Hans-Åke Persson (ed.
Häften för Europastudier nr 5
Cecilia Hansson (ed.)
Thoughts on Europe
Young Scholars on Contemporary European Issues. Six Essays
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Art. No 113781 ISBN 91-44-02944-6 ISSN 1650-4119 © Cecilia Hansson and Studentlitteratur 2003 Cover art: Soﬁa Dahlgren Printed in Sweden Studentlitteratur, Lund Web-address: www.studentlitteratur.se Printing/year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2007 06 05 04 03
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Introduction 5 1 Caught in Europe 9 Renée Jessen, Jana Pohl The State of the Future 22 The Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization Katrine Wilms Anderson, Jemie Sae Koo, Benjamin Fisher, Stephan Petzold A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality 43 Security implications of the enlargement process and idea with a special emphasis on the case of FYROM Arta Alibasik, Rasmus Nilsson The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and possibilities 64 Based on the examples of Romania and Poland Oana Balescu, Agnieszka Winiarczyk, Marek Koska, Lukasz Glebski Argentine Emigration to Spain 87 Push and Pull Factors Eva Bokinge, Noelia Garasievich, Liliana Lopes, Marta Romanska Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region? 109 Valgerdur Bjarnadóttir, Damian Gadzinowski
Most of the lectures and discussions took place at the localities of K3. Over this period we had the great opportunity to meet. Even if the energy reserves are down to zero. questions allowed and the focus on the writing process in our approach to European Studies. within the short period of ﬁve weeks. discuss with. and give lectures to a group of highly motivated young scholars from all over the world. academic as well as existential.Introduction
Sometimes the personal costs of no vacation during summer can be worth paying. At the ﬁnal seminar we ventilated each and every essay with scrutiny. in order to develop a deeper understanding on the relations between integration and fragmentation in contemporary Europe on one hand. an interesting problem. One vital experience from the summer course was the importance of students from different parts of the world coming together and creating a dialogue on urgent subjects. Another was the difference when it came to the amount of critical discussions. Malmö University. while beautiful Sailing Ships majestically passed by outside the windows of the seminar room. The main purpose with the summer course in European Studies was to combine a critical humanistic approach with perspectives from social sciences. which contrasted
. Another purpose was to stimulate the students ability to develop. And indeed the students worked real hard. This is what happened to us during the ﬁve week long summer course in European Studies at the Öresund Summer University 2002. an exciting environment close to the harbour and the old shipyard of Kockums. even if it was one of the warmest and sunniest summers in years. and further to discuss this problem in a meaningful and coherent way in essays that intertwined a personal with an academic approach. and European history on the other. stimulating intellectual challenges can bring back the power.
caught. They use a speech analysis to discuss the question of Otherness. In order to promote this development.Introduction
largely to the educational experiences some of our students had from their home countries. where cultural understanding and critical reﬂection are in focus. written by Renée Jessen from Denmark and Jana Pohl from Germany. or if contemporary developments just mean new organisational practices
. and as a tool to deﬁne Western European identity. Jemie Sae Koo (USA). thus revealing the tendency to treat Eastern Europe as backward. inside the enlarged European Union. can be both useful and important in the coming decades. and of course a whole lot of social activities. The second contribution is written by Katrine Wilms Andersen (Denmark). and very intense period that included not just writing but also a lot of lectures. Already during the summer course we talked about publishing the students efforts in a more lasting form. This is especially important considering the enlargement of the European Union (EU). And here are the results. In this essay the changing borders in Europe comes to the forefront. discusses the burning question of the Russian enclave Kaliningrad and its status. Russia and the enlargement. Benjamin Fisher (Denmark) and Stephan Petzold (Germany). as a bridge between the existing member states and the newcomers. They discuss important theoretical aspects on the future of the National State in an era of globalisation and regionalization. The Öresund Summer University turned out to be a successful and interesting test of this concept. Six Working Papers on different important issues that concerns the European developments. written during a short. The essay raises the question whether the National State is becoming powerless and less important. The International Programme for European Studies combines political theory with history and culture in an attempt to create an understanding for this continent in its change and multiplicity. The ﬁrst essay. as it will be. Here the competence in education and research that already exists at the universities in the Öresund region. connected to the attitudes concerning Kaliningrad. put forward by some of the main political leaders in the EU. steps are being taken at this very moment to establish a common platform for an interdisciplinary European programme with a humanistic orientation.
and applies them on economy. Agnieszka Winiarczyk. expectations and possibilities when it comes to the enlargement process of the EU. the fourth contribution. which means that some tentative questions and arguments raised in the contributions are no longer subjects to speculation. written by Oana Balescu (Romania). The authors uses push and pull factors as analytical tools.
. but real issues for future scholars to develop further. here Poland and Romania. politics. Leaving the young national state Macedonia and approaching states more closer to enlargement.Introduction
when it comes to the state. Valgerdur Bjarnadóttir (Iceland) and Damian Gadzinowski (Poland) describes the main actors within the region and gives an historical account of its interrelating as well as its conﬂicting past. Marek Koska and Lukasz Glebski (Poland). The authors. with focus on Macedonia (FYROM). Noelia Garasievich (Argentina). The ﬁfth essay uses a totally different angle on European integration. Here Arta Alibasik (FYROM) and Rasmus Nilsson (Denmark) discusses if the concept of a united Europe only is a rhetorical ﬁgure. The third essay tackles the European Union and the development on the Balkans. which neglects existing conﬂicts and security problems on the very brink of Europe. the second Irish national referendum on the Nice Treaty was held in October 2002 and resulted in Irelands ratiﬁcation of the treaty. In this essay a detailed inventory of the pros and cons regarding Poland and Romanias adjustments to the EU demands for membership in the union is presented. culture and social relations. Furthermore. The last essay provides a thorough background and introduction to recent developments concerning the organisation and institutionalisation of the Öresund trans-border region. highlights barriers. Poland has recently been given the green light to start the second round of negotiations for a full EU membership. These essays were written in late July to early August 2002. In the end they present three different future scenarios for the National State. For example. The essay concentrates on recent migration from Argentine to Spain. Eva Bokinge (Sweden). They argue in a provocative and thoughtful way for more awareness in the EU when it comes to solving the complexity of the Balkan conﬂicts. Liliana Lopes Sanjurjo (Brazil) and Marta Romanska (Poland) takes as their starting point the Global Europe and international migration processes.
Öresund Summer University. 2002. Inge Eriksson and Hans-Åke Persson Lecturers at European Studies. from past experiences to present conﬂicts and opportunities. Håkan Arvidsson. these essays navigate in time and space.Introduction
. from individualities and differences to generalisations and similarities. They describe an intriguing European journey.
and more importantly a normative difference. Jana Pohl
”Yes. an otherness that is ”a projection into a better future” (STRÅTH 2000: 17). We will show several ways of enacting otherness in our speech analysis in the second half of the essay by exemplifying it with the help of the future EU-enclave Kaliningrad. In 1932. it should have said that the Western-Europeans destiny is incontestably all European and universal. the German political thinker Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) argued for the need of a public enemy to the political unit: ”He does not have to be morally evil. if you please” (Dostoyevsky [1876–1881] 1954: 979). and thereby made a distinction between ”Us” and the ”Other”. At least from a Western European perspective. But there is also the Other as the non-Russian. The main point is that Otherness is a necessary demarcation and a prerequisite for enacting the collective ”Us”. The notion of Otherness in this respect is a way of enacting or constructing a difference. Fedor M. which is most obvious in political discourse. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means perhaps to become a brother of all men. Dostoyevsky was also a writer of political pamphlets. the Russians destiny is incontestably all-European and universal. There are.Caught in Europe
1 Caught in Europe
Renée Jessen. But besides from being one of the most prominent Russian realist writers of novels. and it can […] even be advantageous to have business dealings with him. most importantly the rest of Europe. that argued for the a-historical universalism of Russian civilization. There is the Other as an ideal of the Slavic way for Russia. he does not have to be aesthetically ugly.
. a universal man. There are more ways of staging or enacting the notion of Otherness than these. he does not have to appear as an economic competitor.
What is wrong with this statement? Well obviously. in a sense. two Others at work in this quotation.
Before their emigration from wild Russia the uncivilized. It not only promotes stereotypes and racism but at the same time impedes and even excludes the recognition of the Other in its own right. which was published for the ﬁrst time in 1918. The idea of a European identity very much derives its meaning from a demarcation from an Other.Caught in Europe
He is nevertheless the Other” (SCHMITT  1963: 14). In other words. The Other is in this sense enacted as a normative difference. when he criticizes the way international relations theory is derived from a Western rationalist and universalist posture. At the same time as Dostoyevsky praised Russian civilization. uprooted people […] those [the Russians] were the strangest and the most aloof” (CATHER  1994: 19). could it be possible to recognize the Other as just difference. in which the privileged role of the Western sovereign-self is maintained as a rational. My Antonia. strengthened by the implicit or explicit condescension of the Other as seen in Cather. and vicious Russians in the novel had fed a newly married couple to the wolves. inhuman. and what is perceived as its Other is excluded. marginalized. still enjoys popularity. as just different instead of normatively different. because the Us ”[…] operates as a practice of inclusion/exclusion. modern cogito. This depiction of the Russian immigrants contributes to the very anachronistic Western image of the East as a place of barbarians with no or a very awkward religion. The Other is in this man10
. and to some extend the same is true for the novel’s conception of Russia. Cathers novel. the author Willa Cather draws a very Western picture of Russia and the Russians. These are just two examples of the production of an ”Us”-and”Other”-topos as reﬂected in literature. In her novel on immigrants in the United States. without any normative content? It is this kind of difference Keyman insists on. He argues that the ”ethical space” for the Other to represent itself is reduced. the notion of Eastern Europe being a good example. and denied to be recognized as different” (KEYMAN 1997: 11). Cartesian. Russia seems to the narrator ”more remote than any other country […]” and ”of all the strange. Normative in the sense that the identity of ”Us” builds on a notion of superiority. a quite different perception of Russians was being depicted in the West.
”identiﬁcation […] becomes a prerequisite for the political mobilization of a group” (TÄGIL (ed. It has much the same function as the differentiation made between the Occident and the Orient. The divide between Western and Eastern Europe dates back to the Enlightenment (cf. KEYMAN 1997: 6). through presenting a strong ”Us”. as Edward Said points out in his book Orientalism. demarcated from its eastern neighbors through the ideological thrust of Enlightenment ideas. it was part of Western civilization. he sat in Western Europe. Various deﬁnitions and ideas of what this place between Occident and Orient was. being its contrasting image” (cf.) 2001: 14). The distinction between Eastern and Western Europe can thus be seen as a Western construction of its own collective identity through a normative differentiation from Eastern Europe. In Europe. for individuals and groups to identify with. differentiated from a weaker ”Other”. WOLFF 1994). which began at the Prussian-Polish border. This conversion is what makes Otherness a normative difference. In this manner the enacting of the Other as a normative difference is a (political and ideological) means of mobilizing unity. difference becomes an ontological necessity when he says that ”Identity requires difference in order to be. But they had in common the notion of Eastern Europe being a primitive and underdeveloped area. When Kant (1724–1804) wrote his criticisms in Königsberg. Otherness as a normative difference is then a prerequisite for identity. It thus served to constitute the deﬁnitional character of the West. a differentiation that ”[…] manifests itself in the systematic objectiﬁcation and discursive construction of the Orient as a subject integral to Western hegemony. as opposed to. For William Connolly.s distinction between identity and identiﬁcation. and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (CONNOLLY 1991: 64. barbarianism and.al. where the contrasts to Western Europe only strengthened the
.Caught in Europe
ner a part of a hegemonic ”Us”. existed in the time of Enlightenment. as Larry Wolff argues in his book Inventing Eastern Europe. Following Johansson et. our italics). Kantian Königsberg was part of Western Europe or more precisely. mainly Asian. the backwardness of Eastern Europe. the consequence is that the perception of Eastern Europe sticks to a notion of backwardness. which is the central point here.
the cosmopolitan vision was a vision of a universalized Western Man and Western Rationality. Petersburg. ”Europe but not Europe” (WOLFF 1994: 7). through his recognition of Russias place in Europe. No. or a place that should just be ignored. modern cogitos” as argued by Keyman (KEYMAN 1997: 11). Also the German philosopher. This is of course also a very normative self-perception. crossed the Polish border in 1784 on his way to St. An ”Us” that precisely consisted of ”Western sovereign-selves” that were ”rational. did this only to subsume Russia under the European ”Us” through the universalizing thrust of Enlightenment (cf. Europe as a ”normative centre” (STRÅTH 2000) in this way is what.W. as the ”Other” of Europe. Cartesian. Western European self-understanding is perceived as a rationally acting entity in a rationally progressing culture. historian and diplomat G. When Count de Ségur. Wolff argues that the Eastern Europe was constructed in the ”free-spirited sport” of philosophical geography during the Enlightenment period. Do we presently live in an enlightened age? the answer is. appointed as envoy extraordinaire of Louis XVI to the court of Catherine II. WOLFF 1994: 340). This viewpoint is being dramatically challenged by the EU-enlargement.). Eastern Europe moves further 12
. made ”the Iron Curtain” such a strong metaphor. Leibniz (1646– 1716. as was Kants point of view (cf. made evidently clear in Kants article ”Was ist Aufklärung?” from 1784: ”If it is now asked. The main point is that the condescension of Eastern Europe becomes an integrated part of Western European hegemonic identity. he felt that he had ”left Europe entirely” and had been ”moved back ten centuries” (as quoted in WOLFF 1994: 19). A sport that has put its mark on the way Eastern Europe is conceived today.Caught in Europe
feeling of Western civilization’s superiority. as Said argued. Although the Enlightenment for Kant was a universal project for liberating mankind from its ”selfimposed immaturity”. NEUMANN 1999: 70ff. according to Wolff. Eastern Europe was either a place that needed the guiding hand of (Western) civilization. because it was built on an Enlightenment notion of Eastern Europe. […] we do have clear indications that the way is now being opened for men to proceed freely in this direction and that the obstacles to general enlightenment […] are gradually diminishing” (KANT  1983: 45). but we do live in an age of enlightenment.
was annexed by Russia after the Second World War. and when the agreed and contested rules of application are relatively open.Caught in Europe
east and ”Europe” in reality and conceptually has to reconstruct its collective identity. where Kaliningrad is described as one long detour to social disaster since the Russian take-over. The former East Prussian area. July the 7th 2002. ”[…] even as diversity becomes a watchword. can be seen in the case of Kaliningrad. But. as Stråth points out. These connotations still play a major role in today’s EU-Russia relations. which is now referred to as the Kaliningrad oblast. According to the before-mentioned Enlightenment propositions the concept of Europe connotes progress and civilization whereas Eastern Europe evokes images of backwardness. This way the area itself contributes to the stereotype of Russia’s backwardness as hinted for instance in Cather’s novel. Moreover. The once ﬂourishing Prussian granary was badly run in Soviet times and even more so after the system’s collapse. then the concept in question is an essentially contested concept” (RAPKIN 1990: 3). Europe as a concept is becoming (and in many ways has always been) what Rapkin calls an essentially contested concept: ”When the concept involved is appraisive in that the state of affairs it describes is a value achievement. and as such needs to be able to mobilize some sort of political unity. The notion of ”unity in diversity” is one way of coping with the multifaceted concept of ”Europe”. With the EU-Enlargement in 2004 the Kaliningrad oblast faces the status of an enclave in the EU enclosed by the future members
. Denys Hays old concept of ”Europe as a collective idea” separates the included ”US = Europeans” from all the ”Non-Europeans”. one recent example being the Editorial in the Danish newspaper Jyllandsposten. the EU is becoming a political actor. when the practice described is internally complex in that its characterization involves reference to several dimensions. This also means that in EUropean political discourse the enacting of a normative difference becomes more problematic. One recent example of how this happens through the notion of Otherness. the process towards a single market without internal frontiers and border controls means the fortiﬁcation of the perimeter wall against the Others” (STRÅTH 2000: 21). but also more necessary. The East Prussian capital Königsberg was renamed Kaliningrad according to the Russian tradition of naming cities after Russian politicians.
a sense of a community. published on EUWebsite <www. Several EU-programs regarding Kaliningrad.europa.05. dating back to last year. CH at the European Parliament: EURussia Summit and Hoff Report on Kaliningrad. and for travelers requiring international passports and visas. Presupposing that there is no neutral language we will track this ideological distinction in political speeches made by EU-politicians (see speeches below in chronological order) and by pointing out certain features to show how instrumentalization of language promotes EU-aims in relation with Russia. für Partnerschaft und Offenheit eine Positionsbestimmung”.2002). Russia insists on the implementation of corridors for travelling Russian citizens. chancellor of Germany: ”Deutsche Russlandpolitik europäische Ostpolitik. such as the INTERREG ”Baltic Sea” program launched in September 2001.
. ”weness”. Plenary Session in Strasbourg 14.Caught in Europe
Lithuania and Poland. function as the basis for future geopolitical co-operation.05. Gegen Stereotype. environment.2001. contain aspects of security. where speech I and II. 29.2002. But by drawing the East/West borderline. However.05.06. setting unknown.eu. which all date to May 2002 when the contentious matter of transit between the future European enclave Kaliningrad and Russia started to predominate the EU-Russia-relations. backed up by the Schengen-agreement. Six speeches form our set of primary sources. published in Die Zeit 15. serve as a background. and military. or belonging together is consciously avoided. • Speech II: Javier Solana.2001. the latter speeches do not differ in themselves as far as the general message is concerned. published in Die Zeit 25. economy. The EU on the other hand argues against old-fashioned corridors. • Speech III: Rt Chris Patten.2002 (Ninth EU-Russia Summit taking place in Moscow. representative of the EU of foreign policy and security issues: ”Enlargement of the European Union Opportunity or Threat?” at the Utrecht town hall on 19. • Speech I: Gerhard Schröder. The focus with regard to the Kaliningrad question is on the latter speeches.int>.2002 and speech IV in the European Business Club (EBC) at the conference Shaping Russian-European Integration in the 21st century in Moscow 28.
2002). The Kaliningrad question is only one aspect among others. Russia is not yet European. held in St. e. The underlying message is that only the prevalence of Western European prescriptive.europa.europa. but there is also the public audience. in Leibniz tradition. • Speech VI: Michael Barnier. e. newspaper readers..2002 (Ninth EU-Russia Summit taking place in Moscow. Petersburg. normative values such as democracy. Petersburg The Northern Dimension in an Enlarged Union. President of the European Commission: What the 21st Century holds for the EU-Russia relationship at the European Business Club (EBC) dinner in Moscow 28.” Transl. To put it in a nutshell: He regards Russia as a part of Europe but.05.int>.05.] He stresses co-operation and at the same time talks about ”europäisches Partnerschaftsangebot an Russland” [”a European offer of partnership with Russia”] for Russias future European development. 29. published on EU-Website <www.Caught in Europe
• Speech V: Romano Prodi. all speeches deal with the EU-Russia relations in general. speeches are nowadays written by speechwriters.2002 at the Fourth Summit of the Baltic Sea States in St. consisted mostly of supporters.eu. CH. With regard to the setting it can be assumed that the actual audience of all the speeches.g. Therefore it can be assumed that the speeches reﬂect the general institutions’ opinion and not necessarily the speciﬁc speaker’s intention. in reality. Second. he beyond doubt considers Russia as a part of Europe: ”In seinem Selbstverständnis. its historical ties and its exceptional scientiﬁc and artistic achievements. makes Russia European. human rights etc. seinen historischen Bindungen und seinen außerordentlichen wissenschaftlichen und künstlerischen Leistungen gehört Russland jedoch zweifellos zu Europa”. which on the other hand picks up the distinction. Most of the cited values refer directly to article 6 of the Treaty
. 10. Schröders descriptive speech is a good example of ambivalence: on the one hand. free economic market. published on EU-Website <www.06. Russia without a doubt does belong to Europe.g. the audience in the hall. not necessarily by the speaker. European Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy and Institutional Reform. [”With its self-image.eu.int>. Two things have to be kept in mind: ﬁrst. rule of law. and/or internet users.
as Schröder does. and the challenges of enlargement. As in all the examined speeches. Solanas speech is divided into three parts: Why enlargement?.” It is noteworthy that Schröder uses the term ”Europe” and not ”EU” which can be explained by the lack of differentiation throughout the speech. and the rule of law. ob sich für das Kaliningrader Gebiet ein Fenster zur Zusammenarbeit mit der Europäischen Union öffnet. By not mentioning Russia and Kaliningrad as opportunities but placing this topic in the midst of other challenges Solana directly opposes Pattens. According to Solana one of the challenges. if Kaliningrad shall offer a window open for a co-operation with the European Union.000. a word which is repeated eight times in the speech. the EU-enlargement will bring about relationships to the new neighbors among which 16
. which deals with Germany and Russian co-operation. But apart from the German chancellor none of the examined EU-ofﬁcials this openly calls Russia a part of Europe.” Transl. other estimates run as high as 20.” [”But it will mainly depend on Russia itself. Prodis and Barniers terminology. This way Kaliningrad becomes a metonymy for the whole of Russia that has to open up to Europe by implementing Western values. But the answer to the question of responsibility for Kaliningrad is the same on the EU-side: ”Kaliningrad is essentially a Russian responsibility” (Patten. However.Caught in Europe
of European Union: ”The Union is founded on the principles of liberty. The opportunities of enlargement. Russias responsibility is put in the foreground.. speech III). among which the latter is longest. CH] With the use of ”Fenster” (= window) Schröder alludes to an old metaphor for the opening of Russia to Europe referring back to Peter the Greats Europe-oriented policy. Despite the ethnic cleansing after WW II the oblast ofﬁcially lists some 5. principles which are common to the member states. ”Es wird im Wesentlichen aber von Russland selbst abhängen. The German government today keeps denying all interest in Kaliningrad by declaring. But the stress of Russia’s responsibility is interesting in another respect: Kaliningrad’s past and the correlated present sovereignty. The Kaliningrad question plays a minor role in Schröders speech. respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. rumors of Re-Germanization persist. It is part of the speechs longest paragraph.000 ethnic German residents. democracy. Russia responsible for the area.
P. the area of Königsberg was the cradle of Prussian militarism.P. In theoretical political discourse analysis these shifts are referred to as ”soundbites”.P.] want to ﬁnd peaceful solutions to conﬂict.] raises real issues. Patten underlines the need for cooperation by including Russia into the we: ”We [Russia.] work with them [Russia.). J. The importance of security issues in relation to Russia is stressed by the altering use of the pronoun we in Pattens speech. We [EU. Pattens. It can therefore be concluded that the terminological shift was intended to underpin the problems seriousness already in 2001. J. which the speakers hope in advance will receive attention” (BEARD 2000. In all other cases we replaces the EU-member states. […] we [Russia. As soon as he talks about Kaliningrad.] have now begun to take these issues seriously. which have to be addressed. ring a bell for the informed reader.] to solve the speciﬁc problems which enlargement will bring”. So the phrase Russia being ”our most signiﬁcant neighbor” acquires a completely new meaning. J. […] we [EU.P. which are also stressed in Pattens. EU. internet resource). J. Take two examples: the future of Kaliningrad for Russia and the impact of the Schengen border controls on Ukraine.P. speech IV. When the focus shifts to security. later the beachhead of Soviet military power. Solana drops the euphemistic disguise by substituting the word ”challenge” with ”problem”: ”[…] enlargement for them [Russia.] must also ﬁnd ways to stop the men of violence […]” (Patten. ﬁts well to Kaliningrads ”image of a trouble-spot” (JOENNIEMI 1999: 1).Caught in Europe
the relationship to Russia. EU. J. italics J.] need new means if we [Russia. real problems. ”[…] our most signiﬁcant neighbor […]”. Prodis and Barniers speeches. Ukraine. The importance of security issues with regards to Russia and later on to Kaliningrad. J. EU.P. The denomination of Kaliningrad as a problem.P. ”carefully engineered excerpts. Prodis and Barniers speeches set off by stating the signiﬁcance of these days for Russia meaning the high-level EU-Russia meetings during April and May this year and the USA-Russia agree© Studentlitteratur
. in spite of Russias denial it is probably still an area with nuclear weapons nowadays. Ukraine. J. and the Ukraine are the only ones to be further elaborated on in terms of security and stability issues.P. which is striking to the listener and reader after only perceiving challenges.
speech VI). Russia should…” evidence the gap between ”Us” and the ”Other” and express power relations. italics J. The hereby conveyed message makes compromises and this
. We also hope Russia will make easier the establishment of consulates in Kaliningrad […] We hope that the special meeting of the Cooperation Committee today in Kaliningrad can make further progress […]” (Patten. I hope Russia will accept this […]. To put it bluntly: The EU is willing to pay for required action (establishment of consulates. The East/ West distinction clearly serves as a background since all refer to those relations as Russia’s relations with the West. Prodi points out that ”We [EU] have no wish to see an exclusion syndrome developing on our eastern Borders. if Russia is ready to cooperate with us” (Barnier. and Barniers speeches are all tarred with the same brush. Prodis. EU is ready to…. Barnier ﬁnishes his speech by reafﬁrming that the EU is ”ready to commit still more resources to support these objectives. speech III). In the dichotomy of ratio vs. Patten stresses the EU’s willingness to ﬁnance: ”We have made clear our willingness to increase ﬁnancial and technical help to deal with challenges faced by Kaliningrad” (Patten. speech V). Barnier for instance (speech VI) mentions the INTERREG ”Baltic Sea” program with more than 40 million Euro for the Kaliningrad oblast. Enlargement must not draw new dividing lines across our continent” (Prodi. We shall be looking for progress […] and improved cooperation on border agreement. Solanas. However. the former is combined with an argumentative style of speech to exercise this power factor which becomes obvious when several EU-programs with ﬁnancial EU-support are mentioned in the same breath as the Kaliningrad transit problem. emotio.Caught in Europe
ment on strategic arms reduction. speech III. cheap visas etc. The political discourse rhetoric ﬁgure importance of the three with the verb hope in the following example promotes the effectiveness of what is asked in return: ”Visa-free transit corridors are not acceptable to the candidate countries. EU invites Russia…” and ”Russia must…. EU offers….). of which 11 million Euro have been especially assigned to border-crossings. Pattens.) in order to avoid the violation of the Schengen acquis. the borderline is subconsciously drawn with all speeches using phrases such as ”EU is willing to….P. In this sense.
deﬁned by the voice of the free. Who knows? But until then. The Countries of the Peoples will rise. the future EU and Russia. that ”Russias destiny is incontestably all-European”. Between these Countries there will be harmony and brotherhood” (Guiseppe Mazzini 1912. Perhaps Mazzini was not thinking about Europe anno 2002. he was right about one thing. as quoted in NEUMANN 1999: 29). the EU on behalf of ”Europe” reduces the ”ethical space” that Russia can operate in. the innate spontaneous tendency of the Peoples will replace the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments. it is still an open question to what extent ”Russia is willing to go in this direction. how European does Russia really want to be?” (Patten. not normatively different. none of the speakers utilizes Kaliningrads Western European heritage in order to cross the border between East and West. Although Königsberg was part of Western Europe in Kant’s times. And some day harmony and brotherhood will prevail. Through deﬁning Kaliningrad as a Russian problem.
