The cybernetic paradigm

Gyula MEZEY Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary E-mail: MEZEY@ZMNE.HU

Risk-based decision-making in reducing security risks is based on practical approach, usually a combination of rational and cognitive theories. In riskmanagement analytic, cybernetic, cognitive paradigms can be applied. The Analytic Paradigm has the potential to clarify a decision, but cannot guarantee an improved decision-making. Under the Analytic Paradigm it is asserted, that someone or a group will actively select from among distinct options in a stable decision environment so as to achieve a set of goals. Recently widely recognized, that this assumption is farfetched from reality. The Cybernetic Paradigm has been increasingly in use for group decision support systems. This paradigm focuses onto uncertainty control and not optimization. Qualitative modelling is becoming central instead of quantitative modelling and expert knowledge based systems are in the core.

Shift from the Analytic approach Merkhofer (1986) [1] paraphrases a comment of a leader: ”the value of analysis [Decision analysis] lay not so much in its specific conclusions, (which he suggested were fairly intuitive), but in its clarification of the logic behind conclusions”. Analytic decision-making is based on abstract models, explicit formal theories, which create an information overload on decision-makers, and in many cases it is incompatible with both organizational structure and processes. Some applications may be motivated by the desire only to support a particular point of view. According to Merkhofer (1986) [2] decisions in organizations based on the Analytic Paradigm are typically motivated in certain situations when either: − Procedural rules applied in organizations evolved in stable environment or − Strategic decisions are to be made, or − Responding to changes in the environment of the organization, or − Organizational goals are implicit or fuzzy, or − There is a group within the organization with interest in rational choice, or − There is an inner rivalry between interest groups within the organization or

− Conflict resolution is on the agenda. However, in search for resolution of conflicts the recent Cybernetic Paradigm seems to be a more efficient basis. The Cybernetic Paradigm Conflict is a problem situation, characterized by misalignment of their objectives is perceived by social entities. Misalignment is either different order of importance or mutual exclusivity of goals. A conflict is strategic, if some of these objectives are related to the survival of one of the social entities. Politics uses a combination of coerce, deterrence, and economics. In case of a commercial conflict the resolution is explicitly held in favour of the client company. However, in case of an IR (International Relations) conflict the above assumption is implicit. Explicit aim is to achieve a stable solution by sustaining the peace and international order. But even if violent solution (armed conflict) occurs, the aim in conflict resolution is achieving a stable solution [3]. This may be solved peacefully by finding super-ordinate goals to get only by co-operating together. Results of decisions are hard to evaluate in security, thus in the absence of commonly agreed criteria, or methods, - which exist in business management - the judgement whether a decision was correct or not, depends on the later success (survival) of the respective organisation or individual politician. The Cybernetic Paradigm is grounded on the bounded rationality concept [4] and the cybernetic decision model [5] of Steinbruner (1976). In complex situations decision makers, inherently constrained by cognitive and information processing limitations, typically do not optimise expected value, – they satisfice, and minimize uncertainty. In conflict management a natural goal is trying to predict the future, and the behaviour of adversaries in a conflict. As part of conflict management we deal with forecasting techniques within the context of Crisis Analysis. The quantitative models applied by game theory, decision theory had been proved un-predictive [6], and evaluation of the utility function of the opponent, or probabilities had rarely ever been attained in reality. Decisions are made under risk in the possession of perfect information, when the outcomes of each option and their probability distribution is known, or made under uncertainty if not all the outcomes of each option and their probability distribution are fully known. Due to timestress and cognitive computational limitations of leaders, rather than all alternatives and outcomes are to be considered, some of the alternatives are ignored in favour of a satisfying one. Minimization of uncertainty is

