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Schunk, Editor “Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.” AFFIRMATIVE A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE A11. IRAN A12. NORTH KOREA A13. CUBA A14. MYANMAR (BURMA) A15. IRAQ A16. RUSSIA A17. SOUTH AFRICA A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN NEGATIVE N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE N12. IRAN N13. NORTH KOREA
N14. CUBA N15. MYANMAR (BURMA) N16. LIBYA N17. SOUTH AFRICA N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN ￼
S-K PUBLICATIONS PO Box 8173 Wichita KS 67208-0173 PH 316-685-3201 FAX 316-685-6650 email@example.com http://www.squirrelkillers.com SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS 1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.], JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.” SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. 2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First, sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997). SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876. Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success in changing national policies.
Autumn 2006. it looks at some sanctions failing to have the desired effect for the country. Expanded Academic ASAP. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the sanctioned nation.07) George A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE SK/A01. U. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective. of Notre Dame]. sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation. Expanded Academic ASAP. November 2008. Fall 2007. p. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States. pNA. U. p. . freshly updated for the new edition. and how the end of the Cold War means the United States actually has less power than it used to. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. but even multinational actions work no more than half the time. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions.3. 5. When the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. 50. neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion in damages. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Sanctions that are merely symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior. U.08) George A. 70. Every relevant nation must be on board. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL SK/A01. as well as nearby trading partners. 4.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH. of Notre Dame]. 50. according to research cited by Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE]. 6. Indeed. Fall 2007. Second. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. Even then. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail. When states design sanctions. Filled with countless studies.S.
"For sanctions to work. October 29. 21. Fall 2007. 2009. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK SK/A02. Syria and Iran) and resulting in unintended consequences. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti. BUSINESS WEEK." said Ray Takeyh. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2008. in this age of globalization. First.04) Mark Landler. D.SK/A02. trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. 54. September 28. 2. 50. says unilateral efforts to choke off investment. Donohue [CEO. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. p. U.C. March 3. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Most attempts fail and end up hurting innocent people. p. SK/A02. unilateral sanctions never work. p. FORBES. It's hard to recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. The chronic reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help. . Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. a Washington. of Notre Dame]. Chamber of Commerce]. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. A1. but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. U.02) George A.01) Thomas J. like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 1. they not only have to be multilateral. think tank. Serbia. NEW YORK TIMES. Are economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED SK/A02. p. SK/A02. an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration.
French. In effect. if extensive in nature. We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a twolevel framework. US allies have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries. I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. In studying more than 100 cases of US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000. WORLD ECONOMY. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs.01) Bryan R. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA) SK/A03. lending support to the third-country effect of sanctions. Custom Newspapers. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP SK/A03.S. 70. 2007.SK/A03. NEWSWEEK. both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU. 2009. Part of this is because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies.04) Fareed Zakaria.]. 9. Russian. 34. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. I found that the United States' allies have consistently exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. Harvard U. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total. (This is precisely what's happened on a . 3. Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says. and the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions. August 2009. p. p. would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade. U. 2.S. imports and exports). 1223.S. LEAD 1. It is also because these states use their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation. p.. March 25. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. Malaysian. We argue that unilateral sanctions. In the research I have conducted on the international response to US economic sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. October 15. Over time. Expanded Academic ASAP.02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U. and Chinese companies seized the opportunity. SK/A03. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s SK/A03.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY.] et al. When Congress prohibited U. Autumn 2006. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in the 1990s. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U. The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own businesses. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993.
) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime. . the Indians. where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields. the Thais. and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies. the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation.larger scale in Sudan.
California State U. THE TIMES (London. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS 1. of Political Science. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION SK/A04. p. p. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.such as North Korea or Burma . 68. as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia.. England). and thus. . 2009. much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). But the practice of imposing economic sanctions on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Mississippi]. THE TIMES (London. The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival. high levels of economic impact. p. Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Baldwin 1985). Fall 2007.01) Editorial.02) Editorial. It is to some extent inevitable that the worst of regimes. p. Lopez 1999. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. this relationship remains tenuous. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest also involved subsequent military intervention. February 25. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. even in democratic states.can allow domestic conditions to worsen almost indefinitely. Northridge]. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS SK/A04. 2. 3. 918. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER SK/A04.03) William H. 2. 2009. Autocracies where oppression is almost total . February 25. England).SK/A04.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. In practice. Custom Newspapers. Boulder] & Anton D. SK/A04. The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. 2. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state. will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval. However. as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms. Custom Newspapers. December 2008.
1707." In other words. California State U.." says Pape. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Niblock argued that economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for democratization (p.. 64). For example. Northridge]. "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous decades. Australia] et al. sanctions shrink a country's economy. The result. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. U. The effect would tend to entrench the target's objectionable policy. 68. p. of Wollongong. p. Expanded Academic ASAP.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. 64). 2007. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/A05. He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap between rich and the poor. U. Boulder] & Anton D. NEWSWEEK. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. And it shifts resources in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS SK/A05. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. says Robert Pape. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL SK/A05. a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging study on the topic.02) William H. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. In addition." 4. of Colorado. the government gets stronger. December 2008. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. of Wollongong. In other words. In addition to that. Fall 2007. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY 1. Therefore. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Australia] et al. people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. rather than moving the target further toward compromise. By design. economic sanctions tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government. 3. 1707.. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/A05.03) Fareed Zakaria. . December 2008. is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. 2. p. 34. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. October 15. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/A05. punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. But the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. "Even in Iraq. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. 1999. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Cortright.03) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Millar & Lopez. Weiss.].]. January 2009. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. January 2009. the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights. Professor of Political Science. 59. Specifically. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED SK/A06. 2000. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. extra-judicial killings.]. First. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE SK/A06. cross-national data for the period 1981–2000. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. The extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. p.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. East Carolina U. 2. 62. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. January 2009. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. SK/A06. economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political.02) Reed M. 60. Professor of Political Science. Professor of Political Science. owing to the . Finally. and suppress popular dissent. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions). 1997. The empirical results support this theory. p. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions. and physical hardship on civilian populations. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. The research suggests that. even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. and political imprisonment. social. p. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. torture.. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE SK/A06. 3. East Carolina U. protect core supporters. Utilizing time-series. September 2008. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. East Carolina U. political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.SK/A06. 2001). Wood [U. including freedom from disappearances. 489. p. Rowe. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.
