LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE NFL Topic, January-February 2010 Dr. John F.



S-K PUBLICATIONS PO Box 8173 Wichita KS 67208-0173 PH 316-685-3201 FAX 316-685-6650 SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS 1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.], JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.” SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. 2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First, sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997). SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876. Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success in changing national policies.

When states design sanctions. U. 50. p.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame]. Indeed. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL SK/A01. sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the sanctioned nation. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 70. it looks at some sanctions failing to have the desired effect for the country. When the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. U. Even then. and how the end of the Cold War means the United States actually has less power than it used to. freshly updated for the new edition. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE SK/A01. Autumn 2006. 6. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. but even multinational actions work no more than half the time. sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. p. the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Notre Dame]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. Expanded Academic ASAP.08) George A. Second. 4. Expanded Academic ASAP. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. Expanded Academic ASAP. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Fall 2007. November 2008. Sanctions that are merely symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior. 50. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.07) George A. as well as nearby trading partners.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed. p. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions. Filled with countless studies. neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion in damages. 5. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. according to research cited by Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE].09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH. pNA. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. U.3. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation. Expanded Academic ASAP. Every relevant nation must be on board. Fall 2007.

The chronic reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Most attempts fail and end up hurting innocent people. p. unilateral sanctions never work. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 1. 50. Fall 2007. Donohue [CEO. It's hard to recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. p. "For sanctions to work. Chamber of Commerce]. Are economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion. SK/A02. FORBES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. they not only have to be multilateral. U." said Ray Takeyh.04) Mark Landler.C. p.01) Thomas J. D. of Notre Dame]. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED SK/A02. unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.02) George A. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK SK/A02. 2009. . think tank. but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time. A1. 2. SK/A02. in this age of globalization. September 28. an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration. March 3. 2008.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. Syria and Iran) and resulting in unintended consequences. 21. trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases. 54. U. NEW YORK TIMES. a Washington. October 29. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti. BUSINESS WEEK. First. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. Serbia. 2007. says unilateral efforts to choke off investment. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/A02. Custom Newspapers. Expanded Academic ASAP.

Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Over time. WORLD ECONOMY. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total. Part of this is because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies.S. NEWSWEEK. French. (This is precisely what's happened on a . SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP SK/A03. 2. Custom Newspapers. The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. In the research I have conducted on the international response to US economic sanctions. 34. Harvard U. especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. Expanded Academic ASAP. 1223. When Congress prohibited U. Expanded Academic ASAP. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in the 1990s. October 15. I found that the United States' allies have consistently exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU. p. Russian.. We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a twolevel framework.S. March 25.01) Bryan R. this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own businesses. 9. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade. lending support to the third-country effect of sanctions. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA) SK/A03.02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U. and Chinese companies seized the opportunity.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. SK/A03. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says. Malaysian. and the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions. US allies have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s SK/A03. 3. 2007. p. I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. We argue that unilateral sanctions. August 2009. p. if extensive in nature. In studying more than 100 cases of US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000.04) Fareed Zakaria.S.] et al. LEAD 1. imports and exports). Autumn 2006. In effect. It is also because these states use their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.SK/A03. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 70. 2009.]. U. p.

where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields. then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation. the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. .larger scale in Sudan. the Indians. the Thais.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime. and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies.

The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. Autocracies where oppression is almost total . 2009. Boulder] & Anton D.03) William H. as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. p. It is to some extent inevitable that the worst of regimes. . will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval. The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. December 2008. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER SK/A04. Expanded Academic ASAP.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. But the practice of imposing economic sanctions on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest also involved subsequent military intervention. England). of Colorado. U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.01) Editorial. much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. February 25. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION SK/A04. high levels of economic impact. THE TIMES (London. February 25. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). this relationship remains tenuous. Baldwin 1985). Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.such as North Korea or Burma . p. Fall 2007. p. of Mississippi].02) Editorial. However. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 68. Northridge]. 2. U. Custom Newspapers. by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms. In practice. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. of Political Science. THE TIMES (London. 918. Lopez 1999. 2009. p.SK/A04. even in democratic states. Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case. SK/A04. England). Custom Newspapers. California State U. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 3. 2. as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS SK/A04. because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS 1. The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival.can allow domestic conditions to worsen almost indefinitely. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. and thus. 2.

punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. Fall 2007. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. of Wollongong.. U. economic sanctions tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government. 3. For example. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL SK/A05. p.. U. 64). 2007. 34. December 2008.. 64).02) William H. Expanded Academic ASAP.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.SK/A05. But the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. Niblock argued that economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for democratization (p. "Even in Iraq. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 1707. sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. California State U. In addition. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/A05. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. says Robert Pape." says Pape. 1707. He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap between rich and the poor. The result. is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. October 15. 68. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/A05. Therefore. Boulder] & Anton D. rather than moving the target further toward compromise. sanctions shrink a country's economy. U. In addition to that. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS SK/A05. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies. The effect would tend to entrench the target's objectionable policy. ." In other words. p. Australia] et al. of Wollongong. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2. In other words. Northridge]. p. And it shifts resources in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it. "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous decades.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging study on the topic. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. NEWSWEEK. Australia] et al. December 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP. By design." 4. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY 1. the government gets stronger.03) Fareed Zakaria.

p. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.]. protect core supporters. Wood [U. and political imprisonment. social. 2. The extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. owing to the . p. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. Specifically. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.02) Reed M. Weiss. January 2009. The empirical results support this theory. 3.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Finally. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions). SK/A06. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. Rowe. January 2009. Professor of Political Science. January 2009. p. First.SK/A06. and suppress popular dissent. 60. the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE SK/A06. Utilizing time-series.]. torture. multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. Millar & Lopez. 2000. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED SK/A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. East Carolina U. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool. 59. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. cross-national data for the period 1981–2000. 1999. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE SK/A06. political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al. and physical hardship on civilian populations. 489.]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. Professor of Political Science. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression.03) Dursun Peksen [Asst. including freedom from disappearances. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Cortright. September 2008. East Carolina U. Professor of Political Science. 1997. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. 62. The research suggests that. economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency. p. extra-judicial killings. East Carolina U. 2001)..

economic conditions. and education in target countries (e. Galtung. 1999. 1997.g. Cortright. 1995). Weiss. Lopez & Cortright. the development of civil society. .. economic coercion inadvertently worsens public health. Millar & Lopez.disproportionate economic impact on citizens. 1997. Weiss et al. 1967. 2001. Cortright & Lopez.

Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Fall 2007. U. which. p. . which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to claim the moral high ground.05) William H. 68. Boulder] & Anton D. of Colorado.SK/A06. Expanded Academic ASAP.. Northridge]. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against Iraq. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. many observers argued. California State U. Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human suffering in the target country. created great suffering among the Iraqi populace. particularly through shortages of food and medicines. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.

While such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba. was easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain. ECONOMY 1. Harvard U. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point well. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U. Harvard U. Boulder] & Anton D. U. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. p. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business profitably.S. 2009. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place. 2009. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 9. of Colorado.03) Bryan R. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 9. Remarkably. SANCTIONS HURT U. which imposed huge costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself. The Soviet Union. however.S. occasionally sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. March 25. p. p.S.SK/A07. it would prefer to take a moral stand. U. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms. The sender adopts the position that. . Custom Newspapers. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.S. some of the same congressmen who supported the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act in 1996.02) William H. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs.S. JOBS SK/A07. March 25. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.]. U.01) Bryan R. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. how can we expect them not to leave? SK/A07. ideally at very low domestic cost. Halliburton moved because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the United States. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S." why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs. BUSINESSES SK/A07. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. 68.. This was the case for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union. If Congress can vote to "Buy American. Fall 2007. Northridge]. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007. California State U.]. 2. rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target.

3. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE SK/A07. and are unrecoverable.Hart 2000. workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”.]. Barber 1979. Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed.2 Hufbauer et al. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. sanctions.. Lektzian [U. p. estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded “as a consequence of U.S. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state. but also to the sender nation (Askari et al. April 2007.S.04) David J. they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions. for example. and Elliott 1990. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 2003. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. Schott. . WAGE LOSSES OF U.Hufbauer. 416. Sprecher [Texas A&M U.Wagner 1988).

HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. Fall 2007.. California State U. Instead. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 1. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. U. but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most situations. Boulder] & Anton D. p. California State U. Boulder] & Anton D. Northridge]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SK/A08. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural. the SK/A08. Expanded Academic ASAP. alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be considered. narrowly targeted sanctions. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Such sanctions usually have only very minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals concerned the sanctions can be significant. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U.SK/A08. scientific. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) William H. Fall 2007.. athletic. Northridge]. California State U.02) William H. 68. We believe that among those alternatives. . or academic exchanges between states. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Colorado. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international relations. 68. U. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES SK/A08. Boulder] & Anton D. p. are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic damage to the sanctioning countries. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Northridge]. and sometimes even non-economic sanctions. 68. of Colorado. Fall 2007. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.03) William H. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 1." adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U. p. 490. 19. SK/A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR SK/A09. when sanctions are added to the mix. target countries often interpret the action as a lack of resolve. THE TIMES (London. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. Weiss 1999). Heine-Ellison 2001. February 25.joyner 2003).04) FOREIGN POLICY.g. Second. Crawford 1997. Wood [U. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION SK/A09. Garfield 2002. deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. Devin. Bhoutros-Ghafi 1995). Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets. . 3. Because countries prefer to enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005.]. Schott. declining GNP. 2. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2009. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR SK/A09. 19. Custom Newspapers. and Elliott 1990a. 1997). Faris 1997. conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between countries than if sanctions had not been imposed. then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really wanted because of miscommunication.. July-August 2007. England).01) Reed M. 2002. Hoskins 1997. they [economic sanctions] have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. September 2008. These costs include increased unemployment. It was military action. p. "If you try to get away with foreign policy on the cheap. Hufbauer et al.. World Health Organization 1996)." explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U. July-August 2007. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. drug and arms smuggling. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003. that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban. capital flight. [to] become almost provocative in its actions. not the sanctions applied to them. lost foreign investment. Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that.02) Editorial. 2. Hufbauer.03) FOREIGN POLICY. increased corruption.SK/A09. and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo..]. But a recent study by David Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield. p. That leads "the country being sanctioned . Garfield. and Fausey 1995.

. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. Sprecher [Texas A&M U.05) David J. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. Democracies. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. The results show that after a sanction occurs. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. April 2007. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs. Lektzian [U. p. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals.].SK/A09. 415.

60-61.S. they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. They further speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at improving Chinese human rights practices. According to their results. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS SK/A10. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED SK/A10. 2. September 2008.02) Dursun Peksen [Asst.]. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre failed to improve human rights practices. sanctions threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006.01) Reed M. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Wood [U.SK/A10. By contrast. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE 1. U. pp. Contrary to expectations. . INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. For instance. East Carolina U. U.S. January 2009. p. Li and Drury (2004) and Drury and Li (2006) show that U. Professor of Political Science. 321). 491. Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights.S.

