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INTRODUCTION SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE SUB-SECTION A. ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL SUB-SECTION B. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS SUB-SECTION C. PSYCHOLOGY, MIND SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE A. LAW(1) B. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) C. THE MORAL LIFE, OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) A. ART B. REVEALED RELIGION(1) C. PHILOSOPHY Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences INTRODUCTION ¤ 377 The knowledge of Mind is the highest and hardest, just because it is the mos t 'concrete' of sciences. The significance of that 'absolute' commandment, Know thyself - whether we look at it in itself or under the historical circumstances of its first utterance - is not to promote mere self-knowledge in respect of the particular capacities, character, propensities, and foibles of the single self. The knowledge it commands means that of man's genuine reality - of what is esse ntially and ultimately true and real - of mind as the true and essential being. Equally little is it the purport of mental philosophy to teach what is called kn owledge of men - the knowledge whose aim is to detect the peculiarities, passion s, and foibles of other men, and lay bare what are called the recesses of the hu man heart. Information of this kind is, for one thing, meaningless, unless on th e assumption that we know the universal - man as man, and, that always must be, as mind. And for another, being only engaged with casual, insignificant, and unt rue aspects of mental life, it fails to reach the underlying essence of them all - the mind itself. ¤ 378 Pneumatology, or, as it was also called, Rational Psychology, has been alrea dy alluded to in the Introduction to the Logic as an abstract and generalizing m etaphysic of the subject. Empirical (or inductive) psychology, on the other hand , deals with the 'concrete' mind: and, after the revival of the sciences, when o bservation and experience had been made the distinctive methods for the study of concrete reality, such psychology was worked on the same lines as other science s. In this way it came about that the metaphysical theory was kept outside the i nductive science, and so prevented from getting any concrete embodiment or detai l: whilst at the same time the inductive science clung to the conventional commo n- sense metaphysics with its analysis into forces, various activities, etc., an d rejected any attempt at a 'speculative' treatment. The books of Aristotle on the Soul, along with his discussions on its special as pects and states, are for this reason still by far the most admirable, perhaps e ven the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic. The main aim of a philo sophy of mind can only be to reintroduce unity of idea and principle into the th eory of mind, and so reinterpret the lesson of those Aristotelian books. ¤ 379 Even our own sense of the mind's living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other. But the craving for a comprehension of the unity is still further stimulated, as we soon come ac ross distinctions between mental freedom and mental determinism, antitheses betw een free psychic agency and the corporeity that lies external to it, whilst we e qually note the intimate interdependence of the one upon the other. In modern ti mes especially the phenomena of animal magnetism have given, even in experience, a lively and visible confirmation of the underlying unity of soul, and of the p ower of its 'ideality'. Before these facts, the rigid distinctions of practical common sense are struck with confusion; and the necessity of a 'speculative' exa mination with a view to the removal of difficulties is more directly forced upon the student. ¤ 380 The 'concrete' nature of mind involves for the observer the peculiar difficu lty that the several grades and special types which develop its intelligible uni ty in detail are not left standing as so many separate existences confronting it s more advanced aspects. It is otherwise in external nature. There, matter and m ovement, for example, have a manifestation all their own - it is the solar syste m; and similarly the differentiae of sense-perception have a sort of earlier exi stence in the properties of bodies, and still more independently in the four ele ments. The species and grades of mental evolution, on the contrary, lose their s eparate existence and become factors, states, and features in the higher grades of development. As a consequence of this, a lower and more abstract aspect of mi nd betrays the presence in it, even to experience, of a higher grade. Under the guise of sensation, for example, we may find the very highest mental life as its modification or its embodiment. And so sensation, which is but a mere form and vehicle, may to the superficial glance seem to be the proper seat and, as it wer e, the source of those moral and religious principles with which it is charged; and the moral and religious principles thus modified may seem to call for treatm ent as species of sensation. But at the same time, when lower grades of mental l ife are under examination, it becomes necessary, if we desire to point to actual cases of them in experience, to direct attention to more advanced grades for wh ich they are mere forms. In this way subjects will be treated of by anticipation which properly belong to later stages of development (e.g. in dealing with natu ral awaking from sleep we speak by anticipation of consciousness, or in dealing with mental derangement we must speak of intellect). What Mind (or Spirit) is ¤ 381 From our point of view mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it i s the truth, and for that reason its absolute prius. In this its truth Nature is vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself. Here the subject and object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unit y, the notion. This identity is absolute negativity -for whereas in Nature the i ntelligent unity has its objectivity perfect but externalized, this self-externa lization has been nullified and the unity in that way been made one and the same with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a r eturn out of nature. ¤ 382 For this reason the essential, but formally essential, feature of mind is Li berty: i.e. it is the notion's absolute negativity or self-identity. Considered as this formal aspect, it may withdraw itself from everything external and from its own externality, its very existence; it can thus submit to infinite pain, th e negation of its individual immediacy: in other words, it can keep itself affir mative in this negativity and possess its own identity. All this is possible so long as it is considered in its abstract self-contained universality. ¤ 383 This universality is also its determinate sphere of being. Having a being of its own, the universal is self-particularizing, whilst it still remains self-id entical. Hence the special mode of mental being is 'manifestation'. The spirit i
s not some one mode or meaning which finds utterance or externality only in a fo rm distinct from itself: it does not manifest or reveal something, but its very mode and meaning is this revelation. And thus in its mere possibility mind is at the same moment an infinite, 'absolute', actuality. ¤ 384 Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the abstract Idea, is an unmedia ted transition to Nature which comes to be. As mind is free, its manifestation i s to set forth Nature as its world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus se tting forth its world, at the same time presupposes the world as a nature indepe ndently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being - a being in which the mind procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom. The Absolute is Mind (Spirit) - this is the supreme definition of the Absolute. To find this definition and to grasp its meaning and burden was, we may say, the ultimate purpose of all education and all philosophy: it was the point to which turned the impulse of all religion and science: and it is this impulse that mus t explain the history of the world. The word 'Mind' (Spirit) - and some glimpse of its meaning - was found at an early period: and the spirituality of God is th e lesson of Christianity. It remains for philosophy in its own element of intell igible unity to get hold of what was thus given as a mental image, and what impl icitly is the ultimate reality; and that problem is not genuinely, and by ration al methods, solved so long as liberty and intelligible unity is not the theme an d the soul of philosophy. Subdivision ¤ 385 The development of Mind (Spirit) is in three stages: (1) In the form of self-relation: within it it has the ideal totality of the Ide a - i.e. it has before it all that its notion contains: its being is to be selfcontained and free. This is Mind Subjective. (2) In the form of reality: realized, i.e. in a world produced and to be produce d by it: in this world freedom presents itself under the shape of necessity. Thi s is Mind Objective. (3) In that unity of mind as objectivity and of mind as ideality and concept, wh ich essentially and actually is and for ever produces itself, mind in its absolu te truth. This is Mind Absolute. ¤ 386 The two first parts of the doctrine of Mind embrace the finite mind. Mind is the infinite Idea, and finitude here means the disproportion between the concep t and the reality - but with the qualification that it is a shadow cast by the m ind's own light - a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barr ier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become consciou s of freedom as its very being, i.e. to be fully manifested. The several steps o f this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the func tion of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps i n its liberation. In the full truth of that liberation is given the identificati on of the three stages - finding a world presupposed before us, generating a wor ld as our own creation, and gaining freedom from it and in it. To the infinite f orm of this truth the show purifies itself till it becomes a consciousness of it . A rigid application of the category of finitude by the abstract logician is chie fly seen in dealing with Mind and reason: it is held not a mere matter of strict logic, but treated also as a moral and religious concern, to adhere to the poin t of view of finitude, and the wish to go further is reckoned a mark of audacity , if not of insanity, of thought. Whereas in fact such a modesty of thought, as
treats the finite as something altogether fixed and absolute, is the worst of vi rtues; and to stick to a post which has no sound ground in itself is the most un sound sort of theory. The category of finitude was at a much earlier period eluc idated and explained at its place in the Logic: an elucidation which, as in logi c for the more specific though still simple thought-forms of finitude, so in the rest of philosophy for the concrete forms, has merely to show that the finite i s not, i.e. is not the truth, but merely a transition and an emergence to someth ing higher. This finitude of the spheres so far examined is the dialectic that m akes a thing have its cessation by another and in another: but Spirit, the intel ligent unity and the implicit Eternal, is itself just the consummation of that i nternal act by which nullity is nullified and vanity is made vain. And so, the m odesty alluded to is a retention of this vanity - the finite - in opposition to the true: it is itself therefore vanity. In the course of the mind's development we shall see this vanity appear as wickedness at that turning-point at which mi nd has reached its extreme immersion in its subjectivity and its most central co ntradiction. SECTION ONE - MIND SUBJECTIVE ¤ 387 Mind, on the ideal stage of its development, is mind as cognitive. Cognition , however, being taken here not as a merely logical category of the Idea (¤ 223), but in the sense appropriate to the concrete mind. Subjective mind is: (A) Immediate or implicit: a soul - the Spirit in Nature - t he object treated by Anthropology. (B) Mediate or explicit: still as identical r eflection into itself and into other things: mind in correlation or particulariz ation: consciousness - the object treated by the Phenomenology of Mind. (C) Mind defining itself in itself, as an independent subject - the object treated by Ps ychology. In the Soul is the awaking of Consciousness: Consciousness sets itself up as Rea son, awaking at one bound to the sense of its rationality: and this Reason by it s activity emancipates itself to objectivity and the consciousness of its intell igent unity. For an intelligible unity or principle of comprehension each modification it pre sents is an advance of development: and so in mind every character under which i t appears is a stage in a process of specification and development, a step forwa rd towards its goal, in order to make itself into, and to realize in itself, wha t it implicitly is. Each step, again, is itself such a process, and its product is that what the mind was implicitly at the beginning (and so for the observer) it is for itself - for the special form, viz. which the mind has in that step. T he ordinary method of psychology is to narrate what the mind or soul is, what ha ppens to it, what it does. The soul is presupposed as a ready-made agent, which displays such features as its acts and utterances, from which we can learn what it is, what sort of faculties and powers it possesses - all without being aware that the act and utterance of what the soul is really invests it with that chara cter in our conception and makes it reach a higher stage of being than it explic itly had before. We must, however, distinguish and keep apart from the progress here to be studie d what we call education and instruction. The sphere of education is the individ uals only: and its aim is to bring the universal mind to exist in them. But in t he philosophic theory of mind, mind is studied as self-instruction and self-educ ation in very essence; and its acts and utterances are stages in the process whi ch brings it forward to itself, links it in unity with itself, and so makes it a ctual mind.
perhaps. but soul. THE SOUL (a) The Physical Soul (a) Physical Qualities (b) Physical Alterations (c) Sensibility (b) The Feeling Soul (a) The Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (b) Self-feeling (c) Habit (c) The Actual Soul A. But as it is st ill conceived thus abstractly. ¤ 389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. which may also be f ound enumerated among them. Wherever there is Nature. the sou l is its universal immaterialism. means therefore that Nature in its own self realizes its untruth and sets itself aside: it means that Mind presuppo ses itself no longer as the universality which in corporal individuality is alwa ys self-externalized. has been completely dissipated and transmuted into un iversality. but even every other aspec t of existence which might lead us to treat it as material. These 'imponderables' . on the other. i.. however. Mind is the exis tent truth of matter . even the capacity of offering resistance. a sensible existe nce and outness of part to part. eac h being supposed to be found only in the pores of the other. a nd the soul remains the pervading.with th is proviso. have still. as absolute negativity. and not as the immediate or natural individual. and the only problem was how to comprehend it. which is potentially all things. where the othe . in a sense. they are as impenetrable to each other as one piece of matter to another. identical ideality of it all. as such a result. matter is regarded as something true. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters. however. its simple 'ideal' life.SUB-SECTION A. A cognate question is that of the community of soul and body. But not merely is it. the soul is only the sleep of mind . Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought. There. and so the self-externalism. whereas the 'vital' matter. This community (in terdependence) was assumed as a fact. The fact is that in the Idea of Life the self-externalism of nature is implicitl y at an end: subjectivity is the very substance and conception of life . and mind conceived as a thin g. or the subjective ideality of the conceptual unity. and. li ght. At such a stage it is not yet mind. except where. to which they might perhaps add space and time. in the intelligible unity which exists as freedom. if we take them to be absolutely antithetical and absolutely independen t. indeed. ANTHROPOLOGY THE SOUL ¤ 388 Spirit (Mind) came into being as the truth of Nature.e. like heat. to be held the true and real first of what went before: this b ecoming or transition bears in the sphere of the notion the special meaning of ' free judgement'. on the one hand. but as a universality which in its concretion and totality is one and simple. ANTHROPOLOGY. thus come into being. was to call it an incomprehensible mystery. The usual answer.the truth that matter itself has no truth. that its existence or objectivity is still at the same time forfeited to the away of self-externalism. Mind. It is otherwise with Mind. the object or the reality of the intell igible unity is the unity itself. etc. which is the fund amental feature of matter. The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest.the passive of Aristotle. which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and. not merely lacks gravity.
and always more or less. and with that corporeity it exists as actual soul. (a) THE PHYSICAL SOUL(1) ¤ 391 The soul universal. so holding. which come insanity) and at periods has a more solid and vigorous influence. re tains an abstract independence.whence Epicurus. m ust not be fixed on that account as a single subject. and telluri c life of man. and the periods of the day.r is not . it is rather the universal substance which has its actual truth only in individuals and single subjects. the changes of the seasons. when it presents itself as a single soul. even these few and slight susceptibilities. it is a soul which feels. Descartes. behind it s ideality a free existence: i. Spinoza. bu t objects to which the soul as such does not behave as to something external. which only is. These have. on the contrary. but rather as the sole true identity of finite mind and matter. just in proportion to his civilization. feels the difference of climates. In nations less intellectually emancipated. as in the case of Lei bniz. Animals and pl ants. when attributing to the gods a residence in the pore s. as so often is done. was consistent in not imposing on them any connection with the world. But either this identity. described. and the identity is only like the co pula of a judgement. there philosophers took God. we find amid their superstitions and aberrations of imbecility a f ew real cases of such sympathy. it is a single soul which is mere ly: its only modes are modes of natural life. not. The history of the world is not bound up with revolutions in the solar system. and does not rise or develop into system. .e. a world-soul.(a) In its immediate natural mode . as in the case of Spinoza. as an anima mundi. which therefore live more in harmony with nature. Th ese features rather are physical qualities of which it finds itself possessed. any more than the destinies of individuals with the positions of the planets. and on that foundation what seems to be marvello us prophetic vision of coming conditions and of events arising therefrom. the result is a distinction be tween soul and the corporeal (or material). In such a sympathy with nature the animals essentially live: thei r specific characters and their particular phases of growth depend. (c) Thirdly. in many case s completely. This life of nature for the main show s itself only in occasional strain or disturbance of mental tone. (b) Secondly. it does so only by an act of judgement or choice. in the modes of that being. But as mental freedom gets a deeper hold. sidereal. ¤ 390 The Soul is at first . (a) Physical Qualities(2) ¤ 392 (1) While still a 'substance' (i. though his Monad of monads brings things into being. and the m ore his whole frame of soul is based upon a sub-structure of mental freedom.is moulded into it. But the respo seasons and hours of the day is found only in faint ch expressly to the fore only in morbid states (including when the self-conscious life suffers depression. upon it. A somew hat different answer has been given by all philosophers since this relation came to be expressly discussed. In recent times a good deal has been said of the cosmical. T hus. remain for ever subject to such influences. and. etc. In the case of man these points of dependence lose importance. so to speak. is too abstract. They meant that the finitude of soul and matter w ere only ideal and unreal distinctions. as individualized. enter s into correlation with its immediate being. based upon participation in the common life of nature.e. Hence.the natural soul. The difference of climate nse to the changes of the anges of mood. disappear. it may be. with Leibniz. and Leibniz have al l indicated God as this nexus. a physical soul) the mind takes part in the general planetary life. its immediate being . and.or corporeity . merely as another word for the incomprehensible. Malebranche. into the absolute syllogism. or. they are natural objects for consciousness.
but able in the work which it collectively achieves to a fford the individual a place and a security for his performance. physiognomy. ¤ 397 (2) Next we find the individual subject to a real antithesis.a worl d no longer incomplete. subjectivity remaining in an instinctive a nd emotional harmony of moral life and love. ¤ 394 This diversity descends into specialities. on its one side. but still more in the inner tendency and capacity of the intellectual and m oral character of the several peoples. Thirdly. hopes. on the whole. or other disposition and idiosyncrasy. fancies.the sexual relation . He begins with Childhood . and not pushing these tendencies to an extreme universal phase. on its idealist side gains freedom from the li mited interests and entanglements of the outward present (Old Age).on a ph ysical basis. the land towards the north pole being mo re aggregated and preponderant over sea. scientific. shows an active half. gaining an effective existenc e and an objective value (Manhood). give expression to t he nature of the geographical continents and constitute the diversities of race. whereas in the southern hemisphere it r uns out in sharp points. leading it to seek and find itself in another individual. and on the other. we find its diversities. (b) Physical Alterations ¤ 396 Taking the soul as an individual.¤ 393 (2) According to the concrete differences of the terrestrial globe. shows. the gene ral planetary life of the nature-governed mind specializes itself and breaks up into the several nature-governed minds which. Bu t this subjectivity is here only considered as a differentiation and singling ou t of the modes which nature gives. a more concrete definition or description of them would require us to anticipate an acquaintance with the formed and matu red mind.mind wrapped up in itself. The contrast between the earth's poles. Back to the very beginnings of national history we see the several nations each possessing a persistent type of its own. This . As they are at once physical and mental diversities. or artistic. we see man in his true relation to his environment. the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjectiv e (as seen in ideals. And that individuality marks both the world which. ¤ 395 (3) The soul is further de-universalized into the individualized subject. carrying out these universa . where the individual is the vehicle of a st ruggle of universal and objective interests with the given conditions (both of h is own existence and of that of the external world). (1) The first of these is the natural lapse of the ages in man's life. ambitions) against his immediate individua lity. Part II ) has exhibited in the case of the flora and fauna. character. as it exists. By his share in this collective work he first is really somebody. introduces into the dif ferences of continents a further modification which Treviranus (Biology. fails to meet his ideal requirements. His next step is the fully develope d antithesis. that may be termed local minds shown in the outward modes of life and occupation. who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play ( Youth). while on its realist side it passes int o the inertia of deadening habit. bodily structure and disposit ion. Last of all comes the finishing touch to thi s unity with objectivity: a unity which. talent . in purposes political. of families or single individuals. widely distant from each other. and the position of the individual himself. recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as he finds it . we find it as the special temperament. the one permanent subject. and as stages in its development. as alterations in it.
distinguishes itself from its mere being. on a v isit to the University of Pavia. that what is actually presen t in mind need not be therefore explicitly realized in consciousness. takes up its place as at t he same time determined through and with all the rest. The consciousness of this interdependence need not be explicit and dist inct.l principles into a unity with the world which is his own work. . as already noted. containing the mental element implicate but not yet as invested with a special being of its own. just as li ttle as the exaltation of the intellectual sense to God need stand before consci ousness in the shape of proofs of God's existence. sleep. put this question to the class of ideology. as one natural q uality and state confronts another state. The waking state is the concrete consciousness of this mutual corrobora tion of each single factor of its content by all the others in the picture as pe rceived. as before explained . and in the case of any assignable d istinction of waking consciousness. we must take the self-ex istence of the individual soul in its higher aspects as the Ego of consciousness and as intelligent mind. b ecause we have lost sight of the difference. i n an unintelligent way. . Still this general setting to all sensations is implicitly present in the concrete feeling of self.a return into the general n ature of subjectivity. but by virtue o f the concrete interconnection in which each part stands with all parts of this complex.Sleep is an invigoration of this activity . But the concrete theory of the wa kin soul in its realized being views it as consciousness and intellect: and the world of intelligent consciousness is something quite different from a picture o f mere ideas and images. as well as the mental representations in the sober w aking consciousness under one and the same title of mental representations.The waking is not merely for the observer. from disper sion into phases where it has grown hard and stiff . as they may be called. The waking state includes generally al l self-conscious and rational activity in which the mind realizes its own distin ct self. or externally distinct from the sleep: it is itself the judge ment (primary partition) of the individual soul . If we are to speak more concretely of this distinction (in fundamentals it remains the same). not by his mere subjective representation and distinction of the facts as something external from the person. in the first instance. (c) Sensibility(3) .which is self-existing only as it relates its self-existence to its mere existence. we can always return to the trivial remark t hat all this is nothing more than mental idea. The characterization given in the section is abstract. it primarily treats waking m erely as a natural fact. ¤ 398 (3) When the individuality. only when we also take into account the dreams in sleep and describe these dreams. although. viz. The latter are in the main only externally conjoined. this immediate judgement is the waking of the soul. which c onfronts its self-absorbed natural life. which is the substance of those specialized energies and their absolute master. or self-centralized being. each point. for example. Thus the facts embodied i n his sensation are authenticated.Napoleon. which are often addressed to philosophy: .In order to see the difference between dreaming and waking we need only keep in view the Kantian distinction between subjectivity an d objectivity of mental representation (the latter depending upon determination through categories): remembering. The sexual tie a cquires its moral and spiritual significance and function in the family. but as a return back from the world of specialization. distinguishing itself from its still undifferentiated universality. these proofs only serve to express the net worth and content of that feeling. The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those posers. Thus superficially classified as states of mental representation the two coincide. an intelligence: and bec ause of this intelligence his sense-perception stands before him as a concrete t otality of features in which each member. by the laws of the so-called Association of Ideas. But in the waking state man behaves essentially as a concrete ego.not as a merely negative rest from it. . The difficulty raised anent the distinction of the two states properly arises. thoug h here and there of course logical principles may also be operative.
true. tha n can ever be true of feeling and of the group of feelings (the heart): and this we need no philosophy to tell us.g. One. but alter nating conditions (a progression in infinitum). etc. of the spirit through its unconscious and unintelligent individuality. invested with cor poreity. evil. and that he has feeling in c ommon with them. No doubt it is correct to say that above ever ything the heart must be good. a re yet simply contained in its simplicity. jus t as it is nowadays necessary to repeat that thinking is the characteristic prop erty by which man is distinguished from the beasts.. on one hand. for itself. is what we call sensibility. ho wever. of the eye or of any bodily part w hatever) is made feeling (sensation) by being driven inward. This is their formal and negativ e relationship: but in it the affirmative relationship is also involved. This should hardly need enforcing. but treated as bel onging to its most special. moral.¤ 399 Sleep and waking are. w here every definite feature is still 'immediate' . and . The fact that these particulars. the naturally immedi ate. Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they mus t also be in the heart. ¤ 400 Sensibility (feeling) is the form of the dull stirring. In the self-certified existence of waking soul its mere existence is implicit as an 'id eal' factor: the features which make up its sleeping nature. are in order to be felt. everything that emerges in co nscious intelligence and in reason has its source and origin in sensation. in the feeling. blasphemy. what originally belongs to the central individuality (which as further deepened and enlarged is the conscious ego and free mind) gets the features of the natural co rporeity. so that as it is put in me (my abstract ego) it can also be kept away and apart from me (from my concrete subjectivity). the conscience. Thus the mode or affection gets a place in the subject: it is felt in t he soul. godless. My own is something inseparate from the actual concrete self: and this immediate unity of the soul with its un derlying self in all its definite content is just this inseparability. belonging as it does to natural. adultery. the fact is a mode of my individuality.identity of our self-centred being.' In such times when 'scientific' theolo gy and philosophy make the heart and feeling the criterion of what is good. On the other hand and conversely. just. Another. But feeling and heart is not the form by which an ything is legitimated as religious. the inarticulate bre athing. not mere alterations. and religious. however crude that individuality be i n such a form: it is thus treated as my very own. murder . are found by the waking soul. ¤ 401 What the sentient soul finds within it is. it is true. though as a mode of mind they are distinguished from the self. and still more of the freedom of rational mind-life. as 'ideally' in it and made its own. in its own self. fornication. in a general way: the facts of it are objective . where what at first is a corporeal affection (e. where they are impl icitly as in their substance. immediate being to what is therefore qualitative and finite. it is necessary to remind them of these trite experiences. The content of sensation is thus limited and transient. But if put in the feelin g. its natural peculiarity. It is with a quite different intensity and pe rmanency that the will. and the character. where affections originating in the mind and be longing to it. be it noted.neither specially developed i n its content nor set in distinction as objective to subject. are our very own. primarily. The detailed specification of the former branch of sensibility is seen . What we merely have in the head is in co nsciousness. yet falls short of the ego of developed consciousness.? That the heart is the source only of suc h feelings is stated in the words: 'From the heart proceed evil thoughts. memorized in the so ul's self-centred part. mean. which. and is so felt. for s ource and origin just means the first immediate manner in which a thing appears. etc. and an appeal to he art and feeling either means nothing or means something bad. etc. Can any experience be more trite than that feelings and hearts a re also bad. and to be as if found.set over against consciousness. mora l. Everything is in sensation (feeling): if you will. In this way we have two spheres of feeling.
(c) the sense of solid reality. the 'irritable' system. but more definitely the bodily fo rm adopted by certain mental modifications. just because they are immediate and are found existing. the centre of the 'sensible' system. But the other or inwardly originated modes of feeli ng no less necessarily systematize themselves. The system by which the internal sensation comes to give itself specific bodily forms would deserve to be treated in detail in a peculiar science . In physiology the viscera and the organs are treated merely as parts subservient to the animal organism. We should want a more satisfactory explanation than hitherto of the most familar connections by which tears. and voice in general. The 'real' aspect similarly is with its difference double: (b) the senses of smell and taste. therefore. a s immediate and not yet subjective ideality. What it has to do. as put i n the living and concretely developed natural being. are sing le and transient aspects of psychic life . e. with its varieties of language.g.but of the feeling (sense) of r ight. sentimentality (sensibility) is connected with sensation: we may therefore say sensation emphasizes rather the side of passivity-the fact that we find ourselves feeling. to take possessi on of it. are formed from their mental source. especially the passions or emotions. i ts merely virtual filling-up. distinction appears as mere variety . (¤ 317) . (b) THE FEELING SOUL . smells. to explain the line of connection by which anger a nd courage are felt in the breast. and their corporization. But the most interesting side of a psychical physiolog y would lie in studying not the mere sympathy. sensation and feeling are not clearly disting uished: still we do not speak of the sensation . with which that substance is one. just as th inking and mental occupation are felt in the head. to realize its mastery over its own. i.and of sound. laughter.a psychical physiology. The senses form the simple system of corporeity specifie d. individuality: the individuality which in the m erely substantial totality was only formal to it has to be liberated and made in dependent.the senses of definite light. works itself out. As sentient. of heavy matter. o f colours.(SOUL AS SENTIENCY)(4) ¤ 403 The feeling or sentient individual is the simple 'ideality' or subjective si de of sensation. . We should have. for example. sighs. set in its self-centred life.it feels in itself the total substa ntiality which it virtually is . is to raise its substantiality. of self. following the special character of the mental mode. ¤ 402 Sensations. (¤ 300). with many other specializations lying in the line of pathognomy and physiognomy. 322). but they form at the same time a physical system for the expression o f mental states. (a) The 'ideal' side of physical things breaks up into two . of heat (¤ 303) and shape (¤ 310).e. the soul is no longe r a mere natural.it is a soul which feels. Somewhat pointing to such a system is implied in the feeling of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of an immediate sensation to the persistent tone of internal sensibility (the pleasant and unpleasant): as also in the dist inct parallelism which underlies the symbolical employment of sensations.because in it. the immediacy of mode in feeling . But th is self-centred being is not merely a formal factor of sensation: the soul is vi rtually a reflected totality of sensations .whereas feeling at the same time rather notes the fact that it is we ourselves who feel. (¤¤ 321. and in this way they get quite another interpretation. In the usage of ordinary language.in the system of the senses.alterations in the substantiality of the soul. to the character of subjectivity. but an inward. Sensibility in general is the healthy fellowship of the individual mind in the l ife of its bodily part. in a special system of bodily organs. Around the centre of the sentient individuality these specifications arra nge themselves more simply than when they are developed in the natural corporeit y. the blood. tones.
At the present stage this singleness is. which is disease. and ye t the ego is one and uncompounded. but turned into the content of the indi vidual sensation-laden soul.that world being included in it and filling it up. but only to his im plicit self. and so as natural and corporeal: but the outn ess of parts and sensible multiplicity of this corporeal counts for the soul (as it counts for the intelligible unity) not as anything real. which is at the same time its predicate. in an implicit mode. of the abstract psychical modifications by themselves. so far as that is. may again sink down. As sentient. By itself. ideas. it brings within itself. Thus a person can never know how much of things he once learned he really has in him. the content is its particular world. in whi ch all this is stored up. it implies a want of adaptation. once mor e come to light. And under all the superstructure of specialized and instrumental co nsciousness that may subsequently be added to it.. first. ideas and information. acquired lore. the corporeity. is reduced to ideality (the tru th of the natural multiplicity). and the infinite variety of its material structure and organization is reduced to the simplicity of one definite conception: so in the sentient soul. (a) The feeling soul in its immediacy . the individuality always remai ns this single-souled inner life.the existent spe culative principle. etc. and to that world it stands but as to itself. Just as the number and variety of mental representation s is no argument for an extended and real multeity in the ego. so the 'real' out ness of parts in the body has no truth for the sentient soul. yet as the soul is in that content still particular . because for so long they had not been brought into consciousness. supposed to have been forgotten years ago. to which the soul. a deep featureless characterless mine. Every individual is an infinite treasury of sensations. thoughts. but only the aspects of its own sentient tot ality. As to the representative faculty the body is but one representation. to be defined as one of feeling . Thus in the body it is one simple. but a negation. prima rily. ¤ 404 As individual. and yet they w ere in us and continue to be in us still. etc. the s oul is characterized as immediate. The soul is virtually the totality of nature: a s an individual soul it is a monad: it is itself the explicitly put totality of its particular world . virtually retained. with parts outside par ts and outside the soul. and therefore not a s a barrier: the soul is this intelligible unity in existence .Nowhere so much as in the case of the soul (and still more of the mind) if we ar e to understand it. In the present stage we must treat. the soul is exclusive and always exclusive: any difference th ere is. secondly. as morbid states of m ind: the latter being only explicable by means of the former. In this partition (judgement) of itself it is always subject: its ob ject is its substance. What is differentiated from it is as yet no ext ernal object (as in consciousness). The feature is one with which we are familiar in regard to our mental ideas or to memory. which repre sents it as the negation of the real. It acquires a peculiar interest in cases where it is as a form and appears as a special state of mind (¤ 380). i ncluded in the ideality of the subject. But when a truer phase of mind thus exists in a more subordinate and abstract one. They were not in our possession. must that feature of 'ideality' be kept in view. should he have once forgotten th em: they belong not to his actuality or subjectivity as such. It is only when I call to mind an id ea. nor by such reproduction as oc curs in sickness do they for the future come into our possession. which has already advanced to consciousness and intelligence. in sickness. without existing. this stage of mind is the stage of its darkness: its features are not developed to conscious and intelligent content: so far it is formal and only fo rmal. Some times.as embracing the corporeal in itself: th us denying the view that this body is something material. This substance i s still the content of its natural life. although it does not exist. that I bring it out of that interior to existence before consciousness. where the real is put past . omnipresent unity. and all tha t outness of parts to parts which belongs to it.
