13. OTHER IMPORTANT LABOR PROVISIONS A. CONTRACTING AGREEMENT 1. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. National Labor Relations Commission GR No.
L-66598 December 19, 1986 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search, Inc. (CESI) entered into an agreement under which CESI would provide “Temporary Services” to petitioner consisting of eleven (11) messengers, one of them was Orpiada. The contract period was described as “from January 1976 – although it appeared that Orpiada had been assigned to the bank since June 1975. He rendered messengerial services to the bank, within its promises, together with other the others doing a similar job. In or about October 1976, the bank requested CESI to withdraw Orpiada’s assignment because Orpiada’s services “were no longer needed.” Orpiada filed a complaint against the bank for illegal dismissal and failure to pay the 13th- month pay. The bank impleaded CESI as an additional respondent. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Orpiada. Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by the bank. Issue: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between the bank and private respondent Orpiada. Ruling: Yes. There is an employer-employee relationship that existed between the bank and Orpiada. The fact that Orpiada worked or rendered services to the bank for a period of about sixteen (16) months made him an employee of the bank. Under the Labor Code, any employee who has rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether such service is continuous or not, shall be considered a regular employee. Thus, Orpiada’s services may not be terminated by the bank except for a just cause or when authorized under the Labor Code. CESI was engaged in labor-only contracting. Therefore, the petitioner bank is liable to Orpiada as if Orpiada had been directly employed, not only by CESI but also by the bank. 2. VIRGINIA G. NERI and JOSE CABELIN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY (FEBTC) and BUILDING CARE CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. Nos. 97008-09 July 23, 1993 Petitioners instituted complaints against FEBTC and BCC to compel the bank to accept them as regular employees and for it to pay the differential between the wages being paid them by BCC and those received by FEBTC employees with similar length of service. They contended that BCC in engaged in labor-only contracting because it failed to adduce evidence purporting to show that it invested in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of its business. Moreover, petitioners argue that they perform duties which are directly related to the principal business or operation of FEBTC. It is well-settled that there is labor-only contracting where: (a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others; and, (b) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, because it has established that it has sufficient capitalization. This fact was both determined by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as BCC had a capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and paid for. BCC is therefore a highly capitalized venture and cannot be deemed engaged in labor-only contracting. While there may be no evidence that it has investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, it is enough that it has substantial capital, as was established before
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the Labor Arbiter as well as the NLRC. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc. This is clear from the use of the conjunction "or" instead of “and”. Having established that it has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary for BCC to further adduce evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting. There is even no need for it to refute petitioners' contention that the activities they perform are directly related to the principal business of respondent bank. On the other hand, the Court has already taken judicial notice of the general practice adopted in several government and private institutions and industries of hiring independent contractors to perform special services. These services range from janitorial, security and even technical or other specific services such as those performed by petitioners Neri and Cabelin. While these services may be considered directly related to the principal business of the employer, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of the principal business of the employer. Petition dismissed. 3. FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION (FILSYN), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER VOLTAIRE A. BALITAAN, FELIPE LOTERTE and DE LIMA TRADING & GENERAL SERVICES, respondents. [G.R. No. 113347. June 14, 1996 De Lima Trading was found to be engaged in an independent job contracting since it is a highly capitalized venture and the janitorial services performed by Loterte although may be considered directly related to the business of FILSYN is nevertheless necessary in its operation, without which production and company sales will not suffer. However, with respect to liability, notwithstanding the lack of a direct employer-employee relationship between FILSYN and Felipe Loterte, the FILSYN is still jointly and severally liable with respondent DE LIMA for Loterte’s monetary claims under Art. 109 of the Labor Code without prejudice to the right of FILSYN to seek reimbursement from DE LIMA for whatever amount it will have to pay Loterte. 4. ALEJANDRO MARAGUINOT, JR. and PAULINO ENERO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) composed of Presiding Commissioner RAUL T. AQUINO, Commissioner ROGELIO I. RAYALA and Commissioner VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY (Ponente), VIC DEL ROSARIO and VIVA FILMS, respondents. [G.R. No. 120969. January 22, 1998] Petitioners are considered employers of Viva. They cannot be said to be employees of an independent contractor “producer” since evidences show that the producers have no substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, machines, etc and works directly related to the business of the principal. Hence, with this regard, petitioners are employees of the private respondent. In addition, petitioners have gained the status of a regular employee. Once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently, re-hired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. To rule otherwise would allow circumvention of labor laws in industries not falling within the ambit of Policy Instruction No. 20/Department Order No. 19, hence allowing the prevention of acquisition of tenurial security by project or work pool employees who have already gained the status of regular employees by the employer’s conduct. 5. SMC vs. MAERC INTEGRATED SERVICES; G.R. No. 144672. October 22, 2003 Maerc is a labor-only contractor. The whole arrangement of contracting the bottle washing and segregation activities to MAERC was only devised apparently to avoid labor problems. SMC’s attempt to distance itself from the workers after requiring MAERC to establish the conditions to satisfy the requirements for a status of a legitimate job contractor cannot prosper inasmuch as there is enough evidence to substantiate the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and complainants. This Court has held that it will only recognize a company’s prerogatives so long as they
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are exercised in good faith and for the advancement of the employer’s interest, and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees. 6. MANILA WATER COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HERMINIO D. PENA, et. al., respondents. [G.R. No. 158255. July 8, 2004] Petitioner Manila Water Company, Inc. is one of the two private concessionaires contracted by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to manage the water distribution system in the East Zone of Metro Manila. Under the Concession Agreement, petitioner undertook to absorb former employees of the MWSS whose names and positions were in the list furnished by the latter, while the employment of those not in the list was terminated on the day petitioner took over the operation of the East Zone, which was on August 1, 1997. Private respondents, being contractual collectors of the MWSS, were among the 121 employees not included in the list; nevertheless, petitioner engaged their services without written contract from August 1, 1997 to August 31, 1997. Thereafter, on September 1, 1997, they signed a three-month contract to perform collection services for eight branches of petitioner in the East Zone. Before the end of the three-month contract, the 121 collectors incorporated the Association Collectors Group, Inc. (ACGI), which was contracted by petitioner to collect charges for the Balara Branch. Subsequently, most of the 121 collectors were asked by the petitioner to transfer to the First Classic Courier Services, a newly registered corporation. Only private respondents remained with ACGI. Petitioner continued to transact with ACGI to do its collection needs until February 8, 1999, when petitioner terminated its contract with ACGI. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner, contending that they were petitioner’s employees as all the methods and procedures of their collections were controlled by the latter. ACGI is considered merely an agent of the petitioner. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since ACGI is only a labor-only contractor, the workers it supplied should be considered as employees of the petitioner. 7. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY (NFA), AND JUANITO M. DAVID, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NFA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 1, SAN JUAN, LA UNION, PETITIONERS, VS. MASADA SECURITY AGENCY, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS ACTING PRESIDENT & GENERAL MANAGER, COL. EDWIN S. ESPEJO (RET.), RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 163448, March 08, 2005] NFA had a 1-year contract with the services of MASADA in providing security services in their various offices in the region. Subsequently, the RTWPB issued several wage orders increasing the daily wage rate. In accord with this, NFA made adjustments in the daily wage but denied the adjustments with respect to other benefits and remunerations computed on the basis of the daily wage. This caused the filing of the complaint. SC held the petition meritorious. The term “wage” as used in Section 6 of RA 6727 pertains to no other than the “statutory minimum wage” which is defined under the Rules Implementing RA 6727 as the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his worker. The basis thereof under Section 7 of the same Rules is the normal working hours, which shall not exceed eight hours a day. Hence, the prescribed increases or the additional liability to be borne by the principal under Section 6 of RA 6727 is the increment or amount added to the remuneration of an employee for an 8-hour work. Section 6 pertains to the “statutory minimum wage” as defined herein, principals in service contracts cannot be made to pay the corresponding wage increase in the overtime pay, night shift differential, holiday and rest day pay, premium pay and other benefits granted to workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the statutory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded as to include those not stated in the subject provision. If the lawmaker’s intention was to extend the obligation of principals in service contracts to the payment of the increment in the other benefits and remuneration of workers, it would have so expressly specified. In not so doing, the only logical conclusion is that the legislature
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2005] Petitioner SMC entered into a one-year contract with the Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative. which selected. ABALLA. i. VS. Tio
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. It is therefore not surprising that PLDT would demand that security guards assigned to its premises undergo seminars and trainings on certain areas of concern which are unique to PLDT. Sunflower engaged private respondents to render services at SMC’s Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant at Sta. 159469. the security guards which PSI had assigned to PLDT are already the former’s employees prior to assignment and if the assigned guards to PLDT are rejected by PLDT for reasons germane to the security agreement. in the end. PROSPERO A. Al. et.. should therefore be dismissed for lack of cause of action.e. VI. A complaint was filed by private respondents before the NLRC. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT CO. There being no assumption by NFA of a greater liability than that mandated by Section 6 of the Act. [G. it was the PSI. the security provider of the PLDT. Having discharged its obligation to respondent. Further.intended to limit the additional obligation imposed on principals in service contracts to the payment of the increment in the statutory minimum wage. ABELLA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE PLDT SECURITY PERSONNEL UNION LISTED IN ANNEX “D” OF THIS PETITION. RESPONDENTS. June 28.R. praying to be declared as regular employees of SMC. The employer-employee relationship is deemed perfected even before the posting of the complainants with the PLDT. engaged or hired and discharged the security guards. 8. The latter’s complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the increased minimum wage rate. petitioner.) AND PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. with
Rommel A. 9. From the facts adduced in the trial courts. respondents. No. 2005] The Security Guards are employees of PSI and not of the PLDT.. the interest of the employees will not be adversely affected if the obligation of principals under the subject provision will be limited to the increase in the statutory minimum wage. the parties may enter into stipulations increasing the liability of the principal. then the rejected or terminated guard may still be assigned to other clients of PSI. Bacolod City. and compensation. 149011. The parties therefore acknowledged the application to their contract of the wage orders issued by the RTWPB pursuant to RA 6727.R. Under Article 1231 of the Civil Code. the Wage Rationalization Act is not violated. monitoring and control system in order to rate whether the security agency it hired is performing at par with PLDT’s set standards. Second. Regional Arbitration Branch No. one of the modes of extinguishing an obligation is by payment. [G. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION. This is so because all remuneration and benefits other than the increased statutory minimum wage would be shouldered and paid by the employer or service contractor to the workers concerned. Moreover. sufficient evidences established that PLDT is not the employer of the petitioners. as a case in point. as assignment only comes after employment. its obligation is limited to the payment of the increased statutory minimum wage rates which. ZALDY G. and the COURT OF APPEALS. Thus. all allowances and benefits as computed under the increased rate mandated by RA 6727 and the wage orders will be received by the workers. NFA no longer have a duty that will give rise to a correlative legal right of respondent. it is PSI that determined and paid the petitioners’ wages. (PSI). had already been satisfied by NFA. it is in the ordinary course of things for big companies such as PLDT to assign their own security personnel and supervisors to monitor the performance of the security guards as part of the company’s internal check. Fe. salaries. First. So long as the minimum obligation of the principal. Bacolod City. as the case may be. as admitted by respondent. At any rate. vs. PETITIONERS. The referral to PLDT is nothing but for possible assignment in a designated client which has the inherent prerogative to accept and reject the assignee for justifiable grounds or even arbitrarily. No. payment of the increased statutory minimum wage is complied with. June 08. manufacturing companies usually hold suppliers’ conferences to integrate their suppliers’ corporate goals and visions with their own so that the manufacturing companies are ensured of the quality and timing of their supplies of materials or services. Third. Based on the foregoing interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6727.
building. (ASDAI) and MERALCO took effect on Dec. Inc. (ASDAI) AND ADVANCE FORCES SECURITY & INVESTIGATION SERVICES. it merely shows it had P2. PETITIONER.. INC. formed an integral part of the shrimp processing operations of SMC. Except as to the number of security guards. et.assigned to private respondents. Less than a month later. filed a complaint for unpaid monetary benefits against PSI and MERALCO. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY. Al.000 in paid-up share capital which amount cannot be considered substantial capitalization. 4. they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. the amount to be paid the agency. The individual respondents alleged that MERALCO and ASDAI never paid their overtime pay. On July 25. and deployed as such at MERALCO’s head office in Ortigas Avenue. Sunflower likewise ceased to exist. including the individual respondents.. respondent
Rommel A. the security service agreement between PSI and MERALCO was terminated. it is held solidarily liable with SMC for all the rightful claims of private respondents.. 3. Subsequently. INC. VS.shrimp harvesting. terminating the previous security service agreement with ASDAI. machineries and all other working tools utilized by private respondents in carrying out their tasks were owned and provided by SMC and the alleged office is found within the confines of a small “carinderia” or “refreshment” (sic) owned by the mother of the Cooperative Chairman Roy Asong and the only equipment used and owned by Sunflower was a typewriter. on July 24. from the job description provided by SMC itself. this time against ASDAI and MERALCO. On June 29. 1992. (AFSISI) and MERALCO took effect. 1990. free from the control and supervision of SMC. the control of the premises in which private respondents worked was by SMC and private respondents had been working in the aqua processing plant inside the SMC compound alongside regular SMC shrimp processing workers performing identical jobs under the same SMC supervisors. the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the former PSI security guards. Tio
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. including herein eight individual respondents. P50. and with the closure of SMC’s Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant. its lot. On Nov. premium pay for Sundays and holidays. Sunflower is a labor-only contractor for the following reasons: 1. 10. when the security service agreement of ASDAI was terminated and AFSISI took over the security functions of the former on July 25. 1992. ARMED SECURITY & DETECTIVE AGENCY. it did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method. and the effectivity of the agreement.00 monthly uniform allowance and underpaid their 13th month pay. the work. 1990. Inc. The individual respondents amended their complaint to implead AFSISI as party respondent. Sunflower did not cater to clients other than SMC. 1. Supreme Court ruled otherwise.claims for recovery of all benefits and privileges enjoyed by SMC rank and file employees. the security service agreement between respondent Advance Forces Security & Investigation Services. 1992. Meanwhile. Pasig. 1992 without notice and just cause and therefore guilty of illegal dismissal. the individual respondents were absorbed by ASDAI and retained at MERALCO’s head office. ROGELIO BENAMIRA.their daily time records were signed by SMC supervisors. Immediately thereafter. The individual respondents are licensed security guards formerly employed by People’s Security. 2. although Sunflower was issued a Certificate of Registration by the Cooperative Development Authority. 1992. SMC alleged that Sunflower is engaged in a legitimate labor contracting and hence the private respondents cannot be considered their employees. Metro Manila. Inc.. (AFSISI). 30. Absent any evidence showing that Sunflower has been dissolved in accordance with law. the terms and conditions were substantially identical with the security service agreement with ASDAI. the security service agreement between respondent Armed Security & Detective Agency. the individual respondents filed another complaint for unpaid monetary benefits. service incentive leave pay. They then again amended their complaint to allege that AFSISI terminated their services on August 6. as it is apparent that its role was merely to recruit persons to work for SMC. Since private respondents who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC. 5. receiving and packing. 56 of PSI’s security guards.
Decision: At the outset. the rest of the individual respondents were absorbed by AFSISI but were not given any assignments. MERALCO employed a scheme of hiring guards through an agency and periodically entering into service contract with one agency after another in order to evade the security of tenure of individual respondents. at any time. On January 3. was no longer given any work assignment when AFSISI learned that the former has a pending case against PSI. For its part. (d) MERALCO has the right. it is noted that the individual respondents never alleged in their complaint in the Labor Arbiter. a labor-only contract existed between ASDAI and AFSISI and MERALCO. the latter were merely hold-over guards from ASDAI. thereby dismissing them from the service without just cause. The individual respondents filed a motion for partial reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC. On the other hand. The individual respondents are bound by their submissions that AFSISI is their employer and they should
Rommel A. They insisted that they were absorbed by AFSISI and the latter effected their termination without notice and just cause. Tio
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. the individual respondents. The individual respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. after the submission of their respective evidence and position papers. such that MERALCO is guilty of illegal dismissal without just cause and liable for reinstatement of individual respondents to its workforce. SC referred the petition to the CA which modified the decision of the NLRC by declaring MERALCO as the direct employer of the individual respondents. Issue: Whether or not MERALCO is jointly and severally liable with AFSISI to the respondents. in their appeal in the NLRC and even in their petition for certiorari in the CA that MERALCO was their employer. to inspect the guards. All the parties. claiming that there is nothing due them in connection with their services. 1994. It averred that the individual respondents are the employees of the security agencies it contracted for security services. and that it has no existing liability for the individual respondents’ claims since said security agencies have been fully paid for their services per their respective security service agreement. an employer-employee relationship exists between MERALCO and the individual respondents because: (a) MERALCO had the final say in the selection and hiring of the guards. and. dismissing him from the service without just cause. individual respondents are regular employees of MERALCO since their services as security guards are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of MERALCO and they have been in the service of MERALCO for no less than six years. and. appealed to the NLRC. except AFSISI. as when its advice was proved to have carried weight in AFSISI’s decision not to absorb the individual respondents into its workforce. The CA held that MERALCO changed the security agency manning its premises three times while engaging the services of the same people. AFSISI asserted that: it is not liable for illegal dismissal since it did not absorb or hire the individual respondents. the labor arbiter rendered a Decision holding ASDAI and MERALCO jointly and solidarily liable to the monetary claims of individual respondents and dismissing the complaint against AFSISI. (c) MERALCO’s discretion on matters of dismissal of guards was given great weight and even finality since the record shows that the individual respondents were replaced upon the advice of MERALCO. in effect. MERALCO denied liability on the ground of lack of employer-employee relationship with individual respondents. NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter. it is not obliged to employ or absorb the security guards of the agency it replaced since there is no provision in its security service agreement with MERALCO or in law requiring it to absorb and hire the guards of ASDAI as it has its own guards duly trained to service its various clients. and.security guard Benamira. They have always advanced the theory that AFSISI is their employer. ASDAI denied in general terms any liability for the claims of the individual respondents. conduct or appearance is not satisfactory and ASDAI and AFSISI cannot pull out any security guard from MERALCO without the latter’s consent. to require without explanation the replacement of any guard whose behavior. After the submission of the responsive pleadings and memoranda. (b) MERALCO paid the wages of individual respondents through ASDAI and AFSISI.
raincoats and other paraphernalia of the security guards. thus. such as the business of providing security services. and. Under the security service agreement. Not all rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an employee of the former. machineries. must satisfy the interests. It is simply a security clause designed to prevent the agency from unilaterally removing its security guards from their assigned posts at MERALCO’s premises to the latter’s detriment. Given the above distinction and the provisions of the
Rommel A.not be permitted to change their theory. Verily. There is “labor only” contract when the person acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. it was ASDAI which (a) selected. the terms and conditions embodied in the security service agreement between MERALCO and ASDAI expressly recognized ASDAI as the employer of individual respondents. such merely confirms that the power to discipline lies with the agency. As to the provision in the agreement that MERALCO reserved the right to seek replacement of any guard whose behavior. the individual respondents are the employees of ASDAI. employees of the COMPANY. the security service agreements in the present case provided that all specific instructions by MERALCO relating to the discharge by the security guards of their duties shall be directed to the agency and not directly to the individual respondents. engaged or hired and discharged the security guards. Thus. The agreement even explicitly provided that “[n]othing herein contained shall be understood to make the security guards under this Agreement. It is a standard stipulation in security service agreements that the client may request the replacement of the guards to it. Moreover. In this case. flashlights. Neither is the stipulation that the agency cannot pull out any security guard from MERALCO without its consent an indication of control. employees of the AGENCY alone. ASDAI and AFSISI are not “labor-only” contractors. The agreement provides that the agency is principally mandated to conduct inspections. not due to the strict application of procedural rules but as a matter of fairness. equipment. Service-oriented enterprises. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof. without prejudice to MERALCO’s right to conduct its own inspections. The clause that MERALCO has the right at all times to inspect the guards of the agency detailed in its premises is likewise not indicative of control as it is not a unilateral right. nightsticks. (b) assigned them to MERALCO according to the number agreed upon. (c) provided the uniform. “job (independent) contracting” is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. generally adhere to the business adage that “the customer or client is always right” and. Tio
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. it being clearly understood that such security guards shall be considered as they are. (d) paid them salaries or wages. firearms and ammunition. the CA should not have considered the new theory offered by the individual respondents in their memorandum. Such a change of theory cannot be tolerated on appeal. On the other hand. The individual respondents failed to show that the rules of MERALCO controlled their performance. conform to the needs. for the power of control to be present.” Clearly. and cater to the reasonable impositions of its clients. justice and due process. work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. conduct or appearance is not satisfactory. Needless to stress. and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools. (e) disciplined and supervised them or principally controlled their conduct. the person for whom the services are rendered must reserve the right to direct not only the end to be achieved but also the means for reaching such end. Rules which serve as general guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired result are not indicative of the power of control. A change of theory on appeal is objectionable because it is contrary to the rules of fair play.
security service agreements entered into by petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, we are convinced that ASDAI and AFSISI were engaged in job contracting. The individual respondents can not be considered as regular employees of the MERALCO for, although security services are necessary and desirable to the business of MERALCO, it is not directly related to its principal business and may even be considered unnecessary in the conduct of MERALCO’s principal business, which is the distribution of electricity. Furthermore, the fact that the individual respondents filed their claim for unpaid monetary benefits against ASDAI is a clear indication that the individual respondents acknowledge that ASDAI is their employer. We cannot give credence to individual respondents’ insistence that they were absorbed by AFSISI when MERALCO’s security service agreement with ASDAI was terminated. The individual respondents failed to present any evidence to confirm that AFSISI absorbed them into its workforce. Thus, respondent Benamira was not retained in his post at MERALCO since July 25, 1992 due to the termination of the security service agreement of MERALCO with ASDAI. As for the rest of the individual respondents, they retained their post only as “hold-over” guards until the security guards of AFSISI took over their post on August 6, 1992. In the present case, respondent Benamira has been “off-detail” for seventeen days while the rest of the individual respondents have only been ”off-detail” for five days when they amended their complaint on August 11, 1992 to include the charge of illegal dismissal. The inclusion of the charge of illegal dismissal then was premature. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that ASDAI simply stopped giving the individual respondents any assignment and their inactivity clearly persisted beyond the six-month period allowed by Article 286 of the Labor Code, the individual respondents were, in effect, constructively dismissed by ASDAI from employment, hence, they should be reinstated. The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee relationship between MERALCO and the individual respondents does not exonerate MERALCO from liability as to the monetary claims of the individual respondents. When MERALCO contracted for security services with ASDAI as the security agency that hired individual respondents to work as guards for it, MERALCO became an indirect employer of individual respondents pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code. When ASDAI as contractor failed to pay the individual respondents, MERALCO as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the individual respondents’ wages, under Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code. ASDAI is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while MERALCO is deemed the indirect employer of the individual respondents for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of failure of ASDAI to pay them. This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. However, as held in Mariveles Shipyard Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, the solidary liability of MERALCO with that of ASDAI does not preclude the application of Article 1217 of the Civil Code on the right of reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid, which provides: ART. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept. He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period may be demanded. When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. ASDAI may not seek exculpation by claiming that MERALCO’s payments to it were inadequate for the individual respondent’ lawful compensation. As an employer, ASDAI is charged with knowledge of
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labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any other’s. WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the NLRC are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the joint and solidary liability of ASDAI and MERALCO to pay individual respondents’ monetary claims for underpayment of actual regular hours and overtime hours rendered, and premium pay for holiday and rest day, as well as attorney”s fees, shall be without prejudice to MERALCO’s right of reimbursement from ASDAI. 11. DOLE Phils. vs. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, November 30, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation duly recognized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, engaged principally in the production and processing of pineapple for the export market. Its plantation is located in Polomolok, South Cotabato . Respondents are members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CAMPCO). CAMPCO was organized in accordance with R.A. No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines , and duly –registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) on 6 January 1993. Members of CAMPCO live in communities surrounding petitioner’s plantation and are relatives of petitioner’s employees. On 17 August 1993, petitioner and CAMPCO entered into a Service Contract. The Service Contract referred to petitioner as “the Company,” while CAMPCO was “the Contractor.” The said contract was good for six months. Pursuant to the contract, CAMPCO members rendered services to petitioner. The parties apparently extended or renewed the same for the succeeding years without executing another written contract. However, due to investigations and reliable information, the Regional Director of DOLE exercised his visitorial and enforcement power and found out that CAMPCO is engaged in labor-only contracting together with two other “cooperatives”. The Law cited was Section 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. –(pertaining to Labor-only contracting… 1. no substantial capital; 2. work is directly related to the principal business of the principal b. in such case, the one who alleges as contractor is deemed an agent of the principal while the latter will latter is considered the indirect employer for purposes of enforcement of the labor rights.) Before the NLRC, respondents contended that they have been working more than one year too petitioner. While some of the respondents were still working for petitioner, others were put on “stay home status” on varying dates in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 and were no longer furnished with work thereafter. They, then, filed a case before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, regularization, wage differentials, damages and attorney’s fees. Respondents argued that they should be considered regular employees of petitioner given that: 1. they were performing jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioner; 2. petitioner exercised control over respondents, not only as to the results, but also as to the manner by which they performed their assigned tasks; and 3. CAMPCO, a labor-only contractor, was merely a conduit of petitioner. As regular employees of petitioner, respondents asserted that they were entitled to security of tenure and those placed on “stay home status” for more than six months had been constructively and illegally dismissed. Respondents further claimed entitlement to wage differential, moral damages, and attorney’s fees. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. CA also affirmed.
