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Schunk, Editor “Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.” AFFIRMATIVE A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE A11. IRAN A12. NORTH KOREA A13. CUBA A14. MYANMAR (BURMA) A15. IRAQ A16. RUSSIA A17. SOUTH AFRICA A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN NEGATIVE N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE N12. IRAN N13. NORTH KOREA
N14. CUBA N15. MYANMAR (BURMA) N16. LIBYA N17. SOUTH AFRICA N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN ￼
S-K PUBLICATIONS PO Box 8173 Wichita KS 67208-0173 PH 316-685-3201 FAX 316-685-6650 firstname.lastname@example.org http://www.squirrelkillers.com SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS 1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.], JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.” SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. 2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First, sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997). SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876. Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success in changing national policies.
U. 6. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail. Second.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH. Expanded Academic ASAP. neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion in damages. 70. Expanded Academic ASAP. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE SK/A01. sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL SK/A01. Sanctions that are merely symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. it looks at some sanctions failing to have the desired effect for the country. Indeed. Fall 2007.07) George A. . p. November 2008.S. and how the end of the Cold War means the United States actually has less power than it used to. p. freshly updated for the new edition. but even multinational actions work no more than half the time. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the sanctioned nation. When the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Fall 2007. 50. according to research cited by Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Every relevant nation must be on board. 5. sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States. Autumn 2006. as well as nearby trading partners. Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. U. pNA. Filled with countless studies. p.08) George A.3. 4. 50.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. When states design sanctions. Even then. the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.
Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Are economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion. p. Serbia. Expanded Academic ASAP. unilateral sanctions never work. NEW YORK TIMES. says unilateral efforts to choke off investment.04) Mark Landler. First. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK SK/A02. SK/A02. Chamber of Commerce]. 21. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED SK/A02. they not only have to be multilateral. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/A02. September 28. Donohue [CEO. like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. think tank. trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti. FORBES. 2008.01) Thomas J. . 54. 50." said Ray Takeyh. A1. p.02) George A. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 1. in this age of globalization. Expanded Academic ASAP.C. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. 2009. Custom Newspapers. U. p. p. October 29. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March 3. Fall 2007. BUSINESS WEEK. It's hard to recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration. Most attempts fail and end up hurting innocent people. a Washington. Syria and Iran) and resulting in unintended consequences. but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. 2007. The chronic reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help. 2. D. "For sanctions to work.SK/A02.S. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
S. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total. 9. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says.01) Bryan R. When Congress prohibited U. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Russian.S. French.] et al. p. U. The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a twolevel framework. p. Over time. if extensive in nature. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in the 1990s.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. and Chinese companies seized the opportunity. p. imports and exports). p. Harvard U. Expanded Academic ASAP.02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U. March 25. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/A03. 2. lending support to the third-country effect of sanctions. LEAD 1.. 34. 2009. It is also because these states use their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation. 2007. Malaysian. WORLD ECONOMY. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993. this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own businesses. August 2009. We argue that unilateral sanctions. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA) SK/A03. both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU. I found that the United States' allies have consistently exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. US allies have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries. Custom Newspapers. Expanded Academic ASAP. 3. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s SK/A03. and the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions. 1223. Autumn 2006. In effect.S.SK/A03. would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade. In the research I have conducted on the international response to US economic sanctions.04) Fareed Zakaria.]. I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. NEWSWEEK. Part of this is because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies. 70. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP SK/A03. In studying more than 100 cases of US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000. (This is precisely what's happened on a . October 15.
the Indians. .larger scale in Sudan. the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. the Thais. and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime. where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields. then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation.
. Custom Newspapers. December 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Lopez 1999. because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable.SK/A04. Custom Newspapers. 2009. Boulder] & Anton D. since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest also involved subsequent military intervention. as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. 2. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state.can allow domestic conditions to worsen almost indefinitely. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION SK/A04. p. Baldwin 1985). The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS SK/A04. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. February 25. THE TIMES (London. p. p. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER SK/A04. England). 68.. Northridge]. 2. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. In practice. 2009. THE TIMES (London.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Colorado. Fall 2007. 3. high levels of economic impact. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS 1. England). However. this relationship remains tenuous. and thus. will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. 918. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.such as North Korea or Burma . HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U. U.03) William H. But the practice of imposing economic sanctions on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. of Mississippi]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. even in democratic states. California State U. of Political Science. It is to some extent inevitable that the worst of regimes. Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case. by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms. which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). SK/A04.01) Editorial.02) Editorial. 2. Autocracies where oppression is almost total . The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival. February 25.
sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. Expanded Academic ASAP. He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap between rich and the poor. Northridge]. December 2008.02) William H. 2. And it shifts resources in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it. is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In addition to that. California State U. Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Niblock argued that economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for democratization (p. 34. U. Australia] et al. NEWSWEEK. p. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/A05. of Wollongong. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous decades.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In other words. 1707. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. The result. 1707. punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. U. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/A05. December 2008. of Colorado. The effect would tend to entrench the target's objectionable policy. says Robert Pape. 68. economic sanctions tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government. of Wollongong." says Pape.. Therefore. 3. U." 4. 64). Expanded Academic ASAP. people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.SK/A05. p. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL SK/A05. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. rather than moving the target further toward compromise. sanctions shrink a country's economy. October 15. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY 1.. Australia] et al. Expanded Academic ASAP.. the government gets stronger. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. But the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. By design. 2007. a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging study on the topic. In addition. Fall 2007. For example. Expanded Academic ASAP. "Even in Iraq.03) Fareed Zakaria. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS SK/A05. 64)." In other words.
leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. extra-judicial killings. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.02) Reed M. torture. East Carolina U. economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency. p. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Cortright. minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. and suppress popular dissent. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED SK/A06. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al. 62. Finally. 3. January 2009. p. The extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. Weiss. Rowe. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions).01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. p. 60. January 2009. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. 1999. First.]. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE SK/A06. 59. owing to the .03) Dursun Peksen [Asst. the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights. Millar & Lopez. and physical hardship on civilian populations.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE SK/A06. The empirical results support this theory.]. 2000. East Carolina U. Specifically. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. East Carolina U. Professor of Political Science. 2001). 489. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. Wood [U. cross-national data for the period 1981–2000. January 2009. Professor of Political Science. Utilizing time-series.SK/A06. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. and political imprisonment. 2. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. protect core supporters. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. Professor of Political Science. 1997. including freedom from disappearances. social.]. p. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. The research suggests that. multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions. September 2008. SK/A06..
