Global Governance 2025
at a Critical Juncture
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Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture
Inquiries regarding this report may be made to Mathew Burrows, Counselor to the National Intelligence Council, on (703) 482-0741 and to the EU Institute of Security Studies on 0033-1-56-89-19-51.
NIC 2010-08 September 2010
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academic. we focus on such issues as intrastate conflict. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that a multipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rules and institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability. The diversity of the comments and insights. The US and the EU do not always see eye to eye on every issue on the international agenda. with the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. Doing so will require renewed efforts to address governance gaps and strengthen multilateralism. in partnership with other pivotal centers of power and with the international community at large. Since the mid 1990s. The most recent one. have contributed to the success of this project and to the high quality of this report.
. and in the Gulf region (the UAE). Transatlantic agreement is no longer enough to effectively manage global challenges. We therefore do not go into depth on proliferation or cybersecurity—which we believe are receiving greater attention. Their work has set an excellent example of cooperation in delivering joint analysis and achieving a largely shared perspective. and think tank leaders. testifies both to the richness of the debate and to the difficulty of reconciling different interests and standpoints when reforming global governance. enriched by wide-ranging consultations with government officials. acknowledged elsewhere. but they share fundamental values and strategic interests to an extent not matched by any other partners in the world. Although recognized by many as ongoing challenges. While not being policy prescriptive. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. migration.Preface
The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects for global governance frameworks. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutions in identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. Russia. resource management. The Global Governance 2025 project is innovative in many respects. Japan. The New Global Puzzle. noted that momentous change was ahead. The EUISS produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international system in 2006. published in late 2008. A number of experts. Global Governance 2025 provides an important step with a view to future joint projects on matters of common interest. the NIC has produced four editions of its landmark Global Trends report. and media representatives in Brazil. It is not meant as an exhaustive report card evaluating the performance of individual institutions. Instead. The report does not seek to examine all the various challenges likely to require multilateralist efforts. we believe the long-term impact of these issues on the strength of the international order has not been fully appreciated. This is the first time the NIC has jointly developed and produced an unclassified report with a non-US body. China. This report provides an informal contribution to an important international debate on the way forward for global. Global Governance 2025 is the result of an inclusive process. The Atlantic Council of the US and the Transatlantic Policy Network have been partners in supporting the project. NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows and Giovanni Grevi from the EUISS have steered this process and took charge of drafting the bulk of the report. as well as business. and biotechnology. the report shares a strong belief—as exemplified by multilateralist approaches of the US and EU governments to resolving global problems such as the recent financial crisis—that global challenges will require global solutions. but rather highlights several important governance gaps. South Africa. and bilateral institutions and frameworks to meet emerging challenges. which we have included in the body of the text. India. NGO. regional.
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the growing number of issues on the international agenda. Brazil. the risks to the international system have grown to the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions and groups that have been established recently. which is state-centered and does not make room for nonstate actors. will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the scope for compromise. Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. the developing world. energy security. the economic crisis. food and water scarcity. Three effects of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance. • Brazilians feel there is a need for a redistribution of power from developed to developing states. but the rise of China. and terrorism as well as a new generation of global challenges including climate change. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil tending to like “old fashioned” multilateralism. and their complexity. Many of our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and fundamental defects in the international system but emphasize the need for China to deal with its internal problems. Power is not only shifting from established powers to rising countries and.
. and new technologies are increasingly taking center stage. but also toward nonstate actors. At the beginning of the century. Although global governance institutions have racked up many successes since their development after the Second World War. With the emergence of rapid globalization. and other fast-growing economies has taken economic interdependence to a new level. which is seen as a Western concept. The expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their political influence well beyond their borders. to some extent. Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance. Interdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years. threats such as ethnic conflicts. They see the G-20 as being a step forward but question whether North-South differences will impede cooperation on issues other than economics. India. and state fragility—“hubs” of risks for the future—illustrate the interconnected nature of the challenges on the international agenda today.Executive Summary
Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international level—is at a critical juncture. is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope. infectious diseases. The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance over the next 10 years. international migration flows. The multiple links among climate change and resources issues.
For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the question is what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” They felt that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one of great powers but with more opportunities for transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security.” The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for growing much closer, while China, “with the biggest economy,” will be the main factor in changing the world. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners.
In addition to the shift to a multipolar world, power is also shifting toward nonstate actors, be they agents or spoilers of cooperation. On a positive note, transnational nongovernmental organizations, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, multinational corporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been equally, if not more effective than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue. However, hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks, all empowered by existing and new technologies, can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. Many developing countries—which are likely to play an increasing role at the regional and global level—also suffer from a relative paucity of nonstate actors, that could help newly emerging states and their governments deal with the growing transnational challenges. Global governance institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged, but the adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up with growing demand. Rather, they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions themselves. The emergence of informal groupings of leading countries, such as the G-20; the prospects for further regional cooperation, notably in East Asia; and the multiple contributions of nonstate actors to international cooperation—although highly useful—are unlikely to serve as permanent alternatives to rule-based, inclusive multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions can deliver public goods that summits, nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply, or cannot do so in a reliable way. Our foreign interlocutors stressed the need for decisions enjoying universal legitimacy, norms setting predictable patterns of behavior based on reciprocity, and mutually agreed instruments to resolve disputes and redress torts, such as in trade matters. We assess that the multiple and diverse governance frameworks, however flexible, probably are not going to be sufficient to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges absent extensive institutional reforms and innovations. The capacities of the current
institutional patchwork will be stretched by the type of problems facing the global order over the next few decades. Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing states and potential for more conflict, particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully resolved. Internal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of an Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Nigeria would likely overwhelm international conflict management efforts. Afghanistan, with approximately 28 million people, and Iraq, with 30 million, are among the most populous conflict management cases ever attempted, and they are proving difficult. Regional organizations have performed comparatively few large-scale operational responses to fragile states requiring humanitarian and peacemaking help. Although we can expect increased political and economic engagement from rising powers—in part a reflection of their increasing global interests—emerging powers have deep-seated concerns about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. Prevention, for example, often can require direct political intervention or even the threat or use of military force as a last resort. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed by reluctance and resistance to intervene directly, potentially overriding another country’s sovereignty. Many experts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularly leery of any intervention if it is driven by the “West.” Another cluster of problems—the management of energy, food, and water resources—appears particularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovations. Individual international agencies respond to discrete cases, particularly humanitarian emergencies in individual countries. However, no overall framework exists to manage the interrelated problems of food, water and energy. The stakes are high in view of the impact that growing scarcities could have on undermining the open international system. Resource competition in which major powers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation in other areas. Moreover, scarcities are likely to hit poor states the hardest, leading in the worst case to internal or interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization. Other over-the-horizon issues—migration, the potential opening of the Arctic, and risks associated with the biotechnology revolution—are likely to rise in importance and demand a higher level of cooperation. These issues are difficult ones for multilateral cooperation because they involve more preventive action. Under current circumstances, greater cooperation on those issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve.
Throughout the main text, we have sprinkled fictionalized scenarios that could result if, as we believe likely, the multiple and diverse governance frameworks struggle to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges. The scenarios illustrate various permutations that could happen over the next 15 years. The following summarizes what we see as the principal potential trajectories of the international system as it tries to confront new challenges. We believe the risks of an unreformed global governance system are likely to
cumulate over time. Crises—so long as they are not overwhelming—may actually spur greater innovation and change in the system. Inaction over the long term increases the risks of a complete breakdown. Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat In this scenario, seen as the most likely one over the next several years, no one crisis will be so overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective management advances slowly. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutions are devised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. Formal institutions remain largely unreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of “global governance” as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. This future is not sustainable over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhelm the international system. Scenario II: Fragmentation Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. Asia builds a regional order that is economically self-sufficient. Global communications ensure globalization does not die, but it slows significantly. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles with growing discontent with declining living standards. With a growing work force, the US might be in a better position but may still be fiscally constrained if its budgetary shortfalls and long-term debt problems remain unresolved. Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Under this scenario, severe threats to the international system—possibly a looming environmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreading—prompt greater cooperation on solving global problems. Significant reform of the international system becomes possible. Although less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future, such a scenario might prove the best outcome over the longer term, building a resilient international system that would step up the level of overall cooperation on an array of problems. The US increasingly shares power while China and India increase their burden sharing and the EU takes on a bigger global role. A stable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economic gaps shrink and per capita income converges. Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation This scenario is among the least likely, but the possibility cannot be dismissed. The international system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions, particularly in emerging powers such as China. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the “good life” are stymied. Tensions build between the United States and China, but also among some of the BRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. A nuclear arms race in the Middle East could deal an equally destabilizing blow to prospects for continued global growth. Suspicions and tensions make reforming global institutions impossible; budding regional efforts, particularly in Asia, also are undermined.
Page Preface Executive Summary Introduction International Institutions in the Late 20th Century Chapter One: Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional Capacities Complex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat Chapter Two: Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism? Scenario II: Fragmentation Chapter Three: Some Success in Adapting Informal Groupings Growth of Regionalism Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Chapter Four: An Uncertain Future Weak and Failing States Interlocking Resource Issues “Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global Governance Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation Conclusion Future Opportunities, but also Limits Annexes A-F: A: World Views of Global Governance B: The Prospects for Regionalism C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance? D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States? E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty F: Threats from Biotechnology i iii 1 1 3 4 7 9 10 14 17 19 21 23 27 29 30 32 33 37 39 39 41 43 49 55 57 61 67
The following institutions. James Elles. Member of European Parliament and head of TPN. former head of the global risks programme at the World Economic Forum and now an independent adviser. We would first like to thank the Atlantic Council of the US (ACUS) and the Trans-Atlantic Policy Network (TPN). Elizabeth Arens provided essential editorial support. the National Intelligence Council and the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies received immeasurable and critical help from an array of think tanks. consulting firms. Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA).
Special mention goes to Bruce Jones. William Burke-White of the State Department’s Policy Planning Office provided guidance and substantive advice in addition to accompanying us on all the trips. David Steven. wrote the appendix on the Arctic. Ms. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. and innovative biotechnologies. Dr. and participating staff were gracious in hosting us for major seminars and. Alexander van de Putte of PFC Energy provided material on energy futures. resource issues such as water and food. Within the NIC. ACUS President Frederick Kempe and Vice President Fran Burwell also participated in the planning and discussions in several venues. Administrator of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament. Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). Sao Paulo: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He accompanied us on almost all the trips. Dubai: Dubai Consultancy Research & Media Centre (b'huth). Mr. for providing comprehensive and critical material on failing states. academic and governmental institutions. Ms. Patrick DeGategno were superb in arranging the numerous overseas meetings. ACUS’ Dr. India: Observer Research Foundation (ORF). and literally scores of individual experts on all five continents. migration. Banning Garrett and Mr. in many cases. was pivotal in helping to design the project and orchestrating key discussions in several capitals. Brasilia: Secretaria De Assuntos Estrategicos (SAE). Rosemary Opacic. also provided important contributions and participated in most of the research trips.Acknowledgements
In preparing this work.
. at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University. and Alex Evans. their directors. Dr. who were both partners in supporting this project. Charles Emmerson. inviting other experts in their countries and regions to the meetings: • • • • • • • • Beijing: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
Power shifts are also complicating global governance.” Former Senior Official. Faced
. Without adequate frameworks to bring order to an international system in flux. Global governance does not equate to world government. Much will depend on leadership and political will. and communications. The mix of old and new challenges generates new requirements for collective problem-solving: more international cooperation and innovative approaches. partnerships. Emerging powers are suspicious of current institutional arrangements. no large-scale conflicts rivaling the first or second World Wars have broken out since the formation of the UN in 1945. they run the risk of becoming irrelevant. which implies sovereign prerogatives and hierarchical authority. “There has been unprecedented increase in the speed of movement of goods.Introduction
Global governance—the collective management of common problems at the international level—is at a critical juncture. the growing number of issues on the international agenda. International Institutions in the Late 20th Century Preserving international peace and security was the central preoccupation of the architects of the post-World War II United Nations system. Regional cooperation may also be regarded as an element of global governance insofar as it contributes to broader efforts. Although global governance has been a relative success since its development after the Second World War. Millions of people continue to be affected. which would be virtually impossible for the foreseeable future. and their complexity. The UN Security Council engaged all major powers of the time in this undertaking. which appear to favor established powers. Government of India Some progress has been made to adjust international institutions and regimes to meet the new demands and to create workarounds. if ever. Although the Cold War was punctuated by numerous smaller proxy wars led by the two superpowers and some brutal conflicts occurred.
The term “global governance” as used in this paper includes all the institutions. If global governance structures and processes do not keep up with the changes in the balance of power in the international system. processes. Governance differs from government. if not new frameworks. against the backbone of the US dollar as the international exchange and reserve currency. UN peacekeeping operations continue to be deployed to monitor peace agreements and ensure stability after civil wars. regimes. is outpacing the ability of international organizations and national governments to cope. fueling greater instability. disorder could prevail. This definition subsumes formal and informal arrangements as well as the role of nonstate actors in transnational settings. however. This has led to new problems and inadequacy of international paraphernalia inherited from the 20th Century. people. Such efforts are unlikely to suffice. but conflicts have declined in number. Bretton Woods institutions were set up to help maintain financial and monetary stability and to foster the reconstruction of war-torn economies. and networks that contribute to collective action and problem solving at the international level. Both sets of institutions have had their share of problems but have made substantial contributions in the postCold War period.
the problems of “span of control.
. Over time. especially in view of the push provided by globalization to growing interactions.” increasing “stovepipes. nuclear and non-nuclear states struck a global contract to stop the spread of nuclear weapons—the Nonproliferation Treaty—and the United States and Russia negotiated several treaties to delimit and reduce their respective nuclear arsenals and weapon systems. trade liberalization under the GATT and the WTO provided another global public good in the shape of increasingly low tariffs and open markets. On the economic front. enhancing shared prosperity and preventing protectionism from generating political confrontation.with the danger of nuclear war and proliferation. As a result. Individual agencies focused on specific problems have been a growing feature of global governance. our expectations have continued to grow as the scope for cooperation has expanded.” and “lack of strategic oversight” have come increasingly to the fore as major challenges to ensuring effectiveness in the system.
Expanding Agenda Stretching Institutional Capacities
Although some of the emerging issues have been debated in multilateral forums for over 20 years. At the same time. • This decade opened with the attacks on the Twin towers in New York as well as the Pentagon—bringing transnational terrorism to the fore of the international agenda. and for unprecedented risks. if diverted for criminal purposes. India. Peace operations evolved to include broader mandates such as tackling the root causes of conflict. interconnected problems. but the rise of China. international migration flows. economic.” US Think Tank Participant Interdependence has been a feature of economic globalization for many years. “What worries me is that you see a more chaotic world and less capable US. and the mingling of domestic politics with international issues. In part owing to the rise of economic powerhouses China and India and their growing appetites for energy and other commodities.
Complex Risks Driving Demands for Global Governance The cumulative impact of emerging issues as well as longstanding ones is transforming the scale and nature of the challenges facing the international community. The nascent recovery from the recent economic crisis has highlighted the importance of developing countries— particularly China—to restarting the global economy with many Western countries lagging behind. Climate change has trespassed the boundaries of environmental politics to become the subject of the global political.With the emergence of rapid globalization. and security debate and a new focus of multilateral cooperation cutting across these and other domains. the risks to the international system have grown to the extent that formerly localized threats are no longer locally containable but are now potentially dangerous to global security and stability. for example in the health sector. • Biotechnologies and nanotechnologies bear much potential both for progress. Genetic modifications raise profound ethical questions even while breakthoughs are likely to be critical for societies struggling with resource issues such as food and aging populations. Brazil. energy politics and other 4
resource issues are taking an increasingly pre-eminent place in international affairs.. At the beginning of the century. The offshoring of production and business services from advanced to emerging countries. There are centrifugal forces pulling apart the nations of the world… Resource constraints will have huge implications for global society… The trainwreck is right ahead of us. fast technological progress alerts civil society bodies. The danger of proliferation and use of nonconventional weapons took on new urgency. to new challenges and to the need for cooperation and enables them to play a stronger role. threats such as ethnic conflicts. and terrorism as well as a new generation of global challenges including climate change. such issues have taken on new importance in a globalized world because of the potential for more widespread disruption. infectious diseases. energy security. Three features of rapid globalization are driving demands for more effective global governance: deepening interdependence. and other fastgrowing economies has taken economic interdependence to a new level. food and water scarcity. and new technologies—are increasingly taking center stage. and increasing economic exchanges within the
. such as NGOs..