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ISSUES: Whether the lower courts were correct in ruling that Petitioner is the employer of respondents and that CAMPCO be considered merely as agent of the company HELD: In summary, this Court finds that CAMPCO was a labor-only contractor and, thus, petitioner is the real employer of the respondents, with CAMPCO acting only as the agent or intermediary of petitioner. Due to the nature of their work and length of their service, respondents should be considered as regular employees of petitioner. Petitioner constructively dismissed a number of the respondents by placing them on "stay home status" for over six months, and was therefore guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner must accord respondents the status of regular employees, and reinstate the respondents who it constructively and illegally dismissed, to their previous positions, without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and pay these respondents’ backwages from the date of filing of the Complaint with the NLRC on 19 December 1996 up to actual reinstatement. CRITERIA TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT AND PERMISSIBLE CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP generally established by the following criteria: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment SEVERAL FACTORS ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE TO ESTABLISH A LABOR- ONLY CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENT BY BETWEEN THE MANAGEMENT AND CAMPCO While there is present in the relationship of petitioner and CAMPCO some factors suggestive of an independent contractor relationship (i.e., CAMPCO chose who among its members should be sent to work for petitioner; petitioner paid CAMPCO the wages of the members, plus a percentage thereof as administrative charge; CAMPCO paid the wages of the members who rendered service to petitioner), many other factors are present which would indicate a labor-only contracting arrangement between petitioner and CAMPCO. First, although petitioner touts the multi-million pesos assets of CAMPCO, it does well to remember that such were amassed in the years following its establishment. In 1993, when CAMPCO was established and the Service Contract between petitioner and CAMPCO was entered into, CAMPCO only had P6,600.00 paid-up capital, which could hardly be considered substantial. It only managed to increase its capitalization and assets in the succeeding years by continually and defiantly engaging in what had been declared by authorized DOLE officials as labor-only contracting. Second, CAMPCO did not carry out an independent business from petitioner. It was precisely established to render services to petitioner to augment its workforce during peak seasons. Petitioner was its only client. Even as CAMPCO had its own office and office equipment, these were mainly used for administrative purposes; the tools, machineries, and equipment actually used by CAMPCO members when rendering services to the petitioner belonged to the latter. Third, petitioner exercised control over the CAMPCO members, including respondents. Petitioner attempts to refute control by alleging the presence of a CAMPCO supervisor in the work premises. Yet, the mere presence within the premises of a supervisor from the cooperative did not necessarily mean that CAMPCO had control over its members. Section 8(1), Rule VIII, Book III of the implementing rules of the Labor Code, as amended, required for permissible job contracting that the contractor undertakes the contract work on his account, under his own responsibility, according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. As alleged by the respondents, and unrebutted by petitioner, CAMPCO members, before working for the petitioner, had to undergo instructions and pass the training provided by petitioner’s personnel. It was petitioner who determined and prepared the work assignments of the CAMPCO members. CAMPCO members worked
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then consequently. since CAMPCO shall be considered as a mere agent or intermediary of petitioner RESPONDENTS ARE CONSIDERED REGULAR EMPLOYEES FOR THEY PERFORMED ACTIVITIES THAT ARE NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE TO THE USUAL BUSINESS OF THE PETITIONER Since respondents are now recognized as employees of petitioner. There is no doubt that the activities performed by respondents are necessary or desirable to the usual business of petitioner.. In consideration of all the attendant circumstances in this case. with such an arrangement. However. work or service was required from CAMPCO. Respondents rendered services as processing attendant. functions they performed alongside regular employees of the petitioner.. Lastly. Petitioner likewise want this Court to believe that respondents’ employment was dependent on the peaks in operation. CAMPCO members. absenteeism. that CAMPCO merely acted as a recruitment agency for petitioner. as amended. They could only be removed based on just and authorized causes as provided for in the Labor Code. petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and production of pineapple products for export. as regular employees of petitioner. this Court is tasked to determine the nature of their employment. Fourth. THE COMPANY’S ACT OF PLACING SOME OF THE RESPONDENTS ON "STAY HOME STATUS" AND NOT GIVING THEM WORK ASSIGNMENTS FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS WERE ALREADY TANTAMOUNT TO CONSTRUCTIVE AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL Respondents. an employer-employee relationship is deemed to exist between petitioner and respondents. Therefore. Apart from that. performed activities directly related to the principal business of petitioner. and it is apparent. In the Service Contract of 1993. CAMPCO agreed to assist petitioner in its daily operations. CAMPCO clearly conducted itself as a labor-only contractor. functions which were. work backlogs. CAMPCO complied with this venture by assigning members to petitioner. In the instant Petition. but rather the supply of manpower only. and excessive leaves. and etc. nata de coco processing attendant. not only directly related. including respondents. are entitled to security of tenure. feeder of canned pineapple and pineapple processing. fruit cocktail processing attendant. CAMPCO was not engaged to perform a specific and special job or service. nata de coco processing attendant. bearing in mind that respondents all claimed to have worked for petitioner for over a year. feeder of canned pineapple and pineapple processing. They worked as can processing attendant. Since the undertaking of CAMPCO did not involve the performance of a specific job. petitioner’s acts of placing some of the respondents on "stay home status" and not giving them work assignments for more than six months were already tantamount to constructive and illegal dismissal
Rommel A. and after they are accorded procedural due process. The findings enumerated in the preceding paragraphs only support what DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE Undersecretary Trajano had long before conclusively established.within petitioner’s plantation and processing plants alongside regular employees performing identical jobs. that CAMPCO was a mere labor-only contractor EMPLOYER. then respondent’s continued employment clearly demonstrates the continuing necessity and indispensability of respondents’ employment to the business of petitioner. no other particular job.EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP EXIST BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENT WITH THE DECLARATION THAT CAMPCO WAS ENGAGED IN THE PROHIBITED ACTS OF LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING The declaration that CAMPCO is indeed engaged in the prohibited activities of labor-only contracting. fruit cocktail processing attendant. this Court concludes that respondents are regular employees of petitioner. but were very vital to petitioner’s business of production and processing of pineapple products for export. and etc. and perform odd jobs as may be assigned. a claim which petitioner failed to rebut. a circumstance recognized as an indicium of a labor-only contractorship. Tio
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. SMC is liable for damages and payment of claimed wages and benefits. Inc. 124055. respondents. vs. In this manner. In San Miguel Corporation v. such as the security guards. as between themselves. No. Where. This is the import of Eparwa and LDCU’s solidary liability. not being a computer expert. The existence of an employer-employee relationship is factual and giving due deference to the factual findings of both the NLRC and the CA that an employer-employee relationship existed between SMC (or its subsidiaries) and Maliksi is valid. ROLANDO E. There is no privity of contract between the security guards and LDCU. Solidary liability does not mean that. good customs or public order. having served SMC for an aggregate period of more than three (3) years through employment contracts with these two labor contractors. 2006. November 28. unfair labor practices and the like. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. then the Skill power then the last in in PHILSSEC. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. ESCARIO. morals. Al. the labor contractor likewise ceases its operations. G.R. Eparwa is already precluded from asking LDCU for an adjustment in the contract price because of the expiration of the contract. closure. Creditors. such as the software program being developed by PHILSSEC. LDCU cannot claim any reimbursement from Eparwa for any payment it may make to the security guards (because the contract has expired). G. it is apparent that periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee. the mother company avoids the employeremployee relations. petitioners. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RAFAEL MALIKSI. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Lipercon and Skillpower were declared to be labor-only contractors. an independent contractor. June 8. With respect to PHILSSEC. 150402. from the circumstances. The hard fact is that he was hired and re-hired by SMC to perform administrative and clerical work that was necessary to SMC’s business on a daily basis. He was first under the Lipercon. may collect from anyone of the solidary debtors. No. but LDCU’s liability to the security guards remains because of Articles 106. 2000
Rommel A. and is thus shielded from liability from employee claims in case of illegal dismissal. his placement in the project was for the purpose of circumventing labor laws. but Eparwa’s liability to the security guards remains because of their employer-employee relationship. Presumptuously. Eparwa may claim reimbursement from LDCU for any payment it may make to the security guards. 2006 For the security guards. agreement or practice should be struck down as contrary to public policy. No. MAERC Integrated Services. Petition denied. SMC denied allegation by stating that Maliksi is an employee of PHILSSEC. SC took note of the practice of hiring employees through labor contractors that catered exclusively to the employment needs of SMC or its divisions or other specific business interests. 107 and 109 of the Labor Code (solidary liable). et. However. two solidary debtors are liable for only half of the payment. Maliksi should be considered as SMC’s regular employee. the policy. the actual source of the payment of their wage differentials and premium for holiday and rest day work does not matter as long as they are paid. 14. such that after the specific SMC business or division ceases to do business. SMC itself admits that Maliksi’s work under the computerization program did “not require the operation of a computer system. EPARWA SECURITY AND JANITORIAL SERVICES. LDCU’s ultimate liability comes into play because of the expiration of the Contract for Security Services. Maliksi’s inclusion in the project was uncalled for. LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY.R. INC.. December 6. In lieu of an adjustment in the contract price. 147566 Maliksi filed a complaint against SMC to compel the latter to recognize him as a regular employee of the company. Indeed. AND DONNA LOUISE ADVERTISING AND MARKETING ASSOCIATES INCORPORATED..” By this admission. The act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of the employer. G. vs. providing as they do manpower services to the public for a fee. CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING CO.R. INC. 13.12.
They alleged that the hiring. work or services within a definite or predetermined period. and The contractor has substantial capital / investment which are necessary in the conduct of his business. machineries. Decision: The Supreme Court denied the petition. CMC filed a motion to implead as partydefendant D. D. Both motions were granted. On appeal.Private respondents California Marketing Co. In addition the following factors need be considered whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business the nature and extent of the work the skill required the term and duration of the relationship the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work the control and supervision of the workers the power of the employer with respect to the hiring. The complaint was amended to include alleged dismissal. Inc. Issue: Whether or not D. there is permissible job contracting when a principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or a subcontractor the performance/completion of a specific job. In this arrangement. During the pendency of the case. the NLRC set aside the labor arbiters decision. wok premise. The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under the responsibility according to his own manual and methods. There is labor-only contracting when the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits. supplies or places workers to perform a job. In contract. Petitioners alleged that they were employed by CMC as merchandisers.. is a duly registered promotional firm. work or service for a principa. control and supervision of workers and the payment of the salaries were all covered by CMC through its agent D. firing and payment of workers of the contractor the control of the premises
Rommel A. CMC denied being petitioners employer while D. Inc.L Admark in order CMC to avoid its liability under the law. Private respondent Donna Louis Advertising and Marketing Associates. Petitioners filed a case against CMC before the labor arbiter for regularization of their employment status. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his employer work except as to the results thereof.L Admark asserted it is the employer of the petitioners. The workers recruited and placed by such person performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of the employer.L Admark is a labor-only contractor or as independent contractor. Hence the petition.L Admark petitioners filed a motion for consideration before the NLRC which was denied for lack of merit. But ordered the reinstatement of the petitioners in D.L Admark. the following conditions must concur.L Admark terminated the services of the petitioners. among other tools. the following elements are present: The person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. regardless of whether such job/services is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the manufacturing of food products and distribution of such products to wholesalers and retailers. equipments. In labor only contracting. Tio
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. the latter filed a motion to intervene. The labor arbiter found petitioners as employees of CMC as they were engaged in activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business/trade of CMC.
The court reiterated that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization on investment.
Respondents.00 effective January 8. 1994. 1993. Grigio cannot be considered as an independent job contractor.07 per guard. The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job.the duty to supply premises. 2006 AHI is the employer of the respondents. G. 1991. During the effectivity of the contract. were absorbed by the incoming security agency. doing business under the name and style of Lanting Security and Watchman Agency (LSWA) entered into a Security Service Contract to provide security guards to the properties of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) at the contract rate of P3. 1991 to May 31. the court found that D. or 3. 2. materials and labor mode.L Admark was found to be the employer of the petitioners. dated May 24. 2. 1991. 1993. Applying the four-fold test. Grigio is constrained to follow these provisions and would no longer be able to exercise the freedom to alter these work shifts and schedules at its own convenience. 148619. which consist of the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. manner and terms of payment Based on the foregoing criteria. approved the upward adjustments of the contract price from P3. Grigio is engaged in labor contracting and not jobcontracting. it was not established or proven by substantial evidence that Grigio has substantial capital or investment. otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. EMMANUEL GUERRERO. 1994. LSWA requested the GSIS for an upward adjustment of the contract rate in view of Section 7 of Wage Order No. 16. Such being the case. LSWA filed a Third-Party Complaint against GSIS for underpayment of complainants' wages.000. GSIS terminated the Security Service Contract with LSWA. 1991. By stipulating these matters in a contract. All the complainants.
Rommel A. LSWA alleged that complainants were estopped from claiming that they were underpaid because they were informed that the pay and benefits given to them were based on the contract rate of P103.. R. the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. On August 9. all duties and obligations of the respondents are stipulated in it. appliances. Tio
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. ABOITIZ HAULERS. GSIS vs.00 per guard per month. work or service to be performed. The elements of labor-contracting exist in this case: 1. and P4.000.L Admark is a legitimate independent contractor. NLRC Facts: Tomas Lanting. D. No. which were issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act No. Acting on the request of LSWA.00 per eight hours of work or about P3. were not within the absolute control of Grigio. RAUL MAMATE. and GEMENIANO BIGAW. through its Board of Trustees and under Board Resolution No. on the contract. September 19. Petitioner v.100. 1990 to January 7. 15. 6727. except Virgilio Soriano. supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. On March 15. INC. per month effective November 1. 1 and Section 3 of Wage Order No. tools.200.716.00 to P3. CECILIA AGAWIN. On March 7. considering the fact that the respondents are mere employees of AHI on 1992. the GSIS. Virgilio Soriano also complained of illegal dismissal. 207. complainants filed separate complaints against LSWA for underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard benefits from March 1991 to March 15. MONAORAI DIMAPATOI. The Supreme Court affirmed the NLRC’s ruling. prior to the contract made with Grigio. and continued/ renewed its services until 1996 proves that the respondents’ task as “checkers” is clearly necessary for the petitioner’s business of forwarding and distributing of cargoes. the employees recruited.00 per month. This clearly indicates that these matters.
the GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA arguing that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding GSIS solely liable for complainants' money claims. 1 and 2. that although the Security Service Contract provided that there shall be employer-employer relationship between LSWA and/or its security guards and the GSIS. It submits that Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code were not contemplated by its framers to cover principals or clients of service contractors who had already paid for the wages of the contractor or subcontractor. otherwise. the CA held the GSIS jointly and severally liable with LSWA for complainants' money claims pursuant to Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code. On November 6. that is. Contractor or subcontractor. effective January 8. at P4. that the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the upward adjustment on a month-to-month basis. The Labor Arbiter held LSWA and GSIS jointly and severally liable for the payment of complainants' money claims. that LSWA obligated itself in the Security Service Contract to be solely liable for the enforcement of and compliance with all existing labor laws. in order to ensure that the latter get paid the wages due them. 207 dated May 24. In their Comment.100. 1991 to May 31. shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code. the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or
Rommel A. LSWA appealed to the NLRC.00 a month. Labor Arbiter Renato Bugarin rendered a Decision in favor of complainants. 1 and 2 by incorporating the mandated increase in the Security Service Contract. The NLRC held the GSIS solely liable for payment of complainants' money claims. it would be unjust enrichment on the part of complainants and/or LSWA at its expense. that the GSIS cannot claim that holding it jointly and severally liable with LSWA would result in grave injustice since the law did not leave it without recourse as the GSIS has the right of reimbursement from its co-debtor under Article 1217 of the Civil Code. Held: Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provide: ART. rules and regulations. if any. pursuant to Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code. 1991. Issue: Whether or not GSIS is jointly and severally liable with LSWA. Tio
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. complainants argue that the GSIS is jointly and severally liable with LSWA for complainants' money claims since LSWA actually paid only the sum of P3. On August 27. under Board Resolution No. 106. even though the GSIS incorporated in the Security Service Contract the mandated wage increases in Wage Order Nos.200 per guard per month. In its Comment. 1991.– Whenever an employer enters into contract with another person for the performance of the former’s work. The GSIS avers that it cannot twice be held liable for complainants' salary differentials since it fully paid complainants' salaries by incorporating in the Security Service Contract the salary rate increases mandated by Wage Order Nos. 1996.GSIS alleged that the Third-Party Complaint states no cause of action against it. that GSIS fully paid the services of the security guards as agreed upon in the Security Service Contract. While finding that the GSIS complied with its obligations under Wage Order Nos. LSWA maintains that the GSIS is jointly and severally liable with LSWA because Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provide so and these provisions were intended to ensure that employees are paid the wages due them in case of violation of the Labor Code of either the contractor or the principal. In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wage of his employees in accordance with this Code. which was incorporated in the Security Service Contract. the employees of the contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor. Article 106 of the Labor Code establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a limited purpose. 2000. 1 and 2.
if not guarantees. who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership. thus: The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Code. and a company based in Bukidnon. Thus. which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent cooperative. thus. the GSIS cannot evade liability by claiming that it had fully paid complainants' salaries by incorporating in the Security Service Contract the salary rate increases. and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor’s employees. Such fears are unfounded. respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco . CA’s decision are affirmed with modification that the joint and solidary liability of LSWA and the GSIS to pay complainants' salary differentials shall be without prejudice to the GSIS's right of reimbursement from LSWA. The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of his or her status as a direct employer. This liability facilitates. payment of the workers’ compensation. the Court explained the rationale for the joint and several liability of the employer. National Labor Relations Commission. it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor.subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract. the Court does not agree with the GSIS's claim that a double burden would be imposed upon the latter because it would be paying twice for complainants' services. task. The owners-members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. xxx ART.– The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person. principally those on statutory minimum wage. Inc. and (2) associate member. it has the right to recover from LSWA whatever amount it has paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between the LSWA and the GSIS. who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges provided in its by-laws. if the GSIS should pay the money claims of complainants. partnership. Asiapro Cooperative Facts: Respondent Asiapro. association or corporation which. In Rosewood Processing. Republic of the Philippines/SSc/SSS vs. as a cooperative. Under its by-laws. contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work. 17.
Rommel A. Should the indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. job or project. v. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other livelihood services for its ownersmembers. they receive a share in the service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns from different areas of trade it engages in. Inc. ownersmembers are of two categories. 107 Indirect employer. Petition is denied. Instead.) In this case. to wit: (1) regular member. giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him. is composed of owners-members. Joint and solidary liability is simply meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. This is in line with the policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. (Emphasis supplied. Tio
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. such as the income derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. not being an employer.a division of DOLE Philippines. The owners-members get their income from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered. In the discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives. Under Article 1217 of the Civil Code.
The same was docketed as SSC Case No. 8282 as well as in Section 1. filed an Answer with Cross-claim against the respondent cooperative. Parma. – (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage. Jurisdiction. Manager or Officer-in-charge of the Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had first taken action thereon in writing. Held: Petitioner SSC’s jurisdiction is clearly stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. Section 1. Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure. Eddie A. thus. Again. Similarly. 8282. Issues: Whether the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS against the respondent cooperative. benefits. collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon. hence. sent a reply to petitioner SSS’s letter asserting that it is not an employer because its ownersmembers are the cooperative itself. to comply with Section 19-A of Republic Act No. on 21 October 2002. Respondent cooperative continuously ignored the demand of petitioner SSS. On 9 October 2002. informing the latter that based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco. on the other hand. however. On 26 September 2002. it is an employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. entitlement of benefits. Section 5 of Republic Act No. in the alternative. Jara. respondent cooperative. 1161. petitioner SSS. as amended by Republic Act No. – Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to coverage. Tio
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. filed a Petition before petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco praying that the respondent cooperative or. or any other matter related thereto. the SSS contributions of the said owners-members were equal to the share of both the employer and the employee. x x x. who were assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the latter to register them with petitioner SSS as self-employed and to remit their contributions as such. Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states: Section 1. Settlement of Disputes. Stanfilco be directed to register as an employer and to report respondent cooperative’s ownersmembers as covered employees under the compulsory coverage of SSS and to remit the necessary contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997. 8282 provides: SEC. Atty. There is an employer-employee relationship between [respondent cooperative] and its [ownersmembers]. on 12 June 2003. petitioner SSS through its Vice-President for Mindanao Division. Accordingly. Stanfilco. 6-15507-03. petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the respondent cooperative. it cannot be its own employer. respondent cooperative is actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason. the owners-members of the respondent cooperative. Thus. addressed to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General Manager Leo G. contributions and penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto. shall be cognizable by the Commission after the SSS through its President. petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative ordering the latter to register as an employer and report its owners-members as employees for compulsory coverage with the petitioner SSS. through its counsel.In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997. 5. Respondent cooperative filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging that no employer-employee relationship exists between it and its owners-members. Also. respondent cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report and remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.
Rommel A. shall be cognizable by the Commission. sent a letter to the respondent cooperative.
having declared that there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-member. Clearly then. In sum. controls. can enter into an employment with its owners-members. the agreed terms and conditions must not be contrary to law. In its by-laws. will show that it actually recognized that an owner-member of a cooperative can be its own employee. an owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of the latter and an employer-employee relationship can exist between them. As previously pointed out by this Court. Accordingly. The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract. It is important to note. Inc. and their agreement would have the force of law between them. terms and conditions as they want. the management of the affairs of the respondent cooperative is vested in its Board of Directors and not in its owners-members as a whole. its Board of Directors directs. when in actuality. It has its Board of Directors. It is settled that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations. In this case. it is completely logical that the respondent cooperative. 18. which directs and supervises its business. In fact. the petition-complaint filed by the petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco alleges that the owners-members of the respondent cooperative are subject to the compulsory coverage of the SSS because they are employees of the respondent cooperative. Consequently. the respondent cooperative being the employer of its owners-members must register as employer and report its owners-members as covered members of the SSS and remit the necessary premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997. its Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and management of its affairs. based on the aforesaid allegations in the petition-complaint filed before the petitioner SSC. The respondent cooperative must not be allowed to deny its employment relationship with its owners-members by invoking the questionable Service Contracts provision. The four elements in the four-fold test for the existence of an employment relationship have been complied with. morals. who are also its owners-members. The Service Contract provision in question must be struck down for being contrary to law and public policy since it is apparently being used by the respondent cooperative merely to circumvent the compulsory coverage of its employees. 0-623-2460. that the mandatory coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship except in cases of compulsory coverage of the self-employed. clauses. by the Social Security Law. a closer look at Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City. we conclude that the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by the petitioner SSS. Therefore. that a cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. meaning. In the present case. customs. However. the case clearly falls within its jurisdiction. Tio
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. With that. a cooperative can be likened to a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its owners-members. Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency vs. The question involved here is whether an employer-employee relationship can exist between the cooperative and an owner-member. though. The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. it does exist. and supervises the business and manages the property of the respondent cooperative. as evidenced by its Certificate of Registration No. public policy or public order. when the terms and surrounding circumstances show otherwise. It bears stressing. Consequently.It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS is well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC. it is not disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the Cooperative Development Authority. an employee-employer relationship actually exists between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. as a juridical person represented by its Board of Directors. too. Sales Facts:
1999. all respondents claim for moral and exemplary damages. Furthermore. et al. one of whom is Delta Milling Industries. overtime pay. which." On July 1. underpaid 13th month pay. judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the charges of illegal dismissal on the part of the complainants MELVIN R. SO ORDERED. respondent security guards instituted the instant labor case before the labor arbiter.000. SALES. Moron. MELVIN R. rest day and holiday premium pay. In addition to these money claims. 2000. 1998 and August 21. On September 18. Tio
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. Caranyagan and Tamayo argue that they were entitled to separation pay and back wages. respectively. Melvin Tamayo. CARANYAGAN for lack of merit but ordering respondents JAGUAR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY and DELTA MILLING INDUSTRIES. five days service and incentive leave pay.
Rommel A. 1998: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) wage differentials overtime pay differentials (4 hours a day) rest day pay holiday pay holiday premium pay 13th month pay differentials five days service incentive leave pay per year subject to the exception earlier cited. TAMAYO. 1998.Petitioner Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency ("Jaguar") is a private corporation engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients. Jaguar sought reconsideration of the dismissal. On May 25. but the Commission denied the same in its Resolution dated November 9. for the purpose of proving the liability of Delta. 2004. being the direct employer of the security guards. 1999.. dismissed the petition for lack of merit. for the time they were illegally dismissed until finality of the decision. Caranyagan and Tamayo were terminated by Jaguar on May 26. the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondents Sales. it directed petitioner to file a separate civil action for recovery of the amount before the regular court having jurisdiction over the subject matter.00. 2001. 1995 to April 24. 2002 and Resolution dated February 13. Quezon City. All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1998. the dispositive portion of which provides: "WHEREFORE. Thus... It went on to say that Jaguar. Jaime Moron and Daneth Fetalvero were hired as security guards by Jaguar. All the guard-employees. to jointly and severally pay all the six complainants. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. in the herein assailed Decision dated October 21. They were assigned at the premises of Delta in Libis. night shift differential. ("Delta"). For purposes of any appeal. Jesus Silva. Sales. Allegedly their dismissals were arbitrary and illegal. JAIME MORON and DANETH FETALVERO the following money claims for their services rendered from April 24. Jr. the appeal bond is tentatively set at P100. is the one principally liable to the employees. Dionisio Caranyagan. TAMAYO and DIONISIO C. INC. Private respondents Rodolfo Sales. holding that it was not the proper forum to raise the issue. Fetalvero and Silva remained with Jaguar. Inc. In its Resolution dated September 19. namely: RODOLFO A.
The Research and Information Unit of this Commission is hereby directed to compute and quantify the above awards and submit a report thereon within 15 days from receipt of this decision. petitioner Jaguar filed a partial appeal questioning the failure of public respondent NLRC to resolve its cross-claim against Delta as the party ultimately liable for payment of the monetary award to the security guards. the NLRC dismissed the appeal. claim for monetary benefits such as underpayment.
Nolie Ramirez and Ernesto Calicagan as glass cutters. In its cross-claim. Instead. On 1 December 2002. refuted petitioners' allegations that they were its regular employees. dated 5 March 2002. all assigned to work for respondent. Payment. and that their dismissal from employment without the benefit of due process of law was unlawful. Inc.Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim reimbursement from Delta Milling through a cross-claim filed with the labor court? Held: The Court ruled in the negative. terminated the employment of petitioners on the same date. In their Complaint filed before the Labor Arbiter. 6 Respondent presented before the Labor Arbiter copies of the Opinion dated 18 February 2003 of DOLE
Rommel A. The petition is DENIED. The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an employer-employee relationship exists. Petitioner's cross-claim is within the realm of civil law. Asahi Glass Facts: The present Petition arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees filed by petitioners against respondent and San Sebastian Allied Services. Respondent contested petitioners' contention that they were performing functions that were directly related to respondent's main business since petitioners were simply tasked to do mirror cutting. Respondent. there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Delta Milling. Respondent likewise denied exercising control over petitioners and asserted that such was wielded by SSASI. petitioners asserted that they should be considered regular employees of the respondent. Believing that SSASI was a labor-only contractor. petitioners alleged that respondent (a domestic corporation engaged in the business of glass manufacturing) and SSASI (a labor-only contractor) entered into a service contract on 5 March 2002 whereby the latter undertook to provide the former with the necessary manpower for its operations. (SSASI). it appears that petitioner has yet to pay the guard employees. Pursuant to such a contract. the validity of which was never assailed by the petitioners. and having continuously worked as glass cutters and quality controllers for the respondent — functions which are directly related to its main line of business as glass manufacturer — for three to 11 years. In the present case. the liability of Delta Milling to reimburse petitioner will only arise if and when petitioner actually pays its employees the adjudged liabilities. of the obligation. respondent maintained that SSASI was engaged in legitimate job contracting and was licensed by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to engage in such activity as shown in its Certificate of Registration. is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance. There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling. on the other hand. Petitioners worked for respondent for periods ranging from three to 11 years. which in turn. Tio
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. Finally. SSASI employed petitioners Randy Almeda. Edwin Audencial. In support of their complaint. petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees. the cross-claim involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. in any other manner. respondent claimed that petitioners were employees of SSASI and were merely assigned by SSASI to work for respondent to perform intermittent services pursuant to an Accreditation Agreement. Almeda vs. Rather. petitioners submitted a copy of their work schedule to show that they were under the direct control of the respondent which dictated the time and manner of performing their jobs. 19. and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts. Moreover. an activity occasionally performed upon a customer's order. and petitioner Reynaldo Calicagan as Quality Controller. respondent terminated its service contract with SSASI. In this case.
In light of the factual circumstances of the case.Secretary Patricia Sto. To prevent the execution of the Decision dated 25 June 2005 and Resolution dated 24 November 2005 of the NLRC. [Herein respondent] and [SSASI] are hereby ordered to: (1) reinstate the [herein petitioners] to their former position as glass cutters. This prompted respondent to elevate its case to the Court of Appeals by the filing of a Petition for Certiorari with Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). the NLRC declared that petitioners were employees of respondent and not of SSASI. However. the Court of Appeals issued a TRO on 11 September 2006 enjoining the NLRC from enforcing its 25 June 2005 Decision and 24 November 2005 Resolution. alter or reverse its earlier Decision. the NLRC reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. alleging that the NLRC abused its discretion in ignoring the established facts and legal principles fully substantiated by the documentary evidence on record and legal opinions of labor officials. Respondent prayed that the NLRC vacate its previous finding that SSASI was a labor-only contractor and that it was guilty of the illegal dismissal of petitioners. Tomas authorizing respondent to contract out certain activities not necessary or desirable to the business of the company. the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. On 10 November 2006. The petitioners were recruited and assigned by SSASI to respondent as glass cutters. giving more evidentiary weight to petitioners' testimonies. Eventually. The liability of [respondent] and [SSASI] for [petitioners'] backwages is further declared to be joint and several. SSASI averred that it was the one who hired petitioners and assigned them to work for respondent on occasions that the latter's work force could not meet the demands of its customers. On 18 February 2004. In a Resolution dated 24 November 2005. however. and the Opinion dated 10 July 2003 of DOLE Bureau of Labor Relations (DOLE-BLR) Director Hans Leo Cacdac allowing respondent to contract out even services that were not directly related to its main line of business. Hence. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 27 April 2007. the Labor Arbiter promulgated his Decision finding that respondent submitted overwhelming documentary evidence to refute the bare allegations of the petitioners and accordingly dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. and in giving more credence to the empty allegations advanced by petitioners. the NLRC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent for lack of compelling justification to modify. Tio
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. respondent included in its Petition a prayer for the issuance of a TRO. positions which were directly related to respondent's principal business of glass manufacturing. On appeal. constraining the latter to terminate petitioners' employment. Whether or not they were illegally dismissed?
