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Philosophy of Mind - Hegel

Philosophy of Mind - Hegel

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  • (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12)
  • 10. Inwendiges
  • 11. Das Denken
  • 12. Der praktische Geist
  • 13. Das praktische Gefuhl
  • 14. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr
  • 15. Die Gluckseligkeit
  • 16. Der freie Geist
  • A. LAW(1)
  • (c) RIGHT versus WRONG
  • (a) THE FAMILY
  • (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2)
  • 10. Weltweisheit
  • A. ART



INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any

attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i

s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as

treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.

Wherever there is Nature. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest. where the othe . At such a stage it is not yet mind. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . These 'imponderables' . eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. ANTHROPOLOGY. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. the sou l is its universal immaterialism.the passive of Aristotle. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. It is otherwise with Mind. have still. and mind conceived as a thin g. however. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. not merely lacks gravity. i. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. and not as the immediate or natural individual. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. even the capacity of offering resistance. as absolute negativity. li ght. its simple 'ideal' life. matter is regarded as something true. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. and. The usual answer.the truth that matter itself has no truth. But not merely is it. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body.. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. and so the self-externalism. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. the soul is only the sleep of mind . means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. etc. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. which is the fund amental feature of matter. identical ideality of it all. and the only problem was how to comprehend it.with th is proviso.SUB-SECTION A. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. Mind. There. a nd the soul remains the pervading. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life .e. which is potentially all things. as such a result. like heat. thus come into being. except where. to which they might perhaps add space and time. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. indeed. whereas the 'vital' matter. perhaps. on the one hand. in a sense. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. however. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. on the other. but soul. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A.

(a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. the changes of the seasons. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . But either this identity. in the modes of that being. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. a world-soul. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. and. as individualized. sidereal. they are natural objects for consciousness. Hence. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. it may be. Animals and pl ants. re tains an abstract independence. which only is. In nations less intellectually emancipated. not. even these few and slight susceptibilities. described. its immediate being . upon it. . in many case s completely.whence Epicurus. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom. on the contrary. Descartes. T hus. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. so holding. based upon participation in the common life of nature. it is a soul which feels. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. and. and always more or less. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). Malebranche. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. etc. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. as in the case of Lei bniz. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. (c) Thirdly. with Leibniz. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. when it presents itself as a single soul. just in proportion to his civilization. These have.is moulded into it.e. feels the difference of climates. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. (b) Secondly. and does not rise or develop into system. into the absolute syllogism.e. remain for ever subject to such influences. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold.(a) In its immediate natural mode . is too abstract. and telluri c life of man. and the periods of the day. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. as so often is done. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. as in the case of Spinoza. disappear. merely as another word for the incomprehensible. there philosophers took God. Spinoza. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. or. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. so to speak. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. as an anima mundi. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom.r is not .the natural soul.or corporeity . They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. though his Monad of monads brings things into being.

Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. bodily structure and disposit ion. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. talent . ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). as it exists. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. of families or single individuals. as alterations in it. on the whole. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. fails to meet his ideal requirements. scientific.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age). The contrast between the earth's poles. and on the other.mind wrapped up in itself. carrying out these universa .on a ph ysical basis. and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. in purposes political. and as stages in its development. He begins with Childhood . Thirdly. shows. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. shows an active half. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind. on its one side. where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). we see man in his true relation to his environment. while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. And that individuality marks both the world which. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. hopes. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. character. we find its diversities. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. the one permanent subject. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual. As they are at once physical and mental diversities. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis. This .a worl d no longer incomplete. but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. we find it as the special temperament. give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. widely distant from each other. physiognomy. fancies. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. and the position of the individual himself. or artistic.the sexual relation . the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody.

or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.Napoleon. or self-centralized being. distinguishes itself from its mere being. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. as before explained . which are often addressed to philosophy: . But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. viz. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member.The waking is not merely for the observer. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. for example. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct. If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). sleep. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. . and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self. But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. The characterization given in the section is abstract. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. each point. . we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. as they may be called. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. in the first instance. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. although. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. (c) Sensibility(3) . as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. . but as a return back from the world of specialization. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. put this question to the class of ideology. as already noted. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind.which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . i n an unintelligent way. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations. The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. on a v isit to the University of Pavia.not as a merely negative rest from it.

adultery. moral. are our very own. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. not mere alterations. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness. it is true. and religious. and the character.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. the conscience. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. which. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. primarily. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). but treated as bel onging to its most special. and to be as if found. godless. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. But if put in the feelin g. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. be it noted. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. Another. ho wever. blasphemy. mean. where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. This should hardly need enforcing. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts. etc. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. just. evil. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. in its own self. The fact that these particulars.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. and is so felt. etc. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. murder . the inarticulate bre athing. etc. mora l.identity of our self-centred being. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. invested with cor poreity. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. the fact is a mode of my individuality. the naturally immedi ate. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . are in order to be felt.. and . One. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. are found by the waking soul. for itself. true.set over against consciousness.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject.g. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. On the other hand and conversely. In this way we have two spheres of feeling. in the feeling. is what we call sensibility. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. on one hand. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. fornication.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. belonging as it does to natural. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . its natural peculiarity.

with its varieties of language. We should have. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. As sentient. especially the passions or emotions. to realize its mastery over its own. (b) THE FEELING SOUL . the immediacy of mode in feeling . (c) the sense of solid reality. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. therefore. and voice in general. i ts merely virtual filling-up. (¤ 300). the soul is no longe r a mere natural. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. i. in a special system of bodily organs.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations. tones. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d.in the system of the senses. but an inward. sighs. o f colours.the senses of definite light.g. of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310). We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. for example. of self. 322). with which that substance is one. of heavy matter. are formed from their mental source. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality.e. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . just because they are immediate and are found existing.whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. .alterations in the substantiality of the soul.and of sound. the centre of the 'sensible' system.it is a soul which feels.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. the blood. (¤ 317) . distinction appears as mere variety . individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. set in its self-centred life. What it has to do. But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations . following the special character of the mental mode. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . laughter. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. e. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part.because in it. is to raise its substantiality. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. smells. ¤ 402 Sensations.a psychical physiology. but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. and their corporization. In the usage of ordinary language. works itself out. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. to the character of subjectivity. the 'irritable' system.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . (¤¤ 321. to take possessi on of it.

must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. ¤ 404 As individual. etc. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. yet as the soul is in that content still particular .that world being included in it and filling it up. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is.the existent spe culative principle. a deep featureless characterless mine. may again sink down. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . which is at the same time its predicate. prima rily. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. Thus in the body it is one simple. thoughts. etc. it brings within itself. but only to his im plicit self. so far as that is. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. without existing. In the present stage we must treat. By itself. Some times. to which the soul. the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life. virtually retained. At the present stage this singleness is. They were not in our possession. because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. in an implicit mode. which is disease. to be defined as one of feeling . acquired lore. where the real is put past . of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves.. once mor e come to light. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. the s oul is characterized as immediate. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. in sickness. it implies a want of adaptation. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). in whi ch all this is stored up. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul. ideas. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). As sentient. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. and to that world it stands but as to itself. ideas and information. although it does not exist. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. omnipresent unity. but a negation. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. secondly. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). the content is its particular world.Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence . and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. first. the corporeity. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy .as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. i ncluded in the ideality of the subject.

and is therefore passive.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. character. his secular ideas.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. which. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. the psychical relationship. tal ent. and reasonable. of life. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness. whose decision is ul . fortunes. not yet as its self. developed interests. placenta. incl inations. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. etc.a substance. is visibly present as another and a different individual. congenital disposit ion and temperament. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. it is. injuries. etc. or capac ity. of the mother. but as efficiency and realized activity. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . or virtuality. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena).. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. idiosyncrasies.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . the single self of the two. principles-everything in short belonging to the character. not as a mere possibility. because immediate. controlling genius thereof. say between friends. etc. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions. Here are two individuals.. not a true subject reflected int o itself. self-conscious. self-possessed. The moth er is the genius of the child. and of character. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. intellige nt. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments. all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . as yet nothing impenetrable. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. as concrete subject ivity. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational. temper. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. etc. By the self-hood of the latter it . as it has existence of its own.

educated. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. self-possessed human being is a disease. when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. first of all call for verificati on.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. on the other hand. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. on the cont rary. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of.to be mere deception and impo sture. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage. it must be added. that it is in harmony wi th the facts. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . This totality forms his actual ity. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. At the same tim e. which are also means and ends to each other. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. means. it has already been call ed his genius.his fun damental interests. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . The facts. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. intentions. But such a verification would. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. is. in other words. To that end the phenomena. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling.to show.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. in which the individual here appears innnersed. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . it might seem.

those c onnected with female development. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. external one to another. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. (Thus Cato. . formed. but it is empty. in its sober moods. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius. smells. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. When the substance of both is thus made one. subje ctive reason. in catalepsy. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. then. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in. . in whom it sees. not on the spot.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. and character. the magnetizer.a genius which beh olds itself. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. . and hears.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. But. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. not really a 'person'. unless by the aid of religion. etc. a formal vision and awareness. is under a veil. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. etc. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. or at the approach of death. and to know which. his own and that of the magnetize . exist for it as an outward objectivity. f riends. subject to the power of another person.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. But such clairvoyance . and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. is this. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. however. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . reads. that it is a state of passivity. ca pable of conveying general truths. the selfless individual. for example. and c ontinues to be. and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. wh en it is healthy and awake. in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of.). with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality. tastes. which. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. And because it is the adult. on those left behind.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. after the downfall of the Roman republic. like that of the child in the womb. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. and other diseases. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. etc. which lead up to the result . It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport.) Compare h ome-sickness. and the like. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity.

and hence. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world. it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. which is no less a world of law. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. is without any definite points of attachment . without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. the 'common sense'. anticipate the full-grown an . and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. one sees and hears with the fingers. for example. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. In considering insanity we must. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. In this way it is self. which still marks the self-feeling. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. beholds. e. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect.r. reasons. etc. so long as we assume independent personalities. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. i s just this form of immediacy. on the contrary. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . receives. though all-embracing. and at the same time. i. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. between intelligent personality and objective world. as in the morbid state alluded to. in its capacity as individual.fe eling. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. or med icines for them. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep. The purely sensitive life.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. causality. as in other cases. etc. is impossible. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. it is still susceptible of disease. which. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. in this nominal perception.

