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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS OUGHT NOT BE USED TO ACHIEVE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.
LINCOLN DOUGLAS TOPIC ANALYSIS
Lincoln Douglas Topic Analysis January-February 2010 by Travis Cram
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LD TOPIC ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 AFFIRMATIVE CASE POSITIONS AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS . . . . . . . . . . 12 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . 16 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 UNDERVIEW: ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS SUPERIOR TO SUFFOCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 NEGATIVE CASE POSITIONS NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS EFFECT ON POPULATION IS MINIMAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: DEMOCRACIES NEED SANCTIONS AS A TOOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED, NOT ABANDONED . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: USING GUIDELINES IS BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR IMPROVING SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: DOGMATIC RESPONSES TO SANCTIONS ARE BAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EXTENSION POSITIONS ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SMART SANCTIONS CAN BE EVOLVED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WORK' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'ECONOMIC DAMAGE IS PROOF SANCTIONS WORK' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE LAZILY APPLIED/ABUSED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE MASSIVE ECONOMIC COSTS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE COERCION' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 50 52 53 55 58 61 62 63 64 66 67 69 71 73 75 28 32 34 36 38 39 40 42 46 47
STRATEGIC TIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
predominantly economic but also political and military penalties aimed at states or other entities so as to alter unacceptable political or military behavior -. there are a variety of tools that the United States draws upon. export and import limitations. Haass again explains: Richard N. genocide. p. One part of the topic that is important to call attention to is the modifying statement 'for foreign policy objectives. but most are related to pressuring a particular government or group to cease a specific practice. or specific weapons activities like nuclear proliferation. To accomplish these ends. any aff or neg that deals with sanctions in terms of trade agreements or tariffs related to trade disputes should be disregarded because they are not associated with the topic in any way. Nov/Dec.' This is important because it screens out debates over the use of sanctions for the result of trade purposes. "Sanctioning Madness". By contrast. and credit. the topic wording favors the negative because they can still negate the topic if they prove sanctions are desirable in even one instance. a key question in many of your debates is going to be whether sanctions can actually achieve the desired change in behavior. Even U. a foreign policy expert. 1997.are employed for a wide range of purposes. Before getting into the specifics of the positions contained here. even though the literature is probably skewed to the affirmative. "Sanctioning Madness".asp Excluded here are sanctions introduced to ensure market access or compliance with trade pacts. discourage armed aggression.asp Sanctions -. they have to categorically reject the use of sanctions within any instance. Therefore. it is first necessary to discuss some of the background so that you can get your bearings. p.S. . state and local governments are introducing economic sanctions. As a result. The topic says that economic sanctions ought not to be used to achieve foreign policy objectives. Dozens have adopted "selective purchasing laws" that prohibit public agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business with such countries as Burma and Indonesia. All of these tools try to achieve a variety of purposes. Haass. and oust governments. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. let's discuss the specific positions advanced in this topic. Now that we have a better grasp on the background issues. and the cards in this file are only the start. The United States.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 2 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 INTRODUCTION Greetings! This topic is perhaps one of the best that has come along in recent years given its timeliness and the well balanced debate that occurs in the literature on both sides. end support for terrorism. Economic sanctions for economic purposes tend to be used pursuant to the rules that guide trade. thwart drug trafficking. The evidence quality is unmatched and the issues are very clear. promote human rights. sanctions may take the form of arms embargoes. and investment prohibitions. 1997. far more than any other country. Haass. As a result. It seems that for the aff to be topical. In terms of sanctions themselves. revocation of most favored nation (MFN) trade status. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. import quota decreases. outlines several of them: Richard N. uses them to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. foreign assistance reductions and cutoffs. economic sanctions for political purposes work in the absence of any agreed-on political or legal framework. tariff increases. visa denials. votes in international organizations. Nov/Dec. withdrawal of diplomatic relations. Richard Haass. protect the environment. cancellation of air links. financing. asset freezes. whether it is war. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
an effect known as 'rallying around the flag. it is argued that there are superior policy alternatives that can fulfill the goal of sanctions while avoiding their problems. ultimately resulting in political change. The first argues that sanctions fail in the realm of foreign policy because they are extremely counterproductive because the costs that they impose vastly exceed their possible gains. or as an effective force multiplier that allows war plans to succeed. because it is rogue regimes and dictatorships that are the most common target.' Third. it is a very well rounded topic and the file is a great start for your debates. I hope you enjoy your debates as much as I enjoyed researching it. sanctions are especially ineffective because such leaders can easily weather the storm and fend off the impact. As a result. Furthermore. The final position argues that even if sanctions are problematic. the solution is not dogmatism or the categorical rejection of sanctions in every instance. Sanctions simply seek an extreme outcome (like regime change) while only imposing an economic cost. The first position argues that sanctions can either function as a useful alternative to war.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 3 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 For the affirmative. The second position argues that sanctions actually increase foreign policy dangers. they should be refined or limited or simply used as part of a broader package. there are three basic positions. All in all. The negative. encouraging states to keep up with the activities that the sanctioning state finds problematic. achieving the desired result only in very few instances. The second position argues that sanctions are able to achieve behavior changes in rogue regimes by placing extreme pressure on them. by contrast. Their empirical record is also abysmal. sanctions only increase the misery of the people or drive them closer to the illegitimate regime. Such policies include attempts to constructively engage problem governments and try to lure them towards good behavior with incentives. argues that sanctions are a vitally important foreign policy tool. Good Luck! . Rather.
The goals outsiders sought in Rhodesia and Indonesia were vastly disproportional to the economic tools employed. Nov/Dec. Presentation becomes important so as to ensure that the threat of sanctions is not perceived as a challenge to a country's sovereign integrity. companies between $15 billion and $19 billion and affected some 200. Lavin. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.asp With a few exceptions. sanctions must be implemented in such a way as to not back the target country into a corner.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 4 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1. Core issues of sovereignty cannot be addressed successfully by sanctions. GUARANTEEING THEIR FAILURE Franklin L. they are most effective when applied to marginal issues such as technical trade matters. the answer to that question invariably depends on how demanding a task is set for a particular sanction. The goal in Indonesia was nothing less than a radical change in Indonesia's policy toward East Timor. Peculiarly. . Fall 1996.a fishing dispute. p. policymakers need to give more serious consideration to the impact of a sanction and weigh alternative policies more carefully. for with the former there is no issue of sovereignty at stake. political sensitivities make sanctions a more effective tool in dealing with friendly countries than with unfriendly ones. What country would choose national humiliation over economic hardship? Since even seemingly minor issues -.S. 1997.000 workers. The goal in Rhodesia was to overthrow the government.can be perceived as a test of the sovereignty and integrity of a government. Rather. Thus. for example -.asp The above example also shows the link between proportionality and presentation. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Haass. a former Portuguese colony seized by Indonesia. The prospect of sanctions can be held out with regret. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. A recent study by the Institute for International Economics concluded that in 1995 alone. although they are. the growing use of economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable. p. and not as a threat. "Sanctioning Madness". the problem with economic sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counterproductive. levelled against third-party states that do not support a particular sanctions regime. SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED AS FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS BECAUSE THEY ARE EXTREMELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AS WELL AS COSTLY Richard N. This is not simply because sanctions are expensive. Secondary sanctions. sanctions cost U. FOREIGN POLICY. Nor is it strictly a matter of whether sanctions "work". Because sanctions are a marginal tool. SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK FOR FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY ARE DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CHANGE THAT IS SOUGHT. add to this cost by jeopardizing the United States' trade relations. 2.
sanctions against Libya have been ineffective because they do not apply to Libya's oil exports. Libya has refused to hand over the two individuals accused of destroying Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. Other sanctions have also fallen short of their stated purposes. by creating scarcity. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Scotland. Haass. SANCTIONS FAIL BECAUSE THEY OFTEN CANNOT REACH THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF SUFFICIENCY REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS Franklin L. leaving Libya's economy largely unscathed. Even though they were comprehensive and enjoyed almost universal international backing for nearly six months. 5.asp In addition. Unilateral sanctions are particularly ineffective. its subversion of its neighbors. it now has enough material for at least a dozen bombs. as the League of Nations discovered when it attempted to take action against Italy in 1935-36 for its invasion of Ethiopia. the sanction must reach a level of sufficiency. but it never impaired the North's ability to wage war given its geographic contiguity with then-ally China. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 4. and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. its opposition to the Middle East peace process. Haass. The United States discovered during the Vietnam War that mining Haiphong harbor could disrupt the North Vietnamese economy. There are several possible reasons: sanctions sometimes trigger a "rally around the flag" nationalist reaction.asp THE LIMITATIONS of sanctions are more pronounced than their accomplishments. Despite sanctions against Iran. Nov/Dec. and they create a general sense of siege that governments can exploit to maintain political control. A blockade that covers 90 per cent of the border might in the end exert zero impact on imports. 1997. Nov/Dec. Pakistan's nuclear program is well advanced. 1997. Tehran remains defiant in its support of terrorism. A total blockade is not necessary. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". they enable governments to better control the distribution of goods.N. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 5 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 3. FOREIGN POLICY. "Sanctioning Madness". statist societies are often able to hunker down and withstand the effects of sanctions. Sanctions did not persuade Haiti's junta to honor the results of the 1990 election that brought Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. THE STATES MOST LIKELY TO BE THE TARGET OF SANCTIONS ARE ALSO THE ONES ORGANIZED THE BEST TO WITHSTAND THEM BECAUSE THEY CAUSE A RALLY-AROUND-THE-FLAG EFFECT Richard N. it took nothing less than Operation Desert Storm. Fidel Castro still commands an authoritarian political system and a statist economy. THE LIMITATIONS OF SANCTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY CLEARLY OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFIT THEY MIGHT PROVIDE. This conclusion is consistent with literature suggesting that market economic reform reinforces the development of civil society. . but the sanctions must be harsh enough to have an impact. Lavin. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. nor did they convince Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs for several years to call off their military aggression. MULTIPLE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES PROVE Richard N. p. authoritarian. sanctions can work against forces promoting political pluralism. by reducing the scope for independent action. p. U. Fall 1996. sanctions failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait in 1990.asp First. "Sanctioning Madness". Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve results if the aims are large or time is short. In the end. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.
and human rights. SANCTIONS HAVE MINIMAL INFLUENCE AND ONLY MARGINALLY AFFECT VARIOUS COUNTRIES Franklin L. discouraging any support for "rogue" states' weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile programs. UNDERMINING EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MAJOR CHALLENGES TO SECURITY Richard N. Nov/Dec. 7. one of the keys to success is to target countries already burdened by other problems.asp Sanctions should not hold major or complex bilateral relationships hostage to one or two issues. SANCTIONS ARE BAD FOR FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY REDUCE VERY COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS TO BLACK AND WHITE ISSUES. p. South Africa and Nicaragua both eventually changed policies while being subjected to trade sanctions. Proponents of a continued embargo of Cuba argue that the policy will be effective now that the Soviet Union is gone and Russia can no longer subsidize the Cuban economy. Similarly. economic development.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 6 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 6. but the asphyxiation simply brought to the surface more serious preexisting problems: Each government lacked popular support and was engaged in a costly counter insurgency campaign. Lavin. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". and promoting trade. Fall 1996. FOREIGN POLICY. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. beyond the question of sufficiency and economics comes the issue of confluence: Asphyxiation can raise the cost of actions and exacerbate economic problems but is rarely successful by itself. the United States has a range of interests with Pakistan that go well beyond nuclear matters. managing the Taiwan-China situation.asp Third. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Since sanctions frequently exert only a marginal impact on a country. 1997. Haass. and regional stability. market reform. including promoting democracy. . FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. where the United States has to balance interests that include maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. This is especially true with a country like China. "Sanctioning Madness".
too. Security Council or a Soviet subsidy for a target of U. or ethnic. The media. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". silent. p. of single-issue constituencies. On paper.asp The frequency with which the United States uses sanctions is also a result of the increased influence. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. The so-called CNN effect can increase the visibility of problems in another country and stimulate Americans' desire to respond. which in the past meant a veto in the U. many people would now disagree with President Wilson's assessment. In reality.N. p. 2006. THE ACTUAL APPLICATION AND SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS FALLS SHORT OF THE IDYLLIC VIEW HELD BY ITS PROPONENTS Harry Wolff. or racially oriented causes. Echoing these sentiments. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?"." Recent congressional initiatives." are certainly constructive steps toward meaningful sanctions reform and exhibit elements that should be incorporated into the American sanctions regime. nqa. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have also contributed to the sanctions boom. 2006. several commentators have described sanctions as a halfway point between "diplomacy and military engagement. 3.lexis Senator Lugar succinctly summarized the shortcomings of unilateral sanctions during a presentation on the Senate floor by stating that "unilateral sanctions are often the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action combined with a timid desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American interests. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Sanctions can now usually be introduced without opposition from Moscow. an often-cited expert on economic sanctions quoted former President Woodrow Wilson: A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. notably those promoting human rights.S.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 7 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT 1. Haass. Sanctions offer a popular and seemingly cost-free way of acting. that is exactly how economic sanctions are supposed to function. no modern nation could resist. 1997. religious. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. and whether one accepts his words or not. KNEE-JERK RESPONSE BY THOSE UNWILLING TO TAKE RISKS Harry Wolff. economic sanctions have evolved significantly in the decades since these words were spoken in 1919. The United States should have a more organized. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted. and this statement aptly demonstrates their attractiveness to various politicians and governments over the years. . plays a part. nqa. deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. p. environmentalism. SANCTIONS ARE ONLY POPULAR BECAUSE OF MEDIA DISTORTION AND LOBBYING GROUPS 1 Richard N. in my judgment. sanctions." However. A peaceful means of bringing about change will always be a more attractive option than one that involves armed conflict. while not "cure alls. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN IMPOTENT. the end results rarely reflect President Wilson's idyllic view. 2. Nov/Dec. especially on Congress. but it brings a pressure upon the nation which. peaceful. "Sanctioning Madness".lexis In describing the laudable goals of economic sanctions to a congressional committee. flexible and proactive approach to the assessment of the effectiveness of its sanctions programs so that the results yielded are in fact worth the sacrifices made by the people of the target nation and those of American businesses shut out of the marketplace. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. Apply this economic.
Special-interest groups such as Cuban refugees in Florida.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 8 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT cont'd 4. politicians are office-seeking vote maximisers (Whaples and Heckelman. or Burmese pro-democracy activists in California. with 3 indeterminate cases. Sept. It finds that only 5 of the 40 claimed successes stand up to scrutiny. Pape. If I am right.asp In my article "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL IN THE VAST MAJORITY OF INSTANCES -. In other words. making the probability of political action in their favour likely. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (hereafter HSE). Rarick. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". the success rate has been just 5 out of 115 attempts. Many economists and political scientists agree that public choice economics. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. I also do not address the broader question of whether international economic coercion is generally more or less effective than military coercion. but rather to achieve objectives in the sanctioning country. Issue 3. Pages 65-70 Economic sanctions are frequently a response to the urgencies of the moment in international affairs (Malloy. is a contributing factor in the proliferation of economic sanctions. market failure. nor do they generally care enough to question their application. in the view of public choice advocates. Economic sanctions. Since 1985 the principal empirical basis on which advocates have promoted economic sanctions is the important study by Gary Hufbauer. Fall 1997. Public choice advocates propose that special-interest groups operating in the sanctioning country put enough pressure on politicians to impose sanctions." I ask a straightforward question: Can international economic pressure coerce target governments to change their behavior when important political interests are at stake? I do not address whether economic pressure can be effective in trade disputes. it argues that the deductive logic of the theory of economic sanctions used by HSE and most other studies of economic sanctions omits important characteristics of modern nation-states that make sanctions unlikely to become more effective in the future. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". SANCTIONS ARE NOT EVEN EFFECTIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY ARE LEVERAGED BY DOMESTIC LOBBYING INTERESTS Charles A. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) have proposed that sanctions are used because they are intended not to change behaviour in the sanctioned country. push for sanctions to advance their causes. My article challenges the validity of the HSE study. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 5. as opposed to the usual stated rationale for governmental intervention. the belief that politicians make decisions based upon self-interest. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2007. Jeffrey Schott. represent a classic case of 'government failure'. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. The benefits of their actions are concentrated and the costs are diffuse. Most citizens know very little about the sanctions. and there is no basis for even qualified optimism about the effectiveness of sanctions. . which found that between 1914 and 1990 sanctions were effective in 40 of 115 attempts.PRO-SANCTION ARGUMENTS FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE Robert A. Volume 27. or 34 percent of the total. p. Further. 2005). 2001) and in many cases are motivated by special-interest groups.
2008. I have argued that this increase in repression results from incumbent efforts to prevent the defection of core supporters and to stifle dissent in the face of declining economic conditions or growing opposition support. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. UN-backed weapons embargoes. and UN sanctions contribute to regime repression. 1976 -. preliminary assessment of these causal mechanisms supports the theory. the preliminary tests of the causal mechanisms explicated herein reveal how U. The results also reveal important information regarding the differing effects of sanctions by type and by sender. and UN sanctions contributes to increased state-sponsored repression. this article suggests that multilateral UN sanctions contribute to greater increases in repression than do unilateral sanctions from states such as the United States. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Furthermore. p. vol. however. 52. .S. Specifically.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 9 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT cont'd 6. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.asp This article has demonstrated that the imposition of U. Wood.2001". do not appear to be systematically related to changes in repression.S. QUALIFIED TESTS OF DATA SHOW STRONGLY THAT SANCTIONS INCREASE REPRESSION Reed M.
"Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Fall 1996.S. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Geography is a given. Economic sanctions against Serbia were not airtight. detractors find failed examples of each approach. THEY CANNOT UNDERCUT ITS DETERMINATION TO FIGHT WARS 2 Franklin L. but they still impoverished Serbia and drove inflation to 2. They succeeded on one level. countries will agree to subscribe to the proposed economic sanctions only when the costs are so low as to make their participation essentially symbolic. involving fuel. the denial of weaponry to Iraq was of little military significance because Iraq had stockpiled all the weapons it needed. Lavin.asp Sufficiency is determined by the degree to which the flow of goods is restricted. solidarity is dependent on allies sharing the same perception of a problem and the same prescription. 2. .asp Similarly. 3. Security Council ordered broad economic sanctions. In cases such as North Vietnam. so specialists spend time modeling the target country's autarky. for years Serbia was not hindered in its ability to meddle in Bosnia. FOREIGN POLICY.S.which compounds to about 410 quadrillion per cent a year. p. Lavin. the percentage of its gross domestic product that is derived from exports. viewed as an instant and painless way of advancing U. p.asp Asphyxiation strategy has to assess the extent to which a country's susceptibility to sanctions can be manipulated. FOREIGN POLICY. in that geography and alliance solidarity were sufficient for a near-total economic blockade of Iraq. such as Japan's support for the U. a partial success in closing the border is no success in restricting the flow of goods. nor did they have a particular impact on the war itself. interests. As with Serbia. Iraq. IRAQ PROVES THAT EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN ACHIEVE A NEAR TOTAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. Fall 1996. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Otherwise.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 10 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR 1. then did not. Economic sanctions against Cuba have existed as long as the 37-year-old Castro regime. Two core determinants of sufficiency are geography and alliance solidarity. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. but neither degraded the adversaries' ability to wage war until a number of years had passed. hard currency. THEY CANNOT INFLUENCE STATE BEHAVIOR IF THE STATE IS DETERMINED ENOUGH Franklin L. Fall 1996. A country that is landlocked or has few neighbors will be more vulnerable than one that is littoral or extensive. Lavin. the Persian Gulf war was not a war of attrition. p. Unlike World War I or the American Civil War. both actions helped cripple the targeted economies. Nonetheless. and high-tech weaponry. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". But the sanctions did not induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. after its seizure of Kuwait. yet Fidel Castro remains unchallenged. Sanctions have become the lazy man's foreign policy. blockade of Haiti. More dramatic examples of the limits of asphyxiation might be both the Allies' blockade of the Central Powers during World War I and the Union's blockade of the Confederacy during the American Civil War. GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ALL DEVASTATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS AND ARE OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF POLICYMAKERS INFLUENCE Franklin L. Thus the most important requirements for successful sanctions are largely outside the control of policymakers. The U. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN CRIPPLE A TARGET STATE'S ECONOMY. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.000 per cent a month -. FOREIGN POLICY. and so forth. stands out as an example where sanctions at first worked.N. its gasoline storage and consumption rates.