Rommel A. the NLRC ruled in its Decision dated 29 June 2005: WHEREFORE. which it reiterated in a motion filed on 29 August 2006. he also ordered the payment of separation benefits to petitioners. It appeared to the NLRC that SSASI was engaged in labor-only contracting since it did not have substantial capital and investment in the form of tools. for its part. Only respondent moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing NLRC Decision. claimed that it was a duly registered independent contractor as evidenced by the Certificate of Registration issued by the DOLE on 3 January 2003. 2002 up to the date of their actual reinstatement. the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting respondent's Petition for Certiorari and reversing the NLRC Decision dated 25 June 2005. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners were employees of respondent? (2) If they were. respondent ceased to give job orders to SSASI. equipment and machineries. Acting on respondent's motion. SSASI. and (2) pay [petitioners'] full backwages from December 2. Hence this petition.
petitioners were entitled to security of tenure and could only be dismissed on just or authorized causes and after they had been accorded due process. and the manner and method of accomplishing the jobs. Also. as amended. This Court expounded on the afore-quoted provision. Regular and Casual Employment. Respondent would have wanted this Court to believe that petitioners' employment was dependent on the increased market demand. They were required to observe all rules and regulations of the respondent pertaining to. Tio
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Rommel A. or who supervised petitioners in their work. Obscurity hounds respondent's argument that even if petitioners were working under its roof. bearing in mind that petitioners have worked for respondent for not less than three years and as much as 11 years. there was absolute lack of evidence that SSASI exercised control over them or their work. petitioners worked at the respondent's premises. In the instant Petition. regularity of job output. among other things. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Article 280 of the Labor Code. That. the quality of job performance. There was no showing that it was SSASI who established petitioners' working procedure and methods. but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year. of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. As petitioners' employer. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. Other than being the one who hired petitioners. PETITIONERS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED With regards to the second issue. .Held: PETITIONERS WERE EMPLOYEES OF RESPONDENT In the instant case. However. then petitioners' continued employment clearly demonstrates its continuing necessity and indispensability to the business of respondent. the court ruled in affirmative. it was still SSASI which exercised control over the manner in which they accomplished their work. or who evaluated the same. even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent. Thus. . 280. and nowhere else. Petitioners followed the work schedule prepared by respondent. However. . therefore. any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. raising their employment to regular status. thus — The primary standard. whether such service is continuous or broken. having gained regular status. reads — ART. which respondent did not refute. and that they were afforded procedural due process. the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. respondent has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a cause allowed under the law. the Court has already declared that petitioners' employment as quality controllers and glass cutters are directly related to the usual business or trade of respondent as a glass manufacturer. Hence. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. the employment is also considered regular.
and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank. entered into a Contract for Services with HI. Wilfredo Juegos. NLRC and EPCIB FACTS: Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank). damages. It was HI that paid petitioners’ wages. allowances. The sole reason given for the dismissal of petitioners by SSASI was the termination of its service contract with respondent. inclusive of allowances. as well as to its other branches in the Visayas. Tio
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. The petition is GRANTED. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees. Pursuant to their contract. a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Philippine laws. It would then appear that petitioners were summarily dismissed based on the afore-cited reason. having been unjustly dismissed from work. Sr. hence. then the said reason would not constitute a just or authorized cause for petitioners' dismissal. Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement. an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. Contention of the respondent: E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI. Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position papers. Leonilo Dayday. a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Their earnings elsewhere during the periods of their illegal dismissal shall not be deducted therefrom. monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms.failed to discharge this burden with substantial evidence as it noticeably narrowed its defense to the denial of any employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners. Sr.. and Cesar Peciencia were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue. 20. Cebu City. Sasan. and petitioners were to be deemed the employees of respondent.
Rommel A. having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year. with claims for separation pay. vs. Alejandro Ardimer. But since SSASI was a labor-only contractor. attorney’s fees and costs. petitioners amended their complaints to include a claim for 13th month-pay. that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs. Herein petitioners. Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints against EPCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. Modesto Aguirre. Petronilo Carcedo. The contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Lahug. Petitioners Rolando Sasan. HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. Eleuterio Sacil. and exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. service incentive leave pay. Contention of the petitioner: They had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed. without compliance with the procedural due process for notice and hearing. are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages. Subsequently. and to other benefits or their monetary equivalents computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC. is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits. but the latter refused to comply with the same. it promulgated its Decision on modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. on the other hand. HI designated petitioners to new work assignments. whether actually or constructively. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur: (a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job. and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and. and social and welfare benefits.HI. work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method. free exercise of the right to self-organization. a prohibited act. In labor-only contracting. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI. security of tenure. bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors. work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. HELD: Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job. part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. Able Services and Puritan. and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. work or service for a principal. but affirmed his award for 13th month pay and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay. which cannot be considered engaged in “labor-only contracting. supplies or places workers to perform a job. the following elements are present:
Rommel A. Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job. (b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. Tio
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. to the petitioners. work. and (c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards. asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and. petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without basis. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. Petitioners were its employees.” The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and separation pay. In contrast. work or service within a definite or predetermined period. instead. declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization. thus. labor-only contracting. regardless of whether such job. on the basis thereof. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003. or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners: ISSUE: Whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer.
However. work or service under its own account and responsibility. with Neri charging Purefoods with illegal dismissal. appliances. vs. and (b) The employees recruited. an independent labor contractor. Purefoods filed a partial appeal. underpayment of 13th month pay.(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job. firing and payment of the contractor’s workers. etc. The Court of Appeals. eleven (11) other complainants joined forces with Neri and together they filed an amended complaint. In the case at bar. We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. or in the alternative. Tio
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. that HI is a legitimate job contractor. the control and supervision of the work to another. equipment. 21. it ruled that complainants are regular employees of Purefoods. The NLRC granted the appeal and remanded the case for further hearings on the factual issues. affirmed by the Court of Appeals. the appellate court found that complainants were engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of Purefoods. Purefoods Corp. the nature and extent of the work. who. NLRC The antecedents follow: Lolita Neri (Neri) originally filed a claim for nonpayment of additional wage increase. the skill required.L. the control of the premises. however. Admark. were still working for Purefoods at the time of the filing of the amended complaint. NLRC. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. According to the NLRC.
Rommel A.L. after finding that Neri is not an employee of petitioner. However. The case was remanded to Labor Arbiter Felipe P. dismissed the complaint. All the other complainants. materials and labor. the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work. we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC. Purefoods moved for the reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied for lack of merit. Citing Art. relying on the case of Escario v. and nonpayment of premium pay for holiday and holiday pay against Purefoods Corporation (Purefoods). praying that the claims of complainants be dismissed for lack of merit. the employer’s power with respect to the hiring.The NLRC ruled in complainants' favor and reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's decision. 280 of the Labor Code. In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting. tools. Simply put. save for Neri. Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered. the duty to supply premises. Amansec declared Neri and the complainants as Purefoods' regular employees. Labor Arbiter Arthur L. A memorandum on appeal was nominally filed by all the complainants. petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. we elucidated it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools. Other facts that may be considered include the following: whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business. held that D. the case be remanded for formal hearing on the merits and to implead D.L. the term and duration of the relationship. Pati. and the mode and manner or terms of payment. Admark is a legitimate independent contractor. supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal. Subsequently. Neri was dismissed from her work as a Deli-Attendant. it was only Neri who verified the same. the pieces of evidence on record established the employer-employee relationship between Purefoods and Neri and the other complainants. regularization. Admark as a party-respondent. and Neri as having been illegally dismissed and entitled to reinstatement with payment of backwages. It thus ordered Neri's reinstatement and the payment of backwages or of separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered. nonpayment of service incentive leave. but rather of D.
and that complainants' periods of employment are not fully covered by the Promotions Agreements.
Rommel A. an independent job contractor. D. HELD: The Court agrees with Purefoods' argument that Art. to join or form a union. D.L.L. for purposes of determining the right of an employee to certain benefits. the Court found that: the employees therein were selected and hired by D. and social welfare benefits. Admark employees who will handle particular promotions for petitioner. and the latter's employees.e. It is therefore erroneous on the part of the Court of Appeals to rely on Art. Indeed. there was no mention of the list of D. Finally.L. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE EXIST AND EMPLOYEE-EMPLYER RELATIONSHIP. Argument of petitioner: Purefoods argues that the affidavits it attached to its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals are not evidence presented for the first time. It noted that in the Promotions Agreements between D. Furthermore.L. it does not apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute. but of D. work or service within a definite or predetermined period regardless of whether such job. it is evident from the Promotions Agreements entered into by Purefoods that D. Admark's. Tio
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. Purefoods maintains that Neri and the complainants are not employees of Purefoods. the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method.L. clarification.. Admark. Thus. and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees' entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards. i.and that they were under the control and supervision of Purefoods' supervisors.L. the Court has ruled that said provision is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees. Moreover.L.L. or to security of tenure.L. it claims that Article 280 of the Labor Code is not applicable in a trilateral relationship involving a principal. Admark is a legitimate labor contractor. it cannot be held liable for illegal dismissal. (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment. free exercise of the right to self-organization. an independent job contractor. Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job. Admark paid their salaries. Admark and sample contribution forms. but rather just corroboration. and not of D. an independent job contractor. and/or explanation of what it had advanced in the proceedings below. security of tenure. 280 of the Labor Code finds no application in a trilateral relationship involving a principal. 280 in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between respondent Neri and Purefoods. Admark had the power of dismissal as it admitted that it was the one who terminated the employment of the employees. applying the four-fold test used in determining employer-employee relationship. it was D. as evidenced by the payroll prepared by D. It likewise claims that the other complainants in this case are not entitled to the avails of the suit because they failed to verify the position paper and the memorandum on appeal. In this arrangement. work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. Admark. and finally. Purefoods sought reconsideration2 of the decision but its motion was denied. Admark and Purefoods.L. regular employees and casual employees. and the latter's employees. Admark who exercised control and supervision over the employees.
She had kept her contract with D.The CA affirmed lower court's decision. We also note that Neri herself admitted in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and in the hearings that she applied with D. to it. Admark.L. Admark was her employer and not Purefoods. Issue: Whether or Not MANRED was a labor-only contractor thereby making the petitioner liable in the case herein for illegal dismissal Ruling:
Rommel A.L. the complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims must fail. Admark's employees and Purefoods. Admark. The provisions expressly permit D. and categorically state that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between D. Moreover. but that of D. 1991 TO JUNE 22. complainant could not even be considered as casual employee or provisional employee but project employee which does not ripened into regular employee. 1992.L.1 Respondent worked in Century Park Hotel. Admark is an independent contractor which Purefoods had engaged to supply general promotion services. Even the identification cards presented by Neri are neither binding on Purefoods nor even indicative of her claimed employee status of Purefoods. issued as they were by the supermarkets concerned and not by Purefoods itself.00 PESOS ADJUSTMENT JAN 30.L. 22. an establishment owned by the petitioner. 1996. Admark." signed and received by Neri. Admark's deli attendants.L. Neri is not an employee of Purefoods. Significantly. is proof that Purefoods never considered Neri as its own employee. which had the final say in. While it may be true that complainants were required to submit regular reports and were introduced as Purefoods merchandisers. Indeed.The agreements confirm that D. these are not enough to establish Purefoods' control over them. NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that: (1) MANRED is a labor-only contractor. and not mere manpower services.L. with the latter deporting itself as her employer. and (2) private respondent was illegally dismissed. MANRED has intervened at all stages of these proceedings and has consistently claimed to be the employer of private respondent Oabel. On September 16.L. and inquired about her employment status with D.L. Neri was aware from the start that D. Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondent's complaint considering that complainant job with the respondent hotel was on a per function basis or on a "need basis". it would be foolhardy for any company to completely give the reins and totally ignore the operations it has contracted out. It was D. Maranaw Hotels and Resort vs.L. Hence this petition.L. her termination. and which actually effected. 1997. as her employer. but rather as one of D. private respondent Oabel was transferred to MANRED. 1995. It would be a rare contract of service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement. In the absence of employer-employee relations between Neri and Purefoods. After which private respondent Oabel was dismissed from employment and the same filed a case of illegal dismissal against the petitioner. Ruling that MANRED had insufficient capitalization and was not sufficiently equipped to provide specific jobs and operations of the former is directly related to and usually necessary or desirable in the business of the petitioner. Subsequently. Tio
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. Admark. Admark. the check voucher issued by Purefoods marked "IN PAYMENT OF DL ADMARK DELI ATTENDANTS 12. Admark and that she worked for Purefoods through D. they were imposed only to ensure the effectiveness of the promotion services rendered by D.L. Court of Appeals Facts: Private respondent Oabel was initially hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant on April 24. Admark. Admark to handle and implement Purefoods' project. This lasted until February 7.the petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development Corporation. Even if the report requirements are somehow considered as control measures.L. the pieces of evidence submitted by Neri do not support her claim of having been a regular employee of Purefoods.
given that the latter was a bona fide independent contractor with substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. Tio
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. It appears further that private respondent has already rendered more than one year of service to the petitioner. for the period 1995-1998.e. even if this grave procedural infirmity is set aside. and supervised their work. To prove the status of Interserve as an independent contractor. However. and machinery necessary in the conduct of its business. paid their wages. to make his actions binding on his principal. the corporation. on account of the failure of the petitioner to append the board resolution authorizing the counsel for petitioner to file the petition before the Court of Appeals. petitioner asserted that respondents were employees of Interserve. 23. could only come in the form of a board resolution issued by the Board of Directors that specifically authorizes the counsel to institute the petition and execute the certification. and (3) the payroll records of Interserve. Agito FACTS: Petitioner (Coke) is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing. ISSUES: 1. for which she must already be considered a regular employee. Regular and casual employment. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Said Contract constituted legitimate job contracting. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. (2) the Certificate of Registration of Interserve with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. the Court held. Specific authorization. and (4) the Certificate of Registration of Interserve as an independent job contractor. As a result. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. (2) respondents’ Contract of Temporary Employment with Interserve. it was dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with the rule on certification against forum shopping taking into account that the aforesaid certification was subscribed and verified by the Personnel Director of petitioner corporation without attaching thereto his authority to do so for and in behalf of petitioner corporation per board resolution or special power of attorney executed by the latter. Coke averred that respondents were employees of Interserve who were tasked to perform contracted services in accordance with the provisions of the Contract of Services executed between Coke and Interserve on 23 March 2002. petitioner presented the following pieces of evidence: (1) the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve. since it was the latter which hired them. bottling and distributing soft drink beverages and other allied products.. i. v. as proven by: (1) respondents’ Personal Data Files in the records of Interserve. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. Whether or not Inteserve is a labor-only contractor. Court of Appeals where this Court emphasized that the lawyer acting for the corporation must be specifically authorized to sign pleadings for the corporation.SC affirmed the decision of CA. the petition must still fail.
Rommel A. whether such service is continuous or broken. equipment. issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Coca-Cola Bottler’s Philippines vs. (3) the Income Tax Return. pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code: Art. As decided in the case of BPI Leasing Corp. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. Respondents were salesmen assigned at Coke Lagro Sales Office for years but were not regularized. Furthermore. 280. with Audited Financial Statements. of Interserve for 2001.
and respondents. Tio
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.” Even in its pleadings. The Court does not set an absolute figure for what it considers substantial capital for an independent job contractor.. but it measures the same against the type of work which the contractor is obligated to perform for the principal. materials and labor. Salesmen. the power of the employer with respect to the hiring.” thus. as amended. In other words. equipment. but not necessarily confined to. “to carry out the undertakings specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.2. the Court clarifies that although Interserve has an authorized capital stock amounting to P2. physically fit. we clarified that it was not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools. this is rendered impossible in this case since the Contract between petitioner and Interserve does not even specify the work or the project that needs to be performed or completed by the latter’s employees. The lack of control of Interserve over the respondents can be gleaned from the Contract of Services between Interserve (as the CONTRACTOR) and petitioner (as the CLIENT). as well as Section 5(i) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code. It is also apparent that Interserve is a labor-only contractor under Section 5(ii) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code. Drivers. performed work which was directly related to the principal business of petitioner. conduct.
Rommel A. These contractual provisions strongly indicated that Interserve was merely a recruiting and manpower agency providing petitioner with workers performing tasks directly related to the latter’s principal business. to be considered an independent contractor. tools. The Court cannot. acknowledging that Interserve did not yet have in its employ the personnel needed by petitioner and would still pick out such personnel based on the criteria provided by petitioner. The Contract also states that.00. the duty to supply premises.000. appliances. the skill required. such as. as amended. or service for petitioner. considering that the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve states that its primary purpose is to operate. manner and terms of payment. the control and supervision of the workers. and respondents. and have not been convicted of any crime). However. jurisprudential holdings were to the effect that in determining the existence of an independent contractor relationship.00 thereof was paid up as of 31 December 2001. The importance of identifying with particularity the work or task which Interserve was supposed to accomplish for petitioner becomes even more evident. whether the contractor was carrying on an independent business. under such ambiguous circumstances. The Contract of Services between Interserve and petitioner did not identify the work needed to be performed and the final result required to be accomplished. In sum. the term and duration of the relationship. machineries. only P625. under Article 106 of the Labor Code. its supposed employees. In fact. the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work. Encoders & PD”) and their qualifications (technical/vocational course graduates. Instead. But respondents were hired as salesmen and leadman for petitioner. It is. the CONTRACTOR shall employ the necessary personnel. make a reasonable determination if Interserve had substantial capital or investment to undertake the job it was contracting with petitioner. and the mode. the Contract specified the type of workers Interserve must provide petitioner (“Route Helpers. petitioner carefully sidesteps identifying or describing the exact nature of the services that Interserve was obligated to render to petitioner. the control of the premises. of good moral character.000. etc. but merely bound itself to provide the latter with specific types of employees. and maintain the business of janitorial and allied services.000. equipment. and work premises. Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. NLRC. since it did not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of respondents. several factors may be considered. the nature and extent of the work. machinery and work premises. evident that Interserve falls under the definition of a “labor-only” contractor. thus. Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Clericals. Inc. RULING: At the outset. Interserve did not obligate itself to perform an identifiable job. firing and payment of the workers of the contractor. [In] Vinoya v. and uses the dubious phrase “tasks and activities that are considered contractible under existing laws and regulations. work.
hired on August 1963 petitioner respondent Sergio L. the only defense of petitioner against the charge of illegal dismissal being that respondents were not its employees. this does not mean that such capital and/or investments were likewise sufficient to maintain an independent contracting business for the delivery and distribution of Coca-Cola products. thus. the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method. Nor were they required to give their side regarding the charges made against them. Davao Oriental and Inawayan/Baracatan. The Implementing Rules and Regulation of the Labor Code defines investment—as tools. machineries and work premises. Davao del Sur. Gamo Facts: Petitioner South Davao Development Company. we apply the following conditions: first. operator of a coconut and mango farm in San Isidro. machineries. Employer-employee relationship exists. Ruling: Gamo is not an independent contractor. and second. Issue: Whether or not Gamo is an independent contractor.The certification issued by the DOLE stating that Interserve is an independent job contractor does not sway this Court to take it at face value. Gamo and petitioner failed to agree on a payment scheme. Certainly. i. 24. Gamo (Gamo) as a foreman. petitioner did not renew the "contract" of Gamo. equipment. On 2 October 1999. none of which were alleged or proven to exist in this case. Tio
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.. implements. As regular employees of petitioner. Records also failed to show that petitioner afforded respondents the twin requirements of procedural due process. prior to their dismissal. work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. respondents cannot be dismissed except for just or authorized causes. Sometime in 1987. South Davao Development Company vs. therefore. petitioner proposed a new payment scheme to Gamo.e. free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof. The copra workers were paid by Gamo from his 30% share. They alleged that sometime in December 1999. equipment. the respondents’ dismissal was not carried out in accordance with law and. According to its Articles of Incorporation. All of the abovenamed respondents (copra workers . The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. petitioner verbally terminated them en masse. The Court of Appeals ruled that there existed an employer-employee relationship.all employees in petitioner’s coconut and mango farm) were later transferred (except Eleonor Cosep who has a different case) by petitioner to Gamo as the latter’s copraceros. To establish the existence of an independent contractor. While the DOLE may have found that the capital and/or investments in tools and equipment of Interserve were sufficient for an independent contractor for janitorial services. Respondents were not served notices informing them of the particular acts for which their dismissal was sought. the principal business of Interserve is to provide janitorial and allied services. From 1987 to 1999. Gamo and petitioner entered into a profit-sharing agreement wherein 70% of the net proceeds of the sale of copra went to petitioner and 30% to Gamo. the work for which respondents were employed and assigned to petitioner. actually and directly used by the
Rommel A. petitioner shall be deemed the true employer of respondents. With the finding that Interserve was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting. the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools. illegal. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. The delivery and distribution of CocaCola products. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. were in no way allied to janitorial services. notice and hearing. since the primary purpose stated in the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve is misleading. petitioner appointed Gamo as a copra maker contractor.
Issue: Whether or not Jethro is liable. overtime pay and other benefits. 25. The investment must be sufficient to carry out the job at hand. Ruling: In the case at bar. panglugit and pangtapok are not sufficient to enable them to complete the job. Sec. it is sufficient that the power to control the manner of doing the work exists. one of the security guards deployed by Jethro. IV conducted an inspection at Yakult's premises in Laguna in the course of which several labor standards violations were noted. While the employment records of the employees could not be expected to be found in Yakult's premises in Calamba. for underpayment of wages. or service contracted out. the payrolls presented by it were considered in the ordinary course of inspection. Reliance on these primitive tools is not enough. While petitioner Jethro appealed the inspection results and there is a need to examine evidentiary matters to resolve the issues raised. Tio
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. By order of the DOLE Regional Director. It was also in the exercise of the same power that petitioner corporation put Gamo in charge of the copra workers although under a different payment scheme. In order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. the records show that Jethro was given ample opportunity to present its payrolls and other pertinent documents during the hearings and to rectify the violations noted during the ocular inspection./DOLE Facts: Petitioner Jethro is a security service contractor with a security service contract agreement with copetitioner Yakult. It. Jethro appealed to SOLE and having been denied by SOLE and CA. and night shift differential.16 representing their wage differentials. As to the most determinative test―the power of control. special day premium pay. regular holiday pay. failed to do so. noting petitioners' failure to rectify the violations noted during the above-stated inspection within the period given for the purpose. their status as petitioner corporation’s employees did not cease. Thus. On the basis of a complaint filed by respondent Garcia . 128 (b) of the Labor Code. legal/special holiday pay.contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job. which petitioner corporation owns. the accomplishment of their task required more expensive machineries and equipment. the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case as it does not come under the exception clause in Art. Likewise.210. it does not require the actual exercise of such power. premium pay for rest day. like the trucks to haul the harvests and the drying facility. petitioner comes to SC under Rule 45. payment of their wages was merely coursed through Gamo. found them jointly and severally liable to herein respondents for the aggregate amount of P809. the Court has frequently applied the four-fold test. Gamo and the copra workers did not exercise independent judgment in the performance of their tasks. the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)Regional Office No. it is clear that an employer-employee relationship has existed between petitioner corporation and respondents since the beginning and such relationship did not cease despite their reassignments and the change of payment scheme. 13th month pay. as Jethro's offices are in Quezon City. underpayment of wages. The tools used by Gamo and his copra workers like the karit. work. it was in the exercise of its power of control when petitioner corporation transferred the copra workers from their previous assignments to work as copraceros. In fact. In the case at bar. pangbunot. 13th month pay. night shift differential premium and rest day premium. From the time they were hired by petitioner corporation up to the time that they were reassigned to work under Gamo’s supervision. including keeping of payrolls and daily time records in the main office. bolo. In this case. more particularly to
Rommel A. Jethro Intelligence and Security Group vs. however. overtime pay. and non-registration with the DOLE as required under Department Order. service incentive leave pay.
Petitioners asseverated that while they worked under the direct control of supervisors assigned by TACOR and DFI. respondent Timog Agricultural Corporation (TACOR) and respondent Diamond Farms. in 1992. damages. The Labor Arbiter. Petitioners helped prepare the lands for the planting of banana suckers and eventually carried out the planting as well. It partially granted petitioners' appeal. overtime pay. work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. it likewise failed to register as a service contractor with the DOLE. Ruling: The matter of whether the Cooperative is an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. these companies used different schemes to make it appear that petitioners were hired through independent contractors. and equipment. work or service within a definite or predetermined period.(Cooperative) Three separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by petitioners. regardless of whether such job. Petitioners posit that the appellate court erred in dismissing their petition on a mere technicality. By Resolution dated February 20. 26. 4 for unpaid salaries. pursuant to Department Order No. unregistered associations. 12 the appellate court dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari on the ground that the accompanying verification and certification against forum shopping was defective. by ordering the Cooperative to pay them their unpaid wages. service incentive leave pay. however. join a cooperative and thus became members of respondent Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Cooperative. The NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter's ruling that the employer of petitioners is the Cooperative. WHEREFORE. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Cooperative Facts: By the account of petitioner Traveño and his 16 co-petitioners.submit competent proof that it was giving its security guards the wages and benefits mandated by law. the petition is DENIED. and cooperatives. Traveño vs. as they did. (DFI) hired them to work at a banana plantation at Bobongon. it having been signed by only 19 of the 22 therein named petitioners. service incentive leave pay. Jethro's failure to keep payrolls and daily time records in Yakult's premises was not the only labor standard violation found to have been committed by it. Issue: Whether DFI (with which TACOR had been merged) and DPI should be held solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners' illegal dismissal and money claims. and attorney's fees. to pay the wages and benefits in accordance with the rates prescribed by law. the nominal individual contractors were required to. with the NLRC against said respondents including respondent Dole Asia Philippines as it then supposedly owned TACOR. and that under the last scheme adopted by these companies. The present case does not involve such an arrangement. that the successive changes in the names of their employers notwithstanding. as earlier stated. It thus remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for computation of those awards. 2004. Tio
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. wage differentials. 13th month pay. individually and collectively. Davao Del Norte which covered lands previously planted with rice and corn but whose owners had agreed to convert into a banana plantation upon being convinced that TACOR and DFI could provide the needed capital. 18-02 and. they continued to perform the same work under the direct control of TACOR and DFI supervisors. found respondent Cooperative guilty of illegal dismissal. expertise. including individuals.
Rommel A. Inc. Job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job. and 13th month pay.
inapposite. The absence of the first requisite. it entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement 25 (Contract) with the Cooperative. (c) the presence or absence of the power of dismissal. and sell exclusively to DFI all export quality bananas produced that meet the specifications agreed upon. there must be some evidence of such power. As to the third requisite. This is borne out by the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI. To the Court. good custom. the Cooperative was to handle and fund the production of bananas and operation of the plantation. clauses. which refers to the power of dismissal. Procter and Gamble Philippines
Rommel A. work. (b) the mode of payment of their wages. The rules on job contracting are. albeit not actually exercised. On the second requisite. There being no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the Cooperative's corespondents. Petitioners failed to prove the contrary. or service. public order or public policy. morals. and the fourth requisite. under which the Cooperative would handle and fund the production of bananas and operation of the plantation covering lands owned by its members in consideration of DFI's commitment to provide financial and technical assistance as needed. and shipping bananas. far from being a job contracting arrangement.WHEREFORE. which refers to selection and engagement. but also to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. benefits. DFI did not farm out to the Cooperative the performance of a specific job.: (a) the manner of their selection and engagement. Petitioners' claim of employment relationship with the Cooperative's herein co-respondents must be assessed on the basis of four standards. The Cooperative would hire its own workers and pay their wages and benefits. this applies to them as well. is in essence a business partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture. viz. As TACOR had been merged with DFI. No employment contract whatsoever was submitted to substantiate how petitioners were hired and by whom. petitioners did not present any. under which the Cooperative was to hire its own workers. 27. which refers to the power of control. therefore. Again. Tio
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. including the supply of information and equipment in growing. which refers to the payment of wages. safety. packing. 30 While it suffices that the power of control exists. Instead. it was likewise the Cooperative that paid the same. under the Contract. The Cooperative was also to be responsible for the proper conduct. both were retained by the Cooperative. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called "control test". The Court may not alter the intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their stipulations without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives the contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations. is shown by DFI's total lack of knowledge on who actually were engaged by the Cooperative to work in the banana plantation. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient. the petition is DISMISSED. There is nothing in the records which indicates the presence of any of the foregoing elements of an employer-employee relationship. In the present case. The crucial element of control refers to the authority of the employer to control the employee not only with regard to the result of the work to be done. the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI. and general welfare of its members and workers in the plantation. Aliviado vs. and (d) the presence or absence of control over their conduct. As reflected earlier. provided they are not contrary to law. the latter are not solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners' illegal dismissal and money claims. the Contract stipulated that the Cooperative was to be responsible for the proper conduct and general welfare of its members and workers in the plantation. and DPI is merely alleged to have previously owned TACOR.