What ought to be noted as regards this ps ychical tie are not merely the striking effects communicated to and stamped upon the child by violent emotions.externalities and instrum entalities in the sensible and material which are insignificant as regards the m ain point. The underlying essence of the genius is the sum to tal of existence. By the self-hood of the latter it . by which the female (like the monocotyledons among vegetables) can suffer disruption in twain. as to which see later) all further ties and essential relation ships. yet in undivided psych ic unity: the one as yet no self. and of character. but as efficiency and realized activity. and reasonable. etc. incl inations. In the ordinary course of nature this is the condition of the child in its mothe r's womb: . so that th e child has not merely got communicated to it. developed interests. placenta. Sporadic examples and traces of this magic tie appear elsewhere in the range of self-possessed conscious life. as yet nothing impenetrable. and constitutes the subjective substan tiality of some one else who is only externally treated as an individual and has only a nominal independence. character.a substance. idiosyncrasies. is visibly present as another and a different individual. especially female friends wi th delicate nerves (a tie which may go so far as to show 'magnetic' phenomena). the psychical relationship. because immediate. The sensitivity is thus a soul in which the whole mental life is condensed. The moth er is the genius of the child. tal ent. and the self-possessed subj ectivity is the rational.is then set in vibration and controlled without the least resis tance on its part. The total sensitivity has its self here in a separate subjectivity. etc. his secular ideas. but within its enveloping simplicity it acquires and retain s also (in habit.. But this sensitive totality is me ant to elevate its self-hood out of itself to subjectivity in one and the same i ndividual: which is then its indwelling consciousness.a subject which may even exist as another individu al. but the whole psy chical judgement (partition) of the underlying nature. The total individual under this concentrated aspect is distinct from the existing an d actual play of his consciousness. Here are two individuals. But this s ensitive nucleus includes not merely the purely unconscious. principles-everything in short belonging to the character.a condition neither merely bodily nor merely mental. the single self of the two. incapable of resi stance: the other is its actuating subject. between husband and wife and between members of the same family. whose decision is ul . congenital disposit ion and temperament. This other subject by which it is so controlled may be called its genius. not as a mere possibility. for by genius we commonly mean the total mental s elf-hood. of life. which is only a non-indepen dent predicate . and is therefore passive. which. and as connected with the mother by means of umbilical cord. it is. not a true subject reflected int o itself. self-conscious. and in whose elaboration self-conscious activity has most effectively participated. self-possessed. injuries. As contrasted with this looser aggregate of means and methods the more intensive form of individuality is termed the genius. For such a consciousness the merely sentient life serves as an underlying and only implicitly existent material. etc. controlling genius thereof. or capac ity.. but psychical a correlation of soul to soul. of the mother. or virtuality. If we look only to the spatial and material aspects of the child's existence as an embryo in its special integuments.¤ 405 (aa) Though the sensitive individuality is undoubtedly a monadic individual. not yet as its self. intellige nt. but has originally received morbi d dispositions as well as other predispositions of shape. fortunes. say between friends. as it has existence of its own. as concrete subject ivity. temper. in th e case cited of this sentient life in the ordinary course of nature. Hence the individuality of its true self is a different subject from it . all that is presented to the senses and refle ction are certain anatomical and physiological facts . etc.
when it becomes a form or state of the self-conscio us. even when it is of narr ow range and is wholly made up of particularities. The facts. a surrender of his self-possessed intelligent existence. this world which is outside him has its threads in him to such a degree that . it has already been call ed his genius. (b) Where a human being's senses and intellect are sound. This totality forms his actual ity. that it is in harmony wi th the facts.require an intelligence which has risen out of the inarti culate mass of mere sensitivity to free consciousness. of which the more public consciousness is so liberal.infinitely numerous though they be and accredited by the education and character of the witnesses . which are also means and ends to each other. ¤ 406 (bb) The sensitive life. the first requisite is not to be in bon dage to the hard and fast categories of the practical intellect. means rat her one who is at the mercy of his individual sentiment. and he is aware that this world is in itself also a complex of interconnections of a practically intelligible kind. This morbid condition is seen in magnetic somnambulism and cognate states. The first conclus ion to which these considerations lead. In this summary encyclopaedic account it is impossible to supply a demonstration of what the paragraph states as the nature of the remarkable condition produced chiefly by animal magnetism . on the cont rary. The individual in such a morbid state stands in direct contact with the concrete contents of his own self . Of such good nature or goodne ss of heart it may be said that it is less the genius itself than the indulgere genio. be they great substantial aims or petty and unjust interests: a good-hearted man. is that it is only the range of his individua lly moulded world (of his private interests and narrow relationships) which appe ar there. both the essential and the particular empirical ties which c onnect him with other men and the world at large. means. In order to believe in this department even what one's own eyes ha ve seen and still more to understand it.his fun damental interests. intentions. It is foolish therefore t o expect revelations about the higher ideas from the somnambulist state. on the other hand. Scientific theories and philosophic conceptions or general truths requ ire a different soil . At the same tim e. The chief point s on which the discussion turns may here be given: (a) To the concrete existence of the individual belongs the aggregate of. This genius is not the free mind which wills and thinks: the form of sensitivity. This concentrated individuality also reveal s itself under the aspect of what is called the heart and soul of feeling. be superfluous for those on whose account it was called for: for they facilitate the inquiry for themselves by declaring the narratives . educated. so complex in their nature and so very different one from another. first of all call for verificati on. in other words. is.to be mere deception and impo sture. The a priori conceptions of these inquirers are so rooted that no testimo ny can avail against them. would have first of all to be brought under their ge neral points of view. it might seem. A man is said to be heartless and unfeeling when he looks at things with self-possess ion and acts according to his permanent purposes. and they have even denied what they have seen with th eir own eyes.to show. To that end the phenomena. in the sense that it lies in fact immanent in him. whilst he keeps his self-possessed consciousness of self and of the causal ord er of things apart as a distinct state of mind. with reference to the contents of consci ousness in the somnambulist stage.timate whatever may be the show of reasons. in which the individual here appears innnersed. he is fully and intell igently alive to that reality of his which gives concrete filling to his individ uality: but he is awake to it in the form of interconnection between himself and the features of that reality conceived as an external and a separate world. it must be added. But such a verification would. In his subjective ideas and plans he has also b efore him this causally connected scheme of things he calls his world and the se ries of means which bring his ideas and his purposes into adjustment with the ob jective existences. self-possessed human being is a disease.
in the latter case he is less susceptible of the p sychical state here spoken of. and the like. or at the approach of death. which. formed. and character. etc. it retains along with its content a certain nominal self-hood. This perception is a sort of clairvoyance. and c ontinues to be. and the soul is thus sunk in sleep (in magnetic sleep. etc. And because it is the adult. in whom it sees. subject to the power of another person. is under a veil. But such clairvoyance . This latter self-possessed individual is thus the effective subjective soul of the former.(5) (d) An essential feature of this sensitivity. The patient in this condition is accordingly made. with its absence of intelligent an d volitional personality. those c onnected with female development. his own and that of the magnetize . tastes. . on those left behind. there is only one subjectivity of consciousness: the patient has a sort of individuality. and other diseases. The characteristic point in such knowledge is that the very same fa cts (which for the healthy consciousness are an objective practical reality. But.) Compare h ome-sickness. he is in a remarkable degree self-supporting and in dependent of them. in catalepsy. and to know which. (Thus Cato. so that the one dies or pines away with the l oss of the other. shows the substantial identity which the soul (which even in its concreteness is also trul y immaterial) is capable of holding with another. has for his subjective consciousness the consciousness of the other. like that of the child in the womb. subje ctive reason.As an illustration of that identity with the su rroundings may be noted the effect produced by the death of beloved relatives. so that when the two are thus in psychical rapport. exist for it as an outward objectivity. after the downfall of the Roman republic. in its sober moods. When the substance of both is thus made one.is for that very reason at the mercy of every private contingency of feeling a nd fancy. and hears.). It is f urther to be noted on this point that the somnambulist is thus brought into rapp ort with two genii and a twofold set of ideas. The individu al is thus a monad which is inwardly aware of its actuality . . etc. not actual: and this nominal self accordingly derives its whole stock of ideas from the sensations an d ideas of the other. wh en it is healthy and awake. does n ot go so far as the conscious judgement or discernment by which its contents. external one to another. which lead up to the result . and the genius which may even supply him with a train of ideas. for example. the magnetizer. not really a 'person'. could li ve no longer: his inner reality was neither wider nor higher than it. It is thus impossible to make out whether what the clairvoyants re ally see preponderates over what they deceive themselves in.conditions which cool reflection has in succession to traverse and in so doing feels the li mits of its own external individuality.just because its dim and turbid vision does not present the facts in a rational interconnection . a formal vision and awareness. that it is a state of passivity. (c) But when all that occupies the waking consciousness. and so can dispense with the series o f conditions.But it is absurd to treat this visionary state as a sublime mental phase and as a truer state. however. and finding itself in the very heart of the interconnection. but now as a purely sensitive life with an inward vision and an inward consci ousness. . then that immanent actuality of the individual remains the same substantial total as befor e. f riends. reads. but it is empty. and developed consciousness which is degraded into this state of sensitivity. the world outside it an d its relationship to that world. smells. it needs the intelligent chain of means and conditions in all their real expansion) are now immediately known and perceived in this immanence. ca pable of conveying general truths.a genius which beh olds itself. then. is this. That the somnambulist perceives in himself tastes and smells which are present in th e person with whom he stands en rapport. not on the spot.it is these threads which make him what he really is: he too would become extinc t if these externalities were to disappear. and that he is aware of the other inner ideas and present perceptions of the latter as if they were his own. unless by the aid of religion. for it is a consci ousness living in the undivided substantiality of the genius.not to mention that foreign suggestions (see later) intrude int o its vision. the selfless individual.
which is no less a world of law. or 'general feeling' specifies itself to several functio ns. and hence. in this nominal perception. i s just this form of immediacy. in compliance with the laws and relations of the intellect. it follows that although the subject has been brought t o acquire intelligent consciousness. the 'common sense'.r. causality. it fails to assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual system of the world which a consci ous subject is. though all-embracing. In considering insanity we must. anticipate the full-grown an . (e) As in this sensitive substantiality there is no contrast to external objecti vity. and at the same time. unable to refine it to 'ideality' and get the better of it. In these private and personal sensations it is immer sed. But when it is eng rossed with a single phase of feeling. The fully furnished self of intelligent co nsciousness is a conscious subject. which is consistent in itself according to a n order and behaviour which follows from its individual position and its connect ion with the external world.fe eling. and which from the suggestions of the person with whom he stand s in relation. so long as we assume independent personalities. reasons. i. and to wake up to the judgement in itself. Hence to understand this intimate conjun ction. In this way it is self. The purely sensitive life. ¤ 408 (bb) In consequence of the immediacy. as well as on scientific and intellectual topics. (b) Self-feeling (sense of self)(6) ¤ 407 (aa) The sensitive totality is. so far as to remain fast in a special phase of its self-feeling. for example. and especially with the pit of the stom ach. etc. between intelligent personality and objective world. receives. or med icines for them. and is so at the same time only in the particular feeling. is without any definite points of attachment . in its capacity as individual. in virtue of which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these aspects of itself. To comprehend a thing means in the language of practical intelligence to be able to trace the series of means intervening between a phenomenon and some other ex istence on which it depends . But it is impossible to say precisely which sensations and which visions he. This uncertainty may be the source of many deceptions. as in other cases. and brings to knowledge from his own inward self. even when it retains that mere nominal consciousness. so within itself the subject is so entirely one that all varieties of sens ation have disappeared.so long as we as sume the absolute spatial and material externality of one part of being to anoth er. and the single phase or fixed idea which is not reduced to its proper place and rank. which. and accoun ts among other things for the diversity that inevitably shows itself among sonma mbulists from different countries and under rapport with persons of different ed ucation. essentially t he tendency to distinguish itself in itself. because of the 'ideality' of the particulars. In this way the subject finds itself in contradiction between th e totality systematized in its consciousness. it is still susceptible of disease. and as the feeling too is itself particular and bound up with a special corporeal form. without any distinctions between subjective and o bjective. etc. independent one of another and of the objective world which is their content . it comb ines itself in them with itself as a subjective unit. and without the a forementioned finite ties between them. in consequence of the element of corporeality which is still undetached from the mental life. This is Insanity or mental D erangement. on the contrary. as in the morbid state alluded to. one sees and hears with the fingers. The subject as such gives these feelings a place as its own in itself. is impossible. when the activity of the sense-organs is asle ep.to discover what is called the ordinary course of nature. which still marks the self-feeling. as regards their views on morbid states and the methods of cure. beholds. e.
presupposes the patient's rationality. yet so as to distinguish itself from the particular details. may. It is the evil genius of man which gains the upper ha nd in insanity. but a contr adiction in it. Hence this state is mental derangement and di stress. as a thing. instead of being 'idealize d' in the former. and ceases to keep the natural temper under lock and key.just as in the case of bodily disease the physician b ases his treatment on the vitality which as such still contains health. so as to insert them in their proper place. it c ounts only as the particular being or immediacy of the soul in opposition to its equally formal and abstract realization. In the concrete. and be a realized u niversality. desire. only a contradiction in a still subsisting reason. as something natural and existent. this life of feeling. (c) Habit(7) ¤ 409 Self-feeling.that evil which is always latent in the heart. The cont ents which are set free in this reversion to mere nature are the self-seeking af fections of the heart. but only derangement. and their gratification). into the system of which he subsume s each special content of sensation. and made appear in. And so too the particularity is. and also desires. pride. passions. Mind as such is fr ee. But in older metaphysics mind was treated as a soul. and so makes part of the actual self. The self-possessed and healthy subject has an active and present consciousness o f the ordered whole of his individual world. but in distinction from and contrast to the better and more inte lligent part. and wh ere such being is not rendered fluid in its consciousness.merely personal love and hatred. a diseas e of body and mind alike: the commencement may appear to start from the one more than the other.the settled fixture of som e finite element in it. and in that assumption has the sound basis for deali ng with him on this side . i. is relaxed. immersed in the detail of the feelings (in simple sensations. instincts. etc. i. mere and total. is undistinguis hed from them. but groundless and senseless outburs t of hatred. such as vanity. however. as it aris es. A violent. Error and that sort of t hing is a proposition consistently admitted to a place in the objective intercon nection of things. moral and theoretical. is diseased. Between this and insanity the difference is like that betw een waking and dreaming: only that in insanity the dream falls within the waking limits. In such a phase the self can be liable to the contradiction between its own free subjectivity and a particularity which. Insanity is therefore a psychical disease. earthly elements are set fr ee . But this universality is not the full and sterling truth of the spe cific feelings and desires.e. a nominal universality (which is the truth of these details): and as so unive rsal. and the rest of the passions . The right psychical treatment therefore keeps in view the truth that ins anity is not an abstract loss of reason (neither in the point of intelligence no r of will and its responsibility). But in the self there is latent a simple self-relation of idealit y. and therefore not susceptible of this malady. idea. remains as a fixed element in self-feeling. When the influence of self-pos session and of general principles.. etc.e.fan cies and hopes .feeling. the. and so also may the cure. This humane treatment.e. the self is to be stamped upon. and it is only as a thing.just as physical disease is not an abstract. B ut the main point in derangement is the contradiction which a feeling with a fix ed corporeal embodiment sets up against the whole mass of adjustments forming th e concrete consciousness. The mind which is in a condition of mere being. loss of health (if it were that. in contrast to a presupposed higher self-possession and stability of character. what they specifically contain is as yet left out of account. which is at the same time the natural self of s elf-feeling. i. because the heart as immedia te is natural and selfish. . inclination. This particular being of the soul is t . He is the dominant genius over t hese particularities. that it is liable to insanity . it is often difficult to say where it begins to become derangement. as now regarded. make its victim seem to be beside himself with frenzy.. no less benevolent than reasonable (the s ervices of Pinel towards which deserve the highest acknowledgement). which is there also. it would be death).d intelligent conscious subject. equally formal.
has realized itself) mere intuition and no more. as. will. so far as they belong to self-feeling) made into a natural and mechanical ex istence. as memory is the mechanism of intelligence. and which still continues to exist. dist inguishing it from itself . that recu rs in a series of units of sensation. so is that pure being (which. or dependent in regard to it. or so far as a habit is opposed by a nother purpose: whereas the habit of right and goodness is an embodiment of libe rty.itself a simple being .. is the mode of feeling (as well as intelligence. empty space and empty time. and it has been in vested with the character of self-centred subject. is reduced to unity. sleep. so far as it strictly spea king arises only in the case of bad habits. this being of the soul. a pure act of intuition. The want of freedom in habit is partly merely formal. partly only relative.and becoming the 'ideal'. therefore. it is at the same t ime open to be otherwise occupied and engaged . For. And consciousness it becomes. It is th e corporeity reduced to its mere ideality. The different forms of this may be described as follows: (a) The immediate feeling is negated and treated as indiff erent. nor does it stand in r elationship with them as distinguishing itself from them. In habit the human being's mode of existence is 'natural'. and he is no longer involuntarily attracted o r repelled by it. and that as a barrier for it. the one and the same. or of the immediate corpo reity as such. This process of building up the particular and corporeal expressions of feeling into the being of the soul appears as a repetition of them. is a reflexive universality (¤ 175). as habit merely att aches to the being of the soul. In this manner the soul has the contents in possession. lacking consciou sness.he factor of its corporeity. and waking are 'immediately' natural: h abit. impressing and moulding the corporeality which enters into the modes of feeling as such and into the representations and volitions so far as they have taken corporeal form (¤ 401). and so far only does corporeity belon g to the soul as such. because it is an immediacy created by t he soul. Habit is rightly called a second nature. so far as it is not interested in or occupied with them: and whilst existing in these forms as its possession. and for that reason n ot free. and so no longer interested. a second nature. But this abstract realization of the soul in its corporeal vehicle is not yet th e self . The natural qualities and alterations of age. and reducing the parti culars of feelings (and of consciousness) to a mere feature of its being is Habi t. That is to say. but has them and moves in them.just as in its latent notion (¤ 389) it was the su bstance. because it is an immed iate being of the soul. weariness o . Habit like memory. and this abstract uni ty expressly stated. but the basis of consciousness. is a difficult point in mental organization: habit is the mec hanism of self-feeling. through the supe rsession in it of the particularity of the corporeity. but still free. here we have it breaking with this corporeity. are only subjectiv e forms. su bjective substantiality of it . The main point about Habit is that by its means man gets emancipated from t he feelings. so far as the merely natural phase of feeling is by hab it reduced to a mere being of his. nor is absorbed in the m. One who gets inured against external sensations (frost. of which it is the subjective substance. i. when the co rporcity. and contains them in such manner that in these features it is not as sentient. occupied. without feeling or consciousness of the fact. has been absorbed by it. if in respect of the natural p articular phase it be called an abstract universality to which the former is tra nsmuted. even in being affected by them. The soul is freed from them. et c.say with feeling and with mental consciousness in general. and the generation o f habit as practice. heat.not the existence of the universal which is for the universal. nature. just as space and time as the abstract on e-outside-another. ¤ 410 The soul's making itself an abstract universal being. and the mere substance. of it.e. on the contrary.
etc. re ligious. fo r the man stands only because and in so far as he wills to stand.f the limbs.is felt. casual. And it is true that the form of habit. however free and active in its own pure element it b ecomes. sweet tastes. under its volitional and conceptual characters.e. and carried ou t in the strictly intellectual range. whereof we sha ll speak later. and no other. In scientific studies of the soul and the mind. enabling the subject to be a conc rete immediacy. like any other. is recollection and memory. the spatial direction of an individual. consciousness. Of course in all this it is assumed that the impulses are kept a s the finite modes they naturally are.g. (c) In habit regarded as aptitude. want of habit and too-long-cont inued thinking cause headache).which continues to be an affair of his persistent will. and it is habit of living which brings on death. etc. to be his as this self. to exist as substance in its corporeity. moral. too.or the misfortune . a re subordinated as partial factors to the reasonable will. etc. in this spontaneity of self-centred thought. intuition.enabling the matter of consciousness.). i. The form of habit applies to all kinds and grades of mental action. which make it up.. or skill. but part and parcel of his being. that although the frost. and that they. but it has to be imposed as a subjective aim. his upright pos ture. Even here. or. the affection is deposed to a mere externality an d immediacy. and especially so in the specific bodily part. then without resistance and with ease the body gives them correct utterance. The most ext ernal of them. Habit on an ampler scale. Conce ived as having the inward purpose of the subjective soul thus imposed upon it. In this way an aptitude shows the corporeity rendered completely pervious. habit diminishes this feeling.concentration. and any other purp oses and activity. are no longer bothered with it.. consciousness.a position taken without adjustment and wi thout consciousness . by making the nat ural function an immediacy of the soul. and who hardens the heart against misfor tune. by which it is the property of my single self where I can freely and in all directions range. and particul ar. Thinking. which is rendered subject and thoroughly pervious to it. and the immediate portion of body is a particular possibility for a specific a im (a particular aspect of its differentiated structure. made into an instrum ent. not merely has the abstract psychical life to be kept in tact per se. reflection. is death itself: and yet habit is indispensable for the existen ce of all intellectual life in the individual. (b) There is indifference tow ards the satisfaction: the desires and impulses are by the habit of their satisf action deadened. is open to anything w e chance to put into it. To mould such an aim in the organic body is to bring out and express the 'ideality' which is implicit in matter always. t he body is treated as an immediate externality and a barrier. and be ne ither a mere latent possibility.. it has lost its original and immediate identity with the bodily nature. habit is usually passed over - . and its ea rlier naturalness and immediacy. and thus to enable the soul. cut off from action and reality. a series of musical notes) is in me. the universal psychical life keeps its own abstract independence in it. combines in a single act the several modifications of sensation. nor a transient emotion or idea. a particular organ of i ts organic system). Similarly our eyesight is the concrete habit which. an 'ideality' of soul . this soul. has been by will made a habit . It is through this habit that I come to realize my existe nce as a thinking being. intelligence. Specific feelings can only get bodily shape in a perfectly specific way (¤ 410) . to be made a power in the bodily part. Thus comes out the more decided rupture between the soul as simple self. there is a partnership of soul and body (hence. and only so lo ng as he wills it without consciousness. no less requires habit and familiarity (this impromptuity or form of imm ediacy). so that when the conception (e. viz. if quite abstract. Habit is often spoken of disparagingly and called lifeless. and as external has first to be reduced to that positio n. nor an abstrac t inwardness. nor are they in conce ption rational. This is the rational liberation from them. like their satisfaction. whereas monastic ren unciation and forcible interference do not free from them. and the self-feeling as such. . without an express adjustment. etc. acquires a strength which consists in this. etc.
and which as the Soul's work of art has hum an pathognomic and physiognomic expression. and making it its own. weeping. t he human figure is the supreme phase in which mind makes an appearance. for the soul. 1. 'The autho . who supposed that the Platonic language on the subject of enthusiasm authorized their belief in the sublimity of the rev elations of somnambulistic vision. still vainer than a signatura rerum. Thus soul rises to become Consciousness. has lost the meaning of mere so ul. which at once announces the body as the externality of a higher nature. has implicitly realised the 'ideality' of it s qualities. etc. the soul is actual: in its corporeity it has its free shape.either as something contemptible . Plato says in the Timaeus (p. Plato had a better idea of the relation of prophecy generally to the state of sober consciousness than many moderns. But for the mind it is only its first appearance. This externality.specially a subject of the judgement in which the ego excludes from itself the sum total of its merely natural features as an object. ¤ 412 Implicitly the soul shows the untruth and unreality of matter. of which it is the sign. it is related to itself. 2.but with such respect to that object that in it it is immediate ly reflected into itself. Die fuhlende Seele. in its concentrated self. absorbing it. because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural. or the 'immediacy' of mind. In this identity of interior and exterior. placing the latter over against it as a corporeity incapable of offering resistance to its moulding influence. and the note of mentality diffused over the whole. The actual soul with its sensation and its concr ete self-feeling turned into habit. Naturliche Qualitaten. was therefore one of the vainest fancies. when its corporeity has been moulded and made thoroughly its own. Naturliche Seele. for example. and inexpressible a modific ation. (C) THE ACTUAL SOUL(8) ¤ 411 The Soul. Empfindung. 71). cuts itself off from its immediate being. especially the hand. in being related to which. This note is so slight.. of the mouth . 3. in so far a s it is for the abstract universality. which supposed the shape of a plant to afford indication of its medicinal virtue. unable to represent it in its actual universality. Under the head of human expression are included. and the formation of the limbs. a world external to it . indefinite. or abstract universality. 5. as the absolut e instrument. and the corporeity is an externality which stands as a predicate.laughter. represents not itself. To try to raise physiognomy and above all cranioscopy (phrenology) to the rank of sciences. 4. finds itself there a single subject. Seen from the animal world. in which it feels itself and makes itself felt. but the soul.or rather for the further reason that it is o ne of the most difficult questions of psychology. while language is its perfect expressi on. and can therefore only be an indefinite and quite imperfect sign for the mind. thus setting in opposition its being to its (consc ious) self. in other words. The soul. is at the same time in its physiognomic and pathognomic quality something contingent t o it. and i s infinite self-relation. though the proximate phase of mind's existence. In this way it gains the position of thin ker and subject . This free universality thus made explicit shows the so ul awaking to the higher stage of the ego. the upright figure in general. the latter subject to the former. in this externality it has recollected and inwardized itself. And the human figure.
not to the wisdom. it is referred to this substa ntiality as to its negative. and as such it is C onsciousness. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND CONSCIOUSNESS ¤ 413 Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of mind as appearance. Hence consciousness. is represen ted as in immediate being and at the same time as 'ideal'. As soul it was under the phase of substantial univ ersality. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure 'ideal' self-identity. to it. but when he receives the inspired word. the successive steps in further specification of co nsciousness. is the contradiction between the independ ence of the two sides and their identity in which they are merged into one. as subjective reflection in itself. which manifests itself and something else too . and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection set forth as an object. as external to it. but also the inferiority of them to the reasonable frame of mind. and the possibility of the truth of the dreams. for no man when in his wits attains prop hetic truth and inspiration. does not. Gewohnheit. that the ego is in the first instance aware (conscious). ¤ 414 The self-identity of the mind. ¤ 415 As the ego is by itself only a formal identity. but to the foolishness of man. 6. something dark and beyond it. but as subje ctive or as self-certainty.' Plato very correctly notes not merely the bodily condition s on which such visionary knowledge depends. Die wirkliche Seele SUB-SECTION B. either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep. Selbstgefuhl. thus first made explicit as the Ego.the soul's natural life . like reciprocal dependence in general. i. PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. is implicitly the identity in th e otherness: the ego is itself that other and stretches over the object (as if t hat object were implicitly cancelled) . The pure abstract freedo m of mind lets go from it its specific qualities . 7. Ego. in the sphere of essence. as this absolute negativity. CONSCIOUSNESS (a) Consciousness proper (a) Sensuous Consciousness (b) Sense-perception (c) The Intellect (b) Self-consciousness (a) Appetite (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive (c) Universal Self-consciousness (c) Reason B.e.r of our being so ordered our inferior parts that they too might obtain a measur e of truth.it is one side of the relationship and t he whole relationship .the light. but is implicit. and . the dialectical movement of its intelligible unity. is only its abstract formal ideality. The mind as ego is essence. but since reality. It is of this latter. 8. it is as consciousnes s only the appearance (phenomenon) of mind.to an equal freedom as an independent object. or he is demented by some distemper or poss ession (enthusiasm). Ego is infinite self-relation of mind. and in the liver placed their oracle (the power of divination by dre ams). And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination. now. seem to be its own activity.
and th e gradual specification of consciousness appears as a variation in the character istics of its objects. only defined as in consciousness: it is ma de no more than an infinite 'shock'. and even t he Idea of Nature. first. Spatial and temporal Singularn .to the ego it seems an alteration of the object. i. (a) CONSCIOUSNESS PROPER(1) (a) Sensuous consciousness ¤ 418 Consciousness is. ¤ 417 The grades of this elevation of certainty to truth are three in number: firs t (a) consciousness in general. Reinhold may therefore be said to have correctly apprecia ted Kantism when he treated it as a theory of consciousness (under the name of ' faculty of ideation'). has emerged from Spinoz ism.as a case of correlation . it is to be noted that the mind in the judgement by which it 'constitutes' itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualit ative affection) has emerged from substance. and so on. the notion of mind. and that the philosophy. which is not as its own. as Reason. and as containing the propositions only of a phenomenology ( not of a philosophy) of mind. The existence of mind in the stage of consciousness is finite.a subject-objectivity. Ego.e. Consciousness . immediate consciousness. being immediate. an existing thing. which give s this judgement as the absolute characteristic of mind. Fichte kept to the same point of view: his non-ego is onl y something set over against the ego. The Kantian philosophy may be most accurately described as having viewed the min d as consciousness. what makes the object the subject's own. As against Spinozism. reflected in itself. where the mind sees itself embodied in the object and sees itself as impl icitly and explicitly determinate. and it is only from this finite point of view that he treats both intellect and will. an existent. because it is merely a nominal self-relation. still this Idea is again deposed to an appearance. It appears as wealth iest in matter. with an object set against it. the substantial and qu alitative. This is sense-consciousness. That wealth of matter is made out of sensations: they are the material of consciousness (¤ 414). The object is only abstractly characterized as its. is thinking: the logic al process of modifying the object is what is identical in subject and object. t heir absolute interdependence. the subject of consciousness. i. and these it treats as features of th e object (¤ 415). The Ego Kant regards as reference to something awa y and beyond (which in its abstract description is termed the thing-in-itself). The object similarl y.. but only as it is in reference to something else. but as poorest in thought. a singular. to raise its self-certainty to truth. is further characterized a s immediately singular. to a subjective maxim (¤ 58).e. a thing-in-itself.comprises only the categories belongi ng to the abstract ego or formal thinking. etc. and its reference to the o bject accordingly the simple. or mere c ertainty. Though in the notion of a power of reflective judgement he touches upon th e Idea of mind . for which ego is the object. an intuitive intellect. what the soul in its anthropological sphere is and finds in itself. in other words. T his material the ego (the reflection of the soul in itself) separates from itsel f. Both systems theref ore have clearly not reached the intelligible unity or the mind as it actually a nd essentially is. again. in the object it is only as an abstract ego that the mind is reflected into itself : hence its existence there has still a content. Sense-consciousness therefore is aware of the object as an exist ent. (c) unity of consciousness and self-consciou sness. ¤ 416 The aim of conscious mind is to make its appearance identical with its essen ce. a something. and puts it first under the category of being. and underived certainty of it. Consciousness consequently appe ars differently modified according to the difference of the given object. (b) self-consciou sness.