When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. This humane treatment. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. equally formal. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. This particular being of the soul is t . Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations.d intelligent conscious subject.e. so as to insert them in their proper place.that evil which is always latent in the heart. In the concrete. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. mere and total. as something natural and existent. but only derangement. this life of feeling.merely personal love and hatred. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. passions. But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires. as it aris es. instincts.. is undistinguis hed from them. desire. The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). it would be death). no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). presupposes the patient's rationality. as a thing.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health.e. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. may. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. but a contr adiction in it. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul.just as physical disease is not an abstract. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. the. i. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. the self is to be stamped upon.fan cies and hopes . however. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other. is relaxed. . Insanity is therefore a psychical disease.e. and the rest of the passions . instead of being 'idealize d' in the former.feeling. that it is liable to insanity . Mind as such is fr ee. A violent. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. i. and so also may the cure. inclination. into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling.. etc.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. loss of health (if it were that. and be a realized u niversality. moral and theoretical. pride. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. and made appear in. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. etc. i. it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. and so makes part of the actual self. which is there also. is diseased. earthly elements are set fr ee . such as vanity. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy. And so too the particularity is. and also desires. and their gratification). idea. as now regarded. and it is only as a thing. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y.

The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. Habit like memory. occupied. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. et c. and so no longer interested. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. a second nature. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. and that as a barrier for it.itself a simple being . will. and which still continues to exist.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. weariness o .and becoming the 'ideal'. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. The natural qualities and alterations of age. i. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. nature. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. but still free. are only subjectiv e forms. lacking consciou sness. that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. but has them and moves in them. a pure act of intuition. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul.e. but the basis of consciousness. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. empty space and empty time. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. this being of the soul. of it. as. the one and the same. has been absorbed by it. and the generation o f habit as practice. heat. The soul is freed from them. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence.. and for that reason n ot free.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. sleep. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. of which it is the subjective substance. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. dist inguishing it from itself . therefore. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. partly only relative. That is to say. For. and the mere substance. and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. even in being affected by them. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. And consciousness it becomes.he factor of its corporeity. is reduced to unity.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. or dependent in regard to it. nor is absorbed in the m. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. su bjective substantiality of it . The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. on the contrary. Habit is rightly called a second nature. so is that pure being (which. when the co rporcity.

etc. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. And it is true that the form of habit. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. . or skill. like their satisfaction. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy.f the limbs. Thinking. consciousness. intelligence. viz. a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. etc. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand. etc.enabling the matter of consciousness. Even here.which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se.).g.is felt. a series of musical notes) is in me. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. i. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. an 'ideality' of soul . and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. which make it up. the spatial direction of an individual. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). a particular organ of i ts organic system). his upright pos ture. whereof we sha ll speak later. to exist as substance in its corporeity. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. and any other purp oses and activity. re ligious. and particul ar. It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. habit diminishes this feeling. cut off from action and reality. by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. made into an instrum ent. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. intuition. so that when the conception (e. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. moral. sweet tastes. and thus to enable the soul. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. but part and parcel of his being. etc. has been by will made a habit . to be his as this self. and the self-feeling as such. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. and that they. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self.. and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. without an express adjustment. nor an abstrac t inwardness. or. casual.concentration. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. if quite abstract. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. this soul.e. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. This is the rational liberation from them. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. under its volitional and conceptual characters. and especially so in the specific bodily part. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. nor are they in conce ption rational. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. that although the frost. and no other. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. to be made a power in the bodily part. habit is usually passed over - .. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought..or the misfortune .a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache). by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. The most ext ernal of them. too. etc. Habit on an ampler scale. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. is recollection and memory. consciousness. nor a transient emotion or idea. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. are no longer bothered with it. reflection. like any other. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. and it is habit of living which brings on death. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. acquires a strength which consists in this. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless.

cuts itself off from its immediate being. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. Plato says in the Timaeus (p. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. Naturliche Qualitaten.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. Under the head of human expression are included. in its concentrated self.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. 3. And the human figure. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. Seen from the animal world. for example. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape. represents not itself. Die fuhlende Seele. weeping. a world external to it . and the formation of the limbs. In this identity of interior and exterior. finds itself there a single subject. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. indefinite. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. This note is so slight. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality.either as something contemptible . ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . Empfindung. This externality. who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. or abstract universality. of which it is the sign. 2. Naturliche Seele. as the absolut e instrument. or the 'immediacy' of mind. 5. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. 4. it is related to itself. and i s infinite self-relation. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. 71). has lost the meaning of mere so ul. and inexpressible a modific ation. still vainer than a signatura rerum. especially the hand. 1. the latter subject to the former. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. unable to represent it in its actual universality. but the soul. of the mouth . and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. etc. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. absorbing it. while language is its perfect expressi on. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology.laughter. 'The autho . in other words. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. in being related to which. The soul. and making it its own.. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. for the soul. the upright figure in general.

for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. but since reality. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . something dark and beyond it. as this absolute negativity. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. not to the wisdom.the soul's natural life . and . CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . seem to be its own activity. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. Selbstgefuhl. to it. 6. but to the foolishness of man. as external to it. now. i. does not. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity.e. Gewohnheit. which manifests itself and something else too . Ego.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth. is only its abstract formal ideality. as subjective reflection in itself. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind. ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. 7. thus first made explicit as the Ego.to an equal freedom as an independent object. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. The mind as ego is essence. It is of this latter. like reciprocal dependence in general. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. in the sphere of essence.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. 8. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. but is implicit. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.the light. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious).it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship . and as such it is C onsciousness. but when he receives the inspired word. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. Hence consciousness. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm).

Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). to raise its self-certainty to truth. a thing-in-itself. which is not as its own. is further characterized a s immediately singular. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content.to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. or mere c ertainty. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. an intuitive intellect. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. and even t he Idea of Nature. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. but as poorest in thought. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. Ego. the substantial and qu alitative. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. has emerged from Spinoz ism. This is sense-consciousness. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. t heir absolute interdependence. Spatial and temporal Singularn . etc. and puts it first under the category of being. a singular. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58).as a case of correlation . The object similarl y. with an object set against it. as Reason.e. but only as it is in reference to something else. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. immediate consciousness. reflected in itself. i. and so on.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. and underived certainty of it. the notion of mind. (b) self-consciou sness. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite.e. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. being immediate. what makes the object the subject's own. It appears as wealth iest in matter. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. The object is only abstractly characterized as its. an existing thing. again. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. a something. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. i. in other words. an existent. for which ego is the object.a subject-objectivity. and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. and that the philosophy. Consciousness . (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego.. first. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. the subject of consciousness. As against Spinozism. because it is merely a nominal self-relation.

ess. reflectional attributes. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena .bet ween the individuality of a thing which. by being regarded in their bearings. ¤ 423 The law. which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance. and sensuous consciousness. free from this negative l ink and from one another. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. it is related. Thi s inward. not as merely immediate. which form the alleged ground of general experience. i. the one of the terms. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. i. permanent term s. taken in its concrete content. or the distinction which is none. 73). p. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness . however. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. and more or less by the sciences. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. has many properties. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . is sense-perception. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle. and universalities. lies im mediately in the other. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. however. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. to which.).a variety of relations. in that manner. to describe the sensible. constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know. But in this manner the interior distinction is. and. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. an abstract identity: on the other hand. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. and universal. its necessity on its own part. the thing. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. .between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . in so far as its distinction is the inward one. having passed beyond the sensible. a something external to it. and not yet as external on its own part. wants to take the object i n its truth.a copy of the phenomenon. and am aware'. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. in this case by t he Ego. viz. of the thing is. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. reflected in itself. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth.e. reflected upon. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . but as mediated. and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. what it is in truth. the distinction on its own part. as we called it. on one hand. or as being beside and out of itself. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness.e. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . has.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. experiences. but brought to rest and universality. so constr uing the object. as not externally different from the other.