Moving from a situation to another unforeseen in the beginning. AI is defined as the application of knowledge. Cybernetic (or artificial intelligence/AI/. . than in a traditional information system. The new concept of Decision Support System was introduced. In crisis. prototyping of models is rapid using a tool-box and a flexible ‘qualitative model’ (for instance a knowledge base). CV (Computer Vision). thought and learning to computer systems to aid humans [7] with its major overlapping sub-fields: robotics. or business intelligence) decision-making is based on a working mechanism (for instance a type of organisms modelled by computer). If properly structured it is easy to change some of the RB (Rule Base) to observe what the new outcome would be. or established procedures. Raw data collected must be analysed and structured to provide the decision-maker with usable information. Restructuring. feedback. through information feedback loops. Changes in the situation during a conflict can lead to the modifications of the objectives. simulation are typical functions in conflict-management. decisions must be quick to cope up with fast-changing situations typically in a context of uncertainty (lack of information and/or overwhelming flow of non-consistent data). The Cybernetic Paradigm is based on the assumption of uncertainty control since the psychological effects of uncertainty held to a minimum. Systems ought to learn otherwise they run the risk of presenting obsolete knowledge.facilitated keeping key security policy variables within tolerable ranges. information fusion. The decision-maker does not need to engage in alternative outcome calculations or in updated probability assessments – much of that activity is performed by a mechanism: semi-automated. modification. NLP (Natural Language Processing). but not dissent from rationality. KB (Knowledge-Based) or ES (Expert System). trial-and-error. a knowledge-based system with its ‘qualitative model’ allows dynamic modelling and ESD (Evolutionary System Design) [8]. Stored knowledge of experts readily available provides a more flexible tool for supporting quicker decision-making compared to traditional decision aiding systems. threatening and counter-threatening. Whereas an axiomatic simulation model does not. and learning systems. It was hoped to have better results by not trying to predict “rational” results but to perform simulations in order to train one of the adversaries or give advice. prepare a proposition taking into consideration the behaviour of the opponent.

within a computer. rules in the KB. it is a specific software. An important factor is in crisis management. These models fundamentally rely on mainly quantitative [9] data. an ES “is modelling. not all ESs are RB (Rule Based) systems. user interface. such. − KB (Knowledge Base) In an ES it is useful to separate functional entities (inference engine. Many ES work only at an advisory level [11]. The rules (or the procedures) can be seen as a ‘qualitative model’ (RB). The KB is a basic part of an ES. that the resulting system can offer intelligent advice or take intelligent decisions”. Though it is in combination with a normative component. Though KB is an essential part of an ES. just an advisory level KB system. . The former class will be tackled in the beginning. this qualitative model fundamentally does not rely on a mathematical model. knowledge acquisition facility). When a system has not got such an advanced level knowledge as an expert has. scriptbased or hybrid one as well. KB systems fundamentally rely on qualitative model. then it is not branded as ES. of expert knowledge in a given domain. Qualitative modelling Let us recall some notions in the beginning: − ES (Expert System) According to the BCS (British Computer Society).For decision support in conflict analysis knowledge based (KB) and extended game theory-based systems are frequently used. Extended game-theory based systems in practice can have an important predicting capacity and a training effect. where freedom of the decision-maker results from choosing outcomes and trying different preference orders on the outcomes by means of simulation. that for example EFAR can require 1-2 weeks [10] to get an output. which contains the facts about a narrow domain and relevant heuristic rules. Rather than imitating the reasoning processes experts use to solve specific problems an ES concentrate only to achieve similar results. where freedom of decision maker is greater and comes from both dynamic modelling and flexibility by rapid prototyping. whilst rapid prototyping in KB systems needs only 1-2 days. DMBS (Data Base Management System). – the representative form of knowledge can be for example frame-based. facts in the domain DB (Data Base). but these technicalities are not going to be discussed. while the latter category will be dealt with in the end of this article.

