Wits Business School

WBS-2004-4

Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand
Josi McKenzie sat back and considered the development of Nando’s International since she had joined the company in June 1992, when there were 12 stores in South Africa, and international exposure was limited to Australia and the United Kingdom. Her role was then defined as marketing, which in Nando’s came to mean an absolute understanding of most of the business elements outside of finance. It was January 2004, and together with Robert Brozin, the chief executive officer and co-founder of Nando’s, and Mike Denoon-Stevens, the international development director, she had been strategising as to which global opportunities offered the most promise in the New Year. The company had performed extremely well once again in 2003, with the result that Nando’s had more than trebled its number of stores over the 16 years since inception. By the end of 2003, there were a total of 450 stores throughout the world, 186 of them being in South Africa. McKenzie felt good about this record, especially because the group had managed to improve market share in an extremely competitive industry and a volatile global economy. However, she felt that there was enough potential in the company to perform even better on a global basis in 2004. Since 1997, when 27% of Nando’s stores were located in international markets, that figure had grown to almost 60% by the end of 2003. Nando’s ascribed this success to two strategic approaches. Firstly, it had more recently focussed on a what it termed a hubbing growth strategy as opposed to a shotgun strategy. This meant that the company had concentrated on developing existing geographic regions, chiefly the Middle East and Asia, instead of taking any opportunity that presented itself. Secondly, it had placed a greater emphasis on the correct positioning of the Nando’s brand in each of its international markets. The critical issue up for debate for 2004 was which hub should be developed next. Should it be the United States, South America, the Eastern bloc, or the China/Japan axis? The team had learned that there was no such thing as a one size fits all approach, and had to determine how to best execute a branding strategy tailored to each country they entered. There were a number of issues to consider. Amongst them was the question of how Nando’s could improve its service delivery, recognising that customers rated the importance of service as 80% and that of product as 20%. Furthermore, how could the group polish the brand in order to maintain its positioning? The Nando’s International management team needed to make decisions quickly in order to achieve the goal they had set of 15% store growth in 2004.

This case was prepared by research associate, Tamzyn Dorfling, with lecturer, Dr. Terry Berkow. The case is not intended to demonstrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. It is intended for classroom discussion only. Copyright ©2004 Graduate School of Business Administration, University of the Witwatersrand. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any format - electronic, photocopied, or otherwise - without consent from Wits Business School. To request permission, apply to: The Case Centre, Wits Business School, PO Box 98, Wits 2050, South Africa, or e-mail chetty.l@wbs.wits.ac.za.

Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand The Fast Food Industry
In the accelerated pace of the modern world, the fast food industry had grown on a continuous basis. Changing eating patterns, especially the trends towards snacking and grazing, and eating more meals outside the home, fuelled the growth in fast food outlets. According to the Vegetarian Resource Group, the trend for healthier eating, which had brought menu changes such as the introduction of vegetarian alternatives, did not seem to have affected the demand for all types of fast food, but was expected to have a greater influence in the future.1 Overall, many chains were becoming more health conscious as low-fat or fat-free menu offerings gained popularity. Many of these menu items were vegetarian or could be easily modified to become vegetarian.2 And as described in a 2003 article in The Atlanta Journal Constitution, “After years of searching for the Next Big Thing and struggling through a twoyear slump, the fast-food industry is hitting pay dirt with salads.”3 In fact, despite being relatively pricey menu items, salad sales increased in the United States by 12% in 2003, and overall salad consumption by 2%, with salads becoming meals rather than mere side orders. Besides the emphasis on fresh healthy food as an enjoyable meal, emerging trends revealed by the Mintel International Group showed that eating out had more to do with lifestyle than with cuisine. Thus, eating out was growing faster as a casual pleasure rather than a formal recreation. Furthermore, eating on-the-go and in public had come to be considered a necessity, with the quality of the food not necessarily compromised. The casual nature of dining out had also led to higher levels of integration of dining with other activities. For example, there had been significant growth in the number of stores that offered food together with an entertainment experience, either within the store or at the same location.4 Deloitte and Touche’s 2002 Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising survey showed that the emergence and rapid growth of the fast-casual or quick-casual segment was largely ascribed to the change in nutritional needs of the so-called baby-boom generation. This market segment included those individuals born between 1946 and 1964, who had been the first generation to grow up with fast food, and who had now reached their high income years. The fast casual segment was characterised by upscale menus, with items such as gourmet soups, salads, and sandwiches. In this segment customers paid for upgraded ingredients and atmosphere while keeping an emphasis on fast service. The same survey indicated that fast casual dining in the United States was growing at a rapid rate of around 6-8% per year. In contrast the fast food segment was increasing at only 1-2% per year.5 Other estimates from a 2003 CNCB website article suggested that the 7 000 stores falling into this fast casual segment in the United States were experiencing double-digit growth, and that this would continue for at least another 5-7 years from 2003.6 The fast casual segment was attracting business away from fast-food chains, despite the average bill being more expensive.7 In fact, according to a 2003 article in The McKinsey Quarterly, fast-food chains such as McDonald’s, were suffering because more consumers were demanding what neither could profitably offer: fresh food served quickly in a distinctive, casual environment. The article noted
BT Connect, Fast Food Outlet, BOP085, April 1999, available www.btconnect.com, intelligence link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 2 J Bartas and the Vegetarian Resource Group, Vegetarian Menu Items at Restaurant and Quick Service Chains, 2000, available www.soundvision.com, information link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 3 L Stafford, ‘Restaurants see green’, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 1 August 2003, available www.ajc.com, information link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 4 Mintel International Group Ltd, Emerging Catering Markets, July 2002, available www.marketresearch.com, search link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 5 Deloitte and Touche, Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising, October 2002, available www.retail.ru, biblio link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 6 P LeBeau, Fast food chains freshen their menus, 4 March 2003, available www.cncb.com, search link, (accessed on 11 February 2004). 7 Deloitte and Touche, Food Service, Restaurants and Franchising, op cit.
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1998. quoted in ‘Regular guys make it hot in business’. She had gained invaluable experience in the management of international brands at McCann Erickson. Brozin recognised how important marketing was in Nando’s strategy.8 The McKinsey report9 also estimated that growth in the fast casual segment would be worth $35 billion annually by 2010 and could account for more than half of all food service growth over the period. search link (accessed on 28 January 2004).co. This was in stark contrast to the burger chains’ margin-crushing value menus. but which would capture a dream of pride. If fast casual restaurants maximized consumer choice (and minimized operational overlap by consolidating their supplier relationships). Brozin. R. and casas was the name given to Nando’s stores. Mitchell. then 27.com. personality. introduction link (accessed 11 February 2004). McPherson. Successful fast-casual restaurants offered broad menus and fresh salads. lacked the operational expertise to be efficient at scale. After working on the Nando’s account for two and a half years. serving fresh food was an operational challenge. 9 Ibid. he said. Founder and CEO of Nando’s Chickenland. No. a small Portuguese café in Rosettenville. the company’s marketing efforts were focused on building brand equity through the J.and profits were only expected to come with scale. the report suggested that operators should concentrate on dinner. It was at this small eatery that Brozin was presented with the best chicken he had ever tasted. was particularly motivated by the drive to be the first South African company to go truly global. and M. In order to maximize profits. The McKinsey Quarterly. 10 Ibid. Mitten. from the decor of our stores to our Patrãos13 who welcome you to their casas. they enjoyed it and soon realised they could make a big business out of it. which featured items priced under a dollar. he envisaged a brand which would not only be built on the most magnificent product in the world. ‘Fast Food Fight’. Johannesburg.12 Although the founders had not bargained on how demanding the food business would be. 8 3 . with his have-funand-make-money philosophy. From the beginning.mckinseyquarterly. with operating margins of up to 15 percent. 13 Patrãos13 was the name given to Nando’s store managers. Corporate Report. already the consumer’s favourite meal prepared outside the home.za. 2. V. Although fast-casual restaurants were clearly best positioned to meet the consumer’s dinner needs. and choice when making their dinner plans. 2003. integrity. which did have the fresh food consumers craved. and family. Financial Mail. from the way we advertise to the way our promises are backed by our Escudo guarantee – there’s always an opportunity to entice and enchant our customers and attract new devotees to the taste of Afro-Portugal”. April 10. the report revealed that their challenge remained the bottom line . R. and Fernando Duarte bought Chickenland. 12 R. we make marketing everything! From the product we sell to the packaging in which we sell it. After she came on board. courage.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand that for the burger joints. they could afford to take risks with new food concepts and thus eventually serve even broader groups of customers. was “less an act of daring than a sign of extreme naivete”.10 Nando’s Growth – 1987 to 2000 In 1987 Robert Brozin.14 Josi McKenzie joined his team in 1992 as marketing director. Market analysis showed that time-strapped consumers valued control. A. “In our bid to change the way the world thinks about chicken.11 The decision to buy the outlet and go into competition with fast food giants like Kentucky Fried Chicken and Steers. November 2003. Brozin. and be successful in markets like the United Kingdom and Australia. available www. The payoff was estimated to be large. About Robert Brozin. Brozin asked her to join his team. passion.nandos. One way to achieve scale was superior portfolio management. The Nando’s website noted. while traditional fullservice restaurants. With this traditional Portuguese style flame-grilled chicken. 11 Nando’s International. 14 Available www.

