People vs.
Magallanes the accused PNP officers
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the
direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of
his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abeto’s
cooperation, induced other police officers, namely: Canuday, Pahayupan,
Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia, Delgado and Gargallano, to
abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the
use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident
premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried
the victims in a makeshift shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for
a fee of P500.00 each.
The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty
and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the
alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the
prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the
accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the
motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles
voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the
prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan
because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does
not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the
offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was
denied.
The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later
inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases
to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment
on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of
HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. When the informations in
the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public
officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P
6,000.00.
If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the
present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of “taking advantage
of his position” is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition
of “offenses committed in relation to public office.” It is considered merely
as an aggravating circumstance.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it
only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the
public officers rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar,
none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade “27”
or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in rank among the accused, only
has a rank classified as Grade “18”.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was
already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which
limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade
“27” or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of
litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the
time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if
trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged
orders are AFFIRMED.

Cuyos vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through reckless
imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos
entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case
for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to
Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that
the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00.
He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to
three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x
P18,000.00=P54,000.00).
Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of
Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not
exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial.
The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for
trial. Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos
HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the
Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar
involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365, par.2 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable upon
petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would
be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the time
the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a
penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.
Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through
imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of damages to
three times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of First
Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to property,
the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries,
there should be an additional penalty for the latter.
The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving
cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries is
summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when the
imposable penalty is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while
the fine is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the
information cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting
from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crime
in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide is
six (6) years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and void and
the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect
premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of
the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in
Manila. However, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there was a
shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with
estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but
the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to
try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya
HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. §14(a) of Rule 110 provides that
the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information
charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that
RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without
merit.
Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondent’s
principal place of business is in Manila and Buaya’s failure to remit the
premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila. Besides,
estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where
any of the essential elements of the crime took place.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Zaldivia V. Reyes, Jr.
GR No. 102342/ July 3, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 1990
for violation of a Municipal Ordinance, allegedly committed on May 11,
1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground that it had
already prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion forcing
the petitioner to raise it to the Regional Trial Court wherein the respondent
sustained the decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, particularly emphasizing the last paragraph of the said
rule, stating that it applies in all cases.
Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition for review of
certiorari before the high court invoking Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 3326 as the
provisions that governs the charge against her being a violation of a
municipal ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure or covered by the Rule of Summary Procedure.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent judge only
governs cases that fall under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and is not
applicable to all cases as the said section had begun with for all cases no
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases.
Thus, the respondent judges’ erred in denying the said motion on the
ground that the offense is governed by section 1, rule 110 of the rules of
criminal procedure.
People vs. Guillen
No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)
and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties, as
the information filed against him provided.
Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was later
found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the lower
court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced with
the highest capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)
and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas and company.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of
the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was
not fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing
him from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen
is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of
multiple attempted murder.
CASE: People vs. Uganap
G.R. No. 130605 June 19,2001
FACTS:
The victim and some of the accused were close relatives. Accused
Tirso Arang is the half-brother of the victim, while accused-appellant Felix
Uganap is also the victim’s cousin. Accused Faustino Uganap is the brother-
in-law of the victim, being brother of the latter’s wife, Leilani Asang.
The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of the victim,that at around
8:30 in the evening, he was walking home when he stopped near the house
of Salvador Uganap. He peeped through a hole in the wall of the house and
saw the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap had a .38 revolver, while Nonoy
Panday had a pistolized carbine. The room was illuminated by a lamp.
Samuel Arang moved away from the house and hid behind a coconut tree.
The accused went to the house of Pedro Arang, which was 30 meters away
from where the witness was. Samuel stated that he saw Felix immediately
shoot Pedro when the latter opened the door. Samuel fled because they
were afraid.
Nolly Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was a member of
vigilante religious group called Ituman. That he was also recruited when he
was 14 years old. Felix Uganap was the group’s designated commander as
“Commander Matador”. Luchavez left the group.
Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was proposed by
Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop. Faustino paid Felix P 3,000.00 for the
purpose. The group intended to effect the killing on December 24, but
aborted because Pedro left the town to visit his wife. Hence, the plan was
set to January 6. Luchavez was unable to go with the group because he had
a fever.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy and;
Whether or not the price or reward as an aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated.
HELD:
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested. The accused
appellant was convicted while the other accused were acquitted, by RTC.
The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-examination of the
entire evidence on record. The Court is likewise not prohibited from
instituting a finding of conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of the lower
court, when its existence is manifest from the evidence at hand. In the
instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of a previous
agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness account of how the
conspirators effected their plan, was submitted into evidence but
disregarded by the trial court.
The information alleges that the crime was attended treachery
and evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of treachery, but the evident
premeditation is present. Court also observes that another aggravating
circumstance was proven by evidence. Luchavez’s testimony that the taking
of Pedro Arang’s life carried the price of P3, 000.00 was categorical,
credible and unrebutted.
However, because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure as
revised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating circumstances must be
specifically named in the information, the Court will allow for this
amendment to retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward shall not be appreciated.
Reclusion Perpetua is applicable and award of damages are the same.
CASE: People vs. Nuevo
G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of
December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband
for the drinking spree at Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with
her 10 month old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm,
appellant returned and entered their room. She was awakened when
appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing.
She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail.
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have sexual
intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present, witnessed what was
being done to her. Appellant threatened her and her niece. Roberta
testified that she did not see him because it was very dark that night, she
identified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wife’s story. He saw Sanico
left his father’s place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at around 1:00
pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found on
the victim, that only old lacerations were present.
Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since they were
schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor. He denied, he
invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances. The
accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the
offended party based only on her recognition of the sound of
his voice;
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence suffices for the
conviction of rape and the imposition of the death penalty on
him.
HELD:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with another,
identification becomes quite an easy talk even from a considerable
distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice of a
person is an acceptable means of identification where the witness and the
accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.
In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of the
circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659,
mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying circumstances
and the absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will bar the
imposition of that extreme penalty.
While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use
of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find that these
were not averted in the information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or information
must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances
with specifity. This requirement has retroactive effect.
The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple
rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code amended by R.A.
7659, the law prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished
only with Reclusion Perpetua.
CASE: Casupanan vs. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and the
other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases were filed, with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of forum-shopping considering
the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and
dismiss the civil case.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration. They
insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied for lack of merit. They f
iled a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless
imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case;
Whether or not there is forum-shopping.
HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground
of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy
is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of forum-shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively. It is present when in the two
or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
relief sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of separate civil action which
can proceed independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is “deemed instituted” with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delito. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately
and independently even without reservation.
In no case, however, may the “offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not
the accused.
 Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
 
 
FACTS:
 
    On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of
Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal
knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In other words,
the applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay.
      In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows:
      "That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts,
lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the law."
      At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the Anti-
Usury Board enterd the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez seized some
articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds, check
stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading,
credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and
checks.
     On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal
based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at night and for
non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant.
      On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez
and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
 
ISSUES:
 
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay.
(2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as
required by the law.
  
