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Schunk, Editor “Resolved: Economic sanctions ought not be used to achieve foreign policy objectives.” AFFIRMATIVE A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS A02. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL A03. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.S. LEAD A04. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS A05. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY A06. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS A07. U.S. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE A09. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR A10. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE A11. IRAN A12. NORTH KOREA A13. CUBA A14. MYANMAR (BURMA) A15. IRAQ A16. RUSSIA A17. SOUTH AFRICA A18. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN NEGATIVE N01. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE N02. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE N03. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE N04. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N05. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES N08. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS N09. U.S. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U.S. ECONOMY N10. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR N11. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE N12. IRAN N13. NORTH KOREA
N14. CUBA N15. MYANMAR (BURMA) N16. LIBYA N17. SOUTH AFRICA N18. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN ￼
S-K PUBLICATIONS PO Box 8173 Wichita KS 67208-0173 PH 316-685-3201 FAX 316-685-6650 email@example.com http://www.squirrelkillers.com SK/A01. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE GOALS 1. IT IS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Professor of Political Science, East Carolina U.], JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, January 2009, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 60. Scholars have long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing target countries to comply with the sender’s demands (e.g. Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1997). SK/A01.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. The question, "Do economic sanctions work?" has been perhaps the most fundamental inquiry in the literature debating the effectiveness of sanctions, and the conventional wisdom appears to be that sanctions are ineffective and failed policy instruments in the vast majority of cases (Galtung 1967; Wallensteen 1968; HSE; Pape 1997, 1998; Drury 1998; Elliott 1998). SK/A01.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Do economic sanctions work? The consensus view seems to be somewhere between “no” and “rarely.” SK/A01.04) William H. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics, U. of Colorado, Boulder] & Anton D. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics, California State U., Northridge], HARVARD
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 68, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. Indeed, it is a reasonable generalization to characterize international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and unfair. The fact that sanctions are overused is demonstrated by the large number of sanctions currently in force. They are ineffective, as shown by the number of obvious failures in sanctions policy. They are unfair, not only because of the burden they place on firms that would otherwise freely engage in international commerce, but also because of the heavy suffering they often impose on innocent civilians in target countries. 2. SANCTIONS FAIL 95% OF THE TIME SK/A01.05) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 490. In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful, silent deadly remedy" and an effective, nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states. Their track record, however, falls far short of Wilson's characterization. First, sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990a; Pape 1997). SK/A01.06) Editorial, BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL, October 17, 2009, p. 876. Economic sanctions rarely achieve their stated objectives, with perhaps 5% having any success in changing national policies.
Positive inducements--the proverbial carrots of international economic and political relations--are a necessary complement to the sticks of a sanctions strategy. Autumn 2006. p. SYMBOLIC SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U.S. A more recent problem in the US-UN sanctions dynamic relates to a fundamental challenge of imposing sanctions. 50. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered" looks at the downside of using economic sanctions to persuade other nations to work with the United States. the measures they employ must be sufficient to have some bite. November 2008. sanctions often hurt the wrong people--the weak within the sanctioned nation. . This is especially true in complex cases such as the control of weapons proliferation.10) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. Expanded Academic ASAP. But it is also the case that UN sanctions that lack the full and active support of all permanent Security Council members will fail. 4. pNA. and how the end of the Cold War means the United States actually has less power than it used to. but even multinational actions work no more than half the time. sanctions form only half of the mix of mechanisms needed to alter the behavior of stubborn targets. When the United Nations imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in the 1990s. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. it looks at some sanctions failing to have the desired effect for the country. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. 70. freshly updated for the new edition. EVEN MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS FAIL SK/A01. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U. Sanctions that are merely symbolic will never succeed in modifying behavior.09) INTERNET BOOKWATCH.07) George A. 6. as well as nearby trading partners. Every relevant nation must be on board. of Notre Dame]. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. When states design sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. Even then. Second. Fall 2007. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. SANCTIONS DESIGNED TO PUNISH AND ISOLATE FAIL SK/A01. neighboring Romania claimed that it suffered $10 billion in damages. p. U. 5. Unilateral sanctions are almost always ineffective. Indeed. Expanded Academic ASAP. LACKS THE POWER TO MAKE SANCTIONS EFFECTIVE SK/A01.08) George A. 50. Filled with countless studies. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. according to research cited by Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE]. sanctions as a means of punishment and isolation rarely succeed.3.
FORBES. 21. Most attempts fail and end up hurting innocent people. Are economic sanctions ever an effective tool? In my opinion. NEW YORK TIMES. Serbia.04) Mark Landler.03) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. p. "For sanctions to work. First.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Syria and Iran) and resulting in unintended consequences. 54. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. they not only have to be multilateral. September 28. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2.02) George A. Expanded Academic ASAP. . says unilateral efforts to choke off investment. It's hard to recall a case where sanctions by themselves have brought down an evil regime. an Iran expert at the Council on Foreign Relations who was until last month a senior adviser to the Obama administration. Fall 2007. trade and the like succeed in maybe one in five cases.C. unilateral sanctions seldom succeed--multilateral support and cooperation are essential to the success of sanctions. A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics. think tank. Custom Newspapers. BUSINESS WEEK. Donohue [CEO. 2009. of Notre Dame]. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ALMOST NEVER WORK SK/A02. March 3. The chronic reluctance of China and Russia doesn't help.01) Thomas J. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U. SK/A02. p.SK/A02. in this age of globalization. 50. October 29. LONG-TERM INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY IS REQUIRED SK/A02. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. 2007. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL 1. like the oil-for-food scandal in Saddam's Iraq. a Washington. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. rallying support for dictators (as in Haiti. but there has to be international solidarity over a prolonged period of time. SK/A02. A1. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. D. Chamber of Commerce]." said Ray Takeyh. 2008. unilateral sanctions never work.
70. Over time. OTHER COUNTRIES WON’T FOLLOW U.01) Bryan R. firms from doing business with Iran in 1993. p. SANCTIONS ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES TO FILL THE GAP SK/A03. if extensive in nature. 2007.].02) Jiawen Yang [George Washington U. The other effect of sanctions has been that American firms have mostly been replaced by Chinese companies. In studying more than 100 cases of US-imposed sanctions from 1950-2000. lending support to the third-country effect of sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. Russian.S. I've made several surprising discoveries about the effects the sanctions have on their targets' trade with other countries. March 25. 9. this means that the US subsidizes the economies of its allies to the detriment of its own businesses. p. Both multilateral and unilateral sanctions involving the US and the EU have a negative impact on EU trade (total. In the research I have conducted on the international response to US economic sanctions. NEWSWEEK. WORLD ECONOMY. It is also because these states use their alliances with the US as political cover to shield their companies from American retaliation. When Congress prohibited U. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON IRAN IN THE 1990’s SK/A03. I found that the United States' allies have consistently exploited the commercial opportunities created by US sanctions for their own benefit. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. U.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. both multilateral and unilateral sanctions lead to an increase in a target country's exports to the EU. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. (This is precisely what's happened on a .] et al. imports and exports). SK/A03. Autumn 2006. August 2009. THIS HAPPENED WITH SANCTIONS ON SUDAN & MYANMAR (BURMA) SK/A03. p.SK/A03. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2009. Harvard U. US allies have tended to trade far more with the states it has sanctioned than other countries. 2. 34. We investigate the impact of US economic sanctions on EU's trade using a panel data approach expressed in a twolevel framework. Part of this is because the US has lots of commercially competitive allies. Cremer [author of MAKING SANCTIONS HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE] says. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. Expanded Academic ASAP. 3.S. October 15. We argue that unilateral sanctions. especially in the stage after sanctions have been imposed. LEAD 1. The United States indulged in "sanctions excess" in the 1990s. French. and the rest of the world was happy to capitalize on America's actions.03) THE WILSON QUARTERLY. and Chinese companies seized the opportunity. 1223. Malaysian. would have a depressing impact on target countries' trade. p. In effect. Custom Newspapers.04) Fareed Zakaria.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
larger scale in Sudan. the Malaysians and others have also been happy to step into the vacuum in Burma. the Indians. where American firms discovered and built the country's oilfields.) And while it is perfectly fair to blame Beijing for supporting a dictatorial regime. and now find that the fields have been picked up by Chinese state oil companies. then had to abandon them because of the worsening human-rights situation. the Thais. .
918. U. The evidence here shows that there is some empirical relationship between the amount of economic damage and a sanction's success. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. by the mere fact of their indifference to international norms. p. since many of the situations in which the economic costs of the sanction were greatest also involved subsequent military intervention. civilian punishment have not always resulted in compliance by the target state. Baldwin 1985).02) Editorial. much less autocratic states (Jentleson 2000. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 2009. Scholars have noted that there is no easily discernable transmission mechanism that causes social suffering to be translated into political change. 3.03) William H. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.01) Editorial. Autocracies where oppression is almost total . will be more capable of resisting pressure than countries that seek a measure of approval. TYRANTS DON’T CARE ABOUT WORLD OPINION SK/A04. February 25. However. Expanded Academic ASAP. It is to some extent inevitable that the worst of regimes. THE TIMES (London. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. as occurred in Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. SK/A04. December 2008. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AGAINST TYRANTS 1. In practice. 2. Fall 2007. ECONOMIC DAMAGE DOESN’T TRANSLATE INTO SUCCESS SK/A04. high levels of economic impact. U.SK/A04. 2. of Colorado. But the practice of imposing economic sanctions on repressive regimes and despotic leaderships has only a mixed record. of Mississippi].can allow domestic conditions to worsen almost indefinitely. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. California State U. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Northridge]. because the price will be paid by the already vulnerable. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. THE TIMES (London. even in democratic states. February 25.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. Custom Newspapers. England).such as North Korea or Burma . as recent sanctions episodes in Yugoslavia and Iraq demonstrate. The economic hardship created by the Serb-led government of the crumbling former Yugoslavia led not to political action but to greater focus on survival. 2. The country is a place of systematic violence and a cowed populace. p. p. TYRANTS DON’T CARE IF THEIR PEOPLE SUFFER SK/A04. Lopez 1999. and thus. this relationship remains tenuous. of Political Science. England). Custom Newspapers. 2009. p. . which caused sanctions to fail (Woodward 1995). Sanctions against Zimbabwe are a different case.
2007. 34. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN HARDLINERS SK/A05. 64). But the parts of the economy they shrink most are those that aren't under total state control. We can see this at work from Cuba to Iran. rather than moving the target further toward compromise. "there were far fewer coup attempts in the era of sanctions than in the previous decades.02) William H. The effect would tend to entrench the target's objectionable policy." says Pape. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In addition to that. of Wollongong. In other words. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. For example. 64). "Even in Iraq. 3. Australia] et al. By design. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO DEMOCRACY 1. the government gets stronger. economic sanctions tend to make the country's population to be more reliant on the government. . In addition. punitive sanctions may play into the hands of "hardliners" in the target country in a way that less comprehensive sanctions may not. 68. U. says Robert Pape. 1707. a University of Chicago professor who has authored a wide-ranging study on the topic. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. California State U. sanctions shrink a country's economy. Expanded Academic ASAP.. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics..03) Fareed Zakaria. SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL SK/A05.04) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics.SK/A05. of Wollongong. of Colorado. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Australia] et al. October 15. p. is that "the state gains greater control of a smaller pie. SANCTIONS MAKE DEMOCRATIZATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/A05. U. U.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. p. NEWSWEEK.. 1707. people will depend more on the government in order to survive or maintain their basis supplies. sanctions could support regime's ideological legitimacy (p. Therefore. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Niblock argued that economic sanctions could have an inverse impact on the social basis necessary for democratization (p." 4. Expanded Academic ASAP. December 2008. He argued as well that the multilateral sanctions could widen the gap between rich and the poor." In other words. 2. December 2008. And it shifts resources in the country toward groups that support [the state] and away from those that oppose it. Boulder] & Anton D. Expanded Academic ASAP. SANCTIONS WEAKEN ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/A05. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Northridge]. The result.