1976 -. it certainly exists and is quite straightforward: "Economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior. the HSE database reveals little or no relationship between high punishment and sanctions success. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. but also that an important part the logic of the theory is wrong. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". by persuading the target government that the issues at stake are not worth the price. A patriotic response is more likely when sanctions are imposed against leaders who enjoy broad popular support and those that rely on loyalty rather than repression to maintain their positions (Kaempfer. Castro had successfully blamed U.S. SANCTIONS ARE INCAPABLE OF MEETING THE LEVELS OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION NECESSARY TO CLASSIFY THEM AS SUCCESSES Robert A. and UN sanctions (Heine-Ellison 2001. p. There are few industries in the United States that dominate the global market and are unchallenged by foreign rivals. For instance. 98). nqa. when political and economic returns are already tied closely to ideological or ethnic loyalties. vol. 6. and Mertens 2004. 2008. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL.S. Contrary to the expectations of the theory. resulting in the establishment of a government that will make the concessions. foreign suppliers can replace the American companies with minimal damage to the target country's economy. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 5. sanctions for many of Cuba's economic woes. Pape. 52." My article shows not only that economic sanctions have rarely achieved coercive success.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 11 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR cont'd 4. Wood. Sanctions can coerce either directly. Lowenberg. When the United States imposes a unilateral export embargo. or indirectly. a strategy that had not only helped preserve his tenure in office but had made him into something of an "anti-imperialist hero" to many Cubans (Schreiber 1973.2001". 404). p.that is. CAUSING PEOPLE TO RALLY AROUND THE REGIME Reed M. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. Fall 1997. addressing it herein is problematic for a number of reasons. O'Quinn stated that: Unilateral economic sanctions are not likely to place a sufficiently large financial burden on a target country's economy to persuade its government to change objectionable policies. by inducing popular pressure to force the government to concede or by inducing a popular revolt that overthrows the government. REGIMES CAN MANIPULATE INFORMATION AND SPIN THE SANCTIONS AS IMPERIALIST ATTACKS.asp While Baldwin may not prefer the standard causal logic of economic sanctions recognized by most scholars and policymakers. demonization of the United States and its allies. . Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. First. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". p. Milosevic's manipulation of nationalist sentiment among Serbs.asp While unpacking public response to sanctions is important to understanding regime response and sanctions effectiveness. whether a sanctions event results in a "rally round the flag" effect or increases support for political opposition depends upon a variety of factors that are idiosyncratic to presanctions domestic and economic conditions within the target state.lexis In describing the minimal results from unilateral sanctions. Rallies are also more likely when sanctions are imposed during episodes of extreme ideological rivalry or ethnic conflict -. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CANNOT PLACE A HIGH ENOUGH BURDEN ON A COUNTRY'S ECONOMY TO ALTER THEIR BEHAVIOR Harry Wolff. 40). Similarly. and dissemination of propaganda about imperialist schemes "set upon suffocating the FRY economy" contributed to an initial upsurge in popular support for the regime following U. 2006.
particularly when externally imposed rules prevent the pursuit of self interest.'s actions since 1990. p. 2002. such as the decision to go to war in Iraq. Nov/Dec. The danger inherent in broad sanctions -. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. They discourage other nations from joining the United States in sanctioning problem nations based on the prospect of lucrative contracts for their own companies and citizens. in that sanctions that harm the general population can bring about undesired effects. SANCTIONS ARE WOEFULLY INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS -. . Finally. DECREASING SECURITY Harry Wolff. The current policies open the door for other nations to make foreign policy decisions on the basis of financial opportunism at the expense of their own people. Criticism of the Iraqi and North Korean sanctions policies are anecdotally more focused on the last complaint. 3. Sanctions can be a powerful and deadly form of intervention.2/ADA415058 Whether or not sanctions regimes succeed in accomplishing policy goals.dtic. and retarding the emergence of a middle class and a civil society. Recent controversies surrounding policies in the Middle East. sanctions also generally increase the suffering of the state's population. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". Among the most damning are first that sanctions can interfere with the sovereign right of states to make choices regarding their well-being. REINTRENCHING POLITICAL ELITES. accessed 12. triggering large-scale emigration.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 12 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS 1. Sanctions may degrade the ability of this very segment to resist by unintentionally targeting their means. including strengthening the regime. 1997. SANCTIONS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR BUT ARE A DEADLY FORM OF INTERVENTION THAT CREATES THE SAME EFFECTS AS WAR 3 Richard N. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". in that innocents are affected. and Algeria among others. no one likes to be told what to do in their own sandbox.5. Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq (CASI) has grown up around this policy and devotes itself to documenting the human consequences of the U. have proven that this is a dangerous reality. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. despite the fact that those sanctions have included from the outset a provision allowing Iraq to import humanitarian goods and services. p.2009: handle. CAUSING MASS SUFFERING AND RETARDING POLITICAL PROGRESS Bryan Foy. and practical. After all. "Sanctioning Madness". A possible goal of sanctions is sometimes the attempt to foment internal rebellion or precipitate pressure to change among the target nation's population. Cuba. Mass hardship can also weaken domestic and international support for sanctions. Among these are frightening infant mortality rates and grossly inadequate life and health support infrastructure. the tendency to see economic sanctions as "below" the use of military force on some imagined ladder of foreign policy escalation must be revised.asp Thus. there are some who contend that this alternative is not worth the cost. sanctions may also reduce the standard of living among the middle class professionals most likely to pressure their governments to comply with sanction requirements. often led by the economic middle classes and academics. Sanctions in general draw enduring criticism as a policy tool.mil/100. 2006. nqa. SANCTIONS FAIL AT EVERY LEVEL.THEY ONLY OPEN THE DOOR FOR OTHERS TO CIRCUMVENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. United States Army. Critics have voiced similar concerns about the effect of sanctions in North Korea. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. and while jeopardizing the security of the rest of the world.is both moral. as with Iraq. An entire website at Cambridge University. 2. Secondly.lexis It is clear that some sanctions programs have not and never will achieve the policy goals for which they were implemented. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT.beyond missing the true target -. Haass.N.
p. causing a massive exodus of Haitians to the United States that proved life-threatening for them and expensive and disruptive for Florida. convincing other nations will involve some trade-offs. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. . FOREIGN POLICY. but will bring about no change in behavior. trade sanctions can even bolster support for the targeted government by appearing to be a heavy-handed impingement upon sovereign prerogatives. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. The U. In Bosnia. July 1995. never really embraced a full embargo of South Africa in apartheid days. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. if not all. a Washington Post columnist. since Bosnia's Serbs and Croats had larger stores of military supplies and greater access to outside sources. but leaving the political establishment intact. but the income from its production and sale is denied equivalently to the sanctioning government and/or its businesses. To get all other governments to support the sanctions.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 13 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 4. weapons. "Does Saddam Hussein care that Iraqi children go to bed hungry and sick? Does Gen.S. of the other national actors must be convinced to participate. Haiti is a prime example.N. If sanctions are imposed by one country.asp A fourth determinant of success relates to the issues of national cohesion. the Soviet Union was the only other source of those same materials. "Sanctioning Madness". the arms embargo weakened the Muslims. and proportionality of the actions. and British sanctions against the white minority-ran government of Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979 stand out as an example where a government's domestic position was actually strengthened by sanctions. Raoul Cedras fret about Haitian citizens being deprived of work because he clings to power? How much does Moammar Gadhafi care that Libyans cannot travel abroad easily. destroying the economy. wreaking misery on the general population. Nov/Dec. 6. Calculate that as a cost of the embargo for the sanctioning country.S. SANCTIONS PRODUCE PERVERSE OUTCOMES AND CAN SUSTAIN GENOCIDAL CONFLICTS AND PROLIFERATION EFFORTS Richard N. At the time. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". SANCTIONS DESTROY A COUNTRIES ECONOMY AND DEVASTATE THE POPULATION WHILE KEEPING THE POLITICAL APPARATUS IN POWER AND FUNCTIONING Franklin L. internal political structure. Worse. Assuming the usual diversity of ideologies and self-interest. Jim Hoagland. 1997. not only might sales on the embargoed products be lost. Sanctions exacerbated the island's economic distress. One government exercising sanctions is a demonstration of principle. presentation of the sanctions. U. A product (oil. partly because of a fear of retaliation that would have been a disaster for American industry and perhaps the military. weaponry and dramatically weakened Pakistan's confidence in Washington. USA TODAY. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". South Africa always has been the source of metals necessary in aircraft production. 5. Fall 1996. equipment) is to be denied to the sanctioned country. even in emergencies?" Trade sanctions can function like a neutron bomb. p.asp SANCTIONS OFTEN produce unintended and undesirable consequences. asks. Lavin. Military sanctions against Pakistan may actually have increased Islamabad's reliance on a nuclear option because they cut off its access to U. but the sanctioned nation might and probably will retaliate if possible.asp Here are a few of the problems to be faced: Most. These costs must be factored in. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE ENFORCED ENTIRELY AND RETALIATION COSTS CAN HARM THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE SANCTIONING STATE Llewellyn D Howell. This military imbalance contributed to the fighting and to the disproportionate Muslim suffering. something must be given up or some price must be paid. Economic sanctions always involve something lost for both sides. p. Haass.
China is now a major political supporter of the Burma regime and a supplier of military weapons (Roy. forcing it to form relationships with other countries. providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to challenge the status quo (Allen 2007. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Senders are sometimes acutely aware of the negative impact of sanctions on either elite supporters or the general population and attempt to exploit domestic political tensions created by the uneven distribution of sanctions costs through public dissent. 263. 2008. 2004). "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent. 2006). Rarick. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2007. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. coup. 1976 -. In this case. p. 2007. as relative depravation increases and the economic distance between elites and citizens widen. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". vol. Volume 27. Olson 1979).51. SANCTIONS REINFORCE ANIMOSITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND PUSH ROGUE REGIMES CLOSER TOGETHER Charles A. he argues. 52. a "rally round the flag" promotes loyalty to the regime (Cortright and Lopez 2000. the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister recently visited Burma and expressed Russia's support for the regime and interest in increasing its economic and political connections (Aye. Rarick. between the two great emerging countries of China and India. In addition to the potential economic loss to the United States due to Cuban sanctions. in the case of Burma. For example. US economic sanctions have closed American opportunities in that country and strained diplomatic relations with the current regime. SANCTIONS EITHER BACKFIRE ENTIRELY OR THE REGIME RESORTS TO EVEN MORE EXTREME ACTIONS Reed M. Burma has a strategic location. SANCTIONS ARE STRATEGICALLY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE THEY PUSH THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE REGION OF CONCERN AND MOVE THE ENEMY REGIME CLOSER TO POWERFUL ALLIES Charles A. or revolution in order to achieve policy goals (Nossal 1994. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. In addition.2001". 8. Wood. Combining Venezuela's oil wealth with Castro's political skills could begin a renewed campaign of anti-American sentiment in the region (Barrionuevo and de Cordoba. is to look at the effectiveness of the sanctions compared to the political cost to the sender government. Rowe 2001).asp Citizens can respond to sanctions either by increasing their support for the sanctioned regime or by withdrawing their support for the incumbent in favor of a challenger. Issue 3. 48 -. 2005). Sept. the development of closer ties between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez is troubling for political watchers of Latin American politics. the more intense the repression the regime must employ to maintain stability. Pages 65-70 Sanctions have also caused closer ties between Cuba and other troubling regimes in the region and beyond. Pages 65-70 A better approach. US economic sanctions have resulted in a closer relationship between Burma and China. If the incumbent successfully shifts blame for deteriorating economic conditions to the sender nation. Issue 3. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. Galtung 1967). Volume 27. Sept. Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thus.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 14 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 7. 9. .
states should be aware of the implications of the signal that they send with this type of policy. as expected under the logic of the signaling argument. when democracies.Where we differ is in the costliness of sanctions. it appears that sanctions have not typically served as an effective signal of resolve. Lektzian & Christopher M. Others (Drezner 2003. Because sanctions are predominantly used in a manner that minimizes costs to the sender and maximizes costs to the target. resulting in an increased probability of war accompanying the use of sanctions. Sprecher. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY SIGNAL WEAKER RESOLVE BECAUSE IT SEEMS LIKE THE SANCTIONING STATE IS COST-AVERSE. we find that when you see a sanction. p. As such. our theory and empirical analysis show that. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. However. send externally weak signals with costless sanctions. Costs are generally thought of as something to be avoided. they tend to send a signal of weakness rather than strength. Gartzke. Lektzian & Christopher M. "Sanctions.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 15 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 10. if sanctions can be devised to be costly to the sending country. and Militarized Conflict". Signals. INCREASING PROBABILITY OF WAR David J. A final irony is that touting sanctions as a policy alternative to war may make their signaling properties even weaker. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. April 2007. 11. and Boehmer (2001) say that it was not out of the question that military force might have been used by the United States to block British and French efforts in the Suez crisis. For example. Our conclusion is not that costly signaling arguments about sanctions are incorrect. Therefore. Thus. Li. Li. "Sanctions. Moreover. there is a significantly increased probability that a militarized dispute will follow. but that sanctions tend to send a signal of weakness rather than strength. as a value forgone. Gartzke.asp The findings of this article are supportive of the logic developed in signaling arguments of the causes of war. In conclusion. . We find the signaling logic to be supported by our research. Morgan and Schwebach 1997) have proposed that sanctions will reduce the probability of conflict because of the costly nature of their signal. and Militarized Conflict". but when establishing the credibility of commitments (sending credible signals) they are actually desirable. sanctions increase the probability of conflict. Sprecher. we would caution that while it may enhance the probability of success if senders employ sanctions in a way that maximizes the cost to the target while minimizing the cost to themselves. which are the primary users of sanctions. and Boehmer 2001.asp Costs play a paradoxical role in augmenting the credibility of commitments. April 2007. Signals. they are even more conflict prone due to their propensity to generate internal audience costs that prevent them from backing down. SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE RISKS FOR WAR BECAUSE THEY SHOW WEAKNESS INSTEAD OF RESOLVE BECAUSE THEY ARE SUCH LOW-RISK OPTIONS David J. they will decrease the probability of militarized conflicts. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. consistent with signaling arguments. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. p.
Issue 3. a delay in lifting sanctions cost American business an opportunity. The current wave of sanctions began in 1980 when President Jimmy Carter imposed a grain embargo on the former Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. government budget tables. however. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. they do not show up in U. some of it was purchased by the government and placed in storage at a cost to the taxpayer of billions of dollars (USA Engage. perhaps because. Vietnam Airlines continued to purchase from Airbus. 2. unlike the costs of military intervention.S. Sept. 2007. wreaking havoc with normal commercial relations. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Airbus. Rarick. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Moreover. this cost is difficult to measure because it includes not only lost sales but also forfeited opportunities: governments and overseas companies can elect not to do business with the United States for fear that sanctions might one day be introduced. 2006). resulting in lost sales to Boeing of an estimated $1.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 16 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST 1. In addition to the immediate loss of sales. 1997. affect the economy by reducing revenues of U. Pages 65-70 Economic sanctions harm American business interests and generally do not achieve their intended objectives. 2006). The estimated value of the lost sales was $2-3 billion. since excess grain was being produced by the farmers. Since the United States was not the only source of grain. sanctions can be expensive for American business. Sanctions did not stop the pipeline but did give European and Japanese companies an opportunity to gain experience in Arctic drilling. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 2006). US policy-makers feared that a pipeline from the Soviet Union to Europe would make Europeans too dependent on Russian energy. SANCTIONS ARE NOT ABLE TO SLOW DOWN EVENTS AND DISADVANTAGE AMERICAN BUSINESS BY MAKING THEM UNCOMPETITIVE Charles A. Sept. Rarick. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". In another case. . SANCTIONS IMPOSE DRAMATIC COSTS ON AMERICAN BUSINESSES. Pages 65-70 Also in the 1980s the United States began to prohibit the exporting of equipment used to build the Siberian pipeline. Boeing negotiated a lease agreement with Vietnam Airlines. Issue 3. Volume 27. companies and individuals. the American company Caterpillar held the dominant position in heavy machinery sales to the Soviet Union.6 billion (USA Engage. Nov/Dec. Also during this time. Sanctions do. The grain embargo did not get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. With the prospects of trade normalisation with Vietnam. sanctions run the risk of portraying American suppliers as unreliable sources and thereby deterring future sales. Volume 27. "Sanctioning Madness". Moreover. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE THEIR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSE WHILE COSTING THE UNITED STATES BILLIONS Charles A. the Soviet Union simply purchased it from other countries.S. The pipeline sanctions prevented Caterpillar from selling to the Soviets and their sizeable sales went instead to Caterpillar's main Japanese competitor (USA Engage. perhaps enough for the project to be abandoned. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. When the lifting of the embargo was delayed. The embargo brought protests from American farmers who stood to lose sales of 25 million tons of wheat and corn. p. and to become competitors to US firms on future international construction projects. WHICH IN TURN CAN UNDERMINE THE NATIONAL INTEREST Richard N. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. but did act as a form of foreign aid to our competitors in agricultural products. but far from least. Vietnam Airlines instead got its aircraft from Boeing's main competitor.asp Last. 3. There is a tendency to overlook or underestimate the direct costs of sanctions. The US sanctions were intended to slow progress on construction of the pipeline. 2007. Haass.
Sept.asp The purposes for which sanctions are employed are hardly trivial. Auburn University at Montgomery. and usually don't achieve their objectives.000 worth of trade a year and nearly 200. Moreover. Pages 65-70 According to Losman (1998). The Institute for International Economics has released a study indicating that they cost American exporters at least $19. The fine could be assessed even if the citizen was unaware of the sanction (Duncan. Also. While many sanctions are imposed for good causes. unilateral sanctions exact a serious price. such as the reduction of drug trafficking. 1997. 1998) making life very difficult for ordinary citizens. Issue 3. that is not the case. and the pain they cause.000 jobs.000. Issue 3. however. Volume 27.000 JOBS James A. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. USA TODAY. Sanctions undermine the economic freedom of American businesses and citizens.000. it is an American interest to live in a world with reduced brutality and fewer war-like potentates. 1997). The costs of economic sanctions. to allies and competitors. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". . In September of 2002. The Oasis Hotel was blacklisted by the US government under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and any American who was found doing business with the hotel was subject to a $1 million fine. Rarick. Rarick. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. cause unnecessary pain and suffering in foreign countries. 2005). Boycotts and other 'supply interruptions' produce significant consumer welfare loss in the sanctioned country (Fershtman and Gandal. After all. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ALSO IMPOSE MASSIVE ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY INFLICTING UNNECESSARY COERCION IN ADDITION TO PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE SANCTIONED STATE Charles A. Direct costs of sanctions are loss of sales and earnings. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar. Consider the case of the Oasis Hotel and Convention Center near Tijuana. and increased lobbying expense to avoid sanctions. Volume 27.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 17 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST cont'd 4. potential costs arise as indigenous firms develop in the sanctioned market to fill the void left by foreign companies and then become future competitors. THE UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS COSTS THE UNITED STATES NEARLY 20 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR AND OVER 200. commerce with about 42% of the world's population is left. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. perhaps irretrievably. loss of asset value in the targeted countries and reduced employment. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Politicians increasingly use economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool because they are viewed as cheaper and cleaner than military action (Haass. could perhaps be justified if their success rate was particularly high. Sept. Although cheaper and cleaner than military action. the cost of sanctions to American businesses can be divided into three types. 6. the collateral damage they do has made their use controversial. Nathan. economic sanctions deprive the liberty of the citizens of both the sanctioned and sanctioning countries. Pages 65-70 The growing use of economic sanctions also reduces consumer choice and makes American consumers potential criminals. 2007. Nevertheless. Mexico. 2007. p. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". 5. US Customs agents passed out flyers to American citizens crossing the border into Mexico warning them not to do business with this hotel. Indirect costs include higher costs due to lower production runs and lower economies of scale. THE LEVELS AND TYPES OF COSTS THAT SANCTIONS IMPOSE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS ARE DRAMATIC AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED CONSIDERING THEIR POOR SUCCESS RATE Charles A. Sept.
lexis How do these sanctions affect American business interests? While difficult to approximate. This statement. several recent projections suggest that they have a considerable impact on American companies. One commentator dubbed "American companies and their workers. and that this has resulted in the loss of between 200. is founded on legitimate concerns. nqa. suppliers.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 18 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST cont'd 7. 2006. p. while perhaps overly dramatic.000 jobs! Other estimates have placed the one-year export losses in excess of $ 30 billion. One estimate has predicted that these programs cost $ 15-19 billion per year in lost export revenues. the residual losses of subsequent maintenance. service and replacement contracts is even more damaging in the long run. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEVASTATE THE ECONOMY BECAUSE THEY COST US BILLIONS IN LOST REVENUES AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF JOBS Harry Wolff. Commentators have also pointed out that while the loss of the initial sale in a sanctioned country can be a major loss to an American company. . HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. and shareholders" "friendly-fire casualties" of sanctions policy.000 and 250.
leaders must spend resources on public goods rather than reserving goods for private consumption or transferring them to their supporters. Mexicans.2001". Such was the case in Rhodesia where the Smith regime increasingly shifted the costs of sanctions away from key supporters and onto the black community. Despite some loud grumbling. THE POLITICAL PRESSURE THAT SANCTIONS MIGHT HAVE DOESN'T OCCUR IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHICH MEANS REGIME CHANGE WON'T HAPPEN Reed M. Sanctions on Cuba placate a well-organized domestic contingency of Cuban-Americans. civilian airplanes.S. vol. Nathan. sanctions imposed on democrats are generally both shorter and more likely to prompt concessions or promote regime change compared with those imposed on autocracies (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000. In order for them to be effective. autocrats attempt to transfer costs away from key political elites and onto other groups within the state. Incumbents therefore have an incentive to shield these political elites from the adverse effects of sanctions. this means shifting costs downward to the majority non-elite population. and Canadians. Indeed. sanctions costs are typically unevenly distributed across groups. 1976 -. While they may irritate Europeans.asp Sanctions have become a habit. they must impact on the decision-makers. Between stockpiling and smuggling. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. HARSH REGIMES CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE ALREADY ECONOMICALLY ISOLATED AND CAN EASILY FEND OFF CHALLENGES Llewellyn D Howell. once sanctions are in place.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 19 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES 1. the issues are small and symbolic and. 9 Institutional constraints determine the ability of leaders to redistribute costs. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". on the other hand. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar. USA TODAY. Marinov 2005). and Iraq are supported widely by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. maintain power explicitly through the support and loyalty of a coalition of key political elites. 2. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". Hence. Auburn University at Montgomery. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. oil services. hence. Autocrats. When faced with resource constraints.asp Economic sanctions ordinarily are intended to bring about changes in political decision-making. U. the decision-makers are shielded from much of the impact of sanctions that are directed at such items as fuel. Similarly. raising the probability that the incumbent is removed from office. 19). Iran. sanctions against Libya. Notwithstanding whether they "work" or not. For American lawmakers. sanctions frequently are easy means of dealing with powerful single-issue lobbies. 3. July 1995. p. 1997. If economic sanctions reduce the level of goods available for public consumption. and banking. where there is little responsiveness of the government to the citizenry. Sept. p. Indeed. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. further exacerbating its deprivation (Rowe 2001. 52. Wood.asp The level of coercion necessary to prevent defections varies according to the severity of the sanctions as well as the domestic political institutions of the target. trading partners. .S. Especially with authoritarian governments. Olson 1979. In democracies. USA TODAY. Many economists argue that there often is no such connection. unilateral measures frequently present competitors with easier access to markets they otherwise would struggle to enter such as military materiel. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. it is rare that American sanctions are actively opposed by U. leading to suffering for some and minimizing the costs to (or even benefiting) others (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999. Often. Rowe 2001). 2008. they create their own constituency. unlikely to precipitate dramatic retribution. governments such as those of Serbia or the military regime of Haiti easily can survive most sanctions that are likely to be imposed. voters are increasingly likely to defect from the incumbent to the challenger. p. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AND ACTUALLY AID IN INCREASING MARKET ACCESS FOR TARGETED REGIMES James A.