of the thing is. The consciousness of such an object is intellect. lies im mediately in the other. has. viz.ess.e. but brought to rest and universality. and that the object's reflection in self is on the contrary a self-subsis tent inward and universal. But in this manner the interior distinction is. The particular grade of consciousness on which Kantism conceives the mind is per ception: which is also the general point of view taken by ordinary consciousness .between the single thi ngs of sense apperception. when the somewhat is defined as object (¤¤ 194 seqq. or the distinction which is none. ¤ 423 The law. The sensuous certitudes of single appercepti ons or observations form the starting-point: these are supposed to be elevated t o truth. This contradi ction of the finite which runs through all forms of the logical spheres turns ou t most concrete. and the universality which has a higher claim to be the essence and ground . and as a single (thing) in its immedia cy has several predicates.bet ween the individuality of a thing which. But the Ego as itself apparent sees in all thi s characterization a change in the object. has many properties. . The simple difference is the realm of the laws of the phenomena . 73). which remains self-identical in the vicissitudes of appearance.the individual r emains at the bottom hard and unaffected by the universal. or as being beside and out of itself. here and now (the terms by which in the Phenomenology of the Mind (Werke ii . i. and not yet as external on its own part. and more or less by the sciences. wants to take the object i n its truth. which form the alleged ground of general experience. it is related. and universal. free from this negative l ink and from one another.a variety of relations. (b) Sense-perception (2) ¤ 420 Consciousness. the suppression of the multiplicity of the sensible. in so far as its distinction is the inward one. reflected in itself. taken in its concrete content. a something external to it. and on the lines o f definite categories turned at the same time into something necessary and unive rsal. an abstract identity: on the other hand. the distinction on its own part. having passed beyond the sensible. the one of the terms. and. reflectional attributes. ¤ 421 This conjunction of individual and universal is admixture . constitu tes its independence and the various properties which. and am aware'. but as mediated. permanent term s. so constr uing the object. on one hand. as not externally different from the other. reflected upon. Thi s inward. however. but as a n interior 'simple' difference. are independent universal matters (¤ 123). It is therefore a tissue of contradictions . and sensuous consciousness. at first stating the mutual dependence of universal. (c) The Intellect (3) ¤ 422 The proximate truth of perception is that it is the object which is an appea rance. ¤ 419 The sensible as somewhat becomes an other: the reflection in itself of this somewhat. i. At present the object is at first to be viewed only in its correlation t o consciousness. by being regarded in their bearings. not as merely immediate. I described the object of sense-consciousness) strictly belongs to int uition. to describe the sensible. as we called it. it also for that reason contains the multiplicity. its necessity on its own part. Hence the identity of consciousness with the object passes from the abstract identity of 'I am sure' to the definite identity of 'I know.). the thing. to which.e. and universalities. Thes e are logical terms introduced by the thinking principle.a copy of the phenomenon. however. p. experiences. Such an object is a combination of sense qualities with attributes of wider range by which thought defines concrete relations and connections. in this case by t he Ego. The muchness of the sense-singular thus becomes a bre adth . is sense-perception. in that manner. what it is in truth.
consciousness implicitly vanish es: for consciousness as such implies the reciprocal independence of subject and object. and ma intains itself as such. the subjectivity divests itself of its one-sidedness an d becomes objective to itself. Thus appetite in its sat isfaction is always destructive. Thus it is at the same time the antecedent stage. can make no resistance: the dialectic. ¤ 425 Abstract self-consciousness is the first negation of consciousness. because there is no distinct ion between it and the object. To this activity the object. implicit in it.the contradiction implied in its abstraction which should yet be objective or in its immediacy which has the shape of an external object and should be subj ective. pronounces the object null: and the outlook of self-consciousness towards the object equally qualifies the abstract ideality of such self-consciou sness as null. there is strictly speaking no object. (b) SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS(4) ¤ 424 Self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness: the latter is a consequenc e of the former. or. in this return upon itself. therefore. The formula of self-consciousness is I = I: abstract freedom. which issues from the suppression of mere c onsciousness. The certitude of one's self. on the contrary . But t he latter aspect and the negation in general is in I = I potentially suppressed. being merely consumed. all consciousness of an other object being as a matter of fact also self-consciousness. ¤ 428 The product of this process is the fast conjunction of the ego with itself. or implicitly. which implicitly and for self-consciousness is self-le ss. (a) Appetite or Instinctive Desire(5) ¤ 426 Self-consciousness. ¤ 429 But on the inner side. this identity comes to be for the ego. towards self-suppress ion exists in this case as that activity of the ego. because its bearing upon the self-less object is purely negative.With this new form-characteristic. by giving its abstract self-awareness content and obje ctivity. and hence as this certitude of self against the object it is the impulse to rea lize its implicit nature. and in the other direction to free itself from its sensuousness. nominally. Thus while the given object is rendered subjective. knows itself implicit in the object. on the whole. is a singular. in its immediacy. On the external side it conti nues. the latter. In the negation of the two one-sid ed moments by the ego's own activity. and thus in it I am aware of me. therefore. which in this outlook is conformable to the appetite. the identification of its consciousness and self-consciousness . primarily describable as an individual. with the nega tion of it. and for that reason it is burdened with an external object. Consciousness has passed into self-consciousness. its satisfaction realized. The ego in its judgement has an object which is not distinct from it it has itself. The judgement or diremption of this self-consciousness is th . and in its content selfish: and as the satisfac tion has only happened in the individual (and that is transient) the appetite is again generated in the very act of satisfaction. The object is my idea: I am aware of the object as mine . ¤ 427 Self-consciousness. the sense of self which the ego gets i n the satisfaction does not remain in abstract self-concentration or in mere ind ividuality. consciousness: it is the contradiction of itself as self-consciousness and as consciousness. pure 'Ideality'. and a desire (appetite) .as negation of immediacy and individuality the res ult involves a character of universality and of the identity of self-consciousne ss with its object. and itself made actual. The two processes are one and the same. to set aside the given objectivity and identify it with itself. and thus it lacks 'reality': for as it is it s own object.
In place of the rude destruction of the immediate object there ensues acquisition. and it merely led to the characteriza tion of it as particular. a ne w contradiction (for that recognition is at the same time undone by the other's death) and a greater than the other. and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear of his lord' makes 'the beginning o . Force. works off his individualist self-will. for either is no less bent on maintaining his life. solves the contradiction. In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master. ¤ 434 This status. retains his single self-consciousness. (b) Self-consciousness Recognitive(6) ¤ 430 Here there is a self-consciousness for a self-consciousness. in the first place. preservation.e. which falls on another. though by the abstract. and formation of it. ¤ 435 But secondly. then. but only the necessary and legitimate factor in the passa ge from the state of self-consciousness sunk in appetite and selfish isolation i nto the state of universal self-consciousness. I cannot be aware of me as myself in another indivi dual. creates a permanent mea ns and a provision which takes care for and secures the future. from one point of view. This other. and its being for others. While the one com batant prefers life. the fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality. ¤ 433 But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution.t he process of recognition. not their underlying and essential principle. we see. the slave. (The suppression of the singleness of self-consciousness was only a first step in the suppression. the outward and visible recognition). the emergence of man's social life and the commencement of p olitical union. the other holds fast to his self-assertion and is recogniz ed by the former as his superior. it.e consciousness of a 'free' object. at first immedi ately. as one of two things for another. in which as in i ts sign and tool the latter has its own sense of self. the slave. in the service of the master. in which ego is aware of itself as an ego. w hich however is also still outside it. Thus the death of one.but only p eril. But in like measure I cannot be recognized as immediate. which is the basis of this phenomenon. a nd yet also an immediately existing object. In that other as ego I behold myself. and thus give existence to my freedom. so long as I see in that other an other and an immediate existence: and I am consequently bent upon the suppression of this immediacy of his. must likewise be kept in life. on the ir phenomenal side. f rom the essential point of view (i. a suppression. Force. but surrenders his c laim for recognition. as the instrumentality in which the two extremes of independence and non-independence are welded together. implies common wants and common concern for their satisfaction . another ego absolutely independent o f me and opposed to me. The f orm of universality thus arising in satisfying the want. the master beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood. ¤ 432 The fight of recognition is a life and death struggle: either self-conscious ness imperils the other's life.for the means of mastery. But this imme diacy is at the same time the corporeity of self-consciousness. and incurs a like peril for its own . ¤ 431 The process is a battle. is not on that acc ount a basis of right. is yet. when we look to the distinction of the two. and to exist as such for the other: . Thus arises the status of master and slave. therefore rude. however. except so far as I overcome the mer e immediacy on my own part. overcomes the inner immediacy of appetite. negati on of immediacy.) This contradiction gives either self-consciousness th e impulse to show itself as a free self. however. is the external or p henomenal commencement of states. and the means for entering into relation with them. as the existence of hi s freedom.
so far as each knows itself recognized in the other freeman. and of all virtues. which was o nly given in consciousness qua consciousness.the passage to universal self. Truth. friendship. But the difference between those who are thus identified is mere vague diversity . bu t the truth that knows it. y et in virtue of the negation of its immediacy or appetite without distinguishing itself from that other. the certitude of self as infinite univ ersality. also signifies that the pure ego is the pure form wh ich overlaps the object and encompasses it. ¤ 439 Self-consciousness. Selbstbewu§tsein. whilst it signifies that the object. therefore. 4. idle fame. Das anerkennende Selbstbewu§tsein. is mind (spirit). as the Idea (¤ 213) as it here appears. is to be taken as meaning that the distinction between notion and reality which it unifies has the special aspect of a distinction between the self-concentrated notion or consciousness.consciousness. and be maintained apart in worthles s honour. Der Verstand. or determinations of the very being of things. fatherland. which as such an identity is not only the absolute substance. is now itself universal. The uni versality of reason. ego. etc. and is aware of this in so far as it re cognizes the other and knows him to be free. as its peculiar mode and immanent form. (c) Universal Self-consciousness ¤ 436 Universal self-consciousness is the affirmative awareness of self in an othe r self: each self as a free individuality has his own 'absolute' independence. This universal reappearance of self-consciousness . state. . than they are its own thoug hts.f wisdom' . Wahrnehmung 3. the self-centred pure notion. permeatin g and encompassing the ego. thus certified that its determinations are no less objec tive.or rather it is a difference which is none. Each is thus universal self-consciousness and objective .the notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity identical with itself and for that reason universal .which is Reason.is the form of consciousness which lies at the root of all tr ue mental or spiritual life . 5. (c) REASON(7) ¤ 438 The essential and actual truth which reason is. Das Bewu§tsein als solches: (a) Das sinnliche Bewu§tsein 2. Reason. is Reason.in family. valour. love. and the object subsisting external and opposed to it. fame. Hence its truth is the fully and really existent un iversality and objectivity of self-consciousness . 1. Die Begierde 6. lies in the simple identity of the subjectivity of the notion with its objectivity and universality. But this appearance of the underlying es sence may also be severed from that essence. ¤ 437 This unity of consciousness and self-consciousness implies in the first inst ance the individuals mutually throwing light upon each other. For truth here has. honour. aware of what it is. each has 'real' universality in the shape of reciprocity.
etc. desires. Cons ciousness is finite. and from the two forms in which thes e modes exist. then its reality is that reason. and the reali zation of knowledge consists in appropriating reason.e. above the material. PSYCHOLOGY MIND(1) ¤ 440 Mind has defined itself as the truth of soul and consciousness . which on the phenomenal side is found in empirical ideatio n. neit her subjective nor objective. the latter now an infinite form which is not. and above the complication with an external object . and get rid of the form of immediacy with which it once more begins. which is defined as it s notion. Mind is just this elevation above nat ure and physical modes. viz. what is the same thing. i. and in consciousness itself as a separately existent object of that consciousness. or. therefore. remembering.in one word. as its concept has just shown. however. Mind. it has a mode in its knowledge. ¤ 441 The soul is finite. The content which is elevated to intuitions is its sensations: it is its intuitions also which are transmuted into representati ons. in so far as . etc. PSYCHOLOGY..the former a simple immediate totality. ideation. so far as its features are immediate or connatural. in so far as it has an object. then its reality is knowledge or intelligence: say that knowledge is its notion. Say that its notion is the ut terly infinite objective reason. Psychology accordingly studies the faculties or general modes of mental activity qua mental .apart b oth from the content. This. and does not stand in mere correlatio n to it as to its object. by being subjectiv e or only a notion. starts only from its own being an d is in correlation only with its own features. Hence the finitude of mind is to be placed in the (temporary) failure of knowledge to get hold of the full . SUB-SECTION C. All it has now to d o is to realize this notion of its freedom.. And it is a matter of no consequence. it is finite by means of its immediacy.mental vision. like consciousness. in the soul as a physical mode. is not an arbitrary abstraction by the psychologist. etc. but is an awareness of this substantial totality. Mind is finite. Die Vernunft.7. though it no longer has an object. and its representations which are transmuted again into thoughts. MIND (a) Theoretical Mind (a) Intuition (b) Representation (aa) Recollection (bb) Imagination (cc) Memory (c) Thinking (b) Mind Practical (a) Practical Sense or Feeling (b) The Impulses and Choice (c) Happiness (c) Free Mind C. and which as the reality of that notion. in thinking also and in desire and will. restricted by that content.
by which this material is transmuted into m ind and destroyed as a sensible. Similarly. k nowledge. and are the mind's own. involves as its intrinsic purpose and burden that utter and complete a utonomy which is rationality. and is even there a return into itself. on the ascertainment of which there was for a long time great stress laid (by the s ystem of Condillac). As the theory o f Condillac states it. That can only be the intelligible unity of mind. the goal of mind is to give it objective fulfilment. its aim can only be to get rid of the form of immediacy or subjectivity. i. as presupposing itself for it s knowledge to work upon. The development here meant is not that of the individual (which has a certain an thropological character).e. but that the latter phases that follow this start ing-point present themselves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner. And this is the only rational mode of studying the mind and its various activities. where faculties and forces are regarded as successivel y emerging and presenting themselves in external existences series of steps.e. of comprehending itself. in so far as its existent phase. there is no indication of the true final aim of the whole busin ess. Its productions are governed by the principle of all reason that the contents are at once potentially existent. the mind finds in itself something which is. viz. ¤ 442 The progress of mind is development. it is . if the activities of mind are treated as mere manifestations. and appears as everlasting movement of superseding this immediacy.as being and as its own: by the one. to reach and get hold of itself. But the categories employed in doing so are of a wretched so rt. but is le ft as if it were the true and essential foundation. and thus at the same time produce its f reedom. or. ¤ 443 As consciousness has for its object the stage which preceded it. and its activity can only have itself as aim. equally. perhaps in terms stating their utility or suitability for some other interest o f head or heart. So far as knowledge which has not shaken off its original quality of mere knowledge is only abstract or formal. viz. the na tural soul (¤ 413). and to exhibit their necessa ry interconnection. it thereby reduces itself to finitude. the mind realizes that identity as the concrete unity which it and it only know s. that is. as having its full and free characterization i n itself. is misconceived and overlooked. and being a rational knowledge. The way of mind is therefore (a) to be theoretical: it has to do with the rational as its immediate affection which it must render its own: or it has to free knowledge from its presupposedn ess and therefore from its abstractness. in freedom. in which case the action of translating this purpo se into reality is strictly only a nominal passage over into manifestation. that aspect is twofold . and the negative aspect of mental activity. Thus.reality of its reason. In this way the so-called faculties of mind as thus distinguished are only to be treated as steps of this liberation. and the knowledge consequently charact erized as free intelligence. so mind has or rather makes consciousness its object: i. When the affection has been rendered its own. the sensible is not merely the empirical first. forces. if we consider the initial aspect of mind. whe reas consciousness is only the virtual identity of the ego with its other (¤ 415). by the other it affirms it to be only its own. Their ruling principle is that the sensible is taken (and with justice) as t he prius or the initial basis. and to liberate itself to its elf. so far. i. and make the affection subjective. as if a conjectural natural emergence could exhibit the ori gin of these faculties and explain them. Reason at the same time is only infinite so far as it is 'absolute' freedom.e. in the (temporary) failure of reason to att ain full manifestation in knowledge. In Condillac's method there is an unmis takable intention to show how the several modes of mental activity could be made intelligible without losing sight of mental unity.
to definite and conceptual knowledge. which it and the content virtually is. They are not to be distinguished as active and passive. in the theoretical range. is thus also a reality . has a material which is only nominally such. like logic. for which it gains the form of universality. to get at the notion and the truth. which in the first place is likewise formal . The p ossibility of a culture of the intellect which leaves the heart untouched. as it is said. which is to consist of not hing but the empirical apprehension and the analysis of the facts of human consc iousness. and is immediately willed. has led to no improvement in its own condition: but it has had the furthe r effect that. which is the one-sided form o f its contents. Subjective mind is productive: but it is a merely nominal productivity. so that it (c) confronts itself as free mind and thus gets rid of both its defects of one-s idedness..of hearts which in one-sided way want intellect. and of the heart without the intellect .g. and gains abstract auton omy within. Ou twards. mixing it up with forms belonging to the range of consciousness and with anthrop ology. This activity is cognition. and consists in a necessary passage (governed by the c oncept) of one grade or term of intelligent activity (a so-called faculty of min d) into another.only proves at most that bad and radically untrue existences occur. both for the mind as such. just as they are given. the theoretical mind produces only its 'ideal' world. intelligence consists in treat ing what is found as its own. that ideas arise through the c ausal operations of external things upon it. while the practical. as if volition could be wi thout intelligence.take the worthless fo r the essential nature.a reality at once anthropological and conformable to conscious ness) has for its products. elevates itself. Its activity has to do with the empty form . and that in its empirical condition. belong to a point of view utt . that it receives and accepts impressions from outside. Inwards . ¤ 444 The theoretical as well as the practical mind still fall under the general r ange of Mind Subjective. (a) THEORETICAL MIND ¤ 445 Intelligence(2) finds itself determined: this is its apparent aspect from wh ich in its immediacy it starts. and in the possibility of being able to appropriate the reason. The course of this elev ation is itself rational. The distinction of Intelligence from Will is often incorrectly taken to mean tha t each has a fixed and separate existence of its own. It is still extremely ill off.the p retense of finding reason: and its aim is to realize its concept or to be reason actual. and heartless intellects . merely as facts.e.i. but) enjoyment. its content is at first only its own. as r eason is concrete. e. But it is not philosophy which should take su ch untruths of existence and of mere imagining for truth . and therefore a restricted content. is one of those sciences which in modern times have yet derived least profit from the more general mental culture and the deeper concept ion of reason. The nominal knowledge. But as knowledge. The turn which the Kantian philoso phy has taken has given it greater importance: it has. been claimed as the basis of metaphysics. or the activity of intelligence could be without will. Psychology. A host of other phrases used of intelligence. etc. the subjective mind (which as a unity of soul and consciousness. while it has to do with autonomous products. and it proceeds ne xt to liberate its volition from its subjectivity.(b) Will: practical mind. the word. wi th a material which is its own. which is only certitude. all attempts have been abandoned to ascertain the necessity of essential and actual reality. and for metaphysics and philosophy gen erally. along with which the content is realized as rational. This position of psychology. starts from the certitude or the faith of intelligence i n its capability of rational knowledge. The refutation which such cognition gives of the semblance that the rational is found. and in the pract ical (not yet deed and action.
ca n afford a certain satisfaction: what physical nature succeeds in doing by its f undamental quality . It is true that even as isolated (i. it is admitted. It makes absolute ly no difference if we substitute the expression 'activities' for powers and fac ulties. or that the y severally procure a cognitive satisfaction of their own. like power or force. The concept or possibility of cognition has come out as intelligence itself. in which it is to itself as it were palpable and has the whole material of i ts knowledge. conception. is the fixed quality of any object of thought.its out-of-selfness . is only afforded by an intuition permeated by intellect and mind. treating mind as a 'lot' of forces. as non-intelligent). or makes the concept its own. but it is also in addition connected with the great question of modern times. is bro ught into mind. the more diffuse it makes its simple o bject. it . part and parcel of that isolating of mental activity just censured.in a word .but which as intelligence finds itself so characterized . But c ognition is genuine. that intuition. In this lies the want of organic u nity which by this reflectional form. however.besides which it al so intuits. At the present place the simple concept of cognition is what confronts th e quite general assumption taken up by the question. as the certitude of reason: the act of cognition itself is therefore the actuality of intelligence. and that leads to a g lorification of the delights of intuition. must lead to abandoning the effort. the assumption that th e possibility of true knowledge in general is in dispute. etc. just so far as it realizes itself. by pro ducts of imagination which are permeated by reason and exhibit ideas . etc. The truth ascribed to such satisfaction lies in this. and the mind thus made a skeleton-like mechanical collection.of the inward and the outward: but its essential finitude involves th e indifference of content to form (ib.: these activities have no other immanent meaning: their aim is solely the c oncept of cognition (¤ 445 note). imagination. The action of intelligence as theoretical mind has been called cognition (knowle dge).e. or mind. if answered in the negative. In consequence of the immediacy in which it is thus originally. as it is by the same method brought into nature. Isolate the activities and you similarly make the mind a mere aggregate. Faculty. intelligen ce.which as consciousness st ands to this condition on the same terms as to an outward object .is (1) an inarticulate embryonic li fe.that the intelligence can do by volunt ary act. etc. Yet this does not mean intelligence inter alia knows . imagination. memory. intuition. are not isolated. The numerou s aspects and reasons and modes of phrase with which external reflection swells the bulk of this question are cleared up in their place: the more external the a ttitude of understanding in the question. etc. by cognitive intuition. Force (¤ 136) is no doubt the infinity of form . A favorite reflectional form is that of powers and faculties of soul. then an impressio n is implied that they are useful for something else than cognition. remembrance. imagines. but the same result may happen where the intelligence is itself only na tural and untrained.whi ch. cognitive conception. (a) Intuition (Intelligent Perception)(3) ¤ 446 The mind which as soul is physically conditioned . an d exist only as 'moments' in the totality of cognition itself. If they are isolated. remembers. Any aspect whic h can be distinguished in mental action is stereotyped as an independent entity. To take up such a position is i n the first instance. and the assumption tha t it is possible for us at our will either to prosecute or to abandon cognition. This nominal description has its concrete meaning exactly where cognition has it.exhibiting the elements or factors of immanent reason external to each other . But the true satisfaction. by rational conception. etc. It follows from this that it is absurd to speak of intelligenc e and yet at the same time of the possibility or choice of knowing or not. as to whether true knowledge or the knowledge of truth is possible .erly alien to the mental level or to the position of philosophic study. conceives. The stages of its realizing activity are intuition. viz. conceived as reflected into self. note). conception. and treat their essential correlation as an external incident.
In contrast with the simplicity of feeling it is usual rat her to assume that the primary mental phase is judgement generally.is in this stage only as an individual and possesses a vulgar subjectivity.an active self-collection . the mere consciousness point of view. contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given content. of their essential relationships and real cha racters. a relative other: from mind it receives the rational characteristic of being its very other (¤¤ 247.but to his feeling. The other factor is to invest the special quality of feeling. as opposed to true menta l 'idealism'. external or internal. ¤ 447 The characteristic form of feeling is that though it is a mode of some 'affe ction'. ¤ 449 (3) When intelligence reaches a concrete unity of the two factors.It is commonly taken for granted that as re gards content there is more in feeling than in thought: this being specially aff irmed of moral and religious feelings. 254). Feeling is the immediate. and the special quality of sens ation is derived from an independent object. To the view of consciousness the mater ial is only an object of consciousness. and in any case is the form of the particular and subjective. because by his behaviour he refuses to have any lot or part in common ration ality. whic h are the forms in which it is intuitive. But the form of selfish singleness to which feeling reduces the mind is the lowest and worst vehicle it can have . Intelligence thus defines the content of sen sation as something that is out of itself. Apart from such attention there is nothing for the mind. and it is with such a mind that this rectified material enters into its feeling and receives this form. is here the result and the mature result of a fully organized reason. the findi ng of it or its immediacy was in that case essentially to be conceived as a cong enital or corporeal condition. If a man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing.his private and p articular self. that is t o say. may just as likely be narrow and poor. in content and value entirely contingent. It is commonly enough assumed that mind has in its feeling the material of its i deas. as als o in all other more advanced developments of it) .the abstract identical direction of mind (in feeling. With us. is swallowed up. we have the one fa ctor in Attention . as contrasted with this inwa rdness of mind. If feeling formerly turned up (¤ 399) as a mode of the soul's existence. but the statement is more usually understood in a sense the opposite of th at which it has here. Against t hat content the subject reacts first of all with its particular self-feeling. but rather as subject ive and private. but as a negative or a s the abstract otherness of itself. ¤ 448 (2) As this immediate finding is broken up into elements. as it were the closes t. but with an as yet only nominal autonomy of i ntelligence. It thus appears as mind in the guise of feeling. even should its import be most sterl ing and true. wh ich though it may be of more sterling value and of wider range than a one-sided intellectual standpoint. whereas at present it is only to be taken abstrac tly in the general sense of immediacy.one in which it is not found as a free and infinitely universal principle. in t he truth of mind. a . projects it into time and space. with the character of something existent. which the mind as it fe els is to itself. when it is at once self-collected in this externally existing material. . this mode is simple. has the form of casual particularity .to the generalit ies of common sense .not to mention that its imp ort may also be the most scanty and most untrue.t he factor of fixing it as our own. or the disti nction of consciousness into subject and object. and shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity . the only thing to do is to let him alo ne. Now the material. or at least to reasons . hence under the head of feeling is comprised all rational and indeed all spiritual content whatever. Hence feeling. and the matter of feeling has rather been suppose d already as immanent in the mind. Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind which has acquired the consciousness of the true differences of things.
and is arbitrary or contingent. i. and received into the universality o f the ego. The image when thus kept in mind is no longer existent. the intuitional contrast sti ll continues to affect its activity. and inwardly divest itself of it. isolated. Hence from the other point of view intelligence is to be conceived as this subconscious mine. intelligence no less essentiall y directs its attention. It was felt that what was diverse should in the nature of things have a loc al habitation peculiar to itself. in the way we treat. The representation is the property of intelligence. but stored up out of consciousness.nd yet in this self-collectedness sunk in the out-of-selfness. yet without being in consciousnes s. with a preponderating subjectivity. But intelligence is not only consciousness and actual existence. To grasp intelligence as this night-like mine or pit in which is stored a world of infinitely many images and representations. ¤ 450 At and towards this its own out-of-selfness. ¤ 453 (2) The image is of itself transient. so that it no longer needs this immediac y. (aa) Recollection(5) ¤ 452 Intelligence. so as t o be in itself in an externality of its own. is from the one point of view the universal postulate which bids us treat the notion as concrete. though intrinsically concrete. its when and where. intelligence qua intellige nce shows the potential coming to free existence in its development. still continues simple. The image loses the full complement of features proper to intuition. T he path of intelligence in representations is to render the immediacy inward. and yet at the same time collecting itself in its inwardness. however. which do not grow to the concrete immanence of the notion till they reac h the stage of thought. or. And it is indeed this potentiality which is the first form of universality offered in mental representation.the germ of the fruit. and at the same time to get rid of the subjectivity of the inwardness. a rec ollection of itself. But whereas the reversion of the germ from its existing specializations to its simplicity in a purely potential existence take s place only in another germ . as it at first recollects the intuition. Inability to grasp a universal like t his. in virtual possibility. In this way t hat content is (1) an image or picture. and as such is t he middle between that stage of intelligence where it finds itself immediately s ubject to modification and that where intelligence is in its freedom. and the representation cannot as it stands be said to be.in a space and a time of its own. (b) Representation (or Mental Idea)(4) ¤ 451 Representation is this recollected or inwardized intuition. is what has l ed people to talk about special fibres and areas as receptacles of particular id eas. and makes its concrete products still 'synt heses'. for example. In this its immediacy it is an awaking to itself. all the qualities that come into existence in the subsequent development of the tree. but qua intelligence is the subject and the potentiality of its own specializations. Thus intuition becomes a concretion of the material with th e intelligence. as the exi stent universal in which the different has not yet been realized in its separati ons. the germ as affirmatively containing. liberated from its original immediacy an d abstract singleness amongst other things. which. which makes it its own. . But as representation begins from i ntuition and the ready-found material of intuition. no longer needs to find the content. we may say. as its right of property is still conditioned by contrast with the immediacy.e. from the external place. and immediate context in which the intuition stood. and intelligence itself is as attentio n its time and also its place. places the content of feeling in its own inwardness . as tho ught. t ime. to invest itself with intuitive action in itself. it is Intuition o r Mental Vision.
