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Theodor Adorno 1993 Hegel Three Studies

Theodor Adorno 1993 Hegel Three Studies

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He

g
el
1nree8tudies
` I
He
g
el
1nree8tudies
1neodorW.Adorno
trnslated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen
with an introduction by
Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jeremy]. Shapiro

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Ähc MIÄ Îrcss, Cambrìdµc, Massachusctts,and
London, Inµ!and
··-�·
This edition © 1993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This work originally appeared in German under the title Drei Studien zu Hegel,
© 1963, 1971 Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by
any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or
information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the
publisher.
This book was set in Baskerville by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing
Group and was printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969.
[Drei Studien zu Hegel. English]
Hegel: three studies I Theodor W. Adorno ; translated by Shierry
Weber Nicholsen ; with an introduction by Shierry Weber Nicholsen
and Jeremy J. Shapiro.
p. cm.-(Studies in contemporary German social thought)
Translation of: Drei Studien zu Hegel.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-01 131-X
1 . Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770- 1831. 1. Title.
11. Series.
B2948.A3213 1993
193---dc20
•,--~ ·=:*r ×·ª·t. ¬ ,, •


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92-23161
CIP
Îor Kar! Hcìnz Haaµ
J.¯¹^'
Contents
Introductìonby 5hìcrryWcbcrlìcho!scnand
JcrcmyJ. 5hapìro
Îrctacc
A lotc onthcJcxt
Idìtorìa!Kcmarkstromthc GcrmanIdìtìon
Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy
The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy
Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel
lotcs
lamcIndcx
ix
xxxv
xxxvìì
xxxix
I
53
89
I49
I59
Introduction
8nierryWeoerNicno|sen
|eremy|.8napiro
IsaluteyoufromthePetrihedForestofhumanculture
Wherenothingisleftstanding
Butwhereroamgreatswirlinglights
Whichcallforthedeliveranceoffoliageandbird.
Fromyourhngersßowsthesapoftreesinßower.
Andre Breton, OdetoCharlesFourier
Jhc dcvcIopmcnt otcrítícaI phíIosophy and socíaIthcoryín thc
twcntícth ccntury, cspccíaIIy that ot Jhcodor W. Adorno and
thcÎrankturt5chooI,hasbccníntímatcIyIínkcdwíththcappro-
príatíon and rcíntcrprctatíon otthc thínkcrs otGcrman IdcaI-
ísm, most notabIy HcµcI. 5uch thínkcrs as Adorno, Max
Horkhcímcr, Hcrbcrt Marcusc, andJï\rµcnHabcrmas, throuµh
a crítícaI hcrmcncutíc díaIoµuc wíth Kant, 5chíIIcr, 5chcIIínµ,
HcµcI, 5chopcnhaucr, Marx, Kícrkcµaard, and líctzschc, cIab-
oratcdthcírown thcorctícaI ocuvrc and rcíntcrprctcd thc trcnds
and contradíctíons oÍthc prcscnt hístorícaI pcríod throuµh thc
pcrspcctívcprovídcdbythcsc nínctccnth-ccnturyphíIosophcrs.
Atthcsamctímc, thcymadcímportantcontríbutíonstoourun-
dcrstandínµ ot thcsc thínkcrs. Jo do so, thcy had to pry thc
carIícr phíIosophcrs' thouµht out ottradítíonaI acadcmíc, doµ-
x
Introduction
matíc,andídcoIoµícaIíntcrprctatíonsínordcrtountoIdthccorc
conccptsandcrítíquccontaíncdínthcírwork. Jhíshcrmcncutíc
was contínuousIy cIaboratcd as part ot a radícaI poIítícaI, cuI-
turaI, and socíaIcrítíqucotadvanccd capítaIísm and authorítar-
ían poIítícaI tcndcncícs. It was undcrtakcn wíth thc cx
]
Iícít
convíctíon that¡osítívístícand onc-dímcnsíonaI thínkínµwasín-
hcrcnt ín thc a¡
]
aratus ot domínatíon ín advanccd índustríaI
socícty and that thc ma¡or nínctccnth-ccntur
)
Gcrman¡híIoso-
phcrs, cspccíaIwín thcírcrítíqucotnarrow InIíµhtcnmci¡�and
positívístJhíuKÌU
µ,
O
m
OJ|pJ�Vthctoundatíonstorancwcrít-
ícaI rcIatíonshmto÷dva c�d índustríaI soc ícty. It ís quítc char-
actcrístíc that thc carIícst works ot thc ma]or thínkcrs ot thc
Îrankturt 5chooI (ítwc íncIudc thcír doctoraI dísscrtatíons and
Habilitationsschriften) íncIudc ma]or studícs ot Kant, 5chíIIcr,
5chcIIínµ, HcµcI, and Kícrkcµaard, and that thcír Iatcr works
íncIudc studícs otHcµcI, Marx, 5chopcnhaucr, and líctzschc,
as wcIIas otÎrcud and MaxWcbcr,whom thc crítícaI thcorísts
saw as thc brídµc bctwccn thc phíIosophícaI tradítíon and thc
socíaI scícnccs. In addítíon, thcy anaIyzcd ma]or twcntícth-ccn-
tury thínkcrs, íncIudínµ HusscrI, Hcídcµµcr, 5artrc, Dcwcy,
Larnap, and Wíttµcnstcín, asphíIosophcr-ídcoIoµísts.
Jhc corc otthc crítícaI thcorísts' approach ís thc ímmancnt
crítíquc otídcoIoµy. Jruth ís attaíncdbvuntoIdínµboththctruth
contcntand thc contradíctíons otthouµht throuµh Iínkínµ ít to
1hO truth contcnt and contradíctíons ot íts socíaI contcxt and
commítmcnts.JhísIcadsto ahístorícaIIyrcIatívízcd t
¡¡µ¡|
atís
maxímaII_unívcrsaI¡rccíscIythrouµhawarcncssotítshístorícaI
andsocíaIsítuatíonandIímítatíons.JhccrítíqucotídcoIoµymcans
takínµ thco:y at íts wo:d and at íts dccd. I Icncc thc Îrankturl
·

5chooIproduccdan ímposínµscrícsotcrítícaIhcrmcncutícstudícs
otsocíaI thcory and phíIosophy, most otwhích arc ímport
n
nt
bothas phíIosophícaI and socíoIoµícaI works ín thcír own ríµh
;

Xl
Introduction
andasvaIuabIccontríbutíonstothcundcrstandínµotothcrthc-
orísts. ' lo othcr thínkcr was as ímportant to thís crítícaI hcr-
mcncutícs as HcµcI. Jhc crítícaI thcorísts aímcd ata díaIcctícaI
mcthod thatwas notcmbroíIcd ín thc vaµarícs otsocíaIístparty
poIítícs and posítívístícormctaphysícaI íntcrprctatíons otMarx.
Inboth HcµcIand Marx, thcdíaIcctícaImcthodcIaímcdto pro-
vídcaunítyotthcorctícaIand practícaIrcasonthatsccmcdtorn
asundcr ín contcmporary cívíIízatíon and phíIosophy. And thc
systcmatíc charactcr ot HcµcI's thínkínµ
]
romíscd a
]
ossíbIc
uníbcatíon otthchuman scícnccsthatthccrítíca thcorísts souµht
to brínµ about tor thc radícaI undcrstandínµ otcontcm
]
orary
socíctv throuµh thc íntcµratíon ot socíoIo
k)�
choIoµy, cco-
nomícs,
]
oIítícaI scícncc, and
_
DìÌ
��
o
Y
. HcµcI's own crítíquc
otthcIímítatíonsotthcscícntíbcworId vícwonthconchandand
íts romantíc aItcrnatívc on thc othcr- an íntcIIcctuaI sítuatíon
thatínsomcwaysparaIIcIsthatotthc]uxtaposítíonottwcntícth-
ccntury posítívísm and praµmatísm on thc onc hand and phc-
nomcnoIoµy, cxístcntíaIísm, and hcrmcncutícs on thc othcr-
suµµcstcd an anaIoµous crítíquc otthcsc contcmporary schooIs
otthouµht. HcµcIcIaímcd, and íntcndcd, tobc thc cuImínatíon
otWcstcrn ratíonaIísm, and thís madc hís thouµht an appro-
príatc tocus tor thc crítíquc otWcstcrn cívíIízatíon. Abovc aII,
�cI's tocus on
·
thc ncµatívc and thc
]
owcr otncµatíon and
contradíctíon ínhcrcnt ín thouµht and rcaIít
)
sccmcd a kcy to
rcscuínµthcncqatívctromthcovcrwhcImínµatbrmatívc
]
owcr
otadvanccdíndustríaI socícty.

Adorno,and MarcuscaswcII, rcµardcd HcµcI, dcspítc hísob-
víousconscrvatívc tcndcncícs, asthctrucrcvoIutíonary thínkcr-
pcrhaps morc so than Marx-ítthcncµatívc and díaIcctícaIcorc
ot thís thouµht couId bc rcscucd trom íts cmbcddcdncss ín a
doctrínc otundíaIcctícaI aHrmatíon, rcconcíIíatíon, and uníb-
catíon.Marcusc, ínReaon an Revolution, pubIíshcd ahat-ccntury
xii
Introduction
aµo, attcmptcd toartícuIatc thcncµatívc, crítícaI,anddíaIcctícaI
corc otHcµcI's thouµht and to prcscrvc ítína propcrIyundcr-
stood Marxísm. a Marxísm thatsynthcsízcs thc humanístíccorc
otMarx'scarIywrítínµs,thchístorícaImatcríaIísmotthcGeran
Ideolog, and thc díaIcctícaI anaIysís contaíncd ín Marx's maturc
cconomíc thcory. Marcusc, skcptícaIotthcrcvoIutíonarypotcn-
tíaI otcíthcr socíaI dcmocracy or Lcníníst communísm, ncvcr-
thcIcsssawínHcµcI adíaIcctícaImcthod thatcouIdbc thcbasís
tor a socíaIísm appropríatc to thc hístorícaI sítuatíon ot ad-
vanccd índustríaI socícty. IubIíshcddurínµWorIdWarII, Rea­
son and Revolution Iookcd toward thís humanístícaIIy and
díaIcctícaIIyrcµcncratcdMarxísmasahístorícaI possíbíIíty attcr
thc dctcat otlazísm. Adorno, wrítínµ attcr WorId War II and
thcstabíIízatíon otthc domínatíonstructurcotadvanccdíndus-
tríaI socícty toIIowínµ thc dctcat ot lazísm, and attcr hís and
Max Horkhcímcr's Dialectic of Enlightenment, whích tocuscs on
capítaIístíndustríaIísm's abíIítytocIímínatcaIIopposítíonto thc
domínatíon otboth íntcrnaI and cxtcrnaI naturc, souµht to rc-
cupcratc ín HcµcI thc basís tor a díaIcctíc otrcsístancc to that
powcrotdomínatíonbyconccntratínµonthc nonídcntícaI, that
whíchísbcyond thc domínatíon otrcason.
In thcír íntcrprctatíons otHcµcI, both Marcusc and Adorno
attcmpttoprovídcaphíIosophícaIbasístor¨ncµatívc thínkínµ¨.
tor thouµht that dcsírcs to trcc ítscIt trom thc shackIcs otthc
¨Ioµos ot domínatíon¨ and to scrvc as a basís tor and íntcrprc-
tatíon otcmancípatíon ín thc broadcst hístorícaI scnsc-cman-
cípatíon trom cIass domínatíon, trom thc ¨íron caµc" ot
burcaucratícratíonaIíty, tromthctcrrorworIdotthcconccntra-
tíon camp, trom thc ¨pcrtormancc príncípIc," and Irom onc-
dímcnsíonaI thouµht, admínístcrcd cuIturc, and dctormcd
cxpcrícncc. Ovcr thc haItccnturysíncc thc pubIícatíon otMar-
cusc's Reason and Revolution, and dcspítc onµoínµcmancípatory
xiii
Introduction
undcrcurrcnts and outbrcaks otcmancípatory movcmcnts, thc
abíIíty otthc unívcrsaI markctsocícty, combíncd wíth powcrtuI
statc tormatíons, to controI or absorb opposítíon and cut ottaI-
tcrnatívcsappcarstOhavcíncrcascd. ßutasAdornosaysín¨As-
pcctsotHcµcI'sIhíIosophy,"
aworldintegrated through ºproduction,¨through theexchangerela-
tionship, dependsinallits momentsonthesocialconditionsofitspro-
duction,and in that sense actuallyrealizes the primacy ofthe whole
over its parts, in thisregard thedesperate impotence ofevery single
individual nowverihes Hegel's extravagantconception ofthe system.
.. .Theself-forgetfulnessofproduction,theinsatiableanddestructive
expansive principle ofthe exchange society, is reßected in Hegelian
metaphysics. Itdescribcsthewaytheworldactuallyis,notinhistorical
perspectivebutinessence.
Jhís contínuíty ín ¨thc way thc worId actuaIIy ís" caIIstorrc-
ncwcdncµatívcordíaIcctícaI thínkínµ, andhcncctorarcncwcd
undcrstandínµ ot HcµcI, who was íts toundcr ín an cmphatíc
scnsc. AndthísmcthodotthouµhtandanaIysíscannotbcsímpIy
an opposítíon or ncµatíon trom thc outsídc. Kathcr, to usc thc
conccpt that both Marcusc and Adorno ídcntíhcd as ccntraI to
HcµcI,ítmustbc¨dctcrmínatcncµatíon,"ncµatíonthatcmcrµcs
out otand ís spccíhc to what ít ncµatcs, and that ís part otíts
vcrycsscncc.Jhatíswhyncµatívc thínkínµ, ordíaIcctícaIthínk-
ínµ, ísbothamcthodand notamcthod.
IríortorcccntcurrcntsotantítoundatíonaIísm,aIIotmodcrn
phíIosophywasmarkcdbyastruµµIc tor mcthod.Jhísímpctus
cxtcnds tromDcscartcs'sDiscourse throuµh Kant's Critique, Hc-
µcI's Phenomenolog and Logc, and Marx's Geran Ideolog to
HusscrI's Ideas and thc wrítínµs otthc carIy Wíttµcnstcín and
Larnap. Jhc príoríty otmcthod ís íntímatcIy Iínkcd wíth thc
ídcaotthcsu
[
]cct-cpístcmoIoµícaImcthod,IoµícaItoundatíon,
and thc µroundínµ otknowIcdµc and truth ín thc sub]cct arc
XIV
Introduction
partotasínµIc hístorícaI pro]cct. Ivcnthccrítíqucotthcbour-
µcoís notíon otthc sub]cctínMarx and crítícaIthcoryíscarrícd
out ín thc íntcrcst ota Icss rcstríctívc, Icss rcprcssívc, and Icss
rcprcsscd sub]cct. 5íncc Lukács's announccmcnt, ín Histor and
Class Consciousness, that orthodoxy ín Marxísm ís a mattcr ot
mcthodrathcrthanotcontcnt,thcdcvcIopmcntotMarxíanso-
cíaIthcory has bccn bound upwíth thc qucstíon otthc naturc
otthís mcthod and thcrcIatcd qucstíon otthchístorícaIsub]cct.
JhccrítícaIthcorístsotthcÎrankturt5chooI,ínpartícuIar,wcrc
prcoccupícdwíth thísqucstíon, ín thcIíµhtotthcIapsínµotthc
rcvoIutíonaryworkínµcIassasahístorícaIsub]cct.WhcrcasLukács
ídcntíhcd thcsub]cctwíth thcworkínµcIass and thc Lommuníst
party, thc crítícaI thcorísts' cconomíc, socíoIoµícaI, and cuIturaI
¬
naIysís, combíncdwíth thc coursc otpoIítícaI cvcnts, couId not
supportthís ídcntíhcatíon. Hcncc ncíthcr Marcusc nor Adorno
couId anyIonµcr¨transccnd" HcµcI, as Marxhad, by pro]cctínµ
HcµcI'scatcµorícsontosocíaIcatcµorícs(aIthouµhMarcusccon-
tínucd tobcconccrncdwíththcqucstíonotancmcrµcnthístor-
ícaI sub]cct)

Jo thc contrary, crítícaI thcoryrcturncd to HcµcI
partIyoutotthcbankruptcyotprccíscIythísMarxían¨ovcrcom-
ínµ"andpro]cctíonotHcµcI.
Adorno's thouµhtínµcncraI, and hísíntcrprctatíonotHcµcI
ín partícuIar, scts ítscItan íroníc task. thatotdcvcIopínµ a día-
IcctícaI mcthod, wíth íts conncctíons to a scIt-rcbcctívc sub]cct,
ín a contcxtdch ncd as onc ínwhích thc sub]ccthasbccn Iíquí-
datcdbyítsown attcmpttoIíquídatc cvcrythínµoutsídcotítscII
And hís díaIcctícaI thouµht cannot mcrcIy attcmpt to rcsurrcct
thc Iíquídatcd sub]cct. Îor a truc, ncµatívc díaIcctíc must strívc
to attaín prccíscIy thatothcrncss thatísdcnícd by a sub]cct-orí-
cntcd díaIcctíc. JhatíswhyAdornodíttcrcntíatcs hímscIttrom
HcµcI most cmphatícaIIy ín rcIatíon to thc conccpts ot ídcntíty
and nonídcntíty. In a tcIIínµ and paradoxícaI tormuIatíon that
xv
Introduction
IuIIy¢×u¡¢ss¢s C¢¡nan Id¢aIIsn'sa¡¡¢nu¡¡o¡¢duc¢¢v¢¡y¡!Ing
¡o su5j¢c¡n¢ss, H¢g¢I a¡gu¢d Io¡ ¡!¢ Id¢n¡I¡y oI Id¢n¡I¡y and
nonId¢n¡I¡y.Ev¢n¡!a¡w!Ic!Isnos¡¡¢sIs¡an¡¡o,o¡ou¡sId¢,¡!¢
su5j¢c¡and¡!¢conc¢u¡Isconc¢Iv¢dasanon¢n¡oIan und¢¡-
IyIngunI¡y¡!a¡IsI¡s¢IIsu5j¢c¡andconc¢u¡,¡!usconv¢¡¡Ing¡¢c-
ognI¡IonoI¡!¢IInI¡a¡IonoI¡a¡IonaII¡yIn¡oa!Idd¢naI6¡na¡Ion
oI I¡. Adovno's own auu¡oac! ¡o ºs¡andIng H¢g¢I on !Is !¢ad"
was¡oa¡gu¢u¡¢cIs¢IyIo¡¡!¢ ºnonId¢n¡I¡yoIId¢n¡I¡yandnon-
Id¢n¡I¡y".su5j¢c¡n¢ssandnInd,In¡!os¢v¢¡yacconuIIs!n¢n¡s
In w!Ic! ¡!¢y!av¢nos¡ ¡¢cognIz¢d w!a¡Is 5¢yond o¡ou¡sId¢
¡!¢n,nus¡s¡¡aIn¡owa¡don¢Iu¡¡!¢¡dIn¢nsIonoI¡!¢º5¢yond-
n¢ss"oI¡!Is º5¢yond,"¡¢cognIzIng¡!a¡I¡Is¡¢aIIy5¢yond~y¢¡
wI¡!ou¡ ¡!¢¡¢5y ¡¢ducIng ¡!¢ns¢Iv¢s ¡o sIavIs! !¢¡¢¡onony o¡
s¢II-¢IIac¢n¢n¡.
H¢nc¢ Ado¡no's �nsIs¡¢nc¢ on ¡!¢ ¢×u¢¡I¢n¡IaI con¡¢n¡ oI
H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y andon¡!¢Inu¢¡a¡Iv¢¡!a¡adIaI¢c¡IcaI u!I-
Iosou!y Inn¢¡s¢ I¡s¢II In ¡!¢ ¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢ oI ¡!¢ o5j¢c�. T!a¡ Is
w!y,Io¡ Ado¡no,¡!¢dIaI¢c¡IcaIn¢¡!od canno¡5¢¡¢duc¢d¡oa
s¢¡ oI a×Ioms o¡ Io¡muIas. M¢¡!od In ¡!a¡ s¢ns¢ Is In!¢¡¢n¡Iy
su5j¢c¡IvIs¡Ic, In ¡!a¡ I¡ u¡csun¢s ¡!a¡ ¡¢aII¡y conv¢nI¢n¡Iy a¡-
¡ang¢s I¡s¢II In acco¡danc¢ wI¡! ¡!¢uos¡uIa¡¢s and u¡¢I¢¡¢:tc¢s
oI ¡!oug!¡. IIdIaI¢c¡IcaI ¡hIn!Ing Is¡o avoId ¡!IsId¢aIIs¡Icu¡¢�
sunu¡Ion (w!Ic! can ¢asIIy ¡a!¢ on a na¡¢¡IaIIs¡Ic Io¡n, as In
ºdIaI¢c¡IcaI ma¡¢¡IaIIsn"), ¡!¢n I¡ nus¡ s!au¢ I¡s¢II ¡o ¡!¢ con-
¡ou¡soI¡!¢o5j¢c¡~no¡asanI¡¡¢ducI5I¢gIv¢n5uiasson¢¡!Ing
wI¡!I¡sown¡¢nsIonsandcon¡¡adIc¡Ions,w!Ic!IncIud¢¡!os¢oI
¡!¢ ¡!oug!¡ ¡!a¡ ¡¡I¢s ¡o conu¡¢!¢nd I¡. T!Is auu¡oac! !oIds
¢quaIIyIov¡!¢und¢¡s¡andIngoI H¢g¢I'sown¡!oug!¡,Ioo!Ing
Io¡ I¡s ¡¡u¡! 5o¡! In w!a¡ I¡ g¡asus and In w!a¡ I¡ conc¢aIs, In
w!a¡ I¡ uoIn¡s ¡o 5¢yond I¡s¢II as w¢II asIn w!a¡ !¢¢us I¡ I¡on
g¡asuIng¡!a¡¡ow!Ic!I¡uoIn¡s,Inw!a¡I¡saysasw¢IIasInw!a¡
I¡¡¡I¢s¡osay5u¡cannor.
Introduction
Ado¡no'sHegel ¡sno¡n¢¡¢IyaI¢sson¡nn¢ga¡¡v¢¡!¡n!¡ng. I¡
¡s aIso, I¡!¢ aII !¡s wo¡!, a I¢sson ¡n n¢ga¡¡v¢ ¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢. H¡s
n¢¡!od ¡s an ¡nd¡ssoIu5I¢ un¡¡y oI ¡!¡n!¡ng and ¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¡ng.
¡!¡s¡s¡!¢un¡Iy¡ng¡!¡¢ad¡!a¡¡uns¡!¡oug!aII !¡swo¡!,I¡on
Negative Dialectics and¡!¢s¢¢ssaysonH¢g¢I¡!¡oug!!¡sanaIys¢s
oI nus¡caI and I¡¡¢¡a¡y wo¡!s ¡o !¡s u¢¡sonaI ¡¢8¢c¡¡ons and
au!o¡¡sns. T!¡s ¡s u¢¡!aus w!a¡ nos¡ d¡s¡¡ngu¡s!¢s Ado¡no's
c¡¡¡¡caI ¡!¢o¡yI¡ono¡!¢¡cu¡¡¢n¡soIn¢o-Ma¡×¡an¡!¢o¡y. No¡
onIy s!ouId ¡¡ no¡ 5¢ und¢¡s¡ood as n¢¡¢ ¡!¢o¡y, ¡¡ ¡s no¡ an
a¡¡¢nu¡(!ow¢v¢¡ß aw¢d) a¡aun¡¡yoI¡!¢o¡yandu¡ac¡¡c¢.Ra¡!¢¡,
¡¡ ¡n¡¢nds ¡o 5¢ an ¢ns¢n5I¢ ¡!a¡ ¡n¡¢g¡a¡¢s ¡!¢o¡y, ¡!¢ o¡¡¢n-
¡a¡¡onoIu¡ac¡¡c¢,and¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢ands¢ns¡5¡I¡¡y.Ind¢�d,Aðo¡-
no'swo¡!,aIonzw¡¡!¡!a¡oI B¢njan¡n,¡s¡nua¡¡ana¡zun¢�¡
¡!a¡¡!¢no¡¡onoJ¡!:eiy,p¡_c¡¡c¢,and¡!¢¡¡un¡¡y,as Iound¡n
¡!¢ Ma¡×¡an¡¡ad¡¡¡on,¡sd¢I¢c¡¡v¢~u¡¢c¡s¢Iy5¢caus¢oIand¡o
¡!¢ ¢×¡¢n¡ oI ¡¡s n¢gI¢c¡ oI¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢. I¡¡s ¡!¡s asu¢c¡ oI !¡s

w¡!a¡¡snos¡¡ad¡caIand,¡oson¢,¡nd¡g¢s¡¡5I¢.
Ado¡no'swo¡!¡s¡!usanod¢I oIa ua¡¡¡cuIa¡wayoI¢×u¢¡¡-
¢nc¡nq¡!¢ wo¡Id. I¡ ¡s an ¢×uI¡c¡¡ and ¡nuI¡c¡¡ a¡mn¢n¡ ¡!a¡
�a¡¡v¢¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢¡s¡!¢au¡!¢n¡¡cIo¡n oI¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢Io¡¡!os¢
w!oI¡v¢¡n a con¡¡ad¡c¡ov, an¡azon¡s¡¡csoc¡¢r,an uus¡d¢-down,
p¢¡v¢¡¡¢d wo¡Id. T!a¡ ¡s w!y Ado¡no's ¡n¡¢n¡¡on ¡n Hegel and
{ !¡s o¡!¢¡ wo¡! ¡s ¡n Ia¡g¢ ua¡¡ ¡!¢ u¡¢s¢¡va¡¡on, d¢v¢Ioun¢n¡,¸ ª
and ¡¡ansn¡ss¡onoIa su¢c¡6c¡¢Ia¡¡on ¡o¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢,w!¡c! ¡¢-•.
Ia¡¢s¡ow!a¡ ¡s5y ¡¢Ia¡¡ng ¡ow!a¡¡sno¡,and¡¢Ia¡¢s¡ow!a¡¡s
no¡5y¡¢Ia¡¡ng¡ow!a¡¡s.And¡¡¡s5¢caus¢H¢g¢I¡anu!¡Iosou!y
¡s¡!¢ h¡s¡a¡¡¡cuIa¡¡onoI¡!¢sa¡u¡a¡¡onoI¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢w¡¡!n¢g-

