Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions Author(s): Fiona McGillivray and Allan C.

Stam Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Apr., 2004), pp. 154-172 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176248 Accessed: 10/09/2010 20:06
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PoliticalInstitutions,CoerciveDiplomacy, and the Durationof EconomicSanctions
Departmentof Politics New YorkUniversity

Departmentof Government DartmouthCollege

states A theoryof sanctionduration focuses on differencesbetween democraticandnondemocratic that in the structure leaders'supportcoalitionsis tested,using a hazardmodel to analyzea dataset of 47 sancof of tion eventswith 272 observations. Resultsshow thatleadershipchangestronglyaffectsthe duration sanctions only in the case of nondemocraticstates. Leadershipchange in democraticstates is unrelatedto the senderandnondemocratic of duration sanctions;however,leadershipchangein nondemocratic targetstates is stronglyrelatedto the ending of economic sanctions.

Keywords: coercive diplomacy;democratic leadership;nondemocraticleadership; economic sanctions; sender state; targetstate; policy change

The effectiveness of international economic sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy has been debated at length with little resolution to this point (Drezner 2000; Schott,andElliot 1990;Hass and Dashti-Gibson,Davis, andRadcliff 1997;Hufbauer, O'Sullivan 2000; Hass 1998; Martin 1992; Kaempferand Lowenberg 1988; Pape of 1997;Tsebelis 1990). Althoughourunderstanding the coercive success andfailure of international sanctionsis surprisinglylimited, we know even less abouthow long we might expect economic sanctionsto last (Drezner 1999; Dorussenand Mo 2001). A cursoryglance at the datarevealsthatin some instances,sanctionsremainin place just months before their withdrawal.In other instances, such as the U.S. sanctions of againstCuba,they can remainin place for decades.A betterunderstanding the links will sanctiondurations tell us betweendomesticpoliticalinstitutionsandinternational about coercive diplomacy in particularand, more generally, something something about the distinguishing characteristicsof the policy choices that emerge from differentpolitical systems. One reasonsanctionsend is thatthey succeed in bringingabouta change in policy and/orleader in the targetstate. Leadershipchange in the targetstate can triggerthe withdrawal sanctionsif it leads to policy changes. Sanctionsthatfail to bringabout of
AUTHORS'NOTE:Full regressionresults are available,along with the data, at http://www.yale.edu/ unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol.48 No. 2, April 2004 154-172 DOI: 10.1177/0022002703262858 ? 2004 Sage Publications



policy concessions in the targetstate, however,often persist long afterit is clear that they areineffectiveforeign policy tools. In some cases, it takes a leadershipchange in the senderstateto triggerthe withdrawalof sanctions.For example, the turningpoint in Soviet-Yugoslavsanctions(1949-1954) came in March1953 with the deathof Stalin, the soviet leader.Nikita Khrushchevtook power and, less thana year later,withdrew many of Stalin's restrictionson trade with Yugoslavia(Hufbauer,Schott, and Elliot 1990). in turnover the senderstate,however,does not always lead to a reversal Leadership of sanctionspolicy. The UnitedStateshas continuedto sanctionCubathroughout nine U.S. presidentialadministrations, from Eisenhowerto the currentBush administration. In the U.S./Cubacase, the withdrawalof sanctionsis likely to occur following a leadershipchangein the targetstate.If CubanpresidentFidel Castrogoes, therecan be little doubt thatthe U.S. presidentwill withdrawsanctionson Cuba. The timingof coercivediplomacyin generalandthe duration sanctionsin particof ular seem closely related to leadershipchange in both the targetand sender states. However,the natureof this relationshipis unclear.In this study,we tryto untanglethe relationshipbetween leadershipturnoverand sanctionsduration.We studyhow leadershipchange affects the choice made by senderstatesto terminateor continuesanctions and the choice made by targetstates to resist or comply with foreign demands. We arguethatdomesticpoliticalinstitutionshave an important mediatingeffect on the influence of leadershipchange on sanctionduration. We arguethatdomesticpolitics in boththe senderandtargetnationdrivesthe application and withdrawalof sanctions (Smith 1996; Kaempferand Lowenberg 1988). The distributionof the economic costs and benefits of sanctions is uneven across domestic groups and, as a result, so are the political effects of coercive diplomacy.In the sender state, we argue that the decision to impose sanctions depends on which domestic groupswin representation. durationof sanctionsdependsin parton the The of this representation. Because differentleaderstypicallyrepresentdifferpersistence ent interests,a leadershipchangein the senderstateis likely to leadto a changein sanctions policy. Following the same logic, a change in leaderin the targetstateis likely to trigger the withdrawalof sanctions. If a new leader representsdifferentinterests, a leadershipchange in the targetstatecould well lead to a change in the policy thatinithe tially aggravated senderstate, causing the withdrawalof sanctions. Leadershipturnoverin eitherthe senderor targetstatecan lead to the end of sanctions, butit does not necessarilymeanthatit will. It is only when the new leaderdraws supportfrom differentpolitical groups that leadershipchange is expected to affect sanctions policy. As such, domestic political institutionshave an importantrole in mediatingthe effect thatleadershipchange has on sanctionduration.This is because the natureof the domestic political institutionsdetermineswhich political interests political leaders represent.Perhaps surprisingly,we argue that leadershipturnover affects the durationof sanctionsonly in the case of nondemocraticstates. Ourtheory of sanctiondurationfocuses on the size differencebetween the groups of supporters thatleadersneed to win over to stay in power in democraticand nondemocratic states (Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2003).



