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INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS
CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN
AFPCGSC CLASS 48
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES Command and General Staff College Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE CLASS # 48
CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City
This is an official document of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College.
Quotations from, contractions, and reproduction of all or any part of this document are not authorized without the specific permission from the Commandant, Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College.
The opinions, ideas, and proposals expressed herein are those of the studentauthor and do not necessarily express the official views of the College or any other government agency.
Reference to this work includes the foregoing statement.
Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff College Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo Quezon City
Quezon City ENDORSEMENT In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff Course Class Number 48. “INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS” has been prepared and submitted by CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN. LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M).ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo. MM Adviser iii . this study entitled. the acceptance of which is hereby endorsed.
” prepared and submitted by CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the AFP Command and General Staff Course # 48. entitled “INTERAGENCY COOPERATION: A FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING MARITIME SECURITY THREATS. is hereby accepted. BGEN SALVADOR S COLLANTES JR AFP Commandant Date Signed:___________________ . LTC RONILO C GAMUETA PA(GSC) Member Date Signed : __________________ LTC FILEMON D MAMARIL JR PA(GSC) Member Date Signed: ____________________ COL ORLANDO E ASTRERO PA(GSC) Chairman Date Signed: _____________________ Accepted as fulfillment of the requirements for graduation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and General Staff Course Class Number 48.ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo. Quezon City APPROVAL SHEET This Commandant’s Paper hereto attached.
To LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M).ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to express my gratitude to the following who. Philippine Navy for his insights and invaluable inputs towards the development of this study and to LTJG FLORISSA G HERNANDEZ PN and the staff of OSS. Office of the Strategic Studies. my adviser and my colleague at the UNSW @ ADFA. Senior Researcher. in one way or the other have been instrumental in the completion of this paper: To the Lord Almighty for His eternal blessings and Divine Guidance. my children. Canberra when we took up our masteral studies and provided insights to this study. To Mr Jessie Pascasio. HPN Central Staff. To my wife. who have been my inspiration and whose forbearance and patience get me through the course. PN for their invaluable support and assistance. Cavite City for their active participation without which. PNP-MARIG Operations Division and officers of PN Units Afloat at Sangley Point. BFAR MCS Division. Patrick Reyvin and Alecx Yeuvnrei. To the Philippine Fleet Staff. Euvin. REY T DELA CRUZ CDR PN v . the desired outcome of the study would not have been possibly reached.
it aims: to analyze the threats to our maritime security. the solution is far from over. to determine ways of overcoming the problems of interagency cooperation. secure. The study focused on the agencies with seaborne assets who have the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country in all Philippine waters such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). Masters in Management. agreements and coordinating mechanisms between these agencies. is endowed with a very rich marine resource and vast maritime area. and preserve the country’s maritime domain is wanting. to propose a framework for inter-agency cooperation to address the different maritime security threats. Adviser: LTC MARTIN G VILLASAN PN(M). While several initiatives were already undertaken to coordinate the efforts of all agencies with maritime functions in addressing maritime security threats.ABSTRACT CDR REY T DELA CRUZ PN. UNSW @ ADFA. as a maritime nation. Philippine National Police . AFP Command and General Staff College. the present capacity of the government to protect. Canberra. The Philippines. Unfortunately. vi . More specifically. This study was conducted to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security threats. July 2007. and the Philippine Navy (PN).Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). and lastly. to examine the existing linkages. Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo. It is also a host to a myriad of concerns that threatens its maritime security. Quezon City. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Interagency Cooperation: A Framework in Addressing Maritime Security Threats. to assess the capabilities of government agencies directly involved in maritime security operations.
and survey questionnaire. and PN. maritime terrorism. acquisition of additional seaborne assets. and PNP-MARIG. Moreover. illegal fishing. and maritime disasters. PNP-MARIG. the combined capabilities of these agencies are inadequate to address the maritime security threats to the country. Statistical tools like simple frequency count and total weighted mean were also used to measure the data obtained from the surveys.The descriptive method of research was used in studying the concept of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security along with other research instruments such as structured interviews. marine pollution. a lot of support from the legislative and political leadership is needed to improve interagency cooperation between the agencies concerned. An improved interagency cooperation is anchored on enhancing the understanding and awareness of the threats to our maritime security by the agencies at all levels through information sharing. and informal dialogues between them. the existing linkages between these agencies need to be strengthened at all levels of maritime security operations. Enhancing their capabilities also require the upgrading or modernization of their equipment. vii . However. BFAR. document analysis. formulation of joint doctrines and procedures including the development of an integrated national monitoring. PCG. joint training and exercises. PCG. workshops. Respondents were purposively and randomly selected from across the strategic. Nevertheless. operational and tactical levels of PN. foreign intrusions. Several ways were recommended to improve interagency cooperation between the BFAR. The target agencies have a clear understanding of the country’s maritime security threats such as transnational crimes.
Tactics and Procedures (TTPs). and a national interagency maritime security operations doctrine. is the creation of an interagency cooperation framework to synchronize. At the operational and tactical levels. consolidation of all civilian agencies with maritime functions under one executive department. On the strategic level. and the creation of joint task forces or task groups. Overcoming the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation however. promulgation of an Executive Order for interagency cooperation among agencies with maritime functions. The linkages between these agencies could be enhanced through the “one lead agency” concept and the coordination mechanism under the authority of the lead agency should be duplicated at the operational and tactical levels where the existing working relationship between the agencies is further strengthened. Last but not least. depends to a very large extent on the government’s political and legislative support. joint Techniques. information sharing mechanism such as the provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the coordinating office of the lead agency. the interagency cooperation problems could be improved by implementing the joint/interagency maritime security operations doctrine. viii .control. formulation of a National Maritime Strategy. conduct of joint exercises and maritime security operations. and surveillance (MCS) system. it includes efforts such as the revision and updating of the National Marine Policy. designation of a lead agency in maritime and ocean affairs under the Office of the President. coordinate and optimize the efforts of the above agencies in addressing the maritime security threats of the country.
....................................THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING Background of the Study Geographical Setting of the Philippines Economic Potential Protecting Our Maritime Interests Statement of the Problem Objectives of the Study Conceptual Framework Significance of the Study Scope and Delimitation Definition of Terms CHAPTER II – REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES 1 2 3 3 7 8 9 10 12 13 Related Literature and Studies 15 x ix ............................. ........................................ ...... ..................... ... i ii iii iv v vi ix xi xii CHAPTER I .......... .. .TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Title Page Disclaimer Endorsement Approval Sheet Acknowledgment Abstract Table of Contents List of Tables List of Figures .............................. ...................................... ..
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS Maritime Security Threats Capabilities of Agencies Existing Linkages Between Agencies Issues and Concerns to Interagency Cooperation Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation CHAPTER V .Synthesis of Related Literature and Studies Gaps to be Filled by the Study CHAPTER III . CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Summary Conclusion Recommendations BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES : Survey Questionnaire Structured Interview BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 49 52 53 54 54 56 57 58 61 69 75 80 84 91 98 99 103 105 109 112 x .PRESENTATION.SUMMARY.RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Method of Research Locale of the Study Respondents (or Unit Analysis) Research Instruments Data Gathering Procedures Statistical Treatment of Data CHAPTER IV .
LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Agencies with Maritime Functions NMP Policy Statements and Goals Respondents from Different Agencies Rank Distribution of Respondents Length of Service of Respondents Range and Descriptive Evaluation Used Summary of Design and Methodology Used Perception on Maritime Security Threats Data on Goods Smuggling Data on Illegal Fishing Data on Foreign Intrusions Maritime Terrorism Incidents Piracy Incidents Maritime Disaster Incidents BFAR Assets PCG Assets PN Assets PNP-MARIG Assets Philippine Marine Resources Existing Linkage Between Agencies Perception on Existing Linkages Perception on Issues and Concerns Perceptions on Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation Summary of Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation Page 6 29 55 55 56 59 60 62 64 66 66 67 67 68 70 71 72 73 74 76 78 81 86 101 xi .
LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 National Marine Interests and Key Policy Actors Conceptual Framework MOAC Organizational Structure CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making Model LEDAC Based Decision Making Model NEDA Based Interagency Council Model ARCDEV Model Based on PCSD Structure ARCDEV Model Based on Expanded PCSD Structure ARCDEV Model with Independent Management Board Coastwatch South Conceptual Framework Coastwatch South Functional Structure Drug Smuggling Landing Points Interagency Cooperation Framework Page 4 10 28 30 31 31 38 39 40 43 44 65 102 xii .
” 2 It is subordinated to the broader definition of national security where it is defined as “a state or condition wherein the people’s way of life and institutions. economic. 16-17 May 2005 2 Department of Foreign Affairs. 3 J5 Briefing on National Military Strategy to AFPCGSC. their integrity and sovereignty including their well-being are protected and enhanced.” 3 A comprehensive Philippine maritime security viewpoint therefore considers the military. The Philippines as a Maritime Country: Challenges to National Security. National Marine Policy. piracy and armed robbery against ships. 2007 . maritime practices. maritime terrorism. illegal fishing. territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are protected. conserved and enhanced. Other concerns that we could consider as within the scope of the broad maritime security definition that the country adopted also include fishery and marine environmental protection concerns such as poaching. Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005. . 1995. and maritime disasters. threatened by transnational crimes. Manila: Foreign Service Institute. only four (4) government agencies have the capability to conduct law 1 Almonte.CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING A. J. Maritime security is however.T. marine pollution. In addressing these maritime security threats. and political concerns that affect the country’s maritime domain. environmental. The 1994 National Marine Policy of the Philippines defined maritime security “as a state wherein the country’s marine assets. Background of the Study “Security is every state’s first and foremost national interest” 1 Maritime security in the Philippines forms a part of the broader and complex dimension of national security.
2 million square kilometers. On the whole. It is an archipelago composed of more than seven thousand (7. Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). 832 or fifty six percent (56%) are situated in the coastal areas.800 square km and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 2.2 enforcement at sea and enforce them in all Philippine waters namely: Philippine Navy (PN). 1. p.R. Manila. Geographical Setting of the Philippines The geographic configuration and characteristics of the Philippines as a maritime country are fairly obvious. 10 5 Shahani. on the south by the Sulu and Celebes Sea. is 4/5 waters and 1/5 land.the Pacific Ocean in the East and the South China Sea in the West where links the economies of major powers in the region. . and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). on the west by the South China Sea.496 municipalities. It has the privileged of being situated where two great oceans meet . L.289 kilometers. the Philippines. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. and on the north by the Luzon strait. 6 In the words of General 4 Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation. a territorial sea of 679.. the Philippine archipelago straddles the main maritime highways of the world where more than fifty percent (50%) of commercial maritime passes its maritime jurisdiction. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). 5 The Philippines is also strategically positioned in the region. Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005. 16-17 May 2005 6 N5 Briefing to CGSC Cl 48 2007.. The Philippines as a Maritime Country: The Requirements to Fulfill its Potential. 4 It is bounded on the east by the Philippine Sea. Furthermore. As of 2002.000) islets and islands. its population in the coastal areas is 39 million with sixty two (62) of its seventy nine (79) provinces and of the 1. It has a coastline of 36. Inc.
pp.3 Almonte. In 2000.1% of the GDP. The maritime transport sector is also a major maritime growing industry wherein the country has 1. In general. Owing to the long coastline of the country. 16-17 May 2005 8 Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation.000 domestic vessels plying the different sea routes of the archipelago contributing 7. Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005. “we are located in Southeast Asia’s maritime heartland. the Philippines ranked third in the ASEAN region fisheries international trade. Moreover. coastal tourism is one of the major growth sectors where 18 of the top 25 tourist destinations are situated. 13-14. the former National Security Adviser and Director-General of the National Security Council (NSC). ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. with an estimated value of P20.5 billion from 1990 to 2000.4 billion.9B.” 7 2. .T. the coastal areas made an economic estimated contribution of 60% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).65 billion in earnings from 1990 to 2000. The Philippines as a Maritime Country: Challenges to National Security. 8 3. There are about 800 fishing firms in the country with a recorded net revenue of P1. minerals found in the seabed and in coastal areas of the country contributed P17. Manila.. tourism is contributing an annual average income of P81. . Inc. J.250 ports and 30. In 2000. the Philippines derived enormous uses and benefits from its resources in the maritime domain. Economic Potential As a maritime country. Protecting Our Maritime Interests The fundamental basis in protecting the nation’s marine resources is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides that: “The State 7 Almonte.
DSWD. PNP. PCG. DOJ. DENR. PPA. and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. (3) maritime safety and security interests. LGU. Education & Culture Fisheries (BFAR. PCG) Boundary Delimitation (DFA. DND/AFP. and (5) scientific. BFAR. LGU) Conservation of Biodiversity (DENR. p. PNP) Maritime Law Enforcement (DND/AFP. LGU. and cultural uses of the oceans.. PCG. DENR. DND/AFP. DOJ. 1987 Philippine Constitution.” 10 Figure 1 shows the country’s maritime interests and the key agencies of government interests. PCG. (2) environmental concerns. LGU. (4) territorial and jurisdictional concerns. MARINA. PNP. and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). tasked with protecting these NATIONAL MARINE INTERESTS and KEY POLICY ACTORS Socio-Economic Uses Environmental Uses Maritime Safety and Security Territory and Jurisdiction Science. LGU) Management of Disputed Areas (DFA. DFA. LGU) Pollution/ Siltation (DENR. BFAR) Marine Anthropology & Archeology Marine Transportation & Communications (DOTC. Department of Foreign Affairs. LGU) Energy Exploration ( DOE. NGOs) Regulation of Marine Transport (DOTC. DTI. DENRMGB) Seabed Mining (DOE) SOURCE: ARCDEV Figure 1 Philippine Marine Interests and Key Policy Actors 9 10 Par. NDCC. Art. National Marine Policy. 1995. Sec. XII. DOT. NGOs) Military/ Defense Uses (DND/AFP.4 shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters. educational. DOH) Search & Rescue (DND/AFP. territorial sea. LGU) Marine Scientific Research (DOST. BFAR. Manila: Foreign Service Institute. PNP) Coastal Land Use (DPWH. LGU) Hazard Mitigation (DENR. 2. LGU) Maritime Training (DOTC) Tourism ( DOT. DTI. PCG. 2. 11 . PCG. DOT. NAMRIA. DND/AFP. PCG. NSC.” 9 The country’s marine interests and concerns could be classified into five (5) major functional areas namely: “(1) socioeconomic uses. NSC. PCG. DENRPCMARRD. DENR. DOJ. NSC. PPA. NSC) Territorial Defense (DFA. Id.
. In the NMP. One concrete initiative towards an integrated approach to protecting our maritime interests was the formulation of the 1994 National Marine Policy (NMP) of the Philippines. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow. pp.pdf. is the means to coordinate the efforts of the concerned agencies and the absence of overall designated department or agency as orchestrator of this endeavor to synchronize government efforts. the Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA) was organized and in accordance with the intention of the formulation of the NMP which is “to create a venue for better coordination and integration among agencies with maritime-related functions. New York. 2007 at http://www. Retrieved on May 3.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__ philippines. 64-65. M.” 11 Table 1 shows the agencies with such functions. It consists of ten (10) departments and twenty (20) agencies and bureaus: 11 Garcia. (2005). One could only surmise the need for an integrated and coordinated approach in the management of our maritime domain. Conspicuously lacking however. This is all the more made complex with the numerous government agencies involved in addressing these myriad of maritime concerns. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options.5 Figure 1 clearly shows the magnitude and multitude of tasks to be undertaken in pursuing our equally multifaceted maritime interests.un. Following the formulation of the NMP. the government already recognized the magnitude of tasks of the government as far as ensuring maritime security is concerned.