One difficulty is ‘hypothesis-conflict’ resolution: experts often come up with conflicting hypotheses. − Distributed net of ESs To have a robust redundant ES a loosely coupled network of ESs could be appropriate to use. or results of modelling and simulation. . The evaluation of a rule base (RB) depends only on the adequacy of its resulting outputs fired by the facts. When implementing a change in a rule. and completeness and lack of contradiction are relevant. during simulation). then the control logic should be highly structured. in case of a negotiation support system. it is a fundamental assumption of ES. than in a simple ES. For example. usually one merely can change a parameter (a data beforehand. the coherence of the qualitative model is self-contained. as is mentioned above not all KB systems are real ESs with deep procedural knowledge. In ensuring completeness.although. redundancy. A meta-level evaluation related to the theoretical coherence of the representation is irrelevant. no goal-directed search with programming languages possessing inference capabilities using generalized search should be assumed. Circularity (self-referencing). Neither a single KB. When knowledge representation of a variety is distributed. or interactively.The KB contains either a person’s knowledge related to scenarios. that decision-makers are able to identify the key predictor variables of . Though no single expert is available to provide all the relevant rules from his intuition. procedural. incompleteness. the short of experts and some sort of empirical disaster data can be balanced by higher standards of transparent logic [12]. The various RB agents would have to exhibit organizational behaviour and human-like thought processes. These problems in the particular KB of crisis management are more risky. For the purpose of crisis management the contingency plan and basic response knowledge based on earlier decisions made in the planning. that holistic expert decision-making is valid. nor a uniform way to change knowledge. Next two particular types of ES (useful in defence systems) are identified: − Bootstrapping ‘Bootstrapping’ is the full replacement of the human decision-maker by a linear statistical model. random error in human judgement can usually be found in the KB of an ES. organizing and pre-crisis stages can be included in a KB. A fundamental assumption of ‘bootstrapping’ is. conflicting rules. Cooperating ESs in a distributed system could ‘talk’ to each other like experts do.

Analytical. SOP-based. and a group-process base can be used to handle the group-influencing options. cybernetic. KB is a central element of this framework. which subsequently lead to formulating rules for ES and infer potential solutions for solving future problems. Reducing labour. relationships. – A KB for contingency planning There are six major functional elements of a framework [15] to support scenario generation for contingency planning. predictions to build a statistical model [14]. In a broader meaning all is known about the structure and content of the KB (‘rules about rules’ provided the KB is a RB system) can be called MetaKnowledge as well. the assumed quality of his judgmental input is high. multiple goals. MKB (Meta Knowledge Base) Meta-knowledge has a narrow meaning: the system’s knowledge about ‘how’ it reasons is called Meta-knowledge [19]. The collection of historical cases and their resolutions constitutes a KB and CBR [16] or ANN [17] (Artificial Neural Network) can be applied to identify patterns. If the person is an expert. cognitive (bureaucratic political). a model-base refers to the decision aids available. or according to Flin [20]: RPD (Recognition-primed Decision-making). interpreting the results is also should be contained. Bootstrapping models are best in routine simple decisionmaking while ESs are in advisory roles. Even if it is so. − Linear modelling A particular type of KB. building an ES is highly labour intensive. there are difficulties using ES in dealing with unanticipated events. since beside deep procedural knowledge. dilemmas. linear modelling uses human judgements. The KB should consist of at least three major functional components of a problem: a video-archive can be instructive as to the dimensions. Nevertheless. Creative. Know-how of employing the appropriate models. In contingency planning likely the most important is to represent: • Characterization of alternative command level models • Strategy of decision-making: Categorized either according to certain paradigms: Analytic.that model [13]. meta-knowledge also should be handled. . for structure discovery interactive induction and knowledge acquisition can be combined and automated (for instance: Auto-Intelligence [18]).

