H. J. Res. 307


PART 2 APRIL 18, 1946

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Naval1Affalrs


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DAVID I. WALSH, Massachusetts, Ohairman








JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi


FRANCIS J. MYERS, Pennsylvania

M. E. GAl,LAGRER, Olerk


Statement of: Page

Blandy, Vice Adm. William H., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations

(Special Weapons), and Commander, Joint Task Force·L_________ 22

Kepner, Maj. Gen. William E., (AC) USA, Deputy Task Force Com-

mander for Aviation, Joint Task Force 1._________________________ 23

McAuliffe, Maj. Gen. A. C., USA, Ground Force Adviser to Commander

Joint Task Force L ~ 26

Sawyer, Dr. R. A., technical director, Joint Task Force L____________ 28

Compton, Dr. Karl T., president, Massachusetts Institute of Technol-,

ogy, member of President's Evaluation Committee, and member of

Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board.






The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10: 30 a. m. in room 212, Senate Office Building, Senator David 1. Walsh (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Walsh (chairman), Eastland, Gerry, Ellender, Robertson, Morse, Brewster, and Saltonstall.

The CHAmMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning to further consider Docket No. 187, House Joint Resolution 307, to authorize the use of naval vessels to determine the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels. (H. J. Res. 307 is as follows:)

[H. J. Res. 307, 79th Cong., 2d sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION To authorize the use of naval vessels to determine the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Conoress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, is authorized to employ vessels of the Navy as targets for purposes of test and experimentation in determining the effect of atomic weapons upon such vessels.

SEC. 2. After employment pursuant to authority contained in section 1 of this Act vessels may, in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy or such other

person as may be designated by him, be-- -

(a) sunk if considered unseaworthy; or

(b) retained with or without repair for further test and experimentation, for further naval use, or for other disposition in accordance with other provisions of law.

SEC. 3. Prior to the employment of any vessel of the Navy under authority of section 1 of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall come into agreement with the Naval Affairs Oommittees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with respect to such prospective employment.

SEC. 4. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy shall take such measures as they may deem necessary to safeguard the information, observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations pertaining to and resulting from these tests and which are of a military nature as would normally be attached to any other vital military information or military secret.

SEC. 4A. The President is ~lletl te in his discretion may appoint an advisory board to cooperate with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy in the conduct of these tests, to undertake an independent study of the tests and to submit its observations, findings, conclusions, and recomtnendations to the Secretari,es of




War and of the ~a.v?,. This advisory board shall be composed of-

(a) five ctvillans, one of whom shall be designated as chairman of the advisory board;

(b) three naval officers, at least one of whom shall be a naval aviator'

and '

(c) three Army officers, at least one of whom shall be an Army aviator.

SEC. 5. Such provisions of this joint resolution as relate to the employment of vessels of the Navy as targets shall terminate two years after the date' of its enactment into law:

Passed the House of Representatlves March 12, 1946. Attest:


The CHAIR:M:AN. Admiral Blandy, will you come forward, please? .


The CUAIRJ\{:tN. Admiral Blandy, I do not think it is necessary to review the testimony you before. I believe the only thing that you need to respond to now IS to tell us what progress you have made in the line-up of the number of vessels that can be or should be or would be satisfactory to carry out the tests.

I rather assume that the full number, perhaps, would be better than a lesser number; but I believe it has been indicated as a result of studies that a lesser number could be used and get effective results.

I understand that a study has been made by you and your associates.

What have you to report on that?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir. With your permission I would like to

read a letter, if you have no objection. '

The CUAIRl\fAN. I wish you would.

Admiral BLANDY. This is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Honorable David I. Walsh, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and it reads as follows:


Referring to your letter of April 1 regarding the atomic-bomb tests, I wrote you on April 2 a letter which evidently crossed yours. My letter enclosed information upon the purposes of the tests and the reasons for holding them at an early date.

In your letter, you expressed the opinion that it was important that we should know exactly the President's position. As you know, the President has now stated his position, as being in full agreement with the belief of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the tests are of vital importance to the national defense.

Regarding your suggestions that we should have a review and restudy of the extent and scope of the Navy vessels to be used in making the tests, Vice Admiral Blandy has been making this restudy and I understand that he furnished your naval liaison officer on April 13 with certain data in this regard. I believe that these figures now show a total number of 61 commlsstonrsj United States naval vessels to be exposed in the first test, plus 3 foreign ships 10 small selfpropelled ba~ges or Ilghters, and 3 floating concrete structures, no~-self-propelled. Compared WIth the previous figure of 97 so-called target ships, the difference is due partly to the actual withdrawal of some transports and destroyers from the target array, and partly to the erroneous original classification of some of the smaller noncommissioned craft as "ships."

Considerable misunderstanding apparently bas existed in the minds of a number of people, including a few Senators, that a large number of valuable naval vessels would be destroyed'in the atomic bomb tests. This is not at all



the case. All of the ships to be exposed have been declared surplus to the postwar Navy, with the exception of the light cruiser-hull convert.ed ~ircr~ft carrier Independence and the five heavy-hull submarines. The carrier 1S bemg ,used because there are two tests, and only one other carrier, U. S. S. Saratoga, declared obsolete, was available. The Indep'endenoe-type of carrier was never more than a rather unsatisfactory addition to the number of standard carriers of the Bsse» type manufactured during the war. The five heavy-hull submari,nes were included in order to obtain information upon the strength of this particular type of hull which does not exist in the older submarines of lighter construction.' H is not expected that more than one or two of the five heavy submarines will be lost. As yofI know we have a large number of them in inactive status, All of the other vessels were placed on the surplus list because they are either obsolete or of unsuitable type for retention, compared with the ample number of vessels of better types which will be retained. The sale value of these ships is inSignificant, both in comparison with their original cost and with the value of the data to be obtained in the tests. Probably not more than 1 percent of the original cost of the entire list of target ships could be realized on them by sale.

H is important to realize that a considerable number of ships is necessary in order that graded damage may be obtained upon each tYpe. In other words, the Navy must know the various distances at which the bomb will inflict destruction, heavy damage, light damage or no damage upon ships of various classes, both in order to improve design where practicable and to separate ships more widely .in tactical formations and at anchorages, to the extent which may be proved necessary.

I might say further that a considerable number of the ships will be used solely for carrying instruments or special types of naval or military equipment upon which both the Army and Navy desire information. Some of the equipment in these cases will probably be damaged, but these ships will be at such distances that the 'ships themselves should receive little or no injury.

I believe that the preceding paragraphs make clear that for the purposes of ~ the atomic bomb tests we do not have too many target ships, and that those ships

are being utilized in the most advantageous and economical fashion.

Sincerely yours,


The CUAIRl\fAN. Anything else, Admiral?

Admiral BLANDY. I have nothing else to add personally; but I have with me this morning Major General Kepner, Deputy Task Force Commander for Aviation, Joint Task Force No.1; Maj. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, my adviser for the test on ground-force equipment; Dr. R. A. Sawyer, a civilian scientist, who is the technical director, Joint Task Force No.1.