16 By 2000. 4 . but was usually between five and 15 stores depending on the ultimate country capacity. training and marketing manuals. Malaysia and Indonesia. mutual respect and shared values. intense competition from international competitors in South Africa led the company to consider expansion into other countries. the Nando’s International team focused efforts on entering the Southeast Asia markets.15 In 1996. Nando’s stores had also opened doors for the first time in a number of African countries. 147 of them being in South Africa. 5 December 2003. there was a focus on a single business. was perhaps the most essential ingredient for global success. they placed a high value on their people. One of the key determinants of successfully doing this was the selection of the international partners. they were flexible. significant growth had been achieved in terms of increasing the number of stores not only on the domestic front. International Strategy After 2000 The lessons learnt. Despite the difficulty of accurately identifying the tastes of foreign consumers. but also in Australia and the United Kingdom. L Du Blois and S Klein. Mike Denoon-Stevens joined the firm in that year as group development strategist. Yet equally important was a feeling for the Nando’s brand. Local knowledge was critical.17 Between 1997 and 2000. 5 December 2003. 17 E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie. Emphasis was placed on the competent implementation of the group’s marketing and operational policies and procedures in the actual stores. and Mozambique. and then using a sense of humour that was specific to the country in question (Exhibit 1 includes selected examples of Nando’s print advertising). This number differed from country to country. 1999. the team realised that the criteria for selecting a foreign partner needed to be stringent. After two years of building models. Wits Business School. “The shared value thing from a marketing perspective is a critical thing because if they don’t have the 15 16 E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie. and developing a global information technology system. A good match between the franchisee and franchisor. based on trust. the Nando’s International team believed that their competitive advantages lay in the fact that they were selling an experience as opposed to a product. writing operational. At the same time. they had an entrepreneurial culture. Denoon-Stevens and the management team used these methodologies to restructure and refocus the existing markets such as in Australia. At the same time. and Canada. Initially. establishing Nando’s International in 1995 in order to put more emphasis on international markets. Brozin changed the group’s approach. By 1997 South African operations had grown substantially.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand use of an irreverent style of advertising. proved to be a critical turning point for Nando’s International. Nando’s International had expanded considerably. the United Kingdom. Kenya. Besides this. to the extent that they were becoming difficult to manage. particularly whilst opening and operating outlets in Malaysia. only one of the foreign markets was profitable. This was based on acquiring an excellent understanding of the local psyche. This was because they believed that anybody can make a chicken as good as the rest. His chief role was to develop Nando’s infrastructure so that its new international strategies would be effective. In particular. (See Exhibit 2 for a list of when the first store was opened in each country). Nando’s International had outlets in 15 countries. By 2000. including Malawi. as did the selection of target countries that matched Nando’s offerings. McKenzie elaborated. the difference was going to be in the people doing it. Zambia. the group realised that it had to reach a critical mass of stores in each country in order to show a profit. enabling the team to develop an understanding and thorough knowledge of the market at the local level. Uganda. having 258 outlets. ten years after Nando’s inception it had outlets in eight countries outside of South Africa. Nando’s International: Taking Chicken to the World. and perhaps most important. notably Singapore.