Galtung. Millar & Lopez.disproportionate economic impact on citizens. 2001. Weiss et al. economic coercion inadvertently worsens public health.. Cortright & Lopez. economic conditions. Cortright. the development of civil society. 1995). 1997. 1967. Weiss. 1997. . and education in target countries (e. 1999.g. Lopez & Cortright.
U.. Boulder] & Anton D. which. . p. Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human suffering in the target country. Northridge]. particularly through shortages of food and medicines. many observers argued. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against Iraq. Expanded Academic ASAP. created great suffering among the Iraqi populace. which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to claim the moral high ground. Fall 2007. California State U. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. of Colorado.05) William H.SK/A06. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 68. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Harvard U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.S. . some of the same congressmen who supported the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act in 1996.S. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. it would prefer to take a moral stand. U. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place. Halliburton moved because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the United States. Remarkably.S. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target. however. U. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007.S. Custom Newspapers. which imposed huge costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself. 9. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. SANCTIONS HARM THE U. which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba. ECONOMY 1. U.03) Bryan R." why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs. of Colorado. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. California State U. rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U. This was the case for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union. SANCTIONS HURT U.]. 9. Northridge]. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. how can we expect them not to leave? SK/A07. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point well. While such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target. 2.. March 25. BUSINESSES SK/A07.S. p. The Soviet Union.SK/A07. JOBS SK/A07.S. U.01) Bryan R. Harvard U. p. If Congress can vote to "Buy American. March 25.]. was easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business profitably. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2009. Boulder] & Anton D. The sender adopts the position that. Custom Newspapers. Expanded Academic ASAP. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. 2009. p. ideally at very low domestic cost. 68. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. occasionally sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. Fall 2007.02) William H.
04) David J.S. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. April 2007.3. they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions. 2003. and Elliott 1990. estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded “as a consequence of U. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state. for example..Wagner 1988). workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”. Schott.]. p. Lektzian [U.2 Hufbauer et al.S. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. sanctions. . 416. WAGE LOSSES OF U. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE SK/A07. but also to the sender nation (Askari et al.Hart 2000. Sprecher [Texas A&M U.Hufbauer. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. and are unrecoverable. Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed. Barber 1979.
Fall 2007. U. p. Northridge]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions. are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country. alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be considered.. narrowly targeted sanctions.. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Fall 2007. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. the SK/A08. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) William H. scientific. Instead. We believe that among those alternatives. 68. p. 68. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic damage to the sanctioning countries. Northridge]. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. California State U. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SK/A08. U. The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 1. California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP.01) William H. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES SK/A08.02) William H. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Fall 2007. athletic. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural. Northridge].SK/A08.. p. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. or academic exchanges between states. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international relations. Such sanctions usually have only very minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals concerned the sanctions can be significant. California State U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. of Colorado. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. of Colorado. and sometimes even non-economic sanctions. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most situations. 2. .
not the sanctions applied to them. capital flight. then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really wanted because of miscommunication. declining GNP. [to] become almost provocative in its actions. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005. 2002.. p. drug and arms smuggling.joyner 2003). that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban. Wood [U. and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. That leads "the country being sanctioned . and Elliott 1990a. Garfield 2002. Garfield. Because countries prefer to enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves. 3. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION SK/A09. 2. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 1. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR SK/A09." adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U. Second..]. February 25. Crawford 1997. 2009. 1997). ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR SK/A09. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Hufbauer et al. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. Bhoutros-Ghafi 1995). deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. Faris 1997. But a recent study by David Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield. and Fausey 1995.03) FOREIGN POLICY." explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U. July-August 2007. p. 19. September 2008.04) FOREIGN POLICY. increased corruption. "If you try to get away with foreign policy on the cheap. THE TIMES (London. Schott.01) Reed M. England). . target countries often interpret the action as a lack of resolve.g. Heine-Ellison 2001. Devin.. It was military action.]. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. July-August 2007. lost foreign investment. p. when sanctions are added to the mix. Hufbauer. 19. 490. SK/A09. conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between countries than if sanctions had not been imposed. Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets. Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that. Weiss 1999). they [economic sanctions] have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e.SK/A09. World Health Organization 1996). Custom Newspapers. Hoskins 1997. 2.02) Editorial. These costs include increased unemployment. p. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003.
Sprecher [Texas A&M U. Democracies. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. 415. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs.SK/A09. WILEY INTERSCIENCE.]. Lektzian [U. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. .05) David J. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. April 2007. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. p.
U. pp. U. September 2008. Li and Drury (2004) and Drury and Li (2006) show that U.S. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. By contrast. p.S. January 2009. Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights. For instance. Wood [U.S. . INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.]. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS SK/A10. Professor of Political Science. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre failed to improve human rights practices.01) Reed M. Contrary to expectations. 2. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED SK/A10. 491.SK/A10. East Carolina U. 321). According to their results. they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens. They further speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at improving Chinese human rights practices.02) Dursun Peksen [Asst. 60-61. sanctions threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE 1.
