Lincoln Douglas Topic Analysis January-February 2010 by Travis Cram

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 AFFIRMATIVE CASE POSITIONS AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS . . . . . . . . . . 12 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST . . . . . . . . . . . 16 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 UNDERVIEW: ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS SUPERIOR TO SUFFOCATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 NEGATIVE CASE POSITIONS NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS EFFECT ON POPULATION IS MINIMAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: DEMOCRACIES NEED SANCTIONS AS A TOOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED, NOT ABANDONED . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: USING GUIDELINES IS BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR IMPROVING SANCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UNDERVIEW: DOGMATIC RESPONSES TO SANCTIONS ARE BAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EXTENSION POSITIONS ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SMART SANCTIONS CAN BE EVOLVED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WORK' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'ECONOMIC DAMAGE IS PROOF SANCTIONS WORK' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE LAZILY APPLIED/ABUSED' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE MASSIVE ECONOMIC COSTS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE COERCION' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 50 52 53 55 58 61 62 63 64 66 67 69 71 73 75 28 32 34 36 38 39 40 42 46 47

STRATEGIC TIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

the topic wording favors the negative because they can still negate the topic if they prove sanctions are desirable in even one instance. foreign assistance reductions and cutoffs. but most are related to pressuring a particular government or group to cease a specific practice. whether it is war. genocide. cancellation of air links. import quota decreases. "Sanctioning Madness". The topic says that economic sanctions ought not to be used to achieve foreign policy objectives. discourage armed aggression. All of these tools try to achieve a variety of purposes.asp Sanctions -. Before getting into the specifics of the positions contained here. export and import limitations. 1997. Now that we have a better grasp on the background issues. state and local governments are introducing economic sanctions. or specific weapons activities like nuclear proliferation. Therefore. It seems that for the aff to be topical. Haass. and the cards in this file are only the start. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. To accomplish these ends. a foreign policy expert. a key question in many of your debates is going to be whether sanctions can actually achieve the desired change in behavior. Economic sanctions for economic purposes tend to be used pursuant to the rules that guide trade. thwart drug trafficking. Nov/Dec. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 2 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 INTRODUCTION Greetings! This topic is perhaps one of the best that has come along in recent years given its timeliness and the well balanced debate that occurs in the literature on both sides. far more than any other country. and investment prohibitions. end support for terrorism. it is first necessary to discuss some of the background so that you can get your bearings. they have to categorically reject the use of sanctions within any instance. there are a variety of tools that the United States draws upon. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.' This is important because it screens out debates over the use of sanctions for the result of trade purposes.asp Excluded here are sanctions introduced to ensure market access or compliance with trade pacts. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Haass. withdrawal of diplomatic relations. Dozens have adopted "selective purchasing laws" that prohibit public agencies from purchasing goods and services from companies doing business with such countries as Burma and Indonesia. even though the literature is probably skewed to the affirmative. let's discuss the specific positions advanced in this topic. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. tariff increases. As a result. In terms of sanctions themselves. promote human rights. outlines several of them: Richard N.are employed for a wide range of purposes. votes in international organizations. visa denials. protect the environment. By contrast. and credit.S. "Sanctioning Madness". any aff or neg that deals with sanctions in terms of trade agreements or tariffs related to trade disputes should be disregarded because they are not associated with the topic in any way. sanctions may take the form of arms embargoes. One part of the topic that is important to call attention to is the modifying statement 'for foreign policy objectives.predominantly economic but also political and military penalties aimed at states or other entities so as to alter unacceptable political or military behavior -. economic sanctions for political purposes work in the absence of any agreed-on political or legal framework. p. The United States. Richard Haass. . financing. Haass again explains: Richard N. Even U. asset freezes. Nov/Dec. 1997. revocation of most favored nation (MFN) trade status. As a result. and oust governments. The evidence quality is unmatched and the issues are very clear. uses them to discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Such policies include attempts to constructively engage problem governments and try to lure them towards good behavior with incentives. encouraging states to keep up with the activities that the sanctioning state finds problematic. The second position argues that sanctions are able to achieve behavior changes in rogue regimes by placing extreme pressure on them. Their empirical record is also abysmal. or as an effective force multiplier that allows war plans to succeed. they should be refined or limited or simply used as part of a broader package. Rather. argues that sanctions are a vitally important foreign policy tool. sanctions only increase the misery of the people or drive them closer to the illegitimate regime.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 3 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 For the affirmative. The second position argues that sanctions actually increase foreign policy dangers. The final position argues that even if sanctions are problematic. The negative. Sanctions simply seek an extreme outcome (like regime change) while only imposing an economic cost.' Third. Good Luck! . by contrast. I hope you enjoy your debates as much as I enjoyed researching it. As a result. Furthermore. The first argues that sanctions fail in the realm of foreign policy because they are extremely counterproductive because the costs that they impose vastly exceed their possible gains. the solution is not dogmatism or the categorical rejection of sanctions in every instance. an effect known as 'rallying around the flag. there are three basic positions. All in all. The first position argues that sanctions can either function as a useful alternative to war. it is argued that there are superior policy alternatives that can fulfill the goal of sanctions while avoiding their problems. it is a very well rounded topic and the file is a great start for your debates. achieving the desired result only in very few instances. sanctions are especially ineffective because such leaders can easily weather the storm and fend off the impact. ultimately resulting in political change. because it is rogue regimes and dictatorships that are the most common target.

The goal in Indonesia was nothing less than a radical change in Indonesia's policy toward East Timor. SANCTIONS DO NOT WORK FOR FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY ARE DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CHANGE THAT IS SOUGHT. Peculiarly. What country would choose national humiliation over economic hardship? Since even seemingly minor issues -. Lavin. a former Portuguese colony seized by Indonesia. p. companies between $15 billion and $19 billion and affected some 200. Presentation becomes important so as to ensure that the threat of sanctions is not perceived as a challenge to a country's sovereign integrity. Fall 1996. the growing use of economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable. for with the former there is no issue of sovereignty at stake. Nor is it strictly a matter of whether sanctions "work". GUARANTEEING THEIR FAILURE Franklin L. policymakers need to give more serious consideration to the impact of a sanction and weigh alternative policies more carefully. sanctions cost U. The goals outsiders sought in Rhodesia and Indonesia were vastly disproportional to the economic tools employed.asp The above example also shows the link between proportionality and presentation. add to this cost by jeopardizing the United States' trade relations. The prospect of sanctions can be held out with regret. The goal in Rhodesia was to overthrow the government. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Core issues of sovereignty cannot be addressed successfully by sanctions. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 4 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1. and not as a threat. the problem with economic sanctions is that they frequently contribute little to American foreign policy goals while being costly and even counterproductive. for example -. This is not simply because sanctions are expensive.S.a fishing dispute. A recent study by the Institute for International Economics concluded that in 1995 alone. FOREIGN POLICY.000 workers. "Sanctioning Madness". Haass. 1997. political sensitivities make sanctions a more effective tool in dealing with friendly countries than with unfriendly ones.can be perceived as a test of the sovereignty and integrity of a government.asp With a few exceptions. . Thus. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. they are most effective when applied to marginal issues such as technical trade matters. Nov/Dec. 2. Secondary sanctions. levelled against third-party states that do not support a particular sanctions regime. p. the answer to that question invariably depends on how demanding a task is set for a particular sanction. Because sanctions are a marginal tool. Rather. although they are. SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED AS FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS BECAUSE THEY ARE EXTREMELY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AS WELL AS COSTLY Richard N. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. sanctions must be implemented in such a way as to not back the target country into a corner.

p. There are several possible reasons: sanctions sometimes trigger a "rally around the flag" nationalist reaction. and they create a general sense of siege that governments can exploit to maintain political control. by creating scarcity. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma".asp First.N. Haass. MULTIPLE HISTORICAL EXAMPLES PROVE Richard N. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. they enable governments to better control the distribution of goods. authoritarian. sanctions failed to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait in 1990. THE LIMITATIONS OF SANCTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY CLEARLY OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFIT THEY MIGHT PROVIDE. sanctions can work against forces promoting political pluralism.asp THE LIMITATIONS of sanctions are more pronounced than their accomplishments. Other sanctions have also fallen short of their stated purposes.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 5 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 3. In the end. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Unilateral sanctions are particularly ineffective. Fall 1996. SANCTIONS FAIL BECAUSE THEY OFTEN CANNOT REACH THE NECESSARY LEVEL OF SUFFICIENCY REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS Franklin L. Sanctions alone are unlikely to achieve results if the aims are large or time is short. 4. 5. sanctions against Libya have been ineffective because they do not apply to Libya's oil exports. the sanction must reach a level of sufficiency. its subversion of its neighbors. . statist societies are often able to hunker down and withstand the effects of sanctions. Sanctions did not persuade Haiti's junta to honor the results of the 1990 election that brought Jean Bertrand Aristide to power. 1997. Haass. A total blockade is not necessary. Libya has refused to hand over the two individuals accused of destroying Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. as the League of Nations discovered when it attempted to take action against Italy in 1935-36 for its invasion of Ethiopia. 1997. but the sanctions must be harsh enough to have an impact.asp In addition. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Despite sanctions against Iran. Tehran remains defiant in its support of terrorism. p. Lavin. but it never impaired the North's ability to wage war given its geographic contiguity with then-ally China. "Sanctioning Madness". p. Fidel Castro still commands an authoritarian political system and a statist economy. Even though they were comprehensive and enjoyed almost universal international backing for nearly six months. "Sanctioning Madness". executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. The United States discovered during the Vietnam War that mining Haiphong harbor could disrupt the North Vietnamese economy. nor did they convince Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs for several years to call off their military aggression. Nov/Dec. U. it now has enough material for at least a dozen bombs. This conclusion is consistent with literature suggesting that market economic reform reinforces the development of civil society. by reducing the scope for independent action. THE STATES MOST LIKELY TO BE THE TARGET OF SANCTIONS ARE ALSO THE ONES ORGANIZED THE BEST TO WITHSTAND THEM BECAUSE THEY CAUSE A RALLY-AROUND-THE-FLAG EFFECT Richard N. its opposition to the Middle East peace process. Nov/Dec. Scotland. leaving Libya's economy largely unscathed. and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. FOREIGN POLICY. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Pakistan's nuclear program is well advanced. A blockade that covers 90 per cent of the border might in the end exert zero impact on imports. it took nothing less than Operation Desert Storm.

p. Fall 1996. beyond the question of sufficiency and economics comes the issue of confluence: Asphyxiation can raise the cost of actions and exacerbate economic problems but is rarely successful by itself. discouraging any support for "rogue" states' weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missile programs. Lavin.asp Third. market reform. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.asp Sanctions should not hold major or complex bilateral relationships hostage to one or two issues. This is especially true with a country like China. FOREIGN POLICY. economic development. Nov/Dec. Since sanctions frequently exert only a marginal impact on a country. and regional stability. including promoting democracy. the United States has a range of interests with Pakistan that go well beyond nuclear matters. Similarly.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 6 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS FAIL WITH FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 6. p. SANCTIONS HAVE MINIMAL INFLUENCE AND ONLY MARGINALLY AFFECT VARIOUS COUNTRIES Franklin L. UNDERMINING EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MAJOR CHALLENGES TO SECURITY Richard N. SANCTIONS ARE BAD FOR FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY REDUCE VERY COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS TO BLACK AND WHITE ISSUES. South Africa and Nicaragua both eventually changed policies while being subjected to trade sanctions. 7. 1997. Proponents of a continued embargo of Cuba argue that the policy will be effective now that the Soviet Union is gone and Russia can no longer subsidize the Cuban economy. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". but the asphyxiation simply brought to the surface more serious preexisting problems: Each government lacked popular support and was engaged in a costly counter insurgency campaign. . and human rights. one of the keys to success is to target countries already burdened by other problems. "Sanctioning Madness". Haass. where the United States has to balance interests that include maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. and promoting trade. managing the Taiwan-China situation. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

too. economic sanctions have evolved significantly in the decades since these words were spoken in 1919. SANCTIONS ARE ONLY POPULAR BECAUSE OF MEDIA DISTORTION AND LOBBYING GROUPS 1 Richard N. the end results rarely reflect President Wilson's idyllic view. while not "cure alls. 2006. especially on Congress. 2. Sanctions offer a popular and seemingly cost-free way of acting. "Sanctioning Madness". Echoing these sentiments. Haass." are certainly constructive steps toward meaningful sanctions reform and exhibit elements that should be incorporated into the American sanctions regime. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?".LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 7 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT 1.asp The frequency with which the United States uses sanctions is also a result of the increased influence. or racially oriented causes. many people would now disagree with President Wilson's assessment. On paper. peaceful.N.lexis Senator Lugar succinctly summarized the shortcomings of unilateral sanctions during a presentation on the Senate floor by stating that "unilateral sanctions are often the result of a knee-jerk impulse to take action combined with a timid desire to avoid the risks and commitments involved in more potent foreign policy steps that have greater potential to protect American interests. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. but it brings a pressure upon the nation which. 1997. In reality." However. p. several commentators have described sanctions as a halfway point between "diplomacy and military engagement. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. The media. or ethnic. The so-called CNN effect can increase the visibility of problems in another country and stimulate Americans' desire to respond. which in the past meant a veto in the U. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS IS LITTLE MORE THAN AN IMPOTENT. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". nqa. plays a part. silent. flexible and proactive approach to the assessment of the effectiveness of its sanctions programs so that the results yielded are in fact worth the sacrifices made by the people of the target nation and those of American businesses shut out of the marketplace. The United States should have a more organized. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted. notably those promoting human rights. religious. Sanctions can now usually be introduced without opposition from Moscow. 3. 2006. in my judgment. that is exactly how economic sanctions are supposed to function. environmentalism. deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. p. no modern nation could resist. Nov/Dec. KNEE-JERK RESPONSE BY THOSE UNWILLING TO TAKE RISKS Harry Wolff. nqa. of single-issue constituencies. A peaceful means of bringing about change will always be a more attractive option than one that involves armed conflict. . and this statement aptly demonstrates their attractiveness to various politicians and governments over the years. THE ACTUAL APPLICATION AND SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS FALLS SHORT OF THE IDYLLIC VIEW HELD BY ITS PROPONENTS Harry Wolff. sanctions. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have also contributed to the sanctions boom. Apply this economic.lexis In describing the laudable goals of economic sanctions to a congressional committee.S. an often-cited expert on economic sanctions quoted former President Woodrow Wilson: A nation that is boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. and whether one accepts his words or not. Security Council or a Soviet subsidy for a target of U." Recent congressional initiatives.

in the view of public choice advocates. . Pape. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) have proposed that sanctions are used because they are intended not to change behaviour in the sanctioned country. it argues that the deductive logic of the theory of economic sanctions used by HSE and most other studies of economic sanctions omits important characteristics of modern nation-states that make sanctions unlikely to become more effective in the future. 2007. Most citizens know very little about the sanctions. Fall 1997. Public choice advocates propose that special-interest groups operating in the sanctioning country put enough pressure on politicians to impose sanctions. My article challenges the validity of the HSE study. push for sanctions to advance their causes. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". politicians are office-seeking vote maximisers (Whaples and Heckelman. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". 5. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Many economists and political scientists agree that public choice economics. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. with 3 indeterminate cases. SANCTIONS ARE NOT EVEN EFFECTIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE THEY ARE LEVERAGED BY DOMESTIC LOBBYING INTERESTS Charles A. Jeffrey Schott. nor do they generally care enough to question their application. represent a classic case of 'government failure'. or 34 percent of the total. Rarick. Pages 65-70 Economic sanctions are frequently a response to the urgencies of the moment in international affairs (Malloy. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL IN THE VAST MAJORITY OF INSTANCES -.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 8 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT cont'd 4. If I am right. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. but rather to achieve objectives in the sanctioning country." I ask a straightforward question: Can international economic pressure coerce target governments to change their behavior when important political interests are at stake? I do not address whether economic pressure can be effective in trade disputes. making the probability of political action in their favour likely. Further. The benefits of their actions are concentrated and the costs are diffuse. Issue 3. I also do not address the broader question of whether international economic coercion is generally more or less effective than military coercion. 2001) and in many cases are motivated by special-interest groups. market failure. is a contributing factor in the proliferation of economic sanctions. as opposed to the usual stated rationale for governmental intervention. the success rate has been just 5 out of 115 attempts. Sept. and there is no basis for even qualified optimism about the effectiveness of sanctions. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. which found that between 1914 and 1990 sanctions were effective in 40 of 115 attempts. 2005). or Burmese pro-democracy activists in California. Economic sanctions. It finds that only 5 of the 40 claimed successes stand up to scrutiny. In other words. the belief that politicians make decisions based upon self-interest.asp In my article "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. Special-interest groups such as Cuban refugees in Florida. p. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (hereafter HSE). Since 1985 the principal empirical basis on which advocates have promoted economic sanctions is the important study by Gary Hufbauer. Volume 27.PRO-SANCTION ARGUMENTS FUNDAMENTALLY MISUNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE Robert A.

I have argued that this increase in repression results from incumbent efforts to prevent the defection of core supporters and to stifle dissent in the face of declining economic conditions or growing opposition support. The results also reveal important information regarding the differing effects of sanctions by type and by sender. Wood. this article suggests that multilateral UN sanctions contribute to greater increases in repression than do unilateral sanctions from states such as the United States. 52. do not appear to be systematically related to changes in repression. and UN sanctions contribute to regime repression. QUALIFIED TESTS OF DATA SHOW STRONGLY THAT SANCTIONS INCREASE REPRESSION Reed M. 2008. vol. preliminary assessment of these causal mechanisms supports the theory. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. the preliminary tests of the causal mechanisms explicated herein reveal how U. .LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 9 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ARE SUSPECT cont'd 6.S. and UN sanctions contributes to increased state-sponsored repression. UN-backed weapons embargoes. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. p.S. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. Specifically. 1976 -.asp This article has demonstrated that the imposition of U. however.2001". Furthermore.

in that geography and alliance solidarity were sufficient for a near-total economic blockade of Iraq. . Fall 1996. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". countries will agree to subscribe to the proposed economic sanctions only when the costs are so low as to make their participation essentially symbolic. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.which compounds to about 410 quadrillion per cent a year. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN CRIPPLE A TARGET STATE'S ECONOMY. for years Serbia was not hindered in its ability to meddle in Bosnia. Nonetheless. Fall 1996. the percentage of its gross domestic product that is derived from exports. More dramatic examples of the limits of asphyxiation might be both the Allies' blockade of the Central Powers during World War I and the Union's blockade of the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Lavin. involving fuel.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 10 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR 1. p. a partial success in closing the border is no success in restricting the flow of goods. Two core determinants of sufficiency are geography and alliance solidarity. IRAQ PROVES THAT EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN ACHIEVE A NEAR TOTAL ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. hard currency. then did not. so specialists spend time modeling the target country's autarky. both actions helped cripple the targeted economies. Economic sanctions against Serbia were not airtight. after its seizure of Kuwait. Thus the most important requirements for successful sanctions are largely outside the control of policymakers. interests. 2. Geography is a given. THEY CANNOT INFLUENCE STATE BEHAVIOR IF THE STATE IS DETERMINED ENOUGH Franklin L.000 per cent a month -. Otherwise. Economic sanctions against Cuba have existed as long as the 37-year-old Castro regime. and so forth. Lavin. but they still impoverished Serbia and drove inflation to 2. and high-tech weaponry. FOREIGN POLICY. The U. GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT ALL DEVASTATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS AND ARE OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF POLICYMAKERS INFLUENCE Franklin L.N. But the sanctions did not induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. stands out as an example where sanctions at first worked. blockade of Haiti. Iraq. p.asp Asphyxiation strategy has to assess the extent to which a country's susceptibility to sanctions can be manipulated. nor did they have a particular impact on the war itself. p. They succeeded on one level. Fall 1996. Lavin. the Persian Gulf war was not a war of attrition. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". THEY CANNOT UNDERCUT ITS DETERMINATION TO FIGHT WARS 2 Franklin L. Sanctions have become the lazy man's foreign policy. Security Council ordered broad economic sanctions. the denial of weaponry to Iraq was of little military significance because Iraq had stockpiled all the weapons it needed. A country that is landlocked or has few neighbors will be more vulnerable than one that is littoral or extensive.S. Unlike World War I or the American Civil War. detractors find failed examples of each approach. FOREIGN POLICY. such as Japan's support for the U. but neither degraded the adversaries' ability to wage war until a number of years had passed. viewed as an instant and painless way of advancing U. As with Serbia. FOREIGN POLICY. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. yet Fidel Castro remains unchallenged.asp Sufficiency is determined by the degree to which the flow of goods is restricted.S. 3. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". its gasoline storage and consumption rates. solidarity is dependent on allies sharing the same perception of a problem and the same prescription.asp Similarly. In cases such as North Vietnam.

S. Castro had successfully blamed U. by inducing popular pressure to force the government to concede or by inducing a popular revolt that overthrows the government. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS CANNOT PLACE A HIGH ENOUGH BURDEN ON A COUNTRY'S ECONOMY TO ALTER THEIR BEHAVIOR Harry Wolff. and UN sanctions (Heine-Ellison 2001. 52. Wood. Contrary to the expectations of the theory. REGIMES CAN MANIPULATE INFORMATION AND SPIN THE SANCTIONS AS IMPERIALIST ATTACKS. Milosevic's manipulation of nationalist sentiment among Serbs. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Pape. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". Rallies are also more likely when sanctions are imposed during episodes of extreme ideological rivalry or ethnic conflict -. 5.2001". by persuading the target government that the issues at stake are not worth the price. O'Quinn stated that: Unilateral economic sanctions are not likely to place a sufficiently large financial burden on a target country's economy to persuade its government to change objectionable policies. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. 2006. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression.S. when political and economic returns are already tied closely to ideological or ethnic loyalties. 2008. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 6. 98). SANCTIONS ARE INCAPABLE OF MEETING THE LEVELS OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION NECESSARY TO CLASSIFY THEM AS SUCCESSES Robert A. vol. p. Lowenberg. 1976 -.asp While Baldwin may not prefer the standard causal logic of economic sanctions recognized by most scholars and policymakers. Fall 1997.lexis In describing the minimal results from unilateral sanctions. When the United States imposes a unilateral export embargo. First. p. and Mertens 2004. p.that is.asp While unpacking public response to sanctions is important to understanding regime response and sanctions effectiveness. addressing it herein is problematic for a number of reasons. There are few industries in the United States that dominate the global market and are unchallenged by foreign rivals. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". sanctions for many of Cuba's economic woes. nqa. Sanctions can coerce either directly.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 11 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS DO NOT MODIFY TARGET-STATE BEHAVIOR cont'd 4." My article shows not only that economic sanctions have rarely achieved coercive success. A patriotic response is more likely when sanctions are imposed against leaders who enjoy broad popular support and those that rely on loyalty rather than repression to maintain their positions (Kaempfer. Similarly. resulting in the establishment of a government that will make the concessions. whether a sanctions event results in a "rally round the flag" effect or increases support for political opposition depends upon a variety of factors that are idiosyncratic to presanctions domestic and economic conditions within the target state. or indirectly. and dissemination of propaganda about imperialist schemes "set upon suffocating the FRY economy" contributed to an initial upsurge in popular support for the regime following U. CAUSING PEOPLE TO RALLY AROUND THE REGIME Reed M. but also that an important part the logic of the theory is wrong. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. For instance. it certainly exists and is quite straightforward: "Economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing international trade in order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior. . demonization of the United States and its allies. 404). the HSE database reveals little or no relationship between high punishment and sanctions success. 40). a strategy that had not only helped preserve his tenure in office but had made him into something of an "anti-imperialist hero" to many Cubans (Schreiber 1973. foreign suppliers can replace the American companies with minimal damage to the target country's economy.