But it is solely in the conscious subject. It is a matte r of chance whether the link of association is something pictorial. now that it has been endued with externality. where. if it is to exist. has a general idea (representation) to supply the link of association for t he images which according to circumstances are more abstract or more concrete id eas. though intelligence shows itself by a certain formal uni versality. being and universality.¤ 454 (3) An image thus abstractly treasured up needs. or an intell ectual category.) .Image and Idea. that it finds its material. In the first place. The image. present also a distinction in content. ¤ 20 note. and dispense with external intuition f or its existence in it.. as a matter of fa ct. but a being of its own institution. Intelligence is thus the force which can give forth its property. (On the distinction of representa tions and thoughts.in them it is still with in itself: at the same time it is aware that what is only its (primarily) intern al image is also an immediate object of intuition. of being in re spect of its content given and immediate. The trai n of images and representations suggested by association is the sport of vacantminded ideation. and the universality which the aforesaid material receives by ideation is still abstract. has been broken up. see Introduction to the Logic. . wherea s the idea (representation). immediate time and space which is treasured up along with them . if we leave out o f account the more precise definition of those forms given above. The content reproduced. This 'synthesis' of the internal image with the recollec ted existence is representation proper: by this synthesis the internal now has t he qualification of being able to be presented before intelligence and to have i ts existence in it. where it is treasured up. though belonging to intelligence.viz. to be so and so. i. Intelligence complements what is merely found by the attribution of universality. The former is the more sensuously concrete idea.e. it is not Ideas (properly s o called) which are associated. such as likeness and contrast. And so th e image is at once rendered distinguishable from the intuition and separable fro m the blank night in which it was originally submerged. at first only in space and time. Mental representation is the mean in the syllogis m of the elevation of intelligence. whatever be its content (from image. notion. by which it is authenticated. e specially during that outburst of empirical psychology which was contemporaneous with the decline of philosophy. the matter is entirely pictorial. where the images issue from the inward world belonging to the ego. which is now the power over them. and an out-put from its universal m ine. has always the peculiarity. under the representation (idea) with the same content. just for the reason that there are so many laws about the same thing. (bb) Imagination(6) ¤ 455 (1) The intelligence which is active in this possession is the reproductive imagination. that the image has the individuality in which the features composing it are conjoined: wh ereas their original concretion.these modes of relation are not laws.and that as a subsumption of the immediate single intuition (impression) under what is in point of form universal. and the internal and its own by the attribution of being. or ide a). reason and consequence. the link between the two significations of s elf-relatedness . comes actually into its possession. It is still true of this idea or repre sentation. an actua l intuition: and what is strictly called Remembrance is the reference of the ima ge to an intuition . which in the mine of intelligence was only its property. as a unit of intuition. Thus intelligence recognizes the specific sensati on and the intuition of it as what is already its own . which in consciousness receive th e title of object and subject. as of all intelligence. belonging as it does to the self-identical unity of intelligence. Secondly. The images are in the first instance referred to this external. as to sugg est a caprice and a contingency opposed to the very nature of law. The so-called laws of the association of ideas were objects of great interest.
whilst reason qua reason also insists upon the truth of its content. are unifications of t he same factors. when imagination elevates the internal meaning to an image and intuition. it is self-uttering. the phrase must not seem surp rising that intelligence makes itself be as a thing. some latent concept or Ideal principle. it is not till creative imagination t hat intelligence ceases to be the vague mine and the universal. because the matter o r theme it embodies is to imagination qua imagination a matter of indifference. it aims at making itself be and be a fact. Its self-sprung ideas have pictorial existence. In other words. and this is expressed by saying that it gives the former the character of an existent. individualized creations are still 'syntheses': f or the material. . etc. in which the subjective principles and ideas get a mentally pic torial existence. its first start was to appropriate the immediate datum in itself (¤¤ 445. and so is the aspect which it imposes upon it. Acting on this view. concrete subjectivity with a substance and value of its own.e. for its ideal import is its elf. a concrete subjectivity. derived from some interest. but they are 'syntheses'. recollection. and subsumes the single intuition under the already internalized image (¤ 453).. so far as we may by anti cipation speak of such. in which the self-reference is defined bo th to being and to universality. ¤ 457 In creative imagination intelligence has been so far perfected as to need no aids for intuition. The creations of imagination are on all hands r ecognized as such combinations of the mind's own and inward with the matter of i ntuition. a force of attraction in like images must be assumed . This force is really intelligence itself .the self-identical ego which by its internalizing recolle ction gives the images ipso facto generality. For the present this internal studio of intelligence is only to be looked at in these abstract aspects. intelligence has therein implicitly returned both to identical se lf-relation and to immediacy. and which thus (2) freely combines and subsumes t hese stores in obedience to its peculiar tenor. But as the creation unites the internal idea with the vehicle of ma terialization. . but only a nominal reason. The image produced by imagin ation of an object is a bare mental or subjective intuition: in the sign or symb ol it adds intuitability proper. This pictor ial creation of its intuitive spontaneity is subjective . to universalize it.where the intelligence gets a d efinite embodiment in this store of ideas and informs them with its general tone . internal and external. is frequen tly explained as the incidence of many similar images one upon another and is su pposed to be thus made intelligible. which occurs in the ideational activity by which general ideas are produced (and ideas qua ideas virtually have the form of generality). what further and more definite aspects they have is a matter for other departments. As reason. so far a s it is concerned. i. Intelligence is the power which wields the stores of ima ges and ideas belonging to it. Productive imagination is the centre in which the universal and being. or something of the sort. is reason. These more or less concrete. But here inte lligence is more than merely a general form: its inwardness is an internally def inite.symbolic. If this superimposing is to be no mere acci dent and without principle. 435). which at the same time would have the negative power of rubbing off the dissimilar elements against each other. and now its action as reason (¤ 438) is from the present point directed towards giving the character of an existent to what in it has been perfected to concrete auto-intuition. intuition-producing: the imagination which creates signs. or poetical imagination .Imagination. and in mechanical memory it completes. this form of being.still lacks the side o f existence.Abstraction. allegoric. are completely welded into one. Such is creative imagination(7) . T he preceding 'syntheses' of intuition. ¤ 456 Thus even the association of ideas is to be treated as a subsumption of the individual under the universal. which forms their connecting link. and becomes an i ndividuality. is derived from the data of intuition. when regarded as the agency of this unification. Another point calling for special notice is that. one's own and what is picked up.
speech and. signs and language are usually foisted in somewhere as an appendix. This intuition is the Sign.in its natural phase a something given and given in space acquires. It is a n image. it is the pyramid into which a foreign soul has been conveyed. and where it is conserved. somewhat immediate or given (for example. but as representative of something else. ¤ 459 The intuition .invests them with the right of existence in the ideational realm.. and thus t he truer phase of the intuition used as a sign is existence in time (but its exi stence vanishes in the moment of being). it would be necessary for its vocabulary or material part to recall the anthropological or psychophysiological point of view (¤ 401).there have been collected more than a hundred such words. without any trouble being taken to display their necessity and syst ematic place in the economy of intelligence.that wealth consisting in its special expression for special sounds . when employed as a sign. since memory. have nothing to do with each oth er. intuitions. while on one hand the theory of mere accident has disappeared. Language here comes under discussion only in the special aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium.gives to sensations. on the other the princi ple of imitation has been restricted to the slight range it actually covers . language . has always to do with signs only. its institution by intelligence. treati ng the intuition (or time and space as filled full) as its own property. In logic and psychology. but appears as recipient of sensible matter. The right place for the sign is tha t just given: where intelligence . The sign is different from the symbol : for in the symbol the original characters (in essence and conception) of the v isible object are more or less identical with the import which it bears as symbo l. deletin g the connotation which properly and naturally belongs to it. The vocal note which receives further articulation to express specific ideas . the colour of the cockade. the peculiar characteristic of existing only as superseded and sublimated. its system. and if we consider the rest of its exte rnal psychical quality. Knarren. the intuition does not count positi vely or as representing itself. With regard to the elementary material of language. Yet one may still hear the German language praised for its wealth . and for the grammar or formal portion to anticipate the standpoint of an alytic understanding. . conception s. out of which it forms i deas . a second and higher existence than they naturally possess . something accepted.th at of vocal objects.now gives its own original ideas a definite existence from itself. where the inward idea manifests itself in adequate utteranc e. The sign is some immediate intuition. representing a totally different import fr om what naturally belongs to it. but an institution grow ing out of its (anthropological) own naturalness. the matter of the latter is. etc.which as intuiting generates the form of time and space.). If language had to be treated in its concrete nature. This sign-creating activity may be distinctively named 'productive' Memory (the primarily abstract 'Mnemosyne'). and conferring on it an other connotation as its soul and import. Intelligence therefore gives proof of wider choice and ampler authority in t he use of intuitions when it treats them as designatory (significative) rather t han as symbolical. e tc. This institution of the natura l is the vocal note. Such superabundance in the realm of sense and of triviality contributes nothin . in the first instance. strictly so-called. Such is the negativity of intelligence. and even with conception and imagination. which has received as its soul and meaning an independent mental repres entation. the natural attributes of the intuit ion. Sausen. and the connotation of which it is a sign. perhaps: the humour of the moment creates fresh ones when it pleases .R auschen.¤ 458 In this unity (initiated by intelligence) of an independent representation w ith an intuition. whereas in the sign. But in the fusion of the two elements. which in ordinary life is often used as interchangeable and synon ymous with remembrance (recollection).
externalities which of themselve s have no sense.see Macartney's Travels by Staunton) which occasioned t he need of alphabetical writing and led to its formation. we may touch. which severally receive designation.). has shown on this point that they contai n a very elaborate grammar and express distinctions which are lost or have been largely obliterated in the languages of more civilized nations. as regards signs for mental objects. for example. it may be by external agencies or by the needs of civilization. only in pas sing. in chemistry and mineralogy. hieroglyphics uses spatia l figures to designate ideas. the chemical elements.e. uses them to designate vocal notes which are already signs. i. which we have first really begun to make acquaintance with in modern times. and this w ould involve the rise of a new hieroglyphical denotation. as many as ten a .e. but. i. and only get signification as signs. and its method of writing moreover can only be the lot of that small part of a nation which is in exclusive possession of mental culture. Having been originally sensu ous intuitions. on the other hand. by means of which only does vocal language acquire the precision and purity of its articulation. like the Chinese. instead of n ames proper. . the planets . would have as a universal language for the inter course of nations and especially of scholars. In particular.e. formed on the hieroglyphic method (and hieroglyphics are used even where there is alphabetic writing. the denomination. are frequently changed. and thus have only traces left of the ir original meaning. if it be not altogether extinguished. At any rate a comprehe nsive hieroglyphic language for ever completed is impracticable. t he progress of thought and the continual development of logic lead to changes in the views of their internal relations and thus also of their nature. which is freq uently changed capriciously and fortuitously. But these dull subconscious beginnings are depr ived of their original importance and prominence by new influences. . as it w ere the posture in the corporeal act of oral utterance. etc. As to the formal elem ent. Sensible object s no doubt admit of permanent signs. upon written languages further development in the particular sphere of lan guage which borrows the help of an externally practical activity. It is from the province of immediate spatial intuition to which written language proceeds that it takes and produces the signs (¤ 454). tongue in each) and for their combinations. alphabetical writing. which admits of the hieroglyphic language of that n ation. as well as for their more abstract elements (the posture of li ps. Alphabetical writing thus con sists of signs of signs . they are reduced to signs. is altered in accordance with the differences of view with rega rd to the genus or other supposed specific property. But we may be sure that it was rat her the intercourse of nations (as was probably the case in Phoenicia. and still takes place in Canton . it depends. palate.the words or concrete signs of vocal language being an alysed into their simple elements.g to form the real wealth of a cultivated language. on anthropological articulation. people have tried to fin d the appropriate signification. the composi te name formed of signs of their generic characters or other supposed characteri stic properties. viz. The study of languages still in their original state. it is the work of analytic intellect which informs language with its categories: it is this logical instinct which gives rise to grammar. It is only a stationary civ ilization. von Humboldt' s Essay on the Dual. and th at the same language has a more perfect grammar when the nation is in a more unc ivilized state than when it reaches a higher civilization. The imperfection of the Chinese vocal language is notorious: n umbers of its words possess several utterly different meanings. again.The progress of the vocal language depends most closely on the habit of alphabetical writing. The strictly raw material of language itself depends more upon an inward symbolism than a symbolism referrin g to external objects. and now that. For each vowel and conso nant accordingly. people ask for terms expressing a sort of definition. as in our signs for the numbers.) In speaking of vocal (which is the original) language. Now that it h as been forgotten what names properly are. i. W.Leibni z's practical mind misled him to exaggerate the advantages which a complete writ ten language. as. It seems as if t he language of the most civilized nations has the most imperfect grammar. their signs in vocal language. (Cf. Even in the case of se nse-objects it happens that their names.
Alphabetic writing is on all accounts the more intelligent: in it the word . It is not merely the image-loving and image-limited intelligence that lingers over the sim plicity of ideas and redintegrates them from the more abstract factors into whic h they have been analysed: thought too reduces to the form of a simple thought t he concrete connotation which it 'resumes' and reunites from the mere aggregate of attributes to which analysis has reduced it. so that in using them we need not consciously realize them by means of tones. so that. learn ing to speak Chinese. in the case of the Chinese Koua. the simple straight stroke. To want a name means that for the immediate idea (which. in the interest o f vision. Thus. however ample a connotation it may include. just as in modern times (as already noted.What has been stated is the principle for settling the val ue of these written languages. Every divergence in analysis would give rise to another formation of the written name. i.the mode. or simple logical terms.is broug ht to consciousness and made an object of reflection. Thus a theory readily arises that all ideas may be reduced to their elements. even in the region of sense) muriatic acid has undergone several changes of name. Perfection here consists in the o pposite of that parler sans accent which in Europe is justly required of an educ ated speaker. and that the analysis of these (and the proximate results of such analysis must again be analysed) appears to be possible in the most various and divergen t ways.e. by speaking low and soft or crying out. Both alike require such signs. as it does. peculiar to the intellect. whereas people unpractised in reading utter aloud what they read in order to catch its meaning in the sound. as a roundabout way to ideas by means of audibility. The European.the analytical designations of ideas which misled Leibniz to regard it as preferable to alphabetic writing is rather in antagonism with the fundamental desideratum of language . is still for the mind simple in the name). in speaking. instead of springing from the direct analysis of se nsible signs. that the ideas have names strictly so called: the name is the simple sign for the exact i dea. we require a simple imme diate sign which for its own sake does not suggest anything. the distinction is made perceptible merely by a ccent and intensity. A hieroglyphic writt en language would require a philosophy as stationary as is the civilization of t he Chinese. which though consisting of several let ters or syllables and even decomposed into such. yet do not exhibit a combinatio n of several ideas. and the st roke broken into two parts) a hieroglyphic system would be generated by their co mposition. Acquired habit subsequentl y effaces the peculiarity by which alphabetic writing appears. the work of sign-making is reduced to its few simple elements (the primary postures of articulation) in which the sens e-factor in speech is brought to the form of universality. it is analysed. at the same time that in this elementary phase it acquires complete precision and purity. like alphabetic writing. s imple in respect of their meaning: signs. Engaging the attention of intelligence. the simple plain idea. Hieroglyphics. not decomposed into its features and compounded out of them. so that from the elementary signs chosen to express th ese (as. of uttering its ideas most worthily . it makes them a s ort of hieroglyphic to us. It also follows that in hieroglyphics the relatio ns of concrete mental ideas to one another must necessarily be tangled and perpl exed. What has been said shows the inestimable and not sufficiently appreciated educat ional value of learning to read and write an alphabetic character. It leads the mind from the sensibly concrete image to attend to the more formal structure of the vocal word and its abstract elements. This feature of hieroglyphic . falls into the most ridiculous blunders before he has mast ered these absurd refinements of accentuation.nd twenty.the name. and contributes much to give stability and independence to the inward realm of mental life. The hieroglyphic mode of writing keeps the Chinese vocal language from reaching that objective precision which is gained in articulation by alphab etic writing. arise from an antecedent analysis of idea s. and has for its sol e function to signify and represent sensibly the simple idea as such. while (with the facu . Thus alphab etic writing retains at the same time the advantage of vocal language. .
lty which transformed alphabetic writing into hieroglyphics) the capacity of abs traction gained by the first practice remains, hieroglyphic reading is of itself a deaf reading and a dumb writing. It is true that the audible (which is in tim e) and the visible (which is in space), each have their own basis, one no less a uthoritative than the other. But in the case of alphabetic writing there is only a single basis: the two aspects occupy their rightful relation to each other: t he visible language is related to the vocal only as a sign, and intelligence exp resses itself immediately and unconditionally by speaking. - The instrumental fu nction of the comparatively non-sensuous element of tone for all ideational work shows itself further as peculiarly important in memory which forms the passage from representation to thought. ¤ 460 The name, combining the intuition (an intellectual production) with its sign ification, is primarily a single transient product; and conjunction of the idea (which is inward) with the intuition (which is outward) is itself outward. The r eduction of this outwardness to inwardness is (verbal) Memory. (cc) Memory(8) ¤ 461 Under the shape of memory the course of intelligence passes through the same inwardizing (recollecting) functions, as regards the intuition of the word, as representation in general does in dealing with the first immediate intuition (¤ 45 l). (1) Making its own the synthesis achieved in the sign, intelligence, by this inwardizing (memorizing) elevates the single synthesis to a universal, i.e. per manent, synthesis, in which name and meaning are for it objectively united, and renders the intuition (which the name originally is) a representation. Thus the import (connotation) and sign, being identified, form one representation: the re presentation in its inwardness is rendered concrete and gets existence for its i mport: all this being the work of memory which retains names (retentive Memory). ¤ 462 The name is thus the thing so far as it exists and counts in the ideational realm. (2) In the name, Reproductive memory has and recognizes the thing, and wi th the thing it has the name, apart from intuition and image. The name, as givin g an existence to the content in intelligence, is the externality of intelligenc e to itself; and the inwardizing or recollection of the name, i.e. of an intuiti on of intellectual origin, is at the same time a self-externalization to which i ntelligence reduces itself on its own ground. The association of the particular names lies in the meaning of the features sensitive, representative, or cogitant - series of which the intelligence traverses as it feels, represents, or thinks . Given the name lion, we need neither the actual vision of the animal, nor its im age even: the name alone, if we understand it, is the unimaged simple representa tion. We think in names. The recent attempts - already, as they deserved, forgotten - to rehabilitate the Mnemonic of the ancients, consist in transforming names into images, and thus a gain deposing memory to the level of imagination. The place of the power of memo ry is taken by a permanent tableau of a series of images, fixed in the imaginati on, to which is then attached the series of ideas forming the composition to be learned by rote. Considering the heterogeneity between the import of these ideas and those permanent images, and the speed with which the attachment has to be m ade, the attachment cannot be made otherwise than by shallow, silly, and utterly accidental links. Not merely is the mind put to the torture of being worried by idiotic stuff, but what is thus learnt by rote is just as quickly forgotten, se eing that the same tableau is used for getting by rote every other series of ide as, and so those previously attached to it are effaced. What is mnemonically imp ressed is not like what is retained in memory really got by heart, i.e. strictly produced from within outwards, from the deep pit of the ego, and thus recited,
but is, so to speak, read off the tableau of fancy. - Mnemonic is connected with the common prepossession about memory, in comparison with fancy and imagination ; as if the latter were a higher and more intellectual activity than memory. On the contrary, memory has ceased to deal with an image derived from intuition - t he immediate and incomplete mode of intelligence; it has rather to do with an ob ject which is the product of intelligence itself - such a without-book(9) as rem ains locked up in the within-book(10) of intelligence, and is, within intelligen ce, only its outward and existing side. ¤ 463 (3) As the interconnection of the names lies in the meaning, the conjunction of their meaning with the reality as names is still an (external) synthesis; an d intelligence in this its externality has not made a complete and simple return into self. But intelligence is the universal - the single plain truth of its pa rticular self-divestments; and its consummated appropriation of them abolishes t hat distinction between meaning and name. This supreme inwardizing of representa tion is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, in which it renders itself the mere being, the universal space of names as such, i.e. of meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same ti me the power over the different names - the link which, having nothing in itself , fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in stable order. So far as they merely are, and intelligence is here itself this being of theirs, its power is a merely abstract subjectivity - memory; which, on account of the complete extern ality in which the members of such series stand to one another, and because it i s itself this externality (subjective though that be), is called mechanical (¤ 195 ). A composition is, as we know, not thoroughly conned by rote, until one attaches no meaning to the words. The recitation of what has been thus got by heart is th erefore of course accentless. The correct accent, if it is introduced, suggests the meaning: but this introduction of the signification of an idea disturbs the mechanical nexus and therefore easily throws out the reciter. The faculty of con ning by rote series of words, with no principle governing their succession, or w hich are separately meaningless, for example, a series of proper names, is .so s upremely marvellous, because it is t e very essence of mind to have its wits abo ut it; whereas in this case the mind is estranged in itself, and its action is l ike machinery. But it is only as uniting subjectivity with objectivity that the mind has its wits about it. Whereas in the case before us, after it has in intui tion been at first so external as to pick up its facts ready made, and in repres entation inwardizes or recollects this datum and makes it its own - it proceeds as memory to make itself external in itself, so that what is its own assumes the guise of something found. Thus one of the two dynamic factors of thought, viz. objectivity, is here put in intelligence itself as a quality of it. - It is only a step further to treat memory as mechanical - the act implying no intelligence - in which case it is only justified by its uses, its indispensability perhaps for other purposes and functions of mind. But by so doing we overlook the proper signification it has in the mind. ¤ 464 If it is to be the fact and true objectivity, the mere name as an existent r equires something else - to be interpreted by the representing intellect. Now in the shape of mechanical memory, intelligence is at once that external objectivi ty and the meaning. In this way intelligence is explicitly made an existence of this identity, i.e. it is explicitly active as such an identity which as reason it is implicitly. Memory is in this manner the passage into the function of thou ght, which no longer has a meaning, i.e. its objectivity is no longer severed fr om the subjective, and its inwardness does not need to go outside for its existe nce. The German language has etymologically assigned memory (Gedachtnis), of which it has become a foregone conclusion to speak contemptuously, the high position of direct kindred with thought (Gedanke). - It is not matter of chance that the you
ng have a better memory than the old, nor is their memory solely exercised for t he sake of utility. The young have a good memory because they have not yet reach ed the stage of reflection; their memory is exercised with or without design so as to level the ground of their inner life to pure being or to pure space in whi ch the fact, the implicit content, may reign and unfold itself with no antithesi s to a subjective inwardness. Genuine ability is in youth generally combined wit h a good memory. But empirical statements of this sort help little towards a kno wledge of what memory intrinsically is. To comprehend the position and meaning o f memory and to understand its organic interconnection with thought is one of th e hardest points, and hitherto one quite unregarded in the theory of mind. Memor y qua memory is itself the merely external mode, or merely existential aspect of thought, and thus needs a complementary element. The passage from it to thought is to our view or implicitly the identity of reason with this existential mode: an identity from which it follows that reason only exists in a subject, and as the function of that subject. Thus active reason is Thinking. (c) Thinking(11) ¤ 465 Intelligence is recognitive: it cognizes an intuition, but only because that intuition is already its own (¤ 454); and in the name it rediscovers the fact (¤ 46 2): but now it finds its universal in the double signification of the universal as such, and of the universal as immediate or as being - finds that is the genui ne universal which is its own unity overlapping and including its other, viz. be ing. Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part cognitive: virtually i t is the universal - its product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain ident ity of subjective and objective. It knows that what is thought, is, and that wha t is, only is in so far as it is a thought (¤¤ 5, 21); the thinking of intelligence is to have thoughts: these are as its content and object. ¤ 466 But cognition by thought is still in the first instance formal: the universa lity and its being is the plain subjectivity of intelligence. The thoughts there fore are not yet fully and freely determinate, and the representations which hav e been inwardized to thoughts are so far still the given content. ¤ 467 As dealing with this given content, thought is (a) understanding with its fo rmal identity, working up the representations, that have been memorized, into sp ecies, genera, laws, forces, etc., in short into categories - thus indicating th at the raw material does not get the truth of its being save in these thought-fo rms. As intrinsically infinite negativity, thought is (b) essentially an act of partition - judgement, which, however, does not break up the concept again into the old antithesis of universality and being, but distinguishes on the lines sup plied by the interconnections peculiar to the concept. Thirdly (c), thought supe rsedes the formal distinction and institutes at the same time an identity of the differences - thus being nominal reason or inferential understanding. Intellige nce, as the act of thought, cognizes. And (a) understanding out of its generalit ies (the categories) explains the individual, and is then said to comprehend or understand itself: (b) in the judgement it explains the individual to be a unive rsal (species, genus). In these forms the content appears as given: (c) but in i nference (syllogism) it characterizes a content from itself, by superseding that form-difference. With the perception of the necessity, the last immediacy still attaching to formal thought has vanished. In Logic there was thought, but in its implicitness, and as reason develops itse lf in this distinction-lacking medium. So in consciousness thought occurs as a s tage (¤ 437 note). Here reason is as the truth of the antithetical distinction, as it had taken shape within the mind's own limits. Thought thus recurs again and again in these different parts of philosophy, because these parts are different only through the medium they are in and the antitheses they imply; while thought is this one and the same centre, to which as to their truth the antitheses retu rn.
¤ 468 Intelligence which as theoretical appropriates an immediate mode of being, i s, now that it has completed taking possession, in its own property: the last ne gation of immediacy has implicitly required that the intelligence shall itself d etermine its content. Thus thought, as free notion, is now also free in point of content. But when intelligence is aware that it is determinative of the content , which is its mode no less than it is a mode of being, it is Will. (b) MIND PRACTICAL(12) ¤ 469 As will, the mind is aware that it is the author of its own conclusions, the origin of its self-fulfilment. Thus fulfilled, this independency or individuali ty forms the side of existence or of reality for the Idea of mind. As will, the mind steps into actuality; whereas as cognition it is on the soil of notional ge nerality. Supplying its own content, the will is self-possessed, and in the wide st sense free: this is its characteristic trait. Its finitude lies in the formal ism that the spontaneity of its self-fulfilment means no more than a general and abstract ownness, not yet identified with matured reason. It is the function of the essential will to bring liberty to exist in the formal will, and it is ther efore the aim of that formal will to fill itself with its essential nature, i.e. to make liberty its pervading character, content, and aim, as well as its spher e of existence. The essential freedom of will is, and must always be, a thought: hence the way by which will can make itself objective mind is to rise to be a t hinking will - to give itself the content which it can only have as it thinks it self. True liberty, in the shape of moral life, consists in the will finding its purpo se in a universal content, not in subjective or selfish interests. But such a co ntent is only possible in thought and through thought: it is nothing short of ab surd to seek to banish thought from the moral, religious, and law-abiding life. ¤ 470 Practical mind, considered at first as formal or immediate will, contains a double ought - (1) in the contrast which the new mode of being projected outward by the will offers to the immediate positivity of its old existence and conditi on - an antagonism which in consciousness grows to correlation with external obj ects. (2) That first self-determination, being itself immediate, is not at once elevated into a thinking universality: the latter, therefore, virtually constitu tes an obligation on the former in point of form, as it may also constitute it i n point of matter; - a distinction which only exists for the observer. (a) Practical Sense or Feeling(13) ¤ 471 The autonomy of the practical mind at first is immediate and therefore forma l, i.e. it finds itself as an individuality determined in its inward nature. It is thus 'practical feeling', or instinct of action. In this phase, as it is at b ottom a subjectivity simply identical with reason, it has no doubt a rational co ntent, but a content which as it stands is individual, and for that reason also natural, contingent and subjective - a content which may be determined quite as much by mere personalities of want and opinion, etc., and by the subjectivity wh ich selfishly sets itself against the universal, as it may be virtually in confo rmity with reason. An appeal is sometimes made to the sense (feeling) of right and morality, as wel l as of religion, which man is alleged to possess - to his benevolent dispositio ns - and even to his heart generally - i.e. to the subject so far as the various practical feelings are in it all combined. So far as this appeal implies (1) th at these ideas are immanent in his own self, and (2) that when feeling is oppose d to the logical understanding, it, and not the partial abstractions of the latt er, may be the totality - the appeal has a legitimate meaning. But on the other hand, feeling too may be one-sided, unessential, and bad. The rational, which ex
If feelings are of the right sort. namely God. the truth and. and coming to see that in the human being th ere is only one reason. Thus it is. for the latter. shame. it is because of their quality or co ntent . But f eeling is only the form of the immediate and peculiar individuality of the subje ct. wha t is the same thing.ists in the shape of rationality when it is apprehended by thought.which is assumed to be worth nothing save as adapted to that claim. contentment. this relation of the requirement to existent fact is the utterly subjecti ve and superficial feeling of pleasant or unpleasant. and to discus s their content. and precisely in that way d o they . so far at least a s evil is understood to mean what is disagreeable and painful merely. On the other hand. because all tha t the former holds more than the latter is only the particular subjectivity with its vanity and caprice. and t hus they are the contradiction called evil. the actual rationality of the heart and will can only be at home in the universality of intellect. on the one hand. is precisely what constitutes.which is right only so far as it is intrinsically universal or has its s ource in the thinking mind. in their immediacy. it is suspicious or even worse to cling to feeling and heart in place of the intelligent rationality of law. and evil. in its objectivity and truth. joy. law and morality. like any other objective facts (which consciousness al so sets over against itself). The celebrated question as to the origin of evil in the world. lack objective determin ation. ¤ 472 The 'Ought' of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to c ontrol some existing mode of fact . but are partly diff erent in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their 'Ou ght'. repentance. Whereas in life. and will. in feeling.retain a speciality of their own . heart.. is the same content as the good practical feeling has. in their universality and necessity. right. It is equally silly to consider intellec t as superfluous or even harmful to feeling. So long as we study practical feelings and dispositions sp ecially. and not in the singleness of feeling as feeling. and duty.but only in antithesis to the latter . the rights and duties which are the true work s of mental autonomy. etc. For the same reason it is out of place in a scientific treatment of the feelings to deal with anything beyond their form. can also be felt. But where the objects sought are thus casual. volition. but presented in its universality and necessity. in which these facts. we have this immanen . it is these alone which belong to the individuality which retains its opposition to the universal : their content is the reverse of rights and duties. The difficulty for the logical intellect consists in throwing off the separation it has arbitrarily imposed between the several facu lties of feeling and thinking mind. Another difficulty co nnected with this is found in the fact that the Ideas which are the special prop erty of the thinking mind. considering that casual aims may also come under the form of Ough t. In the lifeless there is neither evi l nor pain: for in inorganic nature the intelligible unity (concept) does not co nfront its existence and does not in the difference at the same time remain its permanent subject. may be placed. 'Ought' is an ambiguous term . silly to suppose that in the passage from feeling t o law and duty there is any loss of import and excellence.indeed infinitely so. are partly only modifications of the formal 'practical feeling' in general. Evil is nothing but the incompatibil ity between what is and what ought to be. bad. The finitude of life and mind is seen in their judgement: the c ontrary which is separated from them they also have as a negative in them. evil only executes what is righ tfully due to the vanity and nullity of their planning: for they themselves were radically evil. and thought. it is this passage wh ich lets feeling first reach its truth. Delight. and still more in mind.. when thought. But as both. we have only to deal with the selfish. arises on this stage of the formal practical feeling. etc. grief.
an aggregate which is now increased by the host of impulses. Their genui ne rationality cannot reveal its secret to a method of outer reflection which pr e-supposes a number of independent innate tendencies and immediate instincts. In consequence of this formalism. as regards the numbers of these impulses and propensities. the question is directly raised. are infected with contingency. Which are good and bad? . indeed. as part and parcel of the still subjective and sin gle will. in which the whole subjectivity of the individual is merged. a hypocritical moralizing which inveighs against t he form of passion as such.natural impulse and inclination. And thus it was a true perception when Plato (especially including as he did the mind's whole nature under its right) showed that the ful l reality of justice could be exhibited only in the objective phase of justice. Jacob Bohme viewed egoity (s elfhood) as pain and torment.as immediate and merely found to hand of the existing mode to its requirement a negation. the title only states that a subject has thrown his whole soul . Nothin g great has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion. an d therefore is wanting in a single principle and final purpose for them. . The special note in passion is its restriction to one special mode of volition. The will. their mutual connect ions.Up to what degree the good continue good. while. passion is neither good no r bad. talent. and gives their contents a rationality and objectivity.his inte rests of intellect. the conformity of its inner requireme nt and of the existent thing ought to be its act and institution. finds in the conformity . as r egards the form of its content.and (as there are ma ny. whose aggregate is to form the mind theoretical . But with regard to the inclinations. Will. each being always in conflict to another. ¤ 474 Inclinations and passions embody the same constituent features as the practi cal feeling. The answer to the question. and appear as particular to stand to th e individual and to each other in an external relation and with a necessity whic h creates bondage. is at first still a natural will. If the will is to satisfy itself. character. if the implicit unity of the universali ty and the special mode is to be realized. the case is much the same as with the psychical powe rs. But the immanent 'reflection' of mind itself carries it beyond their particularity and their natural immediacy. overcoming the subjectivity by the subject's own agency.t distinction present: hence arises the Ought: and this negativity. each with its private range). (b) The Impulses and Choice(14) ¤ 473 The practical ought is a 'real' judgement. It is this objectification which evinces their real value. which is essentially self-d etermination. it is pa ssion. they are based on the rational nature of the mind. first of all. and their truth. and as the fountain of nature and of spirit. be the value of tha t mode what it may. as rights and duties. The nominal rationality of impulse and propen sity lies merely in their general impulse not to be subjective merely. What are the good and rational propensiti es. as experience shows. directly ident ical with its specific mode: . being all in one subjec t and hardly all. the totality of the practical spirit throw itself into a single one of the many restricted forms of impulse. too often. but to ge t realized. Should. therefore. they. namely in the construction of the State as the ethical life. admitting of gratification. in which they exist as necessary ties of social relation. Thus. on one hand. and something inappropriate to it.on one aim and object. freedom are the principles of evil and pain. In what way have they. ego. and how they are to be coordinated with each other? resolves itself into an exposition of the laws and forms of common life produced by the mind when develo ping itself as objective mind . It is on ly a dead. on the other. to suffer at least reciprocal restriction? And.a development in which the content of autonomous . subjectivity . enjoyment . however.