Reliance on domestic reserves of fossil fuels or longterm access to foreign fields makes investment in renewables less attractive and compounds the growth of greenhouse gas emissions.” Administrator. Concerns regarding the security of energy supply. The interconnection of various problems is likely to generate new challenges and make traditional ones harder to manage because of their increasing complexity. and state fragility—“hubs” of risks for the future—illustrate the interconnected nature of the challenges on the international agenda today. Among other factors. and curbed private spending in the developed world. water shortages. but also the EU. the economic crisis. cut credit. included internal and external factors. compounding their fragility. The accumulation of huge foreign currency reserves by emerging powers. Concurrently. Price uncertainty depresses investment in exploration and transit infrastructures.
Many of the issues cited above involve interwoven domestic and foreign challenges. Following the crisis. National policies prone to encourage loose credit and spiraling private debt under little supervision have been enabled by capital flows from emerging economies. has corresponded to the ballooning debt of deficit countries. • Technological developments and geopolitical instability require additional focus on the protection and resilience of the electronic and energy infrastructures underpinning advanced societies. • Growing energy demand translates into higher food prices. and diminishing food stocks. and the EU. China. directly affect the international community. The national energy and environmental policies of big emitters such as China and the United States.latter group. possibly paving the way to supply shortages over the next decade. Emerging economies financed spending by the United States on their own exports. but also demand. The monetary and fiscal policies of the United States. Problems can trigger each other with a cascading effect as shown. Climate change is another example of an issue involving domestic and international priorities. notably China. European Parliament The multiple links among climate change. by the potential impact of energy prices on the prospects for economic recovery. climate 5
change threatens agricultural output in many poor countries with expanding populations. has markedly diversified trade and investment patterns and resulted in value chains spread across different countries and continents. The coordination of macroeconomic measures is imperative to sustain global recovery. have become more intertwined. the management of ballooning public deficits and debts in some advanced countries as well as measures to increase domestic demand in China and other emerging economies are matters for domestic political decisions with huge global implications. given their disproportionate contribution to
. for example. in particular the United States. among other economic powers. such a structural imbalance produced the severe financial crisis that flattened growth. The roots of the financial crisis. “Climate change is an issue of international security—a threat multiplier…The core challenge is that it not only threatens us environmentally but also that it will exacerbate conflicts over resources. may result in policy choices that undermine both the environment and investment. for example.
The tightening of political control on Russia’s largest energy companies as well as broader concerns regarding rule of law and security of investment within the country undermine the strengthening of the EU-Russia energy and economic partnership. but rather how states regain their regulatory role. Crises are dealt with ad hoc and temporary frameworks or institutions are devised to avert the most threatening aspects of them. Such tendencies contribute to making national positions in multilateral forums less accommodating. the public would be focused on jobs and welfare. Many experts see nationalism and xenophobia on the rise in Russia and China. which has been largely export-led. EU countries and the US are not immune from that either. limits its willingness to allow for an appreciation of Chinese currency to help rebalance its trade relations with the US and the EU.” South African Think Tank Participant Projected sluggish economic growth in advanced countries over the next few years. paralleled by aging populations. and angered national public debates fueling each other. with dire consequences for the most exposed countries. Under such circumstances. China’s pervasive priority of domestic economic development. or equity and legitimacy at the international level. This future is not sustainable over the longer term as it depends on no crisis being so unmanageable as to overwhelm the international system. On a different matter. “The central challenge for most countries in their engagement with new forms of global governance is not how to replace the state in international politics. This was the case.the global stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the variation of climate change patterns. Domestic politics creates tight constraints on international cooperation and reduces the scope for compromise. This may trigger a vicious circle of ineffective global governance. Formal institutions remain largely unreformed and Western states probably must shoulder a disproportionate share of “global governance” as developing countries prevent disruptions at home. diverging perceptions. which is probably the most likely over the next several years. for example. with little room for longer term needs such as managing diverse societies. at the recent Copenhagen summit on climate change where domestic politics constrained the positions of a number of participants on reducing emissions. environmental sustainability.
. no one crisis will be so overwhelming as to threaten the international system even though collective management advances slowly. suggests that public attention may become increasingly
introverted. Scenario I: Barely Keeping Afloat In this scenario.
But the change in Iran swept out the old government. Both Tokyo and New Delhi look like they are taking the side of Vietnam. Posted 5/21/17: This is not the time to provoke China. . if not dashed. Posted 12/4/20: But Asia has yet to come off the boil. . Posted 12/1/20: I’m preparing for my Davos panel on the future of the international system . . . I worry about the repercussions for multilateral cooperation.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
. we’re just keeping our heads above water . Posted 5/20/17: India has just come out with a full-scale condemnation of China and expects the US and Europe to back it. We worried a decade ago about a Russia growing more hostile. . Posted 5/15/17: Did you hear about the military incident between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea? It looks like they both suffered casualties. Oil exploration in the Arctic is beginning to pay off. . and we put our heads in the sand. either. In that vein. . . did you see? Years of chattering on security and development and ten countries in Africa are still on the verge of implosion. though it was clear in hindsight. . it could have been much worse. Iran was settled. . Talk about an era of bad feelings . It is not clear where the US stands or whether it can bring the two sides together. Posted 5/17/17: Yeah. Posted 9/15/14: I don’t usually believe in grand bargains. and there is a lot more stability in the Middle East . What happened to developing states sticking together? The dispute also questions the theory that resource wars won’t happen. Had the UN Secretary General not jumped on the plane. but I think we’re witnessing one with the agreement worked out by the UN Security Council with Iran. We were about to see the UN Security Council dramatically transformed for the first time since its founding. with the Party unable to restrain rising nationalism. Posted 5/22/17: Many developing states feel that China has turned its back on them . And the series of mini-disasters and near misses has strengthened defenses. We may be looking to a honeymoon period in international relations when there can be a lot more cooperation. . Posted 12/3/20: But we haven’t done too badly: no nuclear war. The financial crisis led to Russia opening up. our resilience has been more a matter of luck . full of youngsters and short on jobs. It reminds me of the fall of the Soviet Union. . . I guess Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia got fed up with China . There’s been a lot less risk-taking since the financial crisis. Posted 12/2/20: Tell them. . given the continuing tensions in Asia. but a lot of things could still go terribly wrong. . the agreement still would not have happened without the deft intervention by some of the emerging powers in the G-20. . . . . not to speak of the last Failed States Index . Posted 12/5/20: You’re right . . The cyclones in the Bay of Bengal have meant we now have a world action plan for Bangladesh . everything has been affected—from trade to the competition over resources . No one saw it coming last year. . . but it now looks like Japan’s and India’s prospects for permanent UNSC membership are on hold. Posted 5/23/17: Look on the bright side. Few saw that coming. The interesting thing about the Iranian developments is that even if the political turnabout of the Iranian Government was necessary. This multipolar world is just a lot more difficult to manage. it showed that the G-20 had really come of age and could work with the UN. it needed Western technology to exploit the riches of the Arctic and now that is slowly coming to fruition.Scenario I
Barely Keeping Afloat
Excerpts from a long-running World Economic Forum-sponsored blog Posted 3/3/12: Remember when “black swans” were all the rage? We have not had as many disasters as some predicted—but why? Is it perception? Are we more agile? Or were the predictions off? Or a combination? Posted 3/4/12: Don’t count your chickens before they hatch! It’s too early to be so confident.
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Power Shifts Complicating Global Governance
transnational nongovernmental organizations. the expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their political influence well beyond their borders. but also toward nonstate actors. In the second part of the last century. the legitimacy and credibility of the US and the EU as political leaders is openly questioned by other rising power centers and large swathes of the international community. However. civil-society groups. hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks—all empowered by existing and new technologies—can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks. state-owned and state-controlled companies and sovereign wealth funds. Far more states matter in the international system today. Will Multipolarity Enhance or Erode Multilateralism? In the emerging multipolar system. pivotal global and regional actors have different views on sovereignty. but the danger of a loss of coherence and direction in the international system while the redistribution of power plays itself out. the United States shaped an international order that largely reflected its liberal worldview of free markets and democracy. multinational corporations. multilateralism.” European Think Tank Participant Today. and to the view that their positions on issues such as trade and climate change are unfair to the interests of others. to some extent. churches and faith-based organizations. and even on the trade front. often stemming from distinctive historical experiences. In particular after the end of the Cold War. In addition. particularly in emerging economies. industrial policy appears more in vogue. the EU has sought to export its model of regional integration and sovereignty-sharing and has devised a distinctive discourse on global governance and priorities.The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance over the next 10 years. such as economic stability. It can be argued that alternative definitions of modernity are taking hold. which differ widely in terms of their economics and
ideologies. with the US and the West as the center and creator of laws and rules. These actors do not fit neatly into traditional categories as they are driven by a mix of political and economic considerations. and legitimacy. The United States oversaw provision of global public goods such as monetary stability and open trade routes. are indispensable to solving international problems. are likely to play a growing role in global governance.” Russian Think Tank Speaker Power is not only shifting from established powers to rising countries and. Addressing such
. the developing world. be they agents or spoilers of cooperation. diminishes the readiness of others to cooperate. This is partly due to their perceived shortcomings in providing the public goods they guaranteed before the shift to a multipolar world. and interest groups have become increasingly active in framing policy and generating public interest and pressure. At the same time. Many of these states. “At issue…it seems to me. “The Western approach to global governance. particularly those of China and Russia. On a positive note. The virtues of open capital markets are less than universally shared. is less the risk of conflict. other business bodies.
” Chinese Think Tank Expert
diverse perspectives will be critical to fostering international cooperation in a number of domains. When China thinks its sovereignty is guaranteed. but China has to balance sovereignty and international responsibility. sovereignty is the number one priority. Sovereignty is alive and kicking. There is a risk that the potential competition of diverse priorities within regional or global institutions will alienate important actors and drive negotiations to gridlock in multilateral institutions.New International Lineup in 2025?
Power as percentage of global power 25 2010 2025
The relative political and economic clout of many countries will shift by 2025. and technology for individual states. population. defense spending.
“Global governance requires giving over significant sovereignty to others—that is the view in China…So far. it will go ahead to work with other countries. There is no doubt. according to many of the experts we encountered. according to an International Futures model measuring GDP. The 11
. Source: International Futures model.
commit to collective action. such as energy policy or bans on specific types of weapons. under what conditions the international community or international institutions can challenge or override the authority of a state in its internal affairs will also come to the fore. to an international body. at least. not directly affecting them. “We have a major concern that the new organizations do not replicate the unrepresentativeness of the past. or to share sovereignty under majority decision-making. where need be. core values to their domestic political regimes. among others. are cautious not to appear as exporting their values and interfering with the domestic affairs of other countries. take a more relative reading of human rights and are uncomfortable with the bashing or sanctioning of brutal regimes. Russia. and accept stronger prerogatives of international institutions over their domestic governance. the aim of promoting democracy and supporting human rights. share an ingrained suspicion of global governance mechanisms that could impinge on their sovereignty. the biggest democracy in the world with a political tradition of non-alignment and a significant nationalist strand to its foreign policy. For example. The extent to which power should be delegated to international bodies and for what purposes will be debated. On balance. However. Their positions. broadly informs their foreign policies. but there are some indications
. Over the next decade. India. however. the United States. Such a selective approach is. however. The question of whether and. running into trouble because those powerful enough to try to opt out are growing more numerous.way the renewed emphasis on sovereignty will unfold in the next decade will have serious implications for global governance. although the positions and the policies of the US and the EU do not always coincide. the question is how to reconcile the interests and perspectives of major powers and groupings of smaller countries in multilateral frameworks and regimes. balancing such different perspectives with the imperative for cooperation. according to our interlocutors. vary depending on the issue.
In a more heterogeneous international system. if so. stability. will pose a key challenge to states and governance frameworks alike. Participants felt a needed precondition is for all the stakeholders to trust the system. New ways of cooperation will need to be explored. Nuclear weapon states are comfortable with the intrusive powers of the IAEA to inspect the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear weapon states.” Brazilian Senior Official Divergence on values or principles also will affect the prospects for multilateral cooperation. While their domestic political systems widely differ. with considerable support from a number of emerging and developing countries. let alone assign jurisdiction. countries are reluctant to endorse rules constraining their behavior in areas of comparative advantage or strong competition. The EU is the most advanced experience to date of voluntary sharing of sovereignty in a unique experiment of regional integration which has largely succeeded in including post-Communist systems into the larger regional order. including on matters of peace. Most other key global actors are reluctant to delegate regulatory powers. major powers subscribe to advanced forms of international cooperation and supervision that they regard as embodying their interests or. and security. Major powers such as China and Russia. as well as Brazil. China and India.
North-South relations and the need for redistribution of power from developed to developing states remain central to the Brazilian outlook on international affairs. UAE. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or structure.” Some interlocutors were wary of China because in their view it is interested only in African resources.World Views of Global Governance Diverse perspectives and suspicions about “global governance”—seen as a Western concept— will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges. A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of energy producers with those of consumers. Japan. China. The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity. Experts saw Brazil tending to like “old fashioned” multilateralism.” They felt that India is not well-positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations. Many Chinese saw mounting global challenges and “fundamental” defects in the international system but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal problems. are effective. the Japanese felt the G-20 needs stronger political cohesion.” Several questioned whether formal institutions. Several felt let down by lack of support from the West on democratization. The Russians worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security. (See Annex A for further discussion. while China. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers. “with the biggest economy. For Africans. the key question was what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential. which is state-centered and does not make room for nonstate actors.” will be the main factor in changing the world. Many were concerned about the lack of regional frameworks—particularly for hard security—in East Asia but argued that Japan should take a more proactive role toward regional cooperation. in the view of our interlocutors from the countries listed below. Russia. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners. South Africa.” although some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater transnational cooperation. spurred in part by public debates over climate change. the issues connected with global governance are beginning to gain prominence in Brazil. and Russia also have scope for growing much closer. They saw the G-20 as being a step forward but questioned whether North-South differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics.) Brazil. Most emphasized the need to boost national and regional means before reforming international organizations. Nevertheless. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions and groups that have been established recently. Europe.” The United States.
. At the same time. Some feared that a system developed by the “West”—which includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more powerful. For participants from the Persian Gulf region. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. The G-20 has little African representation. with their huge bureaucracies. India.
. the US might be in a better position but probably would continue to struggle with similar issues.” Participant from the Persian Gulf Region
Achieving a fair and equitable distribution of burdens and responsibility probably will become more contentious in the foreseeable future. Global communications ensure globalization does not die. diverse domestic priorities generate different assessments of fairness and equanimity. These and other emerging powers may come to play a key role in UN-mandated multilateral interventions to preserve stability and build lasting peace in conflict areas. For example. With a growing work force. the involvement of China and Brazil in these operations is growing. “We need ‘politics of inclusion’ of the weak not just the powerful. which held sway as the most important issue for greater multilateral cooperation in our discussions with emerging power elites. Asia builds a regional order that is economically self-sufficient. and Bangladesh have long been among the top troop contributors to UN peacekeeping. Many of the emerging powers are interested in international and regional stability to better pursue their own development.of greater burden sharing by emerging powers. Because some major emerging powers (China and India) are relatively poor countries in per capita terms. Scenario II: Fragmentation Powerful states and regions try to wall themselves off from outside threats. while India. This is already apparent in negotiations between developed and developing countries over climate change and trade. Managing differences to foster cooperation leads to addressing the tension between inclusiveness and effectiveness in multilateral frameworks. particularly if its fiscal problems remain unresolved. but it slows significantly. This goes to the heart of the legitimacy question. Europe turns its focus inward as it wrestles with growing discontent over declining living standards. according to many participants.