a¡¡v¡¡y ¡!a¡ Ado¡noass¢¡¡s¡!a¡ º¡!¢s¢days¡¡¡s!a¡dIy uoss¡5I¢
Io¡a¡!¢o¡¢¡¡caI¡d¢aoIanyscou¢¡odojus¡¡c¢¡o¡!¢¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢
oI consc¡ousn¢ss, and ¡n Iac¡ no¡ onIy ¡!¢ ¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢ oI con-
sc¡ousn¢ss 5u¡¡!¢5od¡Iy¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢oI ¡!¢!unan5¢¡ng,w¡¡!-
ou¡ !av¡ng ¡nco¡uo¡a¡¢d son¢¡!¡ng oI H¢g¢I's u!¡Iosou!y."
( ºAsu¢c¡s")
XVll
Introduction
t
Fo¡anIndIvIduaIIIvInqIn acon¡¡adIc¡o¡y,u¢¡v¢¡¡¢dsocI¢¡y,
dIaI¢c¡IcaI¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢Isan¢ss¢n¡IaIv¢hIcI¢Io¡¡!¢u¡¢s¢¡va¡Ion
no¡ onIyoI ¡!¢ ¡¡u¡!~¡!¢cognI¡Iv¢ ¡¡u¡! a5ou¡ ¡!a¡ socI¢¡y-
5u¡oI!Iso¡!¢¡ownId¢n¡I¡y.T!a¡Isw!y n¢ga¡Iv¢¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢
uan¢xµm:nc¢no¡onIyoI n¢ga¡Ion 5u¡aIsooI aH¡natIon. I¡
Is ¡¡u¢ ¡!a¡ nuc! oI ¡!¢ nod¢¡n ¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢ oI ¡!¢ u¢¡v¢¡¡¢d
wo¡Id¡a!¢s¡!¢Io¡n oI Inn¢dIa¡¢n¢ga¡Ion, oInaus¢a,s!oc!,
aII¢na¡Ion,dIssonanc¢,andd¢suaI¡. Bu¡w!II¢¡!¢¢×u¡¢saiono!
¡!Isn¢ga¡IonIsaua¡¡oI¡!¢¡¡u¡!,I¡IsonIyaua¡¡IaIIyd¢v¢Iou¢d
Io¡noII¡.Fo¡¡!¢¡¢aI¡¡u¡!a5ou¡¡¢aII¡yIncIud¢sawa¡¢n¢ssoI
¡!¢uo¡¢n¡IaII¡y,¡!¢d¢sI¡¢,and¡!¢jus¡Ihca¡IonIo¡¡¡ansc¢ndIng
¡!¢u¢¡v¢¡¡¢dwo¡Id.I¡nus¡go5¢yond¡!¢n¢¡¢!ydIaI¢c¡IcaI¡o
w!a¡H¢g¢IcaIIs¡!¢su¢cuIa¡Iv¢,Inw!Ic!¡!¢an¡agonIsnsoI¡!¢
dIaI¢c¡Ic a¡¢ ¡¢soIv¢d. T!¢Ind¡vIduaI In advanc¢d cauI¡aIIs¡ s o-
cI¢¡y, w!o ¡¢cognIz¢st!a¡ no¡!Ing ·I¡!In ¡!a¡ socI¢¡y ¢scau¢s
con¡anIna¡Ion5ydonIna¡Ionand¡!¢connodI¡yu¡IncIuI¢,can
naIn¡aIna¡¡u¢Id¢n¡I¡yonIy¡!¡oug!¡!¢n¢ga¡IonoIaII¡!¢gIv-
¢nsoI¡!¢su¡¡oundIngsocI¢¡yandcuI¡u¡¢.Suc!an¢×Is¡¢nc¢Is
gov¢¡n¢d 5yo¡I¢n¡a¡Ion¡o¡!¢¡¡u�!. I¡¡¢!a¡¢s,¡!¡oug!dIaI¢c-
¡IcaI¡!oug!¡,u¡ac¡Ic¢,and¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢,¡o¡!¢¢ss¢nc¢oI¡!Ings.
Bu¡¡!¡oug!¡!Is¡¢Ia¡Ion,I¡dIsc¢¡nsand¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢s¡!¢good,
¡!¢¡¡u¢,and¡!¢5¢au¡IIuI¡!¡oug! ¡!¢I¡ d¢Io¡na¡Ions~as ¡!¢
n¢ga¡Ion oI ¡!¢ Ia¡¡¢¡, and as ¡¢aI In ¡!Is n¢ga¡Ion. I¡ uu¡su¢s
I¡¢¢don and !auuIn¢ss in a ¡¢u¡¢ssIv¢ and ouu¡¢ssIv¢ socI¢¡y
wI¡!ou¡Id¢oIogIcaIIyd¢nyIng ¡!Is¡¢u¡¢ssIonandouu¡¢ssIon. I¡
uu¡su¢s¡!¢III¢oIac¡I¡IcaIIn¡¢II¢c¡wI¡!ou¡suII¢¡Ing¡!¢d¢Io¡-
na¡Ionand ¡IgIdIIca¡IonoI¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢¡!a¡Is¡!¢no¡naI Io¡n
oIIn¡¢II¢c¡uaI III¢IncauI¡aIIs¡socI¢¡y.
Bo¡! Ma¡cus¢'sReaon an Revolution and Ado¡no'sHegel: Three
Studies a¡¢wo¡!soI ¡!¢c¡I¡IcaI¡!¢o¡Is¡sas ¡¢ac!¢¡sw!owan¡¡o
uasson¡oac¡uaIo¡ uo¡¢n¡IaI s¡ud¢n¡s¡!¢¡ooIsoI¡!oug!¡¡!a¡
wIII ¢na5I¢¡!¢n ¡o ca¡¡y ou¡¡!¢ dIIcuI¡¡as!s InvoIv¢d In ¡!¢
c¡I¡IcaIanaIysIsoI¡!¢wo¡IdandoI¡!oug!¡.Ma¡cus¢and Ado¡no
Introduction
a¡¢¡¢ac!¢¡sno¡as¢×uound¢¡soI doc¡¡In¢,!ow¢v¢¡,5u¡asIn-
¡¢¡u¡¢¡¢¡soI¡¢×¡s¡!a¡a¡¢anong¡!¢nos¡dIIhcuI¡andcon¡¡a-
dIc¡o¡yoInod¢¡n¡!oug!¡.¡¢×¡s¡!a¡,d¢suI¡¢¡!¢I¡¢nu!asIson
¡¢ason, auu¢a¡ !¢¡n¢¡Icand,as Ado¡no s¡a¡¢s,occasIonaIIyun-
d¢cIu!¢¡a5I¢. In 5o¡! wo¡!son¢ d¢¡¢c¡s¡!¢ ua¡!os oI¡¢ac!¢¡s
w!oa¡¢conc¢¡n¢dI¢s¡¡a¡¢andu¡¢cIous¡ooIs¡!a¡can accon-
uIIs! na¡v¢Is IaII In¡o dIsus¢ suc! ¡!a¡ Iu¡u¡¢ g¢n¢¡a¡Ions nay
no Iong¢¡ 5¢ a5I¢ ¡o na¡c! ¡!¢I¡ anc¢s¡o¡s' ac!I¢v¢n¢n¡s, ¡!¢
way u¢¡!aus Ia¡¢-Ronan II¡¢¡a¡I nay !av¢ vI¢w¢d ¡!¢ ¡¡adI¡Ion
oI ¡!¢¡o¡Ic, o¡ ¡!¢way c¡aI¡su¢ouI¢nay Ioo!a¡¡!¢ su¢cIaIIz¢d
!nowI¢dg¢¡!a¡IsIos¡Innassu¡oduc¡Ionandau¡ona¡Ion.
T!us w!II¢ Hegel: Three Studies Is c¢¡¡aInIy a wo¡! oI H¢g¢I
sc!oIa¡s!IuandIn¡¢¡u¡¢¡a¡Ion,I¡IsaIsoawo¡!oIu¢dagogy.OI
Ado¡no's w¡I¡Ings I¡ Is u¢¡!aus¡!¢ cIos¢s¡ ¡o ¡¢u¡¢s¢n¡Ing ¡!¢
In¡¢II¢c¡uaI a¡nosu!¢¡¢ands¡yI¢oIwo¡!IngoIAdo¡no'sPhilo­
sophisches Haupteminar (P!IIosou!y S¢nIna¡) a¡ ¡!¢ 1o!ann
WoIIgangCo¢¡!¢UnIv¢¡sI¡yInF¡an!Iu¡¡du¡Ing¡!¢Ias¡d¢cad¢
oIAdo¡no'sIII¢,w!¢n!¢!ad5¢con¢on¢oIuos¡wa¡C¢¡nany's
u!IIosou!IcaI IunIna¡I¢s and In8u¢n¡IaI ¡¢ac!¢¡s. T!¢ P!IIo-
sou!Isc!¢s Hauu¡s¢nIna¡wasgIv¢n¢v¢¡ys¢n¢s¡¢¡andwasd¢-
vo¡¢daInos¡¢×cIusIv¢Iy¡o¡!¢u¡Ina¡ywo¡!soI Kan¡and H¢g¢I.
I¡ was In ¡!¢s¢ s¢nIna¡s~as w¢II as In ¡¢Ia¡¢d I¢c¡u¡¢s a¡ ¡!¢
UnIv¢¡sI¡y~¡!a¡ Ado¡no u!IIosou!IcaIIy eIa5o¡a¡¢d ¡!¢ n¢ga-
¡Iv¢dIaI¢c¡Ics oI !IsIa¡¢¡¡!oug!¡. T!¢s¢ s¢nIna¡s andI¢c¡u¡¢s
w¢¡¢au¡Ina¡yIn8u¢nc¢on¡!¢In¡¢II¢c¡uaII¢ad¢¡soI¡!¢ C¢¡-
nan N¢w L¢u. AI¡¢qu¢n¡Iy¡oIds¡ud¢n¡ jo!¢In F¡an!Iu¡¡w¢n¡,
¨T!¢R¢voIu¡IonIs5¡¢a!Ingou¡on¡!¢s¡¡¢¢¡.Too5ad~Ican'¡
nIssAdo¡no'sI¢c¡u¡¢."
T!¢ I¢a¡u¡¢s oIAdo¡no's u!IIosou!IcaI s¢nIna¡s ¡!a¡ s¡and
ou¡In¡¢coII¢c¡Ion hgu¡¢u¡onIn¢n¡Iy In ¡!¢ H¢g¢I¢ssaysasw¢II.
T!¢ h¡s¡wasadIaIogu¢anong¡!¡¢¢ua¡¡IcIuan¡s. Kan¡, H¢g¢I,
andAdo¡no(and Ma× Ho¡!!¢In¢¡w!¢n!¢wass¡IIIua¡¡IcIua¡-
xix
Introduction
Ing In ¡!¢ s¢nIna¡), In w!Ic! Ado¡no a¡¡¢nu¡¢d ¡o 5¡Ing ou¡
5o¡!¡!¢¡¢Ia¡Iv¢¡¡u¡!con¡¢n¡and¡!¢¡¢Ia¡Iv¢IInI¡a¡IonoIKan¡
andH¢g¢IIn¡¢Ia¡Ion¡oon¢ano¡!¢¡,agaIns¡¡!¢5ac!g¡oundoI
Ma¡×Ian,na¡¢¡IaIIs¡assunu¡Ions.Ado¡novIndIca¡¢d5o¡! H¢g¢I's
a¡gun¢n¡agaIns¡ Kan¡~¡!a¡¡!¢IInI¡a¡IonsoI¡¢asons¢¡5y Kan¡
aI¡¢ady InuII¢d ¡!¢ ¡¡ansc¢nd¢nc¢ oI ¡!¢s¢ IInI¡s~and Kan¡'s
a¡gun¢n¡ Io¡ ¡!¢n¢c¢ssI¡y oI son¢¡!Ing ou¡sId¢ ¡!¢ ¡o¡aIIzIng
¡¢nd¢ncy oI¡!oug!¡. T!¢s¢condwas¡!¢c¢n¡¡aII¡y oI ¡!¢ H¢-
g¢IIanca¡¢go¡yoIn¢dIa¡Ion¡o¢v¢¡yasu¢c¡oIdIaI¢c¡IcaI¡!In!-
Ing. Mos¡ oI ¡!¢u!IIosou!IcaI cu¡x¢n¡s and sc!ooIs oI ¡!oug!¡
oI5o¡! H¢g¢I'sdayandou¡ownuosI¡,asa5soIu¡¢so¡I¡¡¢ducI-
5I¢ gIv¢ns, u¡IncIuI¢s o¡ ¢n¡I¡I¢s ¡!a¡ a¡¢ In Iac¡ ¡!¢ ¡¢suI¡s oI
a5s¡¡ac¡Iono¡ non¢n¡sInu¡oc¢ss¢sou¡sId¢¡!¢ns¢Iv¢s ¡!a¡¡!¢y
do no¡¡a!¢In¡o accoun¡~¡!¢Iadd¢¡¡!a¡¡!¢y !av¢ cIIn5¢duu
and ¡!¡own away,¡ous¢WI¡¡g¢ns¡¢In's u!¡as¢. T!¢aInoIdIa-
I¢c¡IcaI¡!In!IngIs¡o¡!In!no¡a5s¡¡ac¡Iy5u¡concretely, 5yund¢¡-
s¡andIngId¢asand¡¢aII¡I¢sIn¡!¢con¡¡adIc¡IonsoI¡!¢I¡su¢cIhc
con¡¢×¡sand u¡oc¢ss¢s¡a¡!¢¡ ¡!an In ºa5s¡¡ac¡Ion"I¡on ¡!¢s¢
con¡¢×¡sandu¡oc¢ss¢s~¡ouu¡¡!¢Iadd¢¡5ac!In¡o¡!¢¡!oug!¡.
AndIo¡¡!¢c¡I¡IcaI¡!¢o¡Is¡s¡!¢¡¢I¢van¡con¡¢×¡sandu¡oc¢ss¢s
a¡¢socIaI,cuI¡u¡aI,usyc!oIogIcaI,andIn¡¢II¢c¡uaI~¡!¢ya¡¢!Is-
¡o¡IcaI¡!¡oug!and¡!¡oug!. In¡!¢s¢nIna¡s¡!¢s¡udyoIKan¡
and H¢g¢Iwasca¡¡I¢dou¡In¡!Isv¢¡yway,¡!¡oug!n¢¡IcuIous
dIaI¢c¡IcaIexplication de texte, oIw!Ic!¡!¢¢ssayºS!o¡¢Inos"gIv¢s
son¢ ¢×anuI¢s. And ¡yuIcaIIy ¡!¢ s¢n¢s¡¢¡-Iong s¢nIna¡ d¢-
vo¡¢d,Io¡¢×anuI¢,¡oH¢g¢I'sPhenomenology of Mind wouId!av¢
a¡¡Iv¢da¡¡!¢¢Ig!¡!o¡¡¢n¡!uag¢5y¡!¢¢ndoI¡!¢¡¢¡n~wI¡!
as¢ns¢oI¢×!aus¡¢dac!I¢v¢n¢n¡,and¡¢adyIo¡adIII¢¡¢n¡wo¡!
¡!¢IoIIowIng¡¢¡n.
No¡ onIy dId ¡!¢c¡I¡IcaI ¡!¢o¡Is¡s ¢nd¢avo¡¡o hnd ¡!¢¡¡u¡!
con¡¢n¡oI¡!¢u!IIosou!IcaI¡¡adI¡Ion¡!¡oug!ac¡I¡IcaIconu¡¢-
!¢nsIonoII¡¡!a¡¡a!¢saccoun¡oII¡s¢nn¢s!n¢n¡Inaconc¡¢¡¢
x
Introduction
!Is¡o¡y ¡!a¡ Is ¡!¢ !Is¡o¡y oI con5Ic¡sa5ou¡ donIna¡Ion,¢nan-
cIua¡Ion,¡¢ason,I¡¢¢don,!auuIn¢ss,wo¡!,¡¢¡¡o¡,andu¡ouIan
s¡¡IvIngs. T!¢y wan¡¢d,aIso, ¡o I¢a¡n and¡¢ac! how to read and
understand ¡!¢u!IIosou!IcaI¡¡adI¡Ion I¡s¢II. T!¢ h¡s¡g¢n¢¡a¡Ion
oI F¡an!Iu¡¡ Sc!ooIc¡I¡IcaI¡!¢o¡Is¡ss¡oodInaIa¡dIII¢¡¢n¡¡¢-
Ia¡Ion¡o¡!¢u!IIosou!IcaI¡¡adI¡IonoIC¢¡nanId¢aIIsn¡!ando
¡!os¢ w!o a¡¢ h¡s¡ ¢ncoun¡¢¡Ing I¡ ¡oday. In nany ways, Ma¡-
cus¢'sand Ado¡no'sIn¡¢II¢c¡uaI¢nvI¡onn¢n¡and¡¡aInIngw¢¡¢
as cIos¢ ¡o ¡!os¢ oI Kan¡ and H¢g¢I as¡o¡!os¢ oI ¡!¢ u¡¢s¢n¡.
Y¢¡ 5o¡! ¡aug!¡ wo¡!s oI Kan¡ and H¢g¢I In ¡!¢ unIv¢¡sI¡I¢s,
ac¡ossg¡¢a¡!Is¡o¡IcaIc!asns.Ma¡cus¢¡aug!¡H¢g¢I¡os¡ud¢n¡s
InAn¢¡IcaInau!IIosou!IcaIIyaII¢n¢nvI¡onn¢n¡,and Ado¡no
¡aug!¡ ¡oa g¢n¢¡a¡Ion oI C¢¡nan s¡ud¢n¡sdIs¡anc¢d I¡on !Is
own 5y ¡!¢ T!I¡d R¢Ic!. W¢ !ou¢ ¡!a¡ ¡!Is uu5IIca¡Ion In En-
gIIs!oIAdo¡no'sH¢g¢I¢ssays,In¡!¢Ias¡d¢cad¢oI¡!¢c¢n¡u¡y,
wIIIcon¡¡I5u¡¢¡o¡!¢u¢¡u¢¡ua¡Ionand¢Ia5o¡a¡IonoIdIaI¢c¡IcaI
¡!In!Ingand¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢ac¡ossy¢¡ano¡!¢¡!Is¡o¡IcaIdIvId¢.
RescuingHegel~andonlyrescue,notrevival,isappropriateforhim~
meansfacinguptohisphilosophywhereitismostpainfulandwresting
truthfromitwhereitsuntruthisobvious.
"The Experiential Content ofHegel's Philosophy"
Ado¡no'sHegel: Three Studies ¡a!¢s¡!¢Io¡noI an¢×¡¡¢n¢and
u¡ovoca¡Iv¢d¢I¢ns¢oI¡!¢¡¡u¡!con¡¢n¡In H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!y.
W¡I¡IngIn¡!¢Ia¡¢ I950sand¢a¡Iy I960s,Ado¡nod¢I¢nds H¢g¢I
no¡onIyagaIns¡¡!¢dIsnIssaIsanddIs¡o¡¡Ions¡!¢ncu¡¡¢n¡~¡!¢
uosI¡IvIs¡'sdIsnIssaIoI!InasunIn¡¢IIIgI5I¢o¡¡!¢ SovI¢¡ Ma¡×-
Is¡'sId¢oIogIcaIv¢¡sIonoI¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic~5u¡aIsoagaIns¡¡!¢II5-
¢¡aI's Iu!¢wa¡n !onag¢ ¡o H¢g¢I's s¢ns¢ oI !Is¡o¡IcaI ¡¢aII¡y.
C¢¡¡aInIy¡!os¢vI¢wsoI H¢g¢Iu¢¡sIs¡. Bu¡¡oday Ado¡no'su¡¢-
s¢n¡a¡IonoIH¢g¢IIss¡a¡¡IIng¢v¢nwI¡!In¡!¢con¡¢×¡oI¡!¢con-
XI
Introduction
¡¢nuo¡a¡y wav¢oI In¡¢¡¢s¡In H¢g¢I InI¡Ia¡¢d 5y¡!¢ F¡an!Iu¡¡
Sc!ooI'sownuouuIa¡I¡yIn¡!Iscoun¡¡yand¡!¢n¡¢InIo¡c¢d5y
¡!¢ F¡¢nc! vIa d¢cons¡¡uc¡Ion. Ado¡no'sHegel ¡¢nInds us¡!a¡
nowasnuc!asIn I956,w!¢n¡!¢6¡s¡oI¡!¢s¢¢ssayswasgIv¢n
asaI¢c¡u¡¢,I¡Isno¡aqu¢s¡IonoIw!a¡IsIIvIngandw!a¡Isd¢ad
InH¢g¢I~¡!¢qu¢s¡IonwI¡!w!Ic!C¡oc¢InI¡Ia¡¢d¡!¢¡w¢n¡I¢¡!-
c¢n¡u¡yH¢g¢I¡¢vIvaI~5u¡aqu¢s¡IonoIºw!a¡¡!¢u¡¢s¢n¡n¢ans
In¡!¢Iac¢oIH¢g¢I."Ado¡nou¡¢s¢n¡sa H¢g¢I¡¢ad agaIns¡¡!¢
g¡aInand I¡on ¡!¢u¢¡su¢c¡Iv¢oIac¡I¡Iqu¢oIu!IIosou!yasan
IsoIa¡¢d dIscIuIIn¢, 5u¡ a H¢g¢I w!o Is s¡III, !¢ a¡gu¢s, unsu¡-
uass¢d 5y any ¡w¢n¡I¢¡!-c¢n¡u¡y u!IIosou!y. T!¢ F¡an!Iu¡¡
Sc!ooI'sc¡I¡IcaI¡!¢o¡yoIsocI¢¡y¡¢u¡¢s¢n¡¢dInson¢¡¢su¢c¡sa
¡¢¡u¡n¡o H¢g¢II¡on Ma¡×,andInson¢¡¢su¢c¡sAdo¡no'sHegel
s¢¡v¢s¡oa¡¡IcuIa¡¢Ado¡no'sownu!IIosou!IcaI¢n¡¢¡u¡Is¢asw¢II.
1us¡ as H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y a¡¡¢nu¡s ¡o 5¡Ing ¡o s¢II-conscIous-
n¢ss ¡!¢ Ia5o¡s oI suI¡I¡ uu ¡o !Is ¡In¢, so Ado¡no's wo¡! Is a
s¢II-¡¢8¢c¡Ion oI ¡!a¡ In H¢g¢I w!Ic! !ad no¡ 5¢¢n 5¡oug!¡¡o
conscIousn¢ss wI¡!In H¢g¢I's own wo¡!. In ¡!Is ¡¢su¢c¡as w¢II,
H¢g¢I s¢¡v¢s as a d¢I¢ns¢ oI ¡!¢ con¡¢nuo¡a¡y ¡¢I¢vanc¢ oI
Ado¡noand¡!¢F¡an!Iu¡¡Sc!ooI.
T!¢aInoIHegel: Three Studies, Ado¡no¡¢IIsusIn!Isu¡¢Iac¢,
Is ¡ou¡¢ua¡¢ ºan¢wconc¢u¡Ion oI¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic." T!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic
wo¡!s ¡!¡oug! Innan¢n¡ c¡I¡IcIsn, and ¡!Is Is ¡!¢ auu¡oac!
Ado¡no¡a!¢sIn !Isd¢I¢ns¢ oI H¢g¢I. I¡ Is ¡!¡oug! Innan¢n¡
c¡I¡IcIsn¡!a¡Ado¡noa¡¡ac!s¡!¢¡¡u¡!cIaInsoI¡!¢va¡Ioussc!ooIs
oI ¡!oug!¡~uosI¡IvIsn, C¢s¡aI¡ usyc!oIogy, u!¢non¢noIogy,
¢×Is¡¢n¡IaI on¡oIogy, dIaI¢c¡IcaI na¡¢¡IaIIsn~¡!a¡ cIaIn¡o !av¢
su¡uass¢d H¢g¢I. Mo¡¢ Inuo¡¡an¡, H¢g¢I !Ins¢II, ¡!¡oug! In-
nan¢n¡c¡I¡IcIsn,wIIII¢ad¡!oug!¡¡o¡!a¡n¢wconc¢u¡IonoI¡!¢
dIaI¢c¡Ic,¡!¢ ºn¢ga¡Iv¢dIaI¢c¡Ics"Adono¢×uound¢dIn¡!¢wo¡!
oI¡!a¡ nan¢ uu5IIs!¢ds!o¡¡IyaI¡¢¡Hegel. T!¢ n¢ga¡Iv¢dIaI¢c-
¡IcIswon5y ºw¡¢s¡Ing,"as Ado¡nosays,¡!¢¡¡u¡!con¡¢n¡I¡on
xxii
Introduction
H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y u¡¢cIs¢Iyw!¢¡¢I¡sun¡¡u¡! Isnos¡o5vIous.
Acco¡dIngIy,I¡Is¡o¡!¢ ºs!andaIon"oI H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!y~I¡s
su¢cuIa¡Iv¢a5soIu¡¢Id¢aIIsn,¡!a¡w!Ic!Ismos¡Iad¢d,nos¡dIs-
c¡¢dI¡¢d,nos¡ou¡nod¢dInI¡,¢v¢naso¡¡oIu!IIosou!IcaI!I¡sc!-
¡!a¡ Ado¡no ¡u¡ns ¡o 6nd a dIaI¢c¡Ic ¡!a¡ na!¢s ¡oon Io¡ ¡!¢
con¡Ing¢n¡, ¡!¢ ua¡¡IcuIa¡, ¡!¢nonId¢n¡IcaI. Su¢cuIa¡Ion Is no¡,
Ado¡no¡¢IIsus,son¢!IndoI º¡¡ou5I¢son¢o¡nan¢n¡a¡Ion",on
¡!¢con¡¡a¡y, H¢g¢I's ºsu5s¡an¡Iv¢InsIg!¡s . . . a¡¢ u¡oduc¢d 5y
su¢cuIa¡Ion" .
Becauseofhisidealism, Hegelhasbeenreproachedwithbeingabstract
incomparisonwiththeconcretenessofthephenomenological,anthro-
pological,andontological schools. Buthebroughtinhnitelymorecon-
creteness into this philosophical idea than those approaches, and not
becausehis speculative imaginationwasbalancedby asenseofreality
butbyvirtueoftheapproachh|sphilosophytakes~byvirtue,onemight
say,oftheexperientialcharacterofhisspeculationitself.(ºExperiential
Content¨)
Howcan ¡!Is 5¢so. On¢ oI Ado¡no's answ¢¡sIs¡!a¡¡!¢dI-
aI¢c¡Ic In a5soIu¡¢ Id¢aIIsn Is conc¢Iv¢d non!I¢¡a¡c!IcaIIy. I¡ Is
n¢I¡!¢¡ a nIddI¢ 5¢¡w¢¢n ¢×¡¡¢n¢s no¡ a su5sunu¡Ion oI ¡!¢
conuon¢n¡ua¡¡und¢¡asyn¡!¢¡Icw!oI¢(Io¡¡!Is¡¢ason¡oo,¡!¢
dIaI¢c¡Ic Isno¡ a n¢¡!od no¡ Is H¢g¢I's wo¡! a sys¡¢n). T¡u¡!
¢n¢¡g¢s I¡on a dIaI¢c¡IcaI In¡¢¡uIay oI su5j¢c¡ and o5j¢c¡, oI
ua¡¡IcuIa¡ and w!oI¢, oI n¢dIa¡¢d and unn¢dIa¡¢d. AI¡!oug!
¡!¢¡¢Isnosuc!¡!Ingas¡!¢uu¡¢gIv¢no¡Inn¢d¡a¡¢,¡!¢uu¡¢
¢nuI¡IcaI da¡un, ¡os¢¡v¢ as as¡a¡¡Ing uoIn¡~an ¢¡¡o¡¡!a¡,as
Ado¡nouoIn¡sou¡, 5o¡! ¢nuI¡IcIsn andI¡s I¡¡a¡IonaIIs¡ c¡I¡Ics
na!¢~a su5j¢c¡ conc¢Iv¢d InouuosI¡Ion¡o¢nuI¡IcaI ¡¢aII¡y Is
aIso InuossI5I¢, a n¢¡¢ ¢nuìy su5j¢cìIvIsn. AII In좡u¡¢ìaìIons
oI H¢g¢I ¡!a¡ ¢nd 5y dIsnIssIng!In IaII ¡o acconnoda¡¢ ¡!Is
non!I¢¡a¡c!IcaIconc¢u¡IonoI¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic.II¡¡u¡!Isu¡oc¢ssIn
¡!Iss¢ns¢,I¡IsaIsoconc¡¢¡¢.T!¢nov¢n¢n¡oI¡!oug!¡Isuow-
Introduction
¢¡¢d5y¡!¢s¢II-¡¢8¢c¡¡onoI ¡!¢su5j¢c¡a¡¡¢nu¡¡ng¡oconc¢¡v¢
¡¢aI¡¡y, and uI¡¡na¡¢Iy ¡!¢ a5soIu¡¢n¢ss oI ¡d¢aI¡sn o5I¡¡¢¡a¡¢s
¡!¢ d¡s¡¡nc¡¡on 5¢¡w¢�n su5j¢c¡ and o5j¢c¡. º II, as ¡n H¢g¢I,¡n
¡!¢¡o¡aI¡¡y¢v¢¡y¡!¡nguI¡¡na¡¢IycoIIaus¢s¡n¡o¡!¢su5j¢c¡asa5-
soIu¡¢ su¡¡¡¡,¡d¢aI¡sn¡!¢¡¢5ycanc¢Is¡¡s¢II ou¡,5¢caus¢nod¡I-
I¢¡¢nc¢ ¡¢na¡ns ¡!¡oug! w!¡c! ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡ couId5¢¡d¢n¡¡6¢d
asson¢¡!¡ngd¡s¡¡nc¡,assu5j¢c¡,"( ºE×u¢¡¡¢n¡¡aICon¡¢n¡").S¡¡II,
H¢g¢I!ada¡¡¢nu¡¢d¡oIo¡nuIa¡¢¡!¢d¡aI¢c¡¡cand¡!¢su5j¢c¡-
o5j¢c¡ as a5soIu¡¢ su5j¢c¡. H¢nc¢ ¡!¢ nonsu5suna5¡I¡¡y oI ¡!¢
ua¡¡¡cuIa¡ 5¢con¢s auua¡¢n¡ a¡ ¡!¢ san¢ ¡¡n¢ H¢g¢I's u!¡Ioso-
u!yd¢n¡¢s¡¡.H¢g¢I'su!¡Iosou!y¡s¡!uss¢II-con¡¡ad¡c¡o¡y5y¡¡s
own c¡¡¡¢¡¡on,and ¡¡¡s¡!¢c¡¡¡¢¡¡on,¡!¢ d¡aI¢c¡¡c, ¡!a¡ Ado¡no
hoIdsou¡,aga¡ns¡H¢g¢I,as¡!¢5¢a¡¢¡oI¡!¢¡¡u¡!con¡¢n¡.
Ano¡!¢¡oIAdo¡no'sansw¢¡s¡o¡!¢qu¢s¡¡onoI!owsu¢cuIa-
¡¡oncan¡¡s¢II5¢¡!¢¢×u¢¡¡¢n¡¡aIcon¡¢n¡oI H¢g¢I'su!¡Iosou!y
andcanacconnoda¡¢conc¡¢¡¢n¢ss¡a!¢s¡!¢Io¡noI!¡sd¢v¢I-
oun¢n¡oI H¢g¢I'sno¡¡onoI¡!¢"Arbeit des B
e
grffs," ¡!¢Ia5o¡oI
¡!¢ conc¢u¡. T!¢ Ia5o¡ oI ¡!¢ su¡¡¡¡~¡!¢ s¡¡uggI¢s oI ¡¡u¡! ¡n
u¡oc¢ss,¡!¢¢×¢¡¡¡onsoI¡n¡¢II¢c¡uaIac¡¡v¡¡y,¡!¢¢IIo¡¡s¡nvoIv¢d
¡n w¡¢s¡¡ng H¢g¢I's¡¡u¡! I¡on!¡s un¡¡u¡!~¡sa Io¡noIIa5o¡
¡n¡¡s¢II.I¡¡saIso,Ado¡no¡nd¡ca¡¢s,soc¡aIIa5o¡u¡¢s¢n¡¢d¡n¡!¢
gu¡s¢oIIog¡c,and H¢g¢I'sa5soIu¡¢ su¡¡¡¡¡snon¢o¡!¢¡¡!anso-
c¡¢¡y. ºT!¢ nys¡¢¡y 5¢!¡nd syn¡!¢¡¡c auu¢¡c¢u¡¡on . . . ¡snon¢
o¡!¢¡¡!ansoc¡aIIa5o¡" ("Asu¢c¡s").W!¡I¢¡!¡sansw¢¡n¡g!¡¢as¡Iy
5¢s¢¢nasºsoc¡oIog¡sn,"an¢o-Ma¡×¡s¡s¡and¡ngoI H¢g¢I on!¡s
!¢ad,Ado¡no¡¢scu¢s¡¡andg¡v¢s¡¡aIu¡¡!¢¡¡w¡s¡.Ina¡ou¡d¢
Io¡c¢ ¡!¡oug! w!¡c! !¢ w¡¢s¡s ¡¡u¡! ¢v¢n I¡on H¢g¢I's nos¡
no¡o¡¡ouswo¡!,w¡¡!¡¡snos¡no¡o¡¡ous¡!¢s¡s~¡!¢Philosophy of
Right and¡¡sno¡¡on¡!a¡w!a¡¡s¡¢aI¡s¡a¡¡onaI~Ado¡nod¢v¢I-
ous¡!¢no¡¡onoIan¡agon¡s¡¡c¡o¡aI¡¡y. T!¢uI¡¡na¡¢¡¡u¡!oIw!a¡
¡snos¡ ua¡¢n¡IyIaIs¢ and¡d¢oIog¡caI¡n H¢g¢I~!¡s¢qua¡¡onoI
¡¢ason w¡¡! ¡¢aI¡¡y and ¡n ua¡¡¡cuIa¡ w¡¡! ¡!¢ s¡a¡¢~¡s ¡!a¡, as
XXIV
Introduction
!Is¡o¡y!ass!own,¡¢aII¡y!as5¢con¢u¡¢cIs¢Iy¡!¢!IndoIsys-
¡¢n and ¡o¡aII¡y H¢g¢I u¡ouos¢d I¡ ¡o 5¢.² I¡ Isan an¡agonIs¡Ic
¡o¡aII¡y, a ¡o¡aII¡y onIy5yvI¡¡u¢oI I¡scon¡¡adIc¡Ions,anda sys-
¡¢nInw!Ic!¡!¢IndIvIduaIIs¢v¢¡yw!¢¡¢gov¢¡n¢d5y¡!¢InvIs-
I5I¢¡o¡aIIzIng ¨w¢5oIguII¡"¡!a¡Is¡!¢u¢¡sIs¡¢nc¢oIun¡¢ason.
In¡!IsIIg!¡, H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!y5¢con¢sc¡I¡IcaIno¡onIyoI¡!¢
d¢¡aIIs5u¡oI¡!¢n¢ga¡Iv¢w!oI¢.
Hegel'sphilosophyisindeedessentiallynegative.critique.Inextending
thetranscendentalphilosophyoftheCritique ofPure Reason throughthe
thesis ofreason's identity withwhatexists and makingitacritiqueof
whatexists,acritiqueofanyandeverypositivity,Hegeldenouncedthe
world,whosetheodicyconstituteshisprogram,initstotalityaswell,he
denounceditasawebofguilt[Schuldzua11lenhang inwhich,asMeph-
istophelessaysinFaut, everythingthatexistsdeservestoperish. (ºAs-
pects¨)
T!¢ dIs¡Inc¡Ion 5¢¡w¢¢n Ia5o¡ and na¡u¡¢, 5¢¡w¢¢n u¡oduc¢¡s
and own¢¡s, Is w!a¡ u¡oduc¢s socI¢¡y as an¡agonIs¡Ic ¡o¡aII¡y.
Ado¡no's no¡Ion ¡u¡ns on ¡!¢ Id¢a ¡!a¡ Ia5o¡ I¡s¢II !as, In ¡!Is
s¢ns¢, a ouu¡¢ssIv¢asu¢c¡,¡!a¡I¡Isno¡-and!¢¡¢Ado¡no¡a!¢s
Issu¢ wI¡! Ma¡×'s c¢I¢5¡a¡¢d c¡I¡Iqu¢ oI H¢g¢I~¡!¢ soI¢ u¡o-
duc¢¡ oI vaIu¢. II H¢g¢I u¡¢s¢n¡¢d a IaIs¢ ¡¢concIIIa¡IonIn¡!¢
Philosophy of Right, H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!y,Ina¡I¢as¡aInIng¡owa¡d
ag¢nuIn¢Iy¡¢concII¢dw!oI¢,con¡aInsanon¢n¡oIu¡ouIan!ou¢
¡!a¡Is¢Is¢w!¢¡¢Ios¡. ¨T!¢¡ayoIIIg!¡¡!a¡¡¢v¢aIs¡!¢w!oI¢¡o
5¢un¡¡u¢InaIII¡snon¢n¡sIsnon¢o¡!¢¡¡!anu¡ouIa,¡!¢u¡o-
uIaoI¡!¢w!oI¢¡¡u¡!,w!Ic!Iss¡III¡o5¢¡¢aIIz¢d"( ¨E×u¢¡I¢n¡IaI
Con¡¢n¡").
T!¢no¡IonoIsuI¡I¡'sIa5o¡IsInIac¡¡!¢!¢y¡oAdo¡no'sIn¡¢¡-
utc¡a¡Ion oI HcgcI and !IsdcIcnscoI HcgcI's¡tu¡!. Su!t!¡'s la-
5o¡ Is ¡!¢ dIaI¢c¡IcaI no¡o¡, ¡!¢ ¡¢8¢c¡Ion oI ¢ac! s¡a¡¢ oI
conscIousn¢ssInI¡sIInI¡a¡Ion,¡!a¡Io¡c¢su!IIosou!y¡o5¢con¢
conc¡¢¡¢ and ¢nds 5y p¢¡n¢a¡Ing, as Ado¡no says, ¡!¢Id¢a oI
xxv
Introduction
¡o¡aII¡y wI¡! ¡!¢Id¢aoI con¡¡adIc¡Ion. AndI¡Is ¡!a¡Ia5o¡ ¡!a¡
I¢ads u!IIosou!y ou¡ oI I¡s a5s¡¡ac¡ s¢ua¡a¡Ion I¡on ¢nuI¡IcaI
¡¢aII¡yand¡!¢con¡Ing¢n¡. ºIn¡!¢Phenomenolog of Spirit, ¡a!Ing
as!Is c¡I¡IcaI uoIn¡oI d¢ua¡¡u¡¢ w!a¡Is cIos¢s¡ ¡o !and, unn¢-
dIa¡¢d !unan conscIousn¢ss, |H¢g¢I| acconuIIs!¢s ¡!¢ n¢dIa-
¡IonoI¡!a¡conscIousn¢ssInand¡!¡oug!¡!¢!Is¡o¡IcaInov¢n¢n¡
oI w!a¡ ¢×Is¡s,anov¢n¢n¡ ¡!a¡ ¡a!¢sI¡5¢yond aII n¢¡¢ n¢¡a-
u!ysIcsoI5¢Ing. Onc¢s¢¡In no¡Ion,¡!¢conc¡¢¡Iza¡IonoI u!I-
Iosou!ycanno¡5¢s¡ouu¢d Io¡¡!¢sa!¢oIu!IIosou!y'sIIIuso¡y
dIgnI¡y"(ºE×u¢¡I¢n¡IaICon¡¢n¡").La5o¡,¡!¢¡!¢n¢oIAdo¡no's
Innan¢n¡ c¡I¡IcIsn oI H¢g¢I, Is aIso ¡!¢¡!¢n¢ oI ºS!o¡¢Inos,"
�:¢¡!I¡doI!Is¡!¡¢¢¢ssayson H¢g¢I. ºS!o¡¢Inos"~¡!¢¡I¡I¢aI-
Iud¢s ¡o Ado¡no's d¢I¢ns¢ oI ¡!¢ ºo5scu¡¢" H¢¡acII¡¢s as ou-
uos¢d¡o ¡!¢ ºcI¢a¡" D¢sca¡¡¢s~!asan¢×uIIcI¡Iyu¢dagogIcaIaIn.
I¡d¡aws,asAdo¡no¡¢IIsusIn !Is u¡¢Iac¢,dI¡¢c¡Iyon!Is ¢×u¢-
¡I¢nc¢ ¡¢ac!Ing H¢g¢I a¡ ¡!¢ UnIv¢¡sI¡y In F¡an!Iu¡¡ and Is a
!IndoIu¡oI¢gon¢non ¡o¡¢adIng H¢g¢I~no¡a¡¢adIngoI H¢g¢I
sonuc!asadIscussIonoIw!a¡IsInvoIv¢dIn ¡!a¡¡¢adIng.T!¢
Issu¢In¡¢adIng H¢g¢I,as H¢g¢I!Ins¢II!aduoIn¡¢dou¡In¡!¢
u¡¢Iac¢¡o¡!¢Phenomenolog, w!Ic!s¢¡v¢sInI¡swayasanod¢I
Io¡ ºS!o¡¢Inos,"Is¡!a¡In¡¢IIIgI5III¡y (Io¡ Ado¡no, cIa¡I¡y) Isno¡
¡¢adIIya¡¡aIn¢d 5y¡¡u¢u!IIosou!y. T!¢qu¢s¡IonIsw!a¡¡ona!¢
oI H¢g¢I's Iac! oI cIa¡I¡y, !ow¡o und¢¡s¡and ¡!¢ ¡¡u¡! con¡¢n¡
oI ¡!a¡ v¢¡y uncIa¡I¡y. T!¢ conuI¢n¢n¡a¡y qu¢s¡Ion Is !ow ¡o
¡¢ad H¢g¢Iu¡oduc¡Iv¢Iy,In¡!¢way¡!a¡¡¡u¡!con¡¢n¡¡¢quI¡¢s,
so¡!a¡¡!¢Ia5o¡s¡!a¡!av¢gon¢In¡o¡!¢w¡I¡Ing,andnus¡go
In¡o¡!¢¡¢adIng,oI H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!ya¡¢no¡InvaIn.
Ado¡nous¢s¡!¢dIIcuI¡I¢soI¡¢adIngH¢g¢I~¡!a¡a¡¡In¢sI¡
Is InuossI5I¢¡od¢cIu!¢¡ a uassag¢, ¡!a¡ H¢g¢I wasno¡ ca¡¢IuI
In !Is us¢ oI Ianguag¢, ¡!a¡ !¢ oI¡¢n nad¢ ass¢¡¡Ions wI¡!ou¡
ac¡uaIIy IoIIowIng¡!¡oug!on¡!¢a¡gun¢n¡a¡Ion,andsoon~¡o
uoIn¡ uua u¡o5I¢n¡!a¡go¢sIa¡5¢yondany¢nuI¡IcaIo¡su5-
xxvi
Introduction
j¢c¡Iv¢ w¢a!n¢ss on H¢g¢I's ua¡¡. Fo¡ ¡!¢dII6cuI¡I¢s Inund¢¡-
s¡andIngH¢g¢Ia¡¢o5j¢c¡Iv¢,and¡!¢yd¢¡Iv¢u¡Ina¡IIyI¡on¡!¢
na¡u¡¢oI¡!oug!¡and I¡s¡¢Ia¡Ion¡oIanguag¢. H¢nc¢nuc!oI
"S!o¡¢Inos"Isana¡¡ac! on¡!¢d¢sId¢¡a¡unoIcIa¡I¡yasw¢hnd
I¡In D¢sca¡¡¢s. T!¢d¢nandIo¡cIa¡I¡yu¡¢suuuos¢s¡!a¡¡!¢o5-
j¢c¡ oI ¡!oug!¡ !as 5¢¢n ¡acI¡Iy u¡¢Io¡n¢d ¡o aIIow ¡!¢ co¡¡¢-
suond¢nc¢oI¡!oug!¡andI¡so5j¢c¡.II H¢g¢I's¡¢×¡sdIII¢¡I¡on
¡¡adI¡IonaIu!IIosou!IcaI¡¢×¡s,w!Ic!a¡I¢as¡na!¢au¡¢¡¢ns¢oI
IogIcaI¢×uosI¡Ion¡!a¡IscI¢a¡a¡¢v¢¡yuoIn¡,I¡IsInan¢IIo¡¡ ¡o
dojus¡Ic¢¡oana¡¡¢¡¡!a¡5yI¡sv¢¡yna¡u¡¢¢vad¢s¡!Is!IndoI
cIa¡I¡y, u!IIosou!y, In Ado¡no's Io¡nuIa¡Ion, Is "Iac¢d wI¡! a
ua¡ado×. ¡o say cI¢a¡Iy son¢¡!Ing ¡!a¡ Is uncI¢a¡, ¡!a¡ !as no
6 ¡nou¡IIn¢,¡!a¡do¢sno¡acconnoda¡¢¡o¡¢Ihca¡Ion."T!¢dI-
aI¢c¡Ic ¡o w!Ic! u!IIosou!y nus¡ su5nI¡ In ¡!Isa¡¡¢nu¡ Is ¡!¢
dIaI¢c¡IcoI Ianguag¢I¡s¢II,w!Ic!!as5o¡!an¢×u¡¢ssIv¢ and a
connunIca¡Iv¢¢I¢n¢n¡.T!¢connunIca¡Iv¢asu¢c¡,w!Ic!can-
no¡ 5¢ ¡¢nounc¢d, can n¢v¢¡ 5¢ IuIIy ad¢qua¡¢ ¡o a dIaI¢c¡IcaI
¡¡u¡!,andAdo¡nod¢I¢ndsH¢g¢I's¡¢×¡son¡!Is5asIs.
In Hegel nothing can be understood in isolation, everythingis to be
understoodonlyinthecontextofthewhole,withtheawkwardqualih-
cationthatthe wholeinturnlivesonlyintheindividual moments. In
actuality,however,thiskindofdoublenessofthedialecticeludesliter-
arypresentation,whichisofnecessityhnitewhenitunequivocallystates
somethingequivocal.Thisiswhyonehastomakesomanyallowances
foritinHegel.Thatitcannotinprincipleachievetheunityofthewhole
anditspartsatoneblowbecomesitsweak spot. Everysingle sentence
in Hegel's philosophyprovesitselfunsuitableforthatphilosophy, and
the formexpresses thisinitsinabilityto grasp anycontent withcom-
pleteadequacy.(ºSkoteinos¨)
As a cons¢qu¢nc¢ oI ¡!¢s¢dIaI¢c¡Ics, H¢g¢I's wo¡!s, wI¡!¡!¢I¡
¢quIvoca¡Ions,¡!¢I¡Iac!oIconsIs¡¢n¡a¡gun¢n¡a¡Ion,and¡!¢I¡
Iac! oI IuII ¢dI¡Ing 5y ¡!¢I¡ au¡!o¡, 5¢con¢ "an¡I¡¢×¡s"~"II
xxvii
Introduction
u¡¢ss¢d,on¢nay¡¢ga¡d¡!¢Phenomenolog asa5oo!,wI¡!¡!¢
Science of Logic ¡!IsIsnoIong¢¡uossI5I¢,"saysAdo¡no~¡¢u¡¢-
s¢n¡Ing 5y ¡!¢I¡ v¢¡y Io¡n a c¡I¡Iqu¢ oI a IaIs¢Iy !a¡nonIous
no¡IonoIu¡¢s¢n¡a¡Ion·
Thata thoughtthatmade such extravagantclaims should have fore-
gonetransmissioninspecihc, dehnitive formcanbeexplainedonl, in
termsofitsidealofpresentation, thenegationofpresentation. Atthe
same time, inthe looseness ofa delivery thateven when moshighly
elaboratedismorespokenthanwritten,onecanlookforacorrectiveto
thehubrisoftheconclusiveanddehnitiveofwhich Hegel's workwas
accusedevenduringhislifetime.(ºSkoteinos¨)
InIIIunIna¡Ing¡!¢conc¢u¡oI¡!¢nonId¢n¡IcaIwI¡!InH¢g¢I's
wo¡!,Ado¡no¡acI¡Iy¢×uIIca¡¢sandjus¡Ih¢s!IsowndIaI¢c¡IcaI-
c¡I¡I¢aIn¢¡!odand!IsownconnI¡n¢n¡¡o¡!¢nonId¢n¡IcaI.V¢
IIIunIna¡¢s ¡!os¢ asu¢c¡s oI H¢g¢I ¡!a¡ nos¡ ¡¢s¢n5I¢ !Is o�n

¡!ougn¡andI¡onw!Ic!!¢!asI¢a¡n¢d¡!¢nos¡.Ado¡no's
¿
¢-
I¢ns¢oI H¢g¢I's¡¢×¡sInºS!o¡¢Inos"¢c!o¢s!IsdIscussIonoI¡!¢
¢ssay Io¡n and!Is c¡I¡Iqu¢ oI¡!¢ Ca¡¡¢sIan no¡Ion oIcIa¡I¡y In
ºT!¢ Essayas Fo¡n," ¡!¢ I¢ad ¢ssayIn !Is Notes to Literature�
w!Ic!da¡¢sI¡on¡!¢san¢ u¢¡Iodas¡!¢h¡s¡oI!Is H¢g¢I¢ssavs.
Hegel: Three Studies as a w!oI¢, In Iac¡, Is ¡oug!Iy con¡¢nuo¡a-
n¢ouswI¡!¡!¢najo¡I¡yoI¡!¢¢ssayscoII¢c¡¢dInAdo¡no'sNot
e
s
to Literature, ¡!¢u¢¡IodInn¢dIa¡¢Iyu¡¢c¢dIngandov¢¡IauuI

g
wI¡! ¡!¢u¡oduc¡IonoI !Is Ias¡,Ia¡g¢¡-scaI¢ wo¡!s,Negative Ût-
alectics andAesthetic Theor. Ado¡no'sdIscussIonoI¡!¢d¢nands
H¢g¢I's¡¢×¡sna!¢uuon¡h¢¡¢ad¢¡¡¢v�aIsIns¡IIIg¡¢a¡¢¡¡Ic!-
n¢ss¡!¢!Ins!Iu5¢¡w¢¢nAdo¡noandH¢g¢I.Ado¡no's¢ssayIsIIc
wo¡!onII¡¢¡a¡yandnusIcaI¡¢×¡sanda¢s¡!