ordered by an escalation ladder. Hierarchical situation assessment: − National command level: few key variables. external and internal databases for opportunities and problems.• Framework for organizing information: 1. A DSS can model and analyse data fast. soft data. − Support for the decision implementation phase: A DSS can assist in decision communication. An EIS helps in continuously monitoring by accessing databases rapidly and efficiently. a communication (dialog) subsystem. and within the modules hierarchically structured. Crisis states. and justification. − Support for the design phase: A DSS usually has the capability to generate alternative courses of action. . According to the model of Sprague (1993) [22] the following phases of the decision process can be supported by DSS. criteria for choice and their relative importance. or ES. and often an ES as well) normally in every phases of the decision process can be useful in providing some sort of support. An ES can assess the desirability of the solutions and helps in recommending one. and optionally a KB with a knowledge management subsystem. a DB (Data Base) handled by a DBMS (Data Base Management Software). Crisis levels: the rules are modularised by the current situation. In case of group decisions. 3. DSS (Decision Support System) DSS can support all phases of the decision process. soft data. forecasting the future consequences. includes a model base handled by a model base management subsystem. − Tactical command level [21]. 2. or/and a gaming system. explanation. or EIS (EIS=Executive Information System): − Support for the intelligence phase: Ability to scan the environment. An ES can diagnose problems and interpret information. By definition a DSS (in case of group decision-making a GDSS. a GDSS can be used. − Operational command level: intermediate variables. − Support for the choice phase: By means of a DSS different scenarios can be tested before the final decision. interpretation of what the scanning discovers.

Games 6. Uncertainty can often be handled by probability theory. Discounted Cash Flow 5. Causal chain can be used to relate each individual decision to an overall objective [28]. for example: 1. Morphological analysis: discovers the totality of options [25] 3. CEA [26]. Next we are going to discuss conflict analysis decision support only for the design phase when forecasting future consequences. Decision matrices 2. 3. OR (Operation Research) techniques [24]: for instance linear programming. for instance: 1. Relevance trees [23] 3. Identifying trends in the environment (‘environment scanning’). dynamic programming • Exploratory forecasting techniques could be applied. Scenario writing 8. relevance trees. 4. A causal chain path between cause and possible effect (benefit/cost) can often be represented by a relevance tree [29]. Assumption-based multi-scenarios Shift from trend-based planning The steps of trend-extrapolation in an outside-in perspective [27]: 1. Planning in dealing with the ‘future world’. Generating a ‘future world’ from important trends (‘extrapolation’). time-independent plots. Forecasting techniques • A forecast can be based on some normative (Analytic Paradigm) techniques. Trend extrapolation: extrapolation of time series. Economic analysis: CBA. In identifying a single trend it is difficult to reach a common understanding of a group . Monte-Carlo analysis.An ES can provide training. In practice both normative (decision matrices. 2. Intuitive techniques: for example Delphi method 4. etc. or an influence diagram.) and exploratory forecasting can be combined. We will deal with versions of DSS and technicalities applicable for crisis management later in an other article. Modelling 7. envelope curves 2. Selection of important trends likely to drive the future (expert judgement).

than to predict one future world. its high-level decision preserves the fragmentation in the set of the lowerlevel decisions [32]. Identification of assumptions underlying current operations (reading documents and checking interviews). 3.Assumption-based planning This is failsafe planning. 4. These clusters of routine SOP’s (standard operating procedures). Also it is not yielded a coherent preference ordering for alternative states of the world under trade-off conditions. It is assumed. since it is not necessary to reach a common view of the group. Assumption-based planning leads to multiple scenarios and can be seen as if collective decisions were fragmented into small segments treatable sequentially. [34] provide scenario-construction methods. and isolating effects is . Generating a world for each violated assumption (multiple world generation). A fundamental assumption: Value integration rejected Value integration is purposefully rejected and replaced by only preservative values under the Cybernetic Paradigm. are not readily changed. 5. 2. but it does mean that established routines in the organisation must be rendered consistent. The dominant assumption is to control the variety inherent in the decision problem. ‘hedging and shaping’ actions (‘hedging and shaping’ plans) [30]. Goal integration is “refused” by top management in practice. Co-ordination of executives does not mean analytical integration in practice. It is easier contemplating changes to the current world. because of lack of data (events remain unreported). Gathering plausible elements of change (Delphi-method by a group of experts). Identification of elements of change that could upset current assumptions (no systemic commonly agreed method). The steps of assumption-based approach in an inside-out perspective start from a common understanding of a group. that subjective probability assessment of rare events is of poor quality. which are likely to violate assumptions: 1. estimating dose-response relationships (most populations are exposed to multiple hazards. but monitors a few (critical) feedback variables. looking for changes. rather then to find directly an optimal solution. Developing ‘signposts’. In practice it is really difficult: Calculating probability of hazard. without any clear picture of the actual product. A decision-making mechanism produces a variety in range of outcomes as a consequence of completing a process. This fits to the “labelled sequential attention to goals” process at the top of a hierarchy of units of a large organisation [31]. [33]. once established.