Those two areas are not “self-governing” and need outside help to contain or dampen the potential for conflict and regional conflagration. This began several years after the Great Recession when it became apparent that it would take a long time before the West dug itself out and got back on a reasonable growth trajectory. The US Congress started taking actions against Chinese imports. Many outsiders thought they should not have any power at all. More sectors are deemed “strategic. The growing protectionism is more subtle. We will miss them and at some point they will have to be reinvented.Scenario II
Financial Times op-ed entitled. A lot of the “unwashed” non-Gs thought the Gs were trying to usurp the UN’s role. especially between the Chinese and the United States. G-20 meetings became less frequent. Although all states are interested in energy efficiency. Perhaps it is too early to tell. Personal animosities crept in. I worry about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and South Asia. But now the international system is slowly unwinding. Doha has been definitively shelved so there is no forward movement. The G-20 ended badly. and for the first time the United States. The new powers won’t play even if the transatlantic partners can get their act together—which is rare these days. It was never the right time. The US-China strategic and economic dialogue was suspended. The Gs never had any real power. Canada. The last G-8 summit came to a screeching halt when two of its leaders got into a shouting match over the seating
arrangements at the final dinner. I have no doubt that the United States and the Europeans will mend fences once the crisis breaks. bracing for global conflagration. 2023
he Gs are almost a distant memory. It was always going to be hard to negotiate a follow-on to Kyoto. Does all of this matter? There’s no easy answer. but it may be too late.” requiring some sort of protection. made it virtually impossible. China put more energy into developing regional ties. The Gs were a bit like old boys’ networks—undemocratic and incestuous. just the relentless drifting apart that finally undermined the alliance. US-Chinese ties took a big tumble as Beijing put off again and again a decision on allowing its currency to appreciate. More importantly. Militancy is growing among disaffected groups in India and China while terrorists have stepped up their plotting against the West. but the strains within the G-20. but its rivalry with India made even that difficult. “Crying Over the Gs. There was no explosive tearing asunder of transatlantic ties. Diplomats complained about all the preparation necessary for what were in some cases long-winded statements at the end of G summits that did not always lead to concrete actions or improvements. the US sought more military help in Afghanistan which the Europeans could not give. The UN calculates a tenfold increase in environmental migrants over the past five years. although it will take a major crisis that hits everybody to bring that about.” published March 12. symptomatic of what had been a long period the rising transatlantic tensions. Many in the US thought Europe’s slow recovery was one reason for the United States’ tepid growth. and the Europeans have given up on the G-7. The political mood is indeed very sour. At that point will they be able to do anything without the help of the new powers?
. “What’s the use?” they ask. We’re not yet back in the 1930s. major concerted steps toward carbon cuts are on hold even though there is more evidence of climate change. offsetting some of the decline in Chinese commerce with the US and Europe. Europe has been increasingly focused inward after the prolonged Eurozone crisis of the 2010s. India and China are major trading partners now. Without a stronger international order. Trade within Asia has continued to expand.
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Some Success in Adapting
Rather.Multilateral institutions have adapted to some degree as new issues have emerged. regional initiatives escape lengthy debates in multilateral forums. according to many of our interlocutors. The former will struggle to deliver without serious reform. In practice. inclusive multilateral institutions. In some cases. the perspectives for further regional cooperation. ad hoc and sometimes more accountable forms of cooperation. decisions enjoying universal legitimacy. notably in East Asia. but on the whole they expose a fundamental trend toward looser. Innovative approaches to global governance are developed through trial and error. innovative approaches stem from dissatisfaction with the relative inertia of traditional frameworks or with their perceived Western bias. in some sectors. neither traditional frameworks nor new forms of cooperation are likely to solve global governance problems exclusively. Three innovations are of particular interest as pointers for future developments: the emergence of informal groupings of leading countries. the two forms of global governance can complement one another. “My preliminary conclusions: Addressing different issues with the same mechanism does not work—we need different mechanisms for different problems. norms setting predictable patterns of behavior based on reciprocity. the supply of these public goods will become more important. While multilateral institutions have been struggling to adapt. For some challenges. As the international system grows more diverse and potentially more fragmented. mechanisms for implementation and for overseeing national measures and. but the adaptations have not necessarily been intentional or substantial enough to keep up with growing demand. innovative approaches to global governance have been coming to the fore. and global responses with a division of labor.” Chinese Expert Looking ahead. instruments to resolve disputes and redress torts. Some of these experiments will not stand the test of time. institutional experience. A crisis such as an environmental 18
. All three developments originated from outside global multilateral institutions. such as the G-20. more flexible. and resources. whether they were triggered by governments or civil society. codes of conduct prevail on binding norms. Such approaches often involve “lighter” forms of cooperation than the highly legalized regimes inherited from the 20th century: consultation replaces regulation. nonstate actors and regional frameworks cannot supply. effective cooperation among institutions has been the exception and not the norm. Multilateral institutions can deliver public goods that summits. chiefly. the latter will likely prove unsustainable or unreliable if disconnected from the bedrock of multilateral bodies in terms of norms. regional. These innovative approaches cannot serve as alternatives to rule-based. Such
approaches typically develop in response to a shifting international system. we need a combination of bilateral. However. and whether their scope is global or regional. and the multiple contributions of nonstate actors to international cooperation. such as in trade matters. they have been spurred as much by outside forces as by the institutions themselves. These are. and national prerogatives trump international authorities in implementing and overseeing agreements. or cannot do so in a reliable way.
As informal groupings evolve. and global and regional governance frameworks. So far. The leaders of the BRIC emerging economies met in Russia in 2009 and in Brazil in 2010 and have announced that they will meet in China in 2011. but a reactive approach to such extreme contingencies probably would prove inadequate. Informal groupings such as the G-8 and the G-20 have already significantly affected global governance. speed. and novelty. these formats are experimenting with new ways of managing shared challenges in a more diverse world. In time. Such a development would defeat much of the basic purpose of summit diplomacy. The Major Emitters Forum. the role of the G-8 is likely to be circumscribed to sectoral issues. More generally. the G-8 could remain a useful platform. suggesting interesting avenues for further innovation. among others. “The global financial and systemic nature of the crisis has compelled unprecedented government responses in scope. The G-20 is the most noticeable innovation because of the breadth of its membership and the scope of its agenda. to elaborate ideas and bring them to larger tables. set up in 2007 and renamed the Major Economies Forum (MEF) in 2009. however. new groups have been set up in the last few years in response to pressing issues on the international agenda. Nevertheless. deals with climate change.catastrophe or the implosion of a large failed state could spark cooperation. Over the medium term. The decisions of such forums as the G-8 and the G-20 are of a political nature and nonbinding. the need to foster collective leadership to jointly 19
. governmental and nongovernmental. formal and informal.
Following the establishment of the G-7 in the mid-1970s and of the G-8 in 1998. the main risk to be averted is the creation of different formats that mirror competing geopolitical coalitions. provided that these are closely linked to the agenda of multilateral institutions and of groups such as the G-20. the durability of this grouping remains to be tested. BRIC summits have been more noticeable for opposing existing norms than for proposing new ones and reaching out to other major actors. and an acceptable balance between effectiveness and inclusiveness. this may also become the principal contribution of the BRIC countries’ format to deliberations in broader frameworks. It could also do so by engaging countries on targeted initiatives. The development of the ‘Gs’ responds to two basic needs: First. innovation at the interface between old and new. We had global crisis-management governance. Thus they are unlikely to sideline the UN and Bretton Wood institutions as frameworks for decisionmaking and rulesetting. Informal Groupings The proliferation of regular summit-level meetings held outside global or regional institutions is a key feature of recent global governance innovation. such as the G-20. where the small club of like-minded countries can bring added value if they are prepared to mobilize their resources.” European Expert Progress in setting up a global governance system that draws on the added value of different bodies and networks in a coherent way will depend on three factors: a shared knowledge of the issues to be confronted and their connections to other challenges. Given the different foreseeable economic and political trajectories of the BRIC countries over the next two decades. with an emphasis on the networked coordination of national policies and on deliverables.
between the ‘sherpas’ preparing the various summits. Informal groupings may be increasingly called upon to set the tone and direction of international cooperation on important global issues and to serve as toplevel international agenda-setting bodies. The limited membership of informal groupings entails that deliberations involve fewer countries than those affected by them. such as the G-8.” European Expert The performance of the ‘Gs’ will largely depend on their relations with formal multilateral structures. Under these circumstances. Informal groupings also can become connectors between different frameworks. However. for example. summit decisions can spur institutional reform. as the G-20 did in coping with the fallout of the financial crisis. and second. the two basic rationales behind the ‘Gs’ may or may not prove mutually reinforcing. their legitimacy is contested.address shared problems outside the constraints imposed by formal multilateral structures. The G-20. Informal groupings such as the G-8 have proved flexible and proactive in expanding their original purview. The G-20 infrastructure is not considered robust enough to sustain the stronger flow of information and exchanges that would occur with a greatly expanded agenda and is not structurally connected to competent bodies at the national level. to ensure the consistency of national positions in different formats. becoming a sort of informal global governance “hub. The agenda of the G-20 has also expanded since 2008. This is regarded with suspicion by the vast majority of developing countries and regional powers not engaged in the proceedings. both at the national and at the trans-governmental level. In the energy sector. “There is institutional Darwinism and we will see the survival of the fittest institution. as issues become more challenging or crisis-driven common interests may expand beyond facilitating an economic recovery. When informal groupings are relatively large. and the World Bank. Both requirements can be promoted by stronger coordination. called upon the IMF and the World Bank to advise on the summits’ priorities. As the world grows more heterogeneous.” According to many observers. and develop targeted initiatives to lend financial support to countries in need or to enhance food security. doubts are raised regarding their internal cohesion and their ability to reach
. The G-20 has triggered the transition from the Financial Stability Forum to the Financial Stability Board and has sustained momentum for the incremental reform of the IMF. When informal groupings are too small. with the Pittsburgh summit agreeing on a “framework for strong. the G-20 20
has encouraged closer cooperation between a variety of institutions including the International Energy Agency (IEA). the need to reflect the changing balance of world power. sustainable and balanced growth. the G-20 would suffer from a “capacity deficit” in dealing with a larger agenda. In addition. like the G-20. cohesion within each grouping and coherence between them are essential conditions for their effectiveness.” A debate is under way regarding whether the G-20 has a vocation to enlarge its remit further. monitor relevant national policy measures. The clash of informal groupings or stable coalitions in sector-specific negotiations such as climate change and differences on how to consolidate global economic recovery expose the tension between the shared commitment to problemsolving and the co-existence of different political priorities and agendas. OPEC. OECD. requiring the G-20 to expand its agenda further.
however. Second. relative power is shifting at the regional level as well. be they security crises. the global financial crisis has impacted all global regions and amplified both the suspicion of external interference in regional affairs and a sense of self-reliance to address economic and political challenges. National leaders may be more familiar with one another than in global platforms and regional instruments may be mobilized faster than those of larger multilateral organizations. however. Japan. However. the key question is whether regionalism will prove to be a building block of global governance or a drain on it. compensating for lack of updated and reformed global governance institutions. or trans-regional threats. economic disparities. In practice. such as drug trafficking or state failure. and might develop a sense of solidarity in addressing them. giving them the opportunity to debate issues in depth and finalize agreements not only on guiding principles but also on concrete instruments and arrangements. (See Annex B for further discussion. for example in the field of peacekeeping. and most notably. It is doubtful.) Renewed interest in regional solutions in response to economic and political turbulence could. or Brazil have chosen to invest into regional cooperative frameworks to manage political differences and confirm their leadership. cooperation has fallen well short of its potential in most regions. In the former case. Regional cooperation is likely to make some further strides due to a mix of factors. some progress toward closer cooperation at the regional level has been achieved over the last decade in regions as diverse as South America. setting up support units—perhaps focusing on specific issues and embedded in existing multilateral bodies—and enhancing cooperation between successive annual presidencies. the political capital and resources available for international cooperation are 21
. First. Neighboring countries are directly affected by threats stemming from respective regions. East Asia. or both.” South African Expert Growth of Regionalism No comprehensive trend can be detected toward deepening regional governance structures. Africa. However. Third. If so. whether increased regional groupings in the next decade or two will be able to deal with mounting global challenges. where action often falls short of statements. Options we heard to improve the ‘Gs’ decisionmaking process include strengthening the teams of sherpas assisting political leaders. “Instead of looking at what G-20 will look like in 2025. create new momentum behind regional arrangements and enhance their effectiveness. Regional governance arrangements are closer to the sources of the problems to be tackled. regional cooperation would be complementary to and compatible with broader multilateral agreements.agreement and deliver results—yet their legitimacy remains challenged by those states inevitably left on the outside. there is growing dissatisfaction with the
performance of global governance institutions as either ineffective or carrying political agendas not fitting distinctive regional contexts. Preeminent actors such as China. however. we should ask what will make it credible and legitimate…how do you ensure that voices outside the G-20 are heard while also not slowing its ability to make decisions? To what extent has the G-20 championed the interests of the low-income and developing countries? I don’t think so far that it has. Regionalism could bring an important contribution to managing shared challenges at the local and regional levels and beyond. Longer yearly meetings could be held between national leaders themselves.
At the same time. South America is relatively stable. for example. experts we consulted thought both regional heavyweights—China and Japan—and the members of ASEAN will increasingly favor regional cooperation as the framework within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence. and all would benefit from better transport and energy infrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources. with different states following disparate economic policies and political trajectories. At the same time.scarce. This can contribute to building trust and create incentives to forge ahead with regional cooperation. Contrary to the experience of the European Union. and aversion to conflict. the investment in regional cooperation might detract from the ambition to strengthen global governance frameworks. ASEAN has developed over decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of
institutionalization. this could lead to economic and political fragmentation between different regions. Asian interlocutors saw China’s centrality to the region as growing. have engaged in ideological competition not only against US influence in the region but also toward Brazil and others that have engaged in economic globalization. The region is diverse. It follows that common institutions are relatively weak. State-led projects mostly lag behind the initiative of private actors.” Japanese interlocutors have acknowledged the need to adjust to the new regional context and some envisage a sort of “look West” policy. or feared. the benefits may disproportionately accrue to the biggest economies in respective regions. informality. especially in Asia. In fact. Brazil is the only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address economic asymmetries and political fragmentation with a view toward deepening regional cooperation. in trade matters. “We need to reinforce regional institutions. regional cooperation has so far not resulted in a significant pooling or delegation of sovereignty. In what has been defined as a “paradigm shift. Peru. In turn. which may not include the United States. led by Venezuela. Some of our interlocutors thought Brazil has been punching below its weight in the region and has no strategy for
. Our interlocutors were somewhat dubious that the bilateral alliance between Japan and the US will prove compatible with deepening multilateral frameworks in East Asia. notably in East Asia and South America. Countries such as Chile. China. turning Japan’s focus from its US ally in the Pacific to mainland Asia. reflect the increasingly pivotal position of major regional powers and the extent to which their leadership is accepted. In the latter case. Contrasting trends indicate potential for either regional cooperation or fragmentation in South America. countries face common transnational threats such as drug trafficking. The countries of the Bolivarian Alliance. Business has often played a pioneering role in weaving a dense web of economic links at the regional level. Although growing nationalism may serve as an eventual brake. a non-intrusive agenda. and Colombia have been pursuing economic liberalization and bilateral trade deals with the United States and. contested. most regional frameworks uphold the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states. From an economic and political standpoint. increasingly.” Chinese Think Tank Expert A new phase of East Asian regionalism may be dawning. including when political relations are strained. Regional cooperation dynamics. permanent consultation.