To put togethera sufficientlylargecoalition of supporters win an election, leadto ers in democraticsystems often need to drawsupportfrommanyof the same domestic groupson which theiroppositiondraws.As a result,these groupsreceive representation even when leaders change. Autocratic leaders typically rely on significantly smaller groups of supporters.Because of this, newly installed autocrats are less beholden to the same pivotal groups as theirpredecessor.Thus, leadershipchange in nondemocratic states is more likely to alterthe intereststhatarerepresentedand, as a result, the call for policies that initially incurredthe sanctions.We argue that a new leaderin a nondemocratic senderstateis morelikely to withdrawsanctionsthana new leaderin a democraticsenderstate,and a new leaderin a nondemocratic targetstateis morelikely to triggerthe secession of sanctionsthana new leaderin a democraticstate. Havingcontrolledfor leadershipchange,politicalinstitutionsarenot expectedto have an independenteffect on the durationof sanctions. in The study is structured threeparts.In the first section, we review the literature and arguethatthe standardfocus on the success or failure of economic sanctionsto achieve foreign policy goals has limited our ability to test theoriesof coercive diplomacy.We arguethatan examinationof sanctiondurationoffers a useful approachfor In of extendingourunderstanding this frequentlyused coerciveinstrument. the second section, we develop our theoreticalpredictions.We startby examining the standard war of attritionlogic of sanctionsbetween unitaryactor nations and identify conditions under which sanctions are likely to be observed. We extend this approachby of we unpackingthe internalstructure nations'politicalsystems.In particular, ask how institutionsmoderatethe impact of leadershipchange on sanctions policy. political When Domestic institutionsaffect which groups'preferencesreceive representation. takes place and new leadersenter office, political institutionsdeterpolitical change mine the extent to which the preferencesreceiving representation change. We derive and as to how leadershipturnover domesticpoliticalinstitutionsaffect the hypotheses durationof sanctions.In the thirdsection, we test these predictionson a sampleof 47 sanctions episodes using hazard analysis. We conclude with remarks about the implicationsof this work for the study of sanctions.

SANCTION SUCCESS AND SANCTION DURATION Economic sanctionsarean exampleof coercivediplomacydesignedto inducea target countryto change some policy it would not otherwise(Baldwin 1985). In theory, sanctionsachieve this by inflicting economic damageon the targetstate throughthe of reductionof customarytradeor withdrawal financialrelationsby the sending state. most scholarstake for grantedthe usefulness of economic sanctions,with Although the exception of recentwork by Dorussenand Mo (2001) and Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000), little scholarly analysis focuses on the durationof sanctions. Most political of theoristsinvestigatethe success of economic sanctionsas an instrument foreignpolBaldwin 1985; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Rogers 1996; icy (e.g., Lenway 1988; Hass and O'Sullivan2000; Hart2000; Hass 1998; Doxey 1987). Proponents argue that economic sanctions can be as effective as militaryforce and are


safer and cheaper(Baldwin 1985). According to its advocates,when costs are effectively targetedat ruling elites, sanctions can achieve ambitiousforeign policy goals (Hufbauer,Schott, and Elliot 1990). Whetherthe sanctionshave multilateral support also affects their effectiveness (Martin1992; but see Drezner 1999).1 Moreoften thannot, however,scholarsconcludethatsanctionssimplydo not work. Many argue that sanctions are rarely,if ever, effective tools of coercion (e.g., Pape 1997; Galtung 1967; Morganand Schwebach 1997; Wallensteen1968). Klaus Knorr finds that sanctionsclearly failed in 13 of the 17 cases he studies (Knorr1977). The tradeand business group USA ENGAGE(2004) arguesthat unilateralsanctions are largely prone to failure. Although there is a growing consensus that sanctionsrarely succeed, sanctionscontinueto be used as a foreignpolicy tool makingit likely thatthis debate will continuefor some time. One reasonfor the lack of consensusbetweenpolicy makersandacademicsregarding the efficacy of economic sanctionsas a tool of coercivediplomacyrevolvesaround measurement issues. As Hufbauer, Schott,andElliot (1990) state,"Judgment plays an role in assigning a single numberto each element in the success equation." important In their study of sanctionepisodes, Hufbauer,Schott, and Elliot attemptto minimize the subjectivityby including evaluations of other scholars. Pape (1997), however, reevaluatesthe same data set and comes to a very differentset of conclusions about sanctions' success rate. Scholars are currentlyin the process of reevaluatingPape's reevaluation(Hart2000). This suggests that some rethinkingneeds to be done about the reliabilityof the studyof economic sanctionoutcomes.Because of these measurementissues,thereis littleconsensusas to whichvariables affectthe successof sanctions. the likely suspectsarethe powerrelationships betweenthe two states,the ecoAmong nomic ties bindingthe two states,the aims of the sender,the domesticpoliticalinstitutions in the target states, and the time of interactionbetween the states (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Dashti-Gibson,Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Dorussenand Mo 2001; Hart2000; Wendt, 1999). Only a small fractionof the largebody of researchon sanctionshas looked at why some coercion attemptslast for decades, but otherslast only a few months(Dorussen andMo 2001; Bolks andAl-Sowayel 2000).2However,we thinkthis is a useful puzzle to studyfor a numberof reasons.Althoughthe theoreticalfocus of the sanctionsliteratureis firmlyset on explainingthe success of sanctionsandtendsto focus on politics of the targetstate,we studythe durationof sanctionsto highlightthe importance poliof tics in both the targetand the senderstates. Another, more practical, reason to study the duration of sanctions is that the dependentvariableis simple to evaluatebecause the length of economic sanctionsis more clear-cutthan either the costs of sanctions or their efficacy. Measurementsof sanctiondurationare not biased by the normativeconcerns thatplague the measurement of sanctionsuccess. However,therearetrickyspecificationissues in the empirical analysisof sanctionsduration.Sanctionsend when eitherthe senderdecides to end
1. Othersarguethat sanctionsare often used purelyfor rhetoricalpurposes;the failurerate is misleading because many sanctions are neverimplemented(Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990). 2. The literatureon war duration,anothermore violent example of coercive diplomacy,is, in contrast,much betterdeveloped. See, for example, Goemans (2000) for a review.