tIcIssu¢sIsIo¡nu-

Ia¡¢dIn¡¢¡nsoI¡!¢san¢dIaI¢c¡IcoI¡!oug!¡andIanguag¢w¢
s¢¢In ºS!o¡¢Inos." In ¡!a¡5odyoIwo¡!~¡!¢¢ssay ºP¡¢suuuo-
sI¡Ions," In ¡!¢ s¢cond voIun¢ oI Notes to Literature, Is a good
¢×anuI¢~Ado¡no¢Ia5o¡a¡¢saconc¢u¡IonoI¡!¢c¡I¡IcaI¡¢cIuI-
xviii
Introduction
cn¡'s s¡ancc ¡owa¡d acs¡!c¡¡c o¡ ¡n¡cIIcc¡uaI o5jcc¡s, o¡ geistige
Gebilde. I¡¡sas¡anccc!a¡ac¡c¡¡zcd5y¡!csca¡c!Io¡¡n¡cII¡g¡5¡I¡¡y
as ouuoscd ¡o a s¡¡¡c¡ undc¡s¡and¡ng 5ascd on cIa¡¡¡y, jus¡ as
Ado¡no u¡ouoscs Io¡ ¡!c ¡cadc¡ oI HcgcI.W!a¡ Ado¡no says
a5ou¡¡cad¡ngHcgcI¡s¡nIac¡qu¡¡ccIosc¡ow!a¡!csays¡no¡!c¡
con¡cסsa5ou¡¡!cc×uc¡¡cn¡¡aIac¡¡v¡¡yoI¡!csu5jcc¡oIacs¡!c¡¡c
c×uc¡¡cncc.
No doubt Hegel's style goes against customary philosophical under-
standing,yetinhisweaknesseshepavesthewayforadifferentkindof
understanding, one mustread Hegelby describing alongwithhim the
curvesofhis intellectual movement,byplayinghisideaswiththespec-
ulativeearasthoughtheyweremusical notes. Philosophyasawholeis
allied withartinwanting to rescue, inthe medium oftheconcept,the
mimesisthattheconceptrepresses.(ºSkoteinos¨)
Rcad¡ng w¡¡! ¡!c succuIa¡¡vc ca¡~¡!c u!¡asc dc¡¡vcs o¡¡g¡-
naIIyI¡onK¡c¡!cgaa¡d~¡saIo¡nuIa¡¡onIo¡a!¡ndoIacs¡!c¡¡c
"ua¡¡¡c¡ua¡o¡yIoIIow¡ng¡!¡oug!,"o¡Mitvollzug, ¡!a¡dcnandsa
duaI ac¡¡v¡¡y on ¡!c ua¡¡ oI ¡!c ¡cadc¡.On ¡!c onc !and, ¡!c
¡cadc¡nus¡cngagc¡na!¡ndoIcon¡cnuIa¡¡vcuass¡v¡¡y~Ado¡no
uscs ¡!c u!cnoncnoIog¡caI ¡c¡n "suon¡ancous¡cccu¡¡v¡¡y"~¡n
w!¡c!s!cs¡nuIy8oa¡saIong,us¡ngw!a¡sccns¡o5c¡!c¡n¡cn-
¡¡onoI¡!cw!oIcasagu¡dc¡oundc¡s¡and¡ng.T!¡sco¡¡csuonds
¡o ¡!c "s¡nuIyIoo!¡ng on" o¡ "reines Zusehen, " oI ¡!c¡n¡¡oduc-
¡¡on¡oHcgcI'sPhenomenolog, w!¡c!Ado¡no¡nvo!cs¡cuca¡cdIy.
A¡¡!csanc¡¡nc,¡!c¡cadc¡'sac¡¡v¡¡y¡soncoI¡nnc¡s¡on¡n¡!c
u¡cc¡sc wo¡d¡ng,a!¡ndoIscII-Io¡gc¡IuI¡nnc¡s¡on¡ndc¡a¡Is¡n
w!¡c!,ua¡adoסcaIIy,¡!c¡cadc¡'ssu5jcc¡¡vcassoc¡a¡¡ons,w!¡c!
a¡csu5scqucn¡Iyc!cc!cdaga¡ns¡¡!c¡cס,a¡coI¡!cu¡nos¡¡n-
uo¡¡ancc."HcgcI!as¡o5c¡cadaga¡ns¡¡!cg¡a¡n,and¡nsuc!a
way¡!a¡cvc¡yIog¡caIouc¡a¡¡on,!owcvc¡Io¡naI¡¡sccns¡o5c,
¡s¡cduccd¡o¡¡sc×uc¡¡cn¡¡aIco¡c.T!ccqu¡vaIcn¡oIsuc!c×uc-
¡¡¢ncc ¡n ¡!c ¡cadc¡ ¡s ¡!c ¡nag¡na¡¡on....T!c con¡cn¡ ¡¡scII
XI
Introduction
con¡aIns, as a Iaw oI I¡s Io¡n, ¡!¢ ¢×u¢c¡a¡Ion oI u¡oduc¡Iv¢
InagIna¡Ionon¡!¢ua¡¡oI¡!¢on¢¡¢adIng"( ºS!o¡¢Inos").
T!Is!IndoIInagIna¡Iv¢ac¡IvI¡y,connon¡o5o¡!u!IIosou!y
anda¡¡,Is¡!¢coun¡¢¡ua¡¡5o¡!oIsuI¡I¡'snIn¢¡IcIa5o¡sandoI
¡!¢ ¢quIvoca¡Ions wI¡!In ¡!¢ wo¡! ¡!a¡ ¡¢ß¢c¡ Ianguug¢'s duaI
na¡uv¢. Suon¡an¢ous ¡¢c¢u¡IvI¡y ¡¢quI¡¢san ou¢nn¢ss¡o¡!¢dI-
aI¢c¡IcaI u¡oc¢ss¢s In!¢¡¢n¡In¡!¢o5j¢c¡~¡!¢ ºIa5o¡oI¡!¢con-
c¢u¡" Is 5o¡!¡!¢Ia5o¡ In!¢¡¢n¡ In ¡!oug!¡, w!Ic! Is5yna¡u¡¢
dIaI¢c¡IcaI,and ¡!¢Ia5o¡In!¢¡¢n¡InIoIIowIngan o5j¢c¡¡!a¡Is
5y na¡u¡¢ dIaI¢c¡IcaI. T!oug!¡ InI¡a¡¢s ¡!¢dIaI¢c¡IcaI nonId¢n-
¡I¡yoI¡¢aII¡y,Inw!Ic!¡!¢su5j¢c¡ua¡¡IcIua¡¢s.Languag¢,w!Ic!
InI¡sconnunIca¡Iv¢asu¢c¡ua¡¡IcIua¡¢sIn¡!¢cIa¡I¡yoIconc¢u-
¡uaI IogIc, aIso ua¡¡IcIua¡¢s In¡!¢ nIn¢sIs oI ¡!¢ nonId¢n¡IcaI.
T!¢ wo¡d ¡!a¡ Ado¡nous¢s as avI¡¡uaI hgu¡¢Io¡¡!IsnIn�sIs

auu¢a¡sIn¡!¢¢uIg¡au!Io¡ºS!o¡¢Inos"asw¢II.º Ic!!a5¢nIc!¡s
aIs Rausc!¢n,"aIIn¢I¡on1!¢uo¢¡ RudoII Bo¡c!a¡d¡,Io¡as¢-
I¢c¡IonoIw!os¢ wo¡! Ado¡noIa¡¢¡uu5IIs!¢danIn¡¡oduc¡Ion,
nowIoundIn¡!¢s¢condvoIun¢oINotes to Literature. Rauschen
(w!Ic! aIso,asRausch, n¢ans ¢cs¡asyo¡In¡o×Ica¡Ion)Is¡!¢wo¡d
us¢d Io¡ ¡!¢ nu¡nu¡Ing oI a ¡us!Ing 5¡oo! o¡ ¡!¢ ¡us¡IIng oI
¡!¢wIndIn¡!¢¡¡¢¢so¡¡!¢su¡gIngoIwav¢sona5¢ac!. I¡¡cI¢¡s
¡oIanguag¢'ss¢nsuousasu¢c¡and5¢yond¡!a¡¡o¡!¢wayInw!Ic!
Ianguag¢'sIn¡¢IIIgI5I¢5u¡ IndIs¡Inc¡ac¡IvI¡y~w!a¡Ado¡no¢Is¢�
w!¢¡¢ caIIa ºIogIcI¡y"~InI¡a¡¢s ¡!¢nov¢n¢n¡oI conc¡¢¡¢non-
Id¢n¡IcaI¡¢aII¡y.
T!¢ In¡Ina¡¢ nIn¢¡Ic ¡¢Ia¡Ions!Iu 5¢¡w¢¢n ¡!¢ nonId¢n¡IcaI
and¡!¢Ia5o¡oIsuI¡I¡Is¢n5odI¢dIn¡!¢nos¡uoIgnan¡non¢n¡
oIAdo¡no'sHegel, anon¢n¡¡!a¡IsaIsoa¡ou¡d¢Io¡c¢.Ado¡no's
d¢I¢ns¢oI H¢g¢IagaIns¡¡!¢c!a¡g¢oI 5¢Ing ¡!¢uI¡Ina¡¢5ou¡-
g¢oIsu!IIosou!¢¡and!IssInuI¡an¢ousjus¡Ihca¡IonoI¡!¢5ou¡-
g¢oIsso5¢¡n¢ssInH¢g¢I,ad¢I¢ns¢andajus¡Ihca¡Ion¡!a¡,II!¢
Ado¡no'sc¡I¡Iqu¢oI ¡!¢no¡IonoIcIa¡I¡y,Is aIso Ado¡no'ss¢II-
Introduction
d¢I¢ns¢¡!¡oug! ¡!¢n¢dIunoI H¢g¢I. Ado¡no¢vo!¢sw!a¡Is
nos¡ con¡Ing¢n¡ and nos¡ nonId¢n¡IcaI. H¢g¢I In ¡!¢ 8¢s!,
su¢a!Ing,H¢g¢IwI¡!!IsSwa5IandIaI¢c¡and!IsuIaIn5ou¡g¢oIs
Iac¢. Bu¡ w!a¡ Is nos¡ con¡Ing¢n¡ and nos¡ nonId¢n¡IcaI, ¡!¢
u¢¡son oI H¢g¢I, Is aIso ¡!¢Iocus oI ¡!¢ In¡¢¡uIay oI suI¡I¡ and
ß ¢s!, ¡!¢ Iocus oI ¡!¢ IndIvIduaI ¢×¢¡¡Ions ¡¢quI¡¢d Io¡¡!¢ III¢
oI ¡!¢ suI¡I¡, ¢×¢¡¡Ions ¡!a¡ a¡¢ a¡ ¡!¢ san¢ ¡In¢ a d¢II5¢¡a¡¢
dIv¢s¡I¡u¡¢oI ¡!¢s¢II. T!Isno¡Ion oI¡!¢dIv¢s¡¢ds¢II Is¡!¢aI-
¡¢¡¢dconc¢u¡oI¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢¡!a¡¡a!¢s¡!¢uIac¢oIw!a¡w¢¡!In!
oIasºsu5j¢c¡Iv¢¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢."
In ¢vo!Ing ¡!¢ su¢a!Ing u¢¡son oI H¢g¢I, Ado¡no u¡ac¡Ic¢s
!Isowns¢II-dIv¢s¡I¡u¡¢. I¡IsunusuaIIo¡!In¡ocI¡¢anyon¢5u¡
H¢g¢I In ¡!¢ 5oo!, 5u¡ !¢¡¢ !¢ gIv¢s ¡!¢ ßoo¡, a¡ I¢ng¡!, ¡o
H. C. Ho¡!o, w!o !¢a¡d H¢g¢I I¢c¡u¡¢ In B¢¡IIn and w!o d¢-
sc¡I5¢s!InasIoIIows(!¢¡¢InWaI¡¢¡ KauInann's¡¢nd¢¡Ing).
Exhausted, morose, he satthereasifcollapsed intohimself,his head
bentdown,andwhilespeakingkeptturningpagesandsearchinginhis
long folio notebooks, forward and backward, highand low. His con-
stantdearingofhisthroatandcoughinginterruptedanyßowofspeech.
Everysentencestoodaloneandcameoutwitheffort,cutinpiecesand
jumbled. Everyword, everysyllabledetacheditselfonlyreluctantlyto
receivea strangely thorough emphasis from the metallic-empty voice
withitsbroadSwabiandialect. (ºSkoteinos¨)
W!a¡on¢s¢¢s!¢¡¢In¡!¢con¡Ing¢n¡,no¡¡aI,ß ¢s!Iy !unan5¢Ing
Is In Iac¡ ¡!¢ ac¡IvI¡y oI suI¡I¡ I¡s¢II wI¡!In ¡!¢ IndIvIduaI con-
scIousn¢ss. I¡Is ¡!oug!¡ In ac¡Ion w¢ a¡¢ s¢¢Ing. Ho¡!o su¢a!s
agaIn.
He faltered even in thebeginning, tried to goon,started oncemore,
stoppedagain,spokeandpondered,therightwordseemedtobemiss-
ingforever, butthenitscoredmostsurely . . . . Nowonehadgrasped
theclearmeaningofasentenceandhopedmostardentlytoprogress.
Invain.Insteadofmovingforward,thethoughtkeptrevolvingaround
xxxi
Introduction
thesamepointwithsimilarwords. . . . Slowlyanddeliberately,making
useofseeminglyinsignihcantlinks,somefullthought. . . limiteditself
to the point ofone-sidedness. . . . split itselfinto distinctions and in-
volveditselfi contradictionswhosevictorioussolutioneventuælyfound
the strength to compelthe reunihcation ofthe mostrecalcitrant elc-
ments.Thusalwaystakingupagaincarefullywhathadgonebeforein
orderto develop outofitmore profoundlyina differentformwhat
camelater,. . . themostwonderfulstreamofthoughttwistedandpressed
andstruggled.(ºSkoteinos¨)
In¡!Iss¢ns¢w!a¡w¢¡!In!oIassu5j¢c¡Iv¢¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢IsInIac¡
¡!¢ouuosI¡¢,au¢¡son!oodu¡¡¢¡Iyd¢vo¡¢d¡o¡!¢o5j¢c¡IvI¡yoI
I¡swo¡!. ByaII¡!¢su5j¢c¡Iv¢n¢ansavaIIa5I¢¡oI¡,¡!¢u!IIoso-
u!¢¡'ss¢II¢IIac¢sI¡s¢IIIn¡!¢¡¡u¡!oII¡so5j¢c¡.Innos¢ns¢do¢s
Ado¡no's ¢voca¡Ion oI ¡!¢ u¢¡son oI H¢g¢I ¡¢u¡¢s¢n¡ a 5Io-
g¡au!IcaIIn¡¢¡u¡¢¡a¡IonoI!Is¡!oug!¡,¡a¡!¢¡¡!an¡!¢¡!oug!¡
¢×u¡¢ssIng¡!¢nan,¡!¢III¢oI¡!¢nan!Ins¢II5¢con¢s¡!¢III¢
oI suI¡I¡. ºLI!¢ ¡!¢su5j¢c¡oI !Is¡!¢o¡I¢s,¡!¢ nan H¢g¢I!ad
a5so¡5¢d5o¡! su5j¢c¡ and o5j¢c¡In¡o !Ins¢IIInsuI¡I¡, ¡!¢III¢
oI!IssuI¡I¡IsaIIoIIII¢agaInwI¡!InI¡s¢II " (ºAsu¢c¡s").W¢nay
¡!In! oI H¢g¢I as !avIng an ºIn¡¢II¢c¡uaI 5ody," says Ado¡no,
and!Isu!IIosou!y¡oo "rucht"; I¡nu¡nu¡sand¡us¡I¢sInnI-
n¢sIsoI¡!¢nonId¢n¡IcaI. I¡IsIn¡!Iss¢ns¢¡!a¡ H¢g¢I'su!IIos-
ou!yIsan¢×pr¢ssIonoI¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢,u!IIosou!yIs¡!¢¢×u¡¢ssIon
oIsuI¡I¡,w!Ic!Is¡!¢n¢ga¡IonoIs¢IIIn¡!¢na¡¡¢¡a¡!and.
I¡IsInuo¡¡an¡¡!a¡¡!Isno¡5¢und¢¡s¡oodassInuIyana¡¡¢¡
oI su5IIna¡Ion o¡ s¢II-¡¡ansc¢ndanc¢, ¡!¢ eI¢n¢n¡ oIIa5o¡,¢×-
¢¡¡Ion,andI¡s¡¢Ia¡Ion¡ono¡¡aII¡yIscI¢a¡Iyu¡¢s¢n¡.S¢II-dIv¢s¡-
I¡u¡¢In¡!¢ac¡IvI¡yoIsuI¡I¡Isa!In¡od¢a¡!,¡!¢III¢oI¡!¢suI¡I¡
!as a !Ins!Iu wI¡! no¡¡aII¡y and d¢a¡!. In Ado¡no's wo¡ds,
º H¢g¢I's d¢n¢ano¡, IuII oI suII¢¡Ing,!Is coun¡¢nanc¢ ¡avag¢d
5y ¡!oug!¡, ¡!¢ Iac¢ oI on¢ w!o !as II¡¢¡aIIy consun¢d !In-
s¢II un¡II !¢ Is no no¡¢ ¡!an as!¢s, 5¢a¡ wI¡n¢ss ¡o ¡!Is s¢II-
·
dIv¢s¡I¡u¡¢"(ºAsu¢c¡s").II¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢Is¡!¢co¡¢oIH¢g¢I'su!I-
XXXll
Introduction
Iosou!y, ¡!¢n, I¡ Is 5o¡! ¡!¢ dIs¡III¢d¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢oI III¢ and ¡!¢
¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢oI¡!oug!¡a¡wo¡!wI¡!aIII¡ss¡¡aInsandcon¡¡adIc-
¡Ions. PaIn ands¡¡uggI¢a¡¢Ins¢ua¡a5I¢I¡onI¡,asIn Ado¡no's
own ¢IIo¡¡ ¡o w¡¢s¡ H¢g¢I's ¡¡u¡! I¡on !Is un¡¡u¡!. Ado¡no's
¡¢j¢c¡IonoI¡!¢no¡IonoIuayIng!onag¢¡o¡!¢g¡¢a¡nanno¡-
wI¡!s¡andIng,!IsuI¡Ina¡¢¡¡I5u¡¢¡o H¢g¢IIs¡!¢no¡Ion¡!a¡!¢
¢ndu¡¢d¡!¢s¢¢IIo¡¡s. "Nou!IIosou!ywassou¡oIoundIy¡Ic!,
non¢ !¢Id so unsw¢¡vIngIy ¡o ¡!¢ ¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢ ¡o w!Ic! I¡ !ad
¢n¡¡us¡¢dI¡s¢IIwI¡!ou¡¡¢s¢¡va¡Ion.Ev¢n¡!¢na¡!soII¡sIaIIu¡¢
w¢¡¢s¡¡uc!5y¡¡u¡!I¡s¢II "|"Asu¢c¡s").AndII¡!¢uI¡Ina¡¢c¡I¡-
IcIsnoI H¢g¢IIs¡!a¡!¢Is¡!¢5ou¡g¢oIsu!IIosou!¢¡ua¡¢×c¢I-
I¢nc¢, ¡!¢ "conIo¡¡a5I¢ u¡oI¢sso¡ I¢c¡u¡Ing unconc¢¡n¢dIy on
¡!¢suII¢¡IngsoInan!Ind,"¡!¢n ¡!¢ ¢IIac¢n¢n¡oIs¢II ¡!a¡gIv¢s
!In¡!Is5ou¡g¢oIsuIaInn¢ss~¡!¢Nichterheit ¡!a¡ WaI¡¢¡ B¢n-
janInc¡¢a¡¢d!IsDeutche Menschen ¡o!ono¡~Is¡!¢s¢II-dIv¢s¡-
I¡u¡¢ ¡!a¡ na!¢s u!IIosou!IcaI ¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢ uossI5I¢. As Ado¡no
says,¡¡Is¡!Isso5¢¡d¡yn¢ss"¡ow!Ic!¡!¢nos¡¢×¡¡¢n¢ua¡!os
s!¡Iv¢IsIn H¢g¢I"¡!a¡gIv¢s¡!oug!¡I¡sdIgnI¡y,jus¡as,InadII-
I¢¡¢n¡¡onaII¡y,I¡gIv¢sAdo¡no'sauu¡¢cIa¡IonI¡suoIgnancy.
And Is no¡ Ado¡no !Ins¢II, w!o was ¡¢u¢a¡¢dIy accus¢d oI
5ou¡g¢oIs ¢II¡Isn 5u¡ w!os¢ coun¡¢nanc¢ ¡¢naIn¢d cI¢a¡ and
w!os¢ su¢¢c! was "d¡uc!I¢¡¡Ig"~"u¡In¡-¡¢ady"~su¢a!Ing on !Is
own 5¢!aII !¢¡¢ as w¢II, ¢×u¡¢ssIng ¡!¢¢IIac¢n¢n¡ oI s¢II and
¡!¢su¡¡¢nd¢¡¡ono¡¡aII¡y¡!a¡InIo¡n¢d!Isowna¡¡¢nu¡¡oIn-
n¢¡s¢ ¡!¢ s¢II wI¡!ou¡ ¡¢s¢¡va¡Ion In I¡s o5j¢c¡. And Is ¡!Is dI-
aI¢c¡IcoIs¢II-¢IIac¢n¢n¡and¡!¢¡avagIng¡¡avaIIoIsuI¡I¡In¡!¢
IndIvIduaI no¡ I¡s¢II ¡!¢n¢w conc¢u¡Ion oI ¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic ¡owa¡d
w!Ic! Hegel: Three Studies Ia5o¡s, a conc¢u¡Ion w!os¢ ¢n¢¡gI¢s
wIII, wc!ou¢,Inan ag¢Inw!Ic! ¡!¢ IndIvIduaI IsInc¡¢asIngIy
¢ndang¢¡¢d,con¡Inu¢¡osoundac¡ossbIs¡o¡IcaIc!asns.
T!¢ ¡¡ansIa¡o¡ wouId II!¢ ¡o ¡!an! 1¢¡¢ny S!auI¡o, Qu¢n¡In
SnI¡!,andAnd¡¢w Buc!waI¡¢¡Io¡advIc¢ondIIcuI¡uoIn¡sIn
xxxiii
Introduction
¡!¢ ¡¢×¡, Ton McCa¡¡!yand La¡¡y Co!¢nIo¡¡!¢I¡ un8aggIng
suuuo¡¡ oI ¡!¢ u¡oj¢c¡, and A¡d¢n H. NIc!oIs¢n Io¡ a ca¡¢IuI
andauu¡¢cIa¡Iv¢¡eadIngoI¡!¢nanusc¡Iu¡Inu¡og¡¢ss.1anMIII¢¡
oI ¡!¢ An¡Ioc! CoII¢g¢ II5¡a¡y s¡aII d¢s¢¡v¢s su¢cIaI ¡!an!s Io¡
II¡¢¡aIIygoIng ¡!¢ ¢×¡¡a nII¢ ¡o u¡ocu¡¢¡¢×¡s. As In !¢¡ o¡!¢¡
¡¡ansIa¡Ions oI Ado¡no's wo¡!, ¡!¢ ¡¡ansIa¡o¡ !as a¡¡¢nu¡¢d¡o
u¡¢s¢¡v¢asnanyoI¡!¢I¢a¡u¡¢soI Ado¡no's u¡os¢asa¡¢con-
sIs¡¢n¡wI¡! In¡¢IIIgI5III¡yIn EngIIs!.Fo¡any¡¢suI¡Ingaw!wa¡d-
n¢ss¢s (Ado¡no's wo¡d was ºInconcInnI¡I¢s") s!¢ aIon¢ Is
¡¢suonsI5I¢.
Preface
Wh¢nI¡can¢¡In¢Io¡an¢w¢dI¡IonoIAspect of Hegel's Philoso­
phy, I wan¡¢d ¡o suuuI¢n¢n¡ ¡!a¡ ¡¢×¡ wI¡!¡!¢ nonog¡au! on
¡!¢¢×u¢¡I¢n¡IaI con¡¢n¡ oI H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y ¡!a¡ I !ad uu5-
IIs!¢dIn¡!¢n¢an¡In¢. W!a¡Inu¢II¢dn¢¡ogo5¢yond¡!Iswas
¡!¢ anaIogy wI¡! ¡!¢ sayIng tres homires faciunt collegium: ¡!¡¢¢
nonog¡au!s na!¢ a 5oo!, ¢v¢n II I¡ isa s!o¡¡ on¢. H¢nc¢, In
acco¡danc¢wI¡!aIong-c!¢¡Is!¢duIan, Is¢¡downny¡!oug!¡s
onqu¢s¡IonsoIund¢¡s¡andIng H¢g¢I. T!¢ysu¡IngI¡onnywo¡!
In ¡!¢ P!IIosou!Isc!¢s S¢nIna¡ a¡ ¡!¢ UnIv¢¡sI¡yoI F¡an!Iu¡¡.
Ov¢¡nanyy¢a¡s Ma× Ho¡!!¢In¢¡and I!av¢oI¡¢n5¢¢ncon-
c¢¡n¢d wI¡! H¢g¢I ¡!¢¡¢, ny In¡¢n¡Ion was ¡o us¢ w!a¡ I !ad
o5s¢¡v¢dIn¡!¢¡¢ac!IngsI¡ua¡IonasauoIn¡oId¢ua¡¡u¡¢.CIv¢n
¡!¢ unI¡y oI¡!¢u!IIosou!IcaI¡boug!¡oI ¡!¢¡wooI us¡¢suon-
sI5I¢Io¡¡!¢¡¢I¢van¡In¡¢¡u¡¢¡a¡Ions,I¡wasuossI5I¢¡oIo¡goIn-
dIvIduaI¡¢I¢¡¢nc¢s.
To av¢¡¡ dIsauuoIn¡n¢n¡, I¢¡ n¢¢nu!asIz¢ ¡!a¡ ¨S!o¡¢Inos"
do¢sno¡cIaIn¡oacconuIIs!oII¡s¢II¡!¢IIIunIna¡IonoIH¢g¢I's
naIn wo¡!s, son¢¡!Ing ¡!a¡ Is Iong ov¢¡du¢. I¡ n¢¡¢Iy Io¡nu-
Ia¡¢s consId¢¡a¡Ions oI u¡IncIuI¢ 5¢a¡Ing on ¡!Is ¡as!, a¡ 5¢s¡ I¡
!aza¡ds gu¢ss¢s a5ou¡!owon¢wouIda¡¡Iv¢a¡an und¢¡s¡and-
Ing,wIr!ou¡dIsu¢nsInganyon¢I¡on¡!¢¢IIo¡¡sInvoIv¢dIncon�
xxxvi
Preface
c¡¢¡IzIng¡!os¢consId¢¡a¡IonswI¡!¡¢ga¡d¡o¡!¢¡¢×¡s.T!¢Issu¢
Is no¡ ¡o na!¢ ¡!¢ ¡¢adIng oI H¢g¢I ¢asI¢¡ 5u¡ ¡o u¡¢v¢n¡ ¡!¢
¢×¡¡ao¡dIna¡y¢×¢¡¡Ions¡!a¡ H¢g¢I¡¢quI¡¢s,nowas¡!¢n,I¡on
5¢Ing was¡¢d. Sonc¡!Ing¡!a¡ H¢g¢I ¡¢nInds¢uIs¡¢noIogy a5ou¡
s!ouId 5¢ auuII¢d ¡o Ins¡¡uc¡Ions a5ou¡ !ow ¡o ¡¢ad H¢g¢I as
w¢II. ¡!¢Ins¡¡uc¡Ionscan u¡ov¢succ¢ssIuI onIyIn¡!¢cou¡s¢oI
ca¡¡yIng ou¡ IndIvIduaI In¡¢¡u¡¢¡a¡Ions. T!¢ IInI¡s ¡!a¡ ¡!¢ au-
¡!o¡ oI a u¡oua¢d¢u¡Ic nus¡ s¢¡ Io¡ !Ins¢II wouId ¡!¢¡¢5y 5¢
¡¡ansg¡¢ss¢d.T!¢Iac¡¡!a¡I!av¢s¡ouu¢du¡¢cIs¢Iyw!¢¡¢Ioug!¡
¡o 5¢gIn nay¢×cus¢ son¢ oI¡!¢o5vIousInad¢quacI¢s¡!a¡ dIs-
uI¢as¢n¢.
T!¢wo¡!asaw!oI¢IsIn¡¢nd¢dasu¡¢ua¡a¡IonIo¡a¡¢vIs¢d
conc¢u¡IonoI¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic.
T!¢odo¡Y. Ado¡no
F¡an!Iu¡¡,sunn¢¡ I963
A Note on the Text
ºAsu¢c¡soI H¢g¢I's P!IIosou!y"g¡¢wou¡oIa¡aI!Igav¢a¡¡!¢
F¡¢¢UnIv¢¡sI¡yoI B¢¡IInon Nov¢n5¢¡ I4, I956,conn¢no¡a¡-
Ing¡!¢ I25¡!annIv¢¡sa¡yoI H¢g¢I'sd¢a¡!.T!¢u¡¢IInIna¡ywo¡!
was ¡oo ¢×¡¢nsIv¢¡o5¢ad¢qua¡¢IyInco¡uo¡a¡¢dIn¡o ¡!a¡ ¡aI!. I
was Io¡c¢d ¡o s¢I¢c¡ on¢ conuI¢×, aI5¢I¡ a c¢n¡¡aI on¢, Io¡ ¡!¢
B¢¡IIn ¡aI!and ¡o d¢aI wI¡! o¡!¢¡ no¡IIs InaI¢c¡u¡¢5¡oadcas¡
on H¢ssIan¡adIo. Bu¡sInc¢¡!¢¢I¢n¢n¡s!ad5¢¢nconc¢Iv¢das
a w!oI¢, I ¡!¢n 5¡oug!¡ ¡!¢n ¡og¢¡!¢¡, wI¡! Inuo¡¡an¡ addI-
¡Ions,Inanonog¡au!.
SInIIa¡Iy, ºT!¢ E×u¢¡I¢n¡IaI Con¡¢n¡ oI H¢g¢I's P!IIosou!y"
Isag¡¢a¡Iy¢×uand¢dv¢¡sIonoIaI¢c¡u¡¢Igav¢a¡¡!¢n¢¢¡Ings
oI¡!¢G¢¡nan H¢g¢ISocI¢¡yInF¡an!Iu¡¡onOc¡o5¢¡25, I958,
I d¢IIv¢¡¢d I¡ agaIn s!o¡¡Iy aI¡¢¡wa¡ds In F¡¢nc! a¡ ¡!¢ So¡-
5onn¢. I¡ was u¡In¡¢d In ¡!¢ Archiv fur Philosophie I959, voI.
9. I~2.
ºS!o¡¢Inos,"w¡I¡¡¢nIn¡!¢wIn¡¢¡oI I962~63,Isunuu5IIs!¢d.
SInc¢ ¡!¢ ¡!¡¢¢ conuI¢n¢n¡a¡y ua¡¡s oI ¡!¢ 5oo! !ad 5¢¢n
gIv¢n h×¢d II¡¢¡a¡y Io¡n son¢w!a¡ Ind¢u¢nd¢n¡Iy oI on¢ an-
o¡!¢¡,c¢¡¡aIn no¡IIsa¡¢¡¢u¢a¡¢d,aIways, oI cou¡s¢, I¡on dII-
I¢¡¢n¡u¢¡su¢c¡Iv¢s.
xxxviii
ANoteontheText
IwouIdII!¢¡o¢×u¡¢ssny!¢a¡¡I¢I¡g¡a¡I¡ud¢¡o¡!¢assIs¡an¡s
a¡ ¡!¢ P!IIosou!Isc!¢s S¢nIna¡ a¡¡!¢ UnIv¢¡sI¡y oI F¡an!Iu¡¡,
¢su¢cIaIIy P¡oI¢sso¡ H¢¡nann Sc!w¢uu¢n!äus¢¡, D¡. AII¡¢d
Sc!nId¡,D¡.W¢¡n¢¡B¢c!¢¡,and D¡.H¢¡5¢¡¡Sc!näd¢I5ac!.
T!¢odo¡W. Ado¡no
Editorial Remarks from the
German Edition
T!¢no¡¢sAdono!Ins¢IIu¡ovId¢don¡!¢g¢n¢sIsoIHegel: Three
Studies ¡¢quI¡¢I¢waddI¡Ions.

T!¢ h¡s¡ oI ¡!¢ ¡!¡¢¢ s¡udI¢s was uu5IIs!¢d s¢ua¡a¡¢Iy 5y
Su!¡!anuV¢¡Iag,B¢¡IInand F¡an!Iu¡¡anMaIn,In I957,un-
d¢¡¡!¢¡I¡I¢Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy. T!a¡¢dI¡Ioncon¡aInsa
no¡¡o¡a!¢nI¡on Ado¡no'sMinima Moralia: ºDasCanz¢Is¡das
Unwa!¡¢" [¡!¢ w!oI¢ Is ¡!¢ un¡¡u¢|. A ºno¡¢" ¡o ¡!a¡ ¢dI¡Ion
da¡¢d1anua¡y I957was Inco¡uo¡a¡¢dIn¡o ¡!¢ ºNo¡¢"InHegel:
Three Studies, wI¡! ¡!¢ ¢×c¢u¡Ion oI ¡!¢ Ias¡ ua¡ag¡au!, w!Ic!
¡¢ads. ºA uu5IIca¡Ion a5ou¡ H¢g¢I oII¢¡san ouuo¡¡unI¡y¡o ¡¢-
u¢a¡ ¡!a¡ ¡!¢ u!IIosou!IcaI ¡!oug!¡ oI ¡!¢ au¡!o¡ and ¡!a¡ oI
Ma× Ho¡!!¢In¢¡ a¡¢ on¢ and ¡!¢ san¢. Fo¡ ¡!Is¡¢asouI¡ !as
5¢¢nuossI5I¢¡oIo¡goIndIvIduaI¡¢I¢¡¢nc¢s."
T!¢ ¡!¡¢¢ s¡udI¢s w¢¡¢ uu¡ ¡og¢¡!¢¡ asDrei Studien zu Hegel
Io¡¡!¢s¢¡I¢sº¢dI¡Ionsu!¡!anu,"and¡!¢h¡s¡¢dI¡Ionwas uu5-
IIs!¢dIn I963.
T!¢¡¢×¡oIHegel: Three Studies Is5as¢don¡!¢¡!I¡d¢dI¡IonoI
I969,¡!¢Ias¡¡oauu¢a¡du¡Ing¡!¢au¡!o¡'sIII¢¡In¢.AI¢wco¡-
¡¢c¡Ions !av¢ 5c¢n nad¢ on ¡!¢ 5asIs oI IndIca¡Ions In1!¢ au-
¡!o¡'scouy.T!¢cI¡a¡Ions!av¢5¢¢nc!¢c!¢dandco¡¡¢c¡Ionsnad¢
w!¢¡¢ n¢c¢ssa¡y. Fou¡ ¡¢×¡uaI no¡¢s In ºS!o¡¢Inos" !av¢ 5¢¢n
xl
EditorialRemarksfromtheGermanEdition
nov¢dI¡on¡!¢¢ndno¡¢s¡o¡!¢uag¢s¡ow!¡c!¡!¢y¡¢I¢¡.O¡!-
¢¡w¡s¢¡!¢Io¡noI¡!¢no¡¢sIoIIows¡!a¡oI¡!¢o¡¡g¡naIasIa¡as
uoss¡5I¢, ¢v¢n ¡!¢ uo¡n¡s ¡n w!¡c! ¡!¢y a¡¢ ¡ncons¡s¡¢n¡ a¡¢ an
¢×u¡¢ss¡onoI Ado¡no'san¡¡ua¡!y¡o un¡h¢dsys¡¢na¡¡c¡!oug!¡.
|anua¡y I97I
He
g
el
1nree8tudies
'
Aspects of He
g
el's Philosophy
A!¡s¡o¡¡caIoccas¡onI¡!¢¡!¢ I25¡!ann¡v¢¡sa¡yoIH¢g¢I'sd¢a¡!
couId!av¢¢I¡c¡¡¢dw!a¡w¢caIIanºauu¡¢c¡a¡¡on."Bu¡¡!a¡con-
c¢u¡!as 5¢con¢ un¡¢na5I¢,¡I¡nd¢¢d ¡¡¢v¢¡!adany vaIu¢. I¡
na!¢s¡!¢¡nuud¢n¡cIa¡n¡!a¡ b¢caus¢on¢!as¡!¢du5¡ousgood
Io¡¡un¢¡oI¡v¢ Ia¡¢¡,and5¢

aus¢on¢Lasau¡oI¢ss¡onaI¡n¡¢¡¢st
¡n¡!¢u¢¡sonon¢¡s¡o¡aI!a5ou¡,on¢cansov¢¡¢¡gnIyass¡gn¡!t
d¢ad u¢¡son !¡suIac¢, ¡b¢¡¢5y ¡n son¢s¢ns¢¢I¢va¡¡ng on¢scII
a5ov¢!¡n. T!¡sa¡¡oganc¢¢c!o¢s¡n¡!¢Ioa¡!son¢qu¢s¡¡on Ot
w!a¡¡n Kan¡, andnow H¢g¢Ias
,
¢II,!asany n¢an¡ng Io¡ the
u¡¢s¢n¡~and cv¢n t!¢so-caII¢d H¢gcl¡¢tia¡ssanc¢5cgan!aII a
ccn¡u¡yagow¡¡!a5oo! 5y B¢n¢d¢¡¡oC¡oc¢ ¡!a¡und¢¡¡oo!¡o
d¡s¡¡ngu¡s!5¢¡w¢¢nw!at·asI¡v¡ngandw!a¡wasd¢ad¡n Hcg¢I.
T!¢conv¢¡s¢qu¢s¡¡on¡sno¡¢v¢n¡a¡s¢d.w!a¡¡!¢p¡¢s¢n¡n¢ans
¡n¡!¢ Iac¢oI H¢g¢I,w!¢¡!¢¡u¢¡!aus¡!¢¡¢asonon¢¡nag¡n¢s
on¢ !as a¡¡a¡n¢d s¡ncc H¢g¢I 's a5soIu�¢ ¡¢ason!as no¡ ¡n Iac
Iongs¡nc¢¡¢g¡¢sscd5�!¡nd¡h¢Ia¡æ� and acconnoda¡¢d¡ow!at
n¢¡¢Iv¢

is¡s,w!cn H¢g¢I¡

n ¡¢aaon

t¡i¢d ¡o s¢¡¡!¢ 5u¡d¢n oî
¢×¡s¡¢nc¢¡nmo¡¡on¡!¡oug!¡!¢¡¢ason¡!a¡o5¡a¡ns¢v¢n¡nw!at
¢×¡s¡s. AII auu¡¢c¡a¡¡ons a¡¢ su5j¢c¡ ¡o ¡!¢ judgn¢n¡ uass¢d iri
H¢g¢I's u¡¢Iac¢ ¡o ¡!¢ Phenomenolog of Spirt on ¡!os¢w!o a¡�
a5ov¢ son¢¡!¡ng only 5¢caus¢ ¡!¢y a¡¢no¡¡n¡¡. Auu¡¢c¡a¡¡ons
2
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
IaIII¡on¡!¢s¡a¡¡¡ocau¡u¡¢¡!¢s¢¡Iousn¢ssandcog¢ncyoI H¢-
g¢I's u!IIosou!y 5y u¡ac¡IcIngon !In w!a¡ !¢caII¢d, wI¡! au-
u¡ou¡Ia¡¢dIsdaIn,au!IIosou!yoIu¢¡su¢c¡Iv¢s. II on¢do¢sno¡
wan¡ ¡o nIss H¢g¢I wI¡! on¢'s v¢¡y 6¡s¡ wo¡ds, on¢ nus¡ con-
I¡on¡,!ow¢v¢¡Inad¢qua¡¢Iy,¡!¢cIaIn!Isu!IIosou!yna!¢s¡o
¡¡u¡!,¡a¡!¢¡¡!ann¢¡¢IydIscussIng!Isu!IIosou!yI¡ona5ovc,
and¡!¢¡¢5yI¡on5¢Iow.
LI!¢o¡!¢¡ cIos¢d sys¡¢nsoI ¡!ough¡, H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y avaIIs