United States Army. SANCTIONS FAIL AT EVERY LEVEL.beyond missing the true target -.2009: handle. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. have proven that this is a dangerous reality. Criticism of the Iraqi and North Korean sanctions policies are anecdotally more focused on the last complaint. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.asp Thus. A possible goal of sanctions is sometimes the attempt to foment internal rebellion or precipitate pressure to change among the target nation's population. The danger inherent in broad sanctions -. DECREASING SECURITY Harry Wolff. nqa. and retarding the emergence of a middle class and a civil society. triggering large-scale both moral. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH Haass. and practical. as with Iraq. p. Mass hardship can also weaken domestic and international support for sanctions. Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq (CASI) has grown up around this policy and devotes itself to documenting the human consequences of the U. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". "Sanctioning Madness". Critics have voiced similar concerns about the effect of sanctions in North Korea. CAUSING MASS SUFFERING AND RETARDING POLITICAL PROGRESS Bryan Foy. including strengthening the regime. accessed 12. 1997. and Algeria among others. An entire website at Cambridge University. Sanctions in general draw enduring criticism as a policy tool. SANCTIONS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR BUT ARE A DEADLY FORM OF INTERVENTION THAT CREATES THE SAME EFFECTS AS WAR 3 Richard N. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. 2002. in that innocents are affected. REINTRENCHING POLITICAL ELITES. no one likes to be told what to do in their own sandbox. Cuba. SANCTIONS ARE WOEFULLY INCAPABLE OF ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS -. sanctions also generally increase the suffering of the state's population. Secondly. such as the decision to go to war in Iraq. Nov/Dec. and while jeopardizing the security of the rest of the world. Sanctions may degrade the ability of this very segment to resist by unintentionally targeting their means. . The current policies open the door for other nations to make foreign policy decisions on the basis of financial opportunism at the expense of their own people. particularly when externally imposed rules prevent the pursuit of self interest. After all. Among these are frightening infant mortality rates and grossly inadequate life and health support infrastructure. 2006.5.dtic. They discourage other nations from joining the United States in sanctioning problem nations based on the prospect of lucrative contracts for their own companies and citizens.lexis It is clear that some sanctions programs have not and never will achieve the policy goals for which they were implemented.2/ADA415058 Whether or not sanctions regimes succeed in accomplishing policy goals. Recent controversies surrounding policies in the Middle East. Sanctions can be a powerful and deadly form of intervention.THEY ONLY OPEN THE DOOR FOR OTHERS TO CIRCUMVENT AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.N. the tendency to see economic sanctions as "below" the use of military force on some imagined ladder of foreign policy escalation must be revised.'s actions since 1990. Finally. despite the fact that those sanctions have included from the outset a provision allowing Iraq to import humanitarian goods and services. sanctions may also reduce the standard of living among the middle class professionals most likely to pressure their governments to comply with sanction requirements. there are some who contend that this alternative is not worth the cost. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". often led by the economic middle classes and academics. 3. Among the most damning are first that sanctions can interfere with the sovereign right of states to make choices regarding their well-being. in that sanctions that harm the general population can bring about undesired effects. 2.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 12 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS 1.

Fall 1996. wreaking misery on the general population.S. Military sanctions against Pakistan may actually have increased Islamabad's reliance on a nuclear option because they cut off its access to U. 1997. South Africa always has been the source of metals necessary in aircraft production. U. and proportionality of the actions. At the time.asp SANCTIONS OFTEN produce unintended and undesirable consequences. but leaving the political establishment intact. This military imbalance contributed to the fighting and to the disproportionate Muslim suffering. asks. and British sanctions against the white minority-ran government of Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979 stand out as an example where a government's domestic position was actually strengthened by sanctions. A product (oil. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Haiti is a prime example. the arms embargo weakened the Muslims. USA TODAY. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". SANCTIONS DESTROY A COUNTRIES ECONOMY AND DEVASTATE THE POPULATION WHILE KEEPING THE POLITICAL APPARATUS IN POWER AND FUNCTIONING Franklin L.asp Here are a few of the problems to be faced: Most. To get all other governments to support the sanctions. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. but will bring about no change in behavior. In Bosnia.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 13 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 4. causing a massive exodus of Haitians to the United States that proved life-threatening for them and expensive and disruptive for Florida. internal political structure. The U.S. convincing other nations will involve some trade-offs. "Sanctioning Madness". but the sanctioned nation might and probably will retaliate if possible. July 1995. since Bosnia's Serbs and Croats had larger stores of military supplies and greater access to outside sources. if not all. a Washington Post columnist. but the income from its production and sale is denied equivalently to the sanctioning government and/or its businesses. equipment) is to be denied to the sanctioned country. SANCTIONS PRODUCE PERVERSE OUTCOMES AND CAN SUSTAIN GENOCIDAL CONFLICTS AND PROLIFERATION EFFORTS Richard N. Worse. SANCTIONS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE THEY CANNOT BE ENFORCED ENTIRELY AND RETALIATION COSTS CAN HARM THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE SANCTIONING STATE Llewellyn D Howell.asp A fourth determinant of success relates to the issues of national cohesion. never really embraced a full embargo of South Africa in apartheid days. Nov/Dec. If sanctions are imposed by one country. p. even in emergencies?" Trade sanctions can function like a neutron bomb. Calculate that as a cost of the embargo for the sanctioning country. These costs must be factored in. trade sanctions can even bolster support for the targeted government by appearing to be a heavy-handed impingement upon sovereign prerogatives. "Does Saddam Hussein care that Iraqi children go to bed hungry and sick? Does Gen. Sanctions exacerbated the island's economic distress. Assuming the usual diversity of ideologies and self-interest. FOREIGN POLICY. of the other national actors must be convinced to participate. 6. . Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. Lavin. 5. weaponry and dramatically weakened Pakistan's confidence in Washington. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. p. something must be given up or some price must be paid.N. Economic sanctions always involve something lost for both sides. Raoul Cedras fret about Haitian citizens being deprived of work because he clings to power? How much does Moammar Gadhafi care that Libyans cannot travel abroad easily. p. presentation of the sanctions. weapons. Jim Hoagland. not only might sales on the embargoed products be lost. partly because of a fear of retaliation that would have been a disaster for American industry and perhaps the military. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". the Soviet Union was the only other source of those same materials. One government exercising sanctions is a demonstration of principle. destroying the economy. Haass.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. the more intense the repression the regime must employ to maintain stability. citizens challenge the incumbent regime or shift their support to political opposition groups rather than rallying in support of the embattled leader. Volume 27. Combining Venezuela's oil wealth with Castro's political skills could begin a renewed campaign of anti-American sentiment in the region (Barrionuevo and de Cordoba. coup. Often sanctions are intended to spur exactly this response. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". forcing it to form relationships with other countries. SANCTIONS REINFORCE ANIMOSITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND PUSH ROGUE REGIMES CLOSER TOGETHER Charles A. in the case of Burma. In this case. 48 -. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Pages 65-70 A better approach. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Yet sanctions often generate tensions between the public and the incumbent. Rowe 2001). Pages 65-70 Sanctions have also caused closer ties between Cuba and other troubling regimes in the region and beyond. 1976 -. 8. Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999. or revolution in order to achieve policy goals (Nossal 1994. Senders are sometimes acutely aware of the negative impact of sanctions on either elite supporters or the general population and attempt to exploit domestic political tensions created by the uneven distribution of sanctions costs through public dissent. In addition to the potential economic loss to the United States due to Cuban sanctions. 2008. 2007. 2006). Issue 3. 2004). between the two great emerging countries of China and India. vol. 9. China is now a major political supporter of the Burma regime and a supplier of military weapons (Roy.asp Citizens can respond to sanctions either by increasing their support for the sanctioned regime or by withdrawing their support for the incumbent in favor of a challenger. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. p. Burma has a strategic location. SANCTIONS EITHER BACKFIRE ENTIRELY OR THE REGIME RESORTS TO EVEN MORE EXTREME ACTIONS Reed M. Olson 1979). SANCTIONS ARE STRATEGICALLY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE THEY PUSH THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE REGION OF CONCERN AND MOVE THE ENEMY REGIME CLOSER TO POWERFUL ALLIES Charles A. If the incumbent successfully shifts blame for deteriorating economic conditions to the sender nation. Volume 27. Wood. 2007.2001". Sept. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. 52. Sept. 263. a "rally round the flag" promotes loyalty to the regime (Cortright and Lopez 2000. providing the opposition with opportunity and incentive to challenge the status quo (Allen 2007.51. Issue 3. Galtung 1967). Thus. US economic sanctions have closed American opportunities in that country and strained diplomatic relations with the current regime. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2005). In addition. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Rarick. he argues. Rarick. US economic sanctions have resulted in a closer relationship between Burma and China. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 14 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 7. the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister recently visited Burma and expressed Russia's support for the regime and interest in increasing its economic and political connections (Aye. is to look at the effectiveness of the sanctions compared to the political cost to the sender government. . For example. as relative depravation increases and the economic distance between elites and citizens widen. the development of closer ties between Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez is troubling for political watchers of Latin American politics.

"Sanctions.asp The findings of this article are supportive of the logic developed in signaling arguments of the causes of war. Costs are generally thought of as something to be avoided. p. Li. states should be aware of the implications of the signal that they send with this type of policy. resulting in an increased probability of war accompanying the use of sanctions. as a value forgone. they will decrease the probability of militarized conflicts. SANCTIONS HEIGHTEN THE RISKS FOR WAR BECAUSE THEY SHOW WEAKNESS INSTEAD OF RESOLVE BECAUSE THEY ARE SUCH LOW-RISK OPTIONS David J. we find that when you see a sanction. and Militarized Conflict". .Where we differ is in the costliness of sanctions.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 15 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS INCREASE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS cont'd 10. Signals. send externally weak signals with costless sanctions. Sprecher. sanctions increase the probability of conflict. Li. Because sanctions are predominantly used in a manner that minimizes costs to the sender and maximizes costs to the target. but when establishing the credibility of commitments (sending credible signals) they are actually desirable. A final irony is that touting sanctions as a policy alternative to war may make their signaling properties even weaker. Gartzke. SANCTIONS ACTUALLY SIGNAL WEAKER RESOLVE BECAUSE IT SEEMS LIKE THE SANCTIONING STATE IS COST-AVERSE. Thus. it appears that sanctions have not typically served as an effective signal of resolve. consistent with signaling arguments. there is a significantly increased probability that a militarized dispute will follow. Others (Drezner 2003.asp Costs play a paradoxical role in augmenting the credibility of commitments. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. Lektzian & Christopher M. Therefore. "Sanctions. 11. April 2007. they are even more conflict prone due to their propensity to generate internal audience costs that prevent them from backing down. In conclusion. We find the signaling logic to be supported by our research. when democracies. However. For example. Moreover. Sprecher. we would caution that while it may enhance the probability of success if senders employ sanctions in a way that maximizes the cost to the target while minimizing the cost to themselves. Lektzian & Christopher M. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. which are the primary users of sanctions. and Boehmer 2001. Morgan and Schwebach 1997) have proposed that sanctions will reduce the probability of conflict because of the costly nature of their signal. they tend to send a signal of weakness rather than strength. and Militarized Conflict". but that sanctions tend to send a signal of weakness rather than strength. INCREASING PROBABILITY OF WAR David J. as expected under the logic of the signaling argument. April 2007. As such. our theory and empirical analysis show that. if sanctions can be devised to be costly to the sending country. Signals. Gartzke. and Boehmer (2001) say that it was not out of the question that military force might have been used by the United States to block British and French efforts in the Suez crisis. Our conclusion is not that costly signaling arguments about sanctions are incorrect. p. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE.

SANCTIONS IMPOSE DRAMATIC COSTS ON AMERICAN BUSINESSES. Rarick. Volume 27. Boeing negotiated a lease agreement with Vietnam Airlines. they do not show up in U. In another case. but did act as a form of foreign aid to our competitors in agricultural products. and to become competitors to US firms on future international construction projects. SANCTIONS ARE NOT ABLE TO SLOW DOWN EVENTS AND DISADVANTAGE AMERICAN BUSINESS BY MAKING THEM UNCOMPETITIVE Charles A. this cost is difficult to measure because it includes not only lost sales but also forfeited opportunities: governments and overseas companies can elect not to do business with the United States for fear that sanctions might one day be introduced. since excess grain was being produced by the farmers. "Sanctioning Madness". Since the United States was not the only source of grain. perhaps because. wreaking havoc with normal commercial relations. affect the economy by reducing revenues of U. sanctions run the risk of portraying American suppliers as unreliable sources and thereby deterring future sales. sanctions can be expensive for American business. Sanctions did not stop the pipeline but did give European and Japanese companies an opportunity to gain experience in Arctic drilling. Pages 65-70 Also in the 1980s the United States began to prohibit the exporting of equipment used to build the Siberian pipeline. the American company Caterpillar held the dominant position in heavy machinery sales to the Soviet Union. 2006). but far from least. 3. The current wave of sanctions began in 1980 when President Jimmy Carter imposed a grain embargo on the former Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Issue 3. The pipeline sanctions prevented Caterpillar from selling to the Soviets and their sizeable sales went instead to Caterpillar's main Japanese competitor (USA Engage. perhaps enough for the project to be abandoned. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. The embargo brought protests from American farmers who stood to lose sales of 25 million tons of wheat and corn. Rarick. government budget tables. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 2007. In addition to the immediate loss of sales. 2007. 1997. the Soviet Union simply purchased it from other countries. Sanctions do. Moreover. unlike the costs of military intervention.S. Pages 65-70 Economic sanctions harm American business interests and generally do not achieve their intended objectives. p. The US sanctions were intended to slow progress on construction of the pipeline. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS FAIL TO ACHIEVE THEIR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSE WHILE COSTING THE UNITED STATES BILLIONS Charles A. When the lifting of the embargo was delayed. Issue 3. Vietnam Airlines continued to purchase from Airbus. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Moreover. a delay in lifting sanctions cost American business an opportunity.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 16 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST 1. resulting in lost sales to Boeing of an estimated $1. companies and individuals. Sept. Airbus. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.S. There is a tendency to overlook or underestimate the direct costs of sanctions. Sept. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2006). 2006). With the prospects of trade normalisation with Vietnam. The estimated value of the lost sales was $2-3 billion. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Also during this time. Volume 27. .asp Last. Vietnam Airlines instead got its aircraft from Boeing's main competitor. Haass. WHICH IN TURN CAN UNDERMINE THE NATIONAL INTEREST Richard N. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Nov/Dec. The grain embargo did not get the Soviets out of Afghanistan. 2.6 billion (USA Engage. US policy-makers feared that a pipeline from the Soviet Union to Europe would make Europeans too dependent on Russian energy. some of it was purchased by the government and placed in storage at a cost to the taxpayer of billions of dollars (USA Engage. however.

unilateral sanctions exact a serious price.000 JOBS James A. USA TODAY. Auburn University at Montgomery. Issue 3. Sept. THE UNILATERAL APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS COSTS THE UNITED STATES NEARLY 20 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR AND OVER 200.000 worth of trade a year and nearly 200.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 17 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST cont'd 4. 2007. Pages 65-70 According to Losman (1998). Boycotts and other 'supply interruptions' produce significant consumer welfare loss in the sanctioned country (Fershtman and Gandal.000.000. Pages 65-70 The growing use of economic sanctions also reduces consumer choice and makes American consumers potential criminals. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Moreover. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar. the cost of sanctions to American businesses can be divided into three types. Sanctions undermine the economic freedom of American businesses and citizens. After all. 1997). The Oasis Hotel was blacklisted by the US government under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and any American who was found doing business with the hotel was subject to a $1 million fine. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Nathan. 1997. Rarick. The fine could be assessed even if the citizen was unaware of the sanction (Duncan. Direct costs of sanctions are loss of sales and earnings. and the pain they cause. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. 6. the collateral damage they do has made their use controversial. Indirect costs include higher costs due to lower production runs and lower economies of scale. Although cheaper and cleaner than military action. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ALSO IMPOSE MASSIVE ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY INFLICTING UNNECESSARY COERCION IN ADDITION TO PAIN AND SUFFERING IN THE SANCTIONED STATE Charles A. 2005). and increased lobbying expense to avoid sanctions. however. it is an American interest to live in a world with reduced brutality and fewer war-like potentates. The costs of economic sanctions. commerce with about 42% of the world's population is left. 1998) making life very difficult for ordinary citizens. such as the reduction of drug trafficking. Sept. Mexico. In September of 2002. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. and usually don't achieve their objectives. to allies and competitors. Volume 27. US Customs agents passed out flyers to American citizens crossing the border into Mexico warning them not to do business with this hotel. cause unnecessary pain and suffering in foreign countries. Volume 27. could perhaps be justified if their success rate was particularly high. that is not the case. Also. potential costs arise as indigenous firms develop in the sanctioned market to fill the void left by foreign companies and then become future competitors. Nevertheless. The Institute for International Economics has released a study indicating that they cost American exporters at least $19. While many sanctions are imposed for good causes. 5. Politicians increasingly use economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool because they are viewed as cheaper and cleaner than military action (Haass.asp The purposes for which sanctions are employed are hardly trivial. loss of asset value in the targeted countries and reduced employment. Consider the case of the Oasis Hotel and Convention Center near Tijuana. economic sanctions deprive the liberty of the citizens of both the sanctioned and sanctioning countries. Sept. perhaps irretrievably. THE LEVELS AND TYPES OF COSTS THAT SANCTIONS IMPOSE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS ARE DRAMATIC AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED CONSIDERING THEIR POOR SUCCESS RATE Charles A. p. Rarick. Issue 3. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". . 2007.000 jobs.

and that this has resulted in the loss of between 200. nqa.lexis How do these sanctions affect American business interests? While difficult to approximate.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 18 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT AMERICA'S ECONOMY & NATIONAL INTEREST cont'd 7. is founded on legitimate concerns. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEVASTATE THE ECONOMY BECAUSE THEY COST US BILLIONS IN LOST REVENUES AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF JOBS Harry Wolff. 2006. One estimate has predicted that these programs cost $ 15-19 billion per year in lost export revenues. p. service and replacement contracts is even more damaging in the long run. . HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. the residual losses of subsequent maintenance.000 and 250. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". One commentator dubbed "American companies and their workers. while perhaps overly dramatic. several recent projections suggest that they have a considerable impact on American companies. suppliers. This statement. Commentators have also pointed out that while the loss of the initial sale in a sanctioned country can be a major loss to an American company.000 jobs! Other estimates have placed the one-year export losses in excess of $ 30 billion. and shareholders" "friendly-fire casualties" of sanctions policy.

sanctions frequently are easy means of dealing with powerful single-issue lobbies. . they create their own constituency. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. oil services. Iran. Sept. where there is little responsiveness of the government to the citizenry. Similarly. they must impact on the decision-makers. once sanctions are in place. Many economists argue that there often is no such connection. Nathan. 9 Institutional constraints determine the ability of leaders to redistribute costs. civilian airplanes.2001". it is rare that American sanctions are actively opposed by U. Rowe 2001). sanctions costs are typically unevenly distributed across groups. Mexicans.asp Economic sanctions ordinarily are intended to bring about changes in political decision-making. the decision-makers are shielded from much of the impact of sanctions that are directed at such items as fuel. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. further exacerbating its deprivation (Rowe 2001.asp Sanctions have become a habit. and Iraq are supported widely by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. hence. leaders must spend resources on public goods rather than reserving goods for private consumption or transferring them to their supporters. Between stockpiling and smuggling. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. In order for them to be effective. Auburn University at Montgomery. Such was the case in Rhodesia where the Smith regime increasingly shifted the costs of sanctions away from key supporters and onto the black community. Often. USA TODAY. Despite some loud grumbling. 1997. 19).S. USA TODAY. 52. Marinov 2005). Hence. p. and banking. THE POLITICAL PRESSURE THAT SANCTIONS MIGHT HAVE DOESN'T OCCUR IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES WHICH MEANS REGIME CHANGE WON'T HAPPEN Reed M. voters are increasingly likely to defect from the incumbent to the challenger.asp The level of coercion necessary to prevent defections varies according to the severity of the sanctions as well as the domestic political institutions of the target. leading to suffering for some and minimizing the costs to (or even benefiting) others (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999. While they may irritate Europeans.S. Sanctions on Cuba placate a well-organized domestic contingency of Cuban-Americans. p. unilateral measures frequently present competitors with easier access to markets they otherwise would struggle to enter such as military materiel. Olson 1979. For American lawmakers. 2008. SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE AND ACTUALLY AID IN INCREASING MARKET ACCESS FOR TARGETED REGIMES James A. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". on the other hand. When faced with resource constraints. HARSH REGIMES CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY SANCTIONS BECAUSE THEY ARE ALREADY ECONOMICALLY ISOLATED AND CAN EASILY FEND OFF CHALLENGES Llewellyn D Howell. sanctions imposed on democrats are generally both shorter and more likely to prompt concessions or promote regime change compared with those imposed on autocracies (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000. If economic sanctions reduce the level of goods available for public consumption. 1976 -. July 1995. U. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". autocrats attempt to transfer costs away from key political elites and onto other groups within the state. this means shifting costs downward to the majority non-elite population. vol. trading partners. Wood. governments such as those of Serbia or the military regime of Haiti easily can survive most sanctions that are likely to be imposed. p. the issues are small and symbolic and. Indeed. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. Notwithstanding whether they "work" or not. In democracies. Autocrats. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar. sanctions against Libya. raising the probability that the incumbent is removed from office. maintain power explicitly through the support and loyalty of a coalition of key political elites. Especially with authoritarian governments. unlikely to precipitate dramatic retribution.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 19 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES 1. 3. Indeed. Incumbents therefore have an incentive to shield these political elites from the adverse effects of sanctions. 2. and Canadians.

52. sanctions threaten target regimes when they increase the relative power of the opposition.asp Sanctions could thus succeed both in attaining policy concessions and result in increased repression -. 5.asp The first element of the theory constructed herein is that sanctions contribute to state-sponsored repression by constraining the resource flows of target leaders. target incumbents in turn augment their level of repression. thereby increasing the likelihood of defection from the incumbent's winning coalition to a challenger. 1999. the likelihood of defections increase.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 20 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES cont'd 4. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. 52. they may embolden political opposition groups and/or generate public dissent. I identify two key mechanisms through which sanctions can contribute to instability and generate threat to the incumbent regime. 2008. In response. Schott. AS RESTRICTIONS DRAIN RESOURCES AWAY FROM LEADERSHIP. 6. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE A REGIME. Marinov 2005.that is. 2008. 1976 -. THE INCREASED REPRESSION ISN'T ONLY SHORT-TERM GIVEN HOW LIKELY IT IS THAT SANCTIONS WILL FAIL Reed M. p. This effect is significantly influenced however by the political institutions of the target state. McGillivray and Stam 2004). institutions determine incumbents' ability to allocate resources and redistribute costs (Bueno de Mesquita et al. In order to deter defections and maintain stability. IT ONLY RESULTS IN BIGGER CRACKDOWNS AND REPRESSION AS THEY ATTEMPT TO REESTABLISH CONTROL Reed M. 1999. 2003). sanctions are arguably more likely to contribute to increased instability and repression in the immediate while failing to achieve significant policy concessions in the long run. contribute to social upheaval and dissent. Specifically. targeted leaders increase their level of repression in order to deter threats and stabilize the regime. Olson 1979). "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. vol. Pape 1997). p. Relying on elements of both the public choice and institutional constraints literatures. They likewise affect the ability of incumbents to use repression as a strategy to compel cooperation from a civilian population (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). Wood. Lowenberg. In short. I argue that as sanctions reduce the ability of incumbents to provide resources to supporters. p. Second. Sanctions threaten regime stability because they have the potential to alter economic structures and political alignments within the target state.2001". The threat of political instability leads incumbents to augment their level of repression in order to secure the regime. This scenario is particularly likely given that observed sanctions generally fall on the hardest cases (Drezner 2003. Finally.asp I begin with two related assumptions informed by the literature on threat and regime-sponsored repression: (1) instability increases incumbent perceptions of threat and (2) increased threat perception contributes to increased repression. sanctions constrain the target leader's budget and restrict the flow of resources to supporters. 52.2001". 2008. 1976 -. Political structures influence the probability that a state is the target of a sanctions event (Cox and Drury 2006. and Mertens 2004. vol. or encourage defections from the regime's coalition of supporters (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. Lektzian and Souva 2003). given their low success rate (Hufbauer. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression.2001". INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Marinov 2005). THEY REACT BY TIGHTENING THEIR GRIP ON SOCIETY Reed M. and Elliott 1990a. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. as well as their duration (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000. repression might increase in the immediate only to fall after sanctions succeed in altering the policies of target regimes or in ousting targeted leaders. Kaempfer. vol. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. 1976 -. Wood. First. Wood. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. However. .