the sanctioningpolicy or the targetcomplies with demands.In otherwords, thereare competingrisks thatsanctionsend. When the targetcomplies (i.e., sanctionsare successful), thenour abilityto observewhen the senderwould quitis censored.Similarly, if the senderquits, then our abilityto observewhen the targetwould acquiesceis censored.We discuss differentways of dealingwith this problemin the empiricalsection of the study. Some scholarsarguethatthe problemwith the literature sanctionsuccess is not on measurement errorbutratherthe weak theoreticalunderpinnings the empiricallitof erature sanctions.Empiricalworkon the success of sanctionssuffersfroma sample on selection bias that leads to misleading conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions. Smith(1996) pointsout thatthe success of sanctionsandthe decision to sanction are stronglyinterdependent. When sanctionsarelikely to succeed and when thereis a to impose them, no sanctionswill actuallybe imposed because political willingness theirmerethreatis sufficientto force the targetto changethe policies in dispute.At the otherextreme,if sanctionsare insufficientto force concessions from the targetcountry,then from the goal of achievingpolicy change, they are an ineffective tool for the sanctionerto continueto use.3So, we shouldexpectthatthe merethreator shortimpositionof sanctionsproducespolicy changeor thatsanctionscompletelyfail to produce significantpolicy concessions fromthe target.Indeed,supportingSmith'scontention, Dashti-Gibson,Davis, and Radcliff (1997) find empiricalevidence consistent with in this selection effect. They find a "realdownwardtrend" the likelihoodthatsanctions will succeed as time passes (p. 616). The longer sanctionsare in place, the less likely they are to succeed (see also Hart2000). Scholarswho studythe success of sanctionsas foreignpolicy tools face the empirical problemof sample selection bias. If the sanctionsare going to work,they will not need to be applied. So why do we observe the hundredsof economic sanctionsthat have been imposed?Why do some statessanctionfor decades,long afterit is clearthe sanctionsareinsufficientto changepolicy in the targetstate?We arguethatif sanctions do not workand areeconomicallycostly, they areprobablyimposed for some domestic political benefit. Next we systematically consider this question, starting with Smith's (1996) war-of-attrition approachto studyingsanctions.

THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT of To understand duration sanctions,it is necessaryto controlfor the decision to the with the targetcountry.In the sanction.Sanctionsareboycottson tradingrelationships on sanctions,it is widely assumedthatsanctionsareused by governmentsto literature achieve international political goals, such as influencing policy in the targetnation Withinthis context, sanctions are a battle of wills. They last either (Lenway 1988). untilthe senderdecidesto give up tryingto bringaboutpolicy changeor untilthe target
3. Smith(1996) shows that,except undercertainpeculiardistributional assumptions,sanctionsactually occur only when sanctionsare insufficientto force the targetto alterpolicy and when the senderstate prefersto send sanctionseven though it knows they will fail.


acquiesces. An appropriate technique for modeling such an interactionis a "warof in attrition," which both sides pay costs untilone side decides to quitandthe opponent wins the prize. Smith(1996) uses an incompleteinformation versionofjust such a war-of-attrition The senderchooses whetherto sanctionto get the targetto give up a prize approach. thatit initiallyholds-its preferred policy position.The sanctionscontinueuntileither the targetgives up the prize by changingpolicy (a case of successful sanctions)or the senderdecides sanctioningis no longerworthwhile(a case of unsuccessfulsanctions). the By characterizing Bayesian perfect equilibriumof the game, Smith shows that, absentsome particular distributional assumptions,sanctionsonly occurwhen they are insufficientto force complianceby the targetbut the senderstill wishes to send them, presumablyfor some domestic political reason. The logic behind these results is as follows: first, suppose the sanctionsare sufficiently costly that the target would rathercomply with the sender's demands than endurethe sanctionsindefinitely.In such a setting,becausethe senderknowsthe target will comply, it always sanctions.Knowingthe sanctionswill persist,the targetimmediately complies. Hence, sanctions are either very short or, more likely, their mere threatis sufficientto bring aboutthe target'scompliance. Second, suppose the target would ratherbare the cost of sanctions indefinitely than comply with the sender's demands.In this setting, the targetwill never comply, and sanctions are useless for bringingaboutpolicy concessions. Hence, the senderstatewill neverimpose the sanction unless it gains some domesticpoliticalbenefitthatoffsets the economic cost of the sanctions.Given this logic, Smith (1996) predictsthe sanctionsthat we actually see representthose cases when sanctionsare unlikely to work. These sanctionscontinue for a long time because both sides prefertheir continuance. Smith's(1996) model, althoughuseful, assumesnationsaremonoUnfortunately, lithic, unchanging entities. In reality, nations are not atomistic, and their leaders choose those policies that satisfy the goals of their supporters.This has important implicationsfor the durationof sanctions.Leadership changein eitherthe targetor the senderstate can bring abouta shift in sanctionspolicy. For instance, suppose leadership change occurs in the sender state. Although the previous leader gained some domesticbenefit from imposing sanctions,the supporters the new leadermight not of sanctions.Whenpolitigain suchbenefitsand,as such, the leaderis likely to terminate cal change brings abouta shift in which interestsare represented,such changes often signal the ending of sanctions. Leadership changein the targetstatecan have similarimplicationsfor the endingof sanctions.Suppose, for instance,thatthe supporters the new leaderhave interests of morein line with the demandsof the senderthanthose of the predecessor'ssupporters. Such a shift in leadershipchange is likely to end sanctions:the new leadershifts policies to those thatthe senderdesires. Unfortunately, classifying such an event as a success or failureis fraughtwith dangerbecause it often conflates success and leadership turnover.For instance, the recent removal by militaryforce of Iraqileader Saddam Hussein led to the end of U.S. sanctions against Iraq. Although the United States achieved its policy objectives, does this fact constitute sanctions success? In our attentionto this problem. empiricalsection, we shall pay particular



in Leadershipturnover eitherthe senderor targetstatecan lead to the end of sanctions, but it does not necessarily mean that it will. The structureof our argumentis Leaders adopt those policies most likely to keep them in power, straightforward. desire. As a result, changes in the leaderwhich are the policies thattheir supporters are ship's coalition of supporters liable to lead to a change in sanctionspolicy, be it in the targetor in the sendernation. Ourpredictionsas to when leaderchange causes a aboutwhich groupsreceiverepresentashift in sanctionspolicy reduceto an argument tion underdifferentpolitical systems. Fortunately, comparative politics scholarshave madegreatinroadsalong these theoreticallines uponwhich we draw.We focus on difbetweendemocraticandnondemocratic ferencesin representation politicalsystems.