;'
I¡s¢IIoI¡!¢ du5Iousadvan¡ag¢oIno¡!avIng ¡o aIIowany c¡I¡I-
cIsnw!a¡so¢v¢¡. AIIc¡I¡IcIsnoI¡h¢d¢¡aIIs,acco¡dIng¡o H¢g¢I,
¡¢naIns ua¡¡IaI and nIss¢s ¡!¢ w!oI¢, w!Ic! In any cas¢ ¡a!¢s
¡!Isc¡I¡IcIsnIn¡oaccoun¡.Conv¢¡s¢Iy,c¡I¡IcIzIng¡!¢w!oI¢asa
w!ol¢ Is a5s¡¡ac¡, ºunn¢dIa¡¢d," and Igno¡¢s ¡!¢ Iundan¢n¡aI
no¡IIoIH¢g¢IIanu!IIosou!y.¡!a¡I¡canno¡5¢dIs¡III¢dIn¡oany
ºna×In"o¡g¢n¢¡aIu¡IncIuI¢andu¡ov¢sI¡s wo¡¡!onIyasa¡o�
¡aII¡y, In ¡!¢ conc¡¢¡¢ In¡¢¡conn¢c¡Ions oI aII I¡s non¢n¡s. Ac-
co¡dIngIy,¡!¢onIyway¡o!ono¡H¢g¢IIs¡o¡¢Ius¢¡oaIIowoncs¢II
¡o5¢In¡InIda¡¢d5y ¡!¢ vI¡¡uaIIyny¡boIogIcaIconuI¢×I¡yoI!is
c¡I¡IcaI n�¡!od,w!Ic!na!¢sc¡I¡IcIsn s¢¢nIaIs¢nona¡¡¢¡w!a¡,
andIns¡¢adoIg¡acIousIy o¡ung¡acIousIyIIs¡Ingo¡d¢nyIng hIs
n¢¡I¡s,goaI¡¢¡¡!¢w!oI¢,w!Ic!uw!a¡H¢g¢I!Ins¢IIwasaI¡¢¡.
T!¢s¢ days I¡ Is !a¡dIy uossI5I¢ Io¡ a ¡!¢o¡¢¡IcaI Id¢a oI any
scou¢¡odojus¡Ic¢¡o¡!¢¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢oIconscIousn¢ss,andInIac¡
no¡ onIy ¡!¢¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢oIconscIousn¢ss5u¡ ¡!¢¢n5odI¢d ¢×-
u¢¡I¢nc¢ oI !unan 5¢Ings, wI¡!ou¡ !avIng Inco¡uo¡a¡ed son¢-
¡!IngoI H¢g¢I'su!IIosou!y.Bu¡¡!Iscanno¡5¢¢×uIaIn¢dm¡¢¡ns
oI¡!¢¡¡IvIaIau¢¬u acco¡dIng¡ow!Ic! H¢g¢I,¡!¢a5soIu¡¢Id¢-
aIIs¡, was a g¡¢a¡ ¡¢aIIs¡ and a nan wI¡! a s!a¡u!Is¡o¡IcaI¢y¢.
H¢g¢I's su5s¡an¡Iv¢ InsIg!¡s,w!Ic!¢×¡¢nd¢d¡o¡!¢ I¡¡¢concIIa-
5III¡yoI¡!¢con¡¡adIc¡IonsIn5ou¡g¢oIssocI¢¡y,canno¡5¢s¢ua-
¡a¡¢dI¡onsu¢cuIa¡Ion~¡!¢vuIga¡no¡IonoIw!Ic!!asno¡!Ing
¡odowI¡!¡!¢ H¢g¢IIanno¡Ion~as¡!oughI¡w¢¡¢son¢!IndoI
3
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
¡¡ou5I¢son¢o¡nan¢n¡a¡Ion.On¡!¢con¡¡a¡y,¡!os¢InsIg!¡sa¡¢
u¡oduc¢d5ysu¢cuIa¡Ion,and ¡!¢yIos¢¡!¢I¡ su5s¡anc¢ assoon
as¡!¢y a¡¢ conc¢Iv¢d asn¢¡¢Iy¢nuI¡IcaI. T!¢ Id¢a ¡!a¡ ¡!¢ a
u¡Io¡IIsaIso¡!¢auos¡¢¡Io¡I,anId¢a¡!a¡wasu¡og¡anna¡IcIn
FIc!¡¢ and was¡!¢n IuIIy¢Ia5o¡a¡¢d 5y H¢g¢I,Isno¡an auda-
cIousuI¢c¢oI5on5as¡,I¡Is¡!¢naInsu¡IngoI H¢g¢I's¡!oug!¡.
I¡ InsuI¡¢s 5o¡!!Isc¡I¡IcIsn oIag¡In ¢nuI¡IcaI ¡¢aII¡yand !Is
c¡I¡Iqu¢oIas¡a¡Icau¡Io¡Isn/W!¢¡¢H¢g¢Iconu¢Is!Isna¡¢rIaI
¡osu¢a!,¡!¢Id¢aoIano¡IgInaIId¢n¡I¡yoIsu5j¢c¡ando5j¢c¡''In
suI¡I¡,"anId¢n¡I¡y¡!a¡5¢con¢sdIvId¢dand¡!¢n ¡¢unI¡¢s,Is a¡
wo¡!.O¡!¢¡wIs¢¡!¢In¢×!aus¡I5Iy¡Ic!con¡¢n¡oI !Issys¡¢nwouId
¡¢naIn ¢I¡!¢¡an¢¡¢ accunuIa¡IonoI Iac¡s, and ¡!us u¡¢u!IIo-
sou!IcaI,o¡n¢¡¢Iydogna¡IcandwI¡!ou¡¡Igo¡.RIc!a¡dKron¢¡
¡Ig!¡Iy ouuos¢d d¢sc¡I5Ing ¡!¢ !Is¡o¡y oI C¢¡�an Id¢aIIsn as
advancIng dI¡¢c¡Iy I¡on Sc!¢IIIng ¡o H¢g¢I. Ra¡!¢¡, H¢g¢I ¡c-
�s¡¢d¡!¢dogna¡Icnon¢n¡InSc!¢IIIng�p!IIosop!yoIna¡u¡¢
¡!¡oug!r¢cou¡s¢¡oaFIc!¡¢an,and¢v¢n Kan¡Ia�_stcmolcg-��
¡caIInu
¤
!¢dynanIcoI¡!¢Phenomenolog of Spirit 5¢gIns
In¢uIs¡¢noIogyand¡!¢ngo¢son,oIcou¡s¢,as¡!¢In¡¡oduc¡Ion
aI¡¢ady IndIca¡¢s, ¡o ¢×uIod¢ ¡!¢ uosI¡Ion oI an IsoIa¡¢d o¡, In
H¢g¢IIan ¡¢¡ns, a5s¡¡ac¡ ¢uIs¡¢noIogy. Acco¡dIngIy, ¡!¢ a5un-
danc¢ oI ¢×u¢¡I¢n¡IaI conc¡¢¡¢n¢ss [das Gegenstandliche] ¡!a¡ Is
In¡¢¡u¡¢¡¢d5y¡!oug!¡InH¢g¢Iandnou¡Is!¢s¡!oug!¡In¡u¡n,
Isdu¢no¡sonuc!¡oa¡¢aIIs¡IcI¡an¢oI nIndon H¢g¢I'sua¡¡
as¡o!Isn¢¡!odoIanann¢sIs,suI¡I¡'sInn¢¡sIonInI¡s¢II,o¡,In
H¢g¢I's wo¡ds, 5¢Ing's Inwa¡dIza¡Ionand s¢II-uoss¢ssIon [das in
sich Hineingehen, sich Zusammenziehen des Seins] . II on¢ ¡¡I¢d ¡o
¡¢scu¢ ¡!¢ na¡¢¡IaI su5s¡anc¢ oI H¢g¢IIan u!IIosou!y I¡on I¡s
aII¢g¢dIy ou¡nod¢danda¡5I¡¡a¡ysu¢cuIa¡Ion5y¢¡adIca¡ingI¡s
Id¢aIIsn,on¢wouId!av¢no¡!Ing5u¡uosI¡IvIsnon¡!¢on¢!and
and suu¢¡6cIaI In¡¢II¢c¡uaI !Is¡o¡y on ¡!¢ o¡!¢¡. W!a¡ H¢g¢I
¡!oug!¡, !ow¢v¢¡, Is aIso oI a conuI¢¡¢Iy dIII¢¡¢n¡ o¡d¢¡ ¡!an
4
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
¡!a¡ oI ¢n5¢dd¢d n¢ss In ¡¢Ia¡Ions!Ius¡o w!Ic! ¡!¢ IndIvIduaI
dIscIuIIn¢scIos¢d¡!¢I¡¢y¢s. HIssy¡¢nIsno¡anov¢¡a¡c!IngscI-
¢n¡Ihc sys¡¢nanyno¡¢¡!anI¡Isan aggIon¢¡a¡IonoIwI¡¡yo5-
s¢¡va¡Ions. W!¢n on¢ s¡udI¢s !Is wo¡!, I¡ son¢¡In¢s s¢¢ns as
¡!oug! ¡!¢ u¡og¡¢ss ¡!a¡ suI¡I¡ InagIn¢s I¡s¢II ¡o !av¢ nade,
¡!roug!cI¢a¡n¢¡!odoIogyandI¡on-cIad¢nuI¡IcIsn,sInc¢ H¢-
g¢I'sd¢a¡!andInouuosI¡Ion¡o!In,IsaIIa¡¢g¡¢ssIon,w!II¢¡!¢
u!IIosou!¢¡sw!o ¡!In! ¡!¢ya¡¢naIn¡aInIngson¢¡!IngoI Hc-
g¢I'sI¢gacy!av¢Io¡¡!¢nos¡ua¡¡nIss¢d¡!¢conc¡¢¡¢ con¡¢n¡
onw!Ic!H¢g¢I's¡!oug!¡h¡s¡u¡ov¢dI¡s¢II.
T!In!, Io¡ Ins¡anc¢, oI C¢s¡aIi ¡!¢o�y, w!Ic! Kö!I¢¡ ¢×-
uand¢d¡oa!IndoIu!IIosou!y. H¢g¢I¡¢cognIz¢d¡!¢u¡Inacy
oI ¡!¢w!oI¢ ov¢¡ I¡s6nI¡¢ua¡¡s,w!Ic! a¡¢Inadequa¡¢and,In
¡!¢I¡conI¡on¡a¡Ion wI¡! ¡!¢ w!oI¢,con¡¡adIc¡o¡y. Bu¡ !¢ n¢I-
¡!¢¡d¢¡Iv¢dan¢¡au!ysIcsI¡on¡!¢a5s¡¡ac¡u¡IncIuI¢oI¡o¡aII¡y
no¡ gIo¡Ih¢d ¡!¢ w!oI¢ as suc! In ¡!¢ nan¢ oI ¡!¢ ºgood C¢-
s¡aI¡." H¢ do¢s no¡ na!¢ ¡!¢ ua¡¡s, as ¢I¢n¢n¡s oI ¡!¢ w!oIe,
au¡ononousIn ouuosI¡Ion ¡o I¡, a¡ ¡!¢san¢ ¡In¢, as ac¡I¡IcoI
¡onan¡IcIsn,!¢!nows ¡!a¡¡!¢w!oI¢ ¡¢aIIz¢sI¡s¢IIonIyInand
¡!¡oug! ¡!¢ ua¡¡s, onIy ¡!¡oug! discon¡InuI¡y, aII¢na¡Ion, and
¡¢8¢c¡Ion~¡!¡oug!, In s!o¡¡, ¢v¢¡y¡!Ing ¡!atIs ana¡!¢na ¡o
C¢s¡aI¡¡!¢o¡y.IIH¢g¢I'sw!oI¢¢xis¡sa¡aIIi¡IsonIyas¡!¢quIn-
¡¢ss¢nc¢ oI ¡!

ua¡¡IaI non¢n¡s, whIch aIways uoInt i-,ooc
¡!¢ns¢Iv¢sanda¡¢g¢n¢¡a¡¢dI¡omon¢ano¡!¢¡,I¡do¢sno¡¢×-
Is¡asson¢¡!Ing5¢yond¡!¢n. T!IsIsw!a¡!Isca¡¢go¡yoI¡o¡aI-
I¡y Is In¡¢nd¢d ¡o conv¢y. I¡ Is Inconua¡I5I¢ wI¡! any !Ind oI
¡¢nd¢ncy¡o !a¡nony, nona¡¡¢¡!ownuc!¡!¢Ia¡¢ H¢g¢Inay
su5j¢c¡Iv¢Iy !av¢!adsuc!¡¢nd¢ncI¢s. HIsc¡I¡IcaI¡!oug!¡go¢s
5¢yond5o¡!¡!¢s¡a¡IngoI¡!¢unconn¢c¡¢dand¡!¢u¡IncIuI¢oI
con¡InuI¡y,In!In,conn¢c¡IonIsno¡ana¡¡¢¡oIun5¡o!¢n¡¡an�
sI¡Ion5u¡ana¡¡¢¡oIsudd¢nc!ang¢,and¡!¢u¡oc¢ss¡a!¢suIac¢
no¡¡!¡oug!¡!¢mon¢n¡sauu¡oac!ingon¢ano¡!¢¡5u¡¡!¡oug!
5
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
¡uu¡u¡¢. Mod¢¡n C¢s¡aI¡¡!¢o¡y as In¡¢¡u¡¢t¢d 5y Ma× Sc!¢I¢¡
c!aII¢ng¢s ¡¡adI¡IonaI ¢uIs¡¢noIogIcaI su5(¢c¡IvIsn and In¡¢¡-
p¡¢¡s¡!¢c!ao¡Icna¡¢¡IaIoI¡!¢s¢ns¢s,¡!¢gIv¢nn¢ssoI¡!¢oh¢-
non¢non, w!Icn¡n¢w!oI¢ K¡Ian ¡¡adm ad dIsquah,_
as aI¡¢adv su¢cI6¢d and s¡¡uc¡u¡¢d. H¢g¢I, !ow¢v¢¡, ¢nu!a-
sÏz¢du¡¢cisHy¡5issu¢cIhca¡IonoI¡!co5j¢c¡,wIthou¡In¡!¢u¡o-
c¢ss IdoIIzIng ¡!¢s¢ns¢ c¢¡¡aIn¡ywI¡! ¡!¢ crI¡Iqu¢ oI w!Ic! ¡h¢
Phenomenolog of Spirit 5¢gIns,¡o say no¡!Ing oI In¡¢II¢c¡ua
l
In�
¡uI¡Ion.I¡Isu¡¢cIs¢Iy¡!¡ougha5soIu¡¢Id¢a|Ism,w!Ic!u¢¡mIts
no¡!Ing¡o¡¢naInou¡sId¢¡!¢su5j¢c¡,now¢×uand¢d¡ob¢con¢
InhnI¡¢,5u¡Ins¡¢adsw¢¢us¢v¢¡y¡!ingaIongwI¡!I¡In¡o¡!¢cu¡�
¡¢ntoI Innan¢nc¢, ¡!a¡ ¡!¢ ouuosI¡Ion 5¢¡w¢¢n n¢¡¢ na¡¡¢¡
and a conscIousn¢ss ¡!a¡ 5¢s¡ows Io¡n and n¢anIng Is ¢×¡In-
guIs!¢d. AIIIa¡¢¡c¡I¡IcIsnoI¡!¢so-caII¢dIo¡naIIsn oI¢uIs¡e-
noIogy and ¢¡!Icscan5¢Iound¢×uIIcI¡IyIo¡nuIa¡¢dIn H¢g¢I,
5u¡ !¢ dId no¡ ¡!¢¡¢Io¡¢ I¢au wI¡! a 5ound In¡o ¡!¢ aII¢g¢dIy
conc¡¢¡¢ as dId Sc!¢IIIng 5¢Io¡¢ !In and ¢×Is¡¢n¡IaI on¡oIogy
¡oday. On�cons¢qu¢nc¢ oI ¡!¢un¡¢s¡¡aIn¢d ¢×uansIon oI ¡h¢
su5j¢c¡¡oa5soIu¡¢ suI¡I¡In H¢g¢IIs �!a¡, asnon¢n¡s In!¢¡¢n¡
In ¡!Is suI¡I¡,¨no¡ onIy ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡ 5u¡ aIso ¡!¢ o5j¢c¡ a¡¢ u¡¢-
s¢n ¡¢dassu5s¡an¡IaIandna!Ing¡!¢IuIId¢nandsoI¡!¢I¡own
5¢Ings. H¢g¢I'snuch-adnI¡¢dna¡¢¡IaI¡Ic!n¢ssIsI¡s¢IIaIunc-
¡Ion oI !Is su¢cuIa¡Iv¢ ¡!oug!¡. I¡ was !Is su¢cuIa¡Iv¢ ¡!ougb¡
¡!a¡!¢Iu¢d!In¡osayson¢¡!I�g¢ss¢n¡IaIno¡n¢¡¢Iya5ou¡¡!¢
Ins¡¡un¢n¡soI!nowI¢dg¢5u¡a5ou¡I¡s¢ss¢n¡IaIo5j¢c¡s,wI¡!ou¡
¢v¢¡ susu¢ndIng conscIousn¢ss's c¡I¡IcaI s¢II-¡¢8¢c¡Ion.To ¡!¢
¢×¡¢n¡ ¡o w!Ic! on¢ can su¢a! oI ¡¢aIIsn In H¢g¢I, I¡

Is ¡o 5¢
Iound In ¡!¢ ua¡! IoIIow¢d5y hIs Id¢aIIsn, I¡Isno¡son¢¡!Ing
!¢¡¢¡og¢n¢ous¡oI¡. In H¢g¢It!¢ ¡¢nd¢ncyoIId¢aIIsnIs¡ono�¢
5¢yondI¡s¢II.
Ev¢n¡!¢uoIn¡oInos¡¢×¡¡¢n¢Id¢aIIsnIn H¢g¢I's¡!oug!¡,
¡!¢su5j¢c¡-o5j¢c¡cons¡¡uc¡Ion,s!ouId5ynon¢ans5¢dIsnIss¢d
6
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
as¡!¢a¡¡oganc¢oI¡!¢un¡¢s¡¡a¡n¢dconc¢u¡. In Kan¡,¡!¢¡d¢a
¡!a¡awo¡Idd¡v¡d¢d¡n¡osu5jcc¡ando5j¢c¡,¡!¢wo¡Id¡nw!¡c!,
asu¡¡son¢¡soI ou¡ owncons¡¡¡u¡¡on,w¢a¡¢¡nvoIv¢donIyw¡¡!
u!¢non¢na,¡sno¡¡!¢uI¡¡na¡¢wo¡Id,aI¡¢adyIo¡ns¡!¢s¢c¡¢¡
sou¡c¢oI¢n¢¡gy.H¢g¢Iaddsanun- Kan¡¡an¢I¢n¢n¡¡o¡!a¡.¡!¢
¡d¢a¡!a¡¡ng¡asu¡ng,conc¢u¡uaIIy,¡!¢5Ioc!,¡!¢I¡n¡¡¡!a¡¡ss¢¡
¡o su5j¢c¡¡v¡¡y,¡nund¢¡s¡and¡ngsu5j¢c¡¡v¡¡yas"n¢¡¢"su5j¢c¡¡v-
¡ty,w¢!av¢aI¡¢adyuass¢d5¢yond¡!a¡I¡n¡¡.H¢g¢I,w!o¡nnany
¡¢su¢c¡s ¡s a Kan¡ con¢ ¡n¡o !¡s own,¡sd¡¡v¢n 5y ¡!¢ ¡d¢a ¡!a¡
!nowI¢dg¢,¡I¡!¢¡¢¡ssucha¡!¡ng,¡s5y¡¡sv¢¡y¡d¢a¡o¡aI!nowI-
¢dg¢, ¡!a¡¢v¢¡y on¢-s¡d¢d judgn¢n¡¡nt¢nds, 5y ¡¡sv¢¡y Io¡m,
¡!¢ a5soIu¡¢, and do¢s no¡ ¡¢s¡ un¡¡I ¡¡ !as b¢¢n su5Ia¡¢d ¡n ¡¡.
Su¢cuIa¡¡v¢ ¡d¢aI¡sn do¢s no¡ ¡¢c!I¢ssIyd¡s¡¢ga¡d ¡!¢ hn¡¡s oI
¡!¢uoss¡5¡I¡¡yoI!nowI¢dg¢,¡a¡!¢¡,¡¡s¢a¡c!¢sIo¡wo¡ds¡o¢x�
u¡¢ss¡!¢¡d¢a¡!a¡a¡¢I¢¡¢nc¢¡o¡¡u¡!assuc!¡s¡nIac¡¡n!¢¡¢n¡
¡naII !nowI¢dg¢¡!at¡s!nowI¢dg¢,¡!¡ � !nowI��e
a¡ aII and no¡ a n¢¡¢ duuI¡ca¡¡on oI ¡¢ su5j¢c¡, !nowI¢dg¢ ¡s
te tb�n n¢¡¢Iy

u5j¢ct¡v

, .:¡s obj�ti�ity 1c¯¡!¢ ob|cctive
rcaon ¡n Pla¡o, ¡!¢ I¢gacy oI w!¡c! c!

n¡ca
|
Iy u¢¡mcatcs su5-
jcc¡¡v¢¡¡ansc¢nd¢n¡aIph¡Iosou!y¡nH¢g¢I·nu¡ou¢¡ H¢gcIIan
t�rs on¢ n¡g!¡ say~a¡ t!c sam¢ tine aI t¢¡¡ng !¡n ¡n c¡uc¡aI
¡¢su¢c¡s ¡!¡oug! ¡nt¢¡u¡¢¡a¡¡on ¡!a¡ su5j¢c¡s !¡n ¡o a Iu¡¡!¢¡
¡ound oI ¡¢ß¢c¡¡on--¡!a¡ ¡¡¡s u¡¢c¡s¢Iy ¡!¢ cons¡¡uc¡¡on oI ¡!¢
a5soIu¡¢su5j¢c¡¡nH¢gcI¡!a¡do¢sjus¡¡c¢¡oano5j¢c¡¡v¡¡y¡nd¡s-
soIu5I¢ ¡n su5j¢c¡Iv¡¡y. Pa¡adoסcaIIy, !¡s¡o¡¡caIIy, onIy a5soIu¡c
¡d¢aI¡sn g¡v¢s I¡¢¢ ¡¢¡n ¡o ¡!¢n¢¡!od ¡!a¡ ¡!¢¡n¡¡oduc¡¡on¡o
¡!¢Phenomenolog o;Spirt caIIs"s¡nuIyIoo!¡ngon" [reines Zue­
hen] . H¢g¢I¡sa5I¢¡o¡!¡n!I¡om¡!¢¡!¡ng¡¡s¢IIou¡,¡osu¡¡¢nd¢¡
uass¡v¢Iy, as¡¡w¢¡¢,to¡tsau¡!¢nt¡csu5s¡anc¢, onIy occausc 5y
v¡¡¡u¢oI¡!¢sys¡¢n ¡!¢na¡¡¢¡a¡!and¡s¡¢I¢¡¡¢d¡o¡¡s¡d¢n¡¡¡y
w¡¡!a5soIu¡¢ su5j¢c¡. T!¡ngs¡!¢ns¢Iv¢ssu¢a!¡naub¡Iosou!y
¡!a¡Iocus¢s¡¡s¢n¢¡g¡¢sonu¡ov¡ng¡!a¡¡¡¡s¡¡s¢IIon¢w¡¡!¡!¢m.
7
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Nona¡¡¢¡!ownuc!H¢gcI¡!¢FIc!¡¢an¢nu!asIz¢s¡!¢Id¢aoI
ºuosI¡Ing," oI g¢n¢¡a¡Ion ¡!¡oug! suI¡I¡, no na¡¡¢¡ !ow ¡!o¡-
oug!Iyac
¡
Iv¢andu¡ac¡IcaI !Isconc¢u¡ ofd¢v¢Ioun¢n¡Is,!¢Is
a¡¡!¢san¢¡Im¢uassIv¢In!Is¡¢su¢c¡Io¡¡!¢su¢cIhc, co

ur¢-
b¢nðIng whn¢ansno¡g �

5ario|1e��·
c¢u¡.¯ :tio:sta�¢t¡cccp�¡Ias a ¡oI¢ In
¯ ¢¡I'su!cnon¢noIogy. T!IsId¢a¡ooIs H¢g¢IIan ¡!¡oug!and
¡!¡oug!,¢×c¢u¡¡!atinH¢·¢II¡Is no¡ IInIt¢d¡oasu¢cIhc¡yu¢
oIac¡oItonscIousn¢ss,I ¡d¢v¢Iousa¡aIII¢vcIsoI5o¡!su5j¢c¡Iv�
Ity ando5j¢c¡IvI¡y. H¢gcI¢v¢¡yw!¢¡¢yI¢Ids¡o t!¢o5j¢c¡'sow�
na¡u¡¢, w!Ic!¢v¢¡yw!¢¡¢5¢concs son¢¡bIngImn¢dIa¡¢Io¡!I

agaIn, bu¡I¡Isu¡¢cIs¢Iy¡!Is kIndoIsu5o¡dIna¡Ion¡o¡!¢dIsci
uIIn¢òf¡!¢¡!IngI¡s¢II¡!a¡¡¢quI¡¢s¡!¢nos¡In¡¢ns¢¢IIo¡¡son

¡!¢ua¡¡oI¡!¢conc¢u¡.T!os¢¢IIo¡¡ssucc¢¢da¡¡!¢non¢n¡in
w!Ic! ¡!¢ In¡¢n¡Ions o

f ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡ a¡¢ ¢x¡InguIs!¢d In ¡!¢ ob-
j¢c¡. H¢¢'s�I¡q�¡¡I!¢s

�yc¢¡¢o

¡!¢¡atIc
� �
oI
'¤¤
l�
¤
g

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5j

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5j
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acc¢p¡¢dIogIc oIscI¢nc¢¡a!¢sIo¡ g¡an¡¢d,¡!¢¡¢sIduaI ¡!¢o¡y


u¡!a��o

d

,�

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¡


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s

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so-caII¢d sc c¡o�s !���

ri �It:iIna¡¢, and¡!¢5l�w
!¢ s¡¡I!cs:so d¢a
m
y5¢caus¢ hcdo¢sno¡s¢¡ u

pan I¡¡a¡IonaI
unI¡yoIsu5j¢c¡andobj¢c¡I�ouuosI¡Ion¡o¡!a¡anaIysIs 5u¡In-
s¡¢ad u¡¢s¢¡v¢s ¡!¢ dIs¡Inc¡non¢n¡s oI ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡Iv¢ and ¡h¢
o5j¢c¡Iv¢w!II¢g¡asuIng¡!¢nasn¢dIa¡¢d5yon¢ano¡!¢t.T!¢
InsIg!¡¡!a¡In¡!¢r¢aInoI¡!¢so-caII¢dGeisteswissenchafte
n
|!u-
n
¸�
scI¢nc¢s,II¡¢¡aIIy,scI¢nc¢soI¡!¢suIrI¡|,w
¡
¢¡¢v¢r¡!¢obj¢c¡
I¡s¢IIIsn¢dIa¡¢d5y ºsuI¡I¡,"!nowI¢dg¢5¢con¢sI¡uI¡IuIno¡by
¢×cIudIng¡!¢su5j¢c¡5u¡¡h¡oug!I¡su¡nos¡¢×¢¡¡Ions,¡!rough
aII I¡sInuuIs¢sand¢×u¢¡I¢nc¢s~¡!Is InsIg!¡,w!Ic! scII-¡¢8¢c-
¡IonIsnowIo¡cInguuon¡!¢¡¢sIs¡an¡socIaIscI¢nc¢s,con¢sI¡on
H¢g¢I's sys¡¢n. T!a¡ InsIg!¡ na!¢s hIs sys¡¢n scI¢n¡IhcaIIy su-
u¢¡Ior¡o¡!¢Ins¡I¡u¡IonoIscI¢nc¢andsc!oIa¡s!Iu,w!Ic!,w!II¢
8
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
¡agIngagaIns¡¡!¢su5j¢c¡,¡¢g¡¢ss¢s¡oau¡¢scI¢n¡Ihc¡¢co¡dIng
oI n¢¡¢ un¡¢Ia¡¢d Iac¡s, ¢v¢n¡s, and ouInIons, a ¡¢co¡dIng oI
w!a¡Isnos¡Inad¢qua¡¢Iyandcon¡Ing¢n¡Iysu5j¢c¡Iv¢. AI¡!oug!
H¢g¢Isu¡¡¢nd¢¡swI¡!ou¡¡¢s¢¡va¡Ion¡o¡!¢su¢cIhcI¡yoI!Iso5-
j¢c¡÷ac¡uaIIy ¡o ¡!¢ o5j¢c¡Iv¢ dynanIc oI socI¢¡y÷!¢ Is ¡!o¡-
oug!¡yInnun¢,5y vI¡¡u¢oI !Is conc¢u¡IonoI¡!¢¡¢Ia¡Ions!I u
5¢¡w¢¢n su5j¢c¡ and o5j¢c¡, w!Ic! ¢×¡¢nds In¡o aII su5s¡an¡Iv¢
!nowI¢dg¢, ¡o ¡!¢ ¡¢nu¡a¡Ion ¡o acc¢u¡ ¡!¢ Iacad¢ unc¡I¡IcaIIy.
¡!¢¡¢a¡¢good¡¢asonsw!y¡!¢dIaI¢c¡IcoI¢ss¢nc¢andauu¢a¡�
anc¢ Is nov¢d ¡o ¡!¢ c¢n¡¢¡ oI ¡!¢ Logc. T!Is n¢¢ds ¡o 5¢ �¢-
n¢n5¢r¢da¡a¡In¢w!¢n¡!os¢w!oadmInIs¡¢¡¡!¢dIaI¢c¡IcIn
I¡sna¡¢¡IaIIs¡v¢¡sIon,¡!¢oIhcIaI¡!oug!¡oI¡!¢ Eas¡5Ioc,!av¢
d¢5as¢d I¡ ¡o an un¡¢8¢c¡¢d couy ¡!¢o¡y. Onc¢ dIv¢s¡¢d oI I¡s
c¡I¡IcaI I¢¡n¢n¡, ¡!¢ dIaI¢c¡Ic Is as w¢II si:i¡¢d ¡o dogna¡Isn as
¡!¢Inn¢dIacyoISc!¢IIIng'sIn¡¢II¢c¡uaIIn¡uI¡Ion,agaIns¡w!Ic!
H¢g¢I's uoI¢nIc was dI¡¢c¡¢d. H¢g¢I !¢Iu¢d Kan¡'s c¡I¡IcaI u!I-
Ioso ! con¢In¡oI¡sown5y c¡I¡IcIzIng¡!¢ Kan¡IanduaIIsnoI
Io¡nand con¡¢n¡, 5y d¡awIng ¡ ¢ ¡¡gIdd¢¡¢¡nIna¡Ions oI dII-
� in R¢gO'¯ìn¡¢¡u¡¢¡a¡ion, FIc!¡¢asw¢II÷

-

¡!
�.'.��''

cI
�b
¡!


5I
¹��Y

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¢n
9
-
n¢n¡s ¡o a8a¡,unn¢dIa¡¢dId¢n¡I¡y. Fo¡ H¢g¢I'sId¢aIIsn.r¢a-
¯o�m¢sac¡I¡IcaI¡¢�un�¡!a¡c¡I¡IcIz¢s Kan¡onc¢

a

���,¿



�¤t
��
� n¡sand
s¢¡s ¡!¢n In no¡Ion. T!¢ uoI¢s ¡!a¡ Kan¡ ouuos¢d ¡o on¢ an-
o¡!¢¡÷Io¡n and con¡¢n¡, na��

ti�l ¢o�s,
�� ��� »^_¸ ¤
¢c� ��
|¤I¤
g
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non÷a¡¢ aII u¢¡n¢a¡¢d ¡!¡oug! an�(houg!!�nm
! a way¡!a¡non¢ oI¡|

i
r:a¡Ions a¡¢ |cI¡standIng_
�a�In�. Inorderto5et!oug
!

:

.nd1o �,�c J+1nl+¢r�ntIy
¡¢quI¡¢¡cr ¡atYaoo�¢d¡oI¡. H¢nc¢Io¡H¢g¢In¢-
dIa¡IonIs
·
�,
ev¯�Iddl� ¬¢n¡b¢¢n ¢×¡¡¢n¢s, as, sInc¢
KI¢¡!¢gaa¡d,ad¢adIynIsund¢¡s¡andIng!as d¢uIc¡¢dI¡ a 5¢Ing,
9
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Ins¡¢ad,n¢dIa¡Ion ¡a!¢suIac¢Inand¡!¡oug!¡!¢¢×¡¡¢n¢s,In
¡!¢¢×¡¡¢n¢s¡!¢ns¢Iv¢s.T!IsIs¡!¢¡adIcaIasu¢c¡oI H¢g¢I,w!Ic!
Is Inconua¡I5I¢ wI¡! any advocacy oInod¢¡a¡Ion. H¢g¢I s!ows
¡!a¡ ¡!¢ Iundan¢n¡aI on¡oIogIcaI coti¡¢n¡s ¡!a¡ ¡¡adI¡IonaI u!I-
Iosou!y!ou¢d¡odIs¡III�¡¢no¡Id¢asdIsc¡¢¡¢Iys¢¡oIII¡omon¢
ano¡!¢¡,¡a¡!¢¡,¢ac!oI¡!¢n¡¢quI¡¢sI¡souuosI¡¢,and¡!¢¡¢-
Ia¡Ions!Iu oI aII oI ¡!¢n¡o on¢ ano¡!¢¡ Ison¢oI u¡oc¢ss. Bu¡
¡!Is aI¡¢¡s ¡!¢ n¢anIng oI on¡oIogy so d¢cIsIv¢Iy ¡!a¡ I¡ s¢¢ns
Iu¡II¢¡oauuIy¡!¢wo¡d,asnanycon¡¢nuo¡a¡yIn¡¢¡u¡¢¡¢¡soI
H¢g¢IwouIdII!¢¡odo,¡oaso-caII¢dIundan¢n¡aIs¡¡uc¡u¡¢w!os¢
v¢¡y na¡u¡¢ Is no¡ ¡o 1¢ a Iundan¢n¡aI s¡¡uc¡u¡¢, no¡ ¡o 5¢
vo+€iµ€ror,o¡su5s¡¡a¡un. In Kan¡'ss¢ns¢nowo¡Id,noconti-
tutum, IsuossI5I¢wI¡!om �!¢su¢c¡Iv¢conirmn�oIrason, �I)e
Cituen, and1�g¢I
·
¸
s¢II-¡¢8¢c¡IonoIId¢aIIsn,sInIIa¡Iv, add

¡!a¡¡!

