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10 Mav 2005 1430
Transcriber: Murphy On background Mr Lawrence (in progress) For those not lam1mr w th the Perragon alpnaoet soup that s force str~ctdre,resources and assessment For our purposes here on the call. this information is on background. Any information to be quoted or referenced outside of this cell should be referenced coming from a senkar defense department official. Again, the call is on background.
I am going 10 go anead ano turn it over to-wnos going to open bp w th kind of a brief overview Again, I n s dscusson is on the base realignmentan0 closure process As the mvtation stressed there will be no specifics as to the recommendations d swssed at the meeting Tns w il lav out the orocess tnat s orouohl LS tn where we are lwav .eaoino to the ImmnoInQrelease of , the recomniendationsin the coming weeks
Thank yo-, Dallas Good afternooneveryoooy,how are you today" l just wanted to emphas.ze a coupe of key pomts on both back r o ~ n o process Many of you are probao y ano aware of tome of 4 and 1 k n n w ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^wiÃ§toimake a m i n k of m n t s an0 then Hwi most valuable point of these exercises.
As you ail are very much aware, the secretary will shortly present his recommendations to the Independent Commission or Base Closure and Realignment, chaired by SecretaryPnncipi. And the secretary (Rumsfeld) take this process, and the senior leadershiptake this process quite senousiy It's a matter of great importance to the department
As ~ O know, we've ned fodr prior base real gnment and closbre rounds an0 the msLH of that J has been theclosure of 97 major installationsin the Unted Stares, 55 malor realgnments and anotner 235 or so m nor actions of one kind or another
Based on the budget justification documents that (we?) provide to Congress, our net savings for ill of those actions through the implementation period basically through fiscal year2001 -was about $18 billion, and annually recurring savings that accrue to the department every year after that of about $7 billion.
One of the Key po nts aoout this rouno certain y a t h o ~ g n ngs are important and we'l taI6 a sav little b t more awut this later or. is lhat military value was as a matter of po icy in prior rounds an0 was manoated DV statute for tnis m n d to be the hionest considerailonfor tne secretary's judgment in terms of what to recommend to the independent commission. BJI as we ve approacned this process pretty consistentlyover me last two and a half yeais, we've had a handful of key imperativestnat weve trieo to guide ourselves by .n this process One of Ã In hrmw tranÃ§formann and a kev nan of tnat to mlinnalce our ntrastTUCTtJreto Our --force structure and our mission (sets? Sensed to ensure have our footorint. our Dhvslcai foomrint . where we can maximize capability and military efficiencyand effectiveness
A second key imperative for the department has been to find ways to maximize joint utilizatlon Of our assets And really what we're trying to do here in many ways is look at these assets -.these key military installations, not simply as the asset that belongedto the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine Corps, but they are key national assets and how can we best position them to support the mission and to support the joint warfighter? Certainly a third element m this will speak to some degree of savings is certainly we're very much interested in as we are in all of our programs - i n converting waste lo warfighting That's a bumper sticker, but really what we mean here is to the extent that we have frankly resources that we are exoendina either in terms of dollars or in terms of oeoolefrom a force orotectlon, for example, iersp&tive, addressing or taking care of or supporting assets that we no longer require -those are assets that are not being put on the pointy end of the spear to support the warfighter. So that is an important part of rationalizing our infrastructure
The basic process is from a -after the 16" of May remains very much the same 1 was in the 1 past. il's an independentcommission. The president ultimatelywill approve or disapprovethe work of that commission in whole, but not in part. Congress has an opportunity to reject those recommendationsin whole but not in oart. The commission can make some changes The bar's a little bit higher this time The commission has to find not only that the secretary deviated substantially from either the force svi-ct-re plan tnat we prov oea lo Congress earlier this /ear or DL, seection criteria B-t tney can on y aoo an nsta at on as a c o w e candioate and then actua I vote to c ose I f seven of , m e n ne comm ss oners agree an0 at least two of mem have v s tea tne insta at on But as we sort of have approached