1999. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1. 60. First. Professor of Political Science. Wood [U. 2000. Finally. The research suggests that. The extant literature on the consequences of sanctions has been largely devoted to examining the negative humanitarian effects of economic coercion. East Carolina U. and physical hardship on civilian populations.]. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. 489.].SK/A06. 59. multilateral sanctions have a greater overall negative impact on human rights than unilateral sanctions. SK/A06. 2001). 3. protect core supporters. including freedom from disappearances. The empirical results support this theory. 2. 62. Utilizing time-series. minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. and political imprisonment. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Because the target leadership controls the supply of scarce public resources (typically made more scarce by the sanctions). p.01) Dursun Peksen [Asst. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. economic coercion enhances the repressive capacity of the regime allowing political elites to escape the cost of economic pressure and improving the ties between the political leadership and its constituency. Professor of Political Science. p. and suppress popular dissent.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Economic coercion remains a counterproductive policy tool. p. January 2009.. torture. social. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. GOVERNMENTS SHIFT BURDEN OF SANCTIONS ONTO THE PEOPLE SK/A06. Professor of Political Science. Millar & Lopez. even when sanctions are specifically imposed with the goal of improving human rights. owing to the . SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Specifically. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. cross-national data for the period 1981–2000.03) Dursun Peksen [Asst. GOVERNMENT REPRESSION IS INCREASED SK/A06. 1997. p. The results also show that extensive sanctions are more detrimental to human rights than partial/selective sanctions. HUMAN SUFFERING IS MASSIVE SK/A06. extra-judicial killings. September 2008. January 2009. East Carolina U. January 2009. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. East Carolina U.]. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.02) Reed M. Rowe. Cortright. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. political elites will divert the cost of sanctions to average citizens by unevenly using extant resources in their favor (Weiss et al. Weiss. the findings suggest that economic sanctions worsen government respect for physical integrity rights.
2001. 1967. 1999.disproportionate economic impact on citizens. Cortright. and education in target countries (e.. Cortright & Lopez. Weiss. the development of civil society. 1997. Millar & Lopez.g. 1997. Weiss et al. economic coercion inadvertently worsens public health. 1995). Galtung. Lopez & Cortright. . economic conditions.
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. particularly through shortages of food and medicines. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.05) William H. A case in point is the establishment of the 1990s sanctions against Iraq. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. of Colorado. many observers argued. Fall 2007. U. Northridge]. created great suffering among the Iraqi populace. . Comprehensive economic sanctions also frequently lead to massive human suffering in the target country. which is an outcome that may undermine the sender's ability to claim the moral high ground. California State U. p.SK/A06. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 68.. which.
Fall 2007. Sanctions against Iran have forced American oil companies either to do their business elsewhere or give up their trade to foreign firms. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. It is not a coincidence that after Halliburton was scathingly rebuked by Congress for business dealings with Iran through its Dubai-based subsidiary that the company moved its entire headquarters to Dubai in 2007. p. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. SANCTIONS HARM THE U.S. BUSINESSES SK/A07. p. SANCTIONS CAUSE LOSS OF U. An example is Canada's banning of South African Airways' landing rights during the apartheid era--even though South African Airways flights had never landed in Canada prior to the sanction in the first place. If Congress can vote to "Buy American. was easily able to minimize the damage to itself by seeking out substitute sources of grain. rather than sitting by and acquiescing to the objectionable policy of the target. Northridge]. Remarkably. it would prefer to take a moral stand. how can we expect them not to leave? SK/A07. Expanded Academic ASAP. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs.03) Bryan R. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. of Colorado. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Harvard U. The US sanctions against Iran and Cuba illustrate this point well.S.S.02) William H. ideally at very low domestic cost. some of the same congressmen who supported the "Buy American" provision in the stimulus package similarly supported the Helms-Burton Act in 1996. however. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p.S. Boulder] & Anton D. SANCTIONS HURT U. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. occasionally sanctions designed to take the moral high ground are quite costly to the sender. U. .SK/A07. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. U. U. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. ECONOMY 1. 2. March 25.. Halliburton moved because it was more profitable for it to do business in Dubai than it was to for it to stay in the United States. The sender adopts the position that.01) Bryan R. 2009. The Soviet Union. When the US government prevents its companies from doing their business profitably. which legislatively-mandated the US sanctions against Cuba. which imposed huge costs on US grain farmers and politically on Carter himself. 9. California State U. Harvard U." why can't it vote to "Sell American? " American sanctions cost Americans jobs. Custom Newspapers. While such sanctions are typically of very low cost to both the sender and the target. March 25. Sanctions that take the moral high ground are those that are designed to please interests on the sender's side rather than to have any real impact on the target.S. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs.S. This was the case for US President Jimmy Carter's grain export embargo on the Soviet Union. JOBS SK/A07. 2009. 9.].]. 68. Custom Newspapers.
Hufbauer. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. and are unrecoverable. p. Lektzian [U.. they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions.Hart 2000. Barber 1979.]. and Elliott 1990. sanctions. but also to the sender nation (Askari et al. 2003. estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded “as a consequence of U. April 2007. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. . There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state.3. WORKERS ARE MASSIVE SK/A07. for example.2 Hufbauer et al. Schott.04) David J.S. Sprecher [Texas A&M U. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed. WAGE LOSSES OF U. 416.S. workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995”.Wagner 1988).
The critical failure of current sanctions' policymaking and policy analysis is that there is almost never a clear understanding of what the objectives are or how the implementation will lead to success. of Colorado. Such sanctions usually have only very minor economic consequences for both the sender and the target--although to the individuals concerned the sanctions can be significant. and sometimes even non-economic sanctions. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. of Colorado. the SK/A08. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE SK/A08. Instead. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U. Boulder] & Anton D. Non-economic sanctions are interruptions of cultural. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.02) William H. p. alternative sanctions policies--or even alternatives to sanctions--ought to be considered. California State U. U. FAILED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF ALTERNATIVES SK/A08. California State U. 68. Grasping these two failures leads us to consider alternatives to comprehensive sanctions.01) William H. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. If the point of economic sanctions is to do just that--to make a point--then it may be that non-economic sanctions can make the point more publicly and with less economic damage to the sanctioning countries. . p. Northridge]. athletic.SK/A08. p. or academic exchanges between states. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. narrowly targeted sanctions. Northridge]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING... HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. NON-ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE 1. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 68.. but it is clear that they will not be effective tools for motivating policy change in most situations. In some cases such as an Olympic boycott. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Boulder] & Anton D. scientific. Expanded Academic ASAP. are often more likely to be effective in achieving an intended policy goal than an indiscriminate embargo on all trade and investment flows to a target country. We believe that among those alternatives. California State U. Northridge]. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007. Fall 2007. Multilateral comprehensive sanctions may have their role in international relations. of Colorado.03) William H. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Boulder] & Anton D. 68.
deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. target countries often interpret the action as a lack of resolve. Hufbauer et al.]. Weiss 1999). July-August 2007. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR 1.02) Editorial. 2. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003. and that stopped the genocidal designs of Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo. It was military action. 19. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. February 25. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000.. then you're likely to end up getting into wars that you never really wanted because of miscommunication.joyner 2003). Heine-Ellison 2001. That leads "the country being sanctioned .. These costs include increased unemployment. 19. Devin. But a recent study by David Lektzian of Texas Tech University and Christopher Sprecher of Texas A&M University reveals that sanctions actually make it far more likely that two states will meet on the battlefield. England). Crawford 1997. . and Elliott 1990a. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and Fausey 1995. capital flight. [to] become almost provocative in its actions. drug and arms smuggling. 3. p. not the sanctions applied to them. 2009.g. 2002. that overthrew Saddam and the Taleban. "If you try to get away with foreign policy on the cheap. THE TIMES (London. Second. they [economic sanctions] have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. increased corruption. Lektzian and Sprecher examined more than 200 cases of sanctions and found that. conflict is as much as six times more likely to occur between countries than if sanctions had not been imposed. Bhoutros-Ghafi 1995). July-August 2007. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.]. Faris 1997. Custom Newspapers. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR SK/A09. Garfield 2002. Because countries prefer to enact sanctions that aren't especially costly to themselves. lost foreign investment. World Health Organization 1996).01) Reed M. Hufbauer. p.SK/A09.03) FOREIGN POLICY." adds Lektzian [Texas Tech U. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AREN’T A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WAR SK/A09. 490. Schott. SK/A09. p. Garfield. p. Wood [U. 2." explains Sprecher [Texas A&M U. Hoskins 1997.04) FOREIGN POLICY.. FAILED SANCTIONS REQUIRE USE OF MILITARY ACTION SK/A09. when sanctions are added to the mix. September 2008. Sanctions may have scant effect on their targets. declining GNP. 1997).
the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs.]. Lektzian [U. . 415. April 2007. p. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary.05) David J.SK/A09. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. Sprecher [Texas A&M U. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. of New Orleans] & Christopher M. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Democracies. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force.
S.02) Dursun Peksen [Asst. Li & Drury (2004) show that the USA’s threat to remove China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) status was a failed policy in promoting more respect for human rights. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. 491. U. September 2008. Contrary to expectations. Wood [U. 60-61. THREAT OF SANCTIONS IS INEFFECTIVE 1. They further speculate that constructive engagement by the United States may have proved more effective at improving Chinese human rights practices. THREATS AGAINST CHINA FAILED SK/A10. 321). By contrast. p.SK/A10. pp. they argue that the threat of coercion was counterproductive and resulted in fewer Chinese accommodations regarding the use of repression against citizens. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.01) Reed M.S. sanctions threats were not only ineffective but may have been counterproductive (2006. January 2009. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. U. sanctions threats against China following the Tiananmen Square massacre failed to improve human rights practices. Professor of Political Science. According to their results. East Carolina U. For instance.]. 2. Li and Drury (2004) and Drury and Li (2006) show that U. .S. THREAT OF SANCTIONS ACTUALLY WORSENED HUMAN RIGHTS SK/A10.