. and at the same time deﬁning possible solutions. In all speeches the Enlargement is depicted in positive terms as a historical opportunity from which both sides. The map of Europe is being remade. ”Natural divisions. This does not create ”harmony and brotherhood”. If Mazzinis statement is used as a prediction for the course of European history. If Dostoevsky turns out to be right. will beneﬁt. enforced by ideology and Western hegemony’s need for an Other.Caught in Europe
way the solution to the transit problem becomes difﬁcult for both sides. or EU enclave if you like. But he was well off the mark when he thought that arbitrary divisions would be replaced. The Russian exclave. upon the ruins of the Countries of the kings and privileged castles. The map of Europe will be remade. but rather some even more distant future. maybe the Us could start out by trying to recognize the Other as. speech IV). Kaliningrad stems from arbitrary divisions. but as just different.
05. Gerhard. New York: George Braziller. Europe: The Emergence of an Idea.” Die Zeit 15.Caught in Europe
Primary sources Barnier.2002.06. Shaping Russian-European Integration in the 21st century. Van Dijk. Willa. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox. 1954. Moscow 28. published on EU-Website <www. Jan/ Bulcaen. 20
. Javier. Fourth Summit of the Baltic Sea States in St.int>. published on EU-Website <www. The Diary of a Writer. ”What is political discourse analysis?” In: Blommaert. Chris. Patten. St.eu. 1998: pp. Chris. N. London: Sage Publications. Editorial. published on EU-Website <www. Denys. Romano. Teun A. 1998.europa.05. 11–52. Connolly. ”Deutsche Russlandpolitik europäische Ostpolitik. für Partnerschaft und Offenheit eine Positionsbestimmung. The language of politics.2002.2002. Gegen Stereotype. July the 7th. The archaeology of knowledge & the discourse on language.int>. EU-Russia Summit and Hoff Report on Kaliningrad. Foucault. Political linguistics. published on EU-Website <www.eu. Moscow 28. 2000. Chris (eds. Patten.).2001. Michel. 1994. Dostoyevsky. Cather. Fedor M. Jyllandsposten.europa. Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. London: Routledge. 1991. What the 21st Century holds for the EU-Russia relationship. Prodi. Petersburg The Northern Dimension in an Enlarged Union. Strasbourg 14.int>.eu. ”Enlargement of the European Union Opportunity or Threat?” Die Zeit 25. Michael. Van Dijk. New York: Pantheon Books. Teun A.2002.: Dover Publications. Solana. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP.2001. Hay.europa.Y. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. Schröder. Mineola. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1971. Secondary sources Beard. My Antonia. William. Adrian.europa. Petersburg 10.05.eu. 1968.int>.
Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other. G. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment. Thumann. Royal. Globalization.” In: Perpetual Peace and Other Essays. Keymann. 1983. 3–17. David P. Copenhagen 2000.1999. From Antiquity to the European Union. Berlin: Duncker and Humbolt. Schmitt.2001. ”Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent. 1990. Cambridge: CUP. The Duties of Man and Other Essays. Anthony (ed. Wolff. Putin. 33–54.” Der Spiegel 20.Caught in Europe
Joenniemi. Larry. 1999. Padgen. Eigtveds Pakhus. Brussels: P.). World Leadership and Hegemony. New Jersey: Humanities Press. Rapkin. ”What is Enlightenment. ”Who put the West into Western Civilization?” Intercollegiate Review Spring 1998: pp. Tägil. Immanuel. Boulder: Westview Press.” Working Papers 15.2002. Stråth. Anthony. Iver B. Robert. Das wäre eine Katastrophe.” Die Zeit 21. (ed. Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Collarien. E. ”Kaliningrad. Governeur Wladimir Jegorow über die Isolation der russischen Ostsee-Exklave und den Konﬂikt mit der EU um die Errichtung von Korridoren.” In: Padgen. Sven (ed.-Peter Lang. 1963. Europa historiens återkomst. Neumann. The Idea of Europe. Kant. Carl. Conference on The Northern Dimension and Kaliningrad: European and regional integration 17–18 May 2000. Mazzini. Uses of the Other ”The East” in European Identity Formation.
.I.2001. London: Longman. Michael. 1992. Stanford: UP. Hedemora: Gidlunds Bökforlag.” Der Spiegel 21.2002. ”Kaliningrad as a Discursive Battleﬁeld. 2000. Copenhagen. Fuat. 1912. Russen fordern Korridor. 1997. Inventing Eastern Europe. State.). Bo (ed.” Die Zeit 02. Pertti. Russland muss begreifen: Seine Zukunft heisst Europa. Thumann.).). Russland und die EU sprechen über Kaliningrad: Die marode Exklave könnte blühen. Identity/Difference Toward a critical Social Theory of International Relations. 1994. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. 2002: pp. ”Kaliningrad. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. ”Im Stau nach Westen. Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.E. ”Schau westwärts. Copenhagen Peace Research Institute. Michael. wenn Moskau es nur wollte.
for others later.g. that it is inevitably losing ever more of its importance. Benjamin Fisher. after the Yugoslav crises in the 1990s. Some argue that the complex process of globalization undermines the nation-state.The State of the Future
2 The State of the Future
The Challenges of Globalization and Regionalization
Katrine Wilms Anderson. This is partly due to globalization and the creation of international organizations. cited in Goldmann (2001): 3.
. whereas others believe that the role of the state is not challenged but rather changed. we will discuss whether the state is becoming powerless and will lose its importance or if it is just a question of the state being organized in a manner different from classical state theory. Jönsson et al (2002). The question often raised is whether supranational forms of political organization will supersede the nation state or if there is a revival of nationalism. Stephan Petzold
”I believe that the nation-state is […] only in an evolutionary phase for some earlier. In the future the state will rather become an administrative department in the global order and in no way the object of a national cult”. as some authors have argued e. as they are closely linked to each other2 and
1 2 Vaclav Havel in an interview with the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel in 1999. Jemie Sae Koo. but also that of regionalization. We do not only consider the process of globalization.1
There is at the moment a vivid discussion in social science on the future of the national state. In this paper.
Goldmann (2001): 10.The State of the Future
because we think that it is both from above and below that the state is challenged. Some scholars thinks that the internationalization of problems is not a new phenomenon. and the internationalization of societies.
Alea iacta est – the dice has been thrown
There are various perspectives on globalization in the current ongoing debate regarding this issue. the internationalization of decision-making.5 Such problems deal with. on the other. The increase in intensity means that the decisions made by international organizations are binding for the nationstates. day-to-day activities are increasingly inﬂuenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and. For the purpose of this paper this discussion is not important and therefore we will leave it here. The ﬁrst dimension is that some political problems have been internationalized4. Decisions have therefore been internationalized in intensity as well as in scope. on the one hand. the environment and international crime. the practices and decisions of local groups or communities can have signiﬁcant global reverberations. for example. The EU is the most radical example of the processes of internationalization of
Held (1995): 20. but the new thing is that the decision-makers perception of the problems have changed.
. These globalized problems are sought to be solved on international arenas. The increase in scope means that a wider range of problems and policies are discussed on an international level. we have therefore chosen to work with three dimensions within this issue: the internationalization of problems. The often held conception of globalization is David Helds who sees it as ”the stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across space and time such that. This means – as stated by David Held that more problems on the nation-states political agendas are determined by events taking place outside the states borders and its control.”3 This deﬁnition of globalization is rather abstract.
The following three arguments present why globalization and regionalization – instead of being counteracting forces – can reinforce one another. the internationalization of societies means that all kinds of human relations between nation-states. particularly the exchange of goods. companies need to be situated in strong clusters. services. This is mostly due to two aspects: the ﬁrst is that in the clusters there are competitive pressures between two or more rivaling com6 There has been some discussion between scholars whether the level of trade/ exchange of goods in the globalized world differ from the state of the world prior to World War I. The third dimension. Bauman (1998). The reason the EU is considered a supranational political institution is. have intensiﬁed. the elite are no longer bound to territory or the nation-state and a kind of world-culture emerges. One argument is economic.7 As a consequence. The union has in some ways developed from an inter-governmental cooperation to a supranational political institution. due to: 1) decisions made in the Council of Ministers can be made with qualiﬁed majority voting and 2) the European Commission is empowered to issue – binding directives in various areas. for instance. and information.6 Sociologists emphasize that modernism and globalization have changed the structure of society.”9 The clusters can be environments for innovation. Michael Porter argues that in order to be competitive in the global market.The State of the Future
decision-making.8 Other scholars also point out that ”Americanization” or ”McDonaldization” is a contribution to the globalization process.
Globalization and regionalism
Regionalism can be seen as a consequence of the globalization process.
7 8 9
. Giddens (1995 ). Porter (2000). He deﬁnes a cluster as being ”a geographic concentration of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular ﬁeld. Information technology has made time and space insigniﬁcant.
Robert Cox (1996) makes a similar demarcation. This is due to the internationalization of decision-making. and violent. The development of the region is an attempt to create an innovative cluster with global competitive companies. is an example of such a cluster. whereas the region seems to be a haven that is well known and safe. The complex interaction makes it possible to create and share resources such as technology and know-how.10 This is one reason why globalization and especially the internationalization of societies are contributing to the ”regionalization process”. Another argument for globalization and regionalization being intertwined stems from the internationalization of societies that has made the range global. In this way the regions play an increasing role in the identity making of the ”common” man. which can create economic growth and help the nation-states prosper. which result in production that can be competitive in the global market. Two new classes have emerged and the dividing line is ”mobility”: 1) The elite are those who are mobile and therefore able to use the possibilities of a globalized world and the 2) The ”unfortunate” who are ascribed to where they were born. The Øresund region. For this reason.e. He makes a distinction between the high-skilled workers who are mobile and flexible and the low or unskilled workers who are bound to their native soil. which is due to the complementary relationships between the companies and their suppliers. To them the world is complex. not every human being has the capability to cope with this change. i. As a reaction against this tendency. When decisions are made far away from the people some politicians and debaters argue that they are without democratic control. Furthermore they argue that these decisions are sometimes even made by bureaucrats without democratic mandate. The second reason is that clusters are often innovative. In other words. the human reach is limited even though the range is global. chaotic. some people turn to their region. It is important to stress that public institutions. However.
. play an important role in developing these clusters. but the dividing line is education instead of mobility. Decisions in a globalized world are often made distant from the people.The State of the Future
panies. The third argument concerns the democratic perspective. described as the Medicon Valley. an increasing number of people become involved in
10 Bauman (1998) argues that globalization has changed the traditional class structure. governments (local and national) and universities.
France and other allied powers sought to integrate (Western) Germany and its industrial power into a European framework. It is essential to understand the distinction between why the EC/ EU was created in the 1950s and what it is presently. 12 Johannsen et al (2001).11
The European Union and the regions
The History of the European Community
For many centuries European intellectuals thought about the integration of the European states in a federation or confederation in order to overcome the extreme fragmentation of the continent. Third. the looming Cold War and the fear of Soviet communist dominion over the whole continent supported the integration of the liberal Western part of Europe. for example in school boards. They desire to have inﬂuence and gain control of what is near them and factors that concern their daily lives. the two world wars had brought tragedy and misery to Europe so that European statesmen saw the need to supersede the old European state system in order to eliminate the source and scourge of war from the continent. The EU was not founded because of the internationalization of problems that many have come to believe. having severely suffered from German hubris three times in seventy years. The European Union is now a part of globalization since it is an organization that tries to cope with the internationalization of problems through internationalization of decision-making. Second.12 But it was only after the Second World War that the effort of integration came to realization. There are three main reasons for this occurrence: ﬁrst. which was then seen as the source of perpetual conﬂict and war.The State of the Future
their local communities.
. The United States backed these moves and assisted Western Europe in rebuilding their economies through Marshall Aid. but for the purpose of peace and stability in Europe.
11 Beck (1993).
2002. the union places a huge emphasis on the realization of the Single Market. From the beginning of the European Community.13 The emphasis on the quality of life was therefore an essential issue for the EC. new ones are created due to the emphasis of cultural regions. administrative capacity). 14 This argument was developed in a lecture by Jonas Frykman for Øresund Summer Universitys interdisciplinary day. because the regions will not be as capable of solving problems as the nation-state is. people. It may be easier to make ”a union united in diversity” if the people have regional instead of national identities. This develops a paradox: at the same time as borders are being erased by the Single Market.The State of the Future
The Regional Policies of the EU
As early as the Treaty of Rome.
. For a while the European Union regarded regions primarily as functional regions. However. increase the need for cooperation in the union.
13 See Keating (1998): 46ff and Bullmann (1997): 9. signed in 1957. 02.14 At the same time. the European Union has expanded their regional program and contributed funding to more developed regions in order to help them adapt to the demands of todays economy. it has been a mission for the union to improve underdeveloped regions up to standard with their surrounding regions. It will. through which a large portion of money has been given to maintain and develop the use of regional or minority languages. which enables the free movement of goods.08. The creation of a European identity is probably seen as a utopian idea. This has changed during the 1990s where the EU began to place more emphasis on the cultural and historical regions. due to their lack of resources (knowledge. An example of this can be found in issues concerning language policy. thus. with the realization of the need to compete in the global market. capital and services. the European Community has laid emphasis on the regions. One of the reasons for this emphasis on the cultural regions could be that the union regards strong regional identities as a mean to weaken the nation state.
on the other hand. This deﬁcit can be exempliﬁed in the Parliaments lack of power. Therefore. which gives much power to the intergovernmental decision-making bodies and thus to national leaders. cited in Dettke (2001): 1. most people agree that the internationalization of problems requires that more power is given to supranational institutions. It was only in a few countries where referenda were held on very crucial decisions such as the Maastricht treaty in 1992 and the introduction of the single currency in 1999.17 Given this. has often stressed that too much power has been given away already. it
15 John McCormick (1999): 150. it would have to be rejected. This problem has increased since the integration has expanded to the political. The third factor is usually referred to as the ”democratic deﬁcit”.15 This rather low identiﬁcation of the Europeans with the idea of European integration can be ascribed to three factors. and the power residing in intergovernmental decision-making bodies. 16 McCormick (1999): 152. A former member of the European Commission has even said that if the EU applied for membership in the EU. this causes insecurity on peoples identity. people increasingly experience that the integration inﬂuences their everyday lives.
. First. whereas public complaint. The second factor has to do with the fact that the people of Europe have been marginalized in the national decision-making process in respect of giving away sovereignty. European and national politicians as well as media and academics have not succeeded. This skepticism and hesitancy has increased over the last decade. this problem is inherited in the very structure of the European integration process. social and cultural areas. 17 Lord Dahrendorf. However. which may be deﬁned as ”the gap between the powers held by European institutions and the ability of European citizens to inﬂuence the work and decisions of those institutions”16. the Commissions lack of public accountability.The State of the Future
Many people living in the European Union do not identify with the union. We are here presented with a dilemma: On one hand. if they have ever tried to. in promoting the beneﬁcial effects of the integration to the people.
or the ﬁnal purpose of the integration process. In other words. Gerhard Schröder. is that political decisions should be conducted
18 McCormick (1999): 152. The crisis of legitimacy refers to the states inability to receive enough loyalty from its citizens. one of rationality and one of legitimacy. politicians and people alike have been focusing on reforming EU institutions for a long time. 19 The most famous proposals were those made by Joschka Fischer. This is largely due to the process of globalization or what we called internationalization of problems. In order to overcome the democratic deﬁcit. The basic idea behind this concept. one may also speak of a crisis of democracy. for example: less people take part in elections. which can be seen as a ”new system of European governance”. In this context.
.19 However. as employed by the European Commission.21 The former refers to a state no longer capable of living up to peoples needs and expectations. and so forth. There can be no doubt that the institutions that were made for a union of six states cannot work efﬁciently in a Union of 25 or 30 states. the state is unable to fulﬁll its traditional functions. less people are involved in political parties. Jacques Chirac 20 This can also be seen when looking at academic discourse on the EUs democratic deficit.The State of the Future
is no surprise that there is a ”psychological barrier”18 between the European Union and its citizens. 21 Held (1995). European and national politicians have lay out and elaborated different ideas on how to reform the European Union. In this respect. they no longer trust in the conventional rules of political conduct. see the contributions to Anderson and Eliassen (eds) (1996). This discussion has been highlighted in the wake of the unions Eastern enlargement. At some point. One way of decreasing the EUs democratic deﬁcit and the more general legitimacy crisis of politics is to decentralize the political system. This debate is connected with the future outlook of the EU and the ”ﬁnalité européenne”. it seems as if the nation-state is eroded by peoples insecurity.20 One may say that the nation-state is also suffering from a democratic deﬁcit. Jacques Delors. most proposals are limited in the sense that they only focus on the European institutions without acknowledging that there also exists a political crisis in the nation state. David Held argues that the state is going through a double crisis.
”the leaders of regional.22 This multi-level-governance approach employed by the EU has so far given far more weight on the European and national levels than the regional. a radical decentralization is regarded as the ultimate cure for the democratic deﬁcit. which we will present and embark
22 European Commission (2001): 12.eu. On the one hand. urban and local communities […] have a special responsibility in that they are accountable for their actions to a parliament and for them Europe is an everyday reality.int/comm/governance/docs/index_en.europa.”23
The State undermined?
In this chapter. the territorial state. In order to do so. they are directly involved in applying a whole series of Community rules and programs. which was introduced to make the people closer to the union. On the other. The regions are considered to be able to fulﬁll that function. These concepts portray three different dimensions of the modern state. we have operationalized the ”state” into three different models of the state.The State of the Future
where it is most appropriate and where it is closest to the people. This idea was conﬁrmed in the Treaty for the European Union in 1992 and was called the subsidiary principle. Romano Prodi. To ensure efﬁciency in the political process the ”White Paper on Governance” issued by the European Commission suggests a ”stronger involvement of regional and local authorities in the Unions policies”. 20 September 2001 <http://www. they are in the best position to promote grassroots democracy. as of 3 August 2002>
. we will analyze how regionalism and globalization may undermine the authority of the state.htm#speech. According to the president of the European Commission. the nation-state as Staatsnation and the nation-state as Kulturnation. 23 Romano Prodi in a speech to the Committee of the Regions in Brussels. As this brought about an estrangement between the political elite and the citizens.
at the time
24 This distinction is an ideal model. Examples of this model are France and the United States. in contrast. The Kulturnation. a national identity centered on the state and its institutions could only develop in countries where there was already a state before the nationbuilding started. the state has the monopoly of violence. Its primary role was to provide security for the people living within a given territory. They are differentiated by how national identity was created. These institutions are the source of the nation-states legitimacy. Usually. where national identities were founded on a history of a Grand (or not so grand) revolution. Its citizens identify the nation as embodied in the constitution. Throughout the early modern period. fraternité”. This was the case with those people that were. the state gained more responsibilities and became the sole source of political legitimacy and sovereignty. 1982). In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most European states turned into nationstates. people gather together and sign a social contract in order to overcome the state of nature. in which there is no security.
. parliament and a national anthem or a slogan such as ”liberté. language played a very important role in the creation of distinct national identities.The State of the Future
on in more detail to clarify in what ways the individual concepts are undermined. Thomas Hobbes. By this contract they transfer their individual autonomy to the sovereign to gain security and stability in return. In the process of nation building. According to the founder of modern state theory. The territorial state developed at the turn of the late Middle Ages to the early modern period. it was given a meaning through national identity. national identity was here built upon a common culture. which were given a distinct classiﬁcation: Staatsnation and Kulturnation24. the state received unity by a common identity. The ideal model vulgarizes reality into a model to make analysis easier and clearer (Weber. égalité. There are two ways through which the nation was built. In Max Webers words. came into being where national sentiments could not cling onto an existing state and its institutions. Instead. a shared heritage and a common historical legacy. In other words. National identity in the Staatsnation derives from state institutions and republican values.
26 Both superpowers acquired mutually assured destruction capability by the late 1950s. the existence of nuclear weapons and their potential of massive destruction made the territorial boundaries blur. we have three layers of stateness. as in more or less all Central and East European states. as in Germany. these states were called ”nations without states”.
Form of social organization Territorial state Nation state Staatsnation Nation state Kulturnation Central analytical variables weakened by and elements sovereignty republican values state institutions culture history tradition multi-national corporations. French obsession with the purity of their language may well serve as an example as well as the Germans pride of their constitution and other institutions.and Kulturnation are not separate or mutually exclusive any longer. so to speak. elements of both are found in every nation-state. in case one of the superpowers had initiated a nuclear attack. As John Herz argued in the early 1950s. as the nuclear threat in contrast to conventional arms did not stop at state borders. the opposing super25 This term was used to depict the political situation during the months following the February Revolution in France 1848. Today. however. Once a national identity had developed. 26 Herz (1962).
. or under some sort of imperial rule. if they have ever been so. estrangement between people and elite migration cosmopolitan culture Americanization
The territorial state
The states sovereignty has been challenged by several developments. that both concepts of Staats. One of the ﬁrst signs of a possible threat to state sovereignty was the existence of nuclear weapons. which can be more exactly analyzed when it comes to the weakening of the state than the concept of the state as a whole.The State of the Future
of the ”Spring of Nations”. which meant that.25 either living in several states. It must be said. Thus. international institutions democratic deﬁcit.
Both these norms are stipulated in the UN Charter. the separatist movements in the Basque Country. because protection of human rights may well require interference of the international society in the internal affairs of sovereign states. For a long time they were not seen as bearing potential conﬂict because the human rights-principle was seen as less important. Another factor weakening state sovereignty is the evolution of global norms and values. as it is rather obvious that they have an impact on world politics. which means that the state no longer has the monopoly of violence. 28 Jackson and Sørensen (1999): 263.27 In the United Nations system there has recently been a shift from non-intervention to protection of human rights. SIPRI-Yearbook (2000). war as a means to achieve political goals was no longer possible.
27 The idea of universal human rights has been discussed quite often and it has been said that it is more like the spread of Western norms and values to the other parts of the world. This is seen on the international arena. For a discussion of human rights in world politics see Brown (1997).29 Although this development has mainly affected non-Western states. and these reports inﬂuence states policies. 29 Gantzel (2000). Corsica and Northern Ireland are using terrorism to achieve their goals. The last ten years have also displayed the privatization of violence. As a consequence of this.28 The humanitarian interventions in the former Yugoslavia. This debate on whether there are universal values is not of relevance here. The focus on human rights has also an impact on the Western states. For instance. Somalia and East Timor can all be seen as examples hereof.
.The State of the Future
power would have enough nuclear weapons for a counter-strike that would result in unbearable losses to the aggressor. than the sovereignty-principle. Political pressure from other countries and international organization means that the Western states – as the rest of the worlds states no longer can decide on internal affairs solely on their own. Rwanda. The Amnesty International reports on the conditions of human rights in all states. It was only in the last ten years that there has been increasing tension between the two principles. it has also shown repercussions in Europe. where there has been a decrease of interstate wars and a dramatic increase of intrastate or civil wars since 1945.