this process, you know, we have the joint process we've established- the Service unique functions, and I'll largely call them the operational functions, have been handled by the military Services and analyzed by them separately In reporting those into the leadership And then our common business oriented support functions have been handled by these Joint Cross Service Groups that we established An0 trim mat in s s ma y q~ te a Key po nt A fundamental lesson tnat h e earned from or or fodnos of case cos-re an0 rea ignment was that t h e o nt process - the o nt cross servce gro-P nrnce'w in ne soec f c - n $19 95 nidn t i f e n mum so wnat the secfetarv an0 tne eaoershio them narrowlv constructed - in 119195 we had a arouo on deoot maintenance so instead of . . nav nq a g r o h on Oepol ma ntenance.we nad a"groip cmmg at me entire l a ~ s ta act v i e s of r m me oeoartment S m ar / for me moo.car wor o - instead of c rig mere y at meo ca - m tary meo.ca treatnent faci tes h e re oon ng a1 the ent rely of tne m m cal asset case ratnef man - s t 1006 ng at aoofator es borf ng at lecnnical as a b.s ness m ss on area as vie I as aoairg t ngs we nave n e w oone oefore. frank y on a 1 nt bass heaoqi-aners an0 si-poon 0-r SLPP y 0 , r an1 storage act v ties o eai-cat on a m tra n ng to 006 at tnem in a comprehensve way And those groups had real authority to make real recommendationsto the leadership, and as a result of that, we ended up with a process that resulted in not guaranteeingthat every answer would be joint, but in guaranteeing for the common support structure of the department to support the warfighter, that these functions would get a joint look throughout the process. Mr Laurence f co. a LSI as< whoever na n r n ne if ~ O toulo p s i set yo-r phones on L e mute we re nearing mat yo- cant q ~ t n e r e u o i m e me SO f yo- mua a I pit yo-r onones on mute uvn le ne con1 n_es And whoever s outside . if !OJ COJSO pease DL! lo-r Pnone on mute, that'd be great.
Ana so tnat s me en1 rely of me Ist (-a-gnter ) No -st % 00 rig B L ~nope yo- can a capwe mat =case aga n me real son of point here was on me10nt process s tnat we nave
n enormous emphasb on the joint and the joint p r c m s in this round. Iknowhas a couple points he'd like to make in that regard.
1 and Iknow you missed some of what-said Well, clearly, :
so I'll reinforce a little bit of it. but as we looked across all the recommendations and the process that we embarkedon this year, military value was really the primary considerationin assessing ail the military bases.
And if you look at military value I look at there basically being lour pillars that I use to describe talked through those. But as we saw it from the Joint Cross that support this Service Groups, and, you know, i worked with the vice chairmanand the members ofthe infrastructuresteering group, which is the ISG, includedthe servicevice chiefs. So basicallythe same guys mat are sitting at the (J-rock?) came over worked tne ISG, so tney were very fan liar with wnat the requirements going nto for tne future force needed to be. so it real y became a great soi,noing boam for a lot of dec slons that were be ng made Biit tne four p lars rea ly -enabling transformation, wnch s cntica, And we rea y looked at ooing That by accommodating me redeploying forces both for IDPBS (9) an0 whars tailing place wnh OlF and OFF for antcloatino and resobrcma si-me caoabllnles beca&e s-roe is a bid ssue coming up, and looking at that across operation&rairhg and logistics.
The -no pillar s rea ly anhanc ng wmoat effectiveness A m this is really examin ng and mplementing opporuriitias for greater jont activty In many cases Inis s accompisned by collocating and combining things Ike train ng technoogy oapot maintenance ana things along those lines The third pillar we looked at was clearly cost It's a huge issue. We looked at recurringannual savings, and converted, and how they could be converted to warfightars' resourcesavings in the out years, or even in the near years. An0 men final y thinrf what was really great about Ins process, is That we ire0 to work ham to ensure mparl a ity Its a baance between wnat I ta keo awut as far as military vaie. transformation, jointness and how yo^ maxim ze combal effectveness Iwill tell you mat the BRAC DoD organization, and-talked about this earlier, was key to success. They established it was established early. it was clearly a unity of effort and a common focus. And from the meetings i was at and we supported and worked through, there was clearly an energy and a willingness to look at different ways of doing things. And the Joint Cross Service Groups I think were the real basis for success here. They allowed the Services to think out of the box, and take solutions that they might not have derived on their own.