Inc. with a view to avoiding or minimizing conflicts and competing uses of the ocean.” 12 However. pp. the NMP was never implemented in its totality and failed to achieve its vision. and protecting the long-term values and benefits presented by the extension of marine areas under national jurisdiction. when the Department of Environment and Natural resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation. Manila. 12 . 25. HPN Briefing (2005) The NMP should have filled the gap of providing a “framework of decisions that seeks to achieve the integrated management of marine resources and ocean space.6 Table 1 Agencies with Maritime Functions Department Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Department of Agriculture (DA) Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Department of National Defense (DND) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Department of Finance (DOF) Department of Health (DOH) Department of Justice (DOJ) Department of Tourism (DoT) Office of the President (OP) Implementing Bureaus & Agencies National Mapping and Resource Information Agency (NAMRIA) Coastal Marine Management Office (CMMO) Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) Office of Transportation Security (OTS) Philippine Navy (PN) Philippine Air Force (PAF) Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center (MOAC) Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNPMARIG) Bureau of Customs (BoC) Bureau of Quarantine and International Health Services (BQIHS) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) National Security Council (NSC) Philippine Center on Transnational Crime (PCTC) Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Source: OSS. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development.
and on an ad hoc basis under the auspices of MOAC. p. 29 . More specifically. The Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center. Hence. Philippine National Police . These agencies form the backbone of enforcing our maritime laws at sea and are directly involved in maritime security operations.Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). Manila. 14 Ibid. B. and the Philippine Navy (PN). Inc. but it “neither has a clear authority nor the resources needed” 13 to coordinate the efforts of other agencies in addressing the country’s maritime affairs. Since then. 29. Statement of the Problem Given the above situation. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development.” 14 Hence. an attached agency under the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) took its place. Other agencies with maritimerelated functions rely much on the capabilities of these agencies to perform their respective functions as well through coordination. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). interests and concerns.7 Committee was abolished in 2001.. 13 Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation. this study is conducted to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security threats. this study aims to look at the problems on interagency cooperation in addressing the country’s maritime security threats with the end in view of proposing ways to improve interagency cooperation. this study focused on the agencies with seaborne assets who have the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). government agencies with maritime-related functions “have been coordinating only loosely. p. addressing the different maritime security threats and challenges is beyond the capability of any single agency of the government to effectively address.
this study endeavors to answer the following research questions: 1. coordination mechanisms or frameworks in which these agencies are coordinating their efforts? 4. . To analyze the threats to our maritime security and their implications in the conduct of maritime security operations. What are the existing linkages.8 More specifically. agreements. Objectives of the Study This study has the following objectives: 1. facing today? What are the threats to our maritime security the country is 2. What are the ways or options to improve inter-agency cooperation between and among the focused agencies in addressing maritime security threats? C. What are the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation particularly in the conduct of maritime security operations? 5. What are the capabilities of the agencies directly involved in addressing these maritime security threats? 3.
The Output will be a proposed interagency coordination/cooperation framework or model to achieve . existing coordination mechanism/frameworks or agreements/MOAs/MOUs between these agencies. local and other country’s interagency models and studies. D. To examine the existing linkages. and the Output (IPO). national marine policies. Conceptual Framework This study was developed through the use of systems approach of analysis which has three (3) components namely: the Inputs. the Process. The Process involves the analysis and assessment of current interagency coordination/cooperation mechanism or framework. To determine issues and concerns that hinders interagency cooperation between these agencies in addressing our maritime security concerns and ways to overcome them. To assess the capabilities of the agencies directly involved in maritime security operations. and perception of the respondents.9 2. 5. 4. capabilities of agencies with sea-going assets. 3. To propose a framework for interagency cooperation for the agencies directly involved in addressing the different maritime security threats. agreements and coordinating mechanisms between the agencies directly involved in maritime security operations. The Inputs include all relevant variables bearing on the study such as maritime security threats.
The issues and problems that hinder interagency cooperation could be overcome. PNP-MARIG • Existing Coordination Mechanism/ Framework/ Agreements/MOAs/ MOUs • National Marine Policies • Interagency Models/Studies • Perception of Respondents Analyze and Assess Current Interagency Coordination/ Cooperation Framework and other Models FEEDBACK Figure 2 Conceptual Framework of Analysis E. Significance of the Study This study is significant in the following aspect: . 2. PCG. Hypotheses: This study assumes that: 1. F.10 an improved maritime security situation for the country. The schematic diagram is presented in Figure 2. The Feedback Loop serves as an indicator mechanism whether the desired outcome is attained through the desired Output. OUTPUT PROCESS Interagency Coordination/ Cooperation Framework l INPUTS • Maritime Security Concerns • Capabilities of PN. The agencies with maritime-related functions are willing to cooperate in an interagency arrangement.
It will create awareness among the agencies of the government. people. It gives the reader awareness that the host of maritime security concerns could not be effectively addressed by any single agency of government. It requires the unselfish cooperation of all agencies involved in maritime security. This study will provide policy makers and government authorities some insights to consider an interagency approach in addressing maritime security concerns for sustainable development to take its course. PN) as this study would provide them insights on how to best coordinate. 5. local governments. communities) and the country in general if the concerned government agencies are able to protect.11 1. It will benefit the primary agencies of government with seaborne assets (BFAR. . 2. both military and civilian on the benefits of interagency cooperation in protecting our marine interests including presenting ways of overcoming the problems of an interagency approach in their conduct of maritime security operations. An integrated approach to maritime security is beneficial to all stakeholders (government. As such. local government units. synchronize. preserve and develop our maritime resources for future generations. 3. PNP-MARIG. people’s organizations. it could serve as a reference for a bigger scope and participation of other agencies for interagency cooperation. PCG. 4. and optimize their efforts in addressing the maritime security threats of the country through interagency cooperation.
Scope and Delimitation In consideration of the vast magnitude. BFAR and the PNP-MARIG. it provides challenge to the readers to think of better set-ups and relevant measures to adopt inter-agency cooperation as a framework in improving the country’s maritime security. this study is limited in its scope on interagency cooperation between agencies with assets operating at sea and tasked to enforce all applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters like the PN. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness or appropriateness of the interagency mechanism or framework to be proposed as a result of this study. notwithstanding time constraint.12 As such. G. This could be a subject of succeeding researches or studies. and the number of agencies involved in maritime security operations. PCG. The roles and relationships of other involved agencies which impact on the conduct of maritime security operations are not extensively discussed since they rely much on the aforementioned agencies in addressing their respective maritime concerns through the conduct of joint or coordinated maritime operations. Being at the forefront of maritime security operations. these agencies form the backbone of our maritime security initiatives. the multifaceted aspects of maritime concerns besetting the country. .
or government-owned or controlled corporation. Executive Orders (1987 Admin Code) . Interagency Coordination (US DoD) . Maritime – an adjective which means “of. on. social and cultural developments of a particular society. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) .that area within a landmark limit of one (1) kilometer from shoreline at high tide. It encompasses the understanding of the important role of the sea in the political. Integration . Framework . Definition of Terms Address – attend to or direct one’s attention to. instrumentality. Coordination . and engaged government agencies.the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense. Agency of the Government (1987 Admin Code) .consciousness or.13 H. not exceeding 200 nautical miles from the low water mark. Marine Area . Maritime Awareness .refers to the process of balancing and prioritization of competing ocean uses.is the orderly and harmonized implementation of policies and programs by concerned institutions with the objective of minimizing conflicts among them.consists of government and non-government organizations with defined roles and responsibilities for planning and implementing ocean sector programs and plans and mechanisms for coordination among those organizational units.refers to the area of the ocean beyond the outer limit of the coastal area within the Exclusive Economic Zone. and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. nongovernmental organizations.an essential supporting structure or a basic system. or bordering of the sea. connected with. Institutional Structure .a demanding or difficult tasks. bureau. . office.is the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters. Coastal Area . including a department.Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Challenges . or a local government or a distinct unit therein. or connected with or bordering of the sea. economic.refers to any of the various units of the Government.
etc. people. destruction. and organizational and management strategies. injury. relating to. or bordering on a sea. with a view to avoiding or minimizing conflicts and competing uses of the ocean. Threats .14 Maritime Domain . and protecting the long-term values and benefits presented by the extension of marine areas under national jurisdiction.as a state wherein the country’s marine assets. Maritime Security . and vessels and other conveyances. cargo. Ocean Policy . including all maritime-related activities. Ocean Governance .an indication of something undesirable coming such as a person or thing as likely cause of harm. customs. rules.means all areas and things of. ocean.a framework of decisions that represents a plan for achieving integrated management of marine resources and ocean space. damage. territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are protected. adjacent to. or other navigable waterway. conserved and enhanced. maritime practices. infrastructure. on. under. .the process of optimizing for present and future generations benefits from the resources in the coastal and marine areas through a set of laws.
reviewed “the development of interdepartmental coordination in maritime enforcement between federal departments with regulatory responsibilities for effective oceans management and Canada’s maritime forces. However. These are briefly summarized in the succeeding discussion: A. Interdepartmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience Rear Admiral Fred Crickard (Ret). (1995). McCaffrie (Ed. F.). the proponent was not able to come across a sizeable number of published materials exclusively dealing on the subject of interagency cooperation between the military and civilian agencies with law enforcement functions and capabilities as sea in the context of addressing the country’s maritime security threats. principles and ideas on interagency cooperation in the context of ocean governance and development of a country’s maritime areas as a whole was found in other writings. 15 . Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate (pp.15 CHAPTER II REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES In the course of the research. Related Literature and Studies 1. Interdepartmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience In J. a number of related concepts. Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre. Foreign Literature and Studies a. 103-114). in an article entitled InterDepartmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience.” 15 Crickard.
Transport Canada. 16 The maritime force structure of the federal government’s fleet include the Canadian Royal Navy and its air assets. Corollary. 105-107.. SolicitorGeneral. Moreover. Ibid. and scientific interests in the oceans and inland waters. 16 17 18 19 Ibid. Canadian Coast Guard. monitoring and enforcement. and use of force and diplomacy. These fleets are mandated to support five (5) federal departments namely: National Defence. and Foreign Affairs and International Trade. and the Fisheries and Oceans Fleet. Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) – lead department in oceans matters as well as being responsible for policies and programs in support of Canada’s economic. The DND has no “statutory responsibilities for the protection and preservation of Canada’s coastal zones” 17 because of its blue-water capability. p. 104 Ibid. DND does not have authority for maritime enforcement but contributes to the surveillance and monitoring of Canada’s coastal zones to support maritime activities of the other departments as required. 103 Ibid. p.. Fisheries and Oceans. 18 As for the other departments. strategically meaning naval presence and sea control. below are their respective functions: 19 i. DFO is mandated to coordinate the ocean policies and programs of the Federal Government. its maritime strategy follows the concept of surveillance. . ecological. pp.16 Canada’s policy in protecting its maritime interests is anchored on the implementation of its law.
The Department of Foreign affairs and International Trade provides policy and legal advice on the international aspects of maritime affairs and exercises consultative role in marine context.17 ii. search and rescue. public harbors and ports and the Canadian pilotage authorities. Transport Canada’s Maritime Branch controls the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) which is responsible for marine navigation systems. noted that as early as the 1960’s. The Ministry of the Solicitor-General – lead federal law enforcement agency and coordinates counter-terrorism policy and response to terrorists incidents. ice breaking and Arctic operations. it was only in the early 90s that the interdepartmental coordination mechanism took place after a series of study and lessons learned from past incidents at sea. marine regulations and standards. However. Crickard. iii. It is the lead agency for ship source oil spills and maintains pollution response centers with spill response equipment. iv. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is its enforcement agency within the 12-nm territorial limit. there were already attempts of the Canadian Federal Government at establishing an interdepartmental coordination. The first crucial step was the creation of the Interdepartmental Program Coordination and Review Committee (IPCRC) composed of the governments three operating fleet namely: National Defence- .
DND’s role was revised to include “support of sovereignty. 109-110 . Ibid. a summary of the various Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) governing bilateral or multilateral department operations in normal as well as national or war emergency situations. the Navy and Coast Guard were required to do multi-tasking functions for fisheries patrol. Ibid. and the various operations required or anticipated. 21” With the establishment of IPCRC.18 Maritime Command. pp. pp. command. Crickard asserted that “interdepartmental procedures and operations are becoming formalised and more closely coordinated. environmental surveillance including assisting RCMP in patrolling inshore waters and ports. p. 109 Ibid.. 23” The document laid down the “current departmental mandates. 22” The second crucial factor to the successful interdepartmental coordination in the Canadian experience is the promulgation at the national level of a “joint naval and civilian doctrine in an Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (ICMO). the levels of force in support of other government departments during operations at sea. IPCRC’s tasked is “to match marine enforcement and scientific research requirements vis-à-vis available ship capacity with Fisheries and Oceans as principal beneficiary. Transport Canada-Canadian Coast Guard. 24” 20 21 22 23 24 Ibid. search and rescue.. Consequently. 108-109. Ibid. 20” Thus.. fisheries management. and Fisheries and Oceans. control and communication arrangements.
command and control among others. A. Dr Anthony Bergin noted that Australia “did not really provide a complete framework for a coordinated Australian ocean policy neither did it define any overall strategy or vision for coordinated ocean management. differing perspectives of the conflicting local. Inter-Departmental Coordination: The Australian Experience Despite having a vast maritime area to protect. The primary consideration is that of “naval presence entailing capability for surveillance. either in support or direct armed assistance. Thus. Dr Bergin pointed out however. Accordingly. Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate (pp. patrol and response in Canadian maritime areas. policy conflicts. 110 Bergin. the Navy is designated as lead agency as far as policy direction is concerned based on the Government’s defense policy. there is an Interdepartmental Coordination of Vessel Utilization (ICVU) which coordinates the availability of assets for patrolling the sea. the need for an integrated approach to solve the above 25 26 Ibid. 25” b.).. charges of management inefficiencies and overlaps. McCaffrie (Ed. Interdepartmental Coordination: The Australian Experience In J.19 Last but not least. lost opportunities. that the absence of a mechanism for coordinated efforts in ocean management has resulted to inadequate coordination of efforts among government agencies. Australia: Australian Defence Studies Centre. 26” Ocean matters were approached on a sectoral basis. and a question whether a better coordination system would effectively solve oceanrelated matters. p. In this interdepartmental coordination concept. federal and state governments. confusion. jurisdictional gaps. . fragmentation of responsibilities. and assistance to other Government departments. (1995). Australia’s attempts at having a coordinated ocean policy were hindered by sectoral groups dominance and single issues. 115-132).
27 As a consequence. 124.20 problems was recognized. . Because of the magnitude of task in case of sea response enforcement. an autonomous entity and independently funded to provide and coordinate national civil coastal surveillance to at least eight (8) government agencies referred to as user-clients. inshore electronic surveillance and support. solutions were proposed in three (3) phases as follows: 28 i. 27 28 Ibid. It role was also expanded to include both coordination and control of marine operations with the placement of ACS’ 14 vessels under the organization.. the activities of state-owned and operated sea-going vessels. It is contracted to provide visual surveillance. Coastwatch. and iii. p. p. ii. the functions and responsibilities of Coastwatch and ACS’ sea-going fleet. within the same control and tasking structure. a Civil Coastal Control Agency (CCCA). To integrate the sea-going vessels of other Commonwealth agencies into the CCCA. To arrange the mechanism to coordinate. eight (8) Commonwealth reviews on civil coastal surveillance since 1968 were conducted whose recommendations evolved to Australia’s current maritime security arrangements. Integrate into the management and control of one organization. patrol and intelligence gathering. was established in 1988 within the Australian Customs Service (ACS).. 118 Ibid. and offshore electronic all weather surveillance through a specified number of flying hours of its air assets way out to 300 miles offshore.
p. the main reason for integrating only the seagoing elements of Australia’s marine resources is based on experience of other nations where it was shown that “combined organizations have not been able to perform efficiently the individual agency-specific tasks…” 29 With Australia’s current civil coastal surveillance set up. Bergin asserted that. The Navy provides a number of patrol boats while the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) provides PC3 Orion patrol efforts.. Ibid. The ‘big fix’ should be treated very 29 30 31 Ibid. “the idea that one can seek a perfect national coordinated oceans policy in the sense of one that is integrated. and associated data in support of operations. p. 125 Ibid. 127 . response assistance. and comprehensive is not realistic. Bergin argued that given Coastwatch’s high level of success in coordinating the national program. while command and control arrangements between Coastwatch and Defense has been in working. command of Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and RAAF assets remain with Defense. Defense is represented in the Operations and Program Advisory Committee in the development of all surveillance planning. intelligence. rational. Coastwatch can coordinate for defense assistance while Defense supports Coastwatch operations as the overall national coordinator of civil surveillance program.21 Accordingly. 30 Finally.” 31 He added that centralization in a federal system may not be the best course of action and that “it may be better to focus on particular oceans policy problems.. Defense provides certain levels of offshore surveillance.