A rally effect therefore would presumably not lead to increased repression.asp The argument presented above assumes that sanctions increase the probability of regime defection and ? or popular dissent. Wood. Rowe 2001). vol. SANCTIONS INCITE NATIONALIST REACTIONS. 2008. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. . This strategy shores up support for the regime and may permit it to effectively undermine opposition groups (Cortright and Lopez 2000. and in fact might lower repression as loyalty to the regime. and Mertens 2004). p. 52. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. Galtung 1967). By strategically stoking nationalist sentiment the incumbent may successfully shift blame to the sender. and therefore stability increases (Kaempfer. 1976 -. CAUSING THE PEOPLE TO RALLY AROUND THE LEADERSHIP Reed M.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 21 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS STRENGTHEN ROGUE REGIMES cont'd 7.2001". Lowenberg. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. While there is evidence that sanctions increase dissent (Allen 2007. rallies are not uncommon in sanctioned states (Cortright and Lopez 2000).

it could cost the implementer $1 million in foregone profits. . SANCTIONS ARE THE LEAST COST EFFECTIVE TOOL IN PROMOTING FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. Hungary. because it requires a leap of faith that the determinants of a state's decisionmaking in different policy realms are the same. Coercing a state to reduce import duties on wine is fundamentally different than persuading it to surrender a part of its territory. p. FOREIGN POLICY. 2. Pape. We can argue about how many categories of international coercion we should recognize and where we should divide them. covert action. its purpose is not to make us feel good but to do good. Economically. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". Haass. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. When the United States imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980. "Sanctioning Madness". But in order to deprive the target country of $1 million worth of petroleum. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Disrupting trade hurts all of the target country's trading partners as well. Nov/Dec. Therefore. but simply abandoning categorization would not be useful. Fall 1996. including military intervention.S. Fall 1997. A smaller country will have difficulty enduring economic disruption.asp Accepting Baldwin's approach as a design for a research program would be a mistake. including the use of military force. government and the American economy. but the United States found no alternative buyers. Yet without their support the blockade is meaningless. CAUSING ECONOMIC BLOWBACK THAT HARMS THE SANCTIONING STATE MORE THAN THE OFFENDER Franklin L. sanctions can hurt the target country less than the implementing country. 3. one key to analyzing the relative disruption of sanctions is to compare the size of the target country's economy with that of the implementer. the sanction's likely effect on U. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE ARE NOT EFFECTIVE REGARDLESS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE SPHERE OF COMMERCE BECAUSE THE INTERESTS AT STAKE ARE MUCH HIGHER Robert A. Greece. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Lavin. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". or Romania to do so. the Soviets easily found other suppliers. Foreign policy is not therapy. p. 1997. It is easy for the United States to support an economic blockade against Serbia. public and private diplomacy. not least because the second demand is likely to engage nationalist sentiments far more deeply than the first and more likely to be perceived as threatening the physical security of the citizens. The likely benefits of a particular sanction to U. Scholars study economic sanctions and trade disputes as separate categories because there are good reasons to believe that the variables that dominate target states' decisionmaking in response to different types of demands are often different.asp A FUNDAMENTAL change in thinking and attitude is required.asp The assessment of sanctions' impact should go beyond these criteria for disrupting the target country's economy to consider the relative disruption: Will the target country be hurt more than the implementer or the implementing alliance? There is a Newtonian dynamic to sanctions: Every action has an equal and opposite reaction that can make it less cost-effective than a military attack. but it is much more difficult for the neighboring states of Bulgaria. foreign policy should be greater than the anticipated costs to the U.SANCTIONS LOSE OUT TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVES 4 Richard N. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. or simply doing nothing. MORALIST CRUSADING SHOULD HAVE NO PLACE IN FOREIGN POLICY -. Broad sanctions should not be used as a means of expression. causing maybe $100 million worth of damage. interests should compare favorably to the projected consequences of all other options. A $1 million cruise missile can paralyze a target country's communication network. The same holds for sanctions. Economic sanctions are a serious instrument of foreign policy and should be employed only after consideration no less rigorous than for other forms of intervention. Moreover.S.S. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 22 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR 1.

p. A policy of engagement may produce better results in some of the cases than imposing economic sanctions. ENHANCING ECONOMIC ACCESS IS KEY TO ACHIEVING SOCIAL CHANGE. development ends isolation. prosperity creates a group that seeks greater political freedoms. sees three reasons for this connection. . 1997. because alternatives emerge. nor does it yield as dramatic a sound bite. authority must be divided and shared in complex ways. 1998). FOREIGN AFFAIRS.asp Oxygen. or China. The most common one holds that greater economic activity will lead to positive political consequences. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Lavin. Such an approach. which is a common objective of economic sanctions. Sept.asp The principal alternative to economic sanctions is best described as constructive or conditional engagement." Asia scholar Robert Scalapino. writing in the July 1993 Journal of Democracy. Such an approach is not as simple as imposing economic sanctions. Rarick. 2007. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". economic freedom and development lead people to expect better government. 6. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Fall 1996. CEO of Chevron. "America needs to recognize.-of occupations and status . . NOT CUTTING PEOPLE OFF WITH SANCTIONS BECAUSE IT OVERCOMES THE TRADITIONAL ORDER AND THE RULING REGIME'S MONOPOLY ON POWER Franklin L. Iran. observed: 'Once the free market genie is out of the bottle. Thus neither highly centralized role nor self-sufficient localism is any longer adequate. As this argument goes. it's hard to keep the hunger for political freedom bottled up' (Derr." editorialized the Economist. Haass. 5. Volume 27. . especially if the goal is to weaken the near-monopoly of an authoritarian leadership over a country like Cuba. Its principal advantage is that it might have a more desirable impact at less cost to Americans and American foreign policy." Second. "Sanctioning Madness". The "oxygen" school is backed by several arguments. ALTERATIVE POLICY RESPONSES LIKE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT ARE FAR MORE SUPERIOR THAN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS Richard N. while speaking on the topic of economic sanctions. Pages 65-70 It has been argued that political change may best be achieved through economic opportunity.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 23 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR cont'd 4. FOREIGN POLICY. First. involving a mix of narrow sanctions and limited political and economic interactions that are conditioned on specified behavioral changes. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Nov/Dec. Kenneth Derr. Advancement is no longer determined by the degree to which people follow a party line or a government's dictates. might be preferable. And third. The government loses some of its appeal and legitimacy as an employer or a benefactor. p. growth destabilizes the traditional order by creating "increased diversity -. "that nothing on earth but fast economic growth has the power to shift whole societies for the better more or less overnight. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT ARE FAR MORE EFFECTIVE RESPONSES THAN ISOLATION AND SANCTIONS Charles A. A fourth development from economic progress is that government no longer holds a monopoly over socioeconomic mobility. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Issue 3. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. rather than economic pain.

Hafner-Burton 2005). 1976 -.2001". vol. this article provides additional evidence of the need to develop new strategies of coercive diplomacy that better shield civilians from sanctions fallout. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.may contribute to alterations in regime policy preferences without harming civilians. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IS A SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE IT AVOIDS REGIME BACKLASH AND REPRESSION Reed M. a wealth of opportunity exists for research into alternative tools for promoting state respect for human rights or other changes in target state policies without endangering civilians. 52. if such sanctions trigger domestic dissent they may yet result in an unintended regime backlash. However. Wood. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY.such as those imposed on South Africa and the former Yugoslavia -. noneconomic sanctions tools such as arms embargoes or bans on participation in international sporting events -.asp Finally. while traditional tools of economic statecraft may result in significant collateral damage. To that end. constructive engagement offers a more incentive-based approach to convincing states to respect international law and human rights and may prove more effective in achieving policy outcomes (Drury and Li 2006. 2008. Consequently.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 24 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 AFFIRMATIVE POSITION THREE: OTHER FOREIGN POLICY ALTERNATIVES ARE SUPERIOR cont'd 7. p. For instance. .

Trade is a confidence-building measure. p. Autocratic governments can be induced to behave better by the successful demonstration of open economic arrangements.asp In the oxygen camp. beyond prosperity. Lavin.asp Oxygen supporters argue that. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. FOREIGN POLICY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 25 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS SUPERIOR TO SUFFOCATION 1. p. the school notes that the oxygen approach is more humane since it is likely to improve the day-to-day lives of people in the subject country. . "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Lavin. FOREIGN POLICY. Finally. 2. Fall 1996. The autocratic leadership in these two countries could relax political controls with a fair amount of confidence in continued domestic stability as the countries were enjoying substantial economic success. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS MORE EFFECTIVE AT INDUCING BEHAVIORAL CHANGES Franklin L. Economic growth promoted the establishment of an educated middle class that sought and received more political freedoms. most analysts of South Korea and Taiwan conclude that their moves toward democracy and a Western-style human rights standard were facilitated by their prosperity in the 1980s. SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S TRANSITIONS SHOW THAT ECONOMIC OPENNESS IS A BETTER SOLUTION THAN SANCTIONS Franklin L. familiarity can be gained and mutual benefits dramatized through economic activity. Fall 1996.

"Economic Sanctions as Weapons". 2007. While sanctions may make the sender country feel good about doing something. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER HUMANITARIAN ITEMS ARE EXEMPT Llewellyn D Howell. 2003). Sept. TAKING A LONG TIME TO RECOVER AND HURTING THE HEALTH OF THE POPULATION IN THE LONGTERM Franklin L.and long after Haiti has been forgotten. Fall 1996. and those most harmed are the average citizenry and the poor. Although U. the economic hardship will be felt for years. 2. the people of the receiving country suffer from this form of foreign policy. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. Typically. In the case of China. lingering economic underperformance. FOREIGN POLICY.asp Sanctions have a moral dimension. Pages 65-70 The public choice economics argument would also point out that economic sanctions are not applied universally. will the cost to those not involved in the policy origination be too great? Will it even be considered and included in the sanction equation? It was argued that this was the problem with the embargo on Haiti. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Lavin. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.-backed sanctions were imposed on Haiti for only three years. SANCTIONS ATTACK THE MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION. 3. the Chinese people want democratic reform as much as the Burmese. Just as Nicaragua and South Africa might stand as examples of countries where economic manipulation worked.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 26 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS 1. but impacted the poor to make them even poorer. those hurt the most by sanctions are the people the sanctions were intended to help (Major and McGann. 2005).asp Who is harmed by sanctions? While food and medicines usually are exempted from embargoes and other sanctions. Rarick. July 1995. SANCTIONS CRIPPLE THE ECONOMY AND INFRASTRUCTURE OF A COUNTRY. Politicians have imposed sanctions on Cuba and Burma for their undemocratic governments and human rights abuses. Democratic countries impose sanctions more than non-democratic countries and are more likely to impose those sanctions on non-democratic regimes (Lektzian and Souva. USA TODAY. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". they might also be reminders that crippled economies do not recover easily. no similar sanctions are imposed on China. might prove harmful to the new majority government of Nelson Mandela. p. the economic disruptions will remain long after the political dispute has ended -. Issue 3. Indeed. Economic sanctions deprive the people of the sanctioned country their basic right to a better standard of living. Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. .S. Even if state behavior is altered. Asphyxiation is premised on a philosophy of making things worse before they get better and of inflicting hardship on a broad population. It didn't affect the ruling military junta. Although the initial political problems that prompted the economic sanctions have been rectified. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. as witnessed by the mass demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989. SANCTIONS ARE INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED AND UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY BUILDING EFFORTS BY HURTING THE MOST VULNERABLE PARTS OF THE POPULATION Charles A. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". combined with weighty popular expectations. Democratic governments have a self-interest in maintaining non-interference in each other's economies. Volume 27. in the case of South Africa. however. those most shielded from the economic penalties often are those at the source of the policy that the sanctioner is trying to change. p.

Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature. While a show of international support for the protesters and a strong symbolic condemnation of the regime were well-warranted. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 1995. 1999). social. 5. p. and suppress popular dissent.2001". sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. 1998). minimize the threat posed by potential challengers. Wood. THEY CAUSE A GREATER INCREASE IN REPRESSION AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Reed M. vol. The governing military junta responded by brutally repressing the demonstrations. paragraphs 66-76). This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state-sponsored repression of human rights. 2008.000 in prison camps outside the capital. 52. Wood. Weiss.asp Growing misgivings about consistency and transparency (Conlon. p. complicates the work of humanitarian agencies. as has the Red Cross Movement.asp While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention. 1976 -. vol. p. The empirical results support this theory. protect core supporters. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. von Braunmuhl & Kulessa. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign-policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. and physical hardship on civilian populations. 1995). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) concluded that sanctions have resulted in only minimal political dividends with exhorbitant human costs (Schaar. sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents. EXPERIENCE WITH BURMA SHOWS HOW SANCTIONS INCREASE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENT REPRESSION WITHIN A STATE Reed M. 6. causes long-term damage to the productive capacity of target nations. 1999. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. 2008. killing as many as 138 protesters and detaining up to 10. 1995) have been exacerbated because sanctions often entail such civilian suffering as to overshadow any potential political success (Muller & Muller. democracy activists and Buddhist monks staged large-scale protests throughout Rangoon. Recent political unrest in the country is driven largely by conditions of extreme poverty and chronic underdevelopment. leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime. Consequently. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. SANCTIONS ARE A BLUNT INSTRUMENT THAT PUNISH THE MOST VULNERABLE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY Thomas G. Various sanctions imposed by the United States and EU since the mid-1990s have exacerbated the nation's economic deterioration and have ultimately contributed to the regime's unpopular economic policies. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has viewed sanctions as yet another of the 'hard choices' facing humanitarians (Minear. He stopped short of rejecting sanctions but urged reforms. which recently sparked mass protests and the subsequent violent crackdown. . The City University of New York. greater sanctions may simply induce greater levels of repression. Specifically.Ghali. 52.2001". levying stronger economic sanctions against Burma is perhaps a paradoxical response. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE REGIMES. 1976 -.asp In September 2007.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 27 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS HURT MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS cont'd 4. The Graduate Center. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political. I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. 1995: 25-28. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. In response. the United States and several European nations threatened to tighten unilateral sanctions and urged the United Nations to impose multilateral sanctions on Burma. conditions likely to worsen if additional sanctions were imposed on the fragile economy. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. and penalizes neighbors (Boutros. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali captured the troubling tensions of a 'blunt instrument' that afflicts vulnerable groups.

not national interests. NAM lists two cases when no sanction was ever imposed. p. Jan/Feb 1999. They establish groups with clever monikers like "USA Engage. commits genocide. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.multilateral. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma".for example. silent. deadly enemy. but rather represent U. compliance with U." whose very name implies that those who disagree with them are isolationists.N. identifying it each time as a separate sanction. COMMIT GENOCIDE. But what they really stand for is not engagement but mercantilism -. not an entire industry. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. but one specific entity -. For example. 3. Five are limited bans affecting only military exports to Zaire. stating that they are an "economic. it is less brutal and thus more acceptable than military conflict.S. the measure declaring Sudan a terrorist state is counted five different times. They tacitly admit that sanctions work but insist that sanctions are good only if they defend business interests. SANCTIONS ARE A KEY FOREIGN POLICY TOOL BECAUSE THEY STOP SHORT OF WAR. But if that same government floods the American market with cheap television sets. FOREIGN POLICY.asp But what about those 41 "sanctions" imposed by the executive branch? Five are not unilateral.not an entire country. banning imports from the Chinese Qinghai Hide and Garment Factory for its use of prison slave labor or seizing the assets of individual Colombian drug traffickers. 2. so they attempt to confuse the issue with cooked-up data and claims of an epidemic. SANCTIONS OFTEN UPHOLD MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT AND ARE KEY TO TARGET SPECIFIC PRACTICES THAT SHOULD NOT BE TOLERATED Jesse Helms. America should throw the book at it. p." First.asp What these lobbyists really dislike is not the idea of sanctions themselves but the reason some sanctions are imposed. or at least low cost. Woodrow Wilson summed up the appeal of economic sanctions. Fall 1996. TORTURE THEIR PEOPLE AND SUPPORT TERRORISTS. foreign aid. Security Council sanctions -. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Third. including a November 1994 executive order that even NAM concedes in fine print "did not impose any specific new sanctions on any countries. the business lobbyists cannot say that. the NAM study counts the same sanction repeatedly.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 28 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 1. or supports amoral foreign policy. Lavin. Thirteen affect only a specific foreign company or person -. and Angola. But. ARE LOW COST AND ARE MORAL Franklin L. as NAM charges. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. the use of economic policy to advance foreign policy goals is perceived to be cost free." Eight cases represent mere restrictions on U. According to the lobbyists. tortures its people. by definition. it is a normal human desire to want to be aware of the moral consequences and propriety of one's actions. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. If the United States is going to undertake business activities in a foreign country. Jan/Feb 1999. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". THE MOST AMORAL FOREIGN POLICY Jesse Helms. Nigeria. peaceful.asp The economic role of foreign policy continues to attract considerable interest.S. THE AFF SEEKS TO PRESERVE THE FLEXIBILITY OF ROGUES WHO PROLIFERATE WMD. Americans would like to be assured that such actions are "helpful. In seven cases. Haiti. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". Second. of course. the United States should be hamstrung when a government proliferates weapons of mass destruction." or at the least that they are not unwittingly bolstering distasteful policies. p. Sudan. .

EVEN IF SANCTIONS DON'T ACHIEVE THE INTENDED RESULT. individuals.S. The Graduate Center. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE THE LINCHPIN OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND KEEPING FREE TRADE OPEN Jesse Helms. send symbolic messages.asp Unilateral sanctions.5 billion in trade sanctions if an intellectual property rights agreement was not reached by January 1992. p. 1999. 6. The City University of New York. sanctions are the main leverage the United States has over China. they may also deter other potential offenders.that violates important international standards or threatens U. 1999.S. at governments.even as they campaign to remove them from our nation's foreign policy. such as diplomacy. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law". individuals or corporations that engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Jan/Feb 1999. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. are the linchpin of our nonproliferation policy. "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U. threaten regional stability. raise the costs of non-compliance. isolate miscreants. The threat of unilateral sanctions on China over intellectual property rights and unfair trade barriers has forced China several times to yield. They have also played a crucial role in trade disputes. or threaten U. at governments that conduct aggression against their neighbors. No wonder business lobbyists are so keen to retain unilateral sanctions in the trade arsenal -. In November 1991. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. Not surprisingly. p. "the history of U. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. and enhance respect for international norms. Defense." Short of war.its government.S. 1992. The U. public suasion.S. Sanctions might be positioned at the middle of a continuum. Beyond officially declared purposes. use of force. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". 1. in fact. and to the other end open hostility. government might impose sanctions when other efforts to change behavior have failed. or other friendly means. or businesses -. If sanctions are largely expressive and meant to signal international disapproval of a particular regime or its abusive behavior. at governments that sponsor international terrorism or harbor terrorists from elsewhere. such an agreement was struck on January 16.asp Whether sanctions 'succeed' depends on the goals against which they are measured. According to a recently declassified analysis by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. between the extremes of complete cooperation and agreement at one end. for example. The United States has aimed sanctions at governments that consistently violate internationally recognized human rights. Nov. and Trade Division. cultural and scientific exchanges. Rennack. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. state visits. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY POLICY TOOL TO TRY AND STOP HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND WMD PROLIFERATION Dianne E. Future inquiry could more usefully gauge these 'other' impacts rather than pointing to the obvious inability of sanctions by themselves to change a regime or its aberrant policies.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 29 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 4. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". Weiss. the U.asp Economic sanctions are used when one country (or alliance of countries) wants to condemn or coerce change in the behavior of another country -. military training and education. national interests.S.S. at individuals or governments that traffic narcotics. p.-China relations shows that China has made specific nonproliferation commitments only under the threat or imposition of sanctions. they never examine them in any detail. or all-out war. 5. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS. security or foreign policy interests. THEY SERVE MANIFOLD FOREIGN POLICY GOALS THAT ARE IMPORTANT Thomas G. . trade representative threatened $1. demonstrate resolve to allies or domestic constituents. Although analyses often note the importance of other goals. the solidarity of states imposing them is itself an indicator of success. targeted technical assistance.

asp The Congressional Budget Office (CBO).S. THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY IS NEGLIGIBLE AND SHORT TERM Dianne E. "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U. In a report prepared at the request of the House Committee on International Relations. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY RUNG IN THE LADDER OF FOREIGN POLICY -. This approach is particularly important if multilateral support for coalition warfare becomes the chosen option to mitigate their MWD program. it is apparent that sanctions will not work against North Korea. In this case. when they do.S. where sanctions have failed and military options are unacceptably risky. On the other hand. Rennack.6 trillion for 1997. or that domestic business finds other markets (for both import and export). on the other hand. economy overall is offset by funds saved (by forgoing foreign aid or trade promotion funding).5. CBO did note that sanctions could "result in sharp disruption to and dislocation of specific U. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law". has found that sanctions on foreign commerce have had a negligible effect on the overall U. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS. Sanctions should stand as failed policy to demonstrate that all coercive means short of war have been applied.S. Even this cost was thought likely to be only short-term.dtic. that does not mean there is no justification for continuing to apply them. Defense.THEY ARE AN OPTION WHICH MUST BE EXHAUSTED EVEN IF THEY WILL INEVITABLY FAIL Bryan Foy. firms and workers. p. that loss to the U. and no attempt to refine the effort will make it a constructive engagement policy may be the only remaining way to achieve policy goals on the peninsula. economy.2/ADA415058 Sanctions have not been and likely will not be effective in achieving policy goals in Iraq or North Korea. that exporters would find replacement markets and recover. CBO found that many sanctions do not add to restrictions on commerce and that. 1999. Multi-lateral sanctions must be pursued against Iraq in order to justify and legitimize the seemingly inevitable decision to continue policy by other means. 8. 2002.2009: handle. At the same time. However. accessed 12.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 30 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 7. prosecute regime change and restore stability to the region. and Trade Division.S. Nov. United States Army. Earlier research by CBO put the domestic cost of sanctions at less than $1 billion in lost national income per year (compared with a total national income of $6. the year on which CBO based its analysis). Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. 1." . "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. the cost is often small because commerce with the targeted state is small (as it might be with developing countries).

asp Much of the continuing debate over international sanctions. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. policymakers do "not seem to have been deterred by any academic conventional wisdom from applying sanctions. Dajani have demonstrated in their exhaustive review of seven decades of literature and public statements on sanctions.THEY ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF STATE FOREIGN POLICY Kim Richards Nossal. Using a power analysis perspective derived from the literature on social power. as Philip Hanson has noted." It is perhaps not surprising that much of the literature on sanctions focuses on a dominant puzzle: "If sanctions do not work. practitioners of statecraft seem to hold contradictory views: those who are prone on occasion to embrace sanctions eagerly are just as prone to dismiss their efficacy. who argues that contrary to the repeated assertions of practitioners and scholars. p. has focused on their "effectiveness.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 31 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION ONE: SANCTIONS BOLSTER FOREIGN POLICY GOALS cont'd 9. nqa. there is a revisionist view that challenges the pervasive orthodoxy that sanctions do not work. there is a pervasive view that the many applications of sanctions in the twentieth century' show conclusively that they do not "work. S. Yet. 1989. among scholars and political leaders alike. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". Daoudi and M." Indeed. THE PROBLEM IS NOT SANCTIONS BUT RATHER THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM -. why do states continue to impose them?" To be sure. This view has been advocated most forcefully by David Baldwin. sanctions do "work" and that the real problem is the received wisdom. economic sanctions are indeed an effective tool of statecraft. the view that these measures are an ineffective tool of statecraft has become almost axiomatic." On the one hand. Baldwin argues that when viewed as part of a state's repertoire for the exercise of influence toward others in the international system." As M. . S.

Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. aid should not go to countries that commit genocide. sanctions. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Since Japan was heavily dependent on imported fuel and metals. assets of drug traffickers should be seized. Reluctance to use military force is another motivation.asp ECONOMIC SANCTIONS are popular because they offer what appears to be a proportional response to challenges in which the interests at stake are less than vital. America should not hesitate for one second to place a cost on these reprehensible acts and to restrain those few American companies who would actually conduct business with the perpetrators of such heinous crimes.S. . and government procurement contracts should not be given to foreign companies that sell dangerous technologies to terrorist states. and war. 2. such as respect for human rights or opposition to weapons proliferation. There should be sanctions on companies and governments that proliferate nuclear. That was the logic behind America's most famous attempt at asphyxiation: Franklin Roosevelt's decision to discontinue the sale of American scrap metals and fuel oil to Japan. indeed. FOREIGN POLICY. Fall 1996. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY ALTERNATIVE TO WAR IN TIMES WHEN NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE LESS CRUCIAL Richard N. SANCTIONS ARE A CRITICAL TOOL TO CONTAIN VIOLENT REGIMES AND PREVENT WMD PROLIFERATION AND GENOCIDE Jesse Helms. 3. p. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. Sanctions may not be perfect and they are not always the answer. 1997. a way to signal official displeasure with a behavior or action. chemical. Take away sanctions and how can the United States deal with terrorists. the economic cost of sanctions can directly ameliorate the problem by limiting the government's capacity to engage in the offending practices.S. three tools in foreign policy: diplomacy. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Second. "Sanctioning Madness". p. and Cuba. SANCTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO CURTAIL WAR-MAKING ACTIVITIES BY CUTTING OFFENDERS OFF FROM KEY RESOURCES Franklin L. They thus satisfy a domestic political need to do something and reinforce a commitment to a norm. Jan/Feb 1999. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. PROLIFERATORS AND GENOCIDAL DICTATORS -.THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE APPEASEMENT OR WAR 5 Jesse Helms. Lethal weapons should not be sold to violent regimes in Nigeria and Sudan. imports from Chinese companies that use prison slave labor should be banned." 4. SANCTIONS ARE ONE OF THE FEW OPTIONS WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS. U.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 32 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR 1. but they are often the only weapon. the United States would be virtually powerless to influence events absent war. and genocidal dictators? Our options would be empty talk or sending in the marines. Roosevelt thought an embargo of those goods could halt the Japanese war effort. proliferators. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Jan/Feb 1999. They are also a form of expression. Syria. policies should isolate terrorist regimes like Iran. Iraq. Nov/Dec. attaching an economic cost to bad behavior acts as a disincentive.asp Asphyxiation. "Sanctions can offer a nonmilitary alternative to the terrible options of war or indifference when confronted with aggression or injustice. Without sanctions. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. p. Haass. Lavin.asp U.asp Jefferson is right. There are. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. or export illegal drugs that poison American children. and biological weapons and countries that murder women and children and pile them into mass graves. Libya. As the National Conference of Catholic Bishops points out. support terrorism. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". The "asphyxiation" school also has its points. harbor war criminals. First.

433). "Sanctions. Likewise. 35). and Militarized Conflict". POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. Lektzian & Christopher M. then it is also logical to expect actions between words and war to signal resolve under the right conditions. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Drezner says that evidence from previous empirical studies of the success of economic sanctions is "consistent with the theoretical argument. Florida State University. More recently. Jr.asp If mere statements can be used as signals. p. Grieve argued that sanctions. rather than a complement" (2003. "if effectively applied. Second. 650). THEY ULTIMATELY MAKE IT LESS LIKELY TO OCCUR David J. First. The economic sanctions literature very clearly indicates that the imposition of economic sanctions is often costly to the sender state (Barber 1979. Renwick. challenge a . THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS HAS A DETERRENT EFFECT BECAUSE IT CREATES COSTS WHICH SIGNAL RESOLVE Robert A. others such as Morgan and Schwebach concluded that "sanctions should reduce the likelihood that the disputants will resort to force to settle their differences" (1997.. . Sprecher. there must be some cost or potential cost that accompanies the action. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. 1990). [Which he attributes to Morgan. classical economics tells us that this is costly to both trade partners.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 33 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE KEY TO PREVENT WAR cont'd 5. If this is not the case. Since one type of sanction involves the severing of a trade relationship. Palmer. they did test a multinomial model that included the use of military force and the use of sanctions as possible responses of the United States to being targeted.asp Because of these contending views on whether sanctions signal resolve or indecision. referring to the League of Nations sanctions against Italy. "It was impossible to make sanctions effective without running the risk of war" (1981. April 2007. noting that sanctions "carry with them the possibility of war if they are to be effective" (1979. Wagner 1988. for example. I argue that democracies are able to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve. Clark and Reed (2005) tested a model of foreign policy substitutability to see how the United States responds when it is targeted militarily by another state. . While Clark and Reed did not directly test whether the presence of sanctions increased or decreased the likelihood of a subsequent militarized dispute. Based on these conditions. that economic coercion acts as a foreign policy substitute for military coercion. Bienen and Gilpin also saw the possibility that sanctions would increase the probability of war. Private statements and behavior are just that. Hufbauer et al. and Miers (2000)]. One conclusion of this model was that "the positive correlation between the use of force and sanctions equations indicates that unobserved variables increase the chances policy makers implement both sanctions and force: This is evidence sanctions and force are implemented as complements rather than strictly as substitutes" (Clark and Reed 2005. actions taken must be public. 6. 620). Hart. Additionally.[target] state in as direct and positive a manner as a threat of war" (1968. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CARRY WITH THEM THE THREAT OF WAR. However. there can be no claim that lying or bluffing will be punished domestically if no one is watching. Many scholars note a generally positive association between sanctions and war. June 2000. noted. . there is disagreement in the literature on whether sanctions should make war more or less likely. there is no incentive against bluffing and thus no logical reason for the opponent to think otherwise. Signals. p. 23). "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". 9).

usually by several nations acting together. United States Army. In fact. sanctions have generally served well as an economy of force option by trading some degree of tolerance for time to develop other options. One thought is that "going slow while moving forward offers several advantages.2/ADA415058 This paper will examine the effectiveness of sanctions regimes imposed against South Africa. Secretary-General Kofi Annan says.dtic. sanctions have forestalled precipitous military action for the period of time necessary to consider alternatives. to diminish the capacity of the protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight. This approach seeks to convince a rational actor that a change of behavior is in the best interest of all concerned. as was the case against Iraq in 1991. and. They represent more than just verbal condemnation and less than the use of armed force. seeking to coerce change through military" It seems that the use of sanctions is more effective than polite requests to cease and desist. as is the current situation with North Korea. Sanction regimes generally do not work as intended. THEY BUY CRITICAL TIME AND ALLOW ALL OPTIONS TO BE PURSUED WHILE AVERTING CATASTROPHIC WAR 6 Bryan Foy. Traditionally the range of sanctions available has included arms embargoes. and suffer widespread criticism. U. Occasionally time purchased at the expense of patience has bought only the opportunity to stage combat operations.5. why nations and international institutions continue to include them on their menu of options. The next question is whether or not sanctions can be expected to work and. and why they have thus far failed in the other two. and diplomatic isolation. an international coalition might wage war against the offender.5. the 1990s have been referred to as the "sanctions decade" to describe the dramatically increased use of this particular form of international "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". Iraq and North Korea in the twentieth century. Between these two extremes lies a spectrum of alternatives that combine the coercive effects of the elements of national or international power in a coordinated action short of war. are important in the achievement of long term national security policy objectives. Even more important is to understand why sanctions. Along this continuum is a range of potential solutions referred to as sanctions.2/ADA415058 A reasoned approach is to expend as little political capital and national treasure as possible in the initial attempt. and seeks a quick and peaceful diplomatic solution. against a nation violating international law. especially when one is not clear on the destination. or "coercive measure(s) adopted. the objective has been to change in specific ways the behavior of a government or regime which poses a threat to international peace and stability.2009: handle. At the other extreme. The "other" options occasionally result in a stalemate in which no better solution emerges.N. accessed 12.dtic. On the other hand. the imposition of trade and financial restrictions. It is important to understand why sanctions worked in one case. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. United States Army. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. if not. EVEN IF SANCTIONS ALONE ARE FAILING. And sometimes patience pays off with the peaceful achievement of policy goals. 2. success or failure. in a conflict situation. interruption of relations by air and sea. . accessed 12. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options".2009: handle. and more politically and economically palatable than war because the use of sanctions has increased dramatically throughout the last half of the twentieth century. Usually.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 34 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL 1. SANCTIONS ARE A VALUABLE MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN DOING NOTHING AND ALL OUT WAR -THEY ARE VITALLY IMPORTANT Bryan Foy. in spite of their statistically ineffective performance. and provided the legitimacy that results from first trying available actions short of war prior to commencing hostilities. 2002. 2002." One significant advantage is the opportunity to buy time while examining or developing other options. In every case.

accessed 12.2009: handle. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". Occasionally time purchased at the expense of patience has bought only the opportunity to stage combat operations. as was the case against Iraq in 1991. On the other hand. EVEN WHEN SANCTIONS FAIL. sanctions have forestalled precipitous military action for the period of time necessary to consider alternatives and provided the legitimacy that results from first trying available actions short of war prior to commencing hostilities. United States Army.dtic. And sometimes patience pays off with the peaceful achievement of policy goals. sanctions have generally served well as an economy of force option by trading some degree of tolerance for time to develop other options. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. sanction regimes generally do not work as intended. 2002. and suffer widespread criticism.2/ADA415058 In summary. as is the current situation with North Korea and Cuba. The "other" options occasionally result in a stalemate in which no better solution emerges. success or failure.5.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 35 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS SUCCEED EVEN WHEN THEY FAIL cont'd 3. In every case. THEY ARE A CRITICAL STOP-GAP THAT HELPS DELAY OR PREVENT MILITARY VIOLENCE Bryan Foy. .mil/100.

Jan/Feb 1999. Are these the measures that NAM and USA Engage want Congress to curtail? Let's hope not. A sanction might be an empty gesture according to economic criteria. alternatively. asphyxiation has a certain appeal over oxygen because it is an active step. ECONOMICS IS INEVITABLY A PART OF FOREIGN POLICY AND ALL REGIMES. FOREIGN POLICY. Fall 1996. sanctions can operate on a symbolic level by serving as a prelude to a more serious move. the mechanisms are slow and indirect. p. SANCTIONS ARE A CRUCIAL TOOL TO PREVENT VIOLENT CRIMINAL REGIMES FROM STAYING IN BUSINESS Jesse Helms. . executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. if pushed to extremes. while oxygen is essentially passive." then asphyxiation fits the bill. p. p. making a very different calculus of self-interest than that for which the implementer of sanctions had hoped. Still another prohibited Defense Department aid to countries supporting terrorists. But to argue that economic measures -. SANCTIONS HELP TOPPLE ILLEGITIMATE REGIMES AND ALSO SEND A POWERFUL POLITICAL SIGNAL Franklin L. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations they positive or negative -. Lavin. but it could send a clear political message. But. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". This is a gross distortion.asp Some observers argue that sanctions simply don't work or. One "sanction" blocked assistance to countries knowingly harboring fugitives wanted by the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. One measure placed conditions on assistance to the Palestine Liberation Organization. Another barred aid for military or police training to Haitians involved in drug trafficking or human rights abuses. thereby ending the bad behavior. limitations. economic sanctions could even topple a government through mass discontent or unhappiness within a leadership faction.asp How did NAM come up with 61 sanctions? The study alleges that 20 laws were passed by Congress and 41 were imposed by presidential action. Fall 1996. Countries might not react quickly. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Thus. Nearly three-quarters of the congressional measures were not sanctions at all but conditions. or they might not react the way they are desired to act.S. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. over the long run. foreign aid. for economic strategy is simply applied incentives and disincentives. Lavin. It is true that one rarely finds examples of economic activity working quickly. EVEN THE MOST EXTREME OR ABUSIVE.asp Third. 3. FOREIGN POLICY.tend to act rationally. countries -.even odious ones -. Fourth. 2. TEND TO ACT RATIONALLY Franklin L. that engagement doesn't work.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 36 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES 1. If governments need to demonstrate they are "doing something. or restrictions on U. The Soviet Union once toppled a Finnish government it deemed too conservative through a series of trade actions that sent a clear political not work is to argue that foreign policy does not work.

until 1991 the U. including three Americans. Only without them has the embargo begun to take a toll on Castro's regime. And with good reason: the Clinton administration views sanctions as domestic public relations tools rather than as foreign policy weapons. p. or by undermining the political stability of the regime enough to open the bargaining range between the target and sender (Marinov 2005. allowing the nearly complete democratic transformation of the western hemisphere. 5. p. 2008.S.asp Critics respond that sanctions have failed to bring down regimes in Iraq. Perhaps -. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". Castro's regime is teetering. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Wood. Marinov 2005. citizens. and Cuba. THEY ARE VERY EFFECTIVE AT CONSTRAINING ADVENTURIST DICTATORS Jesse Helms. "What Sanctions Epidemic?".but they have effectively contained the Saddam Husseins. or both. Sudan. Castro's efforts to finance Marxist insurgencies stopped. and Hafiz al-Asads of the world. and Asad would be planning terrorist operations against U. p. Mu'ammar al-Qadhafis.S. This sent the message to Iran and other rogue states that the administration talks tough but caves in under pressure. he has done everything in his power to avoid enforcing it. 6. EVEN IF SANCTIONS CANNOT CAUSE REGIME CHANGE. STRAYING AWAY FROM SANCTIONS ONLY EMBOLDENS DICTATORS AND SHOWS THEM THAT NONCOMPLIANCE WILL PAY OFF Jesse Helms. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. It is the same with Cuba. Saddam would now be threatening the world with VX missiles. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Jan/Feb 1999. 52. 567). Libya. or between the elite and the general populace. . Nossal 1989). Syria. If this policy represents failure. by shooting down two civilian planes flying over international waters. Qadhafi would be blowing up U. embargo was offset by $5 billion to $7 billion in Soviet subsidies. passenger planes. The moment the embargo kicked in.asp When sanctions do not work.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. unless America gives up its leverage by unconditionally lifting the embargo." Such divisions promote instability within the regime and pressure leaders to alter policies. vol. Clinton has also gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid imposing sanctions on China for its missile proliferation. Sanctions therefore achieve the sender's policy goals either by destabilizing the regime to the point that the incumbent is removed and a more "pliant" leader is installed. Olson (1979. But once the camera lights dimmed and the time came to implement it.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 37 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION TWO: SANCTIONS TOPPLE VICIOUS REGIMES cont'd 4. Clinton made a bold speech for the cameras and signed the Helms-Burton law.2001". FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Since then. President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act live on CNN. Without sanctions. it is often because the target government doubts our resolve to keep them imposed. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. After the Castro regime murdered four innocent people.asp A number of scholars have posited that sanctions succeed by creating political instability or rifts among factions within the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 1976 -. Iran. his successors will be anxious to exchange normalized relations with the United States for a democratic transition in Cuba. As for Cuba. For example. 474) argues that sanctions are expected to "foster divisions between elements of the elite. it beats capitulation any day. RESEARCH SHOWS THAT SANCTIONS CAN DESTABLIZE REGIMES AND CAUSE A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP Reed M. despite incontrovertible evidence from American intelligence that sanctionable activities have taken place. Jan/Feb 1999. he lost his nerve.

3. hoarded them in warehouses. the sanctions regime has had grave humanitarian consequences. NOT THE ACTUAL SANCTIONS REGIME Chantal De Jonge Oudraat is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The annual value of imports fell from $11. Likewise. and Mertens 2004). sanctions have been less effective from a political point of view. Jan/Feb 1999.S.5Bn. targeted leaders augment their level of repression (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. . 1976-2001". In order to prevent challenges from within their own coalition and to deter external challenges from opposition groups. ONLY THE REGIME Jesse Helms. 2000. Gartner and Regan 1996). illegally re-exported humanitarian supplies. Survival.S. Nigeria. at $10 billion. Saddam remains in charge in Baghdad. The same goes for China. Kaempfer. even though most people . which have undercut their legitimacy. and has not shelved plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. Foreign Affairs. 52. Past research suggests that the most effective sanctions generate costs for the groups who benefit most directly from the regime's policies (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. sanction because the United States barred sales of defense items to the government. exports plummeted from $28. Mauritania. p. However. However. until December 1996 Baghdad refused to accept these conditions. Major and Mcgann 2005). University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. and frequently ordered insufficient food and medicines. p.5Bn in 1996.ASP The success and duration of sanctions events are linked to the distribution of sanctions costs across groups within the target state. or simply stopped oil exports. and over the same period. as well as the Oil for Food Program adopted by the Security Council in August 1991. Under the terms of the programme. Are not likely to experience significant impact from or awareness of [the] imposition. International Studies Quarterly. vol. The study lists the entire population of the former Zaire (now the Congo) as being under U. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". Lowenberg. THE HORRIBLE HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN IRAQ WERE SPAWNED BY ABUSES BY SADAAM HUSSEIN. Senator and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Exemptions for medicine and food. "'A Hand Upon The Throat Of The Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. These measures have been very effective in terms of their economic impact. SANCTIONS DO NOT DISRUPT THE OVERALL SOCIETY OR ECONOMY OF A COUNTRY. Wood. Access to those countries' commercial goods-and-services markets remains unaffected. revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil could be used to pay for food and medicines. sanctions may create an opportunity for political opposition to challenge the regime. Iraq's GDP in 1993.ASP The claim that 42 percent of the world's population has been affected is also bogus. and implementation of the sanction regime has been relatively good. have not prevented the Iraqi population from suffering. or that provide support to the domestic political opposition in the target country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988. and Pakistan. "What sanctions epidemic?". . SANCTIONS PUT PRESSURE ON LEADERSHIP TO CHANGE THROUGH A VARIETY OF MECHANISMS EVEN IF IT INCREASES REPRESSION IN THE SHORT TERM Reed M. where CRS notes that such highly targeted actions "put the entire populations of these countries into NAM's calculation." U.ASP UN sanctions have now been in effect for over ten years. Moreover. Davenport 1995. especially if the sanctions generate significant public dissent (Allen 2007). 2008. . malnutrition is rampant in the south and centre of the country. p.5Bn in 1980 to $0.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 38 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS EFFECT ON POPULATION IS MINIMAL 1. 2. Successful sanctions therefore threaten to destabilize governments because they harm the interest groups that support the target regime and encourage defections to a challenger.3Bn to $0. These mechanisms also encourage incumbents to increase their level of repression. Child mortality has more than doubled. was close to 1960s levels. and the proportion of low-birth-weight babies rose from 4% in 1994 to approximately 25% in 1997. 2003.

June 2000. The first recognizes that leaders can be punished for foreign policy failure and that it is easier for the general populaces to punish leaders in democratic states. Hart.asp Most analysts argue that economic sanctions are a relatively poor policy tool. Because of this. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. I then identify the role that states' domestic audiences play in their leaders' future and how it shapes and guides what leaders can do to enhance their ability to retain power. June 2000.). but rather that non-democratic states. Specifically. more successful when using economic sanctions. This hypothesis is tested using ordered probit analysis of 81 bilateral sanctions episodes from 1914 to 1989. p. Florida State University. Democracies are likely to be careful in their foreign policies due to the costs associated with failure. The hypothesis is confirmed even when controlling for the known correlates of sanctions success and other potentially confounding factors (relative power. This selection effect would produce the finding that democratic states are more successful when utilizing economic sanctions (see Siverson 1995 for a discussion of this selection effect when democracies go to war). "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". Huth 1996. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Hart. Jr. This finding suggests that we can expand our theoretical expectations on the links between domestic politics and international relations. The empirical work linking regime type and international phenomena indicates that there may be a more useful way to structure scholarly thought on the causes and effects of international behavior than is provided by the realist paradigm. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. f. on average. DEMOCRACIES ESPECIALLY ARE SUCCESSFUL WHEN APPLYING SANCTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR SIGNALING PROPERTIES Robert A. leaders in democracies are likely to be careful when selecting issues over which to sanction..asp Based on the assumptions listed above. . Florida State University. "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". Jr.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 39 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: DEMOCRACIES NEED SANCTIONS AS A TOOL 1. p. I argue that democracies should be.. June 2000. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY.e.. Because of this. SO LONG AS IT IS A DEMOCRACY THAT IS APPLYING THE SANCTIONS. democracies are better able than non-democracies to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve. There are actually two competing explanations for the link between the assumptions listed above and the hypothesis that democracies should be better sanctioners. democracies) can effectively tie their hands internationally by using aggressive foreign policy actions. are unable to use economic sanctions as signals of resolve. THEY WILL LIKELY BE EFFECTIVE AND AVOID ABUSE Robert A. more successful when using economic sanctions because of the signaling properties of sanctions. 2. self-interested individuals whose main goal is to retain office domestically (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995. p. SANCTIONS ARE EFFECTIVE AND WON'T BE ABUSED BECAUSE DEMOCRATIC LEADERS MUST BE CAREFUL OF WHOM TO SANCTION Robert A..asp I begin with the assumption that states are led by rational. ex. because they generally lack the institutional mechanisms to generate domestic costs. on average. In this article I build on a theoretical framework which has the leaders of states being primarily interested in retaining office domestically. "Democracy and the Successful use of Economic Sanctions". leaders of some states (i. I expect that because of the ability to generate potential domestic costs for foreign actions. Jr. This is not to say that democracies are always successful. Hart. 3. I hypothesize that democracies should be. Florida State University.

we should see them as "instrumental" means to a purposive end. 1989. and damaging to the interests of the community as a whole. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. it is a punishment for a "wrong" deemed to be immoral." . p. DEPLOYMENT OF SANCTIONS IS A NECESSARY MODE OF PUNISHMENT -. and despite the widespread skepticism about the punitive utility of international economic sanctions in the literature. I address this orthodox puzzle.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 40 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT 1. accords well with the Latin origin of the word. Sanction was the penalty specified for a transgression of a law or decree and particularly for a violation of a sacredness. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". The Latin origin thus suggests that a sanction is not simply a penalty imposed for a violation of the rules." I seek to establish that sanctions can and should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful demonstrate that only some of these purposes are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used.asp On the other hand. and retribution -. Sanctions constitute a form of "international punishment. SANCTIONS HAVE UTILITY AS A METHOD OF PUNISHMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR THAT MUST BE CONDEMNED 7 Kim Richards Nossal. but I focus on one useful purpose of international sanctions that tends to be either overlooked or dismissed outright in the literature on sanctions: the purpose of punishment. Margaret Doxey has argued that the element of wrongdoing is critical to our understanding of sanctions: "It is still possible -. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. However. by exploring the meaning of the term "sanctions." Such usage. First. it might be added. it could be argued that what prompts one state to invoke "sanctions" -. My argument proceeds in three stages." Such usage more clearly reflects the etymology of the word as well as its concern with the moral gravity of the violation and (to the extent that there is a "public realm" in international politics) the essentially "public" nature of the "objectionable" act." despite the obvious problems of using the notion of punishment in circumstances in which there is no legitimate superordinate authority.not merely the instruments of economic coercion -. or offensive to the moral conscience. preserve the sense of sanctions as penalties linked to real or alleged misconduct.IT SIGNALS MORAL CONTEMPT FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT FOLLOW INTERNATIONAL NORMS Kim Richards Nossal. "International Sanctions as International Punishment"." When this is applied to international politics. prevention. I nonetheless argue that we should see these harms as more than mere forms of "expressive" symbolism embraced for their own the perception that the target state has violated norms of moral behavior valued by the sender and thus deserves not only concrete penalties but also a public proclamation of the target's impiety. Punishment thus involves not only a concrete cost (the deprivation of something of value) but also a public expression of the community's moral disapproval of the act. which clearly establishes the relationship between wrongdoing and the hurts imposed on wrongdoers." 2. for all of the nonrational elements of punishment. nqa. Second.and desirable -. p. rather. I explore the various purposes of punishment -. I argue that exploring sanctions from the perspective of punishment as a purposive human behavior provides us with useful insights into the utilities of international sanctions.asp In this article. 1989.