September 28. the Iranian banks Sepah. 2. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. having weathered them in one form or another since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. In the first half of the year." said Thomas R. SC). NEW YORK TIMES. 47. Iran has proved resilient to sanctions. "Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes. IRAN 1.N. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. that cost may not have risen to a level that will significantly deter trade.04) Rachel L. more centrifuges" for enriching it. March-April 2009. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. years of gradually stronger sanctions against Iran for ignoring that body's to stop enriching uranium have only led to "more enriched uranium. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING." Although Lloyds voluntarily curtailed this practice. and a vow to "wipe a U. SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A11. Robert Morgenthau. A1. the Manhattan district attorney.02) Mark Landler. p. announced that the British bank Lloyds TSB would be fined $350 million for its "systematic process of altering wire-transfer information to hide the identity of its clients. member [Israel] off the map. a former under secretary of state who has held informal negotiations with the Iranians. September 28. Pickering. 2009. p. September 28. as much as I think they deserve it. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. how quickly." SK/A11. 101. November 2008.S. U.N. A10. Germany maintains that one of . A1. NEW FINANCIAL SANCTIONS WON’T BE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL SK/A11. and Saderat had managed to push more than $300 million through the financial system before it was all over. NEW YORK TIMES. Iranian institutions have learned and will continue to learn how to innovate and evade the resulting restrictions. the question is not whether Iran's businesspeople will find a way around financial restrictions but how much they will. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Melli. Ultimately. Custom Newspapers.S. even when such sanctions have increased the cost of doing business with Iran. U. probably don't serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. after a 16 percent decline in 2007. as French President Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out last week at a meeting of the U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. and at what cost? SK/A11. 2009. SK/A11. Just as the United States and its partners have found a new and targeted way to hurt Iran financially.01) Editorial. THE POST AND COURIER (Charleston.03) Mark Landler. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. Unfortunately. Custom Newspapers.SK/A11. large global banks have been willing to help. Custom Newspapers. p.05) Peter Crall. Moreover. 2009. And in some cases. the volume of German trade with Iran has increased by about 14 percent. Treasury Dept. On January 9. Security Council on nuclear proliferation.
that many firms are willing to accept higher costs to keep their access to Iranian markets. . This suggests. however.the key factors behind this increase is the higher cost of doing business with Iran.
and it has maintained a consistently hostile policy toward Tehran ever since. Custom Newspapers. September 28. whatever the assurances that the Russian president. NEW YORK TIMES. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A11. SK/A11. 2009.3. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T FOLLOW U. p. Fall 2007. September 28. U. Medvedev. In other instances. however. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Boulder] & Anton D. Obama. For example. In fact. Fall 2007..07) George A. A1. because it could help the government and strangle the fragile protest movement. the United States imposed unilateral. these officials say. China. said last Monday that he was opposed to an embargo of refined fuel products. of Notre Dame]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. gave last week to Mr. even though nearly 30 years of US sanctions have not significantly weakened the regime or altered its nuclear development efforts. Northridge]. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP.08) William H. Administration officials acknowledge it will be difficult to persuade Russia to agree to harsh. LEAD SK/A11. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. is even less dependable. In 1996. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. 68. Citing those fears. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. given its reliance on Iranian oil and its swelling trade ties with Iran. p. p. U. 4. Custom Newspapers. these sanctions have been counterproductive. p.09) Mark Landler. 50. sanctions backfired by enhancing the political legitimacy of the rulers--the so-called "rally-around-the-flag" effect that has been noted by many sanctions scholars. A1.06) Mark Landler. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. long-term sanctions against Iran. which placed additional restrictions on US interactions with Iran and imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that were investing in Iran.S. NEW YORK TIMES. Dmitri A. These have continued in various forms. strengthening nationalist and conservative forces within Iran. . the French foreign minister. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. On this basis some observers argue that US sanctions against Iran have been counterproductive because they have mobilized domestic political support for the ruling clerics. comprehensive sanctions on Iran in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis. Expanded Academic ASAP. Bernard Kouchner. And the political upheaval creates a new complication: Western countries do not want to impose measures that deepen the misery of ordinary people. of Colorado. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. California State U. 2009. SK/A11.
Expanded Academic ASAP. failing to achieve the goals upon which they were justified.01) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. Winter 2008. However. 2009. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. p. Kim and Trevor Crick conclude that their impact has been negligible. Security Council with a threat to start enriching uranium and attack any country that stops its ships for inspection for military supplies. Not surprisingly. SK/A12. 2. 2009. ballistic-missile and weapons of mass destruction programs or activities of the reclusive communist regime. they do not achieve political change--60 years of US sanctions against North Korea have failed to do so. grants and loans contributing to the nuclear. Michael Whitty. p. North Korea responded Saturday to the latest economic and military sanctions from the U. the authors persuasively argue that economic and political incentives rather . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. prevention of nuclear proliferation. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. October 17. NORTH KOREA 1. economic sanctions and political threats are likely to have emboldened hardliners within North Korea to militarise even further. October 17.03) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Chapter 4 [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. Winter 2008. A1.05) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science]. 875.N. Expanded Academic ASAP. Custom Newspapers. PACIFIC AFFAIRS. The resolution passed unanimously by the council Friday freezes all funds. economic sanctions have been shown to violate the fundamental right to health. June 14. credit lines. In fact. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A12. The authors argue that the political nature of economic sanctions is the main reason for their failure. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 648. the book [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950.SK/A12. SK/A12.02) Editorial. In fact. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] returns to the main theme of the book by analyzing the effectiveness of American sanctions against North Korea and other rogue countries.04) Editorial. SK/A12. 648. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang] goes beyond providing an analysis of economic sanctions against North Korea. SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A12. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. or improvement of human rights. p. 876. Rather. Furthermore. 2009. Little evidence is available that economic sanctions against North Korea have had my impact on political change. p.
. As the authors pinpoint.than sanctions are needed if North Korea is to be reintegrated into the international system. sanctions will only strengthen the Kim Jong II regime and further defer a final solutions to the current nuclear crisis and humanitarian problems in North Korea.
and suggests that negotiations are the only means to solve the current nuclear crisis. Kim explores the new round of American sanctions which followed the North Korean 2006 missile and nuclear tests. Expanded Academic ASAP. October 17. . pp. Events have shown that this prediction was accurate. In the fifth chapter [of ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: An Analysis of United States and United Nations Actions Since 1950. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE KILLED MILLIONS SK/A12. 2009. North Korea’s economy plummeted under the combined effects of economic sanctions and the fall of the Soviet Union. p. 3. Its economic and public health systems further buckled with successive years of floods and droughts. 648. Winter 2008. Similarly. Kim concludes that the sanctions will not work. 875876. edited by Suk Hi Kim and Semoon Chang]. leading to widespread malnutrition and up to one million excess deaths in the 1990s.SK/A12. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. as well as those imposed by the UN.06) Ramon Pacheco Pardo [London School of Economics & Political Science].07) Editorial. PACIFIC AFFAIRS.
SK/A13. March 25. Meacham wrote that President Obama's campaign pledge to repeal all restrictions on Cuban-American family travel to that nation should be fulfilled. Sweig. to Cuba to evaluate the situation. France. including a lifting of economic sanctions.03) Bryan R. SANCTIONS HAVE HARMED U. Japan.]. pNA. 9. 2009.S. 9. that restrictions on Cuban Interests Section personnel travel outside Washington should be lifted and that the United States should drop its opposition to Cuban participation in international institutions. In his report.04) Bryan R. Britain. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Spain.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. THE NATION.. One of the main reasons that these countries are even commercially competitive in Cuba is because of the absence of competition from US businesses. policy of isolating Cuba has not achieved its policy goals.S. CUBA 1.02) Julia E. policy toward Cuba. 2. 2007. p. recently sent Carl Meacham. U. who has long said the U. US sanctions have failed to bring about regime change in Cuba and cost US companies untold billions of dollars in lost opportunities. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Custom Newspapers. Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Richard Lugar released a committee minority staff report Monday calling for dramatic changes in U. 11. Harvard U. 2009. p. 2009. a senior GOP staffer for the panel. the results are impressive. ECONOMY SK/A13. Scrapping the ineffective sanctions against Cuba and setting right a mismanaged U.S. OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE FILLED IN THE GAP SK/A13. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. When American businesses have the opportunity to compete in Cuban markets.S. 3. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Harvard U. in the past five decades Canada. Custom Newspapers. As for US sanctions against Cuba. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. Early [Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. foreign policy could begin normalization in U. and Italy have all played an active role in sanctionsbusting on Cuba's behalf.01) CONGRESS DAILY AM. U. . After Congress lifted most of its sanctions on the export of food and medicine to Cuba in 2000. May 14. February 24. March 25.S. Lugar. Expanded Academic ASAP.]. SK/A13. How many new jobs would be created if US companies could once again fully trade with Cuba? After nearly 50 years.-Cuba relations.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A13. US trade in those products rose from $6 million in 2000 to $350 million by 2006.
When I was in Cuba. rhetoric only bolsters their image at home as the island's antiYanqui defenders. U. . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Who benefits most from this war of words? Fidel and his brother Raul Castro. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. has tried one way of doing this thing for more than 50 years. 2008. who is likely to succeed him. 2007. BUSINESS WEEK. BUSINESS WEEK. and their belief is if you take the sanctions away.S. Critics of Bush's Cuba policy are again urging Washington to consider stepped up contact with Raul--widely regarded as more pragmatic and flexible than Fidel--as a more effective means of jump-starting a democratic transition. SANCTIONS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A13.S. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 19. p. March 3. With plenty of material support from Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. and it doesn't seem to work. you take away all the excuses for the way their government behaves. writing beforehand that Bush's speech reflected the U. Donohue [CEO. I've been to Cuba. SK/A13. November 6.S. p.S. and Fidel Castro was predictable as well. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. trade embargo against Cuba. I talked at length with dissidents.'s desire to "reconquer" Cuba. Chamber of Commerce]. U. Chamber of Commerce].S.4. 21. 2008. The U. Bush reiterated his hard stance against lifting the 45year-old U. the embargo is not so painful as it once was.S. Expanded Academic ASAP. TIME.S. SK/A13.06) Thomas J. 21. Expanded Academic ASAP. It is clear to me that he used sanctions as a means to stay in power.05) Tim Padgett. and heated U. Donohue [CEO.07) Thomas J. March 3. We have basically kept Castro in power.
a time-consuming.000 pro-democracy demonstrators in 1988. Custom Newspapers. free speech and assembly are still smothered. This is only the tip of the iceberg. they have allowed China to dramatically increase its economic and political influence in Myanmar. In January 2007. 2009. p. 1. particularly Russia and China. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE.9-billion agreement for the construction of fuel pipelines that will transport Middle Eastern and African crude oil from Myanmar to China. FORBES.04) Jim Webb. p.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. 2009. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. furthering a dangerous strategic imbalance in the region. This is the second time in less than two years that a sanctions resolution focused upon human rights violations and strongly supported by the United States has been vetoed. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. U. THE NEW YORK TIMES. Expanded Academic ASAP. March 16. SK/A14. RUSSIA AND CHINA REFUSE TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS SK/A14. and any protests are crushed by force. Sanctions by Western governments have not been matched by other countries. p. Broader sanctions were imposed in 1997 and 2003 in protest of human rights violations that included restrictions on the freedom of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other opposition figures.The European Union and other countries have put in place their own embargoes. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. gas and mining projects in Myanmar.01) Seth Mydans. the confrontational approach has made the generals more stubborn.03) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. and analysts say those countries would have to be consulted in any policy change. October 29. According to the nonprofit group EarthRights International. the wealthy generals still leave their people in grinding poverty. China and Russia vetoed a resolution intended to authorize sanctions on Myanmar/Burma. .Rather than forcing change. China and Myanmar signed a $2. Chinese oil tankers will no longer be required to pass through the Straits of Malacca. oil. Custom Newspapers. many analysts say. In March. 2007.But Myanmar's military has not budged. Indeed. 2. The policy has deprived the United States of useful contacts within the government and has left it with little leverage to affect the junta's behavior. Political opponents are still jailed by the hundreds. The sanctions began with an arms embargo after a massacre of as many as 3.SK/A14. SK/A14. August 26. more repressive and more antagonistic toward the West. pNA. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. at least 26 Chinese multinational corporations are now involved in more than 62 hydropower. if history is a guide. Would tougher economic sanctions against Burma work? Probably not. When completed. 54. A23. Expanded Academic ASAP. October 2008.S.