Furthermore. Philippine Navy made a case study of the Philippines as a landlock archipelago citing at the first instance the richness in maritime heritage and characteristics of the Philippines. how serious the problems are and why. 34 Pascasio pointed out that as early as 1898. p. and the country’s educational system. 113-118. 1. unresponsive maritime governance. Maritime Nexus: Bridging Awareness and Capacity-Building in the Philippine Maritime Viewpoint Pascasio. Vol. 128 Ibid. National Maritime Foundation. 34 Pascasio. (2005). J. government policies have focused towards land reform and agricultural development in disregard of the country’s archipelagic nature.. the costs and outcomes of different agencies approaches to oceans matters and how better integration among laws and agencies should be achieved. 1 Winter 2005. No.” 32 He is quick to add however. up Ibid.” 33 c. 33 32 . a senior researcher of the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS). misdirected national policies. it did not. the author claimed that reliance on the US for the country’s security umbrella has led to the neglect of the development of the country’s maritime security capabilities. Maritime Nexus: Bridging Awareness and Capacity-Building in the Philippine Maritime Viewpoint In Maritime Affairs. that Australia has yet to have “a good grasp on what coordinating mechanisms currently exist and how well they work and why. 106-126). India. He discussed the contradictions of this maritime nature against the lack of maritime awareness of the Filipinos brought about by factors such as historical and political developments. While the Philippines was one of the first signatory to the UNCLOS in 1982.22 cautiously. (pp. pp.
uncoordinated efforts. p. p.” 36 He argued that the proliferation of agencies with maritime-related functions has created miniempires. only the Bureau of Customs was the one supervising the country’s maritime industry.. 18 line agencies and attached bureaus. the archipelagic development concept which was supposed to be implemented through the 1994 National Marine Policy. Among these are the losses incurred in the fishery sector. He further averred that “the lack of central authority for the management and administration of the country’s maritime affairs leaves the departments with no effective coordinating mechanism. and sectoral approach in addressing maritime concerns.” 37 The last part of Pascasio’s discussion dealt on the implications of the foregoing to the country’s maritime security and state capacity. duplication or overlapping of functions.23 until the present.. 117. 116. He enumerated the costs and effects of the present state of maritime governance in the Philippines. and 4 other agencies and bodies created for specific maritime concern. Ibid. 118 . he noted that “there are 12 departments. p. economic 35 36 37 Ibid. 5 statutory bodies. 35 Pascasio also noted that in 1960s. resulted to spreading of scarce resources. and their adverse effects on national security. At present however. the P12 billion annual amount spent to support the operations of agencies and departments concerned. was never implemented due to the abolition of the CABCOM-MOA which is tasked to coordinate the efforts of all agencies with maritime-related functions at the national level. Moreover. Ibid. complied with the provisions of UNCLOS particularly on the delimitation of its baselines to define the extent of our national territory.
maritime disasters. Barndt. and global competitiveness. Pascasio noted that from 1989 to 2003.24 growth. and other transnational crimes. p. Pascasio also mentioned the challenges and threats the country has to address in the maritime domain. sustainable development. there were 1.. 124 . p.838 vessels and 4.. and 449 missing. pp. environmental degradation. 39 He concludes by saying that there are only two choices for the Filipinos: “either to do something now and enjoy the benefits later or do nothing and suffer the irreplaceable loss of our maritime treasures. 38 On the aspect of maritime security.489 people victimized with 581 killed.292 piracy incidents in the country involving 1.” 40 d. 119 Ibid.. 230 wounded. Their activities include the bombing of M/V Doulous in 1999. kidnapping of 21 persons in Sipadan. and Salo of the US Joint Forces Staff College citing the US Defense Secretary propounded that “Interagency and interService integration and interoperability are critical to bring the nation’s full capabilities and resources to bear on the national security challenges of today 38 39 Ibid. Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability Birmingham. kidnapping of 3 Americans and 17 Filipinos in Dos Palmas. Malaysia in 2000. Palawan and claiming responsibility of the Superferry 14 bombing. 119-120 40 Ibid. He also stressed the threat of maritime terrorism posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). maritime terrorism. This include piracy incidents.
They also claim that the following current challenges must be overcome for an interagency process to be successful: balance of power. varied approaches. and personal differences. and strategic planning capability. and Salo.. 1. p.ndu. competing interests. They have recognized further that the primary challenge to interagency process is ensuring unity of effort despite diverse organizational cultures.doc.25 and tomorrow. and contingency planning for the U. personnel qualification. chain of command. (2003). Finally. 43 Despite all the challenges and difficulties that interagency coordination pose.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jca_cca_awsp/Achieving_ Unity _of_Effort.jfsc. 43 Ibid. 7 44 Ibid. 2007 from http://www. they contend that “the nation must establish a common national interagency framework to promote interoperability at all levels of government. Armed Forces. 44” Birmingham. Barndt. 42” there is no similar legislation in place for interagency coordination. Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability. p. differing priorities and perspectives.S. 41” Together. Retrieved February 13. authority commensurate with responsibilities.. 15 41 . they advocated the need for an interagency approach to have unity of efforts among and between government agencies in meeting various security challenges to the US. The authors noted that while the Goldwater-Nichols Act “prescribed a hierarchical process for strategic direction. p. strategic planning. and Salo maintained that a GoldwaterNichols Act -like legislation is the solution for the interagency process to work and for all agencies to work as one. Barndt. Birmingham. 42 Ibid.
March). Retrieved February 17. is lacking as an overarching framework. propose for the re-evaluation of the US interagency system wherein the National Security Council (NSC) always play the lead role in view of “the new challenges brought on by lessons learned in interagency operations and a dramatically changing security environment “ 45 particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attack.p. 46 Ibid. 2007 from http://www. M.hicksandassociates. and implementing policies and operations in the national security community across individual departments and agencies. He concluded that the new framework should “define the relationship of new interagency elements to the NSC. 45 . of Hicks and Assocites. Rethinking the Interagency System Donley.com/reports/HAI-occasional-paper. (2005. He also noted from recommendations of various studies like the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). overseeing. to determine department Donley. Accordingly.26 e. in his Occasional Paper # 05-01. Rethinking the Interagency System. and Defense Science Board (DSB) that integration of efforts should not only take place on the strategic or departmental levels but more importantly. 9/11 Commission.. 46” Donley found out that the integration of effort remain as the overarching problem in an interagency system in the face of a new security environment. This recommendation is effectively seen as moving away from the NSC model of interagency system which in the mind of Donley. Inc.1.pdf . This is aimed at improving effectiveness at the operational levels. “the US needs new ways of coordinating. down to all levels of government especially to those on the frontlines who executes national policy on the ground.
p. New York. 10-11 Garcia. Inc. Since then. an attached agency under the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) took its place. government agencies with maritime-related functions 47 48 Ibid. 49 Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation.. promote coordination among government agencies concerned with the use of maritime space and resources.un. 29. Accordingly. Retrieved on May 3.” 47 f. . M. interests and concerns. a United Nations (UN) Fellow of the Nippon Foundation of Japan. pp. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow.” 48 Unfortunately.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__ philippines.27 and agency responsibilities for interagency matters. this was not to be the case since the CABCOM-MOA was abolished in 2001. but it “neither has a clear authority nor the resources needed” 49 to coordinate the efforts of other agencies in addressing the country’s maritime affairs.9. (2005). Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options Garcia (2005). harmonize existing laws and ocean uses. 2007 at http://www. supposedly has had provided the first great stride of the government in achieving an integrated oceans management for the Philippines. Garcia noted that the NMP through the CABCOMMOA. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. studied the progress in the implementation of the NMP through the defunct CABCOM-MOA including the attendant issues to its implementation and the available options that could be considered for the NMP’s implementation. Essentially..pdf. The Maritime and Ocean Affairs Center. and maximize benefits from utilization of ocean resources within sustainable limits. p. Manila. the purpose of establishing a national ocean policy is “for the state to exercise its stewardship responsibilities. and especially to determine the NSC’s future roles and responsibilities in a new interagency system.
” 51 As such the intention of the formulation of the NMP “to create a venue for better coordination and integration among agencies with marine-related functions” 52 was negated. Conference & Secretariat Services Figure 3 MOAC Organizational Structure Accordingly. (2005). Other Law of the Sea Issues.pdf. As a result.. Marine Scientific Research Division 4 International Dispute Procedures. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options. 52 Ibid. and on an ad hoc basis under the auspices of MOAC. Cartography Division 2 International Seabed Authority (ISA). Archipelagic Sealanes. New York. p. 53 Ibid. Marine Environmental Protection. Secretary-General Executive Director Division 1 Territorial and other Maritime Jurisdiction. 64-65. M.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__ philippines. pp. 29 Garcia. 2007 at http://www. Retrieved on May 3. Piracy & Sea Robbery Division 5 Law of the Sea Library. the reason behind this policy change was based on the premise that the Cabinet Secretaries “should do less cluster and interagency committee work so that they can concentrate on running their department.” 50 The table below shows the organizational structure of MOAC. 53 50 51 Ibid. Information Dissemination. the coordination and consultations are done on an ad hoc basis which made the cooperation of other agencies difficult. 65 . p.un.28 “have been coordinating only loosely. Continental Shelf and Resources Division 3 Fisheries.
e. 57 . p.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__ philippines. under existing laws. contiguous zone and continental shelf) are well established under existing Philippine laws and customary int’l law. 1994 54 Garcia. territorial sea. M. and manage offshore/ocean resources based on the principle of sustainable development Marine Economy and Technology Promotion of a viable marine fisheries management program Maritime Security Enhance maritime security – a state wherein the country’s marine assets.un. the extended maritime jurisdictions of the Philippines (i. develop. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options. Retrieved on May 3. processing and distribution of strategic information supportive of the NMP NMP: 54 There is no obligation under the LOSC to redraw existing baselines. maritime practices. (2005).pdf.29 The succeeding table shows the Policy Statements and Goals of the Table 2 Policy Statements and Goals of the NMP National Territory Philippine Territory is defined and delineated. While the int’l recognition of the TOP limits remains an issue. none of which is invalidated by the LOSC. territorial integrity and coastal peace and order are protected. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow. New York. Develop and manage coastal resources within an integrated coastal zone management framework Develop and enhance national marine consciousness through a comprehensive information program Provision of continuous and adequate supply of energy Development of technological capabilities in the maritime sector Encourage the development of a marine research Program Adopt the “polluterspay” principle in ensuring the protection of the marine environment Ensure the high quality of maritime professional schools and other such institutions for training experts in maritime-related issues Promoting investments in marine areas Harnessing information technology to serve NMP goals Enhancing regional economic and technical cooperation in marine and ocean affairs Strengthening trade policies supportive of maritime issues Source: Compiled from the National Marine Policy . conserved and enhanced Promote and enhance maritime security as a key component of national security Provide a stable and peaceful socio-political and administrative environment in the country that fosters sustained profitability and growth for maritime industries Protect and defend the integrity of the Philippines’ marine resources Ensured preparedness for and effective response to natural calamities and manmade disasters Provide leadership and guidance in the proper and effective collection. 2007 at http://www. Marine Ecology Explore.
He also delved in part the significance of defining the extent of our national territory and the need of harmonizing our domestic laws with that of UNCLOS. Garcia also offered some institutional structure options to enhance interagency coordination and integrate oceans policy. Option 1. the paper concludes that “ocean policy coordination through an inter-ministerial body augurs well for integrated ocean management. The institutional structures options presented are as follows: 57 a. Ibid.p.” 55 It also recommended for the reestablishment of an inter-agency coordinative mechanism and asserts the need to address the following: 56 (1) the integration and defining of roles of the subnational development planning bodies in the national ocean policy planning.30 Aside from providing insights on what had happened and the experience gained of the government from the derailed implementation of the NMP through the CABCOM-MOA.. Finally.86-80. Ibid. He pointed out the problems and issues encountered in the process of implementation and discussed ways of overcoming them. and (2) the integration of ocean planning process into the national development planning. . CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making President Congress CABCOM-MOA Senate House of Representatives Committee on Rules Presidential Task Force on Ocean Affairs Chair: DND Vice-Chair: DA Ocean Affairs Caucus/ Ocean Affairs Committee Committee on Rules Ocean Affairs Caucus/ Ocean Affairs Committee Environment Protection Economy Management Team Team (DENR) (DOTC) Maritime Security Team (DILG) Figure 4 CABCOM-MOA Based Decision Making 55 56 57 Ibid.
Foreign Relations House Committee on Appropriations. Natural Resources. NEDA-Based Inter-Agency Council Office of the President Congress ARCDEV COUNCIL Cabinet level + NGO + LGU i ARCDEV Secretariat (IEC. Agriculture & Tourism Figure 5 LEDAC –Based Decision-Making System c. Economic Affairs. Transportation & Communications. Energy.31 b. Option 3. Option 2: LEDAC –Based Decision-Making System President Congress LEDAC Secretariat Ocean Affairs Sub-Committee Desk LEDAC Sub-Committee on Ocean Affairs NEDA NSC DENR DFA DOTC DND DILG DOT DOST OARS Netwrok NGO Coalition on Ocean Affairs Council of Coastal Towns & Cities Senate Committee on Environment. Coastal/Marine Environment Cluster Socio-Economic Cluster Maritime Safety and Security Cluster Territory and Foreign Affairs Cluster Special Projects Regional Development Councils Provincial/City/ Municipal/ Barangay Development Councils Figure 6 NEDA-Based Inter-Agency Council . Policy Review .
58 On the other hand.mil.mil. .32 g. the NMCC although co-located with HQ JFNZ is an independent agency that helps ensure that aircraft and ships available to the New Zealand Government. other government departments and agencies. New Zealand (NZ) Government Interagency Support New Zealand’s interagency set-up for maritime security could be considered as very simple and practical in nature.htm on February 2.nzdf. including the NZDF are put to best use to keep New Zealand safe from maritime threats ranging from terrorism. including information. This integrated structure also allows the headquarters to function as a single point of contact for HQNZDF. 2007. Retrieved from http://www.nzdf. HQ JFNZ is structured as an integrated headquarters organized on functional rather than Service environment lines. All staff in the headquarters supports both COMJFNZ and the three component commanders.nz/operations/govt-interagency-support. operational-level organization instead of the three Service operational command headquarters. A National Maritime Coordination Center (NMCC) is co-located with the Headquarters of Joint Force New Zealand (HQ JFNZ) and co-ordinates New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) support to other government agencies. drug trafficking to illegal fishing. It coordinates civilian use of maritime patrol and surveillance assets. This set up ensures a coordinated and optimized effectiveness of New Zealand's maritime 58 NZ Government Inter-agency Support.htm and http://www. and allied and other foreign operationallevel joint headquarters as well. The NMCC is jointly manned by civilian and military personnel. The headquarters is a joint (tri-Service). the Ministry of Fisheries and the New Zealand Defence Force.nz/operations/structure. including liaison officers from the New Zealand Customs Service.
economy. environment or foreign policy interests of New Zealand. Local Literature and Studies a. 59 The NMCC has three key purposes: 60 i. . 1994 creating the Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA). The primary function of the Committee is “to formulate practical and viable policies and addressing the various concerns which 59 60 Ibid. 2. To contribute to maritime domain awareness (MDA) in relation to risks in the marine environment that could impact on the sovereignty. It is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs with thirteen (13) other departments under the Committee. maritime resource management. National Marine Policy (NMP) The NMP of the Philippines was signed as Executive Order Nr 86 by then President Fidel V. To support the effective and efficient use of New Zealand's maritime patrol and surveillance assets. security. Ramos on July 12. Ibid.33 surveillance. To support and facilitate the effective use and accessibility of maritime-related information from multiple sources that supports the core business of government agencies. barrier law enforcement and barrier control activities. safety. iii. ii.
DND. Address the following priority concerns: extent of the national territory.p. DOTC. p. and DOT as members. Manila: Foreign Service Institute. . DOST. iv. DENR. and maritime security. 1995. NEDA. the NMP. DOF.34 affect the implementation of UNCLOS and other marine-related matters. and.7. Ibid. v.16. View coastal marine areas as a locus of community. protection of the marine ecology. DOE. DOLE. DOJ. iii. ecology and resources. Thus.. DILG. Emphasize the archipelagic nature of the Philippines in development planning. DBM. DA. NSC. the salient provisions of the NMP which the country adopt as national policy include the following: 62 i. The NMP advocates the establishment of a development model in consonance with the Philippines’ status as an archipelagic nation. 61 62 Department of Foreign Affairs. management of the marine economy and technology. ii. and Executive Secretary. DTI.” 61 CABCOM-MOA is composed of the secretaries of the DFA as chair. National Marine Policy. Coordinate and consult with concerned and Implement UNCLOS within the framework of affected sectors through the CABCOM-MOA.