asp To this point. subversion. the conventional wisdom about the ineffectiveness of this instrument of statecraft notwithstanding. James Lindsay's examination of these goals is a useful exemplar of this kind of analysis. sanctions are policy responses to acts perceived by the sender to be acts of moral wrongdoing. international symbolism. punishment may be inflicted in order to compel an offender to cease wrongful behavior. punishment may be inflicted for retribution' -. SANCTIONS ARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A WIDE VARIETY OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. are the instrumental purposes of punishment? In a domestic context. then. Baldwin's approach leads us to conclude that sanctions are in fact a most "effective" and rational instrument of diplomacy. for compulsion. The punishments inflicted on those refusing to comply with a lawful order (for example. 1989. or purpose. or domestic symbolism. and for retribution. What. BUT ESPECIALLY PUNISHMENT Kim Richards Nossal. It is usually argued that the intent. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". legal harms are inflicted upon offenders for one or more of three broad purposes: for prevention. SANCTIONS ARE A NECESSARY RECOURSE AS PUNISHMENT AND ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL Kim Richards Nossal.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 41 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: SANCTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT cont'd 3. However. is always a purposive and instrumental act. of sanctions is to cause harm to the target state in order to achieve a number of foreign policy objectives. Second. the goal of punishing an act of wrongdoing. p. To the extent that sanctions impose an injury on the wrongdoer (and no analyst of sanctions claims that these instruments of economic statecraft do not hurt the target in some way). the retributive purpose was clearly in evidence. purposes of punishment. 1989. 4. nqa. or in order to deter wrongful behavior by other individuals in the community. deterrence. nqa. the order from a judge to answer a query or from a legislature to return to work) are "compellent" in nature: the harm is inflicted until the offender obeys." This may explain why sanctions have been and are likely to remain a durable and attractive policy option for foreign policymakers who are confronted with acts they regard as morally repugnant. rather than for deterrent or compellent reasons. And if we look at sanctions from the perspective of punishment. I have argued that sanctions can be distinguished from other forms of statecraft by the type of acts that provoke their imposition.asp Punishment of wrongdoing. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". I argue here that effectiveness can also be deduced from the nonrational. 1989.the infliction of pain on an offender in return for an evil inflicted on the community. they are seeking to achieve one or more of five broad ends: compliance. international sanctions cannot but "work. however. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. their "effectiveness" is ensured. In other words. He suggests that when states use sanctions. the harm is seen as the appropriate response of the community to someone who had the choice to act otherwise but chose to act wrongfully. or both. p. And if economic sanctions are indeed imposed for retributive reasons. p.' If. and less frequently.asp The argument that a desire to punish wrongdoing can motivate foreign policymakers brings us back to the question posed by so many students of international sanctions: Why do policymakers persist in using what is supposed to be an ineffective tool of statecraft? How we answer this question. it is difficult to exclude the punitive objective of sanctions: in other words. nqa. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. as Baldwin rightly notes. Third. "International Sanctions as International Punishment". a harm may be meted out by public authorities in order to deter or prevent future wrongful behavior by the individual being punished. 5. In the case of sanctions against Afghanistan. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. PUNISHMENT IS NECESSARY TO GET ACTORS TO CEASE UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR AS WELL AS DETER OTHERS FROM ENGAGING IN IT AS WELL Kim Richards Nossal. The second distinctive feature of sanctions is their punitive intent. but nonetheless instrumental. while Baldwin argues that effectiveness must be deduced from using a model of means-end rationality. for their effectiveness lies in their capacity to impose some harm on the target. we come readily to the same conclusion. First. depends on how we define effectiveness. I suggested above. . as I have argued.

boycotts limit and ban imports from the target. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". and strategic goods. triggering public anger and politically significant protest. Indeed. SURVIVAL. or they may be limited to specific services. The Security Council has significant latitude in defining threats to 'international peace and security'. SO LONG AS ALL OTHER ALTERNATIVES ARE INVESTIGATED AND THAT THE USE OF SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL IS SCRUTINIZED. and arms embargoes 11 times. partial. Between 1945 and 1988. Since the end of the Cold War. NOT ABANDONED 1. targeted financial measures twice. 2007. partial sanctions six times. At the very least. or their removal from power. It is not suggested that sanctions imposed for national security reasons (such as restricting the sale of advanced technology to unfriendly countries) should be abandoned. Issue 3. What is suggested is that economic sanctions used to produce political change desired by US policy-makers are carefully examined before being implemented and that other alternatives are considered. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. While it is certainly true that the people of many sanctioned countries live under tyrannical government. Sanctions make their lives more difficult and in some cases place their health in jeopardy. such as air traffic. The human cost of this unethical and often inhumane and ineffective form of public policy requires a search for alternative means of producing change. THEY SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED 8 Charles A. Volume 27. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. it is also true that most citizens of those countries do not want sanctions imposed. Sanctions can be comprehensive. Rarick. In some cases a policy of constructive engagement and/or multinational political pressure can be a more effective form of intervention. and has shown great creativity in doing so. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". SANCTIONS CAN BE SCALED UP OR DOWN AS APPROPRIATE -. . the Security Council has imposed comprehensive economic sanctions four times. 2. This in turn will lead to changes in the behaviour of trouble-making 1lites. Sept. Embargoes limit and ban exports to the target. such as oil.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 42 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. The objective of sanctions imposed by the UN under Chapter VII of its Charter is 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'. They may encompass a multitude of services and goods. some restraint in imposing sanctions is recommended -. 2000. Pages 65-70 The increasing use of economic sanctions as tools of foreign policy is troubling to American business and to advocates of economic freedom.ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION IS KEY TO FORCE ALONG POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.asp The theory behind sanctions is that they will produce economic deprivation. or targeted against individual corporations or people. p. it has increasingly deemed internal conflicts and gross violations of human rights to be justifications for international action. sanctions of any type were imposed only twice (see Table 1).in contrast to the hair-trigger approach now employed.

sanctions can achieve. Nov/Dec.. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington.N. they receive a bill. and may eventually contribute to change in those societies or in their behavior. but they will be useful as a foreign policy tool only when the criteria discussed above are met. FOREIGN POLICY. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". . p. SANCTIONS CAN STILL ACHIEVE SUCCESS AT A HIGH LEVEL. Iraq today is considerably weaker militarily and economically than it would have been without these sanctions.Gibson et al. possibly influencing Pakistan's future actions as well as those of other would-be proliferators. Smarter sanctions include freezing foreign assets.asp Under the right circumstances. SMART TAILORED SANCTIONS CAN ACHIEVE ALL OF THE BENEFIT WITH NONE OF THE HARM Thomas G. the idea of using economic policy as an instrument of foreign policy has been degraded through misapplication. various foreign policy goals ranging from the modest to the fairly significant. 1999. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. p. p.. withholding credits and loans. 1990: 63). The threat of sanctions may have also deterred several European firms from investing in Iran's oil and gas industry. Sanctions have become the lazy man's foreign policy. Lavin. One intriguing finding from the IIE is that financial sanctions succeed in 41% of cases versus 25% for trade sanctions (Hufbauer et al. Smart sanctions thus would target better the wealthy and powerful to apply coercive pressure while sparing vulnerable populations. Haass. "Sanctioning Madness". while having little discernible effect on that country's nuclear weapons program. and Libya. Fall 1996.asp In theory. Achieving greater political gain with less civilian pain would clearly enhance multilateral moral credibility. 1997. Franklin L. 1997). JUSTIFYING THEIR USE Richard N. although the result may be discounted as financial sanctions normally follow a general trade embargo (Dashti. they receive a check. prohibiting investments. Economic policies need to be viewed as a selective instrument of foreign policy that is most often successful when specific circumstances prevail. Weiss. S. viewed as an instant and painless way of advancing U. Sanctions can make a political statement. Sanctions have burdened the economies of Iran. The City University of New York. Both sanctions and economic assistance are frequently invoked like a mantra. and communications. political authorities can craft sanctions that apply pressure on wrongdoers and do not unduly and adversely affect civilian populations or weaken opposition movements. Sanctions were one reason for the Serbs' decision to accept the Dayton agreement in August 1995 ending the fighting in Bosnia.S. Cuba.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 43 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. Sanctions introduced against Iraq after the Persian Gulf War have increased Iraqi compliance with U. resolutions calling for the elimination of its weapons of mass destruction. commerce. or help achieve. EVEN IF NOT SUCCESSFUL IN ALL INSTANCES. 5. If the United States approves of another country's actions. if it disapproves.asp Unfortunately. interests. U. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". have hurt Islamabad both economically and militarily. SANCTIONS ARE ONLY DISPARAGED BECAUSE OF CURRENT PRACTICE -. and restricting travel. sanctions against Pakistan.BEING MORE SELECTIVE IN THEIR APPLICATION IS BETTER THAN REJECTING THEM. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 3. 4. The Graduate Center. They have also diminished Baghdad's ability to import weapons and related technology.

Sanctions. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.S. 1997. almost always outweigh the potential benefits of coercing unwilling friends to join sanctions regimes. Charter. But it is also pragmatic. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. the expected degree of international support or opposition. which allows such states to approach the Security Council for redress. By contrast. Nov/Dec. including the damage to relations with major partners and U. "Sanctioning Madness". members being asked to vote on the proposal would then be able to refer to a report that addresses their questions. portions of this report could be classified to avoid providing information that would be useful to the target. 8. Haass. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. the expected costs to the United States. a fund for this purpose should be established within the U.asp RESTRAINT WILL not materialize by itself Policymakers should be required to prepare and send to Congress a policy statement similar to the reports prepared and forwarded under the 1973 War Powers Act before or soon after a sanction is put in place. THE USE OF SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED BUT NOT ABANDONED Richard N. In addition. including the criteria for lifting the sanction. the legal or political authority supporting its use. If necessary. the expected impact on the target. SANCTIONS ARE STILL LEGITIMATE IF THEY INCLUDE HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS Richard N.S. Such statements should clearly explain the sanction's purpose.asp Humanitarian exceptions should be part of any comprehensive sanctions regime. BUT THEY SHOULD BE CURTAILED FOR MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS Richard N. that innocents should not be made to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary. since it is easier to generate and sustain domestic and international support for sanctions that allow the importation of food and medicine. "Sanctioning Madness". Haass. Nov/Dec. SANCTIONS CAN STILL BE USED. p. efforts to build an effective WTO.N. however. They are not only an admission of diplomatic failure but they are also expensive. The costs to U. 7.asp International compliance with sanctions regimes can be increased by providing assistance to third parties to offset the economic cost of implementing sanctions. foreign policy. . should not necessarily be suspended if the humanitarian harm is the direct result of cynical government policy. the probable humanitarian consequences and what is being done to minimize them. Haass. p. In part this is a moral judgment. 1997. In addition. Any sanction Congress initiates should be approved only after the relevant committees have carefully considered the matter. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 1997. prospects for enforcement. Greater use should be made of Article 50 of the U. retaliatory steps the target or third parties may take.S. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 6. "Sanctioning Madness". FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Nov/Dec. secondary sanctions are not a desirable means of securing multilateral support. such as Iraq's. policymakers should be able to explain why a particular sanction was selected over other sanctions or policies.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 44 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED. that creates shortages among the general population in order to garner international sympathy. p. The cost would be more than offset by the benefits of multilateral cooperation. foreign assistance budget. and an exit strategy.

asp Sanctions should focus. extend to breaking diplomatic relations or canceling high-level meetings. NOT ABANDONED cont'd 9. Rarick. Such limited sanctions would avoid jeopardizing other interests or an entire bilateral relationship. 10. the United States should direct any sanctions toward nuclear or weapons-related activity. as far as possible. LIMITING AND REFINING SANCTIONS IS BETTER THAN REJECTING THEM OUTRIGHT. political responses such as event boycotts and visa denials might be the best way to signal opposition to objectionable behavior when no appropriate economic or military sanction is available or as a complement to something as specific as freezing an individual's assets. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. "Sanctioning Madness". for example by cutting off associated technological cooperation or trade. Volume 27. Sept. 1997. Pages 65-70 Although sanctions in most cases are imposed with good intentions. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. 2007. Nov/Dec. Sanctions designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are a prime example. Political sanctions should not. p. on those responsible for the offending behavior and on limiting penalties to the particular area of dispute. Such interactions help the United States as much as the targeted party. Similarly. In some cases sanctions have been successful in bringing about the desired change. Issue 3. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. BUT REFINED AND LIMITED IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS Charles A. . however. SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE VOIDED ENTIRELY. Where there are transgressions. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". They would cause less collateral damage to innocents. and this paper does not advocate ending all economic sanctions. What is proposed is that sanctions are more carefully applied and that they are designed to maximise their effectiveness. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Haass. Sanctions may have their place in foreign policy. and make it easier to garner multinational support. the probability of their success is not high. such as in the case of South Africa. Richard N.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 45 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 NEGATIVE POSITION THREE: SANCTIONS SHOULD BE REFORMED.

known as "smart" sanctions. accessed 12. The Graduate Center." like those environmental impact statements so common in Federal public works projects. of individuals or classes of individuals -the so-called "smart" sanctions. requires inducements for cooperation and punishments for resistance. A cost-benefit analysis (How many people will die of malnutrition in a poor country? How many U. . JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. United States Army. which hurt large numbers of people who are not their primary targets. they also can make the use of force all but inevitable. USE OF SANCTIONS AS A TARGETED QUID PRO QUO IS EFFECTIVE Thomas G. the recent emphasis on targeted sanctions which prevent the travel. although the question remains whether there are policy instruments such as diplomatic pressure that are more useful.S. 3. or freeze the foreign bank accounts. is a policy routine that helps support global order and U. would seem one obvious place to start. Sanctions work when they are enacted in league with other nations. "Can economic sanctions succeed as foreign policy?". Effective diplomacy.5. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". as the case with Haiti illustrates. A new construct. p. a few simple guidelines would help. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT.S.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 46 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: USING GUIDELINES IS BEST ALTERNATIVE FOR IMPROVING SANCTIONS 1. Further. p.dtic. SUBJECTING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS TO EFFECTIVE GUIDELINES WOULD SOLVE THEIR INEFFECTIVENESS WHILE PRESERVING THEIR UTILITY James A. An "impact statement. as George (1991) has emphasized repeatedly.Annan. citizens will have their standard of living reduced and by what amount? What are the prospects for influencing leadership change through deprivation?) should be assessed in advance and weighed against other methods. though. sanctions need refining if they are to be seen as more than a fig leaf in the future. The effective use of sanctions as a diplomatic tool requires that compliance be acknowledged and reciprocated. we also recognize that sanctions remain a blunt instrument. Auburn University at Montgomery. 1997. of course.2009: handle. Sept. This variant will be more fully explored in the section concerning Iraq. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict examined inducement strategies in combination with sticks (Cortright. interests. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". 1999. The City University of New York. Khalid bin Sultan Eminent Scholar. and policy makers continue to find more effective ways to formulate and enforce them. 2002.asp What is needed. 2.asp Sanctions also stand to benefit from being understood in the context of carrots-and-sticks. or employed to avoid military action.2/ADA415058 As an aside. Sanctions need to be weighed. more specifically targets those areas most likely to influence state behavior while reducing unintended consequences. Hence. Weiss. the way that sanctions are developed and implemented continues to evolve over time. According to Kofi. and cooperation theory teaches that a quid pro quo can generate additional momentum. Perhaps. easing pressure in response to partial steps toward compliance may generate additional gestures. REFINED SMART SANCTIONS AVOID THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH WIDE-SPREAD BLOCKADES Bryan Foy. set in motion as an "expressive" function to show displeasure. just as we recognize the importance of sanctions as a way of compelling compliance with the will of the international community. Sanctions against Iraq have ignored this dynamic. 1997). In the case of sanctions. USA TODAY.

Lavin. that economic sanctions would not work.asp The prevailing orthodoxy is that direct trade-offs exist between political gain and civilian pain -. Wiener's (1998) 'instrumental humanitarianism' is pertinent here.sanctions succeed precisely to the extent that they occasion suffering. THEY MUST BE WEIGHED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS Thomas G. should be designed.indeed. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?".WE SHOULD BE SELECTIVE IN THEIR USE.fortunate to conclude. The City University of New York. and deadly only at the margin (in conjunction with other factors) and over the long run. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. as some leaders continue to overthrow democracy. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". FOREIGN POLICY. It would be un. 3. Good feelings and self-congratulations have given way to less Pollyannaish notions about the pluses and minuses of economic and military coercion. and empirical research is necessary to identify experiences that have been more and less successful. the case for intervention will arise. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". Weiss. but sometimes it.asp To take Wilson's four adjectives. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. if they are to be used at all -. There is considerable doubt that the kind of comprehensive sanctions so quickly enacted against Iraq in August 1990 would be approved today even against a similarly blatant aggressor as Saddam Hussein. is to avoid a dogmatic approach and choose the right tool for the job. EVEN IF SANCTIONS ARE NOT PERFECT. In the late 1990s Iraq is to sanctions what Somalia was to peacekeeping in the early 1990s. Either strategy can work. history has shown that sanctions are not always economic. given the circumstances. engagement offers no automatic prospect of success. Similarly. kill large number of civilians. Too few hypotheses have been tested. is the right formula. but it is shrouded in its own controversies. WE MUST AVOID ABOVE ALL A DOGMATIC RESPONSE TO SANCTIONS -.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 47 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 UNDERVIEW: DOGMATIC RESPONSES TO SANCTIONS ARE BAD 1. 1999. The challenge for the policymaker. NOT CATEGORICAL IN THEIR CONDEMNATION Franklin L. July 2005. or shelter terrorist movements. SANCTIONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT A PRIORI BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY AND THE THREATS THAT WE FACE TODAY Nikolay Marinov. p.asp Whether we wish it or not. sanctions can be designed -. . Yet. Fall 1996. p. not necessarily peaceful. not silent. As is the case for just war doctrine. 2. too. The use of force maybe effective for some purposes. Yale University. and engagement in response to human rights problems. Humane sanctions necessarily will be ineffective while effective sanctions cannot avoid being inhumane. Neither is a terribly effective response to that they are politically effective and attentive to vulnerable populations. as always. The Graduate Center. based on the little that we have established about their ineffectiveness. decisions about coercion are highly contextual and require weighing least-bad options that do not apply a preset formula. It also necessitates fundamentally rethinking ethical and political contexts in order to establish humanitarian limits governing sanctions and to examine objectively armed force. But sometimes they do the trick. p. The challenge of reducing adverse consequences requires safeguards for civilians and better mechanisms for monitoring impacts and improving the management of exemptions. Sanctions tend to be more effective in response to trade issues.

sanctions have been ineffective for over 40 years. do these programs work? With regard to unilateral sanctions. examining 170 cases of economic sanctions. nqa. a more fundamental question is quite simply. In a report issued by the National Bureau of Asian Research. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.asp In a global economy. unilateral sanctions impose higher costs on American firms than on the target country. Nov/Dec. 1997. 2. a unilateral trade or investment embargo may not be enough to persuade a country's government to change its objectionable policies. Research by Elliott and Hufbauer (1999). most unilateral sanctions will be little more than costly expressions of opposition except in those instances in which the ties between the United States and the target are so extensive that the latter cannot adjust to an American cutoff. Unilateral sanctions did. and argues that economic sanctions programs in general have proven marginally effective in bringing about significant changes in their target countries. is a strong critic of the imposition of unilateral economic sanctions. a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation. it was found that economic sanctions against Burma were undermining a reform movement within the government hierarchy. sanctions simply do not appear to be effective tools of foreign policy. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL. 2004) and provided a scapegoat for the failed economic policies of the current regime. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. They also hurt Pakistan. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". Such cases are the exception. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. The sanctions have shifted power further towards those opposed to reform (Hiebert. Issue 3. 2003).STUDIES SHOW THAT THEY ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE ONLY ABOUT 20% OF THE TIME Charles A. however. 3. though. which can usually find substitute sources of supply and financing. Pages 65-70 In addition to high costs. by the Institute for International Economics. O'Quinn has offered a very persuasive summary of the problem: Although multilateral sanctions might succeed under the appropriate circumstances. unilateral sanctions will fail more often than not. Sept.lexis Enforcement issues aside. found that in only a quarter of the cases did the sanctions achieve their aims. 2007. p. which were heavily dependent on trade with the United States. Robert P. O'Quinn. p. "Sanctioning Madness". Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Rarick. 2006.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 48 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' 1. NOT THE RULE -. military and economic aid. THERE IS GROWING CONSENSUS THAT SANCTIONS ARE ALMOST ENTIRELY INEFFECTIVE AT ACHIEVING THEIR FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 9 Harry Wolff. In the case of Cuba. it was found that sanctions were effective in only 20% of the cases (Lukas and Griswold. Haass. the growing consensus among pundits and policymakers is no. Volume 27. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". By itself. THE INSTANCES WHERE SANCTIONS CAN SUCCEED ARE THE EXCEPTION. . In another comprehensive study of economic sanctions.A GLOBAL ECONOMY GUARANTEES EASY CIRCUMVENTION Richard N. prove more costly for Haiti and Cuba. which had been receiving substantial U. SANCTIONS ARE INCREDIBLY INEFFECTIVE -.S.

"Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". Reviewing the universe of sanctions from 1914 to 1990. My article "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work" challenges the validity of HSE. The Haitian case is also an example of how ill-conceived and poorly implemented sanctions can make a bad situation worse and underscores the fact that sanctions are a tool of policy and cannot succeed alone when the policy they serve is incoherent or inept.. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. and 3 are indeterminate. In Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. Pape. If I am right. full achievement of UN goals remains elusive. and Kimberly Ann Elliott (hereafter HSE). p.asp A simple question lies at the heart of the disagreement between Elliott and me: How robust is the evidence that economic sanctions work? Since 1985 the most influential work on this question has been Economic Sanctions Reconsidered by Gary Clyde Hufbauer. again suggesting that a combination of economic and military pressure will often be required to achieve the most difficult goals (HSE. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. What does this imply for policy? Although sanctions are sometimes credited as a low-cost and relatively humane alternative to other coercive instruments such as military force. then sanctions have succeeded in only 5 of 115 attempts.asp At the end of the day. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". including on innocent civilians who have little influence on their government's behavior. the picture is a mixed one. Summer 1998.000 Iraqi children. Jeffrey Schott. Air strikes and military threats also appear to have played important roles in these cases. . however. p. First. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". First. Recent evidence suggests that the international economic sanctions on Iraq since 1990 have led to the deaths of as many as 567. and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the effects of sanctions. I examined the 40 claimed successes and found that only 5 stand up. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. p.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 49 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS HAVE EMPIRICAL SUCCESS' cont'd 4. and the progress made in putting Bosnia back together could easily dissipate in the face of continuing tensions. Summer 1998. This important study provided the empirical support for a significant shift in the scholarly consensus on the effectiveness of sanctions from marked pessimism in the 1960s and 1970s to qualified optimism in the 1980s and 1990s. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.S. 6. In Haiti. economic sanctions often inflict significant human costs on the populations of target states. DC. military forces was required to convince the military government to step down in favor of the legally elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. compared with the reported 40. ONLY WORKING IN 5 OF 115 INSTANCES Robert A. these are not sufficient reasons for employing sanctions in situations where we do not have high confidence that they will work. broad multilateral sanctions completely failed to achieve their goals. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD OF SANCTIONS DOES NOT JUSTIFY ANY OPTIMISM OR THEIR USE IN ACHIEVING FOREIGN POLICY GOALS Robert A.asp Any optimism about the utility of sanctions in the post-Cold War world should probably be tempered. Pape. Eighteen were actually settled by either direct or indirect use of force. in 8 cases there is no evidence that the target state made the demanded concessions. forthcoming). or 34 percent of the total.000 civilian deaths during the 1991 Gulf War. there is little empirical evidence that sanctions can achieve ambitious foreign policy goals. Washington.000 military and 5. 3d ed. THE BEST DATA SHOWS THAT THE USE OF SANCTIONS HAS BEEN WOEFULLY DEFICIENT. 6 do not qualify as instances of economic sanctions. Saddam Hussein continues to put roadblocks in the way of the UN inspectors trying to find and destroy any biological weapons capability. THE HISTORICAL SUCCESSES OF SANCTIONS ARE MIXED AT BEST Kimberly Ann Elliott. and the imminent arrival of U. HSE found that sanctions succeeded in 40 of 115 cases. Summer 1998. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 5.