"'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. AS RESTRICTIONS DRAIN RESOURCES AWAY FROM LEADERSHIP. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. sanctions threaten target regimes when they increase the relative power of the opposition. p. 1999. They likewise affect the ability of incumbents to use repression as a strategy to compel cooperation from a civilian population (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). vol. sanctions are arguably more likely to contribute to increased instability and repression in the immediate while failing to achieve significant policy concessions in the long run. Sanctions threaten regime stability because they have the potential to alter economic structures and political alignments within the target state.2001". 1976 -. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. they may embolden political opposition groups and/or generate public dissent. and Elliott 1990a. repression might increase in the immediate only to fall after sanctions succeed in altering the policies of target regimes or in ousting targeted leaders.that is. In short. Wood. and Mertens 2004. IT ONLY RESULTS IN BIGGER CRACKDOWNS AND REPRESSION AS THEY ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH CONTROL Reed M. Lektzian and Souva 2003). institutions determine incumbents' ability to allocate resources and redistribute costs (Bueno de Mesquita et al. This scenario is particularly likely given that observed sanctions generally fall on the hardest cases (Drezner 2003. The threat of political instability leads incumbents to augment their level of repression in order to secure the regime.asp I begin with two related assumptions informed by the literature on threat and regime-sponsored repression: (1) instability increases incumbent perceptions of threat and (2) increased threat perception contributes to increased repression. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. 52. vol. Kaempfer. p. the likelihood of defections increase. 52. or encourage defections from the regime's coalition of supporters (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. p. given their low success rate (Hufbauer. THEY REACT BY TIGHTENING THEIR GRIP ON SOCIETY Reed M. Second. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE A REGIME. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. as well as their duration (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000. targeted leaders increase their level of repression in order to deter threats and stabilize the regime. 6. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.asp Sanctions could thus succeed both in attaining policy concessions and result in increased repression -. THE INCREASED REPRESSION ISN'T ONLY SHORT-TERM GIVEN HOW LIKELY IT IS THAT SANCTIONS WILL FAIL Reed M. 1999. sanctions constrain the target leader's budget and restrict the flow of resources to supporters. Olson 1979). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This effect is significantly influenced however by the political institutions of the target state. In order to deter defections and maintain stability. 5. Specifically. In response. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. However. contribute to social upheaval and dissent. Schott. McGillivray and Stam 2004). target incumbents in turn augment their level of repression. 2003). First. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. vol. Marinov 2005). 2008. Finally. 2008.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 20 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES cont'd 4. 2008. Political structures influence the probability that a state is the target of a sanctions event (Cox and Drury 2006. Wood. Pape 1997).asp The first element of the theory constructed herein is that sanctions contribute to state-sponsored repression by constraining the resource flows of target leaders. Lowenberg.2001". I identify two key mechanisms through which sanctions can contribute to instability and generate threat to the incumbent regime. Wood. 1976 -. Relying on elements of both the public choice and institutional constraints literatures. I argue that as sanctions reduce the ability of incumbents to provide resources to supporters. thereby increasing the likelihood of defection from the incumbent's winning coalition to a challenger. Marinov 2005. . 1976 -. 52.2001".
2001". A rally effect therefore would presumably not lead to increased repression. and therefore stability increases (Kaempfer. This strategy shores up support for the regime and may permit it to effectively undermine opposition groups (Cortright and Lopez 2000. vol. SANCTIONS INCITE NATIONALIST REACTIONS. 52. While there is evidence that sanctions increase dissent (Allen 2007. . Rowe 2001).asp The argument presented above assumes that sanctions increase the probability of regime defection and ? or popular dissent. 2008. and Mertens 2004). 1976 -. By strategically stoking nationalist sentiment the incumbent may successfully shift blame to the sender. Lowenberg. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Galtung 1967). p. Wood. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. CAUSING THE PEOPLE TO RALLY AROUND THE LEADERSHIP Reed M.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 21 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES cont'd 7. and in fact might lower repression as loyalty to the regime. rallies are not uncommon in sanctioned states (Cortright and Lopez 2000). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
p.S. Coercing a state to reduce import duties on wine is fundamentally different than persuading it to surrender a part of its territory. Economically. covert action. including military intervention.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 22 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR 1. the Soviets easily found other suppliers. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Yet without their support the blockade is meaningless. public and private diplomacy. because it requires a leap of faith that the determinants of a state's decisionmaking in different policy realms are the same.SANCTIONS LOSE OUT TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVES 4 Richard N. Pape. interests should compare favorably to the projected consequences of all other options. government and the American economy. We can argue about how many categories of international coercion we should recognize and where we should divide them. Disrupting trade hurts all of the target country's trading partners as well. The same holds for sanctions. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.asp A FUNDAMENTAL change in thinking and attitude is required. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE ARE NOT EFFECTIVE REGARDLESS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE SPHERE OF COMMERCE BECAUSE THE INTERESTS AT STAKE ARE MUCH HIGHER Robert A. but the United States found no alternative buyers. SANCTIONS ARE THE LEAST COST EFFECTIVE TOOL IN PROMOTING FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. but simply abandoning categorization would not be useful. the sanction's likely effect on U. sanctions can hurt the target country less than the implementing country. A smaller country will have difficulty enduring economic disruption. But in order to deprive the target country of $1 million worth of petroleum. 2.asp Accepting Baldwin's approach as a design for a research program would be a mistake. or simply doing nothing. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". one key to analyzing the relative disruption of sanctions is to compare the size of the target country's economy with that of the implementer. foreign policy should be greater than the anticipated costs to the U. Fall 1997. CAUSING ECONOMIC BLOWBACK THAT HARMS THE SANCTIONING STATE MORE THAN THE OFFENDER Franklin L. including the use of military force. MORALIST CRUSADING SHOULD HAVE NO PLACE IN FOREIGN POLICY -. Fall 1996. Economic sanctions are a serious instrument of foreign policy and should be employed only after consideration no less rigorous than for other forms of intervention. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.S. but it is much more difficult for the neighboring states of Bulgaria. The likely benefits of a particular sanction to U. FOREIGN POLICY. or Romania to do so. 1997. its purpose is not to make us feel good but to do good.S. 3. Broad sanctions should not be used as a means of expression. Scholars study economic sanctions and trade disputes as separate categories because there are good reasons to believe that the variables that dominate target states' decisionmaking in response to different types of demands are often different. Haass. It is easy for the United States to support an economic blockade against Serbia. Greece. p. When the United States imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980. "Sanctioning Madness". Foreign policy is not therapy. Hungary. Therefore. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". Moreover. causing maybe $100 million worth of damage. Nov/Dec. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. . A $1 million cruise missile can paralyze a target country's communication network. not least because the second demand is likely to engage nationalist sentiments far more deeply than the first and more likely to be perceived as threatening the physical security of the citizens. Lavin.asp The assessment of sanctions' impact should go beyond these criteria for disrupting the target country's economy to consider the relative disruption: Will the target country be hurt more than the implementer or the implementing alliance? There is a Newtonian dynamic to sanctions: Every action has an equal and opposite reaction that can make it less cost-effective than a military attack. p. it could cost the implementer $1 million in foregone profits.
Its principal advantage is that it might have a more desirable impact at less cost to Americans and American foreign policy. Haass. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". CEO of Chevron. As this argument goes. A policy of engagement may produce better results in some of the cases than imposing economic sanctions. because alternatives emerge. growth destabilizes the traditional order by creating "increased diversity -. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business"." Second. prosperity creates a group that seeks greater political freedoms. p. ENHANCING ECONOMIC ACCESS IS KEY TO ACHIEVING SOCIAL CHANGE. . Iran.-of occupations and status . NOT CUTTING PEOPLE OFF WITH SANCTIONS BECAUSE IT OVERCOMES THE TRADITIONAL ORDER AND THE RULING REGIME'S MONOPOLY ON POWER Franklin L. Rarick. Pages 65-70 It has been argued that political change may best be achieved through economic opportunity. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. "America needs to recognize. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ARE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSES THAN ISOLATION AND SANCTIONS Charles A. nor does it yield as dramatic a sound bite. The "oxygen" school is backed by several arguments." editorialized the Economist. . especially if the goal is to weaken the near-monopoly of an authoritarian leadership over a country like Cuba. involving a mix of narrow sanctions and limited political and economic interactions that are conditioned on specified behavioral changes. The government loses some of its appeal and legitimacy as an employer or a benefactor. Sept. Volume 27. FOREIGN POLICY. 5. Lavin. sees three reasons for this connection. Such an approach is not as simple as imposing economic sanctions. development ends isolation. 1997. observed: 'Once the free market genie is out of the bottle. which is a common objective of economic sanctions. First. "that nothing on earth but fast economic growth has the power to shift whole societies for the better more or less overnight. Advancement is no longer determined by the degree to which people follow a party line or a government's dictates.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 23 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR cont'd 4.asp The principal alternative to economic sanctions is best described as constructive or conditional engagement. ALTERATIVE POLICY RESPONSES LIKE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ARE FAR MORE SUPERIOR THAN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Richard N. A fourth development from economic progress is that government no longer holds a monopoly over socioeconomic mobility. 6. Thus neither highly centralized role nor self-sufficient localism is any longer adequate. Fall 1996. "Sanctioning Madness". ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Such an approach. it's hard to keep the hunger for political freedom bottled up' (Derr. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Issue 3. p. writing in the July 1993 Journal of Democracy. economic freedom and development lead people to expect better government. while speaking on the topic of economic sanctions.asp Oxygen. 2007. Kenneth Derr. 1998). The most common one holds that greater economic activity will lead to positive political consequences. or China. rather than economic pain. authority must be divided and shared in complex ways. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. might be preferable. Nov/Dec. ." Asia scholar Robert Scalapino. And third.
p. To that end. if such sanctions trigger domestic dissent they may yet result in an unintended regime backlash. 52. Hafner-Burton 2005). 1976 -.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 24 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR cont'd 7. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IS A SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE IT AVOIDS REGIME BACKLASH AND REPRESSION Reed M. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression.may contribute to alterations in regime policy preferences without harming civilians. noneconomic sanctions tools such as arms embargoes or bans on participation in international sporting events -. For instance. vol. constructive engagement offers a more incentive-based approach to convincing states to respect international law and human rights and may prove more effective in achieving policy outcomes (Drury and Li 2006. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2008.2001".such as those imposed on South Africa and the former Yugoslavia -. .asp Finally. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Wood. this article provides additional evidence of the need to develop new strategies of coercive diplomacy that better shield civilians from sanctions fallout. Consequently. while traditional tools of economic statecraft may result in significant collateral damage. a wealth of opportunity exists for research into alternative tools for promoting state respect for human rights or other changes in target state policies without endangering civilians. However.
executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. the school notes that the oxygen approach is more humane since it is likely to improve the day-to-day lives of people in the subject country.asp Oxygen supporters argue that.asp In the oxygen camp. . "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". 2. Lavin. familiarity can be gained and mutual benefits dramatized through economic activity. Autocratic governments can be induced to behave better by the successful demonstration of open economic arrangements. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". The autocratic leadership in these two countries could relax political controls with a fair amount of confidence in continued domestic stability as the countries were enjoying substantial economic success. Economic growth promoted the establishment of an educated middle class that sought and received more political freedoms. p. ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS MORE EFFECTIVE AT INDUCING BEHAVIORAL CHANGES Franklin L. Lavin. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. FOREIGN POLICY. SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S TRANSITIONS SHOW THAT ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS A BETTER SOLUTION THAN SANCTIONS Franklin L. Fall 1996.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 25 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS SUPERIOR TO SUFFOCATION 1. Finally. most analysts of South Korea and Taiwan conclude that their moves toward democracy and a Western-style human rights standard were facilitated by their prosperity in the 1980s. FOREIGN POLICY. Trade is a confidence-building measure. beyond prosperity. p. Fall 1996.
"Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HUMANITARIAN ITEMS ARE EXEMPT Llewellyn D Howell. Although the initial political problems that prompted the economic sanctions have been rectified. Fall 1996. SANCTIONS ATTACK THE MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION. Sept. SANCTIONS ARE INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED AND UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY BUILDING EFFORTS BY HURTING THE MOST VULNERABLE PARTS OF THE POPULATION Charles A. Issue 3. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". lingering economic underperformance. will the cost to those not involved in the policy origination be too great? Will it even be considered and included in the sanction equation? It was argued that this was the problem with the embargo on Haiti. p. Rarick. p. USA TODAY. they might also be reminders that crippled economies do not recover easily. Although U. combined with weighty popular expectations. Indeed. . 2005). "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". the Chinese people want democratic reform as much as the Burmese. Economic sanctions deprive the people of the sanctioned country their basic right to a better standard of living. Asphyxiation is premised on a philosophy of making things worse before they get better and of inflicting hardship on a broad population. the people of the receiving country suffer from this form of foreign policy.S. might prove harmful to the new majority government of Nelson Mandela. 2007. the economic disruptions will remain long after the political dispute has ended -. Typically. Even if state behavior is altered. July 1995. SANCTIONS CRIPPLE THE ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE OF A COUNTRY.and long after Haiti has been forgotten. In the case of China. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. however. Just as Nicaragua and South Africa might stand as examples of countries where economic manipulation worked. Democratic countries impose sanctions more than non-democratic countries and are more likely to impose those sanctions on non-democratic regimes (Lektzian and Souva.asp Sanctions have a moral dimension. and those most harmed are the average citizenry and the poor. in the case of South Africa. the economic hardship will be felt for years. 2. Volume 27. While sanctions may make the sender country feel good about doing something. no similar sanctions are imposed on China. Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Lavin. as witnessed by the mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 26 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS 1. It didn't affect the ruling military junta. Democratic governments have a self-interest in maintaining non-interference in each other's economies. those most shielded from the economic penalties often are those at the source of the policy that the sanctioner is trying to change. 3. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. Pages 65-70 The public choice economics argument would also point out that economic sanctions are not applied universally. but impacted the poor to make them even poorer. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.asp Who is harmed by sanctions? While food and medicines usually are exempted from embargoes and other sanctions. FOREIGN POLICY. 2003). those hurt the most by sanctions are the people the sanctions were intended to help (Major and McGann. Politicians have imposed sanctions on Cuba and Burma for their undemocratic governments and human rights abuses.-backed sanctions were imposed on Haiti for only three years. TAKING A LONG TIME TO RECOVER AND HURTING THE HEALTH OF THE POPULATION IN THE LONGTERM Franklin L.
minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. p. 1976 -. 2008. 5. causes long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations.asp In September 2007. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) concluded that sanctions have resulted in only minimal political dividends with exhorbitant human costs (Schaar.2001". vol. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. The City University of New York. The empirical results support this theory. Weiss. and physical hardship on civilian populations. 1995. vol. and suppress popular dissent. In response. The governing military junta responded by brutally repressing the demonstrations. 1995). Consequently. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has viewed sanctions as yet another of the 'hard choices' facing humanitarians (Minear. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali captured the troubling tensions of a 'blunt instrument' that afflicts vulnerable groups. EXPERIENCE WITH BURMA SHOWS HOW SANCTIONS INCREASE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENT REPRESSION WITHIN A STATE Reed M. The Graduate Center. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. von Braunmuhl & Kulessa. 1999. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. Various sanctions imposed by the United States and EU since the mid-1990s have exacerbated the nation's economic deterioration and have ultimately contributed to the regime's unpopular economic policies. conditions likely to worsen if additional sanctions were imposed on the fragile economy. complicates the work of humanitarian agencies. THEY CAUSE A GREATER INCREASE IN REPRESSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Reed M. 6. protect core supporters. SANCTIONS ARE A BLUNT INSTRUMENT THAT PUNISH THE MOST VULNERABLE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY Thomas G. 1998). "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". Specifically. He stopped short of rejecting sanctions but urged reforms. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. 1995) have been exacerbated because sanctions often entail such civilian suffering as to overshadow any potential political success (Muller & Muller. 52.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 27 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS cont'd 4. sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. 1976 -. and penalizes neighbors (Boutros. as has the Red Cross Movement. 1999). Wood.2001". levying stronger economic sanctions against Burma is perhaps a paradoxical response. social. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. democracy activists and Buddhist monks staged large-scale protests throughout Rangoon. 1995: 25-28. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression.000 in prison camps outside the capital. 2008. 52. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE REGIMES.asp While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention. greater sanctions may simply induce greater levels of repression. Recent political unrest in the country is driven largely by conditions of extreme poverty and chronic underdevelopment.asp Growing misgivings about consistency and transparency (Conlon. which recently sparked mass protests and the subsequent violent crackdown.Ghali. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. . They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability. paragraphs 66-76). p. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. the United States and several European nations threatened to tighten unilateral sanctions and urged the United Nations to impose multilateral sanctions on Burma. While a show of international support for the protesters and a strong symbolic condemnation of the regime were well-warranted. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. p. Wood. killing as many as 138 protesters and detaining up to 10. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.
" or at the least that they are not unwittingly bolstering distasteful policies. peaceful. SANCTIONS ARE A KEY FOREIGN POLICY TOOL BECAUSE THEY STOP SHORT OF WAR. 3. 2. Third. by definition." Eight cases represent mere restrictions on U. silent. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. or at least low cost. Woodrow Wilson summed up the appeal of economic sanctions. If the United States is going to undertake business activities in a foreign country. of course." First. Jan/Feb 1999. so they attempt to confuse the issue with cooked-up data and claims of an epidemic. Second. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. not an entire industry. p.an amoral foreign policy. THE MOST AMORAL FOREIGN POLICY Jesse Helms. According to the lobbyists. tortures its people. compliance with U. FOREIGN POLICY. Nigeria. the measure declaring Sudan a terrorist state is counted five different times. Sudan.asp The economic role of foreign policy continues to attract considerable interest. SANCTIONS OFTEN UPHOLD MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT AND ARE KEY TO TARGET SPECIFIC PRACTICES THAT SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED Jesse Helms. THE AFF SEEKS TO PRESERVE THE FLEXIBILITY OF ROGUES WHO PROLIFERATE WMD. not national interests. Haiti. p.asp But what about those 41 "sanctions" imposed by the executive branch? Five are not unilateral. Thirteen affect only a specific foreign company or person -. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". including a November 1994 executive order that even NAM concedes in fine print "did not impose any specific new sanctions on any countries. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. "What Sanctions Epidemic?".asp What these lobbyists really dislike is not the idea of sanctions themselves but the reason some sanctions are imposed. For example. but rather represent U.S. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". They establish groups with clever monikers like "USA Engage. Americans would like to be assured that such actions are "helpful. Lavin. identifying it each time as a separate sanction. stating that they are an "economic. it is a normal human desire to want to be aware of the moral consequences and propriety of one's actions. foreign aid. the use of economic policy to advance foreign policy goals is perceived to be cost free. But. the NAM study counts the same sanction repeatedly. But what they really stand for is not engagement but mercantilism -. or supports terrorists. banning imports from the Chinese Qinghai Hide and Garment Factory for its use of prison slave labor or seizing the assets of individual Colombian drug traffickers. the United States should be hamstrung when a government proliferates weapons of mass destruction. Jan/Feb 1999. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. as NAM charges. COMMIT GENOCIDE. TORTURE THEIR PEOPLE AND SUPPORT TERRORISTS. In seven cases. Five are limited bans affecting only military exports to Zaire. Fall 1996.N. They tacitly admit that sanctions work but insist that sanctions are good only if they defend business interests. the business lobbyists cannot say that. commits genocide.for example.S. it is less brutal and thus more acceptable than military conflict.not an entire country. but one specific entity -. ARE LOW COST AND ARE MORAL Franklin L." whose very name implies that those who disagree with them are isolationists.multilateral. America should throw the book at it. Security Council sanctions -. and Angola. But if that same government floods the American market with cheap television sets. NAM lists two cases when no sanction was ever imposed. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 28 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1. . deadly enemy.
military training and education.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 29 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 4." Short of war. Not surprisingly.that violates important international standards or threatens U. The City University of New York. and to the other end open hostility. the U.asp Whether sanctions 'succeed' depends on the goals against which they are measured. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law". THEY SERVE MANIFOLD FOREIGN POLICY GOALS THAT ARE IMPORTANT Thomas G. p. "the history of U. The Graduate Center. p. demonstrate resolve to allies or domestic constituents. individuals. The U. Although analyses often note the importance of other goals. for example. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. No wonder business lobbyists are so keen to retain unilateral sanctions in the trade arsenal -. at governments that conduct aggression against their neighbors. threaten regional stability. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS. sanctions are the main leverage the United States has over China. they may also deter other potential offenders. or businesses -. they never examine them in any detail. Nov. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". Beyond officially declared purposes. are the linchpin of our nonproliferation policy. at governments. at individuals or governments that traffic narcotics. 1999. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY POLICY TOOL TO TRY AND STOP HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND WMD PROLIFERATION Dianne E. national interests. 1999. or threaten U. Rennack. government might impose sanctions when other efforts to change behavior have failed. trade representative threatened $1. in fact. individuals or corporations that engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. state visits. public suasion. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. or all-out war. 6. They have also played a crucial role in trade disputes.asp Unilateral sanctions. EVEN IF SANCTIONS DON'T ACHIEVE THE INTENDED RESULT. The threat of unilateral sanctions on China over intellectual property rights and unfair trade barriers has forced China several times to yield. such an agreement was struck on January 16.5 billion in trade sanctions if an intellectual property rights agreement was not reached by January 1992.its government. According to a recently declassified analysis by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. targeted technical assistance. security or foreign policy interests. send symbolic messages. Sanctions might be positioned at the middle of a continuum. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE THE LINCHPIN OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND KEEPING FREE TRADE OPEN Jesse Helms. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". cultural and scientific exchanges. Weiss. and Trade Division. such as diplomacy.S. isolate miscreants.S. Future inquiry could more usefully gauge these 'other' impacts rather than pointing to the obvious inability of sanctions by themselves to change a regime or its aberrant policies. use of force. "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. 5. 1. . Defense. Jan/Feb 1999.asp Economic sanctions are used when one country (or alliance of countries) wants to condemn or coerce change in the behavior of another country -. or other friendly means.even as they campaign to remove them from our nation's foreign policy. between the extremes of complete cooperation and agreement at one end.S. and enhance respect for international norms. p.S. at governments that sponsor international terrorism or harbor terrorists from elsewhere. 1992. If sanctions are largely expressive and meant to signal international disapproval of a particular regime or its abusive behavior.S.-China relations shows that China has made specific nonproliferation commitments only under the threat or imposition of sanctions. In November 1991. The United States has aimed sanctions at governments that consistently violate internationally recognized human rights. the solidarity of states imposing them is itself an indicator of success. raise the costs of non-compliance.
and no attempt to refine the effort will make it so.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 30 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 7.6 trillion for 1997. 8. the year on which CBO based its analysis). "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U. This approach is particularly important if multilateral support for coalition warfare becomes the chosen option to mitigate their MWD program." . "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". the cost is often small because commerce with the targeted state is small (as it might be with developing countries). 1999. or that domestic business finds other markets (for both import and export). CBO found that many sanctions do not add to restrictions on commerce and that. 1.S. accessed 12. Sanctions should stand as failed policy to demonstrate that all coercive means short of war have been applied. and Trade Division. CBO did note that sanctions could "result in sharp disruption to and dislocation of specific U. Defense. that loss to the U.S. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS. firms and workers. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law".THEY ARE AN OPTION WHICH MUST BE EXHAUSTED EVEN IF THEY WILL INEVITABLY FAIL Bryan Foy. Multi-lateral sanctions must be pursued against Iraq in order to justify and legitimize the seemingly inevitable decision to continue policy by other means.S.2/ADA415058 Sanctions have not been and likely will not be effective in achieving policy goals in Iraq or North Korea.dtic. On the other hand.5. In this case. when they do. that exporters would find replacement markets and recover.2009: handle. United States Army. a constructive engagement policy may be the only remaining way to achieve policy goals on the peninsula. economy. prosecute regime change and restore stability to the region. p. on the other hand. Nov. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY RUNG IN THE LADDER OF FOREIGN POLICY -. where sanctions have failed and military options are unacceptably risky. 2002.S.asp The Congressional Budget Office (CBO). USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. At the same time. Even this cost was thought likely to be only short-term. it is apparent that sanctions will not work against North Korea. has found that sanctions on foreign commerce have had a negligible effect on the overall U. In a report prepared at the request of the House Committee on International Relations. However. that does not mean there is no justification for continuing to apply them. economy overall is offset by funds saved (by forgoing foreign aid or trade promotion funding).mil/100. Earlier research by CBO put the domestic cost of sanctions at less than $1 billion in lost national income per year (compared with a total national income of $6. Rennack. THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY IS NEGLIGIBLE AND SHORT TERM Dianne E.