RULING:
 
(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on
mere hearsay.
 RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause.
 But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of  one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is
necessary. The Court held that the warrant is illegal because it is based
on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused.
 (2) Yes, the search can be made at night.
 RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs a search made
at night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched. However, since the search warrant is
declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at night.  papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
 (3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description.
RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders
Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a particular description
of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
 But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, it is not required that technical description be given, as
this would mean that no warrant could issue.
 Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration the
nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more adequate
and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is
difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
 The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabiling him to identify  the articles in question, which
he did.
BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
No. L-64261
December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.:
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of 2
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers,
respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. Publisher-editor of the
“We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search warrant?
Ruling:
The two search warrants were issued wihout probable cause. To
satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at
bar, nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the
claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885, as
amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. In
the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, “It would be legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody” of violating the decree without
reference to any determinate provision thereof.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of
First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real
estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the
filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described
therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the same in
operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the
lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been
made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants
that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss
action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands
sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija
instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the
power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company
for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is
governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an
action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the
proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was
intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real
estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation
presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one
end of the country to the other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands, while,
with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid
and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in
which the lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the
defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such
defendants, may by timely application to the court, require the venue as to
their, if one, his lands to be changed to the province where their lands lie.
In such case, the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would
continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as
to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the
action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and Operations
Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to
proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of
verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal
cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission, they caught in flagrante
the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They
left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and
fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the
deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the
Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide
in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending
trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on
January 16, 1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine
Constabulary in the performance of their duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979.
On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the
Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General Order
No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were
promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59
was enacted before the commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to
the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the
petition was GRANTED.
People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank
located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in
action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
herein complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during
the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with intent to
defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said
property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on
the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had
no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or
pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence
fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the same ones
encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties
listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank)
are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo
Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of
First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held
that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment
or stipulation.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of
First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real
estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the
filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described
therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the same in
operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the
lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been
made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants
that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss
action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands
sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija
instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the
power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company
for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is
governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an
action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the
proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was
intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real
estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation
presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form one
end of the country to the other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands, while,
with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid
and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in
which the lands sought to be condemned is located, nevertheless, the
defendants who have lands lying in another province, or any one of such
defendants, may by timely application to the court, require the venue as to
their, if one, his lands to be changed to the province where their lands lie.
In such case, the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would
continue in the province where originally begun, but would be severed as
to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. Wherefore, the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac with discretion to proceed with the
action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and Operations
Section and together with other PC men they received an order mission to
proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of
verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly engaged in the illegal
cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission, they caught in flagrante
the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they resisted the arrest. They
left the place but brought with them pieces of evidence such as gaffs and
fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfighting, including the
deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier on their way to the
Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide
in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending
trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on
January 16, 1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine
Constabulary in the performance of their duty.
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979.
On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the
Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General Order
No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were
promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59
was enacted before the commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to
the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the
petition was GRANTED.