LEADERSHIP CHANGE AND TYPE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM leaders'political incentives Thereare severalways to characterizenondemocratic both nondemocraticand democraticleaders'goals as (Olson 1993). We characterize ensuringtheirpolitical survival.They do so by buying rewardsfor domestic interests whose supportthey rely on to stay in power. In democracies,elections or the breakdown of cabinetgovernmentoften lead to leadershipchange.In autocracies,a military coup or the deathof the autocratis a typical mechanismfor leadershipchange. In oligarchies,leadershipchange is frequentlythe resultof a power strugglewithinthe oligarchy and a shakeupin the distributionof power among political leaders. All else equal,politicalleaderstypicallylast longerin nondemocratic regimesthan in democraticregimes (Bienen and Van de Walle 1991). Democratic governments have regularlyheld elections. Althoughmanypoliticiansarereelected,they arerarely in power for decades. Indeed,manydemocracieshave termlimits on political tenure. Nondemocraticregimes do not have regularlyheld elections, and leaders' length of time in governmentis highly variable.In some cases, there is rapidleadershipturnover.In othercases, the leadershipis in powerfor decades.However,if nondemocratic leadersare able to avoid a coup in the early years, the risk of turnoverdeclines as the leaderacquirespolitical capital and consolidateshis or her power. If leadershipchange is more common in democraciesthannondemocracies,and if leadershipchange triggersthe withdrawalof sanctions, sanctions will be shorterin wheneitherthe senderor the targetstateis democratic.The shortestsanctions duration of all will be between democraticdyads. Thereis some empiricalevidence thatsanctions are shorterwhen the target state is democratic(Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000). in However,we arguenext thatthe higherrateof leadershipturnover democraticstates is morecommonin democracies, is not drivingthis result.Althoughleadershipchange of it is less likely to be associatedwith the withdrawal sanctionsthanin nondemocratic in the empiricalanalysis, we find thathaving controlledfor leadersystems. Indeed, ship change, political institutionsby themselves have no significant effect on the durationof sanctions. Building on Bueno de Mesquitaet al.'s (Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2003) approach,we argue that a key difference between democratic


that andnondemocratic leadersis the size of the coalitionof supporters leadersneed to retainpower. In democraticsystems, leadersneed the supportof many voters to survive in office. Autocratsrely on the supportof a much smallersegmentof the population. The size of the coalition of supportersrequiredunder different institutional arrangementsaffects the probabilitythat leadership change leads to new interests being represented(Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2003). Leadershipchange in democraticsystems is less likely to change which interestsare representedcomparedwith leadershipchange in autocraticsystems. Because democraticleadersneed to win the supportof a muchlargercoalitionof domesticsupporters than do autocraticleaders, in democracies,there is a higher probabilitythat the new winning coalition will include many of the previous leader's supporters.Leadersin nondemocratic statesstay in powerwith the supportof a smallercoalitionof domestic The smallersize of theirsupportbase meansthatany overlapbetween the supporters. of supporters the old and new leadersis likely to be small, and as a result,the general policy preferencesof new coalitions will differ from previouscoalitions to a greater In states.4 this framework, new leadersaremorelikely to repdegreein nondemocratic resent a differentset of interestsfrom their predecessorsin nondemocraticsystems than in democraticsystems. A democraticallyelected leaderwho resists pressurefrom foreign sanctionsdoes so with the supportof a large coalition of domestic supporters.For these actors, the benefits of the leader's policy choices outweigh the costs imposed by foreign sanctions. If this were not the case, the democraticleaderwould have immediatelyacquiesced to pressurefrom foreign sanctions.Suppose a change in leaderoccurs, but the new leaderdrawssome votes fromhis or her predecessor'scoalitionof domestic supporters. If the new leader wants to stay in office, he or she will continue resisting pressurefrom foreign sanctions. In nondemocratic states,a change in leaderis morelikely to lead to a change in the intereststhe governmentrepresents.If the supporters the new leaderhave interests of more in line with the demandsof the sanctionssenderthanthose of the predecessor's supporters,the leader will likely acquiesce to sanctions pressure.If the new target towardthe senderandhence likely to be receptive leadershipis simplymore"friendly" to significantfuturepolicy revisions,thenthe sendermightend sanctionsto strengthen the new targetleader'sdomestic position. A similar logic can be extended to the cases of democraticand nondemocratic senderstates.In democraticstates,new leadersfollow policies similarto those of their predecessors.For a large coalition of voters,the benefits of sanctioningoutweigh the domestic costs. Until this changes or the targetstate acquiesces, sanctions will continue. In nondemocraticstates, a shift in leaderis likely to lead to a change in which interestsare represented.Sanctionsare imposed because, for these domestic groups, the benefits associatedwith continuingthe previousleadership'spolicy are probably outweighed by the costs of imposing foreign sanctions. The new leader will, as a result, revoke his or her predecessor'ssanctions.We arguethat in democracies,new
4. Anotherway of thinkingaboutnondemocratic systems is thatthe leaderhas a clearhandin policy interestsof thoseon whose support or she relies. he makingas long as he or she rewardstheparticularistic



leadersfollow similarpolicies. Theycontinueto sanctionin the case of the senderstate andcontinueto resistpressurefrom sanctionsin the targetstate.However,in nondemocraticstates,a changein leaderis morelikely to lead to leadersgiving up on sanctions or giving in to sanctionspressure.5 The extent to which new leaders follow new policies does vary within the set of democraticand nondemocraticsystems. Some scholarsarguethat democracieswith single-party governments experience more radical policy shifts with a change in leader than multipartygovernments.However,not all scholars agree (Downs 1957; Cox 1990;Tsebelis 1999). This is a controversial topic, andthereis anextensiveliterature comparingpolicy outcomes in differenttypes of democraticsystems (see, e.g., Hibbs 1977; Hofferbertand Budge 1993). Farless has been writtenaboutleadership turnoveracross differenttypes of nondemocracies(but see Bunce 1981; Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2002; Bueno de Mesquitaet al. 2003; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Olson 1993; North 1981). As in democraticsystems, we might expect differencesin the type of nondemocraticgovernment(e.g., autocraticor oligarchic) to affect the degree to which policy changes with a change in leader.We argue,however,that the effect of leadershipchange on policy shifts is bigger across than within regime type. The United Stateshas a unique style of democracy;nonetheless,the effect of leadership change on sanctiondurationis similarto that in other democraticsystems. The U.S. sanctionson Cuba are a nice example of this. In January1959, Fidel Castro'srevolutionary armydefeatedthe Batista'sincumbent governmentand seized powerin Cuba.By 1960, Castroexhibiteda strongaffinity with communiststates and nationalizedall U.S. economic interestsin Cuba.The U.S. government imposed sanctionsthatpersisttoday,althoughthe natureof the sanctions has changed over time.6Since Eisenhower initiated the sanctions, there have been eight presidentialadministrations. Some leaders have been Democrats,others sanctions have remainedsome of the broadestand most Republicans;nevertheless, stringenteverrecorded.In the UnitedStates,a changein leaderaffectswhich coalition of interestsreceives representation. However,becausethe incumbentleaderandchalseek to win a majorityof the vote, many of the same groups of voters are lengers importantto all leaders. The U.S. Constitutiondeveloped a presidentialstyle of democracy that affects which domestic groupsareimportant all presidentialcandidates.The electoralcolto