" It is perhaps not surprising that much of the literature on sanctions focuses on a dominant puzzle: "If sanctions do not work. .asp Much of the continuing debate over international sanctions. 1989. Baldwin argues that when viewed as part of a state's repertoire for the exercise of influence toward others in the international system. Daoudi and M. policymakers do "not seem to have been deterred by any academic conventional wisdom from applying sanctions.THEY ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF STATE FOREIGN POLICY Kim Richards Nossal. among scholars and political leaders alike. nqa. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". Dajani have demonstrated in their exhaustive review of seven decades of literature and public statements on sanctions. as Philip Hanson has noted. Yet. p. practitioners of statecraft seem to hold contradictory views: those who are prone on occasion to embrace sanctions eagerly are just as prone to dismiss their efficacy. Using a power analysis perspective derived from the literature on social power. why do states continue to impose them?" To be sure. who argues that contrary to the repeated assertions of practitioners and scholars.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 31 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 9. THE PROBLEM IS NOT SANCTIONS BUT RATHER THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM -. S. has focused on their "effectiveness. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION." As M. the view that these measures are an ineffective tool of statecraft has become almost axiomatic. there is a revisionist view that challenges the pervasive orthodoxy that sanctions do not work." On the one hand. This view has been advocated most forcefully by David Baldwin." Indeed. there is a pervasive view that the many applications of sanctions in the twentieth century' show conclusively that they do not "work. economic sanctions are indeed an effective tool of statecraft. sanctions do "work" and that the real problem is the received wisdom. S.
Roosevelt thought an embargo of those goods could halt the Japanese war effort. and war.asp ECONOMIC SANCTIONS are popular because they offer what appears to be a proportional response to challenges in which the interests at stake are less than vital. proliferators. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". "What Sanctions Epidemic?". FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Second. That was the logic behind America's most famous attempt at asphyxiation: Franklin Roosevelt's decision to discontinue the sale of American scrap metals and fuel oil to Japan. support terrorism. indeed. Take away sanctions and how can the United States deal with terrorists. Lethal weapons should not be sold to violent regimes in Nigeria and Sudan. and biological weapons and countries that murder women and children and pile them into mass graves. Fall 1996. harbor war criminals. Iraq. attaching an economic cost to bad behavior acts as a disincentive. or export illegal drugs that poison American children. Syria.asp Jefferson is right. They thus satisfy a domestic political need to do something and reinforce a commitment to a norm. Libya. 1997. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". FOREIGN AFFAIRS. FOREIGN POLICY. SANCTIONS ARE ONE OF THE FEW OPTIONS WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS. the United States would be virtually powerless to influence events absent war. a way to signal official displeasure with a behavior or action.S. There should be sanctions on companies and governments that proliferate nuclear.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 32 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR 1. imports from Chinese companies that use prison slave labor should be banned." 4. 3. Since Japan was heavily dependent on imported fuel and metals. and government procurement contracts should not be given to foreign companies that sell dangerous technologies to terrorist states. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Jan/Feb 1999. the economic cost of sanctions can directly ameliorate the problem by limiting the government's capacity to engage in the offending practices. 2. PROLIFERATORS AND GENOCIDAL DICTATORS -. Nov/Dec. aid should not go to countries that commit genocide. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE APPEASEMENT OR WAR 5 Jesse Helms. First. p. U. "Sanctioning Madness". SANCTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO CURTAIL WAR-MAKING ACTIVITIES BY CUTTING OFFENDERS OFF FROM KEY RESOURCES Franklin L. p. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. America should not hesitate for one second to place a cost on these reprehensible acts and to restrain those few American companies who would actually conduct business with the perpetrators of such heinous crimes. Haass. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Sanctions can offer a nonmilitary alternative to the terrible options of war or indifference when confronted with aggression or injustice. SANCTIONS ARE A CRITICAL TOOL TO CONTAIN VIOLENT REGIMES AND PREVENT WMD PROLIFERATION AND GENOCIDE Jesse Helms. Reluctance to use military force is another motivation. sanctions.asp Asphyxiation. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. There are. Without sanctions. p. policies should isolate terrorist regimes like Iran. Sanctions may not be perfect and they are not always the answer. As the National Conference of Catholic Bishops points out. chemical. such as respect for human rights or opposition to weapons proliferation. p. Jan/Feb 1999. and genocidal dictators? Our options would be empty talk or sending in the marines. They are also a form of expression. . three tools in foreign policy: diplomacy. Lavin.S. and Cuba. The "asphyxiation" school also has its points. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE TO WAR IN TIMES WHEN NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE LESS CRUCIAL Richard N. but they are often the only weapon. assets of drug traffickers should be seized.asp U.
April 2007. 433). Renwick. The economic sanctions literature very clearly indicates that the imposition of economic sanctions is often costly to the sender state (Barber 1979. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 650). for example. More recently. "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". Clark and Reed (2005) tested a model of foreign policy substitutability to see how the United States responds when it is targeted militarily by another state. THEY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR David J. First. and Militarized Conflict". While Clark and Reed did not directly test whether the presence of sanctions increased or decreased the likelihood of a subsequent militarized dispute. 35). there must be some cost or potential cost that accompanies the action. that economic coercion acts as a foreign policy substitute for military coercion. challenge a . referring to the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. Signals. Additionally. Wagner 1988. Since one type of sanction involves the severing of a trade relationship. they did test a multinomial model that included the use of military force and the use of sanctions as possible responses of the United States to being targeted. Private statements and behavior are just that. 9). Drezner says that evidence from previous empirical studies of the success of economic sanctions is "consistent with the theoretical argument. 1990). there is no incentive against bluffing and thus no logical reason for the opponent to think otherwise. Grieve argued that sanctions. Hart. Likewise. 620). However. Bienen and Gilpin also saw the possibility that sanctions would increase the probability of war. 6. Second.asp Because of these contending views on whether sanctions signal resolve or indecision. p. "if effectively applied. Based on these conditions. actions taken must be public. noting that sanctions "carry with them the possibility of war if they are to be effective" (1979. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS HAS A DETERRENT EFFECT BECAUSE IT CREATES COSTS WHICH SIGNAL RESOLVE Robert A. Lektzian & Christopher M.asp If mere statements can be used as signals.[target] state in as direct and positive a manner as a threat of war" (1968. rather than a complement" (2003. there can be no claim that lying or bluffing will be punished domestically if no one is watching. and Miers (2000)].LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 33 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR cont'd 5. "Sanctions. "It was impossible to make sanctions effective without running the risk of war" (1981. [Which he attributes to Morgan. I argue that democracies are able to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve. Jr. there is disagreement in the literature on whether sanctions should make war more or less likely. Sprecher. .. June 2000. Palmer. One conclusion of this model was that "the positive correlation between the use of force and sanctions equations indicates that unobserved variables increase the chances policy makers implement both sanctions and force: This is evidence sanctions and force are implemented as complements rather than strictly as substitutes" (Clark and Reed 2005. classical economics tells us that this is costly to both trade partners. . If this is not the case. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. noted. Florida State University. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. . then it is also logical to expect actions between words and war to signal resolve under the right conditions. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CARRY WITH THEM THE THREAT OF WAR. Hufbauer et al. p. Many scholars note a generally positive association between sanctions and war. 23). others such as Morgan and Schwebach concluded that "sanctions should reduce the likelihood that the disputants will resort to force to settle their differences" (1997.
Sanction regimes generally do not work as intended. At the other extreme. are important in the achievement of long term national security policy objectives. in spite of their statistically ineffective performance.2009: handle.5. In fact." It seems that the use of sanctions is more effective than polite requests to cease and desist. On the other hand.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 34 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL 1. Along this continuum is a range of potential solutions referred to as sanctions. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. Secretary-General Kofi Annan says. and provided the legitimacy that results from first trying available actions short of war prior to commencing hostilities. 2002. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". especially when one is not clear on the destination. and diplomatic isolation.dtic. and suffer widespread criticism. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. 2.2/ADA415058 This paper will examine the effectiveness of sanctions regimes imposed against South Africa. against a nation violating international law. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". an international coalition might wage war against the offender. and. In every case. Usually. Iraq and North Korea in the twentieth century.N. Occasionally time purchased at the expense of patience has bought only the opportunity to stage combat operations. and more politically and economically palatable than war because the use of sanctions has increased dramatically throughout the last half of the twentieth century.dtic. accessed 12. and why they have thus far failed in the other two. and seeks a quick and peaceful diplomatic solution. to diminish the capacity of the protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight. as was the case against Iraq in 1991. It is important to understand why sanctions worked in one case. The next question is whether or not sanctions can be expected to work and. usually by several nations acting together. U. the imposition of trade and financial restrictions. as is the current situation with North Korea. sanctions have forestalled precipitous military action for the period of time necessary to consider alternatives. One thought is that "going slow while moving forward offers several advantages. SANCTIONS ARE A VALUABLE MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN DOING NOTHING AND ALL OUT WAR -THEY ARE VITALLY IMPORTANT Bryan Foy. . EVEN IF SANCTIONS ALONE ARE FAILING. THEY BUY CRITICAL TIME AND ALLOW ALL OPTIONS TO BE PURSUED WHILE AVERTING CATASTROPHIC WAR 6 Bryan Foy. if not. the 1990s have been referred to as the "sanctions decade" to describe the dramatically increased use of this particular form of international coercion. why nations and international institutions continue to include them on their menu of options. or "coercive measure(s) adopted. United States Army. sanctions have generally served well as an economy of force option by trading some degree of tolerance for time to develop other options.2009: handle. Traditionally the range of sanctions available has included arms embargoes. This approach seeks to convince a rational actor that a change of behavior is in the best interest of all concerned. Even more important is to understand why sanctions. 2002. The "other" options occasionally result in a stalemate in which no better solution emerges. United States Army. interruption of relations by air and sea. They represent more than just verbal condemnation and less than the use of armed force. in a conflict situation.mil/100. the objective has been to change in specific ways the behavior of a government or regime which poses a threat to international peace and stability." One significant advantage is the opportunity to buy time while examining or developing other options.5. success or failure. And sometimes patience pays off with the peaceful achievement of policy goals.mil/100.2/ADA415058 A reasoned approach is to expend as little political capital and national treasure as possible in the initial attempt. seeking to coerce change through military action. accessed 12. Between these two extremes lies a spectrum of alternatives that combine the coercive effects of the elements of national or international power in a coordinated action short of war.
as was the case against Iraq in 1991. 2002. On the other hand. Occasionally time purchased at the expense of patience has bought only the opportunity to stage combat operations.dtic. EVEN WHEN SANCTIONS FAIL. The "other" options occasionally result in a stalemate in which no better solution emerges. accessed 12.2009: handle. In every case. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". success or failure. sanctions have forestalled precipitous military action for the period of time necessary to consider alternatives and provided the legitimacy that results from first trying available actions short of war prior to commencing hostilities.5. And sometimes patience pays off with the peaceful achievement of policy goals. as is the current situation with North Korea and Cuba.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 35 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL cont'd 3.2/ADA415058 In summary. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. and suffer widespread criticism.mil/100. sanctions have generally served well as an economy of force option by trading some degree of tolerance for time to develop other options. . United States Army. THEY ARE A CRITICAL STOP-GAP THAT HELPS DELAY OR PREVENT MILITARY VIOLENCE Bryan Foy. sanction regimes generally do not work as intended.
This is a gross distortion. while oxygen is essentially passive. if pushed to extremes. SANCTIONS HELP TOPPLE ILLEGITIMATE REGIMES AND ALSO SEND A POWERFUL POLITICAL SIGNAL Franklin L. for economic strategy is simply applied incentives and disincentives. FOREIGN POLICY. Lavin. One "sanction" blocked assistance to countries knowingly harboring fugitives wanted by the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. thereby ending the bad behavior. or restrictions on U. Jan/Feb 1999. p. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". 3. Fall 1996. countries -. Another barred aid for military or police training to Haitians involved in drug trafficking or human rights abuses. Lavin. alternatively. but it could send a clear political message. TEND TO ACT RATIONALLY Franklin L. p. If governments need to demonstrate they are "doing something.be they positive or negative -. making a very different calculus of self-interest than that for which the implementer of sanctions had hoped. One measure placed conditions on assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization.S. Nearly three-quarters of the congressional measures were not sanctions at all but conditions.asp How did NAM come up with 61 sanctions? The study alleges that 20 laws were passed by Congress and 41 were imposed by presidential action. Fall 1996. over the long run. or they might not react the way they are desired to act. 2. p. It is true that one rarely finds examples of economic activity working quickly. SANCTIONS ARE A CRUCIAL TOOL TO PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMINAL REGIMES FROM STAYING IN BUSINESS Jesse Helms. Are these the measures that NAM and USA Engage want Congress to curtail? Let's hope not.asp Third. that engagement doesn't work. ." then asphyxiation fits the bill. limitations. FOREIGN POLICY. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. But. ECONOMICS IS INEVITABLY A PART OF FOREIGN POLICY AND ALL REGIMES. asphyxiation has a certain appeal over oxygen because it is an active step. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". foreign aid.tend to act rationally. The Soviet Union once toppled a Finnish government it deemed too conservative through a series of trade actions that sent a clear political signal.asp Some observers argue that sanctions simply don't work or.even odious ones -. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Still another prohibited Defense Department aid to countries supporting terrorists. EVEN THE MOST EXTREME OR ABUSIVE. sanctions can operate on a symbolic level by serving as a prelude to a more serious move.do not work is to argue that foreign policy does not work. the mechanisms are slow and indirect. economic sanctions could even topple a government through mass discontent or unhappiness within a leadership faction. Countries might not react quickly.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 36 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES 1. But to argue that economic measures -. Fourth. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. A sanction might be an empty gesture according to economic criteria. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Thus.
Marinov 2005. 567). 52. he lost his nerve. vol. Only without them has the embargo begun to take a toll on Castro's regime.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 37 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES cont'd 4. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". STRAYING AWAY FROM SANCTIONS ONLY EMBOLDENS DICTATORS AND SHOWS THEM THAT NONCOMPLIANCE WILL PAY OFF Jesse Helms. THEY ARE VERY EFFECTIVE AT CONSTRAINING ADVENTURIST DICTATORS Jesse Helms. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed. passenger planes. and Hafiz al-Asads of the world. or between the elite and the general populace. Wood. by shooting down two civilian planes flying over international waters.asp A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. embargo was offset by $5 billion to $7 billion in Soviet subsidies. allowing the nearly complete democratic transformation of the western hemisphere. Libya. 5. p.2001". 2008.asp When sanctions do not work. and Asad would be planning terrorist operations against U.asp Critics respond that sanctions have failed to bring down regimes in Iraq. And with good reason: the Clinton administration views sanctions as domestic public relations tools rather than as foreign policy weapons. Clinton has also gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid imposing sanctions on China for its missile proliferation. Jan/Feb 1999. unless America gives up its leverage by unconditionally lifting the embargo. p. President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act live on CNN. Clinton made a bold speech for the cameras and signed the Helms-Burton law. The moment the embargo kicked in. 1976 -.but they have effectively contained the Saddam Husseins. Sudan. Castro's regime is teetering. despite incontrovertible evidence from American intelligence that sanctionable activities have taken place. Castro's efforts to finance Marxist insurgencies stopped. If this policy represents failure. until 1991 the U. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafis. or both. Perhaps -. Since then. After the Castro regime murdered four innocent people. 6." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. his successors will be anxious to exchange normalized relations with the United States for a democratic transition in Cuba. Jan/Feb 1999. Olson (1979. including three Americans. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CANNOT CAUSE REGIME CHANGE. Nossal 1989). p. As for Cuba. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. and Cuba. . INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. It is the same with Cuba. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. it beats capitulation any day. 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite.S. Iran. For example. But once the camera lights dimmed and the time came to implement it. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". Syria. Qadhafi would be blowing up U. This sent the message to Iran and other rogue states that the administration talks tough but caves in under pressure. RESEARCH SHOWS THAT SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE REGIMES AND CAUSE A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP Reed M. he has done everything in his power to avoid enforcing it. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005. citizens. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Saddam would now be threatening the world with VX missiles.S. Without sanctions. it is often because the target government doubts our resolve to keep them imposed.S.
Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Are not likely to experience significant impact from or awareness of [the] imposition. Foreign Affairs. at $10 billion. 52.5Bn in 1996.ASP The claim that 42 percent of the world's population has been affected is also bogus. targeted leaders augment their level of repression (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. vol. and frequently ordered insufficient food and medicines. Moreover. These mechanisms also encourage incumbents to increase their level of repression. sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime. Gartner and Regan 1996). even though most people . Exemptions for medicine and food. ONLY THE REGIME Jesse Helms. Mauritania. Jan/Feb 1999. especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). .S. p. Saddam remains in charge in Baghdad. 2008. revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil could be used to pay for food and medicines. illegally re-exported humanitarian supplies. "What sanctions epidemic?". SANCTIONS DO NOT DISRUPT THE OVERALL SOCIETY OR ECONOMY OF A COUNTRY. and over the same period. The study lists the entire population of the former Zaire (now the Congo) as being under U.ASP UN sanctions have now been in effect for over ten years. 2. or simply stopped oil exports. Kaempfer. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". was close to 1960s levels. THE HORRIBLE HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN IRAQ WERE SPAWNED BY ABUSES BY SADAAM HUSSEIN. Lowenberg. Wood.ASP The success and duration of sanctions events are linked to the distribution of sanctions costs across groups within the target state. Nigeria. Access to those countries' commercial goods-and-services markets remains unaffected. The annual value of imports fell from $11. and the proportion of low-birth-weight babies rose from 4% in 1994 to approximately 25% in 1997. p. sanction because the United States barred sales of defense items to the government. These measures have been very effective in terms of their economic impact. where CRS notes that such highly targeted actions "put the entire populations of these countries into NAM's calculation. In order to prevent challenges from within their own coalition and to deter external challenges from opposition groups. 3. Child mortality has more than doubled. the sanctions regime has had grave humanitarian consequences." U. 2000. until December 1996 Baghdad refused to accept these conditions. NOT THE ACTUAL SANCTIONS REGIME Chantal De Jonge Oudraat is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 38 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS EFFECT ON POPULATION IS MINIMAL 1. have not prevented the Iraqi population from suffering. SANCTIONS PUT PRESSURE ON LEADERSHIP TO CHANGE THROUGH A VARIETY OF MECHANISMS EVEN IF IT INCREASES REPRESSION IN THE SHORT TERM Reed M. Likewise. which have undercut their legitimacy. and implementation of the sanction regime has been relatively good. exports plummeted from $28. 2003. Survival. However. Iraq's GDP in 1993. "'A Hand Upon The Throat Of The Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. sanctions have been less effective from a political point of view. . Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. as well as the Oil for Food Program adopted by the Security Council in August 1991. and Mertens 2004). The same goes for China. Under the terms of the programme. p. . hoarded them in warehouses. and has not shelved plans to develop weapons of mass destruction.3Bn to $0. Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger. 1976-2001".5Bn in 1980 to $0. Davenport 1995. and Pakistan. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.S.5Bn. However. International Studies Quarterly. or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. Major and Mcgann 2005). malnutrition is rampant in the south and centre of the country.
This hypothesis is tested using ordered probit analysis of 81 bilateral sanctions episodes from 1914 to 1989. ex. Florida State University. more successful when using economic sanctions. but rather that non-democratic states. June 2000. This is not to say that democracies are always successful.. SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AND WON'T BE ABUSED BECAUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADERS MUST BE CAREFUL OF WHOM TO SANCTION Robert A. Florida State University.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 39 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: DEMOCRACIES NEED SANCTIONS AS A TOOL 1. because they generally lack the institutional mechanisms to generate domestic costs. on average. DEMOCRACIES ESPECIALLY ARE SUCCESSFUL WHEN APPLYING SANCTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR SIGNALING PROPERTIES Robert A. leaders of some states (i. The empirical work linking regime type and international phenomena indicates that there may be a more useful way to structure scholarly thought on the causes and effects of international behavior than is provided by the realist paradigm. The first recognizes that leaders can be punished for foreign policy failure and that it is easier for the general populaces to punish leaders in democratic states. p. June 2000. Democracies are likely to be careful in their foreign policies due to the costs associated with failure. p. democracies are better able than non-democracies to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve.).asp Most analysts argue that economic sanctions are a relatively poor policy tool.e. "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". THEY WILL LIKELY BE EFFECTIVE AND AVOID ABUSE Robert A. Jr.. I argue that democracies should be. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. f. Hart. more successful when using economic sanctions because of the signaling properties of sanctions. leaders in democracies are likely to be careful when selecting issues over which to sanction. 1999). SO LONG AS IT IS A DEMOCRACY THAT IS APPLYING THE SANCTIONS. Huth 1996. Hart. There are actually two competing explanations for the link between the assumptions listed above and the hypothesis that democracies should be better sanctioners. Florida State University. . "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions".asp Based on the assumptions listed above.. This selection effect would produce the finding that democratic states are more successful when utilizing economic sanctions (see Siverson 1995 for a discussion of this selection effect when democracies go to war). Jr. self-interested individuals whose main goal is to retain office domestically (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995. democracies) can effectively tie their hands internationally by using aggressive foreign policy actions. 2. p. on average. I hypothesize that democracies should be. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. The hypothesis is confirmed even when controlling for the known correlates of sanctions success and other potentially confounding factors (relative power. Jr. 3. are unable to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve. June 2000. Because of this. In this article I build on a theoretical framework which has the leaders of states being primarily interested in retaining office domestically. "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions".asp I begin with the assumption that states are led by rational. This finding suggests that we can expand our theoretical expectations on the links between domestic politics and international relations.. Bueno de Mesquita et al. Specifically. Because of this. I expect that because of the ability to generate potential domestic costs for foreign actions. Hart. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. I then identify the role that states' domestic audiences play in their leaders' future and how it shapes and guides what leaders can do to enhance their ability to retain power.