Rehearsing the future of adverse scenarios sensitises for specific triggers for these unfolding scenarios as early warnings in order to prompt rapid deployment of intervention towards an unfavourable not impossible future. That is why a “learning mechanism” selects solutions not on a theoretical.however. By generating scenarios of favourable futures. that differences in their individual weighting often do not matter and so there is no point in debating weights. normally the pessimism of the ‘maximin’ decision criterion is applied: choose the best of the worst possible outcomes [38]. But as is wellknown. sensitivity analysis in our case are problems. the aim of the decision is not to select the option with the highest expected value or utility. Rather than identifying an optimal. extrapolating the effects. but to find the ‘most robust’. windows of opportunities can be anticipated. . opaqueness of model internals and outputs. The adaptive behaviour of a cybernetic decision-mechanisms occurs when the decision-making happens in a stable environmental subsystem [37]. so making possible (at least in theory) immediate actions. because of uncertain models – better saying: our limited knowledge. Defence planning is risk averse. Potential threats otherwise may be underestimated or ignored. because predicted behaviour . according to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. This is psychologically likely most important for those preferring the certainty to choice between risky options (‘maximin’ criterion). for example Dynarank. predicting exposure. VISA [35]. it tries to find a robust option that satisfies across a range of possible futures. @RISK (an add-in for Excel). but rather on an instrumental basis. on the expense of explicitly expressed opposite personal opinions. or at least a ‘robust enough’ solution. However. estimating consequences. validation. when members of the decision-making group see. This can contribute to a much quicker decision-making process. Lack of appropriate sensitivity analysis tools for identifying robust solutions led to the recent development of some new software tools. Robust solutions to changes in inputs may provide an easier solution of disagreement about weights.difficult). it is impossible to derive a truly democratic decision for resolving differences of opinion. priorities [36]. measure benefits and costs. Rehearsing the future by predictive and exploratory models Predictive models Computer modelling has been successful in those domains where the predictions of the models can be verified by experiment and troubled when there is no possibility of experimentally validating model correctness and utility. Verification. so a search for a group value or utility function is futile.

partial validation of the model. For an exploratory model assigning error ranges to the outputs is essential. Exploratory models Exploratory use involves the ‘guessing’ of details of a system for which there are no data. peer review of models. verify. only the illusion of realism. but we cannot help doing so. Validation of results of simulations in scenarios with a model based on historical experiences is still an open question as to the relevance of such efforts. Sensitivity analysis (by which uncertainty in inputs is related to the uncertainty of outputs) is critical for a model.of social models cannot be experimentally validated. can contribute to maintaining the integrity of planning – but the model remains still non-predictive. Where prediction. Given the absence of sufficient data. no single ‘true’ model can be agreed upon. so these are to be seen as ‘exploratory models’. So we not only can opt for a multitude of sketchy. but in practice we rely on a sampling search for critical aspects of flexible allocation of resources even when the exact range of outcomes is unknown. it can serve as an ‘inference engine’ in search for conclusions to facts or relationships that are invariant across all the set of plausible models to reveal the desired invariance in a context by some external analytic strategy. and analyse sensitivity models. Validation of models in the social sciences is inherently difficult. A complete sensitivity analysis might assess the behaviour of all plausible models. which is believed – because of confidence in the correctness of the conceptual model – to be predictive. and/or experimental validation is not possible. The implications of these guesses are computed. which might lead to exploration (for instance Chaos Theory was explored as a result of simulating anomalous behaviour). Nonpredictive models must be treated differently from those experimentally validated. . It does not matter. submodel validation where possible. Even when a model is not validated. redundancy of analysis and comparison of results. no amount of detail can provide validation. how detailed is the model. though easy to understand.

