be compensated by honorarium or for hire. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential 3. (case at bar) 3. Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless. (Baird exception for freedom of consultation) 2. Inc. after the "bigger fish" as they say in street parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at bar) 5. by revealing the client's name. vs."so called client is Mr.require that the opposing party should. Angela Leonor C. (case at bar – BAIRD EXCEPTION) 4. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be performed. 5. as a general rule. but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him. the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. 2. No valid cause of action. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.

6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws Applicable a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment." b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of…” c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.” d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," 7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides a wall of protection against uneven application of status and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates against uneven application of legal norms so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment. 8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right against selfincrimination and subverts the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. SEPARATE OPINIONS DAVIDE AND PUNO) VITUG, J., concurring: (THREE OTHER JUSTICES: VITUG,

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1. Confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship - allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full trust and confidence 2. A situation of what it could elicit from a counsel against his client, unreasonable and with thinly disguised threat of incrimination. DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting 1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue burried: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. 2. Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' prayer to exclude them. The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. 3. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. 4. They have no right to make such a demand for until they shall have complied with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to dismiss.The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness. 5. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable. The lawyer-client privilege provides the petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal defendants for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. 6. Wrong use of American jurisprudence in ponencia: 1. Issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand jury proceedings on different States. 2. In the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators. 7. Lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 28 of 147

8. As a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege. Identity of a client is not within the lawyerclient privilege in this manner because every litigant is in justice entitled to know the identity of his opponents. PUNO, J., dissenting: 1. MAIN POINT OF PUNO: Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions. But petitioners need to prove that prove they fall within the exceptions to the general rule. Needs factual basis. 2. REASON: Attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the privilege. 3. Legal advice exception may be defeated through a prima facie: in furtherance of present or intended continuing illegality, as where the legal representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy. [like this case] 4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege: petitioners included as defendants and conspirators. 5. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint on condition they reveal the identity of their client. 6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to discover the truth, need to protect adversary system of justice, need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against self-incrimination and effective counsel in criminal litigations. 7. Attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud. 8. PCGG relented on its original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.

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the Supreme Court affirms the order of the lower court dismissing the appellants petition for certiorari and Created by: Ma. It was interlocutory since the dispositive portion of the order did not provide a definite resolution to the case. When the judge then issued an order to set a date for hearing of the case. ISSUE: Whether the order of the inferior court is interlocutory of not. grounded on the finding the lower court’s order was interlocutory and that the case must be heard. which ordered the case to suspended for 2 years or until further notice. is merely an interlocutory order thus it cannot be reviewed by a petition for certiorari. CFI dismissed the petition. But. Respondent in defense argued that the order. petitioners tried to secure a reconsideration of the hearing order but it was denied.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS MANALANG VS. RICKARDS (Tenant Ejectment Case) GR L-11986 JULY 31. instead it suspended the hearing of the case. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss and suspends the proceedings to 2 years or until further order from the court. This prompted respondent to file ejectment cases against the 3 tenants in the Municipal Court of Manila. They argue that the case must be heard. HELD: YES. General principle of Laws can only be enforced prospectively. CFI held that actions for ejectment were filed before the enactment of RA1162. Angela Leonor C. Petitioner and others filed separate motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of RA 1162. Municipal Judge saw it fit to suspend the proceedings with the expectation that the question of the constitutionality of RA1162 will be discussed. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 30 of 147 . They filed then a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CFI against Respondent – since the Petitioner group did not want the case to be heard. 1958 FACTS: The City of Manila increased the assessment of the properties being rented by petitioner –respondent thus increased the rentals of the lots. and if the lower court made a mistake in dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners insisted to pay the former rent.

Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 31 of 147 . Also. the lower court is given the power to reopen the trial to finally determine the rights of the parties involved –to give resolution to the case. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C.prohibition.

Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 32 of 147 .Created by: Ma.

The private respondent asked the court to execute the deed in behalf of petitioner. The lower court decided in favor of private respondent and its decision became final and executory. Style in decision-making and preparation is personal to the writer. As long as it doesn’t violate Article 7. there are instances that the resolution or ruling is embodied in other parts of the case. Section 12 of the Constitution and Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. ERICTA GR L-40675 AUGUST 17. Nothing can be read in this portion of the purchase price of the subject land. despite the two writs of execution ordered by the trial court. and that past rentals would be applied to the purchase price. The resolution of the case is ordinarily embodied in the dispositive portion of the case. HON.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PHILIPPINE HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORP. Issue: Whether or not judgment can only be found in the decretal portion? Ruling: No. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 33 of 147 . Nonetheless. just like respondent. saying that the decision that should be executed is the one found in the dispositive or decretal portion. the petitioner’s contention is bereft of merit. VS. there is no compelling reason to establish a stringent rule where the judgment must be placed. Nonetheless. Petitioner contested this. 1983 Facts: Private respondent has filed an action for specific performance and prayed that petitioner to issue a deed of absolute sale of a property in pursuant to RA 3802 wherein there is sale at cost to registered tenants. Angela Leonor C. Created by: Ma. petitioner failed to execute the deed of absolute sale.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGEST BROTHER MARIANO “ MIKE” VELARDE VS. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY G.R. NO. 159357 APRIL 28, 2004 Definitions important to understand the case at hand: • Declaratory Relief -A special civil action brought by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance, before breach or violation thereof, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder- Section 1, Rule 64, Rules of Court -Requisites for action: (1)there must be justiciable controversy; (2) controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) party seeking declaratory relief must have legal interest in the controversy; (4) issue involved must be ripe for justiciable determination • Justiciable Controversy -One involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real and not a mere theoretical question or issue • Legal Standing or locus standi -A personal or substantial interest such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of an act • Interest -Material interest • Dispositive Portion -Order or judgment of the court in the case irrespective of contrary statements arising therein • Relief -Refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the right of a plaintiff or a petitioner • Cause of Action -An act or omission of one party in violation of legal rights or rights of another, causing injury to the latter -Essential elements: (1) right in favor of petitioner; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; (3) act or omission that is violative of the right of petitioner or constituting a breach of obligation of defendant to petitioner Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 34 of 147

Facts: Main case - On January 28, 2003, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a petition for declaratory relief1 against Velarde and other significant religious leaders - All accused filed answers2 - Motions to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration were both dismissed, thus… Case at hand - Supreme Court found the following:3 : no justiciable controversy4 : the cause of action5 to which SJS insisted on is merely speculated or anticipated : the 5 page SJS Petition merely sought an opinion : SJS does not have solid evidence showing that their interests would be greatly affected6 : Lower courts that denied the Motions for Dismissal and Reconsideration without explanation and without allowing the parties to file their answers, respectively : The earlier decisions did not have dispositive portions7 Issues Procedural -whether or not petition for Declaratory Relief raise Justiciable Controversy
1

Held and Ratio -No, there simply was no existing case or controversy8

SJS’s concern was that these religious leaders are endorsing candidates of choice for an elective office, as well as urging and/or requiring the members of their religious groups to vote for choice candidate 2 Brother Eddie Villanueva submitted an answer within the time specified, Executive Minister Erano Manalo and Brother Mike Velarde filed Motions to Dismiss, His Eminence Jaime Cardinal Sin filed a comment and Brother Eli Soriano filed an answer within extended period and similarly prayed for dismissal 3 The Supreme Court decided that SJS’s petition should have been dismissed from the very beginning. The Supreme Court, however, also considered the issue at hand of paramount public interest because it does not simply concern the definition of the separation between church and state but it also the very governance of our country 4 SJS failed to assert an existing controversy between them and the religious leaders accused; the petition did not also state any specific legal rights violated or particular acts the latter were in breach of its rights 5 As in footnote 1 6 Presumed interest is impersonal in character, too vague, highly speculative and uncertain (SJS merely points out that they their members are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters 7 Importance of dispositive portion was explained in Manalang vs de Rickards: “The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive portion of the decision or order s the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements ore declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing” 8 As in footnote 4

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-whether or not it states a cause of action - whether or not the respondent have any legal standing to file Petition for Declaratory Relief Substantive -whether or not the RTC decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and Rules of Court -whether or not endorsements of candidacies by religious leaders is unconstitutional

-No, their accusation were mere anticipations and speculations -No, SJS failed to show injury sustained or to be sustained9

-No10

-No definitive answer11

Essential Parts of a Good Decision: 1. Statement of the Case 2. Statement of Facts 3. Issues or Assignment of Errors 4. The Court’s Ruling 5. The Disposition or Dispositive Portion Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court: - Dismissal of cases without allegations. A complaint or petition should contain clear facts on which pleading relies and clear specification of relief sought - If complaint is filed and forwarded, defendant is given 15 days to answer. If not answered, relief is granted. - If the answer sets forth a counter claim or cross claim, it must be answered within 10 days from service to which consequently a reply may again be filed within 10 days from service of the pleading responded to - Failure to answer gives the Court ability to direct judgment on such pleading12 …
9

The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, if they were able to, their petition might have a chance to stand in court 10 The Supreme Court took this opportunity to discuss what standard procedure should have been taken -it was stated in the decision that the RTC judge be held under evaluation 11 In the decision of the Supreme Court, it stated: “Regrettably it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is timehonored rule that the constitutionality of a statute or act will be passed upon only if and to the extent that it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned” 12 Time for filing for motions are provided in Rules of Court

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Angela Leonor C. the case shall be set for pre-trial13 13 Partied are required to attend pre-trial briefs wherein evidences will be presented. Failure to do so results to dismissal of case with prejudice to the absent party Created by: Ma.- After the last pleading has been served anf filed. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 37 of 147 .

Trial court denied motion to dismiss Case at hand . also including the other issue.of the course line the case is under (Ratio decidendi-reasoning or principle upon which a case is based). ET AL. 132524 DECEMBER 29.R.fallo. 1998 Federico Suntay – Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay | Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay – Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay | (1)Margarita Guadalupe (2) Isabel Aguinaldo (3) Emilio Aguinaldo Facts:15 Main case . NO.to which ratio decidendi is being compared (fallo-dispositive part of the order) -dispositive part of the order is the judgment of the court notwithstanding all the contrary statements that arise in the body of the decision 20 … and therefore reverse earlier decision and reward the petitioner to dismiss the respondent’s earlier petition to right of administration of grandmother’s properties Created by: Ma.Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay died without a will . G.Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion20 Held: . this will make understanding the case easier.Petition dismissed Ratio: 14 Suntay Family Tree14 Because several names occur in the family tree.ratio decidendi .Federico moved to dismiss the case alleging that Isabel is an illegitimate child17 (almost 2 years after filing of Isabel’s case) . those highlighted are the ones involved in the case 15 In order of events 16 Take note of time because it is of significance to the court’s decision 17 Isabel’s parents’ marriage was declared null and void by the trial court 18 Grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to dismiss 19 In consideration of what segment. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 38 of 147 .Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuanco-Suntay filed a petition for issuance of Letter of Administration of grandmother’s estate (5 years after death)16 .Federico filed a petition18 Issue:19 .Federico Suntay filed an opposition saying that he has been managing the properties even before death of wife . SUNTAY VS. Angela Leonor C. ISABEL AGUINALDO COJUANCOSUNTAY.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS FEDERICO C.

Rule 16: Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim . freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife. existing at the time of the marriage: (1)x .- Under Section 1 Rule 1621. … (6) x Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 39 of 147 . the petitioner insists that the respondent is an illegitimate child 24 Article 85: A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes. but it would seem that Federico’s petition to dismiss was too late since the higher court found the earlier court’s ruling without grave abuse 23 Because the court’s decision on the respondent’s parents’ legal separation stated ‘null and void’. unless such party. (3) That either party. (2)x . after coming to reason. Angela Leonor C. was of unsound mind.the time when the court filed Isabel’s claim on her grandmother’s properties is not provided. the time limit for petition to dismiss is long overdue22 Respondents are legitimate children23 which is clear under the third paragraph of Article 85 of the New Civil Code24 21 22 Rules on Civil Procedure Section1.

Michael Cummins. sentenced to reclusion perpetua as maximum. Enrile Bertumen—carnapping (RA 6538. THE REASON FOR THE DECISION Facts Petition for review of accused Marvin Mercado in the Supreme Court pursuant to the last par. Created by: Ma.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS MERCADO VS.AntiCarnapping Act of 1972) Sentence: 12 yrs. Angela Leonor C. Of Sec 13. Ruling The petition of Marvin Mercado for review in the Supreme Court is denied. no costs. NOVEMBER 26. and 1 day minimum—17 yrs and 4 months of reclusion temporal maximum In the Court of Appeals. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 40 of 147 .joyride. Mark Vasques.THE PRINCIPLE WHICH THE CASE ESTABLISHES. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with a modification that the penalty to be imposed is reduced to indeterminate prison term of 17 years and 4 months to 22 years.special law (Anti-carnapping Act of 1972)… not under Revised Penal Code • • • • • • Issue Whether the maximum sentence of 30 years given by the Court of Appeals is considered to be within the range of reclusion perpetua which will enable the case to be certified in the Supreme Court for a reevaluation of the facts and evidence. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR 149375. no intention of stealing Car: quarter window broken Carnapping.case taken directly to Supreme Court) Carnapping of the Isuzu Trooper. 2002 *RATIO DECIDENDI. Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure • Marvin Mercado with Rommel Flores. Court of Appeals relying on People vs. sentence increased to 17 years and 4 months—30 yrs. Omotoy (charged with arson.