Sanctions constitute a form of "international punishment. which clearly establishes the relationship between wrongdoing and the hurts imposed on wrongdoers. it might be added. and damaging to the interests of the community as a whole. prevention. accords well with the Latin origin of the word. Punishment thus involves not only a concrete cost (the deprivation of something of value) but also a public expression of the community's moral disapproval of the act.and desirable -." When this is applied to international politics. we should see them as "instrumental" means to a purposive end. and retribution -.to preserve the sense of sanctions as penalties linked to real or alleged misconduct.to demonstrate that only some of these purposes are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used. it is a punishment for a "wrong" deemed to be immoral. p. rather." . and despite the widespread skepticism about the punitive utility of international economic sanctions in the literature." I seek to establish that sanctions can and should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft. but I focus on one useful purpose of international sanctions that tends to be either overlooked or dismissed outright in the literature on sanctions: the purpose of punishment. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. it could be argued that what prompts one state to invoke "sanctions" -.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 40 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT 1. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". nqa. SANCTIONS HAVE UTILITY AS A METHOD OF PUNISHMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT MUST BE CONDEMNED 7 Kim Richards Nossal.is the perception that the target state has violated norms of moral behavior valued by the sender and thus deserves not only concrete penalties but also a public proclamation of the target's impiety. DEPLOYMENT OF SANCTIONS IS A NECESSARY MODE OF PUNISHMENT -. I explore the various purposes of punishment -.IT SIGNALS MORAL CONTEMPT FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS Kim Richards Nossal. Second.asp In this article. However.not merely the instruments of economic coercion -. I address this orthodox puzzle. 1989. or offensive to the moral conscience. 1989." Such usage more clearly reflects the etymology of the word as well as its concern with the moral gravity of the violation and (to the extent that there is a "public realm" in international politics) the essentially "public" nature of the "objectionable" act. p. I nonetheless argue that we should see these harms as more than mere forms of "expressive" symbolism embraced for their own sake. I argue that exploring sanctions from the perspective of punishment as a purposive human behavior provides us with useful insights into the utilities of international sanctions. My argument proceeds in three stages. by exploring the meaning of the term "sanctions. Margaret Doxey has argued that the element of wrongdoing is critical to our understanding of sanctions: "It is still possible -. Sanction was the penalty specified for a transgression of a law or decree and particularly for a violation of a sacredness. for all of the nonrational elements of punishment. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. First." 2. "International Sanctions as International Punishment".asp On the other hand. nqa." Such usage." despite the obvious problems of using the notion of punishment in circumstances in which there is no legitimate superordinate authority.compulsion. The Latin origin thus suggests that a sanction is not simply a penalty imposed for a violation of the rules.
p. 5. they are seeking to achieve one or more of five broad ends: compliance.asp The argument that a desire to punish wrongdoing can motivate foreign policymakers brings us back to the question posed by so many students of international sanctions: Why do policymakers persist in using what is supposed to be an ineffective tool of statecraft? How we answer this question. Baldwin's approach leads us to conclude that sanctions are in fact a most "effective" and rational instrument of diplomacy. as Baldwin rightly notes. PUNISHMENT IS NECESSARY TO GET ACTORS TO CEASE UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR AS WELL AS DETER OTHERS FROM ENGAGING IN IT AS WELL Kim Richards Nossal.asp To this point. It is usually argued that the intent." This may explain why sanctions have been and are likely to remain a durable and attractive policy option for foreign policymakers who are confronted with acts they regard as morally repugnant. p. In other words. SANCTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A WIDE VARIETY OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS.asp Punishment of wrongdoing. nqa. while Baldwin argues that effectiveness must be deduced from using a model of means-end rationality. The punishments inflicted on those refusing to comply with a lawful order (for example. First. I argue here that effectiveness can also be deduced from the nonrational. but nonetheless instrumental. however.' If. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. deterrence. and less frequently. In the case of sanctions against Afghanistan. for their effectiveness lies in their capacity to impose some harm on the target. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". What. p. The second distinctive feature of sanctions is their punitive intent. the goal of punishing an act of wrongdoing. 1989. He suggests that when states use sanctions. purposes of punishment. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. the retributive purpose was clearly in evidence. is always a purposive and instrumental act. BUT ESPECIALLY PUNISHMENT Kim Richards Nossal. 1989. And if we look at sanctions from the perspective of punishment. for compulsion. the conventional wisdom about the ineffectiveness of this instrument of statecraft notwithstanding. To the extent that sanctions impose an injury on the wrongdoer (and no analyst of sanctions claims that these instruments of economic statecraft do not hurt the target in some way). "International Sanctions as International Punishment". or both. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". legal harms are inflicted upon offenders for one or more of three broad purposes: for prevention. Third. I suggested above. 4. their "effectiveness" is ensured. or in order to deter wrongful behavior by other individuals in the community. it is difficult to exclude the punitive objective of sanctions: in other words. are the instrumental purposes of punishment? In a domestic context. the harm is seen as the appropriate response of the community to someone who had the choice to act otherwise but chose to act wrongfully. international symbolism. of sanctions is to cause harm to the target state in order to achieve a number of foreign policy objectives. as I have argued. James Lindsay's examination of these goals is a useful exemplar of this kind of analysis. I have argued that sanctions can be distinguished from other forms of statecraft by the type of acts that provoke their imposition. we come readily to the same conclusion. However. nqa. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. then. and for retribution. Second. And if economic sanctions are indeed imposed for retributive reasons. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY RECOURSE AS PUNISHMENT AND ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL Kim Richards Nossal. rather than for deterrent or compellent reasons.the infliction of pain on an offender in return for an evil inflicted on the community. or purpose. international sanctions cannot but "work. the order from a judge to answer a query or from a legislature to return to work) are "compellent" in nature: the harm is inflicted until the offender obeys. a harm may be meted out by public authorities in order to deter or prevent future wrongful behavior by the individual being punished. punishment may be inflicted for retribution' -.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 41 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT cont'd 3. sanctions are policy responses to acts perceived by the sender to be acts of moral wrongdoing. subversion. nqa. . punishment may be inflicted in order to compel an offender to cease wrongful behavior. 1989. depends on how we define effectiveness. or domestic symbolism.
sanctions of any type were imposed only twice (see Table 1). "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". The Security Council has significant latitude in defining threats to 'international peace and security'. Embargoes limit and ban exports to the target.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 42 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. . Issue 3. and arms embargoes 11 times.ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION IS KEY TO FORCE ALONG POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. At the very least. and strategic goods. Sept. and has shown great creativity in doing so. p. The objective of sanctions imposed by the UN under Chapter VII of its Charter is 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'. partial. boycotts limit and ban imports from the target. THEY SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED 8 Charles A. it has increasingly deemed internal conflicts and gross violations of human rights to be justifications for international action. Pages 65-70 The increasing use of economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy is troubling to American business and to advocates of economic freedom. Since the end of the Cold War. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. such as oil. triggering public anger and politically significant protest. Sanctions make their lives more difficult and in some cases place their health in jeopardy. or they may be limited to specific services. The human cost of this unethical and often inhumane and ineffective form of public policy requires a search for alternative means of producing change.asp The theory behind sanctions is that they will produce economic deprivation. While it is certainly true that the people of many sanctioned countries live under tyrannical government. Rarick. SURVIVAL. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". In some cases a policy of constructive engagement and/or multinational political pressure can be a more effective form of intervention. Indeed. SO LONG AS ALL OTHER ALTERNATIVES ARE INVESTIGATED AND THAT THE USE OF SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL IS SCRUTINIZED. such as air traffic. Sanctions can be comprehensive. targeted financial measures twice. They may encompass a multitude of services and goods.in contrast to the hair-trigger approach now employed. What is suggested is that economic sanctions used to produce political change desired by US policy-makers are carefully examined before being implemented and that other alternatives are considered. 2000. or targeted against individual corporations or people. or their removal from power. 2007. partial sanctions six times. 2. SANCTIONS CAN BE SCALED UP OR DOWN AS APPROPRIATE -. It is not suggested that sanctions imposed for national security reasons (such as restricting the sale of advanced technology to unfriendly countries) should be abandoned. the Security Council has imposed comprehensive economic sanctions four times. some restraint in imposing sanctions is recommended -. Between 1945 and 1988. Volume 27. it is also true that most citizens of those countries do not want sanctions imposed. This in turn will lead to changes in the behaviour of trouble-making 1lites. NOT ABANDONED 1.
various foreign policy goals ranging from the modest to the fairly significant. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 43 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. Smart sanctions thus would target better the wealthy and powerful to apply coercive pressure while sparing vulnerable populations. resolutions calling for the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction. although the result may be discounted as financial sanctions normally follow a general trade embargo (Dashti.BEING MORE SELECTIVE IN THEIR APPLICATION IS BETTER THAN REJECTING THEM. Lavin. Achieving greater political gain with less civilian pain would clearly enhance multilateral moral credibility. Sanctions have burdened the economies of Iran. p. political authorities can craft sanctions that apply pressure on wrongdoers and do not unduly and adversely affect civilian populations or weaken opposition movements. Smarter sanctions include freezing foreign assets.N. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Nov/Dec. Sanctions have become the lazy man's foreign policy. and may eventually contribute to change in those societies or in their behavior. or help achieve. One intriguing finding from the IIE is that financial sanctions succeed in 41% of cases versus 25% for trade sanctions (Hufbauer et al. They have also diminished Baghdad's ability to import weapons and related technology.asp Unfortunately. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. and Libya. and restricting travel. Sanctions were one reason for the Serbs' decision to accept the Dayton agreement in August 1995 ending the fighting in Bosnia. Cuba. while having little discernible effect on that country's nuclear weapons program. viewed as an instant and painless way of advancing U. prohibiting investments. possibly influencing Pakistan's future actions as well as those of other would-be proliferators. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 3. have hurt Islamabad both economically and militarily. they receive a bill. Fall 1996. SANCTIONS ARE ONLY DISPARAGED BECAUSE OF CURRENT PRACTICE -. 1997. interests. JUSTIFYING THEIR USE Richard N. FOREIGN POLICY. if it disapproves. sanctions against Pakistan.. Weiss. withholding credits and loans. 1990: 63). p. Sanctions can make a political statement. U. 5.Gibson et al. The City University of New York. The Graduate Center. but they will be useful as a foreign policy tool only when the criteria discussed above are met. p. 1997). Franklin L. 4.asp Under the right circumstances. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". If the United States approves of another country's actions. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". commerce.asp In theory. Economic policies need to be viewed as a selective instrument of foreign policy that is most often successful when specific circumstances prevail. EVEN IF NOT SUCCESSFUL IN ALL INSTANCES. the idea of using economic policy as an instrument of foreign policy has been degraded through misapplication.S. they receive a check. S. Both sanctions and economic assistance are frequently invoked like a mantra. Sanctions introduced against Iraq after the Persian Gulf War have increased Iraqi compliance with U.. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. SMART TAILORED SANCTIONS CAN ACHIEVE ALL OF THE BENEFIT WITH NONE OF THE HARM Thomas G. . sanctions can achieve. SANCTIONS CAN STILL ACHIEVE SUCCESS AT A HIGH LEVEL. Haass. Iraq today is considerably weaker militarily and economically than it would have been without these sanctions. "Sanctioning Madness". The threat of sanctions may have also deterred several European firms from investing in Iran's oil and gas industry. and communications. 1999.
the expected impact on the target. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. By contrast. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Haass. "Sanctioning Madness".S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. portions of this report could be classified to avoid providing information that would be useful to the target.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 44 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. and an exit strategy. secondary sanctions are not a desirable means of securing multilateral support. such as Iraq's. foreign policy. They are not only an admission of diplomatic failure but they are also expensive. including the damage to relations with major partners and U. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 6. In addition. 8. retaliatory steps the target or third parties may take.asp RESTRAINT WILL not materialize by itself Policymakers should be required to prepare and send to Congress a policy statement similar to the reports prepared and forwarded under the 1973 War Powers Act before or soon after a sanction is put in place. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. "Sanctioning Madness".S. that creates shortages among the general population in order to garner international sympathy. p.N. the expected degree of international support or opposition. members being asked to vote on the proposal would then be able to refer to a report that addresses their questions. In addition. which allows such states to approach the Security Council for redress. Sanctions. Nov/Dec. that innocents should not be made to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary. Greater use should be made of Article 50 of the U. SANCTIONS ARE STILL LEGITIMATE IF THEY INCLUDE HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS Richard N. The cost would be more than offset by the benefits of multilateral cooperation. a fund for this purpose should be established within the U. 1997. But it is also pragmatic. the legal or political authority supporting its use. foreign assistance budget. Haass. SANCTIONS CAN STILL BE USED. policymakers should be able to explain why a particular sanction was selected over other sanctions or policies. THE USE OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED BUT NOT ABANDONED Richard N.asp Humanitarian exceptions should be part of any comprehensive sanctions regime. should not necessarily be suspended if the humanitarian harm is the direct result of cynical government policy. Any sanction Congress initiates should be approved only after the relevant committees have carefully considered the matter. BUT THEY SHOULD BE CURTAILED FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS Richard N. 7. "Sanctioning Madness".asp International compliance with sanctions regimes can be increased by providing assistance to third parties to offset the economic cost of implementing sanctions. the expected costs to the United States. If necessary. . p. Charter. The costs to U. Haass. Nov/Dec. 1997. almost always outweigh the potential benefits of coercing unwilling friends to join sanctions regimes. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Such statements should clearly explain the sanction's purpose. efforts to build an effective WTO. 1997. prospects for enforcement.S. however. since it is easier to generate and sustain domestic and international support for sanctions that allow the importation of food and medicine. Nov/Dec. including the criteria for lifting the sanction. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. In part this is a moral judgment. the probable humanitarian consequences and what is being done to minimize them.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE VOIDED ENTIRELY. Such limited sanctions would avoid jeopardizing other interests or an entire bilateral relationship. and make it easier to garner multinational support. 10. LIMITING AND REFINING SANCTIONS IS BETTER THAN REJECTING THEM OUTRIGHT. Rarick. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Sept. Similarly. BUT REFINED AND LIMITED IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS Charles A. Political sanctions should not. for example by cutting off associated technological cooperation or trade. Volume 27. as far as possible. 2007. Such interactions help the United States as much as the targeted party. "Sanctioning Madness". Haass. Issue 3. Pages 65-70 Although sanctions in most cases are imposed with good intentions. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 9. political responses such as event boycotts and visa denials might be the best way to signal opposition to objectionable behavior when no appropriate economic or military sanction is available or as a complement to something as specific as freezing an individual's assets. the probability of their success is not high. extend to breaking diplomatic relations or canceling high-level meetings. What is proposed is that sanctions are more carefully applied and that they are designed to maximise their effectiveness. Nov/Dec. Where there are transgressions. the United States should direct any sanctions toward nuclear or weapons-related activity. p. on those responsible for the offending behavior and on limiting penalties to the particular area of dispute. Sanctions designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a prime example.asp Sanctions should focus. . 1997. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 45 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Sanctions may have their place in foreign policy. They would cause less collateral damage to innocents. Richard N. In some cases sanctions have been successful in bringing about the desired change. and this paper does not advocate ending all economic sanctions. such as in the case of South Africa. however.
sanctions need refining if they are to be seen as more than a fig leaf in the future. would seem one obvious place to start. Effective diplomacy. . The effective use of sanctions as a diplomatic tool requires that compliance be acknowledged and reciprocated. Hence. 2. as the case with Haiti illustrates. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". although the question remains whether there are policy instruments such as diplomatic pressure that are more useful. interests. they also can make the use of force all but inevitable. accessed 12. SUBJECTING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS TO EFFECTIVE GUIDELINES WOULD SOLVE THEIR INEFFECTIVENESS WHILE PRESERVING THEIR UTILITY James A. and cooperation theory teaches that a quid pro quo can generate additional momentum. 1997). requires inducements for cooperation and punishments for resistance. just as we recognize the importance of sanctions as a way of compelling compliance with the will of the international community. the recent emphasis on targeted sanctions which prevent the travel. According to Kofi.2009: handle. 2002. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. citizens will have their standard of living reduced and by what amount? What are the prospects for influencing leadership change through deprivation?) should be assessed in advance and weighed against other methods. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". 1999. USA TODAY. as George (1991) has emphasized repeatedly. REFINED SMART SANCTIONS AVOID THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH WIDE-SPREAD BLOCKADES Bryan Foy. This variant will be more fully explored in the section concerning Iraq. Perhaps.2/ADA415058 As an aside. of individuals or classes of individuals -the so-called "smart" sanctions. which hurt large numbers of people who are not their primary targets. An "impact statement.dtic." like those environmental impact statements so common in Federal public works projects. United States Army. Sept. 1997. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict examined inducement strategies in combination with sticks (Cortright. The City University of New York. of course.asp Sanctions also stand to benefit from being understood in the context of carrots-and-sticks. or freeze the foreign bank accounts. USE OF SANCTIONS AS A TARGETED QUID PRO QUO IS EFFECTIVE Thomas G. more specifically targets those areas most likely to influence state behavior while reducing unintended consequences. A cost-benefit analysis (How many people will die of malnutrition in a poor country? How many U. p. 3.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 46 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: USING GUIDELINES IS BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR IMPROVING SANCTIONS 1. p.Annan. Weiss. though. The Graduate Center. the way that sanctions are developed and implemented continues to evolve over time. a few simple guidelines would help. A new construct. Further. easing pressure in response to partial steps toward compliance may generate additional gestures. known as "smart" sanctions.5. Sanctions work when they are enacted in league with other nations.mil/100. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". and policy makers continue to find more effective ways to formulate and enforce them. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar.S. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH.asp What is needed. Nathan. Sanctions need to be weighed. Sanctions against Iraq have ignored this dynamic. In the case of sanctions. is a policy routine that helps support global order and U.S. or employed to avoid military action. set in motion as an "expressive" function to show displeasure. we also recognize that sanctions remain a blunt instrument. Auburn University at Montgomery.
p. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. p. WE MUST AVOID ABOVE ALL A DOGMATIC RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS -. But sometimes they do the trick. Good feelings and self-congratulations have given way to less Pollyannaish notions about the pluses and minuses of economic and military coercion. decisions about coercion are highly contextual and require weighing least-bad options that do not apply a preset formula. that economic sanctions would not work. 3.fortunate to conclude. The Graduate Center. NOT CATEGORICAL IN THEIR CONDEMNATION Franklin L. Too few hypotheses have been tested. but sometimes it. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. not necessarily peaceful.sanctions succeed precisely to the extent that they occasion suffering.asp To take Wilson's four adjectives. sanctions can be designed -. and deadly only at the margin (in conjunction with other factors) and over the long run. EVEN IF SANCTIONS ARE NOT PERFECT. There is considerable doubt that the kind of comprehensive sanctions so quickly enacted against Iraq in August 1990 would be approved today even against a similarly blatant aggressor as Saddam Hussein.asp The prevailing orthodoxy is that direct trade-offs exist between political gain and civilian pain -. as always. Neither is a terribly effective response to aggression. not silent.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 47 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: DOGMATIC RESPONSES TO SANCTIONS ARE BAD 1. and empirical research is necessary to identify experiences that have been more and less successful. As is the case for just war doctrine. if they are to be used at all -. is the right formula. Similarly.WE SHOULD BE SELECTIVE IN THEIR USE. Yet. Humane sanctions necessarily will be ineffective while effective sanctions cannot avoid being inhumane. and engagement in response to human rights problems. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?".asp Whether we wish it or not. It also necessitates fundamentally rethinking ethical and political contexts in order to establish humanitarian limits governing sanctions and to examine objectively armed force. July 2005. . the case for intervention will arise.so that they are politically effective and attentive to vulnerable populations. The challenge for the policymaker. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". SANCTIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT A PRIORI BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE THREATS THAT WE FACE TODAY Nikolay Marinov. Either strategy can work. is to avoid a dogmatic approach and choose the right tool for the job. given the circumstances. 1999. or shelter terrorist movements. Weiss. Fall 1996. based on the little that we have established about their ineffectiveness. The challenge of reducing adverse consequences requires safeguards for civilians and better mechanisms for monitoring impacts and improving the management of exemptions.indeed. should be designed. The use of force maybe effective for some purposes. Sanctions tend to be more effective in response to trade issues. Wiener's (1998) 'instrumental humanitarianism' is pertinent here. as some leaders continue to overthrow democracy. It would be un. THEY MUST BE WEIGHED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS Thomas G. Yale University. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". history has shown that sanctions are not always economic. The City University of New York. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. In the late 1990s Iraq is to sanctions what Somalia was to peacekeeping in the early 1990s. too. 2. kill large number of civilians. Lavin. but it is shrouded in its own controversies. FOREIGN POLICY. p. engagement offers no automatic prospect of success.
Such cases are the exception. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 48 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' 1. Sept. it was found that sanctions were effective in only 20% of the cases (Lukas and Griswold. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. NOT THE RULE -. p. unilateral sanctions impose higher costs on American firms than on the target country. a unilateral trade or investment embargo may not be enough to persuade a country's government to change its objectionable policies. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". military and economic aid. and argues that economic sanctions programs in general have proven marginally effective in bringing about significant changes in their target countries. In a report issued by the National Bureau of Asian Research. In the case of Cuba. most unilateral sanctions will be little more than costly expressions of opposition except in those instances in which the ties between the United States and the target are so extensive that the latter cannot adjust to an American cutoff. By itself. by the Institute for International Economics. a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation. THE INSTANCES WHERE SANCTIONS CAN SUCCEED ARE THE EXCEPTION. however. THERE IS GROWING CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY INEFFECTIVE AT ACHIEVING THEIR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 9 Harry Wolff. The sanctions have shifted power further towards those opposed to reform (Hiebert. 2006. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". 3. O'Quinn. Issue 3. Pages 65-70 In addition to high costs. Haass. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Rarick.A GLOBAL ECONOMY GUARANTEES EASY CIRCUMVENTION Richard N. Volume 27. Unilateral sanctions did. In another comprehensive study of economic sanctions. Robert P. "Sanctioning Madness". sanctions have been ineffective for over 40 years. O'Quinn has offered a very persuasive summary of the problem: Although multilateral sanctions might succeed under the appropriate circumstances. it was found that economic sanctions against Burma were undermining a reform movement within the government hierarchy.asp In a global economy. unilateral sanctions will fail more often than not. 2003). 2007. is a strong critic of the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. which had been receiving substantial U. found that in only a quarter of the cases did the sanctions achieve their aims.S. though. Research by Elliott and Hufbauer (1999). the growing consensus among pundits and policymakers is no. p. do these programs work? With regard to unilateral sanctions. SANCTIONS ARE INCREDIBLY INEFFECTIVE -. Nov/Dec. 1997. sanctions simply do not appear to be effective tools of foreign policy. 2. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. which can usually find substitute sources of supply and financing. nqa. examining 170 cases of economic sanctions. a more fundamental question is quite simply. They also hurt Pakistan. which were heavily dependent on trade with the United States.STUDIES SHOW THAT THEY ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE ONLY ABOUT 20% OF THE TIME Charles A. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. . prove more costly for Haiti and Cuba. 2004) and provided a scapegoat for the failed economic policies of the current regime.lexis Enforcement issues aside.