The complaint was later amended to include the matter of their subsequent dismissal. were all done and exercised by Promm-Gem/SAPS. the power of dismissal and control with respect to the means and methods by which their work was accomplished. In December 1991. They claim that the contractors have neither substantial capital nor tools and equipment to undertake independent labor contracting. dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice. To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products. the payment of their wages. then they are its regular employees. Petitioners filed an appeal to NLRC which affirmed the decision of the labor Arbiter and also denied their motion for reconsideration. SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as habitual absenteeism. P&G also contends that the Labor Code neither defines nor limits which services or activities may be validly outsourced. moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation costs and attorney’s fees.5 They were assigned at different outlets. service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages. He found that the selection and engagement of the petitioners. allegedly starting as early as 1982 or as late as June 1991. P&G is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health products.20 Respondents: P&G further argues that there is no employment relationship between it and petitioners. Tio
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. an employer can farm out any of its activities to an independent contractor. On November 29. to either May 5.Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates.
Rommel A. which it sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors. regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature. (2) paid their salaries. and (4) had the power of control over their conduct of work. 1996. alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. He further found that Promm-Gem and SAPS were legitimate independent job contractors. 1992 or March 11. Thus. Issues: (1) Whether P&G is the employer of petitioner (2) Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed (3) Whether petitioners are entitled for payment of actual. said petition was also denied by the CA. P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products. Petitioners insist that since they had been engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of P&G. petitioners filed a complaint10 against P&G for regularization. They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS for periods of more or less five months at a time. It was Promm-Gem or SAPS that (1) selected petitioners and engaged their services. supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. (3) wielded the power of dismissal. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS. the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and P&G. It insists that the determination of whether to engage the services of a job contractor or to engage in direct hiring is within the ambit of management prerogative. However. 1993. Arguments: Petitioner Petitioners further assert that Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors providing services of manpower to their client.
28 and current assets of P719.Ruling: The petition has merit. In such cases. Contractor or subcontractor.000. These factors negate the existence of the element specified in Section 5(i) of DOLE Department Order No. the financial statements26 of Promm-Gem show that it has authorized capital stock of P1 million and a paid-in capital. In legitimate contracting. It is also relevant to mention that Promm-Gem already considered the complainants working under it as its regular.24 distinguishes between legitimate and labor-only contracting: Section 3.28 It also had under its name three registered vehicles which were used for its promotional/merchandising business. the contractor or subcontractor which has the capacity to independently undertake the performance of the job. – XXX There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools. among others. and the contractual workers engaged by the contractor or subcontractor to accomplish the job[.] work or service. Section 5. machineries. the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him. of P500. the principal which decides to farm out a job or service to a contractor or subcontractor. Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. work premises. supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.042. there exists a trilateral relationship under which there is a contract for a specific job. work or service between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor. we find that Promm-Gem has substantial investment which relates to the work to be performed. such as markers.31 Under the circumstances. work or service for a principal. not merely contractual or project employees. tapes. work or service.27 It also has long term assets worth P432. equipment. 106. or capital available for operations.895. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. work or service to be performed and the employees recruited. For this purpose.00 as of 1990. In the instant case. it is necessary to first determine whether Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors or legitimate job contractors. and a contract of employment between the contractor or subcontractor and its workers. supplies or places workers to perform a job.32. 18-02. Under the circumstances. Trilateral Relationship in Contracting Arrangements. or ii) [T]he contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. PrommGem has also proven that it maintained its own warehouse and office space with a floor area of 870 square meters.
Rommel A. Tio
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. Hence. Promm-Gem also issued uniforms to them. The records also show that Promm-Gem supplied its complainant-workers with the relevant materials. and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job. The pertinent Labor Code provision on the matter states: ART. Rule VIII-A. liners and cutters. 18-02. as amended by Department Order No. Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits.29 Promm-Gem also has other clients30 aside from P&G. necessary for them to perform their work. there are three parties involved in these arrangements. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners.
Under the circumstances prevailing in the instant case. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the Labor Code is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings. 1999] Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for under payment of wages and non payment of benefits. an activity that has already been considered by the Court as doubtlessly directly related to the manufacturing business. Tio
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.818. No. their claims ascertained and inventoried. 1985 and 1986. a preference in application. petitioner. CONCEPCION Q. respondents. we cannot consider SAPS as an independent contractor. 86963. [G. having been recruited and supplied by SAPS41 -. the Regional Director.R.. NCR-LSED-CI-2047-87. and their preferences determined. concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor. unpaid salaries from 16 March 1986 to present and vacation/sick leave benefits for 1984.We find that it is a legitimate independent contractor petitioners have been charged with the merchandising and promotion of the products of P&G. ANTONIO MENDELEBAR. It is obvious from its act that SAPS had no other clients and had no intention of seeking other clients in order to further its merchandising business. Furthermore. BATONG BUHAY GOLD MINES.746. the following petitioners. It is but a preference of credit in their favor.40 representing their unpaid 13th month pay for 1985 and 1986. ELSIE ROSALINDA TY. Assured thereby is an orderly determination of the preference given to creditors’ claims. NLRC. AND THE OTHER COMPLAINANTS IN CASE NO. unlike Promm-Gem which dismissed its employees for grave misconduct and breach of trust due to disloyalty. INC. 242 SCRA 59  A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. during which all creditors are convened. From all indications SAPS. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers.are considered as the employees of P&G: Parenthetically. August 6. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent’s assets.which engaged in labor-only contracting -. In pursuant to the exercise of the Regional Director’s visitorial and enforcement power. issued a writ of execution and ordered the sheriff to comply with the same. the petition is GRANTED. When the respondent failed to post a cash/surety bond. The Special Sheriff proceeded to execute the appealed Order and seized three (3) units of Peterbuilt trucks
Rommel A. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. We find that the former is engaged in "labor-only contracting" Where ‘labor-only’ contracting exists. 2 and 5. HONORABLE DIONISIO DELA SERNA IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. workers’ claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. WORKER’S PREFERENCE DBP vs. vs. wage and ECOLA differentials under wage order Nos. SAPS dismissed its employees upon the initiation of P&G.. and the Labor Code. REYES."39 The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. and preserved in harmony is the legal scheme of classification.38 which is the principal business of P&G.40 Consequently. MFT CORPORATION AND SALTER HOLDINGS PTY. the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the ‘labor-only’ contractor. WHEREFORE. the Insolvency Law. it adopted the recommendation of the LSWOs and issued an order directing the respondent to pay the complainants the sum of P4. and upon motion for the issuance of a writ of execution by the complainants. existed to cater solely to the need of P&G for the supply of employees in the latter’s merchandising concerns only. LTD. It is evident that SAPS does not carry on its own business because the termination of its contract with P&G automatically meant for it also the termination of its employees’ services. MA.
In the case of DBP vs. The aforementioned documents were executed between the petitioner and Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) even prior to the filing of the complaint of petitioner’s employees. 50. Article 110 of the Labor Code. mandated to take title to and possession of. On December 8. the company started to employ the services of outsiders under the ‘pakyaw’ system. conserve. on April 30. the board passed another resolution authorizing the payment of separation benefits to BISUDECO’s employees in the event of the company’s privatization. After due proceedings. What is more. illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. This contention is untenable. as amended. as amended by RA 6715. 1992. APT was issued a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. G. Tio
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. it does not disregard the preferential lien of mortgagees considered as preferred credits under the provisions of the New Civil Code on the classification. its mortgaged properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT. Various materials and motor vehicles were also seized on different dates and sold at public auction by said sheriff.R. BISUDECO contracted the services of Philippine Sugar Corporation (Philsucor) to take over the management of the sugar plantation and milling operations until August 31. 1992. Again. 50. “In the meantime. because of the continued failure of BISUDECO to pay its outstanding loan with PNB. 1992. 1991. Barayoga vs. a public trust was created under Proclamation No. 1986. it retained BISUDECO’s existing personnel under the same terms and conditions of employment. October 24. Sometime later. No. at the start of the season sometime in May 1991. on September 23. 1988. Private respondents contended that even if subject properties were mortgaged to DBP (now under Asset Privatization Trust). [Respondent] Asset Privatization Trust (APT). as the sole bidder. 1991. BAPCI purchased the foreclosed assets of BISUDECO from APT and took over its sugar milling operations under the trade name Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (Pensumil). APT’s Board of Trustees issued a resolution accepting the offer of Bicol-Agro-Industrial Cooperative (BAPCI) to buy the sugar plantation and mill. the union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice. Pili. The Supreme Court ruled that the public auction held was null and void since on the properties of petitioner involved was constituted a mortgage between petitioner and the Development Bank of the Philippines. Then. as amended. concurrence and preference of credits. On July 23. illegal deduction and underpayment of wages and other labor standard benefits plus damages. thereafter. Camarines Sur. to the exception of the union members. on August 28. provisionally manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the Philippine government identified for privatization or disposition. a sugar plantation mill located in Himaao.and then sold the same by public auction. 1992. In the Union’s Position Paper. Philsucor started recalling workers back to work. Pursuant to Section 23 of Proclamation No. 160073. Just the same. on October 30. former President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 14 identifying certain assets of government institutions that were to be transferred to the National Government. On April 2. NLRC. Among the assets transferred was the financial claim of the Philippine National Bank against BISUDECO in the form of a secured loan. Nonetheless. 1998. they alleged that when Philsucor initially took over the operations of the company. Management told them that they will be re-hired only if they resign from the union. Aurellano disposed that respondent APT pay complainants of the mandated employment benefits provided for under Section
Rommel A. contemplates bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings of the employer’s business. on July 15. Asset Privatization Trust. the Supreme Court held that the workers preference regarding wages and other monetary claims under Article 110 of the Labor Code. applies just the same. the said provision of law grants preference to money claims of workers over and above all credits of the petitioner. According to them. Meanwhile. 2005 The Facts Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union is composed of workers of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO).
labor-standard benefits. Drilon. computed at the prevailing minimum wage. 1992 (the sale of BISUDECO assets to the BAPCI). illegal deduction and underpayment of wages. as well as other labor-standard benefits plus damages. The CA ruled that APT should not be held liable for petitioners’ claims for unfair labor practice. Finding their computation to be in order. but was impleaded only for possessing BISUDECO’s mortgaged properties as trustee and. were petitioner-union’s members who had not been recalled to work in May 1991. In Sundowner Development Corp.27 of Proclamation No. The Resolution authorized the payment of separation benefits to the employees of the corporation in the event of its privatization. for the period May 1. labor contracts like collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against the transferee of an enterprise. at the time of the employees’ illegal dismissal. to October 30. Moreover. 50 or in the Deed of Transfer between the national government and PNB. The NLRC affirmed APT’s liability for petitioners’ money claims. the properties of the seller or transferor is not obliged to absorb the latter’s employees. The Court’s Ruling The Petition has no merit In the present case. 1992. the assets of BISUDECO had been transferred to the national government through APT. Not included in the Resolution. the NLRC awarded to petitioners their money claims for underpayment. Furthermore. Labor contracts are in personam and thus binding only between the parties. 1991. Between the employees of BISUDECO and APT. To rule otherwise would result in unduly imposing upon APT an unwarranted assumption of accounts not contemplated in Proclamation No. petitioner-union’s members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor in May 1991 seek to hold APT liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. The duties and liabilities of BISUDECO. No succession of employment rights and obligations can be said to have taken place between the two. including back wages from May 1. the CA concluded that petitioners’ claims could not be enforced against APT as mortgagee of the foreclosed properties of BISUDECO. there is no privity of contract that would make the latter a substitute employer that should be burdened with the obligations of the corporation. the APT board of trustees had approved a Resolution on September 23. a bona fide buyer or transferee of all. unless expressly assumed. 1992. Significantly. Any assumption of liability must be specifically and categorically agreed upon. which had resulted in its bankruptcy. 1992 (the date of the sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI). the NLRC ruled that petitioners were not entitled to separation pay because of the huge business losses incurred by BISUDECO. the Court ruled that. Both the union and APT elevated the labor arbiter’s decision before NLRC. the NLRC held that APT should have treated petitioners’ claim as a lien on the assets of BISUDECO. v. We rule in the negative. illegal dismissal. for reasons of public policy and
Rommel A. Issue: The main issue raised is whether Respondent APT is liable for petitioners’ monetary claims. The question now before the Court is whether APT is liable to pay petitioners’ monetary claims. Respondent sought relief from the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of those assets. The most that the purchasing company may do. As found by the NLRC. later. or substantially all. under the principle of absorption. 50 which benefits had been earlier extended to other employees similarly situated. On the other hand. prior to the actual sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30. were not all automatically assumed by APT as purchaser of the foreclosed properties at the auction sale. and ECOLA. including its monetary liabilities to its employees. APT was not the employer of petitioners. It also awarded them their back wages. While no employer-employee relationship existed between members of the petitioner union and APT. 1991 (the date of their illegal dismissal) until October 30. though. Tio
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2007] Zamora filed a labor Complaint against PAL for illegal dismissal. and preserved in harmony is the legal scheme of classification.” No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. on appeal. APT cannot be held responsible for the monetary claims of petitioners who had been dismissed even before it actually took over BISUDECO’s assets. APT cannot be held liable for petitioners’ claims against BISUDECO: illegal dismissal. concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code. and their preferences determined. as amended by Republic Act No. In other words.” Thus. PAG-ASA C. To allow such other action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver. ZAMORA. acquired ownership of the foreclosed properties. be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. The suspension of action for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phases of the suit. whose time. the Petition is hereby DENIED. During the pendency of the case.a lien it assumed as assignee of the loan secured by the corporation from PNB. unfair labor practice. No. CA. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. RESPONDENT. INCORPORATED. the actions that are suspended cover ALL claims against a distressed corporation
Rommel A. Thus. Relevant to this transfer of assets is Article 110 of the Labor Code. BERNARDIN J. was undergoing rehabilitation per SEC’s order appointing a permanent rehabilitation receiver for petitioner. who in its judgment are necessary to the continued operation of the business establishment. the Insolvency Law. ALL claims for actions “shall be suspended accordingly. or (2) the sale or transfer was made in bad faith. RAMOS. PAL. PETITIONERS. and the Labor Code. neither should this Court. Assured thereby is an orderly determination of the preference given to creditors’ claims. upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. Furthermore. 6715. This is to enable the management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the “rescue” of the debtor company. 166996. VIRAY. APT’s lien on BISUDECO’s mortgaged assets is a special preferred lien that must be satisfied first before the claims of the workers. Moreover. RICARDO D. workers’ claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. awarded the reinstatement of Zamora together with the payment of wages and other benefits. Tio
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. VS. being a mortgage credit. WHEREFORE. The liabilities of the previous owner to its employees are not enforceable against the buyer or transferee. the right of employees to be paid benefits due them from the properties of their employer cannot have any preference over the latter’s mortgage credit. non-payment of wages. unpaid back wages and other monetary benefits. it should be remembered that APT merely became a transferee of BISUDECO’s assets for purposes of conservation because of its lien on those assets -. Furthermore. Subsequently. R. ABUYUAN. As a mere transferee of the mortgage credit and later as the purchaser in a public auction of BISUDECO’s foreclosed properties. JESUS FEDERICO V. is to give preference of reemployment to the selling company’s qualified separated employees. Worker’s preference in case of bankruptcy. FRANCISCO X. [G. APT. February 06. reversed said decision. Supreme Court however. which reads: “Article 110. their claims ascertained and inventoried.social justice. during which all creditors are convened. damages and attorney’s fees. unless (1) the latter unequivocally assumes them. It ruled that the law is clear that. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer’s business. YNGENTE IV. effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed toward its restructuring and rehabilitation. It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the Labor Code is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings. his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid. as the highest bidder in the auction sale.
PAL released an implementing guideline on April 22. allowing such actions to proceed would only increase the work-load of the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver. As to the case at bar. 525 SCRA 29  FACTS: This case arose from a labor complaint filed against PAL by PALEA and Mary Anne el Rosario. PAL countered by saying that rank and file employees who were regularized after April 30. not denied their 13th month pay. In its position paper PAL countered that those rank and file employees who were not regularized by April 30 of a particular year are. Payment may be staggered in two (2) stages.whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage. shall be paid in December as a Christmas bonus. consistent with the existing practice shall be paid in advance in May. instead of being channeled toward restructuring and rehabilitation. the rules on preference of credits do not apply in the case of rehabilitation. Tio
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. Phil. 1988 for category 1 a) above. b) Employees covered under 1 b) above shall be paid not less than 1/12 of their basic salary for every month of service within the calendar year.8 Prior to the payment of the 13th month pay. PALEA disagreed and filed the complaint arguing that the cut-off period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for granting the 13th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of employment but the law covers all employees.
Rommel A. collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. Airlines vs. CBA was entered into between PAL and PALEA to cover the period of 1986-1989. not falling within category a) above shall receive their 13th Month Pay on or before December 24. whose precious time and effort would be dissipated and wasted in defending suits against the corporation.10 PALEA assailed the implementation of said guideline on the view that all employees of PAL. should be paid their 13th month pay. 1988. Section 5 – Christmas Bonus The equivalent of one month's basic pay as of November 30. labor cases. The pertinent provisions of which state: Section 4 – 13th Month Pay (Mid-year Bonus) A 13th month pay. in principle. one month basic salary as of April 30. 1988. Director of Personnel of PAL for unfair labor practice for non-payment of 13th month pay of employees not regularized as of 30th of April 1988 as allegedly stated in the CBA. 2) Amount a) For category a) above. Which reads: 1) Eligibility a) Ground employees in the general payroll who are regular as of April 30. considering they receive said mandatory bonus in the form of the Christmas bonus.” the same is erroneous for there has been no declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation. Thus. Moreover. 1988. equivalent to one month's current basic pay. 3) Payment Date: May 9. Airlines Employees Association. whether regular or non-regular. 1988 were not enlisted to the 13th month pay as they were already given the Christmas bonus in December 1988 per PD 851. Phil. b) Other ground employees in the general payroll. It is distinctly understood that nothing herein contained shall be construed to mean that the Company may not at its sole discretion give an additional amount or increase the Christmas bonus. subject to the rules on preference of credits. 1988. the appellate court’s amended directive that “the monetary claims of petitioner Zamora must be presented to the PAL Rehabilitation Receiver.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint as the giving of the particular bonus was deemed only an additional practice made in the past, such being the case, it violated no agreement or existing practice or committee unfair labor practice. On appeal, NLRC and the CA ruled in favor of PALEA. ISSUE: Whether or not a court or a quasi-judicial agency can amen or alter a CBA by expanding its coverage to non-regular employees who are not covered by the bargaining unit. HELD: The court, instead of addressing the issue took cognizance of the fact that PAL, as of that time, was still undergoing rehabilitation per the mandate of the SEC. The pertinent law concerning the suspension for claims against corporations is PD 902-A, as amended. Particularly, Section 5(d) and 6(c) which reads: SECTION 5. In addition to the regulatory adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: xxxx d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association possesses property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the [management of a rehabilitation receiver or] management committee created pursuant to this Decree. SECTION 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following: xxxx c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real or personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: x x x Provided, finally, That upon appointment of a management committee, the rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.) The term “claims” refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means the assertion of a right to have money paid. In the instant case, if the Court does not find merit in the petition, PAL will be obliged to satisfy the pecuniary claims of PALEA. In a plethora of cases, the Court has upheld the suspension of proceedings involving claims against PAL based on the SEC Order which appointed an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver for PAL. In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v NLRC, the Court posited that the rationale for the automatic suspension therein set out would apply to the instant case where the employee’s claim was elevated on certiorari before the Court. xxx the rendition of judgment while petitioner is under a state of receivership could render a violence to the rationale for suspension of payments in Section 6(c) of P 902-A, if the judgment would result in the granting of the private respondent’s claim to separation pay, thus defeating the basic purpose behind Sec. 6 (c) which is to prevent dissipation of the distressed company’s resources.
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In PAL v Zamora, the court held that “Otherwise stated, no other action may be taken in, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension – what are automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment of claims during the execution stage after the case had become final and executor. The suspension of action for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phases of the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. Furthermore, the actions that are suspended cover all claims against a distressed corporation whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. In actual fact, allowing such actions to proceed would only increase the work-load of the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver, whose precious time and effort would be dissipated and wasted in defending suits against the corporation, instead of being channeled toward restructuring and rehabilitation.” All told, this Court is constrained to suspend the progress, development and other proceedings in the present petition. Castillo vs. Uniwide Warehouse Club, G.R. No. 169725, April 30, 2010 FACTS: This case stems from a complaint filed by Castillo against Uniwide and its President Jimmy Gow for payment of Saturdays worked for the year 2001; holiday pay; separation pay; actual, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees. Two months after the filing of the complaint however, the respondents moved to dismiss said complaint on the ground that it petitioned the SEC for suspension of payments and approval of its rehabilitation plan. It appears that on June 29, 1999, the SEC had ruled favorably on the petition and ordered that all claims, actions and proceedings against herein respondents pending before any court, tribunal, board, office, body or commission be suspended, and that following the appointment of an interim receiver, the suspension order had been extended to until February 7, 2000. On April 11, 2000, the SEC declared the Uniwide Group of Companies to be in a state of suspension of payments and approved its rehabilitation plan. Labor Arbiter and NLRC denied the motion of respondent. Respondent then filed a petition under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals which found merit in the petition and reversed the resolutions of the NLRC affirming the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: HELD: Petioner argues that suspension of the proceedings is not in order, because his claim against respondent and the latter’s corresponding liability are yet to be determined. Respondents countered by saying that the CA was correct since it was among those actions for claims that are automatically suspended on the appointment of a management committee or receiver according to Se. 6 of PD 902-A. Respondents advance the notion that while said Section 6 expressly referred to suspension of pending claims, the clear and unmistakable intention of the law is to bar the filing of any such claims in order to maintain parity of status among the different creditors of the distressed corporation at least while the rehabilitation efforts are ongoing. To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. It Whether or not the proceeding can be validly suspended.
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contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings. An essential function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism of suspension of all actions and claims against the distressed corporation, which operates upon the due appointment of a management committee or rehabilitation receiver. P.D. No. 902-A, as amended. Section 6(c) of the law mandates that, upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board, or body shall be suspended. In a plethora of cases, the Court has upheld the suspension of proceedings regaring claims against distressed coprations pursuant to PD902-A. The actions that were suspended cover all claims against a distressed corporation whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. More importantly, the new rules on corporate rehabilitation, as well as the interim rules, provide an all-encompassing definition of the term and, thus, include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. There is no doubt that petitioner’s claim in this case, arising as it does from his alleged illegal dismissal, is a claim covered by the suspension order issued by the SEC, as it is one for pecuniary consideration. Jurisprudence is settled that the suspension of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly applies to “all actions for claims” filed against a corporation, partnership or association under management or receivership, without distinction, except only those expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business. In the oft-cited case of Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. NLRC, the Court noted that aside from the given exception, the law is clear and makes no distinction as to the claims that are suspended once a management committee is created or a rehabilitation receiver is appointed. Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora declares that the automatic suspension of an action for claims against a corporation under a rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phases of the suit, that is, the entire proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment of claims. It must be conceded that the date when the claim arose, or when the action was filed, has no bearing at all in deciding whether the given action or claim is covered by the stay or suspension order. What matters is that as long as the corporation is under a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims against it, whether for money or otherwise, must yield to the greater imperative of corporate revival, excepting only, as already mentioned, claims for payment of obligations incurred by the corporation in the ordinary course of business. In the instant case, a Certification issued by the SEC and signed by its General Counsel states that as of August 17, 2006, the petition of Uniwide Sales, Inc. for declaration of suspension of payments and rehabilitations was still pending with it, and that the company was still under its rehabilitation proceedings. Hence, since petitioner’s claim was one for wages accruing from the time of dismissal, as well as for benefits and damages, the same should have been suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings. In other words, the Labor Arbiter should have abstained from resolving the illegal dismissal case and, instead, directed petitioner to present his claim to the rehabilitation receiver duly appointed by the SEC, inasmuch as the stay or suspension order was effective and it subsisted from issuance until the dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. The Court of Appeals was thus correct in directing the suspension of the proceedings. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND APPEARANCE OF LAWYERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. NLRC, 171 SCRA 556 Facts:
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the NLRC resolved the bargaining deadlock by fixing the wage increases and other economic benefits and ordering them to be embodied in a new collective bargaining agreement to be concluded by BPIEU-Metro Manila and ALU with BPI. That CBA was replaced by another collective bargaining agreement concluded with BPI by the BPIEU-Metro Manila after its disaffiliation valid this time because it was done within the freedom period. the Bureau of Labor Relations did hold that the disaffiliation of the Reyes group from ALU was invalid because it was done beyond the freedom period that is within sixty days before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement on March 31. 1983. where BLR Director Cresenciano Trajano held that the disaffiliation was invalid because it was done beyond the freedom period. seven of the employees of the said branch who were absorbed by BPI were transferred to the General Santos City branch. suspended all the elective officers of BPIEU-Metro Manila led by its president. which was
Rommel A. however. serious differences arose between the Bank of the Philippine Islands Employees Union-Metro Manila and its mother federation. Pursuant to an earlier understanding. claiming to be the legal and sole representatives of BPIEU-Metro Manila. who was replaced by Rolando Valdez as acting president. These cases were later consolidated with the Manifestation and Motion for Interpleader and to Consign Union Dues. BPI dismissed them. the Reyes group filed a petition with the Bureau of Labor Relations for direct certification on the ground of its disaffiliation from ALU. refused to move. this time by the NLRC. 1988. Tio
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. As no agreement could be reached on a wide variety of economic issues. Arturo Napales. 1982. who continued to question the transfer. This petition was denied in a decision dated June 13. even the agreement concluded afterwards was itself to have expired on March 31. G. 1985. Nos. formally disaffiliated from ALU on November 16. On October 19. or almost a year ago. the Minister of Labor sustained the transfer of the three employees by the BPI and issued a return-to-work order. 1985. This prompted the former to manifest that it would henceforth negotiate alone with BPI independently of ALU.Three cases here intertwined which were consolidated because they all involve the same employeeemployer relations of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and its personnel. the Associated Labor Unions. This triggered a strike by the Davao Chapter of the BPIEU-ALU which was followed by sympathy strikes by other local chapters. Claiming to be the labor union referred to in the decision. Second Issue As a result of its merger with the Commercial Bank and Trust Company in 1981. Another return-to-work order was issued. However. In its decision dated June 13. Carlito Reyes. After efforts to persuade them failed. Ongkiko. three of them. 1983. 69746-47 First Issue In the course of their negotiations with the Bank of the Philippine Islands for a new collective bargaining agreement to replace the one expiring on March 31. the issue has become moot and academic. which was filed by BPI in view of the conflicting claims of the Reyes and Valdez groups for the said dues. In fact. holding that this was under the original jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations. which in turn. the dispute between BPI and its employees was certified by the Minister of Labor for compulsory arbitration and docketed in the National Labor Relations Commission as Certified Cases Nos. Issue: The question precisely before the Court then was which as between the Reyes and Valdez groups should be recognized as the legitimate representative of the employees in general to negotiate with BPI NLRC had no jurisdiction to resolve that question. 1983. 1982. That agreement expired on March 31. It did not decide the intra-union dispute. 0279 and 0281. More importantly. the BPI found it necessary to close the COMTRUST branch in Davao City and transfer it to General Santos City. This was ignored by the striking workers. 1982. Reyes and his followers. But that is all past and done now. and Gregorio Gito. In retaliation. On March 22. namely Glenna.R.