can make no resistance: the dialectic. therefore. there is strictly speaking no object. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. implicit in it. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. therefore. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. with the nega tion of it. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. in its immediacy. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative. or implicitly. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. and a desire (appetite) . and itself made actual. this identity comes to be for the ego. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. and thus in it I am aware of me. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. and ma intains itself as such. knows itself implicit in the object. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. The certitude of one's self. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th .as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive.With this new form-characteristic. But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. or. on the contrary . nominally. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. being merely consumed. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. the latter. is a singular. consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. On the external side it conti nues. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. pure 'Ideality'. primarily describable as an individual. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. its satisfaction realized. in this return upon itself. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. on the whole. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. The two processes are one and the same. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. To this activity the object.

solves the contradiction. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. Thus the death of one. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. w hich however is also still outside it. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. In that other as ego I behold myself. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. in the service of the master. which falls on another. While the one com batant prefers life. therefore rude. and thus give existence to my freedom.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. and the means for entering into relation with them. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master.e.but only p eril. when we look to the distinction of the two. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self.for the means of mastery. the slave. ¤ 434 This status. a suppression. then. ¤ 431 The process is a battle. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. as one of two things for another. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction .t he process of recognition. Force. retains his single self-consciousness. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. ¤ 435 But secondly. as the existence of hi s freedom. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. however. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his.e consciousness of a 'free' object. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. This other. and incurs a like peril for its own . I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. and its being for others. we see. works off his individualist self-will. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. and to exist as such for the other: . (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. which is the basis of this phenomenon. on the ir phenomenal side. preservation. at first immedi ately. not their underlying and essential principle. the outward and visible recognition). In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. however. must likewise be kept in life. from one point of view. though by the abstract. Force. f rom the essential point of view (i. Thus arises the status of master and slave. it. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . the slave. and formation of it. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. negati on of immediacy. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. in the first place. is yet. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular.

or determinations of the very being of things. . love. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive. the self-centred pure notion. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. aware of what it is. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective . (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. fame. friendship. idle fame. For truth here has. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other.the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal . Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. is Reason. whilst it signifies that the object. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is.which is Reason. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . honour. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness. Selbstbewu§tsein. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness. 4. valour. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. Der Verstand. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. Die Begierde 6. bu t the truth that knows it.consciousness. The uni versality of reason.in family. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other.the passage to universal self. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. therefore. Wahrnehmung 3. 5. Reason.or rather it is a difference which is none. is now itself universal. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. and of all virtues. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . is mind (spirit). This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . as its peculiar mode and immanent form. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance.f wisdom' . so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. Truth.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 1. etc. than they are its own thoug hts. fatherland. ego. state.

etc. it has a mode in its knowledge. And it is a matter of no consequence. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. so far as its features are immediate or connatural.e. and which as the reality of that notion. Cons ciousness is finite.the former a simple immediate totality. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. SUB-SECTION C. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental . by being subjectiv e or only a notion. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason.apart b oth from the content. which is defined as it s notion. as its concept has just shown. in thinking also and in desire and will. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. etc. therefore. then its reality is that reason. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. in so far as . then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object.mental vision. however. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. neit her subjective nor objective.. and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. above the material. remembering. or. viz. Mind is finite. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes.in one word. Die Vernunft. PSYCHOLOGY. though it no longer has an object. etc. Mind. it is finite by means of its immediacy. This. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom. ideation. in so far as it has an object. like consciousness. in the soul as a physical mode. what is the same thing. i. desires. and above the complication with an external object .. restricted by that content. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. ¤ 441 The soul is finite.7. the latter now an infinite form which is not. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.

in so far as its existent phase.e. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy. the na tural soul (¤ 413). there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. and is even there a return into itself. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. forces. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. and are the mind's own. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. i. the mind finds in itself something which is. is misconceived and overlooked. in freedom. by the other it affirms it to be only its own. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character). its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. i. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. equally. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. and to liberate itself to its elf. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps. of comprehending itself. and being a rational knowledge.e. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. the sensible is not merely the empirical first.as being and as its own: by the one. and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). When the affection has been rendered its own. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. Similarly. and the negative aspect of mental activity. viz. it is . by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity. Thus. viz. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. to reach and get hold of itself. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). it thereby reduces itself to finitude. and make the affection subjective. if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. that aspect is twofold . perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. k nowledge. or. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. and its activity can only have itself as aim. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. so far. that is.e. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. As the theory o f Condillac states it.reality of its reason. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom.

its content is at first only its own. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. and heartless intellects . that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. and that in its empirical condition.i. to definite and conceptual knowledge. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. is thus also a reality . This activity is cognition.. ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. in the theoretical range.take the worthless fo r the essential nature. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. wi th a material which is its own. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. Inwards . and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. has a material which is only nominally such. Its activity has to do with the empty form . e. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has.of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. But as knowledge. to get at the notion and the truth. etc. merely as facts.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. elevates itself. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. and of the heart without the intellect . while the practical. just as they are given.e. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. both for the mind as such. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. Psychology. The nominal knowledge. which it and the content virtually is. and gains abstract auton omy within. as r eason is concrete. but) enjoyment. for which it gains the form of universality.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . and therefore a restricted content. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. This position of psychology. the word. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. along with which the content is realized as rational. like logic. as it is said. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. It is still extremely ill off. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence.g. belong to a point of view utt . which is only certitude. and is immediately willed. while it has to do with autonomous products. which in the first place is likewise formal . Ou twards.(b) Will: practical mind. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality.

which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object . then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. it is admitted. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . imagines.whi ch. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. like power or force. It is true that even as isolated (i. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . memory.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). is bro ught into mind. intuition. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. conceives. part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured. as it is by the same method brought into nature. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. conceived as reflected into self. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally.in a word . If they are isolated. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. But the true satisfaction. conception. if answered in the negative. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. must lead to abandoning the effort.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. To take up such a position is i n the first instance.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. as non-intelligent).is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe.but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . etc. remembrance.e. intelligen ce. cognitive conception.besides which it al so intuits. imagination. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible . It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. conception. imagination.its out-of-selfness . In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. etc. ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . is the fixed quality of any object of thought. etc. or mind. etc. it . Faculty. viz. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. But c ognition is genuine. that intuition. are not isolated. note). and treat their essential correlation as an external incident. or makes the concept its own. by cognitive intuition. by rational conception. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. however. etc. just so far as it realizes itself. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. remembers.

the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling.to the generalit ies of common sense . the mere consciousness point of view. external or internal. With us. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material.t he factor of fixing it as our own. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. a . as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content.an active self-collection . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. in t he truth of mind. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. with the character of something existent. projects it into time and space. even should its import be most sterl ing and true.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. this mode is simple.not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. Feeling is the immediate.his private and p articular self. is swallowed up. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. or at least to reasons . and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) . Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. has the form of casual particularity . ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. that is t o say. hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. may just as likely be narrow and poor. Now the material. 254). Hence feeling. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. as it were the closes t. In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.but to his feeling. . ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. but rather as subject ive and private. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. in content and value entirely contingent. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.

In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. as tho ught. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. we may say. or. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. i. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. . The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. the germ as affirmatively containing. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy. But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. for example. yet without being in consciousnes s. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. in virtual possibility. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. no longer needs to find the content. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. which. The representation is the property of intelligence. and inwardly divest itself of it. however. and is arbitrary or contingent. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. its when and where. t ime. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. as it at first recollects the intuition. from the external place. a rec ollection of itself. but stored up out of consciousness. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be. which makes it its own.the germ of the fruit. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. and immediate context in which the intuition stood.e. with a preponderating subjectivity. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. and received into the universality o f the ego. though intrinsically concrete. isolated. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. in the way we treat. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. still continues simple.in a space and a time of its own.

now that it has been endued with externality.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. present also a distinction in content. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. as a unit of intuition. or ide a). such as likeness and contrast.e. In the first place. which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. as of all intelligence. has always the peculiarity. Secondly. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. But it is solely in the conscious subject. The image. but a being of its own institution. reason and consequence. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it. has been broken up. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. the matter is entirely pictorial. though belonging to intelligence. if it is to exist. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion. . i. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. by which it is authenticated. where it is treasured up. immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality.viz. whatever be its content (from image. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. as a matter of fa ct. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. wherea s the idea (representation). and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. see Introduction to the Logic. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. comes actually into its possession. at first only in space and time.these modes of relation are not laws. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. being and universality. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own .Image and Idea. if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. where. which is now the power over them. that it finds its material. to be so and so. or an intell ectual category. and an out-put from its universal m ine. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest. notion.) . ¤ 20 note.. The content reproduced. under the representation (idea) with the same content. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness .¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs.

one's own and what is picked up. recollection. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. As reason. and becomes an i ndividuality.e. or poetical imagination . and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453). when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. this form of being. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. . or something of the sort. it is self-uttering. what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. but only a nominal reason. and in mechanical memory it completes. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. derived from some interest.the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. Acting on this view. i. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. but they are 'syntheses'. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. are completely welded into one. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. so far a s it is concerned. allegoric. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. In other words. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . a concrete subjectivity. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. some latent concept or Ideal principle. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. 435).. to universalize it. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. which forms their connecting link.still lacks the side o f existence. This force is really intelligence itself . concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. etc. is derived from the data of intuition. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . are unifications of t he same factors. Such is creative imagination(7) . internal and external. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. These more or less concrete. T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. for its ideal import is its elf. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material.symbolic. when regarded as the agency of this unification. Another point calling for special notice is that.Imagination. is reason. which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite.Abstraction. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. .