The nation-state as Staatsnation
The Staatsnation is being threatened by regionalization. As citizens do not perceive the well30 Baumann (1998). the Afro-Americans civil right movements in the United States and women throughout the Western hemisphere. This notion has however been challenged. in which a particular section of the people demanded more rights for the individual and less domination of a sometimes authoritarian and traditional society. Since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s Western society has become increasingly more dominated by the individuals in society. The increasing number of private security guards and the gated communities can be seen as evidence of this trend.The State of the Future
The privatization of violence in the western world is even more articulate when it comes to the fact that people no longer rely on the state as provider of their security. They were arguing on whether society is based on strong individuals coming together and constituting a society or whether it is based on a strong community.g. e. Whereas the conventional way of life was embedded in a family or a village community. to give sense to its members in the ﬁrst place as society marks the framework of their lives. which was regarded as necessary by communitarians. at least in the philosophical arena. it had and still has a quite fundamental inﬂuence on politics of the nation-state. Much of political theory in the 1980s was dominated by the debate between liberals and communitarians. Even though there were different opinions on the process of individualization. The individual became the basic element of society and it is therefore no longer the communal values people hold on to. instead they strive towards their personal well-being and individual progress. globalization and the individualization of society. In the following years a number of emancipation movements emerged. individuality freed from whatsoever kind of command was becoming one of the basic principles of Western society. This process was largely engendered in the political and social movements of the 1960s.
they somehow withdraw from society and from the reach of politics. This is yet more puzzling when taking into account by which means politicians try to ”sell” their policies to the people. if these state institutions are unable to understand and control the forces of globalization? National politicians do not only try to gain popular support by using spin-doctors. People distrust the political elite even more today and do not believe in their capacities. The way politics affect the individual becomes more evident. The states inability to fulﬁll its traditional functions due to internationalization of problems and decision-making also undermines its raison dêtre. people get increasingly involved in non-governmental organizations. Due to individualization political participation has changed.The State of the Future
being of the community or society as the ultimate goal any longer. Why do people need a state.
. Tony Blairs (in)famous arsenal of spin doctors is just one example. they also try to create political participation by decentralizing decisions and the welfare services to the regional or local levels. Moreover national politicians think and hope that political participation in the local or regional politics will create an awareness and interest in politics in general. national governments and all political administration. this will create the legitimacy that can secure the future existence of the Staatsnation. this seems not to solve the problem of legitimacy.31 The politicians are aware of this and try solving the problem by ”listening” to the people. This trend creates a legitimacy crisis for the political system. The idea underlying the decentralization effort is that people will participate if they think the policies will affect their personal well-being. at least to a certain extent. Instead of being members of political parties and participation in elections. However. If decentralization really has such an effect on people. when the decisions are made in the local or regional area. It is not only the individualization that creates problems of legitimacy. They seem to be obsessed with opinion polls and adjust their policies to the respective results. However if participation in local polities does not affect participation in national pol31 This argument is the central thesis in Beck (1993). if it is no longer capable of solving the problems and of caring for their most immediate needs? What are the reasons for having national parliaments.
As constructivist theories consider nations to be human community built upon common historical myths. which is characterized by cultural homogeneity. as they are not theirs. For evidence see Anderson (1991) and Smith (1993). Migration inevitably raises the question of collective self-identiﬁcation: ”who are we?” and ”who belongs to us?” The reason for asking these questions in the globalized world is that the Kulturnation. but also due to migration and Americanization. services and information across national borders.
The nation-state as Kulturnation
The Kulturnation is in many ways threatened by globalization. goods. however. Linguistic diversity and increasing importance of the English language are examples of how the majority of the Kulturnation has lost its cultural hegemony. not thought of as being the greatest threat to the Kulturnation. Besides. Another example of how the Kulturnation is undermined is the emergence of religious diversity in most western societies. This is not only due to the ﬂow of money. requires confessing it publicly. then the regions will resume the role of the Staatsnation and become the new political entity. Religious diversity raises the issue of whether the traditional ways of living should be changed. will be undermined by cultural diversity resulting from immigration.32 An example for this may be Sunday closing laws in Christian countries so that people have the opportunity to rest as God did on the seventh day after he had created everything between heaven and earth. immigrants coming from all over the globe do not share these collective memories.
.33 They do not understand the meaning and sig32 Bauböck (1998): 16. 33 Today. Religion is not only a private matter that is practiced in the domestic sphere because living the life. as this is necessary to become an accepted citizen in the new country. most immigrants will learn to speak the national language of their ”host society”.The State of the Future
itics but becomes a goal in itself instead. which your faith prescribes. it is academic common sense that ethnic and national identities are socially constructed. The linguistic diversity is. This is primarily due to the fact that languages can be regarded as a neutral medium of communication.
Americanization will undermine the Kulturnation because the uniqueness of the original culture will disappear. Americanization is often deﬁned as a process in which cultural models and norms are being exported from the United States to the rest of the world. The Kulturnation is undermined by yet another process: regionalization. the idea of a better life and of ”prosperity for all”. All over the world people are feeling threatened by globalization. Hollywood movies and Levis jeans that went to the other side of the Atlantic but also elements of the ”American dream”. which may be seen as a reaction to Americanization and globalization. Yet another problem occurs when one keeps in mind that the very idea of the Kulturnation is. This ”myth of a common ancestry”34 is at least partly alive in nation-states that build citizenship on the jus sanguinis. always based on ethnic identity. However. it is not only Coca-Cola. Only when they are not offered integration into society.The State of the Future
niﬁcance of particular cultural habits and rituals. which causes them to look toward the regions. One example for this
34 Smith (1993): 29. to a particular extent. If one envisages the Kulturnation as a historically grown community based on ethic similarity. will they begin to be proud of the identity of their home country in order to distinguish them from the society in which they were not admitted.35 Another phenomenon that is believed to undermine the Kulturnation is Americanization. be seen in many Latin American communities in US-American cities or with the young beurs of French North African ghettos. Cultural diversity as a result of immigration will. become a real danger to the Kulturnation only when the immigrants are excluded from full participation in their respective host society. however. which have developed in that country over a very long time. 35 Castells (1997): 274. This tendency can. they are living in as providers of a distinct identity. for instance. The distinct national cultures will no longer be distinguished from that of others and thus the nation will disappear. This exported model of society is one characterized by mass consumption and mass culture. it is very difﬁcult for strangers to be integrated into such a ”naturally” or ”genetically” homogeneous nation.
we have argued that decentralizing power in the European nation-states may be an effective 38
.The State of the Future
is European Union where new ”cultural” borders are created at the same time as the national borders are destroyed because of the single market and Schengen. however. In this paper. According to the logic of zero-sum games it would also lose its importance as his share of power in the game decreases. However.37 When a process takes place within a zero-sum game. The creation of strong regional identities may undermine the Kulturnation and the national political regime. the European integration process has become a device through which nation-states can tackle the problems they face. In a world where democratic nation-states are no longer capable of solving problems autonomously. if one actor gains power. The internationalization of decision-making has been seen as an efﬁcient way of overcoming the inability to solve problems. Predictions on the future of the nation-state depend on whether one conceives of the interplay of regions. rests on the underlying assumption of a zero-sum game. Academic and public rhetoric of the state. It is. This means that if the nation-state gives sovereignty to supranational institutions and/or regional governments. this suggests the nation-state may gain inﬂuence by giving power away to other institutions. this does not necessarily mean that the nation-state will be undermined and disappear as a political entity. the very reason of their existence is questioned. because the regional identity may become the base for political mobilization. the amount of power available always remains constant. being weakened and undermined by invisible global forces. This implies that.
The nation-state is without any doubt under pressure due to globalization and regionalization. In contrast. another or many others must necessarily lose. all too easy just to declare a zero-sum game. nation-states and international actors as a zero-sum or a plus-sum game. it will inevitably lose power. which allows all actors to gain something. Paradoxically. the amount of power can increase in plus-sum games. In this respect.
instead of trying to convince the reader of how the state will precisely look like. The European governments decide as a counter reaction to re-strengthen the nation-state in order to gain popular support. this is regarded as an illusion because the state loses inﬂuence and hence legitimacy as it loses sovereignty. We assume that there is a possibility for the nation-state to beneﬁt from transferring power to supra. The state will become a arbitrator or mediator between the different levels of government. Arguments and public debate over political issues will more or less disappear. The state is no longer capable to live up to the trust that was once bestowed on it. globalization and regionalization have brought the state into a crisis: the state is challenged and we are quite conﬁdent that it will have to undergo tremendous changes within the next decades. This reaction combines both withdrawing the power that they early on gave to supranational institutions and place more emphasis on national identity and unity. Therefore. and supranational institutions. this gain of democratic legitimacy reinforces citizens identiﬁcation with state institutions.and sub-national institutions. but instead it may gain democratic legitimacy. the nation-states have lost public support in a far-reaching degree. Predicting what the nation-state will precisely be in the future is an unfeasible and hopeless task. international.
. In the zero-sum approach. One vision may be that the state will become an administrative authority deprived of any identity-delivering functions. they decide to gain this power themselves. The power resides within regional. we want to explore some alternatives to which the state may be heading. In a second scenario. the states function will be to build clusters that attract investors and companies. The state has been an extraordinarily successful concept in the modern era.The State of the Future
means of closing the democratic deﬁcit. Moreover. In the end. The ”new regionalism” may induce the state to give more sovereignty to the regions. its legitimacy has deteriorated almost entirely. because the governments role will be regulatory and administrative. Nevertheless. As the people realize that the political elite no longer has the power to secure the well being of the citizens. There is a hesitance and ambiguity to what the state might be like in the future and what role it will play.
by Robert Cox (Cambridge: UP). 3–19. in: The Regional Dimension of the European Union. social security and essentially the livelihoods of all who are employed within the corporation. An Introduction. Dieter (2001): ”Europe’s democratic deﬁcit: how truly democratic is our democracy?”. health beneﬁts. Bauböck. Brown. Towards a Third Level in Europe?. Society and Culture. in: Approaches to World Order. Corporations will monopolize the former welfare states function: controlling pensions. States and World Orders”. Reﬂections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso). Vol. Charlie Jeffery (London: Frank Cass). Castells. Udo (1997): ”The Politics of the Third Level”. an uprising will come into being. democracy disappears because the state is the only entity where the people can express political opinions and participating in elections. Bullmann. in: The Globalization of World Politics. ed. Robert (1996 ): ”Social Forces. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: UP). Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration (Aldershot: Avebury). A third scenario is where conglomerate corporations dominate the world.The State of the Future
Anderson. the people will adapt to a new identity where they are no longer citizens but employees. Baumann. Dettke. Those that do not belong to a corporation will be an underclass. Instead of identifying with the state. Chris (1997): ”Human Rights”. paper presented at the Atlantic Conference of the British Council ”The Citizen and the State in an era 40
. Cox. Benedict (1991): Imagined Communities. Rainer (1998): The Challenge of Diversity. which is characterized by anarchy. The underclass will be deprived and left out and as time progresses. 85–123. Therefore. eds. 2: The Power of Identity (Oxford: Blackwell). salaries. a reinforcement of nationalism is induced and in turn history repeats itself. Zygmunt (1998): Globalization The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity). Manuel (1997): The Information Age: Economy.
http://europa.fesdc. Anthony D. Michael (1998): The New Regionalism in Western Europe: territorial restructuring and political change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).uk/global/pdf/Global%20Democracy. Zum historischen Hintergrund von Staatenkonﬂikten. Johansson.org. David (1995): Democracy and the Global Order (Oxford: UP). Christer. 43–101. 3–45. Goldmann. Guibernau. Montserrat (1999): Nations without States. Gantzel.
. Jönsson. Political communities in a global age (Cambridge: Polity Press). Tendenzen. Bernd Wegner (Paderborn: Schöningh). ed. in: Wie Kriege entstehen. Rune. in: European Union Online. McCormick.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/ 2001/com2001_0428en01. (1995): Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press). Rune (2001): ”Ideas on Europe Europe as an Idea. Ralf Ronnquist. John (1962): International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia UP).co. Herz.polity. as of 3 August 2002) European Commission (2001): ”White Paper on Governance”. Anthony (2001): ”Transnational Democracy: Theories and Prospects”. An Intellectual History of European Unity and Cooperation”. Chantilly. Johansson. 26–28 October 2001. http://www.pdf as of 3 August 2002. Perspektiven”. John (1999): Understanding the European Union: a concise Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave).The State of the Future
of global change”.eu. in: Tägil (2001). Sven Tägil and Gunnar Törnqvist (2000): Organizing European Space (London: Sage). Held. in: Tägil (2001). Sven Taegil (2001): ”A Crisis of the Territorial State? Integration and Fragmentation in Europe”. Legitimacy and the European Union (Uppsala: University Press). 299–318. Keating. McGrew. Karlsson. Smith. Virginia (http://www. ursächliche Hintergründe. in: Global Transformations Homepage. Klaus-Jürgen (2000): ”Über die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Kjell (2001): Transforming the European Nation-State: Dynamics of Internationalization (London: Sage). Christer (2001): Democracy.pdf as of 3 August 2002.
in: Border Regions in Comparison. Wolfgang (1996): ”The Modern West European State and the European Union: Democratic Erosion or a new Kind of Polity?”. Martin (1999): The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: UP). Persson. 11–19. The EU and other international Institutions”. How democratic is it?. Max (1982): Makt og byråkrati: essays om politikk og klasse. Michael (2000): ”National Innovative Capacity”. Tägil. in: The Global Competitiveness Report 1999.
. eds. ed. Hans-Åke (2001a): ”Regions in Europe a historical Perspective”. Weber. Anderson and Kjell A. Hans-Åke Persson and Inge Eriksson (Malmö: UP). 183–221. Svein S. samfunnsforskning og verdier (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag). Sven (ed) (2001): Europe The Return of History (Lund: Nordic Academic Press). Porter.The State of the Future
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2001): SIPRI Yearbook 2001 – Armaments. eds. Michael (2000): ”Democratic Governance beyond the Nation State. Van Creveld. in: European Journal of International Relations 6:2. by World Economic Forum (Oxford: UP). Eliassen (London: Sage). Wessels. Zürn. Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: UP). 41–70. in: The European Union.
preamble. that enlargement will take place.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
3 A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Security implications of the enlargement process and idea with a special emphasis on the case of FYROM
Arta Alibasik. double standards and a basic lack of strategy? Such are the questions that will be examined. shortsighted policies. p. with the Community [i. But to what extent does reality correspond with such declarations? Are we actually witnessing the sunrise of a new era in Europe.] as one of the cornerstones…”1 This was but one of many superlatives that in the beginning of the 1990s ofﬁcially heralded the start of ten applicant countrie’s long journey towards integration into the EU. so one of our goals with this essay is to try and pinpoint some
1 ”European Agreement”. Such rhetoric regarding enlargement has since remained an essential part of the ofﬁcial vocabulary.e. A basic hypothesis assumes that an enlargement of the EU is at the present time possible and even desirable. That it is possible doesn’t necessarily mean. Rasmus Nilsson
”Conscious of the importance of this Agreement to establishing and enhancing in Europe a system of stability based on cooperation. but also in governments both within and outside the union.
. 2. eds. however. an era of true unity driven forth by all participants understanding of the enlargements historical necessity? Or are we instead met with insurmountable problems. the EU. not only in the EU itself.
namely FYROM2. however.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
hidden dangers which may trouble not only the enlargement process of today. It doesnt have a unique relationship with the West such as Serbia and Montenegro plus Croatia. the practical efforts of the EU in promoting this could indicate whether or not peace in Europe is still ranked high on the EU-agenda – a vital area of concern for this essay. With its unusually prominent ethnic clashes. Since the countries here are. placed in the heart of European history and being far closer to integration into the EU than most other applicants3 (let alone almost all applicants from the Balkans). And it doesnt have an economy as successful as Slovenias. the entire area has hosted some of the worst disturbances in Europe since the Second World War. The ﬁrst reason has to do with geography. not only to those countries hoping for acceptance by the end of 2002. at least a few reasons present themselves. the expansion of the EU here could (and in many peoples eyes should) in the long run be this solution. With countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic. If the intentions set forth in the beginning of this introduction are ever to come true a solution must be found in the Balkans. and have always been. Choosing FYROM for this study. This could be the case for several countries in the former Yugoslavia. This will be done ﬁrst by focusing on the general picture and then by narrowing down to a study of the relationship between the EU and one of the applicant countries. Most importantly. FYROM isn’t placed under outside surveillance such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having already ofﬁcially declared this to be a goal for the future.
. be they violent or not. considered to be part of Europe. a country that both literally and ﬁguratively is quite a distance from the EU may seem strange. The fact that FYROM is situated in the Balkans makes it especially interesting for this essay. In this essay the terms ”applicants” and ”applicant countries” refer to all countries seeking membership of the EU. but also prove problematic in the longer run. FYROM. but also by the aftermath of bloody confrontations in the 1990s. is distinguished from its former fellow republics in several ways. What it has had is recent ethnic tension and
This acronym stands for ”Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. why should one choose FYROM for a case study? Well. whose strong ties to the Western world are secured not only by historical tradition.
However important these applicant countries may be in themselves.
. Inside the boundaries of such a crude deﬁnition it is obvious that a number of sub-categories exist: Economic. In this context. social etc. namely ”hard” and ”soft” security. old-fashioned security with a focus on military aspects. The fact that FYROMs relationship with the EU isn’t very developed yet naturally impedes our evaluation of this relationship.
General security problems
The ﬁrst step of any examination involving the term ”security” must necessarily focus on the term itself and how it is to be understood.5 This ”soft” security is gradually gaining in importance as old time territorial
4 5 Morgenthau. According to several specialists in this area. Morgenthau’s4 classic realist picture of international affairs and of security was expanded and a ”new” kind of security entered the general debate. Politics among Nations. choosing a ”case country” which will only in the long run have a chance of entering the EU but which is still most deﬁnitely part of Europe may very well provide this essay with a longer perspective and provide a special reminder of some of the problems being forgotten by those analysts focusing only on the ”ﬁrst wave applicants”. demographic. deﬁned only as being non-military. however. as has already been stated. it is the aim of this essay to try portraying several general trends in the enlargement process at large and then project them onto the case of FYROM. since it proved to be a useful tool in analyzing various power-balancing moves among actors (mainly states) in international politics. Hans. scientists began to realize that more and more factors had to be taken into consideration if one was to understand a world that was growing ever more complex. environmental.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
direct EU involvement therein. Still. This type of security was seen as especially important up till and including the Cold War. To speak in very broad terms two deﬁnitions of the word may be distinguished. ”Hard” security is. popularly speaking. This security is known as ”soft” security and is. the number of sub-categories (and sub-sub-categories) number well over a hundred. 1948. Gradually. roughly speaking. Thus.
If one for a moment is to avoid looking at the area of deceased Yugoslavia whats strikingly is a number of territorial settlements. p. then the theme isn’t precisely mutual understanding between the peoples. see Plewa-Thörnquist. not to mention their common companions such as ethnic clashes. how much respect can one actually assume that this Constitution has for the sovereignty of other countries. And when the Hungarian Constitution still claims to be representing all Hungarians. The ﬁrst conﬂict is the one that seemingly has the least to offer.
. For the Hungarian example. terrorism and the like. It is the discrepancy between the borders of today and those of the past. but also with future enlargement processes and their possible effect. One shouldn’t forget. For when a large mosaic on the wall of a church in the Polish border town Przemysl (near Ukraine) shows a Poland of pre-1939. no matter where they be.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
conﬂicts give way to the threats of impoverishment and mass migration. though. After all. least of all their Romanian neighbors that rule over the former Hungarian region of Transylvania?6 Furthermore. If one is to look at security problems showing themselves among the applicant countries. which will only become clearer as we examine the security problems connected not only with the applicant countries as such. which show every sign of stability: Between Poland and the Czech Republic. three conﬂicts especially seem prominent. the Balkans and its former
6 The Polish church was visited by one of the authors in August 2000. and it is the right to settle ones own ”internal affairs” against the right of interference by outside forces (here seen as forces not being applicant countries themselves) with ”legitimate interests”. So there is hardly much to worry about for the EU and a large concern for the Union and for Europe as such has been taken away. that it is exactly among these countries that some of the most terrifying ”hard security”threats seen in the last decade have shown up. it is the question between the right of minorities and the fear of separatism and national disintegration. Or perhaps not quite. 11. Also among the applicant countries for the EU are problems of ”soft” security generally the most prominent. It is ”hard” and ”soft” security in a most volatile mix. Hungary and its neighbors etc. this ”hard” security problem has been solved in the vast majority of the countries concerned. An aspect.
These events are all within the ”hard security”-sphere. Especially two examples come to mind. ”internal affairs” vs. however. Not that this should dissuade the EU and the applicant countries from trying to solve this problem. The Austrian threat of blocking the acceptance of the Czech Republic into the EU due to a possibly insecure nuclear power plant at Temelin is one proof of this.g. one forgets the entire Albanian problem in the Balkans (part of which will be touched upon later). it is important to understand that (apart from Moldova) no attempts of separation have taken place after the Cold War. if one chooses to see the Yugoslavian war not as the breaking up of a state. fear of separatism the problems are even more prominent. as in Moldova) and the local population. Instead we are so far looking at an example of ”soft” security. which was already being used for a Greek border province just south of FYROM. p. The NATO bombings of ﬁrst Bosnia-Herzegovina and then Serbia are already (in)famous as examples of how such a conﬂict may turn out. plus the latent civil war of Moldova to realize that here lays one of the greatest challenges for the region at large. As for minority rights vs. See e. although this could possibly change in the future. pp. not to mention the discrimination of the Roma-people in large parts of the region (although the fear of separatist tendencies may in this case be not very strong at all). Some may therefore be inclined to believe that this kind of conflict only exists as a result of the Soviet heritage. Estonia and Latvia. Nyström in Tägil (ed. however. 500. i. but the breaking up of the Federation that it nominally and (in the eyes of the authors) truly was. see Plewa-Thörnquist. Another is to be seen later on in the essay since FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) as a name only developed after Greek pressure against the name of Macedonia. 8–15.e. All in all. But also Cyprus has for a long time been host to such kinds of tension ever since ﬁrst Greece and then Turkey got directly involved in the islands affairs.7 Still. also has a place here. In that case.8
The conflicts mentioned here all include problems between Russians (or Russiasupporters. ”No danger” is not always the case in the third type of conﬂict.
. but there seems to be no real danger for a ”Yugoslavian scenario” all over this region. For further information.). ”legitimate interests”.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Yugoslav republics is a matter all by itself. One only has to mention Crimea. there still seems to be reason for concern when it comes to this type of conﬂict. ”Soft security”.
So the power balancing (and. True enough. this is also the opinion of this essays authors. perhaps. The remedy for these conﬂicts has by many been seen to be the EU enlargement in itself. If countries among the ”ﬁrst wave-applicants” became disillusioned with the entire EU-idea. at the very least. not to create a lasting organization of their own. what hope could Romania have of ever joining the EU if Slovakia or the Baltic countries were left out? Reasoning such as this could spell disaster for the applicant countries and especially so if they started comparing EU rhetoric with reality and found the two woefully different. Adrian. but more likely to return to old ways of power balancing (at least so far as the Central.9 As already stated in the introduction. hopefully to create their own forms of cooperation. we are convinced that a few more aspects on this matter have to be taken into consideration if the entire security problem is to be addressed. After all. The international politics of East Central Europe. Especially pp.
. we have shown the existence of three types on conﬂicts. Manchester University Press. 1996. First of all. 10 For more information on this subject. several of the countries developed the so-called ”Visegrad”-cooperation in the 90s. East and South East European countries go). as it has been assumed that an enlarged EU would bring peace and prosperity to its new members. then other countries following in their wake could very likely do the same.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Thus. 12–13 shows an example of this. But even worse than such a renewal of old times tension is the fact that all this could come true as some sort of ”domino effect”.10 They simply didnt have enough economic incentives to do so. 122–131. some individual trading agreements with the EU) would be their only possibility. conﬂicts that we later will examine in the context of FYROM. but the basic purpose of this organization was to help the countries involved in their common efforts to join the EU. In both cases the risk exists that disappointed applicants turn away from the EU.
9 Friis. For it seems to be a possibility. that the whole project of enlargement can bring trouble to the applicant countries in several ways. Yet. pp. see Hyde-Price. there is the possibility that the enlargement either doesn’t take place at all at the end of 2002 or else comes to fruition merely as a ”Small Bang” with only a few countries entering the Promised Land. ”EUs Udvidelse mod Øst”.
In that way a ”silver curtain” could be created in Europe with at least two repercussions. would also bring beneﬁts to the new members of the EU. bonds that may be almost as important to the preservation of peace in Eastern Europe as the enlargement. but their problem is that with such a privilege come demands. however. But should the EU begin to focus exclusively on its own problems (e. if not forever. A situation. Slovenia. which in the long
11 These are Estonia. if as many as 10 countries11 were to be invited into the EU in Copenhagen at the end of 2002 (the socalled ”Big Bang”-solution) wouldn’t everything be all right? Well. Most of the applicant countries border to non-EU areas and is thus being compelled by the Union to reinforce these borders if membership of the EU and the Schengen-plan is to be carried through.