2001. Millar & Lopez.disproportionate economic impact on citizens. Lopez & Cortright. .g. 1997. Weiss et al. 1997. 1995). economic coercion inadvertently worsens public health. 1967.. 1999. economic conditions. Cortright. Weiss. Cortright & Lopez. Galtung. the development of civil society. and education in target countries (e.
Fall 2007. created great suffering among the Iraqi populace. 68. which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to claim the moral high ground. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.. California State U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. many observers argued.SK/A06. which. Expanded Academic ASAP. Northridge]. Boulder] & Anton D. . U. Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human suffering in the target country. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against Iraq. of Colorado. particularly through shortages of food and medicines. p.05) William H. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.
how can we expect them not to leave? SK/A07. U. which imposed huge costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself.01) Bryan R. March 25. of Colorado. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business profitably. occasionally sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. The sender adopts the position that. U. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. 2009. Custom Newspapers.S. U. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place.].S. U. ideally at very low domestic cost. Harvard U.S.S.S. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.SK/A07.. BUSINESSES SK/A07. 2009. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms. Remarkably. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Harvard U. JOBS SK/A07. While such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target. March 25. Halliburton moved because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the United States. some of the same congressmen who supported the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act in 1996. 68. ECONOMY 1. p.S. Northridge]. . California State U. Custom Newspapers. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point well. The Soviet Union. Fall 2007. 2. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007." why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs. p. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 9. p. was easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain. rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. This was the case for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. SANCTIONS HURT U. Expanded Academic ASAP. which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. it would prefer to take a moral stand. Boulder] & Anton D.02) William H. 9. however.]. SANCTIONS HARM THE U. If Congress can vote to "Buy American.03) Bryan R.
Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE SK/A07. sanctions. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.3. Schott. 416..]. for example. Barber 1979.Hart 2000. but also to the sender nation (Askari et al.2 Hufbauer et al.S. p. Lektzian [U. 2003.Hufbauer. estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded “as a consequence of U. . Sprecher [Texas A&M U.04) David J.S. workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”. they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions.Wagner 1988). There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. April 2007. and are unrecoverable. WAGE LOSSES OF U. and Elliott 1990.
California State U. 68. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP. . Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.03) William H. and sometimes even non-economic sanctions. Northridge]. Boulder] & Anton D. U. Instead. p. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. or academic exchanges between states. Northridge].. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 1.SK/A08. are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country. Boulder] & Anton D. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions.01) William H. scientific. Northridge]. athletic. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic damage to the sanctioning countries. Expanded Academic ASAP. We believe that among those alternatives.02) William H. U. 68. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international relations. 68. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SK/A08. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. p. Such sanctions usually have only very minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals concerned the sanctions can be significant. 2. the SK/A08... of Colorado. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most situations. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. narrowly targeted sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES SK/A08. Fall 2007. Fall 2007. alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be considered. of Colorado. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott. U. California State U.
. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003." explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION SK/A09. lost foreign investment. Wood [U. July-August 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. February 25. target countries often interpret the action as a lack of resolve. SK/A09. THE TIMES (London. p. declining GNP. Garfield.SK/A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 1.]. World Health Organization 1996). SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR SK/A09. and Fausey 1995. not the sanctions applied to them. and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. England). 19. 1997). Bhoutros-Ghafi 1995). Devin. . that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban. 2002.02) Editorial.04) FOREIGN POLICY. "If you try to get away with foreign policy on the cheap. capital flight. p. Hoskins 1997. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. That leads "the country being sanctioned . Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets.]. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR SK/A09.g. p." adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U.01) Reed M. then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really wanted because of miscommunication. conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between countries than if sanctions had not been imposed. These costs include increased unemployment. Faris 1997. September 2008. It was military action. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. 2. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005.03) FOREIGN POLICY. deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. Garfield 2002. when sanctions are added to the mix. 19.joyner 2003). Custom Newspapers.. But a recent study by David Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield. Crawford 1997. Heine-Ellison 2001. Schott. 490. Hufbauer. Hufbauer et al.. July-August 2007. and Elliott 1990a. Because countries prefer to enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves. increased corruption. 3. Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that. p. Second. 2. drug and arms smuggling. [to] become almost provocative in its actions. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. 2009. they [economic sanctions] have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. Weiss 1999).
Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs. Lektzian [U. Sprecher [Texas A&M U. . WILEY INTERSCIENCE. April 2007. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. Democracies. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. p.]. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.SK/A09. 415. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. The results show that after a sanction occurs.05) David J.
60-61. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].S. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.01) Reed M. Wood [U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens.02) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights. U.SK/A10. 491. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED SK/A10. January 2009. Li and Drury (2004) and Drury and Li (2006) show that U. 321). Professor of Political Science. East Carolina U. . p. They further speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at improving Chinese human rights practices. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE 1. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. pp.]. By contrast. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre failed to improve human rights practices. 2. U. Contrary to expectations. For instance. According to their results. September 2008. sanctions threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006.S. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS SK/A10.S.
SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A11. the volume of German trade with Iran has increased by about 14 percent. Unfortunately. the Iranian banks Sepah. Security Council on nuclear proliferation. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. large global banks have been willing to help. On January 9. In the first half of the year. A1. having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 2009. a former under secretary of state who has held informal negotiations with the Iranians. that cost may not have risen to a level that will significantly deter trade. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and targeted way to hurt Iran financially. 2.]. announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients. as French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U. Moreover. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.05) Peter Crall. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING." Although Lloyds voluntarily curtailed this practice.02) Mark Landler. ARMS CONTROL TODAY.SK/A11." said Thomas R. probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. November 2008. Treasury Dept. 2009. Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. how quickly. more centrifuges" for enriching it. Melli. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.04) Rachel L.03) Mark Landler.01) Editorial. the Manhattan district attorney. September 28. A10. Robert Morgenthau. Custom Newspapers. NEW YORK TIMES. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions. and Saderat had managed to push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over. the question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but how much they will.S. IRAN 1. Custom Newspapers. even when such sanctions have increased the cost of doing business with Iran. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Ultimately. NEW YORK TIMES. as much as I think they deserve it. March-April 2009. September 28." SK/A11.N.S. and a vow to "wipe a U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. p. THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston. p. Pickering. And in some cases. 101. member [Israel] off the map. SC). years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes. 2009. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL SK/A11.N. 47. SK/A11. and at what cost? SK/A11. A1. p. Germany maintains that one of . after a 16 percent decline in 2007. September 28.
the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran. however. This suggests. that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian markets. .
comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis. Obama. In fact. which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran. A1. Fall 2007. p. In 1996.. China. strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran. NEW YORK TIMES. given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran. 68. gave last week to Mr. U.3. SK/A11. p.S. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics. however. These have continued in various forms. these officials say. the French foreign minister. 4. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A11. U. . California State U. A1. because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement. said last Monday that he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. Northridge]. Bernard Kouchner. Medvedev.08) William H. Custom Newspapers. 50. whatever the assurances that the Russian president.07) George A. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U. p. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts. September 28. Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh. Citing those fears. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. and it has maintained a consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2009. LEAD SK/A11. NEW YORK TIMES. In other instances. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2009. is even less dependable. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. September 28. Expanded Academic ASAP. Boulder] & Anton D. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. the United States imposed unilateral. Fall 2007. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. these sanctions have been counterproductive. long-term sanctions against Iran. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. sanctions backfired by enhancing the political legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many sanctions scholars. For example.06) Mark Landler. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Dmitri A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. And the political upheaval creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people. of Notre Dame].09) Mark Landler. SK/A11.
648. NORTH KOREA 1. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. SK/A12. Winter 2008. or improvement of human rights. they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea have failed to do so.05) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science].SK/A12. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. 2009. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and military sanctions from the U.04) Editorial. p. p. 2. SK/A12. economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North Korea to militarise even further. Winter 2008. SK/A12.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Custom Newspapers. In fact. Expanded Academic ASAP. the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. 875. Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on political change. 2009. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A12. Furthermore. The authors argue that the political nature of economic sanctions is the main reason for their failure. However. p.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science].N. 2009. 876. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. June 14. A1. economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health. Michael Whitty. p. The resolution passed unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. Not surprisingly. October 17. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against North Korea. grants and loans contributing to the nuclear. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950.02) Editorial. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A12. In fact. ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the reclusive communist regime. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Expanded Academic ASAP. Rather. failing to achieve the goals upon which they were justified. credit lines. October 17. prevention of nuclear proliferation. the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather . Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. 648.
.than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. As the authors pinpoint. sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea.
p. 875876. 648. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. . 2009. In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. Similarly. Its economic and public health systems further buckled with successive years of floods and droughts. Winter 2008. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS SK/A12. pp. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. as well as those imposed by the UN. leading to widespread malnutrition and up to one million excess deaths in the 1990s.06) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang]. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate. Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests. North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. October 17.SK/A12. and suggests that negotiations are the only means to solve the current nuclear crisis. Kim concludes that the sanctions will not work.07) Editorial. 3.
U.S. US sanctions have failed to bring about regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities. foreign policy could begin normalization in U. Spain..].02) Julia E. US trade in those products rose from $6 million in 2000 to $350 million by 2006. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March 25.-Cuba relations. p. Japan.]. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U.04) Bryan R. 2009. and Italy have all played an active role in sanctionsbusting on Cuba's behalf. THE NATION. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A13. Custom Newspapers. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Lugar. As for US sanctions against Cuba. the results are impressive. p. recently sent Carl Meacham.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM. Meacham wrote that President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to that nation should be fulfilled. ECONOMY SK/A13. 2009. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP SK/A13. March 25. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Harvard U.S. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. a senior GOP staffer for the panel. policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2007.S. to Cuba to evaluate the situation. 11.S. Custom Newspapers. Britain. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. in the past five decades Canada. who has long said the U. 2009. Sweig. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete in Cuban markets. 3.03) Bryan R. including a lifting of economic sanctions.S. Harvard U. pNA. 9. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and setting right a mismanaged U. 9. 2. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U. February 24. France. that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to Cuban participation in international institutions. CUBA 1.SK/A13. Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses. p.S. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years. After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000. In his report.S. May 14. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. SK/A13. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. policy toward Cuba.
05) Tim Padgett. rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's antiYanqui defenders.4. U. 2007. Who benefits most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro. p. who is likely to succeed him. U. the embargo is not so painful as it once was. and Fidel Castro was predictable as well.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. I've been to Cuba.S. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years. March 3. Chamber of Commerce]. It is clear to me that he used sanctions as a means to stay in power. p. November 6. Expanded Academic ASAP. and it doesn't seem to work. and heated U.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. Chamber of Commerce].S. BUSINESS WEEK.S. p. With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. BUSINESS WEEK. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. We have basically kept Castro in power.06) Thomas J. Donohue [CEO. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45year-old U. March 3. 19. Expanded Academic ASAP. and their belief is if you take the sanctions away. 21. When I was in Cuba. 21.07) Thomas J.S. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition. Donohue [CEO. SK/A13. I talked at length with dissidents. . Expanded Academic ASAP. 2008.S. 2008. you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves. SK/A13. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A13.S. trade embargo against Cuba. writing beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U. TIME. The U.
SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A14. October 29.000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International.04) Jim Webb. A23. This is the second time in less than two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly supported by the United States has been vetoed. Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca. pNA.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. gas and mining projects in Myanmar. SK/A14. p. p.But Myanmar's military has not budged. When completed. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. 54. Would tougher economic sanctions against Burma work? Probably not. 1. 2009. This is only the tip of the iceberg. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region. THE NEW YORK TIMES. if history is a guide. China and Myanmar signed a $2.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West. October 2008. Custom Newspapers. many analysts say. In March. Indeed.SK/A14. 2009. August 26. at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower.The European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes. 2007. The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior.S. FORBES. March 16. the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty. U. Broader sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures.Rather than forcing change. the confrontational approach has made the generals more stubborn. oil. Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds. Expanded Academic ASAP. The sanctions began with an arms embargo after a massacre of as many as 3. Custom Newspapers.01) Seth Mydans. a time-consuming. free speech and assembly are still smothered. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS SK/A14. . p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/A14. In January 2007. China and Russia vetoed a resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma. particularly Russia and China. and any protests are crushed by force. they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar. and analysts say those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP.
If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow. . a military presence could easily follow.strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes.
Its economy will suffer. 2009. For more than 10 years. August 26. the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. A23. in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. 34. whose production and supply multiply. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FORBES. The United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country. say. October 15.a.05) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. SK/A14. Expanded Academic ASAP. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable. 5. October 29. Despite a dismal record. 2007. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade. the military. Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A14. sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. enough evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma. ports and checkpoints. and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new rules flourish. Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner. NEWSWEEK. Turning up the heat on Burma (a. the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP SK/A14. black markets spring up. p. which controls border crossings. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. as legitimate businesses dry up. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. always prospers. NEWSWEEK. The ruling regime has . they just keep on ticking.06) Fareed Zakaria. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. But it would take little for either China or India to pick up the slack from. In Burma. 34. its isolation will deepen. p. forcing hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs. which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves.07) Fareed Zakaria. Chevron . p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p.k. 2007. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING SK/A14. The Burmese government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect. 54. Chevron is a 28% partner with France's Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand.08) Jim Webb.3. In all of this. one effect of Western sanctions was to shut down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s. In addition. Then there are drugs. Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be "the last resort"? 4. October 15. With countries like Burma. Expanded Academic ASAP. THE NEW YORK TIMES. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for a country.
The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world.become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. .
Expanded Academic ASAP. noted the particular impact on children." For example. p. "Incidences of disease. during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. water.SK/A15. Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation. mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births). vaccines. 2. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. 2009. the UN secretary general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2007. predicting an "imminent catastrophe. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in USled campaign. those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere.01) Fareed Zakaria. which could include epidemics and famine.03) Shereen T. 34. SK/A15. IRAQ 1. Spring 2007. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country. 337. such as drugs. Ismael [School of Social Work. observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing continued.02) Editorial. its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity. NEWSWEEK. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. including possible epidemics. . and fully understood the implications for Iraqis. Carleton U. and energy. food. will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water. knew the necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. Further US intelligence documents. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS SK/A15. October 15. US intelligence agreed. the most vulnerable in America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met". 875. the DIA wrote in January 1991. p. p. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order." Predictably. Canada]. "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals". Expanded Academic ASAP. including dramatic declines in resources that we essential for health. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN SK/A15.. October 17. Within months of the war.
Carleton U. Carleton U. Even taking into account the possibility of Iraqi exaggeration. Ismael [School of Social Work. particularly children. Carleton U. Spring 2007. malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import sufficient food. including medicine.. The study estimated that there were approximately 46. Ismael [School of Social Work. Expanded Academic ASAP. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. p. The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water supplies. the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent.06) Shereen T. the Iraqi government informed the United Nations that 1. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES.000 household interviews in more than 300 locations. a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war. nearly three years earlier. Spring 2007.303 Iraqis--including 667. 337. p." . Canada]. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE SK/A15. p. Expanded Academic ASAP.05) Shereen T. which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out. In October 1991. The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less. health care and child psychology. SK/A15.04) Shereen T. Ismael [School of Social Work. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 337. The International Study Team sent a task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines. and. By January 2002. 3. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.900 excess deaths during the first eight months of 1991. The study reported an immediate and startling increase in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the collapsing the health care system. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The study covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi government. Expanded Academic ASAP.614.SK/A15. 337. The study was based on 9. Canada]. Spring 2007. severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children.773 children under five--had died from diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions.. Canada].. two prominent US strategic analysts concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history. to conduct an in-depth comprehensive study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians.
on the contrary. p. However. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time being. exposure to a combination of market forces and good governance already has done. September 9. 12.02) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. . like excluding Russia from the Group of Eight. Russian companies should be encouraged to compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A16. September 9. RUSSIA 1. or making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future. September 9. Custom Newspapers. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. 2008. p. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. In the new more cautious global economy of today. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK SK/A16. be further brought in to global markets and international institutions. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Indeed. through a combination of market forces and disciplined and consistent international regulation. more to show Russia the consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve. 12. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. 2. 2008.SK/A16. 12. Custom Newspapers. p. it is highly unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation. not isolated. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/A16. 2008. just one in a wide array of measures the West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior.03) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum].01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. and will do. It would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin" attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. Custom Newspapers. Russia should.
it was willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the international banking community. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. that these financial restrictions were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Fall 2007. 2. p. October 29. SOUTH AFRICA 1. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Colorado. Fall 2007.SK/A17. 54. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. however. FORBES. Boulder] & Anton D. Consequently. U. Northridge]. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS SK/A17. not a governmental sanctions initiative per se. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Northridge]..01) William H. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.03) William H.. 2007. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES SK/A17. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and-despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training South Africans of any color. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. It should be noted. p. SK/A17. California State U. had the unanticipated effect of undermining the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime. 68. which decreased the employment and wages of black labor. The problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt. Boulder] & Anton D.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. . p. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. California State U. 68. of Colorado.
p. Northridge]. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE SK/A18. California State U. Examples are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons. U. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE SK/A18. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Finally. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. pNA. which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. of Colorado. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Malcolm R. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage but was vetoed by China and Russia. June 18. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) William H. 8. p..02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. following widely criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate.SK/A18. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP. JET. . says Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick. West. October 2008. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support. the United States led an unsuccessful effort to have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A18. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. 68. 3. In July 2008. Boulder] & Anton D. 2007.