Rather than only defending the own position.In the absence or short of data the model contains. ‘exploratory modelling’ focuses the question to be answered. A myopic attitude is to put the player and the other player at personal risk in order to maximise his own gain. A meeting. nonmyopic. Bargaining theory tries to explain how wars can occur within rationalist framework of international relations (IR). and cases where the total payoff to all players was not constant. later embracing more then two players. However. The exploratory model should be revised by iteratively redesigned and implemented. Pareto optimum exists if no player gets into a worse situation. Decisions were successfully modelled by game theory. individual actors’ game strategies and collective bargaining manoeuvres [43] are often understood on game theory basis. Nash equilibrium exists when no player has motivation to make a move even if he is capable to do so [41]. The scope of any individual model can be designed to maximize its utility for answering a particular question. a creative attitude based on multi-attribute value analysis to negotiating problems led to a better deal by trading off interests and Pareto optimum was applied [47]. Equilibrium concepts in games are usually: Pareto optimum. Nash equilibriums. The complexities of the system and the uncertainties in the environment are represented by a set of models [39]. The approaches of Nash and Harsanyi [40] in modelling bargaining and negotiation. and VUG (variable universe games) [45] for explaining human behaviour [46]. According to Downs (1967) [42]. There are empirical evidences [44]. Stackelberg equilibrium is when the second player moves in full knowledge of what the first has done. or decision . in game theory normally it is assumed that the players may have different pay-offs from the other. that – at least in some circumstances – human mind works in accord with assumptions of the rational decision theory model. Co-operative game players have the opportunity to communicate and to form binding and enforceable agreements. Classical game theory deals with non-cooperative behaviour and zero-sum games. then covering their co-operative game. which was also applied to explain animal. But in practice this is difficult to assume. but they each know those pay-offs. for any particular choice of options. Stackelberg. during the course of learning through its use. first between two opponents. Forecasting. conflict and negotiation-control by use of extended game theory Game theory assumes conflict situations (‘a game’) controlled by ‘depsychologised’ rational behaviour of the decision-makers.

or probability of transition. − DSS can accommodate differing belief spaces of participants in the rationality. Organisational decision-making. that some equilibrium existing in game theory is used. A strategic conflict decisionsupport system would accommodate the following assumptions and require the following characteristics [51]: − An assumption. The connections between system states. The transitions usually are unrepresentable simply by cost. That is why such a software. with the additive value model being appropriate in many cases [50].conference may be used supported by a decision analyst in case of group decisions examining the impact of losses to be compensated by the increased benefits of other members of the group. structure. Both. and intent dimensions. what constitutes success. the nature of solution. Strategic conflict decision-support requirements Strategic conflict is a conflict of vital interests. objective. personal influence position of senior . Negotiation problems can be characterized by a small number of objectives and a large number of potential courses of actions. That game is unlikely to be zerosum. This is facilitated applying a common scale to measure benefits and a combined multi-attribute utility function [49] or in some cases values and not utilities are applied. like EQUITY [48] is used by the decision analyst in order to perform the reallocation or trade-off calculations within a cooperative group. − The DSS can model the potential. power. motivation of participants in control and direct the conflict. the nature of transitions themselves between the states. Due to the difficulties over transferability of utility functions [52] on which based a common transaction variable between players the utility outcomes could be ordered by preference. The moves will be ruled by authority reputation. Multiple valid viewpoints may exist at all stages of the struggle. It is a practical disadvantage that expressing the mutually exclusive options of the opponents leads to a large number of course of actions even in simple cases. a consensus developed by means of trade-offs within a group and a negotiation between two opponent groups rely on multi-attribute value analysis. and likely to change as the game evolves. and defence decision making particularly requires analytical support in managing conflict. may not commonly viewed by the players.