.strategically vital route where 80 percent of China's imported oil now passes. a military presence could easily follow. If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow.
But it would take little for either China or India to pick up the slack from. ports and checkpoints. which controls border crossings. p. Turning up the heat on Burma (a. There is evidence that many of the women ended up in the sex trade. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. its isolation will deepen. 2007. black markets spring up. p. Then there are drugs. one effect of Western sanctions was to shut down the country's textile exports during the late 1990s. as legitimate businesses dry up. NEWSWEEK. The Burmese government's grotesque crackdown on pro-democracy protests will have one certain effect.3. whose production and supply multiply. forcing hundreds of thousands of people out of jobs. the result has been overwhelmingly counterproductive. Its economy will suffer. say. Chevron is a 28% partner with France's Total in piping 630 million cubic feet of natural gas annually from an offshore field to Thailand. NEWSWEEK.a. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.08) Jim Webb. With countries like Burma. October 29. In all of this. 34. in part fueled by the military government's failure to recognize the results of a 1990 election won by Aung San Suu Kyi's party. In Burma. Burmese gems are now traded actively in this manner. FORBES. 54. sanctions have become a substitute for an actual policy. While the political motivations behind this approach are laudable. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE ACTUALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A14. p. always prospers. If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for a country.06) Fareed Zakaria. The ruling regime has . Myanmar)--targeting existing and not just new investments--may slightly scorch the regime. 5. Custom Newspapers. October 15. August 26. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP.k. Chevron .05) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. enough evidence that in 2003 the then State Department spokesman Richard Boucher acknowledged it but expressed the hope that over time sanctions would change Burma.07) Fareed Zakaria. the military. THE NEW YORK TIMES. A23. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CAUSE WIDESPREAD SUFFERING SK/A14. And what will this achieve? Sanctions are the Energizer Bunny of foreign policy. OTHER COUNTRIES FILL IN THE GAP SK/A14. In addition. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. and the thugs and gangs who can handle these new rules flourish. the United States and the European Union have employed a policy of ever-tightening economic sanctions against Myanmar. they just keep on ticking. 34. For more than 10 years. October 15. 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. 2007. Despite a dismal record. SK/A14. Is it any wonder why India's external affairs minister recently remarked that sanctions should be "the last resort"? 4. which profits from vast resources like natural gas reserves. 2009. The United States and the European Union will place more sanctions on the country.
become more entrenched and at the same time more isolated. The Burmese people have lost access to the outside world. .
October 15. observing the degradation of Iraq's water supply under the bombing continued. 2. such as drugs. devastating its society is a strange path to the new order. 875. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS KILLED MILLIONS OF CHILDREN SK/A15. if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met". If the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a better system for that country." Predictably. the UN secretary general's envoy reported that Iraq was facing a water and sanitation crisis. knew the necessary chemicals were blocked by sanctions.03) Shereen T. The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) identified Iraq's water treatment systems as vulnerable because of their reliance on foreign materials already blocked by sanctions. BRITISH MEDICAL JOUR4NAL. the most vulnerable in America's illegal targeting of Iraq's basic infrastructure were the children. Ismael [School of Social Work." For example. water. 337.SK/A15. and energy. October 17. 2007. which could include epidemics and famine. NEWSWEEK. the DIA wrote in January 1991. and fully understood the implications for Iraqis. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. during 10 years of UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s. Further US intelligence documents. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Spring 2007. including dramatic declines in resources that we essential for health. Carleton U. US intelligence agreed. including possible epidemics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. . Within months of the war. vaccines. predicting an "imminent catastrophe. p. 2009.01) Fareed Zakaria. IRAQ 1. "Incidences of disease. those who thrive in such a gangland atmosphere. food. One of the lessons of Iraq surely is that a prolonged sanctions regime will destroy civil society and empower the worst elements of the country. Subsequent declassified documents reveal that in USled campaign. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. noted the particular impact on children. mortality among Iraqi children under 5 years old more than doubled (from 56 to 131 per 1000 live births). "Iraq will suffer increasing shortages of purified water because of the lack of required chemicals".. 34.02) Editorial. will become probable unless the population were careful to boil water. IRAQ DEMONSTRATES COUNTERPRODUCTIVITY OF SANCTIONS SK/A15. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. Canada]. SK/A15. its forces deliberately destroyed Iraq's water treatment capacity. Economic sanctions create social disruption and material deprivation.
337. Spring 2007. 3. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.06) Shereen T. Ismael [School of Social Work.04) Shereen T.000 household interviews in more than 300 locations. Carleton U. the increase in mortality rate was 350 percent. Canada]. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/A15. including medicine. p. The study estimated that there were approximately 46.614. Canada]. which the protracted sanction regime ultimately wiped out. to conduct an in-depth comprehensive study of the impact of the 1991 Gulf War on Iraqi civilians. p.303 Iraqis--including 667. Canada]. two prominent US strategic analysts concluded that "Economic sanctions may have been a necessary cause of the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history. SANCTIONS KILLED MORE THAN WMD EVER HAVE SK/A15. The study was based on 9. Even taking into account the possibility of Iraqi exaggeration. The study pointed to: an increase in infectious diseases correlated with contaminated water supplies. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES..773 children under five--had died from diseases that could not be treated because of the sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. 337. In October 1991. malnutrition caused by a collapse in crop production and the inability to import sufficient food. Ismael [School of Social Work. p. Ismael [School of Social Work. The study reported an immediate and startling increase in child mortality rate associated with the destruction of the physical infrastructure and the collapsing the health care system.05) Shereen T. a sharp increase in infant and child mortality immediately following the war.900 excess deaths during the first eight months of 1991. By January 2002. Carleton U. Spring 2007.SK/A15. The International Study Team sent a task force of 87 researchers and professionals specialized in a wide variety of disciplines. nearly three years earlier. Expanded Academic ASAP. The study covered all of the Iraqi governorates without interference or supervision from the Iraqi government." . particularly children. 337. health care and child psychology. and. JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE FAMILY STUDIES. Carleton U. Spring 2007. severe impacts on the social and psychological well being of women and children. the Iraqi government informed the United Nations that 1. The study estimated that mortality rate for children under 5-years old increased 380 after the onset of the war: for age 1-year old or less.. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING..
Custom Newspapers. RUSSIA 1. 12. more to show Russia the consequences of its actions than sanctions can ever hope to achieve. SK/A16. exposure to a combination of market forces and good governance already has done. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SANCTIONS WOULD ACTUALLY BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SK/A16. be further brought in to global markets and international institutions. In the new more cautious global economy of today. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. not isolated. . suspending negotiations for Russia's adherence to the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/A16. 2.01) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. 12. September 9. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.02) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. Indeed. it is highly unlikely that a change of heart in Moscow can be forced through further isolation. on the contrary. It would reinforce a "Fortress Kremlin" attitude and push Russia to redirect its business with other authoritarian regimes such as China. Custom Newspapers. Russian companies should be encouraged to compete in global markets on the terms of the very best international governance practices. However. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. 2008. Russia should. 12. like excluding Russia from the Group of Eight. September 9. 2008. Custom Newspapers. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. Isolating Russia economically would actually reduce the opportunities for leverage presented by globalization. through a combination of market forces and disciplined and consistent international regulation. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA WOULDN’T WORK SK/A16. It would also reduce the influence of the business community within the local political agenda. just one in a wide array of measures the West can take to signal discontent and attempt to change Russian behavior. The recent emergency European Union summit meeting came to the conclusion that economic sanctions against Russia were not appropriate for the time being. or making it harder for Russian business people to get visas or invest abroad. Nevertheless they remain an option in the future. and will do. p.03) Brook Horowitz [International Business Leaders Forum]. 2008. September 9. p. p.
. p. Boulder] & Anton D. that these financial restrictions were really a private market response to increased country risk in South Africa. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 54. The problem for the South African government during its 1985 financial crisis was that its very financial footing was at risk if short-term debt could not be rolled over. October 29. FORBES. not a governmental sanctions initiative per se. Consequently. California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. p. which decreased the employment and wages of black labor. p. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.01) William H. It was Nelson Mandela who later thanked Anglo-Dutch Shell and British Petroleum for staying on in South Africa under apartheid and-despite onerous sanctions that delivered mixed results--for encouraging trade unions and training South Africans of any color. SK/A17. Expanded Academic ASAP. Fall 2007.02) Matthew Swibel & Soyoung Ho. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. There is some evidence that sanctions against apartheid South Africa. Expanded Academic ASAP. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. It should be noted. Boulder] & Anton D. Fall 2007. of Colorado. however. California State U. 68. of Colorado. Northridge].SK/A17. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED OPPOSITION FORCES SK/A17. SOUTH AFRICA 1. 2. . had the unanticipated effect of undermining the ability of anti-apartheid movements to mount strikes and boycotts against the regime. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Northridge].. it was willing to take the economic and political actions necessary to address the concerns of the international banking community. REGIME CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WASN’T DUE TO SANCTIONS SK/A17.03) William H. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. Some evidence exists that the most effective economic sanctions policy used against South Africa was the private banking community's resistance to rolling over debt.
California State U. Expanded Academic ASAP. JET. Northridge]. p. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN ARE DOOMED TO FAILURE SK/A18.03) William H. 2007. The text proposed by the United States received the nine votes needed for passage but was vetoed by China and Russia. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Colorado. Boulder] & Anton D. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. October 2008. Expanded Academic ASAP.SK/A18. Examples are the (ultimately unsuccessful) sanctions against India and Pakistan intended to deter them from acquiring nuclear weapons. President Bush's new economic sanctions can't pressure Sudan's government to halt genocide in Darfur without international support. the United States led an unsuccessful effort to have the UN Security Council adopt a binding Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe. 68. 8. sanctions may be aimed at policy modification in the target. Fall 2007. 3. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. 2. SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN EMPIRICALLY FAILED SK/A18. In July 2008. West.. Expanded Academic ASAP. June 18. pNA. following widely criticized elections marked by state-supported violence against supporters of the opposition party and the withdrawal of the opposition candidate. says Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick. p. .01) Malcolm R. Finally.02) AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. U. SUDAN/ZIMBABWE/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. which maintained that it exceeded the Security Council's powers and improperly interfered in Zimbabwe's internal affairs. RUSSIA AND CHINA WON’T SUPPORT SANCTIONS ON ZIMBABWE SK/A18.