Furthermore. the greatest challenge that Nando’s faced was transferring an understanding of the Nando’s brand to its people. and the communication strategy. as well as ongoing debate within the team. Once these details had been determined. reaching far beyond regional and cultural differences. reviewing and analysing the performance of the brand in the various countries.19 Marketing Strategy In addition. 19 February 2004. and that this strategy would continuously change with time. 21 Ibid. (See Exhibit 3 for a list of the drivers of brand choice for Nando’s users in South Africa and the most critical service issues). Even when the brand did become stronger. In particular. studying marketing and branding trends. 17 November 2003. The Nando’s team had found that they required an individual marketing strategy for each country that Nando’s entered.21 Polishing the Brand McKenzie knew that it was up to the team to ascertain what dimensions consumers used to evaluate product offerings in the fast casual market segment. but the marketing strategy in each country was dependent on a number of factors including the product life stage in the country. When the group considered brand positioning. How could the group remain true to each market’s peculiarities in terms of the positioning of the brand. while leveraging off the intrinsics of the brand. They have to have genuine passion for it. hubbing those regions they considered to have potential. The result was that positioning issues were highly complex. yet retain consistency in terms of Nando’s core brand strategy? According to Denoon-Stevens. it would be important not to position Nando’s as a big company. the challenge was how to present Nando’s in each market. the thrust in each country encompassed marketing in its broadest context. the Nando’s management team placed a new emphasis on how they positioned the brand in each country. it took into account the location of the stores. between 1997 and 2003. They now realised that the most strategic thing to do would be to remain in their existing markets and to strengthen them. DenoonStevens explained that in the Nando’s strategy. they had seen that in many countries big was not necessarily beautiful.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand same shared values. “Nando’s is not a cookie cutter chain such as 18 19 Interview with Josi McKenzie. He wanted to be able to “download the brand” to its employees and make sure that they complemented the brand image. you can’t expect them to understand the brand and to keep the integrity of the brand intact. Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. 17 November 2003. and level of sophistication of the customers.”18 By the turn of the millennium Nando’s International’s management team realised that one of the worst mistakes it had made was to adopt an indiscriminate approach to expansion – to shotgun the world. Denoon-Stevens was concerned about how Nando’s managed the people aspect of the business. as they termed it – lured by requests from emigrating South Africans who wanted to open franchises in their destination country. the competitive situation. The branding issues were closely aligned with the broader strategy of the company. 20 E-mail correspondence from Mike Denoon-Stevens. Nando’s positioned itself in the fast casual segment. service and décor). This was the result of an ongoing process of reflecting on. so for me the value part of the equation is fundamental. basic socio-economics of the country. the team knew that. 5 .20 The team had learnt through bitter experience that global branding was a highly complex issue. in these countries. the Nando’s experience (which included food. The team had also found that they had to deal with different branding issues depending on the location of the store and the kind of market for which the company was catering.

24 80% Service. E-mail correspondence from Mike Denoon-Stevens. integrity. particularly restaurant decor and design.za. which was a spice eating country but not a meat eating country. op cit. and the resulting success and change in customer perceptions and feedback had encouraged the team to pay more attention to the implementation of positioning as a formal part of entering any new country.co.nandos. including the friendliness of the store staff. 23 22 6 . 10 April 1998. South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004). which were available to consumers through a network of supermarkets.”23 One of the benefits of Nando’s flexible. Denoon-Stevens explained. “We always try to zig when others zag. flame grilled peri-peri chicken. and the packaging". in Financial Mail.” he said. and the Nando’s creed – pride. For example. the chicken was only part of a unique experience. chicken livers. available www. 20% product. introduction link (accessed on 11 February 2004).28 The Nando’s experience was considered as 80% service. 25 Available www. The core product offered by Nando’s was a marinated.25 Besides the Nando’s Experience. the company had found that in India. 27 J. 20% Product. and the quality of the take-out packaging. the cleanliness and hygiene of the store as perceived by customers. 29 Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. Nando’s had learnt that it needed to adapt its menu offering and menu mix in each country. It wanted customers to be drawn to the magic and warm hospitality that was the Nando’s Way. it would probably not need to change the spice. the irreverent personality. relative to Nando’s. how the guys behind the counter respond to you. and most of all.29 The challenge was for Nando’s to identify those out-of-the-ordinary elements that could enable the company to have more control over the consumer’s eating experience.co. 24 Ibid. less complicated and more personal world. family. The chicken was grilled in front of customers on open-flame grills and repeatedly basted in Nando’s sauces. 28 Ibid.”22 Once the elements that determined the different positioning niches in Nando’s multi-unit restaurant industry were identified. op cit.27 She identified five distinguishing elements that made up the brand: an aspirational element. Nando’s also aimed to create a tradition.za. ‘Food is Just Part of the Experience’. Denoon-Stevens explained that elements of this approach were utilised in the new countries.26 McKenzie described the Nando’s Experience as “the way the outlets look and feel. empowering management style was to encourage innovation. However. the peri-peri flavour. 26 Nando's Annual Report. the team applied these to the practical aspects of their own re-positioning in a Nando’s way. a great eating place where people can savour the experience as well as the food. prego steak rolls.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald’s who have an easier marketing job. coleslaw salads and french fries. delicatessens and other retail stores. passion. and this philosophy led the management team to be highly creative in many areas. Corporate Report. courage. She saw these to be what the customer was buying when they buy Nando’s and believed that if Nando’s stores did not deliver in one area they would disappoint in the others.nandos. There were a variety of other menu offerings. op cit. McKenzie. In everything it did. “This is due to the flexibility we allow our partners in the adaptation of the brand in countries while strictly adhering to the brand intrinsics. it wanted to create a sense of an older. Denoon-Stevens added that the people dynamic was particularly important as a retailer. which meant that a whole range of different issues needed to be dealt with in order to determine how the product would be positioned. where the spirit of Afro-Portugal was able to thrive. some of the favourites being filleted chicken breast burgers. a culture and a way of life. saying that the people in a store can vary turnover by as much as 30%. the delivery of consistent quality. Portuguese salads. but would adapt the food Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. 2002. Nando’s manufactured and distributed branded retail food products.

