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Schunk, Editor “Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.” AFFIRMATIVE A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE A11. IRAN A12. NORTH KOREA A13. CUBA A14. MYANMAR (BURMA) A15. IRAQ A16. RUSSIA A17. SOUTH AFRICA A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN NEGATIVE N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE N12. IRAN N13. NORTH KOREA
N14. CUBA N15. MYANMAR (BURMA) N16. LIBYA N17. SOUTH AFRICA N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN ￼
S-K PUBLICATIONS PO Box 8173 Wichita KS 67208-0173 PH 316-685-3201 FAX 316-685-6650 email@example.com http://www.squirrelkillers.com SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS 1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.], JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.” SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. 2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First, sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997). SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876. Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success in changing national policies.
p. Fall 2007. 6. Filled with countless studies. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. it looks at some sanctions failing to have the desired effect for the country. sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the sanctioned nation. neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion in damages. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP.3. Fall 2007. When the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States. p. the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 50. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. according to research cited by Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE].07) George A. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. When states design sanctions. 50. and how the end of the Cold War means the United States actually has less power than it used to. 70. 4. sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. . Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL SK/A01.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. Autumn 2006. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. pNA. Second. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH. sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed. U. November 2008. freshly updated for the new edition. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. U. of Notre Dame]. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE SK/A01. Even then. Expanded Academic ASAP. U.08) George A. as well as nearby trading partners. Sanctions that are merely symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior. Every relevant nation must be on board. but even multinational actions work no more than half the time. p. 5.
NEW YORK TIMES. 50.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. It's hard to recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. October 29. U. says unilateral efforts to choke off investment. FORBES. 2. trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 1.SK/A02. Donohue [CEO. they not only have to be multilateral. The chronic reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help. Are economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion. 2009. 54." said Ray Takeyh. A1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Serbia. p. 2007. Fall 2007. think tank. 21. Most attempts fail and end up hurting innocent people.01) Thomas J. in this age of globalization. SK/A02. a Washington. but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time. First. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame].02) George A. SK/A02. Syria and Iran) and resulting in unintended consequences. rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. "For sanctions to work. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. March 3. .S. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. BUSINESS WEEK. September 28. Chamber of Commerce].C. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. unilateral sanctions never work. p. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.04) Mark Landler. p. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK SK/A02. 2008. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED SK/A02. an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration. D.
and Chinese companies seized the opportunity. especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. 2. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993. and the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions. NEWSWEEK. this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own businesses.SK/A03. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP SK/A03. October 15. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total. US allies have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries.02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U. Over time. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. Autumn 2006. 34. The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. LEAD 1. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA) SK/A03. Expanded Academic ASAP. We argue that unilateral sanctions. Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says. imports and exports). Russian.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.04) Fareed Zakaria.. August 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Bryan R. When Congress prohibited U. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U. p. both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU. (This is precisely what's happened on a . 1223. lending support to the third-country effect of sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. 2009. WORLD ECONOMY. In effect. Harvard U. I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade. We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a twolevel framework. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s SK/A03. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in the 1990s. 70. Malaysian. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. Part of this is because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies. U. p. p. March 25. In studying more than 100 cases of US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000. p.S. 9. if extensive in nature.]. It is also because these states use their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation. 3.S. I found that the United States' allies have consistently exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. In the research I have conducted on the international response to US economic sanctions. Custom Newspapers. French. SK/A03.] et al. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
larger scale in Sudan. the Indians.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime. . and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies. the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields. then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation. the Thais.
THE TIMES (London. February 25. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. England). The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. p.SK/A04. Expanded Academic ASAP. Northridge]. THE TIMES (London. . The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. However. Fall 2007. of Mississippi]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. February 25. Baldwin 1985). as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms. p. of Political Science. Custom Newspapers. p. SK/A04. much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest also involved subsequent military intervention. U. will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER SK/A04. this relationship remains tenuous. The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival. of Colorado. 68. as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. 3. Lopez 1999.such as North Korea or Burma . Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.can allow domestic conditions to worsen almost indefinitely.01) Editorial.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. high levels of economic impact. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS SK/A04. But the practice of imposing economic sanctions on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. California State U.03) William H. 918. Boulder] & Anton D. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 2009. even in democratic states. December 2008. In practice. 2009. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. Autocracies where oppression is almost total . 2. p. 2. which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). It is to some extent inevitable that the worst of regimes. and thus. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable. England). 2.02) Editorial. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION SK/A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS 1. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE..
October 15. a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging study on the topic. The result. 1707. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Colorado. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Australia] et al. of Wollongong. NEWSWEEK." 4. says Robert Pape. In addition to that. Northridge]. U. people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies. By design. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/A05. 64). 1707. 2007. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW." In other words. p. The effect would tend to entrench the target's objectionable policy. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.02) William H. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/A05. Therefore. In other words. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. In addition. the government gets stronger. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY 1. punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. And it shifts resources in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it. is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Wollongong. . p. He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap between rich and the poor. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL SK/A05. "Even in Iraq..03) Fareed Zakaria. Boulder] & Anton D. For example.. Australia] et al. 64). December 2008. Niblock argued that economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for democratization (p. 68.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. 3." says Pape. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS SK/A05. 34. p.SK/A05. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U.. p. December 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. rather than moving the target further toward compromise. "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous decades. But the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. sanctions shrink a country's economy. California State U. economic sanctions tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government.
p. extra-judicial killings. The empirical results support this theory. The research suggests that. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions). cross-national data for the period 1981–2000. Finally. The extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. East Carolina U. political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al. multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions. Professor of Political Science. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. 1997. 60. Wood [U. p. including freedom from disappearances. Cortright. and political imprisonment.. 2. even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. East Carolina U.].01) Dursun Peksen [Asst.]. social. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. and suppress popular dissent. January 2009. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents.]. Professor of Political Science. 489. torture. January 2009. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. January 2009. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE SK/A06. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. September 2008. Millar & Lopez. East Carolina U. 2000. protect core supporters. minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. 59.SK/A06. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. 1999.03) Dursun Peksen [Asst.02) Reed M. Rowe. First. Utilizing time-series. 62. the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights. economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency. and physical hardship on civilian populations. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. Weiss. Professor of Political Science. SK/A06. Specifically. 2001). GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED SK/A06. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. p. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE SK/A06. owing to the . p. 3.