Expanded Academic ASAP. would prevail. . Fall 2007." the U. of Economics. the sanctionees are no longer just the transgressor nations of yesteryear--now even trade partners are rebuked through the use of secondary sanctions. the Republican faction of the Founding Fathers argued (against the Federalists). and the Montreal Protocol governing chlorofluorocarbons. Online. U.02) James A. The range of states that have become targets of sanctions is growing month by month. especially the British. human rights. in a "contest of self-denial. 68. Sanctions are central to such international agreements as the United Nations Charter. Sanctions have long been important in international relations. Boulder] & Anton D. law prescribes the use of sanctions in circumstances related. of Economics. California State U. Since Thomas Jefferson. 409. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS UNAVOIDABLE 1. COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS USED ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N01. for. Economic sanctions are the international relations tool of choice in this day and age. intellectual property. Americans would have to give up little of value--mere "geegaws" in Jefferson's words. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the British need for American goods and services was essential to England's well-being.03) William H. May 1999.. of Colorado. Nathan. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Northridge].SK/N01.01) Jonathan Eaton [Dept. USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS INCREASING SK/N01. September 1997. the World Trade Organization. p.S. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.] & Maxim Engers [Dept. SK/N01. as is the list of organizations applying this foreign policy instrument. today even "small-time" players like state and municipal governments have discovered that economic sanctions provide them with a wonderful opportunity to assert their positions on international issues. In contrast. U. in the logic of James Madison and Jefferson. and international trade. for example. Americans have been certain that. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. USA TODAY MAGAZINE. would be compelled to yield to American pressures." Governments. of Virginia]. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. p. 37. Such sanctioners are no longer limited to sovereign nations and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. were a form of "peaceable coercion. p. And likewise. U. Boston U. Sanctions. to national security.S. Athens imposed a trade embargo against Megara. ultimately setting off the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC).
Sanctions are a reality of international relations. 3. 59. p. trying to do away with them would be as ineffective as outlawing war. Hence. Columbia U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.SK/N01. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing.]. East Carolina U. January 1999. Professor of Political Science. Online. 19. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. ranging from preventing bloodshed between ethnic groups to punishing countries harboring terrorists.04) Dursun Peksen [Asst. THE SCIENCES.05) Richard M. Expanded Academic ASAP. January 2009. 2000). or ending the use of repression by the government. The ideal goal of sanctions has been to apply economic and diplomatic pressure on target countries to induce the target political leadership to comply with sender countries’ demands.Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common feature of international politics. ABOLISHING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SK/N01. restoring democratic regimes. .]. the last decade has been referred to as ‘the sanctions decade’ (Cortright & Lopez. p.1 Economic coercion is imposed by sender countries with a variety of foreign policy goals.
U. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). 50.01) Gary Clyde Hufbauer [Peterson Institute for International Economics]. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. sanctions techniques have become increasingly effective. 1001. Schott. p. 564. This finding contrasts sharply with HSEO [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. the authors find that the sanctions were effective in the partial or full attainment of the goals in 34 percent of the cases examined. the nature and magnitude of the sanctions.]. the effectiveness of the sanctions in damaging the economy of the target country. 2. p.02) Richard N. p.SK/N02. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U. Fall 2007. SK/N02. Others worry that Congressional trade and aid restrictions combine with UN-mandated sanctions to create a sanctions "epidemic" in US foreign and economic policy. And yet. in 1990. by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. July 2005. Shott. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE. of Notre Dame]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. are reported in a separate CD-ROM. This [ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED. covering 204 episodes up to the year 2000. Cooper. and Barbara Oegg] is the third edition of a well-known study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. 159. p. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. Hufbauer and his colleagues examine each episode for the motivation behind imposing sanctions. SANCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS 33% TO 50% OF THE TIME SK/N02. November-December 2008. which include all on which there is adequate public information in the period from 1914 to 2000. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Kimberly Ann Elliott. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE OFTEN EFFECTIVE 1. . Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Jeffrey J. WILEY INTERSCIENCE. Some lament the limited success rate of sanctions. (All the episodes. 2007]: we claim that partial or total success was achieved in 111 out of 204 sanctions episodes during the past century. Expanded Academic ASAP.) perhaps surprisingly. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. plus 13 more that have occurred since 2000. and Elliott 1990). which most analysts consider to be 33 percent or lower. of which a third have occurred since the second edition was published.04) George A. December 2008. and the efficacy of the sanctions in achieving their stated objectives. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. SK/N02. SANCTIONS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE SK/N02. third edition. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer.
pp. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. which failed to make Italy reverse course. Texas Tech U.]. . of Political Science. EVEN CRITICS ADMIT SOME CASES OF SUCCESS SK/N02. American sanctions against Great Britain and France in 1956 are generally viewed as successfully coercing those states into changing policies. of Political Science.] & Mark Souva [Dept. 848-849. Critics of sanctions effectiveness often rely on a few prominent cases of sanctions failure.3. even the staunchest critics of sanctions admit that they sometimes elicit policy changes. Nevertheless. Florida State U. December 2007. such as the League of Nations sanctions against Ethiopia in 1935. For instance. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE.05) David Lektzian [Dept.
02) George A. Against nondemocracies. As a means for responding to a wide array of national security concerns and violations of international norms. Fall 2007.04) David Lektzian [Dept. 867. Against democracies. p. p. SK/N03. of Notre Dame]. 2. The role of such "smart sanctions" would be to single out those responsible and to increase the personal cost to them of engaging in the objectionable behavior. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 2001. Northridge]. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. broad . These provide states and international organizations with greater versatility of coercive economic measures while limiting the unanticipated humanitarian damage that sanctions can bring. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N03. If sufficient intelligence existed on the sources of wealth of specific politically important individuals. U. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. and end inter-state and civil wars. 68. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Texas Tech U. Boulder] & Anton D. Fall 2007. p. the development of sharpened sanctions techniques--so-called "smart sanctions"--has replaced comprehensive trade sanctions. Fall 2007. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE 1. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.S. one can target the winning coalition with relatively broad sanctions. “SMART SANCTIONS” TARGET RULERS AND THE WEALTHY SK/N03.SK/N03.. the key to sanctions success is to generate political costs for the target regime’s winning coalition. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Florida State U. Second. 50. U. of Notre Dame].03) William H. it has imposed sanctions to restore democratically elected governments. The most frequently used forms of smart sanctions are asset seizures and travel restrictions that affect members or supporters of the offending regime.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science. extradite international fugitives.01) George A. December 2007. both on its own and in conjunction with the UN Security Council. measures could be carefully aimed to reduce that wealth. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 50. Ever since the United States championed UN Security Council Resolution 661 to expel Iraq from Kuwait in August 1990. U. of Political Science. Especially after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of September 11.]. p. the United States has employed more specialized smart sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. of Colorado. In all cases. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. economic sanctions have occupied an increasingly prominent place in the tool kit of US policymakers. to combat what many claim to be the most serious contemporary threat to US and global security--the spread of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Expanded Academic ASAP. IS INCREASINGLY USING “SMART SANCTIONS” SK/N03. protect human rights. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. California State U.
the relationship between the cost of sanctions and regime type is conditional. Success against nondemocratic leaders is more likely to come from sanctions focused predominately on the leadership. . As a result. thereby strengthening their political position and making them less likely to yield.sanctions that impose significant costs on society allow nondemocratic leaders to extract more rents.
the proponents of an objectionable policy are determined by racial. In many instances. 50. and consequently sanctions could be targeted to reduce the income of the supporters of the ruling regime. If sanctions are not creating domestic political costs for autocratic leaders. p. it is imperative for sanctions senders to find ways to create external international costs for autocrats who refuse to comply with sanctions pressure. p. 939. as was the case in South Africa and Bosnia. December 2008. rogue state leaders. Expanded Academic ASAP. With these four considerations integrated into their framework.08) George A. Since the mid-1990s. 50. a blending of US and UN efforts to sanction terrorist groups. Fall 2007. Boulder] & Anton D. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Fall 2007. 3. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. U. .SK/N03. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. p. these leaders will have little or no incentive to alter their behavior. Without facing some political cost associated with sanctions.05) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. U. In these countries consumption patterns differed significantly across the relevant groups. 2001. all UN and multilateral sanctions in which the United States has participated have been smart sanctions. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. curtailing travel. A selective sanction against exports of cigarettes and other tobacco products to South Africa would have had a differential impact on the wealth of whites relative to blacks. especially given the low income and price elasticities generally associated with smoking. Expanded Academic ASAP. Some of the most notable successes in this area have been in interdicting "blood diamonds" and related financial networks in seven African internal wars. the share of income spent on cigarettes was three times greater for whites than for blacks. class. of Political Science.. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N03. of Mississippi]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. of Notre Dame]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.06) William H. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics. They have also been used effectively to capture financial assets and lock down fake passport and travel networks belonging to individuals affiliated with Al Qaeda in the first six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. California State U. In South Africa. The precision and effectiveness of economic coercion now available to the US and other authorities via the imposition of smart sanctions is substantial. Northridge]. of Colorado. Freezing the personal assets of leaders. Fall 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. and limiting exposure to the international community can focus the hardship of sanctions more directly on these leaders themselves. SK/N03. p. In particular. U. smart sanctions can continue to be used as effective tools for bringing about necessary changes of behavior in delinquent countries. 68.07) George A. or religious distinctions. ethnic. of Notre Dame]. “SMART SANCTIONS” HAVE EMPIRICALLY BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N03. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. 4.
.and non-state actors with brutal and law-violating practices has been successful for the past decade.
09) George A. . Fall 2007. imposing smart sanctions in conjunction with significant economic and strategic carrots has produced dramatic positive results. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. substantial economic inducements and mutually conciliatory gestures were actually far more important than punishing sanctions. South Africa's disavowal of the bomb. p. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan's decisions to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Expanded Academic ASAP. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies. During the past two decades. “SMART SANCTIONS” ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION SK/N03. 50. and the nuclear restraint agreements of Argentina and Brazil. U. of Notre Dame]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW.5.
101. the narcotics trade. In the global financial marketplace. The benefit of compliance strategies is that banks do not have to make the difficult determination about whether to handle certain clients on their own. Washington has signaled to banks situations in which it sees dangerous actors intersecting with the international financial system. weapons proliferation.]. even unwittingly.S. 101. The risk of an alarmist headline announcing that a bank has facilitated terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation abroad.02) Rachel L. these restrictions have reached beyond the boundaries of legal jurisdiction. and corruption. 2. government used its asset-freezing authority to deny Bank Sepah ongoing access to the U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) Rachel L. p.SK/N04. Traditionally. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1.04) Rachel L.S. March-April 2009. Expanded Academic ASAP. the United States targeted another of Iran's most important financial institutions. Washington has worked with compliance departments in global banks to combat terrorism. Four months later.S. the United Nations . FOREIGN AFFAIRS.]. thereby cutting individuals and organizations off from the world's financial system. is not worth any potential return for a major global bank. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. p. the underlying business imperative of banks--to understand and assess risk--has begun to encourage cooperation between the public and the private sector against threats posed to global security. Two months after that. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Treasury Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. p. a brand name is a valued asset. Expanded Academic ASAP. BANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO ECONOMIC PRESSURE SK/N04. Governments issue watch lists that banks use to block suspected assets and transactions. have acted on these signals.S. the U.01) Rachel L. Through targeted financial measures. watch lists even when they are not required by domestic or international law to do so. one that takes time to build and virtually no time at all to destroy. Banks. for its involvement in Iran's nuclear weapons development. March-April 2009. March-April 2009.S. and the two most recent chapters in this unfolding story--Iran and North Korea--suggest that using global finance to shape the behavior of international actors can be remarkably powerful. Accordingly. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Bank Sepah. Treasury Dept. U. Treasury Dept. This time. Expanded Academic ASAP. for the most part. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. financial system.]. Banks outside the United States often adhere to U. 101. U. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. March-April 2009. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 101. SK/N04. U.S. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N04. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.]. Surprisingly. p. U. Treasury Dept. SK/N04.
registered its agreement with the measure and listed Bank Sepah in Security Council Resolution 1747. . which toughened sanctions against Iran.