” she said.30 Location the Most Critical Element.chainleader. and what kind of service operation would be suitable. BaskinRobbins in China offered flavours like green tea ice cream. and Australia to a certain extent. which meant significant manufacturing changes. Chainleader Digital Edition. or if it would stretch a little to suit those particular demands.32 McKenzie had found that the degree of communication had to be tailored to suit the country.31 Perhaps the chief lesson the Nando’s group had learnt about going global was that there was no one-size-fits-all. For instance. the most important aspect that had to remain intact when communicating the brand was the defined personality of the Nando’s brand. In this instance. Special Report. available www.34 For McKenzie. while McDonald’s served lamb burgers in India. According to Brozin there was often very little communication about the brand. food preparation in Islamic countries was required to meet halal standards. it had found itself having to deal with a multi-ethnic group.com.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand offering. and strip malls were becoming the order of the day. Brozin noted that the Nando’s management team did not actually want the brand to go mainstream yet in most of their target countries. David rather than Goliath. McKenzie knew that she had to determine whether the Nando’s brand would fit the culture of each country they entered. He said. May 2003. For example. What could they do to ensure that these elements were a part of the eating experience. and whatever type of store it turned out to be. location was perhaps the most critical element of the marketing mix. one of the questions she asked herself was at what point abovethe-line advertising stopped being of significance. However. where stores should be positioned. if closed-in malls – and thus food courts – were becoming less important. 31 Ibid. even when a brand had been driven to a large degree above-the-line advertising. For example. the team realised that they needed to differentiate the Nando’s brand by ensuring consistency in the elements impacting on the Nando’s experience. the operational team would need to know what kind of potential customers lived there. for example. The Nando’s team realised that. The team always asked itself whether the type of store would deliver the Nando’s experience or destroy the customer’s perception of the Nando’s experience. 30 7 . Wherever the store was located. It was critical to find out the eating habits and customs of these people. The type of stores that it developed depended on the perception of fast casual in each particular country. and Subway added more fish products to the menu in Japan.”33 In these countries she had found it was necessary to run a television campaign in order to be regarded as a brand. Other than this. that in London Nando’s core communication related to how its stores were designed. It needed to find out about the flow of people. 33 Interview with Josi McKenzie. “In certain countries – unless you do something that is bold and alive – you are not going to be considered a brand. archive link (accessed on 26 February 2004). 34 Ibid. the communication M Chapman. op cit. An international survey indicated that 80% of American chain operators adjusted their menus to suit local tastes abroad. “South Africa was like that. In many of the countries where Nando’s operated. ‘Abroad Jump’. Nando’s would offer customers an exciting peri-peri vegetarian selection in addition to their famous chicken. On entering a new country. there was no point in putting a huge amount of effort into food court solutions. the management team knew that they had to be in tune with global retail trends if they were to make the right decisions. being in the retail business. particularly in an uncontrolled environment such as a store located in a food court? At the same time. because they felt it was a bit sexier to be a David as opposed to a Goliath. and how they aesthetically looked to a consumer walking in. 32 Ibid.

brand identity. store design. mild. McKenzie did not consider Nando’s to have one single major competitor. decor and staff uniforms also contributed to the 35 36 Interview with Josi McKenzie. In countries other than South Africa. The brand had historically been perceived to be more expensive than its fast food competitors. This was sometimes complicated by the fact that fast casual could mean different things in different countries. It then varied the broad positioning of the brand as determined by the overall fast casual strategy. believed that the market almost set itself on what Nando’s was doing. While the perception in South Africa was that it was a bit more expensive than its competitors. something which was underpinned by the group’s location strategy. 38 Ibid. because it was influenced by how the brand was positioned. McDonald’s was a particularly important competitor. Everything about the store and the customer’s experience had to add value. Nando’s natural packaging enhanced the Nando’s experience. Spur.” she explained. 37 Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. Of the 29 countries in which Nando’s operated. Rather. the Nando’s team would bear in mind the brand positioning.. 8 . Interview with Robert Brozin. Malaysia. These were all countries where the company had reached a critical mass of stores – South Africa. Nando’s promotions gave customers added value rather than discounts. More Expensive. Any new menu item had to enhance the Nando’s experience and be congruent with the Nando’s core brand in every country. op cit. Advertising.36 After looking at the competitive set in a country. For example. the United Kingdom. as it was made of bio-degradable food quality paper and bore the Nando’s emblems. consider prices from the supply side. as this chain was believed to drive the value perception in the market. “If you take South Africa’s environment as a case in point. and Steers. and the competitive activity. op cit. It was largely based on the product life cycle in that country and was usually rather low-key in the start-up phase. and quick service. which also impacted on the strategy. it had more-or-less equal share a stomach with a number of players. including Kentucky Fried Chicken.”35 In South Africa. fine dining. Once the team entered a new country. the pricing strategy could be different. This had established it as an aspirational brand. op cit. and then decide how it should position itself in the minds of consumers. McKenzie pointed out that the competitive environment was changing continually. and Australia. which was flame grilled chicken in lemon and herb. but Added Value. it analysed the different market segments including fast casual. above-the-line methods of communication were used in only four.37 The Nando’s group had observed that – apart from finding the right partners – the next most difficult thing in entering a new market was finding the right store locations. hot or extra hot peri-peri. the management team emphasised that consumers experienced better quality for their money. and Escudo promise.38 From the outset McKenzie had aimed to position Nando’s as good food fast and to set it apart from the perception of fast food as junk food. “Nando’s started up before McDonald’s. store decor and menu offering. Once the segments had been assessed. Other pricing decisions came into play because the team had found that in some instances it had to offer a more competitively priced meal and make up margins in other ways. Store location had financial implications that had impacted market positioning and pricing. Brozin.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand strategy in any given country was flexible. however. Nando’s pricing strategy was determined by the market. The menu had to be focussed on the chain’s core product. the location. Wimpy. This positioning was translated into action in a number of ways. the associated lowest price that could be paid for a general meal without any extras was considered. McDonald’s coming into the environment changed the dynamics considerably in terms of people’s perceptions of where we sit.