R. More to the point. now insisted on remaining in the Davao City branch. Digos Chapter to any office of the BANK within the Southern Mindanao area. but the two lady employees. Lennie Aninon who had earlier agreed to transfer. 1984. 1986. the right of the employer to transfer the employees in the interest of the efficient and economic operation of its business cannot be seriously challenged. it was expressly provided in the collective bargaining agreement then existing that: Section 1. among others. to wit: Member of the UNION's Davao City Chapter. transfer and dismissals for just cause as well as the maintenance of order. Moreover. the local union referred to in Director Trajano's decision is none other than BPIEU-ALU (Valdez). On the contrary. on April 26. That is its prerogative. This motion was opposed by the Valdez group. on the ground that it was the legitimate BPIEU recognized by the BLR. In its decision dated September 26. Such improper motive has not been shown in the case at bar. discipline and efficiency in its operations. are the sole and exclusive right and prerogative of the BANK Management. Napales and Gito agreed to move to General Santos City. . Tagum Chapter. promotion. the NLRC declared as follows: The disaffiliation of Reyes' group having been disapproved. The only limitation on the discretion of management in this regard is its mala fides. to wit Ongkiko and Aninon remained adamant. Section 2. which was granted by the NLRC in its decision dated December 5. it has been established that the transfer was necessitated by the fact that the COMBANK branch in Davao City had to be closed because it was just across the street from the BPI branch. The only time the employer cannot exercise this right is where it is vitiated by improper motive and is merely a disguised attempt to remove or punish the employee sought to be transferred. Upon the inauguration of the said branch. G. There was certainly no justification to maintain the two branches as they both belonged now to the BPI. 1985. She too was included in the motion. The UNION and all its members hereby recognize that the Management and operation of the business of the BANK which include. Nos. which subsequently filed its own petition for the payment to it of the said dues. . It is the union that is entitled to the disputed union dues deposited with this Commission. The BANK and the UNION agree that permanent transfer of a member of the UNION shall be limited only to the offices of the BANK in the following areas. Issue: Whether or not directing the transfer of the four employees is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside. filed a motion with the NLRC for the release to it of the union dues consigned by BPI. unless the transfer to an office of the BANK in another area is requested or agreed to by the member. 76842-44 Following the dismissal of its petition against the BLR the Reyes group. As the disaffiliation of the Reyes group was disallowed by the BLR because it was done beyond the freedom period. The situation was complicated when another employee. . Tio
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. it is not disputed that the lateral transfer of the employees involved no demotion in their rank or salary or other benefits. BPI filed a motion to transfer the said employees thereto as sanctioned earlier by the Minister of Labor.obeyed by the strikers upon admission by the BPI of the three recalcitrant employees to their original stations in Davao City. the Reyes group could not have claimed an Identity distinct from that of the original
Rommel A. It is not disputed that General Santos City is in the Southern Mindanao area. This was done pending the opening of the General Santos City branch. the hiring of employees. Issue: Who was entitled to have a share of the union dues.
The basis of this motion was a resolution dated August 26. private respondent Ignacio Lacsina filed a motion for the entry of attorney's lien for legal services to be rendered by him as counsel of BPIEU in the negotiation of the new collective bargaining agreement with BPI.00 from each of the employees who had signed the authorization.BPIEU-Metro Manila. 1983. 0279 and 0281. A reading of the resolution will clearly show that the signatories thereof have not been in any manner compelled to undertake the obligation they have. There is no compulsion here. On the contrary it is plain that they were voluntarily authorizing the check-off of the attorney's fees from their payment of benefits and the turnover to Lacsina of the amounts deducted. ordering the release to Lacsina of the amounts deducted "except with respect to any portion thereof as to which no individual signed authorization has been given by the members concerned or where such authorization has been withdrawn. BPI deducted the amount of P 200. Ruling: The court see no such imposition in the case at bar. But at the time this petition was filed. the authorized deductions affected only the workers who adopted and signed the resolution and who were the only ones from whose benefits the deductions were made by BPI. It was there categorically declared that the check-off could not be made where "no individual signed authorization has been given by the members concerned or where such authorization has been withdrawn. the issue was very much alive and had to be resolved to determine who were entitled to the union dues and in what proportion. as the mother federation. Issue: Whether or not it was proper for NLRC to order the payment of attorney’s fees to be made directly by the individual workers. this issue of dues-sharing has also become moot and academic now because the Reyes group has finally succeeded in disaffiliating from ALU and is now a separate and independent union. the Valdez group could not exclude the Reyes group from the same BPIEU-Metro Manila because both of them were still part of that original local union. On April 7. 1983. it does not have to share with ALU whatever union dues it may now collect from its members. 1982. And significantly."
Rommel A. No similar deductions were taken from the other workers who did not sign the resolution and so were not bound by it. 1983. on the ground that it was not authorized under the Labor Code. Nos. Upon learning about this. in Certified Cases Nos. The NLRC therefore did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the challenged decision as we have here interpreted it. On April 15. remained intact. As such.R. the petitioners challenged the said order. 76916-17 Following the promulgation by the NLRC of its decision of March 23. G. the NLRC issued a resolution setting aside the order and requiring BPI to safe keep the amounts sought to be deducted "until the rights thereto of the interested parties shall have been determined in appropriate proceedings. That only those who signed the resolution could be subjected to the authorized deductions was recognized and made clear by the order itself of the NLRC. Lacsina or to his duly authorized representative. In other words. conformably to their agreement with him. 1983. For the same reason. the NLRC issued an en banc resolution dated September 27. Accordingly. In any event. Tio
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. Subsequently. BPIEU-Metro Manila then consisted of the members of the two contending groups whose affiliation with ALU. the Labor Arbiter issued an order directing the respondent bank to check off the amount of 5 % of the total economic benefits due its employees under the new collective bargaining agreement between the bank and the union corresponding to the first year of effectivity thereof and to deliver the amount collected to Atty. they are assumed.
(Emphasis supplied. and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
Rommel A. or public policy. After the appropriate complaint was filed by private respondent. respondents. where the payment of the attorney's fees from the wages of the employees was not allowed because: "No check-offs from any amount due to employees may be effected without individual written authorities duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount. As to the attorney’s fees. No. On the issue of jurisdiction. TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT. 120592 March 14. petitioner union referred to private respondent the claims of its members for holiday. hopefully. Traders Royal Bank (TRB). the case is covered squarely by the mandatory and explicit prescription of Art. To be entitled to the additional attorney's fees as provided in their agreement it avers that there must be a separate mutual agreement between the union and the law firm prior to the performance of the additional services by the latter. 222 which is another guarantee intended to protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and consent. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by AND his agreement with the client. Civil Code. vs. 1997 Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. the payment of the additional attorney's fees is considered waived.000. CRUZ. Tio
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. During the existence of that agreement. Since there was none. petitioner.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. The Court ruled on the matter. better stated. it insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorney's fees due to private respondent were covered by the retainer fee of P3. that the Court there impliedly recognized arrangements such as the one at bar with the following significant observation: Moreover.It is noteworthy.A." Finally. morals. such as those authorized in Article 2208. though. In its ordinary concept. an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. public order. In its extraordinary concept. Moreover. On the contrary. Emmanuel Noel A. good customs. Cruz and Associates law firm. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. It is well settled that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.R. Trajano.000.) A similar recognition was made in Galvadores v. Since the claim for attorney's fees by private respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. This action was filed by private respondent to collect his attorney’s fees due him. NLRC cannot grant the same. Cruz. purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.N. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made. also for their mutual benefit. a favored decision was granted by the Court. an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees. the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. head of the E. Petitioner contends that the award for attorney's fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. private respondent's present claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or.00 which it has been regularly paying to private respondent under their retainer agreement. entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3. we hold that the agreement in question is in every respect a valid contract as it satisfies all the elements thereof and does not contravene law. mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer. especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. G. it enables the workers to avail themselves of the services of the lawyer of their choice and confidence under terms mutually acceptable to the parties and.
In fine. instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. For this. A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. These are a general retainer. Attorney's fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. a quasi-contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful. or a retaining fee. unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. The issue over attorney's fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. or as expressly stated therein.000. With respect to the first situation. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Private respondent is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal action in the interest of petitioner before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. To declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer. the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become final." The fee is NOT payment for private respondent's execution or performance of the services listed in the contract. each fee is considered a special retainer. or a retaining fee. While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered. a petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. its "commitment to render the legal services enumerated. or retaining fee. Hence. the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise. In addition. private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday pay differential. A general retainer. the P3. In addition. is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. Of course. it is a compensation for lost opportunities. the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. It is apparent that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees.000. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for attorney's fees. depending upon their arrangement. on top of the P3. voluntary and unilateral prosecution of petitioner's cause without awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did benefit from private respondent's efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in favor of the union.00 retainer fee he received monthly from petitioner. as said monthly fee covers only the law firm's pledge. Tio
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. private respondent's actual rendition of legal services is not compensable merely by said amount.
Rommel A. the difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services AND a remuneration for legal services actually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may pay his lawyer. A client may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. Otherwise. subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there.00 paid to private respondent because.000. The law firm's services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement. as demonstrated earlier. and a special retainer. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3.client. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. Evidently.
In such a case. Viewed from another aspect. Book III of the Implementing Rules is the maximum of the award that may thus be granted. October 16. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents thus the order for reinstatement and payment of backwages in their favor. and (3) We must do unto others what we want them to do unto us under the same circumstances. therefore. illegal dismissal. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon. oral and exemplary damages against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. No. the ten percent (10%) attorney's fees provided for in Article 111 of the Labor Code and Section 11. Some of these principles are: (1) It is presumed that a person agrees to that which will benefit him. 13th month pay and actual. the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In the second place. the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their professional services. NLRC. whether there is an agreement or not. involving a conflict between lawyer and client. The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered.A quasi-contract is based on the presumed will or intent of the obligor dictated by equity and by the principles of absolute justice. Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. in assessing the proper amount. Rule VIII. and not disregarded. This rule of law. it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney's fees in such maximum limit." is used as the basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract. the value of private respondent's legal services should not be established on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code alone. meaning "as much as he deserves.
Rommel A. The measure of compensation for private respondent's services as against his client should properly be addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction. It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation therefor. However. the fees mentioned here are the extraordinary attorney's fees recoverable as indemnity for damages sustained by and payable to the prevailing part. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it. G. 118853. Also. Brahm Industries. In the first place. It. 1997 Respondents filed a case for illegal suspension. would also warrant payment for the services of private respondent which proved beneficial to petitioner's members. and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees.R. It may not be used therefore. (2) Nobody wants to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. In any case. nonpayment of service incentive leave. likewise founded on the principle against unjust enrichment. but recoverable by him from his client. there is at least the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do that you may give). as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of quasi-contract and quantum meruit. illegal layoff. Quantum meruit. behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. illegal deductions. Tio
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. Inc. Article 111 thus fixes only the limit on the amount of attorney's fees the victorious party may recover in any judicial or administrative proceedings and it does not even prevent the NLRC from fixing an amount lower than the ten percent (10%) ceiling prescribed by the article when circumstances warrant it. only they did not enter into a special contract regarding the compensation therefor. Petitioner alleged that respondents were never employed on a regular basis as the latter had their own customers who required them to render home service. while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney's fees. he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services. since it is claimed that petitioner obtained respondent's legal services and assistance regarding its claims against the bank. vs.
Heirs of Aniban vs.00 as additional compensation for his three (3) children under eighteen (18) years of age at US$8. the NLRC reversed the POEA and denied the claim for additional death benefits on the ground that it was the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) which had original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim for death benefits.00 equivalent to 10% of the total award.000. and. petitioners should be awarded the same. or during the period of his employment. In the Labor arbiter’s decision. On 11 January 1994 the POEA ruled that myocardial infarction was an occupational disease in the case of R/O Aniban and granted the prayer of his heirs for payment of death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract as well as under the Collective Bargaining Agreement plus attorney's fees of US$6. 282 SCRA 377  Facts: BRIGIDA P. the National Labor relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision but modified it with respect to attorney’s fees. this petition. (TRANSMARINE) acting in behalf of its foreign principal Norwegian Ship Management A/S (NORWEGIAN) as radio operator (R/O) on board the vessel "Kassel” for a contract period of nine (9) to eleven (11) months. Tio
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. In this case. as well as denying the motion for its reconsideration.00 provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. On 26 June 1992. however. On appeal. Inc.000. reversing that of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which ruled that myocardial infarction was an occupational decease in the case of radio operator Reynaldo Aniban and awarded.700.Upon appeal by petitioner. NLRC. Hence.00. He was survived by a pregnant wife and three (3) minor children who prayed for death benefits provided under par. it invoked Art. Held: The Supreme Court held that despite the fact that the matter on attorney’s fees was touched only once in the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and that no discussion or reason was stated thereof. The claim was granted only to the extent of US$13. R/O Aniban died due to myocardial infarction.00 each. aside from attorney's fees of US$6. The Supreme Court further ruled that nothing precludes the appellate courts from reducing the award of attorney’s fees where it is found to be unconscionable or excessive under the circumstances.00 in death benefits to his heirs: US$13. a total of US$67.00 for death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. US$30. A claim was also made for additional death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed between Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and NORWEGIAN represented by TRANSMARINE.000. (1) Of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The claim under the CBA was rejected on the ground that myocardial infarction of which R/O Aniban died was not an occupational disease as to entitle his heirs to the additional death benefits provided therein. 2208 of the Civil Code which allows attorney’s fees to be awarded by a court where its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons by reason of unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought. A motion to
Rommel A. Issue: Whether or not petitioners were entitled to attorney’s fees.700. Brigida Aniban and her children filed a formal complaint for non-payment of death compensation benefits under the CBA. Reynaldo Aniban was employed by the Philippine Transmarine Carriers. Consequently. the NLRC reduced to 5% the adjudged relief. hence its reduction to 5% of the total monetary award (previously 10%).00 for death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract.000.000. it appearing that the substantial portion of the award referred to respondents’ backwages and not to withheld salaries to which the Court affirmed. Petition was dismissed. ANIBAN representing the heirs of the late Reynaldo Aniban assails the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). US$24.000.
However. we upheld the decision of the POEA adjudging as compensable the death of a seaman on board the vessel of his foreign employer due to myocardial infarction. this claim for death benefits by his widow and children. the POEA ruled that the cause of death could be considered occupational. arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment is vested with the POEA. such conclusion deserves respect and must be accorded finality. the jurisdiction of the ECC comes into play only when the liability of the State Insurance Fund is in issue. Nos. The law applicable at the time the complaint was filed on 13 November 1992 was Art. it is not disputed that R/O Reynaldo Aniban was a Filipino seaman and that he died on board the vessel of his foreign employer during the existence of his employment contract. 180 explicitly provides that the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction only over decisions rendered by either the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) in the exercise of their respective original and exclusive jurisdictions. hence. On the other hand. POEA. Inc. we cannot discount the pressure and strain that went with the position of radio operator.reconsider the decision of the NLRC was denied. involving employer-employee relations. It is not required that the occupation be the only cause of the disease as it is enough that the employment contributed even in a small degree to its development. In Eastern Shipping Lines. Reynaldo Aniban had to place his full attention in hearing the exact messages received by the vessel and to relay those that needed to be transmitted to the mainland or to other vessels. Bk. Tio
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. although compensability was not the main issue. Being a factual finding by the administrative agency tasked with its determination. the ECC may not be considered as having jurisdiction over money claims. this petition by the heirs of R/O Reynaldo Aniban. Hence. of overseas contract workers. In addition to its powers and duties enumerated in Art. hence. R/O Aniban died three (3) months after he boarded "Kassel" due to myocardial infarction. he was certified “fit to work as radio operator" by the examining physician. v. The ECC was created under Title II. albeit death compensation benefits. 20 of the Labor Code as amended by E. Besides we have already repeatedly ruled that death due to myocardial infarction is compensable. 2nd issue Reynaldo Aniban was healthy at the time he boarded the vessel of his foreign employer. Thus. of the Labor Code with the heading of Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund." Hence. as correctly suggested by the Solicitor General. It must be stressed that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation considering that probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. As aforesaid. Ruling: 1st issue On the issue of jurisdiction. His medical records reveal that he had no health problem except for a "defective central vision secondary to injury. Art. 177. Issues: Whether the POEA has jurisdiction to determine the claim of petitioners for death benefits Whether myocardial infarction is an occupational disease as to entitle petitioners to the death benefits provided under the CBA. in so ruling. 797 and 247 which clearly provided that "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims. Although it may be conceded in the instant case that the physical exertion involved in carrying out the functions of a radio operator may have been quite minimal. the NLRC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. As radio operator. IV.
Rommel A. O. We have already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in the wear and tear of the human body.
while as a general rule. 2008 Facts: Petitioner had been employed as watchman from 1 May 1995 to 30 May 1998 when he was terminated on the ground that the project he was assigned to was already finished. whether on the pencil-written or typewritten payroll sheets. when fraud is alleged in the preparation of the payroll. Ruling: I. Thus. In this case. to which they appealed to the NLRC.R. THEY ARE. YES. The same is true with respect to the typewritten payroll sheets. being entries in the course of business. In fact. No. the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision against petitioner. good faith must be presumed in this case.. neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC found any alteration or erasure or traces thereat. enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130. 155034. Section 43 of the Rules of Court. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within our regulatory powers. The NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Entries in the payroll.000. the most minute examination will not reveal any tampering. However the amount of P50. he being allegedly a project employee. Moreover. • Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the salary differential ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Hence. if there is any adverse conclusion as regards the December 1995 payroll sheet.It is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker. The conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that entries in the December 1995 payroll sheet could have been altered is utterly baseless. suffice it to say that Art. G. the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. Indeed.00 claimed as attorney's fees in this case is the reasonable compensation based on the records and not the maximum 10% of the total award as granted by POEA. underpayment of wages and nonpayment of statutory benefits. Thus. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away from his family. it must be confined only to it and cannot be applied to the typewritten payroll sheets. there is substantial proof that myocardial infarction is an occupational disease for which Aniban's employer obligated itself to pay death benefits and additional compensation under the CBA in the event of the demise of its employee by reason thereof. On July 12. The claim that the December 1995 payroll sheet was written in pencil and was thus rendered it prone to alterations or erasures is clearly non sequitur. Furthermore. having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separated from his family for the entire duration of his contract. Tio
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. under the circumstances. 1999. On the award of attorney’s fees: On the award of attorney's fees which NLRC deleted on the ground that there was no unlawful withholding of wages. It should be useful to note that respondent is a single proprietorship engaged in road construction business. Sapio vs. May 22. Undaloc Construction et al. bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to perform his work well. the instant petition. What it explicitly prohibits is the award of attorney's fees which exceed 10% of the amount of wages recovered. 111 of the Labor Code do not limit the award of attorney’s fees to cases of unlawful withholding of wages only. absent any evidence to the contrary. attorney's fees are recoverable for the services rendered by petitioner's counsel to compel Aniban's employer to pay its monetary obligations under the CBA. Issues: • Whether or not the payrolls made in pencil were valid. the
Rommel A. An appeal to the CA yielded no result.
) No. Cadiz. It is primarily engaged in the manufacture and sale of food and beverage particularly beer products. corporation. HE IS NOT.R. but not limited to. That payment of indemnity shall not absolve the employer from the criminal liability imposable under this Act. Moreover. The award of attorney’s fees is warranted under the circumstances of this case. chief executive officer. 6727. bringing their total liability to P13. vice president..156. No. V-0068-95 was employees at private respondents Sales Offices in the provinces.00 rate indicated in the typewritten payroll sheets submitted by respondents. NO. If the violation is committed by a corporation. Respondents are required to pay double the amount owed to petitioner. Tio
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. petitioner’s bare assertions of fraud do not suffice to overcome the disputable presumption of regularity.00) or imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than four (4) years. several employees from the Bacolod. 2008 FACTS: Petitioner is a member of the Philippine Bar who represented the complainants in NLRC Cases No. V0255-94 and No. the president.578. it operates breweries and sales offices throughout the Philippines. V-0068-95 instituted against herein private respondent San Miguel Corporation sometime in 1992 and 1993. the penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the entity’s responsible officers. including. In line with its business. attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employer's liability laws but shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. San Miguel Corp. trust. managing director or partner. on the other hand.A.00 However. firm. Any person. the Labor Arbiter misapplied the wage orders when he wrongly categorized respondent as falling within the first category. G. July 31. The complainants in NLRC Cases No. 8188. NLRC Case No. 151983-84. respondents should have been covered by the second category. is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. The total salary differential that petitioner is lawfully entitled to amounts to P6. association or entity which refuses or fails to pay any of the prescribed increases or adjustments in the wage rates made in accordance with this Act shall be punished by a fine not less than Twenty-five thousand pesos (P25. Based on the stipulated number of employees and audited financial statements. He fixed the daily wage rate actually received by petitioner at P105. general manager. Ortiz vs. trust or firm. The employer concerned shall be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to double the unpaid benefits owing to the employees: Provided.burden of evidence shifts to the employee and it is incumbent upon him to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim. II.00 without taking into consideration the P141. or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court: Provided. The Labor Arbiter erred in his computation. as amended by R. Private respondent. partnership. and Himamaylan Beer Sales Offices filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with backwages.00.00) nor more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100. Under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code.000. Section 12. No. That any person convicted under this Act shall not be entitled to the benefits provided for under the Probation Law.000. V-0255-94 and No.A. Atty. V-0255-94 (Aguirre Cases) In 1992. partnership. The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party. Unfortunately. pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act (R. elevation of employment status from casual-temporary to regular-
Rommel A. association or any other entity.
the cases were submitted for resolution.02. (3) determining that Modesto Jabaybay. He ordered complainants reinstatement to their previous or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights. and (5) attorneys fees in the amount of P91. Jr.75. moral damages and all other claims for lack of merit. (4) declaring that all the complainants except Romeo Magbanua. Renato Junsay. but its motion was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 27 February 1996.. (2) rice subsidy or its monetary equivalent. attorneys fees. and (3) attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award or in the amount of P619.00. privileges and rights enjoyed by the private respondents regular employees in the total amount of P339. with the following modifications: (1) granting sales commission to the complainants and adopting their computation thereof in their Appeal Memorandum filed before the NLRC. (3) monetary equivalent of their uniform for two years consisting of 24 sets of t-shirts and 6 pairs of pants. however. Labor Arbiter Ray Allan T. Subsequently. and Florencio de la Piedra depending on the dates they were employed.50.542.197. non-payment of holiday pay. nonpayment of benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA). where the Aguirre Cases were collectively docketed as NLRC Case No. allowances and sick leaves. dismissed complainants claim for overtime pay. The NLRC would later render a Decision dated 21 July 1995 in the Aguirre Cases affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gulmatico. 06-0210210-92. He ordered private respondent to pay complainants (1) backwages and other benefits in the amount of P572.795.055.95. moral.permanent reckoned after six months from the start of complainants employment. service incentive leave pay. and (4) attorneys fees of 10% of the total monetary award or P198. Drilon (Labor Arbiter Drilon) rendered his Decision in the Toquero Case also ruling that the three complainants were illegally dismissed. On 30 June 1994. V-0255-94. After conducting a full-blown trial.159. 06-01-10031-92. holiday pay. Labor Arbiter Gulmatico. V-0068-95. 06-0710404-93 (hereinafter referred to as the Toquero Case). (4) sales commissions based on the monthly sales of beer sold by their office for the last three years. He also ordered private respondent to pay the complainants (1) full backwages and other CBA benefits in the total amount of P6. Again. On 25 July 1995.
Rommel A. and (5) that complainants Romeo Magbanua and Modesto Jabaybay shall no longer be reinstated. On 26 December 1994. underpayment of salaries. the complainants were not contented with Labor Arbiter Drilons Decision.296. Labor Arbiter Reynaldo J. Thus. The foregoing complaints were consolidated and initially docketed as RAB Cases No. Gulmatico (Labor Arbiter Gulmatico) rendered a Decision in the Aguirre Cases finding all the complainants to have been illegally dismissed. who died on 28 December 1993. 06-02-10211-92. three other employees at the San Carlos Sales Office filed with the Labor Arbiter a similar complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent in 1993. NLRC Case No. service incentive leave pay. and interest. 13th month pay differential. who withdrew his complaint. Tio
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. Agustines Llacuna. (2) all benefits. the NLRC rendered a Decision modifying the 26 December 1994 Decision of Labor Arbiter Drilon by ordering the private respondent to pay the complainants the following: (1) additional awards of sales commission. were entitled to whatever benefits were given under the CBA. 06-01-10048-92. Unsatisfied with Labor Arbiter Gulmaticos monetary and economic awards. Private respondent moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid 21 July 1995 NLRC Decision.28. the parties were given the opportunity to submit their respective memoranda. he ordered the complainants immediate reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights.128. and 06-03-10255-92 (hereinafter collectively referred to as theAguirre Cases). (2) tailoring allowance. 06-01-10049-92. (2) adjusting and/or reducing the amounts awarded to complainants Alfredo Gadian.952. (3) a total of 159 sacks of rice ration. exemplary and other damages. was to receive only the amount of P356.88. Their complaint was docketed as RAB Case No. complainants appealed to the NLRC. and they appealed their case to the NLRC which was then docketed as NLRC Case No. V-0068-95 (Toquero Case) While the Aguirre Cases were still pending resolution by Labor Arbiter Gulmatico.
and in the presence of two witnesses. and docketed the same as CA-G. private respondents Petition was denied due course by this Court in a Resolution dated 18 March 2002 for failure of the private respondent to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court. No. private respondent elevated the NLRC Decisions to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari. Martin Funeral Home v. No. seeking the reversal and setting aside of the 22 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. where they were docketed as G. their complaints were dismissed on account of their duly executed Deeds of Release. No.R. CA-G.R. 54576-77. insofar as complainant Gadian was concerned. 54576-77 Failing to get a favorable ruling from the NLRC in both the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA-G. 151427 became final and executory on 24 July 2002. 124426 and G.R. Private respondent then attached the Deeds of Release. Waiver and Quitclaim. the complainants agreed to settle their claims against private respondent for amounts less than what the NLRC actually awarded. 122975. 54576-77 affirming the NLRC Decision dated 21 July 1995 and Resolution dated 27 February 1996 in the Aguirre Cases. SP. No. all but one of the remaining complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases appeared on various dates before Labor Arbiters Gulmatico and Drilon.In another Resolution dated 30 June 1999. the appellate court denied both motions. In a Resolution dated9 January 2002. Private respondent moved for the partial reconsideration of the 22 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals. respectively. likewise moved for the partial reconsideration of the same Decision of the appellate court praying that the award of attorneys fees of 10% should be based on the monetary awards adjudged by the NLRC. docketed as G. there is a question of fact when the Whether petitioner is entitled to additional attorneys fees on top of what was already
Rommel A. Based on the Deeds they executed. Waiver and Quitclaim to its Manifestation and Motion filed before the appellate court. 151421 and No. Private respondent withheld 10% of the total amount agreed upon by the parties in the said Deeds as attorneys fees and handed it over to petitioner.R. herein petitioner. ISSUES: received.R. Jr.R.R. This Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.R. the NLRC partially granted private respondents motion for reconsideration by allowing the deduction from the award of backwages any earnings of complainants elsewhere during the pendency of their case. The denial of the private respondents Petition in G. which affirmed the 21 July 1995 Decision and 27 February 1996 Resolution of the NLRC in the Aguirre Cases. for their part. RULING: While this Court concedes that the instant Petition for Review raises a question of law. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos. 151421 and No. and the dismissal of complainant Gadians complaint against private respondent for lack of merit. signed separate Deeds of Release. The Court of Appeals accepted the consolidated cases in its Resolution dated 7 September 1999. With respect to the other complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. Waiver and Quitclaim. SP No. it denies the Petition for lack of merit and lack of petitioners standing to file the same.R. On the other hand. On 15 July 1996. While the private respondents Petitions for Certiorari were pending before the Court of Appeals. No. The Court also denied private respondents motion for reconsideration. On 22 August 2001. No. this Court referred the said cases to the Court of Appeals conforming to its ruling in St. SP No. 54576-77. G. (complainant Gadian). SP No. 151427. 151427 Private respondent appealed before this Court by filing a Petition for Review. Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of private respondent. Tio
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. However. only insofar as it concerned complainant Alfredo Gadian. 151421 and No. Complainant Gadian and his counsel. the only complainant who did not execute a Deed of Release.In its Resolution dated 9 October 1995. this Court issued a Resolution consolidating the two cases.
and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client.