Also, at your request, there is present Dr. Karl T~ Compton, the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the President's Evaluation Committee.

The CHAIRl\>fAN. In what order would you suggest that we call them; Major General Kepner first?

Admiral BLANDY. Whiche.ver order you prefer. I would suggest General Kepner first.

The CHAIRMAN. General Kepner, will you come 1'orward, please.

Gentlemen, I present Maj. Gen. William E. Kepner.


The CUAIRl\IAN. Yon are Deputy Task Force Commander for Aviation, Joint Task Force I?

General KEPNER. Yes, sir. •

The CHAIRMAN. And you are familiar with the legislation and with this proposed atomic test?

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The CHAIRMAN. You have been associated with Admiral Blandy in connection with it ~

General KEPNER. Not with the legislation; I have been associated wit? .Admiral Blandy as Deputy Task Force Commander for AVIatIOn.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have represented the Army in that

.respect i

General KEPNER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is representing the Army? General KEpNER. General McAuliffe.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what are your views, General, as a result of your study and research and consideration of this test? Do you think it should be held?

General KEPNER. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. And whyj

General KEPNER. Well, I believe it is the duty of all the services to investigate any possibility that might lead to better defense of the Nation.

I believe that we must be cognizant of everything that is being ,

develoEed anywhere or that has possibilities of development. - .

I believe that we must prepare for the things that will come in the future and to prepare for them as they do come, rather than rest content to follow the course which we followed in the past.

For that reason, I believe that we should especially follow the development of anything of a scientific nature.

Senator EASTLAND. General, can you talk a little louder, please ~ The CHAIRMAN. I suggest that you change seats, General, and sit at the other side of the stenographer.

General KEPNER. I am sorry.

I believe that anything as important as atomic energy should be explored for any use that we may have for it.

The CHAIRMAN. You represent the views of the Air Corps of the Army?

General KEPNER. No, sir; I come only as a Deputy Task Force Commander for Aviation for Admiral Blandy, in Joint Task Force 1.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

General KEPNER. I possibly could have represented them, but I have not communicated with them and I do not feel that I am representing their views in this matter. I feel, however--

The CHAIRMAN. You have been in contact with Admiral Blandy .and you intend to participate in this test?

General KEPNJ'lR. Yes, sir. I joined Admiral Blandy in January

of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Who assigned you?

General KEPNER. The Chief of the Army Air Forces. The CHAIRMAN. For this purpose?

General KEPNER. For this purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Are there any questions?

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to ask a question, Mr. Chair-


The CHAIRMAN. Very well. The Senator from Massachusetts. Senator SALTONSTALLo How many aircraft do you plan to use? General KEPNER. About 77, I think.



Senator SALTONSTALL. Are those aircraft largely expected to be

destroyed? .

General KEPNER. Oh, no, no. There may be one or two destroyed;

it will be something that we do not plan, that they be destroyed. I

However, this is unknown and we are using drones in the danger areas .

The CHAIRMAN. What are drones? ,

General KEPNER. Drones are the pilotless aircraft that are controlled by another aircraft by radio contact some distance away.

They will be used due to the necessity for securing radiological' safety. The radiological conditions would not permit human beings to go into these areas with safety to life.

The drone will be flown out some distance away from the control aircraft and it will he flown through part of this cloud.

vVe will have in the drones-there are both Navy and Army drones, in that test-we will have certain instruments in them which the scientists will supervise installation of; the instruments will be designed to collect the scientific data desired. They will record that data. It will be monitored and there will be a very elaborate report on the data collected.

vVe had no opportunity, you see, in the actual dropping of bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to do it on the scale now planned for.

This being a laboratory test, of course we have been doing everything to get as much data as we possibly can from the tests; it thus requires a pretty complicated set-up in jhe airplane.

It requires not only the airplanes that are involved in flying, actual- i( lyon that day, but it requires the application of the work of people from Wright Field and our own people in our depots putting installations in these airplanes to handle this instrumentation.

Senator SALTONSTALL. There are some Navy airplanes as well as

Army planes in the tests? -

General KEPNER. Oh, yes; about half and half.

Senator ROBERTSON. And there will be some Navy airplanes on the carrier?

General KEPNER. Yes. There are Navy drones on the carrier. They will be a small type, like the fighter type used in the first year or two o'f

the war. -

These mother airplanes, we call them, have radio control, and our preparations involved training in taking off and landing on the surface of the ground, and that is going on from day to day.

Senator ROBERTSON. Who will be invited to observe these tests, other than the official Army and Navy and ~ir Force representatives and members of the task force and committees of Congress?

General KEPNER. That is something that I do not handle. Admiral Blandy, do you wish to answer that?

Admiral ELANDY. Would you care for me to answer that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may.

Admiral BLANDY. There will be invited Members of Congress as determined by the Congress itself, to a maximum of 60, including those members. of the President's Commission.

There will be invited, also, 30 civilian scientists. Senator ROImRTsoN. American?

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Admiral BLANDY. American. Then, the press, a total of about 200 from the press.

Senator ROBERTSON. Is that confined to the American press? Admiral BLANDY. It is planned, to include the foreign press, if the State, War, and Navy Departments decide to invite them. Insofar as the task force is concerned, we are making some allowance for the foreign press, in case they,are invited ..

Senator ROBERTSON. No invitations have been issued?

Admiral BLANDY. No invitations have been issued. The policy, apparently, has not been settled.

Senator BREWSTER. Has the date been determined?

Admiral BLANDY. The date has been determined. JUly 1 will be the date for the first test, or as soon thereafter as the weather permits. The second test immediately follows the first one, as soon as it can be arranged.

. Senator BREWSTER. Will Members of Congress be flown out?

Admiral BLANDY. Arrangements will be made for Members of Congress to be flown out; but those who prefer may go by ship.

The CHAIRUAN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Kepner, I suppose you have found that all that is required to use these Army planes is an order of the ,Val' Department and the approval of the order by the Secretary of War. It is not necessary to get any legislation here; you are proceeding just as you would in any peacetime demonstration or test; is that correct?

General KEPNER. I believe that is correct; yes, sir. There certainly has not been anything to indicate that there has been a problem along that line. We have had excellent cooperation from everyone con-

cerned; so there does not seem to be any problem. .

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think there are any other questions; are


(N 0 response.')

The CHAIRUAN. Thank you, General Kepner. General McAuliffe, will you come forward, please?


The CHAIRMAN. You are Maj. Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, ground force adviser to the Commander, Joint Task Force 1 ?

General McA ULU'FE. I am.

The CHAIRlIfAN. Have you participated in the preparations for this


General McAuLIFFE. Yes, I have. The CHAIRlIfAN. With whom?

General McAuLIFFE. With Admiral Blandy and his staff. The CHAIRlIfAN. Are you the representative of the Army'?

General McAuLIFFE. I am the representative of the Army Ground Forces; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. 'What do you think will be the advantages to the Army as the result of these tests, of holdinz these tests?