Finally.39 McKenzie was vehement in her assertion that. confirming the sustainability of the business model and the economic value of the brand.”42 From an operational point of view. there was a lack of market segmentation in Malaysia. She felt that one of Brozin’s greatest strengths was hiring the right people. 186 of them located in South Africa. By this time Brozin felt that “the global expansion strategy adopted by Nando’s Group Holdings has shown strong growth. Business Day. We never want to become price competitive in terms of our communication. by 2002 headline earnings per share had increased to 6. the group’s store base had grown to include 450 stores. op cit. content link (accessed 28 February 2004). 2 December 2002. 43 Nando's Annual Report 2002. Nando’s Annual Report. international stores had contributed 60% of the group’s net income before tax.44 The Nando’s team believed that between 2001 and 2003. service levels had to be consistently high and were measured through customer care and mystery shopper programmes. Performance was satisfactory in Australia.34 from 2. op cit.bday. and the Middle East. 45 Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. 27 February 2004. and had improved in Canada. 41 L Du Blois and S Klein. Operating income before tax had also increased substantially from just over R14 million to almost R46 million. The flat structure (see Exhibit 7 for an organogram of Nando’s International) he had insisted on encouraged innovation. Indonesia.46 E-mail correspondence from Josie McKenzie. op cit.41 As can be seen from Exhibit 4. where Nando’s had found that there was a set of expectations if the company was a western group. Between 1997 and 2002 the Nando’s group had more than doubled turnover from over R218 million to over R458 million. And with that comes the other marketing thing which is that you don’t want to be seen as playing the value game. He looked for the spark in people’s eyes when he talked about what they were doing at Nando’s. The sense of family was something which the Nando’s management team also worked hard to foster. the performance of the company in the United Kingdom had been particularly good considering the high level of competition in that country. That is a very difficult marketing perspective in a lot of countries to get across. 44 Ibid. “You don’t want to be seen as playing in the fast foods. 2002. 10 April 1998. In 2002.za. ‘Nando’s Global Expansion Shows a Strong Increase’. ‘Nando’s Family Values Pack’. A 2001 PriceWaterhouseCoopers survey ranked the group as South Africa’s fourteenth most global company. for example. By late 2003. Corporate Report. Interview with Josi McKenzie. While in other markets there was a clearly differentiated market in the minds of consumers. and a couple of African countries. the group had also performed well.45 McKenzie felt that the considerable growth of Nando’s International had been influenced by Brozin’s management style. By the end of 2003. The proportion of international stores had doubled from just below 30% in 1997 to just over 60%. with expectations that there would soon be stores in every Middle East country except Iraq for the time being. In 2003. Malaysia. such as Malaysia. Nando’s opened stores in ten new countries. 46 J Hume. in Financial Mail.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand aspirational image of the brand and had to conform to the Nando’s specifications. Stores were located in convenient but upmarket premises.43 (See Exhibit 6 for a segmental analysis giving a breakdown of jurisdictional performance). Results The new approach worked. (See Exhibit 5 for a record of store growth from 1997 to 2003).”40 This was especially tricky in some countries. available 40 39 9 . The result was that communication programmes had to be based on the expectation of discounts and promotions.co. including New Zealand. Cyprus. the core focus areas were the Middle East and Asia. 42 R Brozin in N Jenvey. available www.86 in the previous year. One of the challenges faced by the group was how to keep that feeling of closeness despite the exponential growth that had been experienced on both a local and global level.

November.com. op cit. Poland and Hungary were becoming more appealing as they took steps to join the European Union. Many chains had to close down while others sharply curtailed operations. 2004). ‘Abroad Jump’. the Japan/China axis. search link. as well as the Eastern bloc.biz. and thus posed the highest risk. which were perceived as being cheaper and healthier than fast food outlets. “It is not productive or practical for our partner to have Nando’s as a minority shareholder in smaller countries. South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004). populations were shifting toward the larger cities to seek employment.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Where to Next? For many years American chains had operated successfully in parts of Asia. the more difficult it became to enter that country. the Eastern bloc was considered by the team to be difficult. McKenzie also knew that entry into this part of the world had been difficult for many other fast food chains. • the Nando’s experience was acceptable to that country’s lifestyle. Domino’s and other American chains tried to break into Brazil’s market in the 1990s only to find their efforts thwarted by the country’s volatile economy and unpredictable Brazilian tastes. op cit. op cit. and the size of the country. • the country was English speaking. The challenge was to determine which of the hubs had the optimum growth potential. for example. opening up new opportunities to feed those populations. Eastern Europe. Denoon-Stevens explained. (accessed on 11 February.nandos.za. as was happening in a number of the emerging Eastern European markets. op cit. Fast Food Chains Battle for the Bulge in Brazil. The decision about which to choose would be based on the partner. These hubs would be joint ventures. Brazilians were following the trend of other more developed www.”48 The hubbing strategy had proved particularly successful for Nando’s in South East Asia and the Middle East. 49 L Du Blois and S Klein. or master franchises. with a view to developing hubs in these regions. there needed to be a focus on new markets. • consumers liked spicy food. South America. Europe and Latin America.yahoo.50 Overall. The key criteria the team had used for selecting markets in those countries included that: • chicken was an acceptable food. available www. 2003. where government and local nuances still hampered the free market.47 While the group was focusing on the development of hubs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia in 2004. 51 C DeJuana and L Weber. 50 M Chapman. had been identified: the United States. 47 M Chapman. China. such as Russia. McKenzie considered how important each of the criteria would be in the four chief hubs that. and • the right partners were available. Africa and the Middle East. Latin America One of the most obvious problems in entering Latin America was the different language spoken in these countries. 10 .51 Despite the existence of numerous eating out options such as the well-established local chains and the popular pay-by-weight buffet restaurants. 48 Interview with Mike Denoon-Stevens. some countries in this region remained highly unattractive. But there were clear opportunities in emerging markets in Southeast Asia. The Eastern Bloc As the industrial sector grew. the political and business risk. together with Brozin and Denoon-Stevens.49 The team had kept in mind that the more foreign the country and partner was. ‘Abroad Jump’. Kentucky Fried Chicken. at least to the extent that Nando’s team members could easily communicate with the partners and local management.co. While Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic.