Angela Leonor C. Created by: Ma.There is no basis for the trial court’s decision of 12 years and 1 day since RA 6538 sets minimum penalty for carnapping at 14 years and 8 months. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 41 of 147 . reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. Though the 30-yr period falls within the range. The Court of Appeal’s decision of 17 yrs and 4 months applies only to carnapping committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person of force upon things. The findings of fact of the trial court. Evidence shows that there was force upon the vehicle but does not merit the imposition of full penalty. Relying on the Omotoy case may not be ratio decidendi but it enunciates fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. When the Court of Appeals imposes penalties less than reclusion perpetua. a review of the case may only be had by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only errors or questions of law may be raised. when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding upon the Supreme Court. penalty was reduced. Thus. The crime committed is penalized by a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code. The petition was a review on certiorari and not questions of fact.

as if turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects.case filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte—Mar.judgment on May 19.filed for suspension of the proceedings and reference of the case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission. 1950 June 20.k.denied July 13. 1950— expressly ruled in the judgment of conviction that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty because the murders which he was convicted were committed “not in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal strife between two rival guerilla units. MACADAEG GR L-4316. 1950. San Jose Antonio Guillermo. Ramon R. 1950 • • • Issue: Whether the pronouncement of the Court is obiter dictum and if the Commission has jurisdiction over the petition for amnesty of the convicted. Macadaeg.Hons. HON.July 8. MAY 28. 1950 made absolute with costs against Guillermo.June 5. 1950 Petition for amnesty.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. He may not raise again the issue in any Created by: Ma. 29. Ruling: The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court on Nov. Angela Leonor C. not upon the point or question pending. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 42 of 147 .a Silver • • • • Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission.judgment. Potenciano Pecson. 1947. 24.passing or incidental statements. Facts: Petition to prevent and restrain Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition for amnesty filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo a. 1950.denied July 13. 1948.convicted and sentenced for murder July 15. 1952 *obiter dictum. opinion of the court upon any point or principle which it is not required to decide. Appeal to the Supreme Court. statements made or decisions reached in a court opinion which were not necessary to the disposition of the case. uttered by way.” Motion for reconsideration.

The courts are not excluded in deciding any claim for amnesty. under the principle of res judicata. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 43 of 147 . Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2. The finding of the Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty is final and conclusive. at that time. not an obiter dictum. 217 which expressly states “in view of the appointments of new Judges of First Instances” and not for the purpose of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different commissions. Created by: Ma. Guillermo’s case was assigned to the Second GAC. of the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling. Angela Leonor C.tribunal. 1946. during which date the Guillermo criminal case was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. It was also found that the petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay execution of the judgment of conviction which no court of justice will countenance. Seventh GAC’s claim of jurisdiction of the application was merely based on administrative Order no. judicial or administrative and is now estopped from contesting the judgment. thus the Court has jurisdiction over the amnesty petition of Guillermo.

-After Villadores was arraigned. The CA reversed the Orders and directed that Villanueva’s name appearing as he offended party in the criminal cases be stricken. Villadores filed a Motion for Reconsideration (denied). COURT OF VILLADORES GR 142927 MARCH 19. Villanueva opposed the motion on the ground that the pronouncement is mere obiter dictum. The trial court denied the motion for disqualification. -Villadores then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to annul the Order admitting the amended informations as well as the Order denying his motion for reconsideration. VS. -Villadores then filed petition for certiorari with the CA seeking annulment of the Order denying his motion for disqualification and the Order denying reconsideration. 2002 APPEALS & ROQUE Facts: -Petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties including IBC-13. which the labor arbiter ruled in favor of Villanueva. the fiscal’s office submitted a Motion to Admit Amended Informations with the following amendment: "to the prejudice of Francisco N.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS VILLANUEVA. JR. Jr. Villadores sought reconsideration (denied). -Both documents were found to be falsified. and of public interest and in violation of public faith and destruction of truth as therein proclaimed. so that criminal informations for falsification of public documents against a number of accused including respondent Villadores were filed. -Villadores then moved in the trial court to disqualify Rico & Associates as private prosecutor of Villanueva on the basis of the CA’s pronouncement. Jr. -Villanueva now comes to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari. Issue: w/n the pronouncement of the appellate court that petitioner Villanueva.” (granted). the CA pronounced that Villanueva is not the offended party in the cases and that he could not have sustained damages from the falsifications. Angela Leonor C. Villanueva. IBC-13 appealed to the NLRC. is not an offended party in the criminal cases is obiter dictum (opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which Created by: Ma.. filing a surety bond supposedly issued by BF General Insurance Company and a confirmation letter from its President. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 44 of 147 . Although the petition was dismissed.

Ratio: -The pronouncement touched upon a matter clearly raised by Villadores in his petition assailing the admission of the amended informations. Angela Leonor C. -An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum. and as such is not binding as precedent). Among the issues therein was w/n Villanueva is the offended party. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 45 of 147 . this rule applies to all pertinent questions (even only incidentally involved) presented and decided in the regular course of considering the case. Created by: Ma. and led to its conclusion (or any statement on a matter on which the decision is based).is not necessary to the decision of the case before it.

AUGUST 7. The court dismissed the case filed by petitioner using the ground of res judicata. petitioner filed a case for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not one can file an appeal regarding a court’s dissenting opinion? HELD: No. Angela Leonor C. based on the allegations fronted by respondent. This time. based on the information found in the case of libel. respondent filed a petition for certiorari for alleged grave abuse of discretion of the CA with regard to its dissenting opinion. Doing such is contrary to logic and reason. Nevertheless. Petitioner appealed to the CA who in turn. The respondent alleged that the laundrywoman was just being used by petitioner as payback to the charges filed against him by petitioner’s husband. Never has it happen that the dissenting opinion has been the one appealed of. On the other hand. UCOL GR L-45404. petitioner filed a case of libel against respondent. The case was dismissed due since it couldn’t be proven beyond reasonable doubt that respondent was guilty of libel. 1987 FACTS: The laundrywoman of petitioner filed an administrative charge against respondent.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS RUIZ VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 46 of 147 . What comprises a decision which can be subject of appeal or special civil action is the majority opinion of the court and not the dissenting opinion. Created by: Ma. certified the case to the SC. The administrative charge was dismissed.

Following the dissenting opinion of Teehankee stated as follows: .. contend that a lawful search would be justified only by a lawful arrest. where the warrant was based. but such personalities obtained would still be retained.. in defense. that respondents are enjoined from introducing evidence using such search warrant.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS NOLASCO VS. Respondents contend that the search warrant is valid and that it should be considered in the context of the crime of rebellion. Angela Leonor C. PAÑO GR L-69803 JANUARY 30. concede that the search warrants were null and void but the arrests were not. houses. The court decides to use the dissenting opinion of Teehankee regarding this case. without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. The respondents. Petitioners on the other hand. The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that 'the right of the people to be secure in their persons. ISSUE: Whether or not the personalities seized using an illegal search warrant be returned? HELD: Yes. the search was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search should be returned to the petitioner. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 47 of 147 . it should be. 1987 FACTS: The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void. on the part of petitioner AguilarRoque. And since there was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque. papers and effects aqainst unreasonable Created by: Ma.

.R.searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated' (Bill of Rights. This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. Nos. The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . 71208-09. as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. . . Created by: Ma. 3). All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners. section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. August 30. Pamaran (G. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 48 of 147 . sec. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify. Angela Leonor C. 4[2]).. 1985).

it is untenable. over 20 years since its promulgation. Created by: Ma.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS TOLENTINO VS. who was involved in a case against Ongsiako. Appellant is barred by res judicata. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 49 of 147 . ONGSIAKO GR L-17938 APRIL 30. It is just a dissent from the conclusion of the case. the enforcement of the dissenting opinion is ridiculous as the dissenting opinion enforces no right. claim. This was dismissed by the trial court for lack of cause of action. 1963 FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant claims to be the successor-in-interest of the late Severino Domingo. the decision of the case being final and executory for a long time already. This prompted him to file a complaint for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion. Angela Leonor C. ISSUES: Whether or not appellant’s claim that decision was erroneous and unjust is tenable? Whether or not one can move for the enforcement of the dissenting opinion? HELD: On the first issue. Plaintiff-appellant said that Domingo died without ever receiving the decision of the case. On the second issue. or whatsoever. and he has just found out of the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the trial court should be reversed (or affirmed) because the accused argues that the search and arrest was made without a warrant Held: The RTC decision is affirmed. was found. carrying Hashish. Angela Leonor C. Ratio: The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. 1991 Facts: Mikael Malmstedt. or is attempting to commit an offense. Tublay Mountain Province. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport. a Swedish national. Acop. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 50 of 147 .INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MIKAEL MALMSTEDT “THE SWEDISH NATIONAL WITH HASHISH CASE” 198 SCRA 401 JUNE 19. is actually committing. a derivative of Marijuana. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for the reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was illegal because there was no search warrant. Created by: Ma. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. via a routine NARCOM inspection at Kilometer 14.

INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS BARNES VS. Barnes. the Court of Appeals concluded that non-obscene nude dancing performed for entertainment is a protected right under the first amendment (freedom of expression). Held The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed.ED. and whether or not the court was correct in stating that nude entertainment provided by establishments such as the Kitty Kat lounge and Glen theatre is in fact a form of expression protected under the 1st amendment of the United States constitution. 2D 504 Facts The petitioner is the state of Indiana represented by Atty. and Glen theatre. However. Barnes representing Indiana filed a petition of certiorari (asking Supreme Court to review decision of court of appeals) on the decision of the court of appeals. The respondents both wished to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment. GLENN THEATRE 115 L. while the respondents are The Kitty Kat lounge inc. or manner” restriction where government regulation is justified Indiana’s public indecency statute is justified despite its incidental limitations on some expressive activity Ratio The “time. and the minimum requirement of pasties and g-strings for dancers is a valid restriction. Angela Leonor C. as the restriction on nude dancing is a valid “time. Atty. Issue The issue lies within Indiana’s statutory of prohibited nudity and its’ infringement upon freedom of expression. The petitioner contends that their restriction on nude dancing. place. and previously accused the state of Indiana of violating the1st amendment in applying the nudity prohibition on their establishments. where the Supreme Court accepted the request. place or manner test” was developed for evaluating restrictions on expression that take place on public property Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 51 of 147 .

It is not a means to some greater end. saying Indiana seeks to prevent the erotic message of such entertainment. traditional police power of the state is defined as t he authority to provide for public health. when in fact it is not.Since the state is providing for morals and public order. the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. it is just less graphic. safety. Angela Leonor C.Governmental interest is upheld in the prohibition which forwards the disapproval of nudity in public places among strangers. Respondents contend otherwise. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 52 of 147 . and morals 2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression .protect morals and public order. but an end in itself Created by: Ma. Indiana does not contest erotic messages but public nudity 3) if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest . The states minimum requirement of pasties and a g-string for dancers still allows for erotic messages.The US vs O’brien Case addressed justification of governmental restrictions and limitations on first amendment freedoms (O’brien burned his draftcard on the steps of South Boston courthouse in front of a sizable crowd) Government regulation is sufficiently justified within the constitutional power of the government (further government interest): 1) if it furthers important or substantial government interest .

• In April 1987.S. or mutilate an animal in a Created by: Ma. cultural center. (4) On Sept. 1987 and other subsequent days the Hialeah city council held an emergency public session where several ordinances and resolutions where passed in response to the distress of members of the community regarding practices of the Santeria religion specifically animal sacrifice. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 53 of 147 . the church announced plans to establish a house of worship. including its ritual of animal sacrifice. school. 520) FACTS: • Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah. (3) On August 11. other than for the primary purpose of food consumption was passed. and museum with the goal to bring the practice of the Santeria faith. persons. INC. (2) On June 9. Angela Leonor C." and declared that the City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals. noted the "concern" expressed by residents of the city "that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals. Florida's animal cruelty laws which punishes unnecessarily or cruelly killing of any animal. • On June 9. Resolution 87-90 opposing ritual sacrifices of animals within the City of Hialeah was passed. Resolution 87-66. (5) On Sept. torture. peace or safety. Florida where the word sacrifice shall mean: to unnecessarily kill. peace or safety. torment. incorporated in full. 8. except as to penalty. CITY OF HIALEAH (508 U. Ordinance 87-71 stating that It shall be unlawful for any person. V. (Church) and Ernesto Picardo its president filed an action against the city if Hialeah and its city council named as defendants alleging violation of the their rights under the Free Exercise Clause. Ordinance 87-52 prohibiting public ritualistic animal sacrifice. into the open. (1) On June 9. 22. Ordinance 87-40.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS CHURCH OF LUKUMI BABALU AYE. With the consent of the attorney general of Florida the city attorney assured that the prohibition of sacrificing of animals in a religious practice or ritual is not inconsistent with the state law therefore the city council can make ordinances against it. Inc.