People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L-
19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial Bank
located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and chooses in
action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance Corp.
herein complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during
the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with intent to
defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and encumber the said
property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to quash the information on
the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had
no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged or
pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case, evidence
fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the same ones
encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties
listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank)
are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo
Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court of
First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held
that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment
or stipulation.
CALEON V AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land
denominated at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to petitioner
Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the
lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the private
respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the
apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental
of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent
through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased
premises.
Agus filed a complaint for ejectment MTC of Manila, against the petitioner
citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section
5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to
third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the
required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P.
25).
Petitioner argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in this
case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express
prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner and
private respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.
Therefore, the application of said law to the case at bar is unconstitutional
as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner’s contention is correct?
RULING:
The Supreme Court Ruled that the petitioners contention is untenable. It is
well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality;
one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its
invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, this Court does not decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised
and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of
the case. In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and
subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare
WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit.
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in
connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro
Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of
Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently
filed three (3) applications for search warrants. On September 4, 1985, the
lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied by
the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items
described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with
the private respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search
warrants and ordered the NBI to return the properties that were seized.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued
earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of
the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission of
the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel who
was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search
warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes
owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master
tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give
much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the
application.
Witnesses in the hearing for an application for search warrants must have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony as to the
alleged commission of the offense. Also, the sear warrant must contain a
specific description of the articles to be seized. General warrants are
constitutionally objectionable.
People vs. Gano
Facts
On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the morning Sr. Inspector
Ernesto Garcia received a report of a massacre at a residence in San Mateo
Rizal. At the crime scene Garcia saw the body of Pociano Salen and was
thereafter informed the identity of the suspect. The suspect in the name
of Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or several other known
aliases was arrested and detained in Butuan City after having tried to
escape from the authorities. On their way back to Manila Garcia disclosed
that the accused confessed to him his responsibility for the triple killing and
robbery.
Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a qualified
admission by admitting the killing of the three (3) victims but denying the
charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a complex crime
with a single penalty, the accused with the assistance of his counsel
entered a plea of not guilty.
Issue
WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be mitigating?
Ruling
NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is conditional or
qualified, it is NOT mitigating. The accused was merely confessing to the
crime of homicide but NOT to robbery with homicide, a considerably graver
offence. For voluntary confession to be appreciated as an extenuating
circumstance, the same must not only be made unconditionally but the
accused must admit to the offense charged, i.e. robbery with homicide and
not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence, if the voluntary confession
is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
People vs. Yaoto
Facts
Accused-appellant Eduardo Yaoto was charged with two (2) counts
of rape and pleaded “not guilty” to both counts. In her medico-genital
examination, Dr. Armie Umil certified that Angeline Yaoto, 17 years old,
suffered genital and extragenital injuries. It was found that Angeline was
not only sexually abused but was also physically assaulted. Accused Yaoto
assails the credibility of Angeline and denied having raped her twice. He
also assailed Angeline’s testimony that he had bolo and an ice pick with
which he threatened her considering that the prosecution failed to produce
said items in evidence.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of
its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor,
conduct and attitude especially under cross-examination. Ordinarily, the
Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
the witness considering that it is in a better position to observe her candor
and behavior on the witness stand.
People vs. Bernabe
Facts
On or about October 29, 1998 in Pasay City Virgilio Bernabe by
means of force and intimidation employed upon Maria Esnelia Bernabe, his
daughter, a 17 year old minor, unlawfully have carnal knowledge with said
victim against her will and consent. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded
“not guilty”.
During trial accused denied having raped his own daughter. He
testified that Maria Esnelia charged him with rape because he resented her
boyfriend who for sometime slept in their house. He also depicted his
daughter as a rebel and neglected her studies. Accused also claimed that
his two sisters assisted his daughter in filing the rape case against him
because of a land dispute between them.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that when it comes to the issue of credibility the
Supreme Court as any other appellate court, would ordinarily defer to the
assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only trial courts are
in so unique a position as to be able to observe that elusive and
insurmountable evidence of the witness’ deportment on the witness stand
while testifying.
Gr no. 123340 August 29, 2002
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., respondents
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa
though falsification of public documents before the RTC of Manila.
Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation of a parcel
of land when she knew that there were other surviving heirs. The
offended party did not reserve the right to file a separate civil
action. Hence, it was tried together with the criminal case.
The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the
 return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs.
Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was
denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus
was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction
to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
involving a property in Bulacan.
Decision:
Case Remanded.
There are 3 important requisites which must be present before
the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction
before the subject matter, the territory where the offense was committed,
and over the person of the accused. In this case, the court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to
hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of public
document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since
the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court also
has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because whe voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority.
Art. 100 of the RPC provides that “every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.” Art. 104 of the same Code provides that
“civil liability xxx includes restitution.” In this case, the civil liability is
deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended party did not
reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted, this did not dissolve the
civil aspect of the case.
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs. Hon.
Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga. A
complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after preliminary
investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants of arrest
against the accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was
only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David
then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime
of murder has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon
motion of the private respondents, she conducted a
reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in
conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed
homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner appealed
the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice.
However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the release of
David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for homicide
was also filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the
warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold
departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the
second. He also set the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting
the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for
prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition for prohibition
with the Court of Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the
trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that
he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate. Judge
Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge
Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting
documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts
 entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent
Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the
petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already
been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was
held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the
information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to
set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of
discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts
were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not
bound by the findings of the judge who conducted the investigation, the
resolution should be based on the review of the record and evidence
transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since
all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is
impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the
DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal
once an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring the
resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since the accused
were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since they could
have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he
should have perused the documents submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside
its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control and
supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been deprived of due
process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void and double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.
G.R. No. 104392             February 20, 1996
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, 
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio
City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used
in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from
Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney
owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's driver, Herminio
Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month later, a civil
case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner
himself. The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But
the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to
the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal
action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the
criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of
Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed independently
of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to bring it
separately had been made in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a civil
action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even
though no reservation to file the same has been made.
Issue:
The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against
petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:
Held:
The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes
(ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for
recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has always
been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making power has
been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the keeping of this
Court.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus
driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer
would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. The rule requiring
reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double
recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo v. Garcia, the
injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for
damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a separate civil
action he will be deemed to have elected to recover damages from the bus
driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his cause of action against
the employer will be limited to the recovery of the latter's subsidiary
liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint
against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of
Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian
of said minor, defendants-appellees.
 