1999. Cortright & Lopez.. the development of civil society. 1997. 1995). Weiss. . economic conditions. Cortright. 1967.g.disproportionate economic impact on citizens. 1997. and education in target countries (e. 2001. Lopez & Cortright. Galtung. economic coercion inadvertently worsens public health. Weiss et al. Millar & Lopez.
California State U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Northridge].SK/A06. .. p.05) William H. which. particularly through shortages of food and medicines. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to claim the moral high ground. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. Fall 2007. U. 68. many observers argued. Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human suffering in the target country. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. created great suffering among the Iraqi populace. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against Iraq. Expanded Academic ASAP.
p.01) Bryan R. 68. SANCTIONS HARM THE U. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place.S. Custom Newspapers. This was the case for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union.03) Bryan R. The sender adopts the position that. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. 2009. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U. was easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain. which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba.SK/A07.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. ." why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs. however. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. BUSINESSES SK/A07. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. While such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target. Northridge].S. 2. If Congress can vote to "Buy American. how can we expect them not to leave? SK/A07. rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target. Halliburton moved because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the United States. Harvard U. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms.S. p. U. The Soviet Union. U.]. p. Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. it would prefer to take a moral stand. California State U. 9. of Colorado. U. ideally at very low domestic cost. 2009.02) William H. Custom Newspapers. 9. Remarkably. March 25. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.S. Harvard U. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point well.S. March 25. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. SANCTIONS HURT U. occasionally sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business profitably. ECONOMY 1. JOBS SK/A07. which imposed huge costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself. some of the same congressmen who supported the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act in 1996.
3. and are unrecoverable. 416. workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state. and Elliott 1990. WAGE LOSSES OF U. Schott. . for example.S.S. but also to the sender nation (Askari et al.].. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 2003. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE SK/A07. April 2007. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Barber 1979.Hart 2000. sanctions.Wagner 1988). estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded “as a consequence of U.Hufbauer. Lektzian [U.04) David J.2 Hufbauer et al. Sprecher [Texas A&M U. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions. p. Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed.
Boulder] & Anton D. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES SK/A08.. p. the SK/A08. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international relations. or academic exchanges between states.. narrowly targeted sanctions. California State U. Northridge]. Fall 2007. Northridge]. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and sometimes even non-economic sanctions. U. but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most situations. Such sanctions usually have only very minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals concerned the sanctions can be significant..SK/A08. athletic. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 1. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.03) William H. alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be considered. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SK/A08. Expanded Academic ASAP. Northridge]. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic damage to the sanctioning countries. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions. California State U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. scientific. U. p. of Colorado. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Instead. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country.02) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural. p. 68. U. We believe that among those alternatives. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. 68. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Boulder] & Anton D. Fall 2007. of Colorado.01) William H. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott. California State U. of Colorado.
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. Hufbauer et al. "If you try to get away with foreign policy on the cheap. and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 1. they [economic sanctions] have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. and Elliott 1990a. p. September 2008.04) FOREIGN POLICY. when sanctions are added to the mix. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR SK/A09. SK/A09. . not the sanctions applied to them. target countries often interpret the action as a lack of resolve. 19. then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really wanted because of miscommunication.02) Editorial.01) Reed M.." explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U. England). increased corruption. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. Custom Newspapers. conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between countries than if sanctions had not been imposed. These costs include increased unemployment. Heine-Ellison 2001. Second. Devin. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005.]. 19. deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000.. 1997). FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION SK/A09. Garfield 2002. Hufbauer. [to] become almost provocative in its actions. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR SK/A09. Schott. Because countries prefer to enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves. July-August 2007. Wood [U. Faris 1997. drug and arms smuggling. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.]. capital flight. and Fausey 1995. Garfield. 2. But a recent study by David Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield. 2002.g. p. July-August 2007.. February 25. lost foreign investment. Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that. It was military action. 2009. That leads "the country being sanctioned . Hoskins 1997." adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003.SK/A09. p. THE TIMES (London. World Health Organization 1996).joyner 2003). Weiss 1999).03) FOREIGN POLICY. 490. 3. Crawford 1997. Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. declining GNP. Bhoutros-Ghafi 1995). p. 2.
of New Orleans] & Christopher M. April 2007. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. . because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. The results show that after a sanction occurs. Sprecher [Texas A&M U. 415. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. Lektzian [U. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. p.05) David J. Democracies. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. WILEY INTERSCIENCE.].SK/A09. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender.
p. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].S. they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens.]. September 2008. Wood [U. According to their results. 60-61. 2.SK/A10. By contrast. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS SK/A10. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED SK/A10. pp.01) Reed M. 491. sanctions threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006. .S.02) Dursun Peksen [Asst.S. Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights. East Carolina U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. They further speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at improving Chinese human rights practices. U. Professor of Political Science. 321). INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. U. For instance. January 2009. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre failed to improve human rights practices. Li and Drury (2004) and Drury and Li (2006) show that U. Contrary to expectations. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE 1.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. A10. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Melli. NEW YORK TIMES. large global banks have been willing to help.05) Peter Crall. IRAN 1. as much as I think they deserve it.01) Editorial. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. that cost may not have risen to a level that will significantly deter trade. A1.N. p. having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979." said Thomas R. the question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but how much they will. November 2008. even when such sanctions have increased the cost of doing business with Iran.N. SK/A11. p. the volume of German trade with Iran has increased by about 14 percent.03) Mark Landler. Security Council on nuclear proliferation. Moreover." Although Lloyds voluntarily curtailed this practice. Unfortunately. Treasury Dept. member [Israel] off the map. And in some cases. In the first half of the year. Expanded Academic ASAP. how quickly. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL SK/A11. p. 2. Ultimately. p. THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston. March-April 2009." SK/A11. probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue. the Iranian banks Sepah. On January 9. as French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U. announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and Saderat had managed to push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and targeted way to hurt Iran financially. years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium. 2009. the Manhattan district attorney. and a vow to "wipe a U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. a former under secretary of state who has held informal negotiations with the Iranians. Pickering. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A11. September 28. Custom Newspapers. and at what cost? SK/A11. after a 16 percent decline in 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.04) Rachel L. 2009. Custom Newspapers. A1. NEW YORK TIMES. Custom Newspapers.S. Robert Morgenthau. 101. more centrifuges" for enriching it. U. U. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Expanded Academic ASAP. Germany maintains that one of . 47. p.].02) Mark Landler. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes. Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. September 28. September 28.SK/A11. SC).
the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran. This suggests. however. that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian markets. .
is even less dependable. these officials say. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A11. and it has maintained a consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since. A1. strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran. 2009. sanctions backfired by enhancing the political legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many sanctions scholars. Bernard Kouchner.08) William H. which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran. In other instances. Northridge]. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics. A1.. however. the United States imposed unilateral. In 1996. Expanded Academic ASAP. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. Custom Newspapers. Obama. p. Boulder] & Anton D. 2009. p.06) Mark Landler. U. p. gave last week to Mr. 50. the French foreign minister. Medvedev. these sanctions have been counterproductive. SK/A11. LEAD SK/A11. Dmitri A. given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran. Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh. whatever the assurances that the Russian president. said last Monday that he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. California State U. For example. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.3. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement. 68. And the political upheaval creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people. . Fall 2007. September 28. SK/A11. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.07) George A. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts.09) Mark Landler. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U. In fact.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. These have continued in various forms. NEW YORK TIMES. Custom Newspapers. Fall 2007. September 28. China. long-term sanctions against Iran. NEW YORK TIMES. Citing those fears. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 4.
876. p. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health. Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible. Michael Whitty. SK/A12. Winter 2008. The authors argue that the political nature of economic sanctions is the main reason for their failure. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on political change. p.02) Editorial. 2. NORTH KOREA 1. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea have failed to do so. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. Expanded Academic ASAP. the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather . SK/A12. SK/A12. or improvement of human rights. p. 2009. Rather. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against North Korea. credit lines. 2009. Not surprisingly. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A12. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A12.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. The resolution passed unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds. October 17. A1. June 14. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.N.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. October 17. p.05) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. 648. failing to achieve the goals upon which they were justified. In fact. the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. Furthermore. Winter 2008. In fact. 2009. Custom Newspapers. grants and loans contributing to the nuclear. ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the reclusive communist regime. 875.SK/A12. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. However.04) Editorial. prevention of nuclear proliferation. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North Korea to militarise even further. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and military sanctions from the U. 648.
than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. As the authors pinpoint. . sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea.
06) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. 3. North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. 648. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Its economic and public health systems further buckled with successive years of floods and droughts. Similarly. 875876. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Winter 2008. In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang]. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate. and suggests that negotiations are the only means to solve the current nuclear crisis. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL.07) Editorial. Kim concludes that the sanctions will not work. pp.SK/A12. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS SK/A12. . as well as those imposed by the UN. 2009. October 17. leading to widespread malnutrition and up to one million excess deaths in the 1990s. p. Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests. Expanded Academic ASAP.
2009. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. p. who has long said the U. Lugar. 2.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Britain. including a lifting of economic sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. recently sent Carl Meacham.S. and Italy have all played an active role in sanctionsbusting on Cuba's behalf. 9. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete in Cuban markets. Meacham wrote that President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to that nation should be fulfilled. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A13. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP SK/A13. policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals. p. After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000. March 25.. Harvard U. Custom Newspapers.04) Bryan R.-Cuba relations. SK/A13.]. 2009. 2009. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. ECONOMY SK/A13. Japan. Spain. Expanded Academic ASAP. policy toward Cuba. Harvard U. Sweig. US trade in those products rose from $6 million in 2000 to $350 million by 2006. March 25.03) Bryan R. . February 24. US sanctions have failed to bring about regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities. One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses.S. pNA. CUBA 1.S. Custom Newspapers. U.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. a senior GOP staffer for the panel. in the past five decades Canada. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 9.S. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years. the results are impressive. U. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U.]. that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to Cuban participation in international institutions.02) Julia E. to Cuba to evaluate the situation.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM. foreign policy could begin normalization in U. THE NATION. p. In his report. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U. 2007. May 14. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and setting right a mismanaged U. France. 11. As for US sanctions against Cuba.SK/A13. 3.
19.S. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45year-old U. trade embargo against Cuba. and Fidel Castro was predictable as well. writing beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U. TIME. I talked at length with dissidents. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Chamber of Commerce]. March 3. Donohue [CEO. November 6.S.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. Who benefits most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro. 21. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. the embargo is not so painful as it once was. BUSINESS WEEK. 2008.07) Thomas J.06) Thomas J. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Chamber of Commerce].4. who is likely to succeed him.S.S. I've been to Cuba. and their belief is if you take the sanctions away. 21. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition. . rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's antiYanqui defenders. The U. U. you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves. When I was in Cuba.S. With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. and it doesn't seem to work.S.05) Tim Padgett. Donohue [CEO. BUSINESS WEEK. March 3. p. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A13. p. 2008. U.S. SK/A13. and heated U. We have basically kept Castro in power. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years. SK/A13. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. It is clear to me that he used sanctions as a means to stay in power.