87-71 and 87-72. both to participants and the general public. (6) On Sept. its beliefs such as animal sacrifice “need not be acceptable. corporations or associations to slaughter any animal on any premises in the City of Hialeah. (3) that the city's interest in protecting animals from cruel and unnecessary killing and (4) that the city's interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 54 of 147 . and meeting all the health. except those properly zoned as a slaughter house. HELD: The Supreme Court decided in favor of the petitioner and reversed the previous decisions concluding that that each of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief. 87-52.public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption was passed. Given that the Santeria is a religion. RATIONALE: The US Constitution provides that the Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. Florida. (2) that the children who witness the sacrifice of animals suffer from emotional injury. 22. Ordinance 87-72 stating that it is unlawful for any person. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof through the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment which was applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. • ISSUE: Whether or not the Hialeah city council is in violation of the First Amendment in enacting Ordinances 87-14. Angela Leonor C. • After a 9-day bench trial the District Courts favored the defendants finding absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that no violation of the petitioners’ rights were made finding four compelling reasons: (1) that animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk. persons. Created by: Ma. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion stating that the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution. safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City for the operation of a slaughter house was passed. logical. consistent or comprehensible to others in order to be protected by the First Amendment.

and 87-71 were claimed to advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals but this may be done not by prohibiting Santeria sacrifice alone and there are far more greater ways to do this that would not discriminate the practice of the Santeria religion. The Free Exercise Clause "protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation. Angela Leonor C. all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures. The ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendments rights. Created by: Ma. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Employment Div. 87-52. The ordinances were found to be inconsistent with these requirements and led to the conclusion that the ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 55 of 147 . The Ordinances 87-40. and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices..' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. (b) General applicability needs to be establish with laws burdening religious practice. the Free Exercise Clause commits government to religious tolerance. Also a law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny it must satisfy ‘interests of the highest order. (a) neutrality and (b) general applicability in the law needs to be established. In this case the ordinances fail to satisfy these requirements as well. Lastly.To support the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion. and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest even if it has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Dept. Smith. (a) Neutrality need not only be facial (evident at the text used in the law) but can also be supported by the equal protection mode of analysis in the formulation of the law. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. The ordinances of the Hialeah city council fail to satisfy these Smith requirements.

ordered the bank to stop payment. and Douglas R. as held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. "transcends the private Created by: Ma. 2003 Facts: Pablo C. Villaber. Atty. Cagas alleged that Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila for violation of Batas pambansa Blg. In People vs. Yap. without any valid reason.…" The effects of the issuance of a worthless check. 22 are: 1. Angela Leonor C. petitioner. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in. Martinez. Issue: Whether or not the conviction of private respondent for BP22 constitutes moral turpitude and his disqualification from candidacy? Ruling: The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Thus. Blg. the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. one is disqualified to run for any public office. through Justice Pedro L. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) which is a crime involving moral turpitude. 2. The accused makes. under section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the 2001 elections. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 56 of 147 .INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS VILLABER VS. BIg. Villaber countered mainly that his conviction cannot be the basis for his disqualification on the ground that violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. Rationale: The elements of the offense under Section 1 (checks without sufficient funds) of B. or credit with. and 3. draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value. The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude.P.P. Cagas filed a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter’s certificate of candidacy. Fe Tuanda the Supreme Court held that a conviction for violation of B. COMELEC GR 148326 JANUARY 22.

justice. does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer. is erroneous. Clearly. Fe Tuanda. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 57 of 147 . 22 involves moral turpitude.interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty." Thus. The petitioner’s argument regarding the Court's pronouncement in People v. BIg. in Tuanda. the SC did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Atty. honesty or good morals. Created by: Ma. injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce.P. insofar as it states that conviction under B. paraphrasing Black's definition. Angela Leonor C. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder.

The RTC. 2003 FACTS: Recuerdo. ISSUES: Whether or not Joy Lee Recuerdo violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) on 5 counts. And the court of Appeals affirmed that of RTC. And she is also ordered to pay private complainant Yolanda Floro. Joy Lee Recuerdo. Petitioner contends in her appeal to the SC that she has been convicted of an unconstitutional law and that the trial court erred in not upholding her presumption of innocence as well as upholding the evidence of prosecution even if it didn’t prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Angela Leonor C. After trial. 3 of which were cleared while the 5 were dishonored due to the closure of the petitioner’s account. and pay an amount to Miss Floro plus an amount as damages to compensate the payment for attorney’s fees. is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the five cases at bar. Branch 67 of the Makati MTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on five (5) counts and therefore sentences the accused to suffer imprisonment. issued checks to Yolanda Floro in exchange of a 3-karat loose diamond. petitioner.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS RECUERDO VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 58 of 147 . the amount of Created by: Ma. affirmed the decision of the MeTC. In lieu of imprisonment. PP GR 133036 JANUARY 22. on appeal. The check when presented for payment within 90 days thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank (Prudential) for the reason “ACCOUNT CLOSED” and despite receipt of such dishonor the accused failed to pay the said payee the face amount of the said check or to make an arrangement for full payment within 5 banking days after receiving said notice. Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional? RULING: The Supreme Court AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioner guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

P 22. though not intended for encashment. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 59 of 147 .200. RATIONALE: These matters subject of petitioner’s contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v. of the terms and conditions for their issuance. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property. “A check issued as an evidence of debt. Martinez where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B.P 22: The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank which check is subsequently dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment. Angela Leonor C. before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made.” Created by: Ma. has the same effect like any other check. It is within the contemplation of B.000.00 Pesos representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. It is a policy that can be easily eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued. its primordial intention being instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. but an offense against public order. “any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply for an account or for value.” “BP 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties. which is explicit that. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes.

granted RTC. losses or penalties which petitioner may suffer on account of its guarantees. Decision of the RTC to dismiss the case and deny reconsideration are null and void and set aside. Earlier resolution of the Court of Appeals to dismiss the case are reversed and set aside. filed motion to dismiss on the ground that complainant states no cause of action since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered damages because of the guarantees on the behalf of Phil Infra.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION VS. --. 2004 Facts: Respondents executed a Deed of Undertaking binding themselves to jointly and severally pay or reimburse upon demand of such money or to repair the damages.256. Letters of Guarantee were issued in favor of the Philippine National Bank as security. Motion for reconsideration – denied RTC. Decision: Petition is Granted. Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence because of the refusal of the respondents to comply with their obligation that resulted for the petitioner to pay PNB P19. Respondent BF Homes filed motion to dismiss on the ground of it undergoing rehabilitation receivership in the SEC and PD 902–A. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURE INC. Respondents Phil Infra Inc.RTC. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 60 of 147 . Created by: Ma. where trial court has no jurisdiction --. Seek to set aside the Decision of RTC – denied Court of Appeals. respondents refused to pay and resulted the petitioner to secure services of the counsel and later incur expenses. Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state cause of action. Angela Leonor C. GR 120384 JANUARY 13.denied RTC. Motion to Amend resulted dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action . Motion for reconsideration – denied Court of Appeals.035.57. When PNB called upon the respondents to pay their obligations.

Allegation that the PNB had already called on the guarantees of petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. Angela Leonor C. wherein the indemnitor’s liability arises as soon as the liability of the person indemnified has risen whether or not he has suffered actual loss.Rationale: Petitioner’s cause of action stemmed from the obligation of the respondents under their Deed of Undertaking. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 61 of 147 . Created by: Ma. which is an indemnity against liability.

959. and testified that 19M was paid by the petitioner through the National Treasury for the principal loan and interest After RTC denied motion for reconsideration. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 62 of 147 . P351517. treasury department manager of petitioner.000 for Solid and 9.93 (5. penalty charges 4. petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari against RTC. P20.000 as exemplary damages Motion to dismiss filed by BF Homes and Phil Infra – Judge Roberto Lagman Motion to Amend and Dismissal of case in RTC . 2M for attorney’s fees 5.758.36 for aggregate amount of guarantees of petitioner 2.000 for PBAC) 2. 50. interest 3.311. P21.RTC resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals Court of Appeals dismissed the case in the ff grounds 1.57 for various fees and charges Petitioner wants respondents to also pay: 1. not allowed in such amendment 3. no prohibition for courts to reverse decision and granting motion to dismiss Created by: Ma.Judge Joselito Dela Rosa Motion to Amend Petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo.046.526. Angela Leonor C. real purpose of of petitioner is to introduce a cause of action then non existing when complain was filed. order of dismissal is a final order thus remedy is appeal not by certiorari 2.596.FYI’s Facts: PNB demanded from respondents 1.

Asufrin was hired by SMC as a utility /miscellaneous worker. After reviewing Asufrin’s qualifications. he was designated Warehouse Checker. SAN MIGUEL CORP. Asufrin opted to remain and manifested to Acting Personnel Abadesco his willingness to be assigned to any job. he became a regular employee paid on a daily basis as a Forklift Operator. It must produce adequate proof that such is the actual Created by: Ma. petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner is based on a just and authorized cause. while those who will not avail of it would be redeployed or absorbed at the Brewery or other sales office. Ruling: Petitioner’s dismissal is declared illegal. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 63 of 147 . In November 1973. and respondent is ordered to reinstate him to his former or equivalent position. Bacolod City Sales Office were reorganized. As a consequence. In November 1981. In 1984. Thus. all positions of route sales and warehouse personnel were declared redundant. 2004 Facts: In February 1972. But his request was ignored by Abadesco and even said that his name was included in the list of employees who availed of the early retirement package. Rationale: It is not enough for a company to merely declare that it has become overmanned. SMC implemented a new marketing system known as the “pre-selling scheme”. Several positions were abolished including the petitioner’s position as Stock Clerk. Angela Leonor C. 1996 up to his actual reinstatement. he became a monthly paid employee promoted as Stock Clerk. The employees were informed that they can avail of respondent’s early retirement package pursuant to the retrenchment program. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay petitioner the sum equivalent to 10% of his total monetary reward as attorney’s fees. GR 156658 MARCH 10. with full backwages computed from April 1. In April 1996.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS ASUFRIN VS. the sales office and operations at the Sum-ag.

although he was actually posted in the Sum-ag Warehouse. the petitioner was in the payroll of the Sta. Persuasive as the explanation offered by respondent may be to justify the dismissal of the petitioner. he should have been returned to the Sta. Fourth. it is inconceivable that respondent could not accommodate his services considering that the warehousing operations has not shut down. however. Fe Brewery or any sales office and for any position not necessarily limited to that of a warehouse checker. Fe Brewery and assigned to the Materials Section. Third. First. Given the nature of petitioner’s job as a Warehouse Checker. Angela Leonor C. And whether it be by redundancy or retrenchment or any of the authorized causes. his desire to be redeployed to the Sta. a fair and reasonable criteria must be used. Thus. no criterion was adopted by respondent in dismissing petitioner. even assuming that his position in the Sum-ag Warehouse became redundant. Created by: Ma. Logistics department. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 64 of 147 . In the case at bar. through several letters. the petitioner clearly manifested.situation to justify the dismissal of the affected employees for redundancy. a number of disturbing circumstances. Fe Brewery where he was actually assigned and where there are vacant positions to accommodate him. in selecting employees to be dismissed. it appears that the Sum-ag Sales office is still used for warehousing activities and as a transit point where buyers and dealers get their stocks. no employee may be dismissed without observance of the fundamentals of good faith. The workingman’s most important right is his constitutional right to security of tenure. leave us unconvinced. Second.

6. ____ of Caloocan. approved by provincial board of Rizal. alleging that the court had acted w/o jurisdiction in the following statements. BARRETTO 25 PHIL 245 SEPTEMBER 10. There is another pending action between same parties. of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS HERRERA VS. Cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo. according to section 40j. asked the court to issue a mandatory injunction directed to Herrera. The court issued such order ex parte {from one side} without notice of Herrera due to facts stated in complaint and annexed exhibits. 8 of Caloocan. 4. the defendant. Caloocan are issued by the municipal council. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 65 of 147 . Cockpit license erroneously issued for Constancio has been cancelled according to ordinance No. that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction because it renders null the final decision of court in civil case No. Angela Leonor C. Herrera then began a proceeding against Honorable Alberto Barretto (judge of the Court of First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction re cockpit license) and Joaquin (cockpit licensee) for a writ of certiorari {a document filed wherein the supreme court reviews the decision made by a lower court}. 3. 986. 5. not municipal president (Godofredo). to issue a provisional license for Joaquin to conduct his cockpit. Joaquin. Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction because: 1. He did not give the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8673. Mandatory injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil case No. 1913 FACTS: Constancio Joaquin began action against Godofredo B. plaintiff. Godofredo B. 2. Herrera as Caloocan municipal president when authorities refused to issue a license to open and exploit a cockpit. Created by: Ma. Constancio Joaquin has neither the license nor the right to run the cockpit in Loma and Maypajo.

We do not believe that either of these questions go to the jurisdiction of the court to act. Angela Leonor C. where complaint of Constancio Joaquin and mandatory injunction was based on. its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reviewable on certiorari. It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the license. ISSUES: Whether or not Alberto Barretto and his alleged act of exceeding jurisdiction relative to issuance of mandatory injunction for the cockpit license of Constancio Joaquin should be granted a writ of certiorari? DECISION: The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari and the proceeding is dismissed. cannot be corrected by certiorari. The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which pertained to the cause. decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are decision within its jurisdiction and. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. however irregular or erroneous they may be. RATIONALE: A writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. 8.Objection is based on Bertol and Tanquilina T against municipality to declare null and void Caloocan ordinance No. if he was the proper person. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 66 of 147 . In the case at bar no one denies the Created by: Ma. including issuance of a mandatory injunction to stand until the final determination of the action in which it is issued. for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that. One of the fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular case may have been irregular and erroneous. he had the right to exercise discretion as to whom the license should be issued. It is not sufficient to say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds and in the absence of the other party.