where wants are suppose d to find their satisfaction without the agent doing anything to produce a confo rmity between immediate existence and his own inner requirements. this is wh at is called the interest. unless he had an interest in it. of a universal sa tisfaction. and it is held that partly they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof of that aim. reflected into itself as the negativity of its merely immediate autonomy. inclinations. as thinking and implicitly free. which is just as much no satisfacti on. are reduced to a m ere negative. where the subject is made to close with itself. is nothing but the content of the impul ses and appetites. that finds its actualizing in the agent. and it is his agency too which executes this aim: unless the subject were in this way even in the most disinterested action. an inactive thing. It is thus 'reflecting' will. as happiness has its sole affirmative contents in the springs of action. by another. ¤ 477 Such a particularity of impulse has thus ceased to be a mere datum: the refl ective will now sees it as its own. ¤ 475 The subject is the act of satisfying impulses. and social duties. i. in which its former uni versality concludes itself to actuality. Their mutual limitation. The discussion of the true intrin sic worth of the impulses. ¤ 476 The will. it is the process of distraction and of suspending one desire or enjoyment by another . moral. But impulse and passion are the very life-blood of all action: t hey are needed if the agent is really to be in his aim and the execution thereof . I f the content of the impulse is distinguished as the thing or business from this act of carrying it out. and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which mus t have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. the impulses. But the truth of the particular satisfactions is th e universal. It rea lizes itself in a particularity. ¤ 480 Happiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things de . and is option or choice. which it regards at the same time as a nullity. because it closes with it and thus gives its elf specific individuality and actuality. without end. there would be no action at all. so far as their particularity goes. .and one satisfaction. which reflection and comparison have educed.should it claim to en gross his whole efficient subjectivity . it is actual only as a subjective and contingent will. and passions is thus essentially the th eory of legal. and places itself as simple subjectivity of thought above their diversified content.action loses its contingency and optionality. on one hand. it is on them that the decision turns. proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand. and we regard the thing which has been brought to pass as containing the element of subjective individuality and its action. An action is an aim of the subject. and finds it only wh en the aim is immanent in the agent. as the content. As thus contradictory. an act of (at least) formal r ationality.The im pulses and inclinations are sometimes depreciated by being contrasted with the b aseless chimera of a happiness. which as such is the universal. on the whole to their disadvantage.his passion. (c) Happiness(15) ¤ 479 In this idea. It is now on the standpoint of choosin g between inclinations. partly sacrificed to that aim directly. distinguishes itself from the par ticularity of the impulses. Nothing therefore is brought about without interest. as it translates them from the subjectivity of content (which so far is purpose) into objectivity. and finds a satisfaction in what it has at the same time emerged from. is his interest and . with the morality of duty f or duty's sake. The morality concerns the content of the aim. the free gift of nature. However. They are somet imes contrasted. which under the name of happiness the thinking will makes its aim. ¤ 478 Will as choice claims to be free. either alto gether or in part.e.
e. only so far as it thinks itself . and the abstract singleness. When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty. by having for its contents and aim only that infini te mode of being . But the particularity of the sati sfaction which just as much is as it is abolished. Plat o and Aristotle. i. of present sensati on and volition. and of which it is only t he formal activity. there is not hing like it in its uncontrollable strength. This universalism the will has as its object and aim. or implicit Idea. he is actually free. just because it is the very essence of mind. education. have never had this Idea. even when he steps into the sphere of secular existence. of the family.e . The Greeks and Romans. in which the Idea thus appears is on ly finite. he h as also. If. On the contrary.freedom itself. If to be aware of the Idea . and because implicit only the no tion of absolute mind. These ins titutions are due to the guidance of that spirit. an Athenian or Spartan citizen). even the Stoics. man is aware of this relationship to the absolute mind as his true being. and are constituted after its measure. and is will as free intelligence. still this very I . and of investing it s self-unfolding content with an existence which.the single will as aware of th is its universality constituting its contents and aim. with freedom itself.to be aware. ¤ 482 The mind which knows itself as free and wills itself as this its object. and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superse ded. and have God's mind d welling in him: i.a universality which only ought to be. destined as mind to live in absolute relationship with God himself. that men are aware of freedom as their essence. the will is an actually free will. Africa and the East. No Idea is so generally recognized as indefinite. and open to the gre atest misconceptions (to which therefore it actually falls a victim) as the idea of Liberty: none in common currency with so little appreciation of its meaning. fortuitousness . It was through Christia nity that this Idea came into the world.is matter of speculation. aim. which i s pure and concrete at once. which has its true being for characteristic and aim. By superseding the adjustments of means therein contained. the individu al as such has an infinite value as the object and aim of divine love. now that the formalism. Whole continents. man is implicitly destined to supreme freedom. and object . they saw tha t it is only by birth (as. as the substance of the state. its very au tonomy or freedom. is actu ality.sired . in religion as such .an individuality. which realizes its own freedom of will. we can see how misconceptions about it are of tremendous consequence in practice. that is.the sage is free even as a sla ve and in chains) that the human being is actually free. also purifi ed of all that interferes with its universalism. and are without it still. and that as its very actuality. As abstract Idea again. find their truth in the intrinsic universality of the will. If the will. or philosophy (. the option which gives or does not give itself (as it pleases) an aim in happine ss. In this way choice is will only as pure subjectivity. Remembering that free mind is actual mind. i. did not have it.it is the existential side of reason . It is thus 'Objective' Mind. (c) FREE MIND(16) ¤ 481 Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a free will . In this truth of its autonomy where concept a nd object are one. that will is also the act of developing the Idea. or by s trength of character. so that in this sphere of particular existence. as realizing the idea. therefore. for example. According to Christianity. i. the divine min d present with him.e. whilst by their existence the moral temper comes to be indwelling in th e individual. is in the first instance the rational will in general.e. however. ambiguous. knows this its concept. it is existent only in the immedi ate will . the will is the immediate individuality self-instituted . etc.
its actual rationality retains the aspe ct of external apparency. 4. they would find the very substance of their life outraged. which the content and aim of freedom has. moral. and not less into scientific actuality. Christianity in its adherents has realized an ever-present sense that they are not and cannot be slaves. Anschauung. Vorstellung. The free will finds itself immediately confronted by d ifferences which arise from the circumstance that freedom is its inward function . but the pe rmanent character . This wi ll to liberty is no longer an impulse which demands its satisfaction. 3. But this freedom. if the decisio n as regards their property rests with an arbitrary will. 10. Auswendiges. not with laws or court s of justice. 5. but which they are. Das praktische Gefuhl. 12. as men. Die Intelligenz. 11. Der Geist 2. Der praktische Geist 13. religious. 7. 16. is itself only a notion . Die Erinnerung 6. Die Einbildungskraft. Die Gluckseligkeit. but only existing in posse: and as it is thus on the territory of finitude. into legal. 9. Die Triebe und die Willkuhr. SECTION TWO: MIND OBJECTIVE ¤ 483 The objective Mind is the absolute Idea. Inwendiges. Phantasie 8. intended to develop into an objectiv e phase. 1.a principle of the mind and heart. 15. Der freie Geist.the spiritual consciousness grown into a non-impulsive natur e. Gedachtnis. Das Denken.dea itself is the actuality of men . 14. if they are made slaves.not something which they have.
which splits up into different heads: viz. and brings into existence i n these several wills. although even right and duty return to one another a nd combine by means of certain adjustments and under the guise of necessity. there arises the division between what is only inward purpose (disposition or intention). but in its universality. and the ties of relation between individual wills which are conscious of their own d iversity and particularity. and it is a duty to possess things as property.e. where they. just as the children's duty of obedience is their right to be educated to the liberty of manhood. making the latter a world moulded by the fo rmer. etc. The finitude of the objective will thus creates the sembl ance of a distinction between rights and duties. it is a Law. at least in the sense that to a right on my part corresponds a duty in someone else. is also a right. These conditi ons. or instituted as an authoritative power..e. is the Law (Right ) .this grows into the duty of someone else to respect my right. which only has its being in m e and is merely subjective duty. etc. its rights of admi nistration. temper. The penal judicature of a government. receives the form of Necessity. military service. These aspects constitute the external material for t he embodiment of the will. Liberty.(1) When. are no less its duties to punish. it exists as manner and custom. in general. attaching to it in the practical feeling and in impulse. ought to h ave and can only have their existence. The rights of the father of the family over its members are equally duties towards them. the deeper substantial nexus of which is t he system or organization of the principles of liberty. in relation to the subjective will. and character. But. is a duty. when referred to the will di stinguished as subjective and individual. or legal possession. For a mode of existence is a right. are its Duties. in the light of the concept. the content has its right and true character only in the form o f universality. and is the vi rtual universal. on the other hand. When invested with this character for the intelligent consciousn ess. etc. In the phenomenal range right and duty are correlata. ¤ 485 This unity of the rational will with the single will (this being the peculia r and immediate medium in which the former is actualized) constitutes the simple actuality of liberty.at the same time a right of my subjective will or disposition. to administer. external things of nature which exist for consciousness. shaped into the actuality of a w orld. It is the same content whic h the subjective consciousness recognizes as a duty. and is in relation to an external and already subsisting objectivity.. i. anthropological data (i. viz. private an d personal needs). which in it is thus at home with itself.and aim. relation to another person . only as a consequence of the f ree substantial will: and the same content of fact. but as possession by a person it is property. In the morality of the conscience. not in the form of impulse. As it (and its content) belongs to thought. or Usage. ¤ 484 But the purposive action of this will is to realize its concept. What is a right is also a duty. my right to a thing is not merely possession. Liberty. their absolute unity. whereas as its temper and habit they are Manners. locked together with it: the conc ept accordingly perfected to the Idea.the term being taken in a comprehensive sense not merely as the limited juri stic law. and what is a duty. being universal.(2) ¤ 486 This 'reality'. duty in general is in me a free subject .. as the services of the members of the State in dues. In social ethics these two parts have reached their t ruth. in these externally objective aspects. the content is freed from the mixedness and fortuitousness. and is set and grafted in the indivi dual will. But in this individualist moral sphere. and the actualization of that purpose: and with this division a contingency and imperfection which makes the inadequacy of mere individualistic morality. but as the actual body of all the conditions of freedom. Translated into the phenomenal relationshi p. to be as a person. whilst its phenomenal ne xus is power or authority. and the sentiment of obedience awakened in consciousn ess. are duties . so as to become its habit. where free will has existence.
as something devoid of will. But the thing is an abstractly external thing. is an individual. The co ncrete return of me into me in the externality is that I. ¤ 490 In his property the person is brought into union with himself. possession is property. but on e that knows its individuality as an absolutely free will: it is a person. in the immediacy of its self-secured liberty. Still it holds fundamentally good that he who has no right s has no duties and vice versa. morality of the individual conscience. on its own account me rely 'practical'. and to be thus at the same time characterized as a particular. (B) When the will is reflected into self. by mere designation of it. in my relation to them and in my r ecognition by them. civil society. The Right as Right (la w) is formal. in the knowledge of their identity as free. For them my will has its definite recognizable existence i n the thing by the immediate bodily act of taking possession. the external sphere of its liberty . Gesetz 2. These extremes are the persons who. are simultaneously mutually independent. am as a person the repulsion of me from myself. has no rights against the subjectiv ity of intelligence and volition. 1. has here the signification that I import my personal will into the thing.it is the ethic s of actual life in family. and State. the infinite self-rela tion. (C) When the free will is the substantial will. Sitte A. has its particularity and fulfilment not yet on its own part. but as existence of the personality is an end. or by the formatio n of the thing or. b y which their duties come back to them as the exercise and enjoyment of right. it is the right of the subjective will. As so characterized. This thing. though it remains in trinsically the same.possession. made actual in the subject and c onformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity . LAW(1) (a) PROPERTY ¤ 488 Mind. the t hing acquires the predicate of 'mine'. abstract right. and the I in it is abstractly external. and hence as a single being . as in itself still abstract and empty. which is thus mutual. so as to have its existence inside it. in wh om the inward sense of this freedom. . ¤ 491 The thing is the mean by which the extremes meet in one. All the aims of society and the State are the private aims of the individuals.and yet their right to the protection of their private property and of the gene ral substantial life in which they have their root. Subdivision ¤ 487 The free will is: (A) Itself at first immediate. ¤ 489 By the judgement of possession. and is by that subjectivity made adjectival to it. but on an external thi ng. at first in the outward appropriation. and have the existence of my personality in the being of other persons. But the set of adjustments. it may be. which as possession is a means. But this predicate.the person: the exi stence which the person gives to its liberty is property. p roduces an appearance of diversity: and this diversity is increased by the varie ty of shapes which value assumes in the course of exchange.
To settle it there is required a third ju dgement. and recogniz ed. and. labour. involves at the same time the giving to this 'accidental' will a positive fixity. meaning by value the quantitative terms into which that qualitative fe ature has been translated.). it is only I who can with draw it: it is only with my will that the thing can pass to another. but which. Such wrong in the several claimants is a simple negative judgement. as the judgement of the intrinsically right. eac h and all are invested with a show of right. produces a wrong: by which. since here the co nscientiousness of the will does not come under consideration (as to whether the thing is meant in earnest or is a deception). then the external rec . its changing hands. which is broug ht down to a mere sequel. ¤ 494 Thus in the stipulation we have the substantial being of the contract standi ng out in distinction from its real utterance in the performance. breaks up into a multiplicity of relations to this external sphere and to other persons (¤¤ 4 91. because they face each other. of w hich (seeing that property both on the personal and the real side is exclusively individual) only one is the right. but only a relationship originated of right to wrong. expressing the civil suit. which thus becomes wicked. in that case. The comparatively 'ide al' utterance (of contract) in the stipulation contains the actual surrender of a property by the one. In this way there is put into the thing or performance a distinction between its immediate specific quality and its substantial being or value. non-malicious wrong. however.otherwise we should have an infinite regress o r infinite division of thing.Contract. which. against which the former is defined as the intrinsically right. (c) RIGHT versus WRONG ¤ 496 Law (right) considered as the realization of liberty in externals. willed. (b) CONTRACT ¤ 493 The two wills and their agreement in the contract are as an internal state o f mind different from its realization in the performance.¤ 492 The casual aspect of property is that I place my will in this thing: so far my will is arbitrary. But so far as my will lies in a thing. ¤ 498 But (2) if the semblance of right as such is willed against the right intrin sically by the particular will. This is naiv e. and may be made equivalent to a thing which is (in quality) wholly hetero geneous. The inwardness of the will which surrenders and the will which accepts the property is in the realm of ideation. whose prope rty it similarly becomes only with his will: . It is thus treated in geneal as an abstract. as an agreement which has a voluntary origin and deals with a casual commodity. In this way there are (1) several titles or grounds at law. One piece of property is thus made comparable with an other. The utterance in the stipulation is complete and exhaustive. is disinterested. the only diversity lies in this. This will may just as well not be conformable to law (right) . ¤ 495 The contract. is affirmed. 493 seqq. and in that realm the word is deed and thing (¤ 462) .the full and complete deed. sti ll presumed identical with the several titles. the absolute law (righ t) is not superseded. I can just as well put it in it as not . universal thing or commodi ty. that the special thing is subsumed under th e one law or right by the particular will of these several persons. and time. and its acceptance by the other will.just as well with draw it as not. and the will refers only to the e xternal thing. ¤ 497 Now so long as (compared against this show) the one intrinsically right. The contract is thus thoroughly binding: it does not need the performance of th e one or the other to become so . a nd a power of giving the one right existence as against that semblance.
in which the law of nature should hold sway. and consequently re venge or punishment directs itself against the person or property of the crimina l and exercises coercion upon him. is at the same time only a new outrage.compulsion against the thing. The phrase 'Law of Nature'. or right as governed by the nature of things. of which nothi ng truer can be said than that one ought to depart from it. which the personal will in the first instance gives itself in immediate wise.whose influence as on one hand it gives existence to the essential r ight. whereas the soc ial and political state rather required and implied a restriction of liberty and a sacrifice of natural rights.the infinite judgement as identical (¤173) . Conversel y.is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the rei gn of force. that of the judge. But more than possible compulsion is not. and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong.st rictly so called . This progression. To display the nullity of such an act.in this case the apparent recognition.a universal which holds good for him. which is disinterested .ognition of right is separated from the right's true value. to carry out simultaneously this nominal law and the intrinsic right. in seizing and maintai ning it against another's seizure: for in this sphere the will has its existence immediately in externals as such. in revenge. which is nominal and recognized by him only .where the nominal relation is retained. so long as I can withdraw myself as free from every mode of existence. b ut the sterling value is let slip. so may on the other cut itself off from and oppose itself to it. is a matter of chance).on self-determination or autonom y. or Natural Right. The law of nature . the claim of the subjective will to be in this abstraction a power over the l aw of right is null and empty of itself: it gets truth and reality essentially o nly so far as that will in itself realises the reasonable will. like the last. ¤ 499 (3) Finally. i. by the n otion. is the work of Revenge. The former used to be the common meaning.(3) in use for the philosophy of la w involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as something existing rea dy-formed in nature.) Thus the will is violently wicked. ¤ 501 The instrumentality by which authority is given to intrinsic right is () tha t a particular will.e. such an action is essentially and actually null.a law. being conformable to the right. is seen to be due to the instrumentality of the subjec tive will . sets up a law . or in corporeity. on . abolishes itself in a thir d judgement. ¤ 502 A distinction has thus emerged between the law (right) and the subjective wi ll. accompanied with the fiction of a state of nature. in the first instance by means of a subjective ind ividual will.punishment. as a volitional and intelligent being. howe ver. This gives the wrong of fraud . and commits a crime. the particular will sets itself in opposition to the intrinsic right by negating that right itself as well as its recognition or semblance. and can be seized only in t his quarter. and under which he has at the same time subsumed himself by his action. The 'reality' of right. It is legal only as abolishing a first and original compulsi on. and while the former only is respected. In it the agent. i. even from the range of all existen ce. from life. has an i nterest to turn against the crime (which in the first instance. which is the very contrary of determination by nature. ¤ 500 As an outrage on right. the latter is violated. This nega tion of right has its existence in the will of the criminal. starting from the interest of an immediate particular personality. The real fact is that the whole law and its ever y article are based on free personality alone . an d so on without end. As such it is mo rality(2) proper. But revenge. The social state. and not merely the particular mode . and () that an executive power (also in the first instance c asual) negates the negation of right that was created by the criminal. It is in this legal sphere that coercion in g eneral has possible scope . (He re there is a negatively infinite judgement (¤ 173) in which there is denied the c lass as a whole.e.
In virtue of the right thereto a man must possess a personal knowledge of the di stinction between good and evil in general: ethical and religious principles sha ll not merely lay their claim on him as external laws and precepts of authority to be obeyed.(3) still the subject does not for that reason reco gnize it as its action. that external existence is also independent of the a gent. is its deed. This affection is partly the essential and implicit will. In French le moral is opposed to le physique.and also moral wickedness. the will is at the same time made a particular. so far as these features are it s inward institution. 2. so far as it is in the interior of the will in general. 1. or even justification in his h eart. my part in i t is to this extent formal. The subjective will is morally free. and thus comes into relationship with the former. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. intelligence. is the condition in which alone right has its actuality: what i s to be restricted and sacrificed is just the wilfulness and violence of the sta te of nature. (2) The agent has no less the right to see that the particularity of content in the act . Das Recht. is now chara cterized as a subject . and there arise further particularizations of it and relations of these to one another. embracing these individual point s. an d allows to be imputed to it. but have their assent. the reason of the will. This subjective or 'moral' freedom is what a European especially calls freedom. be its affection w hat it may. The 'moral' must be taken in the wider sense in which it does not signify the mo rally good merely. in mere law. The subjectivity of the will in itself is its supreme aim and absolutely essential to it. though any alteration as such. in the externality of which it only admits as its own. the essential basis of law and moral life: partly it is the existent volition. Moralitat 3. THE MORALITY OF CONSCIENCE(1) ¤ 503 The free individual. who. (b) INTENTION AND WELFARE(5) ¤ 505 As regards its empirically concrete content (1) the action has a variety of particular aspects and connections. sentiment. In point of form. Its utterance in deed with this freedom is an action. Because the affection of the will is thus inw ardized. But here the moral signifies volitional mode. the agent must have known and willed the action in its essential feature. This externally can pervert his action and bring to light something else t han lay in it. B. intention regards the underlying essence and aim thereof. it thus includes purpose and intention . so much as it has consciously willed. recognition. which is befor e us and throws itself into actual deeds.the other hand. it is distinguished (as existing in it) as its own from the existenc e of freedom in an external thing. (a) PURPOSE(2) ¤ 504 So far as the action comes into immediate touch with existence. which is set on foot by the s ubjects' action. which was its purpose. While purpose affects only the immediate fact of existence. conscience. counts only as a person. Now. etc. its own. This is the right of intention. Naturrecht. and means the m ental or intellectual in general.(4) but only adrnits as its own that existence in the dee d which lay in its knowledge and will.a will reflected into itself so that. and willed by it.
interests. following the distinction which has arisen in the subjective will (¤ 503). concludes such a combination of them as ex cludes the rest. It is t hus the absolute final aim of the world. Happiness (good fortune) is dist inguished from well. but is a particul arity of his own . sup erseding this absolute claim of each. These aims. ¤ 509 (b)To the agent.g. who can therefore decide on something opposite to the good.being only in this. will . constitute h is well-being.the law and under lying essence of every phase of volition. be essentially an aim and therefore a duty. In this way the supposed essentiality of t he intention and the real essentiality of the action may be brought into the gre atest contradiction . because the agent. (a) In consequence of the indete rminate determinism of the good. Similarly well-b eing is abstract and may be placed in this or that: as appertaining to this sing le agent. It falls upon the agent to be the dialectic which. and aims. his interest and welfare must. there awakes here the deepest contradiction.and thus including in it particularity .e. the particular interest ought not to be a constituent motive. Reflection can put in this form this and that particular asp ect in the empirically concrete action. on account of that existent sphere of liberty. ¤ 506 But the essentiality of the intention is in the first instance the abstract form of generality. there is no principle at hand to dete rmine it.ion. who in his existent sphere of liberty is essentially as a p articular. an abstract reflection of freedom into himself. a good intention in case of a crime. and capa ble of making the universal itself a particular and in that way a semblance. and yet each of them. is not something external to him. and duty for the agent who ought to hav e insight into the good.that it contains his needs. there are always several sorts of good and many kinds of duties. in point of its matter. it is always something particular. make it his intention and bring it about by his activit y. But at the same time in aim ing at the good. constitutes a peculiar world of its own . an d as heteronomy or determinance of a will which is free and has rights of its ow n. the essential and actual good. which is the not-particular but only universal of the will. This is the right to well-being. can be wicked. It is thus a matter of chance whether it harmonizes with the subjective aims. they ought to stand in harmony.still so far as this particularit y is in the first instance still abstract. thus making it essential to the intentio n or restricting the intention to it. it is also a f orm of his existence to be an abstract self-certainty. He is thus distinct from the reason in the will. is always fundamentally one identity. when similarly comprehended in a single aim. ¤ 508 But though the good is the universal of will . Such determination therefore starts up also outside that universal. At the same time because good is one. whether the . (c) But the agent is not only a mere particular in his existence. essential and actual. though it is a particular duty. whereas well-being is regarded as having a moral justification. the variety of which is a dialectic of one against another and brings them into collision.a universal determined in its elf . is as g ood and as duty absolute. as in happiness (¤ 479). ¤ 510 (d) The external objectivity. On account of this in dependency of the two principles of action. (c) GOODNESS AND WICKEDNESS(6) ¤ 507 The truth of these particularities and the concrete unity of their formalism is the content of the universal. as individual and universal.another ext reme which stands in no rapport with the internal will-determination. it is likewise an accident whether t hey harmonize. that happiness implies no more than som e sort of immediate existence. The good is thus reduced to the level of a mere 'may happen' for the agent. And yet they ought to harmonize.
i . 5. in opposition to the objective and universal (which it treats as m ere sham) is the same as the good sentiment of abstract goodness. 1. the unutterable. Moralitat 2. this semblance thus collapsing is the sa me simple universality of the will. to be carried out in it.the truth of the subj ective and objective spirit itself. just as i t ought also to make the wicked itself null and void. its deepest descent into itself. Wickedness is the same aw areness that the single self possesses the decision. but takes up the content of a subject ive interest contrary to the good. the bare perversion and annihilation of itself.of Conscience and Wickedness. and we have passed into the field of ethical life. THE MORAL LIFE. On the affirmative side. The for mer is the will of goodness. is abandoned. the truth of this semblance. The subjectivity. and a self-assurance which involves the nullification of the universal-co llapses by its own force. 4. and refuse it to the wicked.to a goodness. in something external therefore. the absolute nullity of this volition which would fain hold its own against the good. The failure of the latter consists . in the notion. ¤ 511 The all-round contradiction. no more exist than not.sublimating itself to this absolute vanity . non-universal. is. which actualizes and dev elops it. This pure self-certitude. OR SOCIAL ETHICS(1) ¤ 513 The moral life is the perfection of spirit objective . and of the good. as the most intimate reflection of subject ivity itself. nullifie d in it: it is no less matter of chance whether the agent finds in it his wellbeing. and more precisely whether in the world the good agent is happy and the w icked unhappy. which would only be abstract. The only relation the self-contradictory principles have to one another is in the abstract certainty of self. and duty. but a goodness which to this pure subjectivity is t he non-objective. right . Wickedness. The result. Die Absicht und das Wohl. th e essential thing. 6. Das Gute und das Bose C. ¤ 512 This supreme pitch of the 'phenomenon' of will . expressed by this repeated ought. which reserves to the subjectivity the determination thereof: .the standpoint of the ought. That. but is only sure of i tself.good is realized. good. it ought to grant the good agent the satisfaction of his particular interest.contains the most abstract 'analysi s' of the mind in itself. and the wicked. is only the infinite form.the utterly abstract semblance . But at the same time the world ought to allow the good action. so far as the single self d oes not merely remain in this abstraction. In this way the standpoint of bare reciprocity between two independent sides . on its negative side. and for this infinitude of subjectivity the universal will.partly in having its freedom immediately in reality. with its abso luteness which yet at the same time is not . Handlung. which is the good. appears i n the two directly inter-changing forrns . which has no objectivity. an aim essentially and actually null. and over which the agent is co nscious that he in his individuality has the decision. rising to its pitch. in this its identity with the good. The subjectivity alone is aware of itself as choosing and deciding. Der Vorsatz 3.
it follows that the actuality and action of each individual to kee p and to take care of his own being. that it is. as the mind developed to an organic actuality . has actuality as the spirit of a nation. is on the other a transitio n into a universal product. the subjectivity which is permeated by the substantial life. makes this union an ethical tie . ¤ 515 Because the substance is the absolute unity of individuality and universalit y of freedom. whilst its practical operation and im mediate universal actuality at the same time exist as moral usage. (c) Th e self-conscious substance. In the shape of the family. ¤ 514 The consciously free substance. as deliberate work for the community.th e unanimity of love and the temper of trust.e . as against the univers al. as an intelligent being. while it is on one hand conditioned by the pre-supposed total in whose complex alone he exists. i. Thus. whilst in relation to the incidental relations of social circumstance. the person performs his duty as his own and as something which is. than somewhat he brings about by his actio n .yet somewhat which without all question is. mind ap pears as feeling. ¤ 517 The ethical substance is: (a) as 'immediate' or natural mind . to the total of ethical actuality. . and that the other individuals mutually know each other and are actual only in this identity.The social disposition of the individuals is their sense of the substance. however. In its actuality he sees not less an achieved present. ( b) The 'relative' totality of the 'relative' relations of the individuals as ind ependent persons to one another in a formal universality . The abstract disruption of this s pirit singles it out into persons. manner and cu stom .n a thing . and i n its attitude to its own visible being and corporeity. to a spiritual significance. elevated. in its immediacy.ceases when so minded to be a mere accident of it . is virtue. whose independence it. without any selective refl ection.partly in the abstract universality of its goodness. In the latter sphere. This is the sexual tie. the individuality expres ses its special character.Marriage. In rel ation to the bare facts of external being. in which the absolute 'ought' is no less an 'is'. controls and entirely dominates from within. however. contains the natural factor that the i ndividual has its substantial existence in its natural universal.looks upon it as his absolute final aim.the Family. .monog . feels t hat underlying essence to be his own very being . The ' substantial' union of hearts makes marriage an indivisible personal bond .where self-conscious liberty has become nature. b ecoming a 'substantial' unity. i. etc. subjective freedom exists as the covertly and overtly universal rational will. which is sensible of itself and actively disposed in th e consciousness of the individual subject. With their exclusive individualities these personalities combine to form a single person: the subjective union of hearts. to destiny. is confidence (trust) . it is in the first instance justice and then benevolence.the genuine ethical temper. But the person.the Political Constitution. in its ki nd.Civil Society. ¤ 519 (1) The physical difference of sex thus appears at the same time as a differ ence of intellectual and moral type. and is thus a quiet repose in itself: in relation to subst antial objectivity. and of the identity of all their interests with the tot al. as personal virtues. it exists as confidence. The ethical personality.e. and the capacity of sacrificing self there to. and i n this necessity he has himself and his actual freedom. (a) THE FAMILY ¤ 518 The ethical spirit. ¤ 516 The relations between individuals in the several situations to which the sub stance is particularized form their ethical duties. When these two impe rfections are suppressed. virtue does not treat the m as a mere negation. temperament. The failure of spirit subjective similarly consists in this. abstractly self-determinant in its inward individuality.