. Cyprus (in one form or another) and Malta.g. of course. since a number of European countries would still be left out for several years.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Still. where a previous prospering border trade has much decreased in wake of the former countries border and visa reinforcements. And in this a third danger is hidden. perhaps even for good. a part of the East European region could be left out of the new Europe for a long time. This. For even such a scenario wouldn’t remove the danger of ”Fort Europa”. The ﬁrst of these has to do with the so-called Schengen-plan. this argument could easily be used in favor of the entire enlargement process. Lithuania. not exactly. Hungary. Latvia. Czech Republic. After all. Countries such as Ukraine and Russia have so far been interested in having a close relationship with the EU since they saw a profound opportunity for cooperation here. Slovakia. An example of this can be seen at the border between Poland and Ukraine. At the same time it includes breaking bonds with countries in the region outside the enlargement process. This plan has as its target to create an area (namely the EU) where movement of people and goods can avoid being slowed down by border controls and the like. Poland. implies spending a large amount of money something which countries struggling to recover from the economic downturn in the 90s may be hard pressed to do. This. due to its need for internal reform) and not care about the wishes and words of its eastern neighbors (or if these neighbors perceived this to be the case) then a real risk exists that opposition against the EU would form in these countries. Thus.
the rule of law. And only recently Turkey completed several laws granting their Kurdish minority extended rights to use of the Kurdish language and abolished the death penalty. laws preventing the large. pp.12 We have now listed some of the most prominent security dangers connected to the applicant countries as well as to the enlargement process as such. such as the right to vote) are slowly being mended. all this progress was carried through mainly because of the desire these countries have for entering the EU. The two separate governments of Cyprus (and their patrons) have several times been told that the EU isn’t keen to accept a divided country into its midst. 18. Part of these criteria have to do with respect for democracy. It is time to survey the EU-response to these problems.13 And there do exist several signs of the fact that the EU is doing its best to implement the criteria. that the EU would not accept a country led by the likes of him a fact contributing to his fall from power in 1998. and the Unions insistence that the changes be carried through. 13 See ”The European Union and the World”.
. human rights. As for those problems stemming from the applicant countries themselves. boundaries. All these changes. Russian parts of the population from achieving citizenship (and thus basic rights. when implemented. the examples listed above can just as well be looked at from another angle. and minorities and outside pressure. So in many ways the EU-response to the problems has been sound.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
run could become troubling for the European security arena as such. p. Estonia and Latvia have indeed discriminated (and are to a certain extent still discriminating) against
12 This and the previous paragraphs are based on Friis. And yet again. minorities and the like and should therefore. In Estonia and Latvia. ”EUs Udvidelse mod Øst”. much was already mentioned in the so-called Copenhagen Criteria laid down in June 1993 at the ofﬁcial beginning of the enlargement process. As regards Slovakia it was in the second half of the 1990s made clear to former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. be able to counter two of the aforementioned problems. 24–26. notorious for not playing by the rules and suspected of kidnapping the then-presidential son in 1995. something which may further talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
Or are they? For even though the Union has steadfastly upheld its principles when the applicant countries are concerned. Still. but also of Syria and Iraq. even though Turkey here has the advantage of being member of NATO and thus being able to delay or even hinder NATO / EU military cooperation if need be. but still sees a need to prevent separatism in its easternmost provinces. respectively).partiesand-elections. But all in all it should stand out clear that any EU-interference in the internal affairs of applicant countries could create resentment for the Union in these countries. Turkey doesn’t fear a Kurdish power in this way. Here the EU is the outside actor. See <www. Especially a few areas of concern present themselves. two neighboring countries with substantial Kurdish minorities. Though this can be unpleasant for the applicant countries they are still left with a solid. reliable image of the EU and of the world that awaits them when they enter. ”legitimate interests”. this has not always been the case internally in the EU. but this was done from a basic fear that Russia would otherwise be able to regain hegemony over these states as happened only 60 years ago.
14 At elections in both 1992 and 1994 his HZDS-party gained far more votes than the other parties (37.html>. since ﬁrm Kurdish advance would threaten the territorial integrity of not only Turkey.14 The fact that many are now predicting his political comeback as Prime Minister and that the EU is warning forcefully against it goes to show that the Slovakian population once again could separate the country from the wishes of the EU and what then? This could become a prime example of a security danger mentioned above.3 and 35 %. especially if they aren’t soon accepted into the ”club”. Even when he lost his position in 1998.
. To a certain extent this is also shown in the Unions support for Greece in the discussions over Cyprus. As for Slovakia. namely ”internal affairs” vs. not least to avoid a major threat to the regions security. one could stress that all this merely shows an EU sticking to its basic values when doing so may trouble the application procedure. Vladimir Meciar was democratically elected.de/slovakia2. pressuring the applicant countries to comply with its demands or be kept out.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Russians in their countries. his party still came in first place with 27 % of the votes.
has in reference to terrorist danger detained eleven Muslim Arabs suspected of wrongdoing without presenting them with a trial or charge. 16 ”The Economist”. the ”war on terror” hasnt exactly improved the conditions for many immigrants of Arabic descent. of course. naturally. pp. fear of separatism just as we saw it in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. Northern Ireland. Examples are legion. we are in both cases talking about those who are in some way ”different” from the major ethnic group in the country they inhabit.16 Here it may. which require eight years of residence. A new law was to be the basis for such a practice and even though the Special Immigration Appeals Commission has now rejected this law as ”discriminatory”. There is a conceptual difference between immigrants and minorities.15 Lately. Britain. being renowned for its protection of free speech. The fact that some politicians and others in the West still maintain that Western Europe must guide its eastern counterpart towards ”more civilized standards” in this area can only be seen as a legacy of the enlightenments generalizations on this part of Europe. 28–30. August 3rd–9th 2002. a worrying tendency has shown itself. compared with Estonias ﬁve? In Southern Europe large numbers of North African and other immigrants work illegally in the cities and in the countryside. but also violence and murder stemming from such. One has for instance only to think of the French constitution. Or what about the German laws on naturalization of immigrants. be said that two deﬁnitions are being mixed up. p. And this in three of Europes greatest democracies. For not only do the problems exist all over Europe some of the harsher governmental answers are being presented in Western Europe. 30
.g. And some of the immigrant groups (e.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
First and foremost there is again the problem of minority rights vs. often without legal and medical protection. for instance. plus (in two of the cases) some of the oldest. the Basque Provinces and Corsica have all experienced not only separatist demands. Still. which claims that all its citizens are French and nothing else – to see that there is no room here for minority politics whatsoever. the most important part being that minorities are permanently situated in the region whereas immigrants. are people coming from the outside. Turks in Germany) are of a size that belittles their
15 These paragraphs are based on Plewa-Thörnquist.
there is ample reason to raise the question whether the EU should involve itself at all in the affairs of the applicant countries. So discrimination of these groups is taking place and their size sometimes makes the problem one of great security interest to the country in question. One only has to look at the strict demands being placed by the EU on applicant countries economic stability if these applicants are to be let in to the Euro-cooperation. However. To put light on these questions let us delve into a study of the relationship between the EU and one of the applicant countries.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
minority counterparts. it is also true that the enlargement in itself creates some security problems. As for the other security risks mentioned in regard to the applicant countries (i.e. even though the groups may not strictly be labeled ”minority”. Based on this. one may ask where the EU is really heading. whereas the applicant countries are to go strictly by the book. By themselves these are quite reasonable demands. but for the applicant countries it may seem strange that Germany (and perhaps France) can avoid criticism when they break rules of the Euro economic stability pact. It can be stated that some security problems do exist in the applicant countries and that an enlargement of the EU could to a certain extent solve these problems. territorial conﬂicts and outside intervention) they are not as such present in the EU. Furthermore. and whether there exists a strategy for the Unions future. however. Having said all this.
. Other problems of ”double standards” do exist. which in magnitude are not less than the ones faced so far. but also because the countries comprising the EU don’t always adhere to these ideals themselves. Not only because the ideals behind such action may be disputed. let us review some remarks on the general security aspect in the enlargement process. Thus the two deﬁnitions are in this essay placed under the same label to prove that many minority problems seen outside the EU have counterparts within. at least when it comes to their ”realpolitik”. namely FYROM.
see Nyström in Tägil (ed. at the same time one also has to consider Macedonia. as one Balkan nation after another began to distance itself from the Turks. But if one is to write about FYROM. p. Bulgaria and Serbia followed. For just as well as Macedonians steadfastly claim him as their ancestor17. The name ”Macedonia” dates back to Antiquity and to the empire of Alexander the Great – a connection that is still very much being emphasized by nations inhabiting the area.
.). First. this is also done by Greeks. in reality they were acting as sovereign states. Serbian. In the 5th and 6th century Slavic tribes began arriving from the north and soon the area’s demographic composition was ”muddled” to say the least. meaning something different depending on who was asked. Thus. a Macedonian area could conceivably cover not only present day
17 In July 1991 it was even suggested that new Macedonian coins should be adorned with the image of Alexander the Great.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
FYROM and the EU
This part of the essay is focused on the relationship between EU and FYROM. Such kind of mutability is still very much present today – and it is of utmost importance to understand the nature of this if the area’s security concerns are to be addressed. however. Bulgarian and Macedonian dynasties18 ruled here throughout the Middle Ages and created the background for what later should turn out to be some of the most serious territorial strife in Europe. From this question of origin all other historical discrepancies these nations in between can be viewed. Although these entities preserved their formal allegiance to the Ottomans. 488. With a policy of ethnic tolerance this empire for many years succeeded in preventing ethnic strife – not to mention ethnic mobilization against Istanbul itself. the situation was ripe with difﬁculty for Macedonia. Not many decades after. Different Byzantine. Bulgarians and Albanians. though. 18 The Macedonian dynasty may furthermore have had Armenian blood in it. see Nyström in Tägil (ed. p. Throughout history this has been a most versatile concept.). All this changed. they had to pass through the time of Ottoman occupation from the 14th century onwards. If one is to follow maps from those years. Greece led the way – heavily supported by nationalist sentiments and taking advantage of history with the help of West European romanticism. 487.
problems. A fact. however disputed its nature may be. but on that over which Macedonians have political control. Naturally. That an ambiguity exists. some present day security problems to which Macedonia has to position itself. The Balkan Wars can in this way be seen as a logical consequence of disagreements on origin. And yet this is. shared with countries all over the world: Crime. which has been clearly demonstrated in the successor states of Yugoslavia.). but also large parts of Albania. let us turn back to the security problems. Nyström in Tägil (ed. one may divide them into two categories. however. Having said this. Maps and documents. And this. it became impossible. But what is of interest here. must at all times be kept in mind. Of course these areas are still to some extent populated by ethnic Macedonians and thus of interest to the FYROM leadership. On the other hand it would also be problematic to view everything that has been seen as Macedonia throughout history as the ”interior”.
. is the area known as FYROM. which were already mentioned in the beginning of this essay as examples of ”soft” security problems. as has already been hinted at. are those conﬂicts being especially prominent among applicant countries to the EU. not as simple as it may seem. But which are these ”security problems” and what relationship do they have to each other? To begin with. including heavy smuggling of people and narcotics. can deceive and have done so in all of history. As long as these nations were part of an empire this problem could be kept in the background. more relevantly. But for the purpose of this essay we must concentrate not on what is of interest to Macedonians. Now. etc. pollution. Bulgaria and Greece19. though. For what does ”internal” actually mean here? What is the interior of Macedonia? Is it FYROM? Many people would say so – and point to maps and ofﬁcial documents as proof of their point. FYROM is beleaguered by many problems. Even the name FYROM was only meant to be provisional – once again showing the ambiguity and mutability of this territorial demarcation. So can.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
FYROM. 486. For they often only tell about what the world thinks of an area – not what the area thinks of itself.
19 See map p. Serbia and Montenegro. internal and external.
A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Internally in FYROM. The emergence in the region of armed Albanian groups such as the UCK has only heightened such fears.
. 502. p. 15 21 For a description of Macedonian thoughts on their own identity and on Albanians. but also some southern provinces in Serbia such as Kosovo. pp. this means the minority question the relationship between Macedonians and Albanians. see Nyström. exacerbated by another.
20 See Brunnbauer. Albanians only had to observe the plight of their ethnic kin in Kosovo and elsewhere in recent years to fear for their safety in this region. see Brunnbauer. The problems reached their climax in the beginning of 2001 as armed.20 The combination of such demographic facts and the still relatively loose foundation of identity for many Macedonians in FYROM have in the last decade of the 20th century put a severe strain on the relationship between the two population groups. It is the problem of borders and of identity. which has also been put into question partly by violent clashes with the predominantly Macedonian authorities in FYROM22 and partly by the harsh treatment bestowed by Macedonian authorities on Albanian refugees from Kosovo. The internal problem is. p. Especially in the northwestern parts of the country the concentration of Albanians is very high in some municipalities up to 95 % of the entire population. Whereas the Albanians constitute the overall minority. however. 8–9. This conﬂict has been the most dangerous by far in the short life span of FYROM. Of FYROM. putting FYROM on the brink of a civil war. comprising not only present-day Albania and large parts of FYROM. 22 An example of this came in 1994 as a demonstration for the opening of an Albanian university near the town of Tetovo was forcibly dispersed. Bulgaria and Greece. For Macedonians there has lurked the danger of a ”hidden Albanian agenda” with the ultimate goal of creating a Greater Albania. leaving one demonstrator dead and fifteen wounded. with roots far back in history. Albanian groups in response to what they claimed to be legal injustice towards Albanians clashed with Macedonian military and police forces in the north of the country. this differs heavily from region to region.21 On the other hand. external one. A safety. but also of three of the neighboring countries: Serbia.
but also the rights of Macedonians living in Bulgaria. this country was of course preoccupied elsewhere. the problem came to the forefront.25 So even though it would be wrong to consider these problems entirely solved. by the way. From 1988 onwards. has to respect not only FYROM’s territorial integrity. however. p. And Bulgaria. FYROM found itself surrounded by states with at best a coolly neutral stance towards its existence. has recently in cooperation with FYROM created an oil pipeline running from Skopje to Thessalonica. Lately.com/headlines/mk. only in 1995 accepting the new country’s status. This country demanded the use of the acronym FYROM for the new state. Greece declared the new state to be ”a complete fabrication”. p. which has survived to this day. soon changed its viewpoint only one month after its initial welcoming of FYROM the Bulgarian president Zelev denounced the idea of a Macedonian nation. but didnt look favorably on FYROM secession.). Already at the declaration of FYROMs independence in September 1991.). 25 For more information.newnations. the Sava League. see Nyström in Tägil (ed. And Greece. 495 and 497. and an international military force in Kosovo indirectly gives the neighboring FYROM some security (even though this force couldn’t prevent armed Albanians from crossing the border in 2001!). As for Serbia. Whereas Bulgaria immediately accepted FYROMs integrity and independence. 500.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
We have shown how in history the area in and around FYROM has been contested by a multitude of nations and empires. even if these aren’t ofﬁcially seen as a minority by the government. Yet this disagreement cannot be conﬁned to history alone. For also in the last decade it has been as prominent as ever. there seems to be no immediate danger for the integrity of FYROM. All this. a Serbian nationalistic group. with FYROM as a southern Serbian province. even demanded the rebuilding of Serbia’s pre-1941 borders. Serbia clearly has enough to do with its domestic policies. the primary reason behind the use of FYROM as the name for the new republic24. Already it has been remarked that many Macedonians feel their national identity
23 See Nyström in Tägil (ed. 24 ”Macedonia” already being a province in northern Greece. things have improved somewhat. an attitude. see <www. Bulgaria. doesnt imply that the countrys problems with its neighbors have no inﬂuence whatsoever.23 All in all.html>
. aspiring to enter the EU.
And not that it hasn’t been shown those political and economic criteria with which it has to comply. So the external conﬂict inﬂuences the internal one. The ﬁrst has to do with the enlargement process itself. Albanian forces and for extended recognition of and rights for the Albanian minority in FYROM. And so the EU did.unhcr. It is. The European Union and the European states in general – still remember not only their inability to interfere in the civil war of Bosnia Herzegovina during ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Soon after the conﬂict had begun.26 To avoid a repetition of this scenario and to adhere to the idea of the EU as a ”project of peace” it seemed that the Union had to get involved when the internal security situation in FYROM broke down in the beginning of 2001. however.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=statistics> 27 See Brunnbauer. just as importantly. It also resounds in a wider forum. Not that it hasn’t been accepted as a candidate for future membership. to the Albanian demands. signed by the two parts on the 8th of August and with some difﬁculty ratiﬁed by leaders of the various Macedonian and Albanian parties ﬁve days later. but also the massive stream of refugees following in the wake of this calamity. But for the time being it is difﬁcult to see how a country whose PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is one third of Slovenias and one fourth of Portu26 For background information. very difﬁcult to see how FYROM in the nearest future could enter the EU. as was mentioned in the ﬁrst half of this essay (see footnote 9). the EU (together with NATO) started mediating between Macedonians and Albanians. The agreement mainly called for an immediate end to hostilities. by many been seen as the only way to help countries in Europe’s eastern half to prosper economically and thus avoid the threatening security conﬂicts. what has it NOT done? To analyze these questions we must ﬁrst consider ways in which the EU could actually lessen the security problems of FYROM. 4–7
. The result was the Ohrid Agreement. see <www.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
threatened and have thus reacted harsher.27 So far so good. for disarming of the irregular. But what has the EU actually done for the security of FYROM since then and. There seems to be three main options. pp. This process has. than might otherwise have been the case. to prevent further deterioration of this country and of the entire region.
perhaps.gov> (”world factbook”) 29 For more on this subject. roads and other types of infrastructure have been improved.com/ pipermail/albsa-info/2001-June/001911.eu. but only work slowly towards it.asp> or Brunnbauer. According to the EU itself this is exactly what has been done.29 Should outside armed interference once again become necessary in FYROM.htm>
. indeed.g.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
gals (one of the poorest countries in the EU) should economically be able to enter the Union. better security. <www. EU as such hasn’t had any soldiers or weapons to send even for the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement NATO-troops were being used. such a force still has to be created. the will of European countries to have their military forces bound to FYROM may be quite small.html> 31 See <http://europa. whose mandate had expired in 1999. In an effort to create a more hospitable environment for businesses. For now.30 The third method uses economics and re-organization. with some success.int/comm/external_relations/see/fyrom/index.dk/udenrigspolitik/um-tema/ det_vestlig_balkan/233. see e. replacing those UN-troops. though. it is safe to say that EU cannot use it at the moment.cia. is that the forces being used have all been from NATO or from the UN. a future EU military force might be able to take on this role.”31
28 See <www.alb-net. What is important to stress. So as far as this option is concerned.28 Not to mention the security problems. Even though the EU may not be willing to include FYROM in the organization for many years to come. And given the present day situation with a ”war against terror”. Another option concerns the stationing of armed troops to deter potential troublemakers from attacking each other. 6–7 30 For a Greek suggestion to use such a force in FYROM. see <www. pp.um. This method has already been used by the West in the Balkans for some years. namely in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. different enterprise organizations have been supported. however. a decentralization of the country has taken place and money have been allocated for cultural projects. this shouldnt prevent the Union from helping the Balkan state towards economic prosperity and thus. and to assist the country in the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process. So all in all it is correct to state ”The EU aims to bring the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia closer to EU standards and principles. both before and after the crisis in 2001.
however. the share of the European Unions total trade staid the same. Since then. For even though the EU has a lot of plans for FYROM to prosper. much has been planned and some has been done by the
32 As examples can be mentioned the carrying through of a census and a so-called audience research survey. ﬁnding this area far too complicated to deal with. it is somewhat difﬁcult to understand why the EU has cut down on its ﬁnancial aid to FYROM the last couple of years. After having donated 90 million Euro in 1999 (as part of the post-Kosovo campaign to help the Balkans recover economically) this amount decreased in 2000 and 2001. many other projects haven’t yet been carried through. This is by no means self-evident many international bodies have so far preferred to stay away entirely from the Balkans. ﬁnancial assistance for FYROM in 2001 was only 48 million Euro less than in 1997!34 As for trade between the two entities. For even though the amount of trade in absolute ﬁgures increased during the 1990s.org/EU/statistik/fyrom. and even though some of these plans are presently being implemented.fifoost. having stated this a few discrepancies begin to show themselves. 35 Hardly the most compelling evidence that the well being of FYROM is of high priority for the EU. when the Union ﬁnally seemed to realize the grave security situation of the Balkans. So helping FYROM slowly forward could be seen as quite a prudent strategy.
So what are the conclusions what can be said about the EU engagement in FYROM? Well. indeed.php>
. Even with this in mind. 33 A good depiction of this is given in Friis. which take up much of the Unions time and resources. the EU these days is involved in many very demanding projects33.32 This may seem quite reasonable. p. ”An ever larger Union?”. 5 34 See footnote 31. According to the European Unions own statistics.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
Still. 35 See <www. for the source see footnote 31. In many ways this was also the preferred option of the EU until the Kosovo crisis. things don’t look bright either. ﬁrst and foremost one has to underline the fact that the EU is in many ways engaged in the republic. After all.
so good. a few deductions present themselves. There seems to lack a clear-cut strategy from the side of the Union and perhaps some willpower as well. Unfortunately. maybe not. The EU isn’t only rhetoric some real work is being done to improve security all over Europe. Decreasing economic assistance and stagnating trade between the Union and FYROM do not bode well. has to do with lack of understanding of a central concept. namely security. If we now take this realization and use it to look at the questions posed in the beginning of the essay. For when the security of one ethnic group is heightened. but whose security are we talking about? The Macedonians? The Albanians? Or FYROM’s in general? Probably all of them. most of the plans still have to be implemented. even though EU-plans to reform the country on both governmental and provincial seems to show some afterthought. A prime example here is decentralization. In this. as areas almost exclusively populated by Albanians receive an increased amount of selfrule. perhaps the sign of a new. So far. After all. It is not a matter of which group is more right. All the measures undertaken by the EU are supposed to increase the security. with an emphasis on the last.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
EU in FYROM. including in FYROM. On the other hand.
. At ﬁrst glance it may seem quite reasonable when the international community (including the EU) convinces the FYROM government to increase local self-rule. the other one often feels threatened. One side consists of practical problems as when the EU isn’t willing to spend the required time or money on projects demanding exactly this. FYROM is no exception. For even though each of these plans taken by themselves seem reasonable enough. it is when they are viewed together that they show substantial weaknesses. Such has been the case throughout history competing groups have a tendency to think in ”zero-sum solutions”. this may very well prove to be impossible. And then again. it doesnt take much imagination to understand how some Macedonians feel. The problem here. What matters here is that one or both of the sides in such a dilemma may soon feel themselves threatened and thus start tensions all anew. as far as we see it. decisions should be taken close to the people being governed isn’t it so? But even if one complies with this. But some hidden dangers are at the same time showing themselves. more active policy by the Union in its ”near abroad”. OK.
If the EU can’t come up with clear-cut goals and strategies for the future of Europe. Based upon these eternal truths.M. Wanderlust and the pursuit of fresh Air. ”Robespierre and the French Revolution”. James Thompson once commented that the Parisian mob always acted especially violently in the hottest part of the summer. it most certainly is! With this in mind. In his book about Maximilien de Robespierre and the French Revolution. we dare say. Having criticized something. J. Neither does the implementation of reforms. that they are endowed by Nature with certain unalienable Rights. we hereby present the theory of Picturesquelism. which presented itself as we examined our subject. which threaten (or seem to threaten) the various sides in a conﬂict. but having delved deeper into the topic we are now convinced that a fundamental. For how would it actually be possible to create peace and security in Europe? We have tried to pinpoint fallacies in the approach of the EU to the area of security. Double standards impress no one.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
But there is also another side and a potentially more threatening one.
. For is it not so that doctors often recommend ”a change of air and of surroundings” for patients suffering from one malady or another? Is it not so that human instinct compels us towards strange coasts and valleys hidden behind those hills? Yes. However unintentionally this may be.36 In the book this subject was merely glanced at. then it may very well end up with not much future at all. our theory easily shows itself to be valid.. one must also propose suggestions for improvement. For what it proposes is the following: That all men are created equal. 1970. but this is merely half the job. that among these are Landscape. Thus. yet undiscovered truth lies hidden here. we see no other
Afterthought the theory of Picturesquelism
Having thus completed our essay. we would very much like to add a line of thought.
People travel around as mini-nations (max. P. delta and lake (category three) and the Shetland Isles (category four). In this way we are certain that given a few years.S. Thus. 5. People must constantly be in touch with no less than two of the categories at the same time and a trip to the Shetland Isles is obligatory every fourth year (so as to give people some perspective on their lives).000 at a time) and have to change their habitat each year on the 12th of August (in honor of this theory plus its a nice time of year to move around).: People wanting to move to the Shetland Isles after this will be shot!