BARREDO, J.:
Facts:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack
of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial,
he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." And so, when appellants filed
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill,
on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss.
Issues:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald
in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
Held:
The issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation.
a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
 prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued
for this civil liability arising from his crime.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although he could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.
G.R. No. 129282            November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-ECCI), petitioner,  reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Misamis
Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
Facts:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for estafa against Carmen
Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the
amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to
Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with
the teller of petitioner.
respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI
for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out
of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil
case on the grounds that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37,
arising from the same facts, and that the complaint failed to contain a
certification against forum shopping.
the trial court issued an order dismissing the Civil Case. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order and the trial court granted
respondent's, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for
estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
Held:
as a general rule, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from
the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation
for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from
the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is
either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.
only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent
civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged.
This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
GO VS. CA
FEBRUARY 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-way street in
San Juan, Metro Manila. Rolito Go’s car and Maguan nearly bumped into
each other in an intersection. Because of this, Go shot Maguan and left the
scene. A security guard of a nearby restaurant saw the incident and took
down the plate number of Go’s car. Police investigators were able to get
Go’s picture through the credit card that Go used when he dined in
restaurant near the crime scene the witness positively identified Go as the
gunman. Hence, a manhunt was launched. Several days thereafter, Go
went to the police station where the witness identified him as the suspect.
The police detained Go. A complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by
the police to the Provincial prosecutor. Go was informed of his right to
demand preliminary investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver. Meanwhile,
Maguan died. Hence, prosecutor filed am information of murder without
conducting preliminary investigation. Go posted cash bond and was
released after approval of the same by the court. The prosecutor filed for
leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation and to prayed for the
suspension of court proceedings pending the preliminary investigation. The
same was granted and arraignment of Go was suspended. The following
day, the court recalled its approval and cancelled the bail of Go. Hence, Go
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the SC,
which was remanded to CA. Arraignment took place as scheduled and Go
refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered for him.
Then, CA issued its decision dismissing the petition of Go on the grounds
that Go was validly arrested without a warrant and Go already waived his
right to preliminary investigation. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE 1:
Where or not Go was validly arrested without a warrant.
HELD:
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, among others, that a peace officer or private person may without
warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just been committed,
and the arresting person has personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the incident.
Hence, at the time of his arrest, the crime has not just “been committed”. It
would have been different if Go committed a continuing crime. In addition,
the police officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Go
was he gunman. The police arrested Go by relying on the statement of the
witness. Finally, the plate number of the car that was taken down by the
witness did not point to Go’s car but to his wife.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory and
not constitutional, it is a component of due process of criminal justice. It is
a substantive right. To deprive an accused of this right is to deny due
process. Generally, said right is invoked before entering a plea; failure to
invoke the same amounts to waiver.
In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary investigation be
conducted upon the filing of the information before the court. The fact that
he posted bail did not amount to waiver of said right as he asked for it
when he filed for the approval of the cash bond. The court granted his
prayer for preliminary investigation before the approval of the bond. Go
even filed before the CA for such relief. Hence, Go was entitled to a
preliminary investigation. But since the trial had already commenced, the
trial should be suspended and preliminary investigation should be
conducted. Participation of Go during the trial did not amount to waiver
also as he was merely forced to do so to avail his other rights.
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/ K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING VS. TAYPIN
331 SCRA 697 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng
Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Dev’t Corp., the NBI
filed an application for search warrant with the RTC of Cebu City, to search
the premises of petitioner located in Talisay Cebu, and to seize the wrought
iropn furniture found therein which had allegedly been the object of unfair
competition involving design patents, punishable by Art 189 of the RPC, as
the petitioner manufactured wrought iron furniture similar to that
patented by the Mendco without securing any license or patent for the
same. Seized in the premises were the said pieces of furniture. Petitioners
moved to quash the warrant alleging, among others, that (a) respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (b) the crime they are
accused of does not exist. The denial of the motion prompted petitioners
to come to this court.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners’ contention is of merit
HELD:
(a) No. The Court has consistently ruled that that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain in pursuant to
its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent in
all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. In the
instant case, the premises searched located in Talisay Cebu are well within
the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. SC AO 113-95 merely
specified which courts could ‘try and decide’ cases involving violations of
IPR. The power to issue search warrants in violations of IPR has not been
exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in SC Administrative Order.
(b) Yes. The issue referred to in Art. 189 of RPC had been rendered moot
and academic. Said article has already been repealed by the Intellectual
Property Right Code. Further, the acts complained of does not fall under
any of the provisions of the IPR Code. There being no crime to speak of, the
search warrant does not even begin to fulfill the constitutional
requirements of such, and is therefore defective on its face. Since the
warrants are null and void, all the seized properties must be returned to
petitioners.
La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez
GR. Nos. L-63796-97 May 21, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts:
La Chemise Lacoste SA is a foreign corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines.
It is undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the
trademarks “LACOSTE,” “CHEMISE LACOSTE,” “CROCODILE DEVICE” and a
composite mark consisting of the word “LACOSTE” and a representation of
a crocodile/alligator, used on clothing’s and other goods specifically
sporting apparels sold in many parts of the world and which have been
marketed in the Philippines since 1964.  In 1975, Hemandas & Co., a duly
licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. SR-2225 (SR stands
for Supplemental Register) for the trademark “CHEMISE LACOSTE &
CROCODILE DEVICE” by the Philippine Patent Office for use on T-shirts,
sportswear and other garment products of the company. Two years later, it
applied for the registration of the same trademark under the Principal
Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an order dated 3 March 1977
allowing the application and holding the registrant to be presumed the
owner of the mark until after the registration is declared cancelled.
Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to Gobindram Hemandas all rights,
title, and interest in the trademark “CHEMISE LACOSTE & DEVICE”. On 21
November 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed its application for registration
of the trademark “Crocodile Device” (Application Serial 43242) and
“Lacoste” (Application Serial 43241). The former was approved for
publication while the latter was opposed by Games and Garments in Inter
Partes Case 1658. In 1982, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed a Petition for the
Cancellation of Reg. SR-2225 docketed as Inter Partes Case 1689.
On 21 March 1983, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts of
unfair competition being committed by Hemandas and requesting their
assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The NBI conducted an
investigation and subsequently filed with the trial court (RTC Manila,
Branch XLIX, National Capital Judicial Region) two applications for the
issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of the
premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and
Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas. The court issued
Search Warrant 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of Article 189 of the
Revised Penal Code. The NBI agents executed the two search warrants and
as a result of the search found and seized various goods and articles
described in the warrants. Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that the trademark used by him was different from La
Chemise Lacoste’s trademark and that pending the resolution of IPC 1658
before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil action on the same subject
matter and between the same parties would be premature. La Chemise
Lacoste filed its opposition. The State Prosecutor likewise filed his
opposition. The court was, however, convinced that there was no probable
cause to justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its order dated
22 March 1983, the search warrants were recalled and set aside and the
NBI agents or officers in custody of the seized items were ordered to return
the same to Hemandas
The Supreme Court granted the petition in GR 63797-97, reversing
and setting the order dated 22 April 1983 of the RTC, and made permanent
the Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 April 1983. The Court, on the
other hand, denied due course to the petition in GR 65659 for lack of
merit, and thus lifting and setting aside the Temporary Restraining Order
dated 5 December 1983.
Ruling:
Determination of probable cause mandatory for the issuance of a
valid search warrant; Probable cause defined
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search
warrant, the Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the determination
of probable cause by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce (Constitution, Art IV,
Sec. 3). Probable cause has traditionally meant such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that are in
themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act
in pursuance thereof (People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667).
Determination of probable cause; No general formula or fixed rule
The concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by our
ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause
“presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.” The question of
whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided in the
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v. Morfe,
20 SCRA 507). There is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of the existence of probable cause since the existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310),. However, the
findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run
counter to the clear dictates of reason, more so it is plain that our country’s
ability to abide by international commitments is at stake.
Correction of errors must be based on sound and valid grounds
Herein, the court complied with the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant when at that point
in time; it was fully convinced that there existed probable cause. But after
hearing the motion to quash and the oppositions thereto, the court
executed a complete turnabout and declared that there was no probable
cause to justify its earlier issuance of the warrants. Although the lower
court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any,
but the rectification must be based on sound and valid grounds. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by La
Chemise Lacoste should have been assessed more carefully because the
object of the quashal was the return of items already seized and easily
examined by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and quite
obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal prosecution.
Application for a search warrant is heard ex parte
An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither a
trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be expedited
for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to
the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the witnesses. Herein,
the allegation of Hemandas that the applicant withheld information from
the court was clearly no basis to order the return of the seized items.
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113447
October 9, 1997
FACTS:
The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting
surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of drug
addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area,
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high on
drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents of his hands,
which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the wallet, police officers found
what later on turned out to be crushed marijuana. He was charged with
Illegal Possession of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Manalili
claimed the charges were “trumped up” and that the police officers had
blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence seized
was inadmissible against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General counters that the search and seizure was valid,
but regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by petitioner
since it was not raised in the lower court.
ISSUES:
1) Was the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid?
2) May petitioner raise this defense for the first time on appeal?
RULING:
The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a judicial
warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional. However,
there are exceptions to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2)
search of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs search and
5) waiver by the accused. The court added another exception, the stop-
and frisk, which is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety of police
officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk must be
grounded on probable cause that the accused has committed an offense.
As such, the court ruled that the search and seizure was valid and
admissible as evidence. In addition, Manalili had effectively waived the
defense of an invalid search since this issue was not raised during the trial.
Such issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Mata vs. Judge Bayona et. Al.
GR No. L-50720 March 26, 1985
Ponente: De Castro
Facts:
An information was filed against Soriano Mata, petitioner, alleging
that he offered, took and arranged bets on Jai Alai game by selling illegal
tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine
Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned. Thereafter, a search warrant was issued by the respondent
Judge against him for violation under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance
of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts
and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, “it is with the court”. This
led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was denied by respondent Judge stating that the court
has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of private
respondents and that the fact that documents relating to search warrant
were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents
are to be attached to the records.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant issued by respondent Judge were valid.
Ruling:
The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must before issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant or
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient.
 Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of
the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions
in writing and attaching them to the record. However, illegality of search
warrant does not call for return of things seized which are prohibited.
Orquinaza vs. People
Facts:
On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers
factory, together with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a sworn
statement regarding the allege act of Orquinaza, the general manager of
the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts while she was
taking a nap. The case was referred as a case of sexual harassment.
Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing that it does not
contain allegation to constitute the crime of sexual harassment. The
assistant city prosecutor filed with the MTC an information charging the
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued
against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the
warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be
invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived
of his right to due process since the information for acts of lasciviousness
was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was
for sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. The motion was
denied. He again filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again
denied. He filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation?
Held:
Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the assistant city
prosecutor concluded that the more proper charge should be acts of
lasciviousness. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
offense of acts of lasciviousness would be futile because the complainant
would be presenting the same evidence which have already been studied
by the prosecutor. The lack of preliminary investigation would still not be a
ground to quash the information against the accused much less does it
affect the court’s jurisdiction. The remedy of the accused is to call the
attention of the court to the lack of preliminary investigation and demand
as a matter of right that one be conducted.
No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
The People of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Hon. Emeterio Ocaya, et. al.,
respondents
Facts:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the court of
Hon. Ocaya charging Esterlina Marapao, Letitia Marapao, and
Diosdado Marapao of the crime of serious physical injuries.
Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial was made on
merit and no warrats of arrest were issued. Instead, the
respondent judge held that the respondents should be charged of
either slight or less serious physical injuries only. This is so, even if
the affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the victim, was incapacitated
for more than 30 days and a scar was left on her face, deforming
it.
Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case since the
crime or slight or less physical injuries is not within the jurisdiction
of the court.
The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Hon. Ocaya.
Accordingly, the respondent judge evaluated the case without
hearing the parties nor the witnesses, nor having received their
evidence, as well as ruling against the deformity on the basis of
the medical certificate.
The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the nullification
of Hon. Ocaya’s orders.
Issue:
Whether Hon. Oaya acted with grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision:
The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID.
The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the information or criminal complaint, and not by the
result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judge’s personal
appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and their
witnesses. Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached to the person and
subject-matter, the subsequent happening of events, though it may have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not divest
the court of jurisdiction already attached.
People vs Agbulos
Facts:
Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos, charging him
with Forcible abduction with rape. Agbulos was arraigned on January 23,
1981 where he pleaded guilty. On April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its
case. On August 13,1984, a warrant of arrest was issued against Agbulos,
but was later on recalled because it was issued to the wrong bonding
company, thus the hearing was reset on November 5, 1984,. On the said
date, Agbulos failed to appear before the court. The bonding company was
given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show the cause
why judgement should not be rendered against them. The bonding
company fails to surrender the accused and the court issued an order
stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgement will issue against the full
amount of the bond. Trial was further reset to January 30, 1985 and still
the accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of the court on the
judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to have waived his right to
present evidence, thus, Defense counsel just manifested that they were
adopting the testimony of prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo, thereafter;
the defense rested its case. On July 11 1985, judgement was rendered
against the bonding company, and on June 15 1985, accused was found
guilty of forcible abduction with rape, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and indemnification. On August 16, counsel for accused
appealed.
Issue: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the accused may
appeal?
Held:
Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the constitution. The old case
of people vs Avanceña required the presence of the accused at certain
stages of the trial. This only results in the discontinuance of the trial as long
as the defendant would not reappear or remain at large. This rule would
work for the fugitive’s advantage. This rule is now modified by the bill of
rights which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner cannot simply escape and
thwart the continuance of prosecution and conviction against him provided
that he has been arraigned, duly notified, and his failure to appear
unjustified. By the same rule, the accused forfeits his right to appeal. Rule
124, section 8 of the 1985 rules on criminal procedure provide that the
court may, upon motion of the appellee, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal
is dismissed.
People vs Baao
Facts:
Rowena Frederico is a thirteen year old school drop out, finishing
only grade 1 and of limited native intelligence. She claims she was raped
five times by accused appellant Baao; three times in December 1982, done
in the bathroom of accused-appellant’s house in Dasmariñas Cavite, and
twice in February 1983, the fourth done in the backyard while the fifth was
done in the living room. On March 4 1983, Rowena decided to tell her
mother about the offenses. She said that the first three rapes were done at
8am on dates of December she could not recall, while the fourth was at
about 10 pm on Feb 17, and the fifth at noon of Feb 23. She claimed that
all rapes were done through force and threat of death and that the first
rape caused laceration of her hymen and there was full penetration and
pain in all instances. The victim was subjected to physical examinations
under Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer of the NBI. According to Dr.
Reyes findings, Rowena underwent intercourse for not more than five
times, and that the findings were compatible with the testimony of the
victim. Lucia Federico, the victim’s mother, also testified that after she
came to know of the rapes, the accused-appellant’s wife approached her
and offered her 2000 Php so she would withraw the charges.
The Accused-appellant relied mainly on denial and alibi. He claims that he
was just being set up because he once caught the girl sealing soft drinks
from his sari sari store and had scolded her. He also claims that at the times
stated by Rowena on which dates she was supposedly raped, he was with
his daughter at her house near Manila International Airport in Baclaran, to
do some carpentry work. His daughter testified and said the same thing. He
also argued that the complaint was filed to extort money from him, an
amount of 15,000 which was later reduced to 8000. The Trial Judge
rejected the charges on the second, third and fifth rapes. This leads the
defense to invoke falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, claiming that since the
three charges were rejected, the rest should also be rejected.
Issue:
Whether or not this was merely a tale concocted by Rowena.
Whether or not the two charges of rape should also be rejected
since the other three were rejected by the court.
Held:
Accused-Appellant was held guilty of the crime charged. His
contentions were rejected. His alibi of being in Baclaran on December is
not enough to relieve him of the charges because he couldn’t show that he
did not have any opportunity to go back to Dasmarinas during that month.
Also, considering the demeanour of the victim, she couldn’t have made up
such a story on her own. Alibi is an inherently weak defense.
On the contention that all charges should be rejected since three were
rejected, it could also conversely be argued that since truth was found on
the first and fourth rapes, accused should also be held liable for all five
rapes and be convicted. The choice really is whether it should be total
acquittal or total conviction for all five charges of rape.
People vs. Doria
Facts:
Florencio Doria @ “Jun” was a seller of illegal drugs. Upon a tip of an
informant, PO3 Manlangit together with the informant posed as a buyer of
marijuana, PO1 Badua tagged along as support in the whole operation.
PO3 Manlangit was able to give the marked bills worth P1600 to Florencio,
left and after sometime returned with the 1 brick marijuana at hand. They
were able to arrest Florencio inflagrante delicto in selling the marijuana to
them, when asked where the marked bills where Florencio replied that it
was at the place of “Neneth.” The group went to the house of the so called
“Neneth,” when there they saw the person whose name was Violeta Gadao
carrying water to her house, they questioned her where the marked bills
were. At this time also a box with a flap open was seen by the PO3
Manlangit, his suspicion peeked because he saw at the open flap the same
wrappings as the 1 brick he got from Florencio at that time. PO3 Manlangit
open the box and found 10 bricks of the same marijuana. Simultaneously
PO1 Badua was able to get the marked bills out of Violeta and arrested her.
The RTC ruled in favour of the police and imposed upon Florencio and
Violeta the penalty of Death, the 11 bricks of marijuana were destroyed.
The case went to the SC for automatic review.
Issue:
W/N Florencio is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
W/N Violeta is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
Held:
Florencio is guilty, he was caught inflagrante delicto, and the law authorizes
such arrest without a warrant in such cases.
The law authorizes entrapment, that is the police conducts an operation
against the accused without inducing him to commit the said crime.
The law authorizes the mix of both subjective and objective test in
determining if there is entrapment in a case. The subjective test looks
on the daily practice, background and life of the accused in
determining if the crime is indeed committed out of his volition and
without inducement. The objective test looks into the conduct of the
police in trying to plan and execute the entrapment against the
accused, if it has no inducement in the whole of its process.
Entrapment there is no inducement and the accused did the crime out of
 his volition. Instigation the crime was committed with inducement by
the police and the accused did the crime not of his volition.
Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure enumerate the
valid Arrests without a warrant:
When, in his prescence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the
offense.
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
When the prisoner to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from
a penal establishment or place he is serving final judgement
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
No, Violeta can’t be guilty of selling illegal drugs because the drugs were
illegally seized from her house. The marked bills found in her person
also didn’t prove her participation in the sale of drugs by Florencio
The 5 instances where a search and seizure without a warrant is valid
when:
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Search of moving motor vehicle
Search in violation of customs laws
Seizure of evidence in plain view
When the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizure
Option b, c, and e can be immediately disposed of as a reason.
Since the arrest of Violeta was without a warrant and doesn’t fall among
the exceptions provided in Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
criminal procedure, the search and seizure can’t be the first exception
to a valid warrantless search and seizure. As to (a) it was not in hot
pursuit, and as to (b) there’s no probable cause.
The search and seizure can’t also be considered in plainview, because PO3
Manlangit himself admitted that the items in the box could have been
other items. That marijuana can’t be readily identified with just the
flap open and the plastic pack sticking out.
Florencio was convicted with Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of P500,000
While Violeta was acquitted
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA
G. R. No. 123872
Jan. 30, 1998
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
Ruben Montilla, alias “Joy” was charged for violating Section 4,
Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as amended
by R. A. No. 7659 in an information which alleges: “That on or about 20th
day of June 1994, at Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, xxx the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport and deliver 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves which are considered prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him,
still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the
illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
People vs. Nitafan
Facts:
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R.
Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. Petitioners filed
motions for the consolidation of the three informations with the 21 other
remaining cases pending before the RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in its
motion that “the indictable acts under the three informations form part of
and is related to the transaction complained”. RTC granted the
consolidation and the 3 infornations were re-raffled and re-assigned to
Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any
motion from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring
petitioners to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed on the
ground that it violates Marcos’ right against ex post facto law and the two
other informations on the ground that private respondent’s right against
double jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued
an order dismissing the 1 st criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law
and also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases on the ground of
violation of private respondent’s right against double jeopardy. Prosecution
filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to quash an
information?
Held:
In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges without
filing any motion to quash and as such she has deemed to have waived and
abandon her right to avail any legal ground which she may have properly
and timely invoked to challenge the complaint or information. If the judge
initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case but
also takes the side of the accused. It is clear that the only grounds which
the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or
complaint are (1) those ground stated in the motion and (2) the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole
exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into
the competence of the court to hear and pass judgement on the cause.
The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is
nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused.
PRUDENTE V DAYRIT
PADILLA; December 14, 1989
 