Long described as marginalized in the context of economic globalization. “Increasingly nonstate actors act as policy generators and are directly involved in decisionmaking and implementation of policy. and legitimacy to address issues that affect a much wider range of stakeholders. Unlike in East Asia and South America. and the UN. among others. however. Crisis management and peace-building activities would greatly benefit from better cooperation among the AU. However. it could also contain the seeds of more fragmentation. indicate some ambition to play a greater regional role. it was argued that the domestic evolution and foreign policy priorities of a handful of key countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. Others saw Brazil outgrowing its neighborhood and increasingly focused on enlarging its role in global vice regional forums. Greater development of home-grown civil society organizations attuned to transnational needs would contribute to forging more effective regional networks on such issues as climate change and resource management. Likewise. Nonstate actors are playing a central role both on the “demand” and “supply” sides of global governance. resources. Nigeria.” European Expert The range of nonstate actors contributing to global governance is heterogeneous. Africa is today central to the competition for resources and 23
markets (and even for land) among major global players. will be decisive for the future of the continent. Africa is too big and diverse for a single regional leader to emerge. no African country has sufficient influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. and civilsociety groups as well as multinational
. sub-regional organizations. regionalism in Africa is likely to draw on global governance tools and resources. Instead. perhaps more likely. Egypt. including transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Ethiopia. Nonstate Actors Step Up to the Plate The experts we consulted felt that global challenges cannot be effectively tackled by individual states acting alone. They contribute to setting the international agenda and are essential participants in implementing solutions.playing a leading role. The engagement of nonstate actors is critical given the complexity of the risks facing the international community and multilateral frameworks. and South Africa. Governments often lack the expertise. pandemics. Such renewed centrality could encourage coordination and cooperation at the regional level in dealing with external partners. Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on a combination of factors besides the leadership of major regional players. Recent initiatives. despite its rapid rise. with different countries reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside regional arrangements. or the proliferation of sensitive materials and technologies require flexible responses to a fast-changing agenda as well as capacity-building. South Africa has been playing a key role by its involvement in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. networks of experts. Challenges such as climate change. transnational challenges cannot be addressed by governmental actors on their own. and in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). From this standpoint. such as the launch of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (UNASUR) in 2008. However. in the shift from the Organization for African Unity to the African Union (AU) in 2002.
empower individuals and groups and enable nonstate actors to coordinate actions across national boundaries. the spread of mass media in regions—largely rural—that historically have been cut off has increased pressures on government for better governance—particularly at home. Equally. the exposure by Chinese medical practitioners via the Internet of provincial governments’ efforts to hide the spread of SARS in 2002-2003 led Beijing finally to take action against the virus. In the realm of global health. We need to get people the tools so they will have a stake in the future and policy. As one participant stated.
corporations and business coalitions. but many people in the world don’t have these tools. public-private partnerships (PPPs) have been emerging as an important feature of global governance innovation. with initiatives leading to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS. and Russia. and Malaria and
. with persuasion and legitimacy requiring as much attention as military. As a conference participant put it. people said we had only one superpower. you need information and technology. The action campaigns behind these measures bypassed UN machinery and opposition by the United States.” Economist from a Dubai Think Tank As the scope of transnational challenges has widened and figured more highly on the international policy agenda. “When the Soviet Union collapsed. often associated with business and civil society initiatives or to public authorities. but we had two: the US and international public opinion.” Wider public participation through mass communications also has been important in putting greater emphasis on transparency— honest and open transactions—generating pressure on governments. “The Internet is an enabler.Role of Mass Communications New technologies. Tuberculosis. economic. China. The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Landmines Ban Treaties were both led by civil society actors. such as the Internet. in fact.” In the global health arena. democratic pressure groups used the Internet to organize mass demonstrations. That creates a kind of power shift. notably in the field of sustainable development. a combination of states and nonstate actors caused a veritable revolution. Hybrid. Private philanthropy. has made an important difference in areas such as health and education. Experts on modern diplomacy recently noted that in a globalized world the instruments of power themselves have taken on a different relative strength. During the color revolutions and more recently in Iran. The mass communications revolution— notably the invention and increasing widespread use of the Internet—probably has been the most important vehicle spurring the expanded role of civil society groups and public opinion at large in agenda-setting for governance issues. and political weight. nonstate actors have been at the forefront. supported by like-minded states. pushing on institutions to adapt. The relevance of PPPs is likely to grow in as they reach out to multiple stakeholders. it gives the weak a chance to do things they could not do before. if not more effective than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue. fed the desire for greater participation. Governments’ efforts to adapt and be more transparent have. for example. “To predict the future. They have been equally.
NGOs. an intergovernmental scientific body gathering the contribution of thousands of scientists worldwide to assess the evolution and impact of climate change. Insights and knowledge. certification schemes such as the Forest Stewardship Council and the Maritime Stewardship Council have broken new ground with standards adopted by nonstate actors progressively endorsed by international and national authorities. PPPs can also focus on the implementation of broad agendas established at the multilateral level.” South African Participant In addition to their role as agenda-setters. are also central in the domains of peace and security. mandated to detect and respond to the outbreak of epidemics. and public institutions. For example. These include. First. International organizations’ efforts to create standards and rules are increasingly complemented or paralleled by codes of conduct from the private sector and civil society. In the environmental domain. old and new policy domains would benefit from greater engagement of nonstate actors as partners in standard-setting. thereby acting as catalysts of political purpose and resources. Philanthropic foundations such as those led by Bill and Melinda Gates have made a key contribution in this context. as exemplified by the over 300 partnerships launched following the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. Scientific advice is vital in the field of public health. These partnerships can help bridge the gap between global rule-making and local governance and engage a wide range of stakeholders from within and without individual countries or regions. Gathering and sharing knowledge is the basis for setting international norms and standards. Expertise will become more salient in all fields of international policymaking. “Maybe we are seeing a shift that is not geographical but horizontal—we are seeing the emergence of a global management elite and wondering what that means for the future of liberal democracy. and verification and as providers of scientific advice and field experience. for example. where NGOs with vast field experience fuel decisionmaking through their insights and
play a key role in conflict prevention and peace-building. Multi-stakeholder cooperation. the global health
. among others. nonstate actors are essential sources of knowledge and expertise. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Transnational advocacy and pressure groups have been instrumental in building and keeping momentum behind other major governance initiatives. alerting national and international bodies. monitoring. biosafety and biosecurity standards. opportunities exist to expand the interaction between state and nonstate actors and enhance the performance of PPPs. to enhance transparency in sensitive sectors such as extractive industries and for commodities like coffee and cocoa as well as diamonds. often coming from nongovernmental sources. Looking ahead. is a growing feature of international standard-setting. from managing the implications of technological innovation to food and resource scarcity—issues that require ongoing monitoring.new global governance regimes such as UNAIDS. Important initiatives have been undertaken. the WHO has created the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network. engaging business. involving NGOs. is perhaps the most prominent case in point. such as the Millennium Development Goals launched in 2000. a web of over 140 scientific institutions in over 60 countries.
This has hampered the engagement of nonstate actors and governments from developing and emerging countries. Third.domain at large. such a scenario would be the best outcome over the long term. Although less likely than the first two scenarios in the immediate future. severe threats to the international system—possibly a looming environmental disaster or a conflict that risks spreading—prompt greater cooperation on solving global problems. driven. and supported by governmental and nongovernmental bodies from advanced countries. Second. An increasing focus on local governance and the inclusion of diverse perspectives in the early stages of multi-stakeholders dialogues would ameliorate this problem. A stable concert could also occur incrementally over a long period in which economic gaps shrink and per capita income converges. and measures to adapt to climate change as well as the management of humanitarian crises and international migration. the effectiveness of self-regulation and of public-private partnership is predicated on the existence of clear guidelines and precise targets and on mechanisms for regular reporting and accountability.
Scenario III: Concert of Europe Redux Under this scenario. Fundamental reform of the international system becomes possible. The US increasingly shares power while China and India step up their burden sharing and the EU takes over a bigger global role.
. transfers of green technologies and of dual-use technologies. thus far multi-stakeholder cooperation has been largely initiated. This will entail close interaction with public authorities at the international and national levels to formulate shared objectives and uphold viable standards.
Concert of Europe Redux
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Extracts from the Final Press Conference of the International Energy Organization Summit. unlocked joint finance for top investment projects. Prime Minister of China: It is a pleasure to be here again after the second India-China Comprehensive Partnership Summit last year. I am proud of the role that China and its Partners of the East Asia Economic Community have played in hosting the preparatory conference to this event. my question goes to all of you. Today. Back then. Of course energy and climate are two sides of the same coin. and all other relevant actors to coordinate their initiatives and set joint funding priorities. India World Service: Excellencies. that hope becomes a reality. They agreed on a massive concerted supply of strategic oil reserves. but it happened almost by chance and after dramatic events. Political momentum in the Major Economies Forum has built up for a new deal to coordinate investment in energy efficiency and renewables. we all knew things had to change. and dozens of other countries. later signed by India. That night. OPEC’s response was swift. transit. Pressure from the ACT (Action for Climate Treaty) coalition of developing countries was critical to get there. the International Renewable Energy Agency. Today is nothing less than historic. but all major polluters have finally committed to binding targets to reduce the volume of their emissions and we are on track. The statement you just released says that the establishment of the International Energy Organization (IEO) in Delhi marks an historic turning point. US President: Today matters not just because we set up a new institution but because this is the result of long years of collective leadership. will the IEO make us even more reliant on fossil fuels? What about the Washington Agreement on emissions? EU President: You have touched on a crucial point. BBC: I don’t want to spoil the party but. please convince us. I was honored to host this summit and I am especially grateful that so many world leaders have joined me on this stage. investments had been far below what we needed since the Great Recession of 2008 and we found ourselves on the brink of a second economic crisis. Oil and gas supply could no longer cope with demand. For the first time the entire international community has come together to agree to a single package of rules governing energy markets. Japan. All of that was good. and drafted the Brussels letter to OPEC. 28 November 2025. the World Bank. which years ago sparked the whole process. my predecessor met in Brussels with the Presidents of China and Russia as well as our European allies. for all the pledges to avert that. This would be much more difficult without the Global Environment and Energy Monitoring System launched in Washington. The EU has pushed for a beefed up UNFCCC Secretariat to play a key convening role among the IEO. Let me also take this opportunity to praise the leadership of the US Government and of the EU. Yes. You all recall where we stood in 2018. the largest in the world. and to set up an organization overseeing these rules. it gives us a stronger basis for taking bold decisions. this took too long. Indian Prime Minister: I am pleased to welcome you to the new Global India Congress Center.
. and investment. New Delhi. Why is that? After many empty promises. I think we would not be here today without the 2020 Washington Agreement—global emissions to peak in 2025 and be halved by 2045. the year when the oil price broke the $300/b ceiling. In fact.
Building on earlier national legislation. Business has long sought a predictable regulatory framework. Arab News: Turning to geopolitical risks. What is your outlook for stability in Central Asia? President of Russia: In Central Asia. This precipitated the energy crisis in 2018. including through regional cooperation. The IEO Charter that we adopted today will provide for more accountability and predictability in the energy sector worldwide. we have achieved sustained growth rates and the share of energy exports in Russia’s GDP has fallen. Indian Prime Minister: Nonstate actors have played a key role in facilitating technology transfers to India and many other countries from what was called the Global South. We were all a bit surprised that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. oil and gas supplies from Central Asia to Russia. but have private actors followed? Are they doing their part to mitigate climate change and uphold energy security? US President: Well. China. and the EU could achieve such a coordinated response in a matter of weeks. including India. But networks of officials and nonstate actors have done wonders. We failed to prevent the crisis. The SCO Regional Dialogue with our European and American Partners contributes to the stability of Central Asia. Public-private partnerships like the Energy Investment Council no doubt helped pave the way to the Washington Agreement. we have learned that all dimensions of security are connected: human security and state security. The Smart Partnership to expand smart grids in Asia and in Africa is the next challenge. Private actors have been in the lead on many fronts. with the UNSC blessing the operation. improve the business environment. We also agree with our partners that governance and the rule of law are important factors for growth and stability. security conditions had improved. Capacity-building at the local level to implement mitigation and adaptation measures needs to speed up. This is the road that we took many years ago to modernize and diversify our economy and join the WTO. and we will soon expand that to other partners. The launch of the first generation of power plants equipped with carbon capture and storage systems is an example of what has been achieved. and boost economic growth.Scenario III
Concert of Europe Redux
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New York Times: The Washington deal was a game-changer. When the UN took over. and the EU came to a halt. energy security and economic security. It is not that we have set the stage and others have followed. we achieved in Washington a transatlantic cap-and-trade system. When the civil war started.
. Over ten years ago the G-20 asked the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization to launch a multi-stakeholder process to build a legal framework for sharing green technology and promoting joint R&D. Neighboring countries risked contagion. the crisis in Central Asia showed that energy security remains very vulnerable to disruptions. The impact of the floods in southern India three years ago would have been catastrophic had we not built an efficient alert system and more resilient infrastructure. Over the last 10 years. They showed how resources could be harnessed and channeled to sustain a green industrial revolution not only in Europe and the US but also in new giants like China and India. but I think we did a good job in responding to the situation. NATO. most of them are.
An Uncertain Future
“Some think we have the perfect storm of climate change. resource scarcity. EU Institute for Security Studies Climate change studies indicate growing environmental pressures hitting many of the lowest income countries particularly hard. and Dr. it has also increased pressures as income disparities have widened within and between countries. probably are not going to be sufficient to keep pace with the looming number of transnational and global challenges absent extensive institutional reforms and innovations.” Participant from the Gulf Region
Weak and Failing States1 Numerous studies indicate the growing fragility of many low-income developing states and potential for more conflict. Experts believe the risks are especially high and growing for armed conflict and increased instability in Africa.We assess that the multiple and diverse frameworks. and energy) and over-the-horizon issues. The capacities of the current institutional patchwork—however much bolstered by increasing nonstate support and regional mechanisms—will be stretched by the type of challenges facing the global order over the next few decades. Under current circumstances. it will not be a linear progression but zig-zags and ups and downs. and biotechnology—that are likely to rise in importance and will demand a higher level of cooperation. the Arctic. Professor Barry Hughes (University of Denver). and economic growth that carries with it changing lifestyles and greater resource consumption…” Senior Research Fellow. South and Central Asia. Several clusters of problems—weak and failing states and resources issues—appear particularly unlikely to be effectively tackled without major governance innovations because there is no overall framework to handle them. Commissioned papers from David Steven (Riverpath consultancy). Bates Gill (SIPRI). Alexander van de Putte (PFC).
. Although globalization—particularly the rise in commodity prices—has provided increased benefits. provided additional insights for this section as well as later sections on resource issues (food. which is likely to require a shared assessment of the challenges ahead and close monitoring of the implementation of national measures. however flexible. greater cooperation on those issues in which the risks are not clear-cut will be especially difficult to achieve. probably marked by discontinuities and surprises. Studies show that states neighboring weak or failing ones—many of which are also struggling—also bear many of
We relied on published works from the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management Center and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in developing the analysis in this section on state failure and civil conflict. Alex Evans (New York University). particularly in cases where civil wars were never fully resolved. increasing pressures on what are in many cases the countries’ limited resources. “As for the future. The issues discussed below are difficult subjects for multilateral cooperation because they involve more preventive action. We also cite over-the-horizon issues—migration. The birth rates in many of these countries remain relatively high. Poverty and weak economic links to the global system are often combined with weak governance and unresolved ethnic or tribal divisions. and the Middle East. water.
The researchers on the project argue that the
All these populous countries are listed among the world’s most vulnerable and fragile countries across five major risk assessment projects. Indian. or Nigeria2 would likely overwhelm international conflict management efforts. Many experts in emerging states thought their governments probably would be particularly leery of any intervention if it is driven by the “West” and not mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter Seven.
Emerging powers have played an increasing role: India is the third largest development actor in Afghanistan after the US and the EU. Aside from NATO and the EU. As a result. European. Pakistan. Yet their fears of internationalization are balanced by their fears of the consequences of failure. ASEAN has no peacekeeping capacity. Internal conflict or collapse of large populous states on the scale of Ethiopia. So far. and NATO efforts in the Balkans. Bangladesh. These countries are wary of the internationalization of conflicts in their neighborhood. Carleton University ‘s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Fragile States Index. allowing for preventive diplomatic. Prevention often requires direct political intervention or even the threat or use of military force as a last resort. A joint initiative by the Brookings Institution and New York and Stanford Universities on Russian. including the Brooking Institution’s Index of State Weakness. and regional organizations have growing expertise and success at containing such situations by brokering negotiated settlements and using peacekeepers to enforce solutions. a partial exception is the African Union’s limited but brave initial response in Darfur before the larger joint UN/AU efforts. political. The response to Afghanistan has driven a new evolution. potentially overriding another country’s sovereignty. Prevention Particularly Difficult. The Fund for Peace Failed States Index.the spillover effects from weak and failing states. and the League of Arab States’ only official peacekeeping operation was cover for large-scale Syrian intervention in Lebanon after the conclusion of the Ta’if Accords. and South African approaches to fragile states found there are deep-seated concerns within emerging powers about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. ECOWAS has played an important but relatively brief role in rapid response in West Africa. Efforts to prevent conflict have often been slowed by the international community’s reluctance to intervene directly. and the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (University of Maryland) Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger.
. these efforts have been more aspirational than actual. major powers. namely the creation by ISAF members of substantial bilateral development and civilian operational arms. and economic responses. and they are proving difficult. the Goldstone and Marshall State Fragility Index. conflict has often only been stopped after a significant amount of bloodshed has already occurred. as shown by US. Afghanistan’s 28 million and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most populous cases ever attempted. High-risk situations can be anticipated with greater accuracy than before. Brazil leads the UN peacekeeping effort in Haiti. The UN. increasing the risks of their succumbing to failure. Chinese. Regional organizations have done comparatively little in terms of large-scale operational responses to fragile states. given the difficult challenges posed by smaller countries such as Sudan or Somalia. China has chosen to expand its operational role primarily through the UN. Experts see weaknesses in the bilateral capacities: they are less wellcoordinated than the panoply of UN agencies and lack the comparative experience of effective lessons learned.
“The world will be a sad place if by 2025 we have not legalized quick military intervention for humanitarian causes in cases of failing states. scarcities are likely to hit hardest on poorer states. leading in the worst case to internal or interstate conflict and spillover to regional destabilization. increasing dietary preferences for protein. which hampers their efforts at stabilization and peacebuilding. and a high likelihood of a rise in demand for grain-based biofuel.eventual verdict on the interventions in past years in Iraq and Afghanistan by United States and NATO will have far-reaching impacts on how pro-active emerging powers will be when faced by future calls for intervention. systematic effort is probably most exemplified in the case of the interrelated resource issues of energy. Current technology and input costs put these countries well beyond the realm of food self-
. The stakes are high in view of the impact growing scarcities could have on undermining the current relatively open international system. Moreover. according to internationally accepted benchmarks. food. such as trade and peacemaking. 21 countries. and Latin America. Over the longer run. Although we can expect increased political and economic engagement from rising powers—in part as a reflection of their increasing global interests—the participation of emerging powers is likely to be on an ad hoc basis absent a more concerted multilateral framework. global climate change trends are likely to depress agricultural productivity in some regions. accounting for about 600 million people.