. long live European Picturesqueness!!!. These will be divided into categories as follows: Mountain and sea (category one). the entire Europe will have been seen by all European people who. we see no other alternative than to propose a Europe where people are constantly moved between different natural landscapes. for life. liberty and happiness and especially peace – to be preserved. the punishment will be four years of habitation on the Shetland Isles only equipped with haggis and a television showing washing powder commercials from the 1960s (that’ll teach them!). Should someone in any way violate these guidelines. where all people are entitled to beautiful and ever-changing surroundings. shall never wish to leave their houses again and thus never intrude upon each others homes.A United Europe – Rhetoric and Reality
alternative than to propose a European Union of the Scenery. after this life-altering experience. Long live Landscapes. plain and forest (category two).
democracy. Office for official publications of the European Communities. Their main motivation after the Second World War was to establish conditions for a lasting peace and welfare in Europe build on the principles of rule of law.
Pascal Fontaine: A new idea for Europe.
. which is one of the most signiﬁcant undertakings of the 20th century in Europe. or according to a single plan. Marek Koska. Lukasz Glebski
Introduction: history of the European Union
The idea of the European Union. expectations and possibilities
Based on the examples of Romania and Poland
Oana Balescu. but it is open to any other European nations which share the aims. Agnieszka Winiarczyk. any action taken must in the ﬁrst place concern these to countries. It will be built through practical achievements which will ﬁrst create real solidarity. second edition. expectations and possibilities
4 The EU-enlargement: barriers. The declaration puts forward a number of principles1: • Europe will not be made all at once. The Schuman declaration-1950–2000. • The age old enmity between France and Germany must be eliminated.The EU-enlargement: barriers. derived its roots from the far-sighted project of the so-called fathers of the European integration such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. human rights and justice.
which have fulﬁlled the conditions known as the ”Copenhagen criteria”3 for entering the EU. These criteria include: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy. human rights and respect for and protection of minorities and the existence of a functioning market economy. ﬁrst in 1973 when Denmark. Fontaine: A new idea for Europe. as well as Cyprus and Malta. France. Spain and Portugal 1986. by Sweden. • The decision of the High Authority will be binding on the member countries. Today. and last but not least. expectations and possibilities
• Action must be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point: Franco – German production of coal and steel must be placed under a common High Authority. the idea of a ”United Europe” faces a major challenge due to the concept of its future enlargement. The criteria came as an outcome of the Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993 when the EU made the decision to commit itself to an enlargement process to the East. European Communities. the rule of law. Luxembourg and the Netherlands it has been expanding. Designed initially to serve 6 countries: Italy. The Schuman declaration 1950–2000. The High Authority itself will be composed of independent persons and have equal representation. • The fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a European Community. Ireland and Great Britain joined in. The European Union has been enlarging ever since it was created over 50 years ago.
. All of these together with the capacity to cope with competition on the common market and the ability to
P.The EU-enlargement: barriers. Luxembourg 2000.2
The enlargement of the EU today
The process of enlargement of the EU still continues as currently the Community is negotiating accession with 10 more countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Austria and Finland in 1995. Germany. The authoritys decisions will be enforceable. followed by Greece in 1981. Belgium.
Czech Republic. which can be seen today. economic and monetary union. but the key questions posed are: Q1.The EU-enlargement: barriers. What will be the beneﬁt of an enlargement for both the EU and the countries applying for the accession? If all the candidates for accession are successful. Are these countries ready to enter the EU? Q3. European Communities. as well as from the 15 Member States. the considerable diversity between candidates.
. which faces difﬁculties
The European Union: Still enlarging. Romania. the European Council decided to open negotiations with six further countries: Bulgaria. Lithuania. the EU agreed an accession partnership for Turkey. the EU will eventually stretch from the Arctic to Cyprus and from Ireland to Estonia. Luxembourg 2000. A year later in December 1999. Hungary. once proven to be successful. At what cost will the status of member states be achieved in the candidate countries?. economically. such as. Q2. currently faces a lot of discussion and even some skeptical critique and uncertainty. Poland and Slovenia. Latvia. Q4. that countries which were previously enemies nowadays share common currency and manage their social affairs together with the economic and commercial interests within the framework of joint institutions. Malta and the Slovak Republic. adherence to the goals of political. A future member state should also adopt the acquis communitaire of the EU and change its laws in order to be adjustable to the EU law4. It can result in that the countries not in the ﬁrst enlargement. which will probably be the case of Romania. Estonia. However. The accession negotiations were opened on 31 March 1998 with six countries: Cyprus. In March 2001. expectations and possibilities
take on the obligations of membership. The economic disparities between the candidate countries. The idea. There are multiple hot potatoes in the discussion. are expected to increase with time. both on the side of the 12 candidate countries. politically and culturally will present the Union with major strategic problems. as with other candidates. How well is the European Union prepared for the accession of new countries and among other issues this essay will focus on the structural reform of the EU presented in the Treaty of Nice of 11 December 2000 and its ratiﬁcation process. at its summit in Helsinki.
the Council. New York 2000. i. today are searching for a new shape of community institutions. the Commission and the Court of Justice. traditional culture and social behaviors in these countries. The ﬁfteen Member States. The Treaty of Nice
One of the major problems in the discussion of the future of the European Union is the efﬁciency of its institutions when it will be consisting of 25 or 27 countries. Macmillan Press Ltd. In this essay we will attempt to answer the above questions and the issues mentioned will be discussed upon using the example of Poland and Romania.
Q1. At the same time it will try to point out the fears of the West-European countries associated with the enlargement and confront them with the real status quo. Poland’s government expected that their country would play an important role in the enlargement. Sakwa. These institutions.e. Challenges for the EU with the accession of new countries
A.The EU-enlargement: barriers. The IGC (Inter-governmental conference) conducted in December 2000 in Nice was aimed at changing the structure of the future enlarged EU. p. respectively. countries that represent the so-called Luxembourg and Helsinki negotiation group. which have placed some of their responsibilities under the power of the four institutions of the EU. It will also look closely on the possible outcomes of the enlargement in these states in respect of the religious inﬂuence. The provisions were generally in line with the Polish expectations. The IGC in Nice concluded with the preparation of a new Treaty. Stevens: Contemporary Europe.
. R. the Parliament. expectations and possibilities
in attracting foreign investment necessary to speed up the process of catching up with the European Union5. without major functional and structural reforms shall be enable to serve 25 or even 27 countries after the EU enlargement.164. Poland obtained 27 votes in
5 Ed. pursuing common policies and acting in the general interest of the inhabitants of the European Union. A. dealing with these issues.
How it’s going to be in practice. Great Britain and Italy. is to be found out in the year 2005. Germany. And Irish business will take full advantage of the new economic and trading potential with the wider Europe”6. The system-to-be requires a triple qualiﬁed majority: the number of votes. Nice is ﬁrst and lasts. mainly in the Commission.ie/iveagh/information/display. since Ireland has not yet implemented it. which is running a risk to be even increasing after the EU enlargement. http://www. Friday.g. One can also notice some organizational barriers and difﬁculties for the process within the EU itself. This process is still unﬁnished.asp?
.gov. Brian Cowen. It seems to be a decent resolution. because there are not enough of them. This mechanism works in both directions. In a second national referendum is scheduled for October 2002. On the other hand the largest countries won’t gain a majority. Press Release.e. Mr. which is fundamental for the EU Enlargement. Ireland was the only country to decide on the ratiﬁcation in a national referendum. just after the biggest ”4”. the population of Germany is over twice as big as Poland’s. ”A deﬁnite NO to Nice would be deeply damaging to these prospects (prosperity and economic success) in the future (…). France. such as the necessity to translate the
6 Remarks by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The IGC decided also to change the qualiﬁed majority mechanism in the EU Council. the earliest. taking into account that e. The Irish voters said NO (54%) to the Nice Treaty in June 2001. because of the lack of the population majority. the number of countries and the population of these countries. about enlargement. Poland expects the Irish voters to accept the Treaty. It is about giving other European countries many of whom were relatively recently liberated from external domination the same opportunities that Ireland received thirty years ago”. Department of Foreign Affairs. He also believes that ” (Ireland) will rise to the challenge of Enlargement. Brian Cowen. The public opinion in many member states points out and criticizes the growing bureaucracy. July 19.government of Ireland. has to be implemented by all member states. 2002. expectations and possibilities
the EU Council. One of the paradoxes of the EU enlargement is that the Treaty of Nice. the Irish Foreign Minister in a statement from the 19th of July 2002 said.The EU-enlargement: barriers. which serves as its legal basis. Many small countries wouldnt be able to outvote the largest members. i.
will increase the expenses. Some skeptics of the enlargement also point out the democracy deficit based on the assumption that the Community institutions already now seem detached from the Member States citizens and do not always act to protect their interests. are recognized by the EU institutions. This fact is mainly due to shortages in their work force. services and capital within the EU
Another barrier and a question highly debated nowadays is the access of citizens of new Member States to the labour market and free movement within the Community. Some sociologists point out that it will be easier for the West European societies to accept the arrival of east European nationals in their countries. such as for instance Spain and Sweden. It seems a safe way to solve the
The results are published in Regular Report o Polands Progress Towards Accession.The EU-enlargement: barriers. as well as the whole Community. This. The free movement of goods. Opening of their markets to foreign employees and liberating the labour markets seems to be a possibility to sustain the growth of speciﬁc regions and countries.
B. however. as they are culturally closer than for instance people from Africa or Asia. which annually assesses the progress made by the candidates in their countries7. and therefore attracting both skilled and unskilled workers seems to be a necessary step that will have to be taken by these countries. expectations and possibilities
whole of the acquis communitaire into all of the future Member States languages and the cost involved with it. Currently only a few countries. especially by the Commission. have agreed to allow citizens of newly admitted countries to participate in their labour markets. which prevents these countries from continuous development of their economies. Nobody can deny that the falling birth rates in EU countries. The main barriers seen in the process of enlargement. persons.
. together with the cost of employing several thousand of clerks and entrepreneurs to serve the new EU ofﬁcials and states.
The broader public still has visions of hordes of poor central Europeans waiting to ﬂood in. in the debate about immigration. Transitional periods of up to seven years were introduced but not needed. seasonal or manual migrants have already set up in the EU. when the entry of Spain and Portugal was being negotiated. nevertheless. Information and Inter institutional Relations. Frequently. a certain sense of locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.
. People do not seek to migrate unless there are compelling reasons. Historically. mostly of the extreme right and extreme left continuously talk of enlargement as a means to swamp Europe with immigrants. expectations and possibilities
problem of lacking labour force in certain areas when one looks at the rising issue of racism in Western Europe. so how much less is the attraction then in a wholly different linguistic and social environment? Usually the cost of such an undertaking is too high when compared to the possible gain. staying for some months and then returning to their place of origin to renew the visa. actually reversed: numbers of Spanish migrant workers in France declined from ± 180. coming on tourist visas. in both Member States and candidate countries.000 in 1980 to ± 117. EU Member States expressed similar fears in the early 1980s. The ﬂow of labour.8 Statistical data gathered by the EU Eurostat shows that at present. There is. There are. which will probably not be the case. jobs in one part of a country fail to attract people from other parts. Member States citizens are presented with images of illegal immi8 Thomas Glaser : Directorate-General of Enlargement. Political parties. July-August 2001.000 in 1986 as the Spanish economy geared up for membership and increased in dynamism. One can say that the great bulk of the unskilled. which had been powerful well before this enlargement. as it is analyzed twice a year by the Eurobarometer polls. But this is evident largely to those who make it their business. only around 2% of the EU population live and work in countries other than their own.The EU-enlargement: barriers. along with crime and the environment. some speciﬁc factors to be taken into account on the question of membership negotiations and immigration. To judge from the public mood in the EU. the Courier ACP-EU. immigration and unemployment ﬁgure at the top of the list of public priorities.
The EU-enlargement: barriers. Czech Republic.net. Due to the fact that Poland and Romania are at different stages of the reform process. the media dont point out that these are not immigrants from the applicant countries. 12 <http://www. whereas Romania under Ceausescu was a highly autocratic regime11. but citizens of African and Asian states. fears and possibilities in Poland and Romania
A. which will most probably result in different dates of accession. Despite the fact that they both share a similar kind of postcommunist experience. Latvia. their political legacy of the Cold War era was different.Stevens: Contemporary Europe.000 if family members are included) once the enlargement has taken place.000 immigrants to Germany (335. expectations and possibilities
grants crossing the borders of European countries. Information and Inter institutional Relations. These factors today affect the political culture in Poland and Romania and are an important reason for differences between them. Barriers. and that their economies are at different levels of development with the Polish one being more advanced with GDP per capita of 5904$ compared to Romanias 1545$12 (in the year 2001) they require different approaches from the EU.euro.pap. Macmillan Press Ltd. July–August 2001.9
Q2. Hungary. whereas Romania did in on December 1999 with Slovakia. New York 2000. p.Sakwa. Poland had the strongest movement of popular dissent and the greatest sense of its own national identity.166. Lithuania. includ-
Thomas Glaser: Directorate-General of Enlargement. the Courier ACP-EU. 11 Ed. has come up with the ﬁgure of 220. Facts about Poland and Romania
Both Poland and Romania represent different geographical regions of Europe and are at different stages of accession negotiations with the EU10. Bulgaria. One of the studies conducted by a German research body. A. 10 Poland entered the negotiation process in December 1997 together with Slovenia.pl>
. Cyprus. maybe with the exception of Kurds from Turkey. Estonia. Malta. R. However.
source: <http://www. securing the minority rights and the strengthening of democracy and the civil society system. but the spending cuts have resulted in the increasing support for the populist and anti-European currents. public opinion and the media denounce these currents which are a threatening factor for the accession of Poland to the EU. They also exhibit differences in advancement of the negotiations. which can be seen in the number of chapters that are already closed 13 or perceived as problematic or controversial. Hopefully. Fortunately the ﬁrm majority of the Polish political elite. The situation has improved under the regime of the new government led by Leszek Miller. for the ﬁrst time. both in parliamentary and local government elections. Initially.eu. Currently the support for the enlargement is over 50 per cent.pdf> 14 It is important that the referendum will be held in spring as it is sociologically proven that in Poland more people tend to participate in elections or referenda which are held in the first half of the year.pl>.ukie. This news came as a surprise or even shock for most citizens. will hold a referendum about the Polish accession to the EU whose result will inﬂuence the countrys future. Recently in Poland an important change in the system of local self-government have been introduced and now. as before. which has managed to contain the deﬁcit to slightly over 5 % of GDP.gov. in spring 2003.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/pdf/ stateofplay_july2002. the barriers for these two countries included the necessity of building a market economy system. by the local councils after the election. but it still remains a very sensitive issue in the society.14 In 2001 the budget deﬁcit of Poland increased to nearly 10 per cent of GDP.europa. will the leaders of local government structures be elected in a direct ballot rather than appointed. <http:// www.
13 The number of provisionally closed chapters for Romania is 13 and for Poland 26 out of 30 (stated 31 July 2002).
. It is important that people want to participate in elections and referenda since Poland. expectations and possibilities
ing for instance the amount of ﬁnancial support from the EU structural funds or the social groups which this support should reach. this will revitalize the local governments and will put the authorities closer to those who have elected them.The EU-enlargement: barriers. The last barrier is especially important as one can observe with concern in the Polish and Romanian citizens declining interest in voting.
int/comm/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/countryrep/ poland. both to the EU farmers and the EU Commission due to the estimated high costs for such an undertaking.The EU-enlargement: barriers. and therefore some of them believe that entering the EU will further increase such a tendency. Therefore. which on average are ca. as keeping the deadlines set in ”the road map” in Gothenburg requires many domestic political decisions and improving the economy. which is generally underdeveloped. remote farm producing everything in small quantities. the conclusion of the accession negotiations by the end of 2002 is a true challenge for the country. Barriers and possibilities in Poland and the EU
Polish challenges have their European context. doesnt have to be a threat to the EU farmers when one looks at the possible market
15 <http://europa. A lot of people in Poland do not want to participate in the social and political life of the country.2 hectares whereas the EU average is much larger. expectations and possibilities
One can suppose that these political forces would never have come to power if the majority of the society were more interested in politics. That image of a small. The described underdevelopment. 7.
B. as they feel socially excluded. not efﬁcient and employs too many people compared to the average rate of agricultural employees in the EU Member States.19 ha. i. The country is heading for membership in the EU in order to grow faster and allow Poland to meet the requirements of the global world and international competition. which in Poland is created on average by 27 people. In comparison. One of the major obstacles for the accession of Poland is the situation of its agriculture. however. They dont feel that they have any inﬂuence over the governing of the country. only 2 farmers in Denmark produce the same value of agricultural goods.eu. which are consumed at home and never enter the countrys market15.e.pdf> (July 2002).
. Most of the farms produce goods. and willing to obtain production subsidies is a scary one. The disadvantage of Polish farming lies also in the lack of specialization in the production of speciﬁc goods and the small size of the farms.
Thousand euro. organic food. a branch where they could easily become specialized due to the advantages of low polluted areas. neither the EU farmers. especially among the Polish farmers who know very little about the advantages of joining the EU and are therefore to a great extent against it. They also are skeptical to the short transition periods for buying arable land16 by foreign individuals and the lack of production subsidies for their farms. Their bilateral fears and prejudices are a result of a lack of sufﬁcient information campaigns. which still amounts to ca. Poland is on the verge to omit the stage of high agriculture intensiﬁcation. however. for instance. high level of environmental protection and non-intensive agriculture.
. High unemployment rates in Poland and Romania seem to be a signiﬁcant barrier in their future accession to the EU. which could result in lower annual incomes. In 2001 the Polish GDP grew with only 1 per cent. which together with a low inﬂation rate
16 Poland has asked for transitional periods in buying land for agriculture purposes due to the fears that it will be bought by foreigners too quickly. especially after they repeatedly hear about the production limits that will be imposed on them by the EU. have already point out that it will not be possible to maintain the current level of subsidies without a reform of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). due to lower costs of production and labor there.The EU-enlargement: barriers. They also fear a ﬂood of cheaper food on the EU market from new member states. However. These fears are often employed by radical right wing parties in countries like France and Denmark which sometimes use a rhetoric such as: Do you want 40 million Polish peasants in the EU?17 Most European economists. 17 Rhetoric used by the Danish Folk Party before the previous parliamentary elections. 52 percent of the EU budget. whereas in the EU is much higher. nor Polish and Romanian farmers see it this clearly. and catch up with most Member States at the stage of post-industrialism. In Poland it is the highest in the countrys history. On the other hand the EU farmers fear that they will have to give up some of their subsidies for the sake of new Member States and share their production limits with them. due to its low price as the average price of a hectare of arable land in Poland is app. from which the EU countries are now taking a step back. expectations and possibilities
niche the Polish farmers can ﬁll with.
which entails the general evolution of the whole Romanian society. However. For example. Romanias economic situation was comparable with that of the other ex-communist countries from Eastern Europe (Romanias GDP growth rate for 1991 was 12. compared to Poland. Romania has enrolled in this irreversible process and takes part in the modernization required by the integration in the European Union.9% and for the same year. integration with the EU means a guarantee of stability and economic growth. Cultural background of the economic change in todays Romania At the beginning of the 1990s. Bearing this in mind.phil. Hungary had 11. as foreign investors often remarks that one of the things Poland needs most is an improved infrastructure. the Polish government launched a special program a few months ago and is now pursuing an economic strategy under the headline ”Entrepreneurship-Growth-Jobs”. which covered ca. An important part of this program is aimed at infrastructure investments. was still negative. which in the future will link the EU countries with other post Soviet states. and Romanias economic development towards market economy.
18 <www. the government has already invited private companies to participate in various projects. for instance in constructing a system of motorways. for Romania as for Poland.9%). The EU enlargement leads to a genuine revolution at the level of European policies.
C. 18 per cent of the total work force. expectations and possibilities
resulted in an unemployment of over 3 million people. the difference is more relevant: Poland 4233$ and Romania 1352$)18. This was one of the reasons why Romania was placed in the second group of countries proposed for the EU enlargement (if we examine GDP per capita for 1999. After 10 years the situation was completely different.de/>
. Barriers and possibilities in Romania
Similarly.The EU-enlargement: barriers.1. c.euv-frankfurt-o. in 1999 Romanias GDP growth rate was 4% whereas Poland that same year had a GDP growth rate of +4%.
19 This assumption is an important element in the explanation of how institutions function. s. some researchers found out that that the relationship between religion and economy. With respect to communism and its idea of work. In order to deﬁne what tradition means for a working ethics. factors inﬂuencing human behavior are of great relevance. are conﬁrmed by empirical researchers20. plays a considerable role. Among these factors.19
. After four years of centralright government in Romania (1996–2000) the economic situation in the ﬁeld of privatization looks much better. expectations and possibilities
The difference can be shown.(Poland for instance does not have to make a reform with respect to the property of the ground). not only with the help of economic indicators. concerning the last aspect there were from the start of the democratization process some differences.The EU-enlargement: barriers.19 ibid. we have on the one
19 20 ibidem. The institutions are based on speciﬁc rules for the functioning of which. This is because: ”only when we understand this modiﬁcations in the behavior of the actors can we make sense out of the existence and structure of institution and explain the direction of the institutional change”. in the case of Romania at the end of the 20th century. issues of culture and especially religion. but the economic and social stability is still problematic. but it is also be manifested by factors of social stability and standard of life. The transformation process that took place also involved building new institutions that are important for the functioning of democracy and market economy. This is why the question: is there any relationship between the cultural and religious background in Romania and the economic development in the past twelve years with respect to market economy and capitalistic values? If we take into consideration Max Weber`s theory about the Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. Even if the so-called socialist countries had an economic system based on the principle of plan economy and state property. It is true that for the ﬁrst seven years after the 1989 Revolution Romania had a left wing government and a president coming from this political wing and that this slowed down the privatization process in those years. the reality of communist education must also be taken into account.
In order to deﬁne the causes of this kind of economic development in the case of Romania all the cultural and religious factors that were mentioned before have to be taken into consideration. However. expectations and possibilities
hand. Speaking about rules that are adapted by the way of teaching we also deal with such rules that refer to market economy and private property as far as they are mediated by political culture. manipulative leadership combined with xenophobia and acutely caustic anti-Semitism.ro/Viit_Europei/English/position/ vision_of_the_governm. the candidate countries attention should be shifted. It would not be correct to afﬁrm that the attitude with respect to work in todays Romania is based only upon tradition. which has since been
c. any survey of modern Romanian history reveals a seemingly undeniable pattern of corrupt. The economic statistics show21 that the countries with a predominance of Orthodox-Christian population developed much slower toward capitalist economy. This legacy is perhaps best demonstrated by the shocking behavior of the ultra-right-wing paramilitary group. But still analyzing the respective process we must be aware that simple determinism of a respective kind would be a crude simpliﬁcation. the ofﬁcials models of education and on the other hand some common practice or some customs or mentality. the largest support for joining the EU of all the candidate countries. It is also necessary to consider aspects of cultural and economic history of the country. 23 <http://www. from the challenges of entering the EU into inner problems. the Iron Guard.19 22 Over 80% of the Romanians declare themselves in favour of countrys admission to the EU. during the Second World War. This. If we take a historical approach. which regards Romanias accession to the European structures as a fundamental objective of national policy23. can be explained by the fact that the EU is seen as a huge chance for improving peoples lives and the countrys economy. for the time being.The EU-enlargement: barriers. Romanian elite between tradition and transformation Romanias bid to join the EU is overwhelmingly sustained by its citizens22 and the consensus of the Romanian political class.htm>
The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and possibilities
overshadowed by the monstrous behavior of the Communist leadership against its own citizens. Scholars have repeatedly spoken of social and political culture in Romania as something evident and unalterable, without bothering to deﬁne their terms. Their belief is that the people within the society must be taught democratic procedures because they simply lack the experience of reciprocal, responsible government. However, there are two divergent implications to this position, both of which revolve around the question as to whether the former communist countries lack experience due to historical change and uncontrollable circumstance or whether democracy is inherently antithetical to those societies nature. Simply put, the broader question is whether a society gets the government it deserves.24 Within a historiographic or politically theoretical context this would be acceptable, as it remains a polemical matter. However, the question of NATO and EU accession bring these vague terms into the broader public discourse, as foreign (Western) governments repeatedly stress the need for the Romanian government to both implement reforms, which would intensify austerity measures within the country, and alter its ”social and political culture” or build a ”civil society”. Too often, Westerners impose their concepts of government and civil society on those who simply have not had similar experiences. Ten years after the fall of Communism, it should be now obvious that the market system does not necessarily lead to democracy. However, it is similarly erroneous to conclude that the burden of blame for the failure of reforms or the rise of extremists groups on either end of the political spectrum is directly determined by the nature of a societys history. Romania always used its Roman roots to stress its Western orientation and, more importantly, its strategic geopolitical position as the natural bulwark against Russian expansionism. Romanian politicians, past and present, have used both these factors to present themselves as the last outpost of ”civilized” Europe and therefore the Wests natural allied. Through this relationship Romania acquired political and ﬁnancial support, which, more often than not, served to consolidate the position of political elite rather than beneﬁt Romanian society as a whole.