5. In the democraticcase, the causes of leadershipchange areexogenous to the impositionof sanccase, sanctionspressureis potentiallya cause of leadershipchange. tions, but in the nondemocratic 6. In June 1959,FloridaSenatorGeorgeSmathersproposedlegislationlimitingCuba'ssugarimport quota to the United States. By February1960, this legislation was in effect, reducingsugar importsfrom Cubaby 3 million tons, aboutone-halfof Cuba'sannualcrop,andresultingin morethanU.S.$80 million of lost income (Schreiber1973). The Eisenhowerregime subsequentlydeepenedeconomic sanctions. Most U.S. exports were bannedby October 1960. The Kennedyadministration furthertightenedthe sanctions of calling on the Organization AmericanStates (OAS) to cooperatein imposing imposedunderEisenhower, restrictionson Cuba.Althoughthe 1970s saw the relaxingof some restrictions,with the OAS droppingits banin 1974anda softeningof sanctionsby bothFordandCarter, remained(Schreiber significantrestrictions 1973).Castrohas madesignificantpolicy concessions-particularly in thepastfew years-nonetheless, and U.S. policy remainslargelyunchanged.The intensityof U.S. sanctionspolicy has changed over time.


Presidentialcandidatesneed to win a majorlege indirectlyelects the U.S. president.7 ity of electoralcollege votes, not the popularvote. The more heavily populatedstates have a highernumberof electoralcollege votes, and in most of these states,the candidatewho carriesthese stateswins all of the electoralvotes.8AlthoughFloridais only 1 of 50 states in the United States, it has about 10%of the votes needed to win. In the highly competitivestateof Florida,winning the votes of the highly organizedCuban Americancommunityhas traditionallybeen key in determiningthe outcome of the election (thepluralitywinnertakesall 27 electoralcollege votes). The intensityof antiCastrofeeling amongthe largeFloridianCubanAmericancommunityhas meantthat harshsanctionsagainstCubahaveremaineda partof U.S. foreignpolicy for morethan 40 years, regardlessof the partyor political ideology of the sittingpresidentor major partycandidates(Purcell 1998). The Indonesia-Malaysiasanctionsepisode provides a sharpcontrastto the U.S.Cubancase. In the early 1960s, Indonesia'snondemocratic regimewas ruledby an oligopoly headedby PresidentAhmed Sukarno.In 1963, PresidentSukaro imposed a full trade embargo on the newly federated state of Malaysia in protest against the state'sformation(Hufbauer,Schott,and Elliot 1990; Sodhy 1988). The sanctionsdid of not last long; a reorganization power withinthe Indonesianleadership3 years later of led to the withdrawal sanctions.In March1966, GeneralSuharto, commander the of forced Sukarnoto transfermuch of his executive power to him. Suhartodrew army, supportfromthe military-a differentsupportbase thanhis predecessor,Sukaro. As Indonesia's new leader, Suhartoreestablishedtradeconnections with Malaysia that In very year.9 the UnitedStates,leaderscome andgo, butsanctionspolicy is stableand resilient.Only in nondemocratic systems, such as Indonesia,shouldwe expect leaderturnoverin the senderstate to be key to the terminationof sanctions. ship We are not the only scholarsto explore how domestic political institutionsaffect sanctionpolicy. DorussenandMo (2001), amongthe few scholarsto explorethe duration question,also examinedomestic institutions.They do so, however,from the perspectivethatthese institutionsshapeaudiencecosts andthe abilityof sendernationsto signal their intent (Lenway 1988; Fearon 1997; Schultz 1998; Smith 1996). They argue that democraticinstitutionsmake it costly for leaders to back down. Once a leader imposes sanctions,it is difficult for her or him to back down withoutconcessions from the target.Althoughthey may be rightthatit is hardfor democratsto back down, they fail to explain why successorgovernmentsare encumberedwith the same costs to backing down, given they did not impose the sanctions (McGillivray and Smith 2000; Guisingerand Smith 2002).
7. In the United States, the presidenttypically initiates legislative action on sanctions. Congress, however,can veto presidentialinitiatives.Increasingly,the legislatureinitiates sanctionspolicy. 8. In theory,in a two-partyrace, a candidatecould carrythe electoralcollege vote withjust 25% of the popularvote by winninga baremajorityin the statesused to buildthe electoralcollege coalitionandwinA ning none of the popularvote in the statesoutside the electoralcollege majority. less extremeexample of this took place in the 2000 election when Bush carriedthe electoralcollege vote, whereasGorewon the popular vote. 9. Bartertraderesumedin June 1966, andIndonesiaandSingaporeofficially recognizedone another as states.In August 1966, MalaysiaandIndonesiasigned a normalization agreement,following which they reestablishedtradeand commerciallinks in March 1967.