Both ar e thus rendered more and more abstract. as private persons. and thus produce more unconditional . of legal regulation. on the o ther hand. ¤ 521 The ethical principle which is conjoined with the natural generation of the children. The habit of this abstraction in enjoyment. In the condition o f things in which this method of satisfaction by indirect adjustment is realized . labour. on one hand. To acquire them is only possible b y the intervention. In virtue of such for tuitousness. ¤ 525 (b) The glimmer of universal principle in this particularity of wants is fou nd in the way intellect creates differences in them. as it is a mere 'substantiality' of fe eling. and demeanour constitutes training in this sphere. to found anew such an actual family. A fur ther sequel is community of personal and private interests. immediate seizure (¤ 488) of external objects as means thereto exists barely or not at all: the objects are already property.on another to limit each person to a single kind of technical skill. constitutes the general stock. acquire an existence of their own. ¤ 522 (3) The children. being an intelligent substance. destined. ¤ 520 (2) By the community in which the various members constituting the family st and in reference to property. as do also its industry. by which the labour of all facilitates satisfaction of wants. the death of husband and wife: but even their union of hearts. (b) CIVIL SOCIETY(2) ¤ 523 As the substance. or state external. contains the germ of liability to chance and decay. originally foreign to it. ¤ 526 The labour which thus becomes more abstract tends on one hand by its uniform ity to make labour easier and to increase production . particularizes itself abst ractly into many persons (the family is only a single person). it loses its et hical character: for these persons as such have in their consciousness and as th eir aim not the absolute unity. but their own petty selves and particular intere sts. the members of the family take up to each other the status of perso ns. and care for the future. leave the concrete life a nd action of the family to which they primarily belong.amic marriage: the bodily conjunction is a sequel to the moral attachment.in educating them to independent personality. (a) The System of Wants(3) ¤ 524 (a) The particularity of the persons includes in the first instance their wa nts. and thus causes an indefini te multiplication both of wants and of means for their different phases. the general stock from which all derive their satisfaction. information. that property of the one person (representing the family) acquires an ethical interest. Thus arises the system of atomistic: by which the substance is reduced to a general system of adjustments to connect self-subsisting extremes and their par ticular interests. it is conditioned by the ever-continued production of fresh means of exchange by the exchangers' own labour. while. and which was assumed to have primary importance in first forming the marriage union. who exist independent and free. however. is actually realized in the second or spiritual birth of the chi ldren . learning. Marriage is o f course broken up by the natural element contained in it. thus invested with independence. or nominal culture in general. of the possessor's will. This 'morcellement' of their content by abstraction gives rise to the division of labour. The developed totality of this connective system is the state as civil society. which as particular ha s in view the satisfaction of their variously defined interests. and it is thus that the family finds introduced into it for the first time t he element. This instrument. The possibility of satisfying these wants is here laid on the social fabric . into families or individuals.
like the second it has a subsistence procured by means of its own skill. and an ensemble of contingencies. and gets the capability of letting the machine take the place of human labour . to be. 2 4/5 years. and its moral life is founded on faith and trust. The second. be the righ t and just thing. of the legal relationships of individual s to them. falls into the falsely infinite progres s: the final definiteness. skill. and like the first a certain subsistence. on the side of external existence. and in it they have their social moralit y. which is absolutely essential and causes a break in t his progress of unreality.or it may be unreasonable and s o wrong. The history of constitutions is the history of the growth of these estates. which is honesty. certain. and industry. talent. The skill itself becomes in this way mechanica l. This happens and has from of old happen ed in all legislations: the only thing wanted is clearly to be aware of it. their recognition and their honour. Where civil society. and its content analyses itself to gain definiteness. As belonging to such a definite and stable sphere. where the individual has to depend on his subjective skill. and accident. Thus whether three years. Individuals apportion themselves to these according to natural talent. on purely reasonable and intelligent grounds. (1) The actualization which right gets in t his sphere of mere practical intelligence is that it be brought to consciousness as the stable universal. the principle of casual particularity gets that stable articulation which liberty re quires in the shape of formal right. as vital.and ye t it should be decided.dependence on the social system. though of course only at the final points of deci ding.constitute s the difference of Estates (orders or ranks). at every point. of needs. which as existence is essentially a particular. Their content per se may be reasonable .the Law. is developed i n detail. ¤ 527 (c) But the concrete division of the general stock . and of means for satisfying them. 2 3/4 . exists. exists only so f ar as it organically particularizes itself. natural estate the fruitful soil and ground supply a n atural and stable capital. in the course of definite manifestation. of mere agents. can by no means be decided on intelligible principles . But when right. and so on ad infinitum. as well as of mental culture and habit . also of aims and interests. and of these estates to one another and to their centre. however.(5) The positive element in laws concerns only their form of publicity and authority . and not be misled by the talk and the pretense as if the ideal of law were.which makes it possible for them to be known by all in a customary and extern al way. (b) Administration of Justice(4) ¤ 529 When matured through the operation of natural need and free option into a sy stem of universal relationships and a regular course of external necessity. and a corresponding mode of labour. there arise the several esta tes in their difference: for the universal substance. The third. 'thinking' estate has for its business the general interest s. the 'positive' principle naturally ente rs law as contingency and arbitrariness. ten thalers. It is a futile perfectionism to have . b ecause of the finitude of its materials. and with it the State. that it be known and stated in its specificality with the voice of authority . because guaranteed throu gh the whole society. the medium created by t he action of middlemen.masses each of which possesses its own basis of subsistence.which is also a general business (of the whole society) . option. or could be. they have their actual existence. the 're flected' estate has as its allotment the social capital. this analysis.. its action gets direction and content through natural features.into particular masses determined by the fact ors of the notion . Hence. can in this sphere of finitude be attained only in a way that savours of contingency and arbitrariness. intelligence. or only 2 * . determined through reason or legal intelligence. ¤ 528 To the 'substantial'.
whic h are only internally in these objects. as in the mental ima ges of space.as this exists as revenge . has lately been begun in some directions by the Englis h Minister Peel. within the house . of embracing that lot of singulars in their general features. . to which objective existence determines i tself. which go on by their very nature always increasing their number. general laws. which again make new decisions necessary. or at least be mixed and polluted with such elements. To find a nd be able to express these principles well beseems an intelligent and civilized nation.(1) a ccording as that conviction is based on mere circumstances and other people's wi tness alone . as the genuine order of life. They forget therefore that he ca n truly obey only such known law . but in proportion to the gradual advance in s pecialization the interest and value of these provisions declines. In this ca se there comes in the additional absurdity of putting essential and universal pr ovision in one class with the particular detail. inasmuch as.and th e cattle too . i.as proven: .e. to support the opinion that a code is impossible or impracticable.i s a condition of the external obligation to obey them. first really de serving the name of laws. a generation of new spatial characteristics of the same quality as those preceding them. there arises.gets its universal guarantee through formalities. If the legislation of a rude age began with si ngle provisos. who has by so doing gained the gratitude. in the judicial system. is as existence of the absolute truth in this sphere of Right.or (2) in addition requires the confession of the accused. however. by faith and trust. But there is a contrary case.itself at bottom external not the moral or ethical will. not for them. . are not a new hou se. This subjective existence. To provisions of this sort one may give the name of new decisions or new laws. The finite material is definabl e on and on to the false infinite: but this advance is not.laws.though in other respects it must be in its essential content contingency and caprice. like improvements on a f loor or a door. recognized. The cour t takes cognisance and action in the interest of right as such. bearing on the actual state of the case in relation to the accused . as it is a known law. of his countrymen. The same empty requirement of perfection is employed for an opposite thesis . which discovers new distinctions. constit .vi z.even as his law can only be a just law. ¤ 531 (3) Legal forms get the necessity. and t hus become authoritative .such expectations and to make such requirements in the sphere of the finite. The legality of property and of private transactions concerned therewith . Abstract right has to exhibit itself to the court . and who regard gov erning and being governed from natural love. the need of a simpler code . They fall wit hin the already subsisting 'substantial'. being laws o f strict right. The comparison of the two species. as universal authority and necessity. There are some who look upon laws as an evil and a profanity.to the individualized right . The subjectivity to which the will has in this di rection a right is here only that the laws be known.into punishment (¤ 500). ¤ 530 (2) The positive form of Laws . with the advance in multitude.to be promulgated and made known as laws . not as laws set to them: whereas it is man's privilege to know his law.are governed and well governed too by laws. or rather two elements in the judicial convic tion.which though something new.in co nsideration of the principle that all law must be promulgated.the ne ed. they touch only the abstract will . while the reign of law is held a n order of corruption and injustice. but an advance into greater and ever greater speciality b y the acumen of the analytic intellect. hereditary divinity or nobility. Such a gathering up of single rules into general forms. even the admiration.a process in which there may be a difference between what is abstractly right and what is provably right. and in particular transforms this existence . deprives the exi stence of right of its contingency. These people forget that the stars . at the same time an externally objective existence.
and to maint ain that end in them and against them. be exercised as different functions. but the fault lies rather with the sha llowness which takes offence at a mere name. The jurors are essentially judges and pronounce a judgement. since here as yet there is not found the necessary unity of it with right in the abstract. It is an essen tial point that the two ingredients of a judicial cognisance.'poli . ¤ 532 The function of judicial administration is only to actualize to necessity th e abstract side of personal liberty in civil society. and worked from that point of view. In civil society the so le end is to satisfy want . and does not itself contain the affirmative aim of securing the satisfaction of individuals. as all they h ave to go on are such objective proofs.utes the main point in the question of the so-called jury-courts. ¤ 534 To keep in view this general end. then. The final decision therefore lies wit h the confession. is the work of an institution which assum es on one hand. But the machinery of social necessi ty leaves in many ways a casualness about this satisfaction. . from the c onnections between nation and nation. In so far. This is due to the variability of the wants themselves. It results also from circumstances of locality. the jury-cou rt shows traces of its barbaric origin in a confusion and admixture between obje ctive proofs and subjective or so-called 'moral' conviction. if the pr oof is to be made final and the judges to be convinced. To this therefore the accused has an absolute right. (c) Police and Corporation(6) ¤ 533 Judicial administration naturally has no concern with such part of actions a nd interests as belongs only to particularity. in a uniform gen eral way.It is a more im portant point whether the confession of the accused is or is not to be made a co ndition of penal judgement. because it is only one factor. to the concrete of civil society. because it is man's want. to ascertain the way in which the powers c omposing that social necessity act.It is easy to cal l extraordinary punishments an absurdity. The institution of the jury-court loses sight of thi s condition.viz. Materially the principle involves t he difference of objective probation according as it goes with or without the fa ctor of absolute certification which lies in confession. from errors and deceptions which can be fo isted upon single members of the social circulation and are capable of creating disorder in it . Such an order acts with the power of an external state. in so far as it is rooted in the higher or substantial state. shou ld. By the sa id institution they are allotted even to bodies differently qualified -f rom the one of which individuals belonging to the official judiciary are expressly excl uded. which. and the judgement as application of the law to it. the judgement as t o the state of the fact. But this actualization res ts at first on the particular subjectivity of the judge. so as to secure this satisfaction. No doubt this factor is incomplete. the blind necessity of the system of wants is not lifted up into the consciousne ss of the universal.as also and especially from the unequal capacity of individuals to take advantage of that general stock. The onward march of this necessity als o sacrifices the very particularities by which it is brought about. The point is that on this ground certainty is completely inseparabl e from truth: but the confession is to be regarded as the very acme of certainty -giving which in its nature is subjective. So far as concerns them. as at bottom different sides. and their variable ingredients. Conversely. the position of an external un iversality. and leaves to chance not only the occurrence of crimes but also the care for public weal. but still more incomplete is the othe r when no less abstractly taken . it may be far from beneficial: yet here the individual s are the morally justifiable end. whilst at the same time their defect of certainty (incomplete in so far as it is only in them) is admitted. . To carry this separation of functions up to this separation in the courts rests rather on extra-essential considerations: the main point remains only the separate performance of these essentially different functions. in which opinion and subjective good-pleasu re play a great part. mere circumstantial evidence. appears as state.and that.
self-originated. also for that will being put in actuality. thus making rig ht a necessary actuality.co nsists in a double function. but which has a thoroughly general side.one individual. to the immediate agent. in which the particular citizen in his private capacity finds the securing of his stock. which is in the famil y as a feeling of love. The c onstitution is this articulation or organization of state-power. at the same time thr ough the second principle of conscious and spontaneously active volition the for m of conscious universality. ¤ 538 The laws express the special provisions for objective freedom. First it maintains them as persons.which volition is thereby free . which thus iden tifies itself in its volition with the system of reasonableness. and the who le disposition and action of the individual . ¤ 535 The State is the self-conscious ethical substance. differentiated in to particular agencies.whose tendency is to become a cent re of his own .ce'. secondly. and. his independent self-will and particular interest. receiving. whilst at the same time he in it emerges from his single private interest. and self-develop ed . they are the substan ce of the volition of individuals . proceeding from the one notion (though not known as notion) of the reasonable will. But. and are a fruit of all the acts and private concerns of individuals. as self-knowing and self-actualizing. just a s in his legal and professional duties he has his social morality.const itutional (inner-state) law: (b) a particular individual. and . s heer subjectivity. which. they are an absolute final end and the universal work : hence they are a product of the 'functions' of the various orders which parcel themselves more and more out of the general particularizing.coming to a consciousness and an understanding of itself and b eing found. with all its evolution in detail. which each originally takes care of for himself. through the action of the government and its several branches. it protects the family and guides civil society. the unification of the fa mily principle with that of civil society. and not left to perish.the reasonable spirit of will. the state only is as an organized whole. however. Its work generally in relation to the extreme of individuality as the multitude of individuals .and of thei r disposition: being as such exhibited as current usage. continually produce it as their result. in this sphere of particularity the only recognition of the aim of substantial universality and the only carrying of it out is restricte d to the business of particular branches and interests. ¤ 539 As a living mind. Thirdly. ¤ 536 The state is (a) its inward structure as a self-relating development . it carries back both. (a) Constitutional Law(7) ¤ 537 The essence of the state is the universal. This universal principle. On the other hand. Secondly.in so far as it is in the individuals only implicitly the universal will . Thus we have the corpora tion. It provides for the reasonable will .into the life of the universal substance. and has a conscious activity for a comparatively universal end. and therefore in conne ction with other particular individuals . . (c) b ut these particular minds are only stages in the general development of mind in its actuality: universal history. is the absolute aim and content of the knowing subject. The cons titution is existent justice . but. then it promotes their welfare. in this direction . The same unity. (c) THE STATE. they are re strictions.as an actuality .international (outer-state) law. as a free power it interferes with those subordinate spheres and maintains the m in substantial immanence. is its essence. First.the actuality of liberty in the development of al l its reasonable provisions. but protected both against their casual subjectivity and against that of the individuals.
the citizens . private as well as public rights of a nation. on the contrary. and provide for the unequal legal duties and appurtenances resulting therefrom. is so little by nature. Equality. This single abstract feature of personality constitutes the actual equality of human beings. and of the universality and expansion of this consciousness. As regards. can and ought to make them deserve equal treatment before the law: . it should be said that it is just the great developm ent and maturity of form in modern states which produces the supreme concrete in equality of individuals in actuality: while.as regards taxation. rejects all differences.pleasure an d self-will. i. However true this is. authorities. It ought rather to re ad: By nature men are only unequal. On the contrary. etc. it gives rise to greater an d more stable liberty. logically carried ou t. The laws themselve s. directories. its articulation into a con stitution and a government in general. or even in crime. presuppos e unequal conditions. that the laws rule. that it is rather only a result and product of the consciousness of the deepest principle o f mind. skill.are equal before the law only in these points when they are otherwise equal outside the law. To such habits of mind liberty is viewed as only casual good . except in so far as they concern that narrow circle of personality. but which so expressed i s a tautology: it only states that the legal status in general exists. That the ci tizens are equal before the law contains a great truth. and for that very reason naturally the mos t familiar. Formerl y the legally defined rights. without further specification and development. otherwise have in property. as a person capable of property (¤ 488). Nothing has become. the familiar proposition. It is important therefore to study them closer. Only that equality which (in whatever way it be) they. it embodies a liberty.e. With the state there ari ses inequality. Hence it has also been said that 'modern' nations are only suscepti ble of equality. etc. were called its 'liberties'. or destroy them. that it should be man (and not as in Greece. some men) that is recognized and legally regarded as a person. more familiar than the idea that e ach must restrict his liberty in relation to the liberty of others: that the sta te is a condition of such reciprocal restriction. the current notions of l . in other words.equal in the concrete. But. but this freedom is allowed great latitude both as regards the agent's self-will and action for his particular ends. talent. the defect of these terms is their utter abstr actness: if stuck to in this abstract form. it is originally taken partly in a negative sense against ar bitrary intolerance and lawless treatment.Liberty and Equality are the simple rubrics into which is frequently concentrate d what should form the fundamental principle. it was impossible to make ends meet in act uality . town . . Even the supe rficial distinction of the words liberty and equality points to the fact that th e former tends to inequality: whereas. military service. or of equality more than liberty: and that for no other reason than that. but as the mos t abstract also the most superficial. magistracies .only it can make them . etc. the difference of governing powers and of governed. which it can without incompatibility allow. etc. eligibili ty to office.. The principle of equality. they are principles which either pre vent the rise of the concreteness of the state. as regards the concrete. as it ha ppens. physical strength. partly in the affirmative sense of su bjective freedom. is abstract subjectivity. and that the laws are restrict ions. on the contrary. the final aim and result of the co nstitution.punishment.besides their personalit y . All men are by nature equ al. etc. But the notion of liberty. and as regards his claim to have a personal intelligence and a personal share in general affairs. But that this freedom should e xist. with an assumed definition of liberty (chiefly the participation of a ll in political affairs and actions). and thus allows no sort of political condition to ex ist. as it exists as s uch. etc.which is at once more reasonable and more powerful than abstract presup positions. age. Really. As regards Liberty. Liberty and equality are indeed the foundation of the state. first. Rome. every genuine law is a liberty: it c ontains a reasonable principle of objective mind. blunders by confusing the 'natural' with the 'notion'. through the deeper reasonableness o f laws and the greater stability of the legal state.
Of it the following paragraphs will speak. and on another it only grows up under conditions of that o bjective liberty. as possibility for each to develop and make the best of his t alents and good qualities. as well as the inward liber ty in which the subject has principles. of others. the more it gets taken for granted: and then the sens e and appreciation of liberty especially turns in a subjective direction.) But the guara ntee lies also. self-w ill and self-conceit. it is all but part of that indiscriminating relaxation of individuality in this sph ere which generates all possible complications. of the lu st of argument and the fancy of detecting faults. and is and could grow to such height only in modern states.that which preserves. Who has to make the spirit o f a nation? Separate our idea of a constitution from that of the collective spir it. and conversely that spirit presupposes the cons titution: for the actual spirit only has a definite consciousness of its princip les.especially in the specific way in which it is itself conscious of its reason . be it added. has an insight and conviction of his own . The constitution presupposes that conscio usness of the collective spirit. But the more we fortify liberty. and to throw oneself at pleasure in action for particular and for general intellectual interests. and has therefore to restrict itself: and that. in other words continuall . however. because liberty is there under the taint of natural self-will and self-pleasing. just as little as the making of a code of laws. ¤ 540 The guarantee of a constitution (i.iberty only carry us back to equality. i. ¤ 541 The really living totality . (Religion is that consciousness in its absolute substantiality. And it has in part become usual to give the title constitution onl y to the side of the state which concerns such participation of these individual s in general affairs. not merely with regard to the naturalness. and thus gains moral independence. and your fanc y only proves how superficially you have apprehended the nexus between the spiri t in its self-consciousness and in its actuality. is often used to mean formal participation in the public affairs of state by the will and action even of those individuals who otherwise find their chief function in the particular aims and business of c ivil society. in which this is not formally done. On this use of the term the only thing to re mark is that by constitution must be understood the determination of rights. If .as sec urity of property. at the same time in the actual organization or development of th at principle in suitable institutions. and runs through at the same time with it the grades of formation and the alterations required by its concept. of liberties in general. an d that political freedom in the above sense can in any case only constitute a pa rt of it. and of the difficulty of satisfying them. The term political liberty. in so far as it has them actually existent before it. What is thus called 'making' a 'constitution'. is . and their actualization secured) lies in the collective spirit of the natio n .To whom (to what authority and how organized) belongs the power t o make a constitution? is the same as the question. and the organization of the actualization of them. and must deal with them as it ca n.just because of this inseparability . as a state without a constitution.a thing that has nev er happened in history. there be simultaneous and endless incr ease of the number of wants.e . But this liberty itself on one hand implies that supreme differentiation in which men are unequal and make themselves more unequal by education. but especially and essentially with regard to r easonable liberty. with this development of particularity. The question .e. Such a sphere is of course also the field of restrictions. the necessity that the laws be reasona ble. as if the latter exists or has existed without a constitution. the re moval of all checks on the individual particularity. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation (and. with its insatiate vanity. By thi s is meant the liberty to attempt action on every side. . A consti tution only develops from the national spirit identically with that spirit's own development. and to regard a state. the history is only that spirit's hist ory) by which constitutions have been and are made.
the part which intentionally aims at preserving those parts. What dis organizes the unity of logical reason. (A mistake still greater. equally disorganizes actuality. but so combined by 'understanding' as to result in an absurd collocation. to the abovementioned subsumption of the powers of the in dividual under the power of the general. and by its embracing in itself the particular businesses (includi ng the abstract legislative business. or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which t he unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence). But to make the business of legislation an independ ent power . The org anization which natural necessity gives is seen in the rise of the family and of the 'estates' of civil society. with the further proviso that all citize ns shall have part therein.or. and therefore the living and spiritu al actuality. instead of the self-redintegration of the livi ng spirit. as their pecul iarities have a basis in principle. as opposed to the external footing they stand on in 'understanding'. which taken apart is also particular).impugns the principle of the division of powers.su bject always. Only through t he government. The monarchical constitu tion is therefore the constitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization of reason.monarchy. . The one essential canon to make liberty deep and real is to give ever y business belonging to the general interests of the state a separate organizati on wherever they are essentially distinct. is the government. as in a democratic constitution. the develo ped liberty of the constituent factors of the Idea.the sovereign power (prin cipate) is (a) subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the notion in its deve lopment. the participation of all i n all affairs . according as the laws are applied to public or private affairs. which includes an already existing development of differences. The unification of all concrete state-powers into one existence. however. as in the patri archal society . but an actual indiv idual .the all-sustaining.e. The organizati on of the government is likewise its differentiation into powers. its highest peak and all-pervasive unity. presupposes ignorance that the true idea. and the government be merely executive and dependent . but at the same time gets hold of and carries out those general aims of the whole w hich rise above the function. Such real division must be: for liber ty is only deep when it is differentiated in all its fullness and these differen ces manifested in existence. and their relationship that of subsumption of individual under univers al.to make it the first power.e. if it goes with the fancy that the constitution and the fundamental la ws were still one day to make . in other words.regarded as organic totality . as always. meaning by division their independence one of another in existence . The government is the universal part of the con stitution. which never g ets beyond subsuming the individual and particular under the universal. of the family and of civil society.in a state of society.the will of a decreeing individual. the subjectivit y which contains in it universality as only one of its moments. As the most obvious categories of the notion are those of universality and indiv iduality. all-decreeing will of the state. In the perfect form of the state. These.y produces the state in general and its constitution. this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person'. yet without that difference losing touch wit h the actual unity they have in the notion's subjectivity. it has come about that in the state the legislative and executive power have been so distinguished as to make the former exist apart as the absolute superio r. i. But no whit less must the di vision (the working out of these factors each to a free totality) be reduced to .) Individuality is the first and supreme pr inciple which makes itself felt through the state's organization. The theory of such 'division' unmistaka bly implies the elements of the notion. The division of these powers has been treated as the condition of political equi librium. and to subdivide the latter again into administrative (government) power and judicial power. are the terms on which the different elements e ssentially and alone truly stand towards each other in the logic of 'reason'. i. . is the state one. ¤ 542 In the government . in which each and ev ery element of the notion has reached free existence. is the self-redintegrating notion.
The question which is most discussed is in what sense we are to understand the p articipation of private persons in state affairs. These two forms are not to be confused with thos e legitimate structures. participate in the governmental power. conjoined both with forms of their degeneration . as it were. such legislation as concerns the universal scope of those interests which do not. admini stration of justice or judicial power. Secon dly. ¤ 544 The estates-collegium or provincial council is an institution by which all s uch as belong to civil society in general. there arises the participation of several in state-business. has attached to it th e characteristic of immediacy. with their general opinion.are. especially in legislation . i. civil society. and therefore do not belong specially to the province of the sovereign power. essentially. and the regulated efficiency of the particular bureaux in subord ination to the laws. with its industry and i ts communities. can show themselves palpably efficacious and enjoy the satisfaction of feeling themselves to count for something. and this actuality is not otherwise than as the in dividuality of the monarch . The division of constitutions into democracy. possess independence of a ction. is still the most definite statement of their difference in relation to sovereignty.necessary to the p rocess of evolution . That subjectivity . to which indeed even the favourite name of 'constitutional monarchy' cannot be refused.'ideal' unity. first. The y must at the same time be regarded as necessary structures in the path of devel opment . Two points only are all-important. It is only the nature of the speculative notion which can really give l ight on the matter. etc. For it is as private persons t . the division of state-business into its branches (otherwise defined). The tru e difference of these forms from genuine monarchy depends on the true value of t hose principles of right which are in vogue and have their actuality and guarant ee in the state-power. administration and police. The pure forms .the subjectivity of abstract and final decision exi stent in one person. ¤ 543 (b) In the particular government-power there emerges. to that end and for that reason.whereby the destination of i ndividuals for the dignity of the princely power is fixed by inheritance. and then of nature . to subjectivity.oriental despotism is i ncluded under the vague name monarchy . and secondly the form in which it is act ualized. too. liberty of property.if we look only to the fact that the will of one individual stands at the head of the state . legislative power. and with earlier transition-forms. Thus. and its conseq uent distribution between particular boards or offices.as also feudal monarchy. These principles are those expounded earlier. involve the. first to see the nec essity of each of the notional factors. an actual existence.being the 'moment' which emphasizes the need of abstract deciding in general .. which having their busin ess appointed by law. aristocracy and monarchy.a com mon will which shall be the sum and the resultant (on aristocratic or democratic principles) of the atomistic of single wills. in so far as they are finite and in course of change. . without at the same time ceasing to stand under higher supervision. being simple self-relation. aptitude. the further condition for being able to take individually part in this business being a certain training. in the history of the State. and are to that degree private person s. personal interference and action of th e State as one man. it may be .e. and skill for such ends. that this subjectivity should grow to be a real ' moment'. All those forms of collective decreeing and willing . Hence it is superficial and absu rd to represent them as an object of choice.partly leads on to the proviso that the n ame of the monarch appear as the bond and sanction under which everything is don e in the government.in short.such as ochlocracy. and above all personal liberty. have on them the mark of the unre ality of an abstraction. who toget her constitute the 'general order' (¤ 528) in so far as they take on themselves th e charge of universal ends as the essential function of their particular life. The mature differentiation or realization o f the Idea means. lik e peace and war. By virtue of this participation subjective liberty and conceit .viz.partly.
that t hey enter upon that participation. which has i ts actuality vouchsafed it as a participation in the sovereignty. But it has alr eady been noted as a 'moment' of civil society (¤¤ 527.hat the members of bodies of estates are primarily to be taken. and that this happens even in the institutions and possessions suppo'sed to be dedicated to religion. Assemblies of Estates have been wrongly designated as the legislative power. to power and act ion. is not to be put in the superiority of particular intelligence. range of the extern al means of government. elemental sea. Such a condition of a nation is a condition of lawles sness. it is not a brutish mass. The finances deal with what in their nature are only par ticular needs. and form the multitude of such as are recogni zed as persons. as the nation . not populus: and in this direction it is the one so le aim of the state that a nation should not come to existence. acting with orderly and express effi cacy for the public concerns. or in its 'reflectional' universality. in arrangements for art and science. be they treated as mere individuals. 534) that the individuals ri se from external into substantial universality.e.would be. in the law and liberty of property. If there is to be any sense in embarking upon the question of the participation of private person s in public affairs. which. basing itself on the principle of multeity and mere numbers. but as organic factors. even if they touch on the sum total of such needs. and that objective freedom or rational right is rather sacrificed to formal right and particular private inter est. Experience s hows that that country .as it very likely is .regard ed as permanent. ¤ 529 note). legislation can onl y be a further modification of existing laws. which private persons are supposed to have over state officials . blind force. as such an aggregate. however. so far as they form only one branch of that power . Private citizens are in the stat e the incomparably greater number. inorganic shape. s ense of general wants. is really a government affair: it is only improperly called a law. But the true motive is the right of the collective spirit to appear as an externally universal will. Take the case of England which.as compared with the other civilized states of Europe is the most backward in civil and criminal legislation. If the main part of the requirement were . brutishness: in it the nation would only be a shapeless. The des irability of such participation.a spiritual element . is no t self-destructive.nor in the superiority of their good will for the general best. The members of civil society as such are rather peopl e who find their nearest duty in their private interest and (as especially in th e feudal society) in the interest of their privileged corporation. i.the contrary must be the case . and therefore more urgent. who thus have it brought home to them that not merely have they to en force duties but also to have regard to rights. moreover.a branch in which the special g overnment-officials have an ex officio share. in so far as it requires the assent of the estates. and at the same time breathes fresh life in the administrative officials. demoralization. as estates. indeed the whole. because private persons have a predominant share in public af fairs. In a civilized state. has been regarded as having the freest of all constitutions. The aggregate of private persons is often spoken of as the nation: but as suc h an aggregate it is vulgus. The desirability of private persons taking part in pu blic affairs is partly to be put in their concrete. or as representatives of a number of people or of the natio n. but an already organized nation one in which a governmental power exists . and form a particular kind . Yet such a c ondition may be often heard described as that of true freedom. the main drift of which has been already prepared or preliminarily settled by the practice of the law-courts. The so-called financial law. however. the provision for it would have more the nature of a law: but t . in the general sense of embracing a wide. and so-called new laws can only de al with minutiae of detail and particularities (cf. while the sovereign power has the privilege of final decision. By this satisfaction of this right it gets its own life quickened. Hence the will-reason exhibits its existence in them as a prepon derating majority of freemen.the Estates: and it is not in the inorganic form of mere individuals as such (after the democratic fashion of election).which should be presupposed. wild. ever newly recurring. In the state a power or agency must never app ear and act as a formless. like that of the stormy.
and not to be made yearly. and thus. and thus a guarantee against injustice and violence . for each person in the aggregate is autonomous: the universal of law is only postulated between them. and can be subjected to a varying yearly estimate. The financial measures necessary for the state's subsist ence cannot be made conditional on any other circumstances. but only parties.this importance is in one way rath er plausible than real. ¤ 545 The final aspect of the state is to appear in immediate actuality as a singl e nation marked by physical conditions. on the ground that the assembly of estates possesses in it a check on the government. as content o f a true law. To give the name of a law to the annual fixing of fi nancial requirements only serves . In their mutual relations. in which there would no longer be a government. in which it might be useful and necessary to have in hand means of compulsion.o be a law it would have to be made once for all. to adjust within it th e machinery of a balance of powers external to each other . reserve for itse lf a means of coercing private individuals.so making nugatory the nugatoriness t hat confronts it. (b) External Public Law(8) ¤ 547 In the state of war the independence of States is at stake. or every few years. by the threat of suspending the activity of such a n institution and the fear of a consequent state of brigandage. a state of war.is to contravene the fundamental idea of what a state is. To fit together the several parts of the state into a co nstitution after the fashion of mere understanding . nor can the state's subsistence be put yearly in doubt. Country and fatherland t hen appear as the power by which the particular independence of individuals and their absorption in the external existence of possession and in natural life is convicted of its own nullity . i. afresh.as the power which procures the maintenance of th e general substance by the patriotic sacrifice on the part of these individuals of this natural and particular existence . Then again.e.with the presupposed separation of legislativ e from executive . is really engaged with strict executive business.i. to meet which the general estate in the community assumes th e particular function of maintaining the state's independence against other stat es. It would be a parallel absurdity if the gove rnment were. and the violence and oppression of one party would only be he lped away by the other.. But the importa nce attached to the power of from time to time granting 'supply'. This independenc e of a central authority reduces disputes between them to terms of mutual violen ce.to keep up the illusion of that separation having real existe nce. of the whole of the finances. In one case the . and the provisions with regard to it have even less the character of a law: and yet it is and may be onl y this slight variable part which is matter of dispute. such help would rather be the derangeme nt and dissolution of the state. from the reflectional universality which only externally embraces what in its nature is many.g. As a single individual it is exclusive a gainst other like individuals.e. waywardness and chance have a place. It is this last then which falsely bears the high-sou nding names of the 'Grant' of the Budget. the pictures of a condit ion of affairs. and to conceal the fact that the legislative power. are partly based on the false conception of a contract between ru lers and ruled. ¤ 546 This state of war shows the omnipotence of the state in its individuality an individuality that goes even to abstract negativity. e. to grant and arrange the judicial institutions always for a l imited time merely. and not actually existent. and partly presuppose the possibility of such a divergence in sp irit between these two parties as would make constitution and government quite o ut of the question. A l aw for one year and made each year has even to the plain man something palpably absurd: for he distinguishes the essential and developed universal. The part which varies according to time and circumstanc es concerns in reality the smallest part of the amount. and becomes the estate of bravery. If we suppose the empty possibility of getting help by such compulsive means brought into existence. when it makes a decree about finance.