24 Joanna Rohozinska, Central Europe Review, vol.1, no.11, 6th of September 1999.
The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and possibilities
But the question remains how one should deﬁne Romanias ”social and political culture” and whether the repetitive pattern, evidenced by its foreign policy pursuits, is indicative of the societys capacity, or desire, for reform. Perhaps this is best reﬂected in one of the striking features of Bucharest: the plethora of small kiosks, which take up sidewalk space at every intersection and in every metro station. These packed kiosks, where one can buy anything from soap to cigarettes or radios, stand in stark contrast to the echoing, cavernous buildings, which were intended to house department stores. The idea to catch on has obvious failed, as these buildings now stand mainly empty. Similarly, the more recent introduced Western-style self-service stores are, in general, few and far between and don’t appear particularly popular. Upon the question why, the answer is that these stores simply arent trusted, even though the goods are of ﬁne quality and often are cheaper than in kiosks. Is the answer then that there is a fundamental, ingrained mistrust of anything that appears to be ofﬁcially organized or sanctioned? Even if one assumes this to be true, one shouldnt jump to the conclusion that the future of Romania is necessarily bleak; it merely indicates the magnitude of the task that faces Romanias political leadership. There is a deep cleavage (that has arguably existed) between those who hold power and those they represent. This is obviously not unique to Romania, and we believe that all the former Communists countries have to deal with the same problem. The Bucharest political elite, whose origins predate the formation of the Romanian State in 1878, have consistently pursued policies and employed tactics that support their personal power with little regard of concern for the common people they represent.
Q3: Cost of the accession in the EU for Poland and Romania
The initial strong support of entering the EU may weaken in Romania over time as the example of Poland, which started the process of negotiations earlier, has previously shown. One can notice a trend
The EU-enlargement: barriers, expectations and possibilities
that whenever a controversial issue is brought into discussion on the public arena the support for the enlargement diminishes. This was the case especially after the negotiations with the EU concerning the issue of foreigners buying land in Poland. There exist a common fear used by the populist right wing parties, which at present make up 10 percent of the Polish Parliament, especially among the farmers that Polish land can be too easily and cheaply obtained by foreigners. One can already notice the increasing presence of foreign farmers, especially of German and Danish nationality in north-western Poland, and an increasing ownership of land by German citizens in Mazury lake district, which had a long tradition of German settlers who later had to move out of their territories after the second world war, although ofﬁcially there is no clear evidence of this actually taking place. The fear that Polish land will be possessed by foreigners has determined the governments demand for a very long transition period for buying land in Poland. Although this demand has been turned down by the EU, the common expectation of the majority of the society still remains unchanged. The fear that Polish land will be taken over by foreigners can be explained by the fact that the country continues to build its democracy. It became fully independent as late as 1918, after the 123 years of being partitioned by Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg Empire and it is a strong unifying value for most Poles, especially those living in the rural areas and most of whom having only a basic education. Since the last parliamentary elections these societal groups are strongly represented in the Polish Parliament, which is a phenomenon that none of the political scientists were able to predict25. It proves that some groups of the Polish society are afraid of the integration process, which is partially a result of a lack of efﬁcient government information strategy. The complex terms related to the EU enlargement used by the Polish politicians are not comprehensible to a number of Polish citizens. Therefore, populist parties of a so-called ”social objection” such as, Samoobrona (Selfdefense Party) led by the charismatic Andrzej Lepper, and Liga Polskich Rodzin (The League of Polish Families) a conglomerate of small, mainly Catholic Orthodox and nationalist groups endorsed
25 These euro-sceptical parties reached almost 17% of 460 seats in the Polish Parliament.
The majority of these parties members and supporters are manual laborers. the predominant fears of ordinary citizens currently concern not the entering of the EU but the fear that the transitional period after the communist regime will never end and that they will continue to live on austerity budgets and sacriﬁces. enjoy a large social support. The conditions mentioned are. now feel totally neglected and ﬁnd themselves in a hard economic situation. It is the political class that is blamed for that state of matters. peasants and people from different sectors of industry. which are widely spread in the Polish society. and are not an obstacle in the accession process. Some social scientists argue that these two political parties reﬂect more precisely the moods. These contemporary supporters of the Self-defense party. the maintenance of ”Polish unique traditions and catholic values” and preserving the inﬂuence over the ”degenerated and perverted” societies of the current Member States. in twelve years nothing has really changed for the Romanians in terms of money. which are nowadays facing restructuring or liquidation. shipbuilding industry. such as mining. equal treatment of the Polish farmers from the ﬁrst day of accession. among a variety of others. textile or motor industries.
. who under the communist regime were considered to be the elite of the system. Their leaders are now mentioning the ”accession under certain conditions” rather than following the Belarus example of trying to live in an autarky in a globalized and still widening and deepening Europe. However. even though at the beginning there was a strong feeling of optimism and belief that everything would change for the better. an inﬂuential radio station among elderly and nationalist-oriented catholic listeners rejecting the idea of Poland joining the EU. Here. and it has lost societys trust. This is why we think that in the future Romania will have to face the challenge of an ”iron hand” government who will really want to do something for the country and its people if only the promise that Romania will become a part of EU in 2007. Although the parties are strongly populist their attitude towards the EU has changed since they entered the Parliament. The skepticism towards entering the EU is not a phenomenon in Romania. expectations and possibilities
by Radio Maryja. food and quality of life and therefore they are becoming more and more impatient.The EU-enlargement: barriers.
prostitution and abortion shouldnt be permitted. here we face a contradiction in term of what the government declares and what people really think. There were a lot of debates and the churchs point of view was that homosexuality. One can notice the improved efﬁciency of the legislature and the overall functioning of government. So. the Commission concluded that Romania fulﬁlled the political criteria for EU membership26. And this is what most of the people think too. as well as. the country has made considerable progress in further consolidating and deepening the stability of its institutions.mie. New legislation extending the use of minority language was approved. even though Romania continues to fulﬁll the Copenhagen political criteria. Signiﬁcant progress has been made in the ﬁeld of human rights. homosexuality has been decriminalised and an important new legislation has been passed regarding the restitution of property and the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. but the problem is that even if homosexuality has been decriminalised ofﬁcially. taking also into consideration the fact that the church is one of the institutions that Romanian people trust. the economy still needs to improve in order to be competitive on an international scale. The introduction of probation represents an important reform of the penal system and several initiatives has been taken to address trafﬁcking of human beings. which still remains a serious problem that is largely unsolved. expectations and possibilities
In its 1997 Opinion. a large part of the population doesnt agree with this phenomenon. and a National Strategy for Improving the Condition of
26 <www. the rule of law. Future reforms should seek to modernise the Penal Code and increase the public accountability of police ofﬁcers. guaranteeing democracy. Other particular concerns are the lack of progress in carrying out a strategic reform of the public administration and the need to further guarantee the independence of judiciary. ensure the proportionality of their actions.The EU-enlargement: barriers. However. human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Also the reform of judicial procedures has continued and an effective implementation of new legislation on public procurement should play an important role in the ﬁght against corruption. Reform of the childcare system is well under way. Since then. These were the ofﬁcials declarations.ro>
However. in a difﬁcult social environment. and to improve the living conditions. These still remain some of the challenges for Romania. be able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. efforts to improve the actual living conditions in childcare institutions should continue. the problem is that the Roma strategy has not yet been implemented. Although in recent years Romania had made progress towards establishing a functioning market economy it would not. expectations and possibilities
Roma has been adopted. would permit a gradual shifting of monetary and exchange rate policy towards inﬂation reduction. The country also made progress towards macroeconomic stabilization: the economic growth has resumed and exports have increased. The authorities should give priority to securing macroeconomic stability by ﬁghting inﬂation (see table 1) and halting the deterioration of the external account. Structural reforms have been re-launched.ro>
. The fragile macroeconomic environment. However.mie. However. most notably in the area of privatization and energy price adjustments. focusing on reversing the causes of inﬂation. But. the uncertain legal framework and the poor administrative capacity hinder the development of the private sector. and the demilitarisation of the police has just started and also. anti-discrimination legislation has been adopted but it is not yet operational. it has taken measures that would allow developing its future capacity. with the aim to effectively combat the widespread discrimination.The EU-enlargement: barriers. there still have to be affords put on the implementation of the strategy. Large parts of the enterprise sector have yet to start restructuring or are still in the early stages of the process. in the medium term. The full implementation of the program agreed with the IMF.
27 <www. Romanias reform agenda remains considerable. there are still serious economic imbalances with high inﬂation and a widening current account deﬁcit. The recent privatization (in the past four years) demonstrates a new commitment towards the establishment of a functioning market economy. A further priority is to accompany enterprise restructuring and privatization with the establishment of sound legal and institutional foundations of the functioning market economy27.
When we think of the EU exports to the other applicant countries this number would be much higher All of the applicant countries have already beneﬁted from the access to pre-accession funds.1 The evolution of inﬂation monthly rate in Romania. stabilization of the present and new member states and for mutual beneﬁts. expectations and possibilities
Evolutia ratel a inflatiel din 1990 pana in prezent 32 % 24 %
16 % 8% 0% Nov 90 Nov 91 Nov 92 Nov 93 Nov 94 Nov 95 Nov 96 Nov 97 Nov 98 Nov 99 Nov 00 Nov 01
Table 4.ro/b4/istoricinflatie. The enlargement must not be seen as a goodwill gesture of the rich towards the poor.
. This mutual beneﬁt can be exempliﬁed by the fact that exports from the EU to Poland soared from USD 11 billion in 1992 to USD 31 billion in 2001. ISPA and SAPARD. years 1990–200128
Having discussed the pros and cons of the EU enlargement we highly agree with Mr.The EU-enlargement: barriers. Borowski. but as a process of making a single political and economic organism that holds out opportunities for economic growth.kmarket. a speaker of the Polish Parliament who said that the EU enlargement is a need and of beneﬁt not only to the forthcoming new members but equally to the present member states. such as PHARE. The analysts calculated that it enabled the creation of about 600 thousand jobs in the EU.
One has to bear in mind that member states expenditures. which already are covering it in the form of sacriﬁces they have to make in order to adjust their infrastructure. Generally. a few of them very small states which will not have a great impact on the overall EU performance. Here we think especially about the advantage of a free movement of labor force between countries that have a shortage of it and those that experience unemployment among its citizens. like Poland. We can conclude that the European Union is already prepared for the accession of new countries. to the EU standards. which creates an opportunity for the growth of the member states economies and creation of thousands of new jobs. expectations and possibilities
but it is still important to make sure that the countries with less developed economies such as Romania become net recipients of funds already from the ﬁrst year of their membership.The EU-enlargement: barriers. which would be beneﬁcial for the member states and the EU. for instance. which comprise the EU budget on
. is more problematic but on the other hand the EU can also gain a lot by inviting them to be a part of it. The accession of bigger countries. law systems. on the EU market there still exist barriers that cannot be overcame by Romanian and Polish producers. One must also remember the advantages of an expanded market. Such status quo produces tensions and anxiety on both sides and has to be discussed in order to reach a conclusion. products and services from the EU countries. etc. There exists a fear that even if the 10 or 12 countries enter the EU they will not share the same freedoms and rights as the 15 Member States exercise today and that there will be a center and periphery created within the EU. Common expectations in the candidate countries are that they will be able to enter EU on the same rules as countries that have done so in the past enlargement waves. whereas. Polish and Romanian societies fears associated with the accession are partially the result of the EUs withdrawal from taking up some controversial topics such as for instance the amount of money which will be immediately accessible for the new member states after their accession. The cost of the enlargement will be mostly covered by the applicant countries. the prevailing perception of the public opinion in Poland and Romania about the questions of agriculture and the exercising of the four freedoms is that both countries have already liberated their inner rules concerning the inﬂux of.
2 July 2002. 1. Marek Borowski. Speaker of the Polish Parliament. whereas it is much more that has to be spent by the applicant countries in order to adjust to the requirements of the EU29.
. 27 per cent of their GDPs. expectations and possibilities
average. make up ca.
29 Address by Mr. to the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London: Poland: Political and Economic Challenges.The EU-enlargement: barriers.
planning and images. Liliana Lopes.Argentine Emigration to Spain
5 Argentine Emigration to Spain
Push and Pull Factors
Eva Bokinge. restrain it or prevent it.
1 Sweeney. High rank politicians and ofﬁcials are currently forced to analyze it. there are different standpoints. devising new policies and ways to face and cope with the new world changing scenario. even new ways to control it. might even destabilize sometimes. This is precisely the reasons why so many different administrations and governments all around Europe are meeting and discussing solutions to it. which will endlessly enrich. Deﬁnitely. The topic of migrations can be found in the mass media. Migrations scare. Argentine. bring about new challenges. is now deep into an economic depression and with a population willing to ﬂee. complicate and shed light onto the debate. Consequently. Ernest W (2002). a country that prided itself of being ”el granero del mundo” (the world barn –richness and resources–) less than one century ago and deemed by many as ”the envy of the world and an utopia that opened its arms to generations of immigrants who ﬂooded in with the ﬁrm hope of a better tomorrow”1. different perspectives. Noelia Garasievich. Marta Romanska
There is much debate and controversy over migration issues. in the academic setting as well as in casual encounters. Then there have always existed the potential migrants and their own thinking. new opportunities and even transform whole societies. Migrations have the power to construct as well as to deconstruct and are reframing the global map. migrations are a major issue in Europe today.
. but the common European citizen is also undergoing his/her own private debate at home.
We will also question in what aspects Spain might be different from other potential receiving countries and how Spain has changed its status from ”classical emigration country” to a new receiving region. On one hand we have the push factors that are the reasons ”impelling people to leave the areas of origin. culture and citizenship in the context of our discussion.
.”4 These factors will be used in an attempt to explain why Argentines are getting more and more ”anxious to escape their
2 3 4 Servicio de Estadisticas del Trabajo en Argentina.”3 On the other hand. we analyse the meeting of two different continents. Stephen and Miller. We will then be inevitably confronted with the dilemma of why this new emigration ﬂow is so signiﬁcant for Argentine standards. Pull factors can be described as those reasons ”attracting people to certain receiving countries. Castles. 3.
Push and Pull factors
To understand the recent ﬂow of emigrants from Argentina to Spain we must study the reasons behind these movements.Argentine Emigration to Spain
In the present paper we will elaborate on the underlying fundamentals causing the present migration ﬂow from Argentina to Spain by presenting and describing the recent and contemporary migration ﬂows. we have various pull factors looming in the distant European horizon. (1998). through our primary focus of migrations.2 Obviously. The topic will be tackled from a ”push and pull” perspective. Since our group is composed of both people from South America and Europe. Consequently. we thought this subject would be fruitful and personally enriching. which constitute the second and third chosen destination after Spain. that is Europe and South America. Diario Clarin online (http:// www. this study will not describe Argentines emigration towards other countries of origin such as America or Italy. We will also include the explanation of other concepts such as migration. Furthermore. Ibid. this would take up a new study in itself.com as of 21st July 2002).clarin. Mark J. underlining the factors which play a decisive role in the context of migrations.
”5 It is essential to depict each one of these push and pull factors in more detail.eb. <http://search. Before we move on to the different push and pull factors. which offer similar or even better living standards. one can wonder why they choose Spain after all and not some other countries. where migration can be deﬁned as ”the permanent change of residence by an individual or group. The latest economic and ﬁnancial crisis has been the frontrunner for all the other push factors we will outline later.com/eb/article?eu=42394>. The political and economic crises in the Argentines case are closely intertwined.
The Economist (2002). If we are to track their development we will see that they smoothly blend. we ﬁnd it appropriate to deﬁne the concept of migration. Some want to retrace in reverse the journey made by great-grandparents from Spain or Italy a century ago. The following is meant to be a portray of what the situation is like at present and has been throughout the last ﬁfteen years in the economic and political life of Argentina. we will well see that the economic factor is the main pushing force for emigration. seeking a passport or a visa. Human Migration.
.Argentine Emigration to Spain
countrys economic collapse (…) queuing up at foreign embassies in Buenos Aires. as of 6 of August 2002). One cannot state in which order they broke out. we can assert that the ensuing social crisis broke up as a result of the unsustainability of the general situation. We will try to unveil this in the following paragraphs. We consider that the magnitude of the economic chaos demands for a rather deeper description and account of events that the following lines will further highlight. Nevertheless.”6
While considering the migration movements of Argentines. Encyclopaedia Britannica. If we follow the below mentioned economic events in the life of the Argentines.
telephones. Menem served two terms amid this feeling of fake prosperity. appalling high internal corruption.000 a
Ibid 1. services and resources. stabilize the economy and bring about 10 years of relative peace and prosperity through the pegging of the peso to a ﬁxed one-to-one parity with the US dollar. subways. irresponsible borrowing and lavish spending by the upper class. roads and much more-even control of the petroleum industry. pensions. followed in 1999.
. railroads.Argentine Emigration to Spain
Economic and Political factors The following citation serves well to depict. Cavallos cash restrictions to $1. ”The central issues of Argentinas national life revolve around political power. it is mandatory to look back on the domestic developments in Argentina. the type of Administrations prevailing in Argentina. he introduced free market policies and a capitalist model in the hands of his Harvard-trained ﬁnance minister Domingo Cavallo who managed to halt inﬂation. once emblematic of national sovereignty. and cash bank withdrawals in a measure then known as ”corralito”. in just a few lines. In order to fully comprehend the latest events. and therefore having a social justice ideology. The tragic events unraveling in 2001 started December 3rd when de la Rúas administration was unable to meet the interest payments coming due on the foreign debt. These four elements have determined the course of events in Argentina’s struggle for social justice and economic stability since the beginning of the 20th century”7 when inﬂation was already a chronic problem. The second president in line after the restitution of democracy – Carlos Saul Menem– took ofﬁce amid rampant inﬂationary trends in 1989. Domingo Cavallo – again ﬁnance minister in a new administration – then decided to limit the payment of salaries. a Radical. Fernando de la Rúa. including airlines. charismatic leadership. In spite of being a Peronist. By then the situation was worsening at every level to deepen and had its turning point in December 2001 when he and his whole cabinet were forced to resign following implacable massive violent protests. This in turn entailed the selling off of national industries. economic development and effective democracy.
and has exploded in recent days. ”The economic crisis that conﬁscated peoples money has profound roots. It goes back to 1966. Ibid. 1. the country was excluded from the world ﬁnancial system. as a consequence of the neo-liberal policies of the post-dictatorship governments. This together with ”an excessive amount of foreign debt were the two proximate causes of the argentine crisis. which turned out to be the hardest repression. The crisis continued to build.Argentine Emigration to Spain
month in order to avoid draining the banks. Rioters took to the streets and looters to the supermarkets and the country became ungovernable.”9 Consequently. Andres (2002). when an accelerated process of denationalization of Argentine industry began. ”Finally on
8 9 10 11 12 Peter Katel (2001). ”sparkled a wave of uncertainty and anger throughout the country. Feldstein. discontent mounted and demonstrations erupted. and millions of Argentines faced economic ruin.”10 An overvalued peso consequently undermined export trade and ushered in trade imbalance. 11. Gaudin. Martin (2002).”11 Moreover. De la Rúa imposed a state of siege – suspending constitutional rights for 30 days and giving the government wideranging power to stop riots and other violence – but civilians nevertheless took up civil disobedience as he gave a speech ”but (…) failed to offer any prescription for dealing with the crisis. The $141 billion national debt being the largest sovereign debt default ever went into default. In 1976. the abandonment of all laws that protected workers (…) and with the growing disparities in income distribution. ever ordered by an elected Argentine government. Ibid.
.”12 To come to a close. three different ephemeral presidencies ensued in a 10-day period after De la Rúa left ofﬁce. 29 young people died. Argentina’s national productivity was destroyed.”8 As a result. the brutal military government began building up the foreign debt and there was an enormous transfer of wealth to the most powerful economic actors. ”the privatization of all state-owned industries (…) the concentration of the ﬁnancial sector. it lasted less than 48 hours. during the dictatorship of Juan Carlos Ongania.
discrimination and disparities. The peso was sharply devalued.Argentine Emigration to Spain
January 2 Peronist Eduardo Duhalde took ofﬁce. ”The term ’ñoquis’ is applied to the legions of state bureaucrats who show up at their sinecure jobs only at the end of each month to collect their unearned salaries. Others just cannot simply cope with it. many decide to emigrate. Even though being highly qualiﬁed.
Rule of Law Fourteen million Argentines – over a third of the population – live below the poverty line. the public is completely at odds with corrupt political leaders who increasingly lack credibility. in a country where traditionally public ofﬁce is widely perceived not as a responsibility of service but as an opportunity for personal gain and enrichment. Emotional and personal preferences lead differently in each individual case. Among University professionals this rate has gone up by 53.
.”14 Many Argentines have grown used to living in a corrupt environment. 14 Ibid. elected by a legislative assembly that granted him a precarious legitimacy upheld by a vote which had been the result of party discipline”13. it is increasingly difﬁcult to enter and remain on the job market when companies go bankrupt and the private and public investment areas get dismantled. Justice. Growing gaps in the social strata are triggering crime and insecurity. Though in theory it is easier to get a job and keep it when holding a degree. Confronted with this.
Unemployment It is a paradox that in a land ﬁlled with rich pampas. Politically.8% this last year according to new data widespread by INDEC (National Institute for Statistics and Surveys in Argentina). 10. frustration
13 Ibid. 1.1% unemployment rate in a total population of 37 million people. this might not be the case at present. The latter ﬁnd a stronger reason to emigrate behind such widespread corruption. say many. there is a 25. is bought at least as often as it is impartially administered.
Diario Clarín online (http://www.16 At present. with no expectations and their dreams shattered. Class lecture. nor the unity to make it happen.”15 In order to assert that the rule of Law is properly respected. As a result. the population has lost hope of any societal improvement. European common values. They have been left in despair. When morals are so low and expectations of any change dwindle.
Social and communal factors For some time now. many ﬁnd ways to do so. 16 Vested-Hansen. expert in Political Science and International Relations at the Universidad de San Andrés. 66% as unequal and 63% asserts that they feel they live in a society that has no future.
15 Dime cómo eres. most others do not. Finally. According to an opinion poll on ”the values of the Argentines” conducted by the consulting company Graciela Romer & Asociados in Argentina. University of Aarhus Law School says. says: ”the country is undergoing the partial slump of the State but also experiencing a genuine break-up of the society. 9th August 2002. te dire dónde vives. Jens.com as of 21st July 2002). They just want to leave. citizens see no other way out and they are too immersed in the present crisis. only three out of ten sees it as democratic.278 interviewed in the whole territory perceives it as unjust. Malmö Högskola .clarin.
. there are not many prospects of future prosperity or growth. when it comes to the way Argentines see their own society they found that an astounding 67% of the 1. it is necessary for the citizenship to have predictability.Argentine Emigration to Spain
and the feeling that there is no contention by any authority interest either to bring about solutions or put an end to endless rethoric. the case of Austria and Denmark. Some experts say that Argentina is experiencing a deep process of decadence in the rule of Law. the population is demonstrating because of the lack of justice and legal insecurity. transparency and legal safeguards. As Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. as Jens Vedsted-Hansesn Lawyer.
why. Ibid. 15. when and how. Alejandra (2002). Rather. To Enrique Oteiza – specialist in demography and researcher at the Instituto Gino Germani – this process gradually gets internalized in the culture. ”the way out of the country is beginning to be considered as common and part of their daily life”. ”they are not determining factors but intervene nevertheless and foster that image in the middle class.
. Many who are willing to go and work in another country might get employment through the web even before leaving their country of origin. global communications. Moreover. When such contagious phenomena exist.
Globalisation Internet. international ﬂights and the readily available information of today’s world pave the way for greater and easier channels to make decisions on where to emigrate.18 According to Lelio Mármora – Head teacher of the Master course in Migration Policies at the Universidad de Buenos Aires – the media is an ongoing incentive and they instill the notion that the only way out is Ezeiza (national airport). says Lelio Mármora. TV images and the many stories retold with them and played over and over again on TV cameras have a close-up effect.19 Queues in front of foreign embassies. Ibid.”17 If we follow this logic we might conclude that ”the migration wave is not only being fostered by the unemployment rate and the political chaos (…)”.Argentine Emigration to Spain
The inﬂuence and power of the media ”Specialists in migrations warn that there is a contagious effect powered by the media. 15. it is likely that there will be more frequent communication and contact between relatives in the homeland and the new country of residence via email and thanks to the cheaper cost of international communica17 18 19 20 Dandan.”20 We must say that we have found that this is in no way a rational and consciously planned project to foster people out. it is just a tool the media is using for their own purposes. Ibid. 15. ”They feed the collective psychosis”. migration gets incorporated in the youth culture.
15. That month 3. the Argentines that are leaving at present do not ﬁt in the traditional proﬁle of emigrants. To grasp the Argentine landscape even more it is useful to review some recent ﬁgures and results.110 to 87. The process was further accelerated in December 2001 and especially January 2002. the transfer of money at present is much simpler than it was in the last century.Argentine Emigration to Spain
tion and new technologies. when it comes to air travel as well as the frequency of ﬂights. lack of mutual trust and a fracture in the sense of belonging to the nation expressed in the desire to emigrate. According to Professor Lelio Mármora. Additionally.068.