General McAuLIFFE. I think there are liable to be great advantages and 'we should go ahead with the tests on the same basis as we do,


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with any other weapon or ammunition. vVe habitually train and obtain as much information about every new weapon and every ~lew bit of ammunition that we have in peacetime, in order to save lives and to be able to use them more effectively in case of war.

I think the same thing applies to this great weapon, the atomic bomb,

as applies to the other weapons and ammunition. .

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Army to contribute to these tests in any great extent, other than by the use of planes and personnel?

General McAULIFFE. Yes, sir. vVe are exposing on the decks of ships a number of standard items of Army equipment, such as vehicles, tanks, clothing, rations, radio sets, and similar items at varying distancesfrom the atomic bomb, with a view of determining the effect on these items of the explosion of the atomic bomb.

Senator ROBERTSON. Any live animals?

General McAuLI~FE. Yes, sir; but that is not under the Army Ground Forces. That is handled by the medical personnel of the task force.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you find any difficulty working under the admiral?

General McAULIFFE. None whatever, sir. It has been very pleasant

and enjoyable. .

Admiral BLANDY. And I might say it has. been the same for me, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you satisfied, from your investigation of the

plan, that there will be no danger to human life? 1

General McAULIFFE. Yes, sir; I am satisfied that there will be no danger to human life in these tests.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that is because ships and planes upon which there will be human beings will be at such a distance from the explosions of the bombs that human life will not be endangered?

General McAULIFFE. I feel that that is the case; yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Senator ROBERTSON. I would like to ask a question of Admiral Blandy, Mr. Chairman, to find out if he is satisfied with this test on the Navy ships, which will be more or less sitting ducks. They will be anchored, won't them?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. vVell, is that comparable or as effective as would be a test over a moving force?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir. I think, for our purposes, it will be more effective to have it the way we have planned it, because moving ships, in the first place, present enormous difficulties, considering that the ships are completely unmanned, in keeping that force moving and keeping the ships in proper relationship to each other.

Then, furthermore, for obtaining exact information, the test as planned will be more valuable, as we will know just where the ships were with respect to the bomb.

We plan for next year the only test that cannot be performed with the ships anchored. I refer to the deep under-water test, for which we must be in the open sea.

In the first two tests we can anchor a greater number of ships and sret the graded damage that we must have to tell what the bomb will do to different types of ships at different distances.



Also, we know exactly our conditioning of the test and we can get far more accurate information because, in addition to knowing exactly where the ships were, we have the advantage of islands where we can mount a considerable number of cameras and other instruments which will be undamaged. That would be almost impossible to do in the sea

test. .

You see, sir; this is not in itself a test of tactics. It is a technical and materiel test, but from it we will obtain information which will be extremely valuable from a tactical standpoint.

It will give us information as to whether we need a wider dispersal of ships at anchor ill in our tactical formations at sea. Also, of course, it will show us needed improvements in, design, to protect the ships themselves and their personnel, against the effects of the atomic bomb.

Senator ROBERTSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRl\fAN. Any further questions? (No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Sawyer, will vou come forward, please? Take

a seat right over there. . v


. .

The CHAIRl\fAN. Dr. Sawyer, you are the technical director of Joint Task Force 1 ?

Dr . SAWYER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How longhave you been connected with the prepa-

rations for these tests? "

Dr. SAWYER. I have been a member of the staff of the task force since tthe 10th of January. I was assigned from the Manhattan District.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your occupation in civil life, if I may

ask, Doctor? '

Dr. ,SAWYER. I am on leave of absence from the University of Michigan. I am professor of physics at the University of Michigan.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have, I presume, leave of absence for this purpose?

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir. I had been on active duty with the Navy

previously, during the war.

The CHAIRl\fAN. And are you giving your whole time to this now? Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir,

The CHAIRl\IAN. And your headquarters, I suppose, is at the Navy Department?

Dr. SAwYJ<m. Yes, sir, Navy Building. .

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been consulted regarding your studies of this problem, from the standpoint of scientists?

Dr. SAWYER. Yes. My assignment is to plan, correlate and supervise the carrying out of all experimental measurements which will be made in connection with the tests, as distinguished from measurements of damage to naval vessels and to Army and Navy equipment.

I shall look after measurements of such things as blast, pressure, radioactivity, wave formation, radioactive measurements, and the various .physical phenomena which are associated with the explosion of an atomic bomb.



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The CHAIRl\IAN. Are you familiar with the explosions that have taken place on land already?

Dr. SAWYER. I did not observe them, but I am familiar with the data which were obtained from them.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think will be the benefit to science and to the Army and Navy as a result of the holding of these tests?

Dr. SAWYER. I should say, to the Army and Navy, these tests are indispensable if we are to prepare to defend ourselves against possible attack from atomic bombs in the future. I consider that to be the function of the Army and Navy, or the principal function of the Army and Navy, in peacetime-to consider the attacks which they may have to meet.

It seems to me that it is impossible to do that unless they know what the effect will be of such detonations on Army and Navy equipment, including ships.

The CUAIRl\IAN. From the scientific standpoint, what do you say, aside from the Army and the Navy?

Dr. SAWYER. You mean, from the standpoint of pure science?

The CUAIRMA~. Well, 'what benefit will there be to scientists and to scientific research?

Dr. SAWYER. As to direct additions to pure science, they will not be large. This is not intended as a pure scientific experiment, to advance our knowledge about the atomic bomb or about nuclear fission.

It will, however, advance the knowledge of science in several ways.

We expect, as part of the work, to get the information which the Navy needs on oceanographic work, the effects on plant and fish life, animal life, which will be of scientific value.

vVe also expect to get additional information which has not been obtained from the previous tests as to the phenomena associated with a blast of this size and extent.

vVe consider that it is not possible to scale out from smaller explosions with sufficient accuracy to be certain about the effects to be expected in a detonation of this magnitude.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, have you not gleaned some data as to the effects on human life and animal life from the other experimentation, from the actual explosions of the atomic bombs during the war?

Dr. SA WYER. Yes; some information has been collected on the effects that have been observed at Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Of course, that information is of value; and it cannot be reproduced in this test.

On the other hand, that is all hearsay observation. vVe have to take statements of peop1e as to where they were, what they were doing at the time of the explosion.

Furthermore, we shall get more information from this test as to the radioactivity associated with the bomb, measured information.

The CUAIRl\fAN. Which would amplify the information already


Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir.

The CH,\I_Rl\IAN. Any questions?

Senator SAJ~TONSTALL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Massachusetts.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Aren't you a little overmodest in your statement of what pure science will get from this test, if your job is well done? You say you are working for the Navy, so you are very careful to say that you are just doingit for the Navy.



However, if you do your job well, there is certainly going to be some fundamental information obtained on radioactivitv and other

effects or the explosion, and so on ~ v

Dr. SAWYER. We will get a lot of oceanographic information, a great deal of information on radioactivity and illumination. Such studies will certainly be of scientific value.

I only wish to say that this is not intended primarily as a test of atomic fission, to increase our information on that.