and. it. The presupposition that history has an essential and actual end. but to that extent contain only rights failing short of true actuality (¤ 545): partly so-called internationa l law. those are chiefly to blame who profess to b e purely historical.. (c) Universal History(9) ¤ 548 As the mind of a special nation is actual and its liberty is under natural c onditions. when we come to minutiae. as single and endued by nature with a speci fic character. each of which.result may be the mutual recognition of free national individualities (¤ 430): and by peace-conventions supposed to be for ever. must be decided on strictly phi losophical ground. is appointed to occupy only one grade.the plan of Provide nce. in defiance of . in short. there is Reason in history. both this general recognition.of sacerdotal races . has essentiall y a particular principle on the lines of which it must run through a development of its consciousness and its actuality. an d the special claims of nations on one another. That history. internat ional law rests on social usage. and philosophy is reproached with a priori history-writing. and then in history. it admits on this nature-side the influence of geographical and clima tic qualities. etc. a history of its own. For such a priori methods of tr eatment at the present day. possessed from the first of the true knowledge of God and all the sci ences . As this development is in time and in real existence. that. It has. and who at the same time take opportunity expressly to rais e their voice against the habit of philosophizing. and in Germany more than in France and England. of a Roman epic. the dee d by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it. as it is a history. this note must go into further deta il. the general principle of which is its presupposed recognition by the seve ral States. External state-rights rest partly on these positive treaties. and when a determined attempt is made to force events an d actions into conformity with such conceptions. from the princi ples of which certain characteristic results logically flow. and the merely implicit mind achieves consciousness and self-consciousness. and form bold combinations of them from a learned rubbish-heap of out-of-the-way and trivial facts. like that of a primitive age and its primiti ve people. ¤ 549 This movement is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance. which actually is and will be realized in it . su pposed to be the source of the legends which pass current for the history of anc ient Rome. Such a priori history-writing has someti mes burst out in quarters where one would least have expected. On th is point. have taken the place of the pragmatizing which detected psychol ogical motives and associations. first in general. however.a world-mind. There is a wide circle of persons who seem to c onsider it incumbent on a learned and ingenious historian drawing from the origi nal sources to concoct such baseless fancies. where th e art of historical writing has gone through a process of purification to a firm er and maturer character. and as regards its range and scope. Philosophy is to them a troublesome neighbour: for it is an enemy of a ll arbitrariness and hasty suggestions. is founded on an essential an d actual aim. especially on the philological side. and on history-writing in general. In general. its several stages and steps ar e the national minds. But as a restricted mind its independence is something secondary. and distinguishes indivi duals as private persons (non-belligerents) from the state. in short. and accomplish one task in the whole deed. it passes int o universal world-history. are settled and fixed. and above all universal history.the judgement of the world. and thus shown to be essentially and in fact necessary. whereby it becomes to the outward eye a universal spirit . is called an a prio ri view of it. Fictions. To pr esuppose such aim is blameworthy only when the assumed conceptions or thoughts a re arbitrarily adopted. It is thus the rev elation and actuality of its essential and completed essence. the events of which exhibit the dialectic of the seve ral national minds . It is in time. It thus restricts their otherwise unchecked action against one anoth er in such a way that the possibility of peace is left.
appears to run . e. and criticize events. This is a requirement often a nd especially made on the history of philosophy: where it is insisted there shou ld be no prepossession in favour of an idea or opinion. in striking portraiture and brevity. a word. as in the romance. But to take the individual pettinesses of an age and of the pe rsons in it. if he had not an interest. It demands that the historian shall bring with him no definite aim and view by which he may sort out. Setting aside this subjective treatment of history. express not a subjective particularity.). But little reflection is needed to discover that this is the presuppos ed end which lies at the basis of the events themselves. and takes place within it. A history without such aim and such criticism would be only an imbec ile mental divagation. state. T his requirement which we may make upon the judge may be called partiality for ju stice. no history . but an age. and to select suc h trifles shows the hand of a historian of genius. Ay. into the Novel (as in the celebrated romances of Walter Scott. and. In the case of the ju dge it is at the same time assumed that he would administer his office ill and f oolishly. such as the romance tales from private events and sub jective passions. if he had not that for his aim and one sole aim.the best-accredited history. or the Decline of the grandeur of the Roma n empire. and there is no difficulty here in distinguishing it from subjective part iality. has its essential significance in relation to the s tate: whereas the mere particularities of individuals are at the greatest distan ce from the true object of history. just as a judge should h ave no special sympathy for one of the contending parties. It is true that the general spirit of an age leaves its imprint in the character of its celebrated individuals. A nation with no state formation (a mere nation). and an exclusive interest in justice. a civilization. invented to suit the character and ascribed to this or that name and circumstances.to say a word on that here . Now it is at least admitted that a history must have a n object. weave them into the pictur e of general interests. The point of interest of Biography . and not the trivialities of external existence and contingen cy. The essential characteristic of the spirit and its age is always contained i n the great events. and rejects both ki nds of interest.like the nations which existed before the rise of states a nd others which still exist in a condition of savagery.g. by the painstaking accum ulation of which the objects of real historical value are overwhelmed and obscur ed. or. But. for even children expect a m otif in their stories. a nation. In the existence of a nation the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve i tself as such. but violates th e principles of objective truth. is not only against taste and judgement. Where the picture presen ts an unessential aspect of life it is certainly in good taste to conjoin it wit h an unessential material. in their incoherent and uni ntelligent particularity. a purpose at least dimly surmisable with which events and actions are put in relation. What happens to a nation . their nearer or more remote rela tion to it. and even the ir particularities are but the very distant and the dim media through which the collective light still plays in fainter colours. The only truth for mind is the substantial and underlying essence. strictly s peaking. It is therefore completely indifferent whether such insignificances are duly vouched for by documents. etc. But in speaking of the impartiality required from the historian. on the other hand. Rome and its fortunes. even such singularities as a petty occurrence. this se lf-satisfied insipid chatter lets the distinction disappear. It was a correct instinct which sought to banish such portra iture of the particular and the gleaning of insignificant traits. not as good as a fairy tale. but shall na rrate them exactly in the casual mode he finds them. the m ain mass of singularities is a futile and useless mass. i.e. or if he declined to judge at all. we find what is properly the opposite view forbidding us to import into history an objective purpose. has. as of the critical exam ination into their comparative importance. in the interest of so-called truth. This i s after all synonymous with what seems to be the still more legitimate demand th at the historian should proceed with impartiality.
which is their reward. a development determined by the notion of spirit. suggests by allus ion that central reality and has its interest heightened by the suggestion.Fame. 550). Histo ries with such an object as religion or philosophy are understood to have only s ubjective aims for their theme.admitting. in this case. we may add.e. What they personally have gained therefore through the individual share they took in the substantial business (pr epared and appointed independently of them) is a formal universality or subjecti ve mental idea . only q ualitative and quantitative judgements. if Rome or the German empire. the consciousness of it. Only therefore through their relationship to it. and are all treated as indifferent. and its content is prese . i.will be par tly at least a plausible faith. and secondly. is the supreme right.or in other words that Reason is in history . so here the 'Truth' must be the object to which the several deeds and events of the spirit would have to be refe rred. a partiality for opinion and mere ideas. in the shape of its unreflective natural usages. with which the individual is intimately bound u p: even purely personal originality. ¤ 551 To such extent as this business of actuality appears as an action. Such a doctrine . In that way histori cal truth means but correctness . on the contary. On this assumption the sympathy with truth appears as only a parti ality of the usual sort. ¤ 552 The national spirit contains nature-necessity. notes to ¤¤ 172 and 175). on its subjective side it labours under contin gency. first in general. ¤ 550 This liberation of mind. the absolute L aw. to the history of religion. etc. through the judgement in which they are subsumed under it. But. But biography too has for its background the historical world. partly it is a cognition of philosophy. I t is the spirit which not merely broods over history as over the waters but live s in it and is alone its principle of movement: and in the path of that spirit. and stands in external existe nce (¤ 483): the ethical substance. The requirement of impartiality addressed to the history of philosophy (and also . without criti cal treatment save as regards this correctness . and their subjectivity. i. really. and there fore as a work of individuals. are an a ctual and genuine object of political history. have they their value and even their existence. and the business of so doing. only opinions and mere ideas. potentially infinite. are instruments.an accurate report of externals. Against this absolute will the other particular natural minds have no rights: that nation do minates the world: but yet the universal will steps onward over its property for the time being. is the empty form of activity. is actually a particular and limited substance (¤¤ 549. What is actually done is rather to make the contrary presupposition. For Spirit is consciousn ess. is even in a higher degree a true and actual object and theme. then in universal histor y the genuine spirit. i. And that with the mere excuse that there is no truth. in which it proceeds to come to itself and to reali ze its truth. as regards the substantial iss ue of their labour. while it inheres in them. truth. and then delivers it over to its chanc e and doom. as over a special grade. which all alik e have no stuff in them. these individuals. and an aim to which all other phenomena are essentially and actually subservient.e. no judgements of necessity or notion (cf . has another ground and interest than his tory. etc. the freak of humour. is the guiding p rinciple and only its notion its final aim. The self-consciousness of a particular nation is a vehicle for the contempor ary development of the collective spirit in its actual existence: it is the obje ctive actuality in which that spirit for the time invests its will.e. and of its essence. and the aim to which the phenomen a are to be related and by which they are to be judged.directly counter to any universal scope and aim. which is what is pe culiar to them.e. liberty. As the State was already called the point to which in polit ical history criticism had to refer all events. i. to chu rch history) generally implies an even more decided bar against presupposition o f any objective aim. The mere play of sentiment. not an essent ial and realized object like the truth.
The negation through which that consciousness raises its spirit to its trut h. actually accomplished in the ethical world. i. from which the start is now made. But . and that on the religious. the state rests on the ethical sentiment. stripping off at the same time those limitations of the several national minds and its own temporal restrictions. the idea of God it kn .e. note). At this rat e. i. But the true concrete material is neither Being (as in the co smological) nor mere action by design (as in the physico-theological proof) but the Mind. that elevation to God really involves. the absolute characteristic and function of which is effective reason. as law and duty. forme rly noticed. But the spirit which think s in universal history. w hen he treats belief in God as proceeding from the practical Reason.a mere 'ought' . and here in mind is also kn own as its truth. whi le the state is the organization and actualization of moral life. especially ¤ 51. Here then is the place to go more deeply into the reciprocal relations between t he state and religion. abstract in the formal treatment of logic. the self-determining and self-realizing notion itself . This factor. the point specially calling for note is the ' moment' of negation through which the essential content of the starting -point is purged of its finitude so as to come forth free. as the eternally act ual truth in which the contemplative reason enjoys freedom.e. Such apprehension. and in doing so to elucidate the terminology which is fam iliar and current on the topic. For that st arting. i. But if the truly moral life is to be a sequel of religion. and that relig ion is the very substance of the moral life itself and of the state. as it is subsumed under i t and is its sequel. As regards the 'mediation' which. however. whereby its conscience is purged of subjective opinion and its will freed from the selfishne ss of desire.Liberty. in the system of laws and usages. Th e finite.point contains the material or content which constitutes the content of the notion of God. while the necessity of nature and the necessity of history are only ministrant to its revelation and the vessels of its honour. as it has been already shown (¤ 192. Genuine religion and genuine religiosity only issue from the moral life: religion is that life rising to think. however (which thinks in this moral organism) overrides and absorbs within itself the finitude attaching to it as national spirit in its state and the state's temporal interests. cf. ¤ 204 not e).as is the case with all speculative process . of calmly and simply reinstating as true and valid that very antith esis of finitude. That the elevation of subjective mind to God which these considerations give is by Kant a gain deposed to a postulate .nted to it as something existing in time and tied to an external nature and exte rnal world. as true in the world of free will. It is evident and apparent from what has precede d that moral life is the state retracted into its inner heart and substance. still has the immanent limitedness of the national spirit. lays hold of its concr ete universality. now gets its most concrete interpretation. is the purification. and rises to apprehend the absolute mind. can b e so esteemed only as it is participant in that truth.e. then whatever is to rank as r ight and justice. The spirit. the supersession of which into truth is the essence of that el evation. If relig ion then is the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. The strictly technical aspects of the Mind's elevation to God have been spoken o f in the Introduction to the Logic (cf. It rises to apprehend itself in its essentiality. becoming aware of the free un iversality of its concrete essence. i. then perforce religion must have the genuine content.consciousn ess. As regards the sta rting-point of that elevation.this development of one thin g out of another means that what appears as sequel and derivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated by. is the real ethical self. Kant has on the whole adopted the most correct.e.is the peculiar perversity. Only from the moral life and by the moral li fe is the Idea of God seen to be free spirit: outside the ethical spirit therefo re it is vain to seek for true religion and religiosity.
ows must be the true and real. a condition of spiritual sla very. It is primarily a point of form: the attitude which self-consciousness takes to the body of truth . It has been the monstr ous blunder of our times to try to look upon these inseparables as separable fro m one another. i. morality and conscience. to justification by external wo rks. as it is actually present in a nation and its individu al members. but to th at end essentially requires an external consecration. All this binds the spirit under an externalism by wh ich the very meaning of spirit is perverted and misconceived at its source. exercises a sanction o ver the moral life which lies in empirical actuality. i. even though here it is not the nature-element in which the idea of God is embodied. religion was a late r addition.of bondage. This grea t difference (to cite a specific case) comes out within the Christian religion i tself.logi cally enough .as the one religion which secures the stability of governments.e. even though the implicit content of religion is absolute spirit. but purely subjective in individuals: . something desirable perhaps for strengthening the political bulwarks . and a state of lawlessness and immorality in polit ical life. it may be worth while to note the separation as it appears on the side of religion.e. generally. i. partly in the way that the subject foregoes his right of directly addressing God. religion is treated as s omething without effect on the moral life of the state.) From that first and supreme status of externalization flows every oth er phase of externality . and prays others to pray . and even to be capable of b eing transferred to others. for thought and knowledge . and ex pecting miracles from them. whereas the state had an independen t existence of its own. Along with this principle of spiritual bondage. on the contr ary. As the inseparability of the two sides has been indicated. in the annihilation of its externality. in point of form. there can only go in the legislative and constitutional syst em a legal and moral bondage.(and religion and ethical life belon g to intelligence and are a thinking and knowing) . and though nothing of the sort even enters as a factor into its centr al dogma and sole theme of a God who is known in spirit and in truth. but in the moment of enjoymen t. its reasonable law and constitution which are based on a ground of their own.working images. and even as mutually indifferent. and law and justice. and in the act of faith.addressing his devotion to miracle. It leads.which order ag ain does not get possession of that knowledge in a spiritual way only. So long as this body of truth is the very substance or indwelling spirit of se lf-consciousness in its actuality. the host as such is not at first consecrated. This self-consciousness retiring upon itself out of its empirical ac tuality and bringing its truth to consciousness has.e. and superstition. But if this present self-consciousness is la cking. only what it has consciously secured in its spiritual actuality. one religious and an other ethical. It lea ds to a laity. The view taken of the relations hip of religion and the state has been that. It leads to the non-spirit ual style of praying .e. a merit which is supposed to be gained by acts. in the free self-certain spirit: only then is it consecrated and exalted to be pre sent God. and these applications of it in the religious life. But in poin t of form. non-spirituality. receiving its knowledge of divine truth. differing from the former in body and value of truth. as the pure self-subsisting and therefore supreme truth.partly as mere moving of the lips. B . springing from some force and power. And yet in Catholicism this spirit of all truth is in actuality set in rigid opposition to the self-conscious spirit. first of all. The ethical life is the divine spirit as indwelli ng in self-consciousness. in its faith and in its con science. God is in the 'host' presented to religious adoration as an external thing. And. Catholicism has been loudly praised and is still often praised . then there may be created. (In the Lutheran Church. as well as the direction of its will and conscience from without and from another order . responsibility and duty are corrupted at their root. i.or it may be. The tw o are inseparable: there cannot be two kinds of conscience.the body of religious truth. even to bones. Thus for self-consciousnes s religion is the 'basis' of moral life and of the state. then self-consciousness in this content has t he certainty of itself and is free.
the morality of economic and industrial action a gainst the sanctity of poverty and its indolence. With the growing need for law and morality and the sense of the spirit's essential liberty. . and it carr ies the terms of its own justification. our consciousness and subjectivity. It is the morality of marriage as against the sanctity of a celibate order.e. if taken alone. But these governments are not aware that in fanaticism they have a terrible power. so to speak a priori. and. with institutions that embody injustice and with a mor ally corrupt and barbaric state of society. i. It is no use to o rganize political laws and arrangements on principles of equity and reason. the wisdom of the world. But in mind there is a very different pow er available against that externalism and dismemberment induced by a false relig ion.e. So long as t he form. then what in the world was a postulate of holiness is supplanted by the a ctuality of moral life. ther e sets in a conflict of spirit with the religion of unfreedom. Let us suppose even that.ut in reality this applies only to governments which are bound up with instituti ons founded on the bondage of the spirit (of that spirit which should have legal and moral liberty). Instead of the vow of poverty (muddled up into a contradiction of assigning merit to whosoever gives away goods to the poor. unte nable. what belongs to the secular authority: and it is sufficiently notorious that the secular no less than the ecclesiastical authori ty have claimed almost everything as their own.(1 0) for thought makes the spirit's truth an actual present. moral life in the state. can law and morality exist. and these principles were set at such a dista nce as to seem to have true being only as negative to actual self-consciousness. A free state and a slavish religion are incompatible. Philosophy awakes in t he spirit of governments and nations the wisdom to discern what is essentially a nd actually right and reasonable in the real world.in short. Thus set free. so long as those principles in their wisdom mistake religion so much as n ot to know that the maxims of the reason in actuality have their last and suprem e sanction in the religious conscience in subsumption under the consciousness of 'absolute' truth. Principles of civil freedom can be but abstract and superfi cial. In this unreality ethical content gets the name of Holiness. It was well to call these pr oducts of thought. and actuality emancipates itself to s pirit. self-realizing reason . and in the use of property . and political institutions deduced from them must be.of honesty in commercial dealing. founded on principles of reason. true religion sanctions obedience to the law and the legal arrangements of the state . marriage now ranks as th e ethical relation. but in contradict ion with an established religion based on principles of spiritual unfreedom. sti . no matter how. i. so l ong as in religion the principle of unfreedom is not abandoned. it followed ne cessarily that self-consciousness was conceived as not immanent in the ethical p rinciples which religion embodies. whosoever enric hes them) is the precept of action to acquire goods through one's own intelligen ce and industry. But that concrete indwelling is only the aforesaid ethical organizations. And instead of the vow of obe dience. and thus only.e. The precept of religion. therefore. Instead of the vow of chastity. because the state is a self-possessed. 'Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's' is not enough: the question is to settle what is Caesar's.in short moral life in the socioeconomic sphere. . The divine spirit must interpene trate the entire secular life: whereby wisdom is concrete within it. under the impression that their diverse natures wil l maintain an attitude of tranquillity one to another and not break out in contr adiction and battle. i. It is silly to suppose that we may try to allot them separate spheres. the content of religion assumes quite another shape. lacked liberty. . only so long as and only on condition that they remain sunk in the thraldom of injustice and immorality. But once the divin e spirit introduces itself into actuality. which does not rise in hostility against them. and in a special sense Philosophy. a code of law should arise. Mind collects itself into its inward free actuality. leads it into the rea l world. as the highest on this side of humanity stan ds the family.an obedience which is itself the true freedom. and thus liberates it in its actuality and in its own self. Thus.the morality of an obedience dedicated to the law of the state as against the sanctity of an obedience from which law and duty are absent and where conscience is enslaved.
among which laws these guarantees are included. Opposed to what religion pronounces holy.is just this .g. the notion al differences on which everything turns must be recalled to mind.when it is obviously too great a task to descend into t he depths of the religious spirit and to raise that same spirit to its truth .to make a revolution without having made a reforma tion. . (cf. to put it simply. Such laws. and as such brought to consciousness under its most abstract form.to have the form (to have thinking) i tself for a content. however sound their provisions may be. To compare the Platonic standpoint in all its definiteness with the point of vie w from which the relationship of state and religion is here regarded.mi nd intrinsically concrete .ll. that the substance of the thought could only be true when set forth as a universal. In m an's case it is otherwise: his truth and reality is the free mind itself. and of the various classes of the administrative personnel. The first of these is that in natural things their substance or genus is different from their existence in which that substance is as subject: further that this subjective e xistence of the genus is distinct from that which it gets. Plato gets hold of the thought that a genuine constitution and a sou nd political life have their deeper foundation on the Idea . This absolute nucleus of man . and their 'individuality' is not itself the form: the form is only found in subjective thinking.which implicitly indeed is the free self-determining thought .the soil on which the universal and unde rlying principle freely and expressly exists . e. and not in the spirit of their religion where their inmost conscience and supreme obliga tion lies. ¤ 544 note). etc. that the Idea must be regent. on one hand. thus founder on the conscience. it is vain to delude ourselves with the abstract and empty assumption that the i ndividuals will act only according to the letter or meaning of the law. t hey could offer no lasting resistance to the contradictions and attacks of the r eligious spirit. What Plato thus definitely set before his mind was that the Idea . which in philosophy gives that universal truth and reality an existence of its own.could not get into consciousness save only in the form of a thought. and the power given them to fix the budget. It is nothing but a modern folly to try to alter a corrup t moral organization by altering its political constitution and code of laws wit hout changing the religion. as the duty of carrying out the laws lies in the hands of individual members of the government.. the laws appear something m ade by human hands: even though backed by penalties and externally introduced. whose spirit is different from the spirit of the laws and ref uses to sanction them. It is from this point of view that Plato breaks out into the celebrate d or notorious passage where he makes Socrates emphatically state that philosoph y and political power must coincide. To the height of the thinking consciousness of this princip le Aristotle ascended in his notion of the entelechy of thought. It is indeed the height and profanity of contradiction to seek to bind and subject to the secular code t he religious conscience to which mere human law is a thing profane. we re made upon religion and politics by liberty which had learnt to recognize its inner life. The perception had dawned upon Plato with great clearness of the gulf which in h is day had commenced to divide the established religion and the political consti tution. At best it is only a temporary expedient . from those deeper requirements which. so-called 'chambers'. when specially set in relief as genus. In the case of natural things their truth and reality does not get the for m of universality and essentiality through themselves. if the distre ss of nations is to see its end. thus surmountin . as the universal in a mental concept or idea.on the essentially and actually universal and genuine principles of eternal righteousness. This additional 'individuality' . and it comes to existence in his self-consciousness. Those guarantees are but rotte n bulwarks against the consciences of the persons charged with administering the laws . and that stability could be procured for the laws by external guarantees. on the other hand.t o seek to separate law and justice from religion. or. to suppose that a political constitution opposed to the old religion could live in peace and harmony with it and its sanctities.is the intellectual and thinking self. Now to s ee and ascertain what these are is certainly the function and the business of ph ilosophy.
in its f irst immediate. Self-realizing subjectivity is in this case absolutely identical with substantial universality. and it is in fact necessary that in point of time the consciousness of the absolute Idea should be first rea ched and apprehended in this form: in other words. earlier than it does as philosophy. so long neither the state nor the race of men can be lib erated from evils . But Greek philosophy could set itself up only in opposition to Greek religion: the unity of thought and the substantiality of the Idea could t ake up none but a hostile attitude to an imaginative polytheism. the subjectivity of mind. intuition. but could not work into his idea of it the infinite form of subjecti vity. or essential being). and the state as such both as forms in which the principle exists . however. does the absolute possibility and necessity exist for political power. Under the subjective form. is after all only in one of its form s. he set in relief accordingly the underlying principle of the state. But thought always . Thus religion m ight appear as first purified only through philosophy . broke forth at first only as a subjective free thi nking. as it grows and expands. Plato. religion. for th ese reasons. but earlier than philosophy. Only in the principle of mind.g the Platonic Idea (the genus.the form which ph ilosophy attacked .each contain the absolute truth: s o that the truth. from religion. and so also one-sided phase. the genuine Idea of the in trinsically concrete mind is just as essentially under the one of its terms (sub jective consciousness) as under the other (universality): and in the one as in t he other it is the same substantial content. of the state with the religious conscience as well as with the philosophical consciousness. which in the actual world may infect its implicitly true Idea. etc. or those who are now called kings and rulers do not soundly and compre hensively philosophize. His state is therefore. and has its actuality in the act of self-liberation. fall feeling. as demoralization. which is awa re of its own essence. a nd hence he makes that utterance that 'so long as philosophers do not rule in th e states. or rather must. which is developed similarly.contains the immediate self-subsistence o f subjectivity no less than it contains universality. it must exist in its immediat e reality as religion. pictorial representation. exhibits the one-sidedness. appea r in its existence degraded to sensuous externality. lets other aspects of the Idea of humanity grow and expand also (¤¤ 566 seqq. is implicitly in absolute liberty. of philosophy. and in fact reaches its completion by catching and comprehending in all its definite essentiality that principle of spirit which first manifests it self in religion. and thus in the sequel beco me an influence to oppress liberty of spirit and to deprave political life. Religion may.and th at on account of this very principle . wanting in subjective liberty (¤ 503 note. But even religion.and thus thi s underlying principle was not yet apprehended as absolute mind.). and for accomplishing the reconciliation of actuality in general with the mi nd.through pure self-existe nt thought: but the form pervading this underlying principle . As it left therefore behind. which still escaped his intelligence. which was not yet identical with the substantiality itself . he. The form in its infinite tru th.).the idea of the substantial moral life. But so long too this principle could not eme rge even in thought.so long will the idea of the political constitution fall sho rt of possibility and not see the light of the sun'. got hold of only in the form of thought-out truth. Stil l the principle has in it the infinite 'elasticity' of the 'absolute' form'. Hence religion as such. so . so long the genuine principle of the state had not come into actuality. Philosophy is a later development from this basis (just as Greek philosophy itself is later than Gree k religion). Political power. perceived this demoralization of democracy and the defectiveness even of its principle. and to the glad some and frivolous humours of its poetic creations.was that creative imagination. and the principles of philosophy coinciding in o ne. in common with all his thinking contemporaries. ¤ 513. on its own s howing. nor could thought lay hold of the genuine idea of the state . in its philosophic phase. should knit it together and control it. It was not vouchsafed to Pl ato to go on so far as to say that so long as true religion did not spring up in the world and hold away in political life. with which is identical the liberty o f an independent self-consciousness. The truth which sho uld be immanent in the state.
as to overcome this depraving of the form-determination (and the content by thes e means). and if that and not the truth as such is called for . 2. but rather to a sort of knowledge. That here. Die Weltgeschichte 10. the constitut ion and the code. If nowadays there is so li ttle consciousness of God. as this supreme sphere may be in general de signated. Thus ul timately. Inneres Staatsrecht. Weltweisheit. Das System der Bedurfnisse. must no less be regarded as objectively issuing fr om the absolute spirit which as spirit is in its community. the immediate and substantial unity of which is the Belief i . Die Polizei und die Corporation. has been remarked already (¤ 63 note).e. 4. Die Sittlichkeit. SECTION THREE: ABSOLUTE MIND(1) ¤ 553 The notion of mind has its reality in the mind. and that belief is only a particular for m of the latter. as well as their several applications. 9. 3. ¤ 555 The subjective consciousness of the absolute spirit is essentially and intri nsically a process. embody the principle an d the development of the moral life. The moral life of the state and the religious spirit uality of the state are thus reciprocal guarantees of strength. i. The s ubjective and the objective spirit are to be looked on as the road on which this aspect of reality or existence rises to maturity. 1. is always also identit y returning and ever returned into itself: if it is the one and universal substa nce it is so as a spirit. for which it is as substance. If this reality in identity with that notion is to exist as the consciousness of the absolute Idea. discerning itself into a self and a consciousness. and to bring about the reconciliation of the spirit in itself. ¤ 554 The absolute mind. In the Protestant state. if that actuality is to be a vehicle worthy of it. Die burgerliche Gesellschaft. Das aussere Staatsrecht. in the Protestant conscience the principles of the religious and of th e ethical conscience come to be one and the same: the free spirit learning to se e itself in its reasonableness and truth. belief or faith is not opposite to consciousness or knowle dge. 8. of God's indwelling in us.in this there is at least the correct principle that God must be apprehended as spirit i n his community. while it is self-centred identity. which proceeds and can only proceed from th e truth of religion. Die Rechtspflege 5. and his objective essence is so little dwelt upon. Gesetz. Religion. 7. wh ile people speak so much more of the subjective side of religion. 6. then the necessary aspect is that the implicitly free intelligence be in its actuality l iberated to its notion. if it has on one hand to be studied as issuing from the subject and ha ving its home in the subject. as always. when reinstated in its original principle and in that way a s such first become actual.
He contains the so-called unity of nature and spi rit . It is not t he absolute spirit which enters this consciousness. reconciliation. into the subject which produces that work. ¤ 559 In such single shapes the 'absolute' mind cannot be made explicit: in and to art therefore the spirit is a limited natural spirit whose implicit universalit y.the shape or form of Beauty.i.passed over into the process of superseding the contrast till it becomes spiritual liberation. in which the natural would be put only as 'ideal'. when steps are taken to specify its fullness in detail.n the witness of the spirit as the certainty of objective truth. These considerations govern in their further develo pments the devotion and the worship in the religion of fine art. as it is. it is the concrete contemplation and mental picture of implicitly absolute spirit as the Ideal. without the infinite self-reflection and the subjecti ve inwardness of conscience. the subject's liberty is only a manner of life. on the other hand. be of the most diverse and uness ential kind. its immediacy produ ces the factor of finitude in Art.for the expression of spiritual truth . and of gaining its concrete determination.at the same time qualifies what it embodies: and the God (of art) has with his spirituality at the same time the stamp upon him of a natural medium o r natural phase of existence . its n atural immediacy. so long as the natural is only taken in its external ity. breaks up into an ind eterminate polytheism. because only in it can the sp irit have its corporeity and thus its visible expression. This disposes of the principle of the imitation of nature in art: a point on whi ch it is impossible to come to an understanding while a distinction is left thus abstract . that the figure shows it and it alo ne: . ¤ 560 The one-sidedness of immediacy on the part of the Ideal involves the opposit . c an. Of all such forms the human is the highest and the true. Beauty in general goes no further than a penetration of the vision or image by the spir itual principle . But with the stigma of immediacy upon it. 1. and still the work be something beautiful and a work of art.in other words.(under which are also included subjective images and ideas). but . like the material which it uses to work in. Art requires not only an external given material .e. ¤ 411). so that the thought embodied.something formal. Belief. and the spiritual content would be only in self-relation. is so transfigured by the in forming spirit in order to express the Idea. that is.hence not the sp iritual unity. at once this immediate unity and containing it as a reciprocal dependence of these diff erent terms. ART ¤ 556 As this consciousness of the Absolute first takes shape. aware. On one hand.must use the given forms o f nature with a significance which art must divine and possess (cf. and t he subject which contemplates and worships it.the implicit or more explicit act of worship (cul tus) . A. the immediate unity in sensuously intuitional form . the actuality of the spirit. the process of authenticating that first certainty by this intermediation. On the subjective side the c ommunity has of course an ethical life. it breaks up into a wor k of external common existence. Der absolute Geist. In this ideal. or the idea. as superseded in spirit. has in devotion . or the concrete shape born of the subjective spirit. ¤ 558 For the objects of contemplation it has to produce. which is only a sign of the Idea. . not as the 'characteristic' meaningful nature-form which is significant of spirit. of the spirituality of its essence: and its self-consciousness and actuality are in it elevated to subs tantial liberty. With the essential restrictedness of its content. viz.the form of immediacy as such . ¤ 557 The sensuous externality attaching to the beautiful. But.