Rommel A. which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations. in which case. the complainants who signed the Deeds of Release. and not to petitioner as compensation for his legal services. the employees welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration. In the case at bar. it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. 111. this Court does not need to go over the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties in the proceedings below to determine their probative value. as amended. contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. rather. attorneys fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. What it needs to do is ascertain and apply the relevant law and jurisprudence on the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing parties in labor cases. The basis of this compensation is the fact of the attorney’s employment by and his agreement with the client. there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. Article 111 of the Labor Code. otherwise.(a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered. In determining whether the petitioner should be entitled to the attorneys fees stated in the NLRC Decisions. The aforesaid issue evidently involves a question of law. an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former has rendered to the latter. In its extraordinary concept. National Labor Relations Commission citing Dr. Based on the foregoing. Although express findings of fact and law are still necessary to prove the merit of the award. The instances in which these may be awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. it is a question of fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same. In its ordinary concept. (Emphasis supplied. as amended. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code. specifically provides: ART. In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Codes provisions and implementing regulations. the attorney’s fees awarded by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases pertain to the complainants. Article 111 of the Labor Code. For a question to be one of law. as indemnity for damages. (b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept. Reyes v. this Court enunciated that there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees. Records show that the petitioner neither alleged nor proved that his clients. all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. petitioners clients. which pertains to actions for recovery of wages. unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. which provides that in case of doubt. and Article 1702 of the Civil Code.doubt or difference arises as to the alleged truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Still according to PCL Shipping. shall be resolved in favor of labor. ATTORNEYS FEES. . v. in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the recovery of the wages. Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict construction in the awarding of attorneys fees. willingly agreed that the award of attorney’s fees would accrue to him as an additional compensation or part thereof. specifically paragraph 7 thereof.) In PCL Shipping Philippines. Tio
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. Waiver and Quitclaim. Court of Appeals. the complainants. it is a question of law. Inc. the core issue presented by the petitioner is with respect to the amount of attorneys fees to which he should be entitled: whether he is entitled to the amount of attorneys fees as adjudged by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases or only to the 10% of the amounts actually paid to his clients. attorneys fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
it was totally within the complainant’s right to waive the amount of said attorney’s fees and settle for a lesser amount thereof in exchange for the immediate end to litigation. he is a member of an honorable profession. petitioner challenges the due execution of the Deeds. The foregoing provision cannot be taken to mean that the complainants concerned agreed that the attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC pertained to petitioner as additional compensation or part thereof since (1) the Deeds were executed between complainants and private respondent. i. The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. In fact. It may do well for petitioner to remember that as a lawyer. as well as the personal money he expended for the prosecution of complainants cases for more than seven or eight years. we refer back to Article 111 of the Labor Code. Waiver. I had requested and [herein private respondent] has complied with it. And since the attorney’s fees pertained to the complainants as indemnity for damages. If petitioner earnestly believes that the amounts he already received are grossly deficient. the primary vision of which is justice. as compensation for petitioners services. He should file a separate action for collection of sum of money against complainants to recover just compensation for his legal services. and not the present Petition for Review to claim from private respondent the attorney’s fees which were adjudged by the NLRC in favor of complainants as the prevailing parties in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases. then petitioners remedy is not against the private respondent. In addition. which right I am now exercising without prejudice to my counsels claim to the legally mandated 10% attorneys fees. when the complainants executed their respective Deeds of Release. as amended. this Court has no recourse but to interpret the award of attorney’s fees by the NLRC in its extraordinary concept. Compensation should be but a mere incident.e. that [private respondent] deduct from the gross settlement 10% representing attorneys fees of [herein petitioner] and make a check payable to the latter in such amount. Waiver and Quitclaim are the amounts recovered and the proper basis for determining the 10% attorney’s fees. and Quitclaim was that the 10% attorney’s fees of the petitioner shall be deducted from the amount of the gross settlement.What the complainants explicitly agreed to in their individual Deeds of Release. the petitioner was not even a party to the said documents. As a matter of fact. but against his own clients. as evidenced by several cash vouchers and checks payable to petitioner and signed by his representative. as found by the Court of Appeals. This would show that petitioner has been compensated for the services he rendered the complainants. Thus. Even assuming arguendo that the complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases did indeed agree that the attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC should be considered in their ordinary concept. Petitioner cannot prevent complainants from compromising and/or withdrawing their complaints at any stage of the proceedings just to protect his anticipated attorney’s fees. the amounts actually received by them pursuant to the Deeds of Release. and may not now take an inconsistent position by using the provisions of the very same Deeds as proof that complainants impliedly or expressly agreed that the attorney’s fees awarded by the NLRC pertained to him under the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees. the complainants.. NLRC FACTS:
Rommel A. Waiver and Quitclaim. Tio
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. Since the complainants decided to settle their complaints against the private respondent. As a client. Masmud vs. considering the substantial time and efforts he and his assistant lawyers invested. Even petitioner himself admitted this fact. I have the right to decide on the matter of whether to settle my case and the amount of the settlement. and (2) private complainants request that private respondent withhold 10% attorneys fees to be payable to petitioner was in relation to the amount of gross settlement under the Deeds and not to the amounts awarded by the NLRC. which provides that the attorneys fees should be equivalent to 10% of the amount of wages recovered. Provision 8 of the Deeds of Release. petitioner already received attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the amounts paid to the complainants in accordance with the Deeds. Waiver and Quitclaim reads: 8.
Go caused her substitution as complainant. such that. Thereafter. 2004.On July 9.20. in its extraordinary concept. the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. In consideration of Atty. Rolando B. Go the sum of P680. both in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment. Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent basis. the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P3. and attorney’s fees. reads: WHEREFORE. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. as quoted in the CA Decision.A. leaving a balance of 10%. Atty. SO ORDERED. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s law firm as compensation.A. which was later granted by the LA. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Out of the said amount.079.00 and his sickness allowance of US$2.000. On November 21. moral and exemplary damages.454. Evangelina filed a comment with motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier.348. 2004. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina. Dissatisfied. thus. There are two concepts of attorney's fees.00. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney’s fees. the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification.00. On appeal before the CA. Alexander died. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code. On February 6. The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Alexander’s employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).079. Eventually.5 Alexander’s employers filed a petition for certiorari6 before this Court. as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal.00.000. Go’s legal services. medical expenses. the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit. Atty. Go) as his counsel. sickness allowance. On January 10.20 to Evangelina. The award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted. In effect.000. In the ordinary sense. attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. The employer subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. On the other hand. plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s fees.] jointly and severally liable to pay [Alexander’s] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60. The NLRC denied the same in an Order dated October 26. Jr.000. the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. through the NLRC Sheriff. the late Alexander J. Evangelina paid Atty. Atty. in any of the
Rommel A. judgment is rendered finding the [First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S. for non-payment of permanent disability benefits. On April 30. 2003. the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander’s employer. Evangelina paid only the amount of P680. In her comment. Tio
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.00 as moral damages. petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.00 as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina) husband. During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC.000. filed a complaint3 against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S. the surety company delivered to the NLRC Cashier.454. Upon motion of Atty. (Atty. Go. The dispositive portion of the decision. 2006. 2003.P100. [Alexander’s] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis. and to pay further the amount of P200. 2005. Evangelina manifested that Atty. After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees to Evangelina. Atty. foregoing considered. Masmud (Alexander). Go. Go. the check amounting toP3. In response to the motion filed by Atty.
DECISION: Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition. it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Article 111 of the said Code provides: ART. Considering that Atty. it claimed that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank plantilla for sorters or counters. In addition. he himself would not get his due.cases provided by law where such award can be made.g. the Decision dated October 31. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers’. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner.R. Attorney's fees. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. who worked for more than six months and whose contracts were
Rommel A. Here. G. in view of the foregoing. Go’s compensation. the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. WHEREFORE. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled against the petitioners. NLRC. in substitution of her husband. that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular feature and integral part of their duties. he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation. Section 24. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. we apply the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. 122917. or the compensation that Atty. Private respondent responded that it hired petitioners as “special workers” according to Art.R. July 12. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered. Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. 96279 are hereby AFFIRMED. Private respondent alleged that it hired temporarily the petitioners under special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and political personalities to the respondent Bank. In this regard. Tio
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. However. e. 80 of the Labor Code and not regular employees. SP No. Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA. the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. Go’s compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract. 111. unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. No. Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6. because their task as money sorters and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client. Go successfully represented his client. SPECIAL TYPES OF WORKERS Bernardo vs. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy. the Court reversed such findings and held that (only) the employees.. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. 1999 Complainants are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina. before the labor tribunals and before the court.
In the present case. EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company vs. simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes. and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement. coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose. Why then should they be dismissed. Private respondent was dismissed from the company. The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the ambit of Article 80. discrimination. the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. National Labor Relations Commission. Hence. More important. In other words. Decision: Petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of. justify the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code and not Art. 1991. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. 118978. her services were terminated. After August 8. however. Her services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner. therefore. Since the Magna Carta mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Issue: Whether or not the company policy tantamount to unjust and unlawful discrimination against married women. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.R. 1997 Facts: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever. No. and the right against. An employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of service. its branch supervisor in Baguio City. their dismissal from employment was illegal. that. not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.F. May 23. 80 as alleged by the private respondent. The renewal of the contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others (56) lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No.renewed are deemed regular. the probationary period to cover 150 days. their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them. The primary standard. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. disabled or not. for a fixed period to substitute one C. Official. G. after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them. afforded all women
Rommel A. she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons. Tio
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. this time in replacement of another person. herein petitioners are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code. Delia M. In that memorandum. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. She was once more asked to join the company as a probationary employee. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation. sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15. they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons). these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for employment. She stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time.
and conditions that they may deem convenient. at the time she committed the alleged absences. a prohibited act. 16. 1994. Prima Ybañez. 1994. 2.workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. 29-31 and September 1-10. 1987. 1992. On June 16. 1994. In view of the said alleged absences without permission. it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. PETITIONER. and the latter ordered her to rest for another five (5) consecutive days. good customs. Still not feeling well. public order. Carried to its logical consequences. 1994 hearing. Whether the employment of respondent had been validly terminated on the ground of excessive absences without permission. 1977. The hearing was set on September 23. Hence. Issues: 1. She declared she did not file the adequate leave of absence because a medical certificate was already sufficient per company policy. 1994 she had sent an application for leave to her supervisor. On May 4. DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES. tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status. Prima Ybañez. Marilyn Casino. VS. another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding her absences without permission during the year 1991-1992. Lolita M. a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer. morals. after hearing. LOLITA VELASCO. 1994. 1994. respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner asserting that her dismissal was illegal because she was on the family way suffering from urinary tract infection. she went to the company hospital for check-up and was advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4) days or on August 27 to 30. She explained that for her absence from work on August 15. 1994. terms. the petitioner terminated the services of respondent effective January 16. RESPONDENT. a notice of hearing was sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is for excessive absence without permission on August 15-18. or public policy. the same should not be contrary to law. Tio
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. was again warned in writing by petitioner about her absences without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her. 17 & 18. On January 10. Feeling aggrieved. Velasco started working with Del Monte Philippines on October 21.. 1995. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty. respondent. 1994 due to excessive absences without permission. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment. 1991. a pregnancy-borne. On September 14. Ruling:
Rommel A. 1994 and was again advised two days of rest in quarters on September 2-3. on September 17. but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy. which was not anymore accepted. 1994. the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the said company. Respondent having failed to appear on September 23. respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. 1994 she failed to report to work but sent an application for leave of absence to her supervisor. she went to see an outside doctor. she failed to work on September 1. Whether the petitioner discharged the respondent on account of pregnancy. Dr. Thereafter. INC. 1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1. while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements. Her vacation entitlement for the said employment year affected was consequently forfeited. Unable to recover. or from September 5 to 9. thru a letter. On September 10. It was again reset to October 5. 1994. another notice of hearing was sent to her resetting the investigation on September 30. and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
June 23. dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy. the employment of respondent has not been validly terminated. 1989 until he was dismissed on May 13. the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so. Petitioner was thus forced to hire another driver to replace private respondent. During the elections of May 11. 120473. in the last analysis. that she could not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing condition. while it is not disputed that complainant incurred absences exceeding six (6) days as she actually failed to report for work from August 15-18.00 when he was dismissed in 1992. not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. the existence of which justify the dismissal of the erring employee.private respondent herein filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Ultra Vires Food Haus restaurant and/or its alleged owner Rosie Tio. 2124. However. The Labor Arbiter noted private respondent's admission that he was petitioner's personal driver contained in the mandatory conference order issued by the Labor Arbiter on January 10. like abandonment. her being pregnant at the time these absences were incurred is not questioned and is even admitted by respondent. 12-17.
Rommel A. 1992. No. Private respondent alleged that he was employed as a "do it all guy. Tio
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. Though well aware that May 12.” The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that the respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and policy. service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Petitioner Rosie Tio. private respondent was required to report for work at 7:00 a. Private respondent came back a week after but only to collect his salary. thus. that this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had been duly proven through substantial evidence. and that the petitioner. EMPLOYMENT OF HOUSEHELPER ULTRA VILLA FOOD HAUS vs. in said restaurant. on the other hand. 26-30. 5-10. while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. coldly told petitioner that private respondent was helping in the counting of ballots. 137. Gr. that the respondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences. premium pay. 1994. private respondent acted as a Poll Watcher for the National Union of Christian Democrats. The Court is convinced that the petitioner terminated the services of respondent on account of her pregnancy which justified her absences and. September 1-3. “Art. and maintenance man. Private respondent was likewise given free meals as well as 13th month pay at the end of the year. P70. Private respondent's wife.m. in effect. that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the petitioner’s supervisor refused to receive them.00 in 1989. In this jurisdiction tardiness and absenteeism.In the first issue. The Labor Arbiter concluded that private respondent. committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal. therefore. petitioner called up private respondent that day to ask him to report for work as she had some important matters to attend to. 1992. private respondent was paid P60. Respondent’s rule penalizing with discharge any employee who has incurred six (6) or more absences without permission or subsequent justification is admittedly within the purview of the foregoing standard. – It shall be unlawful for any employer: (2)To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy.00 in 1990." acting as waiter. Petitioner denied dismissing private respondent whom she claimed abandoned his job. P80. Prohibited acts. a prohibited act. are recognized forms of neglect of duties. driver. 1994. GENISTON. As petitioner's personal driver. His employment therein spanned from March 1. petitioner will. The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and. 29-31.00 in 1991 and P90. being a personal driver. For his services. however. 1999 Facts: Renato Geniston. 1992 was a holiday. to drive petitioner to Mandaue City where petitioner worked as the Manager of the CFC Corporation. and October 1-3. be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy. was not entitled to overtime pay. 23-26. maintained that private respondent was her personal driver.
Coverage. Employing the same line of analysis. petitioner admitted that she gave private respondent 13th month pay every December. The Labor Code is silent on the grant of overtime pay. holiday pay. Clearly then. except for a just cause. Coverage.The NLRC ruled that private respondent was an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. Tio
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. 149. including services of family drivers. two requisites must concur: (1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support. If the househelper is unjustly dismissed. we do not find private respondent to have abandoned his job. and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts. domestic helpers. Nevertheless.The provision of this title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not. His dismissal from petitioner's employ being unjust. 141. "Domestic or household service" shall mean services in the employers home which is usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof and includes ministering to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the employers household. Indemnity for unjust termination of services. There is substantial evidence to support such conclusion. . managerial employees. It is quite unbelievable that private respondent would leave a stable and relatively well paying job as petitioner's family driver to work as an election watcher. – If the period of household service is fixed. and not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. premium pay and service incentive leave to those engaged in the domestic or household service. The Supreme Court disagrees with petitioner which submits that private respondent abandoned his job. it would seem that private respondent is not entitled to 13th month pay. such as: private respondent's admission during the mandatory conference that he was petitioner's personal driver. field personnel. Issues: (1) Whether private respondent was an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus or the personal driver of petitioner. petitioner is not obliged by law to grant private respondent any of these benefits. persons in the personal service of another. expressly excludes domestic helpers from its coverage: Art. To constitute abandonment. and (2) Whether private respondent was illegally dismissed from employment. and workers who are paid by results as determined by Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations. Indeed. Moreover. petitioner is entitled to an indemnity under Article 149 of the Labor Code: Art. we deem it just to award private respondent 13th month pay in view of petitioner's practice of according private respondent such benefit. Article 141 of the Labor Code applies. neither the employer nor the househelper may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term. Decision: The Supreme Court finds that private respondent was indeed the personal driver of petitioner. The burden of proving abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is on the employer. 82. which provides: Art.This Chapter shall apply to all persons rendering services in households for compensation. Thus. Petitioner failed to discharge this burden. . copies of the Ultra Villa Food Haus payroll which do not contain private respondent's name and other pertinent documents. with the second requisite as the more determinative factor. No. preferring to work as an election watcher instead. which defines the scope of the application of these provisions. he or she shall be paid the
Rommel A. Consequently. but not to government employees. the specific provision of LC and Article 82.
Nos. houseboys and similar househelps. that she continuously worked with Remington until she was unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site in Edsa. Tan and his family but also to that of the petitioner’s employees. Moreover. The
Rommel A. starting as early as 6:00 a. and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. makes her fall squarely within the definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex Mining case. the terms “househelper” or “domestic servant” are defined as follows: “The term ‘househelper’ as used herein is synonymous to the term ‘domestic servant’ and shall refer to any person. Tan. only to be informed that Remington no longer needed her services. That she works within company premises. that she worked for six (6) days a week. and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr.000. 169295-96. as amended.m. 13th month pay and 10% attorney’s fees. 2006 Facts: Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary of Php 4. Section 1(b). Book 3 of the Labor Code. If the househelper leaves without justifiable reason he or she shall forfeit any unpaid salary due him or her not exceeding fifteen (15) days. G. REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION vs.m. then the person performing such work could not be considered an employee of the latter. the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case. Erlinda believed that her dismissal was illegal because she was not given the notices required by law. she filed her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.” The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer’s home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer’s family. as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and employees. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper. it is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employer's business. after most of the employees. who caters not only to the needs of Mr. who renders services in and about the employer’s home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof. gardeners. Issue: 1. service incentive leave pay. as well as the nature of respondent’s work as a cook. or even later. domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staff house may be similar in nature. She averred that she reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City on January 15. the situs. whether male or female. Tio
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. laundry women. Whether or not she was illegally dismissed. as amended. Caloocan City. because she had to do the marketing and would end at around 5:30 p. November 20. Such definition covers family drivers. ERLINDA CASTANEDA.00 for Remington. if not all.. Whether or not Erlinda Casteneda is a regular employee of petitioner or mere domestic worker of the family of Mr. Clearly. salary differentials. Tan and his family. had left the company premises. Book 3 of the Labor Code. 2. Section 1(b). warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII. 1998. is reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of control over her functions.compensation already earned plus that for fifteen (15) days by way of indemnity. the mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business. Decision: The Court affirmed the decision of the NLRC and CA holding Erlinda a regular employee of petitioner. The criteria are the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer.R. yayas. which is the primary indicator of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. hence. Under Rule XIII. a corporation engaged in the trading business. domestic servants.
The employer’s case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s defense. no less than the company’s corporate secretary has certified that respondent is a bonafide company employee.determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of each case. hence. [G. there is no reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code. but from a quasi-delict or tort. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee. failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. adequate and competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code: “ART 161. The Supreme Court however affirmed the findings of the CA which ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. MEDICAL. she served with the company for 15 years starting in 1983. for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of her desire to return to work.It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. No. she had a fixed schedule and routine of work and was paid a monthly salary of P4. negating the employer’s charge of abandonment. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. It is a form of neglect of duty. abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. INC. a just cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Assistance of employer. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests labor arbiters and the NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations. In termination cases. regardless of the nature of the activities involved. petitioner. thus.000. and that this service was a regular feature of employment with the company. the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent. -. and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. an employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned her work. these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. 149578. From her paper. Erlinda’s immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC negates abandonment. She argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort. but on the failure of private respondents -. which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation. 14. which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer. DENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY EVELYN TOLOSA. FUMIO NAKAGAWA). The labor arbiter ruled in her favor however on appeal. buying and cooking food served to company employees at lunch and merienda.” Likewise. In the instant case. Indeed. vs. with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work. In the second issue. For a valid finding of abandonment. The loss she claims
Rommel A. April 10. respondents. the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. In addition. 2003] Petitioner is the wife of late Capt. ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. respondents contended that her complaint is based on torts (due to negligence) and it is the regular courts of law which have jurisdiction over the action. Her cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation.to provide him with timely. it is evident that the primary reliefs she seeks are: (a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as “actual damages” or “lost income” and (b) blacklisting. She also alleges that the “reasonable causal connection” rule should be applied in her favor.00. PEDRO GARATE and MARIO ASIS.as employers of her husband (Captain Tolosa) -. Further.R. Tolosa praying to hold respondents solidarily liable for negligence which resulted to the death of her husband.. Tio
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In addition. It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages.does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased. Since petitioner’s claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217. but not in the Labor Code. is a corporation engaged in the business of communication services and allied activities. or collective bargaining agreements. petitioner’s claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217. jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts-. or collective bargaining agreements. Management and treatment of employees that may necessitate hospitalization including emergency cases and accidents. Application of preventive medicine including periodic check-up of employees. who died at age 58. overtime compensation or separation pay. which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. It must be noted that a worker’s loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated with wages. 4. While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws. in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental. He ruled that Captain Tolosa. to include the following: 1. and all matters referred which are medical in nature. 2. therein proposing his plan of works required of a practitioner in industrial medicine. 3. Inc. In other words. “It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection. Global Communication vs. Phil. but to his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. Holding of clinic hours in the morning and afternoon for a total of five (5) hours daily for consultation services to employees. On the other hand. other labor statutes. De Vera. Tio
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. 459 SCRA 260  FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Global Communications. This amount is recoverable if the action is based on a quasi delict as provided for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code. (PhilCom). she cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code. evaluating conditions of employees applying for sick leave of absence and subsequently issuing proper certification. De Vera. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the realm of civil law. via a letter dated 15 May 1981. 6. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same Code. these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code. but also damages governed by the Civil Code.
Rommel A. while respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its employees. and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages before the labor arbiter. claims for an employer’s violation thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. or collective bargaining agreements. could expect to live up to 65 years and to have an earning capacity of US$176.400. other labor statutes.” The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. offered his services to the petitioner. Thus.not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters. Attend to certain medical administrative function such as accomplishing medical forms. 5. On 15 May 1981. other labor statutes. and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Conduct home visits whenever necessary. Conduct pre-employment physical check-up of prospective employees with no additional medical fee.
it being made clear therein that respondent will cover "the retainership the Company previously had with Dr. 1996". Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and
Rommel A. thru a letter bearing on the subject boldly written as "TERMINATION – RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT". Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. There are instances. on a finding that De Vera is Philcom’s "regular employee" and accordingly directed the company to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full backwages from the date of his dismissal until actual reinstatement. (8) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based. In December 1996 when Philcom. however. is constrained to look deeper into the attendant circumstances obtaining in this case. the present petition. as appearing on record. Eulau" and that respondent’s "retainer fee" will be at P4. the latter. National Labor Relations Commission. (3) there is grave abuse of discretion. The retainership arrangement went on from 1981 to 1994 with changes in the retainer’s fee. and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision. the Court. modifying that of the NLRC by deleting the award of traveling allowance. (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. the existence of which is. a question of fact well within the province of the NLRC. (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. De Vera was an "independent contractor" and that he "was not dismissed but rather his contract with [PHILCOM] ended when said contract was not renewed after December 31. Said contract was renewed yearly. on the rationale that as a "retained physician" under a valid contract mutually agreed upon by the parties. 1996" because management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company premises. On De Vera’s appeal to the NLRC. (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken.” As we see it. The exceptional instances are where: "xxx xxx xxx (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. Hence. On 21 December 1998. K. However. Nonetheless. (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees. (5) the findings of fact are conflicting. the parties’ respective submissions revolve on the primordial issue of whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and respondent. informed De Vera of its decision to discontinue the latter’s "retainer’s contract with the Company effective at the close of business hours of December 31. where the Court departs from this rule and reviews findings of fact so that substantial justice may be served. Tio
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. given the reality that the NLRC’s findings are at odds with those of the labor arbiter.The parties agreed and formalized respondent’s proposal in a document denominated as RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT which will be for a period of one year subject to renewal. renewal of the contract was only made verbally. and ordering payment of separation pay to De Vera in lieu of reinstatement. for the years 1995 and 1996.000. De Vera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.00 a month. ISSUES: respondent RULING: Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. only questions of law may be reviewed by this Court in decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals. in itself. reversed (the word used is "modified") that of the Labor Arbiter. consistent with its ruling in Jimenez vs. Reyes came out with a decision dismissing De Vera’s complaint for lack of merit. surmise and conjecture. in a decision dated 23 October 2000.
In fine. It simply runs against the grain of common experience to imagine that an ordinary employee has yet to bill his employer to receive his salary. in accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code. For sure. where no registered nurse is available. remarkably absent from the parties’ arrangement is the element of control. a part-time physician and dentist. or the socalled "control test". Where the undertaking is nonhazardous in nature. Here. which thereby negates the element of control in their relationship.The Court. We may add that the records are replete with evidence showing that respondent had to bill petitioner for his monthly professional fees. dentist and full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic. and  the power to control the employee’s conduct. in which case the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of the workers. whereby the employer has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. that from the time he started to work with petitioner. respondent invokes Article 157 of the Labor Code. he never was included in its payroll. respondent has never cited even a single instance when petitioner interfered with his work. Emergency medical and dental services. and The services of a full-time physician. with or without cause. was never deducted any contribution for remittance to the Social Security System (SSS). We note. Either may terminate the arrangement at will. Buttressing his contention that he is a regular employee of petitioner. no employer shall engage the services of a physician or dentist who cannot stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours. Finally. Clearly. the parties themselves practically agreed on every terms and conditions of respondent’s engagement. when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300). petitioner had no control over the means and methods by which respondent went about performing his work at the company premises. and an emergency clinic. too.  the power of dismissal. In cases of hazardous workplaces. considered to be the most important element. The services of a full-time registered nurse. and argues that he satisfies all the requirements thereunder. matters which are simply inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship. we initially find that it was respondent himself who sets the parameters of what his duties would be in offering his services to petitioner. 157. has invariably adhered to the four-fold test. the physician and dentist may be
Rommel A. the elements of an employer-employee relationship are wanting in this case.  the payment of wages. – It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces. in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. not to mention the fact that respondent’s work hours and the additional compensation therefor were negotiated upon by the parties. not disputed by respondent. and not less than eight (8) hours in the case of those employed on fulltime basis. that the power to terminate the parties’ relationship was mutually vested on both. and was in fact subjected by petitioner to the ten (10%) percent withholding tax for his professional fee. to wit:  the selection and engagement of the employee. and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). Applying the four-fold test to this case. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by appropriate regulations the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article. Tio
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. in the case of those engaged on part-time basis. He could even embark in the private practice of his profession. The labor arbiter added the indicia. The provision relied upon reads: ART.
as written. therefore. U-BIX allegedly refused. The very phrase that they may be engaged "on retained basis".engaged on retained basis. not employ. subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency. As a result of the accident. to stress. Bandiola sustained a fracture on his left leg. effective at the close of business hours of 31 December 1996. For sure. U-Bix Corp. The Labor Arbiter’s December 21. The next day. and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. that even as the contracts entered into by the parties invariably provide for a 60day notice requirement prior to termination. however. Bandiola was advised to go back for further medical treatment. the same was not complied with by petitioner when it terminated on 17 December 1996 the verbally-renewed retainership agreement. where they were assigned by U-BIX to install furniture for an exhibit. Bandiola filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter. a part-time physician who needed to stay in the premises of the nonhazardous workplace for two (2) hours. 14 April 1997. Bandiola and two other U-BIX employees were involved in a vehicular accident on their way to Baguio. Had only respondent read carefully the very statutory provision invoked by him. When Bandiola asked for additional financial assistance for further expenses in the treatment of his leg which even needed to be casted in fiberglass. Tio
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. Article 157 of the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally allows employers in non-hazardous establishments to engage "on retained basis" the service of a dentist or physician. and this is admitted by both parties. where he alleged underpayment of salary. revolts against the idea that this engagement gives rise to an employer-employee relationship. that execution of the NLRC decision had already been made at the NLRC despite the pendency of the present recourse. nothing is there in the law which says that medical practitioners so engaged be actually hired as employees. Where the law is clear and unambiguous. 1998 decision was reinstated. The Supreme Court granted the petition. what applies here is the last paragraph of Article 157 which. non-payment of overtime pay. 525 SCRA 566  Facts: Sometime in April 1995. Bandiola. On 13 April 1997. Bandiola was employed by U-BIX to install furniture for its customers. subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe. premium pay for work performed on holidays
Rommel A. The Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside. only requires the employer "to retain"." As correctly observed by the petitioner. Nowhere does the law provide that the physician or dentist so engaged thereby becomes a regular employee. On September 1998. adding that the law. the record shows. U-BIX paid for the medical expenses incurred in both mentioned hospitals. he would have noticed that in non-hazardous workplaces. provides that the employer may engage the services of a physician and dentist "on retained basis". they were transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Orthopedic). Be that as it may. We note. As such. while it is true that the provision requires employers to engage the services of medical practitioners in certain establishments depending on the number of their employees. it must be taken to mean exactly what it says.. Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. After his broken leg was cemented. Bandiola and his co-employees were initially brought to the Rosario District Hospital. As it is. the 60-day notice requirement has become moot and academic if not waived by the respondent himself. accounts of petitioner had already been garnished and released to respondent despite the previous Status Quo Order issued by this Court. vs. The successive "retainership" agreements of the parties definitely hue to the very statutory provision relied upon by respondent. To all intents and purposes. the employer may engage the services of a physician "on retained basis. Respondent takes no issue on the fact that petitioner’s business of telecommunications is not hazardous in nature.