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�(

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�m¡!¡ng¡!a¡ I� mm�I��v,1vo±
¡!¢ ºwo¡Id,' ByvI¡¡u¢oI ¡!IsInsIs¡¢n¡¡¢suons¢,¡!¢d¢adIyI¢g-
�¡¡a
j
I¡IonaI n¢¡auhysIcs, ¡!¢ qu¢s¡IonoI an uI¡Ina¡¢
u¡IncIuI¢ I¡on w!Ic! ¢v¢¡y¡!I

g nus¡ 5¢ d¢¡Iva5I¢, 5¢can¢
n¢anIngI¢ssIo¡ H¢g¢I.
H¢nc¢ ¡!¢ dIaI¢c¡Ic, ¡!¢ ¢uI¡on¢ oI H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!y, can-
no¡5¢II!¢n¢d¡oan¢¡!odoIogIcaIo¡on¡oIogIcaIu¡IncIuI¢¡!a¡
wouIdc!a¡ac¡¢¡Iz¢!Isu!IIosou!y¡!¢way¡!¢doc¡¡In¢oIId¢as
c!a¡ac¡¢¡Iz¢s PIa¡o In !Is nIddI¢ u¢rIod o¡ ¡!¢ nonadoIogy
c!a¡ac¡¢¡Iz¢s L¢I5nIz�T!¢dIaI¢c¡u1sn¢I¡!¢¡an¢¡¢n¢¡!od5y
w!Ic!suI¡I¡nIg!¡¢Iud¢¡!¢cog¢ncyoII¡so5j¢c¡~In H¢g¢I¡!¢
dIaI¢c¡IcII¡¢¡aIIyacconuIIs!¢s¡!¢ouuosI¡¢,¡!¢u¢¡nan¢n¡con-
I¡on¡a¡Ion oI ¡!¢ o5j¢c¡ wI¡! I¡s conc¢u¡~no¡ Is I¡ a w¢I¡an-
sc!auungIn¡ow!os¢sc!¢naon¢!as¡osqu¢¢z¢¡¢aII¡y.1us¡as
¡!¢dIaI¢c¡Ic do¢sno¡Iavo¡IndIvIduaI d¢5nI¡Ions, so¡!¢¡¢Isno
d¢5nI¡Ion¡!a¡5¡sI¡.DIaI¢c¡IcIs¡!¢unsw¢¡vIng¢IIo¡¡¡oconjoIri
l O
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
¡¢ason'sc¡¡¡¡caIconsc¡ousn¢ssoI¡¡s¢IIand¡!¢c¡¡¡¡caI¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢
oI o5j¢c¡s.T!¢sc¡¢n¡¡hcconc¢u¡oI v¢¡¡hca¡¡onna!¢s¡¡s!on¢
¡n¡!a¡¡¢aInoI s¢ua¡a¡¢,¡¡g¡dconc¢u¡s,suc!as¡!os¢oI¡!¢o¡y
and¢×u¢¡¡¢nc¢,onw!¡c! H¢g¢Id¢cIa¡¢dwa¡.II,!ow¢v¢¡,on¢
w¢¡¢¡ona!¢u¡¢c¡s¢¡nqu¡¡¡¢s¡n¡o¡¡sownv¢¡¡6ca¡¡on,¡!¢n¡¡¡s
u¡¢c¡s¢Iy H¢g¢I'sconc¢u¡¡onoI¡!¢d¡aI¢c¡¡c,w!¡c!¡!¢¡gno¡a
9
¡
¡¢nd¡od¡sn¡ssasaconc¢u¡uaIs¡¡a¡t|ack¢¡,¡!a¡¡!¢nos¡¡¢c¢n¡
u!as¢ oI !¡s¡o¡y !as v¢¡¡h¢d. And ¡¡ !as don¢ so ¡o an ¢×¡¢n¡
¡!a¡uass¢sjudgn¢n¡onanya¡¡¢nu¡ ¡oo¡¡¢n¡on¢s¢II¡n ¡¢¡ns
oIw!a¡s¡nuIy¡s¡!¢cas¢and¡odow¡t!ou¡¡!¢aII¢g¢da¡5¡¡¡a¡-
¡n¢ss oI ¡!¢ d¡aI¢c¡¡caI cons¡¡uc¡¡on. ¡n ¡¢¡ns oI !¡s own ¡d¢oI-
ogy, and as ¡!¢ !¢nc!nan oI no¡¢ uow¢¡IuI ¡n¡¢¡¢s¡s, H¡¡I¢¡
a¡¡¢nu¡¢d ¡o ¢¡ad¡ca¡¢ 5oIs!¢v¡sn, w!¢¡¢as ¡¡ was!¡s wa¡ ¡!a¡
5¡oug!¡¡!¢g¡an¡s!adowoI¡!¢SIav¡cwo¡Iddownon Eu¡ou¢-
¡!a¡ san¢ SIav¡c wo¡Id oI w!¡c! H¢g¢I !ad aI¡¢ady nad¢ ¡!¢
on¡nouss¡a¡¢n¢n¡¡!a¡¡¡!adno¡y¢¡¢n¡¢¡¢d !¡s¡o¡y. Bu¡¡¡was
no¡ a u¡ou!¢¡¡c !¡s¡o¡¡caI gaz¢~son¢¡!¡ng Io¡w!¡c!!¢wouId
!av¢!adno¡!¡ng5u¡con¡¢nu¡~¡!a¡¢na5I¢dH¢g¢I¡osay¡!¡s,
¡a¡!¢¡,¡¡was¡!¢cons¡¡uc¡¡v¢Io¡c¢¡!a¡¢n¡¢¡sIuIIy¡n¡ow!a¡¡s,
w¡¡!ou¡ sac¡¡6c¡ng ¡¡s¢II as ¡¢ason, c¡¡¡¡qu¢,and ¡!¢ awa¡¢n¢ss
oIuoss¡5¡I¡¡y.
Fo¡aII¡!a¡,!ow¢v¢¡,andaI¡!oug!¡!¢d¡aI¢c¡¡cd¢nons¡¡a¡¢s
¡!¢¡nuoss¡5¡I¡¡yoI¡¢duc¡ng¡!¢wo¡Id¡oa6×¢dsu5j¢c¡¡v¢uoI¢
and n¢¡!od¡caIIy uu¡su¢s ¡!¢ ¡¢c¡u¡ocaI n¢ga¡¡onand u¡oduc-
¡¡on oI ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡¡v¢ and o5j¢c¡¡v¢ non¢n¡s, H¢g¢I's u!¡Ioso-
u!y,au!¡Iosou!yoIsu¡¡¡¡,!¢IdIas¡¡o¡d¢aI¡sn.©nIy¡!¢doc¡¡¡n¢
oI ¡!¢ ¡d¢n¡¡¡y oI su5j¢c¡ and o5j¢c¡ 1n!¢¡¢nt¡n ¡d¢aI¡sn~an
¡d¢n¡¡¡y ¡!a¡ anoun¡s ¡n ¡¢¡ns oI Io¡n ¡o ¡!e u¡¡nacy oI ¡!¢
suoj¢c¡~g¡v¢s¡¡¡!¢s¡¡¢ng¡!oI¡o¡aI¡¡y¡!a¡u¢¡Io¡ns¡!¢n¢ga-
¡¡v¢Ia5o¡~¡!¢d¡ssoIu¡¡onoI¡nd¡v¡duaIconc¢u¡s,¡!¢¡¢8¢c¡¡on
oI¡!¢¡nn¢d¡a¡¢and¡!¢n¡!¢su5Ia¡¡onoI¡¢8¢c¡¡on.T!¢nos¡
¢×¡¡¢n¢Io¡nuIa¡¡onsoI¡!¡s a¡¢¡o 5¢Iound¡n H¢g¢I's!¡s¡o¡y
I I
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
oI u!IIosou!y. No¡onIy Is FIc!¡¢anu!IIosou!y ¡!¢ conuI¢¡Ion
oI Kan¡Ian u!IIosou!y, as FIc!¡¢ !Ins¢II !ad ¡¢u¢a¡¢dIy as-
s¢¡¡¢d,5u¡,H¢g¢Igo¢ssoIa¡as¡osay,ºInaddI¡Ion¡o¡!¢s¢|¡!a¡
Is, Kant's and FIc!¡¢'s| sys¡¢ns oI p!IIosou!I¢s, and ¡!a¡ oI
Sc!¢IIIng,¡!¢¡¢a¡¢non¢."'LI!¢FIc!¡¢,H¢g¢Ia¡¡¢nu¡¢d¡oou¡do
Kan¡InId¢aIIsn5ydIssolvIngany¡!Ingno¡u¡ou¢¡¡oconscIous-
n¢ss~Ino¡!¢¡wo¡ds,¡!¢gIv¢nnon¢n¡oI¡¢aII¡y~In¡o auos-
I¡Ing5y ¡!¢InhnI¡¢su5j¢c¡. H¢g¢Iu¡aIs¢d¡!¢g¡¢a¡¢¡consIs¡�ncy
oI Kan¡'ssucc¢sso¡sIncomua¡IsonwI¡! ¡!¢a5ysnaIdIscon¡Inu�
I¡I¢soI¡!¢ Kan¡Iansys¡¢n,and!¢¢v¢nou¡dId¡!¢nIn¡!Is¡¢-
ga¡d. I¡ dId no¡ occu¡ ¡o !In ¡!a¡ ¡!¢ Kan¡Ian dIscon¡InuI¡I¢s
¡¢gIs¡¢v¡!¢v¢¡ynon¢n¡oInonId¢n¡I¡v¡!atIsanIndIsu¢nsa5I¢
ua¡¡ oI !Is own conc¢u¡Ion oI ¡!c u!IIosou!y oI Id¢n¡I¡y. In-
s¡¢ad, !¢ uass¢s¡!Isjudgn¢n¡on FIc!¡¢. ºT!¢s!o¡¡conIngIn
¡!¢ Kan¡Ianu!IIosou!ywasI¡sun¡hIn!IngInconsIs¡¢ncy,¡!¡oug!
whIc!su¢cuIalIv¢unI¡ywasIac!Ing¡o¡!¢w!o
|
¢sys¡¢n,and¡!Is
s!o¡¡conIng was ¡¢nov¢d 5y FIc!¡¢. .. . FIc!¡¢'s u!IIosou!y Is
¡!us¡!¢d¢v¢Ioun¢n¡ oI Io¡nInI¡s¢II (¡¢asonIsIn I¡s¢IIasyn-
¡!¢sIsoIconc¢u¡andac¡uaII¡y),andInua¡¡IcuIa¡,ano¡¢consIs-
¡¢n¡ u¡¢s¢n¡a¡IonoI Kan¡Ian u!IIosou!y."2 HIsag¡¢¢n¢n¡ wIt!
FIc!¡¢ ¢×¡¢nds s¡III Ia¡¡!¢¡. ºT!¢ FIc!¡Ian u!IIosou!y !as ¡!¢
g¡¢a¡advan¡ag¢oI!avIngs¢¡Io¡¡!¡!¢Iac¡¡!a¡P!IIosou!ynus¡
5¢ascI¢nc¢

d¢¡Iv¢dI¡onon¢suu¡¢n¢u¡IncIuI¢,I¡onw!Ic!aII
d¢¡¢¡nIna¡Ions a¡¢ n¢c¢ssa¡IIy d¢¡Iv¢d. T!¢ Inuo¡¡an¡ uoIn¡Is
¡!Is unI¡y oI u¡IncIuI¢ and ¡!¢a¡¡¢nu¡ ¡o d¢v¢Iou I¡on I¡ In a
scI¢n¡I6caIIyconsIs¡cn¡ way¡!¢w!oI¢con¡¢n¡oIconscIousn¢ss,
o¡, as !as 5¢¢n saId, ¡o cons¡¡uc¡ ¡!¢ w!oI¢ wo¡Id." ³ T!¢¡¢ Is
II¡¡I¢¡!a¡couIdd¢nons¡¡a¡¢ H¢g¢I'ss¢II-con¡¡adIc¡o¡y¡¢Ia¡Ion-
s!Iu ¡o Id¢aIIsn, w!os¢ !Ig!¢s¡ u¢a! and w!os¢ ¡u¡nIng uoIn¡
!¢ a¡¡aIn¢d, no¡¢IncIsIv¢Iy ¡!an ¡!¢s¢ s¢n¡¢nc¢s. Fo¡¡!¢con-
¡¢n¡oIH¢g¢I'su!IIosou!yIs¡!¢no¡Ion¡!a¡¡¡u¡!�w!Ic!InH¢-
g¢I n¢ans ¡!¢ sys¡¢n÷anno¡ 5¢ ¢×u¡¢ss¢d as a Iundan¢n¡aI
I2
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
u¡IncIuI¢oI¡!Is!Ind,anu¡-u¡IncIuI¢,5u¡Is¡!¢dynanIc¡o¡aII¡y
oI aII ¡!¢u¡ouosI¡Ions¡!a¡can5¢g¢n¢¡a¡¢dI¡onon¢ano¡!¢¡
5yvI¡¡u¢oI¡!¢I¡con¡¡adIc¡Ions.Bu¡¡!IsIs¡!¢¢×ac¡ouuosI¡¢oI
FIc!¡¢'s a¡¡¢nu¡ ¡o d¢¡Iv¢ ¡!¢ wo¡Id I¡on uu¡¢ Id¢n¡I¡y, I¡on
a5soIu¡¢ su5j¢c¡, I¡on ¡!¢ on¢ o¡IgInaI uosI¡Ing. D¢suI¡¢ ¡!Is,
!ow¢v¢¡, H¢g¢I consId¢¡s¡!¢ FIc!¡¢anuos¡uIa¡¢ oI ¡!¢d¢duc-
¡Iv¢ sys¡¢n¢nu!a¡IcaIIy vaIId. I¡ was onIy ¡!a¡ !¢ acco¡d¢d I¡s
s¢condu¡IncIuI¢nuc!no¡¢w¢Ig!¡¡!anFIc!¡¢dIdIn!IsScience
of Knowledge. Ma¡¡¢¡sdono¡r¢s¡wI¡!¡!¢ºa5soIu¡¢Io¡n,"¡ous¢
H¢g¢I'sIanguag¢,¡!a¡ FIc!¡¢¡oo!uuand¡!a¡Is¡o¢ncIos¢¡¢aII¡y
wI¡!InI¡ ,Ins¡¢ad,conc¡¢¡¢¡¢aII¡yI¡s¢II Isson¢¡!Ingcons¡¡uc¡¢d
¡!¡oug! ¡!¢u¡oc¢ssw!¢¡¢5y ¡!oug!¡ g¡asus ¡!¢ ouuosI¡Ion oI
con¡¢n¡¡oIo¡nand ¡!couuosIng con¡¢n¡, II youII!¢,Is d¢v¢I-
ou¢dou¡oI¡!¢Io¡nI¡s¢If. In!Isd¢cIsIon

¡o¡oI¢¡a¡¢noIInI¡s,
¡o¢IInIna¡¢¢v¢¡yua¡¡IcI¢ofad¢¡¢¡nIna¡IonoIdIII¢¡¢nc¢, Hc-
g¢I II¡¢¡aIIy oudId FIc!¡¢an ¡d¢aIIsn. T!¢ IndIvIduaI FIch¡¢an
u¡IncIuI¢s¡!¢¡¢5y Ios¢¡!¢I¡ concIusI

¢ sIgnIhcanc¢. H¢g¢I ¡¢c-
ognIz¢d ¡!¢ Inad¢quacy oI ana5s¡¡ac¡u¡IncIuI¢5¢yond¡!¢dI-
aI¢c¡Ic, a u¡IncIuI¢ I¡on w!Ic! aII ¢ls¢ Is ¡o IoIIow. Son¢¡!Ing
¡!a¡ was InuIIcI¡ In FIc!¡¢ 5u¡ no¡ y¢¡ d¢v¢Iou¢d now 5¢con¢s
¡!¢ d¡IvIng Io¡c¢ oI H¢g¢I's u!IIosou!IcaI ac¡IvI¡y. T!¢ cons¢-
qu¢nc¢oI¡!¢u¡IncIuI¢n¢ga¡¢s¡!¢u¡IncIuI¢I¡s¢II�ndd¢s¡¡oys
I¡s a5soIu¡¢ u¡Inacy. H¢nc¢ In ¡!¢Phenomenolog H¢g¢I couId
s¡a¡¡wI¡!¡!¢su5j¢c¡andg¡asuaIIconc¡¢¡¢con¡¢n¡In¡!¢con-
¡¢nuIa¡IonoI¡!¢su5j¢c¡'ss¢II-nov¢n¢n¡w!II¢on¡!¢o¡!¢¡!and,
In¡!¢Logic, !¢couId !av¢¡!¢nov¢n¢n¡oI¡!oug!¡5¢gInwi¡!
b¢Ing.Co¡r¢c¡Iy und¢¡s¡ood, ¡!¢ c!oIc¢ oI a s¡a¡¡Ing uoIn¡, oI
w!a¡ com¢s 6¡s¡, Is ana¡¡¢¡ oIIndIII¢¡¢nc¢In H¢g¢I's u!IIoso-
u!y,!Isu!IIosou!ydoes notrecognIz¢ aûrstson¢t!Ing oIt!Is
!Indas a h×¢d u¡IncIuI¢ ¡!a¡ ¡¢naIns InaI¡¢¡a5I¢andId¢n¡IcaI
wI¡!I¡s¢IIas¡!oug!¡u¡og¡¢ss¢s. WI¡!¡!Is, H¢g¢II¢av¢saII¡¡a-
dI¡IonaI n¢¡au!ysIcs,and¡!¢u¡¢su¢cuIa¡Iv¢no¡Ion oI Id¢aIIsn
I3
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
asw¢II,Ia¡5¢!Ind.N¢v¢¡¡!¢I¢ss!¢do¢sno¡a5andonId¢aIIsn.
T!¢ a5soIu¡¢ ¡Igo¡ and cIos¢d quaII¡y oI ¡!¢a¡gun¢n¡ ¡!a¡ !¢
and FIc!¡¢ s¡¡ov¢ Io¡ In ouuosI¡Ion ¡o Kan¡ aI¡¢ady ¢s¡a5IIs!¢s
¡h¢ u¡Io¡I¡y oI suI¡I¡, ¢v¢n II ¡!¢ su5j¢c¡ Is d¢6n¢d as o5j¢c¡ a¡
¢v¢¡y s¡ag¢, jus¡ as conv¢¡s¢Iy ¡!¢ o5j¢c¡ Is d¢6 n¢d as su5j¢ct.
W!¢n ¡!¢ con¡¢nuIa¡Ing suIvi¡ u¡¢sun¢s ¡o s!ow ¡!a¡ ¢v¢ry-
. . �
¡!Ing¡!a¡¢×Is¡sIsconn¢nsu¡a5I¢wI¡!suI¡I¡I¡s¢II,wI¡! Logos
and¡!¢d¢¡¢¡nIna¡IonsoI¡!oug!¡,sµI¡I¡s¢¡sI¡s¢IIuuasanon-
¡oIogIcaIuI¡Ina¡¢,¢v¢nIIa¡¡!¢sam¢¡In¢I¡g¡asus¡!¢un¡¡uth
in¡!Is,¡!a¡oI¡!ca5s¡¡ac¡au¡Io¡I,anda¡¡¢nu¡s¡o doawaywI¡!
I¡s own Iundan¢n¡aI ¡!¢sIs. In ¡h¢ o5j¢c¡IvI¡y oI ¡!¢ H¢g¢IIan
dIaI¢c¡Ic, w!Ic! quas!¢s aII n¢¡¢ su5j¢c¡IvIsn, ¡!¢¡¢ Is son¢-
¡!Ing II!¢ awIIIon¡!¢ua¡¡ oI¡!¢su5j¢c¡ ¡ojunu ov¢¡I¡sown
s!adow. T!¢ H¢g¢IIansu5j¢c¡-o5j¢c¡Issu5j¢c¡. T!IsIIIunIna¡¢s
son¢¡!Ing¡!a¡I¡on¡!¢ uoIn¡oIvI¢woI H¢g¢I's ownd¢nand
Io¡conuI¢¡¢consIs¡¢ncyIsanun¡¢soIv¢dcon¡¡adIc¡Ion,¡!¢Iac¡
¡!a¡¡!¢su5j¢c¡-o5j¢c¡dIaI¢c¡Ic,w!Ic!InvoIv¢snoa5s¡¡ac¡!Ig!¢¡-
I¢v¢I conc¢u¡, I¡s¢II cons¡I¡u¡¢s ¡!¢ w!oI¢ and y¢¡ Is¡¢aIIz¢d In
¡u¡n as¡!¢ III¢oI a5soIu¡¢ suI¡I¡. T!¢quIn¡¢ss¢nc¢ oI¡!¢con-
dI¡Ion¢d,acco¡dIng¡o H¢g¢I,Is¡!¢uncondI¡Ion¢d. I¡Is¡!Is,no¡
I¢as¡oIaII,¡!a¡gIv¢s¡Is¢¡o¡!¢!ov¢¡Ing,susu¢nd¢dquaII¡yoI
H¢g¢IIan u!IIosou!y, I¡s quaII¡y oI 5¢Ing uu In ¡!¢ aI¡, I¡s u¢¡-
nan¢n¡skandalon: ¡!¢nan¢oI¡!¢!Ig!¢s¡su¢cuIa¡Iv¢ conc¢u¡,
¡!a¡ oI ¡!¢ a5soIu¡¢, oI son¢¡!Ing u¡¡¢¡Iy d¢¡ac!¢d, Is II¡¢¡aIIy
¡!¢ nan¢ oI ¡!a¡ susu¢nd¢d quaII¡y. T!¢ H¢g¢IIan skandalon
canno¡5¢asc¡I5¢d¡oanyconIusIono¡Iac! oIcIa¡I¡y,¡a¡!¢¡,I¡
Is¡!¢u¡Ic¢H¢g¢I!as¡ouayIo¡a5soIu¡¢consIs¡¢ncy,w!Ic!con¢s
uuagaIns¡¡!¢IInI¡soIconsIs¡¢n¡¡!oug!¡wI¡!ou¡5¢Ing a5I¢¡o
do away wI¡! ¡!¢n. H¢g¢IIan dIaI¢c¡Ic 6nds I¡s uI¡Ina¡¢ ¡¡u¡!,
¡!a¡ oI I¡s own InuossI5III¡y, In I¡s un¡¢soIv¢d and vuIn¢¡a5I¢
quaII¡y, ¢v¢n II, as¡!¢ ¡!¢odIcy oI s¢II-conscIousn¢ss, I¡!as no
awa¡¢n¢ssoI¡!Is.
14
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
WI¡! ¡!Is,!ow¢v¢¡, H¢g¢I ¡¢nd¢¡s!Ins¢II vuIn¢¡a5I¢ ¡o ¡!¢
c¡I¡Iqu¢oIId¢aIIsn.anInnan¢n¡c¡I¡IcIsn,suc!as!¢¡¢quI¡¢d
aII c¡I¡IcIsn ¡o 5¢.H¢ !Ins¢II ¡¢ac!¢d I¡s ¡!¡¢s!oId. RIc!a¡d
K¡on¢¡ c!a¡ac¡¢¡Iz¢s H¢g¢I's¡¢Ia¡Ion¡o FIc!¡¢Inwo¡ds¡!a¡In
ac¢¡¡aIns¢ns¢aI¡¢adyh¡FIc!¡¢. ¨InsoIa¡as¡!¢'I'Isouuos¢d¡o
aII¢Is¢¡!¡oug!¡¢ß¢c¡Ion, I¡Isno¡dIs¡InguIs!¢dI¡onaII¢Is¢, to
¡!a¡¢×¡¢n¡I¡ 5¢IongsIns¡¢ad ¡o w!a¡I¡Is ouuos¢d¡o,¡o w!a¡Is
uosI¡¢d,¡o¡!¢con¡¢n¡soI¡!oug!¡,¡!¢non¢n¡soII¡sac¡IvI¡y."'
C¢¡nan Id¢aIIsn's¡¢suons¢¡o¡!IsInsIg!¡In¡o¡!¢condI¡Ion¢d
na¡u¡¢oI¡!¢ ¨I,"ano¡!¢¡oI¡h¢InsIg!¡s¡!a¡¡!¢u!IIosou!yoI
¡¢8¢c¡Ion In I¡s mod¢¡n scI¢n¡Ihc Io¡n !as onIy Ia5o¡IousIy ¡¢-
gaIn¢d,Is,¡oug!Iy,¡!¢FIc!¡¢andIs¡Inc¡Ion5¢¡w¢¢n¡!¢IndIvId-
uaI and t!¢ su5j¢c¡, In t!¢ Ias¡ anaIysIs ¡!¢ Kan¡Ian dIs¡Inc¡Ion
5¢¡w¢¢n ¡!¢ ¨I" as¡!¢ su5s¡¡a¡unoI¢nuI¡IcaIusyc!oIogy and
¡!¢¡¡ansc¢nd¢n¡aI¨I¡!In!."T!¢hnI¡¢su5j¢c¡Is,asHuss¢¡IsaId
oII¡,aua¡¡oI¡!¢wo¡Id. I¡scII ¡aIn¡¢d �I¡!¡¢Ia¡IvI¡y,I¡canno¡
5¢us¢d¡og¡ound¡!¢a5soIu¡¢. I¡aI¡¢ady u¡¢suuuos¢s~as ¡!¢
Kan¡Ian constitutum, ¡!a¡ w!Ic! Is cons¡I¡u¡¢d~w!a¡ ¡¡ansccn-
d¢n¡aIu!IIosou!yIs¡o¢×uIaIn.J!¢ ¨I¡!In!,"Incon¡¡as¡,uu¡¢
Id¢n¡I¡y,Is¡a!¢n¡o5¢ uu¡¢In ¡!¢¢nu!a¡Ic Kan¡Ian s¢ns¢,In-
d¢u¢nd¢n¡ oI aII sua¡Io¡¢nuo¡aI Iac¡IcI¡y�OnIy In ¡!Is waycan
¢v¢¡y¡!Ing¡!a¡¢×Is¡sdIssoIv¢wI¡!ou¡¡¢maInd¢¡InI¡sconc¢u¡.
In Kan¡¡!Iss¡¢u!adno¡y¢¡5¢¢n¡a!¢n.1us¡ason¡!¢on

¢!and
¡!¢ca¡¢go¡IaIIo¡nsoI¡!¢¨I¡!In!"n¢edasuuuI¢n¢n¡a¡ycon-
¡¢n¡¡!a¡do¢sno¡a¡Is¢ou¡oI¡!¢n¡!¢ns¢Iv¢sIno¡d¢¡¡ona!¢
¡¡u¡!,¡!a¡Is,!nowI¢dg¢oIna¡u¡¢,uossI5I¢,soon¡!¢o¡!¢¡!and
¡!¢ ¨I ¡!In!" I¡s¢II and ¡!¢ ca¡¢go¡IaI Io¡ns a¡¢ ¡¢su¢c¡¢d 5y
Kan¡ asasu¢cI¢s oIgIv¢ns, ¡o ¡!Is ¢×¡¢n¡a¡ I¢as¡ ¡!¢ Critique of
PUTe Reaon is moic a phcnomcnology of sub¡cctivity than a
¯
u¢cuIa¡Iv¢sys¡¢n. In¡!¢ ¨uns'' |us|¡!a¡ Kan¡,In!IsIn¡¡osu¢c-
¡Iv¢naIv¢¡é,con¡Inu¢s¡ous¢un¡¢ß¢c¡Iv¢Iy,!¢ac!nowI¢dg¢s¡!e
¡¢Ia¡Ions!Ip andno¡onIyIn¡!¢I¡ auuIIca¡Ion5u¡In¡!¢I¡o¡I-
I5
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
gin~ofthccatcgoricalformstosomcthingcxisting,namclyhu-
manbcings, thatariscsinturnfromthcintcrplayofthcforms
withscnsorvmatcrial. Kant'srcßcctionsbrokcoffatthispoirit,
thcrcbybcaringwitncss to thcirrcducibilityofthccmpirical to
spirit, thcintcrwcavingofthcmomcnts. Fichtcwasnotcontcnt
withthis. Hcrclcntlcsslydrovcthcdistinctionbctwccnthctran-
�ccndcntalandthccmpiricalsub|cctbcyond Kant, andbccausc
ofthcirrcconcilabilityofthctwohctricdtocxtricatc thc prin-
ciplcofthcº I"fromfacticityandthercby|ustifyidcalisminthe
absolutcncssthatthcnbccamcthcmcdiumofthcHcgcliansys-
tcm.Fichtc'sradicalismthcrcbyrcvcalcdsomcthingthatinKan

was hiddcn in thc twilight oftransccndcntal phcnomcnologv,
but Fichtc also thcrcby involuntarily rcvcalcd thc dubious na-
turc ofhis own absolutc sub|cct. Hc calls it somcthing thatall
latcr idcalists, and ccrtainly thc ontologists among thcm, wcrc
mostcarcfultoavoidcallingit. anabstraction.°Ncvcrthclcss,thc
purc º I" is to dctcrmincwhatitisa5st:act�� from and what it
itsclfisdctcrmincdby,inthatitsvcryconccptcannotbcthought
withoutsuchabstraction.Whatrcsultsfromabstractioncanncvcr
bc madc absolutcly autonomous vis a vis what it is abstractcd
from,bccauscthcabstractum rcmains applicablc tothatwhichis
subsumcdwithinit,andbccauscrcturnistobcpossiblc,thcquality
ofwhatithas bccnabstractcdfromisalways,inaccrtainscnsc,
prcscrvcdinitatthcsamctimc,cvcnifinancxtrcmclygcncral
form.Hcnccifthcformationofthcconccptofthctransccndcn-
talsub|cctorthcabsolutcspiritsctsitsclfcomplctclyoutsidcin-
dividual consciousncss as somcthing spatiotcmporl, whcninfact
thcconccptis achicvcdthroughindividualconsciousncss, thcn
thc conccptitsclfcan �o longcrbc madc good, othcrwise

t�at
conccpt,whichdidawaywithallfctishcs,bccomcsafctishitsclf,
and spcculativc philosophy sincc Fichtc bas failcd to scc that.
Fichtc hypostatizcdthcº I"thathadbccnabstractcd,andinthis
I6
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
rcspcct Hcgcl adhcrcd to whathc did. Both Fichtc and Hcgcl
skippcd ovcr thcfactthat thc cxprcssion ºI," whcthcritis thc
purctransccndcntalI orthccmpirical, unmcdiatcdºI," must
ncccssarilydcsignatcsomcconsciousncssorothcr.Civinganan-
thropological-matcrial¡sttu¬ to this polcmic, Schopcnhaucr had
alrcadyinsistcdonthatinhiscritiqucofKant.Atlcastinmoral
phiIosophy,hcsays,Kant'spurcreasoni

taken. . . notasanintellectualfacultyofman,thoughitisindeednoth-
ingbutthis,onthecontrary,itishypostasizedassomethingexistingby
itself,withoutanyauthority,andthedeplorablephilosophyofourtimes
can serve as an illustration ofthe results ofthat most pernicious ex-
ampleandprecedent.However,thislayingdownofmoralsnotformen
as men, butforall rational beings as such, issomethingsoneartohis
heart,suchafavoritenotionofhis,thatKantisnevertiredofrepeating
itoneveryoccasion.I say,onthecontrary, thatweareneverentitleu
tosetup agenusthat is giventousonlyinasinglespecies,forintothe
concept ofthat genus we could bring absolutelynothingbutwhatwe
had taken from this one species, and thus what we stated about the
genuscouldalwaysbeunderstoodorrlyoftheonespecies.Ontheother
hand, bythinkingawaywithoutauthoritywhatbelongsto thisspecies
inordertoformthegenus,weshouldperhapsremovetheverycondi-
tionofthepossibilityoftheremainingattributesthatarehypostasized
asgenus.ª

ButcvcninHcgclthcmostcmphaticcxprcssions,suchasspirit
and sclf-consciousncss, arc dcrivcdfrom thchnitcsub|cct'scx-
pcricnccofitsclfandtrudlydonotstcmfromlinguisticsloppi-
ncss, Hcgcltooisunablctocutthcticbindingabsolutcspiritto
thc cmpirical pcrson. No mattcr how thoroughly thc Fichtcan
or Hcgclian absolutc ºI," as anabstractionfrom thc cmpirical
¨I, ¨may crasc thc|attcr's spccihc contcnts, ifitwere no longer
at all what itwas abstractcd from, namcly ºI," ifit complctcly
divcstcd itsclfofthc facticitycontaincd inits conccpt, itwould
no longcr bc that bcing-with-itsclfofspirit, that homclandof
I7
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
knowlcdgc fromwhichthcprimacy ofsub|cctivity inthc grcat
idcalist systcms dcpcnds. An ¨Iº thatwas nolongcr ¨Iº in any
scnsc atall, an ¨I,ºthatis,withoutanyrclation to individuatcd
consciousncss andtl:crcbyto thc spatiotcmporal pcrson, would
bcnonscnsc. Itwouldnotonlybc as frcc-ßoatingandindctc�-
minablcasHcgclaccuscdbcing,itscountcrconccpt,ofbcing,in
addition, itcould nolongcrbc grasp¢das an¨I, ºas somcthing
mcdiatcdbyconsciousncss.Analvsisofthcabsolutcsub|ccthas
toacknowlcdgc thc indissolubilityo1�n c�pirical,nonidcntical
�:.it,a momcni that +e¬iu-s ei:»._��
idcalis¡:tc:soIidcntit·�arcnotpcvmittcdto acknowlcdgc�s
indissolublc. In this scnse Hcgcl's philosophy is untruc whcn
mcasurcdagainstitsownconccpt.Inwhatscnscisitthcnncvcr-
thclcss truc:
.
To answcr this qucstion onc must clucidatc somcthing that
dominatcs thcwholc ofHcgcl's philosophy without cvcrbcing
madctangiblc.Thatisspirit.Spiritisnotplaccdinabsolutccon

trasttosomcthingnonspiritual,somcthingmatcrial,originallyit
is notasphcrcofparticularob|ccts,thoscofthclatcrGeisteswis­
senschaften. Rathcr, it¡s unqud and absoJu(c. lcmc¢
¯
in1
¯l, as a¨cgacy ofKan|`spractical rcason, itis cxplicitly callcd
frcc.AccordingtothcdchnitioninthcEncyclopedia, howcvcr,It
is¨csscntiallyactivc,productivc,º'|ustasKant'spracticalrcason
iscsscntiallydistinguishcdfromthcorcticalrcasoninc:-�amits
'�_b|�ct,ºthcdccd.Thc K���� �omcntofspontancity, whicb
is virtuallycquatcdwithconstitutivcidcntityinthcsynthcticuniw
ofappcrccption-·÷Kant's conccpt ofthc¨I thinkº was thc for-
mulaforthclacko iobctwccnpr ctIvcspontaneu
æcui�c � �e�iir:H�gcl,andinmtality
itbccomcs aprinciplcofbcingno lcssthan amlc oftbought.
Butwhc�Hcg�l �o lo�gc�oµpos¢s pvoducion: ðð¢cdtomt�
tcr as sub|cctivc accomplishmcnts but rathcrlooks for thcmin
I 8
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
spccihc ob|ccts, in concrctc matcrialrcality, hc comcs closc to
thc mystcry bchind synthctic appcrccption and takcs it out of
thcmcrcarbitraryhypostasisofthc abstractconccpt. Thcmys-
tcry,howcvcr, is��ne cthc+ than ��iaI1abor.Inthccconomic
andphilosophicalmanuscriptsofthcyoungMarx,discovcrcdin
I932, this was rccognizcd for thc hrst timc. ¨Thc outstanding
achicvcmcntofHcgcl'sPhenomenolog-the dialccticofncgativ-
ityas thc movingandcrcatingprinciplcis . . . thathc . . . grasps
thcnaturcoflabour,andconccivcsob|cctivcman(truc,bccausc
rcalman)asthcrcsultofhisownlabour.' °Thcmomcntofuni-
vcrsalityin thc activc, transccndcntal su5|cctas opposcdto thc
mcrclycmpirical, isolatcd, and contingcntsub|cct,is no morca
fantasythanisthcvalidityoflogicalpropositionsasopposcdto
the cmpirical coursc ofindividual acts ofthought. Rathcr, this
univcrsality is an cxprcssion of thc social naturc oflabor, an
cxprcssion both prccisc and conccalcd from itsclffor thc sakc
otthcgcncralidcalistthcsis,laboronlybccomcslaborassomc-
thingforsomcthingclsc,somcthingcommcnsurablcwithothcr
things, somcthing thattransccnds thccontingcncyofthc indi-
vidual sub|cct. Aristotlc's Politics alrcady tclls us that thc sclf-
prcscrvation ofindividualmcts dcpcnds asmuch on thc la-
� ocsa�socictydcpcndsontbcdccdsof:idals.Thc
efcrcnccofthcproductivcmomcnt oIiriibacktoaunivcrsal
sub|cctrathcr than to an individualwholabors iswhatdchncs
laboras somcthingorganizcd, somcthíngsocial, its own¨ratio-
nality,ºthcordcringoIfunctions,isasocalrclationship.
Translating Hcgcl's conccpt ofspiritintosociallabov clicits
thc rcproach ofasociologismthatconfuscsthc gcncsis and in-
ßucncc of Hegcl's philosophy with its substancc. Jhcrc is no
qucstion that Hcgcl was a transccndcntal analytic philosophcr
Iikc Kant. OnccouldshowindctailhowHcgcl, as Kant'scritic,
sought to do|usticc to Kant's intcntions by going bcyond thc
I9
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Critique of Pure Reaon, |ust as Fichtc'sScience of Knowledge had
pushcd thclimitsofKant'sconccptofthc purc. ThcHcgclian
catcgorics, and cspccially thc catcgory ofspirit, fall within thc
domain oftransccndcntalconstitucnts. ButinHcgcl,socicty, as
thcfunctionalcomplcxofcmpiricalpcrsons,wouldb what Kant
calls aconstitutum, apartofthccxistcnc¢ha¡inHgc!'sLQgc­
in Hcgcl'sdoctrincofthcabsolutclyunconditioncdandofcxis-
tcnccas.c¬� c u_:et-ïa"is!�undcvcl-
opcd out of thc absolutc that Hcgcl says is spirit. Thc
intcrprctation ofspirit as socicty, accordingly, appcars to bc a
µ€roBoo;€l;o\\o yèvo;, a shift to somcthing ofa diffcrcnt
kind incompatiblc withthcscnscofHcgcl's philosophy ifonly
bccauscitdocs notsatisfythcprcccptofimmancntcriticismand
attcmpts to grasp thc truth contcnt ofHcgclian philosophyin
tcrmsofsomcthingcxtcrnaltoit,somcthingthathisphilosophy,
withinitsownframcwork,wouldhavcdcrivcdasconditioncdor
positcd.ExplicitcritiqucofHcgcl,ofcoursc,couldshowthathc
was notsucccssful in thatdcduction. Thclinguistic cxprcssion
ºcxistcncc,"whichisncccssarily conccptual, isconfuscdwithwhat
itdcsignatcs,whichis nonconccptual, somcthingthatcannotbc
mcltcd down into idcntity.'
¹
Immancntly, Hcgclcannotmain-
tainthcabsolutcncssofspirit,andhisphilosophyattcststothat
itsclf,atlcastinsofarasitncvcrhndsthcabsolutccxccptinthc
totalityofdisunity,inunitywithitsothcr. Convcrscly, howcvcr,
socictyforitspartisnotmcrccxistcncc, notmcrcfact.Onlyfor
athoughtthatworksthroughcxtcrnalantithcscs,athoughtthat
is abstractinHcgcl'sscnsc,wouldthc rclationship ofspiritand
socicty bc a transccndcntal-logical rclationship bctwccn consti­
tuens and constitutum. Socictyisallottcdprccisclywhat Hcgcl rc-
scrvcs for spintasopµoscdto a thcisolatcdindividualmomcnts
of cmpirical rcality. Thosc momcnts arc mcdiatcd by socictv,
constitutcdthcwaythingsarcconstitutcdb

spiritforanidcal-
20
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
ist,priorto anyparticularinßucncccxcrtcdbysocictyonphc-
nomcna.socictyismanifcstcdinphcnomcnathcway,forHcgcl,
csscnccismanifcstcdinthcm.Socictyiscsscni¡a¡¡v �onc��|�
as s¡iritis. As thc unityofhumansub|ccts who rcproducctbc
lifcofthc spccics through thcir labor, things comc into bcing
withinsocictyob|cctivcly,indcpcndcntofrcßcction,withoutrc-
gard to thc spccihcqualiticsofthoscwholabororthcproducts
oflabor.Thcprinciplcofthccquivalcnccofsocial lubor �
socicty in its modcrn bourg�ois scnsc both somcthing abstract



�strcalthingofall,|ustwhat Hcgclsaysof tbc���
phatic mtion of thc conccpt. Hcncc cvcry stcp thougbttakcs
comcsupagainstsocicty,andnostcpcanpinitdownassuch,as
oncthingamong othcrthings.Whatpcrmits Hcgclthcdialccti-
cian to prcscrvc thc conccpt ofspiritfromcontamination with
brutcfact, and thcrcby to sublimatc thcbrutalityofthc factual
into spirit and lcgitimatc it, is itsclfsccondary. For thc sub|cct
rcßccting on it, thc cxpcricncc, itsclfunconscious, ¡rac
la5ortak��o:i :nagical³rm. For thatsub|cct,laborbecocsits
own �cßcctcdform,apurcdccdofspirit,spirit'sproductivcunity.
For nothing isto bc cxtcrnal to spirit. But thc brutc fact that
disappcarsinthctotalizcdnotionofspiritrcturnsinthatnotion
as alogicalcompulsion. Thc individual factcan nomorcavoid
itthanthcindividual pcrsoncanavoidthccontrainte sociale. Itis
onlythisbrutalityofcocrcionthatcrcatcsthcscmblanccofrcc-
onciliationinthcdoctrincofanidcntitythathasbccnproduccd.
Evcnbcforc Hcgcl,thccxprcssionsthroughwhichspiritwas
dchncd as originalproductioninidcalistsystcmswcrc allwith-
out cxccption dcrivcd from thc sphcrc of labor. No othcr
cxpicssions could bc found, bccausc intcrmsofitsown mcan-
ing, what thc transccndcntal synthcsis was aftcr could not bc
scparatcdfromitsconncctionwithlabor.Thcsystcmaticallyrcg-
ulatcd activity ofrcason turns labor inward, thc burdcnsomc-
2I
Aspectsof Hegel'sPhilosophy
ncssandcocrcivcncssofoutwardlydircctcdlaborhaspcrpctuatcd
itsclfin thc rcßcctivc, modclingcfforts thatknowlcdgc dirccts
towardits¨ob|cct,ºcfforts thatarc againrcquircdforthcpro�
grcssivc domination ofnaturc. Evcn thc traditional distinction
bctwccnscnsibilityandundcrstanding,^nhitandVrs(and,
indicatcxuímcontnsito wht1 mc�ly givcnby scnsibility,
withoutcompcnsation,asitwcrc,thcundcrstandingdocssomc-
thing. whatis givcnthroughthcscnscsissimplythcrc,likcthc
fruits ofthc hcld, butthc opcrationsofthcundcrstandingarc
sub|cctto volition. As that through which human bcings form
somcthingthatthcnconfrontsthcm,thoscopcrationscanoccur
ornotoccur.ThcprimacyofLogoshasalwaysbccnpartofthc
work cthic. Thc stanccadoptcdby thoughtas such, rcgardlcss
ofits�o�unt, is aconfrontation with naturc that has bccomc
habitual and has bccn intcrnalizcd, an intcrvcntion and not a
mcrc rcccption. Hcncc talk about thought is always accompa-
nicd by talkaboutamatcrial thatlhought knows to bc distinct
fromitsclf,amatcrialitproccsscsthcwaylaborproccsscsitsraw
matcrials. Forthoughtisalwaysaccompanicdbythcmomcntof
violcntcxcrton~arcßcctionofthcdir¯n¢c-sticsei:-�:i.:¯
charac¡cr1zc·1abor; the¯strainsantoiIso!thcconccpt arcnot
t µEo:ca l¯¨¯