Moreover. A1. IRAN 1. A10. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL SK/A11. the Iranian banks Sepah." Although Lloyds voluntarily curtailed this practice.S. probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue.N. Custom Newspapers. as French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U. 2009. and at what cost? SK/A11. the question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but how much they will. September 28. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A11. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and targeted way to hurt Iran financially. having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.N. large global banks have been willing to help. Security Council on nuclear proliferation. p. September 28. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients. SC)." SK/A11. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and a vow to "wipe a U. Ultimately. Unfortunately. 101. the volume of German trade with Iran has increased by about 14 percent. THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston. NEW YORK TIMES. as much as I think they deserve it. U. how quickly. September 28.S. after a 16 percent decline in 2007. p. 47.01) Editorial." said Thomas R. SK/A11. Robert Morgenthau. Treasury Dept. On January 9. even when such sanctions have increased the cost of doing business with Iran. 2009. NEW YORK TIMES. and Saderat had managed to push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over.04) Rachel L. 2009. Germany maintains that one of .03) Mark Landler. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. member [Israel] off the map. that cost may not have risen to a level that will significantly deter trade. p. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Pickering. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. A1. more centrifuges" for enriching it. Custom Newspapers. In the first half of the year. a former under secretary of state who has held informal negotiations with the Iranians. March-April 2009.SK/A11. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. And in some cases. Melli.02) Mark Landler.]. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions. November 2008. p. the Manhattan district attorney.05) Peter Crall.

however. This suggests. .the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran. that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian markets.

In 1996. these officials say. For example. p. 2009. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. U.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. however. comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis. gave last week to Mr.06) Mark Landler. 4. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran. Fall 2007. 2009. These have continued in various forms. p. is even less dependable. NEW YORK TIMES. U. Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh. said last Monday that he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. Medvedev. And the political upheaval creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people. which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. September 28. SK/A11.08) William H. given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran. . 50. A1. the United States imposed unilateral. Dmitri A. China. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Obama. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U.. Bernard Kouchner. Custom Newspapers.3.07) George A. these sanctions have been counterproductive. Custom Newspapers. because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement. California State U. September 28. In fact. Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 68. Citing those fears. LEAD SK/A11. A1. of Colorado.09) Mark Landler. NEW YORK TIMES. sanctions backfired by enhancing the political legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many sanctions scholars. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A11. In other instances. whatever the assurances that the Russian president. the French foreign minister. long-term sanctions against Iran. Expanded Academic ASAP. Northridge]. p. SK/A11. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts. of Notre Dame]. p. and it has maintained a consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since.

October 17. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea have failed to do so.N. 2009. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible.02) Editorial.04) Editorial. In fact. 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. The resolution passed unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. Rather. p. Winter 2008. ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the reclusive communist regime. Not surprisingly. October 17. Custom Newspapers. 876. prevention of nuclear proliferation. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. SK/A12. economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and military sanctions from the U. Winter 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. 648.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North Korea to militarise even further. June 14. However. SK/A12. p. SK/A12. p.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. 875. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against North Korea. 648. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A12. A1. or improvement of human rights. Furthermore. credit lines.SK/A12. the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather . The authors argue that the political nature of economic sanctions is the main reason for their failure. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. grants and loans contributing to the nuclear. In fact. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Michael Whitty. failing to achieve the goals upon which they were justified. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A12. 2009. Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on political change.05) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. p. NORTH KOREA 1. Expanded Academic ASAP.

sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea. As the authors pinpoint.than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. .

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. Expanded Academic ASAP. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang]. Winter 2008. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate. 2009. Similarly. October 17. Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests.SK/A12. and suggests that negotiations are the only means to solve the current nuclear crisis. Kim concludes that the sanctions will not work.07) Editorial. 648. as well as those imposed by the UN. North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS SK/A12. pp. p. 875876. In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. 3. . Its economic and public health systems further buckled with successive years of floods and droughts.06) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. leading to widespread malnutrition and up to one million excess deaths in the 1990s.

and Italy have all played an active role in sanctionsbusting on Cuba's behalf. 3. Lugar. pNA. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and setting right a mismanaged U. a senior GOP staffer for the panel. In his report. 2009. who has long said the U. . One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses. US trade in those products rose from $6 million in 2000 to $350 million by 2006. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete in Cuban markets. Britain.S. March 25. Harvard U. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM. ECONOMY SK/A13. Expanded Academic ASAP. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP SK/A13. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. SK/A13.S. in the past five decades Canada. 11. that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to Cuban participation in international institutions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. US sanctions have failed to bring about regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities. policy toward Cuba.-Cuba relations.]. including a lifting of economic sanctions. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. March 25.S.S.03) Bryan R. CUBA 1. 2009. the results are impressive. policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals. 2009. 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A13. U. As for US sanctions against Cuba. Spain. May 14.S. After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000. foreign policy could begin normalization in U. recently sent Carl Meacham. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. 2. France. p.]. Japan. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 9. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U.S. THE NATION.. Meacham wrote that President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to that nation should be fulfilled. Sweig. February 24. to Cuba to evaluate the situation. U. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U. Custom Newspapers. Harvard U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/A13.02) Julia E.04) Bryan R. 9. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.

S. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years. and their belief is if you take the sanctions away. you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves. TIME. and heated U. March 3.06) Thomas J. and it doesn't seem to work. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Chamber of Commerce]. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45year-old U.07) Thomas J. p. p.S. 2008. SK/A13. writing beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U. 21. the embargo is not so painful as it once was.S. p. When I was in Cuba.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's antiYanqui defenders.05) Tim Padgett. It is clear to me that he used sanctions as a means to stay in power. 2007.S. BUSINESS WEEK. and Fidel Castro was predictable as well. March 3. I've been to Cuba. 2008. With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. trade embargo against Cuba. Who benefits most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A13. I talked at length with dissidents. U.S.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. November 6. Expanded Academic ASAP. who is likely to succeed him. U.4. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition. Expanded Academic ASAP. 21. We have basically kept Castro in power. Chamber of Commerce].S. BUSINESS WEEK. SK/A13. . The U. 19. Donohue [CEO. Donohue [CEO.

p. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. a time-consuming.But Myanmar's military has not budged. In January 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Indeed. China and Myanmar signed a $2. In March. FORBES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.The European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes. THE NEW YORK TIMES. the confrontational approach has made the generals more stubborn. 2007. October 29. China and Russia vetoed a resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma. 1. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A14. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/A14. March 16. SK/A14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Custom Newspapers. if history is a guide. SK/A14. Broader sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures. p. many analysts say.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West. the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty. 2009. Would tougher economic sanctions against Burma work? Probably not. This is the second time in less than two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly supported by the United States has been vetoed.S. and analysts say those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change. August 26. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International. . furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region. 54. Expanded Academic ASAP.01) Seth Mydans. 2. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS SK/A14. October 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China.000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988. and any protests are crushed by force. The sanctions began with an arms embargo after a massacre of as many as 3. Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca. at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower. A23. When completed.04) Jim Webb. pNA. The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior. Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries. This is only the tip of the iceberg. they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds.Rather than forcing change.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. particularly Russia and China. U. gas and mining projects in Myanmar. Custom Newspapers. 2009. oil. free speech and assembly are still smothered.

strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes. a military presence could easily follow. . If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow.

The Burmese government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A14. 54. 2007. In addition. the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar. The ruling regime has . enough evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma. In Burma. But it would take little for either China or India to pick up the slack from.07) Fareed Zakaria. Custom Newspapers. October 15. Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be "the last resort"? 4. say. which controls border crossings. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable. For more than 10 years. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP SK/A14. 2009. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. THE NEW YORK TIMES. whose production and supply multiply. October 15. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.3. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. they just keep on ticking. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. always prospers. in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. p. sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy. Then there are drugs. Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner.05) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves. NEWSWEEK. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for a country. p. A23. Chevron is a 28% partner with France's Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand.08) Jim Webb. black markets spring up. Despite a dismal record. Expanded Academic ASAP. 34. FORBES. 2007. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING SK/A14. In all of this. one effect of Western sanctions was to shut down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s. as legitimate businesses dry up. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.a. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the military. Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. August 26. NEWSWEEK. and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new rules flourish. 34. the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. ports and checkpoints. Its economy will suffer.k. 2007. p. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade. forcing hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs. October 29. Turning up the heat on Burma (a. The United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country. SK/A14. its isolation will deepen. Chevron . 5.06) Fareed Zakaria. p. With countries like Burma.

become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. . The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world.

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING." Predictably. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS SK/A15. water. October 15. p. Within months of the war. Further US intelligence documents. "Incidences of disease. including dramatic declines in resources that we essential for health. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN SK/A15.01) Fareed Zakaria. p. including possible epidemics. its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity. will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water. Expanded Academic ASAP. Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation. and fully understood the implications for Iraqis. Spring 2007. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country. IRAQ 1. October 17. knew the necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions. SK/A15. Expanded Academic ASAP. . food. which could include epidemics and famine. 337. noted the particular impact on children. the most vulnerable in America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met". devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Carleton U. NEWSWEEK. the DIA wrote in January 1991. the UN secretary general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis. p. 2009. observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing continued. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals". and energy. 34. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in USled campaign. those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere.02) Editorial. 2. mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births). 2007. Ismael [School of Social Work.SK/A15. such as drugs. US intelligence agreed. during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. 875.. predicting an "imminent catastrophe. vaccines." For example. Canada].03) Shereen T.

" . 3. Canada]. The study estimated that there were approximately 46. 337. the Iraqi government informed the United Nations that 1. Expanded Academic ASAP. which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out. and. The study covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi government. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The study reported an immediate and startling increase in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the collapsing the health care system.614. a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war. SK/A15. to conduct an in-depth comprehensive study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians.303 Iraqis--including 667. including medicine. p. Carleton U. The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water supplies.04) Shereen T.773 children under five--had died from diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions. p.06) Shereen T. Expanded Academic ASAP. Ismael [School of Social Work.. Carleton U.05) Shereen T. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent.SK/A15.. Spring 2007. Spring 2007. two prominent US strategic analysts concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history. Canada]. 337. 337. Ismael [School of Social Work. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE SK/A15. health care and child psychology. The study was based on 9. In October 1991. Expanded Academic ASAP. Spring 2007. severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children. Canada]. The International Study Team sent a task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines. Ismael [School of Social Work.. p. particularly children. nearly three years earlier. Even taking into account the possibility of Iraqi exaggeration. Carleton U.900 excess deaths during the first eight months of 1991. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES.000 household interviews in more than 300 locations. By January 2002. malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import sufficient food.

not isolated. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A16. like excluding Russia from the Group of Eight.SK/A16. suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. SK/A16. on the contrary. more to show Russia the consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. It would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda. through a combination of market forces and disciplined and consistent international regulation. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK SK/A16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p.01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time being. Custom Newspapers. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin" attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. In the new more cautious global economy of today. 2008.02) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. p. September 9. exposure to a combination of market forces and good governance already has done. However. it is highly unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation. September 9. be further brought in to global markets and international institutions. p. Russian companies should be encouraged to compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices. 12. Indeed. or making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad. 12. just one in a wide array of measures the West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior. 2008. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. September 9. 2008.03) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. 12. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future. RUSSIA 1. and will do. Russia should. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Custom Newspapers. 2. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. .

SOUTH AFRICA 1. it was willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the international banking community. Northridge]. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES SK/A17. SK/A17. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. however. which decreased the employment and wages of black labor.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Boulder] & Anton D. . not a governmental sanctions initiative per se. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. October 29. 54. FORBES. Fall 2007. Boulder] & Anton D. 68. p. Northridge].03) William H.01) William H. California State U. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS SK/A17. p. Consequently. It should be noted. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. The problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. U. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and-despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training South Africans of any color. that these financial restrictions were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa. Expanded Academic ASAP. 68. U. had the unanticipated effect of undermining the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime. 2. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.SK/A17. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 2007. p. of Colorado. California State U.. of Colorado. Fall 2007.