Second. p. not collective security. p. the argument that economic interaction is desirable because it promotes more open political and economic systems normally has more resonance in other capitals. "Sanctioning Madness". there is the newfound willingness by the community of states to intrude in issues that were once off-limits. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. to overcome this anti-sanctions bias. and especially humanitarian ones. Haass. as with Cuba. 3. SANCTIONS UNDERMINE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES BY BOOSTING ANTI-AMERICANISM AND UNDERMINING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS THAT ARE VITAL FOR STABILITY Richard N. Even with Iraq. 'security' has widened beyond military threats to include socio-economic. Haass. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". distracted attention from the provocative behavior of the target governments.asp Three reasons explain the expanded use of sanctions in the post-Cold War era. Iran. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution.S. legislation like the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and Helms-Burton Act. This threat appears to have deterred some individuals and firms from entering into proscribed business activities. foreign policy interests. The Graduate Center. Congress is increasingly turning to secondary sanctions to bolster ineffective unilateral sanctions regimes. SANCTIONS UNDERMINE MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS Richard N. The City University of New York. in all three instances. Nov/Dec. 1999. Ironically 'prevention' is a favorite new expression in public policy discourse. Means become ends. was a prerequisite for their support. In most instances. which responded to a special Security Council mandate including 'non-military' threats to security. First. or none at all. including Egypt and Turkey. 1997. In addition. 2. Weiss. 1997. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. generous compensation for third-party states affected by the sanctions. sanctions now apply to overseas firms that violate the terms of U. Sanctions are ideal when governments have no perceived vital interests. Sanctions are another indicator that sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct.asp Trying to compel others to join a sanctions regime by threatening secondary sanctions can seriously harm U.S.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 50 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' 1. "Sanctioning Madness". states are rarely willing to pay the costs of vigorous intervention. The UN's performance in former Yugoslavia demonstrated that collective spinelessness. other governments prefer minimal sanctions. like Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait. is in vogue. ALLOWING POLITICIANS TO CLAIM THEY'VE DONE SOMETHING WHILE ONLY MAKING THINGS WORSE Thomas G. Such thinking makes achieving multilateral support for sanctions more difficult for the United States. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. . environmental. Third and probably most important. APPLYING SANCTIONS ISN'T COLLECTIVE DEFENSE BUT COLLECTIVE SPINELESSNESS. threatened the future of the World Trade Organization (WTO). but it has increased anti-American sentiment. although it has been used successfully by both the Bush and Clinton administrations to defeat Congress' attempts to revoke China's MFN status. and Libya. Non-forcible sanctions give politicians the ability to 'do something' and engage in cheap moralizing but refrain from serious engagement. Broadening the agenda became official in Boutros-Ghali's 1992 An Agenda for Peace. p.asp Generating international support for sanctions is often extremely difficult. It usually takes something truly egregious. which is accompanied by indifference and ineptitude when faced with the Rwandan genocide. They tend to value commercial interaction more than the United States does and are less willing to forfeit it. and made Europeans less likely to work with the United States in shaping policies to contend with post-Cold War challenges. Nov/Dec. FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

. it is very possible that these programs do more harm than good. they have the potential to result in increased anti-American sentiments. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". SANCTIONS BACKFIRE BECAUSE THEY HINDER THE GROWTH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS. AGGRAVATING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT Harry Wolff. 2006. p. they are one of many options and should not be used exclusively. Given the focus on terrorism and the emerging United States policy of promoting democratization and the spread of freedom around the world. suggesting that while important. By hindering the growth of the middle class in these already volatile countries. nqa.lexis Others have suggested that the true economic effects of sanctions programs differ drastically from those that are intended. Other commentators have questioned the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool in battling terrorism.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 51 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE GOOD MULTILATERALISM' cont'd 4. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL.

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. THE IDEA OF SMART SANCTIONS IS ABSURD -. communications. and Britain on trade. the theoretical attractiveness of financial sanctions is diluted by practical difficulties. And executives who risk being denied access to the United States under the 1996 Helms-Burton act may think twice before entering into proscribed business deals. .asp All this demonstrates that sanctions can be a blunt instrument. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Haass. SMART SANCTIONS DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH TEETH OR COORDINATION TO BE EFFECTIVE Thomas G. and then moving quickly enough to freeze them. However. 1999. and designing "smart" sanctions to target only them is extraordinarily difficult. It is possible that Haiti's military leaders were bothered by the fact their families could no longer shop in Florida.asp The hope of avoiding adverse humanitarian consequences and tightening the screws on elites is enticing. which permits transgressor regimes and elites to move assets with impunity. can often prove impossible. Weiss. 2. "Sanctioning Madness". There is a rationale for this: funds and goods can easily be moved around. 1997. 1997. SMART SANCTIONS ARE NOT FEASIBLE AND TARGETED REGIMES CAN STILL SKIRT AROUND THEM Richard N.asp "SMART" OR "designer" sanctions. The City University of New York. p. Haass. but also European banking centers are reluctant. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". especially with a totalitarian or authoritarian state run by a few people. which penalize leaders while sparing the general public. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. Moreover. and commerce are mild inconveniences that will hardly hurt targets enough to alter behavior. Nov/Dec. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Not only dubious offshore. are only a partial solution. "Sanctioning Madness". but other countries lack comparable resources and skills.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 52 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SMART SANCTIONS CAN BE EVOLVED' 1. NOT THE REGIME Richard N. while those in the government and the military are able to skirt the sanctions. The USA has developed an effective system of tracking and freezing assets. Switzerland has taken the lead on financial sanctions in the Interlaken Process. Another serious shortcoming for multilateral efforts is the inability of the UN to act quickly.SANCTIONS FALL ON THE GENERAL POPULATION. The Graduate Center. But opportunities to employ effective sanctions with precision are rare. Gathering the necessary information about assets. Most sanctions do not discriminate within the target country. p. restrictions on travel. p. The problem with such a broad-brush approach is that sanctions tend to affect the general population. Nov/Dec. 3. Leaders and governments have many ways to insulate themselves. and governments can often command what is in the hands of others.

"Economic Sanctions as Weapons".THEY ARE CIRCUMVENTED AT NEARLY EVERY LEVEL Llewellyn D Howell. it derives from the lack of political will on the part of key leaders around the world. Washington. 2. the more vulnerable they are to economic coercion. . The greatest barrier to making economic sanctions an effective foreign policy tool is not inherent in modern political or economic systems. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Imposed to punish Serbs for "ethnic cleansing" and for refusal to recognize Croatia and Bosnia. high-grade fuel. Resources will have to be devoted to enforcement at the same time that other resources may be necessary to mitigate the most severe effects of broad. Take the example of the UN embargo against Serbia. 3.asp These elements together mean that effective sanctions are likely to be costly in political and economic terms. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Even if governments are willing to cooperate.000 gallons per day. however. Summer 1998. Whether the coalition is ad hoc or organized under the rubric of the United Nations or a regional organization. political capital will have to be expended to build it. appropriate for fighter aircraft and tanks. Nevertheless.000. the sanctions glass will remain at best half full. This in turn means that international cooperation is more important than when the United States was a far more dominant supplier of trade and finance than any single country is today. Increased integration also means that the impact of nearly universal and comprehensive sanctions can be quite severe and can raise concerns about the humanitarian consequences for people in target countries who have little control over or influence on policy. globalization of economic activity means that there are many more suppliers for most goods and services and many more potential markets for a target's exports.asp Second. p. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. SANCTIONS WILL ALWAYS FAIL IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER SOURCES THEY CAN TURN TO Kimberly Ann Elliott. p. USA TODAY. well-enforced sanctions. increased economic integration and interdependence is a double-edged sword for economic sanctions. Until there is some evidence that such will can be generated. it prohibits the shipment of all goods except food and medical supplies. SANCTIONS WILL NEVER BE EFFECTIVE BECAUSE LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD LACK THE POLITICAL RESOLVE NECESSARY TO MAKE THEM ENFORCEABLE Kimberly Ann Elliott. DC. makes its way into Montenegro (still linked with Serbia as the remnant of what once was Yugoslavia) at rates of up to 1. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 53 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' 1. July 1995. multilateral. Summer 1998.asp A critical problem is enforcement. It also raises concerns about the costs borne by key neighbors and trading partners in enforcing sanctions. its citizens often are not. It especially is directed at material that might be intended for military use. p. Washington. DC. To the extent that potential target countries are more dependent on international economic exchange than previously. Stopping it would involve imposing UN troops inside Albania. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS CANNOT BE ENFORCED -. At the same time.

First.once passed. and political profiles of targets. flaws affect their efficacy and equity. The Graduate Center. modifications require a Security Council decision -. as evidenced by maintaining Serbia's military advantage over Croatia and Bosnia in Yugoslavia's wars. Countries depending on a single export or on massive imports of food are likely to be most affected. geographic.asp Although increasingly popular in the 1990s. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". . while those with multiple borders are able to engage in sanctions busting. arms embargoes can hurt one side more than the other. Sanctions have vastly differing impacts depending on the economic. p. Efficacy is reduced when target governments do not have strong opposition movements. The built-in rigidities -. Weiss.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 54 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EASILY ENFORCED' cont'd 4. The City University of New York. expectations about their impact have been scaled down for four reasons. 1999. Moreover.and the ad hoc nature of their design and administration are further weaknesses. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. MULTIPLE CIRCUMVENTIONS POINTS AND SLOPPY APPLICATION GUARANTEE SANCTIONS WILL BACKFIRE Thomas G.

Serbia and others are learning how to counter and avoid them. 2. The U. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". using economic sanctions that are likely to fail may actually increase costs and risks for coercers by increasing the likelihood that the sanctioning state will ultimately resort to force. and they certainly are not without cost. they may not be the substitute for force that many hope for. while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender. July 1995. Signals. they are not without deadly impact that may be just as consequential as the use of bullets and bombs. p. SANCTIONS ARE NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR BECAUSE THEY WREAK THE EXACT SAME COSTS AND ARE AS DEADLY 10 Llewellyn D Howell. described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Sprecher. Democracies. the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 55 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' 1. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary. April 2007. are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. USA TODAY. and Militarized Conflict". p. making publics willing to resort to more extreme measures if sanctions fail. "Sanctions. Pape. Sanctions may even be the "American way of war. However. there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force.asp Economic sanctions seem like they should be an appropriate alternative to force in a post-Cold War world. overreliance on sanctions may contribute to them. because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs." which democratic leaders may sometimes adopt in order to "give peace a chance" and thus disarm criticism of the use of force later. or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Most importantly.asp Second. Republicans seem to think they are a monetarily less costly weapon. Professor of International Studies and Associate Vice President of Overseas Programs at Thunderbird Graduate School. and rhetoric used to justify sanctions can demonize the target regime. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals. is learning this as it attempts the application of sanctions. Summer 1998.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ACTUALLY BACKFIRE AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR BREAKING OUT BY FORCING ESCALATION OF A DISPUTE Robert A. "Economic Sanctions as Weapons". .asp Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy. Lektzian & Christopher M. as Washington discovers more about how to utilize sanctions properly to make them effective. THE DEPLOYMENT OF SANCTIONS DRAMATICALLY RAISES THE PROBABILITY OF WAR BREAKING OUT David J. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Thus. Ironically. The President apparently feels they are politically less costly. The latter lessons seem to be having a greater effect than the former. The results show that after a sanction occurs. far from avoiding unnecessary wars. 3. p. Policymakers may escalate in order to rescue their own prestige or their state's international reputation.

they have failed as a "peaceful" alternative to armed conflict because they often generate significant collateral damage and impose severe costs on the target state's population (e. . SANCTIONS ESCALATE SITUATIONS AND TIE THE HANDS OF DEMOCRATIC LEADERS. however. p. 71). because of their propensity to signal weakness while simultaneously tying the hands of democratic leaders. Schott. Pape. silent deadly remedy" and an effective. April 2007.asp Given the increased proclivity of states to use sanctions in the aftermath of the Cold War. Summer 1998. capital flight. or in which the United States may have to accept that it simply cannot impose its will at an acceptable cost. drug and arms smuggling. Hoskins 1997. are seen as a policy option falling between diplomatic words and wars (Selden 1999). falls far short of Wilson's characterization. Pape 1997). Heine-Ellison 2001. 1997)2. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 2008. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 1976 -. 2003. we are interested in understanding how the use of economic sanctions might affect the probability of military force being used. nonviolent method of coercing policy concessions from other states (in Foley 1923. and Militarized Conflict". they are complements to it (Askari et al. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. 6.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 56 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' cont'd 4. Understanding the limits of both sanctions and force as coercive instruments may help policymakers identify situations in which diplomacy may be a better approach than coercion. Joyner 2003). Others see the use of sanctions as tied intimately with the use of military force. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. Schott. We argue that sanctions tend to increase the probability of militarized conflict. Disasters such as Vietnam and Somalia demonstrate that advocates of military coercion can sometimes be just as overoptimistic as advocates of economic sanctions. 71). lost foreign investment. SANCTIONS FAIL IN 95 PERCENT OF THEIR USES AND INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF VIOLENCE BREAKING OUT Reed M. and Fausey 1995. particularly when used by democratic countries.asp In a 1919 speech to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Garfield.. or do they function as a signal of resolve that helps state leaders avoid armed conflict? Some policy makers have proposed that economic sanctions are a nonviolent policy option. p. Their track record. The primary research question asked in this article is.g. First. however. Weiss 1999). Bhoutros-Ghali 1995). and Elliott 1990a. declining GNP. 52. and illegal trade syndicates (Andreas 2005. 2002. Wood. he correctly characterized sanctions as a "hand upon the throat of the offending nation" (in Foley 1923. Woodrow Wilson described economic sanctions as a "peaceful. Sanctions. Faris 1997. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. p. and when they will not. 5. allowing states to address international crises without resorting to the use of costly military force(Helms 1999). Crawford 1997. "Sanctions. ACTUALLY INCREASING THE CHANCES THAT A WAR WILL BE FOUGHT David J. and other humanitarian costs (Cortright and Lopez 2000. Hufbauer. function as substitutes for military force. in this light. that we should just employ force instead . while Wilson's famous description of sanctions is in retrospect less than accurate. Sprecher. World Health Organization 1996). Lektzian & Christopher M. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. Oudraat 2000). sanctions fail in as many as 95 percent of cases (Hufbauer. These costs include increased unemployment. Thus. vol. Hufbauer et al. increased corruption. Garfield 2002. deteriorating public health standards (Ali and Shah 2000. we develop an argument about the signaling properties of sanctions that helps explain when sanctions will. do economic sanctions tend to lead to war.2001". reduced bilateral trade (Hufbauer and Oegg 2003. THE WEAKNESS OF SANCTIONS DOESN'T MEAN A PRIORI THAT USE OF FORCE IS NEEDED -RATHER IS SHOWS THE NEED FOR DIPLOMACY Robert A. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work". Signals. To help resolve this debate about whether sanctions tend to be a prelude to war or a nonviolent alternative.asp The weak power of economic sanctions does not mean. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Sanctions in this view are not a nonviolent alternative to war. and Elliott 1990a.this is expensive and destructive and often does not work. Devin. Second.

reducing the probability of militarized force (Drezner 2003. "Sanctions.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 57 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS WAR' cont'd 7. Signals. we conclude that when a sanction is observed. and instead of signaling resolve. Morgan and Schwebach 1997). and Militarized Conflict". designs sanctions in a manner so that they will have minimal costs to themselves. following sound domestic economic practices. Lektzian & Christopher M. all too often. and Boehmer 2001. This affects the costly signaling properties of sanctions. Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M. CONTRIBUTING TO MISCALCULATION David J.However. the sender nation. Li. When democratic states use sanctions in this manner.asp Sanctions can function as a signal of resolve. sends a signal of weakness and indecisiveness on the part of the sender. Gartzke. there is a significantly increased probability that a militarized dispute will also occur. As a result. they run an even greater risk of war because they also tend to generate audience costs that tie their hands. SANCTIONS RAISE THE RISK OF WARFARE BECAUSE THEY DON'T SIGNAL STRENGTH. making it more difficult for them to back down. April 2007. ultimately making militarized conflict all the more likely. Sprecher. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. . p.

The sanctions decreased the standard of living of the most disadvantaged members of Haitian society. rising unemployment. former co-ordinator of United Nations Resolution 986 (Food-for-Oil in Iraq) describes economic sanctions as a 'totally bankrupt concept'. Pages 65-70 In addition to their unethical nature. economic sanctions against Iraq resulted in a doubling of the death rate for children less than five years of age and a skyrocketing of infant mortality. The empirical evidence for affecting such change is meager. The City University of New York. However.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 58 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' 1. 2007. it is impermissible to cede to what normally would be a virtue if such an approach leads to more violence and conflict than is necessary or undermines local coping capacities more than an alternative. . Rarick. Gibbons and Garfield (1999) determined that sanctions resulted in declining incomes.THE IRAQ AND HAITI EXPERIENCE PROVE THIS Charles A. Dennis Halliday. uncertain gains. economic coercion. 1999) when one compares the human toll inflicted on the innocent people of sanctioned countries. 2. 1998). ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. p. decreased attention to child welfare and education. Paradoxically. including pacifists. A preference to avoid military force no longer appears unequivocally noble should civilian damage from a so-called nonforcible coercive effort be more substantial than from a forcible alternative. 1999. in certain contexts the use of multilateral military force may emerge as a possibly more humane option than its supposedly nonforcible relative. 2004). But the challenge is to determine whether the greatest good (or the least harm) for the greatest number over the longer term would be better served by rapid and vigorous military intervention to enforce legitimate international decisions rather than slow. civilian pain in the short term is thought to produce humanitarian gains over the longer haul by eliminating weapons of mass destruction or halting ethnic cleansing. Issue 3. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". SANCTIONS ARE UNETHICAL AND INHUMANE -. Sanctions in Iraq caused the price of basic food products to greatly increase. Most readers of these pages have a visceral preference for nonviolence.THEY ARE EVEN WORSE THAN WAR 11 Thomas G. and that an estimated 500. to re-examine their almost universal preference for nonforcible over forcible sanctions. THE MORAL COST OF SANCTIONS MEANS THEY SHOULD BE ABANDONED -. resulted in inadequate nutrition. The authors of the study concluded that the effect of the sanctions continued long after they were lifted in 1994. It thus is crucial for humanitarians of all stripes. Volume 27. The calculations are tortuous and the mathematics inexact. and. The Graduate Center.that is. in addition. food and safe drinking water for their children. Weiss. sanctions represent an inhumane form of public policy. Benign motivations are insufficient if the results are dreadful -.asp It is true that humanitarian concerns often stand behind support for economic sanctions -. Economic sanctions themselves can be called instruments of mass destruction (Mueller and Mueller. and not necessarily less violent. poor nutrition and increased family breakdowns. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Sept. According to UNICEF. the ethical considerations are made even more complex because suffering is likely to outweigh potential. The organisation reports that the sanctions made it very difficult for parents to provide needed medicine. caused a decline of healthcare and led to the collapse of the national currency (BBC. In a study of the impact of economic sanctions imposed against Haiti from 1991-94.just as evil motivations are sufficient if the results are beneficial.000 children under the age of five died between 1991 and 1998 as a result of the sanctions (Pigler. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business".

Unlike the utilitarians who argue for 'the greatest good for the greatest number'. ethical action involves providing each person with equal rights to basic liberties and taking action beneficial to the least advantageous members of society. 2007. 2007. Issue 3. never as a means' -. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Economic sanctions could be evaluated using a number of different ethical perspectives. SANCTIONS ALSO MUST BE REJECTED ON CONSEQUENTIALIST GROUNDS BECAUSE THEY ARE INEFFECTIVE AND COSTLY Charles A. Sept. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Pages 65-70 An additional argument against the use of sanctions can be made on ethical grounds. Economic sanctions imposed on most countries have not harmed the country's leaders and the least advantageous members of society carry the burden. . a consequentialist analysis of sanctions finds them lacking an ethical quality. Volume 27. SUBJECTING THEM TO GREAT PAIN FOR POLITICAL GAIN Charles A. always at the same time as an ends. Volume 27. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Issue 3. The citizens of the sanctioned country are used as a means to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the sanctioning country. Consequentialism contends that an act is right or wrong depending on its actual consequences. If sanctions were effective most of the time. Issue 3. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. 2004). "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". the case. Rarick.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 59 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' cont'd 3. Sanctions are a means to an end. According to Rawls. Economic sanctions do not achieve the goal of allowing the greatest benefits to the least advantaged of society. 4. Volume 27. Sept. The theory operating behind sanctions is to cause as much pain as possible to the people of the receiving country in order for pressure to be brought on the government. Sept. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Rarick. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. it could be argued that the positive results gained by the people of the sanctioned country justified the necessary pain they experienced in the application of the sanctions.'So act that you use humanity. whether in your person or in the person of any other. The practical imperative of Kant (1785) -. A common theory of the consequentialist school of thought is utilitarianism. Pages 65-70 Sanctions do not stand up to the principles of social justice proposed by John Rawls (1971). Rarick. 2007.can be used to argue against the use of sanctions. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. SANCTIONS VIOLATE CORE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE BECAUSE THEY DISADVANTAGE THE MOST VULNERABLE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY Charles A. however. educational and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries. 5. which proposes an act is ethical when it provides the greatest good for the greatest number of people. SANCTIONS OUGHT TO BE REJECTED ON ETHICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE THEY TREAT THE POPULATION AS A MEANS TO AN END. Pages 65-70 Similarly. This is not. social contract theory argues for justice delivered via a social contract between free and equal citizens (Kelly. The consequences of sanctions in most cases have been to lower the economic. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business".