Emigrants and ﬁgures As a result.000 people emigrated. technology and progress has made the uprooting less painful and lonely than it used to be for past migrants. they just cannot afford the move no matter all the other fostering and facilitating factors at play. there is an overall of 62.823.880 emigrants all throughout 2001. have opened up a whole new set of options to choose from. New destinations.259 Argentines left and the following month that same ﬁgure amounted to 10. Distance does not act as a deterrent anymore.”21 This is explained by the fact that when willing-to-be emigrants are so income-constrained by poverty.
. middle class students whose families are supporting from here. Argentines do not or simply cannot do so. who generally send remittances to their families back home. But who emigrates? What is the characteristic of the present emigrant? The young middle class people see in leaving one of the few – if not the only – way to attain their parents former living standards and social conditions. with a prolonged widespread crisis of this sort it is likely that the society will further disintegrate. In many ways. The wave of emigrations started in 2000. In November and with the deepening of the institutional crisis the ﬁgures began rising again. According to data issued by the Dirección
21 Ibid. Unlike emigrants all over the world. In one year the number of emigrants went from 8. ”They are mostly youth. The counterpart – stated in the research ”The value of the Argentines” – results in high individualism. From 2000 to 2001. 140. With that increase.
198 people left the country. Though there has been a decrease in March – 5. This singles out Spain. in a little more than two years 160. The main force behind the decision to leave may vary depending on individuals interests. In January 4. economic and social conditions. At present. Moreover. To sum it all up. the number of expatriates will have doubled shortly. Those individuals have such means as savings. as the paper El País asserts in their dossier on immigration to Spain.Argentine Emigration to Spain
nacional de Migraciones (Migrations National Body) in Argentina and published by the newspaper Página 12. If this trend continues all throughout this year as it is forecasted. But ﬁgures themselves are not as important as their intrinsic meaningful value. knowledge and even a degree or diploma to aid them in new lands and help them adapt to new scenarios encountered abroad. the various factors mentioned will. USA (18%) and Italy (11%). due to new visa requirements and tougher measures by receiving countries) some experts suggest that the ﬂow remains constant towards Spain. affect and exert inﬂuence on individuals in distinct ways and to different degrees. in the eyes of emigrants.328 emigrants – (in part. in turn. As the above mentioned data and ﬁgures in this paper demonstrates. when being compared to other countries. the middle class population may see emigration as a way out more readily than others. The possibility of obtaining Spanish citizenship is the major pull factor in our opinion.
The reasons fostering thousands to go to Spain every year are not much different from those attracting so many other Spaniards to emigrate in the past and most of the migration currents taking place throughout history. The number of Argentines living abroad represents 600.000 have left the country.000 and is the result of ﬁfty years of emigrations.209 left for that destination. which is one third of the amount it took decades to build up abroad. In the case of countries such as Argentina. Other factors that makes Spain different from other potential receiving countries are the colonial ties and the use of the same language as in Argentina. they assert that the preferred destinations are Spain (37%). in January this year alone 23. 96
639.es> as of 21 June 2002.
. Argentines account for the ﬁfth nationality when it comes to immigration after Morocco.Argentine Emigration to Spain
the colonial ties still represent a very powerful pull factor. whose population mainly consists of European immigrants and descendants. that is. At present. In connection with the Spanish legislation concerning immigration we must also take citizenship into account.
A change in trends ”Starting in the 80s.”22
Spanish immigration laws In a country like Argentina. When it comes to Spain. Peru and Colombia.000 foreigners registered in Spain during the latest process of regularization.773 in 1995 to 938. Spain went from being a classical country of emigration to a new country of immigration. the (Iberian) Peninsula became a recipient for immigrants with all the social and demographic changes that it conveyed. This is shown by the fact that even though Spain now constitutes a chosen destination for immigrants. Argentina still has great colonies of Spaniards with a. it is rather easy to track down blood relations and end up getting a visa.349 residents as compared to the ﬁgure of the previous year. much higher number than that of the voters of many of the constituencies in Spain. It is worth browsing some more compelling ﬁgures from the Spanish side. At present.elpais. sometimes. Ecuador. which entailed a rise of 2. the Minister of the Interior ﬁnds that the number of foreign residents went from 499. The entry of the country in the European Union and the subsequent adhesion to the Schengen agreement in 1994 regulating the free ﬂow of people within the EU has fostered the immigration from others in the European continent. more than the double of the 940.783 in 2000. Citizenship can be deﬁned as the ”relationship between an individual and a state in which an individual owes allegiance to that state and in turn is
22 Inmigración en España. still there are 2 million Spaniards abroad. China. El País online <http://www. In 2000 the number of Argentine residents in Spain accounted for 18.
In 2000 there were 2. they acquire a EU citizenship as well.349 regularized immigrants living in Spain. As soon as Argentines obtain the Spanish passport. ”jus soli”.927 Argentines handed in their applications of which 2. 2. If viewed from the perspective of the applications for residence and according to the ﬁgures issued by the Delegación del Gobierno para la Inmigración y Extranjeria in El País. The Spanish passport can be granted exclusively to the sons of a Spanish mother or father.
Colonial ties To better understand the colonial ties between the people of Argentina and the country of Spain we will take a brief look at the history
23 Citizenship.com/eb/article?eu=84903> as of 5 of August 2002.25% favorable resolutions. This principle can further be supplemented by a nations own principles. wherever born.349 were favorably accepted – that is. works in the way that the child acquires citizenship in the country where the birth takes place. Spain has an overall of 18. many Argentineans who have Spanish grandparents search for relevant documents required for entering the EU. The second way. National laws concerning citizenship differ but there are two general ways applied on how to determine citizenship from birth.Argentine Emigration to Spain
entitled to its protection. In other words.eb. 80.
. becomes a citizen in the state where his parents are citizens. With the economic crises looming. 24 Ibid. It means that they are allowed to enter. is more interesting in the case of Argentina and Spain.24 One of the decisive pull factors for Argentineans going to Spain is the fact that Spain plays the role of ”a mother country” by applying the ”jus sanguinis” citizenship. Applying ”jus sanguinis” means that a child. ”jus sanguinis”. The ﬁrst one. Encyclopedia Britannica <http://search. So. 23. Based on the data published by the Spanish paper El País online.”23.639 residents from Argentina. leave and stay permanently on the Spanish territory. ﬁrst the parents make the effort of getting Spanish citizenship and only then the grandchildren can get it as well. the Spanish legislation allows people to acquire Spanish identity on the condition that they have an ancestor in Spain.
26 The immigration to the South American colonies culminated after their emancipation. the emigrants during the 17th century crossed the Atlantic due to the present crises in Spanish society.ne. 28 A journey into the past in <http://www. Magnus (1990). 27.shadow. until 1580. The colonization of the Rio de La Plata area started in the year of 1516 when Spanish navigator Juan Díaz de Solís and his expedition sailed up the river and claimed the region in the name of Spain. Andalucia and Extremadura. Labor was needed.net/^giorigio/ arbentina. 26 Mörner. This massive immigration gave the country a European character. 70–80% of the immigrants came from Spain and Italy but people also came from France.”28 The population increased from 800. The reason for the subvention from Argentinas point of view was the increased export of wheat.25 During these ﬁrst years. The reason for this is that Argentina accepted unskilled labor.html> as of 30th of June 2002). Great Britain and Germany. The immigration to Argentina in the late 19th century was more extensive than to countries like USA and Australia. 27 Argentina in Nationalencyklopedin <http:www. In contrast.
. which consisted of new cities and means of transportation available. Argentina proclaimed its independence formally on July the 9th 1816.jsp?i_artid=117497> as of 26th of June 2002). Spanish immigrants ended up being the main immigration group in Argentina.html> as of 26th of June 2002).se/jsp/search/article. 29 Ibid. which made the trips cheaper and lowered
25 Argentinas general resources and History <http://www.Argentine Emigration to Spain
of the colonization and migration ﬂows between these two countries.27 ”By the 19th century Argentina was a vast territory with a low demographic density.com/somos/pob140ing. subsidizing their travelling costs. The need to attract European immigration was a permanent desire. Another reason for the massive increase of immigration was the development of faster means of transportation. the majority of the immigrants came from the Southwest regions of Spain. which acted as push factors. These early settlers were attracted by pull factors.000 in 1852 to nearly 8 million in the year of 1914. The area from which people came shifted and the number of emigrants from the northwestern regions increased.surdelsur.29 Brazil and Argentina competed in the race of attracting immigrants. such as the steamboat.
26. is otherwise an unrealistic mental image of the country of their roots that might be shattered upon arrival.
Social networks Having an active social network in Spain should not be forgotten as a potential pull factor for Argentineans thinking about migrating. Immigration was no longer desired and Argentina introduced selective immigration. To have someone in the new country that gives personal support in difﬁculties is an important factor. Practical issues should not be forgotten.31 As a result of the above mentioned migration ﬂows from Spain to Argentina we can understand the strong bond between these two parts of the word.30 The depression in the 1930s had a devastating effect on Latin America. 31 Ibid.
30 Ibid. Italy and Portugal was to some extent renewed after the end of the Second World War. The massive immigration from Spain. 608 000 immigrants came to Argentina during the years 1946–57. Having contact with someone in Spain also gives the person a better chance to build up realistic expectations concerning what to expect when arriving in Spain. 26. as we see it.
. in an attempt to keep the population in the country. A possible danger for immigrants. This factor caused the Argentinean authorities trouble and resulted 1911 in the decision to double the cost for a ticket back to Europe.Argentine Emigration to Spain
the death rate during transportation. A connection with a relative or some other person simpliﬁes the social transition between the countries. Finding work is also of big importance and we believe that the chances increase if the person already has the foundation in a social network upon arrival. When talking about migration ﬂows one should keep in mind that many leave their home country with the intention of returning. Many of the European immigrants who came during this period were political refugees. receiving help with bureaucracy and having somewhere to stay when arriving are important things to deal with.
Argentine Emigration to Spain
Cultural issues One can claim that cultural ties are a factor in attracting Argentines to Spain. When the whole critical choice of emigrating emerges.
Common language As it is easy to imagine.32 Language and customs are linked to the cultural concept and will be discussed below. individuals feel less strained if they are heading towards a country where they will be able to communicate and where the transition will go smoothly and be the least traumatic event in an already conﬂicting experience. it might be mentally considered as an extra support factor of contention for individuals. state. for there are some other patterns of thought and behaviors that make Argentines be what they are and not necessarily Spaniards descendants only. According to the linguist Hofstede. Sven et al. ”identity-formation typically has been demarcated by territorial parameters. 33 Tägil. we might as well consider the fact that sharing similar traditions and/or ways of life and customs may make the change much less harsh. (2001).
. Though in the present global world this does not constitute a decisive factor when triggering individuals to emigrate. the language barrier acts as a deterrent for many when choosing their ﬁnal destination.
Similar customs To a lesser degree. To be able to argue in favor of this we would like to start by deﬁning the concept of culture. for they might be closely related but
32 Hofstede. as Johansson et al. culture can be understood as a set of common beliefs. Besides.” 33 If we are to ask individuals in other Latin American countries what Argentines are like. values. G (1991). We might argue that it would be a mistake to assert that Argentines share the same cultural identity as the Spaniards. codes of behavior and ways of thinking that are shared by a group of people. The concept is complex and its definition varies depending on the approach. we will witness that they are obviously perceived in a different manner than the Spaniards.
3000. This does not mean Spain is the best option but is always a better one to the realities confronted at home. which will always make it their host land no matter the ties they might have. in 1975 with the assumption of King Juan Carlos and in 1986 with the entry in the EU. after an isolationist period with a closed economy.
. In the growing gap
34 España ratificó su voluntad de ayudar a la Argentina.”34 Even when the Spanish economy is trying to overcome its own domestic problems and might not be problem-free. There is a clear distinction.000 legal immigrants. of the opening to the world. What might thrust Argentines to Spain might well be their feeling of identiﬁcation with such a group (Spaniards) compared to the little or none-existent identiﬁcation they might ﬁnd with people from other regions in the world. Ten years ago it had high unemployment and today we have 1. It is thus evident that Argentines are not in a position to call Spain their homeland.Argentine Emigration to Spain
still not be like them. Argentines might readily view it as a better alternative to the upheaval prevailing in their homeland.lanacion. The labor market may look more ﬂexible for those ready to do the jobs they would not do back home. corrupt administrations and different sorts of conﬂicts and/or wars. <http://www. asserts the following: ”Spain embarked in the challenge of the other. It is also a world of more equality compared to other regions in a world stricken by lack of natural resources. the Spanish Ambassador to Argentina.com> as of 28th of June 2002). The latter might not be the driving force behind the many Argentines desiring to leave home but the other factors may well apply to their reality. new and better opportunities and the embodiment of the advanced ﬁrst world.
EU membership and other Political issues For many outside Europe – and especially outside the EU – the union means peace and prosperity. This took place in the 60s with the technocrats in the Administration. Manuel Alabart. Spain is the second most open economy in the world after Canada.
Economic As regards the Economy.
Migration as a ubiquitous phenomenon affects people all over the world. Further on. So many factors are at stake simultaneously that they make the phenomenon practically insurmountable. colonial ties and cultural issues bond these two parts of the world. though. Stephen & Miller. Spain’s membership in EU is not an all positive thing from the migrating Argentines perspective. the European landscape seems very attractive. but also having the means to emigrate. Mark J. people are less directly affected by these factors and we believe they only have secondary effect in comparison to other facilitating measures and the EU membership. Increased disparities at home and deeply rooted crisis of different kinds will only widen the gap and give the ﬁnal push to those not only willing to. in all ages and all social groups. while studying the different factors that affect the present emigration from Argentina to Spain – both push and pull
35 Castles. the Spanish EU membership and the image of Europe functions as attractive factors. Spanish immigration laws facilitate the transfer from Argentina to Spain for those who can take advantage of the ”jus sanguinis”. The base for this standpoint towards non-EU countries was set in the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and has since then been followed by several more ”treaties between western European countries designed to improve control of migration.”35 Summing up. Therefore. However. (1998). Finally.
. The reason is that when ”EU countries removed their internal boundaries. We believe this is a very important pull factor because it puts Spain in a separate position when deciding on possible countries to emigrate to. Human beings struggle to ﬁnd a better life and Spain – now an EU member country – could well be the destination in this advanced world.Argentine Emigration to Spain
between the developed and the developing or underdeveloped world. they became increasingly concerned about strengthening external boundaries”. It is such a complicated and broad issue that it is difﬁcult to discuss it in detail embracing all the aspects related to the subject.
in the case of Argentina we believe that the main driving force behind migration is a dire economic and political situation in the country. One can ponder over the question if it is the push factors that are the main driving force behind Argentine emigration or perhaps the pull factors prevail and act as a lure in a country of destination. in addition with the general feeling of hopelessness for the future of Argentina. deserve attention in future research. The question is if the Spanish society beneﬁt economically and socially from the immigration ﬂow or if it constitutes a problematic issue. Some of the questions have to be left open. Do the Spanish accept the newcomers fully or is there perhaps some hostility towards ”new people”? From what we have analyzed so far on the subject of migration. However. some other problematic issues have emerged which. They are all interrelated and cannot be discussed separately. On one hand. better living conditions and perspectives for the future. the pull factors include among others. we have lack of economic opportunities. In the course of our discussion. However. institutional and political upheaval. resulting in high unemployment. On the other hand. we believe that due to the historic ties and heritage the Argentines are generally well accepted into the Spanish society. cultural ties and informal social support networks. In this essay we mainly focus on the push and pull factors that play a signiﬁcant role in the debate about the nature of migration from Argentina to Spain. social unrest. we made an attempt to touch upon some possible factors inﬂuencing the process of migration with a special focus on the case of Argentines leaving for Spain. in our opinion. It is indisputable that all of the factors mentioned above inﬂuence and direct migration to a large extent. One of the interesting subjects for a discussion in the context of migration concerns the attitude of the Spanish government and society towards Argentine immigrants.Argentine Emigration to Spain
factors – we have realized that it is extremely difﬁcult to fully grasp all aspects of migrations today. and thanks to the common cultural background they adopt to the new 104
. media propaganda and a globalization effect. failing democracy and subsequent corruption with lowering living standards. economic and employment opportunities. some of the answers will be based only on speculations and the solutions to the rest of the issues can be tentatively predicted for the nearest future. interstate facilitation measures for immigration and naturalization.
this favorable attitude is changing gradually with the increased immigration and the Spanish government is already cutting down on the number of people entering their country. Moreover. So. Do they feel Spanish having a Spanish passport? Does their identity change in the process of adapting to the Spanish culture? If this is the case. Therefore. In addition.Argentine Emigration to Spain
conditions without much difﬁculties. there are already signs that the Spanish government is cutting down on immigration and making the immigration laws stricter than they used to be. To what extent does the immigrants blend smoothly into the society? Are they treated as outsiders from a foreign land? Another question to discuss is related to the extent the Spanish lifestyle. Is this to restrict the present ﬂow of Argentines going to Spain? Is this to affect the present regulations applicable to Spanish descendants in Argentina? If this is the case. On the other hand. what will the emigrants attitudes be towards this move? When it comes to the EU as a whole. culture and identity are affected by the Argentinean culture. one more asset of Argentines coming to Spain is the fact that in majority they constitute a middle-class society in Argentina. what happens to the many families torn apart by this uprooting of their emigrating children? What does the family left back home think and feel? How do they cope with their new status as immigrants? What is it like to be an immigrant in Spain? Regarding the regulatory framework. they are desired on the Spanish labour market. we can notice that there is a tendency to close not only the Spanish borders but the whole continent. what is this change like? In which ways are the two groups different? So far as psychological aspects are concerned. Does this facilitate or hinder social integration between these two nationalities? It would be worth considering what the Argentines feel when coming to Spain. the question is left open whether the future for Argentineans in Spain will be a bright one or ﬁlled with difﬁculties and the lack of all the opportunities that in fact the Argentines expect to ﬁnd. will the law regulations be harsher and less welcoming towards migration from Argentina? Right now. the migratory policy enables Argentines to cross boundaries and acquire Spanish citizenship. We are witnessing the EU-pressure to introduce and apply stricter poli© Studentlitteratur
. which means they are well educated and highly qualiﬁed workers.
Argentine Emigration to Spain
cies and measures towards immigration. The Argentine Embassy in Spain is now demanding the Spanish Administration to administer the same kind of treatment that Spanish immigrants met when coming to Argentina in the 19th century. Argentine Embassy authorities are concerned about illegal Argentine residents and feel the Spaniards should be helping not only Spaniard descendants but also other immigrants not having European passports or legal papers. The Argentine embassy has expressed that they consider the difference being made at present as based on racial reasons and condemn it. They state that the Spanish Administration cannot remain indifferent before the Argentine situation and should help as Argentina helped before. Additionally, we have some other open questions as regards the Argentines. Will this migratory trend continue? What might happen if the economic situation in Argentina improves considerably? Is the current trend going to be reversed? Is it likely that these Argentine emigrants will go back when the situation regularises? What will be the attitude of the Argentine government and media before emigration if the trend continues? Will they try to prevent or rather facilitate it? Do they view emigration as a potential turmoil? Will they ever consider it to be so? Migration has always been present throughout the history of humankind and we might even argue that the ever-changing topic of migrations is a never-ending study. We hope we have shed some light upon the present speciﬁc migration from Argentina to Spain and that the questions and conclusions we have arrived at may serve as a starting point for future research in the ﬁeld of migration.
A journey into the past. <http://www.surdelsur.com/somos/pob140ing.html> as of 26th July 2002. Argentina’s general resources and History <http://www.shadow.ner/ giorigio/argentina.htm> as of 30th July 2002.
Argentine Emigration to Spain
Castles, Stephen & Miller, Mark J (1998): The age of migration. International population movements in the modern World. New York: The Guilford Press. Dandan Alejandra (2002) Cuando emigrar se convierte en una cuestión cultural. La Nación online <http://www.lanacion.com> as of 30th July 2002. Dime cómo eres, te dire dónde vives. Diario Clarín online <http:// www.clarin.com> as of 21st July 2002. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Human Migration <http://search.eb.com/ eb/article?eu=42394> as of 6th August 2002. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Citizenship <http://search.eb.com/eb/ article?eu=84903> as of 6th August 2002. España ratiﬁcó su voluntad de apoyar a la Argentina in La Nación online <http://www.lanacion.com> as of 28th June 2002. Feldstein, Martin (2002). Argentina’s fall. Lessons from the latest ﬁnancial crisis. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 81 No.2 p8. Gaudin, Andres (2002). Thirteen days that shook Argentina – and now what? NACLA Report on the Americas. Mar/Apr 2002, Vol. 35, p6, 4p, 2bw. Hatton, Timothy, J. & Wiliamson, Jeffrey, G (1998). The Age of Mass Migration. Causes and Economic impact. Oxford: University Press. 1998. P11, p42–46. Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organisation – Software of the Mind. Harper Collins Publishers. Inmigración en España in El País online <http://www.elpais.es> as of 21st July 2002. Johansson, Rune, Rönnquist, Ralf & Tägil, Sven. A crisis of the territorial State? Integration and Fragmentation in Europe (2001). In Europé the return of History. Lund: Nordic Academic Press. Katel, Peter (2001). Argentina’s crisis explained in Time magazine online as of 21st July 2002. Making the most of an exodus in The Economist as of 23rd February 2002, Vol. 362 Issue 8261, p41. Mörner, Magnus. Internationell migration i historiskt perspektiv – Latinamerika, särskilt Argentina och Chile in Day, Dennis & Kós-Dienes, Dora (ed.) (1990), Möjliga Framtidsbilder, Papers in Anthropological Linguistics 23 PAL, Institutionen för lingvistik, Göteborgs Universitet.
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Nationalencyklopedin, Argentina <http://www.ne.se/jsp/search/ article.jsp?i_artid=117497> as of 26th July 2002. World Almanac and Book of Facts (2002) Nations of the World: Argentina <http//: ehostvgw10.epnit.com> as of 26th July 2002. Servicio de estadísticas del Trabajo en Argentina (2001) in Diario Clarín online <http://www.clarin.com> as of 21th July 2002. Sweeney, Ernest W (2002). Argentina: the current crisis in perspective. The day of reckoning, long postponed, inevitably arrived in America Vol. 186 Issue 4, p19, 3p, 1c. Vested-Hansen, Jens. Class lecture. European common values, the case of Austria and Denmark. Malmö Högskola , 9th August 2002. Zedillo, Ernesto (2002). Current events. Cry, Argentina, cry in Forbes Vol. 169 Issue 4, p333, 1p, 1c.
however it must be said that it is a process of which the outcome is unknown. Since then a third level has evolved.
. generally speaking. Regionalization as an answer to Europeization or more broadly speaking – Globalization – has changed the traditional way of cooperation. analyzing the most prominent institutions and actors. Moreover. The most advanced cooperation has developed within the European Union. known as a two-level game had remained the core of cooperation and integration process until the 1990s. which constitute an interesting object of analysis since it is a cross border region of functional character but with a historical background. Nevertheless the tendency to give power down to regions is on its way. The set of mutual interactions between the European and national levels. Damian Gadzinowski
The last ﬁfty years in Europe has brought an increased co-operation between the nation states and the birth of a considerable supranational institutional level.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
6 Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
Valgerdur Bjarnadóttir. we try to trace in what kind of way the region is being integrated and what it does signify to the main actors involved into the process. Regions. still do not enjoy enough power to be able to constitute as much inﬂuential body (the Committee of Regions) as the European Parliament. In this paper we aim to take a closer look upon the integration process in the Öresund Region. namely the regional one.