SK/A18. Examples are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons. In July 2008. says Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick. Northridge]. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE SK/A18. Expanded Academic ASAP. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage but was vetoed by China and Russia. of Colorado. California State U. West. p. June 18. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Finally. sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. following widely criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE SK/A18. p. pNA.01) Malcolm R. . 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. Boulder] & Anton D. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) William H. October 2008.. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. 8. 2. 68.02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 3. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the United States led an unsuccessful effort to have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JET. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A18. U.

. the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson. especially the British. today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. 409. Sanctions have long been important in international relations. ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). p. of Economics. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 1. Northridge]. Athens imposed a trade embargo against Megara. to national security. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. would be compelled to yield to American pressures. intellectual property. the British need for American goods and services was essential to England's well-being. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. Nathan.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Americans have been certain that. p. U. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING SK/N01. for." the U. would prevail. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. for example. were a form of "peaceable coercion. of Virginia]. the World Trade Organization. 37. 2. the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists). California State U. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. Boulder] & Anton D. SK/N01.02) James A. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. . law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related. September 1997. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N01. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Online. of Economics." Governments. p.03) William H. U.SK/N01. Americans would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. And likewise. Boston U. Sanctions. in a "contest of self-denial. May 1999. and international trade. Sanctions are central to such international agreements as the United Nations Charter. Since Thomas Jefferson.S. human rights. 68. USA TODAY MAGAZINE. Fall 2007. and the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. In contrast.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept. Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age.

05) Richard M. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SK/N01. Sanctions are a reality of international relations. Expanded Academic ASAP. January 1999. East Carolina U. 2000). January 2009. Hence. p.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics. the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez.]. 19. or ending the use of repression by the government. . JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science.1 Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals. trying to do away with them would be as ineffective as outlawing war. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 59. 3. p. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. restoring democratic regimes.].SK/N01. Columbia U. Online. THE SCIENCES. The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands. ranging from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing.

Fall 2007. 159. covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000. 2.02) Richard N. This [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. Kimberly Ann Elliott. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 50.) perhaps surprisingly. sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE 1. November-December 2008. Schott. SK/N02. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics]. SK/N02. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. the authors find that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the cases examined. Expanded Academic ASAP. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). p. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. This finding contrasts sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. 564. Shott.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions. and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. third edition. U. of which a third have occurred since the second edition was published. in 1990. plus 13 more that have occurred since 2000. and the efficacy of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. of Notre Dame]. Expanded Academic ASAP. Cooper. the nature and magnitude of the sanctions. 1001. p. July 2005.]. (All the episodes. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy. are reported in a separate CD-ROM. 2007]: we claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the past century. which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country. SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME SK/N02. and Elliott 1990).SK/N02.04) George A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2008. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Jeffrey J. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE SK/N02. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period from 1914 to 2000. p. And yet. p. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. .

] & Mark Souva [Dept. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as successfully coercing those states into changing policies. Florida State U. Texas Tech U. .3. such as the League of Nations sanctions against Ethiopia in 1935. Critics of sanctions effectiveness often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure.]. even the staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Nevertheless. which failed to make Italy reverse course. of Political Science. December 2007.05) David Lektzian [Dept. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS SK/N02. For instance. 848-849. pp. of Political Science.

of Notre Dame].SK/N03. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. and end inter-state and civil wars.01) George A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. p. both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council. Fall 2007. of Colorado. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11. of Political Science. Second.. p. 50. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS” SK/N03. the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.] & Mark Souva [Dept. extradite international fugitives. Texas Tech U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2007. of Political Science. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. U. SK/N03. Northridge]. p. 50. In all cases. 68. Fall 2007. one can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. protect human rights. it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. broad . Fall 2007. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY SK/N03. the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions. Florida State U. California State U. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. 2001. These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms. measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. Expanded Academic ASAP. Against democracies.03) William H. the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. Against nondemocracies. Expanded Academic ASAP.02) George A.04) David Lektzian [Dept. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE 1. p. The most frequently used forms of smart sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the offending regime. The role of such "smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. 867. of Notre Dame]. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals. SK/N03. Boulder] & Anton D.S.

As a result. . thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield. Success against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on the leadership. the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional.sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more rents.

especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking. U. 68. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. or religious distinctions. Since the mid-1990s.06) William H. p. p. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2001. p. 4. curtailing travel. of Political Science. and consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling regime. class. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial. all UN and multilateral sanctions in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In many instances. In particular.. Northridge]. In South Africa. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. . California State U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. December 2008.07) George A. Boulder] & Anton D. 3. a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. U. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions. ethnic. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Some of the most notable successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks in seven African internal wars. U. and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N03. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/N03. With these four considerations integrated into their framework. Fall 2007. In these countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups. Fall 2007. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N03. of Notre Dame]. U.08) George A. 939. Freezing the personal assets of leaders. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N03. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. 50. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. 50. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders. the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for whites than for blacks. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by racial. as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. Fall 2007. smart sanctions can continue to be used as effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries. it is imperative for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse to comply with sanctions pressure. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to blacks. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. rogue state leaders. of Mississippi].

.and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past decade.

5. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION SK/N03. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. During the past two decades. and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. imposing smart sanctions in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive results.09) George A. of Notre Dame]. Fall 2007. South Africa's disavowal of the bomb. 50. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more important than punishing sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. . p. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.

p. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to handle certain clients on their own. This time. Treasury Dept. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. U.]. have acted on these signals. Treasury Dept.S. for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development. financial system. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Surprisingly. the United States targeted another of Iran's most important financial institutions.SK/N04. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.]. Through targeted financial measures. U. the United Nations . March-April 2009. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. U. March-April 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. Expanded Academic ASAP. the U. 101. 101.S.02) Rachel L.S.03) Rachel L. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad. for the most part. Accordingly.04) Rachel L. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. Banks. 2. SK/N04. thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system. a brand name is a valued asset. Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism. Four months later. these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction. is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. 101.S. even unwittingly. Bank Sepah. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N04. Treasury Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Two months after that. Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions. the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE SK/N04.01) Rachel L. SK/N04. In the global financial marketplace. 101. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.]. March-April 2009.S. and corruption. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank Sepah ongoing access to the U. the narcotics trade. Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system.S. weapons proliferation. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Traditionally. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Treasury Dept. p. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. March-April 2009. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so.

which toughened sanctions against Iran. .registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution 1747.

GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global capital markets. November 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 22. Expanded Academic ASAP. March-April 2009. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. November 2008. Stuart Levey. to place pressure on countries of proliferation concern such as Iran. financial system.06) Peter Crall. p. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p. After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U.07) Peter Crall. 101. 47. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. the strategy of implementing targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial system has only been developed in recent years. On Oct. government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities. Although the use of sanctions against entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. the Department of the Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions against Bank Melli. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and." . told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction of the private sector. SK/N04. effectively cutting them off from the U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Treasury Dept.S." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to protect their reputation.S. This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008. p.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global image and operating ability.S. U. Expanded Academic ASAP.05) Rachel L.SK/N04. SK/N04. 47. adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures. more broadly.

MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N05. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.N. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2008. p. including Bank Sepah.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.01) Peter Crall. the council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs.. Collins argued that the application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to discontinue its support for terrorism program. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N05. November 2008. of Wollongong. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. 2. On the other hand. Iran's fifth-largest bank.SK/N05. U. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Australia] et al. Since December 2006. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . 47. 1707. Expanded Academic ASAP. U.

SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY 1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. SK/N06.02) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986, 153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000, 160). 2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58. Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).

3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER SK/N06.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political bargain. SK/N06.05) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia, sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.

SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES 1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567). SK/N07.03) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/N07.04) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to

. 48-51. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. Rowe 2001). citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader.challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. In this case. Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999.

06) William H. U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].. California State U. In other words. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. . Wood [U. the indirect impact of sanctions might work by sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Consequently. individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective action with the opposition group. 509. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. An example of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from 1960 to 1962.SK/N07. Boulder] & Anton D. causing negative aggregate economic growth and potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime activity. Northridge]. SK/N07.05) Reed M. Expanded Academic ASAP. which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition. 68. given tangible evidence of external support. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world. This awareness then gives rise to optimism that. Fall 2007. p. the opposition may someday succeed in its efforts. September 2008. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. p. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically and economically isolate the target regime.

and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world. SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION SK/N08.]. pp.01) Reed M. Kaempfer. Accordingly. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. POLITICAL STUDIES. and Mertens (2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i.SK/N08. 69. at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for governmental policies. 68. p. And if they want to eliminate these costs. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. . March 2009.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.02) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. it is their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies. POLITICAL STUDIES. Lowenberg. the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable. Wood [U. but rather that the unjust policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions.]. The fact that it shares moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government). p. SK/N08. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SK/N08.e. they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence. March 2009. or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition.. 2. 490-491. September 2008. military and police equipment). The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that.

On the other hand.S. 855. sectors that trade or invest in the target country.S. when economic interdependence is low. 2006).02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. SK/N09. THE QUILL.SK/N09. sanctions are likely to be both credible and insufficiently severe. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. p. LOSSES TO THE U.S. December 2007. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Political Science.]. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT SK/N09. and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U. Florida State U. firms and communities.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of GNP (Cox and Drury. Texas Tech U. January-February 1999. When military intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective. one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to occur. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U. 2. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U. of Political Science.S. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. making them more likely to be initiated. . Online. March 2009. GDP. I should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender less than 0.S. U.01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. POLITICAL STUDIES. p.S." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small fraction of U. ECONOMY 1.] & Mark Souva [Dept. Thus. governments often resort to sanctions as a means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap. greater economic interdependence discourages the actual implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and noncredible.03) David Lektzian [Dept. LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW SK/N09. 59. pp. Because sanctions harm the sender’s economy as well as the target’s. 21-24.

SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR SK/N10. Australia] et al. Advocates regard sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road instrument between diplomacy and military action.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1997. despite their harmful consequences. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Online. sanctions rank somewhere between diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding the costs and destruction of war. According to Niblock economic sanctions are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Expanded Academic ASAP. 21-24.02) Richard M. U. Columbia U. 2. January 1999. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology. Sanctions do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation. p. 19. . They are ordinarily incremental and capable of being altered. Still. December 2008. sanctions are almost always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare. THE QUILL. Expanded Academic ASAP. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. January-February 1999. In addition. THE SCIENCES.]. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N10. February 28. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Washington Theological Union]. SK/N10. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR SK/N10. which damages the country's infrastructure and development. COMMONWEAL.04) Kenneth R. of Wollongong. 1707.. Online.01) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg.SK/N10. p. Online. pp. As tools of international pressure. use of armed force only as a last resort is a longstanding element of the just-war tradition. Expanded Academic ASAP.

then the target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat. The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions. SK/N11. 2. of Political Science. . Nooruddin 2002. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. of Missouri-Columbia]. of Political Science. These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis. 2003. p.] & Mark Souva [Dept. If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe. Lacy and Niou 2004. Florida State U. If a target faces a resolute and credible sender. and Sprinz 2005). March 2007.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. Li and Drury 2004. Texas Tech U. 136.01) David Lektzian [Dept. IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES SK/N11. Second. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE SK/N11.03) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. 854-855. Furthermore. Drury and Li 2006). Miers and Morgan 2002. Huseby. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. they should be more committed to conveying their willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat stage. more recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions. like any coercive threat. 143. Drezner 1999.SK/N11. if the issue under dispute is a highly salient issue for senders. of Missouri-Columbia]. Sanctions. then compliance should be more likely since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states. only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi 1998. December 2007. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE 1. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. Y. Hovi.]. March 2007. which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. p. pp.