Interlocking Resource Issues The need for a cross-disciplinary. Climate change also further exacerbates the looming food and water scarcities as well as injecting added urgency to the transition out of fossil into cleaner fuels. On the supply side. The global aggregate demand for grain in the coming decade (2010 to 2025) promises to be substantially increased because of the expected additional 700 million people in Asia. particularly humanitarian emergencies in individual countries. In many of the emerging powers. Individual international agencies serve to respond to discrete cases. The downward trend in armed conflict that was noticeable through the early years of this century has been reversed in part because previously dormant conflicts such as those in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia have resumed. We will need a new legal system for sending quickly military intervention squads to save normal human beings from what they are suffering. are assessed as either cropland or freshwater scarce. contact between personnel involved in peace operations and those leading on trade and investment is limited. This is often the case in the US and the EU as well. No overall framework exists to manage trends interrelated scarcities in the case of food and water and increasing volatility in energy supply. Slow economic growth. Africa. badly timed international aid. and water. In 2010.” Japanese Participant Sustaining the Effort also Difficult. and lack of attention to social reforms are key factors that lead to recurrence. sustained reconstruction and reconciliation after conflict lessens the risk of a recurrence of conflict. Resource competition in which major powers seek to secure reliable supplies could lead to a breakdown in cooperation across a broad spectrum of issues.
• The peripheral role played by migration in post-World War II multilateralism is a reflection of the issue’s controversial nature. As population and average per capita water use have grown. My view is that they do not. the International Energy Agency represents oil. mostly in non-OECD countries.8 billion. Today. Migration is only likely to grow as a salient transnational issue with the emerging powers becoming
. 1. Current institutions were created to address the immediate interests of constituent countries and not the longer term interests of the global community of energy producers and consumers. and the biotechnology revolution.235 cubic kilometers by 2025. Over one billion people live in areas where human use of available water supplies has exceeded sustainable limits. with up to two-thirds of the world’s population living in water-stressed conditions. Water use is closely intertwined with food production. by 2025 this figure will rise to 1. There are numerous historical cases of effective preventive action.and gas-consuming countries and the International Renewable Energy Agency represents the producers of alternatives to oil and gas.sufficiency. food.4 billion people are projected to live in the 36 countries that will experience cropland scarcity. but shared awareness and frameworks—put in place before a crisis hits—are required to avert the worst-case scenarios. Examples of the various forms of disruptions include several that undermine prospects for a smooth transition to less carbon intensive fuels: volatility in prices has led to stop-and-go investments in unconventional sources and renewable and
increased reliance on coal as a secure domestic source regardless of environmental consequences. By that year. Demand is projected to rise further to 5. the amount of fresh water withdrawn globally each year has grown too—from 579 cubic kilometers in 1900 to 3. Experts thought a governance framework that allowed for more agreement on common objectives could reduce price volatility and allow for great joint research and development in areas such as carbon capture and sequestration and other alternative technologies. “The real question is whether scarcity problems lend themselves to global governance. but most irrigation is highly inefficient in water use. conflict over resources is not inevitable. another 15 countries will join their ranks by 2025. These include migration. and of the challenge any international oversight would pose to what many see as central prerogatives of the nation states— control over borders.973 cubic kilometers in 2000. OPEC represents oilproducing countries. rather than its lack of importance. The water situation is a major driver behind food scarcity. On the basis of the population growth. Even as supplies of essential goods such as water. and energy become more difficult. the Arctic. The competition for scarce resources will continue. Climate change will compound the scarcity problem in many regions as precipitation patterns change and many populous areas become drier.” Indian Think Tank Speaker Four decades of oil shocks have proved to be extremely disruptive regardless of whether countries have been oil consumers or oil producers. China will not give up its quest for resources and India should not. 40 percent of the world’s food supply comes from land that is irrigated. “Over-the-Horizon” Issues for Global Governance Another set of issues looms ahead on which even fewer concerted multilateral efforts have been undertaken.
levels of remittances have
. The potential opening of the Arctic as a result of climate change can be regarded as a test case for multilateral cooperation versus a “great game” of competition and potential conflict. including being a potential trigger for increased transnational tensions and controversy over globalization. have seen such high rates of migration that their future demographic trajectory has been shifted upwards. such remittances are widely seen as among the most effective forms of “foreign” or external assistance. biotechnology is another issue that has newly arisen—in this case. emerging states are likely to receive an increasing number of migrants attracted by the economic opportunities. Many developing countries. such as a sharp economic downturn. Emerging markets will become significant targets for migration: their economic power has the potential to outstrip their institutional strength. Climate change and new
Migration has the potential to increase economic interdependence and to reconcile the demographic challenges faced by older and younger countries. and the obstacles to greater cooperation are likely to remain considerable because of growing national sovereignty concerns. Conversely. such as the United States. other destination countries. However. Many of the key challenges will be in emerging and weaker states. with the likely growing flows of migrants. depending on their end use. In many others—even the wealthier countries—the potential for tensions along ethnic faultlines will persist. many countries are experiencing sudden increases in ethnic diversity. but more concerted efforts are required to control environmental risks and enhance transnational cooperation over competition. “Thinking backwards from 2025 or even 2040. Like the Arctic. Regional cooperation has started.increasing magnets for economic migrants. if not increase. finally. including related humanitarian concerns. leading to greater social problems as they become more diverse societies. Some countries already face an unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers. creating strains for globalization. As migratory flows become more complex.
accelerated sharply since 1990. migration also has the potential to act as a disruptive force. Poorer countries. because of technological innovations and the potential for those discoveries to be both exceedingly beneficial or harmful. • Climate change is only beginning to open up the possibilities in the Arctic. have seen levels of “brain drain” running at rates that damage their economic prospects. With their fast-paced economic development. The risks of not trying to better manage migration are great.” South African Participant International cooperation on migration has generally been weak. and exacerbating crises caused by other factors. The lack of governance frameworks nevertheless means that there will be a lack of an instrument to address crises. meanwhile. have little experience effectively managing major outflows of migration. one of the things that will happen with radical climate change and demographic changes in Europe and Russia will be global migrations again. Achieving multilateral cooperation is likely to be challenging because of the number of nonstate actors needed to be involved in any efforts to regulate the booming technology phenomenon.
The development of new agents with the ability to reengineer existing life forms to have an offensive capacity poses a growing challenge.
. and the nature of the challenges. direct modification of DNA at 35
fertilization is widely researched with a goal of removing defective genes. and governments on measures needed to diminish the risks posed by the biotechnology revolution. emotional. Rapidly falling costs will bring biotechnology within reach of a hacker community. They are likely to regard heavy handed international regulations as “protectionist” measures to restrain their freedom to operate. particularly in emerging powers such as China. Tensions build between the United States and China. with India and China investing heavily in biotechnologies and Brazil in biofuels. enabling them to work with a plethora of private actors. In addition. however. but also among some of the BRICs as competition grows for secure resources and clients. budding regional efforts.technologies will create more opportunities for resource exploitation and economic activities and greater potential for competition. particularly in Asia. Richer countries are worried more about their vulnerability to new diseases or the hostile use of biological agents. Dealing with the range of challenges presented by the opening of the Arctic requires appropriate governance mechanisms. The development of new agents and the expansion of access to those with hostile intentions increase the bioterrorism threat. these mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and more ad hoc than an all-encompassing treaty would be. The poorest countries are most concerned about the current impact of infectious diseases. Given the different interests at stake. The way in which the Arctic is managed will test the ability of states to resolve disputes over sovereignty and to enhance current frameworks of international law which apply to the sea and the seabed. Threats are also perceived differently by different governments. China stumbles and the global economy lapses. The potential for dual-use of biotechnology will make the task of regulating and controlling current and new developments an exceptionally complex one. but the possibility cannot be dismissed. discussions of future capabilities open the possibility for designing humans with unique physical. as well as their determination to prevent the region from becoming over-militarized. also are undermined. Nationalistic pressures build as middle-class aspirations for the “good life” are stymied. Rising powers expect their future comparative advantage to lie in a sector where there are relatively few entrenched leaders. Scenario IV: Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation This scenario is among the least likely. or cognitive abilities. creating profound cross-cultural ethical questions that will be increasingly politically contentious. Few experts believe that current governance instruments are adequate for those challenges. Governments will need unprecedented capacities to reach out beyond other governments. however. Such suspicions and tensions make reforming global institutions impossible. while the diffusion of relevant technology could lead to increased leaks of expertise and materials. The international system becomes threatening owing to domestic disruptions. many of whom will not be amenable to traditional regulation. For example. No forum currently exists for dealing comprehensively across the scientific community. Existing biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxin already pose an extremely serious threat. biotechnology—which the OECD thinks will potentially boost the GDPs of its members—can drive new forms of human behavior and association. industry.
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. Once the competitive juices flowed. A couple times. including to help China rise. with a pandemic— not unlike the present—and the challenge was to find which countries could provide emergency vaccines. Much of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was exploited by the Chinese. but most connections have been cut. The small island states whose very existence is really threatened were left out and ignored. though. Even I had to admit that my blood would boil at times.Scenario IV
Gaming Reality: Conflict Trumps Cooperation
In summer 2021. . I am thinking back on world events. . Such economic feats became a contentious political issue in America and led to growing USChina frictions. It is no exaggeration to say we are almost at the point of daggers drawn. For their part. way beyond the 2008 “spikes. What was all that stuff we used to talk about—multilateralism. confrontation was sure to follow. it would only take a minor incident to trigger a major conflict. The current international scene holds an uncanny resemblance to a computer game called “Peace Hero” I used to play with my son years ago. when he was playing the role of the BRIC. I—admittedly a bored diplomat—find myself sequestered for several weeks in Perth (Australia). particularly how the players perverted its intended objective. doctors without borders. I thought I had him over a barrel. but Americans grew increasingly resentful of an ungrateful China not mindful of all the “public goods” which the US had provided in the world. This was despite the fact that they could opt for technological breakthroughs on alternatives and reap many more rewards. He went out of his way not to cooperate with me. I am trying to get back to Europe for my annual leave. Nationalism has made a big comeback in the past decade. It was as if human nature was doomed: the competitive spirit took over even though the rewards were greatest for cooperation. My son—who was a bit of a rebellious teenager at the time—was particularly competitive. To while away the time. Food prices have soared. The world was confronted. No Kyoto followon climate change agreement was reached in 2012. the new Internet society that would bring us all together? A lot had been swept aside in the ten years since the Great Recession. I am reminded a little of how the British and French felt as German power rose in the years before the First World War. In one energy scenario. the new powers were dismissive of what they saw as an antiquated international system no longer possessing any legitimacy—a system that did not protect them from the increasing environmental and resource problems. He said China was of no mind to be deferent given past wrongs. A string of extreme weather events has added to their woes. despite the rapid quarantines put in place. The game actually prompted you to construct a UN Security Council resolution that would quickly be voted into action. The charges and countercharges proliferated with groups hardening around the US on one side and China-India-Brazil and most of the developing world on the other. This alone was probably enough to sour the international atmosphere. Asian cities are particularly vulnerable to the huge tidal surges which have accompanied some of the recent cyclones. Why couldn’t my son just accept the rules laid down in the game? They were for everyone’s good. The game was probably never a best seller. the contestants ended up competing over access to oil. all of whom assumed roles of major countries or international organizations. It was not as if China was at all equal to the US. not Western firms. China’s economy took a hit while the West’s had finally recovered. this one was constructed so you earned points for finding ways to cooperate with fellow contestants. I suppose he had a good case looking back on it. Lo and behold. Unlike most games. has spread and closed down most major airports. Perception is a lot in these situations. I wonder how the game will go . but it had intrigued me. The West resented the new powers as their economies continued to grow while even the US has struggled. We saw in Afghanistan where China actually reaped major economic benefits from the Allies’ efforts to stabilize the country. for example.” Governments—including the new rising powers—have struggled to keep supplies adequate and prices reasonable for their publics. my son became more hostile. A new outbreak of bird flu.
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The recent financial crisis has shown that a highly diverse set of countries and global and regional institutions can come together to avert what could have been another Great Depression. particularly to grapple with the growing interconnectedness of future challenges.
. The first (barely staying afloat) and third (concert redux) would avoid the worst outcomes through preventive action and forethought. Within that set of parameters. our discussions suggested that legitimacy— bringing multilateral institutions more in line with current power realities—has to be an objective of reform as much as dealing more effectively with “hubs” of risks for the future.Conclusion
Future Opportunities. it seems likely that the US and the EU will continue to be at the forefront of initiatives to reform and update the global governance agenda and institutions in the short term. divergent interests. but transforming them into both a newly effective and legitimate system is likely to be the big challenge. none of which ensures a “perfect” world. nonstate actors are likely to continue to play a vital role in generating not only an understanding of potential problems but also solutions in any reform of the global governance system. Many of the experts we engaged with in the emerging powers acknowledge the inadequacies in and challenges facing the global governance system. Over time. regional. and deep-seated worries about the effectiveness of current institutions. The second (fragmentation) and fourth (conflict) are scenarios that would reverse the gains— such as reduction in extreme poverty and slowdown in large-scale interstate conflict— which we have seen over the past half century. and national in addition to nonstate actors is possible. While not the most likely. we have outlined several scenarios. the “fragmentation” and “conflict” scenarios are not so insignificant as to be negligible in a world in which localized disruptions have global implications and preventive action is hard to organize. however. Their engagement will be critical to the success of any proposal for the adaptation and innovation of governance frameworks. we were impressed by the degree to which elites in most of the emerging powers were thinking more “globally” and preparing to take greater responsibilities. However. From our investigations of others’ views. but also Limits Global governance is not slated to approach “world government” because of widespread sovereignty concerns. enhanced and more effective cooperation among a growing assortment of international. However. Many of the key ingredients for improving global governance are at hand. Moreover. and needed. as has been the case for some time.
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” not climate change. the issues connected with global governance are gaining prominence within Brazilian society. and local governance.Annex A: World Views of Global Governance
In preparing this analysis. energy. Below we have encapsulated the country or regional views of our interlocutors on global governance. Effectiveness is not just about fast decisionmaking but incorporating a broader range of voices. Keeping its house in order is seen as a big contribution by China to global governance. Brazil will continue to look at many issues through the lens of the North-South divide and the need for redistribution of power from developed to developing states. India. South Africa. The dominant “matrix” of Brazil’s foreign policy has been the North-South divide. in their view. the governance gap is really a legitimacy gap. One said. and where universal values such as human rights and democracy do not play a central role. Brazil. and scholars and other experts in Japan. and climate change.” Multilateral institutions “cannot work well from Brazil’s point of view if they do not recognize the role of the emerging powers. China. “For developing countries. Global governance has not featured very high in the Brazilian debate until recently. Chinese interlocutors saw the G-20 as being a big step forward but questioned whether NorthSouth differences would impede cooperation on issues other than economics and international finance. does not make room for nonstate actors. spurred in part by the public debates over climate change and the impact of the financial crisis. Many argued that domestic markets and regional cooperation will become more important to ensure sustained growth rates. and “patience” are the key principles at the basis of a sound international system. business and NGO representatives. According to one participant. 43
. Brazil.” Many felt that China needs to manage its domestic development in ways that are compatible with the development and security of others. China. Others argued that the G-20 is essentially a “crisis management tool” which already suffers from a sense of fatigue and cannot be regarded as an alternative to the UN system. national governance. The Chinese participants stressed that trust is critical to prospects for cooperation and that it is rooted in respect for the interests of each party to a negotiation. sovereignty. at least for now. Nevertheless. This is changing largely because the country is playing a bigger role in international economics. the UAE. Some experts noted that the Brazilian Government tends to like “old fashioned” multilateralism. They also noted the progressive “de-concentration” of economic power away from the United States and the discrepancy between such a power shift and the enduring role of the US dollar as global currency. the big issues are food security and resource scarcity. The appreciation of respective concerns. “The governance gap for Brazil is that too much power is given to developed countries at a time when developing countries are emerging. Chinese interlocutors recognized the growing scope of global challenges but emphasized the need for China to deal with its internal problems. which is state-centered. However. and Russia in addition to the European Union and the United States.” For Brazilians. One Chinese speaker cited the need for “a balanced relationship among international governance. we met with government and think tank leaders.