SK/N04. SK/N04. more broadly. p." . November 2008.S. when British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the European Union would impose sanctions against Bank Melli. Expanded Academic ASAP. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. Expanded Academic ASAP. the strategy of implementing targeted restrictions to cut off individuals and organizations from the international financial system has only been developed in recent years. financial system. effectively cutting them off from the U. government's financial intelligence unit stating that the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks had specifically requested the removal of their names from global transactions so that counterparties could not detect the banks' involvement in proliferation and terrorist activities. Stuart Levey. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 47. U. Rejection from London and the rest of Europe would cripple the bank's global image and operating ability.].S. p. p.SK/N04.07) Peter Crall. adding that "the end result is that the private sector actions voluntarily amplify the effectiveness of government-imposed measures. Washington has increasingly relied on such financial restrictions to respond to and deter the financing of proliferation and. Expanded Academic ASAP. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Treasury Dept. March-April 2009. 22. This two-year sweep of financial diplomacy reached a high point in June 2008. to place pressure on countries of proliferation concern such as Iran. undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. the Department of the Treasury levied financial sanctions against the Export Development Bank of Iran and three of its affiliates for their role in providing financial services to Iranian defense organizations suspected of involvement in Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. On Oct. 101.05) Rachel L. After that came a mid-March financial advisory issued by the U. FOREIGN AFFAIRS." He explained that financial institutions have voluntarily cut off business with sanctioned entities and individuals out of "good corporate citizenship" and in order to protect their reputation. November 2008. 47. Although the use of sanctions against entities suspected of involvement in proliferation is not new. This was particularly powerful given London's preeminent role in global capital markets. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S.06) Peter Crall. told the Senate Finance Committee April 1 that the "key difference" between the use of financial sanctions and more traditional sanctions "is the reaction of the private sector.
MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE 1. November 2008. U. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. Collins argued that the application of multilateral sanctions could force the country on which [it] was imposed to discontinue its support for terrorism program. p. HAS SUPPORTED MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SK/N05. . the council has adopted three resolutions requiring that all states freeze the assets of 75 individuals and firms related to Iran's nonconventional weapons programs. Iran's fifth-largest bank. Perhaps the clearest incorporation of financial sanctions in a multilateral forum is a series of UN Security Council resolutions in response to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. p. U. of Wollongong. Australia] et al. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2.. On the other hand.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. including Bank Sepah. Expanded Academic ASAP. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AGAINST TERRORISM SK/N05. December 2008.01) Peter Crall.N. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Since December 2006. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 47. 1707.SK/N05. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES.
SK/N06. CRITICS JUDGE FAILURE OF SANCTIONS TOO HARSHLY 1. FAILURE TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE DOESN’T MEAN FAILURE SK/N06.01) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. of Missouri-Columbia], POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY, March 2007, p. 136. Others, however, have dissented from the conventional wisdom and have been critical of the assessment of sanctions being simply a dichotomous success-failure measure (Daoudi and Dajani 1983; Baldwin 1985; Baldwin and Pape 1998). They argue that compliance ought not to be the sole criterion for judging the success or failure of sanctions. In most of the cases, even though the total compliance of targets may not have been obtained, the sender may have managed to wring significant concessions from the target or succeeded in achieving less ambitious foreign policy goals such as symbolic gains. SK/N06.02) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science, Texas Tech U.] & Mark Souva [Dept. of Political Science, Florida State U.], JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, December 2007, SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE, p. 851. To evaluate the success of sanctions, one should not examine the actions of the target but the political support for the sender. Sanctions may ‘‘rarely force compliance,’’ but that ‘‘does not refute their overall utility’’ (Lindsay 1986, 153). If sanctions appease a domestic interest group, then they earn a political benefit and should be considered successful. ‘‘Critics may deride the symbolic uses of trade sanctions as empty gestures, but symbols are important in politics’’ (Lindsay 1986, 171). A symbol is all the more important when it can ‘‘defuse domestic political pressure’’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000, 160). 2. SANCTIONS SERVE A VITAL SYMBOLIC FUNCTION SK/N06.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U.], POLITICAL STUDIES, March 2009, p. 58. Others question these conclusions, and point to the symbolic goals of economic sanctions which should be taken into account when measuring their success. These include sending a message to the sender political community's domestic constituency; sending a message to the international community as a whole; signalling support for internal opposition within the target political community; and even inflicting pain on the target political community as a means of punishment or revenge. As David Baldwin argues, such symbolic goals are powerful political tools, whose importance should not be overlooked (Baldwin, 1985).
3. SANCTIONS CAN PRESSURE LEADERS TO BARGAIN FURTHER SK/N06.04) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. One of the realities that has been difficult for Washington to comprehend is that smart sanctions seldom produce immediate and full compliance from targets. However, in a number of cases they produce partial compliance and generate pressure on targets to engage in further bargaining. Thus, the economic squeeze on the target comprises one level of success of smart sanctions. But the political success of getting the target to change its behavior results less from the economic pain it experiences and more from gains to be made at the bargaining table. Thus sanctions can be effective if they first force the delinquent state to negotiate after it has initially resisted and then ultimately lead to a political bargain. SK/N06.05) George A. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies, U. of Notre Dame], HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, Fall 2007, p. 50, GALE CENGAGE LEARNING, Expanded Academic ASAP. In Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, sanctions eventually pressured Belgrade to accept the Dayton Accord. In Libya, sanctions were a central factor in the negotiations from the mid-1990s until a decade later that brought suspected terrorists to trial and convinced the regime to reduce its support of international terrorism. In Angola, sanctions that were initially ineffective became stronger over the years and combined with military and diplomatic pressures to weaken the UNITA rebel movement. And in Liberia, sanctions denied first resources, and then legitimacy, to the Charles Taylor regime.
SK/N07. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ASSIST ANIT-GOVERNMENT FORCES 1. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DESTABILIZE AND ISOLATE LEADERS SK/N07.01) Nikolay Marinov [Yale U.], AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, July 2005, WILEY INTERSCIENCE, p. 564. Expanded Academic ASAP. Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure, sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. SK/N07.02) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Marinov 2005; Nossal 1989). Olson (1979, 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed, or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005, 567). SK/N07.03) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 492. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Major and McGann 2005), or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004). Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. Likewise, sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime, especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2. DESTABLIZATION STRENGTHENS ANTI-GOVERNMENT FORCES SK/N07.04) Reed M. Wood [U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill], INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, September 2008, p. 494. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent, providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to
48-51. .challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. Kaempler and Lowenberg 1999. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. In this case. Rowe 2001).
September 2008. Consequently.06) William H. Fall 2007. individuals gain greater personal rewards from joining in collective action with the opposition group. This awareness then gives rise to optimism that. Northridge]. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. causing negative aggregate economic growth and potentially emboldening the opposition by signaling the "world's" support for their antiregime activity. Boulder] & Anton D. U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. In other words. Wood [U. 68. An example of this phenomenon is the US sanctioning of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic from 1960 to 1962. the indirect impact of sanctions might work by sending a message that strengthens collective action among the political opponents. SK/N07. UN-imposed sanctions often diplomatically and economically isolate the target regime. Sanctions demonstrate that the policy that the opposition interest group condemns is in fact also repudiated by others in the world. 509. which provided vital help and encouragement to the domestic opposition. California State U. the opposition may someday succeed in its efforts. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics.05) Reed M. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics. given tangible evidence of external support.SK/N07. of Colorado. . INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. p.
. March 2009. Accordingly. and continue to enjoy the benefits of cooperation with other democracies in the world. Wood [U. The fact that it shares moral responsibility for the injustices is sufficient reason to impose pressure on it so that it changes its behaviour (and withdraws support from its unjust government). INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. at least when the citizenry of the target state is collectively morally blameworthy for governmental policies. SANCTIONS LESSEN TYRANTS’ TOOLS OF REPRESSION SK/N08. Kaempfer. POLITICAL STUDIES. The implications of the above distinctions for the use of collective economic sanctions are that. September 2008.]. And if they want to eliminate these costs. the message of sanctions for the citizens of the target state should not be that each and every one shares the blame of injustice and is condemnable. military and police equipment). of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]. p. 490-491.]. Lowenberg. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DO NOT WORSEN HUMAN RIGHTS 1.02) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. 68. .e.SK/N08.01) Reed M. it is a legitimate target of economic sanctions. and Mertens (2004) suggest that when sanctions restrict target autocrats' access to the tools of repression (i. March 2009. pp. but rather that the unjust policies of their government have costly consequences in terms of the willingness of other democracies to maintain normal relations with their state. p. SANCTIONS AREN’T TO BLAME FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SK/N08. or where they enhance the cohesion of the political opposition. POLITICAL STUDIES. 69. SK/N08. 2.03) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. they reduce the incumbent's capacity to suppress dissent through violence. it is their responsibility to use their democratic power in order to change their government's policies.
Expanded Academic ASAP. Because sanctions harm the sender’s economy as well as the target’s. Online. LOSSES TO THE U. On the other hand. Florida State U.1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) and 65 per cent cost less than 1 per cent of GNP (Cox and Drury.S. December 2007. U.]. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Thus. firms and communities. sanctions are likely to be both credible and insufficiently severe." Usually the cost of sanctions is a very small fraction of U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. making them more likely to be initiated.S. Texas Tech U. ECONOMY 1. p. When military intervention is too costly and diplomacy ineffective. 855. 59. March 2009.03) David Lektzian [Dept. of Political Science. ECONOMY ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT SK/N09. when economic interdependence is low. I should note that some studies argue against the claim that sanctions are significantly costly to the sender political communities: one study shows that 27 per cent of all sanctions cost their sender less than 0. January-February 1999.S.02) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. POLITICAL STUDIES. governments often resort to sanctions as a means of conducting foreign policy "on the cheap. 2006). GDP. SK/N09. greater economic interdependence discourages the actual implementation of sanctions by making the sender’s threat both sufficiently severe and noncredible.01) Avia Pasternak [Stanford U. .]. of Political Science. one side or the other is likely to back down and sanctions are unlikely to occur. LOSSES ARE MINIMIZED WHEN INTERDEPENDENCE IS LOW SK/N09. 21-24. sectors that trade or invest in the target country. SANCTIONS DO NOT HARM THE U. p. and that cost is typically concentrated on a few U.S.S. pp. The costs of sanctions are concentrated on U. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. THE QUILL.SK/N09.] & Mark Souva [Dept. 2.S.
02) Richard M. Himes [Professor of Moral Theology. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. SANCTIONS ARE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN WAR 1. Online. December 2008. Advocates regard sanctions as an important weapon in the arsenal of foreign policy tools a middle of the road instrument between diplomacy and military action. 2. despite their harmful consequences. Expanded Academic ASAP. 19. U. p. February 28. Online.. Online. Columbia U. Australia] et al. of Wollongong. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. 1997.01) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. which damages the country's infrastructure and development. SK/N10.]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. January-February 1999. Expanded Academic ASAP. COMMONWEAL. As tools of international pressure. sanctions rank somewhere between diplomacy and military force: they are usually intended to achieve political ends while avoiding the costs and destruction of war. . According to Niblock economic sanctions are less costly in terms of finance in comparison with war. Expanded Academic ASAP. 1707. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N10. 21-24. Garfield [Professor of Clinical International Nursing. Washington Theological Union]. pp. THE SCIENCES. They are ordinarily incremental and capable of being altered. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N10. In addition. Sanctions do not pose the same dangers of escalation or irreversible miscalculation. THE QUILL. Still. SANCTIONS ARE MIDWAY BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND WAR SK/N10. January 1999.04) Kenneth R. use of armed force only as a last resort is a longstanding element of the just-war tradition. sanctions are almost always less damaging for noncombatants and the environment than modern warfare. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE FAR LESS HARMFUL THAN WAR SK/N10.