Senator SALTON STALL. But the scientists certainly hope that you do

your job well, don't they ~

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, I anticipate they do; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other scientists associated with you ~ Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir; of course, We have a large staff of scientists

to carry out these measurements.

Most of them are civilian scientists, although some of them are military scientists and Reserve officers, who are in uniform.

The number of personnel which will carry out the measurements that I supervise is about 1,000.

Of that 1,000, perhaps 40b or 500 may be carrying out routine observations, such as photography or monitoring the radioactive effects.

Some 300 or 400 of these could certainly 15e called trained scientific personnel, and they come from a wide variety of places, from the Army and the Navy, from laboratories and bureaus, from contract employees of the Army and Navy, university contractors.

The CHAIRMAN. Any_other questions ~ .

. Seantor EASTLAND. How far do you estimate the wave will travel ~ Dr. SAWYER. The wave produced by the explosion]

Senator EASTLAND. Yes, the wave created by the explosion. How far do you estimate that wave will travel?

Dr. SAWYER. From the first explosion which, as you know, will be in the air, or above the water, we expect rather small waves, of course.

We have no information on thati of course, except an estimate, but we believe those waves will certain y not get outside the lagoon.

From the second explosion, the second shot, which will be on the surface or under water, the waves will be much larger. However, we still think that by the time they reach the reef of the lagoon, they probably will not be more than 5 or 10 feet high. There will be very little wave observed outside the lagoon, we feel sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, couldn't that effect on the surface of the ocean, the creation of these waves, be discovered or ascertained by dropping a bomb without any ships at all there ~

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir; the waves could be and they certainly could be measured without the presence of ships.

Of course, the fundamental importance to us of this test, or these tests, I should say,ris the effect of the wave on ship motion; the effect of the shock in the water and in the air on the ships themselves and on component parts and equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. I should think it might be possible to estimate that, to ascertain what would be the disturbance on the surface of the sea.

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir; you could estima te the disturbances; but the effect on ships, I think, you could not estimate.

I would like to make this point, that we have no experience on the effect of shock, either in the air or upder water, of this weapon.



Here we will apply to the whole area of the battleship at one time a tremendous shock.

No explosions which ships have endured in wartime is comparable to an explosion of this kind from the atomic bomb.

No ship constructor can estimate what the effect of, say, applying a ton per square inch on the whole surface of the ship at one time will be, from any under-water mine or torpedo explosion of which we have had any experience.

It may be that the effect will not be what we expect or predict from our previous knowledge.

Senator EASTLAND. As I understand it, from what I have heard about the exploding of the atomic bomb, an explosion beneath the surface would be much more powerful than the effect of the bomb when it is exploded on the surface of the water or in the air. Is that an accurate statement ~

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. Do you have any information on whether or .not a bomb dropped or exploded beneath the surface of the open sea would create a tidal wave?

Dr. SAWYER. No, sir; it would not create a tidal wave. It would create local waves, wave disturbances, but of a strictly limited nature.

Senator ROBERTSON. Dr. Sawyer, did I understand you to say that you have about 1,000 assistants or observers or.helpers in the scientific. end of this test ~

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. Are those confined to citizens or the United


Dr. SAWYER. With two or three exceptions.

Senator ROBEHTSON. ,Vould you like to mention those exceptions? Dr. SAWYER. Admiral Blandy, would you wish to reply to that? Admiral BLANDY. British scientists formerly associated with the

Manhattan project.

Dr. SAWYER. There are a few British scientists, five or six, who have been associated with the Manhattan district during the war, and who will take part in this test.

Senator ROBERTSON. Those are the only onesj Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir.

Senator EASTLAND. You have checked on the background of the 1,OQO employees?

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir; every single one of them will have an individual investigation.

Senator EASTLAND. By what department?

Dr. SAWYER. The task force has a security and intelligence organization which initiates these investigations. For the people who will have more immediate contact with the bomb, those people will have special investigations made by the Manhattan District, also.

Relatively few of these people will come in contact with the bomb at all.

Senator GERRY. Doctor, you think, don't you, that probably, in shallow water, the bomb will not be as effective as it will be in deep water, I mean insofar as damage to ships?

Dr. SAWYER. It will be more effective in deep 'Water.

Senator GEllRY. More effective in deep water; and you want to find how deep that has to be, don't you, to get that measurement?



Dr. SAWYER. We can make some computations.

Senator GERRY. This test will help you ~ .

Dr .. SAWYER. Yes; the real reason for carrying out the under-water tests is to get information which we cannot obtain by calculation or from the tests which have been made over land previously.

The OHAIR~IAN. Doctor, this may be an amateurish question. Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir, that is right.

The OHAIRMAN. Is it possible for different types to be discovered or invented that will have more power or will result in more damage and more disturbance and more losses than the bomb that we may use ~ -

Dr. SAWYER. Sir, I am afraid that I couldn't answer that question in detail. I can say that I consider such things are possible; that testimony has been given by General Groves in that connection, and by others before the hearings on atomic energy.

The OHAIRMAN. You plan to use a certain type of atomic bomb ~ Dr. SAWYER. The bomb that will be used will be the size and type used at.Nagasaki.

The OHAIRMAN. Suppose a larger one or possibly a more powerful one is used by one of our prospective future enemies, do you suppose they could predict the results by what you may discover from this size and type of bomb from these tests? Oould you make such measurements?

Dr. SAWYER. vVe could certainly extrapolate, from the results of the testing of this bomb, the expected results to be obtained from bombs of the same order of magnitude or 5 or 10 times greater.

If a bomb of 1,000 times this power should be made, then we cannot, perhaps, extrapolate that effect, apy more than we can extrapolate the effect of this one, from calculatIOns taken from the explosion of a 1,000-pound bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it possible to make a bomb of greater power than

the one you contemplate using?

. Dr. SAWYER. Is it possible?

TheOHAm~:[AN. Yes, or probable; or is this the maximum destructive bomb that is now known or can be conceived of?

Dr. SAWYER. Well, Senator, I might answer that by saying it is certainly possible to conceive of mo~e destructive bombs. This bomb is the bomb we have at the present time.

Oertainly I am not in a position to make any statements of what we may have 5 or 10 years from now, whether it will be more effective or less effective, assuming that we go ahead with the development of the bomb.

Senator ROBERTSON. You probably have seen in the newspapers, Doctor, or in the magazines, or both, that many people are concerned about the possible effects of this underwater explosion, as to developing explosive qualities, developing something not confined to the bombs -you know what I mean, reactions.

Dr. SAWYER. You mean, Senator, that we may burn up the ocean? Senator ROBERTSON. Yes. I don't say exactly burn up the ocean; but there have been some very extraordinary suggestions 'proposed. 'Vould you like to make a statement on those?

Dr. SAWYER. Yes, sir. I consider that those statements are irresponsible. This is a question we have studied with great care.







I can assure you there is no possibility of such reactions. We will not burn up the ocean; we will not set off a volcano; and we will not burn up the atmosphere.