Many experts were concerned about the future of the UN and one argued that if the reform of the UN fails the institution will progressively become irrelevant.” Others felt that China is increasingly aware of the responsibilities that come with power. “On terrorism. economic.” Some also feared that a system developed by the “West”—which includes democracy and rule of law—would suffer as the “East” becomes more powerful.” Chinese Expert Many Chinese interlocutors see growing convergence on “hard security” despite different perspectives on humanitarian intervention. not developed. Pretty quickly sending leaders to endless summits will create fatigue.“Be careful about the G-20—I give it at most five years’ lifespan. most countries have common interests. economies and it should take a more balanced approach. The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” to deal with mounting challenges. expecting others to take on the responsibilities associated with global 44
. and military power. Some felt that resource issues are not ripe for multilateral solutions and that India and China will continue their quest for resources. The impact of the economic crisis. whereas China considers economic growth as conducive to better governance over time. complaining about a “crisis of leadership. ongoing turbulence in the financial markets.” However. One said. doubts were expressed regarding the legitimacy of the G-20.” The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the different kinds of institutions and groups that have been established recently. It will suffer the same fate as other such forums. On the other hand.…on piracy.” The Japanese opined that the developing and emerging powers are still stuck in old North-South perspectives. India. Some felt this format would benefit from broader consultations with non-member countries to underpin its deliberations. Indian officials and think tank experts worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability. One Indian interlocutor said. “The IMF has focused on developing. Many hoped the United States would continue to be “very much part of the Asian region as a political. there is more of a link with nontraditional security and more room for cooperation. Japan. “It would be a pity if the West does not hang together to influence the future. Many Chinese saw “fundamental” defects in the international system. One said. One noted that global deals are to be based on “mutuality of benefits” and questioned whether the Western approach to the climate change agenda was fair to India and other poor countries.” One expert argued that globalization may have reached a turning point. India is primarily interested in transforming global governance institutions. they opined that India was not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s preponderant role in the region. approaches could differ among different global actors. Western actors regard good governance as a precondition for sustainable development.” One said. Many Japanese saw the governance gap as more about political leadership than “form or structure. Thus. and resource constraints point to a possible scenario of de-globalization. “Europe is not ready to take up the mantle of leadership” and questioned whether it is a regional or a global actor. In the development field. That said.
The potential for cooperation between sub-national authorities such as cities deserves more attention too. for example under the nonproliferation regime. the Japanese felt that more concrete measures should be devised to compel countries to comply with their legal obligations. Two days of meetings with only two hours allotted for each issue results in only “tinkering. the Japanese saw a need to better integrate both advanced countries and new massive energy consumers like China and India in relevant international frameworks to avoid unbounded competition. The driving concept in Russia is “multilateral diplomacy. In their view. the emphasis on energy independence and resource nationalism was regarded as dangerous. The Japanese were concerned that a premature institutionalization of the G-20 or the rapid expansion of its agenda could expose differences within the group. “like-mindedness” in informal groupings is required to achieve results. The United States. Efforts to focus only on global issues and put aside classical state interests are unrealistic. focusing on countries like China to take more action. The pressure of world public opinion had been on the United States—blaming the Bush Administration for lack of commitment to multilateralism—but is now shifting. stronger regional frameworks could compensate for weaker global ones. That will require renewed efforts to establish a stronger legal framework for intervention.
. Informality—which ensures “spontaneity”—may trump formal structures in advancing solutions. Japanese interlocutors questioned whether formal institutions are still appropriate. Instead. for example on energy and the environment.’’ with great powers relations playing a central role. More generally.” The Pacific region is still less governed and there is a need for a greater security framework. in particular for challenges such as climate change and resource scarcity. instead of global governance.” Besides. because of public opinion. whereas different agendas co-exist in the G-20. Russia. noting that Japan itself has to overcome political and legal obstacles to make a greater contribution on hard security. Some argued that international organizations with their huge bureaucracies are ineffective. however. Others stressed that “the state is back” and large powers are reasserting their sovereignty. Many were concerned about the lack of regional structures for hard security in East Asia.challenges. One former official talked of expanding the time allotted to G-20 meetings to enable leaders to exercise leadership. This is changing.” although some expected the influence of multinational businesses to increase and opportunities for greater transnational cooperation. “… (We) cannot expect Russia to cooperate on global issues without first dealing with bilateral issues. In the energy field. The Japanese felt that quick military interventions will be needed in cases of ailing states. Russian experts saw the world in 2025 as still largely one of “great powers. Most Japanese participants emphasized the need to boost national and regional means while reforming international organizations.” Russian Participant Russian participants worried about the relative lack of “transpacific security. which international organizations are still not equipped to handle effectively.
A particular problem for Africa is a “lack of capacity in knowledge and ideas to drive politics. that the G-20. strong states are a “prerequisite” for global governance in the absence of effective multilateral institutions. whose membership is much more diverse than the G-8. and China uses its status as a developing country as a cloak. the South-South solidarity is not likely to hold. The European system of decisionmaking encourages pluralism and engages networks of officials and nonstate actors. “Think globally and act locally—that means a strong state. They thought Africans wanted a rules-based international system but worried.” South African Participant Globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as opposed to creating a single global polity.” They perceive the proliferation of separate initiatives on development. for example. India’s demise as a leader of the South is only a matter of time. many felt that Russia’s modernization strategy is inconsistent and that there is little confidence among the people for things to change. food. In their view.” Technology is as important as governance. However. However. The South Africans doubted. “Some of the BRICs use the South-South agenda to advance their South-North agenda. if not more so. and resources as confusing and leading to more uncertainty on the rules of the game. that Africans were being left out. As one of our interlocutors put it. the G-8 and G-20 lack legitimacy and their future is uncertain. thereby connecting the national and international levels of governance. South Africa. The weakening of the state in Africa is a real problem. These things from global governance ultimately happen at the national and local level. They worried that the losers from globalization increasingly outnumber the winners and cited the need to tackle this problem.Europe. Some experts saw the EU as serving as a model for future global governance. The G-20 has little African representation. could operate effectively on non-financial matters. the UN remains the global institution with the only “legitimate credential. Our South African interlocutors saw weak states as being threatened by unregulated globalization. In their view. some noted that many states in Africa are ill-equipped to fit globalization and are likely to remain so due to demographic trends and poor governance.” South African Participant For Africans. In their view. The Russians thought there was only one institution—the UN—that could engage all the key actors. and Russia have scope for growing much closer while China will be the main factor in changing the world “with the biggest economy.
. Moscow’s role risks being marginalized in the global order. even with the shift to a multipolar world.” Some academics we encountered worried that if Russia does not take into account the main trends of global development.
“Too often when we talk about the future of the Gulf. an uneasy accommodation with Iran will have to be found.” Others.“Africa did not develop because of a lack of technology.” From this standpoint. Asia. there is a need to share power to make decisions. however. In their view. As to the future of the UN. China and other emerging actors will have a long way to go to match the influence of traditional powers. the common feature that unites them is resource nationalism. Some were wary of China because it is interested only in African resources. However. being a model. Africa. “What is the new contract?” After World War II. and Latin America were not involved. “If you look at the BRIC countries. Several felt let down by lack of support from the West on democratization. creating a system. One said. but they stressed that “sharing is about respective priorities. “Now there is no interest in democratization in or outside the region. “Africa has never fit anywhere—it has always been the object of global trends. the key question was what sort of global institutions are most capable of inclusive power sharing. seeing Africa to be exploited for natural resources.” Many interlocutors bemoaned the lack of strong regional organizations—labeling the Arab League and Gulf Cooperation Council as weak and not well-connected to international institutions. the Middle East.” according to one participant. One said. some noted that power is about “building consensus.” Even the nonstate actors come mainly from the most powerful states. UAE.” In their view. noted that China is quick to adjust its policies in response to African concerns. including the fact that powerful actors have sought alternative ways to pursue their interests.” A framework or institution is needed to bring together the “rights” of energy producers with those of consumers. The participants from the Gulf region thought it will be necessary to incorporate these regions if we are to avoid crises in the future. Most saw the region turning to “China and the East” as that region becomes a larger consumer of energy from the Persian Gulf.
. For participants from the Persian Gulf region. One asked. One said. we conclude that we are not real actors. not about exporting Western views. more attention needs to be paid to the reasons why it is not working.
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turning Japan’s focus from its US ally in the Pacific to mainland Asia. informality. China. unlike the inter-regional Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In what has been defined as a “paradigm shift. and aversion to conflict. for example at the interface between China and India along common borders and throughout the region. The question is whether the bilateral alliance between 49
. Both regional heavyweights—China and Japan—and the member states of ASEAN favor regional cooperation as the framework within which to resolve disputes and manage interdependence.” some Japanese interlocutors acknowledged the need to adjust to the new regional context and pursue a sort of “look West” policy. a non-intrusive agenda. For example. because of its non-binding character. On the whole. Third. From an economic and political standpoint. downplaying rivalry and benefiting from booming mutual trade and investment flows. The ongoing shift in the East Asian balance of power has not escaped Japan. on the basis of shared principles. and Japan. In the last few years.
A new phase of East Asian regionalism may be dawning. permanent consultation. ASEAN has developed over decades a distinctive style of regional cooperation based on a low level of institutionalization. However. ASEAN countries have rather developed a range of bilateral relations between themselves and with external actors such as the United States. The so-called “ASEAN way” has not been very effective in delivering concrete solutions to the economic and security concerns of member states at times of crisis. China’s centrality to the region will grow. only include Asian countries. and between China and Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries over rights in the South China Sea. Areas of serious geopolitical tension persist. Beijing extends its political influence in parallel with its growing economic clout in the region in a nonconfrontational and therefore less contentious way. Whether China will be embedded in a sphere of cooperative security and shared prosperity or will seek to steamroll its way through the neighborhood will have far-reaching implications for global stability. China has shown its willingness to engage with neighboring countries on some issues not only at the bilateral level but also through multilateral regional structures. however. In both fields. China delimits the influence of the United States in East Asia by supporting regional structures which. Second. By engaging in regional cooperation. China sets economic and political competition with Japan on peaceful grounds. this cooperative framework has provided a useful platform to involve regional powers in permanent consultation and ad hoc cooperation.Annex B: The Prospects for Regionalism
Regionalism takes many different shapes across the world. as reflected in the debates we held at our seminars overseas. First. China pursues multiple objectives. China has sought to reassure the region on the implications of its momentous rise. it has signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and it has set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization together with Russia and Central Asian countries to tackle shared security threats.
with China at its core. and Colombia have been pursuing economic liberalization and bilateral trade deals with the United States and. have engaged in ideological competition not only against US influence in the region but also toward Brazil and others that are engaged in economic globalization. the gap between the economic performance of Brazil and that of most of its neighbors has been widening. The countries of the Bolivarian Alliance. with different states following disparate economic policies and political trajectories. China. growing economic links among China. Most observers regard Brazil’s regional leadership as a vital condition for it to achieve its goal of playing a major role on the global stage. dependent as they are on the export of energy and other raw materials. Japan has supported a range of initiatives at bilateral and regional cooperation on economic and environmental issues. increasingly. can be envisaged. the emergence of a “hub-and-spoke” system in East Asia. Like China. among others. a large domestic market. In the last two decades. involving India as well as Australia and New Zealand (the so-called ASEAN+6 that meets at the EAS). It has also allocated a large share of its development assistance to the region. South America has been the number one priority of Brazilian foreign policy and it is likely to remain so for years to come. Brazil benefits from sound macro-economic and social policies. led by Venezuela. grounded in shared basic principles. their economic prospects are shaky. To this end. Established multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN co-exist with a thick web of bilateral partnerships and ad hoc functional arrangements and diplomatic processes. Contrasting trends indicate potential for either regional cooperation or fragmentation in South America. however. turmoil in global trade and financial markets.Japan and the US will prove compatible with deepening multilateral frameworks in East Asia. Japan supports more inclusive regional formats than those traditionally championed by China. Brazil accounts for about half of South America’s territory and population and for two-thirds of its gross domestic product. Japan regards regional cooperation as a multiplier of its political influence and as a way of diluting that of potential rivals. From a Japanese standpoint. and developments ahead may follow a similar pattern to that envisaged for East Asia.
Regionalism in South America shares some of these features. Soft balancing within the region and vis-à-vis the US underpins many of these developments. The region is diverse. a diversified industrial base and huge endowments with
. and ASEAN. ASEAN should remain the building block of a larger regional architecture and the annual East Asia Summit (EAS) should evolve into an East Asian Community. Given current trends. In perspective. including for example the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in the security domain. Many wonder whether Brazil is going to be too big to remain focused on its region in one or two decades. The national strategies of major regional actors intersect with cooperative initiatives and engender plans to set up new multilateral platforms such as the East Asia Community. as well as environmental interdependence suggest that regional cooperation may deepen and expand to new areas. Countries such as Chile. which may not include the United States. However. Such a system would be managed through regional structures that would more likely perform a stabilizing and confidence-building function. than a binding norm-setting role. Regionalism in East Asia presents multiple facets. Japan. Peru. So far.
But whether Brazil will be willing and able to play such leading role. Brazil hosted the Latin American and Caribbean Summit too. As in East Asia. have been losing competitiveness and struggle to fit the changing global division of labor. Some of these countries also play a pivotal role in the context of sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States in West Africa. The economic and financial crisis has severely hit the credibility of international financial markets and institutions and suggested to Brazil and its neighbors that stronger domestic markets and regional economic cooperation can help shield the region from future crises. Countries such as Argentina. Nigeria. However. and in the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Instead. serious political challenges lie ahead. Brazil continues to support the Union of South American Nations (MERCOSUR). Brazilian capital constitutes the backbone of investment in regional infrastructure. remains an open question. has achieved less than expected.
Political and security crises all over the continent punctuate the laborious development of regionalism in Africa. among others. Africa is too big and diverse for a single regional leader to emerge. Unlike in East Asia and South America. no African country has sufficient influence and resources to steer regional cooperation at the continental level. in ways that gain consensus in the region. which excluded the United States and that Brazil regards as the harbinger of a future permanent organization. A new regional organization—UNASUR—was launched in 2008 with the goal of making it the main forum for political dialogue and cooperation in South America. although the multilateral Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) set up in 2000. South Africa has been playing a key role by its involvement in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. however. regionalism in South America has not spurred a deeper institutionalization of cooperation and remains exposed to unfolding political circumstances within and between countries. albeit for political more than economic reasons. the Democratic Republic of Congo. Important initiatives suggest that such an attempt is in the making. countries face common transnational threats such as drug trafficking and all would benefit from better transport and energy infrastructures to boost trade and investment and harness their natural resources.natural resources. At the same time. African experts argued that the future of the continent and of its governance will depend on the domestic evolution and foreign policy priorities of a range of key countries such as South Africa. Brazil is the only country with the critical mass to build on these assets and address economic asymmetries and political fragmentation with a view to deepening regional cooperation. and Ethiopia. in the shift from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union (AU) in 2002. and has backed the membership of Venezuela in this organization. These include low levels of mutual political trust and reluctance by Brazil and other countries in the region to constrain their national sovereignty by subscribing to common rules and binding engagements. Egypt. South America is relatively stable. the South African Development Community in the South. However. and the East African Community to the East of the continent. The interplay
Capacity-building will be a core priority for years to come and will require a strong partnership between African actors and external donors. Many African leaders and observers claim that Africa should be proactive in shaping old and
. available for rapid deployment. Planning and command structures are weak while AU operations heavily depend on external support for funding and logistics. for example the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. and between the latter. The presence of strong and assertive states next to many fragile or failing ones. Although some progress has been achieved. regional diplomacy may grow in relevance. Relevant institutional structures have been set up at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and the AU has undertaken some small-scale crisis management operations. and the UN. However. Crisis management and peace-building activities would greatly benefit from deeper cooperation among the AU. such processes and frameworks rarely address the root causes of instability because doing so might entail questioning domestic political regimes. The complicated interplay between the AU and sub-regional organizations. Today. From this standpoint. Long described as marginalized in the context of economic globalization. all of them attached to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in their respective domestic affairs. more particularly. regionalism in Africa is likely to complement rather than replace global governance tools and resources. is also under way. to the implementation of the principle of the “responsibility to protect” enshrined in the constitutive act of the AU. Prospects for regionalism in Africa depend on a combination of factors. With local opposition to the interference by external actors in African affairs on the rise. The APSA was launched in 2004 with the aim of providing African answers to regional challenges and threats. around 70 percent of UN peacekeeping troops are deployed in Africa. poses a major challenge to the future of regionalism in Africa and. Poor governance in many countries in the region fuels a vicious spiral of poverty and instability that generates a growing demand for crisis management and peace-building. with the EU and its Member States likely to remain at the forefront of this effort. major obstacles lie ahead. Efforts at regional cooperation since the establishment of the AU have consequently focused on security issues.between these organizations and the AU is critical to support effective regional solutions to common problems. Africa is today central to the competition for resources and markets (and even for land) among major global players. which African leaders are not inclined to do. sub-regional organizations. African institutions do not have the resources and expertise to take responsibility for crisis response and for peace-building activities. preventive diplomacy and mediation among national leaders in regional forums can be decisive to managing crises within or between countries. The constitution of five stand-by contingents at the sub-regional level. At the political level. poses another obstacle to effective regional cooperation. The engagement of African nonstate actors in transnational cooperative frameworks would contribute to the effectiveness of such frameworks on such issues as climate change. if probably insufficient as such in the absence of a concerted effort. The leadership of major regional players such as South Africa will remain essential.
new partnerships. as opposed to being the object of foreign interests.