if Bolks andAl-Sowayel (2000) arguethatsanctionsareof shorterduration the target is a democraticstate because democraticleaders are more vulnerablethan autocratic leaders to pressure from the domestic groups suffering from the economic effects of sanctions.They find empiricalevidence to this effect. However,just being morerepresentative does not meanthatdemocraticstatesaremorelikely to acquiesce. Whetherdemocraticallyelected leaders acquiesce to sanctions pressuredepends on whetherkey domesticsupporters believe thatthe costs of sanctionsoutweighthe benefits of retainingexisting policy. Only if the costs outweigh the benefits to domestic supporterswill democraticleadersgive in, and then they are likely to do so quickly. However,if the benefits of keeping the existing policy are greaterthan the costs of sanctionsto the majorityof voters,leaderswill resistpressurefromforeign sanctions. Moreover,we arguethatleadershipchange will be unrelatedto the durationof sancof tions, andthe eventualwithdrawal sanctionswill be broughtaboutfor an exogenous reason-perhaps leadershipchange in the senderstate. Indeed,we find thatalthough the durationof sanctions is shorterwith democratictargets than autocratictargets, leadershipchange is not the mechanismthatdrives this. In summary,we hypothesizethe following: increases probability sancthe that 1: nation changein thesender Hypothesis Leadership tionsend. that nationincreases probability sancthe 2: Hypothesis Leadership changein the target with success. tionsend,although eventscanoftenbe conflated sanctions such in is of of 3: changeon the duration sanctions greater Hypothesis Theimpact leadership states. nondemocratic thandemocratic rather Next, we test these hypothesesusing a Weibullhazardmodel fit to a dataset of 56 sanctionepisodes with 363 observations.


The dataon sanctionscome fromHufbauer, Schott,andElliot (1990); we generated the controlvariablesusing EUGene (Bennettand Stam2000); andthe leadershipdata come from Bueno de Mesquitaet al. (2003).'0We discuss the sanctionsdatabelow in moredetail.The dependentvariableis the lengthof sanctionsbetweensendernationA that andtargetnationB. Hazardanalysisestimatesthe probability sanctionsend at any point in time conditional on sanctions not having alreadyended." We use both the Weibullmodel and the semiparametric techniqueof Cox's proportionate parametric hazardmodel. The resultsin Table1 presentthe resultsof the Weibullmodels. The dif10. Many thanksto Randy Siverson(Universityof California,Davis) for sending us these data. to 11. Hazardmodelsarealso referred as survivalmodels, duration models,or eventhistorymodels. A sourcesforduration to basic introduction suchanalysisis in Allison (1984). Comprehensive analysisinclude Greene (1993) and Lancaster(1990). Recent applicationsof hazardanalysis to political science include Warwick(1994), Bueno de Mesquitaand Siverson (1994), Bennettand Stam (1996), Bennett (1998), and Goemans (2000).


WeibullEstimates of InternationalSanctions Duration:ParameterEstimates Pr
Model 1: Censored Successful Sanctions ("Sender's Decision to Quit") Leaderchange A Leaderchange A* polity A Polity A Leaderchange B Leaderchange B* polity B Polity B Ratio of power capabilities Similarityof interests Dyadic age Distance United States Success Durationdependenceparameter, p Observations Cases, n Log likelihood 38.9** (2.04) 0.014** (2.18) 2.05 (0.57) 6.31*** (2.36) 0.215 (1.21) 0.786 (0.28) 0.210 (1.25) 1.01 (0.27) 1.50* (1.24) 2.59** (2.33)

Mo Model 2: Termination All Sanction Cen of ("Sender's and Target's Successf Aggregate Decision to Quit") ("Sender's De 20.5** 0.035** 1.88 4.94*** 0.220* 2.02 1.06 0.962 1.49* 1.65** (1.78) (1.86) (0.53) (2.39) (1.44) (1.11) (0.06) (0.77) (1.55) (1.74)

1.43*** (6.04) 262 47 -34.5

1.14*** (7.25) 272 47 -50.13

12.2* 0.074* 1.11 4.67** 0.156 4.19* 6.02 1.01 2.11** 3.79** 0.124** 1.52** 1.36**

262 47 -11.

*p <. 10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. All one-tailed tests. We presentourresultsas hazardratiosratherthanthe regressioncoeff estimates. Full re creasedriskof failureandhence shorterdurations.Z scores appearin parenthesesnext to the parameter http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm/.



ference between these results and those obtainedusing the Cox estimatorare unreand markable omittedto save space.The Weibullsetupmodelsthe hazardrateat time t, the probabilitythat sanctionsterminateconditionalon not alreadyhaving ended, as h(t) = p t p-l, where X representsthe regressors,k = exp(xj p) andp is an ancillary thatdetermineswhetherthe hazardrate increasesor decreasesover time. parameter Using such hazardapproaches,we can assess whetherfactors such as leadership that changeorregimetype increaseor decreasethe probability sanctionsend. Unfortusome care is needed. Sanctionsend when eitherthe senderdecides to end the nately, sanctioningpolicy or the targetcomplies with demands.There are competing risks thatsanctionsend.12 Supposewe focus on when the senderquits.The recentendingof In sanctionsagainstIraqprovidesa useful illustration. 2003, the UnitedStatesstopped the it did not do so because it chose to "quit"; rather, motisanctioningIraq.However, vation for the sanctions-the removalof SaddamHussein's regime-was no longer there.AlthoughU.S.-Iraqsanctionsended in 2003, it is clear the U.S. willingness to maintainsanctionspersistsshouldthey still be required.In assessing when the sender to quits, the U.S.-Iraqsanctionscase shows thatthe United Stateswas prepared sancStates would have sanction until at least 2003. We do not know whetherthe United tioned in 2004 because this became a moot point following the Second Gulf War. Cases such as these are best thoughtof as censored. In general,when the targetcomplies (i.e., when sanctionsare successful), then our ability to observe when the sender would quit is censored. Similarly,if the sender quits, then our abilityto observewhen the targetwould acquiesce is censored.Unfortunately,as the contentiousdebateover sanctionssuccess indicates,it is extremelydifficult in manycases to ascertainwhich side quits.If we could makesuch a distinction, then a standard competinghazardsapproachcould be used (Gordon2002; Diermeier andStevenson2000).13 Herewe adopta compromisebetweenlumpingtogetherall the effects into a single hazardequation and a competing hazardsapproach.Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990) provide a 16-pointscale of sanctionssuccess. Although, as we alreadyindicated,this scale is controversial, takesuccess ratingsgreaterthan 12 to be instancesof clear success; hence, from the perspectiveof the sender'sdecision to quit, such events are censored. In addition, we estimate the hazardmodel without assumingsuchcensoring-in effect, lumpingboth sides' decisions to quitinto a single equation. We correctedanddroppedobservationsof sanctionsfollowing Pape's(1997) arguments. Hufbauer,Schott, and Elliot (1990) identified 115 cases of sanctions. Pape arguesthat40 of these shouldnotbe consideredcases of sanctions(e.g., tradewars),or the sanctionsended for reasons unrelatedto political factors at eitherthe initiatoror targetstate(e.g., the targetstateceased to exist). Because we arefocusing on the duration of economic sanctionsas a function of political factors in the sending state, we droppedsanctionsthatended due to militarydefeat and coups or by militaryforce in the targetstate.Thereis also a growingbody of evidence to suggest thatinternational
12. See Gordon(2002) for a discussion of competinghazardmodels in political science. 13. Dependenciesbetween competinghazardscan be modeled using frailty models. Unfortunately, given the small sample size, such techniquesare impracticalhere (Gordon2002).