The following form part of the security aspect of the NMP: 63 i. CABCOM-MOA exercises only coordinative and consultative functions over other agencies.35 The NMP should have provided an integrated policy planning and management framework in addressing the entire range of the country’s marine. Provide a stable and peaceful socio-political and administrative environment in the country that fosters sustained profitability and growth for maritime industries. Iii. However. 63 Ibid. It does not have the authority needed for the management and administration of our country’s maritime affairs. coastal. Ensure preparedness for and effective response to natural calamities and man-made disasters. pp. Promote and enhance maritime security as a key component of national security. 11-12. Furthermore. and ocean-related interests. it is clear from the policy that as far as interagency coordination is concerned. . iv. it could be noted that maritime security is given less priority. Protect and defend the integrity of the Philippines’ marine resources. ii.
to consult all concerned and affected sectors. p. Revaluing our Maritime heritage and Affirming the Unity of Land and Sea ArcDev is a study funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and jointly conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Marine Environment and Ibid. Manila: Foreign Service Institute. processing and distribution of strategic information supportive of the NMP. 1995.” 69 b. 6 68 Ibid. p. through the Cabinet Committee on Maritime and Ocean Affairs (CABCOM-MOA).6 Department of Foreign Affairs.36 v. 69 Encomienda. 16-17 May 2005 65 64 . 67 Ibid. The National Marine and Oceans Policy: Challenges and Opportunities. the NMP envisions for the Philippines “the development of comprehensive and coordinated national oceans policy” 67 with the concept of archipelagic development as its core “requiring a paradigm shift in national development thinking to sustainable economic development.. Encomienda laments that “the concept still needs to catch the attention of policy makers and that lack of material time and resources did not allow the full flowering of a visionary policy for Philippine ocean spaces.” 68 Unfortunately. p. 64 It is worth mentioning here that the NMP’s goals require “the concerted effort of government agencies. Provide leadership and guidance in the proper and effective collection. Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. 66 Ibid. Secretary-General of the defunct CABCOMMOA.” 66 According to Ambassador Alberto Encomienda. 12.” 65 It further mandated the Committee to “continually update the NMP and make it more responsive to the national interests. A.A. National Marine Policy.
Inc. Manila. and lack of public awareness and participation in marine concerns. contradictions. There were three (3) options presented as follows: Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Marine Environment and Resources Foundation. pp.. proliferation of agencies tasked with law enforcement. Inc. and governance practices. confusion over National and Local Government responsibilities for marine-related management. The in-depth study noted that national management policies in the coastal and marine areas of the Philippines are characterized by lack of coordination. sectoral fragmentation. 70 ArcDev seeks to find an acceptable institutional mechanism for coordinating and implementing the proposed framework. ArcDev aims to establish a Sustainable Archipelagic Development Framework that would serve as an implementing mechanism and in harmonizing development efforts of government agencies though an integrated coastal and marine policy. power. jurisdictional confusion and conflicts. (MERFI). gaps. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Philippine Archipelagic Development. and overlaps in laws and policies. 30-31 70 . structural obstacles: culture. ineffective system of sanctions for policy violations.37 Resources Foundation.
committee on Bio-Diversity Sub-committee on the Atmosphere Sub-Committee on Water Resources Sub-Committee on Land Resources Sub-Committee on Marine and Ocean Resources Regional Development Councils Committee on Strengthening the Role of Major Groups Committee on the Means of Implementing Agenda 21 Sub-Committee on Financing A t Sub-Committee on Science&Technolo Sub-Committee on Information & Education Sub-Committee on Legal & Institutional Provincial/City/Munici pal/ Barangay Development Councils Figure 7 ArcDev Established on the Basis of PCSD Structure Since ArcDev is a planning framework that encourages multi-stakeholder. consensus-building process. ArcDev can either be subsumed under the Committee on the Conservation and Management of Resources for Development (CCMRD). ArcDev established on the basis of Philippine Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) structure. as one of the sub-committees. the agency mandated to mainstream Sustainable Development (SD) thinking into the national and local development and decision-making processes.. 53 . 71 Office of the President PCSD Secretariat Committee on Social and Economic Dimensions Committee on the Conservation and Management of Resources for Development Sub. as a Sub-committee on 71 Ibid. p. this model may fit into the existing structure of the PCSD.38 Option 1.
.S. G.39 Marine and Oceans Resources. ARCDEV Council Based on Expanded PCSD Structure Office of the President Phil Council for SustainableArchipelagic Devt. (PCSAD) Secretariat Committee on Coastal and Marine SocioEcon Concerns Committee on the Conservation & Management of Resources Committee on Maritime Safety and Security Committee on Territorial and Jurisdictional Concerns Committee on Means of Implementing Agenda 21 and ArcDev Agenda Committee on Strengthening the Role of Major Groups Sub-committee on Population Sub-committee on Bio-Diversity Sub-committee on the Atmosphere Sub-Committee on Internal Waters Sub-Committee on Land Resources Sub-Committee on Coastal. Statement at the PN Maritime Symposium 2005. Marine and Ocean Resources Sub-Committee on Financing Arrangements Sub-committee on Livelihood Sub-committee on Infrastructure Sub-committee on Energy Sub-Committee on Science & Technology Sub-Committee on Info and Education Regional Development Councils Sub-Committee on Legal and Institutional Arrangements Sub-committee on Industry Provincial/City Municipal/ Barangay Development Councils Figure 8 ARCDEV Council Based on Expanded PCSD Structure 72 Jacinto. ArcDev: A Framework for Sustainable Archipelagic Development. 16-17 May 2005 . 72 Option2. or PCSD itself can be expanded to become a Philippine Council for Sustainable Archipelagic Development.
Since ArcDev shall be sharing with the resources of PCSD.40 This model however. therefore an expansion of PCSD itself may be required. and territorial issues and foreign affairs. 73 Ibid. The current PCSD structure does not encompass certain identified ArcDev concerns such as maritime safety and security. 73 Option 3:ArcDev Council with independent Regional Management Board Office of the President Congress ARCDEV COUNCIL (Cabinet Level + LGU) ARCDEV CSO/Private Sector Secretariat ARCDEV Secretariat Coastal/Marine Environment Cluster Socio-Economic Cluster Maritime Safety and Security Cluster Territory and Foreign Affairs Cluster Special Projects Regional ArcDev Management Board Regional Development Councils Provincial/City/Municipal/ Barangay Development Councils People’s Organizations Other Local Stakeholders Figure 9 ArcDev Council with Independent Regional Management Board The proposed structure would have the same features as Option 1 up to the Advisory committee level. . it may have to compete with other equally critical issues handled by PCSD. has several disadvantages. The difference lies in the operational structure.
ArcDev posit that such a mechanism must encompass the following. Whatever mechanism would be implemented. Option 3 proposes the establishment of a regional ArcDev management body based on the six marine ecosystems. and resolution of conflicts among the various agencies and different levels of government involved. and the promotion of various programs.. Ibid. 76” 74 75 76 Ibid.41 While Option 1 makes use of existing administrative regional clusters. 75 c. Government however. the synchronization of. namely: “the design and implementation of an integrated archipelagic development plan (as part of the MTPDP). Its mission is “to provide centralized maritime surveillance and response in the waters of Southern Philippines in order to facilitate the movement of desirable people and goods and prevent the entry and exit of dangerous goods and lawless elements. the harmonization and monitoring of sectoral plans and programs. The Coastwatch South Initiative: A proposed Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Sulu and Celebes Seas Coaswatch South is a Philippine Navy (PN) concept as a mechanism for regulating the use of the sea in Southern Philippines in pursuit of the country’s maritime interests. p. 74 ArcDev is convinced that it is the way forward towards sustainable development. has still to act on any of the options presented. 48 Philippine Navy Concept Paper on Coastwatch South Initiative . including multi-sectoral (GO-NGO-Private sector) partnership programs.
Situational awareness in our maritime domain can be achieved through the gathering of timely and relevant information and the establishment of a reliable database. piracy. smuggling and other transnational crimes. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). and the determination and implementation of appropriate response that result in successful interdictions. the location and assessment of the threats. and analysis of information. sharing. An important information source is An essential feature of this architecture is the fusion. The conceptual framework of Coaswatch South is shown in the next page: . surveillance. Inter-agency maritime patrol operations with these agencies will be forged to have unity of effort in safeguarding the country’s waters from acts of terrorism. and the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). Pooling of existing capabilities and integrating capability development plans among these agencies are therefore necessary. the PN will establish strong links with other government agencies involved in providing maritime patrol. Successful interdictions then lead to the apprehension of security threats and their eventual prosecution. cueing or prioritization.42 The concept recognizes that the foundation of maritime security is situational awareness. These agencies include the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). In operationalizing the above concept.
Embedded within the central command and control facility is a unified information sharing and coordinating center manned by personnel from participating agencies with the primary task of developing a common operating picture and with the capability of providing information that meets the specific requirements of various maritime security agencies. At the strategic level.43 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK Situational Awareness Legal Authority and Jurisdiction Information Surveillance Territorial Security Responsive Decision-Making Architecture Fusion & Sharing Cueing Locate / Assess Interdiction Inter-agency and International Cooperation Interdiction Capabilities Apprehend Prosecute Figure 10 Coastwatch South Conceptual Framework Due to the expected involvement of several players from different departments. an interagency threat assessment coordinating group shall be established which shall be tasked to provide the Coast Watch South operational commander the specific tasking based on a . the organization of Coast Watch South envisions a centralized command and control facility which shall serve as the hub for coordinating maritime surveillance and response operations.
The Coast Watch South operational commander reports regularly to a high-level committee to provide the strategic leadership a visibility of the conduct and results of maritime operations in the Southern Philippines. The result of the risk assessment methodology shall be the basis for the prioritization of threats subject to surveillance and response operations. The AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch: An Assessment Samaco. a Regular Class 38 of NDCP in 2003. This high-level committee could be the existing National Security Core Group chaired by the National Security Adviser. assessed in his study the readiness of the AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch (AFPIMW) to 77 (Composite Manning from all agencies) Maritime Information-Sharing and Coordinating Center (Composite Manning from all agencies) BoC MARINA PPA BIQHS OTHER AGENCIES Ibid. Shown below is the proposed organizational structure of Coastwatch South: 77 High-Level Committee (National Security Core Group) ITACG CWS Command AFP PCG PNP-MG BFAR BID Figure 11 Coastwatch South Functional Structure d.44 common risk assessment methodology that will be developed. .
L. G. R. iii. There is inadequate equipage for maritime defense of air. His study revealed Samaco. ii. 78 The interagency linkages are not coordinated e. The AFP’s Integrated Maritime Watch: An Assessment (Unpiblished Thesis. Problems and Solutions to Inter-agency Cooperation Identified and Proposed by Three Groups of Stakeholders in Curbing Criminality At-Sea in Manila Bay and Surrounding Coastal Areas Corpus’ study focused on identifying the problems encountered in inter-agency cooperation in curbing criminality at Manila Bay which covers the National Capital Region (NCR) and the surrounding coastal areas of Bulacan. land. There is significant difference in the perception of the six groups of respondents as regards adequacy and effectiveness of the AFPIMW within the EEZ and municipal waters. iv. with each other.45 effectively negate security threats to Philippine territorial integrity within the municipal waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). National Defense College of the Philippines: Quezon City 78 . and sea surveillance system of the AFPIMW within the municipal waters and EEZ. There is ineffective existing equipage for maritime defense of air. Cavite and Pampanga. land. Bataan. (2003). and sea surveillance system of the AFPIMW from the municipal waters to the country’s EEZ. His findings revealed the following: i.
Aguilos examined how can ocean management and development may be enhanced through reforms in the current institutional framework with the end in view of achieving sustainable development. planning and implementation. Ocean Law and Policy Series (pp.M. and strengthening the integration. She is quick to add however. 79 . and surveillance activities of government agencies. integration of the coastwatch system with other maritime activities of government agencies. The proposed solutions to the problems identified as a result of the study include extensive information campaign as regards implementation of laws and interagency cooperation. Designing an Institutional Structure for Ocean Governance: Options for the Philippines In M. that reforms in governance and improvements in ocean management are difficult in the Philippine setting.). Manila: Institute of International Legal Studies: University of the Philippines Law Center. coordination. Quezon City 80 Aguilos. Problems and Solutions to Inter-agency Cooperation Identified and Proposed by Three Groups of Stakeholders (Unpublished Thesis). and organizational. p. inadequate funds or logistics. M. She conceded that the issues and concerns of ocean governance is “far more complex to be addressed solely by institutional structure solutions. National Defense College of the Philippines. (2001). Aguilos (Ed. The focus therefore of the study is on the aspects of organizational structure that are likely to promote comprehensiveness. aggregation. She also explored organizational design options for ocean governance that may lead to an integrated national policy making.” 80 Corpus Jr. Designing an Institutional Structure for Ocean Governance: Options for the Philippines In this study. 67-122). 68. (1998). and consistency in national oceans policy. N. 79 f.M. management and administrative matters.46 interagency collaboration problems such as uncoordinated policy implementation and operations.
marine economy and technology management. those in the program level or (operational). 3 and 4 of her study.47 In analyzing the government’s system in relation to ocean resources and environment she offered an operational framework for study based on the NMP’s governance objectives of marine ecology protection. maritime security. and those in the coastal and marine areas or (tactical level). Chapter 3. and objectives. Realign institutional structure according to clear goals making which are: 81 81 Ibid. institutions at all levels.95-97 . enumerated the institutions relevant to ocean management and development based on their administrative and legal mandates. iv.. v. Three institutional levels are discussed which include those in the general system level or (strategic level). and determination of the national territory. beyond sectoral interests. and security. Chapter 2 is basically an overview of the country’s state of ecology. The analysis was discussed in Chapters 2. iii. ii. economy. objectives and strategies. Address need for greater flexibility for activities Improve executive-legislative linkages. pp. Chapter 4 presents some institutional structure options that can be adopted for the country taking into consideration the state of ocean governance in the country and its capability to respond to the country’s demand for ocean structure. Aguilos proposed seven (7) strategies for ocean policy i. Install mechanisms for better communication among Review goals.
This is to be complemented by a presidential Task Force on Coastal and Marine Affairs to coordinate planning and implementation in all levels of government. vii. policy development.. In order to implement the ocean policies. pp. Aguilos offered three (3) institutional design options for the country: “One is the CABCOM-MOA Based Decision-making System based on a situation where the creation of new structures is not feasible in both legislative and executive branches for national policy making and planning. common objectives. The second option is to harness the LEDAC System for ocean governance by creating a Sub-Committee for Ocean Affairs as the primary body to recommend and coordinate national policies and plans for the oceans. ii. The third option is a “Legislative-Executive 82 Ibid. Task forces as control mechanisms for uniform interpretation of policies.48 vi. Provide evaluation and feedback mechanism. National government – local government relations: coordination not imposition.97-98 . Finally. iii. This is to be complemented at the planning and implementation levels by a network of Ocean Affairs Committees nationwide. Aguilos likewise offered the following strategies: 82 Improve national-local government coordination in Synchronize activities of government agencies for i.
BFAR. Synthesis of Related Literatures and Studies The reviewed literatures and studies both foreign and local are definitely related to the conduct of this study of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security. .49 Council for Ocean Affairs” policy making system based on a scenario where existing institutions can be open to more innovations.. “ultimately. It also showed the increasing role of civilian government agencies have to perform alongside the armed services in ensuring the security of the state. This is to be complemented by a tri-task force planning and implementing and coordination framework that will be coordinated at the national level by a National Secretariat for Ocean Affairs headed by a Secretary –General for Ocean Affairs. p. they provided invaluable insights to the researcher in the development of a possible mechanism or framework for interagency cooperation between the PCG. 111 Ibid. Undoubtedly. The interagency concept 83 84 Ibid. The foreign sources revealed that there is indeed a growing recognition of the need for interagency cooperation or coordination in addressing varied threats in the maritime environment. it will be up to the decision-makers to determine the shape of the institutional framework that will be considered appropriate for ocean governance in the Philippines. and PN suited for Philippine setting in addressing the different maritime security threats.” 84 B. This is so because of the broader concept of maritime security today than it was before the 9/11 incident.” 83 The study concluded that. PNP-MARIG.
the US is continuously improving from its present interagency set up. Interagency cooperation should filter down to operational and tactical levels. Need for maritime strategy and national ocean’s policy. the Philippines has yet to adopt a mechanism or framework for interagency cooperation for maritime security. Below is summary of the essential elements of an interagency cooperation as proposed from the foreign literature: 1. the foreign literatures advocated interagency coordination or cooperation in maritime security context as the way to move forward which a government cannot just ignore. Meantime. 4. 2. Improve maritime awareness and capacity. 3. A common factor in interagency arrangement noted is the presence of a body.50 presented enormous challenges to be successful but it is one thing governments cannot do without. committee or agency that provides the direction of other agencies in addressing different maritime security threats. The Canadian experience provides a good model while the Australian experience worked but in a different coordinative arrangement. . One lead/coordinating agency at the ministerial level should be designated in addressing varied threats in the maritime environment. Although several models are proposed. In sum.