Schott. Wood. particularly those imposed by Western states.asp Economic sanctions are a common tool of foreign policy and have been increasingly employed by Western states to coerce recalcitrant leaders into improving human rights conditions. or respecting the rule of law within their borders. since they do not know where they will be positioned in the new society. 52. Lowenberg. Haiti or Iraq. Burma. if sanctions unintentionally contribute to spikes in repression or undermine human rights conditions. Rarick. and Mertens 2004. Professor of Management and Director of International Business at Andreas School of Business. Weiss 1999. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY. without knowing anything about their abilities or interests. a group of individuals are asked to create a society in which they will be living. Kaempfer. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. Sept. In order to protect themselves. p. 2002. Issue 3. "Economic Sanctions: Failed Foreign Policy Tool and a Cost to American Business". Under the 'original position'.2001". Charles A. sanctions frequently impose significant economic and social costs on civilians (Cortright and Lopez 2000. Weiss 1999). Yet sanctions often fail to achieve these goals (Hufbauer. 7. Pages 65-70 Rawls's theory can be further explained by using his 'thought experiment'.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 60 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ETHICAL' cont'd 6. participants create a society where everyone has equal opportunity and where privileged life-styles are minimised. Moreover. Moreover. their view of sanctions would be very different. vol. Li and Drury 2004). It is therefore important to determine whether sanctions improve the human rights practices in the target state or if they perhaps exacerbate an already problematic situation. the human rights impact of sanctions is an important issue of policy. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. SANCTIONS CAUSE SURGES IN THE LEVEL OF ATROCITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES Reed M. . The theory operating behind this process is that no one would be willing to risk the chance of ending up in a very bad position in the new society. Volume 27. 2007. "'A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE REQUIRES THE REJECTION OF SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL. policy makers should weigh this cost against the desired policy outcome. participants select an option that ensures the least bad outcome for themselves. They may also contribute to adverse changes in the domestic political climate and policy decisions of the target state (Drury and Li 2006. Given that improving human rights is often a stated objective of economic sanctions. 1997). Weiss et al. Operating behind this 'veil of ignorance'. and did not know if they would wake up tomorrow as common citizens in Cuba. 2008. Pape 1997. It seems reasonable to conclude that if politicians were operating behind the veil of ignorance. adopting or restoring democratic institutions. 1976 -. and Elliott 1990a.

The success rate importantly depends on the type of policy or governmental change sought" (HSE 2d ed.. there are others. and Syria. the Hufbauer. The basic purpose of imposing these sanctions . or is likely to have. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". both political and economic. UNILATERALLY IMPOSING SANCTIONS DOES NOT ACHIEVE THE FOREIGN POLICY GOAL AND DOES SO AT GREAT HARM TO ECONOMIC INTERESTS Harry Wolff. 92-93). particularly in the Middle East. this article will contend that additional unilateral sanctions.5. common sense also dictates that they can have a detrimental effect on American businesses. It contends that by imposing unilateral trade sanctions. In the process. In these cases surreptitious trade leaks may occur. especially where long term restrictions affect the health of domestic economies or international trade balances. But. and Elliott (hereafter HSE) bottom line on the utility of economic sanctions is not terribly different. are the wrong approach for dealing with the current situations in Iran. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.2/ADA415058 If these criticisms are not reason enough to avoid or discontinue sanctions as a policy tool. he never cites our own interpretation of the evidence. pp.S. are frustrated. 2006. nqa. and outline the impact each has had. failing to realize the foreign policy changes that they are designed to bring about in the first place. . on American business. particularly if the sending nation is powerful and applies unwanted pressure on other states to support its policies.asp While my disagreements with Pape's methods are many. Even multilateral efforts may cause fatigue among the participating parties. vol. American businesses are shut out of substantial markets and put at a distinct disadvantage in an increasingly global economy. the target nation may easily turn to others more willing to meet its requirements. without certain restrictions. North Korea. .lexis While sanctions may be a helpful tool in advancing certain American interests. a sender nation may succeed in sending a strong political statement. the United States shuts American businesses out of important markets while at the same time. discuss several recent changes in these programs. These "others" may also find the unilateral sanction policies of sending states unpopular. clandestinely negating the public efforts of the collective sanctioning body. 105-106). with less than one in four sanctions having any success at all in the 1970s and 1980s (ibid. interests. unilateral trade sanctions are not the most effective method for advancing American interests in many regions of the world. even fewer when the United States acts unilaterally. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Although Pape cites our work as the "key evidence" supporting the perceived optimism that sanctions can achieve major foreign policy goals. those markets simply fill their needs by contracting with businesses from nations that have no such trade restrictions. accessed 12. Summer 1998. HOUSTON BUSINESS AND TAX LAW JOURNAL.dtic. Imposed unilaterally. It will provide an overview of key U. 1. When American companies are prohibited from competing in certain countries. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IS SHARPLY LIMITED AND DECLINES EVEN MORE WHEN UNILATERALLY DEPLOYED Kimberly Ann Elliott.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 61 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'UNILATERAL SANCTIONS WORK' 1.S..' they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend on compelling the target country to take actions it stoutly resists.punishment remains unfulfilled and U. economic sanctions regulations. 2.2009: handle. 3. unless the sender is the sole supplier of some essential resource. This article will argue that in the current political climate. we found that the utility of sanctions had declined sharply over time. pp. Schott. p. . . In particular. 2002. United States Army. "Unilateral Economic Sanctions: Necessary Foreign Policy Tool Or Ineffective Hindrance On American Businesses?". UNILATERAL SANCTIONS ARE USELESS BECAUSE THEY ARE SO EASILY CIRCUMVENTED Bryan Foy. Moreover. Washington. We concluded that "although it is not true that sanctions 'never work. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". p.

scant political gain was achieved at unacceptably high human costs.asp The standard I use is appropriate. ranging from justifiable in South Africa to intolerable in Iraq. and Haiti suggests that sanctions in and of themselves did not bring desired changes. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. but no one calls this a success. the black majority supported sanctions and even benefited from increased employment resulting from import substitution. BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION IS THE KEY DETERMINANT FOR SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS. . The contribution was substantial in the case of South Africa. In South Africa." Including infliction of costs. but so too was the civilian pain resulting from sanctions. In Iraq. Iraq. the United States bombed North Vietnam and inflicted tremendous punishment on its society. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. 2. The City University of New York.asp Even when they fail to coerce. if the target does not concede. sanctions figured in occasional minor concessions by the regime while exacerbating lethal suffering. The central policy purpose of economic sanctions. possibly even if undetected. Weiss. as a sufficient criterion for coding a sanctions effort as successful would mean that the dependent variable could not vary and theories of sanctions success could not be falsified. virtually all economic sanctions inflict harm on the target. Baldwin's proposal to broaden the definition of sanctions success also poses a methodological problem. The Graduate Center. although they do make the failure more ignominious. substantial political gain was achieved without life-threatening suffering.asp A review of multilateral sanctions against South Africa. In Haiti sanctions helped bring the military junta to the bargaining table. THE POLITICAL OUTCOMES OF SANCTIONS ARE MARGINAL WHILE THEIR HUMANITARIAN TOLL IS STAGGERING Thomas G. To varying degrees. like all instruments of coercion. because they have not dislodged Saddam Hussein or obtained satisfactory compliance on weapons inspections. p. Pape. policymakers will normally consider that a success. Accordingly. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". they spurred processes of compromise and contributed to political efforts. Fall 1997. the policy will likely be judged a failure. The huge economic costs inflicted on Iraq (more than on any other target of sanctions in history) and the incredible human costs (including the deaths of more than 500. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. Fall 1997. THE DAMAGE THAT SANCTIONS CAN INFLICT SHOULD NOT BE USED TO DETERMINE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. In former Yugoslavia. their contribution to the final settlement was virtually nil. and non-existent in Haiti. At the same time. p. If the target state concedes to the coercer's demands. 1999. "Evaluating Economic Sanctions". NOT ABILITY TO INFLICT DAMAGES Robert A. considerably less in Iraq and Yugoslavia. Western sanctions against Iraq since 1991 are widely considered to have failed. but not to step down.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 62 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'ECONOMIC DAMAGE IS PROOF SANCTIONS WORK' 1.000 children) have not persuaded observers to consider this an instance of sanctions success. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. former Yugoslavia. is behavior modification. 3. Pape. sanctions were among many factors contributing to the political settlement at Dayton while causing serious but seldom life-threatening hardships. political gains were modest. Robert A. The fact that a target that refuses to concede may suffer substantial costs does not turn failure into success. in fact. sanctions always caused civilian pain. "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". p. From 1965 to 1968. while the humanitarian cost was staggering. especially because he further argues that costs matter even when they are not perceived: "A target state can be influenced regardless of whether the costs imposed are perceived by anyone.



1. EVIDENCE ABOUT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD ARE REASON TO REFORM THEM, NOT REJECT THEM Kimberly Ann Elliott, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?", Summer 1998, p.asp Nevertheless, the flip side of declining utility is that economic sanctions, in our judgment, were a relatively effective tool of U.S. foreign policy in the early post-World War II era. Although increasing international economic integration and declining political hegemony have eroded U.S. leverage, just over half the episodes in which the United States took a leading role from 1945 to 1970 resulted in at least partial success. In that context, our research can be used as a source for ideas about how to strengthen sanctions and make them a more effective foreign policy instrument. 2. CLAIMS THAT SANCTIONS ARE ABUSED OR USED TOO MUCH ARE FALSE -- THEY ARE CAREFULLY TARGETED Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp This is sheer nonsense. The statistics peddled by these lobbyists are grossly inflated and intentionally misleading. Half of the world is not living under American sanctions -- nowhere near it. There is no epidemic. Congress has been cautious and circumspect, passing just a handful of carefully targeted sanctions laws. And unilateral economic sanctions are by no means new: they have been vital weapons in America's foreign policy arsenal for more than 200 years. I have been and continue to be a friend of American business. But the distortions spread by this small cabal of lobbyists in the name of American business are inexcusable. The time has come for a reality check. 3. THE AFFIRMATIVE'S EVIDENCE THAT SANCTIONS ARE USED TOO OFTEN ARE FALSE, MANUFACTURED CLAIMS BY LOBBYIST GROUPS Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp The statistic has become conventional wisdom: in just four years the United States has imposed sanctions 61 times, burdening 2.3 billion people (42 percent of the world). That would be pretty awful, save for one thing -- it is not true. These figures have been circulated by the antisanctions business group USA Engage, based on a study by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). They are a fabrication. At my request, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) evaluated the NAM claim that from 1993 through 1996, "61 U.S. laws and executive actions were enacted authorizing unilateral sanctions for foreign policy purposes." CRS reported that it "could not defensibly" justify the number. "We find the calculation used in the NAM study to be flawed, even if the specific [sanctions] were fairly characterized, which is not always the case," CRS concluded.



1. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST SANCTIONS ARE TANTAMOUNT TO SELLING THUMBSCREWS TO TYRANTS, FORFEITING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND MORAL LEADERSHIP Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp This may shock the business lobbyists. It should not. Americans do not need to sell their souls or their national security to create jobs and economic prosperity. The lobbyists behind this antisanctions crusade are saying, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." America cannot stop rogue states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, they say, so why cede markets for sensitive technology to our European competitors? The United States cannot stop dictators from torturing people, so why not close our eyes and trade with them as if nothing is happening? That is not the American way. Americans do not need to create jobs by selling thumbscrews to the world's tyrants. 2. STUDIES QUOTING LOSSES OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS SIMPLY FALSE AND BEEN DISPROVEN BY OBJECTIVE RESEARCH Dianne E. Rennack, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law", Nov. 1, 1999, p.asp Some suggest that there is a post-Cold War trend toward sanctions becoming the method of first resort in foreign policy. Others contend that sanctions, unilateral or otherwise, are a peacetime means to improving international behavior in important areas such as human rights or weapons proliferation, and should not be avoided solely for trade concerns. Particular attention is paid to the domestic impact of sanctions. A frequently cited report issued by the Institute for International Economic (April 1997) concludes that U.S. unilateral sanctions may have cost U.S. businesses some $15-19 billion in 1995. The Congressional Budget Office, on the other hand, has found that sanctions have had a negligible effect on the overall U.S. economy, with a loss of perhaps $1 billion in 1997, compared to U.S. national income of $6.6 trillion. 3. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF APPLYING SANCTIONS ARE MINUSCULE AND THE MORAL BENEFIT OF SANCTIONS CERTAINLY JUSTIFIES IT Jesse Helms, Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "What Sanctions Epidemic?", Jan/Feb 1999, p.asp The lobbyists' cry that sanctions cost the United States vital access to large markets is a sham. The cost of U.S. sanctions is minuscule. According to Jan Paul Acton of the Congressional Budget Office, "to date, the cost of existing sanctions to the overall economy has been quite modest. CBO's review of research indicates that the net cost may be less than $1 billion annually. That compares with $6.6 trillion of total national income in 1997." The United States gave away roughly $13 billion in foreign aid during 1997. Besides, cutting foreign aid to punish misbehavior actually saves taxpayers' money. Even if we use the business lobbyists' standard tactic of applying costs to entire populations, the price tag for U.S. economic sanctions comes to a whopping $3.77 per American -- about the cost of a Big Mac and fries. That is a small price to pay for a moral foreign policy -- and a price most Americans are willing to bear. A 1998 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll taken on the eve of the president's visit to China showed that less than one-third of Americans agreed that "We should maintain good trade relations with China, despite disagreements we might have with its human rights policies." Fully two-thirds of Americans agreed that "we should demand that China improve its human rights policies if China wants to continue to enjoy its current trade status with the United States."



4. THE USE OF SANCTIONS IS KEY TO ACHIEVING QUICK ECONOMIC SUCCESSES. Franklin L. Lavin, executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington, FOREIGN POLICY, "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma", Fall 1996, p.asp Even supposedly "empty" trade sanctions can be useful political tools. The 50-year-old Arab economic boycott of Israel has had minimal economic impact, but it has promoted Arab solidarity and served an important domestic political role. In general, asphyxiation is more effective than oxygen in making a political statement, because government policy can more readily disrupt market forces of trade and investment than encourage them. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS IS EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE THE MORE RAPIDLY THEY ARE APPLIED Richard N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Sanctioning Madness", Nov/Dec. 1997, p.asp Any imposition of sanctions should be swift. As with other forms of intervention, including military action, gradual escalation allows the target to adapt and adjust. Such an approach forfeits shock value and allows asset shifting, hoarding, and other arrangements to circumvent sanctions -- as Libya and Iran found. This recommendation is easier said than done, since gaining international support for sanctions will in many cases require that the United States move slowly and gradually, further limiting the potential effectiveness of economic sanctions in today's world. 6. THE HIGH ECONOMIC COSTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE PART OF THEIR CREDIBILITY BECAUSE IT SHOWS THE STATE IS WILLING TO ABSORB COSTS David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, Assistant Professors of Political Science at University of New Orleans and Texas A&M, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict", April 2007, p.asp One of the central concerns within international politics is the question of how states interact in an anarchic international environment. In the absence of compelling mechanisms to enforce agreements, how do states make their promises (or threats) credible? Baldwin captures the essence of this problem when he says, "The projection of credible images is difficult for sovereign states. In the absence of an overarching authority capable of enforcing agreements, it is often difficult for statesmen to convince others that they mean what they say" (1985, 106). Fearon describes the problem more succinctly as, "how can a leader make a threat to use force credible when the leader would, in fact, be willing to use the military?" (1997, 69). How do states overcome credibility problems of this type? One way of increasing the credibility of commitments, frequently proposed by international relations theorists, is the use of costly signals that allow observers to separate states into types. Costly signals are actions that generate costs that the leader would not be inclined to absorb if he or she were unwilling to carry out the promise or commitment that was made (Fearon 1997). By incurring costs, a state can separate itself from other, less committed states, which are unwilling to incur those costs (Morrow 1999; Schwebach 2000). We propose that the imposition of economic sanctions can function as just such a costly signal of a state's commitment to have a dispute resolved in its favor. When a state chooses to respond to a crisis by imposing economic sanctions, it chooses to impose costs on itself, partly economic and partly political, that will restrict its future range of choices. Furthermore, according to Baldwin (1985), when a powerful state goes out of its way to signal the importance of an issue by incurring costs, that action should neither be ignored nor written off as trivial. There is wide agreement in the sanctions literature that the imposition of sanctions can be economically costly not only to the target state, but also to the sender nation (Askari et al. 2003; Barber 1979;Hart 2000;Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990;Wagner 1988). Hufbauer et al., for example, estimated the economic costs of unilateral sanctions to the United States and concluded "as a consequence of U.S. sanctions, workers probably lost somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion in export sector wage premiums in 1995" (1997, 7). Since these costs are lost when sanctions are imposed, and are unrecoverable, they represent sunk costs associated with the imposition of sanctions.

Ohio. The vigorous debate in academic and policy circles on the effectiveness of economic sanctions mirrors their growing use as a tool for intervention. Shott. The practice of imposing costs through economic pressure is often justified as a means for changing the behavior of a foreign government. The benchmark for measuring success is typically whether economic sanctions can change the behavior of a foreign government at an acceptable cost. p. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. multilateral support for economic sanctions should typically be a prerequisite for the United States' imposition of them.asp In this article I show that economic sanctions work in at least one respect: they destabilize the leaders they target. Haass. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Yale University.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 66 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ARE ILLEGITIMATE COERCION' 1. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Except when the United States is in a unique position to exert leverage based on its economic relationship with the target. or a civil war break out without causing a group of states to react with economic sanctions. with the end of the Cold War. While only five countries were subject to economic pressure around 1950. may restore to sanctions the leverage that they had when the United States was the dominant economic and military power in the Western world. Leaders are more likely to compromise if pressure threatens their survival in office. In the last decade. Policymakers must then consider whether some alternative would not be better than weaker or unilateral sanctions. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". This finding confirms a basic intuition behind much of the theory and practice of economic sanctions. The leader of a government who comes under economic pressure in a given year is more likely to lose office than a leader who does not. July 2005. it is likely because of the perception shared by many that broad multilateral sanctions helped to end apartheid in South Africa. but it should be all but certain to follow. Summer 1998. Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. it may now be possible for the United Nations to take action in defense of collective security and to protect international norms. virtually nowhere could democratic rights and freedoms be suspended. SANCTIONS CAN STILL BE LEGITIMATE IF THEY TAP INTO MULTILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT Richard N. DC. The hope is that multilateralism. SANCTIONS ARE AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF COERCION BECAUSE THEY CAN UNDERMINE ILLEGITIMATE REGIMES Nikolay Marinov. Such support need not be simultaneous. 3. often high-level diplomatic efforts and even then may not succeed. that number had increased to 47 by the mid-1990s. SANCTIONS WILL BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY WORK IN A POST COLD WAR WORLD BECAUSE THEY HAVE GREATER LEGITIMACY Kimberly Ann Elliott. have forced Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cooperate grudgingly (and sporadically) with the UN inspectors seeking to destroy his weapons of mass destruction. and induced Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to come to the negotiating table in Dayton. Here the optimism is based on the fact that. human rights grossly abused. Building international support will require intense. and Elliott 1990). p. The most comprehensive study of the effectiveness of economic sanctions assesses that the measure works about 35% of the time (Hufbauer. . "Sanctioning Madness". Nov/Dec. combined with the relatively greater legitimacy accorded to UN enforcement actions. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. unilateral sanctions should be avoided. My basic conclusion is that sanctions are more likely to coerce than previously thought. Proponents of the use of sanctions argue that economic pressure can help achieve desirable goals while avoiding the high costs of military intervention (Baldwin 1985).asp For pragmatic more than normative reasons. as was originally intended. p. Washington.asp To the extent that there is a degree of optimism today about the potential effectiveness of sanctions. 2. 1997.

Washington. p. we have not confined our research to the utility of economic sanctions as an alternative to military force. Sanctions by Nigeria against Biafra and by the United Kingdom against Argentina in 1982 were also judged against this more modest standard. DC. Weiss. The disagreements arise over whether to include "military impairment" cases and. HELPING TO ACHIEVE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES 12 Kimberly Ann Elliott. military. the calculation in Tripoli that led to the extradition of two Libyan nationals allegedly involved in the Lockerbie bombing is illustrative. but a more promising line of investigation is examining whether sanctions stand alone as the policy against a targeted state or are part of a larger mix of carrot-like (involving persuasion and incentives) or stick-like (involving coercion through military force) policies. But economic and military pressure can act together synergistically . Economic coercion may encourage political compromise or spark dialogue and negotiation. 2. Sanctions can also serve as a tangible signal: either that support for opposition forces is explicit or that support for the ruling regime has been withdrawn. 3. SANCTIONS SHOULDN'T BE USED ALONE BUT ARE INCREDIBLY EFFECTIVE WHEN DEPLOYED AS PART OF A PACKAGE STRATEGY Thomas G. In that context. BUT CAN ACTUALLY ASSIST IN WAR-FIGHTING GREATLY. as in World Wars I and II.asp As Pape that goals can be achieved at acceptable political. p.just as naval and infantry forces usually work with air power . IS CRITICAL AS A FORCE-MULTIPLIER THAT ALLOWS FOREIGN POLICIES TO BE EXECUTED WITH LOWER COSTS Kimberly Ann Elliott. This might be.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 67 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' 1. THE APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS. for example.asp Pape's approach to the confluence of military and economic force is akin to the archetypal air force general who would like to attribute victory in World War II. and economic cost. In these cases we agree that military force was decisive in determining the outcome. 1999. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". "Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses". whether some cases should be included because the commercial issues involved actually mask broader political disputes. and every war since. at the other end of the spectrum. we judge sanctions as a success if they contributed to victory by inhibiting the ability of the target to effectively carry on military operations. Washington. JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH. Summer 1998. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. As noted. by increasing political opposition to the target regime or impairing its capability to respond to military challenges by opponents. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Summer 1998. Although sanctions alone have seldom brought about major policy changes. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. DC. . EVEN IF NOT DECISIVE ALONE. to air superiority. accelerating the timing of the outcome and lowering the cost of achieving the sender country's goals. but we also believe that sanctions made a useful contribution by rendering the target's military capability less effective than otherwise. we agree that military force was decisive in determining the outcome. we believe that some degree of success may be attributed to sanctions if they contributed at least modestly to the outcome. p. In cases combining economic and military measures. they may make a difference when blended with other international actions. The Graduate Center. SANCTIONS DO NOT ONLY HAVE TO BE AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. In many of the cases involving either a threat or actual use of military force. The City University of New York. we largely agree on what the definition of an economic sanction ought to be.asp Is there common ground between those who oppose sanctions because of their inhumane consequences and those who support them as a tool of statecraft irrespective of their impact on civilians? Accountability and transparency require assessment. Therefore we believe it is legitimate to include sanctions intended to buttress military power and hasten an adversary's defeat.

As former U. SANCTIONS ARE ULTIMATELY ONLY A TOOL AND WILL EXPERIENCE VARIED SUCCESS -.THE KEY IS EXPLORING HOW TO USE THEM MORE APPROPRIATELY Bryan Foy. economic sanctions may be an alternative to the indiscriminate use of force. sanctions emboldened the opposition enforce the sanctions. goals. 5. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". 2002." . in conjunction with what other tools. to strategically buttress their effects. The withdrawal of financial resources in these cases made it more difficult for the two regimes to deliver on promises made to key constituencies and exacerbated the macroeconomic consequences of expansionary macroeconomic policies.S.S. in situations that are sufficiently serious and where the foreign policy objective is important. Sanctions can be effective only if they are part of an overall coherent policy including skilled diplomacy and. Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. by depriving the target government of economic resources. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". contributed to goals being achieved sooner or at lower cost than otherwise. and various governments in Laos. in conjunction with other measures. NO ONE ADVOCATES THE USE OF SANCTIONS EXCLUSIVELY -. then it is an effective policy tool. Whether or not they work. as in the case of South Africa. Sometimes they do not. Similarly. 182-187. p. THEY STILL MAKE IT EASIER OVERALL Kimberly Ann Elliott. Washington.asp Contrary to Pape's assertion. the possibility must be clearly communicated to the target that force will be used if necessary . All said.2/ADA415058 Sometimes sanctions work. pp. and under the auspices of which institutions. DC. aid did not by itself cause the coups but that. Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam. If sanctions result in nothing more than the creation of time in which to stage combat operations. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. it did contribute to the achievement of U. 546-551. we would regard sanctions as having played a useful role in the outcome.2009: handle. DC.. but in what instances they are most effectively employed. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. A distinguished International Fellow in this year's War College class captured the utility of sanctions with the observation that "the pertinent question for policy makers is not whether economic sanctions are effective. However. we agree with Lars Schoultz. or as a last resort if sanctions fail. 160-167). Again. in combination with military pressure. Desi Bouterse in Suriname. Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) Donald McHenry noted recently in the context of a discussion of policies for preventing deadly conflict. if the economic pressure. however. 6. Washington. When used appropriately. who has studied the overthrow of Presidents Joao Goulart in Brazil and Salvador Allende in Chile and concludes that the interruption of U. sanctions are only one of many available tools in the box. in cases targeting Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. If the sanctions regime succeeds on its own. Nor should they be.dtic. EVEN IF THEY ALONE CANNOT ACCOMPLISH GOALS. Summer 1998. sanctions are seldom expected to achieve ambitious foreign policy goals in the absence of other policy tools. accessed 12. they allow sending nations and/or the international community to bide time in the search for the most effective way to achieve policy goals. made it more difficult to confront domestic insurgencies (ibid.S. then they are still useful tools because they provide the perception of doing something while waiting. Sanctions imposed as an alternative to force because the political will to use force is lacking are not likely to be credible and therefore are not likely to be successful. 260-266. SANCTIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY SUPPLEMENTS. where appropriate.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 68 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS ALONE ARE INSUFFICIENT' cont'd 4. 452-456. sanctions can be an important and effective policy instrument for influencing behavior short of war.5. p. credible threats of additional force if compliance is not forthcoming.asp Similarly. Summer 1998. United States Army.THEY ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHEN USED AS A SUPPLEMENT WITH OTHER FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS Kimberly Ann Elliott. If sanctions do not succeed but achieve a stasis in which the offending nation's behavior remains within a band of tolerance. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?".mil/100. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. they are effective and legitimate to the degree that comprehensive planning and preparation saves military and civilian lives.