On January 9. November 2008. Custom Newspapers. September 28. more centrifuges" for enriching it. March-April 2009. Security Council on nuclear proliferation. Ultimately. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 2009. Melli.N.S. that cost may not have risen to a level that will significantly deter trade. September 28. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL SK/A11. A10. Custom Newspapers. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A11. p. 2.N.]. the volume of German trade with Iran has increased by about 14 percent. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes. Treasury Dept. September 28. Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. 2009. A1. how quickly.S. years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium.01) Editorial. THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston. NEW YORK TIMES. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. U.SK/A11. IRAN 1. as much as I think they deserve it. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but how much they will.02) Mark Landler. In the first half of the year. member [Israel] off the map.03) Mark Landler.05) Peter Crall. p. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. SC)." Although Lloyds voluntarily curtailed this practice. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. Unfortunately. Robert Morgenthau. SK/A11." SK/A11." said Thomas R. And in some cases. as French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U. and at what cost? SK/A11. probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue. 47. p. a former under secretary of state who has held informal negotiations with the Iranians. Pickering. U. and Saderat had managed to push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over. the Manhattan district attorney. even when such sanctions have increased the cost of doing business with Iran. large global banks have been willing to help. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and targeted way to hurt Iran financially. NEW YORK TIMES. Germany maintains that one of . Expanded Academic ASAP. Moreover. 101. p. 2009. Custom Newspapers. and a vow to "wipe a U. announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. A1. the Iranian banks Sepah. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. after a 16 percent decline in 2007. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions.04) Rachel L.
that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian markets. however. . This suggests.the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran.
Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. 2009. Fall 2007. gave last week to Mr. California State U. p. the United States imposed unilateral. Dmitri A. 2009. September 28. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U. NEW YORK TIMES. LEAD SK/A11. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A11. U.06) Mark Landler. Medvedev. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Citing those fears.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 4. 50. comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis. these sanctions have been counterproductive.S. These have continued in various forms. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. And the political upheaval creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people. is even less dependable. In 1996. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. . p. Custom Newspapers. long-term sanctions against Iran.08) William H. because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement. September 28. In fact. A1. SK/A11. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Obama. given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran. In other instances. p. of Notre Dame]. A1. For example. strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran. of Colorado. NEW YORK TIMES.07) George A. sanctions backfired by enhancing the political legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many sanctions scholars. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics. U. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. these officials say. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and it has maintained a consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since. 68. p. Bernard Kouchner. which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran.3. Custom Newspapers.09) Mark Landler. said last Monday that he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. whatever the assurances that the Russian president. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/A11. Northridge]. Fall 2007. the French foreign minister. China. however.
they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea have failed to do so. 648. ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the reclusive communist regime. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. However. p. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North Korea to militarise even further. p. The resolution passed unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and military sanctions from the U. the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. A1. Michael Whitty. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A12. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. grants and loans contributing to the nuclear. failing to achieve the goals upon which they were justified. June 14.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. p. Furthermore. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 875. p. Winter 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. SK/A12. October 17. Winter 2008. 876. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries. October 17. 2. PACIFIC AFFAIRS.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. 648. credit lines. The authors argue that the political nature of economic sanctions is the main reason for their failure. SK/A12.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A12. Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on political change. 2009. NORTH KOREA 1.02) Editorial.05) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. In fact. 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health.04) Editorial. prevention of nuclear proliferation. Rather.SK/A12. or improvement of human rights. SK/A12. the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather . Custom Newspapers. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against North Korea. Not surprisingly. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible. In fact.
than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. . As the authors pinpoint. sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea.
In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950.07) Editorial. Winter 2008. p. and suggests that negotiations are the only means to solve the current nuclear crisis. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. . 3. as well as those imposed by the UN.SK/A12. Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests. Its economic and public health systems further buckled with successive years of floods and droughts.06) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. October 17. North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. pp. 875876. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate. Similarly. 2009. leading to widespread malnutrition and up to one million excess deaths in the 1990s. Expanded Academic ASAP. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang]. Kim concludes that the sanctions will not work. 648. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS SK/A12. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
S. 9. . 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000. Lugar. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years.04) Bryan R. policy toward Cuba. ECONOMY SK/A13. Custom Newspapers.]. p. US sanctions have failed to bring about regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities. U. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A13. As for US sanctions against Cuba. foreign policy could begin normalization in U.SK/A13. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U. France. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and setting right a mismanaged U. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete in Cuban markets.S. Harvard U. 9. Spain.S. in the past five decades Canada. policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March 25. US trade in those products rose from $6 million in 2000 to $350 million by 2006. p.S.-Cuba relations.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM. p. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 11. Harvard U. Sweig. Britain. Custom Newspapers. THE NATION.S. One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses. recently sent Carl Meacham. who has long said the U. February 24.S. including a lifting of economic sanctions. In his report. Meacham wrote that President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to that nation should be fulfilled.. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. to Cuba to evaluate the situation. 2009. U. that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to Cuban participation in international institutions.02) Julia E. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Japan. 3.03) Bryan R. May 14. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U. March 25. pNA. SK/A13. and Italy have all played an active role in sanctionsbusting on Cuba's behalf. 2007. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP SK/A13. 2009. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. the results are impressive. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. CUBA 1. a senior GOP staffer for the panel.
21. TIME. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. 2008. SK/A13.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years. BUSINESS WEEK.S.06) Thomas J. 19. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Donohue [CEO. November 6. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and heated U. U. U. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A13.S. the embargo is not so painful as it once was. Chamber of Commerce]. We have basically kept Castro in power. Expanded Academic ASAP. It is clear to me that he used sanctions as a means to stay in power. When I was in Cuba. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition.S.S.4. . BUSINESS WEEK. Donohue [CEO. and it doesn't seem to work. 21. With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. p. 2007. p. I've been to Cuba. SK/A13. rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's antiYanqui defenders.S. I talked at length with dissidents.S. writing beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45year-old U. March 3. who is likely to succeed him. you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves. p.07) Thomas J. Chamber of Commerce].05) Tim Padgett. trade embargo against Cuba. and their belief is if you take the sanctions away. and Fidel Castro was predictable as well. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. March 3. The U. Who benefits most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2008.