Paine vs. it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject matter and even between the same parties. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. The contention that the decision of one of those questions. Sutton. and is as though it as though it had not been done. an order of the court} and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. Christianson: “…an erroneous decision of any of these other questions could not impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when brought in question collaterally. or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action for mandamus {mandate. Bowles). Since it is the power to hear and determine. The authority to decide a cause at all. but must be corrected by appeal. however erroneous. Angela Leonor C. Lee: “…In a word. Mooreland. Colton vs." (See also: Hagerman vs. On JURISDICTION and ERRONEOUS DECISIONS: Chase vs. A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and prohibition fully support the proposition already stated that. the third is irregular and must be corrected by motion. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction." Hardin vs. its decision of any question pertaining to the cause. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 67 of 147 .” Freeman vs. and not the decision rendered therein. error and nullity are not legal equivalent or synonymous. where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person. the second is wrong and must be reversed upon error. authority. Thompson: “The distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court. Beardsly. O'Rielly vs. Wertheimer vs. and a wrongful or defective execution of the power… In the first instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly void. which was not the fact in this case. Nicholson. is what makes up jurisdiction. Created by: Ma. if wrong. cannot be reviewed by certiorari. destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.power. Boonville. Gray vs. does not touch the jurisdiction of the court to act.

" Lewis vs. if the justice had jurisdiction to render it. no matter how irregular or erroneous it may be. Second Judicial District: “…Certiorari may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court. Larson: “The judgment of a justice of the peace will not be reversed on a common-law certiorari. Angela Leonor C." Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 68 of 147 .On CERTIORARI: States vs.

decided that lower court committed a grave error in saying that they had no jurisdiction over the matter.000 pesos.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PEOPLE VS. The PEOPLE then appealed and the Supreme Court having citing the Judicial Act of 1948 and the fact that Estafe and Malversation are 2 different and distinct offense and that the military commission has no authority over the charges placed on Mariano. As so ordered by the Supreme Court the respondent judge was to continue the criminal case against Mariano. 44 states that the Court of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months or a fine of over 200 pesos. The respondent judge then granted the motion on the basis that the court indeed had no jurisdiction over the case. Mariano then filed with the court a motion to quash all information. MARIANO GR L-40527 JUNE 30. citing that a military commission had already ruled on a malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same properties questioned at bar. the appointed liason officer of a municipality in the Province of Bulacan was charged with etsafa of goods amounting to no more than 6. The issues presented: Does the civil court & military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the case of the estafa of goods amounting to no more than 6.000 Pesos. The Ruling: Military commissions have no authority over estafa cases and the court of first instance has original jurisdiction as so implied by the Judicial Act of 1948. 1976 Facts: Hermogenes Mariano. The respondent judge noted that case having been heard and decided by a competent tribunal gives no jurisdiction to his court to pass anew judgment on the same subject matter. Angela Leonor C. Ratio: The Judicial act of 1948 sec. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 69 of 147 . Estafa more than meets with Created by: Ma.

Angela Leonor C.requirements needed for the Court of First Instance to acquire original jurisdiction. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 70 of 147 . Created by: Ma.

where the parties will have to Created by: Ma. J. Unless he has filed said motion. but he may also raise the question as to whether or not the order of default was correct or in accordance with law and facts of the case. 1948 FACTS: Sitchon was declared in default due to his (the plaintiff) failure to answer to the counter claims of the defendant within the time fixed by the rules of court.. Dissenting Opinion of Perfecto.. Rationale of the Supreme Court: The plaintiff should have filed a motion to set aside the order of default under section 2. : The appeal should not be dismissed. because the reversal of the order of default will necessarily carry with it the invalidity of the subsequent final judgment on the merits. and if denied. And on appeal. the case will be remanded by the appellate court to the lower court. He then appealed the default. appellant may not only have the judgment revised and corrected. J. : Under the proceeding outlined in the majority resolution. the parties will have to enter first in a trial and wait for a final decision. should the order of default be reversed on appeal.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS SITCHON VS. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF 80 PHIL 397 FEBRUARY 27. Angela Leonor C. to appeal from the final judgment of the court on the merits of the counterclaim. ISSUES: Whether or not the lower court acted correctly in issuing the order that declared the plaintiff-appellant in default. the defaulting party can not appeal from a final judgment on the merits. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 71 of 147 . Rationale of Perfecto. HELD: The appeal is dismissed. before an appeal against the order of default can be taken. asking that the issue of the default be first handled before the case goes on. Rule 38.

they should have filed first a motion to set aside the order of default under section 2 of Rule 38. proceeded in effect to introduce an amendment to the rules. in making it. That majority. before plaintiff may appeal against the order of default. There is nothing in the rules nor in judicial precedents in support of the suggestion.face and undergo a new trial and the lower court shall have to render a second decision. Created by: Ma. Art. We do not believe that the Supreme Court can legislate by decisions. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 72 of 147 . The Constitution requires that the rule "shall be uniform" and there can not be any uniformity when for any specific case a new specific rule is to be adopted. We disagree with the suggestion that. The rule-making power granted to it by the Constitution (section 13. Angela Leonor C. VIII) must not be exercised through decisions or resolutions in pending specific cases.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. and as provided in Section 17. PP 1017: NOW. do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 2006. Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 73 of 147 . Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President.. #5 declaring a state of national emergency. and pursuant to Proclamation No. Created by: Ma. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (PP1017 CASE) FACTS: • On the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS DAVID VS. whenever it becomes necessary. 1017 dated February 24. President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). . by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18. . General Order No. .rebellion. THEREFORE. . to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines. .” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief. . I. and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines. Angela Leonor C. by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines. I GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO. PGMA issued PP 1017 and G.O. prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees. orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. . 5: NOW. THEREFORE. .

A week after the issuance of PP 1017. • PGMA cancelled all programs related to the celebration & revoked any permits for rally which were issued earlier by local gov’ts. the Solicitor General specified the factual bases (indicated in the case) for issuance of PP 1017 which were not refuted by the petitioners. to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. for the unconstitutional issuance of PP1017 as it had no factual bases and the unconstitutional acts committed during the national state of emergency. No. Randolf S. Constitutional Basis c. as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP. CIDG & PNP raided Daily Tribune offices and surrounded the premises of Malaya & Abante. the President issued Proclamation No. Constitutional Bases: Created by: Ma.O. They were violently dispersed by policemen.m. b. there were groups that still rallied in Edsa. During oral arguments four (4) days after issuance of PN. Despite the revocation.I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP. As Applied Challenge Ruling of the Court: Factual Bases: The issuance of PP 1017 was indeed justified and had factual bases. At 12:20 a. • • • • • Issues presented in the case: W/N the issuance of PP 1017 was justified and had factual bases. A compound of petitioners filed cases against PGMA & Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita et al. David and Ronald Llamas were arrested w/o warrant. Angela Leonor C. 5 are unconstitutional. 1021 lifting the PP 1017 & declared that the state of emergency has ceased to exist. 1021. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 74 of 147 . A statement was issued thereafter warning the media to have “balance reporting” or suffer the consequences. Whether PP 1017 and G. During which.

Significantly. The Court also rules that under Section 17. the Court finds G. Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.O. No. 5 valid. cannot take over privatelyowned public utility and private business affected with public interest. no law has been enacted to guide the military. the law Created by: Ma. No. Angela Leonor C. Article XII of the Constitution. No.O. (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members.” But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G. 5. David and Ronald Llamas.On PP 1017: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. On G. However. and eventually the courts. in the absence of legislation. it also provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees. are not authorized by the Constitution. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G. are ultra vires and unconstitutional. and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials. (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press. While “terrorism” has been denounced generally in media. No. 5: In the same vein. Applied Challenge: On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier. the President. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 75 of 147 . The proclamation is sustained by Section 18.O. and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press. (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President. to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. O. it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S.

the Congress may. Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. voting separately. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe.and jurisprudence. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Created by: Ma. 23. 5. is totally bereft of factual basis. G. (1) The Congress. authorize the President. No. to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Constitutional Bases: PP 1017 Constitutional: Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 76 of 147 . Section 1.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. with supporting reports forming part of the records. 18. shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary. by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled. invasion or rebellion. Angela Leonor C. (2) In times of war or other national emergency. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and Rationale of the aforementioned rulings: Factual Bases: Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power. Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. by law. PP 1017 Unconstitutional: This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Section 23.O. by issuing PP 1017.

Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. Applied Challenge: In the case of David: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and *Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. In the case of the dispersal of the rally: Section 4 of Article III guarantees: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. In the case of the Daily Tribune: Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 77 of 147

Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. * All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 78 of 147

INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PEOPLE V. MAURICIO GR 133695 FEBRUARY 28, 2001 FACTS: Daniel Mauricio is the father of Jonalyn Mauricio. When she was 9 years old, her father raped her inside her room. For 2 years, Daniel repeatedly molested and raped her daughter. When Jonalyn was 11, she sought the help oh her neighbor and called Bantay Bata 163 (Elmer Chavez answered) PNP crime laboratory result: laceration at 1 o’clock position; girl is in a non-virgin state. Jonalyn gave statement to mandaluyong police. Daniel denied allegations but court found him guilty of rape and attempted rape. He was sentenced to death.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Daniel is guilty of rape? 2. Whether or not Daniel is guilty of attempted rape? RULING: 1. Art.335 of the Revised Penal Code states that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following circumstances: - Victim is under 18 years of age - Offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative within the 3rd civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the victim’s parent Both relationship and minority must be alleged in the information given by the prosecution for the crime to qualify as punishable by death. To hold otherwise would deny the accused his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusations against him. Thus, the court modifies the decision of the trial court. Daniel Mauricio is guilty of rape under Art. 335 of the RPC and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua instead of death. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 79 of 147

Overt acts: some physical deed indicating the intention to commit a crime. which if followed through its natural course. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 80 of 147 . Under Art. Daniel’s act of throwing Jonalyn cannot be classified as an overt act because the act did not have a direct or necessary connection with the crime he was about to commit. Created by: Ma. The court reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus. would eventually lead to the perfection of the offense.6 of the RPC: There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous circumstance.2. Angela Leonor C. accused is acquitted of the attempted rape.

JOHNSON 491 US 397 JUNE 21. The State’s argument cannot depend on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS TEXAS VS. It should focus on the precise nature of the expression. Penal Code. 1969 Facts: Johnson participated in a political demonstration during the Republican National Convention. Issue: Whether or not Johnson’s conviction is inconsistent with the First Amendment? Held: Yes. he burned an American flag to protest the renomination of Ronald Reagan as President. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that punishing Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances is inconsistent with the first amendment. The State’s interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson’s conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. Ratio: The principle underlying the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Created by: Ma. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore affirmed. Nor does the State’s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 81 of 147 . The Court of Appeals for the 5th District of Texas affirmed the conviction however the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the decision. During the protest. He was charged and convicted with the crime of desecration of a venerated object in violation of the Tex. Angela Leonor C.

There is no reasonable likelihood that Johnson jury would have found itself foreclosed from considering the relevant aspects of his youth. was the conduct done deliberately and with the expectation of death of the deceased or another will result. States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty. are rapidly comprehended as a mitigating factor in consideration of the 2nd special issue. Created by: Ma. no. the death penalty was going to be imposed on petitioner. is there a possibility that accused would do criminal acts of violence that would make him a continuing threat to society? If the answer to the two questions is yes. and two. Youth’s ill effects are subject to change as a defendant ages and thus. if it is otherwise. On deciding to whether convict him or not. the Texas special issues allowed adequate consideration of petitioner’s youth.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS JOHNSON VS. the judge posed two questions to the jury: one. then it would be life imprisonment. since it received the second special issue instruction and was told to consider all mitigating evidence. 1993 Facts: Johnson was 19 years old when he was convicted of capital murder. Angela Leonor C. TEXAS 509 US 350 JUNE 24. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 82 of 147 . Issue: Whether or not the courts sentenced Johnson without adequate consideration to his youth? Whether or not the jury made a reasonable moral response to the evidence of youth? Held: On the first issue.

Without a search warrant. that didn’t happen since the accused wasn’t arrested outright. Thus. Rodrigueza should be acquitted. Created by: Ma. Also. the accused should be caught red-handed and arrested then and there if caught in the act. The arrest of the accused were also illegal. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 83 of 147 . it is inadmissible since it was seized illegally and without a search warrant. RODRIGUEZA 205 SCRA 791 FEBRUARY 4. Angela Leonor C. He was found guilty by the trial court. In a buy-bust operation or entrapment. He was tipped off by an informer of the NARCOM and was identified through entrapment or buy-bust operation. there’s some contradictions with the testimonies of the officers involved and the evidence presented against accused. Without an arrest warrant. his house was searched and paraphernalia were seized.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PP VS. 1992 Facts: Accused has been charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Though it should be noted that he wasn’t arrested when he was caught red-handed. with regard the evidence. he was arrested along with 2 more. Issue: Whether or not Rodrigueza should be acquitted? Held: Yes. In this case. Furthermore.