" Governments. of Economics. would be compelled to yield to American pressures. U. May 1999. USA TODAY MAGAZINE. Sanctions have long been important in international relations. Expanded Academic ASAP. in a "contest of self-denial. Sanctions are central to such international agreements as the United Nations Charter.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept.S. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING SK/N01. p. ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC).. Online. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. U. were a form of "peaceable coercion. the World Trade Organization. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Economics. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. and international trade. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N01. intellectual property. In contrast. 409. would prevail. especially the British.SK/N01. . for. Americans would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. September 1997. human rights. today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. Boulder] & Anton D.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. Athens imposed a trade embargo against Megara.S. Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age. p. And likewise. 68. the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. Northridge]. Since Thomas Jefferson. law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related.02) James A. to national security. the British need for American goods and services was essential to England's well-being. in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month. SK/N01. Nathan." the U. California State U. 37. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Sanctions. Americans have been certain that. Boston U. of Colorado. for example. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 1. Fall 2007.03) William H. U. the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists). and the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. of Virginia]. 2. p. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.
trying to do away with them would be as ineffective as outlawing war. THE SCIENCES. restoring democratic regimes. p. Sanctions are a reality of international relations.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. 3. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. 59. Professor of Political Science. East Carolina U. the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez. Online.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics. 2000).1 Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals. January 2009. p. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SK/N01.05) Richard M. Columbia U. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. Hence.SK/N01. The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands. January 1999.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. or ending the use of repression by the government. . 19. ranging from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists.
SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME SK/N02. p. Fall 2007. Shott. July 2005. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE 1. of which a third have occurred since the second edition was published. November-December 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. of Notre Dame]. . the nature and magnitude of the sanctions. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Expanded Academic ASAP. the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country. and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. 564. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. plus 13 more that have occurred since 2000. p. Schott. 2007]: we claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the past century. sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective. which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period from 1914 to 2000. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. This [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE SK/N02. which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions. covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000. (All the episodes. and Elliott 1990). third edition. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions. 159.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U. p. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 1001. And yet. Cooper. SK/N02.SK/N02.) perhaps surprisingly. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy.04) George A. SK/N02. 50. December 2008. Jeffrey J. Kimberly Ann Elliott. and the efficacy of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. the authors find that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the cases examined. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. U.02) Richard N. p. in 1990. are reported in a separate CD-ROM. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics]. 2. This finding contrasts sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.].
even the staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. Critics of sanctions effectiveness often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure. Nevertheless.05) David Lektzian [Dept.3. Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS SK/N02. Florida State U. 848-849. American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as successfully coercing those states into changing policies. December 2007. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. which failed to make Italy reverse course. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Political Science. pp.]. of Political Science. For instance. . such as the League of Nations sanctions against Ethiopia in 1935.
of Colorado. Northridge]. California State U. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. U. Against nondemocracies. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The most frequently used forms of smart sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the offending regime. economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. Boulder] & Anton D. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. 68. of Notre Dame]. Fall 2007. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS” SK/N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY SK/N03.S. Second. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990. 50. Texas Tech U. measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth.04) David Lektzian [Dept. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. of Political Science. to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Florida State U. SK/N03. Against democracies. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.].03) William H. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. December 2007. of Notre Dame]. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. broad . The role of such "smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. 867. extradite international fugitives. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 2001. p. of Political Science. both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council. protect human rights. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) George A. 50. As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms. Expanded Academic ASAP. it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments.02) George A. one can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE 1.] & Mark Souva [Dept. the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. p. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11. U. Fall 2007. SK/N03.SK/N03. These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. p. and end inter-state and civil wars. p. the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. In all cases..
. the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional. Success against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on the leadership. As a result.sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more rents. thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield.
or religious distinctions. U. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions. SK/N03. curtailing travel. U. 50. 939. Expanded Academic ASAP. all UN and multilateral sanctions in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions. as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Fall 2007. of Political Science.06) William H. . smart sanctions can continue to be used as effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries. class.07) George A. Boulder] & Anton D. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves. In many instances. of Mississippi]. ethnic.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for whites than for blacks. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. p. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Some of the most notable successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks in seven African internal wars. In particular. of Notre Dame]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Freezing the personal assets of leaders. the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by racial. December 2008. With these four considerations integrated into their framework. California State U. of Notre Dame]. especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking. Northridge]. p.SK/N03. Expanded Academic ASAP. U.. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to blacks.08) George A. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders. of Colorado. it is imperative for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse to comply with sanctions pressure. p. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N03. p. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N03. and consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling regime. Expanded Academic ASAP. Since the mid-1990s. 50. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial. In South Africa. U. Fall 2007. 3. these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. 2001. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 4. rogue state leaders. Fall 2007. In these countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups.
and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past decade. .