SK/A14. more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West. many analysts say. 54. at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1.SK/A14. August 26. Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries. if history is a guide. . p. Broader sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures. In March. oil. a time-consuming. particularly Russia and China. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/A14.S. 2. free speech and assembly are still smothered. FORBES. China and Russia vetoed a resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma.Rather than forcing change.01) Seth Mydans. p. October 29. This is the second time in less than two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly supported by the United States has been vetoed. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds. The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior. A23.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. March 16. gas and mining projects in Myanmar. Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca. 2007.But Myanmar's military has not budged. The sanctions began with an arms embargo after a massacre of as many as 3. October 2008. Custom Newspapers. China and Myanmar signed a $2.04) Jim Webb. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region. In January 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS SK/A14. and any protests are crushed by force. the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty. THE NEW YORK TIMES. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A14. Would tougher economic sanctions against Burma work? Probably not.000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. pNA. When completed. Expanded Academic ASAP. and analysts say those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change. 2009. p. This is only the tip of the iceberg. Expanded Academic ASAP. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International.The European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Indeed.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar. U. 2009. 1. the confrontational approach has made the generals more stubborn.
a military presence could easily follow.strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes. If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow. .
2007. 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade. 34. Its economy will suffer. Despite a dismal record. which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves. October 15. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A14. October 15. its isolation will deepen. In all of this.05) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. A23. forcing hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs. p.06) Fareed Zakaria. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. The ruling regime has . p. Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be "the last resort"? 4. NEWSWEEK. FORBES. p. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new rules flourish. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP SK/A14. October 29. The Burmese government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect. 34. THE NEW YORK TIMES.08) Jim Webb. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. SK/A14. Then there are drugs.a. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable. whose production and supply multiply. Expanded Academic ASAP. For more than 10 years. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. say. Expanded Academic ASAP. always prospers. black markets spring up. the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. Chevron is a 28% partner with France's Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand.07) Fareed Zakaria. one effect of Western sanctions was to shut down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s. Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime. the military. But it would take little for either China or India to pick up the slack from. August 26. In Burma. 54. In addition. they just keep on ticking. Custom Newspapers. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING SK/A14. Chevron . Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner. as legitimate businesses dry up. 2007. 5. The United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country. sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy. the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar. NEWSWEEK. 2009. which controls border crossings. ports and checkpoints.k. With countries like Burma. Turning up the heat on Burma (a. enough evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for a country.3. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world.become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. .
which could include epidemics and famine. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in USled campaign. "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals". the most vulnerable in America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. 875. during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. the UN secretary general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP." Predictably. NEWSWEEK. p. 2007. food. will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water. p. those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere. 34. predicting an "imminent catastrophe. observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing continued. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS SK/A15. p. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. including dramatic declines in resources that we essential for health. water. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country. US intelligence agreed. Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation. October 17. and fully understood the implications for Iraqis. Canada]. such as drugs." For example. October 15.01) Fareed Zakaria. its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity. and energy. Spring 2007. if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met". vaccines. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . including possible epidemics. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) Shereen T.SK/A15. 2.. IRAQ 1. noted the particular impact on children. "Incidences of disease.02) Editorial. 337. the DIA wrote in January 1991. Ismael [School of Social Work. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births). If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN SK/A15. SK/A15. Within months of the war. Further US intelligence documents. knew the necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions. 2009. Carleton U.
.614. the Iraqi government informed the United Nations that 1.000 household interviews in more than 300 locations. Ismael [School of Social Work. a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war.900 excess deaths during the first eight months of 1991. Canada]. Canada]. Spring 2007." . Expanded Academic ASAP. The study reported an immediate and startling increase in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the collapsing the health care system. Ismael [School of Social Work. The International Study Team sent a task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines. The study estimated that there were approximately 46. The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water supplies. The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less. nearly three years earlier. which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out.. 337. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. Carleton U.05) Shereen T. 337. and. By January 2002. malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import sufficient food. particularly children. Even taking into account the possibility of Iraqi exaggeration. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP.06) Shereen T. p. The study was based on 9. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The study covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi government. Carleton U. to conduct an in-depth comprehensive study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians. SK/A15. Spring 2007. severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children.SK/A15. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE SK/A15. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. In October 1991. p. health care and child psychology. the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent. Ismael [School of Social Work. 337.773 children under five--had died from diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions.04) Shereen T. Carleton U.. 3. Spring 2007. including medicine. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.303 Iraqis--including 667. p. Canada]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. two prominent US strategic analysts concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history.
12. just one in a wide array of measures the West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. Russian companies should be encouraged to compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices. Custom Newspapers. on the contrary. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A16. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK SK/A16. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin" attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. RUSSIA 1.02) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. p. or making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. September 9. Indeed. 2008. In the new more cautious global economy of today. it is highly unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation. SK/A16. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time being. Russia should. through a combination of market forces and disciplined and consistent international regulation. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. . and will do. more to show Russia the consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve.03) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. 2008. September 9. 2008. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. p. not isolated. 12. It would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda. September 9.SK/A16. 12. exposure to a combination of market forces and good governance already has done.01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. However. be further brought in to global markets and international institutions. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. like excluding Russia from the Group of Eight. suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Northridge]. Fall 2007. not a governmental sanctions initiative per se. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. of Colorado. it was willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the international banking community. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 68. 2. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES SK/A17. 2007. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. however. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Consequently. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 68. It should be noted. Fall 2007. California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.01) William H. Boulder] & Anton D. that these financial restrictions were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS SK/A17. U.. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. October 29. U.. had the unanticipated effect of undermining the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and-despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training South Africans of any color. Boulder] & Anton D. which decreased the employment and wages of black labor. of Colorado. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. The problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. SOUTH AFRICA 1. SK/A17. . FORBES. 54. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa.03) William H. Northridge].02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. California State U.SK/A17. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt. p.
pNA.SK/A18. sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. says Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick. October 2008. of Colorado.. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. 68. JET. which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE SK/A18.01) Malcolm R. p. Fall 2007. p. 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. California State U. the United States led an unsuccessful effort to have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. 3. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. . Expanded Academic ASAP. Northridge]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage but was vetoed by China and Russia. In July 2008. June 18. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Examples are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons. Boulder] & Anton D. Finally.03) William H.02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. West. following widely criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A18. 8. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE SK/A18.