March 16. free speech and assembly are still smothered. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. and analysts say those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. oil. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds. U.Rather than forcing change. furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region. 2009. particularly Russia and China. This is only the tip of the iceberg. 54. 2009. Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries. In March. 2. October 2008. p. and any protests are crushed by force. Custom Newspapers. they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . Expanded Academic ASAP. p. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A14. October 29. China and Myanmar signed a $2. 2007. This is the second time in less than two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly supported by the United States has been vetoed. Expanded Academic ASAP.But Myanmar's military has not budged. August 26. When completed. Indeed. Broader sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior. many analysts say. if history is a guide. 1.The European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower. A23.04) Jim Webb. the confrontational approach has made the generals more stubborn. China and Russia vetoed a resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma. the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty.SK/A14. The sanctions began with an arms embargo after a massacre of as many as 3. SK/A14. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS SK/A14.S. Would tougher economic sanctions against Burma work? Probably not.000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West. gas and mining projects in Myanmar. SK/A14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. FORBES.01) Seth Mydans. p. pNA.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. a time-consuming. THE NEW YORK TIMES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca. In January 2007.
strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes. a military presence could easily follow. If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow. .
enough evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma. and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new rules flourish. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. October 15. But it would take little for either China or India to pick up the slack from. For more than 10 years. p. as legitimate businesses dry up. 5. The ruling regime has .06) Fareed Zakaria. ports and checkpoints. THE NEW YORK TIMES. 54.08) Jim Webb. Custom Newspapers. which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves.k. In Burma. Despite a dismal record. sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy. Chevron is a 28% partner with France's Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand. NEWSWEEK. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING SK/A14. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP SK/A14. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. say. 2009.a. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. 2007. which controls border crossings. Expanded Academic ASAP. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for a country. FORBES. The United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country.3. they just keep on ticking. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A14. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. In addition. Turning up the heat on Burma (a. the military. SK/A14. one effect of Western sanctions was to shut down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s. its isolation will deepen. p. Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be "the last resort"? 4. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade.07) Fareed Zakaria. the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar. October 29. whose production and supply multiply. Chevron . NEWSWEEK. Expanded Academic ASAP. Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner. always prospers. The Burmese government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect. August 26. the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. With countries like Burma. Then there are drugs. 2007. 2007. In all of this. 34. forcing hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. October 15.05) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. p. 34. Its economy will suffer. Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime. A23. black markets spring up. p.
become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. . The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world.
2. Further US intelligence documents. "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals". NEWSWEEK. US intelligence agreed. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in USled campaign. SK/A15. October 15. 2009. p.. the UN secretary general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis. p.01) Fareed Zakaria. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 34. Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation. observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing continued." Predictably. Canada].02) Editorial. during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. vaccines. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN SK/A15. Ismael [School of Social Work. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. 875. October 17. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country. IRAQ 1.SK/A15. 337. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. water. 2007. p. food. will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water. . including dramatic declines in resources that we essential for health. mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births). Spring 2007. such as drugs. Expanded Academic ASAP. Within months of the war. and energy. including possible epidemics. noted the particular impact on children. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. "Incidences of disease. Expanded Academic ASAP. and fully understood the implications for Iraqis. if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met". which could include epidemics and famine. predicting an "imminent catastrophe. its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity.03) Shereen T. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS SK/A15. the most vulnerable in America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. Carleton U. those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere. the DIA wrote in January 1991." For example. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. knew the necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country.
04) Shereen T. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. The study estimated that there were approximately 46." . Ismael [School of Social Work. Spring 2007.000 household interviews in more than 300 locations. SK/A15.. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. The study reported an immediate and startling increase in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the collapsing the health care system. p. malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import sufficient food. which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out. 337. 337. Spring 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. Carleton U.773 children under five--had died from diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions. Ismael [School of Social Work. nearly three years earlier. The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water supplies. to conduct an in-depth comprehensive study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians.SK/A15. including medicine. Expanded Academic ASAP. a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war. 337. The International Study Team sent a task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines. Canada]. two prominent US strategic analysts concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history. the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent. health care and child psychology..900 excess deaths during the first eight months of 1991. p. p. The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less. Canada]. severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children. particularly children. the Iraqi government informed the United Nations that 1. The study was based on 9. Spring 2007. In October 1991.05) Shereen T. 3.. The study covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi government. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE SK/A15. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. Expanded Academic ASAP.303 Iraqis--including 667. Even taking into account the possibility of Iraqi exaggeration. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.614. Canada]. Carleton U. Ismael [School of Social Work. By January 2002. Carleton U. and.06) Shereen T.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. not isolated. just one in a wide array of measures the West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior. Russia should. SK/A16. p. Custom Newspapers. However. It would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda.03) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE.02) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum].01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. and will do. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Russian companies should be encouraged to compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices. 12. through a combination of market forces and disciplined and consistent international regulation. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin" attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. on the contrary. September 9.SK/A16. In the new more cautious global economy of today. September 9. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK SK/A16. 2008. suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2. 2008. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time being. RUSSIA 1. 12. more to show Russia the consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve. it is highly unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. or making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad. 2008. 12. Indeed. Custom Newspapers. Custom Newspapers. . p. p. be further brought in to global markets and international institutions. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A16. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. exposure to a combination of market forces and good governance already has done. like excluding Russia from the Group of Eight. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. September 9.
that these financial restrictions were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa. 54. 2. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. SK/A17. had the unanticipated effect of undermining the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime. 68. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and-despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training South Africans of any color. California State U. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. FORBES. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS SK/A17. Boulder] & Anton D. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt.01) William H. It should be noted. Northridge]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/A17.. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. not a governmental sanctions initiative per se. Fall 2007. of Colorado. p. October 29. p.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES SK/A17. of Colorado. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.03) William H. it was willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the international banking community. U. SOUTH AFRICA 1. Northridge]. however. 2007. which decreased the employment and wages of black labor. California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. The problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. . Consequently.
the United States led an unsuccessful effort to have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. says Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick. 8.SK/A18. . California State U. which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. Boulder] & Anton D. p. Fall 2007.02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Northridge]. October 2008. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 2. 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE SK/A18. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE SK/A18.01) Malcolm R. pNA. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A18. JET. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. U. June 18. following widely criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.03) William H. 3. Finally. West. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage but was vetoed by China and Russia. 68. Expanded Academic ASAP. In July 2008. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. Examples are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons.. Expanded Academic ASAP.
Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 1. Sanctions. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations." Governments. September 1997.03) William H. In contrast. Northridge]. Boston U. to national security. Americans would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words." the U. ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). U. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. intellectual property. And likewise. and international trade. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Fall 2007. USA TODAY MAGAZINE. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. for. Since Thomas Jefferson. 409. and the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N01. U. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month. Nathan. the World Trade Organization. of Virginia]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson. 68. Online. were a form of "peaceable coercion. law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related.02) James A. SK/N01. the British need for American goods and services was essential to England's well-being. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. human rights. California State U.S. of Economics. May 1999. p. Sanctions are central to such international agreements as the United Nations Charter.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept. the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. 37. would prevail. the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists). USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING SK/N01. U. for example. today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. in a "contest of self-denial. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. p.. Athens imposed a trade embargo against Megara. Expanded Academic ASAP.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. Boulder] & Anton D. of Colorado. Americans have been certain that. . of Economics. Sanctions have long been important in international relations. especially the British.SK/N01.S. would be compelled to yield to American pressures.
Sanctions are a reality of international relations. Hence.05) Richard M. . The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands.SK/N01. p. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SK/N01. East Carolina U.]. January 1999. 19. Professor of Political Science. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. 3. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.]. trying to do away with them would be as ineffective as outlawing war. 2000). THE SCIENCES.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics. Expanded Academic ASAP. January 2009. or ending the use of repression by the government. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. restoring democratic regimes. ranging from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists.1 Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Online. Columbia U. 59. the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez.
Fall 2007.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics]. Expanded Academic ASAP. which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period from 1914 to 2000. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 50. p. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U. the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country. And yet.SK/N02. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. This finding contrasts sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. and Elliott 1990).) perhaps surprisingly. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Jeffrey J. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy. in 1990. Kimberly Ann Elliott. (All the episodes. of which a third have occurred since the second edition was published. 2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p.04) George A. Cooper. the authors find that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the cases examined. p. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. . U. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. plus 13 more that have occurred since 2000. 1001. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE SK/N02. sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective. by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Shott. covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000. 2007]: we claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the past century. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. of Notre Dame]. p. This [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE 1. November-December 2008. which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. and the efficacy of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Schott. July 2005. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME SK/N02. December 2008. the nature and magnitude of the sanctions.]. 564. and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions.02) Richard N. 159. SK/N02. SK/N02. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. are reported in a separate CD-ROM. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions. third edition.
even the staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. 848-849. American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as successfully coercing those states into changing policies.3. December 2007. such as the League of Nations sanctions against Ethiopia in 1935. For instance.]. Texas Tech U. . Florida State U. of Political Science. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS SK/N02. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.05) David Lektzian [Dept. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. which failed to make Italy reverse course. of Political Science. Nevertheless. Critics of sanctions effectiveness often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure. pp.] & Mark Souva [Dept.
. of Political Science.03) William H. extradite international fugitives. the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. Fall 2007. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. The most frequently used forms of smart sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the offending regime.]. of Political Science.] & Mark Souva [Dept.02) George A. Fall 2007. to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. and end inter-state and civil wars. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.SK/N03. 68. Fall 2007. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. p. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS” SK/N03. Against democracies. 867. 2001. U. The role of such "smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. 50. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990. Northridge]. In all cases. the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions. p. 50. Texas Tech U. U. protect human rights. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. U. California State U. p. one can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2.04) David Lektzian [Dept. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE 1.01) George A. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY SK/N03. U.S. SK/N03. measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments. Boulder] & Anton D. of Notre Dame]. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. December 2007. Second. As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms. Florida State U. SK/N03. Expanded Academic ASAP. Against nondemocracies. of Notre Dame]. economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. broad . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. of Colorado. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals. Expanded Academic ASAP. These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council. p.
thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield. . Success against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on the leadership. As a result.sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more rents. the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional.
U. smart sanctions can continue to be used as effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries. of Mississippi]. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N03. Some of the most notable successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks in seven African internal wars. the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by racial. 50. In these countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups. U.08) George A. of Colorado. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. 4. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. In many instances. Boulder] & Anton D. curtailing travel. class. Since the mid-1990s. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N03. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial. of Notre Dame]. a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups. U. or religious distinctions. In South Africa. 50. as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. 2001. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. 939. p. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to blacks. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. p. In particular. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions. all UN and multilateral sanctions in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions. 3.SK/N03. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.. 68. Freezing the personal assets of leaders. p. these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. December 2008. U. it is imperative for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse to comply with sanctions pressure. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. California State U. ethnic. p.06) William H. SK/N03. especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders. the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for whites than for blacks. Northridge]. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves. Fall 2007. and consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling regime. With these four considerations integrated into their framework. rogue state leaders. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. of Political Science.07) George A.
and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past decade. .