¯¯

. .. . . .. .. . . ~- ¬~.~,.
..|T� Hcgcl ofthcPhen9"ero.(G, in whom thc consciousncss
I � ~~= .. ,,. _... , ·. . - · ·
...,. . .. ·~ ~
ofspiritaslivingactivityanditsidcntitywiththcrcalsocialsub-
|cct was 1caa atrop1icd¡l¡an
¯
¡n(bcJatcr1cg€, rccognizcd thc
spontamcou¯spirit as labor,iI r:o¡ in tbcory ��

¡� .bislan-
guagc.Thcpathnaturalconsciousncssfollowstothcidcntityof
absoutckowhgc¹W·:en]¡sI¡seov.¯Thc¯cLtionslri¡ of
spirit to w!at is givcn mannats ¡tscIFon¨thc modcl ofa social
proccss,auroccssoflabor. ¨Knowlcdgcinitshrstphasc,orim-
mcdiatc Spirit, is thc non-spiritual, i. c. scnsc-consciousncss. In
ordcr to bccomc gcnuinc knowlcdgc, to bcgctthcclcmcntof
22
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Scicnccwhichis thcpurcNotionofScicnccitsclf,itmusttravcl
alongwayandworkitspassagc. º' ' Thisisbynomcansahgurc
ofspccch. ifspn:o bc rca|, thcn its labor is ccrtainly rcal.
Thc Hcgclian ¨laborofthc conccptº is notaloosc circumlocu-
tionforthcactivityofthcscholar. Hcgclalwaysrcprcscnts thc
lattcr, as philosophy, as passivc, ¨looking on,º as wcll, and for
good rcasons. Thc philosophcr's labor actually aims solcly at
hclping to cxprcss whatis activc in thc matcrialitsclf, what, as
sociallabor, hasanob|cctivcform thatconfronts human bcings
andyctrcmainsthclaborofhumanbcings. ¨Thc movcmcntin
which thc uncsscntial consciousncss strivcs to attain this onc-
ncss,º Hcgcls says in a latcr passagc in thcPhenomenolog, ¨is
itsclfthrccIold in accordancc with thc thrc�bold �cIationu
¯ciousncss willhavcwith itsincarnatcbcyond. F¡st, as purc
c¢n�ciousncss, sccond, as a particular individual who a�
p:oac1�th�z �ua�¬rld in thc form ofdcsircand



���
¯
t1ird, as consciousncss tha is awarc of its ow� b�i



itscl¡'''²
. .
.
�erprctcrs ofHcgcl havc rightly insistcd that cach ofthc
primary momcnts distinguishcd within his philosophy is at thc
samctimcthcwholcaswcll. Butthatisccrtainlyalsotrucofthc
conccptoflaboras arclationshiptorcality.forthc dialccticas
such,asadialccticofthcsub|cct-ob|cctidcntity,isprccisclysuch
arclationship. Thccrucialconncctionbctwccn thc conccpts of
dcsircandlaborrcmovcsthclattcrfromthcpositionofamcr
analogytothcabstractactivityofabstractspirit.Laborinthcful
scnscisinfactticd todcsirc,whichitinturnncgatcs. itsatishc�
thcnccdsofhumanbcingsonalllcvcls,hclpsthcminthcirdif-
hculties,reproduceshumanlife,anddemandssacri5cesofthem
in rcturn. Evcninitsintcllcctual form,laborprovidcs alongcr
arm withwhich to procurc thcmcans oflifc, itis thc principlc
ofthcdominationofnaturc,whichhasbccomcautonomousand
23
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
thcrcbyalicnatcd fromitsknowlcdgcofitsclf. But idcalismbc-
comcs falsc whcn it mistakcnly turns thc totality oflabor into
somcthingcxistinginitsclf,whcnitsublimatcsits principlcinto
amctaphysicalonc,intothcactus pur ofspirit,andtcndcntially
transhgurcs somcthing produccdby humanbcings, somcthing
falliblcandconditioncd,alongwithlaboritsclf,whichisthcsuf-
fcringofhumanbcings,intosomcthingctcrnalandright.Ifon�
wcrc pcrmittcd to spc�ulatc aboHcgcl'ssccution, onc might
s¡sc thatthc cxtcnsionofspiru'obccom���s tl¡ ¡�
vvsion

oî1bc xc
9
k
r:iiion thatspiritis prccisclvnot an1solatcd
r
¯
��t somc sclf-sufhcicnt substancc, but rathcr a mo-
mcnt ofsocial l�br, tbcmomcntth�t

1s smarau6�m|xsìcaI
labor. Butphysicallaborisncccssarilydcpcndcntonsomcthing
otTc+ than itsclf, on naturc. Labor~and inthclastanalysis its
rcßcctivcform, spirit, aswcll--cannotbcconccivcdwithoutthc
conccpto£naturc, anymorcthancannaturcwithout labor. thc
two arcdistinctfromand mcdiatcdbyonc anothcratthcsamc
timc. Marx's CrtiqY the Gotha Progcscribcsastatcofaf-
fairshiddcndccpwithinHcgcl'sphilosophy, and docsso all thc
morc prcciscly in thatitwas notintcndcd as a polcmic against
Hcgcl.Marxisdiscussingthcfamiliarsaying¨laboristhcsourcc
ofallwcalthandallculturc,ºtowhichhccountcrs,
Laborisnotthesourceofallwealth.Natureisjustasmuchthesource
ofuse values(anditissurelyofsuchthatmaterialwealthconsists| )�
�, wh¡chitself·�o:|the�a�Ie�ta��on �fa
ñ�
�����h
º�º.
laborpo�m. Theabove phraseistobefoundinallchildren'sprimers
»nd iscorrectinsofarasitisimpliedthat laborisperformed with the
appurtenantsubjectsandinstruments. Butasocialist program cannot
allows voisµbn�c�

opassoverinsilencetheconditionsthat
alone give them meaning. And in sofar as man from the beginning
behavestowardsnat�re, the¡rmarysourceofJ¡·�tr

9
¹�
¹"

«
d
¯°J
b
jects oflabor, as an owner, treatsher asbelongingto him, his labor
becomesthe source ofusevalues, ooIwea|th. Thebour-
¨"¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ .
~
24
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
geoishaveverygoodgroui:d� ffal�e|ya�cri�irigpenaturalcreative
µ. W�tolabor,sinceprecisely fromthefactthatlabordependsonna-
tmt followsthattheman·ho ¡ss+s es nootherprope¡ty¯tb¯nis
laborpowermust, in all conditions ofsociety and culture,betl:e slave
ofother men who have made themselves theowners oIthe matcrial
conditionsof |abor.

But bccauscofthis Hcgclcannotafford to cxprcss thc scpara-
tionofmcntalandmanuallabor,andhcdocsnotrcadspiritas
an isolatcd aspcctoflabor but instcad, convcrscly, dissolvcsla-
borintoamomcntofspirit, oncmightsayhctakcsIhc:hctori-
calhgurcpars pro toto as his maxim. Dctachcdfromwhatis not
idcnticalwithit,laborbccomcsidcology. !hoscwhohavcatthcir
disposalthc laborofothcrsascribctoitinhcrcntvalu+¯onsmcr
it lsolutcandprimary,prccisclybccausclaborisonlylaborf�
othcrs. !hc mctaphysicsoflabor andthc appropriauon ofthc
labo�ofothcrsarccomplcmcntary. !his socialrclationshipdic-
tatcsthcuntruthinHcgcl,thcmaskingofthcsub|cctassub|cct-
ob|cct, thc dcnial ofthc nonidcntical in thctotality, no mattcr
howmuchthc nonidcnticalrcccivcs its ducin thc rcßcction�of
anyparticular|udgmcnt.
Apartfromthcchapt�ronlordshipandbondagc,inthcPhe­
nomenolog of Spirit thcnaturcofH�gclsproductivcspiritasla-
bor appcars, surprisingly, most ghically in thc matcrial on
¨natural rclIgion, ºatthc third stage ofwhich thc spiritualbc-
comcsrcligi�us contcntfor thchrsttimc, asa ' p�od��t oIIu-
mælaborº.'' ºSpirit,thcrcforc, hcrc appcars as�na�mv, atid
«.actionwhcrcbyitproduccsitsclfas ob|cctbutwithouthaving
yctgraspcdthcthoughtofitsclfisainstinctivcopcration,likc
thc buiIdingofahoncycombbybccs. . . . !hccrystalsofpyra-
mids and obclisks . . . arc thc works of this artihccr ofrigid
form. º'º Innotsimply opposingfctish worship to rcligionas a
primitivcordcgcncratc stagcbutinstcaddchningitasancccs-
·
×
25
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
sarymomcntinthcformationofthcrcligiousspiritandthcrcby,
in thc scnsc ofthcPhenomenolog's sub|cct-ob|cctdialcctic, as a
ncccssary momcnt in thc formation ofrcligion itsclfand ulti-
matclyofthcabsolutc, Hcgclinclud¢an.laboin.ts
co¤
-
�¹9
I
�º
tcrial form
¬� '�
c
¯��³�¹�!���¹²�¹��
tic

ofs

ir

as thc absolutc. Only a littlc morc woul� bc nccdcd~rcmcni-
brance o£uc�Imultancouslymcdiatcd and irrcvocably natural
momcnt in labor~and thc Hcgclian dialcctic would rcvcal its
idcntityandspcakitsownnamc.
Wi
I
h thcscparationofmcntalandmanuallabor,privilcgcrc-
scrvcs mcntallabor,whichdcspitcallasscrtions tothccontrary
isthccasicr, foritsclf. Butatthcsamctimcmanuallaboralways
rcapp�arsinwarninginthcspiritualproccss,whichisanimita-
uofphysical action mcdiatcd by thc imagination, spiritcan
ncvcrgtcomplctclyfrccofitsrclationshiptothcnaturcitisto
dominatc.Spiritobcysnaturcinordcrtomastcrit,cvcnitsproud
sovcrcignty is purchascd with suffcring. '
³
Thc mctaphysics of
spirit, howcvcr, which makcs spirit, as laborunconsciousofit�
sclf, an absolutc, is thc afhrmation ofits cntanglcmcnt, an at-
tcmptonthcpartofasclf-rcßcctivcspirittorcintcrprctthccursc
towhichitsubmitsasablcssingbypassingiton, and thcrcby to
|ustify it. In this rcgard, cspccially, Hcgcl's philosophy can bc
accusca

�fcingIdc¬gic�l�m ¡t� �position, taIcn to thc cx-
trcmc,ofthcbourgcoiscclcbrationoflabor. Itisprccisclyinthis
most clcvatcd point of thc idcalist systcm, thc absolutc pro-
claimcdccstaticallyatthccndofthcPhenomenolog, thatthcsobcr
rcalistic fcaturcs of Hcgcl takc rcfugc. At thc samc timc, cvcn
�·
ccc
�=1¤¢
r
I¤¯
ati
¤¤
o
!)�¤ï¯
ith
(
c
__
abs
� 1¯�
basis. To thc cxtcnt to which thc world forms a systcm, itbc-
J. oncprccisclythroughthccloscdunivcrsalityofsocialla-
bor, sociallaborisinfactradical mcdiation, bothbctwccnman
and naturc andalso withinspirit, whichcxists foritsclf, which
'
IOGAli CI ONI\ERSITESI I<0JUPHANESI .
26
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
tolcratcsnothingoutsidcitsclfandforbidsrcmcmbranccofany-
thing outsidc it. Thcrc is nothing in thc world that shall not
manifcstitsclftohumanbcingssolclythroughsociallabor.Evcn
whcrclaborhasnopowcrovcrit,purcnaturcis dchncdthrough
its rclationship to labor, cvcn if that rclationship is a ncgativc
onc. OnlyawarcncssofallthatcouldlcadthcH�gcliandialcctIc
b�vond itsclf, anditisprcciscly thisawarcncssthatisforbiddcn
r
toit.itwouldpronounccthcnamcthatholdsitinitsspcll. Bc-
cu nothingis knownbutwhathas passcd throughlabor, la-
bor, rightly and wrongly, bccomcs somcthing absolutc, and
disastcr bccomcs salvation, this is why thc wholc, which is thc
part, compulsivcly andunavoidablyoccupicsthc positionoftruth
.n thc scicncc ofmanifcstingconsciousncss. For thc absolutiza-
tionoflaboristhatofthcclass rclationship:a humankind frcc
oflaborwouldbcfrccofdomination.Spiritknowsthatwithout
bcingpcrmittcdtoknowit,thisisthcpovcrtyofphilosophy.But
thcstcpbywhichlaborsctsitsclfupasthcmctaphysicalprinci-
plc purc and simplc is nonc othcr than thcconsistcntclimina-
tionofthcºmatcriaIºtowhichalllaborfcclsitsclfticd,thcmatcrial
that dchncs its boutidary for it, rcminds itofwhatis bclow it,
andrclativizcsitssovcrcignty.Thisis whycpistcmology|uggles
thingsuntilthc givcngivcsthc

illusionofhaving5ccnproduccd
byspirit.Thcfactthatspirittoosìandsundcrthccompulsionof
laborandi�itsclI1abor:stodIsappcar,thcgrcatclassicalphilos-
ophylit�rally ¡ass¢silic qintcsscnccofcocrciono1fasîrccdo�.
Itg¢is rcf�(cdbccausc¡hcrcductionofwhatc si&tosou
not succccd, bccausc that cpistcmological position, as Hcgcl
himsclfkncw, must bc abandoncd in thccoursc ofits own dc-
vclopmcnt. Butithasitstruth,inthatnoonciscapablcofstcp-
ping out of thc world constitutcd by labor into anothcr and
unmcdiatcd onc. Thcidcntihcationofspiritwith labor can bc
27
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
criticizcdonlyinconfrontingthcphilosophicalconccptofspirit
with what that conccpt actually accomplishcs and not through
rccoursctosomcthingtransccndcnt,howcvcrpositivcitsnaturc.
l Spirit did notaccomplish this. Wc know thatinits cmphatic
Hcgclian vcrsion, thc conccptofspiritis to bc undcrstood or�
ganically, thc partial mom�ntsarc to growinto andbcintcrpe-
nctratcd by onc anothcr by virtuc of a wholc that is alrcady

inhcrcntincvcry onc ofthcm. This conccpt ofsystcm implics
thcidcntityofsub|cctandob|cct,whichhasdcvclopcdintothc
solc and conclusivc absolutc, and thc truth ofthc systcm col-
lapscs whcnthatidcntitycollapscs. Butthatidcntity,fullrccon-
ciliationthroughspiritinaworldwhichisinrcalityantagonistic,
isa mcrc asscrtion. Thc philosophical anticipation ofrcconcili-
ationisatrcspassagainstrcalrcconciliation,itascribcsanything
thatcontradictsittoºfoulºcxistcnccasunworthyofphilosophy�
Butascamlcsssystcmand�nachicvcdrcconciliationarcnotone
and thc samc, rathcr, thcy arc contradictory. thc unity ofm
systcmdcrivcsfromunrcconcilablcviolcncc.Satanically,thcworld
asgraspcdbythc Hcgcliansystcmhasonly now,ahundrcdand
hftyycarslatcr, provcditsclftobcasystcmin thc litcralscnsc,
namclythatofaradicallysocictalizcd socicty. Oncofthc most
rcmarkablc aspccts `of Hcgcl's accomplishmcnt is tbai hc in�
fcrr¢d thatsystcmaticHaracurofsocictyfromthcconccptlong
bcfor÷ it could gain asccndancv in thc spbcrc ofHcgcl's own
cxpcr¡cnc�, thatofaCcrmany f�rbchindin itsbourgcoisdcvcl-
oumcnt. / ·ºoHdintcgratcdthroughºproduction,"throughthc
cx changcrclationship, dcpcndsin allitsmomcntsonthcsocial
conditions ofits production, and in that scnsc actually rcalizcs
thc primacy ofthcwholcovcritsparts, inthis rcgard thcdcs-
pcratcimpotcnccofcvcrysinglcindividualnowvcrihcsHcgcl's
cxtravagantconccptionofthc systcm. Evcnthccultofproduc-
28
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
tion is morc than thcidcologyofhumanbcingswhodominatc
naturcandpursucthcirownintcrcstswithoutrcstraint. Inthat
cultisscdimcntcdthcfactthatthcunivcrsalcxchangcrclation-
ship in which cvcrything that cxists, cxists only for somcthing
clsc,standsundcrthcdominationofthoscwhoholdsocialpro-
duction atthcir disposal, this domination is worshippcd philo-
sophically. Evcnthcbcing-for-somcthing-clscthatis thcofhcial
|ustihcationforthc cxistcnccofallcommoditicsisonlysccond-
arytoproduction. Thcvcryworldinwhichnothingcxistsforits
ownsakcisalsothcworldofanunlcashcdproductionthatfor-
gcts its human aims. Thc sclf-forgctfulncss ofproduction, thc
insatiablc and dcstructivc cxpansivc principlcofthc cxchangc
socicty,isreßcctcdinHcgclianmctaphysics.Itdcscribcstbc«¬
thcworldactua1lyis,notin historicalpcrspcctiv« bu:n�«ncc,
withoutcrcatinganyblucsmokcinthcproccsswiththcqu�stion
ofauthcnticity.

Civi1 �ocictyisanantagonistictotality. Itsurvivcsonlyinand
throughitsantagonismsandis notablctorcsolvcthcm. Inthc
workbyHcgcl thatis most notoriousforits rc�tor�tionist tcn-
d¯ncæauology for thc stauis cuo, anditscultofthc statc,
t!cPhilosohy of Rtght, thatisstatcdbluntly.Thc¯cryc� k
itic�andpovocativc passagcs that arc rcsponsiblc forthc fact
thatimportant thinkcrsinthcWcstlikcVcblcn, Dcwcv, andcvcn
Santayanahavc lumpcdHcgcltogcthcrwith Ccrmanimpcrial-
ismandfascismshould thcmsclvcsbcsccnasdcrivcdfromHc-
gcl'sconsciousncss ofthcantagonistic charactcrofthctotality.
ThisiswhyHcgcl'sidolizationofthcstatcshouldnotbctrivial-
izcdbybcingtrcatcdasamcrccmpiricalabcrrationoranirrcl-
cvant addcndum. Rathcr, that idolization is itsclf produccd by
insightintothcfactthatthccontradictionsofcivilsocictycannot
bcrcsolvcdbyitssclf-movcmcnt.Passagcslikcthisoncarccrit-
ical.
29
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Ithencebecomesapparentthatdespiteanexcessofwealthcivilsociety
isnotrichenough,i.e.itsownresourcesareinsufhcienttocheckexces-
sivepovertyandthecreationofa penurious rabble. . . . Thisinnerdi-
alecticofcivilsocietythusdrivesit~oratanyratedrivesaspecihccivil
society~topushbeyonditsownlimitsandseekmarkets,andsoitsnec-
essarymeansofsubsistence,inotherlandswhichareeitherdehcienti
the goods ithas over-produced, orelse generallybackward in indus-
try, 8c. '²
Thc frcc play offorccs in capitalist socicty, whosc libcral cco-
nomic thcory Hcgcl had acccptcd, has no antidotcforthc fact
thatpovcrty,¨paupcrismºinHcgcl'sold-fashioncdtcrminology,
incrcascs with social wcalth, still lcss could Hcgcl cnvision an
incrcascinproductionthatwouldmakcamockcryofthc asscr-
tion that socicty is not rich cnough in goods. Thc statc is ap-
pcalcd toindcspcrationas ascatofauthoritybcyond this play
offorccs. Paragraph 249 cxprcssly rcfcrs to thc cxtrcmcly ad-
vanccd passagc|ust quotcd. Thc bcginning ofthat paragraph
rcads,
While the public authority must also undertake the higherdirective
functionofprovidingfortheinterests whichlead beyondtheborders
ofits society (see Paragraph 246), its primary purpose is to actualize
and maintain the universal contained within the particularity ofcivil
society,anditscontroltakestheformofanexterna|system andorga-
nizationfortheprotectionandsecurityofparticularendsandinterests
en masse, inasmuchastheseinterestssubsistonlyinthisuniversal.'
°
It is intcndcd to allay somcthing that could not othcrwisc bc
smoothcd ovcr. Hcgcl's philosophy of thc statc is a ncccssary
tour dc forcc, a tour dc forccbccauscitsuspcnds thc dialcctic
undcr thc acgis ofa principlc to which Hcgcl's own critiquc
of thc abstract could bc applicd, a principlc whosc locus, as
Hcgclatlcastsuggcsts,isbynomcans outsidcthc playofsocial
forccs.
30
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
Particularinterestswhichare common toeveryonefallwithincivilso-
cietyandlieoutsidetheabsolutelyuniversalinterestofthestateproper
(see Paragraph 256). The administration of these is in the hands of
Corporations(seeParagraph25I),commercialandprofessionalaswell
as municipal, andtheirofhcials, directors, managers and the like. It is
thebusinessoftheofh cialstomanagetheprivatepropertyandinterests
oftheseparticularspheresand,fromthatpointofview,theirauthority
restsontheconhdenceoftheircommonalties andprofessionalequals.
On theotherhand, however, thesecirclesofparticularinterests must
besubordinatedtothehigherinterestsofthestate,andhencethehlling
ofpositionsofresponsibilityin Corporations, 8c., wi|lgenerallybeef-
fected by a mixture ofpopular election by those interested with ap-
pointmentandratihcationbyhigherauthority.
'
"
But thc tourdcforccwas ncccssarybccausc othcrwisc thc dia-
lcctical principlc would havc cxtcndcd bcyond whatcxists and
thcrcby ncgatcd thc thcsis ofabsolutc idcntity~and it is only
absolutcin thatitisrcalizcd, thatis thccorcofHcgcl's philoso-
phy.Nowhcrcdocsthatphüosophycomccloscrtothctruthabout
its own substratum, socicty, that whcrc it turns into nonscnsc
whcnconfrontcdwithit.Hcgcl'suhilosophyisindccdcssc�tiall�
ncgativc.critiquc.Incxtcndingthct:ansccnde+tal¡bìIosophyof
thcCritique of Pure Reason throughthcthcsisofrcason'sidcntity
withwhatcxistsandmakingitacritiqucofwhatcxists,acritiquc
ofany andcvcrypositivity, Hcgcl dcnounccdthcworld, whosc
thcodicyconstitutcs his proe��m, mìu tot�lity as wcll, hc dc-
nounccd it as a wcb ofguilt[Schuldzusammenhang] inwhich, as
McphistophclcssaysinFaust, cvcrythingthatcxistsdcscrvcsto
pcr¡sh.EvcnthcfalscclaimthattIicworIdu:onctliclcssagooð
world containswithinitthclcgitimatcdcmand that thc cmpiri-
calworldbccomcagoodandarcconcilcd world, notmcrcly in
thc Idcathatisitsoppositcbutinthcßcsh. Ifinthclastanalysis
Hcgcl's systcm makcs thc transition into untruth by following
its own logic, this is a|udgmcntnot simply on Hcgcl, as asclf-
3I
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
rightcouspositivistscicnccwouldlikctothink,butrathcra|udg-
mcnt on rcality. Hcgcl's scornful ¨so much thc worsc for thc
facts"isinvokcdagainsthimsoautomaticallyonlybccauscitcx-
prcsscs thc dcad scrious truth about thc facts. Hcgcl did not
simply rcconstructthcminthought, hcgraspcd thcmandcriti-
cizcd thcm by producing thcm in thought. thcir ncgativity al-
ways makcs thcm into somcthingothcr than what thcy mcrcly
arcandclaimtobc.Thcprinciplcofrcality'sbccoming,through
which it is morc than its positivity, that is, thc ccntral idcalist
motorofHcgcl's thought, is atthc samctimcanti-idcalist. Itis
thcsub|cct'scritiqucofarcality thatidcalism cquatcs with thc
absolutc sub|cct, namcly consciousncss ofcontradiction within
thc thing itsclf, and thcrcby thc forcc ofthcory, a forcc with
which thc lattcr turns againstitsclf. IfHcgcl's philosophy fails
in tcrms ofthchighcstcritcrion,itsown,itthcrcbyalso provcs
itsclftruc. Thcnonidcntityofthc antagonistic, anonidcntityit
runsupagainstandlaboriouslypullstogcthcr,isthcnonidcntity
ofa wholc thatis notthctrucbutthc untruc, thc absolutc op-
positcof |usticc.Butinrcalitythisvcrynonidcntityhasthcform
ofidcntity,anall-inclusivcncssthatisnotgovcrncdbyanythird,
rcconcilingclcmcnt.Thiskindofdcludcdidcntityisthccsscncc
ofidcology,ofsociallyncccssaryillusion.Onlythroughthcpro-
ccsswhcrcbythccontradictionbccomcsabsolutc,andnotthrough
thc contradiction bccoming allcviatcd in thc absolutc, could it
disintcgratcand pcrhaps hnditswaytothatrcconciliationthat
musthavcmislcd Hcgclbccauscitsrcalpossibilitywasstillcon-
ccalcdfrom him. Inallitsparticularmomcnts Hcgcl's philoso-
phyisintcndcdtobcncgativc,butif,contrarytohisintcntions,
itbccomcs ncgativcas awholcaswcll, itthcrcbyacknowlcdgcs
thcncgativityofitsob|cct. Inthatultimatclythcnonidcntityof
sub|cctandob|cct,conccptandthing, idcaandsocicty,cmcrgcs,
unpacihablc,inhisphilosophy,inthatitultimatclydisintcgratcs
32
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
in absolutc ncgativitv, it ncvcrthclcss also rcdccms its promisc
andtrulvbccomcsidcnticalwithitscnsnarcdsub|cctmattcr. In
thclastanalvsis,cvcninHcgclthcquicsccnccofmovcmcnt,thc
absolutc,mcanssimplvthcrcconcilcdlifc,thclifcofthcpacihcd
drivcthatnolongcrknowscithcrdchcicncvorthclabortowhich
alonc, howcvcr, it owcs that rcconciliation. Hcncc thc locus of
Hcgcl's truthis not outsidc thcsvstcm, rathcr, itis as inhcrcnt
inthcsvstcmashisuntruth.Forthisuntruthisnoncothcrthan
thcuntruthofthcsvstcmofthcsocictvthatconstitutcsthcsub-
stratumofhisphilosophv.
Thcob|cctivcturnthatidcalismtookinHcgcl,thcrcstitutionof
thc spcculativc mctaphvsics thathadbccn shattcrcd bv Kant's
critical philosophv, a rcstitution thatrcstorcs conccptslikcthat
ofbcingandthatwantstosalvagccvcnthcontologicalproofof
Cod~allofthishascncouragcdpcoplctoclaimHcgclforcxis-
tcntialontologv. Hcidcggcr'sintcrprctationofthcintroduction
tothcPhenomenolog inH olzwege isthcmostwcllknownifbvno
mcans thc hrsttcstimonvto that. From thisclaim onc canlcarn
somctmngthatcx¡stcntialontologviscurrcntlvrcluctanttohcar~
cxistcntial ontologv's afhnitv with transccndcntal idcalism,
somcthing it imagincs it has ovcrcomc through thc pathos of
bcing. Butwhilcwhatnowgocsundcrthcnamcofthcqucstion
ofbcinghasaplaccasamomcntinHcgcl'ssvstcm,Hcgcldcnics
bcingthcvcrvabsolutcncss,thcvcrvprioritvovcrallthoughtor
conccpt,thatthcmostrcccntrcsurrcctionofmctaphvsicshopcs
to sccurc. Bvvirtuc ofits dchnition ofbcingas an csscntiallv
ncgativc, rcßcctcd, criticizcd momcnt ofthc dialcctic, Hcgcl's
thcorv ofbcing bccomcs incompatiblc with thc contcmporarv
thcologization ofbcing. Scarcclvanvwhcrcdocs his philosophv
havcmorccontcmporarvrclcvanccthanwhcrcitdismantlcsthc
conccptofbcing.Evcnthcdchnitionofbcingatthcbcginning
ofthcPhenomenolog savsthcprccise oppositcofwhatthcword
33
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
is intcndcd to suggcst today. ¨Furthcr, thc living Substancc is
bcingwhich isintruthSub|cct,or, what isthcsamc,isintruth
actualonlyinsofarasitisthcmovcmcntofpositingitsclf,oris
thc mcdiation ofitssclf-othcringwith itsclf.
,,
²ºThc distinction
bctwccn bcingassub|cctandthcbcing[Seyn] writtcnwiththcy
thatfor Hcgclwasstillorthographicbuttodayisarchaic,is thc
distinction that makcs all thc difIcrcncc. In contrast to taking
sub|cctivc consciousncss as a point ofdcparturc, Hcgcl'sLogc,
as wc know, dcvclops thccatcgorics ofthoughtitsclffromonc
anothcrinthcirob|cctivityandindoingsobcginswiththccon-
ccptofbcing.Thisbcginning,howcvcr,docsnotfoundanyprma
philosophia. Hcgcl'sbcingis thcoppositc ofaprimordialcntity.
Hcgcldocsnotcrcditthcconccptofbcing,a aprimordialvaluc,
with immcdiacy, thc illusion that bcing is logically and gcncti-
cally prior to any rcßcction, any division bctwccn sub|cct and
ob|cct, instcad, hc cradicatcs immcdiacy. Bcing, hc says at thc
bcginning of thc scction ofthcLogic for which thc word being
scrvcsas thc titlc,is ¨indctcrminatcimmcdiacy,
,,
² ' and bccausc
ofits indctcrminatcncss, thisvcry immcdiacy to whichcxistcn-
tialontologyclingsbccomcsforHcgcl,whoundcrstoodthcmc-
diatcdncssofcvcrythingunmcdiatcd,anob|cctiontothcdignity
ofbcing,itisbcing'sncgativity, purcandsimplc,thatmotivatcs
thc dialcctical stcp that cquatcs bcingwith nothingncss. ¨In its
indctcrminatc immcdiacyitis cqual only toitsclf. . . . Itis purc
indctcrminatcncss and cmptincss. Thcrc is nothing to bc in-
tuitcd init,ifonccanspcak hcrcofintuiting, or, itisonlypurc
intuitingitsclf,|ustas littlc is anythingtobcthoughtinit, orit
¡s cqually only this cmpty thinking. Bcing, thc indctcrminatc
immcdiatc, is in fact nothing, and ncithcr morc or lcss than
nothing.º²²Thiscmptincss,howcvcr,isnotsomuchanontolog-
icalqualityofbcingasadchcicncyinthcphilosophicalidcathat
tcrminatcsinbcing. ºIfwccnunciatcBcingasaprcdicatcofthc
34
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
absolutc,ºwritcs Hcgclathis mostmaturc, in thcEncyclopedia,
¨wc gct thc hrstdchnitionofthc lattcr. Thc AbsolutcisBcing.
Thisis(inthought)thcabsolutclyinitialdchnition,thcmostab-
stract andstintcd.º²³Thcconccptofbcing, thc ultimatclcgacy
ofHusscrl's ¨originaryintuition,ºis currcntlybcingcclcbratcd
as somcthingrcmovcdfromallrcihcation, as absolutcimmcdi-
acy. Hcgclnotonlysawthatitisincapablcofbcinggraspcdin-
tuitivcly bccausc ofthat indctcrminatcncss and cmptincss, hc
alsosawthatitis aconccptthatforgctsitisaconccptand mas-
qucradcs as purc immcdiacy, in a ccrtain scnsc it is thc most
thinglikc conccptofall. ¨Whcnbcingistakcnin this simplicity
andimmcdiacy, thcrccollcctionthatitisthcrcsultofcomplctc
abstraction, and so for that rcason alonc isabstractncgativity,
nothing,islcftbchind . . . ,º²¹hcwritcsatasomcwhatlatcrpoint
in thcLogc. But onc can scc from statcmcnts in thcLogc di-
rcctcd spccihcallyagainst|acobi that Hcgcl is not cngaging in
sublimcplaywithur-wordshcrc, rathcr,thccritiqucofbcingis
infactintcndcdas acritiqucofanyandcvcrycmphaticuscof
thisconccptinphilosophy.
Withthiswhollyabstractpurityofcontinuity,thatis,indeterminateness
andvacuityofconception, itis indifferentwhether thisabstractionis
calledspace,pureintuiting,orpurethinking,itisaltogetherthesame
as what the Indian calls Brahma, when for years on end, physically
motionlessandequallyunmovedinsensation,conception,fantasy,de-
sire,andsoon,lookingonlyatthetipofhisnose,hesaysinwardlyonly
Om, Om, Om, orelse nothingatall. This dull, empty consciousness,
understoodasconsciousness,is~being.²³
Hcgcl hcard thc cvocation ofbcing in its manicrigidity as thc
formulaic clattcringofthc praycr whccl. Hc kncw somcthing
thathascurrcntlybccnfalsihcd and lost,forall thctalkofthc
concrctc, lostprccisclyin thcmagicofthc undchncdconcrctc-
ncss that has no substancc butits own aura. that philosophy is
I
35
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
notpcrmittcdtolookforitssub|cctmattcrinthcmostsuprcmc
univcrsalconccpts~whicharc thcnashamcd ofthcirownuni-
vcrsal conccptual charactcr~for thc sakc of thcir prcsumcd
ctcrnityandimmutability.LikconlythcNictzschcofthcTwilight
of the Iols aftcr him,Hcgclrc|cctcdthccquationofphilosophi-
calsubstancc~truth~withthchighcstabstractions,andlocatcd
truthinthcvcryspccihciticswithwhichtraditionalmctaphysics
wastoorchncd to dirtyitshands. In Hcgcl idcalismtransccnds
itsclfnotlcastofallinthisintcntion,whichhccarricsoutmag-
nihccntlyinthcclosclinkingofstagcsofconsciousncsswithso-
ciohistoricalstagcsinthcPhenomenolog of Spirit. Whatcurrcntly
claims to risc abovc dialcctics as an cvocation ofur-words, as
"Sage," now morc than cvcr falls prcy to thc dialcctic. itis ab-
straction,whichinßatcsitscfintoasomcthingthatcxistsinand
foritsclfandinsodoingsinksdownintosomcthinguttcrlywith-
outcontcnt, into tautology, into bcing that says nothing about
bcing, ovcrandovcragain.
Sincc Husscrl, contcmporary philosophics ofbcing havc rc-
voltcd against idcalism. Tothis cxtcnt thc irrcvocablc situation
ofhistoricalconsciousncssiscxprcsscdinthcm.thcyrcgistcrthc
fact that what is

cannot bc dcvclopcd or dcduccd fvom mcrc
sub|cctivcimmancncc,fromconsciousncss.Butthcythcrcbyhy-
postatizc thc suprcmc rcsult of sub|cctivc-conccptual abstrac-
tion, bcing, and thus, both in tcrms ofthcir stancc on socicty
and in thcir thcorctical approach, thcy arc trappcdwithinidc-
alism withoutbcingawarcofit. Thcrc is nothingthatdcmon-
stratcs this morc strikingly than thc spcculations ofthc arch-
idcalistHcgcl.AswcsccalrcadyinHcidcggcr'scarlyworkona
work attributcd to Duns Scotus, thosc whowant to rcstorcon-
tologyfcclthcmsclvcslargclyinagrccmcntwithHcgcl,namcly
with rcspcct to an ovcrall conccption ofWcstcrn mctaphysics
thatthcy hopc to gctfrccoflatcr, andinfactin Hcgclthccx-

AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
trcmcs of idcalism do indccd transccnd mcrc sub|cctivity,
thc dclusory sphcrc ofphilosophical immancncc. To apply an
cxprcssionofEmilLask's tosomcthingmorc gcncral,inHcgcl
too, idcalism's intcntion points bcyond itsclf. But bchind this
formalconsonanccwiththc ontologicalimpulscarchiddcndif-
fcrcnccs whosc subtlcty makcs all thc diffcrcncc in thc world.
ThcIdca,whichinHcgclisactuallydircctcdagainsttraditional
idcalism,isnotthcidcaofbcingbutthcidcaoftruth. ¨Thatthc
form of thought is thc pcrfcct form, and that it prcscnts thc
truth as it intrinsically and actually is, is thc gcncral dogma of
philosophy.º ²
³
Thc absolutcncss of spirit, as opposcd to any-
thingmcrclyhnitc,isintcndcdtovouchfor thcabsolutcncssof
truth,whichis rcmovcdfrommcrcopining, fromallintcntion,
from all sub|cctivc ¨facts ofconsciousncssº, thisis thc apcxof
Hcgcl'sphilosophy.Forhimtruthisnotamcrcrclationshipbc-
twccn|udgmcntandob|ccts,notaprcdicatcofsub|cctivcthought,
rathcr, itisintcndcd to riscsubstantiallyabovcthat, indccd,as
somcthing¨in andforitsclf,º knowingtruthisforhim nothing
lcss thanknowingthc absolutc. this is thcintcntofhiscritiquc
ofKant'scritical philosophy withits dclimitations anditsirrcc-
oncilablcscparationofsub|cctivity andbcing-in-itsclf. In apas-
sagc citcd by Kroncr, Hcgcl says that Kant's ¨so-callcd critical
philosophyº has ¨soothcd thc conscicncc of ignorancc of thc
ctcrnalanddivincbyhavingprovcd thatnothingcanbcknown
ofthc ctcrnal and divinc. . . . Nothingis morc wclcomc to su-
pcrhcialityofknowlcdgcandcharactcr,nothingscizcduponmorc
rcadilythanthisdoctrincofignorancc,inwhichthissupcrFcial-
ity and shallowncss is prcscntcd as cxccllcncc, as thc aim and
rcsultofallintcllcctualcndcavor.º²'Thiskindofcmphaticidca
oftruthgivcs thc lic to sub|cctivism, whosc assiduous conccrn
withwhcthcrtruthistruccnoughtcrminatcsinthcabolitionof
truth. Thc contcntofconsciousncssthatdcvclops into truthis
37
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
not truth mcrclyforthc knowingsub|cct, whcthcr thatsub|cct
bc a transccndcntal onc or not. Thc idca ofthc ob|cctivity of
truthstrcngthcnsthcsub|cct'srcason. itistobcpossiblc,attain-
ablc for him, currcnt attcmpts to brcak out ofsub|cctivism, in
contrast,arcallicdtoadcfamationofthcsub|cct.Asanidcaof
rcason, howcvcr, Hcgcl's Idcais distinguishcd from thc rcsto-
rationofthcabsolutcconccptofbcingbybcingmcdiatcdwithin
itsclf. For Hcgcl truth initsclfis not¨bcingº, itis prccisclyin
bcingthatabstraction,thcapproachofthcsub|cctthatproduccs
its conccptsnominalistically,ishiddcn. In Hcgcl's idcaoftruth,
howcvcr, thc sub|cctivc momcnt, thc momcnt ofrclativity, is
surpasscd in that it bccomcs awarc ofitsclf. Thc idca is con-
taincdinwhatistruc, althoughitisnotidcnticalwithit, ¨rcason
is, thcrcforc, misundcrstood whcn rcßcction is cxcludcd from
thc Truc, and is not graspcd asapositivcmomcntofthc abso-
lutc. º ²° Pcrhaps nothingsays morcaboutthcnaturc ofdialcc-
tical thought than thatsclf-consciousncssofthc sub|cctivc mo-
mcntintruth,rcßcctiononrcßcction,istocffcctarcconciliation
with thcin|usticc that thc opcrating sub|cctivity docs to imma-
ncnttruthinmcrclysupposingand positingas trucsomcthing
that is ncvcrwholly truc. Ifthc idcalist dialcctic turns against
idcalism, itdocs so bccauscits own principlc, bccauscthcvcry
ovcrcxtcnsionofitsidcalistclaim,isatthcsamctimcanti-idcal-
ist.Thcdialccticisaproccssintcrmsofthcimmancnccoftruth
asmuchasintcrmsofthcactivityofconsciousncss.proccss,that
is,istruthitsclf. Hcgclcmphasizcs thisinoncformulationaftcr
anothcr. ¨Truthis itsownsclf-movcmcnt, whcrcas thc mcthod
|ust dcscribcdisthcmodcofcognitionthatrcmainscxtcrnalto
its matcrial.º²"This movcmcntis clicitcd by thc sub|cctin thc
activityofthinking. ¨Inmyvicw. . . cvcrythingturnsongrasp-
ingandcxprcssingthcTruc, notonlyasSubstancc,butcqually
as Sub|cct.
,,
³º But bccausc thc matcrial that cvcry individual
38
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
|udgmcntisconccrncdwithisconfrontcdwithitsconccptinthat
|udgmcntand bccausc cvcry individual, hnitc|udgmcntdisin-
tcgratcs as untruc in that proccss, thc sub|cctivc activity ofrc-
Ðcction lcads truth out bcyond thc traditional conccpt ofthc
adaptationofthcidcatoitssub|cctmattcr. truthcannolongcr
bcapprchcndcdasaqualitycharactcrizing|udgmcnts.InHcgcl
truthiscallcd,asinthctraditionaldchnitionyctinsccrctoppo-
sition to it, ºagrccmcnt of thc conccpt with its actualityº,³' it
consistsinºthccoincidcnccofthcob|cctwithitsclf,thatis,with
itsconccpt.º³²Bccausc,howcvcr,nohnitc|udgmcntcvcrattains
thatagrccmcnt,thcconccptoftruthistornlooscfrom prcdica-
tivclogicand transposcd intothcdialccticas awholc. Itis ncc-
cssary, says Hcgcl, ºtodiscard thc prc|udicc thattruth mustbc
somcthing tangiblc. ' ' ³³ Hcgcl's critiqucofthc rigid scparation
ofthcmomcntsofthc|udgmcntfuscstruth, insofarasitiscon-
ccivcd asmcrc rcsult, with proccss. It dcstroys thcillusionthat
truth could consistin consciousncss'smcasuringitsclfin tcrms
ofsomcindividualthingconfrontingit.
'True' and'false' belongamongthose determinate notions which are
heldtobeinertandwhollyseparateessences,onehereandonethere,
eachstandinghxedandisolatedfromtheother,withwhichithasnoth-
ingincommon. Against this viewit must be maintained that truth is
notaminted cointhatcanbegivenand pocketed ready-made. Noris
theresuchathingasthefalse,anymorethantherei somethingevi|.
... To knowsomethingfalselymeansthatthereisadisparitybetween
knowledge andits Substance. But this verydisparity is the process of
distinguishingingeneral,whichis an essential moment 'in knowing].
Outofthisdistinguishing,ofcourse,comestheiridentity,and thisre-
sultant identityis the truth. But itis nottruth as ifthe disparityhad
been thrown away, like dross from pure metal, noteven like the tool
which remains separate from the hnished vessel, disparity, rather,
as the negative, the self, is itselfstill directly present in the True as
such.³¹
39
Aspectsof Hegel'sPhilosophy
Hcgclbrcakshcrcwiththcdoctrincoftruthasanadaequatio rei
. atque cogitationi, adoctrincparrotcdbythcwholcofphilosophy.
Through thc dialcctic, which is thc approach of a consistcnt
nominalism awakcncd to sclf-consciousncss, an approach that
cxamincs any andcvcry conccpt in tcrms ofits sub|cctmattcr
and in doingsoconvictsitofitsinadcquacy, aPlatonicidcaof
truth is adumbratcd.Thisidcais notasscrtcdassomcthingob-
viousanddircctly prcscntto thcintuition, instcad,itisarouscd
inanticipationbythcvcryinsistcncc ofintcllcctual labor, which
customarily stops with thc critiquc ofPlatonism. philosophical
rcason too has its cunning. Only whcn thc dcmand fov truth
rcfuscstohonorthcncvcrthclcssincscapablcclaimto truthmadc
incachandcvcrylimitcdandthcrcforcuntruc|udgmcnt,aclaim
that at thc samc timc cannot bc dispcnscd with, only whcn it
ncgatcsthcsub|cctivcadequatio throughsclf-rcßcction,docstruth
makc thc transitionofits ownaccord into an ob|cctivcidca,an
idca thatis no longcrnominalistically rcduciblc. Hcgcl also al-
ways intcrprcts thc movcmcnt that is supposcd to bc truth as
¨sclf-movcmcntº [Eigenbewegung] that is motivatcd as much by
thc statc ofaffairs withwhich thc|udgmcntisconccrncdasby
thcsynthcsiscffcctcdbythought.Thatthcsub|cctmaynotsim-
plycontcntitsclfwiththcmcrcadcquacyofits|udgmcntstothc
statcs ofafIairs|udgcd dcrivcs from thc fact that|udgmcntis
notamcrcsub|cctivcactivity,thattruthitsclfisnotamcrcqual-
ityof |udgmcnt,rathcr,intruthsomcthingalwaysprcvailsthat,
althoughitcannotbcisolatcd,cannotbcrcduccdtothcsub|cct,
somcthingthattraditionalidcalistcpistcmologicsbclicvcthcycan
ncglcctasamcrcunknown. Truthdivcstsitsclfofits sub|cctiv-
ity. bccauscnosub|cctivc|udgmcntcanbctrucandyctcachand
cvcry oncmustwant tobctruc, truthtransccnds itsclfandbc-
comcs somcthingin-itsclf. Assomcthingthatmakcs thctransi-
tioninthisway,howcvcr,somcthingthatisnotmcrcly¨positcdº
40
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
any morc than it is somcthing mcrcly ºrcvcalcd,º truth is also
incompatiblc with what ontology hopcs to discovcr through its
inquirics. Hcgcl's truth is nolongcrintimc,asnominalisttruth
was, nor is it abovc timc in thc ontological fashion. for Hcgcl
timc bccomcs a momcnt oftruth itsclf. Truth as proccss is a
ºpassagcthrough al momcnts"as opposcd to aºproposition that
containscontradictions,ºandassuchithasatcmporalcorc.This
liquidatcs thc hypostasis of abstraction and thc sclf-idcntical
conccpt that dominatcs traditional philosophy. If Hcgcl's
ºmovcmcntofthcconccptºrcstorcsPlatonisminaccrtainscnsc,
thisPlatonismisncvcrthclcsshcalcdofitsstaticquality, itsmythic
hcritagc, and has absorbcd into itsclfall thc spontancityoflib-
cratcd consciousncss. Dcspitc cvcrything, Hcgcl ultimatcly rc-
mainsticdtothcidcntitythcsisandthcrcforctoidcalism,butat
amomcntinthchistoryofspiritwhcnconformitychainsspirit
in a way that was not thc casc a hundrcd ycars ago, thc now
chcap critiqucofidcalism thatatthattimchadtobcwonfrom
thcsupcriorpowcrofidcalismnccdstobc rcmindcd that thcrc
is a momcntoftruth in thcidcntity thcsisitsclf. If, inKantian
tcrms,thcrcwcrcnosimilaritybctwccnsub|cctandob|cct,ifthc
two, as anunrcstraincd positivism would havcit,stoodinabso-
lutc and unmcdiatcd opposition to onc anothcr, thcn not only
wouldthcrcbcnotruth,thcrcwouldbcnorcasonandnoidcas
atall.Thoughtthatcomplctclycxtirpatcditsmimcticimpulsc~
thckindofcnlightcnmcntthatdocsnotcarryoutthcsclf-rcßcc-
tionthatformsthccontcntofthcHcgcliansystcm, namingthc
rclationshipofthcmattcrathandtothcidca~wouldcndupin
madncss. Thought that is absolutcly without rcfcrcncc~thc
complctc oppositc ofthc philosophy ofidcntity~thought that
rcmovcsallparticipationonthcsub|cct'spartandallanthropo-
morphism from thc ob|cct, is thc consciousncss ofthc schizo-
phrcnic. Its ob|cctivity cclcbratcs its triumph in a pathos-hllcd
4I
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
narcissism. Thc spcculativc Hcgclian conccpt rcscucs mimcsis
through spirit's sclf-rcßcction. truthis notadaequatio butaun-
ity, and in thc dcclinc ofidcalism rcason's mindfulncss ofits
mimcticnaturcisrcvcalcdbyHcgcltobcitshumanright.
Hcrconccould ob|cctthatin hypostatizingspirit Hcgcl, thc
Platonicrcalistandabsolutcidcalist,indulgcdinthcsamccon-
ccptualfctishism thatoccursinthcnamcofbcingtoday. Buta
|udgmcnt that invokcd this similarity would itsclf rcmain ab-
stract. Evcnifabstractthoughtandabstractbcingarcthcsamc,
as an admittcdly disputcd linc from a pocm by Parmcnidcs
claimcdatthcbcginningofWcstcrnphilosophy,thcontological
conccptofbcing has adifIcrcnt status than thc Hcgclian con-
ccptofrcason.Bothcatcgoricsparticipatcinthcdynamicofhis-
tory. Somc pcoplc, Kroncr includcd, havc tricd to list Hcgcl
amongthcirrationalistsonthcbasisofhiscritiqucofhnitcand
limitcdrcßcction,andthcrcarcstatcmcntsbyHcgclthatcanbc
adduccd to support that argumcnt, such as his statcment that
spcculation, likc unmcdiatcd bclicf, stands opposcd to rcßcc-
tion. Butlikc Kantinthcthrcccritiqucs,Hcgclmaintainsdcci-
sivclythatrcasonisonc,thatitisrcason,ratio, thought.Evcnthc
movcmcntthatis tolcadoutbcyondallhnitcconccptualdctcr-
minationsisasclf-criticalmovcmcntonthcpartofthought. thc
spcculativc conccpt is ncithcr intuition nor ¨catcgorial intui-
tion."ThcrigorofHcgcl'sattcmpttorcscucthcontologicalproof
ofCod inoppositionto Kantmaybc qucstioncd. Butwhat im-
pcllcd him to it was not a dcsirc to cclipsc rcason but on thc
contrarythcutopianhopcthatthcblock,thcºlimitsofthcpos-
sibilityofcxpcricncc,"mightnotbchnal,thatsucccssmightbc
achicvcdanyway,asinthcconcludingsccncofFaust: thatspirit,
in all its wcakncss, limitations, and ncgativity, rcscmblcs truth
and is thcrcforc suitcd for knowlcdgc oftruth. Ifatonctimc
thc arrogancc ofthc Hcgclian doctrinc ofabsolutc spirit was
42
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
rightlycmphasizcd, today, whcn idcalismisdcfamcdbycvcry-
oncandmostofallbythcsccrctidcalists,awholcsomccorrcc-
tivc bccomcs apparcntin thc notion ofspirit's absolutcncss. It
passcs|udgmcntonthcparalyzingrcsignationincontcmporary
consciousncss, which, outofits own wcakncss, is cvcrrcady to
supportthcdcgradationdonctoitbythcsupcriorforccofblind
cxistcncc. ¨Inthcso-callcd'ontological'proofofthccxistcnccof
Cod,wchavcthcsamcconvcrsionofthcabsolutcconccptinto
cxistcncc.ThisconvcrsionhasconstitutcdthcdcpthofthcIdca
in thc modcrn world, although rcccntly it has bccn dcclarcd
inconccivablc, with thc rcsult that knowlcdgc of truth has
bccnrcnounccd, sincc truthis simply thcunityofconccpt and
cxistcncc. º³°
IfHcgclian rcasonrcsistsbcingmcrclysub|cctivc and ncga-
tivc, and rcpcatcdly functions as spokcspcrsonforwhat is op-
poscd tothissub|cctivc rcason, cvcnuncarthingthc rationalin
thcirrationalwithgusto,Hcgcldocsnotsimplycompclthcobc-
dicnccofonc who would rcbclagainstthisby makingthc hct-
cronomousandcstrangcdappctizing,asthoughitwcrcrcason's
naturalsub|cctmattcr,nordocshcmcrclywarnthatitisnousc
opposingwhatcannotbcchangcd.Rathcr,inhisinncrmostcorc
Hcgclscnscd thatthcnaturcanddcstinyofhumanbcingscan
bc rcalizcd only through what is cstrangcd, only through thc
world'sdomination,asitwcrc,ofhumanbcings.Humanbcings
mustappropriatccvcnthcpowcrsthatarchostilctothcm, thcy
must insinuatc thcmsclvcs into thcm, so to spcak. Hcgcl intro-
duccd thc cunning ofrcason into thc philosophy ofhistory in
ordcrto providcaplausiblcdcmonstrationofthc wayob|cctivc
rcason,thcrcalizationoffrccdom,succccdsbymcansofthcblind,
irrationalpassionsofhistoricalindividuals.Thisconccptrcvcals
somcthing about thc cxpcricntial corc ofHcgcl's thought. His
thought as awholc is cunning, it hopcs to achicvcvictoryovcr
43
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
thcsupcriorpowcrofthcworld,aboutwhichithasnoillusions,
by turning this supcrior powcr againstitsclfuntil it turns into
somcthingdiffcrcnt. InaconvcrsationwithCocthc, handcddown
byEckcrmann,inwhichhcwasunusuallycandid,Hcgcldchncd
thcdialccticas thcorganizcdspiritofcontradiction. Thatkind
ofcunningisnotaninsubstantialclcmcntinthcdialcctic,akind
ofgrandiosc pcasantshrcwdncss thathas lcarncd to submit to
thc powcrful and adapt to thcir nccds until it can wrcst thcir
powcrfromthcm.thcdialccticoflordshipandbondagclctsthat
sccrct out.Wc knowthat throughout hislifc Hcgcl hcld tothc
Swabian dialcct, cvcn as an ostcnsiblc Prussian statc philoso-
phcr, and rcports about him rcpcatcdly notc with amazcmcnt
thcsurprisingsimplicityofthccharactcrofthismanwhowasso
cxccptionally diucult as a writcr. Hc rcmaincd unfaltcringlv
faithfultohisorigins, thcprcconditionforastrongcgoandany
clcvationofthought.Ofcourscthcrcisarcsiducoffalscpositiv-
ityinthis. Hcgclfocuscsonthccircumstanccsinwhichhchnds
himsclf, likc thc pcrsonwho bclicvcs hc willrcafhrmhis valuc
by lctting onc know, through gcsturcs orwords, that hc is an
unimportant man. But thatnaivctéofthcunnaivc, whoscana-
logucinthcsystcmisthcrcstorationofimmcdiacyatallitslcv-
cls,itsclftcstihcstoaningcniouscraftincss,cspcciallyincontrast
to thc stupid, pcrhdiousrcproach ofartihcialityandcxaggcra-
tion thathasbccnblabbcrcdagainstcvcrydialccticalidcasincc
thcn. Inthcnaivctéofthcidcathatissoclosctoitsob|cctthatit
is onintimatctermswithit, asitwcrc, thcothcrwiscso grown-
up Hcgcl prcscrvcd, as Horkhcimcrsaid, an clcmcntofchild-
hood,thccouragctobcwcakthatgivcsthcchildthcidcathatit
willultimatclyovcrcomccvcnwhatismostdifhcult.
Inthisrcgardtoo,ofcoursc,Hcgcl'sphilosophy,pcrhapsmorc
dialcctical than it itsclfimagincd, walks a narrow linc. For as
littlc as it is willing to ¨rcnouncc knowlcdgc oftruth,º its tcn-
44
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
dcncyto rcsignationisundcniablc. Itwouldlikcto|ustifywhat
cxists as rational and dispcnscwith thcrcßcction that opposcs
this,withasupcriorattitudcthatboastsabouthowdifhcultthc
worldisanddrawsthcmoralthatitcannotbcchangcd. Ifany-
whcrc,itishcrcthatHcgclwasbourgcois.Buttositin|udgmcnt
onhimcvcninthisrcgardwouldbcasignofascrvilcattitudc.
Thc most qucstionablc, and thcrcforc also thc bcst known of
Hcgcl's tcachings, that what is rcal is rational, was not mcrcly
apologctic.Rathcr,inHcgclrcasonhndsitsclfconstcllatcdwith
frccdom. Frccdom and rcason arc nonscnsc without onc an-
othcr. Thc rcal can bc considcrcd rational only insofar as thc
idca offrccdom, that is, human bcings' gcnuinc sclf-dctcrmi-
nation,shincsthroughit.Anyoncwhotricstocon|urcawaythis
lcgacyofthcEnlightcnmcntinHcgclandcampaignforthcidca
thathisLogc has nothingto dowith arationalordcringofthc
world falsihcs him. Evcn whcrc, in his latcr pcriod, Hcgcl dc-
fcndsthcpositivc~thatwhichsimplyis~thathcattackcdinhis
youth,hcappcalstorcason,whichundcrstandswhatmcrclycx-
istsasmorcthanmcrclycxisting,undcrstandsitfromthcpoint
ofvicw ofsclf-consciousncss and thc sclf-cmancipation ofhu-
manbcings.Onccannotrcmovcthcob|cctivcconccptofrcason
fromabsolutcidcalism, anymorcthanonccanrcmovcits sub-
|cctivc origins in thc sclf-prcscrving rcason ofthc individual,
cvcnin Kant'sphilosophyofhistory,sclf-prcscrvationturns,by
virtuc ofits own movcmcnt, into ob|cctivity, into ¨humanity,"
intoatrucsocicty.ThisalonccnablcdHcgcltodchncsub|cctivc
rcason,ancccssarymomcntinabsolutcspirit,assomcthinguni-
vcrsalaswcll. Evcnifitdocs notknowit,thc rcasonofthcin-
dividual, with which, in thcdialcctic ofscnsc ccrtainty, Hcgcl's
movcmcnt ofthc conccpt bcgins, is always alrcady potcntially
thc rcason ofthc spccics. This much is truc cvcnin thc othcr-
wisc falsc doctrinc of thc idcalists that scts up transccndcntal
45
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
consciousncss, which is an abstraction from individual con-
sciousncss, assubstantialand immancnt dcspitc itsgcnctic and
logical dcpcndcncc on individual consciousncss. Thc |anus
charactcrofHcgcl'sphilosophybccom�sparticularlyobviousin
thccatcgoryofthcindividual. Hcgclsccsthroughthcmomcnt
ofillusioninindividuationaswcllashisantipodcSchopcnhaucr
docs~thcobstinacyofdwcllingonwhatonc mcrclyis oncsclf,
thc narrowncss and particularity ofindividualintcrcsts. Ncvcr-
thclcss Hcgcl did not disposscss ob|cctivity or csscncc ofthcir
rclationshiptothcindividualandthcimmcdiatc. Thcunivcrsal
isalwaysalsothcparticularandthcparticularthcunivcrsal.By
analyzingthisrclationship, thcdialccticgivcsanaccountofthc
social forcc hcld in which cvcrythingindividualissociallyprc-
formcdfromthcoutsctandatthcsamctimcnothingisrcalizcd
cxccptinandthroughindividuals.Thccatcgoricsofthcpartic-
ularand thc gcncral, thc individual and socicty, cannotbcput
torcstanymorcthan canthoscofsub|cctandob|cct, norcan
thc proccss that takcs placc bctwccn thcm bc intcrprctcd as a
proccssbctwccntwopolcsthatrctainthcirindividualidcntitics.
thccontributionsofthctwo momcnts~indccd,whatthoscmo-
mcnts actuallyarc~an bc disccrncd onlyin historical concrc-
tion. IfncvcrthclcssinthcconstructionofHcgclianphilosophy
thcunivcrsal,thcsubstantial,asopposcdtothcfrailtyandwcak-
ncss ofthcindividual, andultimatclythcinstitutionalarc most
stronglyacccntuatcd,thiscxprcsscsmorcthanacomplicitywith
thccourscofthcworld,morcthanthcchcapconsolationforthc
fragilityofcxistcnccthatrcmindsitthatitsimplyisfragilc.Whilc
Hcgcl'sphilosophydraws thcfullconscqucnccsfrombourgcois
sub|cctivism,thatis,itactuallyundcrstandsthcworldasawholc
as thc productoflabor~ascommodity, ifoncwill,atthcsamc
timcHcgclgivcsancxtrcmclysharpcritiqucofsub|cctivity,onc
thatgocsfarbcyondFichtc'sdistinctionbctwccnthcsub|cctand
46
AspectsofHegel's Philosophy
thcindividual.InHcgcl,thcnot-I, whichinFichtcwasabstractly
positcd, is dcvclopcd, sub|cctcd to thc dialcctic, concrctcly, and
hcncc notonlyin gcncral tcrms but in its full spccihc contcnt,
thus scrving to dclimit thc sub|cct. Whcrcas Hcinc, surcly not
thclcast|udiciousofHcgcl'slistcncrs,couldundcrstandHcgcl's
tcachingsprimarilyasavalidationofindividuality,individuality
itsclfhnds itsclfdcaltwith roughly, cvcn with contcmpt, atnu-
mcrous lcvcls ofthc systcm. Butthis rcßccts thc ambiguity of
civilsocicty,whichtrulyattaincdsclf-consciousncssinHcgcl,whcn
it comcs to individuality. To civil socicty, thc human bcing, as
unrcstraincd produccr, appcars to bc autonomous, hcirofthc
divinclcgislator,virtuallyomnipotcnt.Forthis rcason, howcvcr,
thcparticularindividual,whointhissocictyistrulyamcrcagcnt
of thc social proccss of production and whosc own nccds arc
mcrcly ground down, so to spcak, in thc proccss, is also con-
sidcrcdcomplctclyimpotcntandinsignihcantatthcsamctimc.
Inunrcsolvcdoppositionto¡hcpathosofhumanism,Hcgclcx-
plicitlyand implicitlyordcrs humanbcings, as thosc who pcr-
form sociallyncccssary labor, to sub|cct thcmsclvcs to an alicn
ncccssity. Hc thcrcby cmbodics, in thcorctical form, thc anti-
nomy ofthc univcrsal and thc particular in bourgcois socicty.
Butby formulat¡ng itruthlcssly, hc makcs thisantinomymorc
intclligiblcthan cvcrbcforc andcriticizcsitcvcnas hcdcfcnds
it. Bccausc frccdom would bc thc frccdom ofrcal, particular
individuals, Hcgcldisdains thcillusionoffrccdom,thcindivid-
ualwho,inthcmidstofunivcrsalunfrccdom,bchavcsasthough
hcwcrcalrcadyfrccandunivcrsal. Hcgcl'sconhdcnccthatthc-
orcticalrcason canstillachicvcits goals amounts to thc knowl-
cdgc that rcason has a hopc ofrcalizing itsclf, ofbccoming a
rationalrcality,onlyifitindicatcs thcpivotalpointfromwhich
onc can dislodgc thc agc-old burdcn ofmyth. Thc burdcn is
mcrccxistcncc,whichinthclastanalysiscntrcnchcsitsclfinthc
47
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
individual, its pivot point is rcason, as thc rcason ofcxistcncc
itsclf. Hcgcl's apologcticsandhis rcsignationarcthcbourgcois
maskthatutopiahasputonto avoidbcingimmcdiatclyrccog-
nizcdandapprchcndcd,toavoidrcmainingimpotcnt.
How littlc Hcgcl's philosophy can bc rcduccd to bourgcois
civilityis pcrhaps mostobviousinhisstancconmorality. Itisa
momcnt inhiscritiqucofthccatcgoryofindividuality as such.
Hcwas probably thc hrsttocxprcss, in thcPhenomenolog, thc
idcathatthcriftbctwccnsclfandworldpasscsinturnthrough
thcsclf,thatitcontinucs, as Kroncrsays, onintothcindividual
anddividcs himinaccordanccwiththcob|cctivcandsub|cctivc
rationalityofhiswillandhisdccds.³
³
Hcgcl kncw carlyonthat
thc individual himsclf is both somcthing socially functioning,
somcthingdchncd bythcmattcrathand, namcly, byhislabor,
and also somcthing that cxists for itsclf, with spccihc inclina-
tions,intcrcsts,andtalcnts,andthat¡hcsctwomomcnts pointin
diffcrcnt dircctions. But thc purcly moral action in which thc
individualthinks hcishimsclfand only himsclf,actingautono-
mously, thcrcby bccomcs ambiguous, asclf-dcccption. Modcrn
analytical psychology's rccognitionthatwhatthcindividualhu-
manbcingthinksabouthimsclfisillusoryandtoalargccxtcnt
mcrc¨rationalizationºhasprovidcdahomcforoncpicccofHc-
gclian spcculation. Hcgcldcrivcd thctransition frompurc moral
sclf-consciousncsstohypocrisy~whichthcnbccamcthcfocusof
Nictzschc's critical attack on philosophy~from its momcnt of
ob|cctivc untruth. Historically, ofcoursc, formulations likc thc
oncinthcPhenomenolog aboutthc ¨hardhcartº thatinsistson
thcpurityofthcmoralcommandmcntstillfallwithinthccon-
tcxtofthcpost-KantianSchillcriancritiqucofrigorousKantian
cthics,butatthcsamctimcthcyrcprcscntaprcludctoNictzschc's
notion of ressentiment, of morality as ¨rcvcngc. º Hcgcl's statc-
mcntthatthcrcisnothingmorallyrcalisnotamcrcmomcntin
48
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
thctransitiontohisnotionofconcrctccthicallifc[Sittlichkeit] . In
itthc rccognition thatthcmoralcanbyno mcansbc takcnfor
grantcd, that conscicncc docs not guarantcc right action, and
that purc immcrsion ofthc sclfin thc qucstion ofwhat to do
and what notto do cntanglcs onc in contradiction and futility.
HcgcltakcsanimpulscofthcradicalEnlightcnmcntfarthcr.Hc
docsnotopposc thcgoodtocmpiricallifcasanabstractprinci-
plc, a sclf-sufhcicnt idca, but instcad links it through its own
contcnt to thc production ofa truc totality~to prcciscly what
appcars undcr thcnamcofhumanityinthcCritique of Practical
Reason. Hcgcl thcrcby transccnds thc bourgcois scparation of
cthos, as somcthingthatalthoughunconditionallybindingisvalid
only forthcsub|cct,from thcob|cctivityofsocicty,whichisos-
tcnsibly mcrcly cmpirical. This is onc ofthc most rcmarkablc
pcrspcctivcs providcd by Hcgcl's mcdiationofthcaprioriand
thcapostcriori.Thcincisivcncssofhisformulationtakcsusby
surprisc.
Thedesignationofanindividualasimmoralnecessarly fallsawaywhen
morality in general is imperfect, and has therefore only an arbitrary
basis.Therefore,thesenseandcontentofthejudgementofexperience
issolelythis,thathappinesssimplyassuchshouldnothavebeenthelot
ofsome individuals, i.e. thejudgmentis an expression ofenvy which
coversitselfwiththecloakofmorality. Thereason,however, whyso-
called good luck should fall to the lot ofothers, is good friendship,
whichgant andwihes them,anditself,too,thisluckychance.³²
No mcrcbourgcoiswouldhavc talkcdthisway. Thcbourgcois
glorihcation ofwhat cxists is always accompanicd by thc dclu-
sion thatthcindividual~thatwhichcxistspurclyfor itsclf, which
is how thc sub|cctncccssarilyappcars tohimsclfinthccxisting
ordcr~iscapablcofthcgood. Hcgcldcstroycdthisillusion.His
critiquc ofmorality cannotbcrcconcilcdwith thatapologvfor
49
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
socicty, whichnccdsamoralidcologyofthcindividualandhis
rcnunciationofhappincsstosustainitsclfinitsownin|usticc.
Oncc onc has sccn through thc cliché ofHcgcl'sbourgcois
civility, oncwill no longcr succumb to thc suggcstion madc by
Schopcnhaucr and thcn Kicrkcgaard, who dismiss Hcgcl as a
pcrsonasconformistandinsignihcantanddcrivcthcirncgativc
vcrdictonhisphilosophynotlcastfromthat.To Hcgcl'scrcdit,
hcwas notan cxistcntial thinkcrin thc scnsc thatwas inaugu-
ratcdbyKicrkcgaardandhasnowdcgcncratcdtoasclf-satishcd
cliché.Thcfactthatthcmostrcccnt~andalrcadythrcadbarc~
vcrsion ofthc cultofpcrsonality docs noththim docs not dc-
gradc Hcgcl to thc comfortablc profcssor lccturing, uncon-
ccrncd, on thc suffcrings ofmankind, thc picturc with which
KicrkcgaardandSchopcnhaucrsosucccssfullydcfamcdhimto
postcrity. Infact,Schopcnhaucrshowcdinhnitclylcsshumanity
and gcncrosity to Hcgcl than thc oldcr man had shown him,
Hcgcl grantcd SchopcnhaucrhisHabilitation dcspitcthcfactthat
Schopcnhaucr, in afoolishdcbatc, had arrogantlyplaycdhim�
sclfoffagainst Hcgcl as a high-principlcd rcscarchcrwhowas
cxpcrtinthcnaturalscicnccs.Hcgcl'scritiquchadgoncbcyond
thcnotionofcxistcnccthatopposcdhimlongbcforccxistcncc,
manthc philosophcrandhis authcnticity,hadbcguntogivcit-
sclfairsandthcnbccomccstablishcdinacadcmiaaswcll.|ustas
thc cmpirical pcrson who thinks lagsbchindthc powcrandob-
|cctivity ofthc idca hc thinks whcncvcr thc idca i an idca, an
idca'sclaimtotruthdocsnotlicinitsadcquacyasanillustration
ofthcthinkcr,inthcpaltryrcpctitionofwhathcisanyway. But
rathcr,thisclaimisprovcninthatwhichgocsbcyondcntanglc-
mcntin mcrc cxistcncc, in thatinwhich thcindividualhuman
bcingdivcstshimsclfofhimsclfsothathcmayhnallyrcachhis
goal. Hcgcl'sdcmcanor, full ofsuffcring, hiscountcnanccrav-
5O
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
agcd by thought, thc facc of onc who has litcrally consumcd
himsclfuntilhcisnomorcthanashcs, bcarwitncsstothissclf-
divcstiturc. Hcgcl's bourgcoisunprctcntiousncssworkcd to thc
bcnchtofhisimmcasurablccfforts,inscribcdwiththcirownim-
possibility, to think thc unconditioncd~an impossibility that
Hcgcl's philosophyrcßcctswithin itsclfas thc cpitomc ofncga-
tivity. Inthcfaccofthat,thcappcaltoauthcnticity,risk,andthc
boundary situation is amodcstonc. Ifthcrc istrulya nccd for
thcthinkingsub|cctinphilosophy,ifthcrccan bc noinsightinto
thc ob|cctivity ofthc mattcr at hand without thc clcmcnt cur-
rcntly dcalt with undcr thc tradcmark of thc cxistcntial, that
momcntachicvcslcgitimacynotinshowingoffbutinshattcring
that sclf-positing through thc disciplinc imposcd on it by thc
thing itsclf and cxtinguishing itsclf within it. Hcgcl is almost
withoutpccrinfollowingthispath.Butassoonasthccxistcntial
momcnt asscrts itsclfto bc thc basis oftruth, it bccomcs a lic.
Hcgcl's hatrcd ofthosc who ascribcd thc right offull truth to
thcimmcdiacyofthcircxpcricnccisdircctcdto this licaswcll.
ThcwcalthofcxpcricncconwhichthoughtfccdsinHcgclis
incomparablc, itis putinto thc idcas thcmsclvcs, ncvcr appcar-
ingas mcrc ºmatcrial,ºto say nothingofcxamplc or cvidcncc
cxtcrnaltothcidcas.Throughwhatiscxpcricnccd,thcabstract
idcaistransformcdbackintosomcthingliving,|ustasmcrcma-
tcrial is transformcd through thcpaththoughttravcls. onc could
show thisincvcryscntcnccofthcPhenomenolog of Spirit. Hcgcl
wasinfactgrantcdsomcthingpraiscd,usuallywithout|ustihca-
tion,inartists.sublimation, hctrulyposscsscdlifcinitscolorcd
rcßcction, in its rccapitulation in spirit. But undcr no circum-
stanccs should oncconccivc sublimation in Hcgclascquivalcnt
tointcrnalization. Hcgcl's conccptionofsclf-divcstiturc,likcthc
critiqucofaºvainºanddcludcdsub|cctivitycxistingforitsclf,a
critiquchcsharcswithCocthcandwhichmovcsoutbcyondidc-
5 I
AspectsofHegel'sPhilosophy
alism, is thc oppositc ofintcrnalization, and as a pcrson Hcgcl
shows hardly a tracc ofit. Likc thc sub|cctofhis thcorics, thc
manHcgclhadabsorbcdbothsub|cctandob|cctintohimsclfin
spirit, thclifcofhisspiritisalloflifcagainwithinitsclf.Hcncc
Hcgcl's withdrawal from lifc should not bc confuscdwith thc
idcologyofscholarlyrcnunciation. As sublimatcd spirit, Hcgcl
thcpcrsonrcsoundswiththcoutwardandthcphysicalthcway
grcatmusicdocs. Hcgcl's philosophymurmursandrustlcs. As
withhisdcvotcdcritic, Kicrkcgaard,onccouldspcakofan¨in-
tcllcctualbodyºinhim.Hisbridc,thcBaroncssMariavonTuchcr,
took it amiss whcn hc addcd thcsc words to a lcttcr shc had
writtcntohissistcr. ºFromthisyoucanscchowhappyIcanbc
withhcrforallthcrcstofmylifc,andhowhappythcattainmcnt
ofsuchlovc,forwhichIscarcclyhadanyhopclcftinthisworld,
ismakingmccvcnnow,insofarashappincssispartofthcdcs-
tinyofmylifc. º³°ThcwholcantiprivatcHcgclisinthcscprivatc
words. Latcr, in Zarthutr, thc thought in thcm was givcn a
pocticizcdform. ºTrachtcich dcnnnachClück:Ichtrachtcnach
mcincm Wcrkcº 'Do I covct happincss: I covctmywork]. But
thcalmosttradcsmanlikcdryncssandsobrictytowhichthcmost
cxtrcmcpathosshrivclsinHcgclgivcsthcidcaadignityitloscs
whcnitprovidcsitspathoswithafanfarc.TbcmcaningofHc-
gcl'slifcisticdtothcsubstanccofhisphilosophy.Nophilosophy
wassoprofoundlyrich, nonchcldsounswcrvinglytothccxpc-
ricncctowhichithadcntrustcditsclfwithoutrcscrvation.Evcn
thcmarksofitsfailurcwcrcstruckbytruthitsclf.
The Experiential Content
of Hegel's Philosophy
I will bc dcalinghcrc with somc modcls ofintcllcctual cxpcri-
cnccasitmotivatcsHcgcl'sphilosophy~motivatcsitob|cctivcly,
not biographically or psychologically~and makcs up its truth

contcnt. Initially, thc conccpt ofcxpcricnccwillbc lcftundc-
�h ncdonlythcprcscntationcanconcrctizcit.Thcconccptisnot
intcndcd tocapturc phcnomcnological ºur-cxpcricnccº, nor,likc
thc intcrprctation of Hcgcl in Hcidcggcr's Holzwege, is it in-
tcndcdtogctatsomcthingontological,thcºWortdcsScinsº'word
ofBcing]orthcºScindcsScicndcnº'Bcingofbcings] . ' Accord-
ing to Hcgcl himsclf, nothing of this sort is mcant to bc cx-
tractcdfromhistrainofthought.Histhoughtwouldncvcrhavc
ratihcd Hcidcgr's claim that ºthc ncw objcct thatariscs for
consciousncss in thc coursc ofits formationº is ºnotjust any-
thingthatistruc,oranyparticularbcing,butisthctruthofwhat
u truc. thc Bcingofbcings, thc appcarancc ofaµcarancc.º²
Hcgclwouldncvcrhavccallcdthatcxpcricncc,instcad,forHc-
gclwhatcxpcricnccisconccrncdwithatanyparticularmomcnt
is thcanimatingcontradiction ofsuchabsolutctruth.Nothing¿
can bc known ºthat is not in cxpcricncc
,,
³~including, accord-

gly, thc Bcing into which cxistcntial ontology displaccs thc
ground ofwhat cxists and is cxpcricnccd. In Hcgclbcingand
54
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
ground arc ºdctcrminations ofrcßcction" [Refexionsbestimmun­
gen] , catcgorics inscparablc from thc sub|cct, as in Kant. Thc
suppositionthatcxpcricnccis amodc ofbcing, somcthingthat
hasprcsub|cctivclyºbccnappropriatcdascvcnt"[ereignet] orºbccn
clucidatcd" [gelichtet], is simply incompatiblc with Hcgcl's con-
ccption of cxpcricncc as a ºdialcctical movcmcnt which con-
sciousncsscxcrciscsonitsclfandwhichaffcctsbothits knowlcdgc
and itsob|cct"inasmuchasthc ºncw trucob|cctissucsfromit.''¹
Nor,howcvcr,docsthcconccptofcxpcricnccrcfcrtoisolatcd
cmpirical obscrvations thatwould bc proccsscd synthctically in
Hcgcl's philosophy. My thcmc is thc cxpcricntial substancc of
Hcgcl'sphilosophy, notcxpcricntialcontcntin Hcgcl'sphiloso-
phy. What I havcinmindis closcrto what Hcgcl, in thcintro-
ductiontohisSystem of Philosophy, calls thc ºattitudcofthought
to ob|cctivity"~thc attitudc of his own thought. I will try to
translatcintosomcthingascloscto contcmporarycxpcricnccas
possiblc what Hcgcl csscntially undcrstood, whathcsaw about
thcworld, priortothctraditionalcatcgoricsofphilosophy,cvcn
thc Hcgclian catcgorics, andthcircritiquc. Iwillnotgointothc
controvcrsywithinintcllcctualhistoryaboutthcrclativcpriority
ofthcologicalandsociopoliticalmotifsinHcgcl'sbiography.What
I am intcrcstcd in is not how Hcgcl sub|cctivcly arrivcd atthis
or that doctrinc but rathcr, in thc Hcgclian spirit, thc compcl-
lingforccofthc ob|cctivc phcnomcnathathavcbccnrcßcctcd
in his philosophy and arc scdimcntcd in it. Norwill I bc con-
ccrncd with what has bccn canonizcd as Hcgcl's historical
achicvcmcnt~hisconccptionofthcnotionofdevclopmcntand
its linking with mctaphysics, which had bccn static sincc Plato
andAristotlc~orwith thosc aspccts ofhiswork thathavcbccn
absorbcd intothcindividualscholarlydisciplincs