In contrast." Governments. U. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N01. law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. 409. the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept. of Colorado. of Virginia]. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. Boston U. Sanctions have long been important in international relations. 68. the British need for American goods and services was essential to England's well-being. Sanctions are central to such international agreements as the United Nations Charter. 37. 2.S. May 1999. Since Thomas Jefferson. Fall 2007.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. would be compelled to yield to American pressures. the World Trade Organization. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. intellectual property. Nathan. Expanded Academic ASAP. human rights. of Economics. p. ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC). U. Sanctions. for example. USA TODAY MAGAZINE. California State U. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING SK/N01.S. were a form of "peaceable coercion. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. Athens imposed a trade embargo against Megara. September 1997. in a "contest of self-denial. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. to national security. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Northridge]. Online. in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson. the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists). especially the British." the U. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month. And likewise. Americans would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words. of Economics. . today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. p. would prevail. SK/N01. and the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. for. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Boulder] & Anton D. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 1. Americans have been certain that. as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument.SK/N01. p.03) William H.02) James A. and international trade.
04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez. ranging from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics. 19. The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands. Professor of Political Science. Hence. restoring democratic regimes. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. January 2009. . THE SCIENCES.]. East Carolina U. p. January 1999. Columbia U. p.05) Richard M. Sanctions are a reality of international relations. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SK/N01. 2000). Online. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. 3. or ending the use of repression by the government. trying to do away with them would be as ineffective as outlawing war.SK/N01. Expanded Academic ASAP.1 Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals. 59.].
The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. July 2005. November-December 2008. SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME SK/N02. Fall 2007. 564. p. p. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE 1. 50. and Elliott 1990). SK/N02. 2007]: we claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the past century. Schott. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Shott. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Jeffrey J. in 1990. are reported in a separate CD-ROM. and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics]. (All the episodes. and the efficacy of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. 1001. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SK/N02. sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U. of which a third have occurred since the second edition was published. U. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. p. This finding contrasts sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame]. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions. the authors find that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the cases examined. which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period from 1914 to 2000. plus 13 more that have occurred since 2000.]. December 2008. This [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country.) perhaps surprisingly. which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. Kimberly Ann Elliott. p. 159. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions. the nature and magnitude of the sanctions. .02) Richard N. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. by Gary Clyde Hufbauer.SK/N02. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000. And yet. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE SK/N02. third edition.04) George A. Cooper. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. 2.
Florida State U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. of Political Science. . which failed to make Italy reverse course.05) David Lektzian [Dept. Nevertheless. pp. Texas Tech U.3. December 2007. even the staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. of Political Science. Critics of sanctions effectiveness often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure. American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as successfully coercing those states into changing policies. 848-849. such as the League of Nations sanctions against Ethiopia in 1935.]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. For instance. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS SK/N02.
2001. protect human rights. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Florida State U. December 2007. U. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Against nondemocracies. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Northridge]. p. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. 50. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11. broad . of Notre Dame]. extradite international fugitives. Texas Tech U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.04) David Lektzian [Dept. Fall 2007. the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions.SK/N03. of Political Science. U. 50. of Notre Dame].03) William H. SK/N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE 1. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Second. In all cases. U. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.. both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council. 2.02) George A. it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments. As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms. Expanded Academic ASAP. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY SK/N03. economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS” SK/N03. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Colorado. Against democracies. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. The role of such "smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. 68. Boulder] & Anton D. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. one can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. California State U. p. SK/N03.]. The most frequently used forms of smart sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the offending regime. These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. and end inter-state and civil wars. U. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990. Fall 2007. the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions. 867. of Political Science.S. the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.] & Mark Souva [Dept.01) George A.
. As a result. Success against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on the leadership.sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more rents. thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield. the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional.
the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by racial. class. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N03. U. p. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Since the mid-1990s. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders. In many instances. of Mississippi]. California State U. of Colorado. p. Northridge]. a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups.SK/N03. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. Some of the most notable successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks in seven African internal wars. smart sanctions can continue to be used as effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries. and consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling regime. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. Boulder] & Anton D. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Fall 2007. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. rogue state leaders. it is imperative for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse to comply with sanctions pressure. the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for whites than for blacks.. ethnic. these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N03. curtailing travel. 68. 2001. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves. 50. . Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. With these four considerations integrated into their framework. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions. 3. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to blacks. 939. or religious distinctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.07) George A. Expanded Academic ASAP.08) George A. U. Freezing the personal assets of leaders. Fall 2007. December 2008. p. SK/N03. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. In South Africa. In these countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. 4. In particular. all UN and multilateral sanctions in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 50. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Notre Dame]. of Political Science.06) William H. especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking. p.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. of Notre Dame].
.and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past decade.
Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. imposing smart sanctions in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive results. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.5. During the past two decades. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION SK/N03. 50. substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more important than punishing sanctions. of Notre Dame]. and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil. Fall 2007. U. p. South Africa's disavowal of the bomb. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons.09) George A.