In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil.09) George A. of Notre Dame]. South Africa's disavowal of the bomb. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 50. p. During the past two decades. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.5. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more important than punishing sanctions. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION SK/N03. imposing smart sanctions in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive results. .
a brand name is a valued asset.]. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank Sepah ongoing access to the U. Surprisingly. the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction. SK/N04. March-April 2009. one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 101. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p.S. 101. U. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE SK/N04. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Expanded Academic ASAP. is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. weapons proliferation. Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system.04) Rachel L. Treasury Dept. 101. 2. March-April 2009. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to handle certain clients on their own.02) Rachel L. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. and corruption. Four months later. 101. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N04. Treasury Dept.SK/N04. U. for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.S. This time. Treasury Dept. Through targeted financial measures. Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions. Expanded Academic ASAP. thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system.S. for the most part. Two months after that. financial system.01) Rachel L. the United States targeted another of Iran's most important financial institutions. the United Nations . Expanded Academic ASAP. Bank Sepah. Banks. Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism. the U. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad.]. and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. the narcotics trade. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N04. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March-April 2009. have acted on these signals. p.S. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. Accordingly.03) Rachel L. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. even unwittingly. March-April 2009.S.S.]. Traditionally. In the global financial marketplace. U. Treasury Dept.
which toughened sanctions against Iran. .registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution 1747.
S.S. After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U. 22. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008.05) Rachel L. March-April 2009. Treasury Dept. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction of the private sector. U. adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures.06) Peter Crall. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. Stuart Levey." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to protect their reputation. SK/N04. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global capital markets. government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 101. 47. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. Expanded Academic ASAP. the Department of the Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. Expanded Academic ASAP." . SK/N04. p. 47. On Oct. more broadly. Expanded Academic ASAP. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global image and operating ability. to place pressure on countries of proliferation concern such as Iran. November 2008. financial system. p. effectively cutting them off from the U.S. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. November 2008.07) Peter Crall. Although the use of sanctions against entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new. p. the strategy of implementing targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial system has only been developed in recent years. when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions against Bank Melli.].SK/N04.
November 2008. Since December 2006. Australia] et al. of Wollongong. .. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. On the other hand. Expanded Academic ASAP. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N05. U. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N05. 47. 1707.SK/N05. including Bank Sepah. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Iran's fifth-largest bank. p. December 2008. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Collins argued that the application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to discontinue its support for terrorism program.01) Peter Crall. 2.N.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.
SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY 1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. SK/N06.02) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986, 153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000, 160). 2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58. Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).
3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER SK/N06.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political bargain. SK/N06.05) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia, sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.
SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES 1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567). SK/N07.03) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/N07.04) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to
Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999.challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. 48-51. Rowe 2001). . Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. In this case.
California State U. p. which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition. Fall 2007. Northridge]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. causing negative aggregate economic growth and potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime activity. In other words.05) Reed M.SK/N07. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. SK/N07. This awareness then gives rise to optimism that. An example of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from 1960 to 1962. of Colorado. the opposition may someday succeed in its efforts. Expanded Academic ASAP. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world.. 509. p. September 2008. Consequently. the indirect impact of sanctions might work by sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.06) William H. U. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective action with the opposition group. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Wood [U. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically and economically isolate the target regime. given tangible evidence of external support. 68. Boulder] & Anton D.
and Mertens (2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i. pp. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1.SK/N08. The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that.]. and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world.02) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. 2..01) Reed M. p. they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence. the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable. military and police equipment). INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Kaempfer. Wood [U. but rather that the unjust policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. 69. p.]. it is their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies. it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions. The fact that it shares moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government). March 2009. POLITICAL STUDIES. SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION SK/N08. 68. September 2008. POLITICAL STUDIES. SK/N08.e. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SK/N08. at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for governmental policies. Accordingly. 490-491. And if they want to eliminate these costs. March 2009. Lowenberg. .
greater economic interdependence discourages the actual implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and noncredible.02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. Online. GDP. sectors that trade or invest in the target country. December 2007. Because sanctions harm the sender’s economy as well as the target’s. ECONOMY 1. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. POLITICAL STUDIES.SK/N09.01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. March 2009.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of GNP (Cox and Drury. LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW SK/N09. Thus.S. pp.S. making them more likely to be initiated. Florida State U. 59. Expanded Academic ASAP. 855.S. January-February 1999. Texas Tech U. THE QUILL.] & Mark Souva [Dept. I should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender less than 0. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT SK/N09.03) David Lektzian [Dept. U. LOSSES TO THE U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 21-24.S. governments often resort to sanctions as a means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap. On the other hand. of Political Science.S. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small fraction of U. sanctions are likely to be both credible and insufficiently severe. and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.]. when economic interdependence is low. 2. of Political Science. firms and communities. p.]. . SK/N09. 2006). p. When military intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective. one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to occur.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. In addition. U. February 28. p. Washington Theological Union].03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. p.SK/N10. THE SCIENCES. 2.04) Kenneth R. Sanctions do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation. which damages the country's infrastructure and development. Online. Australia] et al. Advocates regard sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road instrument between diplomacy and military action. 1707. Columbia U. THE QUILL. use of armed force only as a last resort is a longstanding element of the just-war tradition. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR 1. pp. SK/N10. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR SK/N10. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP.02) Richard M. Still. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. SK/N10. January-February 1999. sanctions rank somewhere between diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding the costs and destruction of war. sanctions are almost always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare. Online. SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR SK/N10. 19. 1997. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. According to Niblock economic sanctions are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war. COMMONWEAL. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. Expanded Academic ASAP. despite their harmful consequences. Online. . January 1999. They are ordinarily incremental and capable of being altered.01) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. of Wollongong. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology. As tools of international pressure. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 21-24. Expanded Academic ASAP.