February 2003. McKenzie and Denoon-Stevens knew it was not without its problems. such as McDonalds (560 outlets) and Kentucky Fried Chicken (1 000 outlets)54.gov. they were not yet accustomed to it being served in a fast food manner.7 billion by 2003 and it was expected to keep climbing. for example. and Burger King was also planning to enter the country. and the food was presented on porcelain dishes with silverware. U.busrep. 58 J Cee and S Theiler. with many linkages that were invisible to the outsider. together with a population of 175 million made the market an attractive one.60 Furthermore. French Fries Heat Up China’s Fast Food Industry. Chinese Fast Food Chains Battle Foreign Competitors. had become more popular than Chinese-style fast-foods because they were known for quality control and good store management. In the meanwhile. This trend. op cit. 54 Sapa-AP. information link (accessed on 11 February 2004). 1999. M Chapman. the Western restaurants were trying to win the hearts of more Chinese customers with a Chinese look. ‘Abroad Jump’.foodinstitute. taste. front page link (accessed on 16 February 2004). U.ce. as the numbers of Chinese fast food restaurants were greatly outnumbered by Western ones. op cit. 13 February 2003.S. op cit. op cit. according to the China Economic Information Network (CEIN).za. In more recent times. China Economic Information Network. and even a Chinese way of eating. China was a country in which foreign companies had to deal with constant regulation changes. Chains such as Domino’s and KFC had made new attempts to expand into Brazil.fas. French Fries Heat Up China’s Fast Food Industry. The team knew that in 1997 McDonald’s had been opening outlets at a rate of one every five hours. and chains had realized the importance of catering to the particular needs of each country.com.58 However attractive this market looked. when Kentucky Fried Chicken was introduced into Brazil. 60 Y Kageyama.55 In a 2004 Business Report article.gov. and to be noticed there C DeJuana and L Weber. available www.52 China In China there was a growing middle class which meant a growing customer base. 56 Sapa-AP. the chain had been reintroduced as a joint venture with a local businessman.57 Market research suggested that Western-style fast-food consumption would continue to grow in China at an annual rate of more than 46% over the 2000-2002 period. available www. available www.S. challenging McDonald’s dominant position. 55 J Cee and S Theiler. most Chinese people preferred traditional foods. op cit. while at the same time Chinese fast-foods were projected to grow by only 15 percent. 57 Available www. ‘Abroad Jump’. Yum! Targets juicy expansion in China and Tibet. the different languages spoken in China and Japan would also make it difficult to enter these countries. and it was governed by a relationship-oriented economy. The United States The United States was a major challenge for Nando’s International. In the early 1990s. search link (accessed on 16 February 2004).usda. Yum! Targets juicy expansion in China and Tibet. The potential for consumption at Brazilian restaurants rose 17 percent from 2000 to an estimated $11.co.59 The Japanese market was also problematic in that Nando’s had also been losing out to a host of emerging competitors during a period when prices for eating out had dropped significantly.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand markets of eating out more often.56 Although. with the menu being modified to include Brazilian staples such as rice and beans. search link (accessed on 11 Februar 2004). 59 M Chapman. Losses Triple at McDonald’s Japanese Unit.cei.cn. the popularity of KFC in China was ascribed to its identity as a quick-service location or a grab-and-go sandwich-oriented operation that suited the needs of Chinese consumers – this was in contrast to the family meals and take-home chicken in bucket needs of US consumers. customers were put off by having to eat greasy chicken with their hands. atmosphere.53 Fast-food restaurants with strong brand name images. 53 52 11 .

dining out becoming a habit. In 2001. with more women working. Burger King. generating sales of more than $131 billion in 2002.bizcommunity.65 Perhaps one of the most important drivers was the rising average age of the US population.bday. 62 N Jenvey. 66 Deloitte and Touche.63 Historically this industry had expanded at an average of 4% per year. consisted of more than 228. available www.co. available www. more Americans telecommuting.69 However.tns. research link (accessed on 16 February 2004). no author mentioned. Restaurants and Franchising. The world's most valuable brands.64 Some of the key market drivers in the States included changing lifestyles. Kentucky Fried Chicken. many of these chains were developing portfolios of restaurants for growth in the domestic market because they believed it would improve sales and earnings. South Africa link (accessed 11 February 2004). more time required for getting to and from work. 2003. In the United States the quick-service restaurant industry. search link (accessed on 28 January 2004). and because the industry was required to be innovative to cater for an unpredictable consumer market whose tastes were trendy. but also in the United States.61 Until 2004. 10 April 1998.com.com. and an indulgence trend exacerbated by the events of 11 September. research indicated that this would be more effective in the case of fast casual chains.70 61 Financial Mail. found on www. At the same time. 12 .Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand they would have to roll out hundreds of outlets rapidly. available www. Pizza Hut. Dining Out Review Market: Volume 1 – QSR – US Report. South Africa and Australia. In the United States eating out was considered part of a routine. 63 National Restaurant Association. The average amount spent per person on fast food in the United States was much higher than in Europe and in Asia. reducing their time available for exercise just as their metabolisms were slowing down. fast food research reports link (accessed on 16 February 2004). July 2002. op cit. marketing link (accessed on 26 February. Corporate Report.com.000 stores. not necessarily a reward.restaurant. which included limited-service and snack and non-alcoholic beverage bars. Forecasts indicated that the intensity of competition in the quick service restaurant business was expected to escalate significantly. Nando’s had treaded warily. 1st Edition. eating on the go. 2001. Food Service. ‘The Chicken Has Landed’.org. Restaurants and Franchising survey indicated that one of the best ways to enhance pricing in the crowded marketplace was to develop strong customer loyalty.marketresearch.62 McKenzie had done her research. The Restaurant Industry 2000 Year in Review. 7 November 2001. the group had started to retail cooking sauces. and this trend was expected to continue. op cit. content link (accessed on 28 February 2004).68 (Exhibit 8 lists the world’s 100 most valued brands in 2003.za. 70 TNS Intersearch. weight maintenance and quality of food. so that this market would be exposed to the Nando’s brand. This was evidenced by the fact that meals eaten away from home commanded nearly half of the household food dollar. they also faced escalating work and family responsibilities. Business Day. The baby boom generation of individuals aged between 37 and 55 were faced with a paradox that had resulted in important new consumer needs. 68 Ibid. available www.67 A 2002 Deloitte and Touche Food Service. March 2002. with fast food groups featured by highest value first: McDonald’s. 65 Mintel International Group Ltd. and Starbucks). as the shift from traditional quick service restaurants to fast casual chains was evident in the higher consumer commitment to the latter. The Indifferent Nature of QSR Consumers – The 2003 QSR Consumer Commitment Study. time-challenged consumers who valued convenience.66 The US fast food market was crowded. Interbrand Sampson SA.nandos. 2004). forcing US chains to look abroad for growth opportunities.co. 64 Mintel International Group Ltd.za. not only in its key markets of the United Kingdom. 67 Ibid. and the underserved markets in other countries were considered fertile ground for expansion by US chains. 69 J Sampson. While they were entering a life stage where there would usually be more of a focus on nutrition. available www. ‘Nando’s to implement a pan-African food service’. typically through brand awareness.