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
 
FACTS
- On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice
of the CA, an application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, for violation
of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). Dimagmaliw alleged,
among others that: That he has been informed and has good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Nemesio Prudente who may be found at the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Anonas St., Sta., Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives,
handgrenades and ammuntion which are illegally possessed or intended to
be used as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio
Prudente is keeping and concealing at the premises of the PUP. In support
of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles,
OIC of the Intelligence Section of ISAD, executed a "Deposition of
Witness"2 dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge.
- On 1 Nov 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, and
P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. They found in the
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging
brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers.
- On 6 Nov 1987, petitioner Prudente moved to quash the search warrant.
He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles,
had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the
issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was
not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant
was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe
the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense;
and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. Respondent
Judge issued denied the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to
quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
this present recourse.
 
ISSUES
1. WON the Search Warrant is invalid as it does not show a probable cause
since it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not
within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based
on hearsay evidence
2. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were
several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP
3. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection
with one specific offense
 
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant must be shown to be
within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay.
Reasoning
[a] In his application for search warrant, Dimagmaliw stated that "he has
been informed" that Prudente "has in his control and possession" the
firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the
report and found it to be a fact." In his supporting deposition, Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days,
they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the
said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information
from other sources or persons. [b] What the records show is the deposition
of witness, Angeles, as the only support to Dimagmaliw's application, and
the said deposition is based on hearsay. Evidently, the allegations contained
in the application of Dimagmaliw and the declaration of Angeles in his
deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant.
As held in the Alvarez case: "The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant,
of the existence of probable cause."
2. NO
Ratio A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the offices of the Department of
Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the
President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at
the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently
complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were several
rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
3. NO
Ratio The application for search warrant which was captioned: "For
Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." means that
it was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives.
Reasoning
[a] While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in
this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc."
As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions
and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the
specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the
failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD No.
1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation
on this score.
[b] The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of
firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another
for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different
informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single
information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Search Warrant No. 87-14 ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE.
 