South Africa's disavowal of the bomb. U. 50. of Notre Dame]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.5. . and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil. p. imposing smart sanctions in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive results. During the past two decades. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION SK/N03. Expanded Academic ASAP. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more important than punishing sanctions. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.09) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.S. Bank Sepah. the United States targeted another of Iran's most important financial institutions. Expanded Academic ASAP. March-April 2009. Banks. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. This time. Accordingly. the narcotics trade. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. 101. Treasury Dept. Traditionally. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Four months later. Through targeted financial measures. In the global financial marketplace. Expanded Academic ASAP. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE SK/N04.].S. thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system. March-April 2009.01) Rachel L. 101. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N04. U.03) Rachel L. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. Treasury Dept. 2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the United Nations . these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction.S.S.].]. Expanded Academic ASAP. even unwittingly. for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development. p. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad. and corruption. financial system. for the most part. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.02) Rachel L. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SK/N04.SK/N04. 101. Two months after that. is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. Treasury Dept.S.S. SK/N04. Treasury Dept. March-April 2009. March-April 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions. a brand name is a valued asset. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U.S.].04) Rachel L. 101. weapons proliferation. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank Sepah ongoing access to the U. Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism. Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system. and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. have acted on these signals. Surprisingly. U. the U. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to handle certain clients on their own.
which toughened sanctions against Iran. .registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution 1747.
After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U.]." . FOREIGN AFFAIRS. government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities. Although the use of sanctions against entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. the Department of the Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions against Bank Melli. 47.06) Peter Crall. Expanded Academic ASAP. U.05) Rachel L. financial system. SK/N04. SK/N04. On Oct. Expanded Academic ASAP. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global image and operating ability. effectively cutting them off from the U.S.SK/N04. Treasury Dept. 47. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and. Stuart Levey. 22. March-April 2009. November 2008. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global capital markets. adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures. p. more broadly. the strategy of implementing targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial system has only been developed in recent years. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.07) Peter Crall. 101. told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction of the private sector. November 2008. p. This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008. to place pressure on countries of proliferation concern such as Iran. ARMS CONTROL TODAY." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to protect their reputation.
. Since December 2006. . December 2008. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1.N. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. including Bank Sepah. Collins argued that the application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to discontinue its support for terrorism program. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Iran's fifth-largest bank. of Wollongong. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N05.01) Peter Crall. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p.SK/N05. On the other hand. Australia] et al. November 2008.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. 1707. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. 47. p. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N05. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs. 2.
SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY 1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. SK/N06.02) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986, 153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000, 160). 2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58. Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).
3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER SK/N06.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political bargain. SK/N06.05) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia, sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.
SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES 1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567). SK/N07.03) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/N07.04) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to
Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999. citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader.challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. In this case. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. 48-51. Rowe 2001). .
of Colorado. causing negative aggregate economic growth and potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime activity. p. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Consequently. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. September 2008.. In other words. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically and economically isolate the target regime.SK/N07.06) William H. This awareness then gives rise to optimism that. Wood [U. given tangible evidence of external support. the indirect impact of sanctions might work by sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N07. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. . 509. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. Fall 2007. 68. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world. An example of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from 1960 to 1962. Boulder] & Anton D. which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition. p. California State U. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective action with the opposition group. Northridge]. U. the opposition may someday succeed in its efforts.05) Reed M.
the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable.]. it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions. March 2009..]. Wood [U. . it is their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies. 69. or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. pp. The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SK/N08. 2. The fact that it shares moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government).SK/N08. 68. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. and Mertens (2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for governmental policies. they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence. Kaempfer.01) Reed M. September 2008. SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION SK/N08. p. Lowenberg.e. POLITICAL STUDIES. 490-491. Accordingly. but rather that the unjust policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. military and police equipment). March 2009. p. And if they want to eliminate these costs.02) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. SK/N08. POLITICAL STUDIES.
01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of GNP (Cox and Drury. Thus. firms and communities. governments often resort to sanctions as a means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap.S. of Political Science. 2006). Expanded Academic ASAP. making them more likely to be initiated. SK/N09.] & Mark Souva [Dept. one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to occur. Florida State U. and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U.S. pp. greater economic interdependence discourages the actual implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and noncredible. sectors that trade or invest in the target country. 855. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT SK/N09. p.S.S.]. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U. p. December 2007. 21-24. 2. I should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender less than 0. 59. GDP.S. when economic interdependence is low.03) David Lektzian [Dept. March 2009. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THE QUILL. . ECONOMY 1. Texas Tech U. Online. Because sanctions harm the sender’s economy as well as the target’s.]. POLITICAL STUDIES. sanctions are likely to be both credible and insufficiently severe. LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW SK/N09. January-February 1999.02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg.SK/N09. LOSSES TO THE U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Political Science. On the other hand. When military intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small fraction of U.S.
January-February 1999. sanctions rank somewhere between diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding the costs and destruction of war. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. sanctions are almost always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare.04) Kenneth R. COMMONWEAL. According to Niblock economic sanctions are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology. SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR SK/N10. p.01) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. 19. U.02) Richard M. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR SK/N10. Columbia U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. THE SCIENCES. Expanded Academic ASAP. They are ordinarily incremental and capable of being altered. despite their harmful consequences. In addition. SK/N10. Advocates regard sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road instrument between diplomacy and military action. December 2008.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. pp. 1997. p.. As tools of international pressure. February 28. Still. January 1999. 2. use of armed force only as a last resort is a longstanding element of the just-war tradition. which damages the country's infrastructure and development. Washington Theological Union]. Sanctions do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation.SK/N10. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR 1. 1707.]. of Wollongong. Expanded Academic ASAP. Australia] et al. . THE QUILL. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 21-24. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Online. Online. Online. SK/N10.