afterWorldWarII (Gowa 1999). As a result,we also relationschangedfundamentally droppedcases includingand before WorldWarII. Ourdatathereforecover the years from 1948 to 1990. We begin with 60 cases; we drop 13 more due to missing data.We economic sanctions with 363 yearly observations. analyze 47 cases of international Eachof the remainingincidentsof sanctionshas multipleobservations,with a rangeof 2 to 31.'4An observationreflects one of two occurrences:the ending of the sanctions or the end of a calendaryear.Following Hufbauer, Schott,andElliot (1990), as well as we code sanctionsas bilateral,not scoringjoiners but only the initiator Pape (1997), and targetstates. The variable"leaderchangeA" is a dummyvariablethatcodes whetheranyleadership change took place in a particular year in the sender nation,A. There is a corresponding variablefor leadershipchanges in the targetstate, B. Using the numberof instancesof leadershipchange, ratherthan simply presenceor absence of leadership change, yields much the same results. Domestic politicalinstitutionsarecoded on the Polity III scale. Specifically,polity A is the Polity III democracyscore minus the polity autocracyscore for stateA. Both these scores rangebetween0 and 10. We normalizethe differencebetween these indices by adding 10 anddividingby 20. In ourhazardmodels, polity A rangesbetween 0 and 1. Democratic states score high on this measure.Polity B is the corresponding measurefor the targetstate. In additionto the political variables,we include the following controlvariables: 1. Ratioofpowercapabilities: A A B), power A/(power + power where power represents theCorrelates War of indexfornation A. (COW) composite power 2. Similarity interests: measure similarity thetwostates' We the of interests Bueno with of 3. Dyadic the of that haveexisted siage:Wemeasure amount timein years thetwostates in If from system thenrethe and multaneously theinternational system. onestate drops the to anew. usethelogarithm dyadage We of appears, ageclockreverts zeroandstarts plus 1 year. 4. Distance: variable This measures logarithm thegeographic the of distance between the twostates' in capitals kilometers. 5. United States: dummy A variable whether United the is States thesender state. coding 6. Success: variable This the measures potency thesanctions thetarget in terms of on state of proportional relative grossnational cost to (GNP).It is a 1 to 16 scale.16 product
de Mesquita's(1981) global tau-bmeasure.This is a-1 to 1 correlation the two states' of alliance portfolios.15

RESULTS The estimatesof the hazardmodels areshown in Table 1. Two differentapproaches arepresented: estimatesof the sender'sdecision to quitandthe aggregateeffect of both
14. The mean numberof observationsis 6. 15. We hadmissing datafor roughly5% of the cases on this variable.Forthese cases, we substituted the mean value for the rest of the series. 16. For details on the success scale, a productof two 1 to 4 scales, see Hufbauer,Schott, and Elliot (1990).



the sender's and target's decisions to quit. As discussed above, sanctions can end because either the sender quits or the targetcomplies, althoughin many cases, it is impossible or controversialto distinguishbetween these outcomes. In attemptingto to estimatethe sender'sdecision to quit, it is not appropriate considerevents when the targetclearly complied as instances of quitting.In such a scenario, we do not know when the senderwould have quit, only thatshe or he did not quit priorto the target's compliance.Hence, when sanctionswere definitely successful (> 12 on the Hufbauer scale), the sender'sdecision to quit is censored.We referto this case as the "sender's decision to quit."We also present analyses in which we do not (or more practically cannot) distinguish who quit. We refer to this case as the "sender's and target's aggregatedecision to quit." Before moving to the prominentquestions of political and leadershipchange, we briefly describe the impact of the control variables.The relative strengthof the two parties,as measuredby the powerratiovariable,has no significantimpacton the duration of sanctions.The similarityof interestsmeasuredby Bueno de Mesquita'stau-b measurealso has no significantimpacton the length of sanctions.The analyses show that the longer a dyad has interacted,the shorter that sanctions are likely to be. Although this variableis statisticallysignificant in some models, it is not in others. the Furthermore, substantiveimpactof this variableis small. Across all the analyses, the greaterthe distancebetween senderandtarget,the morelikely sanctionsareto end. The ancillaryparameter, assesses the extent to which the risk of sanctionsending p, in increasesor decreasesover time. The coefficientgreaterthan 1, reported each of the models in Table 1, indicatesthatthe longerthatsanctionslast, the more likely they are to end. Models 3 and4 includecontrolsfor whetherthe United Statesis the senderandthe level of eventualsuccess of the sanction.Both variableshave a powerfulrole in predicting the length of sanctions.All else equal, the United States is only about 10%as likely to end sanctions compared to other nations. As the experience of sanctions againstCuba shows, the United States is preparedto impose long-termsanctions. The success variablestronglyinfluences the ending of sanctions.However,this is The success of sanctionsis an ex post evaluationand, in manycases, is not surprising. to the end of sanctions. In models 1 and 3, we censor those termination equivalent events when sanctionsendedwith clear success. Althoughthe inclusionof the success variableimprovesthe model fit, it does not substantivelyalterthe impactof the political and leadershipvariables.It is these variablesthat are of most interesthere. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERSHIP CHANGE The variable"leaderchange A" is coded 1 if leadershipturnoveroccurs in the senderstatein a particular yearlyobservationand0 otherwise.The statisticallysignifisenderstate,the in canthazardratioof 38 reported model 1 meansthatfor an autocratic likelihoodof quittingsanctionsis 38 times greaterif leaderchangeoccurs.Leadership