2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting North Korea's illegal financial dealings. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U. U. Asher asserted that because proliferators still rely on the global trading system. SK/N12. Expanded Academic ASAP. according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. Custom Newspapers. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the country's nuclear programme. September 28. September 28. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY SK/N12.SK/N12.S. THE FINANCIAL TIMES. 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today. U. 1.04) Brian Radzinsky. efforts to marshal worldwide pressure against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a clandestine nuclear site. 2009. Custom Newspapers. Deutsche Bank. and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran.03) Mark Landler. November 2008. IRAN 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran.01) James Blitz. 3. meanwhile. SK/N12. p. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/N12. Senior Obama administration officials. senior administration officials said Sunday. p. major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse. David Asher. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 47. p. Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy. SANCTIONS ON IRAN SK/N12. Expanded Academic ASAP. ARMS CONTROL TODAY.S. November 27. the sanctions "make life much harder for the . p.05) Peter Crall. 2009.. said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having a dramatic effect. 2. Custom Newspapers. 14. In an Oct. NEW YORK TIMES. In the last several years. said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. 42. The sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted. 9. p. THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE. September 2008. It finds that UN. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. A1. and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks.S.02) Mark Landler.

Summer 2008. 2." regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on the regime itself. SK/N12. but if the international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking.proliferator or procurement agent. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. Success is far from guaranteed. . p. A debate within Iran about the wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting.06) Michael Jacobson. it should use greater economic pressure. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.

Instead. it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 101. Treasury Dept. U. In June. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the already broad sanctions program. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.09) Rachel L. SK/N12. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. 2009. p. IRAN.]. In September 2006. yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent press. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE SK/N12. LIKE SOUTH AFRICA. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. 101. sanctions against Iran . they eliminated a small but significant exception to the program.S.08) Rachel L.S. For a bank in a country that still had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade. England). the so-called U-turn authorization. March-April 2009. Similarly.4.07) Editorial. THE TIMES (London. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore. For years. March-April 2009. is its primary livelihood. the costs of financial pressure have been high and unwelcome. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a frictionfree financial relationship with the outside world. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. To do so. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. and has responded to pressure. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and 30 percent. Treasury Dept. p. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Iran has a nuclear programme that is patently not designed purely for generating electricity. Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for supporting terrorism. U. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological confidence. South Africa systematically disenfranchised its black majority. Though the regime is hardly undermined by sanctions. which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks. February 25. The Washington Post reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly impossible to pay for goods. . being rejected by Wall Street was serious business. 2. the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. Expanded Academic ASAP. but bankers engaged in the day-today work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. for Bank Saderat. 5. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. also denominated in extremist regime but not a totalitarian state have had some successes when consistently applied. Custom Newspapers.S. Few foreign-policy watchers noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs. IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION SK/N12.

paving the way for a gradual economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and the United States were Iran's top export markets 14 years ago. . Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. "You're going to see non-U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. SK/N12." he says. a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran. 976.12) CQ RESEARCHER.13) Rachel L. but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer seem to exist.SK/N12.” SK/N12. p. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. global financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran. U. banks cease to do business with [Iranian entities]. Expanded Academic ASAP. 79. Even Germany. This shift reflects not just the inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider pursuing contracts with Iran. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Treasury Dept. 101. sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down Iran's use of the international financial system.]. he acknowledges. Whereas Japan." he continues. China and Turkey had taken second and third place by 2006.S.S.10) Rachel L. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. NATIONAL JOURNAL. Treasury Dept. p. but European banks could cooperate. But a former National Security Council (NSC) official. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 6. 2007. if only to avoid complicating their own dealings with the United States. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and incentive packages multiple times. p. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED SK/N12. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment of the new financial statecraft. "Already. U. financial gamesmanship is but one of the many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics. Lee Wolosky. March-April 2009. "This has had a certain measure of success. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. European governments may ignore the sanctions.S.11) James Kitfield. p. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program. which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006. March-April 2009. The refusal of private banks. has seen its exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years. March 3.S. 101. the United Kingdom. But in this context. November 16. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. 2007.

when Washington actually made it illegal for U. but rather the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. p.S. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS SK/N13. By March 2007. and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far outweighed any benefit.01) Peter Crall. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007. Treasury officials continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the international financial system. November 2008.]. they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Mongolia." SK/N13.S. 101. Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China. The United States and its multilateral partners promised that if Korea complied with their demands. Expanded Academic ASAP. many in the global financial community had already cut ties with BDA on their own. March-April 2009. it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean business. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. In the case of Banco Delta Asia. p. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N13. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. the methods and substance of compromise were nearly the same as in the Libyan case. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 2. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Japan. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Expanded Academic ASAP. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea. 47. Similarly. in the two instances of North Korea halting the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007. Treasury Dept.03) Rachel L. Fall 2007. officials have argued that the success of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen. U.S. NORTH KOREA 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. for example.02) George A. of Notre Dame]. Singapore. 50. the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only to U.S. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million. . banks to maintain relationships with BDA. Nonetheless. Vietnam. In short. North Korea gained access to these economic benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in accordance with international standards.SK/N13. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.