now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. This intuition is the Sign. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. its system. but appears as recipient of sensible matter.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. the colour of the cockade. The sign is some immediate intuition. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. language . it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. and the connotation of which it is a sign. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . whereas in the sign. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. e tc. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. Knarren. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. It is a n image.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space. . representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection). and even with conception and imagination. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . out of which it forms i deas . deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it.gives to sensations. strictly so-called.speech and. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. Sausen. something accepted. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne').). Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases . In logic and psychology. and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. its institution by intelligence.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. somewhat immediate or given (for example. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. when employed as a sign. But in the fusion of the two elements. ¤ 459 The intuition .that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds .. conception s. have nothing to do with each oth er. etc.there have been collected more than a hundred such words.invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm. With regard to the elementary material of language. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. the matter of the latter is. intuitions.th at of vocal objects. and where it is conserved. since memory. it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401). on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. has always to do with signs only. Such is the negativity of intelligence.R auschen. but as representative of something else. in the first instance. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l.

it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. only in pas sing. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. the planets . it depends. . viz. as many as ten a . has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. In particular. i. i. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. as regards signs for mental objects. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. and only get signification as signs. and now that. as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. as in our signs for the numbers. are frequently changed. like the Chinese. for example. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. instead of n ames proper. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. the denomination. W. the chemical elements. again. As to the formal elem ent. if it be not altogether extinguished. alphabetical writing.e. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. externalities which of themselve s have no sense. but. we may touch. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. etc. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. in chemistry and mineralogy. (Cf. they are reduced to signs. on anthropological articulation. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. It is only a stationary civ ilization.).the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties.e. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. . uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. as. The study of languages still in their original state. their signs in vocal language. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly.e. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. which severally receive designation.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. palate. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. on the other hand. i. and still takes place in Canton . tongue in each) and for their combinations.

whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. however ample a connotation it may include. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. Both alike require such signs.the mode. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. Thus.e. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character.nd twenty. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways.the name. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. of uttering its ideas most worthily . just as in modern times (as already noted. The European. peculiar to the intellect. so that. by speaking low and soft or crying out. Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . . This feature of hieroglyphic . in speaking.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Engaging the attention of intelligence. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. the simple plain idea. in the interest o f vision. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. or simple logical terms. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. Hieroglyphics. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. i. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. in the case of the Chinese Koua. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. as it does. it is analysed. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. is still for the mind simple in the name). learn ing to speak Chinese. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. like alphabetic writing. while (with the facu . the simple straight stroke. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity.

lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,

but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you

ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.

¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex

Thus it is. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. in which these facts. and thought. in its objectivity and truth. and evil. but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. it is because of their quality or co ntent . wha t is the same thing. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. namely God.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. we have this immanen . it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. On the other hand. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. but presented in its universality and necessity. If feelings are of the right sort. lack objective determin ation. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. may be placed. and precisely in that way d o they . for the latter.indeed infinitely so. so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. grief. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. But as both. on the one hand. and to discus s their content. in their universality and necessity. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant.. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . Whereas in life. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. and still more in mind. we have only to deal with the selfish. and duty. joy. is precisely what constitutes. shame. But where the objects sought are thus casual. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. etc. is the same content as the good practical feeling has.. etc. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. heart. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. in feeling. silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. in their immediacy. Delight. when thought.retain a speciality of their own .but only in antithesis to the latter . and will. it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. right. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. repentance.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. law and morality. contentment. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. bad. the truth and. can also be felt. volition.

each being always in conflict to another. as r egards the form of its content.a development in which the content of autonomous . however. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. the question is directly raised. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency. each with its private range). But with regard to the inclinations. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. Will. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. admitting of gratification. therefore. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment. ego. In what way have they. are infected with contingency.an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. and their truth. being all in one subjec t and hardly all.his inte rests of intellect. passion is neither good no r bad. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . The will. as rights and duties.and (as there are ma ny. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. Which are good and bad? . But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation.natural impulse and inclination. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. Thus. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . finds in the conformity . an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . freedom are the principles of evil and pain. they. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity. as experience shows. In consequence of this formalism. and something inappropriate to it. first of all. If the will is to satisfy itself.on one aim and object. on one hand. be the value of tha t mode what it may. their mutual connect ions. . on the other. but to ge t realized. It is on ly a dead. subjectivity . in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. while. too often. it is pa ssion. (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. character. indeed. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. Should. is at first still a natural will. What are the good and rational propensiti es.Up to what degree the good continue good.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. enjoyment . talent. The answer to the question. which is essentially self-d etermination. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such.

and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. moral. an inactive thing. which reflection and comparison have educed. and is option or choice. . with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. which is just as much no satisfacti on. i. on the whole to their disadvantage. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. inclinations. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content. I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . It is thus 'reflecting' will. are reduced to a m ere negative. They are somet imes contrasted. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. It rea lizes itself in a particularity.his passion. where the subject is made to close with itself.and one satisfaction. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . this is wh at is called the interest. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. on one hand. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. by another. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. without end. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. However.action loses its contingency and optionality. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. ¤ 476 The will. An action is an aim of the subject. the free gift of nature. which as such is the universal. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. as the content. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . so far as their particularity goes. is his interest and . as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. there would be no action at all.e. either alto gether or in part. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. and social duties. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. it is on them that the decision turns. an act of (at least) formal r ationality. As thus contradictory. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. unless he had an interest in it. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. that finds its actualizing in the agent. The morality concerns the content of the aim. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. of a universal sa tisfaction. as thinking and implicitly free. it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. Their mutual limitation. where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. the impulses. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity.

which i s pure and concrete at once. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will .the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. just because it is the very essence of mind. still this very I . is actu ality. or by s trength of character. i. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. As abstract Idea again. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). so that in this sphere of particular existence. as realizing the idea. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind.a universality which only ought to be. Plat o and Aristotle. i. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. The Greeks and Romans. only so far as it thinks itself . it is existent only in the immedi ate will . that men are aware of freedom as their essence. even the Stoics. It is thus 'Objective' Mind. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. that is. If the will. of the family. If to be aware of the Idea . man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. and object . ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. now that the formalism.e. he is actually free. aim. however.freedom itself. and are constituted after its measure. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. which realizes its own freedom of will. In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. education. and is will as free intelligence. with freedom itself. and have God's mind d welling in him: i. and of which it is only t he formal activity. for example. of present sensati on and volition. It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world.is matter of speculation.e . and are without it still.an individuality. Africa and the East. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. its very au tonomy or freedom. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being.it is the existential side of reason . By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. he h as also. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. knows this its concept. did not have it.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. ambiguous. as the substance of the state. and the abstract singleness. fortuitousness . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . or implicit Idea. therefore. If. According to Christianity. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. is in the first instance the rational will in general. in religion as such . In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning.e. the will is an actually free will. i. they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. etc.to be aware. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. or philosophy (. Whole continents. and that as its very actuality.sired . even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. On the contrary.e. the divine min d present with him. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . have never had this Idea. and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love.

4. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. as men.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function .not something which they have. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. into legal. Das Denken. Der Geist 2. 3. But this freedom. Die Einbildungskraft. Vorstellung. not with laws or court s of justice.a principle of the mind and heart. 7. 14. if they are made slaves. but which they are. Inwendiges. Der praktische Geist 13. 16. which the content and aim of freedom has. Anschauung. This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 11. Die Erinnerung 6. is itself only a notion . 10. 9. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Der freie Geist. and not less into scientific actuality. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase.dea itself is the actuality of men . but the pe rmanent character . its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. Die Gluckseligkeit. 12. Auswendiges. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. 1. Phantasie 8. moral. Die Intelligenz. Gedachtnis. religious. Das praktische Gefuhl. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. 15. 5.

is a duty. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. but as possession by a person it is property. receives the form of Necessity. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. or Usage. Liberty.. or instituted as an authoritative power. their absolute unity. i. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. and what is a duty. my right to a thing is not merely possession. in these externally objective aspects. private an d personal needs). viz.(1) When.. military service. are duties . in general. it is a Law. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse.e. etc. but in its universality. anthropological data (i. not in the form of impulse. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. in the light of the concept. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. where they. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. or legal possession. etc. relation to another person .e. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty. are no less its duties to punish. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. The penal judicature of a government. to be as a person. In the morality of the conscience. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. it exists as manner and custom. so as to become its habit. which splits up into different heads: viz. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. and is the vi rtual universal. and it is a duty to possess things as property. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. and brings into existence i n these several wills. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea. is also a right. What is a right is also a duty. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept.. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. For a mode of existence is a right. duty in general is in me a free subject . where free will has existence. is the Law (Right ) .at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. etc.this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. to administer. These conditi ons. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. its rights of admi nistration. Liberty. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). As it (and its content) belongs to thought. and character. are its Duties. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. as the services of the members of the State in dues. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. in relation to the subjective will. temper. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. on the other hand. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. But in this individualist moral sphere. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. which in it is thus at home with itself. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity.and aim. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity. being universal. But.