would enable the team to develop a core strategy tailored to each country. “What do we do to polish the brand? And how do we polish the brand so that we make sure that our positioning is maintained?” she asked herself. This information. the chief challenge for Nando’s International in 2004 was to decide which geographic area to develop next. McKenzie and the international marketing team referred to this as ‘polishing’ the brand.71 McKenzie agreed with Brozin’s view that Nando’s International had retained its entrepreneurial spirit despite significant growth. 13 . together with an analysis of competitors and the industry environment. the company needed to maximise its opportunities in the countries in which it already had a presence if it was to reach a critical mass of stores on the ground.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand The Challenges McKenzie knew that selecting the global geographic areas that Nando’s should target would enable her team to make decisions about customer targets and the needs of those customers. 71 Interview with Josi McKenzie. op cit. Clearly. The particular concerns for McKenzie were how to determine the appropriate marketing mix and implement a strategy that had been customised for each target market. In addition.

Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 1 Selected Nando’s Print Advertisements Australia: Australia : 14 .

5 December 2003.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 1 Continued Australia: Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie. 15 .

16 . 5 December 2003.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 2 Country Details: Year First Opened and Number of Stores in 2003 Country South Africa Australia Zimbabwe United Kingdom Israel Canada Botswana Namibia Malaysia Malawi Kenya Zambia Uganda Saudi Arabia Mozambique New Zealand Tanzania Ghana Pakistan Qatar United Arab Emirates Indonesia Bahrain Swaziland Portugal Cyprus Angola 1st Store Opened 1987 1992 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 No of Stores 186 64 18 73 13 13 8 8 19 2 7 2 1 3 2 12 1 2 2 2 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 450 Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie.

17 .86 Turnover Operating Income Ordinary Shareholders’ Interest Total Long-Term Liabilities Non-current Assets Earnings Per Share (ZARc) Headline Earnings Per Share (ZARc) Source: Nando’s Annual Report.34 Year ended 28 Feb 2001 ZAR 471 907 33 015 46 131 55 961 170 938 2. 2001 and 2002 Amounts in ‘000 Year ended 28 Feb 2002 ZAR 458 140 42 419 89 621 34 283 188 569 6. information based on a survey commissioned by Nando’s South Africa. Exhibit 4 Selected Financial Information for the Nando’s Group. 2002.34 6.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 3 Drivers of Brand Choice for Nando’s Users and Most Critical Service Issues – South Africa 2001 Drivers of Brand Choice for Nando’s Users • Quality of food • Freshness of food • Menu variety • Service • Cleanliness • Atmosphere • Value for money • Cater for the whole family Most Critical Service Issues • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Fresh food Clean plates and cutlery Clean and tidy store Appearance of staff Clean and tidy sit-down area Quality food Clean floor and counter Receiving correct food order Clean toilets Clean sauce bottles First come. 17 November 2003.37 2. 2001. first served Value for money Litter free exterior Availability of staff at counter Treated as a valued customer Source: Interview with Josi McKenzie.

5 December 2003.1997 to 2003 1997 1998 Country South Africa Australia United Kingdom Israel Canada Malaysia Saudi Arabia Pakistan Quatar Egypt Botswana Ivory Coast Kenya Malawi Mocambique Tanzania Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe Angola Bahrain Cyprus Ghana Indonesia Namibia New Zealand Portugal Swaziland United Arab Emirates 100 7 7 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 137 122 14 7 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 169 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 142 32 15 9 7 3 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 234 147 33 23 9 6 6 2 0 0 1 3 0 6 1 1 0 1 1 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 258 160 48 30 10 7 10 3 0 0 0 4 1 7 1 1 1 1 2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 304 177 59 47 11 8 13 3 1 1 0 6 1 6 1 1 1 1 2 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 357 186 64 73 13 13 19 3 2 2 0 8 0 7 2 2 1 1 2 18 1 2 1 2 4 8 12 2 1 1 450 Source: Nando’s Annual Report. 2002. 18 . The figures for 2003 were obtained from e-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 5 Record of Nando’s International Store Growth .