 
 Sapiera vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several
occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly cigarettes
and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These
checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When they were presented for
payment, the checks were dishonoured because the drawer’s account was
already closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo de Guzman
and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were
filed against Sapiera while two counts of BP 22 was filed against Arturo de
Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On December 27 1999, the RTC
Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but did not rule on
the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for the 2 BP
22 cases and was ordered to pay Sua 167,150 Php as civil indemnity and
was sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day. Respondent Sua
appealed regarding the civil aspect of Sapiera’s case but the courtdenied it
saying that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute. Respondent filed a
petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals praying that the appeal
be given due course, this was granted. On January 1996, CA rendered a
decision ordering Sapiera to pay 335000 php to Sua. Sapiera filed a motion
for reconsideration. The CA the issued a resolution noting that the
admission of both parties that Sua already collected 125000 for the 2 check
paid by De Guzman on the BP 22 cases. It appears that the payment should
be deducted on her liability as they involved the same two checks which
Sapiera was involved in. the CA deducted the liability to 210,000 Php.
Hence this petition by Sapiera claiming that the CA erred in rendering such
decision because she was acquitted and the fact from which the civil
liability exists did not exist.
Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was
acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless
this shows that the fact from which the civil liability is based is proven to
not have existed because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not extinguished
where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt. (b) Where the
court expressly declares that the liability is not criminal but only civil, (c)
where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act. The
decision of the case would show that the acquittal was based on failure of
the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between
her and De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by Sapiera on the back,
sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law says that she would be considered an
indorser of the bill of exchange and under section 66 thereof would be held
liable for breach of warranty and is held liable to pay the holder who may
be compelled to pay the instrument.
Stonehill vs. Diokno L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against the
corporate offices and private residences of the accused. The warrants
directed police officers to seize and take possession of various items of
personal property such as “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, etc.” The warrants were based on alleged violations of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff Laws, and the like. Petitioners assailed the validity
of the warrants as such warrants did not describe with particularity the
things to be seized. In addition, petitioners assert that other items not
included in the warrants, such as cash, were also seized. They filed
petitions with the court, seeking the quashal of the warrants and the
return of their seized property. On the other hand, public respondents
claimed the warrants were valid, and any defects were cured by consent of
the petitioners. They also claim that such evidence, regardless of the
validity of the warrants, were admissible as evidence in court.
ISSUES:
1) Are the 42 search warrants valid?
2) Are the documents and other effects admissible as evidence
against respondents?
RULING:
The seized items were taken from two kinds of locations: the offices of the
petitioners and their residences. With regards to the seized items from the
offices, petitioners have no cause of action since only the corporation, as a
separate juridical personality, may question the validity of the warrants. As
the petitioners filed the objection in their personal capacities, the court
cannot act on the petition. As to the effects seized from the homes of
petitioners, it is clear that the warrants were “General Warrants,” issued on
the basis of no specific offense and with no particular definition of the
items to be seized. General Warrants are prohibited by the Consititution
since there are clearly issued to conduct fishing expeditions, and not on the
basis of actual probable cause. The Constitution provides that items to be
seized must be “particularly described” and probable cause can only be
found “in connection with one specific offense.” Since these items were
seized on the basis of an invalid warrant, they are to be deemed fruits of a
poisonous tree. As such, they may not be used as evidence against the
petitioners.
 VENUS VS DESIERTO
OCTOBER 21, 1998
J. DAVIDE
FACTS:
Eriberto Venus (Venus) was the mayor of New Washington, Aklan.
The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality issued a Resolution
authorizing Venus to negotiate with the Board of Liquidators in the
purchase of a lot in the municipality. Hence, Venus went to Manila and
submitted with the Board of Liquidators the resolution and a letter-
proposal for the purchase of the lot. The proposal was rejected by the
board and set bidding on Sept. 19, 1988. Venus informed the SB of the
denial. Then, Venus sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor as to the
requirements of bidding in order that the municipality may validly
participate. The Provincial Auditor opined that it would be impossible to
participate as it would need a resolution from the SB. And that the funds
would be pre-audited before its release, which would take at least 2 weeks.
This means that the funds will not be available on the day of bidding. Using
his personal funds, Venus went to Manila and asked for the postponement
of the bidding but it was denied. Hence, Venus bid and got the property,
being the highest bidder, using his own money. The lot was used as garage
for the municipality’s fire truck free of charge. Nearly four years after the
sale, SB members Mars Regalado and Harry Abayon filed a complaint
before the Provincial Prosecutor charging Venus with violation of
paragraph H, Sec. 3 RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices act). It was
forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman of Cebu and was dismissed.
Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the dismissal and the case was re-
raffled to Deputy Ombudsman Tanco who recommended the filing of
information against Venus. Upon review, Special Prosecutor Ines found
reasonable ground for filing of information against Venus. Ombudsman
Desierto approved the resolution recommending the filing of information
against Venus. The information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. Upon his
surrender to the Sandiganbayan, it was found out that Venus was not given
the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
recommending the filing of information. Sandiganbayan then granted him
time to file a motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration was
filed before the Office of Special Prosecutor. Said prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause. Desierto disapproved
the recommendation. Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan set Venus’ arraignment.
Hence, this petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arraignment may be restrained with injunction or
writ of prohibition.
HELD:
YES. Generally, criminal prosecutions may no be restrained
through injunction or prohibition as the determination of probable cause
for the filing of information is within the discretion of ombudsman or
prosecutor. However, in the case of Brocka vs. Enrile, the Supreme Court
provided exceptions to the above-mentioned rule. Among those
enumerated is when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
 In the case at bar, the Deputy Ombudsman found no ground to
believe that Venus violated RA 3019 but the Ombudsman and the other
Deputy Ombudsman disagreed. In the motion for reconsideration, the
special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. In human
relations, good faith is always presumed. He who charges bad faith has the
burden of proving the same. In not finding facts constituting bad faith, it
was an error for the ombudsman to pass on the duty of finding bad faith to
Sandiganbayan. There was no bad faith in the actuations of Venus. The
resolution issued by the SB was for him to negotiate with the Board of
Liquidators for the sale of the lot. Venus did as he was mandated and
returned with the denial of their offer. The municipality did not intend to
participate in the bidding as shown by the absence of a resolution to that
effect and the absence of the funds for the occasion. Venus faithfully
performed his duty and this duty ended when he asked for postponement
even if it was denied. Further, RA 3019 requires that bad faith must be
EVIDENT. In finding no bad faith, logically there could be no evident bad
faith. Hence, there was no prima facie case against Venus.
In finding the manifest innocence of Venus, the Supreme Court
ordered Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case.
Villaflor vs. Vivar
Facts:
An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for
beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian
met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries
sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had appeared
so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the charge for
slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for grave
threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he
filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats since it was made
in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should have been
absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC granted the
motion to quash and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of preliminary investigation?
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation be considered a ground to quash the informations?
Held:
The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a
preliminary investigation was for slight physical injuries was
conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information
was however amended when petitioner’s injuries turned out to be
more serious. However the change in the information was only a
formal amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still involves
the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the
complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack
of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash.
When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash
before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right.
Washington Distillers, Inc. Vs Ca
Facts:
On the basis of a search warrant issued by the Judge of the RTC of Manila,
314, 289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles were seized by the NBI
from the premises of petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga for alleged
violation of RA 623, otherwise known as An act to regulate the use of duly
stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, and other similar
containers, as amended by RA 5700. Petitioners filed a motion to quash on
the ground that the RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant to
be executed in Pampanga, which was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was issued my private respondents but was denied.
Thereafter, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals and CA set aside the decision of RTC ruling that a search warrant
may be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of Manila
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant issued against petitioners is valid.
Held:
No. The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a result
of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution and the bottles
seized from them should be returned to petitioners in the absence of any
civil action for their recovery.
What is noticeable about this case is the that possession of the bottles was
transferred to private respondents through the expediency of a search
warrant, so that instead of merely being an ancillary writ issued either as
an incident of criminal proceedings, the proceeding for search warrant
have become, for all intents and purposes, the main proceedings by which
private respondents have been able to obtain possession of what it claims
to be its property. There was neither complaint by which the petitioners
could have been informed of the charge against them nor answer by which
they could have heard in the defense, before property claimed by them
was taken from them and given to private respondents.
Crespo V Mogul
151 SCRA 462 (1987)
 
