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Result is different from what was intended

PEOPLE vs ILIGAN

FACTS: At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy
Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a
barrio fiesta. On the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo
Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box
him. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall,
Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed.
Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and
even passed the house of Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being
chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On the way back the three
accused suddenly emerged from the road side, Fernando Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr.
on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran. Upon
returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted.
The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the
victim died of “ shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was due
to a vehicular accident and not the hacking.

HELD: YES. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had
fallen from the bolo hacking perpetrated by Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. This
finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of
Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and
that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence
of the felony committed by the offender.

It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony
committed was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered
superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away
with him.

The hacking incident happened on the national highway where vehicles pass any
moment, the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by a
vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victim’s
death.

Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any qualifying circumstances


Result is different from what was intended

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO

FACTS: VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE


allegedly committed as follows:

On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at
Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10)
centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee
bottle. She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was
maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA
Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at the
appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" The appellant tired of
hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim
(t.s.n., p. 14, Id). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. The appellant was
investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement where she admitted
having burned the victim.

Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity
General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral
Burns 2 secondary. 3

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given;

(2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia
which was the cause of the victim's death.

HELD:

1) YES. No denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police
investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely
affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be
released later.

Furthermore almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were
practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity
of her declarations contained therein
2) YES. The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar
bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim
as shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body.
The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained.
While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to
state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second
degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the
burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory

Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred.

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act


done be different from that which he intended.

The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed;
and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender
Result is different from what was intended

THE UNITED STATES vs. JAMES L. BROBST

FACTS: The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were
engaged in work on a mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave
employment to a number of native laborers.

Mann discharged one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come
back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a
thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers.

A few days afterwards, some time after 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July,
1907, Saldivar, in company with three of four others, went to the mine to look for work.
The defendant, caught sight of Saldivar, ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad
Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to leave, and although the
order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant, whereupon the latter
became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with
his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of
Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended.

On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. (dio vueltas � spun around
helplessly) and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house,
which stood about 200 yards away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he
reached the door of the house, and was buried some two or three days later.

ISSUE: Whether or not Brobst is guilty of homicide and not homicide as a result of
reckless negligence.

HELD: YES.

We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt
that the defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that was
far in excess of such authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or
justified as an exercise of necessary force in the exercise of a right
We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as a result of the blow
inflicted by the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a
laborer in defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he
left her house in apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short
time afterwards he received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body
where many of the vital organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the
short trail leading to his sister's house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of
evidence of any intervening cause, we think there can be no reasonable doubt that
his death resulted from the blow.

In the case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and
unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and
while it is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take the life of his
victim, there can no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some
injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is
therefore, criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act,
under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which prescribes that

Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur


criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that
which he had intended to commit.

In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the
natural consequences of hi illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such
consequences, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance,
as did the trial judge in this case.
Impossible Crime

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA

FACTS: Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the
following information filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila:

The accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt
acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion
of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true
and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on
the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear
the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number.

He presented the falsified ticket. exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that
said number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the
corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket

the said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the
crime of estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some
causes other than this spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to
whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and
immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said
accused right then and there.

ISSUE: whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime

HELD: NO. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a
falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but
the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible
within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal
Code

Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say
that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa
thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had
not exercised due care.

This being a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or


security of the Philippines,.Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be
lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years.
It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
Impossible Crime

SULPICIO INTOD vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos
Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina
Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be
killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the
four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions,
Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that
Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and
his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by
the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness
testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you
were not injured

ISSUE: Whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime

HELD: YES. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility
which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility
occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or


beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar
belongs to this category.
In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing
the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the
phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because
the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will,
will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for
an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of
the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
Impossible Crime

PEOPLE, vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN

FACTS: The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982,
while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez,
Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's
signature on a medical certificate.

Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan. Enrico
became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man
told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father.

After that the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to
Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got suspicious
and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. the tanods went after the two, Somehow,
the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a
passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and
already looking for him.

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an
envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of
Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting
in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the
note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the other hand, Enrico
was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had
detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian.

Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon

ISSUE:

1) whether or not the act constitutes a crime of kidnapping under art 267
2) whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime

HELD:

1) YES. Kidnapping may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but
also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
2) NO. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be
considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its
accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The
delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the
offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico
of his liberty

Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of
Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its
delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and
geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective

The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan
approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him,
angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. 19
The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his
release.
Stages of commission

THE UNITED STATE vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE

FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part
at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to
the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles
and tissues of that part. Fortunately the girl was able to survive

The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that
she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped
her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was
living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed

The accused is charged with frustrated murder. We are satisfied that there was an intent
to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed toward a vital part
of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the
body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had killed the
complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is to be charged with frustrated murder.

HELD: YES. The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the
defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated
crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts.

A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. To put it in another way, in
case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense.

On the other hand, attempted murder is defined as when the offender commences the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own voluntarily desistance. Hence the subjective phase is completely passed.
Subjectively the crime is complete.

The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between
the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that
time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the
acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where he
begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the
offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the
subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but
continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
Rape

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEILITO ORITA

FACTS: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape

The Pertinent information filed in the said case reads as follows:

Complainant, Cristina S. Abayan arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home
from a party Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house All of a
sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.

She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him.

With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.

He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in
her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however,
appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving

Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part
again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor.
Complainant thought of escaping

Still naked, she darted to the municipal building. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his
jacket and wrapped it around her. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant

Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate
(Exhibit "A") which states:

PE Findings � Pertinent Findings only.

Neck- � Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck. Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent
nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.Back Multiple pinpoint marks.Extremities Abrasions at (R) and
(L) knees.Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous (sic)
areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining
finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.

ISSUE: whether or not the accused’s conviction for frustrated rape is proper given that
there was no penetration

HELD: NO.

We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential.
There is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape.
Frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will.

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge defined
by blacks dictionary the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman
of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the
offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the
felony is consummated