51 5. The need for a joint national civil – military doctrine for interagency operation for maritime operations
On the local sources, there were already some proposals but the appropriate model has yet to be selected and implemented. It only shows that there is already an increasing awareness of the importance of interagency cooperation to address more effectively our maritime security concerns. The interagency problems such as lack of coordination, overlapping of functions and jurisdictions, uncoordinated plans and programs, fragmented approach to maritime security, and spreading of scarce resources were pointed out as a result of an integrated framework for interagency cooperation which as discussed, could be avoided if the concerned agencies are going to work as one in an integrated and coordinated manner.
Below is a summary of the recommendations from the above literature to make interagency cooperation work: 1. The promulgation of an overarching national ocean’s policy.
Designation of one lead agency at the ministerial level.
The need for a mechanism or framework for interagency
cooperation to integrate government agencies’ efforts.
Jointness in information sharing, patrols, exercises, use of
assets, liaison officers.
52 5. 6. assets are needed. 7. The need for coordinated policy implementation. Need for executive-legislative support and linkage. Adequate funds and logistics support including additional
C. Gaps to Filled by the Study Owing to the presence of several proposals or models already presented for interagency cooperation in addressing the maritime security concerns of the country, this study aims to further fill in the gaps between the strategic level and the operational and tactical levels of interagency cooperation. It was noted in the review of related literature that the interagency cooperation between agencies at the strategic level seemed to be adequate. However, in the process of implementation or execution, the desired outcome falls short of what is expected. There were difficulties encountered in achieving a truly integrated interagency effort at the operational and tactical levels to include factors such as absence of lead agency and clear policy, lack of coordination mechanisms, inadequate equipage and resources, lack of jointness, civil-military relations and perceptions between the agencies directly involved in maritime security operations like the BFAR, PCG, PNP-MARIG, and PN. This is one focus of this study in the hope of filling in the said gaps by surveying the perceptions of the personnel of the above agencies at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Further, this study also endeavors to look at the ways that facilitate the making of a framework for interagency cooperation to work in addressing the varied maritime security threats of the country.
This chapter presents the procedures to find answers to the research problem and specific questions to reinforce the outcome of the study. It consist of six (6) component parts namely: the Research Design; Data Collection Techniques; Data Gathering Instruments; Respondents/Unit Analysis; Locale of the Study; and Statistical Treatment of Data. These components are discussed in the following sections:
A. Method of Research The descriptive method of research is used in studying the concept of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security. It is used to analyze current conditions, practices and situations in addressing maritime security concerns such as maritime terrorism, piracy, transnational threats, foreign intrusions, illegal fishing, maritime disasters and marine pollution. In addition, the present capabilities of government agencies with sea-going assets, coordinating mechanisms or agreements are also analyzed using the same method. Lastly, this research method is also applied in examining the proposed interagency models of some policy experts including that of other countries to determine their viability to Philippine setting. Since this study is concerned with the present conditions or status of interagency arrangements between agencies concerned, the descriptive method of research is the most appropriate method to use.
the personnel of the agencies in these areas are expected to be well-trained and well versed in the issues and challenges of interagency coordination as they deal both with policy and operational concerns. C. Likewise. As can be shown on Table 3. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). The respondents for the survey included officers from the Headquarters. operational and tactical levels of maritime security operations. The universe of the survey is concentrated on the agencies concerned which are the PN. Respondents (or Unit Analysis) In conducting the survey. they have experienced being deployed at the tactical level of maritime operations prior to their shore assignments.54 B. PNP-MARIG. Philippine Fleet (PF). This is to be able to get the perceptions on interagency cooperation of those in the policy/strategic. PN) as well as their main operating units. The distribution of the survey participants are shown on Table 3. Philippine Navy (HPN). PNP-MARIG and BFAR. PCG. BFAR. Locale of the Study The study is limited within the geographical area of the National Capital Region and Cavite. and PNP-MARIG. the purposive random sampling procedure was used. the combined number of respondents from the HPN and the Philippine Fleet comprise the majority of the respondents followed by the respondents from the PCG. These places host the national headquarters of the different maritime security agencies (BFAR. . In many ways. PCG. Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG) and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR).
Since the distribution reflects the size of the organization of each surveyed agency. it can then be concluded that the responses of the sample can be used as basis of information to meet the objectives of this study. A section of the senior officers and civilians were also sampled by the survey. Half of the sampled individuals belong to the rank of Lieutenant Junior Grade and Lieutenant Senior Grade followed by Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders. Table 4 Rank Distribution of Respondents Unit HPN Philippine Fleet PCG PNP-MG BFAR TOTAL Percentage O2-O3 18 35 10 7 0 70 50% O4-O5 10 19 12 6 0 47 34% 13 9% O6-O7 2 6 3 2 0 Others 5 0 0 0 5 10 7% Total 35 60 25 15 5 140 100% .55 Table 3 Number of Respondents from Different Agencies Agency / Unit HPN Philippine Fleet PCG PNP-MG BFAR TOTAL No. of Respondents 35 60 25 15 5 140 Percentage 25% 43% 18% 11% 4% 100% Rank 2 1 3 4 5 The distribution of respondents is representative of the size of each of the maritime security agencies considered for the study. The respondents were also distributed according to the rank of the samples. Table 4 shows the distribution of respondents according to their rank.
the variety of experience that the sample can contribute to this study is also evident on the distribution of respondents according to their length of service shown in Table 5. Table 5 Length of Service Profile Length of Service 5 yrs below 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 Total Agency / Unit PHILFLT PCG PNPMG 4 7 7 11 4 2 35 25 22 6 4 3 0 60 8 14 3 0 0 0 25 1 2 2 6 1 3 15 Total BFAR 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 38 47 20 22 8 5 140 27% 34% 14% 16% 6% 4% 100% Percentage HPN D. Survey Questionnaire. It is also indicative of the extent or variety of experience that the sample has in maritime security operations. The survey questionnaires are structured with a four-point scale to allow the respondents four (4) choices in expressing . A great majority of the respondents has experience ranging from six (6) to twenty (20) years. Research Instruments The following data gathering instruments are used for this study: 1. This means that the many of the respondents are experienced in maritime security operations. With an even distribution of junior and more senior officers. Moreover. the perceptions of the respondents can then be used as an input for this study.56 The distribution of sampled individuals for this study is also representative of the normal situation within each organization where there are more junior officers and lesser number of officers as the rank goes higher.
Headquarters Philippine Fleet c. Data Gathering Procedure The method of data collection used is the normative survey. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources MCS Division 2. Headquarters.57 their perceptions.Maritime Group e. Document Analysis. The questionnaire was distributed to the officers assigned at the following locations: a. and the like of people in . and information on the subject of study. The comments and recommendations of the test sample for the questionnaire were noted by the researcher and the required changes were made. This involves the thorough examination and analysis of relevant documents. Structured Interview. Headquarters. Philippine Coast Guard d. The questionnaire was developed based on the identified gaps and the objectives of this study. A draft of the survey questionnaire was distributed initially among the navy student officers of CGSC Class 48 in order to test the clarity of the questionnaire. records. E. 3. Headquarters Philippine Navy b. It is used to collect data about the opinions. Relevant questions to the study are prepared beforehand. ideas and insights from respondents. perceptions. Philippine National Police . This is to elicit information. attitudes.
. Used to determine the number of respondents in each stratification level and establish the homogeneity of the population groups (e. The following statistical tools are used to measure the data obtained from the surveys: 1. and summarized for analysis and interpretation and presented in Chapter IV of this paper. 2. The results are analyzed. the normative survey is the most appropriate method in gathering the data. Statistical Treatment of Data The perceptions of the respondents as a result of the survey are carefully recorded. Where TWM is: TWM = ∑ (fs) n Where: f = frequency of response s = scale of response n = total number of respondents . ranks. Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). length of service). tabulated. This is used to measure the level of perceptions of the respondents on the concept of interagency cooperation in addressing maritime security concerns.g. Total Weighted Mean (TWM). organized and interpreted. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).58 the targeted concerned agencies with sea-going assets like the Philippine Navy (PN). F. Simple Frequency Count. major service. Since the present research is a status study.
49 2. The obtained TWM is provided with the following descriptive value for purposes of evaluation and interpretation as shown in table below: Table 6 Range and Descriptive Evaluation (DE) Used TWM Range 1.00 Descriptive Evaluation (DE) Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Disagree (D) Strongly Disagree (SD) .75 .00 .24 3.50 .74 1.59 The TWM obtained by the survey was arranged based on its range and a descriptive evaluation was assigned in each range.188.8.131.52 -4.
the table below depicts the methodology used in this study. capabilities of the Design Analysis laws and other agencies directly issuances involved in addressing Historical these maritime Design Structured Interview security concerns? What are the existing Descriptive Documentary Official documents.Design Analysis agency cooperation Survey Questionnaire particularly in the Purposive conduct of maritime Sampling security operations? Survey Descriptive Statistics (TWM) Focused Interview What options are Descriptive Documentary Structured Interview available that can be Design Analysis adopted for interSurvey Questionnaire agency cooperation Quantitative between and among Analysis Descriptive Statistics the agencies involved (TWM) in addressing Focused maritime security Interview threats? Purposive Random Sampling . linkages.60 In summary. agreements. Table 7 Summary of Research Design and Methodology Used for the Study Research Problems Design Used Data Gathering Research Instruments Technique Used Used What are the threats Descriptive Documentary Reports and journals to our maritime Design Analysis security that the Survey Questionnaire country is facing Purposive today? Sampling Structured Interview Survey What are the Descriptive Documentary Official documents. Design Analysis laws and other or frameworks in issuances which these agencies are coordinating their Structured Interview efforts? What are the issues Descriptive Documentary Structured Interview and concerns to inter.
marine pollution. Maritime Security Threats While the Philippines. illegal fishing. The result of survey (Table 8) conducted was used to determine whether maritime agencies have a clear understanding of the maritime security threats. piracy or armed robbery against ships. is naturally endowed with rich marine resources. . foreign intrusion. ANALYSIS and INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS A.29) that the Philippines confronts maritime security threats and that maritime security is a significant component of national security (TWM of 1.18). the respondents strongly agree (TWM of 1.25 respectively).61 CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION.68) the PN and BFAR respondents simply agreed to the statement (WM of 2. maritime terrorism. This include transnational crimes. some differences on the level of perception can be found on whether the government has a clear understanding of the threats to maritime security. and maritime disasters. Generally. The questionnaire delved into the level of understanding of maritime security threats.21 and 2. as a maritime nation. However. While the PNPMARIG and the PCG strongly agreed that the government has a clear understanding of the threats to maritime security (WM of 1.67 and 1. it is equally faced with a myriad of maritime security threats.
35 1. Foreign intrusions (poaching) d.95 1.21 2.47 1. drug/human trafficking) c.22 1.22 1.35 1.15 2.44 1. 4.00 1. The country is beset with maritime security threats today that need to be addressed.42 1.18 1.23 1.52 SA SA SA SA SA SA SA . The government is taking necessary steps to adequately address our maritime security threats. Illegal Fishing (blast fishing.75 1. trawling) e. Piracy/Armed Robbery Against Ships g. The following are the maritime security threats: a.93 1.78 1.30 1. 5.40 1.56 1.45 1.84 1. muro-ami.50 1.00 1.22 1.24 1.25 2.00 1.40 1. Maritime security is a significant component of our national security.17 1.15 1. 2.25 1.25 1.41 1.28 1.75 1. The government has a clear understanding of the threats to our maritime security. Marine Pollution f.62 Table 8 Perception on Maritime Security Threats Maritime Security Threats 1.63 1.92 1.25 1.12 1.16 1.44 1. 3.29 1.33 1.44 1.67 1. Maritime Disasters HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE 1.44 1.20 1.52 1.90 SA SA A A 1. Transnational Crimes (arms/goods smuggling.44 1.33 1.24 1.87 1.49 1.56 1. Maritime Terrorism b.38 1.30 1.50 1.26 1.50 1.57 1.68 1.16 1.33 1.44 1.
44 and 1.90). while the agencies may differ in perception on how much government understands the threats to maritime security. This difference in exposure and extent of tasks may cause the agencies to differ on perception as to what level of understanding the government has with respect to the threats of maritime security. Both agencies are also regarded as the main maritime law enforcement agencies in the Philippines.63 The difference can be explained by the nature of the tasks and exposure of the PNP-MARIG and the PCG with respect to maritime security operations as against the two other agencies. Since maritime concerns are overshadowed by the priority in . However. the respondents all agree that the government is taking the necessary steps to address maritime security threats (TWM 1.95) among the agencies sampled. Thus. The PCG and PNP-MARIG both have adequate presence in both the land-based component of maritime security (ports) and the offshore areas. Interestingly. it can be said that the PNP-MARIG and the PCG are directly performing more maritime security tasks than the two other agencies. the respondents from the PN have the highest computed weighted means (WM 2. BFAR relies mainly on the PNP-MARIG and PCG as its enforcement arm and the PN do not have a significant presence in the other aspects of maritime security such as ports and harbor security or marine environmental protection. This can be explained by the unique experience of the PN as a maritime force within a larger organization with priority on internal security operations (ISO).
64 internal security operations, it is normal for the PN respondents to view government action on maritime security to be inadequate.
Among the identified maritime security threats, the respondents also are unanimous in strongly agreeing that transnational crimes (TWM of 1.23), illegal fishing (TWM of 1.28), foreign intrusions (TWM of 1.33), marine pollution (TWM of 1.41), Maritime terrorism (TWM of 1.42), piracy and armed robbery against ships (TWM of 1.49) and maritime disasters (TWM of 1.52) composed the significant maritime security threats the country is facing today. Corollary, the findings of the survey are corroborated by the data on maritime security threats obtained from various documents and sources. These are shown in the succeeding tables: 1. Transnational Crimes Table 9 Goods Smuggling Incidents (01 Jan – 31 Dec 2006) Month Jan Feb No. of Inc 20 24 Pers Involved 46 51 Ves Involved 25 36 38 39 49 47 59 48 69 48 31 40 529 Total Value P94.495M 83.76 81.588 60.906 92.008 38.362 102.56 223.956 126.09 163.689 86.114 119.02 P1,272.548M
Mar 28 48 Apr 33 41 May 39 56 Jun 24 52 Jul 41 66 Aug 42 50 Sep 51 80 Oct 45 60 Nov 26 38 Dec 22 41 Total 395 629 Source: ON2 Yearend Report (2006)
65 On drugs smuggling incidents along the shorelines of the archipelago, the most prominent incidents were the seizure of 503 kgs of shabu in Real, Quezon and 350 kgs of shabu in San Narciso Zambales in recent years. 85 Figure 12 below shows the drug smuggling landing points and suspected landing points in the country.