00 in exemplary damages for refusing to reimburse Bandiola for the medical expenses he incurred after it failed to report to the Social Security System (SSS) the injuries sustained by Bandiola It affirmed Bandiola's entitlement to reimbursement of his medical expenses. injury or death of their employees.50 that were allegedly issued four months before their presentation. the amount of actual damages he was able to prove. The other claims. Moreover. Contrary to the arguments put forward by U-BIX. and the payment of actual. An injury is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of employment.00 and exemplary damages of P25. moral and exemplary damages.742. but reduced the amount to P7. Clearly. and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. NLRC amended the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter ruling that U-BIX should reimburse Bandiola the amount for the medical expenses he incurred in connection with his fractured leg.50 for medical expenses because its failure to comply with its duty to record and report Bandiola's injury to the SSS precluded Bandiola from making any claims.000.742. Ruling: Yes.000. reimbursed its other employees who were involved in the same accident for their medical expenses.742. separation pay. The aforecited provisions of the Labor Code provide that: ART 205.Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code set the reportorial requirements in cases when an employee falls sick or suffers an injury arising in the course of employment.50.and rest days.000. sleepless nights.000. the reimbursement of medical expenses for injuries incurred in the course of employment is part of the benefits enjoyed by U-BIX's employees. dated 16 September 1998. by its own admission. He claims that this entitles him to moral and exemplary damages. dates and places of the contingency. Incidentally. service incentive leave pay. mental torture. and serious anxiety. Tio
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. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION FOR WORK-RELATED INJURIES. DISABILITIES AND DEATHS . The only justification for its refusal to reimburse Bandiola was that he intended to defraud the company by presenting spurious receipts amounting to P7. and further ruled that U-BIX is liable to pay Bandiola P25. the award of these claims is no longer questioned in the present petition.00 to said respondent Bandiola. RECORD OF DEATH OR DISABILITY
All employers shall keep a logbook to record chronologically the sickness. Labor Arbiter allowed Bandiola's claim for salary differential.00 in moral damages and P25. service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay due to U-BIX's failure to present payrolls or similar documents. he suffered physical pain. setting forth therein their names. It also affirmed without modification the award of moral and exemplary damages. particularly those for medical expenses that Bandiola allegedly incurred and for moral and exemplary damages. the employer shall report to the System only those contingencies he deems to be work-connected.
Rommel A. Bandiola asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any financial assistance after he was injured in the performance of his duties. fright. 13th month pay. at a place where the employee may reasonably be. were dismissed. it is liable to reimburse Bandiola the amount of P7. and that as a result. Bandiola filed an appeal before the NLRC. nature of the contingency and absences.742. Entries in the logbook shall be made within five days from notice or knowledge of the occurrence of contingency. U-BIX.50 and pay for moral damages of P25. Within five days after entry in the logbook. and the monetary award granted by the Labor Arbiter Issue: Whether or not petitioner U-BIX should reimburse respondent Bandiola for alleged medical expenses of P7. In its Decision.
citing the entry number. U-BIX was also aware that the Orthopedic instructed Bandiola to return for further medical treatment. (4. Bandiola was on the way to Baguio. (2) When the employee officially files an application for leave of absence by reason of the contingency from which he suffers. and had them transferred to the Orthopedic. Had U-BIX performed its lawful duties. However. to Rosario District Hospital. Such logbook shall be made available for inspection to the duly authorized representatives of the System. and (4) When the employer can be reasonably presumed to have had knowledge of the employee's contingency. Tio
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. in view of the following circumstances: 4. incapacitated to work. However. Given the foregoing circumstances. U-BIX did not present any evidence showing that it had complied with these legal
Rommel A. Under Section B of ECC Board Resolution No. the SSS.3) The specific circumstances of the occurrence of the contingency have been such that the employer can be presumed to have readily known it soon thereafter. in accordance with Articles 205 and 206 of the Labor Code. At the time of the accident. the denial may be appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) within 30 days. page number and date.All entries in the employers logbook shall be made by the employer or any of his authorized official after verification of the contingencies or the employees absences for a period of a day or more.As a general rule. The claim is forwarded to the SSS. there is no dispute that Bandiola's leg injury was sustained in the course of his employment with U-BIX. or the ECC on appeal. where he was ordered by U-BIX to install furniture for an exhibit. could have properly considered whether or not Bandiola was entitled to reimbursement for his medical expenses. injury or death shall be given to the employer by the employee or by his dependents or anybody on his behalf within five days from the occurrence of the contingency. It is implicit that Bandiola needed further treatment for his broken leg and was. (3) When the employer provides medical services and/or medical supplies to the employee who suffers from the contingency. ART 206. the employer of a private company reports the work-related sickness or injury to the SSS.1) The employee was performing an official function for the employer when the contingency occurred. where they were confined. In the present case. as well as his other co-employees.2) The employee's contingency has been publicized through mass media outlets. NOTICE OF SICKNESS.4) Any other circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable presumption that the employer has been aware the contingency. or (4. were injured during the accident. who is obligated to enter the notice in a logbook within five days after notification. sickness or death of the employee need not be given to the employer in any of the following situations: (1) When the employee suffers the contingency within the employer's premises. INJURY OR DEATH Notice of sickness. issued on 5 August 1982. No notice to the employer shall be required if the contingency is known to the employer or his agents or representatives. Rey Reynes. or (4. as well as disability benefits while he was unable to work. notice of injury. the law provides an exception to the rule requiring an employee to notify his or her employer of his injuries. When the SSS denies the claim. thus. and to report the same to the SSS within five days after it was recorded in the logbook. the injured employee must notify his employer. the employer shall furnish the necessary certificate regarding information about any contingency appearing in the logbook. which decides on the validity of the claim. GENERAL RULE AND EXCEPTION ON NOTIFICATION . Moreover. U-BIX had the legal obligation to record pertinent information in connection with the injuries sustained by Bandiola in its logbook within five days after it had known about the injuries. Within five days after making the entry. Upon request by the System. U-BIX was aware that Bandiola. U-BIX admitted to providing Bandiola and his co-employees with medical assistance and it even sent its representative. 2127.
The cost of administration is low. . Mendoza. instead of an act of charity to be given at the employer's discretion.requirements. The expense and delay undergone by Bandiola since 1997 in obtaining reimbursement for his medical expenses of P7. over payment of benefits. .
Rommel A. it stresses at the same time that the claims for compensation are to be promptly and properly addressed. The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act was to secure workmen and their dependents against becoming objects of charity. U-BIX arrogated upon itself the duty of determining which medical expenses are proper for reimbursement.742. as in the past. under the theory of such statute. The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The law has since treated such compensation as a right. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled. as was done in this instance. the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. It had not even replied to Bandiola's allegations in his Position Paper. that is. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control. under the doctrine of man's humanity to man. In other words. this Court emphasized. and ultimately charged to the consumer. if the industry produces an injury. to provide a proper and prompt settlement of his claims. Tio
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. .50 very clearly defeat the purpose of the law. this Court further noted that while the present law protects employers from spurious and long overdue claims. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. that if the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment. Under such act injuries to workmen and employees are to be considered no longer as results of fault or negligence. Employee's Compensation Commission. the cost of compensation must be one of the elements to be liquidated and balanced in the course of consumption. dated 13 April 1998.As early as 1938. Compensation for such injuries is. HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF “EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION” . By failing to report Bandiola's injury to the SSS. the theory of law is that. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. employers no longer need to determine the validity of a claim or to defend themselves from spurious claims. In De Jesus v. but as the products of the industry in which the employee is concerned. The law substitutes for liability for negligence an entirely new conception. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. Instead. The payment of benefits is more prompt. in the case of Murillo v. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee. that is. There is neither notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. that its employees were not even members of the SSS. is now absent. . Their duties are thus limited to paying the monthly premiums and reporting the sickness. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. the cost of that injury shall be included in the cost of the product of the industry. which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant. by making a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to the employment. No employer opposes his claim. On the other hand. that labor laws have demonstrated an impetus towards ensuring that employees are compensated for work-related injuries. U-BIX disregarded the law and its purpose. The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. which the employees can claim. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. like any other item in the cost of production or transportation. More importantly. injury or death for which compensation is due. In doing so. Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation. it could unnecessarily delay and unjustifiably refuse to reimburse Bandiola for medical expenses even if they were adequately supported by receipts.
if not flat-out refused. moral shock. who were involved in the accident. Parañaque City. The amounts indicated therein range from P200. To automatically presume that Bandiola intended to defraud the company despite the absence of supporting evidence would constitute a hasty and unsubstantiated generalization. read: Art. Articles 2217 and 2219. he approached U-BIX three times for financial assistance in connection with his medical expenses. social humiliation and similar injury. Barangay B. Unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof. U-BIX could have easily confirmed with MCP or Dr. i. It refused. Clarisse. U-BIX asserts that no demand was made by the petitioner and that it only came to know of Bandiola's medical expenses when it received the Summons to attend a preliminary conference before the Labor Arbiter. fright and serious anxiety. if established. but he was refused. U-BIX's affirmative defense that the receipts are spurious is rejected due to utter lack of proof. no weight can be attached to the allegation that the receipts are spurious. The party who alleges the fact has the burden of proving it. Though
Rommel A. The burden of proof is assigned to the defendant of a claim when he or she alleges an affirmative defense. or around the time the accident occurred on 13 April 1997. Celestino Musngi. will be a good defense. Under the facts of the case. For his part. mental anguish. Celestino Musngi.U-BIX does not question its liability to pay for medical expenses incurred in connection with the 13 April 1997 accident. It also failed to present any evidence that these receipts are fake.00. Tio
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. If he or she fails to establish the facts of which the matter asserted is predicated. in the present case — but is one which. Dr.e. then it would have been more likely that it ignored. wounded feelings. however.. in connection with Article 21 of the Civil Code. besmirched reputation. there is no showing that these documents are false or falsified. it admits that it paid for all the medical expenses of its other employees. There is no question that moral damages may be awarded in cases when a wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant mental anguish. the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her favor. 2217. it failed to allege that it took any steps to check the authenticity of the receipts. as evidenced by the Certificate of Indigency issued by Barangay BF Homes Chairperson Florencia N. The receipts were issued on 24 April 1997 and 6 May 1997. which displays a prejudice against ordinary workers. serious anxiety. in this case — has the burden of proving it. If U-BIX had refused to take cognizance of the receipts presented during a quasi-judicial proceeding before a public officer. Amurao. the authenticity of the documents. As of 20 September 2006. One who alleges an affirmative defense that is denied by the complainant — the falsity of the receipts. From the face of the receipts. U-BIX alleges that it sent Rey Reynes to look for Bandiola in the address recorded in their office files. Sampaloc Site II-B.F. fright. U-BIX's continued and stubborn refusal to reimburse Bandiola's medical expenses was made evident during the mandatory conference before the Labor Arbiter when it refused to recognize the receipts shown to it. which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the complainant's cause of action — the existence of the receipts. In this case. U-BIX maintains that Bandiola kept the company in the dark regarding his medical expenses because he intended to file a baseless suit aimed at extorting money from the company. Homes. However. to consider the said receipts when the same were presented by a lowly employee.50 issued by MCP and his attending physician. but that he no longer resided therein. such as Bandiola.00 to P2. Bandiola insists that before filing the case with the NLRC. Bandiola contested this allegation by stating that he had not changed his residence. Absent any proof. Bandiola presented eight receipts with a total amount of P7. to reimburse Bandiola for further medical expenses on the ground that the receipts were counterfeit and belatedly presented to U-BIX. Bandiola is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. his or her cause will not succeed. Moral damages include physical suffering.742. an avoidance of the claim. This Court finds it implausible that a worker who received less than minimum wage would choose to initiate legal proceedings before even seeking to collect from his employer. Bandiola still resided at the same address.936.BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE DEFENDANT OF A CLAIM . Bandiola identified the persons he spoke to as Rey Reynes and a certain Ms. who issued said receipts.
As regards the award of moral damages. It is not difficult to accept Bandiola's claim that he suffered mental anguish. 32. of the spiritual and/or psychological status quo ante. vs. it need not have defended itself from what it perceived to be spurious claims. The Labor Code provides for the medical expenses. who were reimbursed for their medical expenses. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21. 34. It should enable the injured parties to obtain means. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco (petitioners) were engaged in 1999 and 1996. U-BIX unreasonably refused to reimburse him for the expenses.742. Instead.incapable of pecuniary computation. good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.50. Tio
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. 178827. The prolonged litigation of his valid claims is not the only miserable situation which the present labor laws sought to prevent.00 as moral damages. this Court sustains the award of P25. thereafter. U-BIX was clearly indulging in malicious conduct. in addition to the moral. It reads: Art. serious anxiety and fright when UBIX left him without any options for financial support while he was suffering from and rendered incapacitated by work-related injuries. March 4. In other words. which are given by law to injured employees. Pepito (respondent doctor) to work in her clinic
Rommel A. 27. temperate. liquidated or compensatory damages. 26. this Court has ruled that there is no hard and fast rule in determining the fair amount for moral damages. in light of the sufferings sustained by Bandiola. 2229. He was severely distressed by his plight that he felt that he could no longer continue to work for U-BIX.R. 2009 FACTS: Registered nurses Jeromie D. failed to extend the same "financial aid" it extended to other employees who were involved in the same accident. Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. respectively. rightfully imposed against U-BIX. as well as disability benefits of workers suffering from work-related injuries and recognizes such compensation as their right. 30. diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured party has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. demonstrates bad faith. 28. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. thus.000. By singling out Bandiola from its other employees. it took upon itself the duty of determining the validity of Bandiola's claims and unjustifiably refused to reimburse his properly receipted medical expenses. All that U-BIX was required to do was to report the injury. since each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. Indeed. Shangri-la’s Mactan Island Resort et al. and forcing him to litigate for ten years in order to claim the unsubstantial amount of P7. and. Art. Therefore.. but the pathetic situation wherein a laborer is placed at the mercy of his or her employer for recompense that is his or hers by right. U-BIX's unjustified and continued refusal to reimburse Bandiola after it failed to report his injury to the SSS. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for public good. by Dr. Jessica Joyce R. and their imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. U-BIX failed to perform its legal obligation to report to the SSS the injuries suffered by Bandiola. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals. by way of example or correction for the public good. Escasinas et al. and therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. and 35. the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible. 2219. 21.. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission. despite the receipts he presented. AWARD ON MORAL DAMAGES . a system has been put in place for the prompt collection of the benefits. Exemplary damages are. No. Art. G. After it was shown the receipts for the medical expenses Bandiola paid for in connection with the injuries. 29.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la. fire and supervise the work of nurses under her.at respondent Shangri-la’s Mactan Island Resort (Shangri-la) in Cebu of which she was a retained physician. and thus ordered Shangri-la to grant them the wages and benefits due them as regular employees from the time their services were engaged.(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC decision. – It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of: (a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces. contrary to petitioners’ postulation. in which case the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of the workers. non-payment of holiday pay. does not make it mandatory for a covered establishment to employ health personnel. that Article 157 of the Labor Code. Art. concluding that all aspects of employment of petitioners being under the supervision and control of respondent doctor and since Shangri-la is not principally engaged in the business of providing medical or healthcare services. Tio
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. and that respondent doctor is a legitimate individual contractor who has the power to hire. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. 280 of the Labor Code states that if a worker performs work usually necessary or desirable in the business of an employer. and that the Memorandum of Agreement between the respondent and the respondent doctor amply shows that respondent doctor was in fact engaged by Shangri-la on retainer basis. Whether or not Article 157 of the Labor Code make it mandatory for covered establishment to employ health personnel. the Article provides: ART. Thus. the NLRC declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Shangri-la and petitioners. he cannot be automatically deemed a regular employee. Shangri-la claimed. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by appropriate regulations the services that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article. that the services of nurses is not germane nor indispensable to its operations. underpayment of wages. noting that the petitioners usually perform work which is necessary and desirable to Shangri-la’s business. Upon appeal. even if Art. Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Shangri-la and petitioners. petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for regularization. HELD: The Court holds that. when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300). where no registered nurse is available. claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-la. and
Rommel A. ISSUES: 1. 2. night shift differential and 13th month pay differential against respondents. that petitioners were not its employees but of respondent doctor. however. as amended. In late 2002. petitioners could not be regarded as regular employees of Shangri-la. It ruled that contrary to the finding of the LA. a part-time physician and dentist. and an emergency clinic. 157 does not require the engagement of full-time nurses as regular employees of a company employing not less than 50 workers. under which she could hire her own nurses and other clinic personnel.
Against the above-listed determinants. the employer’s power with respect to the hiring. De Vera: x x x while it is true that the provision requires employers to engage the services of medical practitioners in certain establishments depending on the number of their employees. SSS contributions and other benefits of the staff. Indeed. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type of employment of the person engaged to provide the services. the physician and dentist may be engaged on retained basis. Shangri-la. i. even without being hired as an employee. Under the foregoing provision. materials and labor. Tio
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. the provision merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees. for Article 157 must not be read alongside Art. the nature and extent of the work. So De Vera teaches: x x For. the control of the premises.The term “full-time” in Art. Article 280 of the Labor Code. (3) the payment of wages by whatever means. we take it that any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of another. respondent doctor is the one who underwrites the following: salaries. is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship. appliances. (2) power of dismissal.e. is mandated to “furnish” its employees with the services of a full-time registered nurse. 157. and the mode. regular and casual. As held in Philippine Global Communications vs. the maintenance of a clinic and provision of medical services to its employees is required under Art. As it is. existence of an employer. group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance for the staff with minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employee’s last drawn
Rommel A. firing and payment of the contractor’s workers. x x x The phrase “services of a full-time registered nurse” should thus be taken to refer to the kind of services that the nurse will render in the company’s premises and to its employees. The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business. which are not directly related to Shangri-la’s principal business – operation of hotels and restaurants. and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300). a part-time physician who needed to stay in the premises of the non-hazardous workplace for two (2) hours. subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency. no employer shall engage the services of a physician or dentist who cannot stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours. the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work. group life. which employs more than 200 workers. Where the undertaking is nonhazardous in nature. not the manner of his engagement. and an emergency clinic which means that it should provide or make available such medical and allied services to its employees. with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. On the other hand.(c) The services of a full-time physician. as written. the skill required. Besides. dentist and full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic. in the case of those engaged on part-time basis. That Shangri-la provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests does not necessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and investment. no matter how necessary for the latter’s business. and not less than eight ( hours in the case of those employed on fulltime basis. the control and supervision of the work to another. quoted by the appellate court. the term and duration of the relationship. adding that the law. the duty to supply the premises. manner and terms of payment. not employ. As to payment of wages. a part-time physician and dentist. In cases of hazardous workplaces. the Court holds that respondent doctor is a legitimate independent contractor. not necessarily to hire or employ a service provider. and (4) the power to control the worker’s conduct. only requires the employer “to retain”. This set-up is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. 280 in order to vest employeremployee relationship on the employer and the person so engaged.employee relationship is established by the presence of the following determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers. nothing is there in the law which says that medical practitioners so engaged be actually hired as employees. tools..
156381. DELA ROCA. 1997 to May 1.. pay their SSS premium as well as their wages if they were not indeed her employees. provides:
Rommel A.R. 1997. EMMANUEL M. were employed as construction workers at Formosa Plastics Corporation.” Likewise. It is unlikely that respondent doctor would report petitioners as workers. each respondent would receive a monthly salary of NT$15.00 monthly retainer fee and 70% share of the service charges from Shangri-la’s guests who avail of the clinic services. 2005] Respondents. There is no question that petitioner violated its contract with respondents. alleged that petitioner hired them as construction workers for its Taiwan-based principal/employer Formosa Plastics Corporation. that they were forced to resign and to pre-terminate their employment contracts in view of petitioner’s breach of their provisions. Undoubtedly. excluding respondents.” Clearly. Instead. VILLENA. Ltd. the termination of respondents’ services is without just or valid cause. VIAJE. JOEL C. as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by petitioners. Pursuant to the parties’ contracts of employment. 15. EDGARDO B. No. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [G. 1998. Ltd. GERARDO R. AMADO E. assisted by MECO officials. With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff.” and “it was not their fault that they were left out from among those workers who were considered for employment by the foreign employer. they sought assistance from Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) officials who directed them to sign separate affidavits alleging that they were assigned. In fine. Their employment covered a period of one (1) year or from May 1. Aggrieved. MIGRANT WORKER’S ACT AND OVERSEAS FILIPINO ACT OF 1995 AND RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT JSS INDOCHINA CORPORATION. petitioner did not assign them as construction workers for Formosa Plastics Corporation. it is not petitioners’ employer. Tio
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. they were directed to work as cable tray/pipe tract workers at Shin Kwan Enterprise Co.salary. respondents pre-terminated their respective contracts of employment as they refused to work after being assigned as cable tray/pipe tract workers by Formosa Plastics Corporation to 33 KV Worksite being administered by Shin Kwan Construction Company Limited. “Clinic Policies and Employee Manual” claimed to have been prepared by respondent doctor exists. CALDAIRA. On May 17. Section 10 of RA 8042. VS. But upon their arrival. there was no employer on hand. but as cable tray/pipe tract workers at Shin Kwan Enterprise Co.00. It is thus presumed that said document. sourced from her P60. to which petitioners gave their conformity and in which they acknowledged their coterminus employment status. HENRY G. The Labor Arbiter found that respondents’ “decision to resign from their employment were made by force of circumstances not attributable to their own fault. HILARIO Z. MENDOZA AND GERONIMO O. and not the employee manual being followed by Shangri-la’s regular workers. it is not disputed that a document. PETITIONER. governs how they perform their respective tasks and responsibilities.000. ASOR. they were repatriated to the Philippines. DAYRIT. only 20 workers. TIBUYIN. LAUDENCIO O. As found by the Labor Arbiter. MARIANO C. Issue: Whether respondents were illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner.. the NLRC held that respondents’ “decision to go home to the Philippines was justified in view of the evident breach of contract” by petitioner. as “it clearly appeared that upon their arrival at the jobsite. FERRER. RESPONDENTS. the NLRC and the Appellate Court. NOCON. claiming that. in their complaint. October 14. not as construction workers for Formosa Plastics Corporation. Petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint. SALAZAR. as well as value added taxes and withholding taxes. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act. both labor tribunals correctly concluded.360. MELITON A.
G.“SECTION 10. whether for profit or not. it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. Thus. contract services. It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment. as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency. while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. hiring. Petition denied. it was clearly established that appellant is not a mere employee of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. Appellant’s act of
Rommel A. plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. procuring workers and includes referring. that such non-licensee or non-holder who. utilizing. As the crewing manager. The Court sustained the findings of the trial court. — In case of termination of overseas employment without just. It shall likewise include the following acts. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. transporting. FLORENCIO O. when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. No.R. November 11. otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided. However. as amended. and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment. CAPT. To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. with no ceiling. promising or advertising for employment abroad. in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. contracting. (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment. the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. 442. Verily. whether a non-licensee. whether committed by any persons. 2005 Respondent’s guilt which has been proven beyond reasonable doubt appealed that he was not engaged in illegal recruitment. licensee or holder of authority. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage. RA No. it is inconsequential (insignificant) that appellant committed large scale illegal recruitment while Great Eastern Shipping Agency. non-holder. valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract. 168445. GASACAO. 8042 defines illegal recruitment which shall mean any act of canvassing. Inc. Money Claims. or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance. Tio
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. whichever is less. with interest at 12% per annum. in any manner. The Court thus finds that the trial court committed no reversible error in not appreciating that the manning agency was a holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the private complainants. respondents who were unjustly dismissed from work are actually entitled to an amount representing their three (3) months salary considering that their employment contract has a term of exactly one (1) year. it was appellant who made representations with the private complainants that he can secure overseas employment for them upon payment of the cash bond. plus a full refund of their placement fee. it appears that even licensees or holders of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment should they commit any of the above-enumerated acts. From the testimonies of the private complainants. was holding a valid authority. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. enlisting.
intimidation and pressure from private respondents’ principal abroad. Republic of China. while it may be true that petitioners were not coerced into giving up their jobs. 1999. five complainants testified against appellant’s acts of illegal recruitment. They were likewise informed that the dormitory which would serve as their living quarters was still under construction. from 8:00 p. thus entitling them to benefits plus damages. coercion. As the Court has held previously. 8042. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found that petitioners admitted they resigned from their jobs without force. No. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. he collected cash bonds and promised their deployment notwithstanding the proscription against its collection under Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R. Petitioners claim they were made to work twelve hours a day. the petitioners did not voluntarily resign. 8042. the deplorable. Tio
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. 1999. 1999.m.00. unreasonable or unlikely. In effect. Such failure to deploy constitutes a violation of Section 6 (l) of RA No.A.. 3D Pre-Color Plastic. according to the Labor Arbiter. thereby rendering his acts tantamount to economic sabotage. Upon arriving at the job site. and JULIET MENDEZ. (3D) in Taiwan. Inc. petitioners were not paid any salary for work rendered on December 11-15. oppressive and sub-human working conditions drove petitioners to resign. MYRNA RAMONES. No.promising the private complainants that they will be deployed abroad within three months after they have paid the cash bond clearly shows that he is engaged in illegal recruitment.m. They booked a flight home. Act No.R. 8042 which state that: SEC. 2006 Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by private respondent Join International Corporation (JIC). vs. Issue: Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed under Rep. 159832. They were requested to temporarily bear with the inconvenience but were assured that their dormitory would be completed in a short time. due to unbearable working conditions. to its principal. they had to ask permission to use the men’s comfort room. Worse. MERCEDITA ACUÑA. under a uniformly-worded employment contract for a period of two years. The NLRC also ruled that there was constructive dismissal since working under said conditions was unbearable. In addition. to 8:00 a. when it became clear that appellant cannot deploy the private complainants without their fault. Although he informed them that it is optional. they were made to sign another contract which stated that their salary was only NT$11. constructive dismissal covers the involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible. According to the Labor Arbiter. a factory owned by 3D. they were constrained to inform management that they were leaving. they were made to sign a written waiver. with 18 other contract workers they left for Taiwan. he failed to return the amount of the cash bond paid by them. HON. Petitioners alleged that they were brought to a “small room with a cement floor so dirty and smelling with foul odor (sic)”. Gasacao’s assertion that he was unaware of the prohibition against the collection of bonds or cash deposits from applicants is unavailing. G. On December 9. – In no case shall an employment agency require any bond or cash deposit from the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. 60. Forty women were jam-packed in the room and each person was given a pillow. The defense of good faith is neither available. at their own expense. May 5. Before they left. a licensed recruitment agency. Herein private respondent Elizabeth Alañon is the president of Join International Corporation. It is an established dictum that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Since the ladies’ comfort room was out of order. when there is a demotion
Rommel A. The petitioners averred that on December 16. In this case. COURT OF APPEALS and JOIN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and/or ELIZABETH ALAÑON.840.
the law considers the matter. daily time records and similar documents before allowing claims for overtime pay. Since AIMS was the local agency which recruited Lacerna for Proxy. The claim of overseas workers against foreign employers could not be subjected to same rules of evidence and procedure easily obtained by complainants whose employers are locally based. The contract of Lacerna as approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) reveals that Proxy was her designated principal employer. In this case. AIMS argument that it cannot be held liable for the monetary claims of Lacerna because its contract was limited only to Lacerna’s employment with Low See Ting and when she resigned as domestic helper of the latter. credence must be given to the said official records. the burden of proving just or authorized cause for termination rests with the foreign based employer/principal and the local based entity which recruited the worker both being solidarily liable for liabilities arising from the illegal dismissal of the worker. between the alleged Lacerna’s resignation letter to Low See Ting and the letters of the Hong Kong Immigration Department showing that Lacerna could not have been employed by her. the contract was allegedly extinguished making AIMS no longer privy to the subsequent employment contract entered into by Proxy and Lacerna was untenable. coerced or intimidated into signing a quitclaim waiver in the amounts of P13.00 a month.R.670. and legal cause for the termination.080 and P16. G. a case of illegal dismissal. The records of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong belie the contention of AIMS that Lacerna was employed by Low See Ting. the Court of Appeals correctly declared Lacerna’s termination illegal since no reason was given to justify her termination. In termination cases involving Filipino workers recruited for overseas employment. In dismissing her. a recruitment entity in the Philippines. Neither did Proxy explain the ground for her dismissal. The claim for overtime pay should not have been disallowed because of the failure of the petitioners to substantiate them. VS. Petition denied. or when a clear discrimination. October 9. The Court rule for the petitioners. 169652. may AIMS be held liable for the monetary claims of Lacerna. However. While normally we would require the presentation of payrolls. the agreed salary was HK$3. The Court answered in the affirmative. the liability of AIMS was not extinguished. a Hong Kong based recruitment agency hired her through AIMS. COURT OF APPEALS and ANICETA LACERNA. valid. P15. it is solidarily liable with the latter for
Rommel A. It is therefore the private respondents who could have obtained the records of their principal to refute petitioners’ claim for overtime pay. (AIMS). Donna gave no reason for her termination. Nor was there a disparity between the amount of the quitclaim and the amount actually due the petitioners. even granting that Lacerna truly resigned as domestic helper of Low See Ting.in rank or a diminution in pay. Issue: Was Lacerna illegally dismissed? If yes. a perusal of the records reveals that petitioners were not in any way deceived.200 respectively. INC. And where there is no showing of a clear. in this case.640. and the contract duration was for two years. By their failure to do so. that would be requiring the near-impossible. There is no dispute that the last employer of Lacerna was Donna and not Daisy Lee because the Hong Kong government directed her repatriation before she could sign her contract with the latter. Hence. No. insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee. 2006 The facts as alleged by Lacerna show that Proxy Maid Services Centre (Proxy). Tio
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. ASIAN INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES. although quitclaims are frowned at under the law. private respondents waived their defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the petitioners. especially so that AIMS never assailed their authenticity. Moreover.