].S. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. U. 101. p.S. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to handle certain clients on their own. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. even unwittingly.S.S. 2. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.01) Rachel L. and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system. and corruption. Through targeted financial measures. SK/N04. March-April 2009.]. U. the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Four months later. the United Nations . these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE SK/N04. Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system. Expanded Academic ASAP. Surprisingly. March-April 2009.02) Rachel L. the U. p. 101. March-April 2009. the narcotics trade. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank Sepah ongoing access to the U.]. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N04. a brand name is a valued asset. financial system. This time.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. Expanded Academic ASAP. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U.]. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad. weapons proliferation. have acted on these signals.S. for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development. the United States targeted another of Iran's most important financial institutions. 101. Expanded Academic ASAP. one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. Treasury Dept. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.03) Rachel L.SK/N04. Two months after that.04) Rachel L. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. for the most part. SK/N04. Bank Sepah. Treasury Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In the global financial marketplace. Accordingly. Treasury Dept. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so. Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions. Banks. March-April 2009. p. Treasury Dept.S. Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism. Traditionally. 101. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
which toughened sanctions against Iran.registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution 1747. .
November 2008. U. effectively cutting them off from the U. After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U. the Department of the Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. November 2008. adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures. government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities. when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions against Bank Melli.06) Peter Crall. 101. p. 47.S.05) Rachel L.07) Peter Crall. Although the use of sanctions against entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new. p. Stuart Levey. 47.S." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to protect their reputation.SK/N04." . Expanded Academic ASAP. more broadly. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. SK/N04. the strategy of implementing targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial system has only been developed in recent years. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global image and operating ability. told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction of the private sector. Treasury Dept. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. p. financial system. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and. to place pressure on countries of proliferation concern such as Iran.S. This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global capital markets. Expanded Academic ASAP. 22. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Expanded Academic ASAP. March-April 2009. SK/N04. On Oct. ARMS CONTROL TODAY.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
including Bank Sepah. December 2008. ARMS CONTROL TODAY.N.01) Peter Crall. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N05. the council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs. 47. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. November 2008. U. 1707. Australia] et al. Iran's fifth-largest bank. Expanded Academic ASAP.. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N05. Since December 2006. On the other hand. . Collins argued that the application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to discontinue its support for terrorism program. of Wollongong. 2. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. p. U. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N05.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1.
SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY 1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. SK/N06.02) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986, 153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000, 160). 2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58. Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).
3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER SK/N06.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political bargain. SK/N06.05) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia, sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.
SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES 1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567). SK/N07.03) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/N07.04) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to
citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. In this case. 48-51.challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. Rowe 2001). Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999. .
Wood [U.SK/N07. which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition. p. causing negative aggregate economic growth and potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime activity. Consequently. This awareness then gives rise to optimism that. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N07. 68. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.05) Reed M. In other words. An example of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from 1960 to 1962. California State U. 509. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.06) William H. Expanded Academic ASAP. given tangible evidence of external support.. the opposition may someday succeed in its efforts. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Boulder] & Anton D. . the indirect impact of sanctions might work by sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Fall 2007. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. p. individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective action with the opposition group. September 2008. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world. Northridge]. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically and economically isolate the target regime. U. of Colorado.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. 69. and Mertens (2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i. Lowenberg. or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition. The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that. SK/N08. but rather that the unjust policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. 68.SK/N08. March 2009. they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence. the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable. it is their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies.. September 2008.02) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. The fact that it shares moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government). pp. . SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION SK/N08. p. And if they want to eliminate these costs.e. POLITICAL STUDIES.01) Reed M. at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for governmental policies. Accordingly.]. Kaempfer. POLITICAL STUDIES. and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SK/N08. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill].]. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. 490-491. March 2009. it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions. 2. military and police equipment). Wood [U. p.
].S.] & Mark Souva [Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. POLITICAL STUDIES. When military intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective. Texas Tech U. governments often resort to sanctions as a means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap. March 2009. and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U.SK/N09. SK/N09.03) David Lektzian [Dept. making them more likely to be initiated.S. Because sanctions harm the sender’s economy as well as the target’s. p.S. firms and communities. . p. 21-24. Thus. On the other hand. of Political Science. one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to occur.S. greater economic interdependence discourages the actual implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and noncredible. 2006). LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW SK/N09.]. I should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender less than 0. 855. sanctions are likely to be both credible and insufficiently severe.S. January-February 1999. THE QUILL. when economic interdependence is low.02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. 59. Expanded Academic ASAP.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of GNP (Cox and Drury. GDP. Online. LOSSES TO THE U. ECONOMY 1. Florida State U. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.S.01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small fraction of U. 2. December 2007. U. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT SK/N09. sectors that trade or invest in the target country. pp. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. of Political Science.
Australia] et al. 1707. p. Sanctions do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation.]. December 2008. They are ordinarily incremental and capable of being altered.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR 1.SK/N10. As tools of international pressure. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology. In addition. Washington Theological Union]. . Online. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N10. which damages the country's infrastructure and development. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR SK/N10. 21-24. sanctions are almost always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare. Advocates regard sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road instrument between diplomacy and military action. Online.04) Kenneth R. U. sanctions rank somewhere between diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding the costs and destruction of war. of Wollongong. THE SCIENCES. February 28. Online. use of armed force only as a last resort is a longstanding element of the just-war tradition. p. According to Niblock economic sanctions are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. January-February 1999. SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR SK/N10.01) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. THE QUILL. Columbia U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1997. pp. January 1999.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. COMMONWEAL. 19. despite their harmful consequences. Still. Expanded Academic ASAP.02) Richard M.