Reviewing the universe of sanctions from 1914 to 1990. p.000 Iraqi children. What does this imply for policy? Although sanctions are sometimes credited as a low-cost and relatively humane alternative to other coercive instruments such as military force. Air strikes and military threats also appear to have played important roles in these cases. The Haitian case is also an example of how ill-conceived and poorly implemented sanctions can make a bad situation worse and underscores the fact that sanctions are a tool of policy and cannot succeed alone when the policy they serve is incoherent or inept. If I am right. compared with the reported 40. In Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. First. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. HSE found that sanctions succeeded in 40 of 115 cases. and the progress made in putting Bosnia back together could easily dissipate in the face of continuing tensions. . in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target state made the demanded concessions. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. My article "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work" challenges the validity of HSE. Eighteen were actually settled by either direct or indirect use of force. economic sanctions often inflict significant human costs on the populations of target states. Pape. In Haiti. or 34 percent of the total. there is little empirical evidence that sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals. military forces was required to convince the military government to step down in favor of the legally elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. THE BEST DATA SHOWS THAT THE USE OF SANCTIONS HAS BEEN WOEFULLY DEFICIENT. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD OF SANCTIONS DOES NOT JUSTIFY ANY OPTIMISM OR THEIR USE IN ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Robert A. and 3 are indeterminate. p. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work".asp A simple question lies at the heart of the disagreement between Elliott and me: How robust is the evidence that economic sanctions work? Since 1985 the most influential work on this question has been Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. p. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (hereafter HSE). Summer 1998. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. and the imminent arrival of U. 3d ed. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 49 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' cont'd 4. Saddam Hussein continues to put roadblocks in the way of the UN inspectors trying to find and destroy any biological weapons capability. including on innocent civilians who have little influence on their government's behavior.S. ONLY WORKING IN 5 OF 115 INSTANCES Robert A. Washington.asp At the end of the day. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions. Summer 1998.000 military and 5. forthcoming). Pape. DC. Recent evidence suggests that the international economic sanctions on Iraq since 1990 have led to the deaths of as many as 567. full achievement of UN goals remains elusive.asp Any optimism about the utility of sanctions in the post-Cold War world should probably be tempered. I examined the 40 claimed successes and found that only 5 stand up. however. This important study provided the empirical support for a significant shift in the scholarly consensus on the effectiveness of sanctions from marked pessimism in the 1960s and 1970s to qualified optimism in the 1980s and 1990s. again suggesting that a combination of economic and military pressure will often be required to achieve the most difficult goals (HSE. Jeffrey Schott. THE HISTORICAL SUCCESSES OF SANCTIONS ARE MIXED AT BEST Kimberly Ann Elliott. broad multilateral sanctions completely failed to achieve their goals. Summer 1998. First.000 civilian deaths during the 1991 Gulf War. the picture is a mixed one. 5.. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the effects of sanctions. then sanctions have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts. these are not sufficient reasons for employing sanctions in situations where we do not have high confidence that they will work. 6. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.
"Sanctioning Madness".asp Trying to compel others to join a sanctions regime by threatening secondary sanctions can seriously harm U. First. although it has been used successfully by both the Bush and Clinton administrations to defeat Congress' attempts to revoke China's MFN status. The City University of New York.asp Generating international support for sanctions is often extremely difficult. Sanctions are ideal when governments have no perceived vital interests. It usually takes something truly egregious. Even with Iraq.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 50 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' 1. Non-forcible sanctions give politicians the ability to 'do something' and engage in cheap moralizing but refrain from serious engagement. The UN's performance in former Yugoslavia demonstrated that collective spinelessness. 2. not collective security. APPLYING SANCTIONS ISN'T COLLECTIVE DEFENSE BUT COLLECTIVE SPINELESSNESS. Broadening the agenda became official in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace. Ironically 'prevention' is a favorite new expression in public policy discourse. as with Cuba. Such thinking makes achieving multilateral support for sanctions more difficult for the United States. Iran. Sanctions are another indicator that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct. This threat appears to have deterred some individuals and firms from entering into proscribed business activities. Second. sanctions now apply to overseas firms that violate the terms of U. or none at all. ALLOWING POLITICIANS TO CLAIM THEY'VE DONE SOMETHING WHILE ONLY MAKING THINGS WORSE Thomas G. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. which is accompanied by indifference and ineptitude when faced with the Rwandan genocide.S. "Sanctioning Madness". The Graduate Center. in all three instances. Weiss. 'security' has widened beyond military threats to include socio-economic. 1997. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Congress is increasingly turning to secondary sanctions to bolster ineffective unilateral sanctions regimes. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. which responded to a special Security Council mandate including 'non-military' threats to security. . and Libya. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. there is the newfound willingness by the community of states to intrude in issues that were once off-limits. SANCTIONS UNDERMINE MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS Richard N. In addition. like Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. p. They tend to value commercial interaction more than the United States does and are less willing to forfeit it. Third and probably most important. the argument that economic interaction is desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems normally has more resonance in other capitals. states are rarely willing to pay the costs of vigorous intervention. was a prerequisite for their support.asp Three reasons explain the expanded use of sanctions in the post-Cold War era. other governments prefer minimal sanctions. but it has increased anti-American sentiment. legislation like the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Helms-Burton Act. Haass. threatened the future of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 1999. and made Europeans less likely to work with the United States in shaping policies to contend with post-Cold War challenges. generous compensation for third-party states affected by the sanctions. including Egypt and Turkey. 1997. environmental. and especially humanitarian ones. Means become ends. In most instances. p. Nov/Dec. SANCTIONS UNDERMINE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES BY BOOSTING ANTI-AMERICANISM AND UNDERMINING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE VITAL FOR STABILITY Richard N. to overcome this anti-sanctions bias. is in vogue. Haass. distracted attention from the provocative behavior of the target governments. Nov/Dec. p.S. 3. foreign policy interests. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses".
AGGRAVATING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT Harry Wolff. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. nqa. Other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool in battling terrorism. they are one of many options and should not be used exclusively. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". Given the focus on terrorism and the emerging United States policy of promoting democratization and the spread of freedom around the world.lexis Others have suggested that the true economic effects of sanctions programs differ drastically from those that are intended. SANCTIONS BACKFIRE BECAUSE THEY HINDER THE GROWTH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. . By hindering the growth of the middle class in these already volatile countries. p. 2006. suggesting that while important.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 51 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' cont'd 4. they have the potential to result in increased anti-American sentiments. it is very possible that these programs do more harm than good.
Gathering the necessary information about assets. . especially with a totalitarian or authoritarian state run by a few people. Another serious shortcoming for multilateral efforts is the inability of the UN to act quickly. and then moving quickly enough to freeze them. Most sanctions do not discriminate within the target country. the theoretical attractiveness of financial sanctions is diluted by practical difficulties. communications. 1997. SMART SANCTIONS ARE NOT FEASIBLE AND TARGETED REGIMES CAN STILL SKIRT AROUND THEM Richard N. can often prove impossible. p. which penalize leaders while sparing the general public. Nov/Dec. "Sanctioning Madness". Nov/Dec. 3. NOT THE REGIME Richard N.asp The hope of avoiding adverse humanitarian consequences and tightening the screws on elites is enticing. It is possible that Haiti's military leaders were bothered by the fact their families could no longer shop in Florida. "Sanctioning Madness". Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 1999.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 52 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SMART SANCTIONS CAN BE EVOLVED' 1. There is a rationale for this: funds and goods can easily be moved around. However. which permits transgressor regimes and elites to move assets with impunity. and commerce are mild inconveniences that will hardly hurt targets enough to alter behavior. The USA has developed an effective system of tracking and freezing assets. Weiss. 1997. Not only dubious offshore. p. THE IDEA OF SMART SANCTIONS IS ABSURD -.asp All this demonstrates that sanctions can be a blunt instrument. and designing "smart" sanctions to target only them is extraordinarily difficult. Leaders and governments have many ways to insulate themselves. The problem with such a broad-brush approach is that sanctions tend to affect the general population. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. but other countries lack comparable resources and skills. but also European banking centers are reluctant. Switzerland has taken the lead on financial sanctions in the Interlaken Process.SANCTIONS FALL ON THE GENERAL POPULATION. Moreover. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". But opportunities to employ effective sanctions with precision are rare. 2. Haass. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Haass. p. SMART SANCTIONS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH TEETH OR COORDINATION TO BE EFFECTIVE Thomas G. are only a partial solution. restrictions on travel. and Britain on trade. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. and governments can often command what is in the hands of others. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. And executives who risk being denied access to the United States under the 1996 Helms-Burton act may think twice before entering into proscribed business deals. The Graduate Center.asp "SMART" OR "designer" sanctions. The City University of New York. while those in the government and the military are able to skirt the sanctions.
It also raises concerns about the costs borne by key neighbors and trading partners in enforcing sanctions. DC. p. DC. Washington. makes its way into Montenegro (still linked with Serbia as the remnant of what once was Yugoslavia) at rates of up to 1.asp Second. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Imposed to punish Serbs for "ethnic cleansing" and for refusal to recognize Croatia and Bosnia. Whether the coalition is ad hoc or organized under the rubric of the United Nations or a regional organization. USA TODAY. This in turn means that international cooperation is more important than when the United States was a far more dominant supplier of trade and finance than any single country is today. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS CANNOT BE ENFORCED -. it derives from the lack of political will on the part of key leaders around the world. It especially is directed at material that might be intended for military use. At the same time.asp A critical problem is enforcement. Summer 1998.asp These elements together mean that effective sanctions are likely to be costly in political and economic terms.THEY ARE CIRCUMVENTED AT NEARLY EVERY LEVEL Llewellyn D Howell. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 53 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' 1. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Take the example of the UN embargo against Serbia. the sanctions glass will remain at best half full. Resources will have to be devoted to enforcement at the same time that other resources may be necessary to mitigate the most severe effects of broad. it prohibits the shipment of all goods except food and medical supplies. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. 2. SANCTIONS WILL ALWAYS FAIL IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER SOURCES THEY CAN TURN TO Kimberly Ann Elliott. Summer 1998. To the extent that potential target countries are more dependent on international economic exchange than previously. high-grade fuel. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Washington. multilateral.000 gallons per day. p. Even if governments are willing to cooperate. the more vulnerable they are to economic coercion. globalization of economic activity means that there are many more suppliers for most goods and services and many more potential markets for a target's exports. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Nevertheless. well-enforced sanctions. appropriate for fighter aircraft and tanks. political capital will have to be expended to build it. . its citizens often are not. 3. Stopping it would involve imposing UN troops inside Albania. increased economic integration and interdependence is a double-edged sword for economic sanctions. SANCTIONS WILL NEVER BE EFFECTIVE BECAUSE LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD LACK THE POLITICAL RESOLVE NECESSARY TO MAKE THEM ENFORCEABLE Kimberly Ann Elliott. The greatest barrier to making economic sanctions an effective foreign policy tool is not inherent in modern political or economic systems. however.000. Increased integration also means that the impact of nearly universal and comprehensive sanctions can be quite severe and can raise concerns about the humanitarian consequences for people in target countries who have little control over or influence on policy. Until there is some evidence that such will can be generated. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. July 1995.
expectations about their impact have been scaled down for four reasons. p. as evidenced by maintaining Serbia's military advantage over Croatia and Bosnia in Yugoslavia's wars. Weiss. 1999. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Moreover. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". flaws affect their efficacy and equity. geographic.asp Although increasingly popular in the 1990s. Efficacy is reduced when target governments do not have strong opposition movements. MULTIPLE CIRCUMVENTIONS POINTS AND SLOPPY APPLICATION GUARANTEE SANCTIONS WILL BACKFIRE Thomas G.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 54 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' cont'd 4. The Graduate Center.once passed. modifications require a Security Council decision -. First. Countries depending on a single export or on massive imports of food are likely to be most affected. Sanctions have vastly differing impacts depending on the economic. while those with multiple borders are able to engage in sanctions busting. The built-in rigidities -. arms embargoes can hurt one side more than the other. . and political profiles of targets. The City University of New York.and the ad hoc nature of their design and administration are further weaknesses.
Thus.asp Second. 3. Sanctions may even be the "American way of war. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. and they certainly are not without cost. April 2007. Summer 1998. they may not be the substitute for force that many hope for. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". 2. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. overreliance on sanctions may contribute to them. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs. Democracies. Policymakers may escalate in order to rescue their own prestige or their state's international reputation. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SANCTIONS DRAMATICALLY RAISES THE PROBABILITY OF WAR BREAKING OUT David J. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. The President apparently feels they are politically less costly. USA TODAY. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. Republicans seem to think they are a monetarily less costly weapon. making publics willing to resort to more extreme measures if sanctions fail. and Militarized Conflict".S. Signals. The latter lessons seem to be having a greater effect than the former.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 55 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' 1. p. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". However. SANCTIONS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR BECAUSE THEY WREAK THE EXACT SAME COSTS AND ARE AS DEADLY 10 Llewellyn D Howell. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. July 1995.asp Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy." which democratic leaders may sometimes adopt in order to "give peace a chance" and thus disarm criticism of the use of force later. as Washington discovers more about how to utilize sanctions properly to make them effective. described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Sprecher. Serbia and others are learning how to counter and avoid them. Pape. is learning this as it attempts the application of sanctions. The U. "Sanctions. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ACTUALLY BACKFIRE AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BREAKING OUT BY FORCING ESCALATION OF A DISPUTE Robert A. they are not without deadly impact that may be just as consequential as the use of bullets and bombs. p. and rhetoric used to justify sanctions can demonize the target regime. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. . Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. using economic sanctions that are likely to fail may actually increase costs and risks for coercers by increasing the likelihood that the sanctioning state will ultimately resort to force. Ironically. far from avoiding unnecessary wars.asp Economic sanctions seem like they should be an appropriate alternative to force in a post-Cold War world. Most importantly. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. p. Lektzian & Christopher M.
Their track record. World Health Organization 1996). "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. Faris 1997.. Pape 1997). or do they function as a signal of resolve that helps state leaders avoid armed conflict? Some policy makers have proposed that economic sanctions are a nonviolent policy option.asp Given the increased proclivity of states to use sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War. declining GNP. reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003.asp The weak power of economic sanctions does not mean. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. p. deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. he correctly characterized sanctions as a "hand upon the throat of the offending nation" (in Foley 1923. Weiss 1999). and Elliott 1990a. Hufbauer. nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states (in Foley 1923. 2002. 6. Thus. we are interested in understanding how the use of economic sanctions might affect the probability of military force being used. we develop an argument about the signaling properties of sanctions that helps explain when sanctions will. particularly when used by democratic countries. Sanctions. The primary research question asked in this article is. ACTUALLY INCREASING THE CHANCES THAT A WAR WILL BE FOUGHT David J. 1997)2. and Fausey 1995. capital flight. Schott. April 2007. Oudraat 2000). Crawford 1997. We argue that sanctions tend to increase the probability of militarized conflict. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Wood. vol. however. Understanding the limits of both sanctions and force as coercive instruments may help policymakers identify situations in which diplomacy may be a better approach than coercion. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. Others see the use of sanctions as tied intimately with the use of military force. they have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. Disasters such as Vietnam and Somalia demonstrate that advocates of military coercion can sometimes be just as overoptimistic as advocates of economic sanctions. 2008. Garfield. Second. Pape. sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer. Devin. lost foreign investment. and Militarized Conflict". function as substitutes for military force. THE WEAKNESS OF SANCTIONS DOESN'T MEAN A PRIORI THAT USE OF FORCE IS NEEDED -RATHER IS SHOWS THE NEED FOR DIPLOMACY Robert A. while Wilson's famous description of sanctions is in retrospect less than accurate. however. Sprecher. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 56 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' cont'd 4. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005. To help resolve this debate about whether sanctions tend to be a prelude to war or a nonviolent alternative. 2003. 1976 -. Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful.2001". p. Joyner 2003). Summer 1998. in this light. Hoskins 1997. and when they will not. These costs include increased unemployment. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. SANCTIONS FAIL IN 95 PERCENT OF THEIR USES AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT Reed M. are seen as a policy option falling between diplomatic words and wars (Selden 1999). SANCTIONS ESCALATE SITUATIONS AND TIE THE HANDS OF DEMOCRATIC LEADERS.this is expensive and destructive and often does not work. do economic sanctions tend to lead to war. . Schott. silent deadly remedy" and an effective. or in which the United States may have to accept that it simply cannot impose its will at an acceptable cost. Garfield 2002. 71). because of their propensity to signal weakness while simultaneously tying the hands of democratic leaders.g. increased corruption. Bhoutros-Ghali 1995).asp In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. 71). "Sanctions. allowing states to address international crises without resorting to the use of costly military force(Helms 1999). Heine-Ellison 2001. 5. Sanctions in this view are not a nonviolent alternative to war. and Elliott 1990a. p. falls far short of Wilson's characterization. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. First. Signals. 52. Lektzian & Christopher M. that we should just employ force instead . Hufbauer et al. they are complements to it (Askari et al. drug and arms smuggling.
ultimately making militarized conflict all the more likely. p. April 2007. designs sanctions in a manner so that they will have minimal costs to themselves. .However. reducing the probability of militarized force (Drezner 2003.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 57 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' cont'd 7. all too often. the sender nation. Li. Gartzke. sends a signal of weakness and indecisiveness on the part of the sender. and Boehmer 2001. and instead of signaling resolve. SANCTIONS RAISE THE RISK OF WARFARE BECAUSE THEY DON'T SIGNAL STRENGTH. When democratic states use sanctions in this manner. and Militarized Conflict". "Sanctions. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Sprecher. we conclude that when a sanction is observed. Morgan and Schwebach 1997). As a result. making it more difficult for them to back down. there is a significantly increased probability that a militarized dispute will also occur. following sound domestic economic practices. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M.asp Sanctions can function as a signal of resolve. they run an even greater risk of war because they also tend to generate audience costs that tie their hands. CONTRIBUTING TO MISCALCULATION David J. This affects the costly signaling properties of sanctions. Signals. Lektzian & Christopher M.
2007. former co-ordinator of United Nations Resolution 986 (Food-for-Oil in Iraq) describes economic sanctions as a 'totally bankrupt concept'. Sept. Weiss. According to UNICEF. and that an estimated 500. The organisation reports that the sanctions made it very difficult for parents to provide needed medicine. 2004). It thus is crucial for humanitarians of all stripes. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. But the challenge is to determine whether the greatest good (or the least harm) for the greatest number over the longer term would be better served by rapid and vigorous military intervention to enforce legitimate international decisions rather than slow. Rarick. SANCTIONS ARE UNETHICAL AND INHUMANE -. Volume 27. Benign motivations are insufficient if the results are dreadful -. The City University of New York.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 58 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' 1. and. sanctions represent an inhumane form of public policy. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. caused a decline of healthcare and led to the collapse of the national currency (BBC. Economic sanctions themselves can be called instruments of mass destruction (Mueller and Mueller. decreased attention to child welfare and education. Pages 65-70 In addition to their unethical nature. Sanctions in Iraq caused the price of basic food products to greatly increase. However. in addition.asp It is true that humanitarian concerns often stand behind support for economic sanctions -. A preference to avoid military force no longer appears unequivocally noble should civilian damage from a so-called nonforcible coercive effort be more substantial than from a forcible alternative. food and safe drinking water for their children. The calculations are tortuous and the mathematics inexact. 1999) when one compares the human toll inflicted on the innocent people of sanctioned countries. including pacifists. uncertain gains. The sanctions decreased the standard of living of the most disadvantaged members of Haitian society. Most readers of these pages have a visceral preference for nonviolence. the ethical considerations are made even more complex because suffering is likely to outweigh potential. The authors of the study concluded that the effect of the sanctions continued long after they were lifted in 1994.just as evil motivations are sufficient if the results are beneficial. p. In a study of the impact of economic sanctions imposed against Haiti from 1991-94. resulted in inadequate nutrition. rising unemployment. Gibbons and Garfield (1999) determined that sanctions resulted in declining incomes. Dennis Halliday.that is. 1999.THEY ARE EVEN WORSE THAN WAR 11 Thomas G. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". to re-examine their almost universal preference for nonforcible over forcible sanctions.THE IRAQ AND HAITI EXPERIENCE PROVE THIS Charles A. and not necessarily less violent. Issue 3. civilian pain in the short term is thought to produce humanitarian gains over the longer haul by eliminating weapons of mass destruction or halting ethnic cleansing. economic coercion. in certain contexts the use of multilateral military force may emerge as a possibly more humane option than its supposedly nonforcible relative. economic sanctions against Iraq resulted in a doubling of the death rate for children less than five years of age and a skyrocketing of infant mortality. 2. 1998). poor nutrition and increased family breakdowns. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". The Graduate Center. . The empirical evidence for affecting such change is meager.000 children under the age of five died between 1991 and 1998 as a result of the sanctions (Pigler. THE MORAL COST OF SANCTIONS MEANS THEY SHOULD BE ABANDONED -. it is impermissible to cede to what normally would be a virtue if such an approach leads to more violence and conflict than is necessary or undermines local coping capacities more than an alternative. Paradoxically. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.
it could be argued that the positive results gained by the people of the sanctioned country justified the necessary pain they experienced in the application of the sanctions. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Sept. Sept. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. never as a means' -. Issue 3. 2007. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. 4. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. SANCTIONS OUGHT TO BE REJECTED ON ETHICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE THEY TREAT THE POPULATION AS A MEANS TO AN END. Rarick. Pages 65-70 An additional argument against the use of sanctions can be made on ethical grounds. A common theory of the consequentialist school of thought is utilitarianism. Economic sanctions do not achieve the goal of allowing the greatest benefits to the least advantaged of society. Rarick. SUBJECTING THEM TO GREAT PAIN FOR POLITICAL GAIN Charles A. This is not. SANCTIONS ALSO MUST BE REJECTED ON CONSEQUENTIALIST GROUNDS BECAUSE THEY ARE INEFFECTIVE AND COSTLY Charles A. Economic sanctions imposed on most countries have not harmed the country's leaders and the least advantageous members of society carry the burden.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 59 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' cont'd 3. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. always at the same time as an ends. The citizens of the sanctioned country are used as a means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning country. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". 2007. According to Rawls. a consequentialist analysis of sanctions finds them lacking an ethical quality. social contract theory argues for justice delivered via a social contract between free and equal citizens (Kelly. Volume 27.can be used to argue against the use of sanctions. Pages 65-70 Sanctions do not stand up to the principles of social justice proposed by John Rawls (1971). The consequences of sanctions in most cases have been to lower the economic. Unlike the utilitarians who argue for 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Consequentialism contends that an act is right or wrong depending on its actual consequences. Issue 3. If sanctions were effective most of the time. Volume 27. whether in your person or in the person of any other. the case. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. however. Sanctions are a means to an end. Rarick. Economic sanctions could be evaluated using a number of different ethical perspectives. The practical imperative of Kant (1785) -. 2004). . 5. 2007. The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the people of the receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. which proposes an act is ethical when it provides the greatest good for the greatest number of people. educational and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries. Sept. Pages 65-70 Similarly. ethical action involves providing each person with equal rights to basic liberties and taking action beneficial to the least advantageous members of society. Issue 3. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". SANCTIONS VIOLATE CORE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE BECAUSE THEY DISADVANTAGE THE MOST VULNERABLE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY Charles A. Volume 27.'So act that you use humanity.