Drury and Li 2006). IGNORING THREAT EFFICACY OVERSTATES SANCTIONS FAILURES SK/N11. more recent studies in the literature demonstrated that assessments of sanctions effectiveness have neglected the threat of sanctions. Florida State U. These studies argue that sanctions succeed more often than commonly suggested once the cases in which coercion is threatened but not imposed are also included in the analysis. .SK/N11. then compliance should be more likely since the expected costs of sanctions will be higher for target states. pp. if the issue under dispute is a highly salient issue for senders. SK/N11. 854-855. Drezner 1999. March 2007. 2003. Furthermore. p.] & Mark Souva [Dept. and Sprinz 2005). Hovi. of Missouri-Columbia]. 2. they should be more committed to conveying their willingness to impose sanctions in response to noncompliance by the target during the threat stage. of Missouri-Columbia]. Nooruddin 2002. Second.01) David Lektzian [Dept.]. of Political Science. Miers and Morgan 2002. December 2007. 136. which has resulted in a selection bias (Smith 1996. Li and Drury 2004. of Political Science. If a target faces a resolute and credible sender. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. like any coercive threat. Huseby. only occur when a threat is credible but not sufficiently severe to bring about compliance (Hovi 1998.03) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. March 2007. The assumption is that if the targets expect that they will change their policies as a result of the imposition of sanctions.02) Adrian U-Jin Ang & Dursun Peksen [both U. THREAT OF SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE 1. 143. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. Y. Sanctions. Texas Tech U. p. they may prefer to capitulate to the sender at the threat stage to avoid the economic cost of implemented sanctions. MERELY THREATENING SANCTIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVE SK/N11. If a threat is credible and sufficiently severe. Lacy and Niou 2004. then the target will yield prior to full implementation of the threat. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION.
Custom Newspapers. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. p. noting the number of banks that have curtailed business with Iran. SANCTIONS ON IRAN SK/N12. September 2008. who formerly led the State Department's Illicit Activities Initiative targeting North Korea's illegal financial dealings. David Asher. The sanctions could include a cutoff of investments to the country's oil-and-gas industry and restrictions on many more Iranian banks than those currently blacklisted. and EU sanctions are choking foreign investment and hurting the profitability of Iranian banks. major international financial institutions such as Credit Suisse. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. IRAN 1. SK/N12.03) Mark Landler. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the sanctions "make life much harder for the . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. said they had the international support necessary to impose crippling sanctions. SK/N12. Asher asserted that because proliferators still rely on the global trading system. p. p. November 2008. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. September 28. 2009. 42.05) Peter Crall. 3. p. November 27. Senior Obama administration officials. Sanctions appear to be taking their toll on Iran's economy. NEW YORK TIMES. SANCTIONS ARE DAMAGING IRAN’S ECONOMY SK/N12. Custom Newspapers. 2009. and HSBC have curtailed or halted their business with Iran. efforts to marshal worldwide pressure against Iran have gained traction since the revelation last Friday that Iran was operating a clandestine nuclear site. 9. U. said that the financial sanctions against Iran were having a dramatic effect. 23 e-mail to Arms Control Today. Custom Newspapers.01) James Blitz. THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE. meanwhile. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In the last several years.. 2009.SK/N12. according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Aug. Deutsche Bank. September 28. 1. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SUPPORT U.S. SANCTIONS ARE MAKING PROLIFERATION MORE DIFFICULT SK/N12. 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. 14. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. In an Oct. 47. The International Atomic Energy Agency looks likely today to deliver its first formal condemnation of Iran in nearly four years over the country's nuclear programme. p.04) Brian Radzinsky. THE FINANCIAL TIMES. A1. senior administration officials said Sunday. in a move that would give significant momentum to the imposition of economic sanctions on Tehran.S. It finds that UN.S.02) Mark Landler.
SK/N12." regardless of whether they have had a persuasive effect on the regime itself. Expanded Academic ASAP.proliferator or procurement agent. THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY. Summer 2008. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. but if the international community is truly determined to try to change Tehran's decisionmaking.06) Michael Jacobson. p. 2. it should use greater economic pressure. A debate within Iran about the wisdom of its nuclear program appears to be starting. . Success is far from guaranteed.
Treasury Dept. . 2009. For a bank in a country that still had at least 20 percent of its foreign reserves in dollars and for which the oil trade. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.an extremist regime but not a totalitarian state have had some successes when consistently applied. SK/N12. Custom Newspapers. Few foreign-policy watchers noticed this barely perceptible development in world affairs. p. the costs of financial pressure have been high and unwelcome. but bankers engaged in the day-today work of clearing international transactions knew exactly what it meant: Bank Saderat could no longer process dollar transactions through the United States. Washington went further and targeted Bank Saderat--one of Iran's biggest state-owned banks for supporting terrorism. IS VULNERABLE TO WORLD OPINION SK/N12. March-April 2009. U. they eliminated a small but significant exception to the program. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Costs associated with Iranian trade have reportedly gone up by between 10 and 30 percent. England). GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. South Africa systematically disenfranchised its black majority. The vice president of the Dubai-based Iranian Business Council has stated that no one is accepting Iranian letters of credit anymore. The country's image ultimately mattered to a leadership that had lost ideological confidence. Expanded Academic ASAP. which is why Iranians are moving out of Iran in order to establish relationships with other foreign banks. the United States had had in place an expansive sanctions program against Iran that barred all but the most minimal financial relations. Instead. yet possessed multiple political parties and an often courageously independent press. IRAN. and has responded to pressure. p. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. Though the regime is hardly undermined by sanctions.S. is its primary livelihood. Expanded Academic ASAP. In June.07) Editorial. it is anxious to remain within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.S. for Bank Saderat. SANCTIONS ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE SK/N12.].4. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. the so-called U-turn authorization. THE TIMES (London. March-April 2009. From the vantage point of Iranian businesspeople seeking a frictionfree financial relationship with the outside world. being rejected by Wall Street was serious business. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 5.S. Similarly.08) Rachel L. 2. 101. U. Iran has a nuclear programme that is patently not designed purely for generating electricity. For years.]. The Washington Post reported that the honorary president of the private German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce said that the financial sanctions against Iran's international banking network have made it nearly impossible to pay for goods. sanctions against Iran . February 25. also denominated in dollars. To do so. Treasury Dept. LIKE SOUTH AFRICA.09) Rachel L. In September 2006. policymakers did not resort to a dramatic expansion of the already broad sanctions program. 101. p.
Expanded Academic ASAP. Treasury Dept. March-April 2009.S.11) James Kitfield. p.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SK/N12. has seen its exports to Iran drop by roughly a quarter in just the last two years. p. 101. . global financial institutions and European countries to conduct financial transactions with the government of Iran is creating a severe financial squeeze in Iran. banks cease to do business with [Iranian entities]. 6. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. sees the sanctions as capable of slowing down Iran's use of the international financial system. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.SK/N12. European governments may ignore the sanctions. March-April 2009. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States in conjunction with the global banking system might be the most effective weapons in their confrontation rather than military threats. Treasury Dept. financial gamesmanship is but one of the many tools in the arsenal of policy tactics. There is no sign that Iran has suspended or given up its efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program. the United Kingdom. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. but European banks could cooperate. Lee Wolosky. March 3. which was Iran's top import supplier from 1994 to 2006.12) CQ RESEARCHER." he continues.]. U. U. 976. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.]. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. NATIONAL JOURNAL. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs.S. This shift reflects not just the inevitable "rise of the rest" that is affecting the trade portfolios of many countries but also the pressure many European governments have put on their domestic industries to reconsider pursuing contracts with Iran. but it clearly provides a lever of influence where fewer and fewer seem to exist." he says. a great deal of informal pressure is being applied to European banks to reanalyze relationships with Iran. November 16. "This has had a certain measure of success. p. if only to avoid complicating their own dealings with the United States.” SK/N12. The refusal of private banks. Expanded Academic ASAP. 2007. The moment has not yet come for a final assessment of the new financial statecraft. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS STILL HAVE POTENTIAL TO SUCCEED SK/N12. Whereas Japan.10) Rachel L. and the United States were Iran's top export markets 14 years ago. 79.13) Rachel L. "Already. 101. "You're going to see non-U. paving the way for a gradual economic causation combined with patient diplomacy by the U. But in this context. 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP.S. he acknowledges. But a former National Security Council (NSC) official. p. Tehran has rebuffed or ignored multilateral overtures and incentive packages multiple times. China and Turkey had taken second and third place by 2006. Even Germany.
Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. NORTH KOREA 1. but rather the reaction by financial institutions to the sanctioned entities. Levey stated April 1 that "banks in China.03) Rachel L.]. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.02) George A. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. when Washington actually made it illegal for U." SK/N13. In the case of Banco Delta Asia.01) Peter Crall. institutions caused banks around the world to refrain from dealing with BDA [Banco Delta Asia] and North Korea.SK/N13. 47. CURRENT SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER SUCCESS SK/N13. p. U. The United States and its multilateral partners promised that if Korea complied with their demands. Singapore. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. March-April 2009. Vietnam. Mongolia. ARMS CONTROL TODAY. they would ease sanctions and grant a substantial food relief package and sustained fuel deliveries. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.S. 101. the mere announcement of a possible regulatory measure that would apply only to U. p. in the two instances of North Korea halting the development of its own nuclear program via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and in the Bush Administration's Six-Party Agreement of 2007. Expanded Academic ASAP. Even after the Banco Delta Asia funds were returned in 2007. . the value of the North Korean assets frozen only amounted to about $25 million. many in the global financial community had already cut ties with BDA on their own. Treasury officials continue to tout the success financial sanctions have had in isolating North Korea from the international financial system. p.S. SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE SK/N13. In short. U. 2. Similarly. North Korea gained access to these economic benefits in exchange for allowing a UN monitoring team to ensure that it was behaving in accordance with international standards. and across Europe decided that the risks associated with this business far outweighed any benefit. for example. banks to maintain relationships with BDA. By March 2007. it has been characterized as a success because banks shied away from North Korean business. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. officials have argued that the success of such sanctions should not necessarily be measured in the amount of assets frozen. 50. Expanded Academic ASAP. Treasury Dept.S. Nonetheless. Fall 2007. Japan. of Notre Dame].S. the methods and substance of compromise were nearly the same as in the Libyan case. November 2008.