00. and sought the dismissal of the complaint. 2007 FACTS: Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. whichever is less. However.R. shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. Eventually. the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. plus placement fee of P18. and Managing Director of PCIB. To detach itself from the liability of Proxy. when she received a letter from Remegio David -. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency. she was promoted to Manager position. No.
Rommel A. Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them. In case of termination of overseas employment without just.. until September 1999. Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected by any substitution. valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract.liabilities arising from her illegal dismissal. plus salaries for the unexpired portion of her employment contract or for three months for every year of the unexpired term. Section 10 of R.A. 157376. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being. provides: SEC. as provided by law. Sim vs.informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. to absolve AIMS from liability based on its unsubstantiated claim that it is not privy to the subsequent employment provided by Proxy for Lacerna would be to undermine the avowed policy of the State.010. Thus. Proxy did not demand a new placement fee from Lacerna. shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. European Head of PCIBank. in transferring Lacerna from one employer to another. NLRC et al. Tio
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. The Constitution mandates the protection of labor and the sympathetic concern of the State for the workers conformably to the social justice policy. October 2.the Senior Officer. the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering AIMS to pay HK$11. the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. Thus. – The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. The joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. Verily. 10. AIMS must show by clear and convincing evidence that its contract is limited to Lacerna’s employment by Low See Ting. The illegal dismissal of Lacerna entitles her to the full reimbursement of placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum. whichever is less. On the contrary.Europe -. No.0000. aside from its bare allegation. plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. Money Claims. AIMS presented no proof to corroborate its claim. alleging that she was initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office.00 corresponding to three months of her salary or its equivalent in the Philippine Peso at the time of payment. amendment or modification made locally or in a foreign country of the said contract. G. This only shows that Proxy’s conduct was in accordance with the original contract executed with AIMS and not on an entirely new and separate agreement entered into in Hong Kong. 8042. This interpretation is in accord with the rule that all doubts in the construction of labor contracts should be resolved in favor of the working class.
the CA dismissed the petition due to petitioner's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. ISSUE: Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. In other words. However. she held a position of trust. and. which was affirmed by the NLRC. whether petitioner. exceptions. HELD: Under Rule 65. However. do not fall within the exception from the filing of a motion for reconsideration. These are mixed questions of fact and law and. the CA was not in error when it dismissed the petition. as such. Petitioner also contends that the issue at bench is purely a question of law. Petitioner argues that filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC would be merely an exercise in futility and useless. hence. which was denied by respondent. 2002. petitioner failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. It was only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA's resolution of dismissal and in the petition filed in this case that petitioner justified her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration. speedy. indeed. Consequently. But it is not for petitioner to determine whether it is so. More so since petitioner failed to show any error on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in ruling that she was dismissed for cause. Tio
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. a careful reading would reveal that the issues raised in this case are mixed questions of fact and law. It was wrong for the Labor Arbiter to rule that "labor relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial jurisdiction. the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal. Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. The legality of petitioner's dismissal hinges on the question of whether there was an employer-employee relationship." Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission. however. It is well-settled doctrine that the basic premise for dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Labor Arbiter stressed that labor relations system in the Philippines had no extra-territorial jurisdiction. the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. 2003. The Court notes. committed a breach of trust and confidence justifying her dismissal. In a Resolution dated October 29. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was nonetheless denied by the CA per Resolution dated February 26. the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit. Complainant as General Manager is an employee whom the respondent company reposed its trust and confidence. if in the affirmative. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. There are of course. a palpable error in the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case.On September 3. petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On appeal. 2001. an exception to the rule. In fact.
Rommel A. the case must still be dismissed. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. And assuming that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. or any plain. the Court notes that the petition filed before the CA failed to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. the present recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Hence. This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.
8042 provides that the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual. 1997. 1997. On February 17.A. it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from employer-employee relations. The private respondent claimed that he was underpaid in the amount of US$110. among whom are overseas Filipino workers. the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual. 2008 FACTS: Private respondent Reynaldo Chua was hired by the petitioner shipping company..) No. Also. 1997.
Rommel A. the Court finds no compelling reason to relax the rule on the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. for brevity) and the petitioner's principal. 1997 incident. In any event. the vessel's master. on March 9. The petitioner justified its monthly deduction made for union dues against the private respondent's salary in view of an alleged existing CBA between the Norwegian Seaman's Union (NSU. 1997. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. exemplary and other forms of damages.R. 162195. April 8. 1997. Bahia Shipping Services vs. He further asserted that his salaries were also deducted US$20. No. Section 10 of Republic Act (R. 1997.Moreover.00 per month for that same period of five (5) months. subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC. Money Claims. WHEREFORE. Inc. the private respondent reported for his working station one and one-half (1½) hours late. Blackfriars Shipping Co. the private respondent filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims. the master of the vessel served to the private respondent an official warning-termination form pertaining to the said incident. or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Tio
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. The petitioner further asseverated that the private respondent has violated the terms and conditions of his contract as manifested in the said official warning-termination form by always coming late when reporting for duty even prior to the February 15.. including termination disputes involving all workers. provides: SECTION 10. the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide. Under these provisions. moral. and considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC's factual findings as regards the validity of petitioner's dismissal are accorded great weight and respect and even finality when the same are supported by substantial evidence. Thereafter. the petition is DENIED. Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R. Chua. private respondent was dismissed from the service on the strength of an unsigned and undated notice of dismissal. as a restaurant waiter on board a luxury cruise ship liner M/S Black Watch pursuant to a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) approved employment contract dated October 9.00 per month by the petitioner for alleged union dues. 1996 for a period of nine (9) months from October 18. On March 8. moral. ship captain Thor Fleten conducted an inquisitorial hearing to investigate the said incident. G. Ltd. Bahia Shipping Services. 8042. On February 15. within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint. An alleged record or minutes of the said investigation was attached to the said dismissal notice. On March 24.A. 1996 to July 17. since the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition before it for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. No. exemplary and other forms of damages. Private respondent argued that it was his first offense committed on board the vessel.
1997. 1997 or four months prior to the expiration of his employment contract on July 17. 8042. Finally. that the second option which imposes a three months – salary cap applies only when the term of the overseas contract is fixed at one year or longer. Petitioner assails the ruling of the CA for being based on the faulty premise that respondent incurred tardiness only once when in fact he had done so habitually. As such. iii) Whether or not respondent is entitled to overtime pay which was incorporated in his award for the unexpired portion of the contract. the Court defers to the concurrent assessments of the LA and NLRC. wherein the overseas contract involved was only for six months. for the evaluation of evidence and the appreciation of the credibility of witnesses fall within their expertise. the inclusion of his "guaranteed overtime" pay into his monthly salary as basis in the
Rommel A. Tio
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.A. Upon a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner. as affirmed by the CA. it follows that the latter is entitled to payment of his salary for the unexpired portion of his contract. as provided under Republic Act (R. ISSUES: i) Whether or not the Court of Appeals could grant additional affirmative relief by increasing the award despite the fact that respondent did not appeal the decision of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. v. Mira. Whether respondent had been habitually tardy prior to February 15. 1998. No. 1997 when he reported for work 1½ hours late is purely factual in nature. In Skippers Pacific. the commensurate penalty for such single tardiness would have been suspension for one or two weeks. otherwise. 2003 Decision assailed herein. v. Inc. ii) Whether or not reporting for work one and one-half (1½) hours late and abandoning his work are valid grounds for dismissal. the CA rendered the August 28. he could not have rendered any overtime work.) No. Section 10 of R. whichever is less." The CA correctly applied the interpretation of the Court in Marsaman Manning Agency. It being improbable that respondent rendered overtime work during the unexpired term of his contract. the Court comes to the issue on whether in the computation of the foregoing award. Petitioner contends that there is no factual or legal basis for the inclusion of said amount because. 8042 which is applicable in that the overseas worker who was illegally dismissed is entitled to payment of all his salaries covering the entire unexpired period of his contract.A. holding petitioner liable to respondent for illegal dismissal and unauthorized deductions. the first option applies in that the overseas worker shall be entitled payment of all his salaries for the entire unexpired period of his contract. HELD: The LA declared the dismissal of respondent illegal for the reason that the infraction he committed of being tardy by 1½ hour should not have been penalized by petitioner with the ultimate punishment of termination. respondent's "guaranteed overtime" pay amounting to US$197. modifying the NLRC decision as to the monetary award.00 per month should be included as part of his salary.A. entitles an overseas worker who has been illegally dismissed to "his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Inc. No. This time. after respondent's repatriation. It being settled that the dismissal of respondent was illegal. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision but modified the monetary award therein. 8042. considering that his employment was pre-terminated on March 9.The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dated March 5. rather. petitioner's contention is well-taken. the Court held that it is the first option provided under Section 10 of R. National Labor Relations Commission.
Trans-Global. Masangcay instituted a complaint against Trans-Global and Ventnor. Petitioner Marciano Masangcay was hired by Ventnor. as an oiler on M/T Eastern Jewel. because of lower abdominal pain and left loin pain with difficulty in urinating. 172800. et al.
Rommel A. Masangkay vs. Upon his arrival in Manila. 2008 FACTS: Ventnor is a foreign company based in Liberia and engaged in maritime commerce. Labor Arbiter found Masangcay’s complaint meritorious and ordered Trans-Global. Masangcay noticed a “reddish discoloration of his urine upon urination. declared Masangcay fit to go back to work after a regular medical examination.computation of his salaries for the entire unexpired period of his contract has no factual or legal basis and the same should have been disallowed. While on board M/T Eastern Jewel. de la Cruz of the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) for a second opinion. an oil tanker. Masangcay alleged that his illness was contracted during the term of his Contract of Employment. No. Dr. damages and attorney’s fees. the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Masangcay was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center for treatment. in behalf of Ventnor. paid Masangcay his full 120 days Sick Leave Pay as well as all his medical and hospital expenses and professional fees of his attending physicians. and co-respondent herein.R. a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Ventnor. he was informed by the Port Captain that he can no longer be deployed due to negative reports about him coming from its principal. G. dela Cruz pronounced that Masangcay was fit to resume work as all his laboratory examinations showed normal results. before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the payment of disability benefit. the Commission affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. On appeal to the NLRC. Tio
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... Trans-Global’s designated physician. Masangcay was then referred to Dr. Better removal of the right pelvi-ureteric calculus was the recommended treatment but Masangcay refused surgical intervention and insisted on being repatriated back to the Philippines instead. Ventnor. Trans-Global. Accordingly. RULING: We rule in the negative. Trans-Global. and Estaniel to pay Masangcay for disability benefit. United Arab Emirates. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of TransGlobal and Ventnor. WHEREFORE. through its manning agent. Masangcay was asked to report back to the office of Trans-Global for deployment line-up. including Trans-Global’s President. When Masangcay reported to the premises of Trans-Global. This happened several times and later became associated with bouts of left lower abdominal pain radiating to the loin area. Hence. Trans-Global Maritime Agency Inc. An operation was made and proved successful. ISSUE: Whether or not Masangcay is entitled to disability benefits on account of his present condition. Masangcay was immediately referred to Trans-Global’s designated physician. Michael Estaniel. The removal of the non-functioning right kidney was advised but Masangcay refused. however. October 17. Reynaldo C. Masangcay was brought to the Fujairah Hospital. It is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent. It nullified and set aside the challenged Resolutions of the NLRC for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
To be entitled to compensation and benefits under said provision. it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled.Under Sec. it still does not entitle him to compensation and benefits for a permanent disability. in order to hold Trans-Global and Ventnor liable for payment of his claims. co-petitioner ODF Jell ASA. Chronic renal failure. at the minimum. Magsaysay Maritime Corp. Masangcay must prove that he is suffering from permanent total or partial disability due to a work-related illness occurring during the term of his contract. aggravated by his working conditions at the M/T Eastern Jewel. No. The dispute could have easily been resolved had the parties stayed true to the provisions of Sec. Masangcay must also present evidence that such infirmity was work-related. et al. Velasquez. chronic or otherwise.. or at the very least aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was contracted for. While on duty as second cook on board the vessel M/T Bow Favour. much less presents no proof. paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment. G. Without the opinion of a third doctor. This. Tio
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. which included the medical certifications of their respective physicians. Velasquez was hired by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation as second cook for its foreign principal. there is nothing on record to substantiate the same and would have justified an award of compensation on top of the aid or assistance already extended to him by Trans-Global and Ventnor. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. that the illness was caused or aggravated by his employment. his body temperature reached
Rommel A.. but it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted for. he did not do. November 14.. But even assuming that Masangcay is suffering from chronic renal failure.R. respondent suffered high fever and was unable to work. 32 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. 32-A thereof. or that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions. There is no substantiation that the progression of his ailment was brought about largely by the conditions of his job as an oiler. or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. et al. 20(b). 20(b). But other than Masangcay’s bare avowal of entitlement just because an illness became manifest during his contract of employment. 2008 FACTS: Respondent Jaime M. nor an occupational disease under Sec. Masangcay does not even assert that his illness is work-related and/or was. Proof that he not only acquired or contracted his illness during the term of his employment contract is clearly not enough. showing a reasonable connection that the nature of his employment or working conditions between the conditions of his work and his illness. By the fourth day. Masangcay makes no allegation. The evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how he contracted or developed such disease and on how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same. is neither listed as a disability under Sec. He took fever relieving medicine but his condition worsened. of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels: permanent total or partial disability suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract must be caused by work-related illness or injury. His medical history and/or records prior to his deployment as an oiler in M/T Eastern Jewel were neither presented nor alluded to in order to demonstrate that the working conditions on board said vessel increased the risk of contracting renal failure. The burden is clearly upon Masangcay to present substantial evidence. paragraph 6. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. vs. 179802. we are constrained to make a ruling based on the evidences submitted by the parties and made part of the records of this case. Accordingly.
R. However. CA set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. respondent refused to accept the assessment made by the company-designated physician that he is fit to work. then the seaman is bound by such declaration. He claimed that he was compelled to seek medical treatment from an independent doctor.9°C. Alegre) and the physician appointed by respondent (Dr. Efren Vicaldo who diagnosed him to be suffering from staphylococcal bacteremia. 167614. multiple metastatic abcesses. Vicaldo). Respondent alleged that upon his repatriation. No. pleural effusion and hypertension and declared his disability as Impediment Grade 1 (120%). damages and attorney’s fees but petitioners refused to pay. The parties are both bound by the provisions of the POEA Contract which declares that the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated physician. Vicaldo treated or examined respondent only once. The NLRC rendered a decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. March 24. the credibility of the findings of company-designated doctors was properly evaluated by the NLRC. considering the amount of time and effort the company doctor gave to monitoring and treating respondent’s condition. Vicaldo was based on a single medical report which outlined the alleged findings and medical history of respondent despite the fact that Dr. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability claim of the seafarer. 2009 – En Banc
Rommel A. It is undisputed that the recommendation of Dr. illness allowance/ reimbursement of medical expenses. He consulted a certain Dr. Serrano vs.3 of the POEA clearly illustrate that respondent’s disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician. when the seaman’s private physician disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician. a third doctor’s opinion may be availed of in determining his disability. The POEA Contract is clear in its provisions when it provided who should determine the disability grading or fitness to work of seafarers. Gallant Maritime Services et al. Vicaldo further concluded that respondent was “unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity. he was not confined to St. RULING: CA committed reversible error in ignoring the medical assessment of the company-designated physician. respondent filed a claim for disability benefits. As between the findings of the company-designated physician (Dr. As such. It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. The POEA contract recognizes only the disability grading provided by the company-designated physicians. Respondent was brought to a hospital in Singapore where he was confined.” Hence. the former deserves to be given greater evidentiary weight. We agree with the NLRC that the doctor more qualified to assess the disability grade of the respondent seaman is the doctor who regularly monitored and treated him. The company-designated physician cleared respondent for work resumption upon finding that his infection has subsided after successful medication. Section 20 B. Dr. Thereafter. he was repatriated to the Philippines.. Luke’s Medical Center as he expected. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error when it upheld the findings of respondent’s private physician rather than the findings of the company-designated physician. Tio
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.40. The company-designated physician possessed personal knowledge of the actual condition of respondent. then such declaration should be given credence. If the companydesignated physician declares him fit to work. This however was not resorted to by the parties. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of respondent. as here. Since the company-designated physician in this case deemed the respondent as fit to work. In this particular case. G.
00. In awarding Soriano a lump-sum salary of US$8. ordering MSI to pay Soriano. the date of his departure.770.” MSI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed. he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract.00/compensation per month. vacation leave pay = US$2. + US$490.50 US$4. He filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26.”
Rommel A. Soriano also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services.50
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to Soriano by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2. jointly and severally.669. US$1. 1999. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal.applying the subject clause. fixed overtime pay.00 because R. petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1. the LA applied the salary rate of US$2. and for vacation leave pay.0 hours per week US$700. Ltd. MSI did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.400. Inc. Inc. upon the assurance and representation of MSI that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.00/month. In a Decision dated June 15. Soriano refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26.00/month.00 US$4. consisting of petitioner's “[b]asic salary. 1998 up to March 19.00. He got a favourable decision with the Labor Arbiter in the amount of US$ 8.00/month + US$700. but at the time of his repatriation on May 26.00. at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following: 1.442.000.590.00 to US$1.00 TOTAL US$4. Hence.400. the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only -. However. leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. 2.00 days per month
On March 19. 8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay. and Marlow Navigation Co. which should be proven to have been actually performed. under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions: Duration of contract Position Basic monthly salary Hours of work Overtime Vacation leave with pay 12 months Chief Officer US$1.00 per month 7.Facts: Antonio M. Three (3) months salary $1.400 x 3 Salary differential 45.400.. OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. 1998.590.245.590. Soriano’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19.00 10% Attorney’s fees424.A. 1998.rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract . v. 3. 2000.00.200. in Philippine currency. Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services. 1998. Tio
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.770. No.73 as well moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. the NLRC modified the LA Decision.00 48.
the above-named accused. in the Municipality of Malolos. Philippines. But with the enactment of R.400. That in or about the month of November.00] to him. 181475. 8042. prior to R. and the balance of P12. and by means of deceit of similar import. by means of deceit. G. Domingo. illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap. specifically the adoption of the subject clause.
Rommel A.000 in two installments – P2. Bulacan. On his scheduled departure. Manzo] to give. No. No. which the accused misappropriated to himself.500 during his medical examination at Newton Clinic in Makati City. but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Rogelio Cambay: Domingo recruited him for a painting job in Marianas Island for which he paid him the amount of P15. as in fact the latter gave and delivered the amount of [P14. false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations. appellant did not show up at their meeting place in Malolos. In sum. Domingo.00]. in the municipality of Malolos. did then and there willfully. People vs. The NLRC denied the motion.R. undertake illegal recruitment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that. province of Bulacan. the around one hundred people who waited for him organized a search party to look for him in Zambales. Soriano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1. province of Bulacan. The Informations for 23 counts of Estafa. placement or deployment of Wilson A. hence. 2000. 2000. Tio
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.Soriano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 2000.A. 2009 Facts: In or about the month of November 1999 to January 20.000.500 before the scheduled departure on January 25.00 per month. April 7. whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment. it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts. and 22 other individuals. as the accused knew fully well his representation was false and fraudulent and designed to inveigle [Wilson A. No. Philippines. in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged. Issue: Whether or not Soriano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days? Held: Yes. 8042. Manzo. being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas employment.A. as it was committed in large scale. to the damage and prejudice of Wilson A. This offense involved economic sabotage. 2000 at the Balintawak tollgate. did then and there willfully and feloniously. with false pretenses. Manzo] by then and there falsely representing that he has the power and capacity to recruit and employ persons in Saipan and could facilitate the necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary amount. all of which were similarly worded but varying with respect to the name of each complainant and the amount which each purportedly gave to Domingo.000. OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. Appellant was arrested on February 25. Manzo in the said amount of [P14. unlawfully and feloniously defraud one [Wilson A. when in truth and in fact. but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. and with intent of gain. 1999 to January.
promising or advertising for employment.000. utilizing. 1999. it did not materialize.000 to Domingo inside the latter’s car on November. Domingo’s Argument: Domingo. he (Cabigao) was found to have an ailment. 1999 after his medical examination. It was Gimeno who undertakes recruitment activities in Dakila. 2003. Testifying anew. transporting. Ma. 1999 for employment as carpenter in Saipan with a guaranteed salary of $375 per month. Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment. 2000. or procuring workers. He gave P30. 2000. Dionisio Aguilar: In September. NBI clearance. For the promised employment. He was scheduled for departure on February 23. He was among those who looked for appellant in Zambales. for which she paid appellant P10. hiring. contract services. and that they only agreed among themselves to file a case against appellant because Gimeno was nowhere to be found. and that the other cases for illegal recruitment filed against him before other courts have all been dismissed. but like the other complainants. The term “recruitment and placement” is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as follows: (b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing. offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. While he was twice scheduled for departure. per information of Domingo. Simeon Cabigao: He was recruited by Domingo in September. this time for the defense. Florentino Ondra: He was recruited by Domingo for employment as laborer in Saipan. Domingo likewise presented as witnesses Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who actually recruited them. denying all the accusations against him. Gimeno. whether for profit or not.Verification with the Department of Labor and Employment showed that appellant was not a licensed recruiter. Provided. per his affidavit dated March 3. Bulacan at the residence of Eddie Simbayan. That any person or entity which. contracting. tested for a hotel job. she applied for a job as a domestic helper in Saipan. but the same never took place. and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to get even because Gimeno could not be located. claimed as follows: He was a driver hired by the real recruiter. enlisting. he averred that the one who actually recruited him and his co-complainants and received their money was Danilo Gimeno (Gimeno). whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September. 1999. and scheduled for medical examination. supposedly to bribe the examining physician because. locally or abroad. he paid Domingo P3.
Rommel A. for which he gave P14.700 representing expenses for passporting. she was never deployed. and an additional P9. Tio
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. Leah Vivas: After meeting Domingo thru Eddie Simbayan on October 19. in any manner. Cabigao later recanted this testimony.000 for medical fee. Malolos. Issue: Whether or not Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment despite that there is no evidence showing that he actually received money from complainants? Held: Yes. he met Domingo thru a friend whereupon he was interviewed. and includes referrals. and medical examination.000.
The following day. paragraph (a) of the Labor Code. the prosecution must prove three essential elements. 80619 and CA-G.On the other hand. to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment. On January 6. (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). under which the accused stands charged. G. Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion. Jasmin’s remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction. Inc. the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances. Surigao. including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code.(a) Any recruitment activities.R. Tio
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. 38. SP No. Article 38. 1998. metallic poison and insecticides
Rommel A. provides: Art. however. SP No. 2008 in CA-G. it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by nonlicensee or non-holder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code. From the foregoing provisions.R. 1999. he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities. 2009 FACTS: These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. with a corresponding salary of US$247. she died allegedly of poisoning. No receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. vs. 81030 finding White Falcon Services. tested negative for non-volatile. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Over a year later. . No. On March 11. and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or as a group. (2) he/she did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. for a contract duration of three years.R. Inc. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.73 in actual damages with interest.00 per month. and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. To prove illegal recruitment in large scale. Great Southern Maritime Services Corp.686. enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. as amended. September 18. Illegal Recruitment. since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. Inc. Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3. The toxicology report of the NBI. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4. 1997. 183646. For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him. (b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
 the State shall. in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country. In their position paper. Inc They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations. and Filipino migrant workers. Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Inc. Tio
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. Inc. The State shall provide adequate and timely social. by way of benefits and damages. On February 28.. would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason. and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her employment contract. Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab). having occurred at the employer’s premises that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen. in general. In their complaint. via its November 22.740. at all times. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to “iqama insurance” because this refers to the “issuance” – not insurance – of iqama. Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion. Under Republic Act No. which was contractually provided by the employer. 2001.00. or residency/work permit required in the KSA. the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related.
Rommel A. and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmin’s heirs for her death. White Falcon Services. that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103. Rajab & Silsilah Company. economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60). she is entitled to “iqama insurance” coverage. HELD: Yes. ISSUE: The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims. for the death of their daughter Jasmin. arising out of and in the course of her employment. documented or undocumented. which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247. the Commission. 1999. the same having occurred at the dormitory. they are. Inc. White Falcon Services. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employer’s premises.. in general. claiming death and insurance benefits. 8042).000. are adequately protected and safeguarded.On November 22. citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings that Jasmin’s death was compensable. in particular. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130. as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report.00 per month under her employment contract. based on substantial evidence adduced. The rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos. or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas. On appeal.A. the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. and Filipino migrant workers. 8042 (R. respectively. Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression.. the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA. multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25. 2002 Resolution declared that. in particular.00 from the OWWA. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina. Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide. Rajab & Silsilah Company.
good customs and public policy. and regulate the relations between workers and employers. Whether employed locally or overseas. they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin committed suicide. and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability. helplessness. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin’s case. especially those in distress. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. 8042. indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.Becmen and White Falcon. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs. placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employee’s – all these are contrary to morals. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor.A. miserably failed to abide by the provisions of R. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case. race or creed. ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex. and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her family’s ignorance.
Rommel A. treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. Tio
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. promote full employment. all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation. contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. they abandoned Jasmin’s case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them. Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad. their uncaring attitude. Worst of all. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin. who are entitled to full protection under the law. Clearly. as licensed local recruitment agencies. which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature. Rajab. Instead. their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death.