FACTS:  filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
 
An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in
the Criminal Circuit Court of Lucena.  When the case was set for
arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground
that there was a pending Petition for Review with the Department of
Justice.  Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul.  Crespo’s Motion For
Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed a TRO with the CA, which
granted the same.  Thereafter, the CA granted Crespo’s Writ of Injucntion
and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged until
the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal to move
for dismissal of the case.  The Fiscal then filed a Motion attaching the
Secretary’s Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case.  Judge Mogul
denied the Motion and set Crespo’s arraignment.  Hence, his recourse to
the SC.
 
ISSUE: 
 
W/N the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the
Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and instead insist on
arraignment.
HELD:
 
The petition must fail.  The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that
once a complaint or information is filed in court, the ultimate disposition
thereof lies solely on its sound discretion.  Therefore, the Secretary of
Justice should refrain from entertaining a petition for review when the
complaint or information has already been filed in court.
 
            Petition dismissed.
Crespo vs. Mogul
FACTS: On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the
case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1,
1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order
of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to
afford nine for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an order of
August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the
Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the
arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall
have finally resolved the petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig,
Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal
of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10,
1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of
Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the private
prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. On November 24,
1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment.
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or TRO
in the Court of Appeals. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment
of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October
25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the
restraining order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said
decision filed by the accused was denied.
Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse
to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD: The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that
justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is
the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or
acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing
for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less
should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void.
The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the
prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of
the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case
is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination
of the Court.
Republic vs. Sunga
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the CFI of
CamSur dismissing motu proprio a criminal case as well as of the order of
the same court denying the motion for reconsideration of said earlier
order.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by
the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents
Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set
on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was,
however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused,
respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police
authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the
arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29
and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which
dismissed the criminal case and consequently, the order of arrest issued by
the Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is
hereby ordered lifted. The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of
the accused is ordered cancelled. In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose
Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is ordered to release said accused from
their detention immediately upon receipt of the order.
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was
executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and subscribed and
sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court. It alleged, among others, that
he was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the case and that
he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material
witnesses could no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies,
the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and
that in view of those circumstances, he requests for the dismissal of the
said case.
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was
denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April 1974.
Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the
basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but
without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
HELD:The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for
the arrest of the accused is isued by the trial court and the accused either
voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The Court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear
and determine the case. Fiscal determines direction of prosecution;
complainant must ask fiscal if he wants to dismiss the case; the motion to
dismiss must be addressed to the court which has disretion over the
disposition of the case.
While the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge
on whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or
information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of the
complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without
objection of the accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal
for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution
of the case and he may have his own reasons why the case should not be
dismissed. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the
Court should exercise its exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the
case.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.
People vs. Mercado
FACTS: This is an appeal by the prosecution form an order of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga whereby said court declared itself without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decided two criminal cases pending
before it, for theft of large cattle, against the appellee Francisco Mercado,
on the ground that, although the stolen animals were afterwards brought
by the appellee to the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, where they
were found in his possession, said crimes had taken place and had been
committed in the municipality of Gapan, of the Province of Nueva Ecija.
On June 21, 1936, in the municipality of Candaba, Province of Pampanga,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused,
Francisco Mercado, with intent of gain, did, then and there, voluntarily,
maliciously, illegally and criminally, take, steal, and carry away two male
carabaos belonging to Pedro A. Ladores, worth sixty pesos (P60) each and
to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P120 and a male
carabao valued at ninety pesos (P90), owned by Leon Ladores. The
commission of both having been commenced at Gapan, Nueva Ecija, and
consummated at the municipality of Candaba, Pampanga, and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner.
The informations were filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the
Court of First Instance of said province after receiving the report of the
preliminary inquiries made, upon complaint, by the justice of the peace
court of Candaba, Pampanga, where the case originated. The appellee
waived his right to a preliminary investigation and asked that the two cases
be remanded to the Court of First Instance for trial and final judgment.
Lower court ruled that the cases are not triable in Pampanga.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI of Pampanga has jurisdiction to try and
decide the two cases in question, it being alleged in the informations by
which they were commenced that the accused stole the carabaos
described therein in Gapan, in the Province of Nueva Ecija, which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the court, in order to bring them, as he in fact did
afterwards, to Candaba, Pampanga, where they were found in his
possession.
HELD: In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one can not be held to
answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it
was committed. Said rule is based on the legal provision which prescribes
the essential requisites of a good complaint or information, one of which is
the allegation that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court where the complaint or information is filed and that said court has
authority to try it.