. Such renewed centrality could encourage coordination and cooperation at the regional level in dealing with external partners. with different countries reaping the benefits of bilateral deals outside regional arrangements. However. it could also contain the seeds of more fragmentation.
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Russia. and the United States) have preferred to keep discussions of Arctic sovereignty among themselves. more risks for the environment. where interests are most closely aligned or at least most clearly understood. Denmark. Larger groupings provide greater legitimacy and may be the only format for dealing with more complex and interrelated issues but are harder to manage and less likely to produce practical cooperation. is perhaps the most effective and the obvious candidate as a governance mechanism for the Arctic. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). the Barents Euro Arctic Council. The Arctic can be regarded as a test case for global governance. these mechanisms are likely to be more fluid and more ad hoc than an allencompassing treaty would be. UNCLOS delimits and codifies the potential areas of dispute. As a general rule. Dealing with the range of challenges presented by the opening of the Arctic requires appropriate governance mechanisms. and the nature of the challenges. But these are complicated in a number of ways. which does not include security issues. and the Northern Dimension of the European Union in addition to a number of bilateral arrangements on areas of cross-border interest such as the longstanding fisheries arrangements between Norway and Russia. However. The members of the self-defined group of five Arctic coastal states (Canada. provides the legal basis on which a state may claim economic sovereignty over the sea and seabed. These include the Arctic Council. tend to produce the greatest degree of practical cooperation. however. A range of frameworks—many of which are essentially forums for discussion rather than formal governance mechanisms—already exists. Some of the challenges raised by the growing economic and political salience of the Arctic are in a sense traditional. its arbitration body. bilateral agreements. are not binding. but the findings of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Arctic Council.
. which the United States has not ratified.Annex C: The Arctic: Challenge or Opportunity for Global Governance?
The potential opening of the Arctic as a result of climate change is a seminal event. and it lacks a permanent independent secretariat and formal powers. its agenda. which has the broadest membership. Using the North Sea Route would cut shipping routes between East Asia and Europe by about 40 percent. relating to questions of sovereignty. Given the different interests at stake. A region that has generally been understood as being outside the current of global affairs is becoming central to them. and greater potential for competition. as well as their determination to prevent a region from becoming over-militarized. The way in which the opening of the Arctic is managed will test the ability of states to resolve disputes over sovereignty and to enhance current frameworks of international law that apply to the sea and the seabed. in the Arctic as elsewhere. Climate change and new technologies will create more opportunities for resource exploitation and economic activities. is narrow. Norway. In 2009 the US Geological Survey estimated that the Arctic region holds massive resources of oil and natural gas.
But many of the possible challenges facing the Arctic require effective policing. of course. depriving both Norway and Russia of potential revenues. China. but getting the governance frameworks right (and the infrastructure in place) for such potential activity will be important. in particular. Canadian. Very few states have the ability to adequately surveil or control their Arctic territory and seas.
. and domestic political decisionmaking. particularly within NATO. Rising economic interest in the Arctic could. will depend to differing degrees on price. but also possibly more secure than current routes. overlapping claims have to be resolved by states. It will take decades before the Arctic is a major shipping channel. it was highly unlikely that commercial activity would take place in that area. make some existing disputes more acute and increase the perceived strategic importance of such overlapping claims. much of what happens in the Arctic—including how highly controversial questions of resource development play out—will happen within a single state. The challenges raised by the potential opening of the Arctic concern not only Arctic states but non-Arctic states as well. or between the United States and Canada over maritime domain awareness and possibly ice-breaking capacity. Moreover. in terms of understanding what responsibilities are shared and which fall to each NATO-member. There are a number of outstanding sovereignty disputes in the Arctic. for instance. These may take the shape of formal structures—such as a strengthened Arctic Council—or more informal data-sharing and network-building. The environmental and possible human consequences of a shipping disaster need no elaboration. if ever. states might miscalculate. is showing a growing interest in the region—as a shipping route both shorter and cheaper than existing shipping routes. Without an agreement. let alone the possible consequences of a political dispute over access. The future good governance of the Arctic depends to a large degree on the will of states to act cooperatively externally as well as their ability to act responsibly domestically. Moving toward more common alignments of incentives and perceptions between states will be key. either by over-reaching themselves or failing to signal their interests and intentions. The key question is whether states will be capable of resolving their disputes through negotiation and what conditions need to be in place to make that happen. as elsewhere in the world—many of which pre-date UNCLOS—and more could occur. There are opportunities within existing institutions for greater cooperation.Ultimately. As in all diplomatic engagement. Norway and Russia moved dramatically toward final resolution of a longstanding dispute over ownership of a large portion of the Barents Sea. In 2010. accessibility. or a real ability to control. The question of whether US. This is exacerbated in a region such as the Arctic where asserting sovereignty may be as much about power as it is about presence. or Russian oil and gas resources are developed. which is believed to hold considerable hydrocarbon wealth. But this is not necessarily the case.
By the end of this period. and NGO financing for reconstruction programs. Looking ahead toward 2025. Since 1988. or Bangladesh. Since 2006. several wars that ended just after the Cold War later relapsed.
Our interlocutors worry that the international system for conflict management and response to failed states has several major weaknesses. Such successes as have been recorded by international conflict management mechanisms have been in countries that are small or modest in scale and/or population. etc. and regional mediation. NATO. The end of the Cold War created the political conditions for the UN Security Council to take a more active stance on internal conflicts but did not stop new civil wars from breaking out. State fragility seems certain to remain a pressing problem until the population of the poorest countries has stabilized. there has been a slight uptick in the number of both interstate and internal wars. in societies characterized by weak institutions and the destabilizing impact of rapid social change. with major civil wars—those defined by more than 1. Speed. Ethiopia. UN. UN. At present.Annex D: Are Global Governance Tools Sufficient for Fragile States?
Response to failing and failed states has been a major operational feature of the international conflict management system since the end of the Cold War. • Scale. bilateral. this system has been continuously deployed. Nigeria. bilateral. UN. Were the current system confronted with state collapse in a country the size of Pakistan. A number of countries will experience high levels of demographic risk. more than 40 countries have some form of international monitoring. however. NGO and bilateral humanitarian programs.000 battle deaths—declining 80 percent in that period. Afghanistan’s 28 million and Iraq’s 30 million are among the most populous cases ever attempted. EU and other regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The net result of a change in political conditions and of the creation of the conflict management system is that from a peak in 1992. Mediation efforts fail roughly three-quarters of the time and peacekeeping efforts roughly half.). and World Bank. land. the number of civil wars in the world declined steadily to 2006. the world’s population is expected to reach eight billion. it would be overwhelmed. NATO can respond quite quickly to outbreaks of violence. peacekeeping. This system includes UN. as well as that of coalitions of the willing. as the proportion of young men in their population creates competition for scarce resources (jobs. or enforcement presence within their borders. with the growth heavily concentrated in the towns and cities of poorer countries. the risk of state failure will remain high. water. but even NATO has discovered limits on its rapid response capacity in Afghanistan. The EU and regional
short term. The international community seldom has a coordinated political strategy. and Europe. Development agencies are particularly ill-equipped to understand and respond to the powerful political incentives that lead elites to resist reform. There are also important questions of legitimacy for international actors in the broader Middle East: US and Western actors face greater legitimacy constraints than others. if any. cases of real prevention of major internal wars or state collapse processes are few and far between. and reinforce. Asia. effective tools for dealing with transboundary features of fragile states. Most countries that have experienced internal conflict in the post-Cold War system remain stuck in a cycle of low growth/weak capacity. political. there are few. Within conflict management systems. They are not unheard of. The bulk of international conflict management has been in Africa. with Pakistan an example of a country where billion of dollars of support has often yielded counterproductive results.organizations such as ECOWAS can deploy small forces rapidly. There is little in the toolkit of international systems designed to respond to the particular features and particular challenges of conflict and internal crisis in the broader Middle East. financial. developed or semi-developed ministry of interior/justice/police systems. in Kenya. Many experts believe that conversely—and unfortunately—Western policy has often contributed to the hollowing out of institutions in fragile states. International judicial. and rigid in terms of how it interacts with fractious governments. Post-crisis Development and Risk. Financing systems for post-conflict recovery is slow. recent preventive efforts by ECOWAS with UN support in Guinea halted a spiral of escalation. meaning that precisely those elements of the international response system that are most capable (in terms of force and speed) are least welcome. Prevention. The UN normally deploys very slowly indeed: the time between mandate and deployment is up to nine months. Statistically. where a coalition of donors has placed governance at the heart of their joint strategy for countries. although fresh approaches have been tried in countries such as Nigeria. • Regional Gaps. such as transnational criminal networks or penetration by terrorist organizations. Transnational Threats. Kofi Annan led an integrated mediation effort that halted a spiral of escalating violence and established a transitional power-sharing government. Existing systems for responding to organized crime are highly fragmented and designed to integrate with. they also exhibit a continued high risk of relapse. police. however: arguably the international peacekeeping. and transnational threat responses in fragile states are in their infancy. Early political.
. The Institutional Challenge. Development agencies have had little demonstrable success in helping strengthen institutions in states that may be at risk of failure in the future. and security responses to the erosion of governance or manifest signs of state failure are episodic at best. Similar problems bedevil post-conflict recovery. and economic responses to Lebanon after the Israel-Hizballah war (see below) prevented full-blown collapse of the Lebanese state.
they vote (both in formal chambers.
. New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. prepared to tolerate high levels of operational risk. In such cases. geography matters. in a similar political and operational role to that played by South Africa in Burundi. In the former. political support to UN and regional operations. For weak or failing states that are not of high strategic significance. First. Practices differ widely. rising powers tend to cooperate to avoid total collapse (which would be detrimental to the interests of regional powers and emerging investors). which we have cited in the main text and this annex. In Afghanistan. rising powers are contributing to international conflict management systems. However. by providing peacekeepers. In more distant fragile states. aiming to build support among key Afghan constituencies in the east of the country as part of its strategy for countering Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan. Second. when it comes to strategically significant countries (most of which happen to be highly populous)—such as North Korea. and Pakistan—specific regional and geostrategic concerns dominate. and (to a lesser degree) aid and civilian support. There is a fundamental difference in emerging power roles in fragile states in their immediate neighborhood and those further afield. Although they resist measures that have the effect of extending the scope and timing of international intervention. meanwhile. Indian. They are also active investors. they have divergent interests that preclude cooperation on political and economic reconstruction and undermine potential management efforts.3 Three factors are of particular relevance in shaping the approach of rising powers to fragile states. they have— unsurprisingly—identified strong interests in being heavily involved in both the political management of fragility and recovery. Chinese. Brazil is leading international peacekeeping efforts. India is providing large quantities of reconstruction aid linked to local governance reform. and are increasingly forceful competitors for commercial and national
The Managing Global Instability Project—an initiative of the Brookings Institution. and in being commercially engaged in the recovery. Some early findings have emerged from this work. rising powers currently seem largely aligned with broad international patterns of UN-led containment and reconstruction. China is using a combination of unfettered aid and commercial investment to take a major position in mineral and energy sectors. and Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation— is conducting a series of case studies of Russian. by contrast. In the Pacific Rim. the perceived importance of a country has a paradoxical impact on the willingness of rising powers to engage with the international community in supporting it. Nigeria.Rising Powers and Fragile States
A critical determinant of future capacity to respond to the challenge of state fragility and failure will be the strategy pursued by rising powers as they play an increasingly global role and potentially see growing threats to their economic and security interests from state failure. and with their feet) in support of UN peacekeeping operations—including operations with complex. multi-faceted mandates designed to promote democratic governance and market reform. However. and South African approaches to fragile states. In Haiti. for example.
In Sudan. The potential conflict between extractive commercial practices and more benign peacekeeping and reconstruction assistance is not. Yet fears of internationalization are balanced by fears of the consequences of failure. China. rising powers tend to be highly sensitive to the adverse and unintended consequences of Western-led interventions in countries where they have a strategic interest. 13 of the 15 largest companies are Chinese. Investors are often from the private sector. There is limited contact between personnel involved in peace operations and those leading on trade and investment. as yet.energy purposes. is worried by the consequences of an influx of refugees from North Korea. they are influenced by the failure of Western-led attempts to build stable states in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Third. this is rooted in their own histories (India’s experience in Sri Lanka. China’s in Vietnam). This reflects a lack of integrated government within the rising powers. The eventual verdict on these interventions (eventual success after significant changes of strategy vs. India remains conscious of potential links between Nepali and Indian Maoists (although evidence for these links is limited). even if funded by governments or sovereign wealth funds. They tend to be skeptical about their own capacity to engage in large-scale interventions and wary of the political costs of unilateral action. there are deep-seated concerns within emerging powers about the consequences of the proactive management of state fragility. They are wary of the internationalization of conflicts in their neighborhood. failure and withdrawal) will have far-reaching impacts on how proactive emerging powers will be when faced by future calls for intervention. India accepted a UN role in Nepal but has ensured that this role is tightly constrained. with China now Africa’s second largest trading partner (after the United States) and Brazil seeing its imports from Africa rise more than sixfold between 2000 and 2008. Even commercial strategies are much less coherent than is commonly perceived. for example. but to a greater extent. Brazil is worried by the nexus of criminal interests and ungoverned spaces on its borders. Brazil has accepted the internationalization of Haiti but is wary of this trend being repeated elsewhere in Latin America. In part. Perhaps most importantly. especially in the Amazon. for example. a major part of the policy debate within or among emerging powers.
capable of arousing an intense political reaction that could lead to friction between ethnic groups. The right to regulate borders is regarded by governments as a key component of their national sovereignty. more than one in ten of those living in a developed country were born elsewhere. Today. however. In the past. There is no guarantee that the international community will continue to manage current levels of migration. and reaching 3. but those left behind in societies that risk losing skills at an unsustainable rate. affecting not just those who move from a country. as the world again sees the abrupt and involuntary flows of people that were characteristic of some of the darkest times in the 20th century. when there were just 75 million migrants. In 1960.5 percent of the population of developed countries. there were 214 million international migrants in 2010. At best. by definition. At worst. transforming societies over many generations.1 percent in 2010. Countries with high rates of outward migration tend to have little international leverage to promote stronger standards of global governance. at which point there was marked acceleration. before climbing to 2.
.) Sixty percent of today’s migrants live in developed countries. not success. though the demand to migrate almost certainly will remain high. According to UN figures. with some regions and countries experiencing a sharp increase in migration. It touches the lives of people more directly than any other facet of globalization. international cooperation on migration has generally been weak.