Hovi. Miers and Morgan 2002. 2. March 2007. SK/N11. Nooruddin 2002. Li and Drury 2004. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions. Y. only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi 1998. . they should be more committed to conveying their willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat stage. like any coercive threat.SK/N11. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. Drury and Li 2006). If a target faces a resolute and credible sender.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. 2003. Sanctions.] & Mark Souva [Dept. pp. Second. 143. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE SK/N11. Drezner 1999. of Political Science. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE 1. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. then compliance should be more likely since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states. 136. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Missouri-Columbia].03) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia].]. Furthermore. 854-855. Lacy and Niou 2004. These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis. they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. Florida State U.01) David Lektzian [Dept. Texas Tech U. which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996. p. Huseby. if the issue under dispute is a highly salient issue for senders. p. March 2007. then the target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat. December 2007. and Sprinz 2005). of Political Science. more recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions. If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe. IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES SK/N11.
S.S. September 28. Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy. 2. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. IRAN 1. efforts to marshal worldwide pressure against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a clandestine nuclear site. Asher asserted that because proliferators still rely on the global trading system.03) Mark Landler. and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks. p. Custom Newspapers.S. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/N12. THE FINANCIAL TIMES. 2009. The sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted. p. 47. Senior Obama administration officials. in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran. the sanctions "make life much harder for the . 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today. Custom Newspapers. p. In the last several years.02) Mark Landler. noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran. p. and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran. In an Oct.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. September 2008. 9. senior administration officials said Sunday. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the country's nuclear programme. Expanded Academic ASAP. 3. said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. Deutsche Bank. David Asher. p.01) James Blitz. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. meanwhile. U. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE. 42.SK/N12. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY SK/N12. who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting North Korea's illegal financial dealings. SANCTIONS ON IRAN SK/N12. It finds that UN. November 2008. September 28. 2009.04) Brian Radzinsky. A1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1. NEW YORK TIMES. SK/N12.05) Peter Crall. U. 14. said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having a dramatic effect. November 27. SK/N12. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U. Custom Newspapers.
SK/N12.06) Michael Jacobson. Summer 2008. Success is far from guaranteed. A debate within Iran about the wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. 2. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. but if the international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking.proliferator or procurement agent. Expanded Academic ASAP. it should use greater economic pressure." regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on the regime itself. p.
Custom Newspapers.09) Rachel L. 2009. IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION SK/N12. . but bankers engaged in the day-today work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. England). it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. LIKE SOUTH AFRICA. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a frictionfree financial relationship with the outside world. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the so-called U-turn authorization. 2. March-April 2009. they eliminated a small but significant exception to the program.S. the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. the costs of financial pressure have been high and unwelcome. To do so. Treasury Dept. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N12. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the already broad sanctions program. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and 30 percent. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. 101.07) Editorial. which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks. yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent press. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. In June. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Similarly. Though the regime is hardly undermined by sanctions. THE TIMES (London. For years. Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for supporting terrorism. p. being rejected by Wall Street was serious business. p. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE SK/N12. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological confidence.08) Rachel L. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. for Bank Saderat. March-April 2009.an extremist regime but not a totalitarian state have had some successes when consistently applied. 101. U.4. 5. U. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore. In September 2006.]. U. p. For a bank in a country that still had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade. Treasury Dept. is its primary livelihood. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. The Washington Post reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly impossible to pay for goods. Few foreign-policy watchers noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs. Instead. IRAN. February 25. and has responded to pressure.S. also denominated in dollars. Iran has a nuclear programme that is patently not designed purely for generating electricity. sanctions against Iran . South Africa systematically disenfranchised its black majority.
13) Rachel L. 2007. p. paving the way for a gradual economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U. March-April 2009. global financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran.11) James Kitfield. a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran. but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer seem to exist. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program. sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down Iran's use of the international financial system. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.” SK/N12. 2007. but European banks could cooperate. But in this context. Even Germany.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED SK/N12.]. March 3. Expanded Academic ASAP. p." he says. March-April 2009.SK/N12. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N12. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. "You're going to see non-U.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Treasury Dept. Lee Wolosky. p. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment of the new financial statecraft. Whereas Japan. 6. which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006. 101. 976. and the United States were Iran's top export markets 14 years ago.S. But a former National Security Council (NSC) official.10) Rachel L. Expanded Academic ASAP. has seen its exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years." he continues. This shift reflects not just the inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider pursuing contracts with Iran. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. Expanded Academic ASAP. he acknowledges. financial gamesmanship is but one of the many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics. banks cease to do business with [Iranian entities].12) CQ RESEARCHER. China and Turkey had taken second and third place by 2006. U. European governments may ignore the sanctions. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and incentive packages multiple times. November 16. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p. "Already. 101. if only to avoid complicating their own dealings with the United States. 79. the United Kingdom.S. Treasury Dept. "This has had a certain measure of success.S. The refusal of private banks. . NATIONAL JOURNAL.
47. Treasury officials continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the international financial system. 101. Singapore. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. In short. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. In the case of Banco Delta Asia. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Fall 2007. March-April 2009. November 2008. NORTH KOREA 1. banks to maintain relationships with BDA. North Korea gained access to these economic benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in accordance with international standards. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.S. many in the global financial community had already cut ties with BDA on their own. Treasury Dept. Japan. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N13. they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007.02) George A. Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China. and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far outweighed any benefit. in the two instances of North Korea halting the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007. U.]. 2. 50. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. officials have argued that the success of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen. By March 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The United States and its multilateral partners promised that if Korea complied with their demands.S. but rather the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. the methods and substance of compromise were nearly the same as in the Libyan case. Vietnam. p.SK/N13. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. when Washington actually made it illegal for U. Mongolia.01) Peter Crall. Nonetheless.S. p. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. U. . the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only to U. it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean business. for example. Similarly. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS SK/N13. of Notre Dame].03) Rachel L. the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million." SK/N13. Expanded Academic ASAP. p.