"'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. 52. Weiss et al. Charles A. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Lowenberg. In order to protect themselves. p.asp Economic sanctions are a common tool of foreign policy and have been increasingly employed by Western states to coerce recalcitrant leaders into improving human rights conditions. 1976 -. policy makers should weigh this cost against the desired policy outcome. Under the 'original position'. Operating behind this 'veil of ignorance'. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. a group of individuals are asked to create a society in which they will be living. their view of sanctions would be very different. 7. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. or respecting the rule of law within their borders. Haiti or Iraq. Moreover. Given that improving human rights is often a stated objective of economic sanctions. Wood. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Weiss 1999). Sept. 2008.2001". and Mertens 2004. 1997). if sanctions unintentionally contribute to spikes in repression or undermine human rights conditions. since they do not know where they will be positioned in the new society. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE REQUIRES THE REJECTION OF SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 60 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' cont'd 6. Pape 1997. Moreover. Yet sanctions often fail to achieve these goals (Hufbauer. . particularly those imposed by Western states. without knowing anything about their abilities or interests. and Elliott 1990a. Schott. SANCTIONS CAUSE SURGES IN THE LEVEL OF ATROCITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Reed M. It is therefore important to determine whether sanctions improve the human rights practices in the target state or if they perhaps exacerbate an already problematic situation. Li and Drury 2004). It seems reasonable to conclude that if politicians were operating behind the veil of ignorance. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2002. Pages 65-70 Rawls's theory can be further explained by using his 'thought experiment'. and did not know if they would wake up tomorrow as common citizens in Cuba. The theory operating behind this process is that no one would be willing to risk the chance of ending up in a very bad position in the new society. participants create a society where everyone has equal opportunity and where privileged life-styles are minimised. adopting or restoring democratic institutions. 2007. Rarick. sanctions frequently impose significant economic and social costs on civilians (Cortright and Lopez 2000. They may also contribute to adverse changes in the domestic political climate and policy decisions of the target state (Drury and Li 2006. Kaempfer. Weiss 1999. Burma. vol. participants select an option that ensures the least bad outcome for themselves. Volume 27. Issue 3. the human rights impact of sanctions is an important issue of policy.
3. In particular.2/ADA415058 If these criticisms are not reason enough to avoid or discontinue sanctions as a policy tool. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". those markets simply fill their needs by contracting with businesses from nations that have no such trade restrictions. and Elliott (hereafter HSE) bottom line on the utility of economic sanctions is not terribly different.5. Schott. Summer 1998. on American business. 92-93). This article will argue that in the current political climate. Washington. 2002. But. Even multilateral efforts may cause fatigue among the participating parties. p. Imposed unilaterally. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IS SHARPLY LIMITED AND DECLINES EVEN MORE WHEN UNILATERALLY DEPLOYED Kimberly Ann Elliott. accessed 12. and Syria. the Hufbauer. The basic purpose of imposing these sanctions . even fewer when the United States acts unilaterally. unless the sender is the sole supplier of some essential resource. 2006. are the wrong approach for dealing with the current situations in Iran. the United States shuts American businesses out of important markets while at the same time. It contends that by imposing unilateral trade sanctions. . nqa. there are others. When American companies are prohibited from competing in certain countries.punishment remains unfulfilled and U. vol. failing to realize the foreign policy changes that they are designed to bring about in the first place.dtic. . UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE USELESS BECAUSE THEY ARE SO EASILY CIRCUMVENTED Bryan Foy. interests. without certain restrictions.mil/100. 1. United States Army. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". the target nation may easily turn to others more willing to meet its requirements. unilateral trade sanctions are not the most effective method for advancing American interests in many regions of the world. American businesses are shut out of substantial markets and put at a distinct disadvantage in an increasingly global economy. The success rate importantly depends on the type of policy or governmental change sought" (HSE 2d ed. 105-106).S. particularly if the sending nation is powerful and applies unwanted pressure on other states to support its policies. We concluded that "although it is not true that sanctions 'never work.asp While my disagreements with Pape's methods are many. clandestinely negating the public efforts of the collective sanctioning body. or is likely to have.' they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country to take actions it stoutly resists. ..2009: handle.. discuss several recent changes in these programs. particularly in the Middle East. Although Pape cites our work as the "key evidence" supporting the perceived optimism that sanctions can achieve major foreign policy goals. this article will contend that additional unilateral sanctions. a sender nation may succeed in sending a strong political statement.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 61 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WORK' 1. he never cites our own interpretation of the evidence. It will provide an overview of key U. In these cases surreptitious trade leaks may occur. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. pp. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL.lexis While sanctions may be a helpful tool in advancing certain American interests. we found that the utility of sanctions had declined sharply over time. economic sanctions regulations. DC. In the process. North Korea.S. UNILATERALLY IMPOSING SANCTIONS DOES NOT ACHIEVE THE FOREIGN POLICY GOAL AND DOES SO AT GREAT HARM TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS Harry Wolff. pp. are frustrated. and outline the impact each has had. Moreover. These "others" may also find the unilateral sanction policies of sending states unpopular. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. both political and economic. common sense also dictates that they can have a detrimental effect on American businesses. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". p. . especially where long term restrictions affect the health of domestic economies or international trade balances. with less than one in four sanctions having any success at all in the 1970s and 1980s (ibid. 2.
asp The standard I use is appropriate.asp Even when they fail to coerce. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. In former Yugoslavia. From 1965 to 1968. Baldwin's proposal to broaden the definition of sanctions success also poses a methodological problem. substantial political gain was achieved without life-threatening suffering. p. p. Weiss. in fact. former Yugoslavia. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. policymakers will normally consider that a success. the black majority supported sanctions and even benefited from increased employment resulting from import substitution. is behavior modification. and Haiti suggests that sanctions in and of themselves did not bring desired changes. sanctions were among many factors contributing to the political settlement at Dayton while causing serious but seldom life-threatening hardships. NOT ABILITY TO INFLICT DAMAGES Robert A. their contribution to the final settlement was virtually nil. Pape. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". Robert A. political gains were modest.asp A review of multilateral sanctions against South Africa. Accordingly. At the same time. The central policy purpose of economic sanctions. 3. The contribution was substantial in the case of South Africa. THE DAMAGE THAT SANCTIONS CAN INFLICT SHOULD NOT BE USED TO DETERMINE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. The City University of New York. Pape. considerably less in Iraq and Yugoslavia. although they do make the failure more ignominious. as a sufficient criterion for coding a sanctions effort as successful would mean that the dependent variable could not vary and theories of sanctions success could not be falsified. the policy will likely be judged a failure. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". ranging from justifiable in South Africa to intolerable in Iraq. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". Fall 1997.000 children) have not persuaded observers to consider this an instance of sanctions success. In Haiti sanctions helped bring the military junta to the bargaining table. The fact that a target that refuses to concede may suffer substantial costs does not turn failure into success. while the humanitarian cost was staggering. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. like all instruments of coercion. virtually all economic sanctions inflict harm on the target. p. the United States bombed North Vietnam and inflicted tremendous punishment on its society. The huge economic costs inflicted on Iraq (more than on any other target of sanctions in history) and the incredible human costs (including the deaths of more than 500. Fall 1997. they spurred processes of compromise and contributed to political efforts.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 62 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'ECONOMIC DAMAGE IS PROOF SANCTIONS WORK' 1." Including infliction of costs. 1999. and non-existent in Haiti. If the target state concedes to the coercer's demands. possibly even if undetected. To varying degrees. but so too was the civilian pain resulting from sanctions. BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION IS THE KEY DETERMINANT FOR SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS. sanctions figured in occasional minor concessions by the regime while exacerbating lethal suffering. In Iraq. The Graduate Center. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. especially because he further argues that costs matter even when they are not perceived: "A target state can be influenced regardless of whether the costs imposed are perceived by anyone. scant political gain was achieved at unacceptably high human costs. because they have not dislodged Saddam Hussein or obtained satisfactory compliance on weapons inspections. Iraq. sanctions always caused civilian pain. THE POLITICAL OUTCOMES OF SANCTIONS ARE MARGINAL WHILE THEIR HUMANITARIAN TOLL IS STAGGERING Thomas G. 2. but not to step down. if the target does not concede. Western sanctions against Iraq since 1991 are widely considered to have failed. In South Africa. but no one calls this a success. .
LD TOPIC ANALYSIS
ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE LAZILY APPLIED/ABUSED'
1. EVIDENCE ABOUT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD ARE REASON TO REFORM THEM, NOT REJECT THEM Kimberly Ann Elliott, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?", Summer 1998, p.asp Nevertheless, the flip side of declining utility is that economic sanctions, in our judgment, were a relatively effective tool of U.S. foreign policy in the early post-World War II era. Although increasing international economic integration and declining political hegemony have eroded U.S. leverage, just over half the episodes in which the United States took a leading role from 1945 to 1970 resulted in at least partial success. In that context, our research can be used as a source for ideas about how to strengthen sanctions and make them a more effective foreign policy instrument. 2. CLAIMS THAT SANCTIONS ARE ABUSED OR USED TOO MUCH ARE FALSE -- THEY ARE CAREFULLY TARGETED Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp This is sheer nonsense. The statistics peddled by these lobbyists are grossly inflated and intentionally misleading. Half of the world is not living under American sanctions -- nowhere near it. There is no epidemic. Congress has been cautious and circumspect, passing just a handful of carefully targeted sanctions laws. And unilateral economic sanctions are by no means new: they have been vital weapons in America's foreign policy arsenal for more than 200 years. I have been and continue to be a friend of American business. But the distortions spread by this small cabal of lobbyists in the name of American business are inexcusable. The time has come for a reality check. 3. THE AFFIRMATIVE'S EVIDENCE THAT SANCTIONS ARE USED TOO OFTEN ARE FALSE, MANUFACTURED CLAIMS BY LOBBYIST GROUPS Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp The statistic has become conventional wisdom: in just four years the United States has imposed sanctions 61 times, burdening 2.3 billion people (42 percent of the world). That would be pretty awful, save for one thing -- it is not true. These figures have been circulated by the antisanctions business group USA Engage, based on a study by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). They are a fabrication. At my request, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) evaluated the NAM claim that from 1993 through 1996, "61 U.S. laws and executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral sanctions for foreign policy purposes." CRS reported that it "could not defensibly" justify the number. "We find the calculation used in the NAM study to be flawed, even if the specific [sanctions] were fairly characterized, which is not always the case," CRS concluded.
LD TOPIC ANALYSIS
ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE MASSIVE ECONOMIC COSTS'
1. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST SANCTIONS ARE TANTAMOUNT TO SELLING THUMBSCREWS TO TYRANTS, FORFEITING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND MORAL LEADERSHIP Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp This may shock the business lobbyists. It should not. Americans do not need to sell their souls or their national security to create jobs and economic prosperity. The lobbyists behind this antisanctions crusade are saying, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." America cannot stop rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, they say, so why cede markets for sensitive technology to our European competitors? The United States cannot stop dictators from torturing people, so why not close our eyes and trade with them as if nothing is happening? That is not the American way. Americans do not need to create jobs by selling thumbscrews to the world's tyrants. 2. STUDIES QUOTING LOSSES OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS SIMPLY FALSE AND BEEN DISPROVEN BY OBJECTIVE RESEARCH Dianne E. Rennack, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law", Nov. 1, 1999, p.asp Some suggest that there is a post-Cold War trend toward sanctions becoming the method of first resort in foreign policy. Others contend that sanctions, unilateral or otherwise, are a peacetime means to improving international behavior in important areas such as human rights or weapons proliferation, and should not be avoided solely for trade concerns. Particular attention is paid to the domestic impact of sanctions. A frequently cited report issued by the Institute for International Economic (April 1997) concludes that U.S. unilateral sanctions may have cost U.S. businesses some $15-19 billion in 1995. The Congressional Budget Office, on the other hand, has found that sanctions have had a negligible effect on the overall U.S. economy, with a loss of perhaps $1 billion in 1997, compared to U.S. national income of $6.6 trillion. 3. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF APPLYING SANCTIONS ARE MINUSCULE AND THE MORAL BENEFIT OF SANCTIONS CERTAINLY JUSTIFIES IT Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp The lobbyists' cry that sanctions cost the United States vital access to large markets is a sham. The cost of U.S. sanctions is minuscule. According to Jan Paul Acton of the Congressional Budget Office, "to date, the cost of existing sanctions to the overall economy has been quite modest. CBO's review of research indicates that the net cost may be less than $1 billion annually. That compares with $6.6 trillion of total national income in 1997." The United States gave away roughly $13 billion in foreign aid during 1997. Besides, cutting foreign aid to punish misbehavior actually saves taxpayers' money. Even if we use the business lobbyists' standard tactic of applying costs to entire populations, the price tag for U.S. economic sanctions comes to a whopping $3.77 per American -- about the cost of a Big Mac and fries. That is a small price to pay for a moral foreign policy -- and a price most Americans are willing to bear. A 1998 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken on the eve of the president's visit to China showed that less than one-third of Americans agreed that "We should maintain good trade relations with China, despite disagreements we might have with its human rights policies." Fully two-thirds of Americans agreed that "we should demand that China improve its human rights policies if China wants to continue to enjoy its current trade status with the United States."
LD TOPIC ANALYSIS
ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE MASSIVE ECONOMIC COSTS' cont'd
4. THE USE OF SANCTIONS IS KEY TO ACHIEVING QUICK ECONOMIC SUCCESSES. Franklin L. Lavin, executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, FOREIGN POLICY, "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma", Fall 1996, p.asp Even supposedly "empty" trade sanctions can be useful political tools. The 50-year-old Arab economic boycott of Israel has had minimal economic impact, but it has promoted Arab solidarity and served an important domestic political role. In general, asphyxiation is more effective than oxygen in making a political statement, because government policy can more readily disrupt market forces of trade and investment than encourage them. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS IS EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE THE MORE RAPIDLY THEY ARE APPLIED Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Sanctioning Madness", Nov/Dec. 1997, p.asp Any imposition of sanctions should be swift. As with other forms of intervention, including military action, gradual escalation allows the target to adapt and adjust. Such an approach forfeits shock value and allows asset shifting, hoarding, and other arrangements to circumvent sanctions -- as Libya and Iran found. This recommendation is easier said than done, since gaining international support for sanctions will in many cases require that the United States move slowly and gradually, further limiting the potential effectiveness of economic sanctions in today's world. 6. THE HIGH ECONOMIC COSTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE PART OF THEIR CREDIBILITY BECAUSE IT SHOWS THE STATE IS WILLING TO ABSORB COSTS David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict", April 2007, p.asp One of the central concerns within international politics is the question of how states interact in an anarchic international environment. In the absence of compelling mechanisms to enforce agreements, how do states make their promises (or threats) credible? Baldwin captures the essence of this problem when he says, "The projection of credible images is difficult for sovereign states. In the absence of an overarching authority capable of enforcing agreements, it is often difficult for statesmen to convince others that they mean what they say" (1985, 106). Fearon describes the problem more succinctly as, "how can a leader make a threat to use force credible when the leader would, in fact, be willing to use the military?" (1997, 69). How do states overcome credibility problems of this type? One way of increasing the credibility of commitments, frequently proposed by international relations theorists, is the use of costly signals that allow observers to separate states into types. Costly signals are actions that generate costs that the leader would not be inclined to absorb if he or she were unwilling to carry out the promise or commitment that was made (Fearon 1997). By incurring costs, a state can separate itself from other, less committed states, which are unwilling to incur those costs (Morrow 1999; Schwebach 2000). We propose that the imposition of economic sanctions can function as just such a costly signal of a state's commitment to have a dispute resolved in its favor. When a state chooses to respond to a crisis by imposing economic sanctions, it chooses to impose costs on itself, partly economic and partly political, that will restrict its future range of choices. Furthermore, according to Baldwin (1985), when a powerful state goes out of its way to signal the importance of an issue by incurring costs, that action should neither be ignored nor written off as trivial. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state, but also to the sender nation (Askari et al. 2003; Barber 1979;Hart 2000;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990;Wagner 1988). Hufbauer et al., for example, estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded "as a consequence of U.S. sanctions, workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995" (1997, 7). Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed, and are unrecoverable, they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions.
Building international support will require intense. combined with the relatively greater legitimacy accorded to UN enforcement actions. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. This finding confirms a basic intuition behind much of the theory and practice of economic sanctions.asp To the extent that there is a degree of optimism today about the potential effectiveness of sanctions.asp In this article I show that economic sanctions work in at least one respect: they destabilize the leaders they target. virtually nowhere could democratic rights and freedoms be suspended. Except when the United States is in a unique position to exert leverage based on its economic relationship with the target. that number had increased to 47 by the mid-1990s. it may now be possible for the United Nations to take action in defense of collective security and to protect international norms. The vigorous debate in academic and policy circles on the effectiveness of economic sanctions mirrors their growing use as a tool for intervention. 3. but it should be all but certain to follow. Yale University. While only five countries were subject to economic pressure around 1950. SANCTIONS CAN STILL BE LEGITIMATE IF THEY TAP INTO MULTILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT Richard N. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. Ohio. DC. The hope is that multilateralism.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 66 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE COERCION' 1. Summer 1998. often high-level diplomatic efforts and even then may not succeed. July 2005. Washington. Haass. The practice of imposing costs through economic pressure is often justified as a means for changing the behavior of a foreign government.asp For pragmatic more than normative reasons. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Shott. and induced Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to come to the negotiating table in Dayton. with the end of the Cold War. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985). "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". Leaders are more likely to compromise if pressure threatens their survival in office. as was originally intended. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. and Elliott 1990). human rights grossly abused. My basic conclusion is that sanctions are more likely to coerce than previously thought. 2. p. The leader of a government who comes under economic pressure in a given year is more likely to lose office than a leader who does not. "Sanctioning Madness". multilateral support for economic sanctions should typically be a prerequisite for the United States' imposition of them. unilateral sanctions should be avoided. p. 1997. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". have forced Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cooperate grudgingly (and sporadically) with the UN inspectors seeking to destroy his weapons of mass destruction. SANCTIONS WILL BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY WORK IN A POST COLD WAR WORLD BECAUSE THEY HAVE GREATER LEGITIMACY Kimberly Ann Elliott. it is likely because of the perception shared by many that broad multilateral sanctions helped to end apartheid in South Africa. or a civil war break out without causing a group of states to react with economic sanctions. . Policymakers must then consider whether some alternative would not be better than weaker or unilateral sanctions. may restore to sanctions the leverage that they had when the United States was the dominant economic and military power in the Western world. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Nov/Dec. In the last decade. SANCTIONS ARE AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF COERCION BECAUSE THEY CAN UNDERMINE ILLEGITIMATE REGIMES Nikolay Marinov. Here the optimism is based on the fact that. p. Such support need not be simultaneous.
p. In that context. Sanctions by Nigeria against Biafra and by the United Kingdom against Argentina in 1982 were also judged against this more modest standard. In these cases we agree that military force was decisive in determining the outcome. Summer 1998. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Economic coercion may encourage political compromise or spark dialogue and negotiation. we have not confined our research to the utility of economic sanctions as an alternative to military force. 1999. p. DC. IS CRITICAL AS A FORCE-MULTIPLIER THAT ALLOWS FOREIGN POLICIES TO BE EXECUTED WITH LOWER COSTS Kimberly Ann Elliott. we judge sanctions as a success if they contributed to victory by inhibiting the ability of the target to effectively carry on military operations. Washington. Weiss. for example. the calculation in Tripoli that led to the extradition of two Libyan nationals allegedly involved in the Lockerbie bombing is illustrative. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. In cases combining economic and military measures. SANCTIONS DO NOT ONLY HAVE TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. they may make a difference when blended with other international actions. As noted.asp As Pape notes. military. The City University of New York. we agree that military force was decisive in determining the outcome. Washington. as in World Wars I and II. EVEN IF NOT DECISIVE ALONE. THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS. we largely agree on what the definition of an economic sanction ought to be. accelerating the timing of the outcome and lowering the cost of achieving the sender country's goals. at the other end of the spectrum. But economic and military pressure can act together synergistically . but we also believe that sanctions made a useful contribution by rendering the target's military capability less effective than otherwise.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 67 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' 1. This might be.so that goals can be achieved at acceptable political. by increasing political opposition to the target regime or impairing its capability to respond to military challenges by opponents. HELPING TO ACHIEVE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES 12 Kimberly Ann Elliott. 3.asp Pape's approach to the confluence of military and economic force is akin to the archetypal air force general who would like to attribute victory in World War II. BUT CAN ACTUALLY ASSIST IN WAR-FIGHTING GREATLY. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Sanctions can also serve as a tangible signal: either that support for opposition forces is explicit or that support for the ruling regime has been withdrawn. we believe that some degree of success may be attributed to sanctions if they contributed at least modestly to the outcome. 2.asp Is there common ground between those who oppose sanctions because of their inhumane consequences and those who support them as a tool of statecraft irrespective of their impact on civilians? Accountability and transparency require assessment. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Therefore we believe it is legitimate to include sanctions intended to buttress military power and hasten an adversary's defeat. Although sanctions alone have seldom brought about major policy changes. SANCTIONS SHOULDN'T BE USED ALONE BUT ARE INCREDIBLY EFFECTIVE WHEN DEPLOYED AS PART OF A PACKAGE STRATEGY Thomas G. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". DC. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.just as naval and infantry forces usually work with air power . "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". p. and every war since. whether some cases should be included because the commercial issues involved actually mask broader political disputes. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". . but a more promising line of investigation is examining whether sanctions stand alone as the policy against a targeted state or are part of a larger mix of carrot-like (involving persuasion and incentives) or stick-like (involving coercion through military force) policies. Summer 1998. and economic cost. The disagreements arise over whether to include "military impairment" cases and. to air superiority. The Graduate Center. In many of the cases involving either a threat or actual use of military force.