In addition.who are looking for ways to strengthen sanctions and make them more effective are generally far more nuanced in their conclusions and more limited in their expectations of what sanctions can achieve than Pape asserts. which in his oversimplified characterization says that economic sanctions . Targeted financial sanctions. the development of sanction strategies and problems of implementation. SURVIVAL. These difficulties notwithstanding. THE AFFIRMATIVE RELIES ON A STRAWMAN REPRESENTATION OF PRO-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS Kimberly Ann Elliott. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". remain extremely difficult to implement. many sanction regimes have had secondary and unintended consequences. economic sanctions. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. DC. few suggest that economic sanctions are necessarily more humane or that their use can be justified regardless of the humanitarian consequences. and if they are implemented properly. Arms embargoes may keep victims defenceless. His target is an "emerging optimism" about sanctions. p. 2000. while air-traffic restrictions may impede the delivery of humanitarian relief. although certainly no panacea. And in the wake of the experiences in Iraq and Haiti. notably the actual use of force.if certain conditions are met. Most scholars and analysts have. Neither comprehensive nor partial sanctions has succeeded in stopping civil strife in the countries that they have targeted. . 2. The misapplication of this policy instrument in the 1990s should not lead us to remove sanctions from our policy repertory. Comprehensive. and even partial or selective.used in isolation from other tools . paid too much attention to the outcomes of sanction regimes. and too little to the conditions under which they are imposed. on balance. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". Two conditions need to be met for them to be effective." Robert Pape sets up a straw man and then boldly proceeds to knock it down. 2000. Many sanctions regimes in the 1990s failed because they did not meet these two key conditions.asp The track record of UN sanction regimes has been mixed.and certainly policymakers .THE PROBLEM IS HOW THEY ARE APPLIED. Washington. 90). SURVIVAL. MISFIRES IN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS ARE NOT A REASON TO ABANDON THEM -. In fact. the missed opportunities in the FRY and Haiti. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Summer 1998. sanctions risk sparking humanitarian crises in target countries. show that sanctions can bring about political change -. sceptical. They have also tended to study economic sanctions in isolation. NOT SANCTIONS THEMSELVES Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.are "as effective as military force and more humane" (p. however.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 69 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' 1.asp In "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. requiring monitoring and enforcement capabilities that most countries do not possess. can be effective if they are part of comprehensive coercive strategies that include the use of force. ANTI-SANCTIONS SCHOLARS HAVE IGNORED OTHER FACTORS RELATED TO FAILURES -.THEY ARE VERY SUCCESSFUL AT BRINGING ABOUT POLITICAL CHANGE IF THE CONDITIONS ARE RIGHT Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. while attractive in theory.asp The scholarly literature on sanctions is abundant and. 3. But policy analysts . and that may be too expensive for them to acquire. p. and even to some extent in Sierra Leone. independent of other coercive policy instruments. p.

How important to the targeted country is our economic cooperation? Is the United States a significant trading partner. sanctions need to be implemented and complied with by third parties.asp Second.asp In order to knock down the straw man he has created and prove his assertion that sanctions cannot work. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS. requires resources. the United States took in only about 5 percent of that country's exports. and keeping the relevant international actors focused on them. He excludes cases where economic pressure is intended to complement military force. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS BECAUSE THERE ARE SO MANY VARIABLES Dianne E. In the case of Iraq. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". NOT ABANDONING THEM Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. like using force. a country's relative wealth. for the targeted country. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law". . Sanctions should only be considered if the problem is serious enough to ultimately warrant the use of force. SURVIVAL. especially when it has devastating humanitarian consequences -. 6. One should also consider the United States' relative importance -. and membership in a common trading bloc all factors that might determine the success or failure of a unilaterally imposed sanctions regime. 5. He argues that my colleagues and I wrongly counted as sanctions successes 35 of 40 cases. and Trade Division.S. ENERGY SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON ENFORCING SANCTIONS. 2000. p. by defining sanctions so narrowly and setting the bar for success so high that. The support of more substantial trading partners in Europe was needed to have any hope of having an impact. He then concludes that "economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals" (p. Neighbouring countries might need to be compensated for economic losses. An interested supporting party has to take the lead in defining the precise objectives that the sanctions seek to achieve.asp Effectiveness is the most difficult aspect of sanctions policy to evaluate. Coercion is a serious business. the US has played such a role. and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms need to be put in place. The impact. Imposing sanctions. A recent study considers geographic proximity. Pape must debunk the evidence that sanctions have ever worked. DC. Summer 1998. scientific and intellectual exchanges. Most importantly. indeed. "Economic Sanctions to Achieve U. common language.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 70 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS INEFFECTIVE' cont'd 4. and that 5 successes is far too few to be optimistic about sanctions ever being effective. and only if they are determined to see the process through. and he attributes policy success to economic sanctions only if it occurred in the absence of accompanying policies. however. States should go down this road only if they are prepared to meet the costs of coercion. Washington. 1. and history -. If outside powers are not willing to consider using military force. cost and benefit of sanctions cannot be considered in a vacuum. Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. such as military threats or covert action. 1999. volume of economic sanctions generally do. In the FRY and Haiti. Pape arrives at this terms of trade. they should not contemplate imposing economic sanctions. the US hesitated and the sanctions efforts faltered. 93). Nov. few cases reach the threshold. or only marginally engaged? Consider. culture. and they might need assistance in setting up monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. "The sanctions glass: half full or completely empty?". p. Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation Foreign Affairs. p. that at the time that sanctions were imposed against the former Yugoslavia. Rennack. to ensure third-party compliance a broad international consensus on the use of coercive action needs to be built. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. ANTI-SANCTIONS ARGUMENTS ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS RELY ON MASSIVE DISTORTIONS OF DATA Kimberly Ann Elliott. Defense.

executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. Lavin. Further. economic activity thrives around the world -or fails to do so for a series of complicated reasons. As a Turkish saying puts it. p. MAKING SANCTIONS PART OF A BROADER COERCIVE PACKAGE ENHANCES THEIR EFFECTIVENESS Chantal de Jonge Oudraat is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. and only then does pressure begin to build on the authorities to relax an authoritarian political structure. SURVIVAL. "Making Economic Sanctions Work". "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". policymakers. sanctions should not stay in place for long periods. p. . for as long as asphyxiation can take. West Germany's Ostpolitik employed a deliberate policy of economic engagement. Fall 1996. Lavin.asp On the oxygen side. an oxygen strategy may take even longer. sanctions need to be part of a comprehensive coercive strategy that includes the threat and use of military force. and not generally because of U. Thus. p. Indeed. Fall 1996. when and how to step up coercive pressure. or Osthandel. TRYING TO COAX CHANGES IN BEHAVIOR WILL FAIL BECAUSE THEY TAKE TOO LONG AND THERE ARE OTHER UNDERLYING FACTORS THAT ARE MORE IMPORTANT Franklin L. To the dismay of government planners. Thus. economic and political effects. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. the parties imposing sanctions must consider early on what course they will take should sanctions fail. and when to change instruments.asp First. FOREIGN POLICY. the East European country that interacted most frequently with the West was East Germany because of its special relationship with West Germany. As difficult as it is for a government to disrupt another country's economic activity. The full emergence of a middle class can take decades. Because of their potentially serious social. they erected a massive security apparatus. of all the former Warsaw Pact countries. because the East German leadership was aware that interaction with the West might infect the body politic. policy. FOREIGN POLICY. Thus.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 71 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' 1.asp But oxygen is not merely the opposite of asphyxiation. sanctions should be seen as part of a coercive continuum.: any would argue that the West's economic activity with the Soviet bloc served to prolong the Soviet system by subsidizing a system in decline. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". THE EXPERIENCE WITH EAST GERMANY SHOWS THAT ECONOMIC OPENNESS CANNOT GUARANTEE SOCIAL OR POLITICAL CHANGE Franklin L.S.S. "The dog barks and the caravan rolls on. it is still easier than stimulating it. Knowledge of the target is essential. economic interaction by itself does not seem to guarantee a political opening. 3. and in complete disregard for the views and desires of U. 2000. Nonetheless. East Germany was also the most Stalinist in structure and the most enduringly loyal to the Soviet Union. A sound coercive strategy will tell outside powers when and how to impose sanctions. 2." Moreover.

5. world-wide. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. if not instigated. 2002. at the grass roots level not only in concerned Western countries.THEY CAN ACHIEVE CHANGE IN THE RIGHT CONTEXT Bryan Foy.that swept cities and states across the country and that the Congress eventually put forward at the national level. After almost 25 years of coercive effort. accessed 12. For Success in South Africa indicates that sanctions are more likely to succeed against target nations with either democratically inspired governments or those unable or unwilling to suppress widespread dissension.2009: handle. Today the world knows what a failure that policy was. United States Army.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 72 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO SANCTIONS' cont'd 4." Even those South African officials who were responsible for countering them admit the impact of the anti-apartheid sanctions. says Bishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa. REFINED SMART SANCTIONS ARE THE NEXT NECESSARY STEP -. Only when serious sanctions started to take a significant economic toll on my country did the road to real reform begin. timing and pace of change in South Africa. It is also important to avoid inadvertently degrading the population's means to resist. but also in the target nation as well. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". but none appears as central as the willingness and ability of the host population to demand change.5.2/ADA415058 There is utility in the idea that the effectiveness of sanctions may be predicted based on the the sanctions -. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". . 5. It is essential to separate military and civilian aspects of future policy and carefully target subsequent efforts against regime leadership rather than populations.2/ADA415058 In conclusion. United States Army. a rising tide of anti-apartheid opinion swept the globe. accessed 12. "They significantly dictated the form. substance. roughly 30 years of sanctions chipped away at South Africa's unacceptable racial policies. Governmentally imposed sanctions were supported. A variety of other factors contribute to the success or failure of sanctions. and from 1986 to 1993 a comprehensive. Failures in Iraq and North Korea indicate that sanctions are less likely to succeed against a ruthless dictatorial regime in which the leader is unconcerned with the welfare of his population and is able to completely suppress internal rebellion. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. some governments claimed that the best way to deal with the apartheid regime in South Africa was by continuing to talk and trade. "Sanctions did work. 2002. SOUTH AFRICA PROVES THAT SANCTIONS ARE COMPARATIVELY SUPERIOR TO ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES Bryan Foy." Sanctions were demonstrably more effective than engagement policies. The reason for this is to invalidate "Arab Street" style propaganda campaigns and assuage the international community's concerns over inadvertently punishing an innocent populace. President Clinton said that "Americans had a lot to do with ending apartheid -.dtic. With this in mind. nearly leak free sanctions regime helped achieve multi-lateral policy goals. it is increasingly important to develop more selective or "smart" sanctions policies in a continued attempt to coerce target governments to change their unacceptable behavior.2009:" wrote senior South African official Les De Villiers in the New York Times.

27 July 2003. Studies of economic statecraft and coercive diplomacy look only within cases David Rieff.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 73 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' 1. 2. Using panel data on 136 countries. critics can point out to Castro's survival in office as a glaring flaw in the policy. "Were Sanctions Right?.asp Do economic sanctions destabilize the governments they target? A form of foreign pressure. to those in which it was not. EFFECTING POLICY CHANGE Nikolay Marinov. This is appropriate only if the question to be answered is why are some cases of coercion more successful than others.asp A natural way of answering this question is to look at whether economic sanctions hurt the survival of government leaders in office. I compare cases in which coercion took place to cases it was absent. There is much pessimism on whether they ever work. What did the literature miss? Unlike existing work on economic sanctions. and defenders can point out the importance of sanctions as a signal of disapproval. The result holds after adjusting for other determinants of leadership survival such as domestic political institutions. SANCTIONS ARE RATHER EFFECTIVE AT DESTABLIZING REGIME'S HOLD ON POWER. p." New York Times Magazine. July 2005. . This article shows that economic pressure works in at least one respect: it destabilizes the leaders it targets. Specifically. the level of economic growth. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. The sanctions data comes from the most comprehensive dataset on economic sanctions available. I conclude by noting that greater optimism regarding the effectiveness of sanctions should be balanced by a careful consideration of the policy's real and sizeable costs for those caught in the middle. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. I find evidence that pressure destabilizes in a large panel of cross-country time-series data. time in office. that by Institute for International Economics (2002) of coercion. Yale University. sanctions are typically meant to alter the policies of other countries. I find that the presence of sanctions against a government leader in a given year makes her or him significantly more likely to lose power in the following year. observed over an average of 37 years. If the question is "Does coercion work?. THE BEST SETS OF DATA ANALYSIS REVEAL THAT SANCTIONS GREATLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A BAD LEADER WILL LOSE POWER Nikolay Marinov. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". Thus. Yale University. aimed at domestic and international audiences. The destabilization finding indicates that sanctions may be more effective at altering policies than we think. sanctions increase the baseline risk of losing power by 28%. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". p. some would contend that they have succeeded." we need to compare cases in which pressure was applied. While many observers would agree that sanctions against Cuba have failed. July 2005. and any residual country-specific heterogeneity. I present a theoretical argument that explains why destabilization is a necessary condition for successful coercion.

A related study by McGillivray and Stam (2004) shows that leadership succession in at least some target states is significantly associated with the removal of economic sanctions. sanctions end. This also means that we cannot be confident that coercion is ineffective in producing policy change. p. To borrow some terms from game theory. we can check whether sanctions are more likely to be lifted after a new incumbent assumes power in a targeted state. By reducing their demands. in view of the finding that sanctions destabilize. Second. SANCTIONS ARE VERY EFFECTIVE AT CAUSING POLITICAL CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP THAT BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED END Nikolay Marinov. (2) the sender may try to reach a compromise with the current incumbent by offering to lift sanctions in return for at least some change in policy. that the results reported here contradict the pessimistic view in the literature regarding sanctions' effectiveness. leaders would have an incentive to avoid it. In this way.g. The success rate of 35% reported by Hufbauer. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". It may seem. Yale University. There is also substantial evidence of sender states bargaining with incumbents over a compromise to have sanctions lifted. Schott. it is essential to use the right comparison. In a number of cases. the evidence that sanctions destabilize indicates that they may work in an 'invisible' way. in fact. July 2005.. in a different setting.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 74 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS CAN'T CAUSE POLITICAL CHANGE' cont'd 3. the problem can be resolved altogether. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. Some or many potential targets may pursue policies congruent with the sender's preferences. Because pressure threatens destabilization.asp Recalling a point made earlier. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. There is some evidence that both mechanisms are at work in actual sanctions episodes. senders make them more acceptable to targeted leaders. the sender may impose sanctions to secure policy changes in one of two ways: (1) Advanced statistical techniques (e. shows one way to assess the magnitude of the problem through the use Monte Carlo simulations. to understand and evaluate the record of success of economic pressure. This provides one reason to believe that sanctions may be more effective in securing policy change than previously thought. leaders would have an incentive to com. sanctions may bring to power a pliant leader. July 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". more likely to be lifted after a change of power in target. When the political price for conceding foreign demands becomes lower than the price of being sanctioned for the target.asp There are three main implications of the argument made. Schultz (2001a). p. We can expect to see this if new incumbents are more likely to concede. SANCTIONS ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE LEADERSHIP OF COUNTRIES TO CEASE BAD BEHAVIOR AS WELL AS DETERRING THEM FROM FUTURE MISTAKES Nikolay Marinov. by destabilizing the incumbent. Survival analysis on the data at hand confirms that sanctions are. Third. the arrival of new leaders in targeted states has brought about the policy changes requested by sender states. Bargaining results in partial success to both sides. a Heckman test) can be applied to adjust for the influence of this type of selection effect. it appears that we have not learned whether pressure works. Given that existing studies have looked only within cases of coercion. and Elliott (1990) in part reflects the willingness of senders to revise down their initial expectations of success. As a way of testing whether there is a systematic link between leadership change and change in policy. Yale University. if pressure is effective in destabilizing the leaders it targets." 4. . without ever crossing the threshold that would cause foreign pressure to be applied. First. the threat of punishment "off the equilibrium path" may be inducing compliance "on the equilibrium path.promise once under pressure.

p. can economic statecraft be up to the task? Economic sanctions have been receiving poor reputation.asp The leaders of a large number of states around the world continue to pursue policies many outside observers would find objectionable. In the end. "Asphyxiation or oxygen? The sanctions dilemma". Fall 1996. as admitted by the Union Bank of Switzerland. Long-run sanctions against some of the world's most vicious regimes have done much to obscure the average effect of economic sanctions. FOREIGN POLICY. this theory holds.S. proceeded to denounce them by arguing: "But in the more typical cases of Iraq." One way to summarize the main conclusion of this study is to say that the cases of Cuba. Yale University. They shifted to favoring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the boycott would be ended.asp U. the South African business establishment realized that apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in Washington. labor.25 billion in reparations to Holocaust survivors was a direct result of threatened sanctions. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION BOTH TESTIFY TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY Franklin L.S. after conceding the limited effectiveness of sanctions for ending apartheid in South Africa. 2. Lavin. They played a pivotal role in forcing communist Poland to release political prisoners and legalize Solidarity -. Cuba and North Korea. the decision to freeze $47 million in U. p. When strong normative grounds exist for disapproving of another state's policies. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had to come to terms with the West. sanctions helped bring down the Soviet Union. After years of economic stagnation. Our targeted Nigerian sanctions are beginning to bear fruit as the military government wearies of its pariah status. associated with greater government instability. If intervention is needed. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Jan/Feb 1999. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?". Haiti. because he had no economic option except to reduce military expenditures. Many scholars point to the Reagan administration's determination in restricting the Soviet Union's access to international funding as a factor that exacerbated its economic problems. Iraq.asp Successful examples of either approach can be found. FOREIGN AFFAIRS. A New York Times op-ed. the case can be made for intervening from the outside to alter policies inside. p. South Africa is also held up as an example of a government against which sanctions were used successfully. In Guatemala. Such cases constitute highly atypical outliers in a set of pressure episodes which are. SANCTIONS HAVE A PROVEN RECORD OF SUCCESS -. CUBA AND NORTH KOREA ARE EXTREME EXCEPTIONS TO THE SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS AND ARE FAR FROM TYPICAL Nikolay Marinov.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 75 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' 1. 3. HIGH PROFILE EXAMPLES LIKE IRAQ.THEY PLAYED A PIVOTAL ROLE IN ENDING THE COLD WAR Jesse Helms. and North Korea are anything but typical. . sanctions have seemed only to empower dictators. aid (one of the "sanctions" that business is lobbying to curtail) and the mere threat of lost trade convinced business. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. sovereignty notwithstanding. and military leaders to roll back President Jorge Serrano Elas' May 1993 coup. "What Sanctions Epidemic?". The amount of attention such episodes have commanded is unfortunate in the sense that it has thrown other cases out of focus. typically. July 2005.sparking the collapse of communism. Swiss banks' recent decision to pay $1.

" President Clinton simultaneously repealed all remaining federal anti-apartheid sanctions with the exception of the long standing arms embargo.dtic. President DeKlerk replaced Botha in 1989 and took immediate steps to hasten reform and eliminate apartheid policies. In May of 1994. and un-debatable universal condemnation of policy that appealed to the white. 5. SOUTH AFRICA SHOWS THAT SANCTIONS CAN RESULT IN POLITICAL CHANGE WITHOUT RESORTING TO WARFARE Bryan Foy. democratic elections. accessed 12. African National Congress leader. state) governments to repeal their own sanctions before October 1995" under pain of losing their federal transportation and in June of that year. United States Army.5.2/ADA415058 The bottom line is that a number of well placed sources credit the sanctions regime against South Africa for bringing an end to apartheid. In 1990. from his life sentence in prison and worked with him to develop a transitional government that would support free. but this situation was successfully resolved without armed conflict. diplomatic and economic pressure. Nelson Mandela became the first democratically elected President of South Africa.S. but reaccredited South Africa as a member in full standing in the United quasi-democratic government with political. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. United States Army. the U. European heritage of the minority government. Other reasons include significant internal pressure to change. USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT. 2002. The end of 1993 saw the approval of a majority rule constitution that supported a coalition government of more than twenty existing political parties including Indians.2009: handle.dtic.N. 2002. not only lifted its arms embargo. nearly leak-proof global embargoes of essential services. Discriminatory policies and laws fell one by one in the years between 1986 and 1993. blacks and "coloreds. accessed 12. SOUTH AFRICA AND THE FORCED END OF APARTHEID TESTIFIES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS Bryan Foy. Sanctions worked in South Africa for debatable reasons that include completely isolating a somewhat sensitive. commercial and governmental sanctions had the intended effect. imports and exports. .LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 76 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 ANSWERS TO: 'SANCTIONS EMPIRICALLY FAIL' cont'd 4. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". DeKlerk released Nelson Mandela.2009: handle. "Sanctions: Buying Time for Better Options". It took more than 30 years. universal. supported overwhelmingly by South African whites.2/ADA415058 Private. This repeal "also call(ed) on local (U.

You must be able to win whether or not they can achieve behavior changes. it is difficult to see how they will lose the entire debate because it locks down the affirmative's ability to generate offense. the punishment arguments are a great way of finding a way to defend the use of sanctions even if they don't accomplish a specific goal. It is difficult to sustain the argument that sanctions are superior to war when they have the same devastating effect on a countries economy and infrastructure. A big challenge in generating all of your arguments is going to be finding reasons why sanctions are either uniquely harmful or useful in and of themselves. If the negative wins this argument. . This is a devastating argument because it forces the affirmative to defend that sanctions in and of themselves are responsible for failure. 6. but it mostly favors the affirmative. 7. 11. 9. This is the crux argument whether you are affirmative or negative. The empirical data on the use of sanctions is a bit fuzzy and there's a bit of debate on both sides. This block should dovetail nicely with other parts of your case that you will construct and contains a variety of values and perspectives. 4. This is one of the best evidentiary examples of the 'only alternative to war' genre of arguments. Similar to the previous note (6). 3. the historical record of the use of sanctions has not been the strongest. The block is very strategic because it allows you to prove that there is a utility to sanctions even in instances when they fail to achieve their specified goals. One of the most rhetorically powerful arguments for sanctions are that 'they are the only alternative to war' -this evidence does a fabulous job of questioning that. Creatively bringing in alternative foreign policy tools is a great way to do this. This block is especially strategic because it allows you to indict a wide majority of the negative's arguments by calling the soundness and motivations of their arguments into question. 2. 5. 10.LD TOPIC ANALYSIS PARADIGM RESEARCH 77 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 STRATEGIC TIPS 1. 12. 8.