U. Washington's action had significantly increased the costs of being a rogue state. regulatory action. North Korea demanded that roughly $25 million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities. but the issue was not the availability of the money. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. As a result of the U. through the U. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions. thanks to the unwillingness of global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime. North Korea could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two central banks working through days of negotiations.S. launched May 25. Ontario. as well as the greater international community. In the spring of 2007. Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing missiles. This was a tremendous statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the neighbors. A1. The funds were available for immediate physical withdrawal. Ultimately.. and finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. p. not the United States--be transferred from BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing.]. the $25 million in frozen assets had to travel from Macao.. Pyongyang seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and unfettered access to the international financial system. 101. I think these sanctions .05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. March-April 2009. Treasury Dept.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. June 14. Expanded Academic ASAP.04) Rachel L.SK/N13.S. p. The sanctions were in response to the country's second nuclear test. Clinton said during a visit to Niagara Falls. Mrs. she said. SK/N13. Custom Newspapers. give the world community the tools we need to take appropriate action.
to change Cuban policies.SK/N14. and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana.e. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime.S. Lopez [Asst. addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U. ORBIS. of Illinois at Chicago]. U. to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy. Professor of Political Science. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior. neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Illinois at Chicago]. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE SK/N14. U. embargo does not have this aim.02) Juan J. including military officers. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship. Professor of Political Science. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. Currently.S. the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U. SK/N14. SK/N14. there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments.01) Juan J. CUBA 1. Expanded Academic ASAP. U.03) Juan J. and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. its aim now is to bring about a regime change.S. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Moreover. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. ORBIS. Summer 2000. 345.S. to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. p. The argument here is that any critique of the U. The U. 345. embargo should be maintained.. of Illinois at Chicago]. Summer 2000. Professor of Political Science. Rather. ORBIS. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship. p. Lopez [Asst. Summer 2000. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT .S. if ever. Lopez [Asst. 345. U. p. i.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the U. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes. although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely.
83. sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U. March 1999. sanctions. However. if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat. Representative].SK/N14. Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST. p. . Without U. it is because U.S.S.S.
01) Seth Mydans. In any case. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. you are setting yourselves up for failure. . Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. said Sean Turnell. March 16. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. where the policy carries emotional resonance and has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups. though. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15. coordinator of Altsean-Burma.. 2. Turnell [Macquarie U. Custom Newspapers. a regional human rights group. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. a weakening of sanctions would face tough opposition in Washington. 1. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the people the message needs to be sent to. an expert on the Burmese economy at Macquarie University in Sydney. Although sanctions have failed so far. 2009. none of whom have shown any interest in joining an economic embargo."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this description. TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15." said Debbie Stothard. "If you want to throw away the best cards that you have."Sanctions may not be an all-or-nothing issue. October 16. p. But the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners. 7. blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits."I think we have to stay the course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue.SK/N15.02) Seth Mydans. 2007.
50. Expanded Academic ASAP.. or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender countries.. p. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Wollongong. Libya plays an important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. p. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this balancing act rather well. 50. Conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the earlier 1990s.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N16. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Australia] et al. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya. Furthermore. LIBYA 1. Libya agreed in 1998 to comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103 airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. p. Australia] et al. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/N16. December 2008. U. many observers were surprised by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear. SK/N16. Australia] et al.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. of Wollongong. of Notre Dame]. U. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. 1707. 1707. of Notre Dame]. 2. After six years under various UN sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. The sanctions possible to accomplish success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that exceed more than 2% of their GDP. . AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Libya is a small oil-producing developing economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue. December 2008. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA SK/N16. Stephen argued that multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism sponsors.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. U.04) George A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. He concluded that economic sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision. the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya. U. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies..05) George A. Fall 2007. of Wollongong. As referenced earlier. Fall 2007. U. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SK/N16. SK/N16. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. 1707. December 2008. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. When this extradition was completed.
chemical. . This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a lifting of the sanctions. and biological weapons programs. but also open access to European investors and markets. while also allowing international inspectors to verify compliance.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 940.02) Franklin L.SK/N17. 2. p. pp. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. 2009.01) Editorial. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Online. Online.05) James Tellenbach. Online. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. 21-24. The sanctions levied against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic punishment). SK/N17. WORLD AND I. Expanded Academic ASAP. FOREIGN POLICY. Expanded Academic ASAP. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. SK/N17. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 16. pp. THE QUILL. May 1999. of Political Science. THE TIMES (London. Lavin [Executive Director. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. Even under apartheid. somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. South Africa was a semi-democratic country. SOUTH AFRICA 1. U. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE SK/N17. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 1996. After years of economic stagnation. 138-153. December 2008. Economic sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system. Asia Pacific Policy Center]. p. January-February 1999.03) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. 2. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population. Sanctions against South Africa worked in . JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. targeted sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SK/N17. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Semi-democratic regimes are more vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah that accompanies multilateral sanctions. England). Sanctions in that case were undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system. SK/N17. of Mississippi]. Custom Newspapers. not least because the initiative enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained sensitive to external opinion. February 25. Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against autocratic regimes.
. Sanctions bit. The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then lobbied the government to change its policies.that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change. but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity.
June 18. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more than 200. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/N18. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING." she said. "The Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and encourage the international community. the European Union. 2. delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. Northridge]. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan may have. such as in the case of police repression. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to pursue their policy objectives. West. following the president's recent announcement. Expanded Academic ASAP. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder.03) William H. 8. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. California State U. China. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right direction. JET. West. 68. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. in fact. June 18. but more must be done. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its objectionable policy. Expanded Academic ASAP. .5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels. and the Arab League." she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET. to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SK/N18. of Colorado.02) Malcolm R.01) Malcolm R. 2007. p. Fall 2007. Restricting the ability of a country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. SK/N18. and displacement of some 2. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N18. p. JET. p. U. rape. Boulder] & Anton D. including the United Nations. 2007. 8. mutilation and plunder. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.000.
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