]. p. Drury and Li 2006). . Hovi. Florida State U. p. they should be more committed to conveying their willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat stage. 136. 2. Y. March 2007. then compliance should be more likely since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states. December 2007.] & Mark Souva [Dept. Nooruddin 2002. 2003.01) David Lektzian [Dept. they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. of Missouri-Columbia]. SK/N11. Furthermore. only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi 1998. Sanctions. more recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions. like any coercive threat. pp. Texas Tech U. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. Li and Drury 2004. of Political Science. Miers and Morgan 2002. Drezner 1999. and Sprinz 2005). The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions. Lacy and Niou 2004.03) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia]. 854-855. Second. Huseby. IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES SK/N11. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. then the target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat. which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996. If a target faces a resolute and credible sender. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE SK/N11. These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis.SK/N11. of Political Science. if the issue under dispute is a highly salient issue for senders. If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. 143. March 2007. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE 1.
S. Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy. the sanctions "make life much harder for the . SK/N12. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. efforts to marshal worldwide pressure against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a clandestine nuclear site. THE FINANCIAL TIMES.05) Peter Crall. November 2008. 3. 9. Custom Newspapers. U. A1. Expanded Academic ASAP. and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran. and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks.. IRAN 1. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1. In the last several years. 47. according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. p. said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having a dramatic effect. U.02) Mark Landler. The sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the country's nuclear programme. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. SANCTIONS ON IRAN SK/N12. Asher asserted that because proliferators still rely on the global trading system. 14. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. senior administration officials said Sunday. September 28. p.SK/N12. It finds that UN. major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse. In an Oct. SK/N12. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U. NEW YORK TIMES. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/N12. p.04) Brian Radzinsky. David Asher. meanwhile. Deutsche Bank.S. November 27. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY SK/N12. Senior Obama administration officials. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran. Custom Newspapers. THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE. September 2008. 42.03) Mark Landler. 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today. 2009. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. September 28. who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting North Korea's illegal financial dealings.01) James Blitz. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 2009. 2. p. in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran.
but if the international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking. . SK/N12." regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on the regime itself. Expanded Academic ASAP.06) Michael Jacobson. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Summer 2008. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY.proliferator or procurement agent. Success is far from guaranteed. 2. it should use greater economic pressure. A debate within Iran about the wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting.
and has responded to pressure. Though the regime is hardly undermined by sanctions. p. sanctions against Iran . SK/N12. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a frictionfree financial relationship with the outside world. p. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION SK/N12. which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks. the costs of financial pressure have been high and unwelcome. being rejected by Wall Street was serious business. March-April 2009. South Africa systematically disenfranchised its black majority. March-April 2009.08) Rachel L.S. for Bank Saderat. Similarly. LIKE SOUTH AFRICA. For a bank in a country that still had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for supporting terrorism. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.]. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. also denominated in dollars. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. they eliminated a small but significant exception to the program.S.]. Custom Newspapers. In June.07) Editorial. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE SK/N12. Few foreign-policy watchers noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs. . but bankers engaged in the day-today work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. Expanded Academic ASAP. For years. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. In September 2006. 101. Instead.09) Rachel L. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and 30 percent. U. yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent press. England). the so-called U-turn authorization. the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. IRAN.4. 101. THE TIMES (London. is its primary livelihood. 5.S. U. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the already broad sanctions program. 2009. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. February 25. Iran has a nuclear programme that is patently not designed purely for generating electricity. Treasury Dept. 2. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore. To do so. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological confidence. Treasury Dept.an extremist regime but not a totalitarian state have had some successes when consistently applied. The Washington Post reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly impossible to pay for goods.
U. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and incentive packages multiple times. global financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran. Lee Wolosky." he says. Even Germany.S. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. The refusal of private banks. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program.10) Rachel L. if only to avoid complicating their own dealings with the United States. p. banks cease to do business with [Iranian entities]. which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006. "Already. But a former National Security Council (NSC) official. March 3. the United Kingdom. has seen its exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March-April 2009.12) CQ RESEARCHER. March-April 2009. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED SK/N12. 2007. European governments may ignore the sanctions. But in this context. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Expanded Academic ASAP. "You're going to see non-U. but European banks could cooperate.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. financial gamesmanship is but one of the many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics." he continues.].” SK/N12. 101. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.]. NATIONAL JOURNAL. 6. p. 79. November 16.13) Rachel L. 2007. U. 101. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down Iran's use of the international financial system. Treasury Dept. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer seem to exist. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. China and Turkey had taken second and third place by 2006. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment of the new financial statecraft. Treasury Dept. Whereas Japan. This shift reflects not just the inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider pursuing contracts with Iran.11) James Kitfield. SK/N12. paving the way for a gradual economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U. he acknowledges.S. a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran. "This has had a certain measure of success.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and the United States were Iran's top export markets 14 years ago. 976. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.SK/N12.
Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China. p. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea. the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million. Expanded Academic ASAP. Vietnam. Mongolia. they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. Similarly. in the two instances of North Korea halting the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007.].S. ARMS CONTROL TODAY.S. By March 2007. it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean business. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 101. the methods and substance of compromise were nearly the same as in the Libyan case. the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only to U. officials have argued that the success of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . North Korea gained access to these economic benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in accordance with international standards. for example. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In the case of Banco Delta Asia.S.02) George A. Nonetheless. and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far outweighed any benefit. many in the global financial community had already cut ties with BDA on their own. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Treasury Dept. of Notre Dame]. 47. p. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Singapore.S. p. NORTH KOREA 1. Treasury officials continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the international financial system. In short. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS SK/N13. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N13.SK/N13. banks to maintain relationships with BDA. November 2008. Japan. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March-April 2009. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.01) Peter Crall. The United States and its multilateral partners promised that if Korea complied with their demands. 50. when Washington actually made it illegal for U. Expanded Academic ASAP. but rather the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. U." SK/N13. 2. U.03) Rachel L.