I consider that our experts, who worked on this question, have had the information and the ability to answer the question correctly.

I have no respect for those statements which I have seen in the press. Senator ROBERTSON. 'VeIl, Doctor, I am sure your answer is very reassuring or should be reassuring to many people.

Dr. SAWYER. Certainly, sir, you wouldn't expect us to go out and do this thing if there was any possibility of that happening?

Senator ROBERTSON. I am not one of thosethat suggests those possibilities.

Dr. SAWYER. Well, sir, I am going myself; I am going as a volun-

teer, but not as a guinea pig. [Laughter.] The OHAIR~lAN. Any other questions? (No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Oompton, will you come forward, please?


The OHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I present to you Dr. Karl T. Compton, . the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, member of ' the President's Evaluation Oommittee, and member of Joint Chiefs

of Staff Evaluation Board.

Doctor, first of all, I want to say that we appreciate greatly your coming here in response to our invitation.

I have observed in the press that you had given out a statement indicating the importance or holding this test and the value of it. I would like to have you elaborate to the committee your views along that line, Doctor, 'if you will.

Dr., OO~:[PTON. Senator 'Valsh and gentlemen of the committee, I do consider, although I am a member of these evaluation boards, I am convinced that the tests ought to be made, and I say that without any compulsion due to my membership on these boards.

Perhaps I can illustrate that by saying that as long ago as last September, when I was in Tokyo, I urged on some of the officers there that tests be made while there was an opportunity for making the tests.

My reason was this: That unless these tests are.rnade there would be, it seems to me, endless argument and discussion without coming to any certain conclusion with regard to what would be the effect of atomic bombs on naval ships or what ought to be done to protect the ships, and questions of that sort; it seems to me that the only way to avoid endless discussion and uncertainty was to carry out the tests and get the facts.

I remember on the Baruch rubber committee, Mr. Baruch used to emphasize over and over again when questions came up, the same thing. He said, "Let us not argue or draw our conclusions until we get the facts." That, I take it, is the purpose for these tests.



Furthermore it seemed to me very important that the tests be made promptly for v~rious reasons, two of which are very i.mportan~.

One reason is that I believe thev should be made while the ships are available. I think that Admirn1 Blandy has adequately expl~ined the fact that these ships, which are due to be scrapped, are available now. They could not be available or might not be available later on, without a great deal more expense, if the tests are postponed for a

considerable period of time. . . .

Another reason is that a large proportion of these scientists that Dr.

Sawyer is depending upon for instrumentation are on leave of absence

from universities and colleges.. .,

·With the great number of returmng veterans who will be g?ll:g t.o school next fall. these scientists will be very badly needed; as It is, It has been very difficult to get extended their leave of absence during the summer.

Consequently, it will be very difficult to get the technical assistants necessary to carry out the tests unless they can be done before next fall.

Now the reasons for the tests I think have been pretty adequately brougl;t out. I would like to amp~ify one of Dr. Sa:vye~'s answers to one of the questions that came up m regard to the scientific aspects of these tests.

I think it is generally realized that we do not know everything there is to know about the atomic bomb Itself. There has only been one of these bombs that has been observed with any measuring instruments; that was the one in New Mexico on July Hi.

The effects of the second bomb of the same type 011 Nagasaki have been observed only by examining the results and trying to calculate hack what must have been the power and pressure.

Now, some of the observations that were made at Nagasaki are not in conformity with what would have been expected from the measurements that were made in New Mexico. There is a pretty good indication that the two bombs did not go off in quite the .same way.

The theoretical people point out the f~ct.that tl~e. particular way in which a bomb .does explode has a certain probabil ity factor that depends on just how-the explosion is initiated. Consequently, one of the very important aspects of this test is to make the type of measurements which are included in those that Dr. Sawyer has charge of, to find out just what is the efficiency of the bomb, to find out what proportion of the energy that is theoretically available in that 'bomb actually comes out in the explosion.

1Vithout those measurements, the results of the tests, such results as the damage to naval ships, may not be very important, in comparison.

Suppose nothin.g much happened, that there wa,s~'t very much damage. That might be due to the fact that our ShIpS are sowell constructed that they can stand anything; or it might be due to the fact that this particular bomb is sort of a dud, like a firecracker fizzling

instead of exploding. .

So, one of the' things important to do in order to dl:aw valid conclusions is to make the estimate. as to the energy released m the bomb, that is, the efficiency of this nuclear reaction in the bomb, silllultaneol~sly with the measurements made of the effects of this bomb on the ships,

r 1



Senator ROBERTSON. May I ask a question there? The CHAIKUAN. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBERTSON. In the test will there be welded as well as riveted ships?

Dr. C01>Il'TON, Yes, sir; there, will be both welded and riveted.

Most of the ships, I believe, are welded ships. Admiral Blandy, of course, knows more about that in detail than I do.

But perhaps I would answer what you have in your mind in this way: That, in order to assure ourselves that-lam speaking now for the evaluation board-to assure ourselves that the plan of these tests is such that the Bureau of Ships feels that it can get the information that it needs from these tests. ,,,e have secured from the Chief of the Bilreau of Ships his analysis and his statement to the effect that the types of ships and the arrangements are such that he feels that valid conclusions can be drawn which would be essential when it comes to future desi an.

Senator §ALTONSTALL. :Mr. Chairman. The CHAlR~IAN. Senator Sa1tonstall.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Following up what Senator Robertson intimated, is it not true that any expense, no matter how great it might appear, up to $100,000,000, or whatever it is; in your opinion, is it not true that it is well spent in the destruction of these old ships, that it is well worth while from the viewpoint of our future security, the security of our country and of the Navy?

Dr. COJUP'I'ON. I am convinced of that. Senator Saltonstall. I feel that, while it may be rather a large sum , it is still small, compared

with what is spent on the Navy. "

Consequently, it would seem to me to be a very poor policy of economy either not to carry out the tests at all-in which case we wouldn't have the answers and would continue to move in uncertainty-or to diminish the amount of information that we can get from the tests to the point of diminishing return.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you have a theory as to what the effect may be?

Dr. COllIPTON. Yes. Yes; I have theories. Some of the people wO'rking on this, among whom are, some of the best mechanical engineers and mathematicians and physicists in this country, have been working on this, trying to estimate as near as they can what would happen. It has been important to do that, in determining these target arrays, how far the ships should be apart, and so on, in order to get the information that would be most useful.

They can make estimates; but the estimates are based on extrapolation or past experience.

This is so far beyond past experience that there is involved. perhaps, an uncertainty factor of 10 or, maybe more than that. They simply cannot do more than estimate. They simply cannot calculate accurately in advance what will happen.

Senator BREWSTER. Doctor, you consider it would be of value to have these prognoses proved or disproved, so that we might have so that we might form an estimate of the accuracy of your anticipati~n?

Dr. CO:UPTON. That, I take it, will be one of the things that will be

done, in the evaluation of these tests. _ .

Senator BREWSTER. So that, in future estimates, we can form some opinion as to how accurate our estimate will be. -



President Roosevelt always put down the election estimate he had in advance, to find out how good he was at guessing.