. where appropriate. Desi Bouterse in Suriname. in conjunction with other measures.asp Similarly. If the sanctions regime succeeds on its own. aid did not by itself cause the coups but that. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.S. pp. made it more difficult to confront domestic insurgencies (ibid. 160-167). who has studied the overthrow of Presidents Joao Goulart in Brazil and Salvador Allende in Chile and concludes that the interruption of U.5. and various governments in Laos. however.2009: handle. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". the possibility must be clearly communicated to the target that force will be used if necessary . As former U. 452-456. sanctions are only one of many available tools in the box. When used appropriately. 5. if the economic pressure. and under the auspices of which institutions. in situations that are sufficiently serious and where the foreign policy objective is important. in cases targeting Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. sanctions emboldened the opposition and. p. goals.dtic.2/ADA415058 Sometimes sanctions work. Washington. SANCTIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY SUPPLEMENTS. then it is an effective policy tool. Similarly. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Donald McHenry noted recently in the context of a discussion of policies for preventing deadly conflict. Washington. 260-266. credible threats of additional force if compliance is not forthcoming.THEY ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHEN USED AS A SUPPLEMENT WITH OTHER FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS Kimberly Ann Elliott. contributed to goals being achieved sooner or at lower cost than otherwise. Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. p. 546-551. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". However. United States Army. The withdrawal of financial resources in these cases made it more difficult for the two regimes to deliver on promises made to key constituencies and exacerbated the macroeconomic consequences of expansionary macroeconomic policies. Whether or not they work. it did contribute to the achievement of U." .to enforce the sanctions. accessed 12. 182-187. to strategically buttress their effects. economic sanctions may be an alternative to the indiscriminate use of force. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. If sanctions do not succeed but achieve a stasis in which the offending nation's behavior remains within a band of tolerance. as in the case of South Africa. All said. EVEN IF THEY ALONE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH GOALS.S. Sometimes they do not. DC. 2002. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 68 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' cont'd 4. then they are still useful tools because they provide the perception of doing something while waiting.asp Contrary to Pape's assertion. A distinguished International Fellow in this year's War College class captured the utility of sanctions with the observation that "the pertinent question for policy makers is not whether economic sanctions are effective. THEY STILL MAKE IT EASIER OVERALL Kimberly Ann Elliott. they are effective and legitimate to the degree that comprehensive planning and preparation saves military and civilian lives.THE KEY IS EXPLORING HOW TO USE THEM MORE APPROPRIATELY Bryan Foy. in conjunction with what other tools. sanctions can be an important and effective policy instrument for influencing behavior short of war. DC. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. by depriving the target government of economic resources. If sanctions result in nothing more than the creation of time in which to stage combat operations. we would regard sanctions as having played a useful role in the outcome. NO ONE ADVOCATES THE USE OF SANCTIONS EXCLUSIVELY -. Summer 1998. Summer 1998. SANCTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY ONLY A TOOL AND WILL EXPERIENCE VARIED SUCCESS -. Sanctions imposed as an alternative to force because the political will to use force is lacking are not likely to be credible and therefore are not likely to be successful. we agree with Lars Schoultz. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Sanctions can be effective only if they are part of an overall coherent policy including skilled diplomacy and. 6. but in what instances they are most effectively employed.S. Nor should they be. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.mil/100. or as a last resort if sanctions fail. in combination with military pressure. Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Again. sanctions are seldom expected to achieve ambitious foreign policy goals in the absence of other policy tools. they allow sending nations and/or the international community to bide time in the search for the most effective way to achieve policy goals.
can be effective if they are part of comprehensive coercive strategies that include the use of force.and certainly policymakers . Most scholars and analysts have. economic sanctions. although certainly no panacea. SURVIVAL. THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIES ON A STRAWMAN REPRESENTATION OF PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS Kimberly Ann Elliott.asp In "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. and if they are implemented properly. Many sanctions regimes in the 1990s failed because they did not meet these two key conditions. 2. and too little to the conditions under which they are imposed. ANTI-SANCTIONS SCHOLARS HAVE IGNORED OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO FAILURES -. In fact. "Making Economic Sanctions Work".if certain conditions are met. Targeted financial sanctions. the development of sanction strategies and problems of implementation. and that may be too expensive for them to acquire. Comprehensive. Arms embargoes may keep victims defenceless. In addition. independent of other coercive policy instruments. They have also tended to study economic sanctions in isolation. Two conditions need to be met for them to be effective. p. The misapplication of this policy instrument in the 1990s should not lead us to remove sanctions from our policy repertory. and even to some extent in Sierra Leone. His target is an "emerging optimism" about sanctions. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. And in the wake of the experiences in Iraq and Haiti. requiring monitoring and enforcement capabilities that most countries do not possess." Robert Pape sets up a straw man and then boldly proceeds to knock it down. p. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.asp The track record of UN sanction regimes has been mixed. Washington. paid too much attention to the outcomes of sanction regimes. SURVIVAL.asp The scholarly literature on sanctions is abundant and. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". which in his oversimplified characterization says that economic sanctions . few suggest that economic sanctions are necessarily more humane or that their use can be justified regardless of the humanitarian consequences. remain extremely difficult to implement. NOT SANCTIONS THEMSELVES Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". notably the actual use of force. on balance. But policy analysts . many sanction regimes have had secondary and unintended consequences. the missed opportunities in the FRY and Haiti.who are looking for ways to strengthen sanctions and make them more effective are generally far more nuanced in their conclusions and more limited in their expectations of what sanctions can achieve than Pape asserts.used in isolation from other tools . however. while air-traffic restrictions may impede the delivery of humanitarian relief. Summer 1998. These difficulties notwithstanding. p. MISFIRES IN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS ARE NOT A REASON TO ABANDON THEM -.THEY ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL AT BRINGING ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE IF THE CONDITIONS ARE RIGHT Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DC. 2000.THE PROBLEM IS HOW THEY ARE APPLIED. . 3.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 69 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' 1. while attractive in theory. sceptical.are "as effective as military force and more humane" (p. show that sanctions can bring about political change -. and even partial or selective. 90). sanctions risk sparking humanitarian crises in target countries. 2000. Neither comprehensive nor partial sanctions has succeeded in stopping civil strife in the countries that they have targeted.
indeed. 2000. In the FRY and Haiti. He argues that my colleagues and I wrongly counted as sanctions successes 35 of 40 cases.asp In order to knock down the straw man he has created and prove his assertion that sanctions cannot work. and Trade Division. p. and he attributes policy success to economic sanctions only if it occurred in the absence of accompanying policies. Most importantly. 1999. scientific and intellectual exchanges. He excludes cases where economic pressure is intended to complement military force. such as military threats or covert action. especially when it has devastating humanitarian consequences -. the United States took in only about 5 percent of that country's exports. The impact.asp Effectiveness is the most difficult aspect of sanctions policy to evaluate. In the case of Iraq. p. Sanctions should only be considered if the problem is serious enough to ultimately warrant the use of force. or only marginally engaged? Consider. An interested supporting party has to take the lead in defining the precise objectives that the sanctions seek to achieve. and only if they are determined to see the process through. Defense.asp Second. the US hesitated and the sanctions efforts faltered. sanctions need to be implemented and complied with by third parties. One should also consider the United States' relative importance -. How important to the targeted country is our economic cooperation? Is the United States a significant trading partner. few cases reach the threshold. 6. and keeping the relevant international actors focused on them. p. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY VARIABLES Dianne E. The support of more substantial trading partners in Europe was needed to have any hope of having an impact. by defining sanctions so narrowly and setting the bar for success so high that. Nov. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". to ensure third-party compliance a broad international consensus on the use of coercive action needs to be built. Coercion is a serious business. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. Imposing sanctions. He then concludes that "economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals" (p. SURVIVAL. volume of trade. and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms need to be put in place. requires resources. Washington. 93). and they might need assistance in setting up monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 5. Pape must debunk the evidence that sanctions have ever worked. common language. A recent study considers geographic proximity.to the targeted country. . Neighbouring countries might need to be compensated for economic losses. States should go down this road only if they are prepared to meet the costs of coercion. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. and membership in a common trading bloc all factors that might determine the success or failure of a unilaterally imposed sanctions regime.as economic sanctions generally do. DC. "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U. that at the time that sanctions were imposed against the former Yugoslavia. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS.S. 1. culture. Pape arrives at this conclusion. a country's relative wealth. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". and that 5 successes is far too few to be optimistic about sanctions ever being effective. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law". and history -. like using force. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. ENERGY SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON ENFORCING SANCTIONS. ANTI-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS RELY ON MASSIVE DISTORTIONS OF DATA Kimberly Ann Elliott. for example. cost and benefit of sanctions cannot be considered in a vacuum.in terms of trade. the US has played such a role. NOT ABANDONING THEM Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. however. Rennack. If outside powers are not willing to consider using military force. they should not contemplate imposing economic sanctions. Summer 1998.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 70 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' cont'd 4.
"Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". and when to change instruments. and only then does pressure begin to build on the authorities to relax an authoritarian political structure. East Germany was also the most Stalinist in structure and the most enduringly loyal to the Soviet Union. economic activity thrives around the world -or fails to do so for a series of complicated reasons. the parties imposing sanctions must consider early on what course they will take should sanctions fail. Because of their potentially serious social. Thus. Knowledge of the target is essential. FOREIGN POLICY. As difficult as it is for a government to disrupt another country's economic activity. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". they erected a massive security apparatus." Moreover.S.asp First.asp But oxygen is not merely the opposite of asphyxiation. p. 2. and in complete disregard for the views and desires of U. p. of all the former Warsaw Pact countries.asp On the oxygen side. the East European country that interacted most frequently with the West was East Germany because of its special relationship with West Germany. Thus. 3. SURVIVAL. an oxygen strategy may take even longer. The full emergence of a middle class can take decades. Lavin. policy. p. Lavin. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. or Osthandel. 2000. FOREIGN POLICY. Fall 1996. because the East German leadership was aware that interaction with the West might infect the body politic. THE EXPERIENCE WITH EAST GERMANY SHOWS THAT ECONOMIC OPENNESS CANNOT GUARANTEE SOCIAL OR POLITICAL CHANGE Franklin L. Fall 1996. Further. MAKING SANCTIONS PART OF A BROADER COERCIVE PACKAGE ENHANCES THEIR EFFECTIVENESS Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Nonetheless. As a Turkish saying puts it. . sanctions should not stay in place for long periods. policymakers.S. "The dog barks and the caravan rolls on. for as long as asphyxiation can take. it is still easier than stimulating it. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". West Germany's Ostpolitik employed a deliberate policy of economic engagement. Thus. economic and political effects. and not generally because of U. economic interaction by itself does not seem to guarantee a political opening.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 71 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' 1. TRYING TO COAX CHANGES IN BEHAVIOR WILL FAIL BECAUSE THEY TAKE TOO LONG AND THERE ARE OTHER UNDERLYING FACTORS THAT ARE MORE IMPORTANT Franklin L. A sound coercive strategy will tell outside powers when and how to impose sanctions. Indeed. To the dismay of government planners. when and how to step up coercive pressure.: any would argue that the West's economic activity with the Soviet bloc served to prolong the Soviet system by subsidizing a system in decline. sanctions should be seen as part of a coercive continuum. sanctions need to be part of a comprehensive coercive strategy that includes the threat and use of military force.
It is also important to avoid inadvertently degrading the population's means to resist. it is increasingly important to develop more selective or "smart" sanctions policies in a continued attempt to coerce target governments to change their unacceptable behavior.5." wrote senior South African official Les De Villiers in the New York Times. 2002. For years.2009: handle. some governments claimed that the best way to deal with the apartheid regime in South Africa was by continuing to talk and trade.by the sanctions -. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. 2002. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". at the grass roots level not only in concerned Western countries. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. Success in South Africa indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed against target nations with either democratically inspired governments or those unable or unwilling to suppress widespread dissension.that swept cities and states across the country and that the Congress eventually put forward at the national level.dtic. Only when serious sanctions started to take a significant economic toll on my country did the road to real reform begin. but also in the target nation as well. "They significantly dictated the form. United States Army." Even those South African officials who were responsible for countering them admit the impact of the anti-apartheid sanctions. substance. . accessed 12.mil/100. if not instigated." Sanctions were demonstrably more effective than engagement policies. It is essential to separate military and civilian aspects of future policy and carefully target subsequent efforts against regime leadership rather than populations. accessed 12.2/ADA415058 There is utility in the idea that the effectiveness of sanctions may be predicted based on the application. Today the world knows what a failure that policy was. Failures in Iraq and North Korea indicate that sanctions are less likely to succeed against a ruthless dictatorial regime in which the leader is unconcerned with the welfare of his population and is able to completely suppress internal rebellion. timing and pace of change in South Africa. and from 1986 to 1993 a comprehensive. A variety of other factors contribute to the success or failure of sanctions. says Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa. After almost 25 years of coercive effort.5. REFINED SMART SANCTIONS ARE THE NEXT NECESSARY STEP -. a rising tide of anti-apartheid opinion swept the globe. With this in mind.dtic. "Sanctions did work.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 72 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' cont'd 4. nearly leak free sanctions regime helped achieve multi-lateral policy goals. The reason for this is to invalidate "Arab Street" style propaganda campaigns and assuage the international community's concerns over inadvertently punishing an innocent populace. 5.THEY CAN ACHIEVE CHANGE IN THE RIGHT CONTEXT Bryan Foy. President Clinton said that "Americans had a lot to do with ending apartheid -. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". United States Army. but none appears as central as the willingness and ability of the host population to demand change. Governmentally imposed sanctions were supported. world-wide.mil/100.2009: handle.2/ADA415058 In conclusion. roughly 30 years of sanctions chipped away at South Africa's unacceptable racial policies. SOUTH AFRICA PROVES THAT SANCTIONS ARE COMPARATIVELY SUPERIOR TO ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES Bryan Foy.
observed over an average of 37 years. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". SANCTIONS ARE RATHER EFFECTIVE AT DESTABLIZING REGIME'S HOLD ON POWER. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion. p. THE BEST SETS OF DATA ANALYSIS REVEAL THAT SANCTIONS GREATLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A BAD LEADER WILL LOSE POWER Nikolay Marinov. p. . The result holds after adjusting for other determinants of leadership survival such as domestic political institutions. Specifically. critics can point out to Castro's survival in office as a glaring flaw in the policy." we need to compare cases in which pressure was applied. Yale University. Studies of economic statecraft and coercive diplomacy look only within cases David Rieff. While many observers would agree that sanctions against Cuba have failed. 2. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. some would contend that they have succeeded. Yale University. the level of economic growth. July 2005. to those in which it was not. aimed at domestic and international audiences. This is appropriate only if the question to be answered is why are some cases of coercion more successful than others. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. July 2005. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle. 27 July 2003. that by Institute for International Economics (2002) of coercion. sanctions increase the baseline risk of losing power by 28%." New York Times Magazine. Using panel data on 136 countries.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 73 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' 1.asp Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure. I find that the presence of sanctions against a government leader in a given year makes her or him significantly more likely to lose power in the following year. If the question is "Does coercion work?. The sanctions data comes from the most comprehensive dataset on economic sanctions available. and any residual country-specific heterogeneity. and defenders can point out the importance of sanctions as a signal of disapproval. What did the literature miss? Unlike existing work on economic sanctions. Thus. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. time in office. EFFECTING POLICY CHANGE Nikolay Marinov.asp A natural way of answering this question is to look at whether economic sanctions hurt the survival of government leaders in office. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. "Were Sanctions Right?. This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. I compare cases in which coercion took place to cases it was absent. sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?".
There is also substantial evidence of sender states bargaining with incumbents over a compromise to have sanctions lifted. Schultz (2001a). "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". in view of the finding that sanctions destabilize. without ever crossing the threshold that would cause foreign pressure to be applied. we can check whether sanctions are more likely to be lifted after a new incumbent assumes power in a targeted state. (2) the sender may try to reach a compromise with the current incumbent by offering to lift sanctions in return for at least some change in policy. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Second. . July 2005.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 74 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' cont'd 3.asp Recalling a point made earlier. First. Some or many potential targets may pursue policies congruent with the sender's preferences. SANCTIONS ARE VERY EFFECTIVE AT CAUSING POLITICAL CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP THAT BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED END Nikolay Marinov. There is some evidence that both mechanisms are at work in actual sanctions episodes. it is essential to use the right comparison. Third. by destabilizing the incumbent. the problem can be resolved altogether. a Heckman test) can be applied to adjust for the influence of this type of selection effect. shows one way to assess the magnitude of the problem through the use Monte Carlo simulations. July 2005. By reducing their demands. if pressure is effective in destabilizing the leaders it targets. It may seem. to understand and evaluate the record of success of economic pressure. Bargaining results in partial success to both sides. leaders would have an incentive to com. The success rate of 35% reported by Hufbauer. Yale University. To borrow some terms from game theory.promise once under pressure. the arrival of new leaders in targeted states has brought about the policy changes requested by sender states. A related study by McGillivray and Stam (2004) shows that leadership succession in at least some target states is significantly associated with the removal of economic sanctions. SANCTIONS ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE LEADERSHIP OF COUNTRIES TO CEASE BAD BEHAVIOR AS WELL AS DETERRING THEM FROM FUTURE MISTAKES Nikolay Marinov. Because pressure threatens destabilization. sanctions may bring to power a pliant leader. Given that existing studies have looked only within cases of coercion.. leaders would have an incentive to avoid it.asp There are three main implications of the argument made. more likely to be lifted after a change of power in target. in fact. As a way of testing whether there is a systematic link between leadership change and change in policy. sanctions end. the threat of punishment "off the equilibrium path" may be inducing compliance "on the equilibrium path. Yale University. In this way. it appears that we have not re.ally learned whether pressure works. p. and Elliott (1990) in part reflects the willingness of senders to revise down their initial expectations of success." 4. senders make them more acceptable to targeted leaders. the evidence that sanctions destabilize indicates that they may work in an 'invisible' way. in a different setting. Schott. that the results reported here contradict the pessimistic view in the literature regarding sanctions' effectiveness. p. the sender may impose sanctions to secure policy changes in one of two ways: (1) Advanced statistical techniques (e. We can expect to see this if new incumbents are more likely to concede. In a number of cases. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?".g. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. This also means that we cannot be confident that coercion is ineffective in producing policy change. This provides one reason to believe that sanctions may be more effective in securing policy change than previously thought. When the political price for conceding foreign demands becomes lower than the price of being sanctioned for the target. Survival analysis on the data at hand confirms that sanctions are.
the case can be made for intervening from the outside to alter policies inside. sovereignty notwithstanding. and North Korea are anything but typical.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 75 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' 1. as admitted by the Union Bank of Switzerland. The amount of attention such episodes have commanded is unfortunate in the sense that it has thrown other cases out of focus. Many scholars point to the Reagan administration's determination in restricting the Soviet Union's access to international funding as a factor that exacerbated its economic problems. p. can economic statecraft be up to the task? Economic sanctions have been receiving poor reputation." One way to summarize the main conclusion of this study is to say that the cases of Cuba. sanctions helped bring down the Soviet Union. They played a pivotal role in forcing communist Poland to release political prisoners and legalize Solidarity -. p. HIGH PROFILE EXAMPLES LIKE IRAQ. the decision to freeze $47 million in U. SANCTIONS HAVE A PROVEN RECORD OF SUCCESS -. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended. proceeded to denounce them by arguing: "But in the more typical cases of Iraq.S. 3. and military leaders to roll back President Jorge Serrano Elas' May 1993 coup.THEY PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN ENDING THE COLD WAR Jesse Helms. Yale University. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. Cuba and North Korea. Jan/Feb 1999. Our targeted Nigerian sanctions are beginning to bear fruit as the military government wearies of its pariah status. FOREIGN POLICY. If intervention is needed. associated with greater government instability.asp The leaders of a large number of states around the world continue to pursue policies many outside observers would find objectionable. After years of economic stagnation. In the end. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". typically. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had to come to terms with the West. Iraq. . executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Fall 1996. Haiti. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". July 2005. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. because he had no economic option except to reduce military expenditures. CUBA AND NORTH KOREA ARE EXTREME EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS AND ARE FAR FROM TYPICAL Nikolay Marinov.asp Successful examples of either approach can be found. A New York Times op-ed. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. this theory holds.sparking the collapse of communism. When strong normative grounds exist for disapproving of another state's policies. Such cases constitute highly atypical outliers in a set of pressure episodes which are. p. after conceding the limited effectiveness of sanctions for ending apartheid in South Africa. aid (one of the "sanctions" that business is lobbying to curtail) and the mere threat of lost trade convinced business. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". Long-run sanctions against some of the world's most vicious regimes have done much to obscure the average effect of economic sanctions.S.asp U. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. Swiss banks' recent decision to pay $1.25 billion in reparations to Holocaust survivors was a direct result of threatened sanctions. sanctions have seemed only to empower dictators. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION BOTH TESTIFY TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY Franklin L. labor. In Guatemala. Lavin. 2.
President DeKlerk replaced Botha in 1989 and took immediate steps to hasten reform and eliminate apartheid policies. commercial and governmental sanctions had the intended effect.2/ADA415058 The bottom line is that a number of well placed sources credit the sanctions regime against South Africa for bringing an end to apartheid.2009: handle. . quasi-democratic government with political. and un-debatable universal condemnation of policy that appealed to the white. nearly leak-proof global embargoes of essential services. and in June of that year. not only lifted its arms embargo. United States Army.mil/100. This repeal "also call(ed) on local (U. Nelson Mandela became the first democratically elected President of South Africa. supported overwhelmingly by South African whites.5. diplomatic and economic pressure.2/ADA415058 Private.2009: handle. imports and exports. The end of 1993 saw the approval of a majority rule constitution that supported a coalition government of more than twenty existing political parties including Indians. Other reasons include significant internal pressure to change.5.N. accessed 12. Sanctions worked in South Africa for debatable reasons that include completely isolating a somewhat sensitive. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". DeKlerk released Nelson Mandela.mil/100. state) governments to repeal their own sanctions before October 1995" under pain of losing their federal transportation funds. accessed 12. In 1990. African National Congress leader. European heritage of the minority government." President Clinton simultaneously repealed all remaining federal anti-apartheid sanctions with the exception of the long standing arms embargo. universal. 2002.S. but reaccredited South Africa as a member in full standing in the United Nations. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. democratic elections. United States Army. but this situation was successfully resolved without armed conflict.dtic. 2002. SOUTH AFRICA SHOWS THAT SANCTIONS CAN RESULT IN POLITICAL CHANGE WITHOUT RESORTING TO WARFARE Bryan Foy. 5. In May of 1994. It took more than 30 years. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". blacks and "coloreds. Discriminatory policies and laws fell one by one in the years between 1986 and 1993. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT.dtic. the U. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FORCED END OF APARTHEID TESTIFIES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS Bryan Foy.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 76 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' cont'd 4. from his life sentence in prison and worked with him to develop a transitional government that would support free.
7. 12. The empirical data on the use of sanctions is a bit fuzzy and there's a bit of debate on both sides. You must be able to win whether or not they can achieve behavior changes. This is the crux argument whether you are affirmative or negative. 8. 3. 2. Creatively bringing in alternative foreign policy tools is a great way to do this. 11. It is difficult to sustain the argument that sanctions are superior to war when they have the same devastating effect on a countries economy and infrastructure. A big challenge in generating all of your arguments is going to be finding reasons why sanctions are either uniquely harmful or useful in and of themselves. 5. it is difficult to see how they will lose the entire debate because it locks down the affirmative's ability to generate offense. but it mostly favors the affirmative. This is a devastating argument because it forces the affirmative to defend that sanctions in and of themselves are responsible for failure. the punishment arguments are a great way of finding a way to defend the use of sanctions even if they don't accomplish a specific goal. This block is especially strategic because it allows you to indict a wide majority of the negative's arguments by calling the soundness and motivations of their arguments into question. This block should dovetail nicely with other parts of your case that you will construct and contains a variety of values and perspectives. 4. If the negative wins this argument. 6. the historical record of the use of sanctions has not been the strongest. 10. The block is very strategic because it allows you to prove that there is a utility to sanctions even in instances when they fail to achieve their specified goals.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 77 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 STRATEGIC TIPS 1. 9. One of the most rhetorically powerful arguments for sanctions are that 'they are the only alternative to war' -this evidence does a fabulous job of questioning that. . Similar to the previous note (6). This is one of the best evidentiary examples of the 'only alternative to war' genre of arguments.