SK/N11. December 2007. Y. Hovi. of Missouri-Columbia]. Texas Tech U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Second. Nooruddin 2002. These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis. . they should be more committed to conveying their willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat stage. Li and Drury 2004. Lacy and Niou 2004. Miers and Morgan 2002. of Political Science.]. 136. The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions. 2. then compliance should be more likely since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states. If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe. which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996. like any coercive threat. 854-855. then the target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat. 2003. March 2007. of Political Science. Drury and Li 2006). more recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions.SK/N11. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. March 2007. p. Sanctions. and Sprinz 2005). Drezner 1999. If a target faces a resolute and credible sender. if the issue under dispute is a highly salient issue for senders. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. p.03) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. of Missouri-Columbia]. Florida State U. IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES SK/N11. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE SK/N11. only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi 1998. Furthermore. Huseby.01) David Lektzian [Dept. 143. pp. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE 1.
efforts to marshal worldwide pressure against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a clandestine nuclear site. 2009. 2009. Deutsche Bank. Expanded Academic ASAP. NEW YORK TIMES. major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse. THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE. SANCTIONS ON IRAN SK/N12. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N12. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.04) Brian Radzinsky. IRAN 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 14. THE FINANCIAL TIMES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran. U..02) Mark Landler. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/N12. September 2008. p. according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. the sanctions "make life much harder for the .05) Peter Crall.01) James Blitz. in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran. 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today. Senior Obama administration officials. Custom Newspapers. who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting North Korea's illegal financial dealings.03) Mark Landler. 2. said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having a dramatic effect. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the country's nuclear programme. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY SK/N12. SK/N12. The sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted. Expanded Academic ASAP. 3. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. 9. In an Oct.S. p.SK/N12. November 2008. meanwhile. November 27. It finds that UN. senior administration officials said Sunday. U. September 28.S. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. A1. David Asher. In the last several years. September 28. and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks. 47. and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran. Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy. Asher asserted that because proliferators still rely on the global trading system. 42. Custom Newspapers. p. 1. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U. p.S.
." regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on the regime itself. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. Summer 2008.06) Michael Jacobson.proliferator or procurement agent. Expanded Academic ASAP. it should use greater economic pressure. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. SK/N12. p. Success is far from guaranteed. but if the international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking. A debate within Iran about the wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting.
February 25. Few foreign-policy watchers noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs. 2009. For years. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Similarly. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.an extremist regime but not a totalitarian state have had some successes when consistently applied. p. LIKE SOUTH AFRICA. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. also denominated in dollars. for Bank Saderat. Treasury Dept. The Washington Post reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly impossible to pay for goods. sanctions against Iran .]. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and 30 percent. p. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological confidence.4. March-April 2009. THE TIMES (London. 5. IRAN. p. South Africa systematically disenfranchised its black majority.09) Rachel L. . and has responded to pressure. Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for supporting terrorism. which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks.07) Editorial. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. In June.S. IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION SK/N12. the so-called U-turn authorization.08) Rachel L. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N12. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Treasury Dept. is its primary livelihood. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a frictionfree financial relationship with the outside world. they eliminated a small but significant exception to the program. the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. U. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the already broad sanctions program. being rejected by Wall Street was serious business. Instead. Expanded Academic ASAP. 101. but bankers engaged in the day-today work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. 101. Expanded Academic ASAP. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE SK/N12. yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent press. 2. March-April 2009. Custom Newspapers. U. For a bank in a country that still had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade. it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In September 2006. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore. Though the regime is hardly undermined by sanctions. To do so.S. England).S. the costs of financial pressure have been high and unwelcome. Iran has a nuclear programme that is patently not designed purely for generating electricity.].
a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran.10) Rachel L.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING." he says. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 79. p. March-April 2009. which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006. Treasury Dept. Expanded Academic ASAP. global financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran. SK/N12.S. but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer seem to exist. U. European governments may ignore the sanctions. p. The refusal of private banks. sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down Iran's use of the international financial system. 6. if only to avoid complicating their own dealings with the United States. the United Kingdom. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED SK/N12. Even Germany. paving the way for a gradual economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U. But in this context. financial gamesmanship is but one of the many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics. March-April 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. But a former National Security Council (NSC) official. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs." he continues. March 3. Lee Wolosky. U. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment of the new financial statecraft. 101. "Already. "This has had a certain measure of success. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 976. 2007.” SK/N12. 101. and the United States were Iran's top export markets 14 years ago. This shift reflects not just the inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider pursuing contracts with Iran.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. . but European banks could cooperate. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. 2007. has seen its exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years. "You're going to see non-U. he acknowledges.]. NATIONAL JOURNAL. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. banks cease to do business with [Iranian entities].11) James Kitfield.13) Rachel L. p. China and Turkey had taken second and third place by 2006.12) CQ RESEARCHER. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and incentive packages multiple times. November 16. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Whereas Japan.SK/N12. Treasury Dept.S.
47.S. Treasury Dept. 2. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS SK/N13.03) Rachel L. officials have argued that the success of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. in the two instances of North Korea halting the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Japan. November 2008. the methods and substance of compromise were nearly the same as in the Libyan case. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N13. U. By March 2007. when Washington actually made it illegal for U. p. it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean business. The United States and its multilateral partners promised that if Korea complied with their demands. North Korea gained access to these economic benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in accordance with international standards. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. . p." SK/N13. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. but rather the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million. Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China. Nonetheless. of Notre Dame]. In the case of Banco Delta Asia.]. Mongolia.02) George A. they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. Expanded Academic ASAP. many in the global financial community had already cut ties with BDA on their own. March-April 2009. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Singapore. U. the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only to U. Vietnam. In short. NORTH KOREA 1. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007. 101.S. banks to maintain relationships with BDA. Similarly.01) Peter Crall.S.S. 50. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea. U.SK/N13. Treasury officials continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the international financial system. Fall 2007. and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far outweighed any benefit. Expanded Academic ASAP. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. for example.