Petitioner was engaged in selling imported goods from Iran. he learned when he was released.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS MINUCHER VS. is the determination of whether or not he was acting in a diplomatic nature. This was however reversed by the CA saying that he was clothed with diplomatic immunity. he was not acting within the scope of his Created by: Ma. Also. he was handcuffed and arrested. that valuable goods were taken from his house. Later on. Private respondent was asking for the dismissal of the complaint since he had diplomatic immunity. The arrest of petitioner was seen in media in many countries. Nonetheless. He then knew of the allegations of drug trafficking. Petitioner was later acquitted of the charges. which later on found him guilty. CA GR 142396 FEBRUARY 11. There. 2003 Facts: Petitioner was charged with the violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. Petitioner iterated that he met private respondent through an acquaintance and that the latter befriended him and even bought the goods he was selling. The arrest was led by private respondent Scalzo. without explanation. he was invited to go outside. Issue: Whether or not private respondent should be acquitted due to his diplomatic immunity? Held: The main yardstick if one is a diplomat clothed with immunity. excusing him from civil or criminal jurisdiction. He then filed a civil case against Scalzo for damages on account of the trumped up charges of drug trafficking done by the latter. he was still responsible for acts outside of his official duties. There is no dispute that indeed Scalzo was clothed with diplomatic immunity. heroin was seized. when he was in his house and visited by private respondent. Even if he was granted diplomatic immunity. He even raised this concern to the SC but the SC denied such and remanded the case to the trial court. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 84 of 147 . Angela Leonor C. He was arrested in his residence through a buy-bust operation where allegedly.

official duties during the time of petitioner’s arrest. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. he couldn’t raise the defense of diplomatic immunity. Thus. A diplomatic note was his only support for his contention that he had been acting under his official duties. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 85 of 147 . which was insufficient.

The trial court received an office protocol from the DFA saying that petitioner has immunity from suit. the mere invocation of immunity doesn’t result to the ipso facto dropping of the cases against accused. The trial court shouldn’t have accepted the DFA’s advice ex parte and dismissing the case moto propio. Created by: Ma. Due process of law is a right of the accused as well as the prosecution.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS LIANG VS. On the second issue. Petitioner appealed this to SC. Issue: Whether or not the DFA’s determination of immunity of petitioner is binding upon the courts? Whether or not private respondent should be acquitted due to his diplomatic immunity? Held: On the first issue. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 86 of 147 . Such act violates the right of the prosecution to due process of law. Furthermore. under Section 45 of the agreement between ADB and the Philippines: Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities: a. the DFA’s determination of immunity is only preliminary and not binding upon the courts. This prompted the trial court to dismiss the case. The private respondents then appealed this case to the RTC which then reversed the decision of trial court and ordered that the warrant of arrest be implemented. no. being an officer of the ADB.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity. Angela Leonor C. 2000 Facts: A fellow ADB officer filed a case of grave oral defamation against petitioner. PEOPLE GR 125865 JANUARY 28.

Immunity under this agreement is not absolute. It requires that the acts done in official capacity. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Slandering a person is not part of the immunity given here. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 87 of 147 .

Issue: Whether or not Bradford’s diplomatic immunity constitutes a bar for her to be sued by private respondent? Held: The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. 40 thus: I. of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court decided in favor of the private respondent and petitioner appealed. Court of Appeals. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 88 of 147 . The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent. she is still immune from suit since the law that public employees and officials sued in personal capacity for ultra vires and tortuous acts is municipal and not international law. She contends that even if she was acting ultra vires of her official capacities. now expressed in Article XVI Section 3. is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II. Section 2. The rule is that if the judgment against such Created by: Ma. REYES GR 79253 FEBRUARY 14. 1992 Facts: Private respondent sued private petitioner for damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts done by the latter in excess of her authority as store manager of NEX JUSMAG. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Private petitioner contends that case should be dismissed since she is clothed with diplomatic immunity.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS USA VS. Angela Leonor C. 41 While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent.

it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that. the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. Angela Leonor C. vs. under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have. however. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications. said complaint is not then vulnerable to a motion to dismiss based on the grounds relied upon by the petitioners because as a consequence of the hypothetical admission of the truth of the allegations therein. . 42 It must be noted. he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff. the case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.. Aligaen. is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State." 44 The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. et al. Created by: Ma. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 89 of 147 . 45 Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. etc. and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them. et al. while claiming to act or the State.officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same. for the protection of his rights. 43 "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. In the same tenor.

Angela Leonor C. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. economic or social and mainly non-political. Upon failure of petitioner to give separation pay. NLRC GR 86773 FEBRUARY 14. Issue: Whether or not public respondent has jurisdiction over petitioner? Held: Being an intergovernmental organization. which decided in favor of private respondent amidst contention of petitioner that Labor Arbiter doesn’t have jurisdiction over them. 1992 Facts: Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aqua Culture Department is a department of SEAFD. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State. they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 90 of 147 . enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. Yap stated in their book. an international institution formed by an international agreement of Southeast Asian countries. according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of Created by: Ma. the International Danube Commission. Private petitioner sent a letter to private respondent. 83. NLRC affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter.): Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes. 1956 ed. As Senator Jovito R. SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD). informing him of his termination due to financial restraints of the department. the International Institute of Agriculture.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS SEAFDEC-AQD VS. Public International Law (p. As such. private respondent filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter. Latter was informed that he was going to receive separation pay.

i. 284-1285).]) The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. Id. jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. 83 [1956 ed. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction. besides. that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. pp.their own. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 91 of 147 . Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board.. The Law of International Institutions. for instance. (See Jenks. such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. (See Jenks. Angela Leonor C. Series of 1984 — 4. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization.e. which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law. pp. . the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Id. In the case at bar." (Salonga and Yap.. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations. Public International Law. Created by: Ma.. even worse. 139. See also Bowett.

ET AL GR L-7995 MAY 20.In answer. deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law o subject not expressed in title thereof  title is misleading or defective as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein o Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines o Provision of the act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business from hereditary succession. 1180.. and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin. and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in retail business violates constitution . and to enjoin Hernandez. . et al. Secretary of Finance. filed a petition with regard to certain provisions stipulated in Republic Act No. ICHONG vs JAIME HERNANDEZ. which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival o The act has only one subject embraced in the title o No treaty or international obligations are infringed o As regards hereditary succession. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 92 of 147 . only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS LAO H. “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”.Whether or not the court shall grant Inchong’s petition with regard to the validity and constitutionality of RA No. with costs against petitioner RATIO: Created by: Ma.Petitioner’s grounds: o RA 1180 denies alien residents equal protection of law. from enforcing its provisions. Angela Leonor C. 1999 FACTS: .Ichong. the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: o The act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State. declaring such to be unconstitutional. ISSUE/S: . 1180 COURT RULING: Petition denied.

Concurring and Dissenting: Agrees to the proposition. principle or rule that courts may not inquire in to the wisdom of an act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. to its disadvantage. but the expression of legitimate desire and determination of the people. and felt by all sections and groups that compose the Filipino community which could endanger the national interest. J. o Law is not a product of racial hostility. thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens Law doesn’t violate equal protection clause of the constitution o Sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated. Law doesn’t violate the due process of law clause o Because law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of alien already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege Wisdom and efficacy of law to carry its objective is evident Provisions of law are clearly embraced in title o Suffers from no duplicity o Has not misled legislators/population Cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty of obligations o No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject o Police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any conventional agreement Padilla. to free the nation from economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly. prejudice or discrimination. a reality proved by official statistics.- - - - - - Court holds that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business o Court finds alien domination and control to be a fact. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien. specifically those with Created by: Ma. However courts could still inquire and determine whether the Act is against a provision/s of the Constitution .Disagrees with the clause that prohibits associations and partnerships to engage in retail business. Enactment clearly falls within the police power of the state o Law is clearly in the scope of police power. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 93 of 147 - .

and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business. administration.capital not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines. Created by: Ma. or by his executor. after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 94 of 147 . Angela Leonor C. o Certain sections of the Act are thereby invalid for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution. even before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners.

Specifically the issue is whether the provisions of EO 97-A confining the application of RA 7227 within the Created by: Ma. in contravention of the equal protection guarantee. (3) no exchange control policy. Providing Funds Therefore and for Other Purposes” Hence. Angela Leonor C. specifying the areas within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege was operative (only in secured areas consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be the completely tax and duty-free area in SSEZ – some of the citizens from areas no longer included in the new delineated areas challenged the constitutionality of EO 97-A According to the citizens.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS TIU VS. enjoy the same privileges. creation of Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) SSEZ has multiple benefits such as (1) free flow or movement of goods and capital. After which. Congress. RA 7227 included the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic. • • • • • Issue: • Whether or not EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 1999 Facts: • • Petition for review seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution. the lands occupied by the Subic Naval bases Agreement and within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa. It has effectively discriminated against them without reasonable or valid standards. Province of Bataan as secured areas of SSEZ and should. Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose. (2) tax and duty-free importations of raw materials. Province of Zambales. (4) banking and finance shall be liberalized. approval. passed into law RA 7227 entitled “An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses. therefore. Ramos issued EO 97-A. EO 97-A excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law. capital and equipment. w/ Pres. CA GR 127410 JANUARY 20. Pres. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 95 of 147 .

but is subject to reasonable classification. Costs against petitioners. Ruling/Decision: • The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. (2) be germane to the purpose of the law. RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 96 of 147 . • Created by: Ma.secured area and excluding the residents of the zone outside of the secured area is discriminatory or not. Ratio: • • • The equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. to be valid. The fundamental right of equal protection of the law is not absolute. Classification. must (1) rest on substantial distinctions. The assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED. (3) not be limited to existing conditions only. and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Furthermore.

This decision was reversed by the state Supreme Court. OF HEALTH FACTS: Nancy Beth Cruzan was left in a persistent vegetative state after sustaining serious injuries in an automobile accident. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 97 of 147 . Petitioner Nancy Cruzan was rendered incompetent due to her injuries from an automobile accident. The court found that a person in Nancy’s condition had a fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions to refuse and direct the withdrawal of death prolonging procedures. After it was apparent that she had no hopes of recovery.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS CRUZAN VS. ISSUE: Did the State’s refusal to terminate the life support system of Cruzan violate her right to due process and liberty interest rights to refuse medical treatment? Ruling: The US Supreme Court in a 6-3 ruling found that a person did have a liberty interest under the due process clause of the 14th amendment to refuse medical treatment. Without this evidence. The court found that the statements of Nancy Cruzan under certain conditions were unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent and thus insufficient to support co-guardians claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy’s behalf. The court also found that Nancy’s expressed thoughts at age 25 in somewhat a serious conversation with her housemate friend that if sick or injured she would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally suggests that given her present condition she would not wish to continue on with her nutrition and hydration. a state obligation to uphold human life overrules the wishes of patient or parents. concluding that no person can assume that choice of an incompetent in the absence of formalities Created by: Ma. It rejected the argument that Cruzan’s parents were entitled to order the termination of the life support system. She was supported with an artificial life support system. The hospital authorities wouldn’t heed such request if there is no court approval. The parents sought and received authorization from the court. provided that they are competent and there was clear and convincing evidence that the person didn’t want artificial support to keep them alive. her parents asked the hospital authorities to withdraw the life support system. Angela Leonor C. MISSOURI DEPT.

inherently reliable evidence absent here. the Cruzans had no clear or convincing evidence like a living will to terminate the life support system. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 98 of 147 . In this case.required under Missouri’s Living Will Statutes or the clear and convincing. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C.

Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 99 of 147 . Angela Leonor C.Created by: Ma.

McElroy Film Productions. CAPULONG GR 82398 APRIL 29. Honasan vs. Branch 134. Enrile filed his Consolidated Answer on April 6. entitled "Gregorio B. in Civil Case No. Lope Juban and PMP Motion for Pictures Production. Petitioner Ayer Productions also filed its own Motion to Dismiss. 1988. On March 22 1988. the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. respondent court issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners. 88-413. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 100 of 147 . 1988. As a result.. dated March 22. 1987. Ayer Productions Pty. 1988. issued a TRO and set for hearing the application for preliminary injunction. petitioner Hal McElroy informed the Court that a TRO dated March 25. The respondent did not approve of the showing of the film and filed a complaint with application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on February 23. petitioner Ayer Productions filed a Petition for certiorari dated March 21 1988 with an urgent prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. invoking his right of privacy. petitioner Hal McElroy also filed separate Petition for certiorari with Urgent prayer for a Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. 1988. 1988. On March 23 1988. Angela Leonor C. In response. the petitions were consolidated and Enrile was required to file a consolidated answer. The Court also granted a TRO partially enjoining the implementation of the respondent Judge's Order of March 16 1988 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein. was issued by Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the RTC of Makati. Hal McElroy filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction. 1988. Branch 147. 1988 FACTS: In a letter dated December 16. By a Resolution dated March 24. Hal McElroy. alleging lack of cause of action as the mini-series had not yet been completed. 1988. In an order dated March 16 1988. On February 24. ISSUES: Created by: Ma. which was about the EDSA Revolution. Private respondent filed a Counter-Manifestation on April 13. Ltd. 1988.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. Australian film maker and petitioner Hal McElroy informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the motion picture he intended to make. and allowing the petitioners to resume producing and filming those portions of the projected film that do not make any reference to private respondent or his family or to any fictitious character based on the respondent. In a Manifestation dated March 30.

Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple private citizenship. RATIONALE: 1. the Court. Angela Leonor C. 1988 and made PERMANENT b) Treating the Manifestations of petitioners dated March 30. in the exercise of its plenary and supervisory jurisdiction. RESOLUTION: The court concluded that the production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not. The extent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile that would be entailed by the production and exhibition of "The Four Day Revolution" would be limited in character. 2. The right of privacy of a "public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. The Petitions for Certiorari are granted due course. 1988 as separate Petitions for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order. TO DISMISS Civil Case No. required Judge Teofilo Guadiz of the RTC of Makati. 1988 and April 4. He continues to be a "public figure. 88-413 and to set aside and dissolve his TRO dated March 25 1988 and any Preliminary Injunction that may have been issued by him. The limited TRO granted by the Court on March 24. must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. 3. in the circumstances of the case. 5. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression Created by: Ma. The subject relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this country and as such. enjoining unqualifiedly the implementation of respondent Judge's order of March 16. There was no "clear and present danger" or any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.Whether or not the production and filming of the projected miniseries would constitute an unlawful intrusion into the privacy of the private respondent. the Senate of the Philippines. Branch 147.” He sits in a very public place. and the March 16. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 101 of 147 . constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy. 1988 order of trial court granting a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is set aside." a. 4. 1988 is modified.

and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 102 of 147 . Created by: Ma.

Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 103 of 147 .

case remanded for further proceedings. Petitioners were arrested. or whether or not it violates the Due Process Clause HELD: . petitioner Garner.“A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex. conduct was in private and consensual Complaints described their crime as: “deviate sexual intercourse with member of same sex” Petitioners exercised right to a trial de novo.” Petitioners were adult at the time of the alleged offense. 2003 FACTS: Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District. constitutional arguments still rejected and convictions affirmed. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 104 of 147 . is valid.The Texas statue making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. unconstitutional RATIONALE: Created by: Ma. engaging in a private. State Court of Appeals held that statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment considering Bowers v. consensual sexual act. v TEXAS US SUPREME COURT 02-102 JUNE 26. contentions were however rejected. Angela Leonor C. challenging the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. petitioners were each fined $200 plus court costs. - - - - ISSUE: .INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS LAWRENCE et al. Hardwick.Whether or not the Texas statute. charged and convicted in violation of Texas Statute .

Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 105 of 147 . Equal Protection Clause o When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State. o Consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character Concurring opinion Justice O’Connor .Agrees with the Court that Texas’ sodomy law banning “deviate sexual intercourse” between consenting adults of the same sex. based conclusion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause – “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. Texas statute furthers no legitimate State interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and private life. Certain deficiencies found as regards Bowers v Hardwick. expression. Historical grounds relied upon are overstated. It does tend to show that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like conduct between heterosexual persons.- - - - - Liberty under the Due Process Clause –Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. This does not suggest approval of homosexual conduct. early American laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity more generally. that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and private spheres. but not between consenting adults of different sexes is unconstitutional. Pattern of nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private. Angela Leonor C. Petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. belief. and certain intimate conduct.” Dissenting opinion Justice Scalia Created by: Ma. With respect to the issue presented whether the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. Liberty of the constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. It presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought.

Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when the ratified the Bill of Rights. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 106 of 147 .” On the contrary. Fundamental rights. homosexual sodomy do not implicate a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause. Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not deny equal protection of the laws. are those deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. Created by: Ma. Texas’s prohibition of sodomy is unsupported by a rational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate state interest.- - - Texas’s prohibition of sodomy does not infringe a “fundamental right” (which the Court does not dispute). as defined. Angela Leonor C. o Due Process Clause prohibits states from infringing fundamental liberty interest unless infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. o Bowers held. o Court failed to establish that the right to homosexual sodomy is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.

Issue: Created by: Ma. they would be dismissed. those from the 1st and regular shifts should not participate in the demonstration.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION VS. 51 SCRA 189 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang in order to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.. A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to participate. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO. But it was stressed that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression. Since it was too late to pull back. Angela Leonor C.. The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No strike and No lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 107 of 147 . This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally. Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. After learning about the planned mass demonstration. otherwise. the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. INC. During the meeting. The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial relations for being filed two days late. called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO.

Whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations was justified in dismissing PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was filed two days late. Whether or not the company was justified in dismissing the officers of the PBMEO 4. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 108 of 147 . 3-4. The fact that they were willing to sacrifice a day’s wage in order to express their grievances against the Pasig police only goes to show how important it was for them to fight for their rights. freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances should be upheld over the company’s right to property. freedom of expression and freedom to petition for redress of grievances. The workers acted well within their constitutional rights in staging the rally. the CIR should not have denied their motion for reconsideration. Since the CIR is a creature of the Legislature and even the rules of the legislature itself must be liberally applied if strict adherence to it would result in the denial of a person’s constitutional right. The company’s right to property should yield to the workers Constitutional right to freedom of speech. The company’s loss of unrealized profits for the day of the strike is not as important as the workers fight their rights. In doing so. 2. Angela Leonor C. Whether or not the mass demonstration of the PBMEO was a violation of the company’s “No strike and No lockout”rule. Thus. 3. Held: 1. In fact. The Court of Industrial Relations should not be confined by technical and procedural rules in its quest for justice. 2. the court divested itself of their jurisdiction which renders their decision in favor of the company null and void. Whether or not the workers constitutional rights to freedom of expression. The CIR rules against late filling cannot prevail over basic Constitutional rights Created by: Ma. The company was in fact informed by the union and it was stressed that the rally was not against the company since they had no quarrel with management. the demonstration was not a violation of the ‘No strike and No lockout’ clause but was in fact a valid exercise of the workers constitutional rights.1. they were even able to save money on the operational expenses for that day.

A court may suspend its own rules whenever the purposes of justice requires it.The eight officers of the PBMEO who were dismissed are thus reinstated and are entitled to backwages. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion. Created by: Ma. to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. free assembly and petition are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man’s enjoyment of his life. namely EXISTENCE OF A GRAVE AND IMMEDIATE DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVILWHICH THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO PREVENT. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 109 of 147 . Angela Leonor C. Human rights are supreme over property rights since property rights can be lost through prescription while human rights do not prescribe. its judgments and orders become null and void. When a Court acts against the Constitution. Doctrines: The rights of free expression.

but. (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law. (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only." as counsel for the appellant asserts. 1639. usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. and (3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state. was accused for possessing one bottle of A-1-1 gin. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions. an intoxicating liquor. Act No. Angela Leonor C. distinctions.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PEOPLE VS. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. not to religious belief. to be reasonable. And the classification. but upon the degree of civilization and culture. (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers. Issue: The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws. supra. more directly. other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. Held: 1. to the geographical area. and. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable. in a way. 1939 Facts: Cayat. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage. CAYAT 68 PHIL 12 MAY 5. Provincial Board of Mindoro. Created by: Ma. not merely imaginary or whimsical." (Rubi vs. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 110 of 147 . being a member of the non-Christian tribes. to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization.

Angela Leonor C. to constitute due process of law. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture. notice and hearing are not always necessary. Finally. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. is not an argument against the equality of its application. receive. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. or Created by: Ma. the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. It has been the sad experience of the past. or drink any ardent spirits. Appellant contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes. ale. have in his possession. that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. as the observations of the lower court disclose. other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act. (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation. as counsel for appellant asserts.That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted." is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes." On the contrary. 2. upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence. beer. or intoxicating liquors of any kind. (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed. wine. Thus a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing. The prohibition "to buy. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 111 of 147 . Besides. The Act was not predicated. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government. The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment.

is a legitimate exercise of the police power. in fact. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law.property used in violation of law may be confiscated." On the contrary. Created by: Ma. the same must be upheld. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. Any measure intended to promote. with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. by appropriate measures. does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race. is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and. to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 112 of 147 . The law. education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state. if there is. 3. peace. there are now lawyers. and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. the government has endeavored. Act No." As a matter of fact. no equality in education. as above stated. develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all the powers of the government. eventually. Angela Leonor C." as appellant's attorney impressively avers. or when the Property constitutes corpus delicti. are definitely asserting themselves in a competition world. morals. and that they are "a virile. is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law. as in the instant case. It has been aptly described as a power coextensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. 1639. the health. doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding. to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. upand-coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme. then. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines.

the wisdom of the policy adopted. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 113 of 147 . the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. and we hold it does exist.In the constitutional scheme of our government. and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it. are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. if in the application of the law. this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. If the power exists. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer. And. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by a certain class of persons.

(c) petitioner. deceit and false pretenses. promised to marry private respondent. she allowed herself to be deflowered by him. Issue: 1.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 114 of 147 . Angela Leonor C. CA affirmed this decision. CA GR 97336 FEBRUARY 19. d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her. 1993 Facts: Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of their agreement that latter will marry her based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. He then wanted to repudiate their agreement of marriage and confessed that he was already married to someone else. who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality. Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. He asked her to live with him and after he had took the virginity of private respondent. Petitioner was an exchange student in the Philippines who courted and promised marriage to private respondent. This prompted private respondent to file a case for damages wherein the trial court decided in her favor. through machinations. Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar? Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. good customs. (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner. This Created by: Ma. culture and traditions. (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances. The trial court based its decision on (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers. have offended our sense of morality. inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens. his moods started to change and even became violent. (e) by reason of that deceitful promise.

Angela Leonor C. and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage. The girl becomes pregnant. as the girl is above nineteen years of age. which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Thus at one stroke. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless. A promise of marriage either has not been made. Article 21. But under the proposed article. if the forgoing rule is approved. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 115 of 147 . in the interest of justice.notwithstanding. 23. would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. the said Code contains a provision. 20 As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report: But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule: Art. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes. 21 Article 2176 of the Civil Code. which defines a quasi-delict thus: Created by: Ma. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed. the Commission has deemed it necessary. or can not be proved. Under the present laws. she and her parents would have such a right of action. An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. there is no crime. the legislator.

Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 116 of 147 . Quasi-delict. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana. 23 In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. We are of the opinion. Angela Leonor C. is obliged to pay for the damage done. good customs or public policy. false imprisonment and deceit. no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act. is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress. in the absence of Article 21. would have been beyond redress. in reality. intentional and malicious acts. and so hold. proof that he had. with certain exceptions. Created by: Ma. Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Such fault or negligence. are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Article 21 fills that vacuum. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence. it has become much more supple and adaptable than the AngloAmerican law on torts. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code. but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery. could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. however. there being fault or negligence.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Thus. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which. that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals. It is essential.

This prompted the private respondent to file a case against petitioner for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the private respondent.l ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed an abuse of discretion in abandoning its original decision? HELD: No. which includes the right to amend its decisions. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 117 of 147 . MAY 20. finding that there was indeed illegal dismissal and absence of due process (as private respondent was never informed through notice). which decided intheir favor but later on abandoned its original decision. This was appealed by the petitioner to the NLRC. 1999 FACTS: Private respondent was dismissed by petitioner due to the loss of trust and confidence. Courts have the inherent power to control and amend its processes and orders as to make it comformable to law and justice. NLRC GR 121905. especially if it is its honest opinion that it committed an error. in favor of the private respondent.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS VITARICH VS. Angela Leonor C. the NLRC didn’t commit any abuse of discretion. Created by: Ma.

1984. approved on March 14. given that the law wherein it based its contention was only a temporary statute. In the said election. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 118 of 147 . 697. CUMBA GR 118861 APRIL 27. The COMELEC then issued a resolution saying that they have the exclusive jurisdiction over appeal concerning election cases and also. Petitioner mentioned that COMELEC has committed a grave abuse of its discretion. Angela Leonor C. which prompted the respondent to file a petition for appeal to the COMELEC. This was contested by petitioner saying that even if COMELEC’s position is inherently compelling. is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining Created by: Ma. The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not there is merit to the stand of COMELEC having exclusive jurisdiction over appeal of election cases? HELD: Yes there is. Blg. 50. it ordered for respondent to be reinstated to the position of mayor. Section 50 provides: Sec. Section 50 of BP 697: B.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS RELAMPAGOS VS. 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER. APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.P. its position should be given scant consideration. The COMELEC has been granted this through a special law. only to be applied to a past Batasang Pambansa election. 1995 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent are both candidates for a mayoralty election in a certain town. Definition. the latter was declared the winner and this was protested by the petitioner in the trial court.

decrees. This special law wasn’t expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code or is a temporary statute. (Emphasis supplied) The special law wasn’t expressly repealed and according to jurisprudence. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code. In reference to the repealing clause of the Omnibus Election Code: Sec. The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. is hereby repealed. Created by: Ma. Angela Leonor C. The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari. as amended. Furthermore. All other election Laws. mandamus. implied repeal of laws is frowned upon. except Presidential Decree No. which was vested by the Constitution to have exclusive jurisdiction over appeal in election cases.(Emphasis supplied). 282. rules and regulations or parts thereof. no body is more apt in entertaining appeals through petitions of certiorari. Repealing Clause. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 119 of 147 . 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. or prohibition other than the COMELEC. inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed. political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. executive orders. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate. prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. as the petitioner wishes to assert.

decided in favor of the respondents. 1965 FACTS: The case at bar is an appeal of the decision of the CA to uphold the trial court’s issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. the respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal. Created by: Ma. The respondents then questioned the record saying that it was incomplete and defective. The petitioner filed with the court a notice of appeal. The trial court approved this and it issued a writ of execution prior appeal. The CA on its original decision decided in favor of petitioners and issued also a writ of preliminary injunction. Angela Leonor C.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS ASTRAQUILLO VS. in a case filed by the petitioners against respondents. saying that the respondents didn’t raise any new issue in its motion for the CA to have substantive reason to reverse its decision. damages. and asking the petitioners to pay respondents unpaid rentals. appeal bond and record of appeal. While waiting for the appeal to be perfected. This was appealed by the petitioners with the CA under petition for certiorari. based on the alleged insolvency of the petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the order of the trial court to execute its decision pending appeal? HELD: The CA didn’t erred in upholding the writ of execution pending appeal of the trial court. dismissing the complaint and rendering the real estate mortgage void. the CA reversed its decision and upheld the writ issued by the trial court. JAVIER GR L-20034 JANUARY 30. The trial court then ordered the appeal to be first perfected. The trial court. On a motion for reconsideration though by the respondents. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 120 of 147 . This was questioned by the petitioners. and other costs.