Current Migration Trends
The number of migrants has been accelerating over the latter half of the 20th century. migration could be driven primarily by economic failure.9 percent in 1990 and 2000.Annex E: Migration in the Age of Uncertainty
International migration poses unique challenges to the global system. The global picture. emerge as a destabilizing factor before or after conflict within and between nations. the increase in the proportion of migrants in the world’s population has been modest. This fell slightly in the 1970s and 1980s. migrants represented 3. Two and a half percent of the world’s people were migrants in 1960. Movements of people across national borders have a profound economic impact on both source and destination countries. At a global level. and even be placed into reverse. 40 percent in the developing world. a substantial increase from 50 years earlier. and those who live in cultures that will be substantially reshaped by migration. Migration is a contentious issue. (These figures may be an underestimate because they do not account for “irregular migrants” who enter or remain in a country in breach of that country’s laws. a transnational phenomenon. migration could help harmonize the different economic and demographic conditions that will be experienced by countries as the world moves toward its peak population. Migration is. both in absolute and relative terms. with gradual increases until the 1980s. does not reveal important patterns.
and third-generation immigrants. In recent years. Europe has four countries on the list. there are also significant disparities.4 percent annually over the last decade. mainly from Mexico. making up more than 20 percent of the population. China is an outlier. American Hispanics will play a crucial role in keeping the country young. France. but as it is one of only nine countries to provide no data on migration to the United Nations. by which time it would have grown by over 80 million. some countries have experienced sizeable increases in their total number of immigrants. The European Union represents an important case study.3 percent of the population in 1960. Northern America and Oceania have seen both population growth and a substantial increase in relative numbers of migrants (from 6.4 percent in 1960 to 14. Under one projection.3 percent of Europeans currently live outside their country of origin. the dichotomy between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states is being eroded. Syria (1. with net migration averaging above one million per year in the period 2000-2010. the United States’ Hispanic population would grow by 25 million by 2050. Some 2.6 million) and Italy (2. the United Kingdom. and from 12. with Spain seeing its migrant population increase by 26. Europe has seen its population increase only slightly. 9. as well as Saudi Arabia and India. reflecting the growing importance of rising powers as receivers of migrants.5 percent in 2010).000 migrants. the Hispanic population would exceed 20 percent of the total by 2025 and 30 percent by 2050. According to some experts. a trend strengthened by fertility rates that are projected to stay above replacement levels (unlike any other racial or
.3 million) have only recently emerged as significant receiving countries. Asia. with Canada also featuring in the top ten. Even if no further migration occurred.Regionally.6 percent to 16. which has seen eight million additional migrants. patterns of migration are growing more diverse. demonstrating the long-term influence of migration on receiving countries and the role played by second. Africa. as a region that has allowed free movement of people since April 2004. but it experienced a net increase of nearly a million refugees between 2005 and 2010. and Spain. Ten countries host over half of the world’s migrants. It is believed to host only around 600. namely Germany. Pakistan’s total migrant stock stayed steady over the decade. led by the United States.8 percent for the latter).2 percent in 2010 for the former. Nine have gained more than a million immigrants in just ten years.3 million) and Jordan (1 million) have seen the influx of large numbers of refugees from Iraq. and Latin America have all seen a falling proportion of migrants as they have experienced rapid population growth. Russia and Ukraine feature on the list. The US Census Bureau’s national projections illustrate the cumulative impact that these flows will have on US demography over the next 40 years. this figure can only be regarded as a very rough estimate. but has experienced a dramatic change in its relative share of migrants (2. Most countries experience both emigration and immigration while some countries have taken on an important role as transit zones for migrants. following the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the country level. One in five lives in the United States. The United States is the world’s leading migrant-receiving country. Spain (4.
3 percent of its population in the 1990s and a further 11. remittances are estimated to have fallen slightly in 2009 as a result of the economic crisis.8 percent) all show worrying levels of brain drain. the burden on some countries remains considerable. shows rapid fluctuations in its net migration. Some experts believe the optimal level of skilled worker emigration at 5-10 percent. Moldova (31. but lost 4. Pakistan. the emigration of highly skilled individuals represents a potentially serious loss for poor countries. Central America (16. to South Africa and other neighboring countries. while in Chad.000 people a year leave over the subsequent 20 years. Tanzania.ethnic group).8 percent of the GDP of lower income countries in 2008. and Zambia more than 50 percent of migrants have refugee status. Among middle income countries with the highest rates of emigration over the past decade. Conversely. with countries such as Tajikistan (49. helping to create a “culture of migration” with around 10 percent of its population living overseas. This is a part of a pattern that sees refugees concentrated in poorer parts of the world. with small island developing states seeing 42. and is likely to be an older society than its neighbor sometime shortly after 2035. with 85 percent of the world’s refugees in less developed countries.4 percent of skilled citizens
. Experts’ data show 60 percent of developing countries are above the 10 percent threshold. these were estimated at over $600 billion. through remittances and other effects such as migrants returning with enhanced skills and the creation of business and trade networks. Iraq. Three countries/areas have more than a million refugees (Jordan.2 percent between 2000 and 2010. Migration is associated with considerable flows of remittances to countries of origin. While the total number of refugees has fallen somewhat (and significantly so.9 percent). The Philippines is also noteworthy in that its government has pursued a deliberate policy of exporting labor. Experts argue that skilled migration offers even poor countries some gains when at a modest level. though the fall has been eased by a “remittance flow boom” to East Asia and the Pacific.9 percent). more than half of whom are temporary workers. Zimbabwe is another country that shows how rapidly migration outflows can accelerate. Sub-Saharan Africa (12. It gained nearly 300. Lebanon. and the Caribbean (42.6 percent). Mexico. with harmful effects increasing above a 15 percent threshold. It gained migrants in the 1980s.000 migrants a year in the 1980s but has seen an average of 265. The LDC bloc (12. relative to an increasing population). In 2008. Refugee flows are a direct consequence of levels of conflict or other serious social breakdowns. Mexico has seen two significant waves of migration.1 percent) considerably above this level.4 percent) and Lebanon (25. After many years of sustained increases. of which three quarters went to developing countries.9 percent). with net outward migration running at 5 percent of the population in both the 1980s and the 2000s. and Syria). in contrast. Most of Zimbabwe’s migrants have moved only short distances. will age rapidly. Remittances accounted for 5. A large upward trend in refugee numbers during the second half of the Cold War was followed by steady decline as international peacekeeping and mediation helped bring a large number of civil wars to an end. Small countries are especially vulnerable. Occupied Palestinian Territory. meanwhile.
and El Salvador) experience levels of skilled migration that exceed 30 percent. Somalia. where average costs have been estimated as ranging from US$200 for migration within Africa to US$26. a great deal of attention is paid to the free movement of goods. In contrast. but the exact nature of this influence is hard to predict. the free movement of people has often been neglected. and capital. if not impossible to forecast the scale and direction of future migration…World migration patterns in the next 20 years or so will be shaped by many different. Social networks. Expected benefits must therefore be sufficiently high for sustained migratory flows to occur from one country to another. vulnerability to discrimination. demographic. The experience of Southern European countries and Ireland during the 20th century suggests that a wage differential of 30-40 percent is needed to create a widespread incentive to emigrate.
Future Migration Trends
According to the OECD.
Economic drivers have a powerful impact on both origin and destination countries. Economic. especially for those traveling illegally. In discussions of globalization. and environmental—all of which carry within them significant levels of uncertainty. Ghana. the challenges of managing migration will continue to have a significant impact on prospects for international cooperation.” Predictions are further complicated by a lack of in-depth research and the poor quality of much of the available data. with the migrant’s quest for opportunity largely driven by wealth disparities. Within the constraints of this considerable uncertainty. the following conclusions can be drawn about the future evolution of migration and its likely impact on the global order: Migration has a profound impact on economies and societies. Migrants face uncertainty about the rewards that await them. “it is hard. services.
Future Migration Challenges
Looking forward. which link sending and receiving countries through connections between migrants and their countries origin. Angola. creating a series of interlocking incentives for migration. Mozambique. Sudden movements of people may also
.emigrate. Migration is costly. while their quality of life may suffer (separation from family and friends. Running counter to this are policy measures that inhibit the free movement of people across borders. Laos. Uganda.000 for migration from Asia to the Americas. with Haiti’s brain drain running at an astonishing 83. The primary “pull” factor creating demand for migrants is the need for labor in receiving countries. and political drivers have a transnational impact. geopolitical.). can help encourage and sustain migration. Kenya. technological. Nine countries with a population over five million (Haiti. • • The motivation to migrate can be broken into two “push” factors: the desire to find opportunities overseas on the one hand and a response to risk at home on the other.6 percent. etc. relative poverty in their new country. powerful forces—economic. social.
Poorer countries. meanwhile. The critical axis will be between migration and social cohesion. Governments have taken a predominantly national approach to the issue. Italy). Governance systems for dealing with refugees may be stretched to the point of a breakdown. in contrast. Countries without a tradition of migration (Spain. putting pressure on neighboring states that may also lack resilience and be destabilized by these flows. as has been seen in a number of fragile states and. Social networks will make it hard to limit migratory flows. in Europe during the first half of the 20th century and on the Indian subcontinent after independence. Income disparities will remain high enough to maintain the attractiveness of migration for a significant section of the global population. and friends having strong incentives to follow existing migrants.” a status that increases vulnerability in states that have weak institutions and inadequate human rights provision. and possibly growing. or global order. has been seen as a “safer” area for international cooperation. creates an upsurge in conflict.
Demand for migration is unlikely to abate. rather than its lack of importance.be a symptom of a breakdown in national. A significant. as a given “stock” of migrants transforms a society across many generations. have little experience in effectively managing major outflows of migration (with exceptions such as the Philippines). or simply entrenches global economic inequality. with family. Trade. or both. Can origin countries manage outwards flows to contain levels of youth unemployment and underemployment while retaining
. and of the threat it poses to what many see as the central prerogatives of the nation state.
Many key challenges will be in weaker states. Their economic power has the potential to outstrip their institutional strength. The peripheral role played by migration in the post-World War II settlement (barring the creation of new norms for managing refugees) is a reflection of the issue’s controversial nature. proportion of migrants will continue to be “irregular. neighbors. increased competition for talent could exacerbate this trend. Migration’s impact is cumulative. Some countries already face an unsustainable loss of highly skilled workers. Even an era of economic turbulence and resource shocks could lead to new migratory flows if it weakens vulnerable states. but which have seen substantial recent flows must respond to increased diversity. while national elites have adopted policies that often lack popular support. • Migration will prove highly challenging to manage. Aging societies need labor. regionally. regional. Migrants themselves will generally face higher levels of risk than native populations and will be especially vulnerable at times of economic underperformance and/or political turmoil. leading to potential problems as they become more diverse societies. Even the United States will confront issues raised by running on two very different demographic tracks (though the potential rewards will be substantial if the United States can use its institutional strength to release a “demographic dividend” from ethnic groups with a youthful age profile). • Migration’s significance has inhibited the policy attention paid to the issue. or are ineffective. despite its essentially international nature. while low-income countries are unlikely to be able to offer jobs to their baby boomers as they seek jobs in growing numbers. Emerging markets will become significant targets for migration even as they face severe residual development challenges at home. Risk-avoiding migrants will tend to move only short distances.
A next generation terrorist movement may make a sustained attempt to “break” multiethnic societies. Tunisians.
. In the worst case. The politicization of migration. also makes it highly likely that there will be at least some episodes of expulsion of migrant communities. the ongoing movement of people cannot be treated as a given. will migration regimes support the relatively free movement of people? Or will the primary focus be on sealing borders? • Despite future demand for migration. conflict. and a lack of resilience in the face of natural disasters. respond to the needs of secondand third-generation immigrants. a breakdown in migration is possible. Palestinians. or actual.
Flows of forced migration are unlikely to be one way. The rise of extremist political movements and campaigns of systematic persecution of migrant communities will have the potential to seriously destabilize regional and global cooperation and even to create demand for intervention from the international community. resulting from state failure. however. conflict along ethnic faultlines will remain. and maintain popular support for diversity? Internationally. Even if the period to 2025 is relatively peaceful.sufficient skilled workers to build strong economies and societies? Or will migration be dominated by abrupt and chaotic movements. there are certain to be at least some refugee flows. The potential for political. History suggests that the breakup of any large state will be a moment of particular danger. with some countries following the model of Libya (which has expelled Egyptians. while transnational migrant networks will link conflicts and facilitate criminal flows across borders. all of which are themselves exacerbated by brain drain? Will destination countries successfully integrate new arrivals. and citizens of various Sub-Saharan African nations at times of political tension). Even in the EU—the region that has the most liberal migration regime—a reversal is possible. while natural disasters will also continue to displace people over borders. with ethnic identities likely to strengthen should this prove to be a turbulent period for globalization.
The International Health Regulations (2005). Under the convention. control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with. the international governance regime has the following primary components: • The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1975). public health challenges will intensify with a billion additional people expected to live in towns and cities by 2025. while the current expert review of the response to pandemic flu provides some measure of independent external scrutiny. The regulations aim “to prevent. the potential for dual use of biotechnology will make the task of regulating and controlling existing and new developments an exceptionally complex one. which brings together 140 institutions to support countries experiencing a public health emergency. WHO is also empowered to investigate media and citizen reports of public health emergencies. It requires national compliance. The authority has been used sparingly. General Assembly Resolution 100. public health risks. but the 2005 upgrade also gave WHO the ability to pre-emptively assess the quality of national mechanisms for compliance with GOARN reporting standards. with states obliged to develop minimum public health capabilities and to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of public health events within their borders that meet agreed criteria. The network. would argue that the system is fit for the challenges that the world will face in a “biological century. and restricted to. produce. GOARN is the “early warning system” for outbreaks. The Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN). many of whom will not be amenable to traditional regulation.Annex F: Threats from Biotechnology
Currently. while making it more likely that a new disease will break out before it can be contained. enabling them to work with a plethora of private actors. Governments will need unprecedented capacity to reach out beyond other governments.
. and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade.” Twenty-three states have not signed the convention. while 16 have signed but not ratified it. Meanwhile. provides an example of the kind of distributed systems that are likely to prove effective.” In developing countries. stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents.” The regulations represent a significant intrusion on state sovereignty. Levels of monitoring and enforcement of compliance lie somewhere between weak and non-existent.
Few observers. however. enabling diseases to spread further and faster. Buried in an otherwise obscure General Assemby Resolution is the authority for the Secretary-General to investigate any suspicious event that could involve a biological weapon. or toxins …. Mobility will also increase. protect against. states commit “never in any circumstances to develop.
in particular the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation with its emphasis on funding innovation.
. at least initially. The WHO is clearly a more effective actor than it was before Gro Brundtland took over in 1998. Researchers have found that “the majority of our scientific resources [are] focused on places from where the next important emerging pathogen is least likely to originate. are not effectively aligned to threats. The situation in public health is somewhat more encouraging. Rising powers expect their future comparative advantage to lie in a sector in which there are relatively few entrenched incumbents. Efforts to forge standing links between the Secretary-General’s office and labs have foundered. Countries with traditional views of their sovereignty will often be resistant to international cooperation (as China was. Resources. producing little in the way of rapid response capacity. in many cases. such the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization. and governments on measures needed to diminish the risks posed by an increasingly broadly distributed biological capacity. or deliberate release of a deadly toxin. There are no international contingency plans for such an occurrence. nor are even the basic information systems in place to link WHO/GOARN reporting to potential response mechanisms like the UN Security Council or NATO.Threats are perceived differently by different governments. The poorest countries are most concerned about the current impact of infectious diseases (though. accidental. If a major outbreak were to occur in a middle income or lower middle income state. while investment in health research is extremely poorly matched to the global burden of disease. An effort to propose basic reporting functions from the WHO to the UNSC was rejected by the Chinese in 2005. not concerned enough to implement simple and extremely cheap public health measures). was to be affected by a naturally occurring. Response mechanisms for a large-scale outbreak of a deadly infectious disease are not in place beyond the highly developed West. Health has also received sustained attention from a new breed of foundations. This is a pressing problem for biosecurity which is a “weakest link” public good—the whole is only as safe as the weakest individual effort. industry. although the authority exists for the UN Secretary-General to investigate suspected biological incidents. for example. Similarly. government response capabilities probably would be overwhelmed before they could contain the spread of affected people to international transport hubs. Rich countries are worried about potential threats—new diseases or the hostile use of biological agents. over SARS). he has no standing capacity to do so. When called upon to investigate a biological event (as in Iraq). If a fragile state that hosted a large refugee population. its ability to control population flow to its neighbors and beyond would be nearly nonexistent. finally. while actors on the margins—who pose the greatest threat— are ungoverned. There is as yet no forum for creating the consensus that is needed across the scientific community. the UN has to organize the inspection capacity from scratch from labs and governments. with India and China investing heavily in biotechnologies and Brazil in biofuels.” Public health systems are weakest in the places they are most needed. Regulatory structures are most onerous for reputable organizations in the public sector in rich countries. and are likely to regard them as protectionist measures that restrain their freedom to operate. and public-private partnerships.
The development of new agents will increase the threat. experts expect: • Levels of Risk to Increase. The use of bioweapons is also easy to conceal. Rapidly falling costs will bring biotechnology within reach of a hacker community. The Risk to Become More Distributed. It is easy to imagine a state responding in a way that fails to meet long-term strategic goals. potentially making rapid attribution of responsibility impossible. placing democratic governments under severe pressure to respond forcefully. while repeat attacks are likely as a bio-capable attacker probably would possess a substantial stockpile. The Risk of a Counterproductive Reaction to a Biological Strike is High.000 liters of the latter). potentially. while a growing number of reputable laboratories will “leak” expertise and. Existing biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum toxin already pose an extremely serious threat (Iraq was believed to have 8. with the ability to reengineer existing life forms to have offensive capacity already a growing threat. A biological attack has a psychological impact that outstrips its lethality.Between now and 2025. while a counterstrike against the wrong target is a real (and disastrous) possibility. materials.000 liters of the former in the 1990s and 18.
NIC 2010-08 September 2010