Dr. CO:UPTON. Well, Senator, this is not the kind of thing that can be predicted by a Gallup poll.

But it is one of the things that are important. Once we get the information that will come out of these tests, then there will be a basis for very much more accurate calculations in the future; and I think it should not be necessary to repeat these tests.

I can describe it something like this. Suppose you plot a curve [demonstrating on sheet of paper] and you have some experimental points down around here and we want to know what will happen when you get up around here [indicating].

Now, it 'is very uncertain, if we attempt to extrapolate that curve, because we do not know whether it will happen off here [indicating] or if it will go off here [indicating].

Now, if we can fix a point right here [indicating], let us say; by experiment, then we have a point which could be very greatly extended. That is hoped to be achieved by these tests.

There is another thing that it is important to keep in mind. Admiral Blandy mentioned this awhile ago: This is not a test as between the Air Force and the Navy. It is not a test of a tactical operation.

It is a scientific and engineering experiment to get data, and the plans have all been made with that in mind.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not take up any question of defense against the bomb, except possibly when it comes to the matter' of construction of future ships?

Dr. COUP'l'ON. Not at this time. I think those will be involved in evaluating the conclusions that will come from these tests.

. Senator ELLENDER. Dr. Compton, by these tests, will you be able to determine whether or not the entire force has been expended in the bomb?

, Dr. COMPTON. Yes, sir. I believe-Dr. Sawyer may correct me on this-I believe in the first test, when the bomb goes off in the air, there are four different methods being used in order to calculate that. That is, there are four different types of experiments, from the results of which that calculation can be made.

Now, in the test that will be carried out on the surface or perhaps a little below the surface, perhaps, there may be only two of those methods that can be used.

In this very deep underwater test that is conceived as one of the difficulties, that it will be very difficult for them to make measurements a mile under the surface of the water to find out how efficient that bomb had been.

The results of the explosions on the ships can be determined, but it will be very difficult to find out just what the bomb did when it went off under the water.

The CHAIR~IAN. Doctor, I have a question that may not be of any

particular value.

Dr. CO~IPTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can these bombs be transported with safety? Dr. CO~IPTON. Yes, sir; I think with complete safety.

The CHAIH~IAN. It is not like the ordinary bomb; there is no need for taking the kind of precautions that we take in transporting other explosives?




Dr. COMPTON. I would say it is much safer to transport than the same amount of nitroglycerme, until you get the thing actually put together and armed, just prior to the test or use.

, The CHAIRMAN. It is not put together until just prior to the test. Is that correct?

Dr. COMPTON. That is my understanding; that is correct. The CHAIR1I1:-AN. It is put together on. the bombed

Dr. CmIPTON~ Until it has the arming mechanism, which I cannot describe because I do not know it, but until that is done it cannot go off.

The CHAIRMAN. It cannot explode? Dr. CmIPToN. No.

Senator SAL'I'ONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, Senator.

Senator SALTONSTALJ,. My question is perhaps a foolish question, I don't know; it occurs to me from something that Dr. Compton has already said.

Such a test as this, Doctor, in your opinion, is a wise procedure for the Government to conduct in order possibly to save the lives of many people in the future, is it not?

Dr. CmIP'I'ON. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. For that reason alone it would be 'warranted?

Dr. CmIPToN. Yes.

Senator SALTON STALL. And if such a test were not conducted, then it is possible, is it not, that our future lives, and the lives of our children

and generations to come might be just that much more unrertain j 'I

Dr. COl\1PTON. Yes, sir ; it will certainly reduce the risk because

if atomic warfare ever happens, then we have gQt this information, and it is better to have it before the thing happens than after.

Senator SALTON STALL. But even if atomic warfare does not come and atomic power is used, then it is definitely advantageous for the future of atomic power ~

Dr. COUP'I'ON. There will be information from this test that will be of use.

Senator ELLENDER. Well, it may be possible that the destruction

may be so great that it will act as a deterrent to war. Isn't that true ~ Dr. COMPTON. Yes, sir; I think that is true.

Senator BREWSTER. Will there be any land structures nearby?

Dr. COMPTON. Well, Senator, you probably know the construction of Bikini Atoll. It is sort of oval-shaped, about 20 miles long and about 10 miles wide. There is the circumference of this reef; at a number of points the reef comes up above the surface of the water and there is a series of little islands, and those were the islands mentioned awhile ago on which observing equipment will be set upstationed.

Senator BREWSTER. Will there be any surface structures of any character so that, from observations there, we could tell the possible effect of the atomic bomb on the city of New Y ork ~

Dr. COMPTON. I think that is not planned; no. There will be, as far as I know, only special structures on the islands as necessary to mount and protect observing instruments.

Senator BREWSTER. You do not feel, Admiral Blandy, that it would be feasible to have anything of that kind?

Admiral BUNDY. It would be feasible to put up. the structures, Senator Brewster, but we wouldn't get any satisfactory information because the distance would be too great.

We hoped that we could get the target ships close enough to Bikini Atoll to test the effect of the bomb on the ships and the structures at. the same time, but, unfortunately, the water was so shallow near the islands that we could not do it.

The CHAIR~IAN. Any other questions of Dr. Compton by the com-


(No response.)

The CHAIR~IAN. Dr. Compton, we thank you.

Dr. CO~IPTON. Might I add one thing, Senator Walsh, speaking as one who is not a member of Task Force 1 ?

I would like to bear testimony for the civilian members of our evaluation board as to the excellent spirit of cooperation that we have seen between the various elements that are operating under Admiral Blandy. I, personally, have not seen the slightest indication anywhere of any maneuvering for relative position as between one service or another.

Senator BREWSTER. You think we had to have the atomic bomb in order to have that harmony?

Dr. CO~IPTON. Well, sometimes it takes danger to weld a group


Senator SAI,TONSTALL. Even the scientists?

Dr. COMPTON. Right. .

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Compton.

Admiral Blandy, do you have anything further to make by way of statement?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir.


Admiral BLANDY. I would like to make a statement with regard to the purposes of the tests and the reasons for conducting them at an early date.

The main purpose is to test the effect of the atomic bomb against naval vessels in order to gain information upon possible required' changes in (1) ship design; (2) tactical formations at sea, and anchoring distances in port; (3) number and location of operating bases and repair yards; and (4) strategic disposition of ships.


1. To test the effect of the atomic bomb against aircraft, both air-borne and grounded, and upon a wide variety of military ground weapons and equipment in order to learn what redesign of any items may be necessary, and what may be needed in the way of dispersal, to minimize the effects of the bomb.

2. To learn more of the various effects of the atomic bomb against living beings in order to provide much needed information upon protection, early disagnosis, and treatment of personnel who may hereafter be exposed to atomic explosions, either in war or in peace.



, With regard to diagnosis, I might interpolate there that there was not an opportunity to make an early diagnosis in the case of Japan because the medical officers did not arrive in time, the war was not over soon enough for our men to arrive.