abstract right. though it remains in trinsically the same. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. The Right as Right (la w) is formal.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. But the set of adjustments. so as to have its existence inside it. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. 1. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. it is the right of the subjective will. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. but on an external thi ng. the infinite self-rela tion. Sitte A. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. civil society. As so characterized. it may be.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. and State. as in itself still abstract and empty. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. . Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. These extremes are the persons who. But this predicate. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. which as possession is a means. are simultaneously mutually independent. on its own account me rely 'practical'. This thing. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. by mere designation of it. and hence as a single being . in the knowledge of their identity as free. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. (B) When the will is reflected into self. the external sphere of its liberty . Gesetz 2. LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. at first in the outward appropriation. but as existence of the personality is an end. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals. possession is property. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. which is thus mutual. and the I in it is abstractly external. or by the formatio n of the thing or. is an individual.possession. morality of the individual conscience. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing. ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. as something devoid of will. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'.

produces a wrong: by which. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance. is affirmed. willed. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. which thus becomes wicked. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will.the full and complete deed. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. and its acceptance by the other will. It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing.). Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. and recogniz ed.just as well with draw it as not. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. 493 seqq. in that case. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. is disinterested. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. I can just as well put it in it as not . the only diversity lies in this. then the external rec . The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. its changing hands. but which. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. however. it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) . whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . universal thing or commodi ty. and. labour. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. because they face each other. ¤ 495 The contract. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance. non-malicious wrong. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. expressing the civil suit. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. which.Contract. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. This is naiv e. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). as the judgement of the intrinsically right. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. and time. But so far as my will lies in a thing.

in which the law of nature should hold sway.on self-determination or autonom y. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll.compulsion against the thing. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. The former used to be the common meaning. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on.where the nominal relation is retained. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action.e. the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will.a universal which holds good for him. which is nominal and recognized by him only . b ut the sterling value is let slip.) Thus the will is violently wicked. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right.punishment. or right as governed by the nature of things. on .in this case the apparent recognition. The law of nature . is at the same time only a new outrage. is a matter of chance). in revenge. This progression. even from the range of all existen ce. and while the former only is respected.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. which is disinterested . ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole. abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. But more than possible compulsion is not. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality.ognition of right is separated from the right's true value.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) .is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. being conformable to the right. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. or in corporeity. that of the judge. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will. But revenge. Conversel y. by the n otion.st rictly so called . It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. The 'reality' of right. and not merely the particular mode . ¤ 499 (3) Finally. This gives the wrong of fraud . an d so on without end. such an action is essentially and actually null. or Natural Right. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong. sets up a law . i. The social state. as a volitional and intelligent being. and commits a crime. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. from life. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights. like the last.a law.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . i. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will. and can be seized only in t his quarter. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. In it the agent. To display the nullity of such an act. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. howe ver. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. is the work of Revenge. the latter is violated.e.

recognition. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. In point of form. the will is at the same time made a particular. the reason of the will.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed. who. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. or even justification in his h eart.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. intelligence. and means the m ental or intellectual in general. Now. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. though any alteration as such. is now chara cterized as a subject . This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. in mere law. and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. 2. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. is its deed. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. Naturrecht. an d allows to be imputed to it. my part in i t is to this extent formal. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. which was its purpose. In French le moral is opposed to le physique. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. This is the right of intention. The subjective will is morally free. Moralitat 3. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. be its affection w hat it may. so far as these features are it s inward institution. sentiment. Das Recht.a will reflected into itself so that. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence.the other hand. embracing these individual point s.and also moral wickedness. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. so much as it has consciously willed. its own. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. it thus includes purpose and intention . etc. and thus comes into relationship with the former. but have their assent. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. and willed by it. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. 1. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. B. counts only as a person. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds. conscience. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general.

that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. essential and actual. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. it is always something particular. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. because the agent. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. sup erseding this absolute claim of each. These aims. constitute h is well-being. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. in point of its matter. interests. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. will . whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it. is always fundamentally one identity. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. can be wicked. as in happiness (¤ 479). This is the right to well-being. is not something external to him. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize.that it contains his needs. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination.g. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent. though it is a particular duty. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. the essential and actual good. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good. a good intention in case of a crime.a universal determined in its elf . following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. is as g ood and as duty absolute. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. his interest and welfare must. At the same time because good is one. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction .e. whether the . an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. they ought to stand in harmony.being only in this.and thus including in it particularity . And yet they ought to harmonize. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. and yet each of them. there awakes here the deepest contradiction. but is a particul arity of his own .ion. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. and aims. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. as individual and universal.

THE MORAL LIFE. good. which would only be abstract. in something external therefore. 6. and the wicked. Moralitat 2. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. which has no objectivity. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. and duty. non-universal.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. 1. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . expressed by this repeated ought. the truth of this semblance. On the affirmative side.the standpoint of the ought. on its negative side. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. The failure of the latter consists . In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . Wickedness. But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. is. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will.the utterly abstract semblance . The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. in this its identity with the good. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself.of Conscience and Wickedness. in the notion. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. Die Absicht und das Wohl. The result. The for mer is the will of goodness. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective .good is realized. and refuse it to the wicked. and of the good. the unutterable. its deepest descent into itself. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest. which is the good. is abandoned. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: . to be carried out in it. This pure self-certitude. right . i . th e essential thing. Das Gute und das Bose C. Der Vorsatz 3. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself. 5. The subjectivity. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not .sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . but is only sure of i tself. That. no more exist than not.to a goodness. is only the infinite form.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. an aim essentially and actually null. 4. which actualizes and dev elops it. Handlung. rising to its pitch. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself.

Marriage. in its immediacy.looks upon it as his absolute final aim. feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being .the genuine ethical temper. and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. in its ki nd. makes this union an ethical tie . ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond .th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust. In the latter sphere.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . to destiny.n a thing . it exists as confidence. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . The ethical personality. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence. is virtue. ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being.the Family. however. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal. whose independence it. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n . virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. In the shape of the family.monog . When these two impe rfections are suppressed. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. is confidence (trust) . controls and entirely dominates from within.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness.the Political Constitution. . the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. to a spiritual significance.Civil Society. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality. as personal virtues. But the person. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . i. as against the univers al. i. however. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage.yet somewhat which without all question is. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. manner and cu stom . This is the sexual tie. the individuality expres ses its special character. elevated. as deliberate work for the community. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. temperament. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. etc.where self-conscious liberty has become nature. has actuality as the spirit of a nation. Thus. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. that it is. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity.e . to the total of ethical actuality. without any selective refl ection. mind ap pears as feeling. it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. as an intelligent being.e. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. .

and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. originally foreign to it. destined. as private persons. information. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. learning. or state external. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . and thus produce more unconditional . and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. or nominal culture in general. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. as do also its industry. and care for the future. particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). acquire an existence of their own. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong. thus invested with independence. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention.in educating them to independent personality. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. ¤ 522 (3) The children. on the o ther hand. into families or individuals. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. of the possessor's will. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. This instrument. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. who exist independent and free. In virtue of such for tuitousness. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. to found anew such an actual family. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. on one hand. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. while. constitutes the general stock.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment. being an intelligent substance. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. however. of legal regulation. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. labour.

there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. talent. skill. the medium created by t he action of middlemen. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. But when right. as well as of mental culture and habit . this analysis.. and with it the State. Hence. which is honesty. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. or could be. exists.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. also of aims and interests. Where civil society. and so on ad infinitum. of mere agents.and ye t it should be decided. as vital. 2 3/4 . where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. determined through reason or legal intelligence. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality. of needs. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. certain. their recognition and their honour.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. Their content per se may be reasonable . 2 4/5 years. and accident. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. and a corresponding mode of labour. is developed i n detail.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . to be. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. on the side of external existence. which as existence is essentially a particular. be the righ t and just thing. and an ensemble of contingencies. and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were. they have their actual existence. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. its action gets direction and content through natural features.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . b ecause of the finitude of its materials. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . and industry. The third.the Law. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. Thus whether three years. and in it they have their social moralit y. in the course of definite manifestation. at every point. option. The second.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. It is a futile perfectionism to have . like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. however. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . and of means for satisfying them. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . intelligence. because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. and like the first a certain subsistence. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it.dependence on the social system. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. or only 2 * . ten thalers. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.

. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity. hereditary divinity or nobility. of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. by faith and trust. they touch only the abstract will .e.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. The comparison of the two species. in the judicial system.to the individualized right . within the house . i. the need of a simpler code . however. as in the mental ima ges of space.as this exists as revenge . or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion. not for them. Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. and in particular transforms this existence . This subjective existence. These people forget that the stars . recognized. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. .even as his law can only be a just law. as universal authority and necessity. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith .laws. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity.such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused .which though something new. ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. and t hus become authoritative .gets its universal guarantee through formalities. which discovers new distinctions. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail.vi z. with the advance in multitude. which again make new decisions necessary. general laws. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. like improvements on a f loor or a door. as it is a known law. has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel.are governed and well governed too by laws. but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice.and th e cattle too . or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos.the ne ed.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known. even the admiration. But there is a contrary case. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis .to be promulgated and made known as laws . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. of his countrymen. being laws o f strict right. first really de serving the name of laws. at the same time an externally objective existence. to which objective existence determines i tself.as proven: . is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not. there arises. as the genuine order of life. constit . which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect.into punishment (¤ 500). inasmuch as. are not a new hou se. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable. whic h are only internally in these objects. not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law. deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone .

¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. mere circumstantial evidence. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. which. So far as concerns them.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. then. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . and the judgement as application of the law to it. . is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. so as to secure this satisfaction. because it is only one factor. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. in a uniform gen eral way. the position of an external un iversality. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . as at bottom different sides. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. and their variable ingredients.'poli . In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal. shou ld. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. . as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. Conversely. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. appears as state. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. be exercised as different functions. from the c onnections between nation and nation.viz. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. Such an order acts with the power of an external state. It results also from circumstances of locality. because it is man's want. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. and worked from that point of view.and that. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. No doubt this factor is incomplete. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. to the concrete of civil society. In so far. To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. and to maint ain that end in them and against them. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition. and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals.

international (outer-state) law.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. which each originally takes care of for himself. (c) THE STATE. also for that will being put in actuality.one individual. it protects the family and guides civil society. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. then it promotes their welfare. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.co nsists in a double function. through the action of the government and its several branches.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. which. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. with all its evolution in detail. receiving. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. to the immediate agent. continually produce it as their result. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own . just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality. but. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. Thus we have the corpora tion. (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. his independent self-will and particular interest. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. Secondly. the state only is as an organized whole. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . self-originated. The cons titution is existent justice . differentiated in to particular agencies.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . in this direction . which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. This universal principle. it carries back both.the reasonable spirit of will. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals . It provides for the reasonable will . and not left to perish. The same unity. and. they are re strictions. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. but which has a thoroughly general side. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals .into the life of the universal substance. and . First it maintains them as persons. secondly. they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. On the other hand.which volition is thereby free . . s heer subjectivity. But. First. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence.as an actuality . in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing. Thirdly.and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love.ce'. ¤ 539 As a living mind. and self-develop ed . is its essence. however.

the final aim and result of the co nstitution. Really. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. Equality. without further specification and development. But that this freedom should e xist.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions.as regards taxation. or destroy them. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. etc. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. private as well as public rights of a nation. the familiar proposition. skill. magistracies . It is important therefore to study them closer.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. directories. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. presuppos e unequal conditions. The principle of equality. physical strength. . and that the laws are restrict ions. The laws themselve s. talent.pleasure an d self-will.punishment.besides their personalit y . except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. it embodies a liberty. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. eligibili ty to office. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. logically carried ou t.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. as regards the concrete. which it can without incompatibility allow.only it can make them . and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. Nothing has become. All men are by nature equ al. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. age. is so little by nature. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . as it exists as s uch. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. As regards Liberty. were called its 'liberties'. on the contrary. it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while. first. With the state there ari ses inequality. military service. etc. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. On the contrary. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. rejects all differences. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. the citizens . that the laws rule. the current notions of l . But the notion of liberty. otherwise have in property. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. Formerl y the legally defined rights. etc. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. But. the difference of governing powers and of governed. on the contrary. or even in crime.equal in the concrete. etc. town .. i. However true this is.e. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. Rome. authorities. As regards. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . etc. as it ha ppens. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. in other words. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . etc. is abstract subjectivity.

and the organization of the actualization of them. has an insight and conviction of his own . there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants.that which preserves. The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. . with this development of particularity.) But the guara ntee lies also. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. in other words continuall . of others. in which this is not formally done. and to regard a state. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. and must deal with them as it ca n.To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. Of it the following paragraphs will speak. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states. ¤ 541 The really living totality . of liberties in general. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les. and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n . with its insatiate vanity. and thus gains moral independence. The term political liberty. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications.iberty only carry us back to equality.e. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights.just because of this inseparability . the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. i. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. self-w ill and self-conceit. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. But the more we fortify liberty.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions.a thing that has nev er happened in history. The question . as a state without a constitution. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. is . But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. just as little as the making of a code of laws. be it added.as sec urity of property. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i. If . and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. not merely with regard to the naturalness.e . however. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development.

is the self-redintegrating notion. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. The government is the universal part of the con stitution. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein. is the state one. i.to make it the first power. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. Only through t he government. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to . i. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason. as always.in a state of society. however. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. and the government be merely executive and dependent . instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence).e. In the perfect form of the state. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea. the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al. which taken apart is also particular). (A mistake still greater. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . but an actual indiv idual . is the government. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. . all-decreeing will of the state. as in the patri archal society . are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. These. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason.su bject always. in other words. ¤ 542 In the government . and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. which includes an already existing development of differences. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . . in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. equally disorganizes actuality. as in a democratic constitution. But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power .the all-sustaining. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. of the family and of civil society. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society.monarchy.impugns the principle of the division of powers. the participation of all i n all affairs . this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'.y produces the state in general and its constitution.or.the will of a decreeing individual.e.regarded as organic totality .) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function.

the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. essentially. with their general opinion. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. These principles are those expounded earlier. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means.viz. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state .being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general . without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. and are to that degree private person s. . to subjectivity. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. admini stration of justice or judicial power. and then of nature . liberty of property. it may be . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. civil society. legislative power.in short.partly. and with earlier transition-forms. to that end and for that reason.are. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. For it is as private persons t . as it were. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . administration and police. first. and skill for such ends. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. which having their busin ess appointed by law. The pure forms .as also feudal monarchy. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration .'ideal' unity. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. with its industry and i ts communities. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. there arises the participation of several in state-business. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit . participate in the governmental power. The division of constitutions into democracy. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. Secon dly. and above all personal liberty. i. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . etc. being simple self-relation.e. Two points only are all-important. Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.such as ochlocracy. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. especially in legislation . That subjectivity . involve the. aristocracy and monarchy.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . in the history of the State. The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. an actual existence. too. possess independence of a ction. Thus. personal interference and action of th e State as one man.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government.. lik e peace and war. aptitude.the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance.

and form a particular kind . or in its 'reflectional' universality. ever newly recurring. Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. but as organic factors. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. range of the extern al means of government. Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. The des irability of such participation. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . which. however. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. so far as they form only one branch of that power . the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est.which should be presupposed. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. in the general sense of embracing a wide. s ense of general wants. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs.e. inorganic shape. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. in arrangements for art and science. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. be they treated as mere individuals.would be. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. in the law and liberty of property. brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. Experience s hows that that country .as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. that t hey enter upon that participation. it is not a brutish mass. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. demoralization. however. is no t self-destructive.regard ed as permanent. as the nation . and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. ¤ 529 note). The so-called financial law. wild. In a civilized state. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. as such an aggregate.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election). legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. moreover. blind force.as it very likely is .a spiritual element . elemental sea. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . and therefore more urgent. to power and act ion. as estates.the contrary must be the case . and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. If the main part of the requirement were . But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. like that of the stormy. Take the case of England which. indeed the whole. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. i. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs.

This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce.i. In one case the .so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. of the whole of the finances. nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals. a state of war. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. e. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . waywardness and chance have a place. when it makes a decree about finance. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . In their mutual relations. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . i. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other.g.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is.e. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. and becomes the estate of bravery.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. in which there would no longer be a government. as content o f a true law.e. but only parties.. Then again. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. and thus. or every few years. reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves .this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. afresh.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . is really engaged with strict executive business. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. and not to be made yearly. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many. and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and not actually existent. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake.

the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. when we come to minutiae. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. and on history-writing in general. which actually is and will be realized in it . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end.of sacerdotal races . in defiance of . is founded on an essential an d actual aim. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. It is in time. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. internat ional law rests on social usage. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. especially on the philological side. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. and then in history. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground.and. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. is appointed to occupy only one grade. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit .a world-mind. both this general recognition. however. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. in short. as it is a history. there is Reason in history. in short. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. each of which. that. are settled and fixed. On th is point. It has. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. That history. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. etc.the plan of Provide nce. In general. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. a history of its own. and above all universal history. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. this note must go into further deta il. As this development is in time and in real existence. is called an a prio ri view of it. an d the special claims of nations on one another.. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. it passes int o universal world-history. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. and as regards its range and scope. first in general. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. it.the judgement of the world. Fictions. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. and in Germany more than in France and England. of a Roman epic. has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality.