In the case at bar. considering the facts are binding since in appeals through Rule 45 the CA’s decision is conclusive with regard to facts and cannot be disturbed by the SC. but it could be inferred through the circumstances shown and raised. control or inquire upon such discretion unless there is abuse thereof. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The trial court acknowledged this and found it to be substantial. The contention of the petitioners about the lack of substantial reason for the CA to reverse its original decision is bereft of merit. The CA affirmed this in its disputed resolution. Angela Leonor C. moving it to use its power to grant the respondent’s motion. Under the Revised Rules of Court.Under Section 2. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 121 of 147 . the SC finds that there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the SC in upholding the writ of execution. Created by: Ma. Also. respondents were able to show records and even the testimonies of the petitioners themselves to prove their claims. it has been established that it is discretionary upon the court if it will grant or deny a motion and the appellate courts will not interfere to modify. the insolvency of petitioner doesn’t need to be proven directly. courts have the power to amend and control its orders and processes to make them conform to law and justice. Furthermore. Courts have the right to reverse themselves especially when it is their honest opinion that they have committed an error or mistake in their judgment.

11 The order to pay full backwages is a consequence of the employer's action in dismissing an employee without notice which makes said dismissal ineffectual. and their proportionate 13th money. were given one-month pay for every year of service. Angela Leonor C. Furthermore. ISSUE: Whether or not the notice requirement has been complied with to effectuate a legal dismissal? HELD: No. The NLRC said that petitioner was afforded due process. The employees. The labor arbiter decided for petitioner to be paid full backwages and be reinstated. 2000 FACTS: Private respondent terminated petitioner along with other employees under security checker due to the employment of cost-saving devices. while recognizing the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. providing for the payment of full backwages for failure of an employer to give notice. 12 The employee Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 122 of 147 . NLRC GR 117040 MAY 04. Article 283 or 284 mentions that for authorized causes of termination. 30-day notice or in lieu thereof.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS SERRANO VS. their last salaries. 283-284. The private respondent doesn’t have the right to substitute the rights of his employees by giving them 30-days pay than giving them notice. All he received was a dismissal later saying he was being laid off due to retrenchment without any mention that the laying off employees would lessen costs. saying that he wasn’t afforded due process. Petitioner didn’t give his reaction to the offer as he didn’t show up during the time the separation pay was given. seeks to vindicate the employee's right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off. He filed for illegal dismissal and the Labor Arbiter decided in his favor. except for petitioner. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in Arts. The law requires that a written notice should be served to the employee who is about to be dismissed. Private respondent appealed the decision to the NLRC. 30 days pay. The written notice shall afford time to employee of his eventual loss and for the DOLE to ascertain if there was indeed an authorized cause for termination.

Created by: Ma. therefore. he should be paid his salaries in the interim. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 123 of 147 .is considered not to have been terminated from his employment until it is finally determined that his dismissal/termination of employment was for cause and.

or illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. provincial governors."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers. allowed to possess firearms and ammunition. Macarandang wherein a secret agent was sustained as equivalent a peace officer and thus. or ammunition. Angela Leonor C. or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines]. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment as secret agent of a provincial governor constitutes sufficient defense for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 124 of 147 . The trial court found him guilty of the offense. MAPA 20 SCRA 1164 (1967) FACTS: Accused was found in possession of a homemade gun without any license or permit. HELD: No. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms. soldiers. the Philippine Constabulary. . guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons. "it shall be unlawful for any person to . Created by: Ma. lieutenant governors. municipal mayors. with regard to a prior ruling in People vs.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS PEOPLE VS. detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed." are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. it doesn’t anymore speak of authority. municipal police. provincial treasurers. He was a secret agent for the provincial governor and this he raised as defense for the possession of his firearm. sailors. municipal treasurers. parts of firearms.” Furthermore. since it conflicts with this decision. A case was filed against him for violation of Section 878 of the New Administrative Code. . possess any firearm. and guards of provincial prisoners and jails.

But acting on a filed Motion to Lift Search Warrants. not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the search warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants were properly lifted due to lack of probable cause? HELD: Section 2. CA 164 SCRA 655 (1988) FACTS: Petitioner sought assistance of NBI to conduct searches and seizures in connection with the latter’s anti-piracy campaign. the trial court withdrew the warrants. This constitutional guarantee is a time-honored precept. The court had occasion to define probable cause for a valid search “as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched”. the petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films. This was affirmed by the CA. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 125 of 147 . In its lettercomplaint.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS 2OTH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP. which circumscribes government action with regard to the pronouncement of a search warrant. Article 3 of the Constitution mentions that no warrant shall be issue except upon probable cause. the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by petitioner and subsequently filed applications for search warrants. in violation of PD 449 or Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property. Angela Leonor C. The court held that the constitutional provision demands “no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be justified” in order to convince the judge. The desired search warrants were issued. Acting on the letter-complaint. VS. Created by: Ma.

Created by: Ma. it was due to the misrepresentations of NBI agents that copyright infringement or a piracy of a film was being committed. The court cannot presume that the duplicates were taken from the master tapes that petitioner owns.In the case at bar. Angela Leonor C. As found by the lower court. It was only petitioner’s counsel who had personal knowledge since he was present when the searches were being done and identified the confiscated tapes as taken from the master tapes of petitioner. there was no personal knowledge on the part of the agents. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 126 of 147 . The court ruled that there was no probable cause. It was thus ruled that the master tapes be presented from which the copyrighted films were allegedly copied. which was necessary for the validity of the search warrants against those who allegedly engaged in pirated films. the lower courts lifted the warrants on the ground that when they issued the warrants.

The 20th Century Fox ruling couldn’t be applied in this case since the incident in this case happened before the ruling was ever upheld. CA 261 SCRA 144 FACTS: Petitioner lodged a formal complaint with the NBI for violation of PD 49. unless the contrary is provided. Created by: Ma. the ruling in the 20th Century Fox case should only serve as a guidepost. Angela Leonor C. An application for search warrant was undertaken by NBI. as amended. These were corroborated by two other witnesses. whose affidavits and depositions were taken. It is not always necessary to present the master tapes before one can ascertain probable cause. The court granted the said motion and justified it on the ground that the master tapes of the copyrighted films were never presented. the CA sustained the decision of the trial court. a motion for reconsideration of the Order was filed. Laws and judicial decisions should be applied prospectively. Furthermore. Agents of the NBI made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila. they found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted films of petitioner as well as equipment and materials. A Motion To Lift Search Warrant was filed but was later denied. At appeal. The search warrant sought was duly issued and a search was conducted by the NBI and in the course of the search.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 127 of 147 . including private respondent. Thereafter. as given by the Civil Code. ISSUES: Whether or not the ruling in the 20th Century Fox case could be applied in deciding the present case? HELD: No.

Respondent contends that his actions were just in accordance to the ruling in the Gerona case: The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not the students were validly expelled? HELD: No. there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers. The Court likewise explained the 2-fold aspect of religious freedom. the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. After all. . They were expelled from their schools.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASES EBRALINAG VS. otherwise. the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. an emblem of national sovereignty. (1) the absolute freedom to believe as long as such is limited Created by: Ma. . much less to a follower of said group or sect. The school children didn’t want to participate in the flag ceremony and patriotic pledge. especially the Free Exercise Clause. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. which penalizes educational institutions that refuses or doesn’t perform the flag ceremony. . The Gerona case was reexamined by the Court and ruled that compelling one to take part in a flag ceremony would undermine one’s constitutional rights. of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government. 1995 FACTS: Petitioners in the present case are children of parents who were members of the religious sect Jehovah’s witnesses. DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS 219 SCRA 256 DECEMBER 29. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 128 of 147 . in violation of RA1265. Angela Leonor C. They didn’t want to participate since it is their religious belief that such would amount to idolatry. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect.

(2) the freedom to act on one’s belief. which is of serious evil to public interest. Thus. In the case at bar. It underscored the rule that the only justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 129 of 147 . as granted by the Constitution was likewise violated by effecting the expulsion. Moreover. the Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ non-participation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a clear and present danger to society. Created by: Ma. restraint on the part of the government would be unjustified. the petitioner’s right to quality education.within the realm of thought. which may be regulated. both grave and imminent.

” which. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. SECTION. These officials issued replies which that they wouldn’t be able to show up due to other pending matters they should cater to. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing.INTRODUCTION TO LAW: CASE DIGESTS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows: SECTION 1. – In accordance with Article VI. The Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to inquire about the unlawful provisions found in the contract for the North Rail project and other concerns. This kind of incident was repeated for several times. Nature.R. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 130 of 147 . G. took effect immediately. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. 95367. EO464 is as follows: “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS. EO464 was declared by the President. Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government. ERMITA GR 169777 APRIL 20. the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. pursuant to Section 6 thereof. all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. 20006 FACTS: This is a petition questioning the constitutionality of EO 464. Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. This prompted the Senate President to deny the latest decline of Ermita to show up in Senate. After this. No. Vasquez. Angela Leonor C. 23 Created by: Ma. ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. 2. – (a) Nature and Scope. .

Public Estates Authority. – The following are covered by this executive order: i. No. Chavez v. Created by: Ma. 23 May 1995. diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. No. iv. G. v. including: i. 130716. 130716. No. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order. 133250. iii. Republic Act No.May 1995). ii. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. 23 May 1995. No. G.R. Vasquez. 9 July 2002). 130716. Presidential Commission on Good Government. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Vasquez G.R. Military. No. 9 December 1998). 9 December 1998).R. 95367. 133250. 95367. Presidential Commission on Good Government. G. Presidential Commission on Good Government. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 131 of 147 . Public Estates Authority. Further. No. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v.R. 9 December 1998). Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. 9 July 2002). No.R. G. (b) Who are covered.R. G. G.R. Chavez v.

– All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers. alleging that EO 464 is unconstitutional as it violates certain constitutional provisions. adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. the inquiry went on and the military officials who showed up were relieved of their military posts and were due to Court Marshall. pursuant to EO464. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 132 of 147 ii. Senate President Drilon received a copy thereof from Ermita. mentioning that the officials invited wouldn’t be able to attend because they don’t have prior consent from the President. iii. Such other officers as may be determined by the President. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege. Whether or not EO 464 violates the right of the people to information with regard to public concern? 3. Angela Leonor C. SECTION 3. and v.Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On the same date wherein EO464 was declared. . Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the power to inquire by Congress? 2. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the implementation of EO 464 without prior publication in a newspaper of general circulation constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Created by: Ma. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. Nonetheless. This prompted the petitions filed with the Supreme Court. iv.