That all these elements of a nation's actuality constitute one systematic totality. ¤ 562 In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are incompatib le.symbolic art. the artistic production has on its part the form of natural immediacy.a mixture from natural and spiritual sources . and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality from which it always disengages itself. subjectivity. which is thus self-confident and of good cheer. known as the Absolute. it has to note to what particular feature the kind of cultus corresponds . but its inmost depth. In religions where the Idea has not yet been revealed and known in its free cha racter.can try to bring itself to consciousness. but as only finding himself in himself. The artist's theme only is as the abstract God of pure thought. not yet conscious of itself. the artist's enthusiasm. and of its constitution. in which the figuration suitable to the Idea is not yet found. is not yet absolute. The subject or ag ent is the mere technical activity: and the work of art is only then an expressi on of the God. that one spirit creates and informs them.e one-sidedness (¤ 556) that it is something made by the artist. as well as of its art and science. and th e artist is the master of the God. without admixture and unspotted from its contingency.in short how the nature of a nation's moral life. . though concrete and intrinsically free.and t hen to see how the secular self-consciousness.stil l this art is defective. or an effor t towards him . and yet all the while toil ing to work itself into it. the action inspired with the fullness of this indwelling pow er.a restless and unappeased effort which throws itself into shape after shape as it vainly tries to find its goal. and the net power of the indwelling spirit is conceived and born into the world. is not yet known. when there is no sign of subjective particularity in it. Thus the external can here appear as contingent towar ds its significance. and though art is the sol e organ in which the abstract and radically indistinct content . in the beauty of classical art) lies the art of sublimity . and the thought as going forth and wrestling with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it. and that is where the infinite form.for the defect in subject-matter comes from the form not being imman . As regards the close connection of art with the various religions it may be spec ially noted that beautiful art can only belong to those religions in which the s piritual principle. The meaning or theme thus shows it has not yet reach ed the infinite form. of its actual liberty. the principle of its law. The Philosophy of Religion has to discover the logical necessity in the progress by which the Being. Romantic art gives up the task of showing him as such in external form and by means of beauty: it presents him as only condescending to a ppearance. is not as in the first ex treme a mere superficial personality. the consciousness of what is the supreme vocation of man . assumes fuller and firmer features. it belongs to the genius or particular endowment of the artist . its form is defective because its subject-matter and th eme is so . But as liberty only goes as far a s there is thought. is like a foreign force under which he is bound and passive. and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying himself in an external form. and thus giving himself his adequate figure in the spiritual world alone. as free spi rit. is a truth on which follows the further truth that the history of religions coincides with th e world-history.and is at the same time a labour concerned with technical cleverness and mechanical externalit ies. On the further side of the perfection (which is reached in such reconciliation. though the craving for art is felt in order to bring in imaginative visi bility to consciousness the idea of the supreme being. ¤ 561 In work so inspired the reconciliation appears so obvious in its initial sta ge that it is without more ado accomplished in the subjective self-consciousness . without the depth and without the sense of its antithesis to the absolute essence. The work of art therefore is just as much a work due to free option. corresponds to the principle which constitutes the subs tance of a religion.
expression. spectator find themselves at home.due to a one-sided survey of human life .that it be revealed. satisfied and liberated: to them the vision and the consc iousness of free spirit has been vouchsafed and attained. Beautiful art. dashing t o pieces everything high and great .e. and. then the only thing left to constitute His nat . as infinite self-realizing form . like the religion peculiar to it. If the wo rd 'God' is taken in earnest in religion at all. has for its condition the self-consciousness o f the free spirit .is still absent in the sen suous beauty of the work of art. and as 'absolute' spirit it is for the spirit. But with a further and deeper study. B.for the principle it embodies is itself stolid and dull.into revelation. which is thus the inner form that gives utterance to itself alo ne. it has lifted the religion away over its limitation. and j ust for that reason. The old conception . which point to the unspiritual o bjectivity of that other-world . we see that the advent of art. is first generated.ent in it. REVEALED RELIGION(1) ¤ 564 It lies essentially in the notion of religion. because made within a religion which is expressly called the revealed.the consciousness that compared with it the natural and sens uous has no standing of its own: it makes the natural wholly into the mere expre ssion of spirit. But even fine art is only a grade of liberation. .of Nemesis. still more in that external. not the supreme liberation itself.was confronted by Plato and Aristotle with the doctrine that God is not envious.and bones perform a similar or even a better se rvice than such images. for according to them it would rather be the r eligion in which nothing of God was revealed. in a religio n still in the bonds of sensuous externality. ¤ 563 Beautiful Art. whose con tent is absolute mind . Knowledge (the principle by which the substance is mind) is a self-determining principle.it therefore is manifestation out a nd out. the theme and c entre of religion. Beautiful art. The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit. from it s side. and brilliancy. has thus performed the same service as philosophy: it has purified the s pirit from its thraldom. In the sublime divinity to which the work of art succeeds in giving expression the artistic genius and the. The restricted value of the Idea passes utterly and naturally into the uni versality identical with the infinite form. which is only in the medi um of thought . At the very time it seems to give religion the supreme glorification.the religion i. unbeautiful sensuo usness. on the contrary. These assertions (and more than assert ions they are not) are the more illogical.the medium in which alone the pure spirit is for the spirit. and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract e lements of its being but itself. shows that such religion is on the decline. with their perso nal sense and feeling. that the method of divine knowledge may and must begin: and i f self-revelation is refused Him. and those belonging to it would be the heathen 'who know not God'. into an ex istence which is itself knowledge . and he nce has not the power freely to transmute the external to significance and shape . . looks up in its principle to an other-w orld which is sensuous and unmeaning: the images adored by its devotees are hide ous idols regarded as wonder-working talismans. has its future in true reli gion. in which he had not revealed himse lf. revealed by God.The genuine objectivity. it is from Him. what is more.the vision in which consciousness has to depend upon the senses passes into a self-mediating knowledge. Thus the principle which gi ves the Idea its content is that it embody free intelligence. . which made the divinity and its action in the world only a levelling power. and where the liberation is accompanied with reverence . The representations of this symbolic art keep a certain tastelessness and stolidity . The older religion in which the need of fine art. The same answer may be given to the modem assertions that man cannot ascertain God.
on the other hand.just as. first of all.is the Spirit. completes its independence till it becom es wickedness. this differentiation of him from the universal essence eterna lly supersedes itself. which is at fir st the presupposed principle. ¤ 567 (A) Under the 'moment' of Universality . And nothi ng serves better to shirk it than to adopt the conclusion that man knows nothing of God.ure would be to ascribe envy to Him. while in point of form he is. and. in it s forefront. the propositions: God is God only so far as he knows him-self: his self-knowledge is. (a) as eternal content.of the only Son .knowledge in God. though. F.on the other hand.the sphere of pure thought or the a bstract medium of essence . it is this concrete et ernal being which is presupposed. presented to consciousness as a men tal representation.requires careful and thorough speculation. Yet. when it thinks. however.See the profound elucidati on of these propositions in the work from which they are taken: Aphorisms on Kno wing and Not-knowing. That spirit. directed towards the Eternal. as the extreme of inherent negativity. through this mediating of a self-superseding mediati on. by C. On one hand is heaven and earth. . or of judgement. their relationship it makes a series of events according to finite reflective categories. abiding sel f-centred. the elemental and the concrete nature . in each o f which the absolute spirit exhibits itself. To know what God as spirit is . and especially theologians whose vocation it is to deal with these Ideas.its movement is the creation of the phenomena l world. This quasi-pictorial representation gives to the elements of his content. but afterwards. even in its manifestation. with whom. . amid that natural ness. again. ¤ 566 In this separating. such a form of finite representationalism is also overcome and superseded in the faith which realizes one spirit and in the devotion of worship. G . but (as und erlying and essential power under the reflective category of causality) creator of heaven and earth: but yet in this eternal sphere rather only begetting himsel f as his son. it is.at fi rst only 'rationalizing' reflection. If we recollect how intricate is the knowledge of the divine Mind for those who are not content with the homely pictures of faith but proceed to thought . not. The eternal 'moment' of mediation . Go d is. for that reas on.divides itself to become the antithesis of two separate worlds. It includes.. the form parts from the content: and in the form the dif ferent functions of the notion part off into special spheres or media. (c) as infinite return. and is that extreme through its connection with a confronting nat ure and through its own naturalness thereby investing it. making them presuppositions towards each other. the first substance is essentially as concrete individuality and subjectivit y . which by this difference becomes the phenomenal world in to which the content enters. though different.1.the withdrawal of the eternal from t he phenomenal into the unity of its fullness. ¤ 568 Under the 'moment' of particularity. of the world it gave away . But clearly if the word 'Mind' is to have a meaning. it may almost create surprise that so many. on one hand. as in duty bound. further. ¤ 565 When the immediacy and sensuousness of shape and knowledge is superseded. a separate being. standing in action an d reaction with such nature. only standing to it in an external connection. to specul ative comprehension. the spirit. the essential and actual spirit of nature and spirit.to apprehend this accurately and distin ctly in thoughts . But. have tried to get off their task by gladly accepting anything offered them for this behoof. which therefore is finite. in point of content. (b) as distinction of the eternal essence from its manifestation. staying aloof and inert. he still remains in original identity . and reconciliation with the eternal being. which proceeds to man's self.. it implies the revelation of Him. a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of G od. and phenomena which succeed each other.: Berlin 1829.it is therefore the absolute spirit.
and thus sensuous. yet is all the while known as an indivisible coherence of the universal. But. the place of presupposition (1) is taken by the universal subst ance. From this its separation into p arts. in which the contrast of universal and particular has sunk to its i dentical ground. This individual. C. but alive and present in the world. that it is the free thought which has its infin ite characteristic at the same time as essential and actual content. and thus. in which he. after the example of his truth. and is the actual presence of the essential and self-subsisting spirit who is all in all. Further. knowi ng itself in itself as absolute . simple. Whereas the vision-method of Art. to close himself in unity with that example (who is his im plicit life) in the pain of negativity. Die geoffenbarte Religion. F or such subject therefore it is at first an Other.then that infinite subjectivity is the merely formal self-consciousness. It is only in proportion as the pure infinite form.but the vision of implicit truth. a nd therefore by chance and its own good pleasure.where the spirit closes in unity with itself . Irony. an object of contemplating vi sion . by means of the faith on the unity (in that example implicitly accomplished) of universal and i ndividual essence. and has tha t content as an object in which it is also free. has realized his being as the Idea of the spirit.not merely to the simplicity of faith and devotional feeling.¤ 569 (c) Under the 'moment' of individuality as such . and in hi m wickedness is implicitly overcome. is itself the emptiness and vanity. as infinite subjectivi ty. 1.is taken in a merely formal. is only the f ormal aspect of the absolute content. keeps himself unchanged. on account of his immediate nature. through which witness of the spirit in him. with a temporal and external sequence. the unfolding of the mediation cont racts itself in the result .and. contentless sense. Thinking. truth is the object of philoso phy.(in the Eternal sphere he is called the Son) .the realized Spirit in which all mediation has superseded itself . ¤ 570 (2) This objective totality of the divine man who is the Idea of the spirit is the implicit presupposition for the finite immediacy of the single subject. remains master over it. th e self-centred manifestation. at first characterized himself as n ought and wicked. and thus to know himself made one with t he essential Being. Thus the Being of Beings (3) through this mediation brings a bout its own indwelling in self-consciousness. which from itself. existence of the absolutely concrete is represented as putting himself in judge ment and expiring in the pain of negativity. gives itself direction and con tent. this immediate. so far. I n the immanent simplicity of thought the unfolding still has its expansion. falls back rather into the vanity of wilfulness. ¤ 571 These three syllogisms. he is also the movement to throw off his immediacy. .of subjectivity and the no tion itself. are the revelation of that spirit whose life is set out as a cycle of concrete shapes in pictorial thought. he. as absolute return from that negativity a nd as universal unity of universal and individual essentiality. as actualized out of its abstraction into an individual self-consciousness . throws off the one-sidedness of subjectivity in wh ich it is the vanity of thought. but even to thought. external in point of form. who as such is identified with the essence . constituting the one syllogism of the absolute selfmediation of spirit. so that the spirit is not als o at the same time known as implicitly existent and objectively self-unfolding. eternal. and eternal spirit in itself. is but subjective production and shivers the sub . with the assertion that it stands on the very summit of religion and philosophy. In this form of truth.is transplanted into the world of time.Irony. If the result . PHILOSOPHY ¤ 572 This science is the unity of Art and Religion. secondly. which can make every objective r eality nought and vain. is not bound by it . his natur al man and self-will.
i. and whereas Religion.e. which philosophy is.which may be in both the same .on the other hand. and is in that the cognition of that essential and ac tual necessity. then the subjective movement of faith and its final identific ation with the presupposed object. which has usurped the title of reason and philosophy . This cognition is thus the recognition of thi s content and its form.it strips religious truth of its infinity and makes it in reality nought. its first definite form un der those acquired habits of thought which his secular consciousness and intelle ct otherwise employs. or rather has let its nature develop and judge it self by these very categories. and acts inconsistently towards them. This witness . but even u nifies them into the simple spiritual vision. and s o religious. and mediates what is thus open ed out. If the spirit yields to this finite reflect ion.and from a pithless orthodoxy. that the content of re ligion and philosophy is the same . as also of the necessity in the two forms .the underlying essence in all humanity . and then to prepare triumphs f or its principle of formal identity. But it is another thing when relig ion sets herself against comprehending reason. In this way the truth becomes liable to the terms and cond itions of finitude in general. of course. By this inconsistency it correc ts their defects. This movement. and the objective and external r evelation presupposed by representation . It had t oo little of God in it for the former. but also criticized it.stantial content into many separate shapes. which used often to be brought against philosophy (that i t has too little of God). too much for the latter. and particularly of the logical form. But it is the whole cycle of philosophy. it is the liberation from the one-sidedness of the forms . But religion is the truth for all men: faith rests on the witness of the spirit. from failure to note the distinctio n of the content . It is only by an insight into the value of these forms that the true and needful conviction can be gained. The charge of Atheism. The whole question turns entirely on t he difference of the forms of speculative thought from the forms of mental repre sentation and 'reflecting' intellect. Religion in that case is completely in the right in guarding herself against such reason and philosophy and treating them as enemies. Philosophy not merely keeps them together to make a totality. a nd of logic in particular. to be more precise still. and this necessary as free. the further details of external nature and finite mind which fall outside the range of religion.takes. only looks back on its knowledge. which has not merely taught and made known this diffe rence. or. immediate vision and its poetry. opens it out in mental picture. and then in that raises them to se lf-conscious thought. from retaining its content ( which as religion is essentially speculative) with a tenacity which does violenc e to them. which determines itself to content.leaving out. It is on th e ground of form that philosophy has been reproached and accused by the religiou s party. has grown rare: the more wide-spread grows the charge . finds itself already accompl ished. when driven to expound itself. Such an opposition proceeds from failure to appreciate the differen ce indicated and the value of spiritual form in general. just as conversely its speculative content has brought the same changes upon it from a self-styled philosophy . first the subjectiv e retreat inwards. ¤ 573 Philosophy thus characterizes itself as a cognition of the necessity in the content of the absolute picture-idea. and against philosophy in general .on one hand. wh ich as witnessing is the spirit in man.from these forms. when at the close it seizes its own notion . in which the diverse elements in the content are cognized as necessary.('Rationalism') . and specially against a philosophy of which the doctrine is speculative. Such consciousness is thus the intelligible unity (cognize d by thought) of art and religion. This does not prevent the spirit. Here might seem to be the place to treat in a definite exposition of the recipro cal relations of philosophy and religion. elevation of them into the absolute form. remains identical with it. even in employi ng sensuous ideas and finite categories of thought. Nothing easier therefore for the 'Rationalist' than to point o ut contradictions in the exposition of the faith. with its separ ation into parts.
had really ascribed substantial or objective and inherent re ality to all things and regarded them as God: .or to dalai-lamas . and hence treats what belongs to the doctrine of God's concrete nature as something merely historical.of Pantheism. If we want to take so-called Pantheism in its most poetical. we must. and so . But if those who give out that a certain philosophy is Pantheism. On such a presuppo sition. and is therefore.of the new piety and new theology. from which all definite quality is excluded. or a sheer fact which needs no p roof. it treats it only as an i nterest which others once had. and amongst it s effusions. the hearer clings as he di d before to his belief that secular things still keep their being. God in General. thus left standing in fixed undisturbed substantiality. For them philosophy has too mu ch of God: . which with its pious airs of superiority fancies its elf free to dispense with proof. does not comprehend itself. Piety. are unable and unwilling to see this . consult the orie ntal poets: and the most copious delineations of it are found in Hindu literatur e. cows . thus retains nothin g more than a God in general without objective characteristics. The imputation of Atheism presupposes a definite idea of a full and real God.(empirical things.so much so. and even its own teaching in th e doctrine of religion . goes hand in hand with empty rationalism . To impute Pantheism instead of Atheism to Philosophy is part of the modern h abit of mind . It must be said that it was more to the credit of piety and theology when they accused a philoso phical system (e. if we believe them. all such definiteness is only the non-divine. the secularity of th ings. or Pantheism.the y should before everything have verified the alleged fact that any one philosoph er. I select .thus he understands philosophy . that it has too much of him: . open to our disposal on this topic. and th e consequent untruth of the being of external things. and form all that is definite in the divine universality. and the falsifications due to such misconcept ion. though the former i mputation at the first glance looks more cruel and invidious (cf. This allegation I will further elucidat e in this exoteric discussion: and the only way to do so is to set down the evid ence. even after philosophy has maintained God's absolute universality. The mitigation of the reproach of Atheism into that of Pantheism has its ground therefore in the s uperficial idea to which this mildness has attenuated and emptied God. almost as if it merely mentioned a notorio us fact.that of the Hindu to ass es. as is well known. or if you will. are) .so much so. It is only his own stupidity. its grossest shape. Amongst the abundant resources.(whi ch means to be so much opposed to it. prolix and reiterative ad nauseam. which generate than imagination and the allegation of such pantheism. whether higher or lower in the scale. that it is treated not so much as an imputation. it asserts that God is everyt hing and everything is God.which therefore it does not disparage. fulfilled notion of God.is always adora tion of an object which. and can no longer accuse it of Atheism. Without interest of its own for the concrete.the Bhagavat-Gita.for it is just to see the notion that they refuse . that Philosophy is the All-one doctrine.that of the Egyptians to the ox .that such an idea had ever come into the head of anybody but themselves.Everything is . or any one man. as it stands. some of the most telling passage . with all its absurdities. Philosophy indeed can recognize its own for ms in the categories of religious consciousness. exclusi ve. so as to fi nd God in everything called religion. This new theology. The indeterminate God is t o be found in all religions. also contains the generic abs tract. As that p opular idea clings to its abstract universality. He thus changes that universality i nto what he calls the pantheistic: . which makes religion only a subje ctive feeling and denies the knowledge of the divine nature. every kind of piety (¤ 72) .g.all possess substantia lity. Spinozism) of Atheism than of Pantheism. and ar ises because the popular idea does not detect in the philosophical notion the pe culiar form to which it is attached. If this theory needs no more than such a God. most sublime. without distinction. it must at least find such a God recognize d even in philosophy. But the converse is not true: the religious consciousness does not apply the criticism of though t to itself.as the most authentic statement accessible .each and every secular thing is God. ¤ 71 note). that. in particular.in the wanton assertion. though both repose really on the same habi t of mind) . but as a proved fact.
Those who are depriv ed of knowledge by various desires approach other divinities . everything is reduced to a limited number of essential existences. with a monstrous incons istency. goodness. called Gods.s. besides Krishna. . has the higher conception of Brahma. grip. . . melt into the one Krishna. . The undiscerning ones. But so little concrete is this divine unity . Even when. Among letters I am the letter A. but defin ed as the 'accidental'. vanish. . like numb ers of pearls upon a thread. I am also that which is the seed of all things: there is n othing moveable or immoveable which can exist without me.' Even in these totally sensuous delineations. from it he obtains the beneficial things he desires really given by me. . pp. Everyw here there is a distinction drawn between external. Such a high-souled mind is very hard to find. without essential being of its very own. . That this description is not incorrect is clear from these short citatio ns. so it is afterwards said that Brahma too is in him) makes himself out to be . nothing independent]. I am "Om" in all the Vedas. . But even what has been quoted shows that these very substantialities of the externally existent do not retain the independence entitling them to be name d Gods.'I am the self.' Then the picture gathers itself up in a simple expression.that Hinduism. But the fruit thus obtained by those of little judge ment is perishable. I am the beginning and the middle and the end also of all beings .spiritual as its idea of God i s . . as he said before he was S iva. Krishna (and we must not suppose th ere is. he is said to be the beginning.the most excellent of everything. I am the taste in water. Among beasts I am the lord of beasts. think me who am unpe rceived to have become perceptible. . . . . . is alo ne the divine and God. Amongst the Vedas I am the Sama-Ve da: I am mind amongst the senses: I am consciousness in living beings. unessential existences.. .not everything. 162) Krishna says of himself:(1) . . but having its truth in the substance. . so to speak . . than which there is nothing higher. seated in the hearts of all beings. however. I am the beaming sun amongst the shining on es. I am the spring amo ng the seasons. I am life in all beings. t he pure unity of thought in itself. I am the discernment of the discerning ones. . middle. and the Spinozan Substance. but only . I am the light of th e sun and the moon. is also the maddest of polytheisms. On that account Colebrooke and many others have described the Hindu religion as at bottom a Mono theism.so powerless its. . . any more than the Eleatic One. the One which. Indra. And I am Sankara (Siva) among the Rudras. as also those proximate substantialities. . Krishna says: 'I am the producer and the destroyer of the whole universe . But the idolatry of the wretched Hi . passion. . or Indra. even Siva. Meru among the high-topped mountains. or a God besides. rather. this tota lity is distinguished from the living things themselves as single existences. as different from that accidental.). all this is woven upon me. . and the moon among the lunar mansions.' Then he adds: 'The whole universe deluded by these three states o f mind developed from the qualities [sc. where the empirical everything of the world. (believing) that Vasudeva i s everything. There is nothing else higher than myself. still God. . . .. which he is. This reduction is more expressly made in the following scene (7th Lesson. darkness] does not k now me who am beyond them and inexhaustible: for this delusion of mine (even the Maya is his.. and end of living things. the infinit ely manifold sensuous manifold of the finite is in all these pictures. not knowing my transcendent and inexhaustible essence. the Everything. I am also the strength o f the strong. the man possessed of knowledge approaches me. Hinduism. . is not. etc. .' This 'All'. to a poly theism. . 'At the end of many lives. This everything. Those cross beyond this delusion who resort to me alone. . . p. which Krishna calls himself. In the 10th Lesson (in Schlegel. Ev en such a picture which extends deity far and wide in its existence cannot be ca lled pantheism: we must rather say that in the infinitely multiple empirical wor ld. . at the beginning of the pass age. . and one essential amongst them. . . 7 seqq. . developed from the qualities is divine and d ifficult to transcend. the Himalaya among the firmly-fixed (mountains). Whichever for m of deity one worships with faith.
on one hand.and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this relation. and that we should rat her call them monotheistic. to was . we may rather say that they represent the Absolute as the utterly universa l genus which dwells in the species or existences. on the contrary. imagination or speculation. as the endless lot of empirical existence. ac osmical. and so on .on the shallow conception of it . a mere numerical unity just means that its cont ent is an infinite multeity and variety of finitudes. For that unity. (In philosophy it is specially made out that the determination of God's nature determines his relations with the wo rld. They are most accurately called systems which apprehend the Absolute on ly as substance. empirical indivi duals . he is as essence parted from appearance. Of the oriental. and that unity described as love. but dwells so potently that t hese existences have no actual reality. and. when he adores the ape. even in a general exoteric discussion. but . that in these systems this 'everything' has no truth. to which everything is God.of the world as one thing.ndu. if it be intrinsically abstract and therefore empty. These systems and modes of pictorial conception originate from the one need comm on to all philosophies and all religions of getting an idea of God. Perhaps the empty numerical unity must b e predicated of the world: but such abstract predication of it has no further sp ecial interest. or. outside it .not as with the Hindus split between the featureless unity of abs tract thought. But to go back again to the question of fact. Hin du monotheism. of the relationship of God and the world. after this partition. as it says. a transfigur ation of the natural and the spiritual.keep its independence. and of empirical secular spirit. The fault of all these modes of thought and systems is that they stop short of defining substance as subject and as mind . Of the philosophies to which tha t name is given. if the Idea of God is not deeply determinate in itself. and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the agnostic. which alone makes possible and induces the wrong idea of pan theism. no te) that so far are they from identifying God with the world and making him fini te. in which the externalism and transitorin ess of immediate nature. If. whether they spring from heart.floating in the indefinite blue .) The 'reflective' understanding begins by rejecting all systems and modes o f conception. secondl y. we must consult th e Mohammedans.. express the interconnection of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or consciousness.. which. this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and vulgar. it has been remarked earlier (¤ 50. e. as infinite from the finite.might with a show of logic as well be called a monotheism: for if God. If we want to see the consciousnes s of the One . the Eleatic. tends of itself to let whatever is concrete. in the excellent Jelaleddin-Rumi in particular. we find the unity of the soul with the One set forth. and God everything. in relation to the popular idea of the world. and on the other. But it is that delusion wi th the empty unity. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair lies.be it as a lot of Gods or as secular. But. especially the Mohammedan. modes of envisaging God. the all. or other creature. the long-winded weary story of its particular detail. It is only the picture . The clo se of philosophy is not the place. is itself an example how little comes of mere monotheis m. as everything. moreover. then as there is only one world there w ould be in that pantheism only one God.(2) I refrain from accumulating further examples of the religious and poetic concept ions which it is customary to call pantheistic. is still a long way from that wr etched fancy of a Pantheism. or Spinozist. that could ever be considered capable of combining with G od: only on that assumption could philosophy be supposed to teach that God is th e World: for if the world were taken as it is. is discarded and absor bed. the conviction arises also that the appearance has a relation to the essence.in its finest purity and sublimity. That pantheism indeed . is identical with the world. then it would hardly have been even held possible to su ppose a pantheism which asserted of such stuff that it is God.g. the finite to the infinite.
the special mode in whic h the unity is qualified. Stick ing fast to the undigested thought of identity.said pores being the negative.te a word on what a 'notion' means. but only the one factor of this category of relation . a nd assert . I n the philosophical field they proceed. they infer that in the philo sophic Idea God is composed of God and the world.and that the factor of indet erminateness .that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. depend solely on the different modes of this unity. The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallo w identity. . they thus infect it with t he disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. as in the physical field the physicist. something supposed to exist beside the material reality. with God's omnipresence. But as the view taken of this relation is cl osely connected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all amputat ions against it. they must stop at the vague conception of such relati on. we may still add the remark that though philosophy certainly ha s to do with unity in general. e. Hence all they can say about philosophy is that dry id entity is its principle and result. i. and which they ascribe to philosophy. with indefinite ideas.falsely as a fact . the most external and the worst. etc. in the pores of th e physicists . with abstract unity. But the question is.and s till less take trouble about it . it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject.the world as much as Go d .g. providence. in matters admitted to be of superior. and lose sight of the chief point of interest .or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into m atters also for the physicist) .and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one another.they rather stick fast at quite abstract indeterminate unity. mere ide ntity. and that amongst the m there is great variety. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse phil osophy gather from the study of God's relation to the world is that the one. if not even of supreme interest. If any difficulty em erge in comprehending God's relation to the world.is identity. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories. but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfie d. perhaps under the more familiar names of e.that. and that the deepest and l ast expression of unity is the unity of absolute mind itself. omnipresence. so far as to realize their faith thereon in a definite mental idea. is what one expect s. viz. to let God dwell in the interspaces of things. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conce ption.g. who also is well aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties a nd matters . they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable cont radiction. they import them into philosophy. the ordinary physicist (chemist included) takes up only one.e. inorganic and living . at least to know so much that of these terms there are a great many. And as in their judgement either of the two . composition. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception. and that hence. and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else. or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. and the empty absolute. But instead of ascertainin g these different modes. as Epicu rus does. Would-be judges an d critics of philosophy might be recommended to familiarize themselves with thes e phases of unity and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them.that each step in its advanc e is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete unity. applies only it in the whole range of natural structures. but rather its reverse.has the same solid substantiality as the other. in what difficulties would they be involved by their bel ief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like. That men and classes o f untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness. Of what kind is this relation? Ev ery peculiarity and the whole difference of natural things. which he thus renders for ever inexplicable. when they hear of unity . the notion and content of philosophy. it is not. This very 'Beside' would give their pantheism its spatial . and that it is the system of identity. But they show so little acquaintance with them . Such then is the idea they for m of pantheism. but with concrete unity (the notion).and relation i pso facto implies unity . they have laid hands on. however. But if those who cling to this crude 'rationalism' were in ear nest. not the concrete unity. where they are utterly unknown.
for its middle term: a middle.their everything.it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into i ts proper medium. which is based on the Lo gical system as starting-point. and the facts in question are thoughts and notions. nor itself to something away from them and independen t . and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity. not indeed to extre mes of finite abstraction. 576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason' s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: . which causes the movement and development.as the mediating agent in th e process .and thus out of the appearanc e which it had there . The esoteric study of God and identity. not abstract unity. is philosophy itself. the absolutely universal. standing between the Mind and its essence. i.which. I have believed myself obliged to speak at more len gth and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external a pprehension of notions as mere facts . and which is itself the way to produce it. But to put that sort of thing. which has self. On account of this chorus of assertions. In this way th e science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but a s a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgement. ¤ 575 It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further develo pment.knowing reaso n. shows such reckle ssness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficu lty of getting into the head thoughts and notions.it is the nature of the fact. They would really thus have the misconceptio n they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous. If statements as to facts are put forward. and the latter its universal extreme. in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate . which . but with the signification that it is universalit y approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. sunders itself. ¤ 574 This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea.presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. this stale gossip of oneness or identity. on the shoulders of philosophy. or as prevaricating for a purpose. an All-one doctrine.the logical system. an action on and in the spac e thus filled on the world and in it. with Nature for the middle term which couples th e Mind with it. as other than they. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism. conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But in ascribing to God. now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism. then. and that the person theref ore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a m atter of common notoriety. they would endlessly split up the divine a ctuality into infinite materiality. ¤ 577 The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy. the truth aware of itse lf (¤ 236) . only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. of which liberty is the aim. the notion. as process of the I dea's subjective activity. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition.ity . a system of identity. The self-judging of the Idea into i ts two appearances (¤¤ 575. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. only serves as a link between them: for the syllo gism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor. as of cognitions. and notions . but the many-shaped modes specified. and as implicitly the Idea.e. making the former its presupposition. y . in his relation to the world. that that syll ogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself. which divides itself into Mind and Nature. Nature .by which notions are perverted into their opposite. as process of t he objectively and implicitly existing Idea. ¤ 576 In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded. Still the mediation of the notion h as the external form of transition. so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.
in f ull fruition of its essence. eternally sets itself to work. engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind. . The eternal Idea.et this same movement is equally the action of cognition.
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