It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. has. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. or. e. and an exclusive interest in justice. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim. i. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. and takes place within it. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. but an age. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. The point of interest of Biography . a word. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances. a nation. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation).to say a word on that here . state. as in the romance.the best-accredited history. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. and criticize events.g. no history . if he had not an interest. on the other hand. is not only against taste and judgement. in the interest of so-called truth. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history.appears to run . and.e. But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. Rome and its fortunes. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. and rejects both ki nds of interest. Ay. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. or if he declined to judge at all. a civilization. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. not as good as a fairy tale. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality.). weave them into the pictur e of general interests. but violates th e principles of objective truth.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. in striking portraiture and brevity. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. strictly s peaking. But. What happens to a nation . and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. etc. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality. express not a subjective particularity.

and there fore as a work of individuals. are instruments. truth. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. 550). The mere play of sentiment.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. the absolute L aw. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth.or in other words that Reason is in history . and their subjectivity. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth. only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). and secondly. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. while it inheres in them. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. is the supreme right. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. But. these individuals. the consciousness of it. so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. etc. we may add. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged. Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. which is what is pe culiar to them. and the business of so doing. without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it.Fame. Only therefore through their relationship to it. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf .e. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth.an accurate report of externals. have they their value and even their existence.e. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. i. and are all treated as indifferent. which is their reward. only opinions and mere ideas. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. is the empty form of activity. and its content is prese . as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. But biography too has for its background the historical world. i. if Rome or the German empire. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. in this case. has another ground and interest than his tory. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will. to the history of religion. on the contary. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. a development determined by the notion of spirit. and of its essence. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit.e.e. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient. which all alik e have no stuff in them. liberty. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion. i. For Spirit is consciousn ess. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. i. potentially infinite.admitting. as over a special grade. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. really. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . Such a doctrine . etc. first in general. In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . the freak of humour.

and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. especially ¤ 51. and that on the religious. actually accomplished in the ethical world. This factor. But .e.consciousn ess. ¤ 204 not e). as true in the world of free will. Th e finite. is the real ethical self. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct. i. and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. in the system of laws and usages. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. Such apprehension. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. from which the start is now made. forme rly noticed. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. is the purification. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth.e. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. For that st arting. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. lays hold of its concr ete universality. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion.is the peculiar perversity. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude.as is the case with all speculative process . At this rat e. i. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. the idea of God it kn . Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. now gets its most concrete interpretation. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate . Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity. then perforce religion must have the genuine content. cf. i. that elevation to God really involves. note).Liberty. The spirit. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation.e.a mere 'ought' . as law and duty.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom.nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation. But the spirit which think s in universal history. however. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. As regards the 'mediation' which. i.e.

addressing his devotion to miracle. something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . one religious and an other ethical. and superstition.logi cally enough . i. i. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has. and ex pecting miracles from them. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state. (In the Lutheran Church. and even as mutually indifferent. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth. It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. generally.working images. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. but in the moment of enjoymen t.e. for thought and knowledge .of bondage. and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others.partly as mere moving of the lips. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. It leads. a condition of spiritual sla very. and these applications of it in the religious life. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . but purely subjective in individuals: . first of all. even to bones. religion was a late r addition. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. and law and justice. B . morality and conscience. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. in point of form. to justification by external wo rks. and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth.as the one religion which secures the stability of governments. in its faith and in its con science.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. the host as such is not at first consecrated. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. i.ows must be the true and real. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying . in the annihilation of its externality. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. then there may be created. It lea ds to a laity.e. And. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth .e. and in the act of faith. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. springing from some force and power. But in poin t of form. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free. differing from the former in body and value of truth.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. non-spirituality. i. responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root.e. and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. on the contr ary.or it may be.the body of religious truth. and prays others to pray .

moral life in the state. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit.in short. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. unte nable. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. the wisdom of the world. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. lacked liberty. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. . but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. Instead of the vow of chastity. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion. and. and thus only.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved.e. and in the use of property .ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). our consciousness and subjectivity. So long as t he form. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. i. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.e. a code of law should arise. i. Thus set free. and political institutions deduced from them must be. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. if taken alone. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order. founded on principles of reason. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. no matter how. the content of religion assumes quite another shape.of honesty in commercial dealing. And instead of the vow of obe dience. and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. which does not rise in hostility against them. i. self-realizing reason .e. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. therefore. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . so to speak a priori. can law and morality exist. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. . what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own. and in a special sense Philosophy. leads it into the rea l world. . Let us suppose even that. only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. The precept of religion. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family. sti . Thus.the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. because the state is a self-possessed.

This additional 'individuality' . It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them.to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion.the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . to put it simply.is the intellectual and thinking self. on the other hand. as the universal in a mental concept or idea. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities. which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own. This absolute nucleus of man . t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. thus founder on the conscience. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. so-called 'chambers'. and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. ¤ 544 note).among which laws these guarantees are included. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . .mi nd intrinsically concrete . or. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth . thus surmountin . Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . (cf. from those deeper requirements which. and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. Such laws.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content.ll. however sound their provisions may be.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought . Opposed to what religion pronounces holy. that the Idea must be regent. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. At best it is only a temporary expedient . What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.is just this . on one hand.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. when specially set in relief as genus. and the power given them to fix the budget. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought.g.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. e. etc. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind.. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded.

The form in its infinite tru th. Under the subjective form.). which still escaped his intelligence. Political power. as demoralization. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. so . fall feeling. which is awa re of its own essence. he. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'.the idea of the substantial moral life. or essential being). Religion may. But thought always . he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. of philosophy. and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . religion. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. etc. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states.g the Platonic Idea (the genus. as it grows and expands. or rather must.the form which ph ilosophy attacked . and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind. intuition.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. which is developed similarly. ¤ 513. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. Plato. for th ese reasons.was that creative imagination. Only in the principle of mind. on its own s howing. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. the subjectivity of mind. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. But even religion.and th at on account of this very principle .). from religion. earlier than it does as philosophy. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion).each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state. in its f irst immediate. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. is after all only in one of its form s. wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. but earlier than philosophy. however. exhibits the one-sidedness. and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd. His state is therefore. in its philosophic phase. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. and so also one-sided phase. As it left therefore behind. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations. should knit it together and control it. pictorial representation. is implicitly in absolute liberty. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. Hence religion as such. Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy .

Die Sittlichkeit. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. Religion. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. 4. 2.e. the constitut ion and the code. 7. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. of God's indwelling in us. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. Weltweisheit. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. In the Protestant state. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual. Gesetz. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. Die Weltgeschichte 10. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. Die Rechtspflege 5. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. Thus ul timately. 6. 9. That here. as always. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. and if that and not the truth as such is called for . ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. i. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea.as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). Das aussere Staatsrecht. Die Polizei und die Corporation. while it is self-centred identity. Das System der Bedurfnisse. Inneres Staatsrecht. 8. as well as their several applications. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note). 1. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. but rather to a sort of knowledge. 3. for which it is as substance.

something formal. 1. or the idea. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . and of gaining its concrete determination. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. ¤ 411). its n atural immediacy. like the material which it uses to work in. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y. viz. Art requires not only an external given material . because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. but . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. c an. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. . when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail. on the other hand. as it is.hence not the sp iritual unity. In this ideal. A. reconciliation. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it. But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form .the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. the actuality of the spirit. Belief. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism.i. But.for the expression of spiritual truth . or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. as superseded in spirit. Der absolute Geist. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. which is only a sign of the Idea.e.He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . so that the thought embodied.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea.the form of immediacy as such .(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). into the subject which produces that work. that is. aware. On one hand. not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art.in other words. With the essential restrictedness of its content. has in devotion .the shape or form of Beauty.

is not yet absolute. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. though concrete and intrinsically free. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. is not yet known.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. as free spi rit.can try to bring itself to consciousness. that one spirit creates and informs them. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . as well as of its art and science. As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. assumes fuller and firmer features. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form.symbolic art. and of its constitution. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. the principle of its law. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy. but its inmost depth.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . but as only finding himself in himself. known as the Absolute.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. not yet conscious of itself.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. the artist's enthusiasm. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive.stil l this art is defective.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history. in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and th e artist is the master of the God. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. and that is where the infinite form. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. . That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. or an effor t towards him . of its actual liberty. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . subjectivity.

of Nemesis. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. The old conception .into revelation. revealed by God. and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. in which he had not revealed himse lf. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. shows that such religion is on the decline. B.the religion i. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form.that it be revealed. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. we see that the advent of art. has its future in true reli gion. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit . and j ust for that reason.e. The older religion in which the need of fine art. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle. it is from Him. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. the theme and c entre of religion.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. is first generated. dashing t o pieces everything high and great . expression. and brilliancy. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical. looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . . like the religion peculiar to it. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . Beautiful art.ent in it. as infinite self-realizing form . still more in that external. and.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. what is more. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out.The genuine objectivity.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. . and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. spectator find themselves at home. not the supreme liberation itself. from it s side.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull. which is only in the medi um of thought . The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. Beautiful art. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne.due to a one-sided survey of human life . whose con tent is absolute mind . that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . But with a further and deeper study. At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. on the contrary. unbeautiful sensuo usness. with their perso nal sense and feeling. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit.

standing in action an d reaction with such nature.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. directed towards the Eternal. and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. but afterwards. It includes.on the other hand.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. by C. staying aloof and inert.requires careful and thorough speculation. in point of content. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. a separate being. And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . of the world it gave away . again. further. however. abiding sel f-centred.. it is. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . and reconciliation with the eternal being. first of all. in it s forefront..the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . (a) as eternal content. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . which proceeds to man's self.1. on the other hand. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. Yet. as the extreme of inherent negativity. it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. the elemental and the concrete nature . such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. which therefore is finite. when it thinks. only standing to it in an external connection. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. the spirit. it implies the revelation of Him. and phenomena which succeed each other. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. That spirit. which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters.: Berlin 1829. . amid that natural ness.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. . their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded.just as.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . for that reas on. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. making them presuppositions towards each other.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. not. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation. and. ¤ 566 In this separating. but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. G . ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. on one hand. To know what God as spirit is . completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. (c) as infinite return. as in duty bound.knowledge in God. F.it is therefore the absolute spirit.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. while in point of form he is. to specul ative comprehension. in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. though. with whom. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. even in its manifestation. he still remains in original identity . the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . But. though different. But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. Go d is. it may almost create surprise that so many. On one hand is heaven and earth.is the Spirit.of the only Son . or of judgement.

yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. But.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms.the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself .and. secondly. simple. PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . contentless sense. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . this immediate. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. remains master over it. Whereas the vision-method of Art. an object of contemplating vi sion . with a temporal and external sequence. by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. Die geoffenbarte Religion. In this form of truth. is but subjective production and shivers the sub .Irony. If the result . is itself the emptiness and vanity. but even to thought. This individual. with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. and thus sensuous.is taken in a merely formal. is not bound by it . are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. C. From this its separation into p arts. Irony. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. truth is the object of philoso phy. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content.is transplanted into the world of time. eternal. he. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. gives itself direction and con tent.of subjectivity and the no tion itself. in which he. throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought.but the vision of implicit truth. and thus. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. so far. Thinking. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. and eternal spirit in itself. through which witness of the spirit in him. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result . . so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. his natur al man and self-will. keeps himself unchanged. on account of his immediate nature. after the example of his truth. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form. who as such is identified with the essence . Further.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) . th e self-centred manifestation. as infinite subjectivi ty. external in point of form. 1. but alive and present in the world. which from itself. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such .

wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man. to be more precise still. with its separ ation into parts. but also criticized it.on one hand. or. too much for the latter. immediate vision and its poetry. when at the close it seizes its own notion .('Rationalism') . only looks back on its knowledge. The charge of Atheism. But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy .it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. when driven to expound itself.leaving out. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence.which may be in both the same . which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God).i. and whereas Religion. It had t oo little of God in it for the former. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . as also of the necessity in the two forms . or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . a nd of logic in particular. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object.stantial content into many separate shapes. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.e.on the other hand. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion. but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. elevation of them into the absolute form. which determines itself to content. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. opens it out in mental picture. This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. and s o religious. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies.takes. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . This does not prevent the spirit. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. which philosophy is.the underlying essence in all humanity . of course. and this necessary as free. and against philosophy in general . If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion. This movement. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. and mediates what is thus open ed out. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. remains identical with it. This witness . It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity.from these forms. and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. finds itself already accompl ished. and acts inconsistently towards them. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general.and from a pithless orthodoxy. and particularly of the logical form.

For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. if we believe them. This new theology. or any one man. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. that. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. God in General. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. also contains the generic abs tract. To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e.that of the Hindu to ass es. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .of the new piety and new theology. It is only his own stupidity.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . does not comprehend itself. or Pantheism. its grossest shape. open to our disposal on this topic.in the wanton assertion. Piety. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) .the Bhagavat-Gita. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached.that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves. and is therefore. Amongst the abundant resources. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. I select . and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical. had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: . Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism.each and every secular thing is God. we must. and amongst it s effusions. most sublime. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. in particular. that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine.is always adora tion of an object which. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality.so much so.(empirical things.so much so. fulfilled notion of God.or to dalai-lamas .as the most authentic statement accessible . and form all that is definite in the divine universality. But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. exclusi ve. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact. the secularity of th ings. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God. as it stands. from which all definite quality is excluded. as is well known. ¤ 71 note). whether higher or lower in the scale. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. are) . some of the most telling passage . or if you will. On such a presuppo sition. If this theory needs no more than such a God. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . that it has too much of him: . without distinction.which therefore it does not disparage. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things.g. goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e.all possess substantia lity. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. but as a proved fact. which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. and so .of Pantheism. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. Without interest of its own for the concrete.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. are unable and unwilling to see this . The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions.thus he understands philosophy . or a sheer fact which needs no p roof.Everything is . with all its absurdities.that of the Egyptians to the ox .(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. cows .

so powerless its.'I am the self. . . nothing independent]. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . . which he is. . . melt into the one Krishna. like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. I am the light of th e sun and the moon.. unessential existences.not everything. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his. pp. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. even Siva. where the empirical everything of the world. however. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings .' This 'All'. .the most excellent of everything. But so little concrete is this divine unity . this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. .' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression. The undiscerning ones. as different from that accidental. middle. . is also the maddest of polytheisms. is alo ne the divine and God. with a monstrous incons istency. . . . This everything. he is said to be the beginning. . is not. . . p. . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. than which there is nothing higher. . Meru among the high-topped mountains. so to speak . and the moon among the lunar mansions.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. t he pure unity of thought in itself. Hinduism. at the beginning of the pass age. Even when. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . . I am "Om" in all the Vedas. all this is woven upon me. 'At the end of many lives. I am also the strength o f the strong. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. . and one essential amongst them. . goodness. grip. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. vanish. .). think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. or a God besides. . the Everything. . etc. Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith. passion. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism.spiritual as its idea of God i s . And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. .. besides Krishna. to a poly theism. or Indra. but having its truth in the substance. . the One which. which Krishna calls himself. There is nothing else higher than myself. . any more than the Eleatic One. I am the spring amo ng the seasons.that Hinduism. called Gods. . and end of living things. . But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable.. as he said before he was S iva. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. I am life in all beings. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me. 7 seqq. but only . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. seated in the hearts of all beings. as also those proximate substantialities. rather. Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . . . so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . and the Spinozan Substance. . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. has the higher conception of Brahma. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. . . . Indra. .' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) .s. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. without essential being of its very own. . still God. . I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. Among letters I am the letter A. I am the taste in water.

imagination or speculation. For that unity. the Eleatic. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. we must consult th e Mohammedans. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. But. e. of the relationship of God and the world. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. and so on .ndu. when he adores the ape. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. moreover. But to go back again to the question of fact. and.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. modes of envisaging God.) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. as the endless lot of empirical existence. It is only the picture . and of empirical secular spirit.not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought.floating in the indefinite blue . as it says. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. ac osmical.on the shallow conception of it . (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld.of the world as one thing. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies. The clo se of philosophy is not the place. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God. even in a general exoteric discussion. empirical indivi duals . he is as essence parted from appearance. a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. whether they spring from heart. outside it . But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. the all. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual. or other creature. Of the oriental. is identical with the world. we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. If. Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. on the contrary. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness. That pantheism indeed . and on the other. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m..keep its independence. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God. especially the Mohammedan. to which everything is God. but . and God everything. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence. Hin du monotheism. secondl y. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. as infinite from the finite. or Spinozist. which. is discarded and absor bed.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. to was . These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. and that unity described as love. or. on one hand.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. after this partition. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic..g. in relation to the popular idea of the world.in its finest purity and sublimity. the finite to the infinite. as everything. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth.

Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. with God's omnipresence.te a word on what a 'notion' means. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. mere ide ntity. perhaps under the more familiar names of e. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. I n the philosophical field they proceed. a nd assert . composition. where they are utterly unknown. it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. in the pores of th e physicists .that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. etc. e.g.has the same solid substantiality as the other. but rather its reverse. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. and lose sight of the chief point of interest .and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another.and relation i pso facto implies unity .and s till less take trouble about it .that. in matters admitted to be of superior. the most external and the worst. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. when they hear of unity . Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them. and that amongst the m there is great variety.is identity. as Epicu rus does. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures.or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) . or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.and that the factor of indet erminateness .that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. and that it is the system of identity. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity. but only the one factor of this category of relation . the notion and content of philosophy. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. and that hence. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. But the question is. if not even of supreme interest. Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. as in the physical field the physicist. they import them into philosophy.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. is what one expect s. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one.g. i. with indefinite ideas. . not the concrete unity. it is not. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. viz.e. they have laid hands on. at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. omnipresence. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. providence. but with concrete unity (the notion). inorganic and living . The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity.the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. and the empty absolute. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general.falsely as a fact .the world as much as Go d . who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world. they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. however. and which they ascribe to philosophy.said pores being the negative. And as in their judgement either of the two . with abstract unity.

as other than they. y .it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. standing between the Mind and its essence. for its middle term: a middle. which . and which is itself the way to produce it. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea. On account of this chorus of assertions. on the shoulders of philosophy. is philosophy itself. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. as of cognitions.their everything. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. of which liberty is the aim. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor.knowing reaso n. an All-one doctrine. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . the absolutely universal. not abstract unity. But to put that sort of thing. But in ascribing to God. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. in his relation to the world. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: .presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. which causes the movement and development. i.e.which. and notions . and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. then.it is the nature of the fact. which has self. but the many-shaped modes specified. a system of identity. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. Nature . they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. and the latter its universal extreme. The esoteric study of God and identity. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . making the former its presupposition.by which notions are perverted into their opposite. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. If statements as to facts are put forward. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. or as prevaricating for a purpose. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded.as the mediating agent in th e process . The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575.ity . only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. sunders itself. and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions. the notion. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself.and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning.the logical system.

. eternally sets itself to work. The eternal Idea. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition. in f ull fruition of its essence.

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