And fina y from meomt perspective, we represent the combatant wrnmanoers motvement in this process we Ã§ren and saw them on the road. we worxed a reading room where tney were 04 fami a r with eveN scenano that was beino worked An0 mev were oaramOLnt to recommendma to makina sure that we maximize combateffectivenesswhile oresewma surge caoabiill~ allowed us to continue to help protect the homeland
i think I am ready for any questions you may have, and Ithink-
is, as well
Mr. Lawrence- If folks when they ask their questions if they could state their nameand who
they're representingon the call, that'd be great With that, we'll open it up to questions. Question: This is (Col) Jeff McCausland working with CBS News. Great overview. Quick question and (one other? Longer?) question. Quick question is I saw where Mr. Principi had commented about whether or not the governors have to be involved if you decide to close, let's say a National Guard's by like an airfield adjacent to a major airport, where there's a lot of you, we got fighter
wings and all that kind of stuff. "A," can you talkabout that, and the longer question, can you talk about the coordination of Bus effort with the global restatloningplan? of To the frst qdesl on, I l u s t reterate what Mr Wynne said in h s letter m a n~mber members of Congress s tnat this depanment wil folow all applcable StatJtes in oeve op ng ootions an0 recommendations to the eadershio and L timatelv for tne secretary to cons oei lor forwarding to the independent commission, and Iwouldn't want to characterizeit beyond that. Your second question - I want to be precise in the answer. Could you repeat for me, please? Col McCai-stand Yes, co-b you ta k about this process,and how t was m r d nated #Kh me global restatoning plan we (ba ance? Bomce?) out that effort with this elfor Yes. We'll there are a number of misperceptions that have been out there with regard to some of the suggestions that have been made or characterization of the Overseas Basing Commission's work. And i know a lot of folks have had both before and subsequent to the release of their report questions about this. One of me things bear mentoning s that the mots of tne lowl postare re* ew me integrated global presence and bas ng strategy thal^^^^^^^Hreferreo to botn ways nas 1s roots ,n And ODR one And i n we've been at tn s for some t ma . stoh-"mi .to ODR fine me secretary -- . . . .. .. . . -. ... . . . . . -- . . . .- - - . , ~ orovided directionsl a the combatant commanders to beoin to develm ootions for the repositioning resettingthe force globally And we beganto work on thatprocess in earnest Frankly, that process as it evolved, came twether in a wav and the decisions were rendered in a ~ ~ ~ way that made them available to inform t h e 6 process. And that's important, because to the extent mat we were comemplat ng the return of forces from abroad to me J n led Stales, tne BRAC Process gives JS a key opportunity to look at ail of our instal atlons an3 rea ion our misslon sets in ower to accommodate retirning forces Yes tnat s true but it gives "s an opportunity to ask an0 answer the qdeston where can retiming forces best oe pas toned? AS opposed to the quest on wed have to ask and answer wnnout BRAC which is largely where COJO we f t them? And the timing of this, the length of time of consideration, the full involvement of the combatant commanders, the State Department, our interagency partners, our consultationswith the Congress over the course of some period of time resulted in a fairly comprehensive report to the Congress last year - last September, I believe that laid out our broad strategy for and decisions for how we would repositionthe force globally.
Now certainly a lot of that will on the things that are overseas related will continue to take the form of negotiationswith interestedparties and host governments, but those pieces that involve the return of forces to the United States. oarticularlv from Eurooe. are stronalv suvwrted bv the certainly in many ways he inttiated agood deal of combatant commander, General ~ones,'and that. And we believe we're well positioned to implement this effectively. An0 Jeff. just to pile on, two po nts thatmaoe tnat are crncai here s that we haa to OJ Id a program this fa1 That real y supportea wnat we wanted to 00 from a posnloning oJr forces from overseas, and so we ha0 to basically set the table for wnere BRAC could ao Ana in Ine w Ih that we worxed Ã§rt the Services to mace sure that tnev'd build a force structure out a force structure dan that we've already delivered to Conaress that laid out exactly what we thought force structure would look likiin the program review that we build simultaneously with the (7 POM?)
Question: This is Ken Beaks from BENS (Business Executivesfor NationalSecurity). Ken, how are you?
Mr. Beaks: Great, thanks. When we look at the 1st on Friday, because I know you don't want to say anything now about which ones are on there obviouslv, but when we look at the imperatives of furtnennitransformat on and max mizing jointness s h o ~ we be loo<ng for a sign fcant o number of act ve operat ona joint oases or JO nt tra ning bases? Is that sometnlng tnat we shotld expect? And as a second part of that, the secretary's backed off on tne 20 to 25 percent excess capac ty nmbef to a nJmber that s more iixe 10 to 12 think he said the other day But weal kno* that some of the calegones had a ot more than tnat going n So. sho- a we expect to see mores gnificanl CJS in th ngs iixe depots ana some of the lam and P&E lac Hies? Tnanxs I Ken, to the first part of your question, I really wouldn't want to characterize what would be in the secretary'srecommendations beforethe secretary makes his recommendations.And I don't think that would be prudent thing to do, even on background. But once he comes to a final determinationand makes his recommendations to the commission, we can talk about that and fully explain it in more detail.