3. To gain information regarding the relative value of atomicbomb attack against naval vessels, as compared with other types of targets, to see what the effect would be in the event ships may be attacked, as compared with cities or industrial centers.

4. To gain further information of general scientific value upon phenomena accompanying atomic explosions.


1. Types of effects: Considering all three tests-air burst, surface or shallow underwater burst, and deep underwater burst-the bomb can produce against a ship and her crew the following types of effects : (a) Air blast, tending to crush the above-water structure and kill or maim personnel.

(b) Intense heat, affecting the ship's structure, the crew, and possibly the ammunition and fuel.

(c) Radioactivity, affecting the personnel, and certain types of equipment, such as, perhaps, radio and radar.

(d) High waves, endangering both the safety of the ship, especially at anchor, and the lives or health of the crew by throwing "green water" or spray, contaminated by radioactive fission products upon the ships.

("Green water" is the nautical expression for a heavy quantity of unbroken water, as distinguished from spray. I might add that the presence of radioactive water might render the ships uninhabitable for a matter of weeks, or perhaps longer, thereby making it impracticable to use the ships for a considerable period thereafter even with

.a relief crew.) ,

(e) Underwater shock, tending to loosen equipment attached t? fixed parts of the ship, and turn all loose objects .into projectiles, endangering the personnel.

(I) . Underwater pressure, tending to rupture.the hull and sink

the ship, .

2. Importance of various tests: Each of the three tests will produce tw~ or more of the above effects. While the third test is commonly b~heved to be the most important,it is by no means. certain that it WIll prove so. The sur:fac~ or .slu~llow un~erwater burst may readily turn out to .be m<?re effe.ctIve m Its combined effects upon ship and crew+especially smce this attack can be made either at sea or in port, and the bomb can be quickly brought to the desired exploding positton ; that IS, on the surface or slightly below it.

. The deep underwater. explosion, on the other hand, can be brought into effect only on the highseas, and the weapon itself must be placed thousands .0,£ feet below the. surface. To so place an atomic depth bomb, which must be specially constructed to withstand terrific underwater pressures, under a naval task force free to maneuver at lug]_l spe~d, IS ~ job which will certai?ly challenge the ingenuity and engmeermg skill of the most expenenced desizners of underwater

weapons and the skill of our best tacticians. b


~ • .-... ................ .._, V....:l .LJ~.u~O

3. Inadequacy of existing data on battle damage: While we learned much about damage to our ships and injury to our men, from orthodox weapons during the war, we cannot afford merely to extrapolate from these lessons to deduce the effects of the atomic bomb, which are of far greater magnitude and, in some respects, of an entirely different nature.

4. Necessity for prompt informatione Scientists have said that any moderately industrialized nation can produce the atomic bomb in a few years; yet it is not expected by the best informed on the subject that a positive guaranty against the use of atomic weapons can be accomplished except through a step-by-step process over an indefinite period. In the absence of such a guaranty, it is therefore essential that our designers, tacticians, strategists, and medical officers learn as much as possible now, regarding the effects of this new and revolutionary weapon upon naval and other targets not thus far exposed to it. 'Without the information which can be gained from these experiments, these men will be groping their way along a dark road which might lead to another and worse "Pearl Harbor."

5. Cost of tests: It has been stated by people not too well informed that the tests will cost $425,000,000 for the target ships, and another $100,000,000 for other expenses. Such figures are excessive. The first figure is the approximate total of the original cost of the ships. Many are obsolete, and a great majority had already been declared surplus to the postwar Navy and were scheduled to be disposed of in some manner, before planning for "Crossroads" began. By no means will all of these ships be destroyed in the tests, as it is intended to learn the distances at which light damage will be incurred, as well as the lethal range of the bomb, against various types of ships. But even if all ships were to be sunk, the cost of the taxpayer, for at least 90 p~rcent of the ship~, would b"e only. their scr~p value .. An~ this value, WIth the present high labor costs involved m scrappmg, IS estimated to be less than 1 percent of the original cost of the ships.

In other words, we would be fortunate to get $4,000,000 for the $450,000,000 original cost.

The other figure, $100,000,000, has no foundation whatsoever, as neither the ';Val' find Navy Departments nor the joint Army-Navy task force which is /;o'ca.rry out the tests, has ever published an estimate of the operating costs. .

I might say we are having an estimate made now. It could not be done earlier in the planning, because we did not know what would be the extent of the plan.

The actual principal elements of cost are (1) the pay and food, for about 6 months, of the crews of the target ships and a few operating ships previcusly scheduled for ~he inactive fleet; (2) the maintenance of these ships for the same period ; (3) the scrap value of those obsolete or otherwise surplus ships actually destroyed in the tests, plus the value as fighting ships, of the few modern vessels sunk, if any; (4) the cost ~f repairs to a few modern ships damaged; (5) the ammunition and fuel destroyed by fire or explosion ; (6) the fuel and transportation costs of the operation; and (7) the cost or special instrumentation.

I do not say that those are all the elements of cost, but they are the principal ones.

'The total cost of the tests will only be a few percent of the annual naval appropriation, and will probably not exceed the total cost of



one large new ship; while. the lessons learned may .save many lives, many ships, and many millions of. dollars by .gmdmg future naval expenditures into the most productive a~~ efficient cl~a.nnels:

I would like to add that the harsher critics of the military m peacetime contend that the generals and admirals are busily engaged in pre-

paring for the last preceding war instead of the next on~. "

Well, here is a case wherein the services are attemptmg to prepare for a possible future war, in the unfortunate event that there should be one, and in the more unfortunate event that the atomic bomb should be used in that future war.

Senator BREWSTER. Your estimate of the cost, Admiral, as I gather it, might go to the extent of $100,000,000?

Admiral BLANDY. I think it would not exceed that. I do not know yet exactly what the cost will be, but I believe it will be very much less

than that. .

Senator BREWSTER. You do not think it will run into any such figure as that?

Admiral BLANDY. I don't think it will.

Senator BREWSTER. That is not in contemplation. I notice that you only have one cargo ship. Do you have any merchant-marine ships?

Admiral BLANDY. I will give you the number of transports. Those are ships 'of merchant type, merchant hull construction; so that we do get a test on the merchant type.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you have one cargo ship and assault transports; those are merchant-type construction, I understand.

Admiral BLANDY. There are in the first test 19 transports.

Senator BREWSTER. Those transports are all of merchant-type construction?

Admiral BLANDY. Merchant-type construction, built by the Maritime Commission.

Senator BREWSTER. You think it will be a fair test of what would

happen to merchant vessels?

Admiral BLANDY. Yes, sir; they are typical merchant construction. The CHAIRMAN. Are _you through?

Senator BREWSTER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything further to say, Admiral? Admiral BLANDY. No, sir.

Senator MORSE. I would like to ask the admiral some questions and make a few remarks.

As I understand it, there will be 98 ships, American ships, in the experiment?