Figure 12 Drug Smuggling Landing Points in the Country
Batanes Cagayan Ilocos Sur Pangasinan Zambales Aurora Quezon Mindoro
Suspected Landing Points
Masbate Palawan Sorsogon South Cotabato Davao Sulu Tawi Tawi
Source: PDEA Briefing (2005)
PDEA Briefing (2005)
2. Illegal Fishing Table 10 Reported Illegal Fishing Incidents for CY 2000 - 2003 Year No. of Inc. Illegally Caught Fish Value (in Tons Million pesos) 9.30 132.90 12.26 175.00 268.00 3,828.50 9,775.81 139.65 10,065.37 4,276.05
509 2000 595 2001 2,681 2002 1,416 2003 TOTAL 5,201 Source: ON2 Briefing (2004)
3. Foreign Intrusion Table 11 Incidents of Foreign Intrusions (Poaching) Year PN Apprehensions Nr of No. of Inc. Vessels No. of No. of Vessels No. of Apprehensions Apprehended Persons Apprehended 489 862 10 14 86 56 133 6 10 91 104 221 7 16 234 87 272 10 14 103 68 262 10 20 142 804 1,750 43 74 656
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 TOTAL
Source: ON2 Briefing (2005)
00 7. Maritime Terrorism Table 12 Maritime Terrorism Incidents Year 2002 Incidents Bombing of Our Lady Mediatrix Sasa Wharf Bombing Bombing of Superferry 14 Bombing of MV Dona Ramona Location of Misamis Occidental Davao Manila Bay Lamitan.010.67 4.00 Killed 5 13 20 15 53 Wounded 2 8 14 7 31 Missing 25 20 44 4 93 . PN Briefing (2005) 5.000. Basilan 2003 2005 Source: OSS.500.00 1. 000. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Table 13 Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Nr of Victims 2000 46 217 2001 40 193 2002 51 227 2003 33 213 TOTAL 120 850 Source: ON2 Briefing (2004) YEAR Nr of Inc Estimated Value 214.00 6.00 15.000.000.739.000.
transnational crimes and illegal fishing got the highest weighted means (TWM 1. piracy and maritime disaster. compared with the threats of maritime terrorism.28). The survey results on the maritime threats can have the following interpretations: a.23 and 1. The perception of the respondents points to the fact that threats are . The threats to the country’s maritime security are real and far reaching. the weighted mean obtained by each of these threats are also indicative of their likelihood of occurrence.68 6. 1990 -1996 On the result of perception surveyed from the respondents. Maritime Disasters Table 14 Maritime Accident Report Type of Accident Aground Drifted/Engine Trouble Fire Collision Capsized Sank Missing Rammed Flooding TOTAL 1990 104 61 10 27 87 117 50 0 0 456 1991 27 29 10 5 39 28 17 0 0 155 1992 26 30 16 13 44 51 16 0 0 196 1993 26 27 11 12 41 45 11 0 0 173 1994 23 24 18 13 37 35 13 0 0 163 1995 58 13 23 17 33 37 0 0 0 181 1996 19 9 6 5 32 35 0 10 3 119 Source: MARINA. Thus.
b. the MCS vessels of BFAR are operated by the local governments or the PNP-MARIG as they lack personnel from their office to man these vessels. The following are their capabilities: 1. The more prevalent and persistent threats remain those that have the highest percentage of occurrences within the country’s maritime territory and jurisdiction such as illegal fishing and transnational crimes. These vessels are also augmented by several indigenous watercraft through their “Bantay-Dagat” Program composed of the local fisherfolks. . They provide BFAR personnel onboard these vessels though when operations at sea are conducted. These are the only agencies with floating assets namely: Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) BFAR has fourteen (14) Monitoring. there are only four (4) agencies that have the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters. Philippine Navy (PN) and the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG).69 prevalent and that the government is viewed as the primary institution that has to address this concern. Control and Surveillance (MCS) vessels deployed throughout the archipelago as shown in Table 15. However. Capabilities of Agencies Directly Involved in Maritime Security Altogether. B. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG).
Lianga Bay. City. Divilican Bay. Lagonoy Gulf. Tapiantana Group. Ragay Gulf and EEZ Tacloban City San Pedro Bay. Zambales Area. Occidental Mindoro. Surigao Strait. Coron Bay. and South China Sea Port of Baler Baler Bay.70 Table 15 BFAR Assets Vessel Name MCS 3001 MCS 3002 Home Port Cagayan River. Cariaga Bay. Aparri Palawan Areas of Responsibility MCS 3003 MCS 3004 MCS 3005 MCS 3006 MCS 3007 MCS 3008 MCS 3009 MCS 3010 MCS 1011 MCS 1102 MCS 1103 Babuyan Channel. Bay and Taytay Bay Palawan . Philippine Sea and EEZ Tilik Port. Paluan. Palanan Bay. Polilio Strait. Lamon Bay. Samar Sea and Sogod Bay Cebu Cebu Strait. Visayan Sea. Burdeous Aurora Bay. Manila Bay. all coastal waters of Zamboanga Port Peninsula. Basilan Strait. Narvacan. Albay Gulf. Masbate Pass. Lubang Municipalities of Mamburao. Batangas. Bashi Channel and EEZ Honday Bay. Leyte Gulf. Pangutanan Group. Moro Gulf. Casiguran Sound. Dinagat Sound and EEZ Davao. Burias Pass. Lubang Mindoro Waters. Subuguey Bay. Bohol Sea. Matarinao Bay. Tanon Strait and Guimaras Strait Liminangcong Malampaya Sound. Island Bay. Bislig Bay. Sibutu Group. Palawan Passage. Tubbataha Reef. San Jose. Dasol Bay. Subic Bay. Mayo Bay. Dumaran Channel. Busuanga Water. Mindoro Strait and EEZ Tacloban Eastern Samar seaboard. Balintang Channel. Bangui Bay. Linapacan Strait. Tawi-tawi Bay. Helm Bay. Poro point. Imuruan and Taytay.Sulu Sea. Luzon Strait. Calbayog Waters. Port Complex Cateel Bay. Batanes Bashi Channel. Camotes Sea. Laoag. Cavili Island. Cuyo West Pass. East Sulu Sea. Currimao. Cabugao Bay. Bacuit Bay. Balintang Channel. Scarborough Shoal. Inner Sound. Cagayan Island. Sual Pangasinan Basco. Pasaleng Bay La Union Sual and EEZ Port. San Antonio Bay. Dalia Fish Davao Gulf. Luzon Strait. and EEZ Zamboanga City Zamboanga Vicinities. Cape San Jose. Green Island Bay. Sarangani Bay and EEZ San Fernando Lingayen Gulf. Baculin Bay. Babuyan Channel. Mindoro Strait and EEZ Cavite City Cavite. Apo West Pass.
At present. Toril Baculin Bay and Cateel Bay Source: BFAR Briefing (2006) 2. Port Daliao. there are fifty four (54) Coast Guard Stations and 195 Coast Guard Detachments operating in various ports nationwide. and undertake other activities in support of the mission of the DOTC. Its floating assets are shown in Table 16. PCG has 3. safeguard the marine environment and resources. Table 16 Status of PCG Assets OPNL LOPNL 4 3 6 4 21 39 0 TYPE SAR Vessel 35-Meter Patrol Vessel 30-Meter Surveillance vessels 7-Meter Surveillance Vessel Small Watercraft Total NOPNL 1 4 10 15 TOTAL 4 4 10 4 31 53 Source: PCG Briefing (2006) 3.849 uniformed and civilian personnel manning Coast Guard offices. Mayo Bay.71 MCS 1104 Davao City Fish Davao Gulf. enforce all applicable maritime laws. Operating Units are deployed in ten (10) Coast Guard Districts along with their respective stations and detachments. Samal Island. Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) The mission of the Philippine Coast Guard is to promote safety of life and property at sea. Pujuda Bay. Philippine Navy (PN) .
e) to pursue the PN’s capability development program. c) to assist in international defense and security engagements. To carry out the said roles. territorial defense and maritime law enforcement.72 The mission of the PN is “to organize. The seagoing assets of the navy are shown in the table below: Table 17 Status of Philippine Navy Assets Type DE/MSF PCE JCPV LSV LST CYCLONE AW/AF/AM/AT CPIC/PKM/FACP LCU/LCM/TB 65 ftr PCF 36 ft RUC Not Operational 1 4 2 1 3 5 11 9 5 6 Operational 2 4 1 1 2 1 5 2 5 15 3 Total 3 8 3 2 5 1 10 13 14 20 9 Operational Rate 66% 50 33 50 40 100 50 15 35 75 33 .” It has the following roles: a) to provide surface. equip. the PN has six (6) naval forces scattered in the country. b) to assist in disaster response. humanitarian assistance/ and peacekeeping operations. This is to ensure that corresponding naval assets will be able to sustain naval operations under the different unified commands. air and ground forces for internal security. train. deploy and sustain naval and marine forces to defeat the CTM by 2010. d) to assist in national development. destroy the ASG and contain the SPSG in order to establish a physically and psychologically secured environment conducive to national development. and.
and ensure public safety over Philippine Territorial Waters.500 personnel scattered throughout the country in its Regional Maritime Offices (RMOs). This is practically a next to impossible task that they are . Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG) The mission of PNP-MARIG is to enforce the law. maintain peace and order. Table 18 Status of PNP-MARIG Assets TYPE Police Patrol Boat (PPB) Police Coastal Craft (PCC) Police Speed Boat (PSB) Police Rubber Boat (PRB) Total OPNL 5 16 4 2 27 LOPNL 2 2 NOPNL 17 9 4 3 33 TOTAL 24 25 8 5 62 Source: PNP-MARIG Briefing (2006) Using the given combined operational vessels of these agencies of 133 regardless of their size. It has about 1. lakes. territorial and internal waters combined. along coastal areas to include ports and harbors. and small islands for the security and sustainable development of the Maritime environment.73 11 13 PG AGG TOTAL 59 53 Source: Philippine Navy Briefing (2007) 24 112 54 47% 4.908 square nautical miles of sea space out of the total 652. one vessel is charged to patrol an approximately 4.800 square nautical miles of our country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The floating assets of the Group are shown in Table 18. and rivers.
Oceanic 2. 2003 1. 193. these agencies should coordinate their efforts in order to effectively protect our maritime areas from the previously discussed maritime threats. it is obvious that these agencies have to optimize the utilization of these assets given their very limited number.74 required to do. and maritime security .654. each vessel would have to patrol an area of 1. 18. each agency claim that they do not have enough assets to perform their respective functions. They all clamor for more assets especially the PN despite having the most number of sea assets and being the most capable agency in securing the maritime areas of the country. 17. Conversely. patrols. Total Marine Waters Area (including the EEZ) 220. Based from this data.000 sq.460. Alternatively. Coastal b. Table 19 Philippine Marine Resources. a. as shown in Table 19.135.000 ha. and technical expertise on maritime matters.000 ha.000. Coral Reef Area 4.600.km. Shelf Area (Depth 200m.000 ha.000 ha. 27. Comparing it with the combined available assets of the four (4) agencies. Their capabilities are also adversely affected by logistics and budget for repair and maintenance including lack of personnel. we have about 220M hectares of total marine waters area including the EEZ. Coastline (Length) 26. DA-BAS) Based from the result of structured interview conducted.) 3.34 hectares of water.400. This unfortunate situation has also denied these agencies the capability to conduct joint exercises.460 km Source: Fisheries Statistics of the Philippines (2001-2003. training.
PCG. DENR. and NSC. and PN to work together is defined under the Fisheries Code of the Philippines or RA 8550 where fishery enforcement powers were granted to them and the law enforcement officers of the LGUs. PNP-MARIG and other agencies like the BuCUS. C. PPA. MOAC does not exercise authority over them but only presides in a coordinative manner and meetings are done in an ad hoc basis. DND. DTI. Unfortunately. EMB National Prosecution Service (NPS) of the Department of Justice on September 11. PNP-MARIG. These departments include DFA. the need for the formulation of joint doctrine for interagency operations is likewise viewed as important element in enhancing their capabilities. There was also a MOA entered into by and between the BFAR. The PN however. Existing linkages between agencies The linkage between the PNP-MARIG. PCG. However. was excluded despite its mandate to enforce fishery laws as stipulated under RA 8550 as deputized. and the PN at the strategic level is represented through their respective departments under the MOAC. NEDA. The more formal basis for BFAR. 1995 to coordinate their operations in the enforcement of fishery laws through the National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC) situated at Headquarters PNP. DILG. DOE. DA. PCG. DOJ. DFA coordinative and consultative mechanism. The .75 operations to improve their inter-operability. DBM. DOTC. NALECC stops at the department level and is not duplicated at the lower echelons. DOF. Moreover. DOST. BFAR.
Below is a summary of the existing linkages between these agencies: Table 20 Existing Linkages Between Agencies Linkage Members Excluded Nature Coordinative and consultative Mechanism fishery law enforcement law enforcement MOAC 10 Depts. search and rescue (SAR). in October 1996. search and rescue (SAR). the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). law enforcement at sea.maritime law enforcement MARIG . PCG.76 PN is likewise mandated to enforce all applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987. and complementation between and among themselves to attain their respective objectives towards the promotion of maritime safety. PCG MOA MARINA. PCG PN PN vessel safety. marine environmental protection. the PN and PCG also entered into a MOA in 1998 when the PCG was separated from the Navy regarding the continuation of the conduct of joint maritime law enforcement (MARLEN) operations where the PCG would act as lead agency in such cases. PCG. PCG. The areas of cooperation enumerated include vessel safety. Later. and creation of info net for database. coordination. marine environmental protection. On the other hand. RA 8550 BFAR. BFAR. PN NALECC PNP-MARIG. and PNP-MARIG entered into a MOA forming themselves into a “Tripartite Committee on Maritime Safety” in order to establish cooperation. 20 under DFA Agencies PNP-MARIG. PNP. and PNP-MARIG MOA PN. law enforcement at sea BFAR.
it did not provide for a framework where these agencies should coordinate their efforts together on the ground. The PNP-MARIG. it is interesting to note that the PN respondents disagreed with the statement (WM of 2.77 Based from the above existing linkages between these agencies.82). separate MOA’s are entered into between agencies because of the absence of an overall coordinating mechanism for them to avoid duplication and overlapping of functions. PCG. Similarly. . the MOAC coordinative function does not filter down to the operational and tactical levels as it does not have the resources and capability to do so. In most cases. it performs law enforcement functions but only as a deputized agency and as its secondary mission.46) is adequate. As a result. While the respondents for the survey (Table 21) generally agree that existing linkages at the strategic level (TWM of 2. However. most are done at the strategic level where they understood each other. the PN being a military organization is not part of these existing linkages at the strategic level for law enforcement although operationally. while RA 8550 mandated these agencies to enforce fishery laws. This can be explained by the limited involvement of the PN in existing maritime security linkages especially with the civilian agencies. and BFAR are members of existing maritime security arrangement for law enforcement like the National Law Enforcement Coordination Committee (NALECC).
3.03 1.80 1.15 2.00 2. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the operational level.68 1.11 1. 4.25 2.20 2. skills.56 A D 2. and procedures HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE 2.92 2.80 1.44 2. 2.98 1.46 2. Civil-military relationship d.97 1.00 2.88 1.52 2.89 2. Interoperability of equipment.76 1. Organizational Culture e.44 2.82 2.33 2.89 2.85 2.00 2. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the strategic level.72 2.90 2.01 1.00 2. Agency Organizational Set-up c. The following factors enable inter-agency cooperation: a. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the tactical level.00 2.94 A A A A A .09 2.00 1.72 1.73 2.65 D 2.11 1. Habitual Relationship b.00 2.50 2.77 2.78 Table 21 Perception on Existing Linkages between Agencies Linkages Between Government Agencies 1.00 1.25 2.24 2.76 2.88 2.75 2.09 2.
94) This result can be interpreted as providing the requirements for interagency operations. What is significant in the results of the survey is the general agreement that civil-military relationships are an important requirement of interagency operations. This finding is also validated by the findings based on existing linkages of these agencies to engage in interagency operations.90) c. skills and procedures (TWM of 1. interpersonal relationship is also important in establishing an effective mechanism for interagency operations. Habitual Relationship (TWM of 1. Civil-military relations (TWM of 2. Interoperability of equipment. At the very least. The existing informal relations between . the survey also found that the following factors promotes interagency cooperation to develop: a. Likewise.65 respectively).56 and 2. Organizational culture (TWM of 1. Agency Organizational Set-up (TWM of 1.01) d. On the other hand. the agencies must develop organizational set-up that can both fulfill their respective mandates and at the same time have the capability to operate in an integrated manner with the different agencies.98) b.97) e.79 It is also evident from the results of the survey that the inter-agency linkages at the operational and tactical levels are not adequate as viewed by the respondents (TWM of 2.
00 respectively). a difference in the perception between the military and civilian respondents of the survey was also noted by the study.80 these agencies at the operational and tactical levels could be the take off point to enhance interagency cooperation. This is corroborated by the findings of the survey discussed earlier on the inadequacy of existing linkages at the operational and tactical levels. However. it is interesting to note that while BFAR.56 and 3. On the adequacy of activities like workshops. While the PCG and PNP-MARIG agree that government personnel are aware of existing national rules. Issues and concerns to inter-agency cooperation The most prominent concern identified by the survey results in Table 22 where the respondents strongly agree. . D. regulations and procedures on inter-agency coordination (TWM of 2. the need for a centralized authority to coordinate maritime security operations is further validated by the existence of competing priorities of each agency as well as the overlapping mandates between agencies (TWM of 1. seminars. respondents from the PN and the BFAR disagree with the statement (TWM of 2. and meetings that promote interagency cooperation. This further validates the need for the PN and civil agencies to enhance their interaction through appropriate linkages and address the inadequacy of the present system.67 and 1.16 and 2.72 respectively).00). PNP-MARIG and PCG agree (TWM of 2. is the need for a central coordinating body for inter-agency operation with a TWM of 1.51. Furthermore.00.