A1. Loeffler [former Deputy Director of Global Affairs. give the world community the tools we need to take appropriate action. Federal Reserve system and the Bank of Russia. As a result of the U. The funds were available for immediate physical withdrawal. but the issue was not the availability of the money. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.SK/N13.05) THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Ontario. Clinton said during a visit to Niagara Falls.]. North Korea demanded that roughly $25 million--funds frozen by the Macanese authorities. she said. In the spring of 2007. I think these sanctions . North Korea could achieve this simple money transfer only through an unlikely route that involved two central banks working through days of negotiations.. regulatory action. 2009. SK/N13. Ultimately. p. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the sanctions give the world community the necessary tools to curb the North's nuclear weapons ambitions.S. and finally to a small bank in Russia's Far East. The sanctions were in response to the country's second nuclear test. June 14. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. North Korea also raised tensions in recent months by test-firing missiles.04) Rachel L. Custom Newspapers. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. the $25 million in frozen assets had to travel from Macao. Pyongyang seemed to understand that what was at stake was not just $25 million but also ongoing and unfettered access to the international financial system. as well as the greater international community. Mrs.. 101. This was a tremendous statement on behalf of the world community that North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver those weapons through missiles is not going to be accepted by the neighbors.S. launched May 25.S. Treasury Dept. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Washington's action had significantly increased the costs of being a rogue state. p. March-April 2009. through the U. not the United States--be transferred from BDA [Banco Delta Asia] to another bank of their choosing. thanks to the unwillingness of global banks to deal with BDA or the North Korean regime. .
01) Juan J. And consistent with previous findings on the successes of economic sanctions in destabilizing target governments. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The argument here is that any critique of the U.S. But unilateral economic sanctions can be effective by reaffirming a commitment to international norms of democracy and justice and by weakening the Castro government and promoting a change of regime. Rather. Expanded Academic ASAP. SK/N14.S. p. embargo should be maintained.S. embargo in terms of the usual ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions to change policies or behaviors is misdirected for the simple reason that the U. The U. 345. sanctions against the Castro regime are to signal disapproval of Cuba's violations of human rights and other reprehensible behavior. 345. embargo is weakening the Castro dictatorship and thereby contributing to its eventual demise. addressed the relevant scholarly literature that provides important theoretical insights and empirical findings germane to whether the U.e. SANCTIONS ON CUBA HAVE NOT BEEN A FAILURE SK/N14. Lopez [Asst. there is reason to believe that Cuba's economic problems have generated serious discontent within the Communist Party's own cadres. Moreover.S. Summer 2000. neither engagement nor the embargo by itself will move the Castro government toward political liberalization.S. ORBIS.S. to change Cuban policies. Lopez [Asst. of Illinois at Chicago]. embargo does not have this aim.. to destabilize the Castro regime and hasten a transition to democracy.03) Juan J. 345. Summer 2000. and the deterioration of the Cuban economy in the 1990s can be clearly linked both to the marked development of independent groups that challenge the government and to the increase in overt opposition on the part of the general population. and perhaps to impair the military potential of Havana. Expanded Academic ASAP. ORBIS. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. p. But what of the rest? Is there evidence to measure progress toward destabilizing Castro's rule? The answer is yes.S. its aim now is to bring about a regime change. of Illinois at Chicago]. Given the nature of the Cuban dictatorship. Currently. 2. U. SANCTIONS HAVE ELIMINATED CUBA AS A MILITARY THREAT . GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N14. i. although critics and supporters of the embargo on Cuba have barely. ORBIS. The mere fact of the embargo is sufficient to fulfill the first and last goals. including military officers. CUBA 1. p.SK/N14. Professor of Political Science. to foster a transition to democracy in Cuba. Expanded Academic ASAP. U. Professor of Political Science.02) Juan J. Lopez [Asst. of Illinois at Chicago]. Summer 2000. if ever. the most salient objectives mentioned in the discussion of U. sanctions impose serious economic costs on the Castro dictatorship. Professor of Political Science. the U. U. U.
S. Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. sanctions crippled the Castro regime from building its forces and arsenal. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST.S. However. 83. it is because U.04) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen [U. March 1999. p. sanctions. Representative].SK/N14. if it [Cuba] does not pose a military threat.S. Without U. .
a weakening of sanctions would face tough opposition in Washington. Australia] and other analysts said they could still be effective if combined with a coordinated international campaign of engagement and diplomatic pressure. Although sanctions have failed so far. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. March 16. p." said Debbie Stothard."Some of Washington's current sanctions fit this description. TARGETED SANCTIONS HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15. 7. Custom Newspapers. a regional human rights group. Turnell [Macquarie U. In any case. 2."I think we have to stay the course and use this form of pressure to push the regime to greater dialogue. an expert on the Burmese economy at Macquarie University in Sydney. 2007. coordinator of Altsean-Burma. October 16. none of whom have shown any interest in joining an economic embargo.02) Seth Mydans. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. But the analysts said such a campaign would require more than routine diplomacy to gain the cooperation of Myanmar's trading partners. 2009. "If you want to throw away the best cards that you have. . you are setting yourselves up for failure. p. blocking certain bank transactions and visa permits. said Sean Turnell."Sanctions may not be an all-or-nothing issue. MYANMAR (BURMA) 1. SANCTIONS ON MYANMAR HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N15. Custom Newspapers. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. 1.He pointed to "targeted sanctions" that aim to cripple the financial dealings of the junta and its associates and "send exactly the right message to the people the message needs to be sent to.. where the policy carries emotional resonance and has many backers in Congress and among human rights groups.01) Seth Mydans. though.SK/N15.
Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.. SK/N16. Australia] et al. of Wollongong. p.02) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. 50. Expanded Academic ASAP. We believe that these criteria have already satisfied in the case of Libya. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SANCTIONS IMPOSED EFFECTIVE PRESSURE ON LIBYA SK/N16. p.. December 2008. of Wollongong.01) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. of Wollongong. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Australia] et al. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. LIBYA 1. U. many observers were surprised by Muammar Gaddafi's December 2003 decision to disclose and dismantle Libya's nuclear. 1707. As referenced earlier. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. The sanctions possible to accomplish success when the following criteria are fulfilled if the target countries face economic losses that exceed more than 2% of their GDP.. 2. Lopez [Institute for International Peace Studies.SK/N16. U. U. Libya is a small oil-producing developing economy in North Africa and its economy is heavily dependent on oil revenue. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. 1707.04) George A. SK/N16. December 2008. Libya agreed in 1998 to comply with UN demands to turn over suspects wanted in connection with the Pan Am 103 airline bombing to an international tribunal at The Hague. 50. of Notre Dame]. Hochman examined the December 2003 decision that has been made by the Libyan government to dismantle nonconventional weapons program. He concluded that economic sanctions and the US invasion of Iraq are the main reasons for this Libyan decision. p. of Notre Dame]. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF APPLIED SCIENCES. Fall 2007. Furthermore. After six years under various UN sanctions. When this extradition was completed. Expanded Academic ASAP. SANCTIONS REDUCED TERRORISM AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SK/N16.05) George A. Libya plays an important role as a member of OPEC in the supply of oil to the world market. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. p. December 2008. . or they have a vital trade relationship with the sender countries. p. Fall 2007. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.03) Abdusalam Faraj Yahia [School of Economics. Expanded Academic ASAP. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Conditions in the Libyan economy worsened in the 1990s as a result of international sanctions that were imposed by United Nations in the earlier 1990s. Australia] et al. the Security Council responded by suspending and eventually lifting UN sanctions on Libya. Stephen argued that multilateral sanctions seem to have caused Libya's removal from the position of terrorism sponsors. The case of Libya from 1998 to 2004 illustrates this balancing act rather well. 1707. U. SK/N16. U.
chemical. This unprecedented decision was essentially brought about by long-term negotiations with the United States and Great Britain in which Gaddafi was promised not only a lifting of the sanctions. while also allowing international inspectors to verify compliance. and biological weapons programs. but also open access to European investors and markets. .
GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE CLASSIC CASE OF EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS SK/N17. Online. 940. 138-153. 2. Asia Pacific Policy Center]. Fall 1996. Online.03) Gary Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Expanded Academic ASAP.04) Susan Hannah Allen [Dept. TARGETED SANCTIONS WERE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE SK/N17. U. Online. Semi-democratic regimes are more vulnerable to the public disaffection with economic hardship and the label of international pariah that accompanies multilateral sanctions. Expanded Academic ASAP. South Africa was a semi-democratic country. targeted sanctions are directed toward the heart of the interests of those in power. SK/N17. Sanctions in that case were undoubtedly a just cause pursued against an evil system. While comprehensive sanctions affect the entire targeted population. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SOUTH AFRICA 1. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Lavin [Executive Director. not least because the initiative enjoyed broad multilateral support and because the white minority government remained sensitive to external opinion. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. SK/N17. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully.SK/N17. FOREIGN POLICY. 16. December 2008. The sanctions levied against South Africa included general limitations not only on trade but also on the trade of diamonds (which affected the purses of the business elite) as well as a ban on participation in international sporting competitions (which was viewed by white South Africans as a tragic punishment). Economic sanctions contributed to the collapse of the apartheid system. p. p. Expanded Academic ASAP. pp. Apartheid South Africa is the most frequently cited case of a regime brought low by international pressure. 2009. of Mississippi]. somewhat sensitive to international public opinion. England).01) Editorial. Efforts to implement targeted sanctions may improve the effectiveness of sanctions against autocratic regimes. p. SAGE JOURNALS ONLINE. February 25. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. pp. of Political Science. WORLD AND I. May 1999. SK/N17. THE QUILL.05) James Tellenbach.02) Franklin L. After years of economic stagnation. 21-24. Sanctions against South Africa worked in . Even under apartheid. January-February 1999. 2. THE TIMES (London. Custom Newspapers.
. but they touched different segments of society with different degrees of severity. The South African businessman in the export sector would have found trade constrained and then lobbied the government to change its policies.that they played an important role in persuading the white leadership of the need for change. Sanctions bit.
5 million who fled fighting between Sudanese government forces and rebels. The sanctions against Darfur "are a step in the right direction. p. Restricting the ability of a country to acquire these goods effectively raises the price of the objectionable policy and may serve as a deterrent to pursuing it further. 8. such as in the case of police repression. in fact. 8. SUDAN/INDIA-PAKISTAN 1. HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW. Restricted access to technology in India and Pakistan may have.02) Malcolm R." she [Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Chairwoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick] told JET. Expanded Academic ASAP.03) William H. China. The conflict erupted in February 2003 when members of Darfur's ethnic African tribes rebelled against the government. p. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING. Expanded Academic ASAP. rape. Lowenberg [Professor of Economics.000. California State U. . mutilation and plunder. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.. to divest their financial resources in Darfur immediately. Sudanese leaders reportedly retaliated by unleashing the janjaweed militia to put down the rebels using a campaign of murder. and the Arab League. SANCTIONS ON SUDAN HAVE POTENTIAL FOR SUCCESS SK/N18.SK/N18. 2007. SK/N18. the European Union. delayed these countries' production of nuclear weapons for decades. Northridge]. U. Kaempfer [Professor of Economics." she said. West. June 18. but more must be done. The Sudanese government has been accused of attacks on the civilian population in its western Darfur region that have resulted in the deaths of more than 200. JET. Boulder] & Anton D. 68. and displacement of some 2. Expanded Academic ASAP. West. including the United Nations. following the president's recent announcement. SANCTIONS SLOWED INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SK/N18. Technological and military goods are frequently necessary for targets to pursue their policy objectives. p. of Colorado. Fall 2007. 2007. "The Congressional Black Caucus will continue to urge the president to demonstrate leadership and encourage the international community.01) Malcolm R. June 18. JET. Targeted sanctions can also impact a country's ability to implement its objectionable policy. 2. GALE CENGAGE LEARNING.
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