IR (International Relations) conflict resolution and behavioural conflict analysis approaches do not seem to be easily usable for computation.players. VUG.e. under the urgent need for action. metagames. − New evidence or perception should lead to data improvement. − Adaptive to changing circumstances – the original aim can change as well. because these models are brought down from the pedestal of the infallible ‘black box’ to occupy a more modest position as a complement to the thinking and deducing powers of crisis management. − Be itself acceptable to the social environment in which it is going to operate. − The DSS accommodates limited. except for Knowledge Based systems. and different pay-off for given terminal states. Extensions of game theory (deterministic graphical games [VUG. the cost of delay. FAR) have shown the potential to be developed for DSS (Decision Support System). − Non-conflicting with the already existing systems. VUG3) Players have different knowledge of characteristics of the game space. and confrontation analysis and drama theory. although at a potential lower level for specific purposes and situations it must be taken into account. − Both hard and soft data should be accepted. The key is the different . and sanctions. Non-game theoretic conflict analysis is usually underdeveloped to provide a procedural basis. − System-centred and not viewing the conflict/struggle from the viewpoint of one party. Extensions of game theory approaches to conflict Conventional game theory fulfils only few of the criteria established above. multiple futures planning (ie. defective and deceitful data. VUG1. Within a local subset of the wider network a variety of particular micro-economics and game theory methods should be invoked to reach a local (tactical level) optimum for local negotiations and decisions. DG]. hypergames. Variable universe games (i. VUG2. − Auditability/backtraceability. foveal games. − The DSS accepts human and group irrationalities. − Depth-changing ability between strategic and tactical level negotiations and decision-making in practice means high and low resolution representation (zooming). but.

Players may disagree about the very structure of the game. For practice it is a problem. Super-games It concerns decisions of parties with a choice between continuing cooperation (alliance) or betrayal [57]. data-improving. Human attributes like hate. DG. might be unending (with 0 payoff). then rank ordering the rest on a diagram [59]. can also be represented. Hyper-games Complex interactions among protagonists can be flexibly modelled [58]. and ‘forgiving’ ability. It has a depth-changing. ‘Sense making’ is a specific communication using Habermas (1981) communicative rationality concept [62]. anger. Meta-games Representing the conflict situation a meta-game offers a list of options asking the user for identifying which options are excluded.‘belief sets’ of the players [53]. In practice an earlier analysis (‘sense-making’) and planning is required [61] before the list of outcomes put out. usually these are fragments of the ‘improvement paths’. DGT. DGA) Brams (1994) established a complete taxonomy of 2x2 discrete DG’s [55]. It is a problem when information in a table is incomplete or . But one cannot control the outcomes simply by choosing an attractive one – this is just ‘management by hope’. Both the CAP (Conflict Analysis Program) and DECISIONMAKER were designed by Fraser and Hipel (1984) [60]. DGA (DG with time-averaged pay-offs) games extend DGT and stationary equilibrium have been described [56] and is shown. that pure strategy history-remembering Nash equilibriums always exist. Deterministic graphical games (i.e. But it is difficult to establish a cost function associated with a player’s changing his tactical choices. Its problem is the sparse literature. [54]. Scenarios are seen and their related possible ‘improvement paths’ with associated benefits and costs. in meta-game analysis each player needs a separate table for each outcome. that both DGT and DGA assume perfect information. Literature is available on case studies of incompatible goals of players. DGT (DG terminal) games are formalised as cyclic graphs. You may control only your moves. Planning here means action planning – the aim of the meta-game is to produce coherent action plans for the player. and recommendations are presented in a graphical way. Next. large number of tables must be generated.