There are adequate activities (e.56 1.51 2.15 SA A A 2.47 2. There are overlapping mandates between agencies that affect the ability to cooperate at an inter-agency level.14 2.72 A .47 2. HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE 1. etc.67 A SA 2.16 1. A central coordinating body is required to develop inter-agency coordination at the national level.29 1.g. 3.25 2.57 1.00 2.83 1.23 2. workshops. rules and regulations are adequate to institute inter-agency operations.25 2. 5.21 A 1.46 1.81 Table 22 Perceptions on Issues and Concerns to Interagency Cooperation Issues and Concerns to Interagency Cooperation 1.38 2. meetings. seminars. There are competing priorities among agencies that affect inter-agency coordination.56 1.25 1. regulations. Government personnel are aware of existing national rules.04 2.94 2. exercises.89 1.25 2.00 1.78 2.37 1. and procedures on inter-agency coordination.) that promote inter-agency cooperation.25 1.35 2. Existing laws.85 2.56 1.00 1.60 2.00 1.75 3.88 1.96 1. 2.89 2. 6.74 1.89 2.00 1. 4. 7. Existing agency organization is suited for inter-agency cooperation.
it can be expected that the respondents from these agencies will at least. Such exposure may be limited for the PN and BFAR. Moreover. The PCG and PNPMARIG are both heavily involved in maritime law enforcement and have presence on the same areas with each other. and 2. Thus. the PN can definitely augment the capabilities of the different agencies in addressing maritime security concerns. This survey result as validated by the other findings on the perception of the respondents in the other parts of the survey clearly point to the need of retooling the PN for interagency operations. have the same level of knowledge when it comes to government regulations on maritime security matters.74). it must also have the requisite knowledge. With the preponderance of capability. the PN as an organization still needs to acquaint itself of the realities and intricacies of civil maritime operations and the various regulations and limitations that come with it. the result of survey on the issues and concerns that hinder interagency cooperation were also found out in previous studies. only the PN disagrees (TWM of 2. However.89. This can be explained again by the differences on the level of involvement of the respondents on maritime interagency operations. The following is a summary of the factors cited that hinders an integrated interagency approach in addressing the maritime security concerns of the country.82 1.04 respectively) with this statement. understanding and skills to operate together with other civilian maritime security agencies of the government. It is not enough that the PN has the capability. .
Ambiguous policy-making linkages. Professional jealousy. . personnel and platforms.83 1. 7. Absence of a lead coordinating agency. Conflicting and competing agency priorities. Lack of trust between agencies. Lack of cooperation at the agency’s lower level of echelon. In addition. Absence of an overarching ocean policy framework. Lack of support from the legislative and political leadership. credit grabbing and “turf war. Absence of operational procedures for monitoring and review mechanisms 5. Resource and technical capacity limitations. 6.” 4. Duplication and overlapping of functions. 10. 3. No strong overall lead or coordinating agency above these agencies. Differing orientation and interpretation of functions. Lack of interoperability of forces at sea. 2. 5. Lack of resources. 6. responsibility and jurisdiction. BFAR. 2. 9. and PCG. 4. PNP-MARIG. the following were pointed out as issues and concerns for interagency cooperation: 1. 3. Lack of coordination and consultation mechanisms. Personality conflict between heads of agencies. 8. based from the structured interview conducted with selected senior officers from the PN. 7.
84 11. procedures and requirements (TWM of 1. meetings. Enhancing the capability of the PN. Conduct of information and education activities to orient and familiarize government agencies on inter-agency rules. This result can be interpreted as a result of not only the lack of interagency cooperation activities conducted between these agencies but by the nature of existing linkages identified earlier as well. The present set-up is confined to addressing a specific agency’s concern and do not address the whole maritime security situation holistically. The findings also validated the results of earlier researches and by the agreement of the respondents on the continued presence of these issues and concerns in the present situation. dialogues. 2. PNP-MARIG and PCG for maritime law enforcement (TWM of 1. 12. No sharing of information. workshops. Ways to improve interagency cooperation While there are several issues and concerns raised that hinder interagency cooperation as far as addressing maritime security is concerned. The result of survey in Table 23 shows that the respondents strongly agree that the following factors are some of the ways to improve interagency cooperation: 1. . E. seminars. Organizational culture and immaturity of organizations.36). recommendations to improve same also abound.43).
Reorganization of the existing maritime agencies to enable coordination at all levels (TWM of 1. Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one executive department (TWM of 1. Development of an integrated national monitoring.50). 7. .60). control. The review and revision of the National Marine Policy (TWM of 1. 9.54).54) 6. 8. Foreign assistance and support to enhance inter-agency cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-building (TWM of 1.71).58).85 3.46). and surveillance (MCS) system (TWM of 1. Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy (TWM 1. 4. Formulation of a coordination framework to enhance maritime security (TWM of 1. 5.
46 1.25 1.50 1.48 1.74 1.25 1.40 1.50 1.67 1.41 1.00 1.56 1. Develop an integrated national monitoring.54 1.28 1.44 1.65 1. 8.80 1.80 1. 6. 2. PNPMG and PCG for maritime law enforcement. 4.00 2. Formulate a coordination framework to enhance maritime security.25 1.89 1. 9.05 1.50 1.89 1.52 1.78 1.35 1. All maritime security activities must be coordinated by the National Security Council. Enhance the capability of the PN.32 1. Foreign assistance and support can be utilized to enhance inter-agency cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-building.67 1. procedures and requirements.60 1. Review and revise the National Marine Policy.36 SA SA A SA SA SA SA SA SA SA .58 1. 5. and surveillance (MCS) system.71 1.43 1.50 1.44 1. Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation 1. HPN PNP-MG PCG PHILFLT BFAR TWM DE 1. control.48 1.24 1. 10.63 2. 7.62 1.25 1.89 2.25 1.11 2.53 1.74 1. Formulate a National Maritime Strategy.44 1. All civilian maritime agencies must be consolidated under one executive department. There is a need for the conduct of information and education activities to familiarize government agencies on interagency rules.25 1.68 1.54 1.86 Table 23 Perceptions on Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation E.38 1.70 1.44 1. 3.48 1.74 1.43 1. Existing maritime agencies need to be reorganized to enable coordination at all levels.33 1.25 1.28 1.76 1.
This is reinforced in the finding that maritime security is a significant component of national security. The need to enhance their capabilities is corroborated by the findings on their capabilities and the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation. The next two factors. PNP-MARIG.The respondents however. PCG. This is due to absence of an effective linkage between the agencies and the absence of an overall coordinating agency.80).43 and 1. Control and Surveillance (MCS) system (TWM of 1. as found out. and the PN for maritime security operations as manifested by its TWM of 1. interagency activities and the need for an integrated Monitoring. The survey result is indicative of the preponderance of the strong need to enhance the capability of BFAR. information sharing. On the other hand. is not the case. It can be noted that the first three factors are activities that are supposed to be taking place at the operational and tactical levels which.46) affirmed that there is indeed a lack of interagency activities conducted between these agencies.36. Capability enhancement is also an outcome of the need for these agencies to address the various maritime security threats besetting the country and the vast maritime expanse of the country that these agencies have to secure. The result could be brought about by the majority of . and delineation of functions among them in the present situation. the clamor for a national integrated MCS system confirmed the lack of coordination of efforts. agree that the National Security Council (NSC) should be the lead agency in coordinating all maritime security activities of these agencies (TWM 1.
4. reorganization. The other succeeding factors which can contribute in enhancing interagency cooperation are more of strategic concerns like the formulation of national ocean policies. Development of operational procedures for monitoring and review mechanisms. Designation of only one lead coordinating agency. 2.88 respondents who are junior officers and consequently. coordination frameworks. These concerns depend to a great extent on the legislative and political leadership support. and capacity building. are in the tactical level of maritime security operations. 3. The results also show the awareness of the respondents on the elements that an interagency framework must consider from the strategic to operational and tactical levels points of view. . strategies. There should be an overarching national ocean policy framework. The survey result is also corroborated by the recommendations from the related literature by maritime experts on the subject of an integrated and coordinated approach to ocean governance or interagency cooperation which include the following: 1. The need for a policy framework to provide the coordination and consultation mechanisms between agencies concerned.
89 5. Inasmuch as the national interest on maritime domain transcends national boundaries and sectoral interests, there should be coordination and support of policy from the legislature and political leadership.
Corollary, the points of view gathered from the structured interview conducted with selected senior officers from the PN, BFAR, PNP-MARIG, and PCG, supports the survey findings with the following proposals improve interagency cooperation: 1. information. Additional resources, personnel, platforms and sharing of
Conduct of joint exercises, CPX, seminars, dialogues, workshops,
conferences to improve interoperability and develop mutual respect and trust.
One overall coordinating agency supported by other agencies with
specific authority and own budget under the Office of the President or on a ministerial level.
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Punishment of errant government agency personnel. Creation of interagency task forces/task groups at the tactical level. Solicitation of foreign assistance to improve capability. Continuous orientation and education. All civilian agencies with maritime functions should be placed under
90 The findings above are also validated through the result of the survey conducted where most of the respondents strongly agree on the above proposals as shown in Table 23. The results only show that there is already an awareness of the problem at hand and a clamor for solutions to these problems of interagency cooperation. It expressed the open mindedness and willingness of the respondents to accept change, subordinate their parochial organizational interests to cooperate to better address the maritime security threats. The result shows that the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation could be overcome. However, the more challenging recommendations lie on the decisions and actions of the political leadership and the legislative support to be realized.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Summary This study was conducted to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a framework in addressing the country’s maritime security threats. It is premised on the fact that the Philippines is a maritime nation endowed with rich marine resources but is also confronted with a myriad of maritime security threats against the very limited capabilities of the agencies directly involved in maritime security operations. Given situation, this study propounded that these agencies should work in an integrated and coordinated manner to protect and preserve our marine resources for sustainable development. While interagency cooperation poses some problems, they are not insurmountable as manifested by the findings of the study. In fact, several ways or options to enhance interagency cooperation were proposed. This study has the following objectives: 1. To analyze the threats to our maritime security. 2. To assess the capabilities of agencies directly involved in maritime security operations. 3. To examine the existing linkages between and among these agencies. 4. To determine the issues and concerns that hinders interagency cooperation. 5. To propose a framework for inter-agency cooperation.
92 The descriptive method of research was used in studying the concept of interagency cooperation in the context of maritime security along with other methodologies such as structured interviews. and survey questionnaire. PCG. maritime terrorism. the significant threats to our maritime security include transnational crimes. Maritime Security Threats In general. There was a strong recognition that maritime security is a significant component of national security. piracy or armed robbery against ships. illegal fishing. and maritime disasters. Likewise. the perceptions on maritime security threats are based on . The difference may be due to the exposure and extent of tasks these agencies have to perform as PCG and PNP-MARIG have significant presence and exposure to maritime threats at sea and ashore unlike the PN and BFAR. marine pollution. document analysis. a slight difference is noted as to their perception of the government’s understanding of these threats. However. PNP-MARIG. BFAR. foreign intrusions. BFAR. The agencies sampled (PCG. The findings of this study are as follows: 1. and PN) have a clear understanding of the threats to our maritime security. Respondents were purposively and randomly selected from across the strategic. and PNP-MARIG. operational and tactical levels of the agencies enforcing all applicable laws of the land at sea and in all Philippine waters like the PN.
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Their capabilities are also adversely affected by logistics and budget for repair and maintenance including lack of personnel. piracy. there only four (4) agencies that have floating assets and the capability to enforce applicable laws of the country at sea and in all Philippine waters namely: the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). even with the combined number of operational vessels of these agencies of 133 regardless of size.908 square nautical miles of sea space out of the total 652.34 hectares of water. Thus. This situation has also denied these agencies to conduct joint . and comparing it with the combined available assets of the four (4) agencies.800 square nautical miles of our country’s EEZ.93 their indicative likelihood of occurrence. one vessel is charged to patrol an approximately 4.135. 2. Conversely. territorial and internal waters. of the 220M hectares of total marine waters of the country including the EEZ. each vessel would have to patrol an area of 1. and maritime disaster in that order. Philippine Navy (PN) and the Philippine National Police-Maritime Group (PNP-MARIG). transnational crimes and illegal fishing got the highest weighted means compared with the threats of foreign intrusions. there is a very limited number of available seagoing assets for these agencies to perform their functions and to effectively protect our maritime areas from the previously discussed maritime threats to the country. Government Agencies Directly Involved in Maritime Security Altogether. Nevertheless. training.654. Simply put. maritime terrorism. and technical expertise on maritime matters.
Although operationally. is sometimes not part of existing linkages at the strategic level for law enforcement among civilian agencies. .94 exercises to improve their interoperability and enhance their capabilities for the conduct of interagency operations. Existing linkages between agencies The existing linkages between PCG. being a military organization. joint exercises. CPX. and the PN are mostly understood at the strategic level. There was a noted gap in these existing linkages from the strategic to operational and tactical levels of maritime security operations. Likewise. interpersonal relationship is also recognized as an important factor in establishing an effective mechanism for inter-agency operations. 3. BFAR. separate MOA’s are entered into between these agencies because of the absence of an overall coordinating mechanism for them to minimize duplication and overlapping of functions. equipment. However. budget. PNP-MARIG. There was also a general agreement that civil-military relations are an important requirement of interagency operations. the linkages and cooperation of these agencies are also affected by their limited resources. these linkages did not provide for a framework where these agencies could coordinate their efforts together on the ground. and so on. the PN performs law enforcement functions but only as a deputized agency and as its secondary mission. personnel. In part. As a result. It is also noted that the PN. and training capabilities to engage in interagency operations.
Lack of support from the legislative and political leadership. Lack of coordination and consultation mechanisms. d.” d. b. Moreover. Lack of resources. personnel and platforms. At the operational and tactical levels. Lack of interoperability of forces at sea. g. c. At the strategic level. Absence of operational procedures for monitoring and review mechanisms e. c.95 4. f. Absence of an overarching ocean policy framework. Lack of trust between agencies. the following were pointed out as issues and concerns for interagency cooperation: a. e. it was found out that the existing linkages are confined to a specific sector’s concern and do not address the whole maritime security at a holistic level. . Lack of coordination of policy reforms with the legislature. Resource and technical capacity limitations. Personality conflict between heads of agencies. credit grabbing and “turf war. the following were considered as major causes that hinders an integrated interagency approach to maritime security: a. Issues and concerns to inter-agency cooperation The most prominent concern for interagency cooperation is the need for one strong central coordinating body. b. h. This is to ensure the adequacy of existing linkages at the operational and tactical levels. Ambiguous policy-making linkages. Professional jealousy. Absence of only one lead coordinating agency.
j. Conduct of information and education activities to familiarize concerned agencies on interagency rules. Ways to improve interagency cooperation While there are a lot of issues and concerns raised to achieve interagency cooperation. i. Duplication and overlapping of functions. No overall lead or coordinating agency structure at operational and tactical levels. procedures and requirements. 5. seminars. k. No sharing of information mechanism including lack of interagency meetings. PNP-MARIG and The following were recommended to improve interagency PCG for maritime law enforcement. Lack of cooperation at the lower level of echelon.96 f. . Differing orientation and interpretation of functions. Conflicting agency priorities. it was also found out that several way and options are available to enhance or improve interagency cooperation between the agencies concerned. h. dialogues. Enhancing the capability of the PN. workshops. g. responsibility and jurisdiction. cooperation: a. b.
g. control. the following were proposed to improve inter-agency cooperation: a. j. Additional resources. e. Development of an integrated national monitoring. Legislative and political support. Formulation of an interagency coordination framework to enhance maritime security. f. Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one i. Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy.97 c. personnel and platforms. h. from the lower levels point of view. d. . Corollary. and surveillance (MCS) system. Designation of one lead coordinating agency at the all maritime security ministerial level under the Office of the President for activities. executive department. The review and revision of the National Marine Policy. Foreign assistance and support to enhance inter-agency cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-building.
operational. Conduct of joint exercises. and maritime disasters. The existing linkages between and among these agencies need to be improved at the strategic. PN) have a clear understanding of the country’s maritime security threats such as transnational crimes. communications system. 3. foreign intrusions. f. Dedication. . seminars. honesty. marine pollution. The combined capabilities of these agencies involved in maritime security operations are inadequate to address the maritime security threats to the country. CPX. and tactical levels of maritime security operations. B. Sharing of information. c.98 b. d. 2. workshops. Creation of interagency task forces/ task groups. dialogues. illegal fishing. PCG. maritime terrorism. conferences to improve interoperability and develop mutual respect and trust. e. PNP-MARIG. Punishment of errant government agency personnel. Conclusion Based from the findings of this study the following are deduced: 1. The agencies (BFAR.