Washington's action had significantly increased the costs of being a rogue state. A1. and finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. North Korea demanded that roughly $25 million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities. Expanded Academic ASAP. June 14. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. . Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia. regulatory action. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Treasury Dept. North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing missiles. through the U. the $25 million in frozen assets had to travel from Macao.S. launched May 25. p. give the world community the tools we need to take appropriate action.].05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. North Korea could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two central banks working through days of negotiations. The funds were available for immediate physical withdrawal. Custom Newspapers.04) Rachel L. as well as the greater international community. As a result of the U. U. but the issue was not the availability of the money. This was a tremendous statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the neighbors. The sanctions were in response to the country's second nuclear test.S. I think these sanctions . Ontario.. SK/N13. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions. Clinton said during a visit to Niagara Falls. not the United States--be transferred from BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing. 2009. March-April 2009.SK/N13. Ultimately. 101.S. thanks to the unwillingness of global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime. Mrs. she said. Pyongyang seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and unfettered access to the international financial system. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. In the spring of 2007.
addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE SK/N14. to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy. U. SK/N14.S. Lopez [Asst. p.S. CUBA 1.S. 345. its aim now is to bring about a regime change. i. neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization. 345. Expanded Academic ASAP. and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior. The argument here is that any critique of the U. of Illinois at Chicago]. The U. U. although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely. including military officers. Rather. to change Cuban policies. there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres. ORBIS..S. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U. to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. ORBIS.S. p. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. 345. Lopez [Asst. SK/N14. the U. Summer 2000.S. embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. U. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes. ORBIS. Lopez [Asst. Summer 2000. and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana. U. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT . Expanded Academic ASAP. Moreover.03) Juan J. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N14. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. embargo should be maintained. 2.e. Professor of Political Science. embargo does not have this aim. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship.02) Juan J. of Illinois at Chicago].S. p. Summer 2000. of Illinois at Chicago]. the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U.01) Juan J. if ever. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship. Professor of Political Science. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. Currently. Professor of Political Science. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments.
. sanctions. if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat. However. it is because U.S.S. 83. Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. March 1999. sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal. p.SK/N14. Without U.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U. Representative].S. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST.
2009. coordinator of Altsean-Burma. blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits.. you are setting yourselves up for failure. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. 2007. 2. In any case. Custom Newspapers. where the policy carries emotional resonance and has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups. But the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners."I think we have to stay the course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue. March 16. Turnell [Macquarie U. none of whom have shown any interest in joining an economic embargo. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N15. an expert on the Burmese economy at Macquarie University in Sydney. p. Although sanctions have failed so far. 1. said Sean Turnell. "If you want to throw away the best cards that you have. Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. October 16.02) Seth Mydans. Custom Newspapers.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the people the message needs to be sent to." said Debbie Stothard. 7. a regional human rights group. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. a weakening of sanctions would face tough opposition in Washington.01) Seth Mydans. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE."Sanctions may not be an all-or-nothing issue. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. though. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this description. . TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15.
As referenced earlier. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this balancing act rather well. p.. Conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the earlier 1990s.. U. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Australia] et al. SK/N16. 50. 50. p. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. . U.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Libya is a small oil-producing developing economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue. December 2008. LIBYA 1. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya. Libya plays an important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. U. or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender countries. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. December 2008. 1707. The sanctions possible to accomplish success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that exceed more than 2% of their GDP. Australia] et al. Furthermore. 1707. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.SK/N16. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N16. He concluded that economic sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision. Expanded Academic ASAP. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. of Notre Dame]. many observers were surprised by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear.04) George A. Expanded Academic ASAP. of Wollongong. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Stephen argued that multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism sponsors. 1707. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame]. U. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SK/N16. p. 2. When this extradition was completed.. December 2008. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Fall 2007. Australia] et al. of Wollongong.05) George A. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. Fall 2007. of Wollongong. After six years under various UN sanctions. SK/N16. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA SK/N16. Libya agreed in 1998 to comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103 airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Expanded Academic ASAP.
This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a lifting of the sanctions. but also open access to European investors and markets. . and biological weapons programs.chemical. while also allowing international inspectors to verify compliance.
The sanctions levied against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic punishment). Expanded Academic ASAP. U. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. WORLD AND I. Lavin [Executive Director. p. THE TIMES (London. somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. May 1999. 21-24. England). SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. January-February 1999. Sanctions against South Africa worked in . Asia Pacific Policy Center]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N17. Online. p. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE SK/N17. Online. of Political Science. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. THE QUILL. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. pp. 2. Even under apartheid. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Economic sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system. not least because the initiative enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained sensitive to external opinion. December 2008.02) Franklin L. Semi-democratic regimes are more vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah that accompanies multilateral sanctions. SK/N17. Online. 2. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. 2009. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SK/N17. Expanded Academic ASAP. SOUTH AFRICA 1. Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against autocratic regimes.05) James Tellenbach. Sanctions in that case were undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system. After years of economic stagnation.03) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. FOREIGN POLICY.SK/N17. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 16.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. 940. pp. Custom Newspapers. p. targeted sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. of Mississippi]. Expanded Academic ASAP. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population. SK/N17. February 25. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 138-153. South Africa was a semi-democratic country.01) Editorial. Fall 1996.
The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then lobbied the government to change its policies. .that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change. Sanctions bit. but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity.
SK/N18. 68. California State U. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its objectionable policy. Expanded Academic ASAP. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to pursue their policy objectives. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SK/N18. Restricting the ability of a country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. U. but more must be done. 2007. JET. p. 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Fall 2007. including the United Nations. following the president's recent announcement.000. p. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more than 200. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.03) William H. 2. 8. mutilation and plunder. June 18. Northridge]. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder. of Colorado. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan may have.02) Malcolm R. 8.5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. West. JET. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. June 18." she said. the European Union. Expanded Academic ASAP. Expanded Academic ASAP. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right direction. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades.01) Malcolm R. in fact." she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N18. "The Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and encourage the international community. West. to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately. and the Arab League. China. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. such as in the case of police repression.. rape. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. SK/N18. and displacement of some 2. Boulder] & Anton D.
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