change appearsto have an enormousimpact on the durationof sanctions.However, this interpretation applies only to autocraticstates. The variable"leaderchange A* polity A" is the productof the leadershipchangedummyandthe institutional arrangements in nationA. When the sender state is fully autocratic,and hence polity A = 0, then this variablehas no impacton the durationof sanctions.For such a state,only the "leaderchange A" variableis relevantin assessing the impact of leadershipchange. However,when the sender state is democratic,then the impact of leadershipchange termin model 1 is 0.014. For dependson bothterms.The coefficienton the interaction a fully democraticstate(polity A = 1), the impactof leadershipchangeon the decision to quit sanctioningis negligible. This patternis repeatedthroughout othermodels the in Table 1, althoughthe magnitudeof the effect differssomewhat.Consistentwith our expectations,leadershipturnoverreduces the durationof sanctionsin autocratic,but not democratic,senders. Leadershipchange in targetstates also drasticallyaffects the probabilityof sanctions ending.The variable"leaderchange B" is coded 1 if leadershipchangeoccurs in the targetstateand 0 otherwise.Across the four models presentedin Table 1, the proportionatehazardon this variableis around4, meaningthat leadershipchange in the targetstatemakessanctionsfourtimes morelikely to end when the targetis autocratic. This result should not surpriseus. In many cases, the implicit goal of sanctions is regime change. When the targetis democratic,the impactof leadershipchange is negligible. The variable"leaderchange B* polity B" is the productof any leadershipchange and the target'sregimetype. Whenthe targetis democratic(polity B = 1), thenthe net effect of hazards(equivalently, sum of the leadershipchangeis the productof the proportionate the coefficients).The net effect of leadershipchange in democraciesis 0. As ourtheoretical argumentspredict,to put togethera sufficiently large coalition of supporters, leaders in democraticsystems often need to draw supportfrom many of the same domestic groups.Therefore,the interestsof these groupsreceive representation even when leaders change. Autocraticleaders rely on smaller groups of supporters.As such, they are less beholden to the same pivotal groups as their predecessor,and so leadership change alters the interests that are representedand hence the calls for policies that incur sanctions. Having controlledfor leadershipchange, political institutionsby themselves have no significanteffect on the durationof sanctions.The variablespolity A and polity B code the regimetype of sender.Neitherof these variablesaltersthe lengthof sanctions directly.As arguedearlier,there are competing influences determininghow institutions affect sanctions. Although the impact of leadershipchange is greaterin autocraticsystems, leadershipturnover more common in democracies.The resultssugis gest that neithereffect dominatesthe other, so taken together,regime type does not alterthe length of sanctions. The results also show that leadershipturnoveroften ends sanctions in autocratic nations,with the effect being muchless in democracies.Leadership changeis relevant in both senders and targets.It is worthreturningto the distinctionbetween models 1 and 3 and models 2 and4 to considerthe relevanceof these results.In models 1 and 3,



we focus on instanceswhen the senderquitssanctioningby censoringthose eventsthat end in success (e.g., when the targetcomplied).Despitethatthe focus of these analyses is on the sender,leadershipchangein the targethas a significantimpacton the sender's to decision to quit sanctions.Severalfactorscontribute this result.First,an implicit,if not explicit, reason for sanctions is regime change. Hence, although the sanctions mightnot be a coercive success, once a majorreasonfor the sanctionshas disappeared, the sender quits. Second, if the new targetleadershipis friendliertowardthe sender and hence likely to be receptiveto significantfuturepolicy revisions, then the sender might end sanctionsto strengthenthe new targetleader'sdomestic position. Even in the sender's decision, leadershipchange in the targethas significant impact on the decision to maintainsanctions. Models 2 and 4 make no attemptto distinguishhow sanctionsend. As such, they the represent aggregateeffect of boththe sender'sandthe target'sdecision to quit.The changein analysesproducevery similarresultsto those in models 1 and3. Leadership to the terminationof sanctions because new autocratic autocraticstates often leads leadersoften shift theirsupportbase relativeto theirpredecessors,which leads to difIn ferent interestsreceiving representation. democraticsystems, the requirementto often forces both incumbentsand challengersto form a large coalition of supporters seek the supportof the same domestic groups. Because satisfying the goals of these key domestic groups is essential for political success, leadership change has less impacton sanctionspolicy. Whetherfrom the perspectiveof the sender'sdecision to quit or the aggregateof both the sender'sand target'sdecisions, the impactof leadership change in both the sender and targeton the length of sanctionsdepends on the institutional contextin which leadersserve.In democracies,leadershipchangehas little impact of the cessation of sanctions. In contrast,leadershipchange in autocratic states is likely to bring aboutthe end of sanctions.

CONCLUSIONS In this study,we developeda model linkingleadershipchange anddomesticpolitical institutionsto the durationof economic sanctions.Domestic political institutions role in mediatingthe effect thatleadershipchange has on sanctions play an important because institutionsdeterminewhich politicalinterestspoliticalleadersrepresent.We of statesin the structure focus on differencesbetween democraticand nondemocratic coalitions.We arguethatleadershipchange stronglyaffects the duraleaders'support tion of sanctionsonly in the case of nondemocraticsystems. A change in nondemoof craticleadershipis morelikely to triggerthe withdrawal sanctionsthana change in democraticleadership-in eitherthe senderor the targetstate.We fit a hazardmodelto a data set of 47 sanctionevents with 272 observations.Ourfindings stronglysupport our predictions.Leadershipchange in democraticsenderstatesanddemocratictarget states is unrelatedto the durationin sanctions. However,leadershipchange in both nondemocratic targetand sender states is a strongpredictorof sanctionduration.


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