PNP-MARIG. and PN at all levels of maritime security operations but again. provision of additional assets. control. Recommendations With the findings and conclusion made above. joint simulation exercises. and surveillance (MCS) system for these agencies. Continue to enhance understanding and awareness of the threats to our maritime security at all levels of the PN. and BFAR through information sharing. symposium. and informal dialogues between these agencies. PCG. 5. formulation of joint doctrines and procedures. . PNP-MARIG. a lot of support is needed from the legislative and political leadership. workshops. joint training.99 4. There are several ways to improve interagency cooperation between the BFAR. The issues and concerns that hinder interagency cooperation between these agencies are not insurmountable and could be overcome but needs a lot of support from the legislative and political leadership. 2. Improve the capabilities of these agencies through the upgrading or modernization of their equipment. and increasing their budget including the development of an integrated national monitoring. PCG. the following are recommended: 1. C.
Overcoming the issues and concerns to interagency cooperation depends to a very large extent on the government’s political and legislative support. PNP-MARIG. meetings. the interagency cooperation problems could be improved by having a joint interagency maritime security operations doctrine. conduct of joint exercises and maritime security operations. including the reorganization of civilian agencies with maritime functions under one executive department for better coordination. 4. designation of a lead agency in maritime and ocean affairs under the Office of the President. BFAR) under one executive department. PNP-MARIG. provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the designated coordinating office of the lead agency. information sharing mechanism such as interagency symposium. 5. Improve linkages between and among these agencies through the “one lead agency” concept and the coordination mechanism under the authority of the lead agency should be duplicated at the operational and tactical levels. At the operational level and tactical levels. The succeeding table shows the summary of the recommended ways to improve interagency cooperation between PCG.100 3. workshops. BFAR. and dialogues. Techniques. it includes efforts such as the revision and updating of the National Marine Policy. On the strategic level. promulgation of an Executive Order for interagency cooperation among agencies with maritime functions. and PN which is also applicable to the other agencies: . and the creation of joint task forces or task groups. Tactics and Procedures (TTPs). Another way to improve linkages is to consolidate all civilian maritime security agencies (PCG.
The review and updating of the National Marine Policy. • Joint maritime security operations doctrine. • Information and data collection system. procedures and requirements. Executive Order for Maritime Interagency Cooperation. Tactical Level . • information sharing mechanism such as interagency symposium. personnel and platforms.. Operational Level • Lead agency operational level coordinating structure. dialogues. Development of an integrated national monitoring.101 Table 24 Summary of Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation Strategic Level • • • • • • • • • • Legislative and executive support. • Joint Exercises. meetings. • Creation of interagency task forces/task groups. • Formulation of a coordination framework to enhance maritime security. joint TTPs. workshops. • Conduct of joint exercises and maritime security operations. maritime security operations. CPX. • Development of joint operational procedures for monitoring and review mechanisms. • Sharing of information. and dialogues. control. seminars. • Conduct of joint exercises. and surveillance (MCS) system. Foreign assistance and support to enhance interagency cooperation in areas such as capacity and capabilitybuilding. PNP-MARIG and PCG through additional resources. workshops. • Provision of liaison officers or agency desks at the designated coordinating office of the lead agency. conferences to improve interoperability and develop mutual respect and trust. • Upgrading the capability of the PN. Formulation of a national interagency joint maritime security operations doctrine. Designation of a maritime lead agency. Consolidation of all civilian maritime agencies under one executive department. • Punishment of errant government agency personnel. • Conduct of information and education activities to familiarize these agencies on inter-agency rules. Formulation of a National Maritime Strategy. Policy framework to provide the coordination and consultation mechanisms between agencies.
being the best-equipped and best-situated compared to the other agencies. other agencies with maritime concerns could also coordinate their requirements for joint maritime security operations. Based on the above ways to improve interagency cooperation. Through this structure. and PN provides the backbone for maritime security cooperation as they are the only agencies with seaborne assets. BFAR. Educ & Culture OPERATIONAL LEVEL Area Command Naval Forces MOAC Regional Information Sharing & Coordinating Office Naval Forces Operations Center (Composite Liaisons/desks from PCG. PNP-MARIG. The PN in particular.102 6. Exercises. TTPs) MOAC Provincial/City/ Municipal Information & Coordinating Office . Figure 13 Interagency Cooperation Framework STRATEGIC LEVEL Office of the President Congress Maritime & Ocean Affairs Commission (MOAC) MOAC Secretariat Coastal/ Marine Environment Cluster SocioEconomi c Cluster Maritime Security and Safety Cluster DND/AFP: Lead Agency Territory & Foreign Affairs Cluster Science. BFAR. is chosen as the focal point for all maritime security operations at the operational level. the interagency cooperation framework/structure below (Figure 13) is likewise recommended where the PCG. PNP-MARIG & other agencies) TACTICAL LEVEL Interagency Task Groups (Joint Maritime Opns.
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A. Retrieved on December 15. Retrieved on May 3.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair37/mcnair37.jfsc.com/issue1/ htmls/reformulating.com/reports/HAIoccasional-paper.pdf. 2007 from http://www. Achieving Unity of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability. W. Niemenkari.htm and http://www.mil/au/awc/ns/15thedcourse/Lsn31/clarkhagee.htm. Progress in the Implementation of the Philippine National Marine Policy: Issues and Options.104 INTERNET SOURCES Batongbacal. 2007 at http://www.nzdf.mil. (2001). htm Birmingham.nz/operations/structure. UN – The Nippon Foundation Fellow. New York.doc Bradford. (2005).pdf The US National Strategy for Maritime Security. Rethinking the Interagency System.gov/homeland/maritime-security.aph.fas. 2007 from http://www. 2007 from http://www. (2002). Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Retrieved on May 4 2007. Barndt. and Salo. New Zealand Defence Policy and Maritime Strategy Retrieved on February 2.au/house/committee/jfadt/exchange/report/ chapter3.org/irp/threat/conplan. United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan.pdf Garcia.hicksandassociates. 2007 from http://www.nzdf. Retrieved on May 4. Retrieved February 13.html. (1995). March). J.pdf. 2007 from http://www.mil. 2006 at http://www.un. M.ndu. NZ Government Inter-agency Support. and Mendell. Retrieved on March 15. .tripod. M. Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations Retrieved on February 13. Retrieved February 17. 2007 from http://arcoastnews.au.ndu.nz/operations/govt-inter-agency-support.html Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operation Retrieved on March 15. Reformulating the National Marine Policy Retrieved on January 25. (2003).af. The Finnish Border Security Concept.org/Depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_page s/fellows_papers/garcia_0506__philippines.pdf. (2005. 2007 from http://www.gov. 2007 from http://www. D.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/j ca_cca_awsp/Achieving_ Unity _of_Effort.whitehouse. Donley.
105 APPENDICES .
Quezon City 08 June 2007 Dear Respondent: 106 Greetings! The undersigned is presently taking up the AFP Command and General Staff Course (AFPCGSC) Class 48.” The undersigned intends to assess the present state of interagency cooperation between and among agencies with maritime functions particularly those with assets at sea like the PN. Alternatively. REY T DELA CRUZ CDR PN AFPCGSC Class 48 . In this regard. PCG. I will personally collect them back or my representative will do the rounds after three days. I chose to make a study that aims to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a framework or mechanism in addressing the maritime security challenges in the country. PNP-MARIG and BFAR.APPENDIX A HEADQUARTERS ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES Command and General Staff College Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo. Sincerely yours. One of the requirements of the course is a research paper concerning current issues relevant to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. I could be reached at this contact number: 09184153400 Thank you for your time and cooperation. Rest assured that your answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality and no reference to your person or identity will be made without your explicit consent. may I solicit your indulgence to kindly answer the attached questionnaire by providing the information asked or by checking your preferred choice. I feel that there is the need for a framework or mechanism for interagency cooperation for these agencies in order to achieve unity of effort and for them to work as one in addressing our maritime security concerns. The title of my research is “Interagency Cooperation: A Framework in Addressing Maritime Security Threats. Hence. I am looking forward to your most favorable participation for without it. this study will not be as complete as it should be.
Piracy/Armed Robbery Against Ships g. Foreign intrusions (poaching) d. Marine Pollution f. Name___________________________________________ (optional) B. Maritime Security Threats 1. The country is beset with maritime security threats today that need to be addressed. 3. Maritime security is a significant component of our national security.Strongly Agree A.20 years ( ) 6 -10 yrs ( ) 21-25 yrs ( ) 11-15 yrs ( ) 26 . Present Position or designation: ______________________________ II. Length of Service: ( ) 5 yrs below ( ) 16 . Rank/Grade: ( ) O2-O3 ( ) O4-O5 C. trawling) e.30 yrs ( ) O6-O7 Others_________________ D. drug/human trafficking) c. Transnational Crimes (arms/goods smuggling. The government has a clear understanding of the threats to our maritime security. Instructions: Please check the appropriate box which best represents your opinion with regard to the question or statement provided on the left: SA . 5. Personal Data of Respondent: 107 A. Illegal Fishing (blast fishing. The following are the maritime security threats: a. Maritime Disasters SA A D SD .Disagree SD .APPENDIX A SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE Respondent No. 2. muro-ami. Unit/Office: ________________________________________________________ E.Agree D. _______ (leave it blank) I. The government is taking necessary steps to adequately address our maritime security threats.Strongly Disagree A. Maritime Terrorism b. 4.
There is a need for the conduct of information and education activities to familiarize government agencies on inter-agency rules. Ways to Improve Interagency Cooperation 1.g. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the strategic level. The following factors enable inter-agency cooperation: a. rules and regulations are adequate to institute inter-agency operations. 7. Challenges to Interagency Cooperation 1. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the operational level. 5. Foreign assistance and support can be utilized to enhance inter-agency cooperation in areas such as capacity and capability-building. All maritime security activities must be coordinated by the National Security Council. seminars. Organizational culture e. Existing maritime agencies need to be reorganized to enable coordination at all levels. 5. There are overlapping mandates between agencies that affect the ability to cooperate at an inter-agency level. meetings. 3. Civil-military relationship d. All civilian maritime agencies must be consolidated under one executive department. Government personnel are aware of existing national rules. Agency Organizational Set-up c. There are adequate activities (e. 4. Linkages Between Government Agencies 1. and procedures C. Existing agency organization is suited for interagency cooperation.APPENDIX A B. 2. 3. 6. 4. SA A D 108 SD SA A D SD SA A D SD . procedures and requirements. 2. exercises. Interoperability of equipment.) that promote inter-agency cooperation. workshops. 3. etc. regulations. and procedures on interagency coordination. 2. Habitual Relationship b. skills. Existing laws. There are competing priorities among agencies that affect inter-agency coordination. 4. The existing linkages or coordination mechanism between agencies are adequate and effective at the tactical level. A central coordinating body is required to develop inter-agency coordination at the national level. D.
PNP-MARIG and BFAR. PCG. 9. and surveillance (MCS) system. . control. 109 III. Thank you very much for your time. 8. Formulate a coordination framework to enhance maritime security. Formulate a National Maritime Strategy. Other Comments and Recommendations. Develop an integrated national monitoring. PNP-MARIG. 10. Enhance the capability of the PN. 7. Please write your other comments and recommendations on how to improve interagency cooperation between agencies of government with maritime-related functions specifically between PN. PCG and BFAR for maritime law enforcement.APPENDIX A 6. Review and revise the National Marine Policy.
Quezon City 12 June 2007 CAPT MARIO C ROYENA PN(MNSA) Director. this study will not be as complete as it should be. REY T DELA CRUZ CDR PN AFPCGSC Class 48 . PNP-MARIG).” The undersigned intends to assess the present state of interagency cooperation between and among agencies with maritime functions particularly those with assets at sea (PN. I feel that there is the need for a framework or mechanism for interagency cooperation in order to achieve unity of effort and for them to work as one. BFAR. The title of my research is “Interagency Cooperation: A Framework in Addressing Maritime Security Threats. PCG. Manila 110 Sir: Greetings! The undersigned is presently taking up the AFP Command and General Staff Course (AFPCGSC) Class 48. Naval Safety Office Headquarters Philippine Navy Roxas Boulevard. Very truly yours. Rest assured that your answers will be treated with utmost confidentiality and no reference to your person or identity will be made without your explicit consent. I opted to make a study that aims to assess the concept of interagency cooperation as a framework or mechanism in addressing the maritime security challenges in the country. I am looking forward to your most favorable participation for without it. Alternatively. One of the requirements of the course is a research paper concerning current issues relevant to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.APPENDIX B HEADQUARTERS ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES Command and General Staff College Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo. I will personally collect them back or my representative will do the rounds after three days. may I solicit your indulgence to kindly answer the attached questionnaire by providing the information asked. In this regard. I could be reached at this contact number: 09184153400 Thank you for your time and cooperation. Hence.
and PNP-MARIG in addressing these maritime security concerns at sea? 3. coordination mechanisms or frameworks in which these agencies are coordinating their efforts? . BFAR. agreements. How would you assess the effectiveness of existing linkages. PCG. What would you consider as the more significant maritime security threats the country is facing today? 2.APPENDIX B STRUCTURED INTERVIEW 111 Name of Respondent: ____________________________________________ Rank: ___________________ Present Position/Unit Assignment:_________________________________ 1. How would you assess the capabilities of government agencies specifically PN.
What do you think are the issues and concerns that hinder inter-agency cooperation in the conduct of maritime security operations? 5.112 APPENDIX B 4. what would you recommend to improve the interagency cooperation between the above agencies? 6. Other comments: . Alternatively.
” he was assigned onboard LT-507. He is the eldest of the five siblings of Domingo dela Cruz and Florasol Topinio. To further enhance his education and learning. He took up the Philippine Military Academy entrance examination and joined the PMA “Hinirang” Class of 1987. and the International Strategic & Security Issues Course at the Foreign Service Institute. Ship Executive Officer Course Nr 02-03. he took up the Naval Intelligence Officers Course (NIOC) Class 52. AW-33. As Operations and Executive Officer. and PS-70 until the completion of his junior billets aboardship. he was assigned aboard PS-35. After completing the 116th Naval Officer’s Qualification Course (NOQC) “A. DFA. he was commissioned as Ensign with the Philippine Navy. Peacekeeping Force Staff Seminar Class Nr 07-04. PS-21. Command at Sea Course Class 06. . Canberra. Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in 2002. the Naval Command and Staff Course (NCSC) Class 44. Isabela. PS-37 and PS-38 respectively. Australian Defense Force Academy (ADFA). Upon graduation from PMA. LT-516.113 APPENDIX C BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH CDR REY TOPINIO DELA CRUZ O-9747 PN was born on 01 January 1965 in Jones. He finished his elementary education at the Jones North Central School (JNCS) in 1978 and his secondary education at the Jones Rural School (JRS) in 1982. He earned his Masters in Management Management) at the (Project University of New South Wales (UNSW). PS-36.
At Headquarters Philippine Navy. Philippine Fleet in Sangley Point Cavite City. He was also once the Deputy Commander of the Fleet Training Group. N8. he assumed various positions at the Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Education and Training. AFP and the Office of the Secretary Joint Staff. CDR DELA CRUZ PN now looks forward to assuming his first Command at Sea tour after having hurdled the PN Command at Sea Board (CASB) just prior to taking up the AFP Command and General Staff Course Class 48 in October 2006. Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Plans. AFP. Batanes with whom he has one son and a daughter: Patrick Reyvin (8) and Alecx Yeuvnrei (7). N5. . PN. He is married to the former Euvin Viola Ponce from Basco.APPENDIX C CDR DELA CRUZ PN 114 was also assigned in various positions at the General Headquarters. AFP at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. and as the Deputy Chief of the Office of Strategic Studies.