North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing missiles. The funds were available for immediate physical withdrawal.05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. and finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia. she said. March-April 2009. In the spring of 2007.S. I think these sanctions .04) Rachel L. Mrs. 2009. through the U. Custom Newspapers. . North Korea could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two central banks working through days of negotiations. Treasury Dept. regulatory action. not the United States--be transferred from BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing. Pyongyang seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and unfettered access to the international financial system. give the world community the tools we need to take appropriate action. Expanded Academic ASAP. but the issue was not the availability of the money. The sanctions were in response to the country's second nuclear test. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions. A1. North Korea demanded that roughly $25 million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities. Ultimately. the $25 million in frozen assets had to travel from Macao. As a result of the U. Clinton said during a visit to Niagara Falls.S.. thanks to the unwillingness of global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime.]. as well as the greater international community. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 101. Washington's action had significantly increased the costs of being a rogue state.SK/N13. SK/N13. p. p. launched May 25. This was a tremendous statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the neighbors. June 14. U.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Ontario. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana. U. neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. 345. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Professor of Political Science. including military officers. CUBA 1. U. 2. Summer 2000. Professor of Political Science. its aim now is to bring about a regime change.S. of Illinois at Chicago]. 345. to change Cuban policies. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba.S. addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments. ORBIS. of Illinois at Chicago]. embargo should be maintained. Lopez [Asst.S.03) Juan J. Currently. embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U.S.S. The argument here is that any critique of the U. Lopez [Asst. ORBIS. Expanded Academic ASAP.01) Juan J. 345. there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres. embargo does not have this aim. to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy.S. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N14. the U. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U. Rather. Professor of Political Science. SK/N14. i. Moreover. if ever. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT . p. of Illinois at Chicago]. although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely. p. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship.S. Lopez [Asst. The U. and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. ORBIS. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N14..e. p. Summer 2000. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE SK/N14.02) Juan J. Summer 2000.

S.SK/N14.S. However. p. . CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST. March 1999. Without U. 83. sanctions. Representative]. if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat. Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. it is because U.S. sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U.

though. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. said Sean Turnell."Sanctions may not be an all-or-nothing issue. an expert on the Burmese economy at Macquarie University in Sydney. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING."I think we have to stay the course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue. But the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners. Custom Newspapers.. In any case. 1. "If you want to throw away the best cards that you have. p. 2007.SK/N15. Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15.02) Seth Mydans.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the people the message needs to be sent to. p. Turnell [Macquarie U. where the policy carries emotional resonance and has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups. 2009. 2. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. you are setting yourselves up for failure. 7."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this description. October 16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE." said Debbie Stothard. coordinator of Altsean-Burma. March 16. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Seth Mydans. Although sanctions have failed so far. a weakening of sanctions would face tough opposition in Washington. a regional human rights group. Custom Newspapers. TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15. . none of whom have shown any interest in joining an economic embargo.

SK/N16. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. of Notre Dame]. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. 50. p. p. Fall 2007. Furthermore. Conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the earlier 1990s. . Libya is a small oil-producing developing economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SK/N16.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.05) George A. Expanded Academic ASAP. LIBYA 1. p. Australia] et al. The sanctions possible to accomplish success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that exceed more than 2% of their GDP. p. After six years under various UN sanctions. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this balancing act rather well. As referenced earlier. of Wollongong. Fall 2007. U. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA SK/N16. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Expanded Academic ASAP. Australia] et al. SK/N16. December 2008. Libya plays an important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya. p. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender countries.04) George A. He concluded that economic sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U.. 50. U.. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N16.. U. of Wollongong. Australia] et al. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. 1707. the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya. many observers were surprised by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2. Stephen argued that multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism sponsors. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1707. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. of Wollongong. SK/N16. December 2008. Libya agreed in 1998 to comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103 airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. When this extradition was completed. 1707.

chemical. but also open access to European investors and markets. This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a lifting of the sanctions. and biological weapons programs. while also allowing international inspectors to verify compliance. .

Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against autocratic regimes. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. Fall 1996. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. THE QUILL. not least because the initiative enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained sensitive to external opinion. South Africa was a semi-democratic country. Lavin [Executive Director. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE SK/N17. U. of Political Science. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. pp. p. Online. Economic sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system. p. After years of economic stagnation. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. The sanctions levied against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic punishment).03) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. Online. FOREIGN POLICY. February 25. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.02) Franklin L.SK/N17. Even under apartheid. 16. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. England). Sanctions against South Africa worked in . 138-153. somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. targeted sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. Expanded Academic ASAP. May 1999.01) Editorial. p. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population. Semi-democratic regimes are more vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah that accompanies multilateral sanctions. December 2008. SOUTH AFRICA 1. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. January-February 1999. of Mississippi]. WORLD AND I. SK/N17. pp. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SK/N17.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. 940. THE TIMES (London. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Asia Pacific Policy Center]. Online. 2009. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. 21-24. SK/N17. SK/N17. Custom Newspapers.05) James Tellenbach. Sanctions in that case were undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system. 2.

The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then lobbied the government to change its policies. Sanctions bit. but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity. .that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change.

the European Union. Boulder] & Anton D.5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels.01) Malcolm R. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SK/N18. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.000. Fall 2007. to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately. June 18. delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades." she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 8. but more must be done. Northridge]. June 18. . 68. JET.02) Malcolm R. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more than 200. 8.. West. of Colorado. SK/N18. U. p. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. China. Expanded Academic ASAP. and the Arab League. mutilation and plunder. 2007. p. California State U. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N18. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N18. following the president's recent announcement. Expanded Academic ASAP. including the United Nations. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to pursue their policy objectives. West. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan may have. such as in the case of police repression. and displacement of some 2. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right direction. 2007.03) William H. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. rape. in fact." she said. JET. "The Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and encourage the international community. Restricting the ability of a country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its objectionable policy. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1.

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