I do want to spend a moment on this 20 to 25 percent excess capacity number because it has its
roots in two studies that Congress requested be done over the course of a six-year period, first in 1998 and then in for 2004. the latter Dart k i n a nart of the secretary'siuatificafcn for additional round of proceeding I should say with an additional round of base &lo&re.
Those were perimetrii (sp) estimates, based on base-loading constructs,and they were sort of cornparat ye relationalways of iook ng at number of people to a cena n way of coking at an asset n a vary inear. almost amhmetc way It was NOT a BRAC analysis t was not a mi nary valm ana VSIS . it was Ã mntv A fo-badinn manv -- - - , -. . - - -- --- rnnfttnir- that f vnil ha0-so ~ - oeooie at one mint - - -- -in time to so many acres and tnose numbers cnanged over time what's tne d lfelence oatween tne two? And ass-nnmo mat vou were ootimailv oraanized in the first instance do IOJ have excess capacity or under capacity?
All those studieswere able to show us was that a aross order of maanitiiudethat we had excess capacity throughout the department, in some cases over, in some cases under capacity, but In a lot of cases we had some excess capacity, and that only a true military value oriented analysis would show us how to rationalizethat infrastructurein a way that made sense. The secretary In his recent comments has commented on a couple of things in relation to the effect on the analysis of returningforces from abroad, as well as the requirement which would have been. aoain. a matter of oolicv but Conaress included in the statute that we have to accommodate for reasonable expekation of&me. And so, when we sort of do all of that, Imean I was his Judgmentin looking at ilthat it wouldn't be 20 to 25 percent. And certainly one of the things about that number over time that got misinterpretedwas that that somehow got translated s nto that that means the secretary believes that one in four bases should c.ose Capacity 1 not the same as a base Ana so tnmlgh this process we wi i have hope - pend ng the secretarys decision a rooust transformations BRAC that we will do some things that are very very mportanl for the f ~ t u of tne armed forces an0 for the future of the oepaftment and for the tJiure e of tne codnlry But I wouldn't want to sort of characterizenumbers or fry to give weights, or try to characterize what you should more look for in the report. I think that would be a more fruitful discussion frankly on Fnday. An0 as you iook at tne combat effectivenessacross ail tne different Services. I tn nk tne answer to your question also Ken is the m l l o c a t i o n ~ t king abolt, an0 tne a iv combin no of tra n no. technotoov laboralores deoot maintenance s b ~ ~cnaln management operation,things along those lines, that's wheie the Joint Cross ~ e r v i & ~ r o u p really came in s and made their impact. So basically, they were empowered to go and look at different ways of doing it, either from a business practiceor what made sense basicallyfor example, how You
might want to do something in education and training. So theywere able to look, you know. not only across the department, but at each Service to see what made sense them. And I think when what comes out on Friday that you'll basicallysee that will be the fruits of that product.
Question: David Rodriquez, the national commander of the American (GI?) Forum (7). Basically what you're saying, we're setting up the military to be a brigade-sized unit, or first strike, and limit our division size, so this way we can kind of down-size the Service, and still be able to do the same kind of job. Is that what you're saying? 1think what you're alludingto is basicallywhere the Army is going with modularization. And there are some discussions and decisions that take place not only in the force structure for what the Army's putting in that will impact what could be submitted in a BRAC submission. But that is germane to where we're headed but that's not really one of the things we're looking at as far as the BRAC process. Question- Don Sheppard, CNN. What provisions have you made in this list for the homeland security mission? Well the homeland defense mission of the department is covered is governed by the and ifI can oull the selectioncriteria uo here it's specificallymentioned here in criterion two, where we haveto consider the availabilityand conditionof land facilities and associatedair space including, you know, the (?inaudible) number of missions, but to also include the homeland defense missions of the armed forces. So we have to take homeland defense into account, and we have Mr. Lawrence. Next question please. Are there any additionalquestions for the group? Thank you very much. Just to reiterate,this was on background, any quotes to be used should be quoted as senior defense department officials. And we look forward to talking to you folks, in the near future.
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