101. In the spring of 2007. March-April 2009. Pyongyang seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and unfettered access to the international financial system. Washington's action had significantly increased the costs of being a rogue state. As a result of the U. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.04) Rachel L. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.. thanks to the unwillingness of global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime. p. not the United States--be transferred from BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing. North Korea demanded that roughly $25 million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities. Expanded Academic ASAP. . Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia. through the U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. as well as the greater international community. North Korea could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two central banks working through days of negotiations. Mrs. The sanctions were in response to the country's second nuclear test. June 14. Treasury Dept. the $25 million in frozen assets had to travel from Macao. but the issue was not the availability of the money. North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing missiles. SK/N13. and finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. The funds were available for immediate physical withdrawal. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions.S. 2009.S.]. Custom Newspapers.S. This was a tremendous statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the neighbors. p.. give the world community the tools we need to take appropriate action. Ontario. launched May 25. A1. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. regulatory action. Clinton said during a visit to Niagara Falls. Ultimately.SK/N13. I think these sanctions . she said.
embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 345. SK/N14. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments. U. embargo does not have this aim. Currently. Professor of Political Science. although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely. Summer 2000. and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. if ever. Summer 2000. Lopez [Asst. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U.S. to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. Moreover. U. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE SK/N14. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT . Lopez [Asst. i. p. 345. p. the U. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior. to change Cuban policies. U. Professor of Political Science. its aim now is to bring about a regime change. ORBIS. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship. The argument here is that any critique of the U.02) Juan J. Expanded Academic ASAP. Summer 2000. SK/N14. ORBIS. addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U.e.03) Juan J. Professor of Political Science.S. ORBIS. Lopez [Asst. of Illinois at Chicago]. U.S. to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana.SK/N14. there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres.S. The U.S. including military officers. Rather. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. 345. CUBA 1. the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Juan J.S.. of Illinois at Chicago].S. neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. of Illinois at Chicago]. Expanded Academic ASAP. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship. p. embargo should be maintained.
S. if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat. p. sanctions. Representative].S.S. sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal. 83. However.SK/N14. Without U. Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. it is because U. . March 1999.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST.
2009."I think we have to stay the course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue. TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15.01) Seth Mydans."Sanctions may not be an all-or-nothing issue. blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits. 2. 7. p. "If you want to throw away the best cards that you have. a regional human rights group. But the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners. 2007. In any case. a weakening of sanctions would face tough opposition in Washington. Custom Newspapers. October 16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. said Sean Turnell. . p. March 16. coordinator of Altsean-Burma." said Debbie Stothard. Custom Newspapers.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the people the message needs to be sent to. where the policy carries emotional resonance and has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups.SK/N15. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. none of whom have shown any interest in joining an economic embargo. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Turnell [Macquarie U. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15. you are setting yourselves up for failure.02) Seth Mydans.. though. Although sanctions have failed so far."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this description. an expert on the Burmese economy at Macquarie University in Sydney. 1.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. Conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the earlier 1990s. U. p.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.. of Wollongong. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. When this extradition was completed. LIBYA 1. 50. of Wollongong. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. many observers were surprised by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear. The sanctions possible to accomplish success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that exceed more than 2% of their GDP. p.05) George A. Fall 2007. December 2008. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender countries. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SK/N16. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. SK/N16. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya. p. After six years under various UN sanctions. Australia] et al. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. p.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Fall 2007. SK/N16. December 2008. He concluded that economic sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision. Stephen argued that multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism sponsors. As referenced earlier. 2. Furthermore. December 2008. of Notre Dame]. 1707.. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya. . U.SK/N16. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. Australia] et al. of Notre Dame]. Libya plays an important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Australia] et al. Expanded Academic ASAP. Libya is a small oil-producing developing economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue.. Libya agreed in 1998 to comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103 airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this balancing act rather well. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Wollongong. 50. SK/N16. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. 1707. 1707.04) George A. Expanded Academic ASAP. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA SK/N16. U.
chemical. but also open access to European investors and markets. . This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a lifting of the sanctions. while also allowing international inspectors to verify compliance. and biological weapons programs.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Even under apartheid. SK/N17. 2009. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE SK/N17. Sanctions against South Africa worked in . February 25. Semi-democratic regimes are more vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah that accompanies multilateral sanctions. Online. U. South Africa was a semi-democratic country. 2. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against autocratic regimes. SOUTH AFRICA 1. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 1996. SK/N17. p. May 1999. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/N17. After years of economic stagnation. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THE QUILL. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. 2. of Mississippi]. not least because the initiative enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained sensitive to external opinion. Custom Newspapers. targeted sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SK/N17. SK/N17. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. FOREIGN POLICY. 16.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept.03) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. Sanctions in that case were undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system. The sanctions levied against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic punishment).01) Editorial. Lavin [Executive Director. 940. Economic sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. January-February 1999. 138-153.02) Franklin L. 21-24. WORLD AND I. p. pp. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population. p. pp. England). GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. THE TIMES (London. December 2008. somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. Asia Pacific Policy Center]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Online. of Political Science.05) James Tellenbach. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. Expanded Academic ASAP. Online.
. Sanctions bit.that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change. The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then lobbied the government to change its policies. but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity.
SK/N18. Expanded Academic ASAP.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. West. West. of Colorado. such as in the case of police repression. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades.000. 8. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SK/N18. following the president's recent announcement. China. 8.01) Malcolm R. but more must be done. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more than 200. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics." she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET. JET. California State U. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007.SK/N18. JET. in fact. 2007. 2007. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N18.03) William H.5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan may have." she said. 2. June 18. p. mutilation and plunder. and displacement of some 2. Northridge]. June 18. and the Arab League. rape. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right direction. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to pursue their policy objectives. including the United Nations. "The Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and encourage the international community. 68. Boulder] & Anton D.02) Malcolm R. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. p. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its objectionable policy. to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately. the European Union. Restricting the ability of a country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.