It implies that human beings and activities are. p.180). p. p. the intensiﬁed cooperation between border regions raise other phenomena such as ”the idea of a Europe united at the local level” (Persson 1999.212). seeing regions as an obstacle to the process of integration. p. the connection between institution-building processes on the supranational level (macro integration) and the process of micro-integration can be observed in the borderlands (Blatter 2001.11).Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
The Theoretical Background and the Key Concepts
This chapter aims to clarify some basic notions. p. Therefore. Hence. Some proponents of the rise of the regional state (Ohmae 1993 in Blatter 2001.214–215). Törnqvist. during the last decade there has been a growing awareness that the European Union is not the only challenge to the Westphalian system of sovereign nation states.20). As Joachim Blatter (2001) stated. with the emphasis on the latter one.180) 110
. 2000. the nationstate is challenged but the outcome of these processes is very arguable. While globalization leads to an increased dependence of the outside world. p. more close to citizens and more competent to handle political issues than the traditional nation states (Tägil 2001. and will remain. What then could constitute those challenges? For the purpose of this paper it is sufﬁcient to choose and enumerate globalization and regionalization. However. since it concerns a future state of order. The Subsidiary principle. the opposite opinions are also expressed. regionalization points in another direction. Regionalization processes can also be seen as a reaction to the development of centralized. and to provide a discussion about contemporary processes challenging nation states within the European Union. tightly bound to a local and regional environment (Jönsson. bureaucratic Brussels (Persson 1999. This explains why the subsidiary principle has become so important. which this paper deals with. as expressed in the Maastricht agreement in December 1991. has been read as a conﬁrmation of the growing importance of the region as the most appropriate level of European organization. The modern societies and states are facing the tension between global and local forces. Tägil. Undoubtedly.
i. a crossborder region and what phenomena follow them. p. regions can vary greatly in size. However. Cross-border regions form here an interesting concept. Finally. Rönnquist. are functional regions. 139). 213). and not necessarily encompass the state territory. p. Törnqvist 2000. However. transportation. ﬁtting into its boundaries. demarcated from the others in terms of travel.29). p. 147). Tägil. On the other hand it must be noticed that such cross-border
. Tägil. A region can be a supranational entity. Many of Europe’s cross-border regions have been transformed into areas of cooperation and development.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
take cross-border regions as examples for a future characterized by the declining importance of the nationstate and the increasing relevance of regions that are being shaped by intensive socioeconomic interdependencies (Blatter 2001. Tägil. This form of regionalization neutralizes international borders and thus may create a more challenging factor for the nation state (Jönsson. Therefore a regional identity may endure long after the region has been stripped of its political and administrative relevance (Persson 1999. as well as a state. which are deﬁned on the basis of economic and political criteria (Johansson.29). p. the historical region is deﬁned on the basis of the historical. p. Törnqvist 2000. regions can be intrastate entities that have developed a distinct identity over time. p. the nation-states in a foreseeable future will remain in power to handle the most important decisions. The second type of regions we are interested in. Further on.181).e. Therefore. but does not replace states (Osthol 2001. achieve status under public law in one country. It is necessary to explain what could constitute a region. On the other hand Östhol (2001) claims that the tough negotiations between center and periphery may ”bring about a more ﬁrm recognition of the signiﬁcance of cross-border problems and opportunities” (Östhol 2001.16). cultural roots and traditions of the population. Both the already mentioned types might blend into this one. cross-border cooperation perforates borders. cross-border region building cannot gain legal status as one single judicial entity in two countries and thus. In spite of mentioned challenges. Central Europe. p. Generally. contacts and other dependency relations that connect people and structures (Jönsson. intrastate regions based on a distinct identity (culturally and historically deﬁned) must be distinguished from those.
That is why Jönsson.214). The major problem may be linked with institutional networks since they bind together the different sites and entities of economic and political life (Jönsson. Tägil. Tägil. which accompanies networks is that. Törnqvist 2000. The risk. 24). universities. that socio-cultural networks ”involve complex structures that together forge a virtually impenetrable network morphology” which can 112
.149) here employ the term transnational instead of international to describe the true nature of cross-border networks. p. may concern mainly institutional networks and. political parties and cultural organizations. Social and cultural networks may work as binding ties. Tägil and Törnqvist (2000. This problem. on networks and center-periphery perspective. they may ”become autonomous in relation to the individual territories to which democratic control is conﬁned” (Jönsson. thus. Tägil. p. Cross-border regionalization differs from traditional vertical regionalization by creating mostly horizontal links. Networks within or between particular territories/regions are points (actors) bound together by particular links (set of transactions).Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
cooperation has contributed to the elimination of traditional interstate border conﬂicts (Persson 1999. p. trade unions. in this paper. p. to a lesser extent. Törnqvist 2000. our interest focuses. social and cultural networks while excluding entirely physical ones since they are composed of constructions for transportation of goods. transparency etc. some types of networks may not be accessible for democratic control. chambers of commerce.
Having the Öresund Region example in mind. p. Jönsson. 23). aiming in overcoming mutual stereotypes and forge mutual understanding. mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. acting contrary to one of the most important ideas which is laid as a base for regionalization and subsidiary principle that is to say: increase of transparency and democratic control. Naturally not all the networks need or can be transparent while remaining harmless to democratic rules. Törnqvist (2000. people and information.24) say however. In other words. This includes actors such as ﬁrms.
Tägil 2001. On the other hand.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
constitute another kind of challenge to the nation-state when we take a closer look upon major cities (Copenhagen/Malmö area) where two new social groups emerge. For both of them the traditional nation-state is rather an obstacle than an opportunity. Their visions and lifestyles often clash with traditional middle-class values (Jönsson. Generally speaking the center – periphery theory has been used to express. On the other hand half an hour from Malmö we ﬁnd the Danish capital. The most important political decisions still must be taken in Stockholm. Although Malmö is the third biggest city in Sweden. First of them is a new cosmopolitan social group with new lifestyles and consumption patterns. Johansson. The case of the Öresund Region in that respect is a peculiar one. economic or cultural centers (Johansson. Looking from the Malmö perspective the Swedish capital is too distant. a territorial one and proximity in networks. and Tägil (2001) make an interesting remark that the citys most evident geographic advantages are that it offers two types of proximity.176). p. while Copenhagen naturally becomes closer and closer. also the social one as well as discrepancies in status and closeness/distance from the decision makers in political. Rönnquist. It consists of high-income earners who represent a cosmopolitan work culture. Copenhagen is growing as a center for Malmö and the southern Sweden. Tägil. however in this particular case the distance between Malmö and Stockholm can only grow. but it is the biggest city in Scandinavia. Then. people. it is rather provincial in comparison with other European cities. the second rootless group consists of low paid immigrants. when it comes to economy.
The Centre-Periphery Dimension
Another relevant aspect of the state – region relations is the center – periphery one. p. 158). Rönnquist. besides the geographic distance. not only for Denmark. where the latter lacks the status and prestige of the Swedish capital and may have a feeling of being disregarded by the capital. On the one hand we have Stockholm – Malmö relations. serving as a center. and institutions are within reach
. Törnqvist 2000. culture or transport. Thanks to advanced means of transportation and communication.
and especially Scania. to Europe and overseas.159). Zeeland and Skåne are linked […] Two countries are brought together in one region.
The Öresund Region Case
Reading declarations of both Swedish and Danish governments. Löfgren 2000. Nevertheless. has gradually been replaced by an ordinary day life.11). The enthusiasm that welcomed the Öresund Bridge. we are observing the beginning of a long. p.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
and easy access (ibid. uneasy process of co-operation and integration. Moreover. Hence. one may feel confused whether the name ”Öresund Region” is legitimized. But the vision of a dynamic development based on faith in the future […] that exists!” (Öresund – en region bliver til 1999 in ibdm. The Greater Copenhagen region and the Malmö–Lund–Helsingborg area are perceived as the core of the Öresund Region (Berg Löfgren 2000.). Öresund is born” (The Birth of a Region 1999 in Berg. ﬁnished only a long process of attempts to link the Swedish and Danish Shores. the opening of the Öresund Bridge on the 1st of July 2000. This fact gave an extraordinary opportunity to foster integration between the Swedish region Scania and its Danish counterpart Zeeland within the Öresund Region. as Berg and Löfgren (2000) say. the next statement says that: ”The Öresund Region exists already. thanks to its well-developed transportation and infrastructure. of which the outcome is still uncertain.7). Any number of actors from both sides of the Öresund strait express different visions and expectations as for the future of the Öresund Region and its patterns of co-operation. but does not really exist yet. 114
. Copenhagen has become a sort of gate for southern Sweden. The question about what composes the discussed region is. However. however it can be stated that it encompasses the Swedish region Scania and the north-eastern part of the Danish island Zeeland. p. Does the region really exist? The troublesome concept is visible when merely reading: ”With the building of the bridge […] water ceased to be a barrier. p. the source of constant dispute.
Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
For a better understanding of temporary processes and attempts, which the Öresund Region is undergoing, it is relevant to present some of its key historical events. The history of the region does not explain all the tendencies, however constructs a base for a further analysis of the phenomenon. Before the Öresund Strait started to integrate, it had for more than three hundred years been a dividing borderline between the two Scandinavian kingdoms. What we agreed to call the Öresund Region here had been ruled by the Danish – Norwegian dual monarchy until the Pace of Roskilde was signed in 1658. Then victorious Sweden, beside other lands, took over Scania. Despite the second war over Scania, it has remained in Sweden. In order to unite newly conquered lands, Sweden imposed a policy of ”Swediﬁcation” (Linde-Laursen 2000, p.143). The policy targeted mainly three social groups: the clergy, the kings ofﬁcials and the nobility. It aimed to secure the loyalty of these particular groups as well as to create uniformity within the Kingdom. The realization of the nation-state since the 19th century had caused what the Swedish author Claes Krantz described as ”the immense distance across the narrow water” (Linde-Laursen 2000, p.145–150). The Öresund border became effective in causing relatively little inter-exchange between the Danish and Swedish coasts. Nevertheless, it must be said that neither the policy of ”Swediﬁcation” nor creating distinct and strongly centralized, unitary nation-states have prevented Scania from developing an ”understanding of separateness” and difference from the rest of the nation. This ”understanding of separateness” and closeness to the rest of Europe has become a disassociating factor in the Scania – Stockholm relations. Thus, for some Scanian actors both the bridge and the region are means to promote an institutionalized independence from the national center in Stockholm, as Linde-Laursen (2000, p.153–157) put it. The institutional issue is linked to language and culture as The Foundation for the Future of Scania (Stiftelsen Skånsk Framtid) expressed it, when asking the Swedish government to ”postpone the question of the formal status of the regional languages until such time the regions have their own democratic political institutions” and then, to ”give the regional languages legal protection as well as additional and more generous resources” <http://www.scania.org>. So far the Swedish govern© Studentlitteratur
Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
ment has not recognized such demands and is unwilling to impose any special legislation for the region – ”Lex Öresund” (LindeLaursen 2000, p.157) might be a consequence of linking Scania with Zeeland in a foreseeable future. It must be said that the ”understanding of separateness” is not strong enough to be compared with other European regions, i.e. Catalonia. The Danish counterpart of the Öresund Region creates radically different phenomena. Firstly, in Scania it is rather common that people express their afﬁnity with Denmark and/or Copenhagen and the latter one is seen as an actual capital, rather than the distant Stockholm. This is not the case in Denmark. More than three hundred years of separation has created number of stereotypes, which can be a source of many different reactions but afﬁnity. Thus, one could ﬁnd Danes saying, ”Asia begins in Malmö” (Löfgren 2000, p.38). That is not to say that every Dane shares this image, however it is more common that the Swedes from Scania associate themselves with the Greater Copenhagen region than the other way around. The Danish reasons to engage in the Öresund project, thus, has been mostly economic, whereas the Swedish counterpart was also economic but followed by those other reasons, previously mentioned in this paper. During the past decades Denmark has gradually changed its economic and demographic structure. From the country founded on agriculture and family business, it has developed into an urbanized, capitalistic nation with a strong and competitive economy. This perception has opened the understanding for a bridge across the Öresund that could be an extraordinary instrument in expanding the market for Danish products and services eastwards (Linde-Laursen 2000, p.153). We must notice that the Öresund Region is the most densely populated metropolitan area in Scandinavia with approximately 3,5 million inhabitants, two thirds living on the Danish side and one-third living on the Swedish side. Another important factor is a network of 15 universities, 120 000 students and 10 000 researchers, a number of science parks and an innovation oriented public sector <www.oresundskomiteen.dk>. The international conditions after the end of the Cold War were also in favor of the project. For nearly ﬁfty years, due to possible Soviet veto, it was simply impossible to realize the idea of the bridge 116
Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
across a strategic strait such as Öresund. Hence, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the Swedish and Danish governments ﬁnally agreed to build a ﬁxed link across the Öresund in 1991 (Tangkjår 2000, p.180).
Institutions in the Öresund Region
When thinking about the Institutions in the Öresund Region that are contributing to integration we should keep in mind that perhaps not all aspects of integration are positive. ”Some scholars have forecast that in the future, the inﬂuence of the discursive framework of nation-states on international political and economic processes will diminish. Instead of nation-states, they believe networks of metropolises will appear that will lead development. Transgressing borders, promoting advanced technology…The networks are thought to undermine the homogenizing effects the bureaucracies of the nation-states have had within each political-geographic unit and at the same time erode differences, the barriers as they are most often referred to between imagined communities (Berg, Linde-Laursen, Löfgren 2000, 155) The question to keep in mind is thus: Will the nation state be able to adapt to such intimidation? In the following sections we will try to critically examine the integrative bodies of the Öresund region.
The Integration bodies of the Öresund Region
The Öresund Committee The Öresund Committee (ÖC) initiates co-operation between Institutions and Interest-Organisations and administrates the EU programme, Intereg-Öresund. It also arranges conferences and seminars to spread knowledge about the region. The Öresund Committee is a co-operation organ for regional and local politicians on both of sides of Öresund. The purpose of the co-operation is to create a region where it is simple and easy for the inhabitants to
In the view of the ÖC a common region must be built on the preferences of its inhabitants. The ÖC initiates and supports co-operation projects. which is a forum for political representation at the European political level as well as a forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences. Thus the Öresund Committee consists of political representatives from Swedish and Danish governments as well as representatives from regional and local authorities in Scania and greater Copenhagen. The Öresund Committee’s goal is to strengthen and promote the region nationally and internationally as well as to create the basis for increased growth in the region economically. The task is to further develop a common region based on two different countries. living and pleasure. For this to happen the politicians on both sides of Öresund look into rules and regulations and try to create a working relationship between these.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
choose where they want to live. The ÖC focuses on seeing these differences as possibilities and not as barriers. There should be good environment for industrial co-operation and expansion. They all meet four times a year. Also it has the vision that the region will become a common market. not only for investments by trade and industry. study and work. Among other things it supports cultural co-operation projects and analyze the integration process. The Swedish and Danish governments have the role of observers. In the ÖC you ﬁnd 32 local and regional politicians representing 13 member organisations – counties and municipalities on both sides of the Öresund. It works for the creation of an environment that will enable people to take part in the capacity on the other side and to share experiences. but also for daily life: work. The differences in regulations and legislations could attract and stimulate investments depending on industry or trade. The aspiration is that the Öresund Region will become one of the most integrated metropolitan regions in Europe. culturally and socially in order to exploit the area’s joint resources for International competition.
. Since the mid 1990s the Öresund Committee has been a member of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR).
the Öresund Committee is administrating the program Interreg-Öresund. regional competence. Giving sub-national authorities a role in the decision-making can be good for several reasons. partly because they have information about the speciﬁc conditions in which EU legislation has to be carried out and how EU initiatives have to be adjusted to local conditions. for example labor market integration. be more cost efﬁcient and increase democracy. education.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
The European Dimension In the view of the EU Committee of the Regions. Budget deﬁcits have been reduced and unemployment has fallen. These authorities implement much of the EU policy in their respective countries.
. It would widen EU’s scope and efﬁciency. The role of the sub-national authorities is also important because the EU does not always have the competence to implement its policies. Together with the Danish regional authority HUR and the Swedish national authority NUTEK. business development. the role of local authorities regions have played a major part in positive developments around Europe. Sub-national authorities can deliver this. Only then can these authorities take political and administrative responsibilities for public functions and carry out EU policy. (Committee of the Regions: 2001)
The EU Support The EU supports the cross border cooperation in the Öresund Region. this saves money for the taxpayers. The political responsibility by sub-national authorities is generally related to ﬁnancial capacity. This is a EU program aimed at furthering the integration in the Öresund Region. We can understand the roles of states in EU co-operation better through looking at the ﬁnancial capacity of sub-national authorities. tourism. These projects can lie within many different areas. Interreg-Öresund creates opportunities for cooperation across nation borders. The increased cost efﬁciency rises from the fact that sub-national authorities pay for implementation of part of the EU policy. Between 2002 and 2006 there will be spent 60 million Euros in different cooperation projects. The latter process would happen because the decisions would be made closer to the citizens and they would therefore be more inclined to participate.
superior educational levels and an innovative business climate (The Öresund Identity Network ).oresundskomiteen.dk>
Discussion about the Öresund Committee The Öresund Committee has a broad overall goal but is sponsoring many programs that are important in the integration process.
Öresund Identity Network
An organization was created early in 2000 to continue the work with branding the region (naming its qualities and providing it with a logo). But one has to keep in mind that a great deal of the money that the ÖC uses for its projects comes from the EU. media and culture. It also seems to have helped bolstering the economy of the region in recent years. which therefore play a major role in furthering the integration process. authorities and institutions that associate 120
. Obstacles and barriers will hopefully be minimized and the opportunity for new networks and institutions will be created. regional and local governments as well as tourist organizations. Through these cooperation projects people and organizations will be able to discover new possibilities and learn from each other’s experiences. Öresund Identity Network controls the region’s logo and seeks members among businesses. organizations. environment. <www. This project is supposed to give the Inhabitants of the Öresund region an opportunity to use all of the regions resources in spite of the national borders. since one of the regions merits has become a strong and competitive business sector characterized by high efﬁciency. The organization’s board of directors includes representatives for national. EU thus has a direct effect on certain integration projects by accepting to contribute ﬁnancially or not. The overall goal is to make the Öresund Region one of Europe’s most integrated and functional border regions. This has been carried out within a project called ”The birth of a region”. It is thus contributing to making the region more functional. This is for example the case for the Interreg-Öresund project.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
research development. which started in 1997. The rest of the ﬁnancing comes from regional and national authorities.
between Denmark and Sweden and between Öresund and other regions in the world. between academia. but not least.
Öresund Science Region This is an alliance between IT Öresund. entrepreneurs. Medicon Valley Academy. Also developing and securing an innovative environment and efﬁcient commercialization structure global branding of Öresund Region as a high tech region that can secure sustainable economic growth within a high ethical and humane standard. will be close partners of ÖSR. symposia and big international conferences. capital and companies into the Öresund Region. Last. stimulating new knowledge within areas where Öresund is competitive on a global scale. It also wants to be a catalyst for creating a worldwide inﬂow of students. one of the functions is to organize conferences and symposia with a mix of small-specialized meetings. industry and the public sector. all with focus on human needs. The overall aims and activities of Öresund Science Region are: To establish a region of networks with special emphasis on promoting cross-disciplinary research and development. IT. One of the functions is to promote and initiate advanced courses.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
themselves with the message that the Öresund region is a new centre for growth and quality of life in northern Europe. promoting integration across borders in the region: between disciplines. biotechnology. industry organiza© Studentlitteratur
. researchers. They. PhD and summer universities and life long learning programs within strategically important areas. Öresund Science region is part of this network. together with The Öresund Committee for Research and Development (Öforsk). A greater emphasis on value instead of technique gives the Öresund Science Region a unique potential with its competitive brand ”Technology with a Human Touch”. Öresund Environment and Öresund Food network and Öresund University. Öresund Science Region (ØSR) gathers four strong clusters. food and environment. Furthermore. Öresund Science Region will work closely together with its partners in the region: local and regional authorities. The Foundation for Technology Transfer in Lund and the Danish Ministry for IT and Research made it ﬁnancially possible to launch Öresund Science Region in August 2001.
oresundnetwork. as within the ÖC. In many respects though. strong cultural attractions. The Kulturbro Foundation’s main task is to put the Öresund region on the map as an area that holds its own. the parties within ÖIN seem already to treat the ÖR as a functional integrated metropole region at least with respect to business and industry and the goal is to become more internationally competetitive. Thus there are both public and private founders. The goal is to promote regional integration. regional and local authorities.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
tions. thereby strengthening the regions position internationally. By creating the framework for this biannually recurring event. The 122
. The chairman and the Foundation Secretariat made the allocation of grants to the projects. Kulturbro. <www. the Danish Ministry for Information Technology and research. The foremost ﬁnancing agencies for the ØSR structure are the Foundation for Technology Transfer in Lund.
The Culture Bridge Foundation 2000
The vision of creating stronger cultural links and co-operation within the new Öresund Region led on August 1st 1997 to the formation of the Swedish-Danish ”Kulturbro 2000” founded by the Ministry of Culture in Denmark. Danish Ministry for IT and a host of private contributors. The funding for ÖIN comes from foundations. Likewise.com>
Discussion about Öresund Identity Network
Here. The ofﬁcial part of the Foundation’s ﬁnancing of Kulturbro 2000 – 50 million Danish Kroner – was granted on March 9th 1998. and to the cultural institutions on the recommendation to the committee. the Foundation aims to promote and develop the funding of cultural co-operation between cultural institutions in the Öresund region. Öresund University and other sponsors and companies and business organizations and EU funds. The Foundation intends to successfully pursue its goals of cultural ampliﬁcation and integration. the main actors are national. agencies for marketing and branding and institutions for research and innovation.
Löfgren 2000. 162).Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
committee made the ﬁnal decision and the ﬁnal funding to ”Kulturbro 2000” was allocated during fall 1999.
General discussions about Integration bodies in Öresund
Some authors are not sure that we will end up with a fully integrated region or if the role of the nation state will remain the same or change. and it is certain that perceptions of the border have already changed. ”It is still to early to predict whether these creative institutional bridge building efforts will have the effect that the Öresund will end up also being the center of a new natural region. kulturbron.Linde-Laursen. The board of representatives consists of representatives from the companies and funding contributing to the running of the Foundation and who have wished to join the board. One may
. The day to day running of the Foundation is ﬁnanced partly by public funding and partly by support from businesses and private funding. Many forces in Danish and Swedish society are pushing for such a development. When looking at the integrative institutions of the Öresund region one gets the impression that the creation of a functionally effectively integrated region is already well under way. The Department of Culture in Sweden. as well as the chairman. During the last century it was repeatedly predicted that the nation states would lose their importance due to American cultural imperialism and globalization. <www. Copenhagen Council and Wonderful Copenhagen each appoint a member. The Ministry of Culture in Denmark appoints a member. However it is uncertain whether this means that the roles played by the natural nation states will diminish. national and regional authorities play a major role behind the culture bridge both ﬁnancially and otherwise. The committee of the Cultural Bridge Foundation has the highest authority and has nine members.com> As with the two former institutions.” (Berg. and Malmö Council/Region Scania and the Foundation representatives each appoint two member Sponsors.
Since the major actor. then the nation state will probably change in its role in/for the future. which could be interested in doing so. this process is mature enough not to be stopped or rewind. Its powers and its role will be different. These are for example tax regulations. They feel that the integration process is coming to a halt and state the main obstacles that the process is now facing.com> When looking at the three integrative institutions that we have described. Tensions arise between a number of actors and their different goals and this fact prevents integration from going smoothly. So then we face the task of ﬁnding out what the nations state should best focus its resources on in the future and to redeﬁne its role completely. The Öresund chamber of commerce has called for stronger action to boost integration of the Öresund region. They have stated that the lack of harmonization between Danish and Swedish rules constitutes the biggest barrier to the integration and future growth of the Öresund region. This seems to be a paradox because at the same time the same authorities are the biggest obstacles to integration at least in the view of the Swedish commerce of chambers. no common currency.
. it is important to note that national.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
also look at the question from the perspective of the business and industries. toll fees on the Öresund Bridge and differences in labor market regulations <www. is the nation-state.oresundnetwork. If the power of the nation state’s central authorities will diminish and diffusion of power to different kind of networking takes place.
The uneasy integration process of the Öresund Region has begun and actually it is in just an early phase. as mentioned earlier. The chambers of commerce in Sweden may be taken to speak for their view. it will remain very cautious about pursuing the integration process in the Öresund Region. However. local and regional authorities play a major role in ﬁnancing all of these and may be regarded as major driving forces behind the integration process along with the private industries.
”Debordering the World of States: Towards a Multi-Level System in Europe and a Multi-Polity System in North America? Insights from Border Regions” in European Journal of International Relations... . The making of the Öresund Region.
.175 – 209 Committee of the Regions. regional authorities etc) on how to do things. this would cause a number of demands from other Swedish or Danish regions. Responsibilities and resources.. Lund: Studentlitteratur Blatter K. nr2.
Berg O. sub national authorities. vol. (eds). Regional and Local Government in the European Union.P. In our opinion. 2001. However.Integrating the Öresund – what kind of region?
Further and deeper integration is closely linked with demands for the ”Lex Öresund”. O. With regard to the integration projects discussed in this paper. This networking is putting a strain on the nation state by creating the aforementioned conﬂicts within the system. These tensions have to be solved within the framework of the nation state. Part of the challenge for the future of the nation state may be to solve these internal conﬂicts.O. 2000. at what pace and what policies to apply. Whether this is a negative or positive thing has to be looked at closer. That is to say a growing ”network gap” between the Southern Sweden and Stockholm. national authorities. Since the EU is a big contributor to many of the integration projects its policies are undoubtedly having a great effect on how things are done within the nation state. p. due to the reasons discussed in the paper.J. P. European Union (CdR-Studies E-1/2001). ”Studying the Birth of a Transnational Region” in Berg. Linde-Laursen. 7. Invoking a Transnational Metropolis. Sweden may become the side where the challenges and tensions would grow. Löfgren. Löfgren O. As mentioned earlier some of the tensions associated with the new networking processes such as the Öresund Integration project described in this paper seem to be sources of tension between existing authorities within the nation state (Ministries. A. the EU and the private sector are all working together for integration in networking kind of way.
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