Furthermore. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. there is no need for prior determination if they are under the provisions of EO 464. under Section 21. the Executive department might invoke the executive privilege. Section 22 of the Constitution which says: SECTION 22. with the consent of the President. general powers of inquiry of Congress as well as the definition of executive privilege should be discussed. (Underscoring supplied) The power of inquiry of Congress is grounded to the fact that information is necessity in legislation. Even so. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the Created by: Ma. not all information can be under the so-called executive privilege that the executive department will preclude the power of inquiry of Congress. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions. parts of EO464 should be analyzed individually. Further. it pertains to department heads and unlike Section 3.HELD: To answer the first issue. Angela Leonor C. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative. but may cover matters related thereto. as the rules of each House shall provide. On one hand. Article 6: SECTION 21. General power of inquiry by Congress is mandated by the Constitution. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. If it is valuable to legislation. appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 1 doesn’t pertain to any information and doesn’t invoke the executive privilege. Section 1 is grounded on Article 6. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. executive department officials can then be called by Congress to answer inquiries. To be able to directly answer the first issue. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 133 of 147 . or upon the request of either House. which is grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers. With regard to Section 1 of EO464.

there is presumption of the President’s authorization and has the effect of prohibiting an official from showing up in Congress. it could just be implied that the persons concerned hold such information. and not during inquiries for aid of legislation. Such silent authorization is contrary to the essence of executive privilege. it is mandatory for them to show up during inquiries in aid of legislation. is too broad. But accordingly. and those officials by determination of their heads are covered by executive privilege. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 134 of 147 . Section 1 in its face is valid. It should be noted that in Section 2b and 3. Furthermore.President so states in writing. it should still be by his order. This doctrine strengthens the essence of Congress inquiring with the executive branch. the claim of executive privilege shouldn’t be taken lightly. Angela Leonor C. On the second issue. It also includes other officials that may be determined by the President. there is implied claim of executive privilege whenever an official invokes EO 464. the enumeration of public officials that should get prior consent from the President before appearing in Congress. It is used in context of persons wherein it should be in context of information. especially in the performance of its legislative functions. Thus. Even so. with regard to Section 3 wherein there is no mention of any basis on why such invocation of executive privilege. Such is underlined by executive privilege. In Section 2b. It is limited to the President to determine if information is under executive privilege. it is invalid per se. it should be invalidated due to the unlawful delegation of authority exercised by heads of office. which underlies their power of inquiry and Created by: Ma. If he delegates such authority. There should be assertion of this claim as well as basis. there is difference between the right of Congress to information. though it can only be invoked during inquiries in the question hour. With regard to Section 2(b) and 3. While it is discretionary for executive officials to show up during question hours. it can be followed that there are two types of Congressional inquiry—one is the question hour and the other is the inquiry in aid of legislation. when they determine that a certain information falls under the executive privilege. This power of Congress lies in the doctrine of separation of powers. the appearance shall be conducted in executive session Following the intent and meaning of the abovementioned section. Thus. executive privilege is being misused.

the right of the people to information due to public concern. which are generally made public. Created by: Ma. it is a consequence of EO 464 that the right to information of the general public is being impaired. it affects the general public and thus general circulation should have been facilitated before its implementation. Even if the order pertains to officials of the executive department. it is not an excuse for it not to be published. Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 135 of 147 . the public’s right to information is being impaired. consequentially. On the third issue. Indirectly. Thus. When officials unduly limit disclosures of information during inquiries in aid of legislation. there was grave abuse of discretion.

Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 136 of 147 . o Regulation IV: Every producer of petroleum should file a monthly statement giving information on the company and oil production. 1933. Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry out EO 6199 and 6204 on July 15. This was due to overproduction and a general economic slowdown. 1933. President issued Executive Order 6199 on July 11. o Regulation VII: Aforementioned should keep adequate books and records of all transactions involving the production and transportation of petroleum and petroleum products. RYAN 293 U. to • • • • Created by: Ma. authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to exercise authority as vested in the President in enforcing section 9(c) and EO 6199. 1933.S. President issued Executive Order 6204 on July 14. V. o President issued an EO on August 28. 1933 designating the Sec. Angela Leonor C. o The oil industry sought Congressional intervention to control the situation. o Basis for this EO was section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act. of the Interior as the Administrator and the Department of the Interior as the federal agency. imprisonment. 1933 regulating the production of petroleum as deemed necessary by each state’s requirement. or both.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS PANAMA REFINING CO. o Regulation V: Every purchaser/shipper/refiner of petroleum should file a monthly statement giving information on the company and oil production. banning interstate oil shipments if the oil was produced in excess of state quotas. which authorizes the President to prohibit transportation of excess oil and prescribes punishment of a fine. Further EOs: o President issued “Petroleum Code” (Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry) on August 19. 388 FACTS: • Historical background: o One of the economic problems caused by the Great Depression was faltering oil prices.

This gives the President “unlimited authority to determine the policy… as he may see fit. Cases came to the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari. RULING: EO 6199. and regulations) have constitutional validity. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 137 of 147 . and the Amazon Petroleum Corp. Constitution: Created by: Ma. has laid down no rule. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed decrees against the federal officials and directed that the bills be dismissed. RATIO: From the U. no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited. In trying to regulate the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission. pressed suits on October 1933 to restrain the defendants (federal officials) from enforcing the restrictions on the production and disposition of oil.• • • • • exercise on behalf of the President all powers vested in him under that Act and Code. has established no standard. The Panama Refining Co. Angela Leonor C. thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers.S. of the Interior are without constitutional authority. 6204. “the Congress has declared no policy. Court of three judges denied injunction and dismissed the bill as against the defendants. District Judge granted a permanent injunction. 6204 and the regulations issued by the Sec. There is no requirement.” This “hot oil” provision was seen as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the executive branch. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.” Congress had failed to provide a “primary standard” to guide the executive branch. ISSUE: Whether or not certain regulatory measures (EO 6199. This oversight allowed the president to act as he pleased rather than within an administrative role.

Created by: Ma. which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 138 of 147 .Article 1 Section 1. Angela Leonor C. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.

Angela Leonor C. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 139 of 147 .Created by: Ma.

Msgr. agreed to sell 3 parcels of land to Ramon Licup. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 140 of 147 . a sovereign state due to the Lateran treaty. The trial court said that when the petitioner entered into the commercial transaction. ROSARIO GR 101949 DECEMBER 1. Cirilos returned the earnest money and wrote that private respondent should pay the purchase price. Within the same period. necessary to the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission. It was actually donated by the Archdiocese of Manila for the residence of the papal nuncio. Angela Leonor C. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner enjoys sovereign immunity? HELD: The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations recognizes the right of a foreign sovereignty to acquire property. the selling price should be lowered down. it has been provided in our Constitution the general principle of law that a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the Created by: Ma. contending it has state immunity. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case. The private respondent counter-proposed that if it would undertake the eviction. HON. it had shed off its sovereign immunity. The squatters refused to leave and Msgr. Cirilos proposed that either the private respondent take action for the eviction of the squatters or the earnest money would be returned. It wasn’t disputed that the land sold wasn’t purchased for profit or gain. 1999 FACTS: Petitioner. either real or personal. The lots were donated to petitioner for the residence of the papal nuncio. Private respondent is demanding rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots. but this was denied. Further. There was an agreement that the earnest money will be given to the petitioner and it will clear the land of squatters.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS HOLY SEE VS. Private respondent alleges that it incurred a big loss in profits since it had already made plans of developing the lots but didn’t push through due to the sale to Tropicana. Licup has assigned his rights to the property to private respondent. to no avail. Private respondents returned the earnest money and later found out that the lands were sold to Tropicana Corporation without their knowledge.

If this immunity is granted the envoy. With regard to the intervention of the DFA in the case. courts should accept such claim as not to embarrass the executive branch of the government. all the more it is applicable as regards the sovereign itself. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 141 of 147 .receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state. which is the petitioner. Angela Leonor C. which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for purposes of the mission. When the plea of sovereign immunity is affirmed and recognized by the executive branch. Created by: Ma. and its certification of the sovereign immunity of petitioner is a political question and is conclusive upon the courts.

which says “any legal action arising from the Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City. has entered into a Maintenance Agreement with the private respondent. equality. for the maintenance of some of their office equipment.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS. In the changing and continuous evolution of international law though.” The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and this was appealed to the CA for the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the trial court. The rule that a State cannot be sued without its consent is in accordance to equality and independence of states. it found that the services rendered by private respondent were unsatisfactory and thus. stating that it has sovereign immunity. private respondent was informed that the continuance of the agreement would depend on the decision of the incoming Chief Administrator. Angela Leonor C. The CA affirmed the decision to deny petitioner’s motion. 2003 FACTS: Petitioner. ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the decision of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss? HELD: Yes. The CA said that the petitioner waived its sovereign immunity by agreeing to the abovementioned clause. The petitioner moved for the case to dismiss. Private respondent contends that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Upon arrival of the new Chief administrator. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 142 of 147 . International law is founded on shared principles of comity. VINZON GR 154703 JUNE 26. which is included in our Constitution. prompting him to sue the petitioner. there Created by: Ma. Private respondent opposes this by citing a clause in the Agreement. and independence of states. Prior to the expiration of the agreement. didn’t want to renew the Maintenance Agreement and it was terminated. reciprocity. through its counsel.

Angela Leonor C. doesn’t necessarily mean that petitioner waived its sovereign immunity already. Its establishment entails maintenance and upkeep. the establishment of a diplomatic mission is undisputedly a jure imperii. In the present case. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 143 of 147 .came a restrictive theory. the clause wherein it mentions that any legal action arising from the Agreement shall be settled in accordance to Philippine laws and in the proper courts in Makati City. None was present in the agreement. wherein sovereign immunity only applies to public acts or jure imperii. the state can enter into contracts for the maintenance and upkeep of its premises and equipment. It should be asked if such was in accordance to the creation or maintenance of the diplomatic mission. Created by: Ma. and not to private acts or jure gestionis. Thus. It should be explicitly given or with necessary implication. to ensure the maintenance of their diplomatic mission. the mere entrance of a sovereign state into a contract doesn’t automatically make it a test if the act was jure imperii or jure gestionis. Also. Submission of a foreign state to local jurisdiction should be clear and unequivocal. Furthermore.

This has been enshrined not only in the fundamental law of the land but also in the labor code. The Constitution clearly provides that it is the right of workers for humane conditions in work. There came a deadlock in CBA negotiations between them and the school. They are doing the same services of same value. the case at bar. Angela Leonor C. wages shouldn’t be used by the school in attracting the foreign hires. The foreign-hires receive more benefits and salaries than the local-hires. QUISIMBING GR 128845 JUNE 1. ISSUES: Whether or not the foreign hires should be given a higher pay than the local hires? HELD: Public policy frowns against discrimination and inequality. limited tenure. following that there was valid classification of the foreign hires and local hires. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 144 of 147 . Created by: Ma. The DOLE decided in favor of the school. The petitioner is the labor union of the local hires in the said school. Equal pay should be given to them for equal work of equal value. 2000 FACTS: International School hires both foreign and local teachers to accommodate its students of different nationalities and classifies the two as foreign-hires and local-hires. The discrepancy of treatment between the foreign hires and local hires should be frowned at. especially with regard to the compensation scheme. Hence.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. They filed a notice to stike and the DOLE took jurisdiction of the case. and to attract them to teach in the school. Discrimination in wages is abhorred in our Labor Code and furthermore. the argument of the private respondent being to entice the foreign hires to stay and also the dislocation factor. It is bereft of merit to contend that the foreign hires are given more than the local hires due to the dislocation factor. This doesn’t only pertain to the physical workplace but also to how the employers treat their employees.

Hence. this does not mean that it should be foregone. this case at bar. there must be expeditious action upon a receipt of an extradition request. the DOJ arranged for a panel of lawyers to evaluate and assess such request. no. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 145 of 147 . This was in accordance to the Extradition Treaty of the Philippines and US. Angela Leonor C. A Created by: Ma. is one’s right to due process in conflict with the treaty? HELD: On the first issue. that it is too premature for Jimenez to be furnished the papers. LANTION GR 139465 JANUARY 18.INTRODUCTION TO LAW CASE DIGESTS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. saying that the US requested that there be no unauthorized disclosure of the papers. 2000 FACTS: An extradition request was given by the US government to the Department of Justice of the Philippines for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for accusation of several crimes in the US. and certiorari and the court issued a temporary restraining order against petitioner. an individual’s right to due process is not dispensible even in extradition proceedings. Jimenez requested for a copy of the said extradition papers so that he could have ample time to comment on the said accusations and he also requested for the abeyance of the proceedings. It may not be mentioned in the extradition treaty nor in the statute implementing it. prohibition. ISSUES: Whether or not one’s rights to due process is indispensable in extradition proceedings? Whether or not the accordance of due process to a future extraditee constitutes a breach of the extradition treaty of the US and Philippines? If yes. Upon the receipt of such request. This was denied by petitioner. and also. that the DOJ doesn’t have authority to hold abeyance proceedings in an extradition request since in a treaty. nonetheless. This prompted Jimenez to file with the trial court a writ of mandamus.

international law forms part of the land and no legislative action is needed to make it applicable in the domestic sphere. This doctrine is used to settle conflicts in municipal tribunals between international law and municipal law. and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution.P. The two should be harmonize together but if it happens that it is irreconcilable. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action. B. that requires the parties in a treaty to perform their obligations. Civil Code). such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer. There is no conflict with regard to the treaty and municipal law. then the international law should yield to municipal law for the reason that such are organs of municipal law and accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704. it may be absent in the statute and treaty. 2. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action. Angela Leonor C. It doesn’t matter if the treaty is void on any provision on one’s right to due process. there is a rule called pacta sunt servada in international law. Using the abovementioned conditions. and the replacement of a temporary appointee. that is. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 146 of 147 . Furthermore. An application of one’s right to notice and hearing wouldn’t conflict anything with the extradition proceeding. not one is satisfied by the extradition proceedings. Under the doctrine of incorporation. Blg. they are actually intertwined. This has even been mentioned in our Constitution. Created by: Ma. The constitution not only guarantees one’s right to due process but also the right to information regarding public concern. nonetheless. and 3.person’s right to due process—the procedural aspect—may only be foregone in the following circumstances: 1. but it constitutionally guaranteed. the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63. On the second issue. where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected. Local Government Code. the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency. then the rules of fair play should be employed. 337).

one has the right to explain himself and seek consideration of whatever resolution was made. Angela Leonor C. Created by: Ma. Aguinaldo Ateneo Law 1E 2010 Page 147 of 147 .In administrative proceedings.

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