whereby no audit is possible [70]. A ‘crystal ball’ of the UK A number of tools: FAR. In its first stage FAR applies the AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) to be filled in by experts [69]. local . It has some applications and has a DSS available [66]. and quantitative input data are difficult to absorb. The tree can also be considered as a N-space of combinations of N field descriptors with each combination describing a conceivable future outcome (scenario). symmetric meta-rationality. where we are (a present state in an N-space of situations) it is desired to transit us to a wished situation (the object state). EFAR) The ‘foveal game’ structure consists of three games: the strategic scenario game is based on heuristically derived future scenarios. Here 3 levels of rationality are specified: rationality.e. an outcome. the discrete state transition based FAR tree can forecast for instance the development of the possible futures of a region. Confrontation analysis and drama theory Drama theory is an extension of the meta-game [64] to understand the effect of changing motivations and utilities by players during the evolution of the game. Most of the outcomes form meta-equilibrium.e. which is rational for all players. business long-range planning. It seems as if the establishment of the positions of the players could only achieved with their co-operation. embodying traditional and new concepts on the verge of rational and ‘irrational’ decision-making [63]. Powergraph (UK) and KORA (US-Russia) have been in use for decision support purposes in political. FAR) FAR (Field Anomaly Relaxation) is a future scenarios development tool [67] used in political and military planning [68] This is a discrete state transition based network analysis. others are adverse. Foveal games (i. how the drama is likely to develop [65]. the method is difficult to computerise. The problem space can be considered as a N-space of combinations of N field descriptors with each combination describing a conceivable future outcome (scenario). military. general meta-rationality. It is the mathematical treatment within confrontation analysis. Getting from the situation. Each player in each scene adopts a position – a scenario of the wished outcome. The output of FAR is that the states are finally arranged into a ‘future tree’ form. Foveal games (EFAR). After clustering the values of the output. A drama evolves through scenes with tactical choices (represented by trees) can be made by each actor. which provides suggestions. some of them are desirable.misleading. Multiple futures planning (i.

By means of forecasting. risk and society. Decision science and social risk management. business competition struggle for a bid. An output of the EFAR analysis is a network of scenarios. the players preferences to those states. Reidel Publ. or a tactical level player. are using conventional game theory. It allows the specific analysis of the transitions between states. states of the future (as a network). which allows – in the frame of the EFAR a ‘foveal game’ – the representation of the specific options open to either an operational. Powergraph ‘Powergraph’ is a technique [73]. ‘Powergraph’ is most effective when used in an iterative fashion [74]. It is appropriate for the decision support of the management in a specific conflict.. motivational changes. . negotiations at tactical level may affect the position of the strategic level player so maintenance of validity of the local/tactical decision is necessary. algorithmically performs both activities: it determines motivated power and examines feasible developments.. ‘Powergraph’ identifies the players. (D.Co. decisions. technology. notes [1] Merkhofer. and there is a transition game in order to ensure consistency between strategic and local levels. campaign. Netherlands 1987) p. It has depth-changing and focusing abilities between strategic and tactical level decision-making. rank-orders the players preferences to the states. References. EFAR can represent the more dynamic nature and future movement of organisations within the business context. but these are not detailed enough for use to play a local game. then identifies responses based on: power plays. battle. contingency plans. Actions. in order to convert them into an action plan. considers who controls the transitions between the states specified above (Boolean expressions in a transition power matrix expressing the ability of each player to move the system between the states). M.295. EFAR (Extended Field Anomaly Relaxation) extends FAR to business strategic planning purposes as well [71]. intertwined action planning and sense-making of a complex scene at any stage is possible. and that decisions can depend both on the beliefs and desires of a decision maker. where the environment can recover to previous states[72] so backtracking/audit is possible. By an iterative solution process. helps in the formulation of a strategy taking into consideration capability and intent. An output of EFAR is a set of strategic directed graphs.W.

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