Admiral BLANDY. No, sir; there are 61 United States commissioned naval vessels, of which only 33 are of combatant type. Taking the 61 United States naval vessels, there are in addition 10 small selfpropelled barges used in amphibious operations; there are 3 captured

, enemy vessels; there are 3 concrete structures-one small drydock

and two oil barges-they are non-self-propelled.

The CHAIRMAN. The original figure, Senator, has been changed. Senator MORSE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been testified to this morning, before you came in.

Senator MORSE. I see.



The CHAIRMAN. At the suggestion of the committee, there was a restudy of the number of ships; it was reduced to the present number.

Admiral BLANDY. The only ships among the whole target array which would normally be retained in the postwar Navy are the carrier Independence and five submarines of modern construction.

/I'he reason for using the carrier Independence is, as was explained in the letter that the Secretary wrote to the chairman, that we had only one other carrier available, which was obsolete. There were two tests; we wished to get a thorough test of carrier construction in both of them.

Now, then, the Independence was one of 10 light aircraft carriers, obtained by converting light cruisers under construction, which was done in order to get more carriers, just as we converted a number of slow merchant-type ships to escort-type carriers. They were not as satisfactory as the larger E88ew type of aircraft carrier.

They did do good service, but they were not so valuable as the E88ew class and, therefore, not so important for retention. But it is important to learn the effect of the bomb on the carrier's flight deck structure.

Then, there are five submarines, which are used only because they have a heavy hull construction. The officers responsible for our submarine design are most anxious to test this type of hull. The other submarines of lighter design will not be adequate for the purposes desired.

It is not expected that all of these submarines will be lost; they will be placed at various distances.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that 'if the number of ships to be used in the test has been cut down, and I find that it has been, then it only strengthens my position with regard to the

cooL •

I have with me pertinent data on that point which I was going to put into the record but which I will not put into the record now, I do not deem it necessary.

As I understood it, 98 ships were going to be used, many of which were obsolete anyway.

With reference to the argument about the value of the ships as scrap iron or scrap metal, even if I use the original estimate, there would only be about 140,090 tons that could be salvaged and the value of that metal, taking an average of $10 per ton, would only be about $1,500,000.

The argument that these original vessels were worth $480,000,000 will certainly not stand up in the analysis now, in the light of the present value; that figure was based, the $480,000,000 figure, as I understand it, onthe original cost.

It seems to me, if it is agreed that we ought to try to find out all the scientific information that we can about the effect of this atomic bomb on ships, that now is the time to do it, before we proceed here, in the Committee on Naval Affairs, to make a great many expenditures in the next decade preparing for a future war, without having any facts.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to read into the committee record a statement made by the President of the United States on the forthcoming atomic bomb tests, the statement bearing date of April 12, 1946.





You will remember that at the time of the resolution there was some uncertainty what the President's position was. This statement seems to clear it up. It reads as follows:

Preparations for the atomic bomb tests in the Pacific are being pressed forward and I have been assured that the present target dates for the explosions will be met. I am in complete agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in their view that these tests are of vital importance in obtaining information for the national defense. Without the information from these experiments, designers of ships, aircraft, and military ground equipment, as well as our strategists, tacticians, and medical officers will be working in ignorance 'regarding the effects of this revolutionary new w~apon against naval and other targets not previously exposed to .it. These tests which are in the nature of a laboratory expenment, should give us the info~mation which is essential to Intelligent planning in the future and an evaluation of the effect of atomic energy on our defense establishments.

Also the President wrote to the chairman of this committee on April 4: 1946 asking to have section 3 of the bill stricken out. I will read what he 'says about section 3, I will not read the whole letter into the record.

* * * Section 3 would provide that before the use of any vessel of the Navy under authority of section 1, the Secretary of the Navy shall come into agreement with the Naval Affairs Committees of the Senate and of the House 01'

• Representatives with 'respect to such use. I believe this latter provision is unconstitutional and that it should therefore be stricken from the measure.

The Constitution of the United States divides the function of the Government into three great departments; the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. It establishes the principle that these departments should be kept separate, and that no one of them should exercise functions properly belonging to either of the others. It is apparent that section 3 of the measure, by requlrtng the Secretary of the Navy to corne into agreement with the Naval Affairs Oommtttp-s of the Congress violates this principle by entrusting to the legislative branch of the Government executive functions properly belonging to the executive branch.

The Congress has the power and the right to enact or refuse to enact a law, but once the law is passed it should be executed by the executive branch of the Government. In no other way can the Government be efficiently managed and responsibility for such management ,d~finitely fixed,

As President Washington stated in a message to the Congress, "It is essential to the due administration of the Government that the boundaries fixed by the Constitution between the different departments should be preserved."

I believe that the provision in question, Itonaeted, would result in an invasion of the province of the Executive, and, accordingly, I strongly urge that it be stricken from the pending measure.

I communicated this information to the chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs and he agreed that section 3 would be eliminated, although I think he has some reservation as to whether the position.taken-by the President was sound or not, as to the matter of section 3 being in violation of the Constitution. In any event, he agreed that it shall be eliminated.

Without objection, that will be done.

There is one further amendment that has been proposed:

The number of combatant vessels, exclusive of those received from foreign governments, which may be employed as targets for the purposes set forth in section 1 of this resolution, is limited to 33. The term "combatant vessels" for purposes of this section is defined as naval vessels of the following categories; battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines.

As I understand it, you have no objection to that ~

Admiral BLANbY. None, sir. . ,

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, what do you say about reporting the bill ~



Senator SALTONSTALL. May I ask a question before it is done? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SALTONSTALL. We just eliminated section 3 without objection. If this resolution is now reported back into the Senate it will go through?

The CHAIRUAN. We hope.

Senator SALTONSTALL. vVe hope. Then it is through, as far as Congress is concerned. Now, if this amendment is adopted it will have to go back to the House and I was wondering whether the thing would be delayed.

The CHAIRl\iAN. It would have to go even if section 3 is stricken out; it would have to go back even if we did nothing else, and I see no harm inputting in that amendment.

Senator SALTONSTALL. It will go back to the House anyway? The CHAIRUAN. It will go back to the House anyway. Senator SALTONSTALL. Why, sir ~

The CHAIRMAN. Because we have changed the bill. The House has one bill and we have a different bill. They passed this bill with section 3 in it.


The CHAIRMAN. And we are taking out section 3; therefore, we • present a different bill.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Well, suppose we leave section 3 in ~

The CHAIRMAN. Then it would not have to be changed, but then, probably, you would get a veto.

Senator ROBERTSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question

on a point of information. .~

On line 18 of section 3 (a) "is authorized to" are deleted and "in

his discretion may" inserted. Is that an amendment of this committee 1 The CHAIRl\1AN. Yes; I think we put in that amendment in the previous hearing, before the bill was reported.

Senator ROBERTSON. Anyway, it would have to go back to the House whether we did anything or not?

The CHAIR~fAN. That is right. Is there any objection to reporting

the bill?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. If not the bill will be reported.

The committee will remain in executive session for a few minutes. Thank you, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, at 11: 50 a. m., the committee retired into executive session. )


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