075 189.672 10.679 Africa 1.753 59.288 56.429 There are no separately identifiable business units.569 90.199 17.771 36 4.192 Note 1 Operating income before taxation 18.717 Total 188. 2002 45.409 Note 1: Revenues exclude revenues from associate companies South Africa Assets non current current Liabilities non current current 130.161 13.961 190.299 23.442 Malaysia 2.681 4.232 136.864 Canada 4.374 278.212 R’000 South Africa United Kingdom Revenues 303.679 2.831 26.487 6.826 7.945 2.714 49.197 87.140 45.294 1.848 Middle East 13.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 6 Segmental Analysis which gives a Breakdown of Jurisdictional Performance Middle East 53.595 Total 458.566 5.322 19 .943 56.428 Australia 39. Reconciliation of operating income before taxation per the segmental analysis to income before taxation per the income statement: Operating income before taxation Associate companies taxation charge Income before taxation Source: Nando’s Annual Report.971 975 20.331 21.708 USA 637 -2.864 12.247 133.436 33.870 Australia 81.064 5.306 Canada 15.039 20.708 1.

joint ventures and companyowned jurisdictions • Manufacture. SB MJ LP.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 7 Nando’s International Organogram. MR FD. 20 . JP FD. MR. marketing and distribution for joint ventures. RS RB. FD. franchised and companyowned jurisdictions • Support veins for all countries for grocery and restaurants • Focus on bulk/large volumes and core lines (peri-peri) • Export – opportunity for 2004 RB. JM. PA. 2003 STRATEGY SPECIALISED SUPPORT DELIVERY OF MEASURABLES GROCERY FACTORY • Fast Casual Positioning •Business Strategy (Grocery/ restaurant) •Trends •Communication •Brand/ culture • Legal • Financial • Marketing • NPD • R&D • Country Support – for franchised. RDL. EN Source: E-mail correspondence from Josi McKenzie. MJDS. 5 December 2003.

Japan U.S.151 21.425 13.S.S. U.311 30.S.237 9.S. U.693 9.406 1% -2% -3% -3% -11% -14% -10% 4% 10% -3% -32% 5% -5% -7% -4% -6% -30% 3% -2% 4% -7% -3% -6% 5% -25% N/A -21% 9% N/A -10% 12% -3% -6% 30% 2% -15% U. S.S.S.310 7.776 16.222 16.S.S. Korea U.S.510 11. U.S.S.230 11. U.S.671 9. U.448 18. Germany Japan Switzerland U.066 16.S.S. U.010 20.770 9.S.970 29.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand Exhibit 8 Ranking of 100 of the World’s Most Valuable Brands. U.287 21 .803 9.138 8. 2002 2002 Rank Brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Coca-Cola Microsoft IBM GE Intel Nokia Disney McDonald’s Marlboro Mercedes Ford Toyota Citibank Hewlett-Packard Cisco AT&T Honda Gillette BMW Sony Nescafe Oracle Budweiser Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley Compaq Pfizer JPMorgan Kodak Dell Nintendo Merck Samsung Nike Gap 2002 Value % change Country of Origin ($ billions) from 2001 69.S. U.349 11.403 19.S. U. U.S. U.059 15.S. Finland U. U.S.188 41.724 7.064 14. Japan U.091 51.S.375 24. U. American Express 16.205 9.843 11.S. U. U.637 64. U. Germany U.959 14.S.S.861 29. Japan U. U.S. U.256 26.S. U.899 12.219 9.

416 3.054 3.S.078 6.S. Britain U.S.182 5.602 4.690 3. U. France U. U.482 3.079 4.S.399 4.S.S. Germany U.545 6.347 7. U.686 3.209 7. France Germany Japan Sweden U. France U.191 7.S.589 3.054 6.194 7.682 3. U.747 4.S.S.039 4. 22 . U.S.454 3.079 5. U.S.561 4.394 6.773 4. U.611 4.409 4% -2% -9% 3% 0% 7% 2% 9% 3% 13% -8% 1% 2% -3% -12% -1% N/A N/A -1% -7% 5% -12% 1% -7% N/A 1% -4% 0% 1% N/A -12% 1% 0% -1% -49% 0% -8% -9% -18% U. U.430 4.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand 2002 Rank Brand 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 Heinz Volkswagen Goldman Sachs Kellogg’s Louis Vuitton SAP Canon IKEA Pepsi Harley-Davidson MTV Pizza Hut KFC Apple Xerox Gucci Accenture L’Oreal Kleenex Sun Wrigley’s Reuters Colgate Philips Nestle Avon AOL Chanel Kraft Danone Yahoo! adidas Rolex Time Ericsson Tiffany Levi’s Motorola Duracell 2002 Value % change Country of Origin ($ billions) from 2001 7. Sweden U.266 6.775 6.046 5. U. France U.S.855 3.S. U. Netherlands Switzerland U.308 5.S.S.S. Germany Switzerland U. U.S.346 5.S.S. U.S.272 4.304 5.S.S. U.316 5. Italy U.326 4.S.721 6.S.

723 2.961 Polo Ralph Lauren 1.141 2.579 1. Germany U.341 3. Britain/Neth.961 1.937 1. U. found on www.509 4% -7% 4% N/A 1% -10% -27% -1% 5% N/A N/A -1% 6% -2% -11% 16% -10 12% -5% 1% 2% 0% 0% N/A 1% Britain U.810 2. Bermuda U.928 Source: J.S.396 2.S.919 1.358 2. U.163 2.509 Wall Street Journal 1.Nando’s International: Flying High with a Global Chicken Brand 2002 Rank Brand 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 BP Hertz Bacardi Caterpillar Amazon.com.175 3.com Panasonic Boeing Shell Smirnoff Prada Moet & Chandon Heineken Mobil Burger King Nivea Starbucks Barbie FedEx Johnnie Walker Jack Daniel’s 3M Armani 2002 Value % change Country of Origin ($ billions) from 2001 3.489 2.059 1. U.S.S.S. Italy France Netherlands U.S.362 3.S. Sampson. Britain U. 2004).580 1.S. The world’s most valuable brands. Japan U.218 3. U.S.S.S.S. Interbrand Sampson SA. marketing link (accessed on 26 February.654 1. Italy Johnson & Johnson 2. U. U.bizcommunity. Britain U. U. 23 .973 2.S. July 2002.S.390 3.445 2.

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