Myinquiryis
conccrncdwithwhathis philosophycxprcsscs as philosophy, and
55
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
this hasitssubstancc notlcastofallinthc factthatitis notcx-
haustcdbythchndingsofindividualdisciplincs.
Itsccms timclytoappcaltothis. Thc traditionofatlcastthc
post-Kantian Ccrman Idcalism that found its most compclling
formin Hcgcl hasfadcd,andforthc most partits tciminology
sccmsfarrcmovcdfromus. Ingcncral,Hcgcl'sapproachstands
in obliquc rclationship to thc program of unmcdiatcd acccp-
tanccofthc so-callcd givcnas ahrmbasis ofknowlcdgc. Sincc
Hcgcl'sdaythatprogramhascomcalmosttobctakcnforgrantcd,
andby nomcansmcrclyinpositivismbutalso inauthcntic op-
poncntsofpositivismlikcBcrgsonandHusscrl.Thclcsshuman
immcdiacy is tolcratcd by thc omniprcscnt mcdiating mccha-
nisms ofcxchangc, thc morc fcrvcntly acompliantphilosophy
asscrtsthatitposscsscsthcbasisofthingsinthcimmcdiatc.This
kindofspirithastriumphcdovcrspcculationbothinthcpositiv-
isticscicnccsandinthciropponcnts. Itisnotthatthcrchasbccn
an arbitrary changc in stylcs ofthought or philosophical fash-
ions,asacsthcticistorpsychologistvicwsofthchistoryofphilos-
ophylikc to portrayit. Instcad, idcalismhasbccnforgottcn, or
hasatlcastbccomcamcrcculturalcommodity,boihoutofcom-
pulsionandoutofncccssity, throughthccompulsionofcritical
rcßcction and out ofncccssity in thc dcvclopmcntofa socicty
that has lcss and lcss fulhllcd Hcgcl's prognosis that it would
bccomc absolutc spirit, thatitwouldbcrational. Evcnidcas that·
wcrc atonctimchrmlycstablishcdhavcahistoryofthcirtruth
andnotamcrcaftcrlifc,thcydonotrcmaininhcrcntlyindiffcr-
cntto what bcfalls thcm.Atthc prcscnttimc Hcgclianphiloso-
phy, andalldialccticalthought,issub|cctto thcparadoxthatit
hasbccnrcndcrcdobsolctcbyscicnccandscholarshipwhilcbcing
atthcsamctimc morc timcly thancvcrinitsoppositiontothcm.
This paradox mustbc cndurcd and notconccalcd undcracry
56
TheExperlentlalContentofHegel'slhllosophy
ot"back to . . . ' oran cttort to dìvìdc thcshccp trom thc µoats
wìthìn HcµcI`s phìIosophy. Whcthcr wc havc onIy an acadcmìc
rcnaìssancc ot HcµcI that ìt ìs ìtscIt Ionµ outdatcd or whcthcr
contcmporary conscìousncss hnds ìn HcµcI a truth contcnt whosc
tìmc ìs ducdcpcndsonwhcthcrthat paradoxìs cndurcd ornot.
Itoncwìshcstoavoìd haIthcartcdIy prcscrvìnµwhatpcopIc praìsc
as HcµcI'sscnscotrcaIìty whìIc at thc samc tìmc watcrìnµdown
hìs phìIosophy, onc has no choìcc but to put thc vcry momcnts
ìn hìm that causc constcrnatìon ìnto rcIatìon to thc cxpcrìcnccs
hìs phìIosophy ìncorporatcs, cvcn ìt thosc cxpcrìcnccs arc cn-
codcdwìthìn ìt and thcìrtruthìsconccaIcd.
Jo do so ìs not to bctray HcµcI to cmpìrìcìsm but rathcr to
kccptaìthwìthhìsown phìIosophy,wìththcdcsìdcratumotìm-
mancnt crìtìcìsm, whìchìsaccntraIpìcccìn hìs mcthod. ÎorHc-
µcIìan phìIosophy cIaìms to havc µonc bcyond thc opposìtìon
bctwccn ratìonaIìsm and cmpìrìcìsm, asbcyondaIIrìµìd opposì-
tìons ìn thc phìIosophìcaI tradìtìon. ìt cIaìms both tocapturc spìrìt
ìntcrprctìvcIy ìn ìts cxpcrìcnccs ot thc worId and to construct
cxpcrìcnccthrouµh thc movcmcnt otspìrìt. Onc ìs onIy takìnµ
hìs phìIosophy atìtswordwhcnoncvìrtuaIIydìsrcµardsìts pIacc
ìn thc hìstory ot phìIosophy and rcduccs ìt to ìts cxpcrìcntìaI
corc, whìch shouIdbc ìdcntìcaIwìth ìts spìrìt. Inapassaµc trom
thc ìntroductìon to thc Phenomenolog, cìtcd by Hcìdcµµcr as wcII,
HcµcI hìmscItìdcntìhcscxpcrìcnccwìth thc dìaIcctìc.ºOnc may
ob]cct that ìt ìs prìmarìIy ìndìvìduaI catcµorìcs and ìdcas that havc
bccn scIcctcd and thc tuIIy cIaboratcd systcm ìs not µìvcn ìm-
mcdìatc consìdcratìon, whcn thc systcm ìs supposcd to bc dccì-
sìvc tor aII thcìndìvìduaI cIcmcnts ìn ìt, butHcµcI'sownìntcntìon
oncc aµaìn covcrs thc ob]cctìon. Jhc systcm ìs not to bc con-
ccìvcd ìn advancc, abstractIy, ìtìs not to bc an aII-cncompassìnµ
schcma. Instcad,ìtìs supposcd tobcthccttcctìvcccntcrottorcc
Iatcnt ìn thc 1ndìvìduaI momcnts. Jhcyarc supposcd to crystaI-
57
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
lizc, on thcirown andby virtuc ofthcir motion and dircction,
into awholc thatdocs not cxistoutsidc ofits particulardctcr-
minations. Thcrc is no guarantcc, ofcoursc, that rcduction to
cxpcricnccswillconhrmthcidcntityofoppositcswithinthcwholc
thatisbothaprcsuppositionandarcsultofthc Hcgclian mcthod.
Pcrhaps thcrcductionwillprovcfatalto thcclaimofidcntity.
Thcdifhcultyspecihctobcginningshouldnotbc minimizcd.
Inschoolsofphilosophythatmakccmphaticuscofthcconccpt
ofcxpcricncc, in thc tradition ofHumc, thc charactcr ofim-
mcdiacy~immcdiacyinrclationto thcsub|cct~is itsclfthccri-
tcrionofthatconccpt. Expcricnccis supposcd to bcsomcthing
immcdiatclyprcscnt,immcdiatclygivcn,frcc,asitwcrc,oFany
admixturcofthoughtandthcrcforcindubitablc. Hcgel'�¡hilos-
ophy, howcvcr, challcngcs this conccotofimmcdia
�)


nd with
itthccustomary�ccpto�cxp��¡cnc��'��a���u�cdia�dis
oftcnhcld tobcsupcrior, thcmcdiatcd bcing thoughtofasdc-
pcndcnt.Thcconccpt,howcvcr,hasbothaspccts.itismcdiation
u h its sublation ofmcdiation, and sois immcdiacy.º°
·
-
cording to Hcgcl, thcrc is nothing bctwccn hcavcn and carth
thatis not "vennittelt" 'mcdiatcd] , nothing, thcrcforc, that docs
not contain, mcrcly by bcing dchncd assomcthing that cxists,
thcrcßcctionofitsmcrccxistcncc,aspiritualmomcnt. ºImmc-
diacyitsclfiscsscntially mcdiatcd.º'IfKantian philosophy,which
Hcgcl, for all his polcmics, prcsupposcs, trics to tcasc out thc
forms ofthc spirit as constitucnts ofall valid knowlcdgc, thcn
Hcgcl,inordcrto doawaywiththcKantianscparationofform
and contcnt, intcrprcts any and cvcry cxisting thing as somc-
thingthatis atthcsamctimcspiritual. Notthclcastsignihcant
ofHcgcl'scpistcmological hndingsis thcidcathatcvcnthcclc-
mcntsinwhich knowlcdgcimagincsitsclfto posscss its ultimatc
and irrcduciblcbasisarcin turn always thcproductsofabstrac-
tion and thcrcby ofºspirit.ºA simplc illustration ofthis is that
58
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
thcso-callcdscnscimprcssionstowhich thcoldcrcpistcmologv
rcduccsallknowlcdgcarcthcmsclvcsmcrcconstructionsanddo
not appcar as such in purc form in livingconsciousncss, that
cxccpt in thc artihcial conditions of thc laboratorv, cstrangcd
fromlivingknowlcdgc,norcdatallispcrccivcdfromwhichthc
so-callcd highcr svnthcscs would thcn bc composcd. Thosc al-
lcgcdlvclcmcntarvqualiticsofimmcdiacvalwavsappcaralrcadv
catcgoricallv formcd, and thus thc scnsorv and thc catcgorial
momcnts cannot bc clcarlv distinguishcd from onc anothcr as
ºlavcrs. "ºEmpiricismisnotmcrclvan obscrving, hcaring, fccl-
ing,ctc.,apcrccptionofthcindividual, foritrcallvsctstowork
tohnd thcspccics,thcunivcrsal,todiscovcrlaws. Nowbccausc
it docs this, it comcs within thc tcrritorv of thc conccpt . . . º°
Hcgcl'santipositivistinsighthasbccnrcdccmcdbvmodcrnsci-
cncconlvtothccxtcntthatCcstaltthcorvhasshownthatthcrc
is no such thing as an isolatcd, unqualihcd scnsorv ºthis thing
hcrc",itisalwavsalrcadvstructurcd. ButCcstaltthcorvdidnot
upsctthcprimacvofthcgivcn,thcbclicfinits prcccdcnccovcr
thc contribution madc bv sub|cctivitv, and thcrcbv harmonizc
knowlcdgc.|ust asforpositivism thcgivcnwas unmcdiatcd, so
for Ccstalt thcorv its unitvwithformis unmcdiatcd, a kind of
thinginitsclfamidthcimmancnccofconsciousncss.Thatform
andgivcnncss,bctwccnwhichclassicalcpistcmologvmadcasharp
distinction,arcnotfullvcquivalcntisonlvpcriphcrallvacknowl-
cdgcdbvCcstaltthcorv,indistinctionslikcthatbctwccnthcgood
and thcbad Ccstalt,whichfallwithin thc Ccstaltconccptthatis
acccptcd from thc outsct. Hcgcl had alrcadv gonc farbcvond
this in thcPhenomenolog of Spirit. Hc dcmolishcd thc thcsis of
mcrcimmcdiacvasthcbasisofknowlcdgcandopposcdthccm-
piricistconccptofcxpcricnccwithoutglorifvingthcgivcnasthc
bcarcrofmcaning.Itischaractcristicofhismcthodthathccval-
uatcd immcdiacv bv its own critcrion and chargcd it with not
59
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
bcing immcdiatc. Hccriticizcsimmcdiacy in principlc and not
mcrclyasbcingatomisticandmcchanical, immcdiacyalwaysal-
rcady contains somcthingothcr than itsclf~sub|cctivity~with-
out whichitwould notbc ºgivcn" atall , andby thattokcnitis
alrcady not ob|cctivity. '¹his principlc ofExpcricncccarricswith
it thc unspcakablyimoortantcondition that, in ordcr to acccpt
and bclicvcanyfact, wc mustbcincontactwithit, or, inmorc
cxact tcrms, that wc must hnd thc fact unitcd and combincd
withthcccrtaintyofourownsclvcs.""ButHcgcldocsnotsimply
sacrihcc thc conccpt ofimmcdiacy, ifhc did, his own idca of
cxpcricncc would losc its rational mcaning. ºImmcdiacy of
knowlcdgcis sofar fromcxcludingmcdiation,thatthctwo things
arc linkcd togcthcr,~immcdiatc knowlcdgc bcing actually thc
productandrcsultofmcdiatcdknowlcdgc. "'ºOnccannomorc
spcak of mcdiation without somcthing immcdiatc than, con-
vcrscly,onccanhndsomcthingimmcdiatcthatisnotmcdiatcd.
Butin Hcgclthctwomomcntsarcnolongcrrigidlycontrastcd.
Thcy producc and rcproducc onc anothcr rcciprocally, arc
formcd ancw atcach stagc, andarc to vanish, rcconcilcd, only
in thc unity ofthc wholc. ºAnd to show that, in point offact,
thcrc is a knowlcdgcwhich advanccs ncithcr by unmixcd im-
mcdiacy nor by unmixcd mcdiation, wc can point to thc cx-
amplc ofLogic and thc wholc ofphilosophy. "' ' But with this,
thc intcntion ofdcriving Hcgcl's philosophy from cxpcricncc
sccmsitsclfcondcmncdbythcvcrdictitpronounccswhcnittakcs
Kant'scriticalphilosophytothccxtrcmc.Thconlyºcxpcricncc"
ofwhichitcanbcaqucstioninandwithrcspccttoHcgclaltcrs
thcusualconccptofcxpcricnccdccisivcly.
It is mostdiucult to gcthold ofthc cxpcricntialcontcnt of
Hcgcl'sphilosophywhcrcitsctsitsclfofffromphilosophicsthat
takccxpcri�nccas thcirprinciplc.Aswcknow, Hcgclcncrgcti-
cally acccnti¡atcs thc momcnt ofnot-I in spirit. But to disputc
ö0
TheExperlentlalContentofHegel'slhllosophy
thathc ìsanìdcaIìstmustrcmaìnthcprcroµatìvcotìntcrprctìvc
arts that toIIow thc maxìm ¨Kcìm dìch odci ìch trcss dìch¨ 'Iìt-
craIIy
.
¨rhymc or I`II cat you¨, ìn othcr words
.
¨comc out rìµht
or thcrc wìII bc troubIc¨| whcn thcy scc a chancc to cxpIoìt thc
authorìty ota µrcat namc tor propaµanda purposcs. Jhcy wouId
havc to rcducc hìs statcmcnt that truth ìs csscntìaIIysub]cct' ´to
an ìrrcIcvant statcmcnt that ìn thc Iast anaIysìs wouId Icavc no
diferentia specica ìn HcµcI's systcm. Instcad
.
onc ouµht to Iook
tor thc cxpcrìcntìaI contcnt otHcµcIìan ìdcaIìsmìtscIt. ßut that
ìs somcthìnµ hc sharcs wìth thc movcmcnt otthc post-Kantìan
systcms ìn Gcrmany as a whoIc
.
and cspccìaIIy wìth Iìchtc and
5chcIIìnµ. Îcrhaps undcr thc tcnacìous suµµcstìon ot DìIthcy
.
that pcrìod contìnucs to bc torccd too narrowIy ìnto thc pcr-
spcctìvc otìndìvìduaI thìnkcrs and thcìr dìttcrcnccs. In actuaI-
ìty
.
ìn thc dccadcs trom Iìchtc's Science of Knowledge to HcµcI's
dcath
.
ìdcaIìsm was Icss somcthìnµ strìctIy ìndìvìduatcd than a
coIIcctìvc movcmcnt. ìn HcµcI's tcrmìnoIoµy
.
an ìntcIIcctuaI at-
mosphcrc. Jhc ìdcas wcrc ncìthcr attachcd cxcIusìvcIy to onc
systcmorthc othcr nor aIwaystuIIyartìcuIatcdbythcìndìvìduaI
thìnkcr. Ivcn attcr thc spIìt bctwccn 5chcIIìnµ and HcµcI onc
hndsìnbothotthcm-ìnthcAges of the Wodd ìn5chcIIìnµ'scasc
.
ìn thcPhenomenolog ìn HcµcI's-tormuIatìons and whoIc traìns
otthouµht ìnwhìchìtìs]ustas dìthcuIttoìdcntìty thc authoras
ìtwasìn thc wrìtìnµsotthcìryouth.Jhatouµht
.
ìncìdcntaIIy
.
to
cIcar up a numbcr otdìthcuItìcs. Jhcsc wrìtcrs do not opcratc
wìthhxcd conccptsìnthcmanncrotaIatcr phìIosophymodcIcd
on thc scìcncc thc ìdcaIìst µcncratìon opposcd. Jhc cIìmatc ot
coIIcctìvc aµrccmcnt pcrmìttcd onc to cxprcss onc's opìnìon cvcn
whcnthc ìndìvìduaI tormuIatìondìdnotachìcvccompIctcIucìd-
ìty, ìtmay cvcn havc workcd aµaìnst a conccrn tor ìncìsìvc tor-
muIatìon
.
as thouµh such tormuIatìonwouId vìoIatcthc contcnt
otthc coIIcctìvc undcrstandìnµby producìnµìtcxpIìcìtIy. ßyno
6I
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
mcansdocsthccxpcricntialcontcntofidcalismsimplycoincidc
withitscpistcmologicalandmctaphysical positions. !hc pathos
in thcword ¨spirit,'whichultimatclymadcitsuspcctofhubris,
rcsistcd thc hrst symptoms of thc typc of scicncc~which in-
cludcs scholarship~that has sincc scizcd powcr cvcn whcrc it
supposcdlydcalswithspirit.!hatimpulsccanbcscnscdcvcnin
passagcs likc this onc from thc Diference Between Fichte's and
Schelling's System of Philosophy, thcDiferenzschrift:
OnlysofarasreßectionhasconnectionwiththeAbsoluteisitReason
and its deed a knowing. Through this connection with the Absolute,
however, reßection's work passes away, only the connection persists,
anditisthesolerealityofthecognition.Thereisthereforenotruthin
isolated reßection, in pure thinking,save the truthofits nullihcation.
ButbecauseinphilosophizingtheAbsolutegetsproducedbyreßection
forconsciousness, itbecomes thereby an objective totality, awhole of
knowledge,anorganizationofcognitions.Withinthisorganization,every
partisatthesame timethewhole,foritsstandingisitsconnectionwith
theAbsolute.Asapartthathasotherpartsoutsideofit, itissomething
limited,andisonlythroughtheothers.Isolatedinitslimitationthepart
is defective, meaning and signihcance ithas solely through its coher-
encewith thewhole. Hencesingleconceptsbythemselvesandsingular
cognitions (Erwnntnisse) must notbe called knowledge. There can be
plentyofsingularempirical knownitems (Kenntnisse). As knownfrom
experience they exhibittheirjustihcationin experience, that is,in the
identity ofconceptand being, ofsubjectand object. Precisely for this
reason, they are not scientihc knowledge. they hnd theirjustihcation
only in a limited, relative identity. They do notjustify themselves as
necessary parts ofa totality ofcognitions organized in consciousness,
norhasspeculationrecognizedtheabsoluteidentityinthem,i. e. , their
connectionwiththeAbsolute.'³
Asa critiquc ofthcinstitutionalizcd scicncc thatis as dominant
nowasitwasthcn,Hcgcl'stotalidcalismhasitstimclincss.against
somcthingclsc,notinits¢lf. !hcimpulsctoclcvatcspirit,how-
cvcr dcludcd, draws its strcngth From a rcsistancc to dcad
62
TheExperientia|ContentofHege|'sPhi|osophy
knowlcdgc. arcsistanccto thc rcihcdconsciousncssthatHcgcl
both dissolvcd and, in opposition to romanticism, salvagcd as
incscapablc. Thccxpcricnccofpost-K�ntianG�rm�n 1e�lism
rcacts againstphilistinc narro�mcs� and contcntm�ntwith ihc
compartmcntalizationoflifcandor�d1�owl�dgcinaccor-
dancc with thcdivisiono �or. Inthisrcgard cvcnsccmingly
pcriphcral,practicaltcxtslikcFichtc'sDeduzierte Plan andSchcll-
ing's Einleitung ins Akademische Studium havc philosophical im-
port. Thcwatchword ºinhnity,"whichßowcd so casilyfrom all
thcirpcnsasithad notfrom Kant's, takcs onitsspccihccolora-
tiononlyinrclationtowhatwcrcforthcmthcprivationsofthc
hnitc, ofcntrcnchcd sclf-intcrcst and thc drcary spccialization
ofknowlcdgcinwhichthatsclf-intcrcstwasrcßcctcd.Sinccthcn,
talkaboutwholcncsshasbccndivcstcdofitspolcmicalmcaning
andhasbccomcnothingmorcthananti-intcllcctualistidcology.
InthccarlyIdcalistpcriod, whcnbourgcoissocictyhadnotyct
rcallytakcnshapcasatotalityinundcrdcvclopcdCcrmany,thc
critiqucofthcparticularhadadiffcrcntkindofdignity. Inthc
thcorcticalsphcrc,idcalismrcprcscntcdthcinsightthatthcsum
totalofspccihcknowlcdgcwasnotawholc,thatthcbcstofboth
knowlcdgcand humanpotcntialslippcd throughthcmcshcsof
thcdivisionoflabor. Cocthc'sºfchltnurdas gcistigcBand" 'ºBut
thcspiritualbondismissing"~Faust] givcsthatscntcniiousfor-
mulation. Atonc timc, idcalism attackcd Faust's Famulus Wag-
ncr. OnlywhcnthclikcsofthatWagncrhadinhcritcdidcalism
didit rcvcalitsclftobc thc particularitythatJcgclhadrccog-
nizcd,atlcastinFichtc.Inatotalsocicty,totalitybccomcsradical
cvil.WhatrcsonatcsinHcgclalongwiththcnccdforaprogrcs-
sivcintcgrationisthcnccdforarcconciliation~arcconciliation
thctotalityhasprcvcntcdcvcrsinccitachicvcdthcrcalityHcgcl
cnthusiasticallyanticipatcdforitinthcconccpt.
63
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
Oncdocsnotnccdthcspcculativcconccpttoundcrstandthis
motifinthccritiqucofscicncc. thatwhatlicscloscsttothcindi-
vidualsub|cct,whathasimmcdiatcccrtaintyfor him, is notthc
ground oftruth and notabsolutclyccrtain. The pcrsonal con-
sciousncss ofthc individual, which was analyzcd by traditional
cpistcmology,canbcsccntobcillusion.Notonlydocsthcbcarcr
ofpcrsonal consciousncss owc his cxistcncc and thc rcproduc-
tionofhislifctosocicty.Infact,cvcrythingthroughwhichhcis
spcciûcallyconstitutcdas acognitivcsub]cct, hcncc, thatis, thc
1
9
k
''¹
!
¤n
ivcrsalitythatgovcrnshisthinking,is,asthcschoolof
Durkhciminparticularhas shown, always also socialinnaturc.
!l
c
¡
ndiv«u�,whoconsidcrshimsclfuæ
k
itimatcbasisoftrut!
�yvirtuc ofwhatis supµoscd to bcimmcdiatclyivcn for him,
o�ys_m� wefdeltrsio�o£asocictythatfalscl_butncccssatily
thinksofitsclfasindividualistic. Whatthcindividualholds tobc
primary and irrcfutably absolutc is dcrivcd and sccondary, down
to cvcry individual piccc ofscnsory data. ¨Thcrcforc thc indi-
vidualas hc appcars inthisworldofproscandcvcrydayis not
activcoutofthccntirctyofhisownsclfand his rcsourccs, and
hcis intclligiblc notfrom himsclf, but fromsomcthingclsc. "'¹
Takingasonc's pointofdcparturc thc purc immcdiacyofthc
¨thisthinghcrc,"whichisprcsumablywhatismostccrtain,docs
not gct onc bcyond thc contingcncy of thc individual pcrson
who simply cxists, docs notgctbcyond solipsism. As Schopcn-
haucrsaid,solipsismmaybccurablc,butitisnotrcfutablc.This
is thcpriccininsanitypaidforthatwcbofdclusion.Amodcof
¹'¹!
Ì�¤
<�
atundcrstandsthcindividualaszoon Jolitikon a:rduc
cat�goricsof�u�cctivcconsciousncssas implicitlysocialwill no
longcr cling to a notion ofcxpcricncc that hypostatizcs th�·n-
dividual, cvcn if involuntarilv. Expcricncc's advancc to con-
sciousncssofitsintcrdcµcndcnccwiththccxpcricnccofallhttman
64
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
bcínµsactsas arctroactívccorrcctíontoítsstartíngpoíntínmcrc
índívíduaI cxjcrícncc. HcµcI's phíIosophy IormuIatcd thís. Hís
crítíquc oIímmcdíacy µívcsan account oIhowwhatnaívccon-
scíousncss trusts as ímmcdíatcand most íntímatc ís, ob]cctívcIy,
no morc ímmcdíatcandprímarythan anyothcrkínd oIposscs-
síon. HcµcI dcstroys thc vcry mythoIoµy oI somcthíng ¨hrst".
¨Jhat whích hrst commcnccs ís ímpIícít, ímmcdíatc, abstract,
µcncraI-ítís whathasnotyctadvanccd, thc morcconcrctcand
ríchcr comcs Iatcr, and thc hrst ís poorcr ín dctcrmínatíons. "' º
5ccní ntcrms oIthís kínd oIdcmythoIoµízatíon, HcµcIían phí-
Iosophybccomcs thchµurc oIacomprchcnsívc commítmcntto
a Iack oI naívctó, an carIy answcr to a statc oI thc worId that
ínccssantIy partícípatcsín wcavínµíts ownvcíI oIíIIusíon. ¨As a
mattcr oI Iact, thínkínµís aIways thc ncµatíon oI what wc havc
ímmcdíatcIybcIorcus.
,,
' ºLíkc5chopcnhaucr,hísantípodc, Hc-
µcI wouId Iíkc torcndthcvcíI. hcncc híspoIcmíc aµaínst Kant's
doctríncoIthcunknowabíIítyoIthcthínµínítscII.'' Jhisísccr-
taínIy onc oI thc dccpcst motívcs oI HcµcI's phíIosophy, cvcn
thouµh hís phíIosophyítscIIísunawarcoIít.
Jhc Iaycr oI thouµht touchcd on hcrc ís dístínµuíshcd Irom
Kantandthc whoIccíµhtccnth ccntury, asísíndccd aIrcadythc
cascínÎíchtc,byancwcxprcssívcnccd. Havínµmaturcd, thouµht
wants to do somcthínµ ít had prcvíousIy donc onIy uncon-
scíousIy. ítwantstowrítcthchístoryoIspírít, to bccomcanccho
oIthc hour that has struck Ior ít. Itís thís, morc thanwhat thc
oIhcíaI hístory oI phíIosophy has dcsíµnatcd as thc díÜcrcncc,
thatdístínµuíshcs Gcrman IdcaIísm,andHcµcIín partícuIar, Irom
thcInIíµhtcnmcnt.Jhís díIIcrcnccís morc ímportantcvcn than
InIíµhtcnmcnt'sscII-crítíquc, thc cmphatícíncorporatíonoIthc
concrctcsub]cctandthchístorícaIworId, orthcdynamízatíonoI
phíIosophícaI actívíty. Wíth Kant, thcorctícaI phíIosophyatIcast
stíII drcw íts canon Irom thc posítívc scícnccs wíth íts cxamína-
65
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
tionofthcirvalidity,thatis,thcqucstionofhowscicntihcknowl-
cdgcispossiblc.Nowphilosophyturns,withitswholcarmaturc
ofsclf-rcßcction on thc thcory ofscicncc, to thctaskofgiving
cogcnt cxprcssion to somcthing that is pcrccivcd as ccntral in
rcalitybutslips1hroughthcmcshcsofthcindividualdisciplincs.
This,andnotagrcatcrabundanccofmatcrial,iswhatmotivatcs
µhilosophy's turn to contcnt, thc modcrn climatc of Hcg�l as
contrastcdwithKantandnowFichtc aswcll. ButHcgcldidnot
makc philosophy intoaconsistcnt intcllcctual trcatmcntofcx-
pcricnccsofrcality through spontancous, unrcßcctcdthinking,
cithcr in thc form ofnaivc-rcalistic thought or in thc form of
what is popularly callcd unbridlcd spcculation. Instcad, rathcr
than rcstrict himsclf to a propacdcutic cxamination ofcpistc-
---"
----- . .
mological possibilitics, hc lcd pIUosup!iv to csscntial insights
t��gh critical sclf-rcßcction ofcritical-Enlightcnmcnt philos-
ophyandthcscicntihcmctbo�.Traincdinscicnccandusingits
mctb�u�, Hcgclwcntbcyond thclimitsofascicnccthatmcrcly
asccrtaincd andarrangcd data, ascicnccthataimcdatthcpro-
ccssing ofmatcrials, thc kind ofscicncc that prcdominatcd bc-
forc Hcgcl and thcn again aftcr him, whcn thought lost thc
inordinatcspanofitssclf-rcß cction. Hcgcl'sphilosophyisboth
a philosophy ofrcason and an antipositivist philo�hy. It at-
tacks ���.sul���iib� tbatcpistc�
moloconsidcrs tocnstitutc knowlcdgc dcpcnd as much on
t�tk�I�dgc vicc-sa� ��c �n� frm atall
without mattcr and no mattcrwithout form. Mattcr and form
gcncratc cach othcrrcciprocally. º'°Inordcr to dcmonstratc that,
howcvcr, Hcgcl himsclfmakcs usc ofa morc consistcntcpistc-
mology. Ifcpistcmology, thc doctrinc of thc contingcncy and
impcnctrability ofcontcnt and thc indisµcnsability offorms, dug
thc trcnchbctwccn mattcr and form, Hcgclcxtcndscpistcmol-
ogyuntilitbccomcsobviousthatitisnotitsplacctodigtrcnchcs,
66
ExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
thatin scttinglimits, consciousncssncccssarily transccndswhat
itdclimits. CanonicforHcgcl is Cocthc's statcmcnt thatcvcry-
thing pcrfcct points bcyond its own kind-and Hcgcl has far
morcin commonwith Cocthcthanoncmightsuspcctfromthc
supcrhcial diffcrcnccbctwccnthcdoctrincofthcur-phcnomc-
nonandthatofasclf-movingabsolutc.
Kant¨anchorcd`philosophyinsynthctic apriori|udgmcnts,
thcycpitomizcd,sotospcak,whatwaslcftofthcoldmctaphys-
icsaftcrthccritiqucofrcason. Butthcrcisadccp contradiction
runningthrough synthctic a µriori ]udgmcnts. Ifthcywcrc a
µrioriin thc strict Kantian scnsc, thcywould havc no contcnt.
Thcywouldinfactbcforms,purclogicalpropositions,tautolo-
gicsinwhichknowlcdgcdocsnotaddanythingncwordiffcrcnt
toitsclf.If, howcvcr, thcyarcsynthctic, thatis,ifthcyarcgcn-
uincknowlcdgcandnotmcrcrcduplicationsofthcsub|cct,thcn
thcy nccd thc contcnt that Kant wantcd to banish from thcir
sphcrc as contingcnt and mcrcly cmpirical. Civcn this radical
discontinuity,howformand contcnt mcctand Ft togcthcr, how
thcknowlcdgcwhoscvalidityKantwantcdto|ustifyisachicvcd,
bccomcs ancnigma. Hcgcl's rcsponsc is thatform andcontcnt
arc csscntiallymcdiatcdbyonc anothcr. This mcans, howcvcr,
thatamcrclyformalthcoryofknowlcdgc,suchascpistcmology
sctsforth, ncgatcsitsclf, itisnotpossiblc. Inordcrtoattainthc
cogcncy cpistcmology ycarns for, philosophy must brcak cpis-
tcmologyopcn. Hcnccaphilosophizingfocuscdoncontcnt,onc
that trics to formulatc cxpcricnccs in thcir ncccssity and co-
gcncy, is broughtaboutprccisclyby thc sclf-rcßcctionofafor-
mal philosophizing that had rc|cctcd it and prohibitcd it as
dogmatic.Withthistransitiontocontcnt,thcscparationofthca
priori from thc cmpirical world, a scparation that had bccn
maintaincdin thcwholcPlatonic-Aristotcliantraditionthrough
Kantandwashrstqucstioncdby Fichtc,is abolishcd. ¨Thccm-
67
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy

l d ` ` h ` ` h l `
·
|
`'"Ph pirca,graspc II itssynt csis,ist cspccuattvcconccµt. 1-
losophy acquircs thc right and acccpts thc duty to appcal to
matcrial momcnts originatingin thc rcallifc proccss ofsocial-
izcd human bcingsas csscntialandnotmcrclycontingcnt

Thc
artiFcially rcsurrcctcd mctaphysics oftoday, whichcastigatcs that
as adcsccnt into mcrc facticity and claims to protcct thcbcing
ofbcingsfrombcings,rcgrcsscsbchind Hcgclwhcnitcomcsto
whatiscrucial,nomattcrhowmuchthatmctaphysicsmistakcnly
considcrsitsclftobcmorcadvanccd thanhisidcalism

Bccausc
ofhisidcalism,Hcgclhasbccnrcproachcdforbcingabstractin
comparisonwiththcconcrctcncssofthcphcnomcnological,an-
thropological,andontologicalschools.Buthcbroughtinhnitcly
morc concrctcncss into his philosophical idcas than thosc ap-
proachcs, and notbccausc his spcculativc imaginationwasbal-
anccdby ascnscofrcalityandhistoricalpcrspcctivcbutbyvirtuc
ofthc approachhis philosophytakcs~by virtuc, onc mightsay,
ofthccxpcricntialcharactcrofhisspcculation.Philosophy,Hc-
gclasscrts,mustcomctoundcrstandthatºitscontcntisnoothcr
thanactuality. AtFrstwcbccomcawarc ofthcsccontcntsinwhat
wc call Expcricncc. '²º Philosophy rcfuscs to bc intimidatcd, to
rcnounccthchopcofcomingto knowthatwholcofrcalityand
its contcnts to which thc institution ofscicncc and scholarship
barsacccssinthcnamcofvalid,watcr-tightFndings.Hcgclscnscd
thcrcgrcssivcandtyrannicalmcmcntin Kant'smodcstyandop-
poscd thc famous sayingwithwhichKant'sEnlightcnmcntcn-
dcarcditsclftoobscurantism. ºIhavcthcrcforcfounditncccssary
to dcny knowlcdgc, inordcrto makc room forfaith. Thc dog-
matismofmctaphysics, thatis, thc prcconccption thatitis pos-
siblctomakchcadwayinmctaphysicswithoutaprcviouscriticism
of purc rcason, is thc sourcc ofall that unbclicf, always vcry
dogmatic, which wars against morality.
,,
²' Hcgcl's antithcsis to
thisrcads,ºThcscalcdcsscnccofthcunivcrschasnopowcrthat
68
ExperlentlalContentofHegel'slhllosophy
couId wìthstand thcspìrìtoIknowIcdµc, ìt ìs compcIIcdtoopcn
ìtscIItoìtandIay outìtsrìchcsandìtsdcpthsandoIIcr thcmIor
ìts cn]oymcnt."´´ In IormuIatìons Iìkc thìs, thc ßaconìan pathos
oI thc carIy bourµcoìs pcrìod ìs cxtcndcd to bccomc that oI a
maturc humankìnd. wc may yct succccd. 5ccn aµaìnst thc rcs-
ìµnatìonoIthccurrcntcra, thìs ìmpuIsc cstabIìshcs HcµcI`s truc
contcmporaryrcIcvancc. Jhc cxtrcmc oIìdcaIìsm, thc crìtcrìon
by whìch thc carIy HcµcI, Iìkc HöIdcrIìn, condcmncd a spìrìt
pIcdµcd to "utìIìty" and thus unIaìthIuI to ìtscII, has ìts matcrì-
aIìst ìmpIìcatìons. Jhcy dìsappcar whcn thìs kìnd oI cxtrcmc
ìdcaIìsm makcs an aIIìancc wìth what was Iatcr caIIcd rcaIìsm,
whcnspìrìtadapts-and oIcourscìtwas madcabundantIy cIcar
to spìrìt thatìtcouId notactuaIìzc ìtscIIcxccptby adaptìnµ. Jhc
Iarthcr HcµcI takcs ìdcaIìsm, cvcn cpìstcmoIoµìcaIIy, thc cIoscr
hc comcs tosocìaImatcrìaIìsm,thcmorchc ìnsìsts, aµaìnst Kant,
on comprchcndìnµhìs sub]cctmattcrIrom thcìnsìdc out. 5pìr-
ìt's conhdcncc that thc worId "ìn ìtscII" ìs spìrìt ìs not onIy a
narrow ìIIusìon oIìts own omnìpotcncc. It Iccds on thc cxpcrì-
cnccthatnothìnµwhatsocvcrcxìsts outsìdc oIwhatìs produccd
by human bcìnµs, that nothìnµ whatsocvcr ìs compIctcIy ìndc-
pcndcnt oIsocìaI Iabor. Ivcn naturc, sccmìnµIy untouchcd by
Iabor,ìsdchncdasnaturcbyIaborandtothìscxtcntìsmcdìatcd
byìt. 5uchrcIatìonshìpsarcstrìkìnµIycvìdcntìn thcprobIcm oI
thc so-caIIcd non capìtaIìst arcas, whìch accordìnµ to thc thcory
oIìmpcrìaIìsm arc a Iunctìon oIthc capìtaIìst arcas. thc Iattcr
nccd thc Iormcr Ior thc vaIorìzatìon oIcapìtaI. Lcìbnìz's cIaìm
to havc constructcd thc worId onthc basìsoIìts ìnncr prìncìpIc,
a cIaìm that Kant rc]cctcd as doµmatìc mctaphysìcs, rcturns ìn
HcµcI as ìts opposìtc. What cxìsts comcs to approxìmatc thc
productoIIabor, wìthout, howcvcr, thc naturaI momcntdìsap-
pcarìnµwìthìn Iabor. II, as ìn HcµcI, ìn thc totaIìty cvcrythìnµ
uItìmatcIy coIIapscs ìnto thc sub]cct as absoIutc spìrìt, ìdcaIìsm
ö9
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
thcrcbv canccls itsclfout,bccauscnodiffcrcncc rcmains through
which thc sub|cct would bc idcntihcd as somcthingdistinct, as
sub|cct.Oncc thc ob|ccthas bccomcsub|cctin thc absolutc, thc
ob|cctis no longcrinfcriorvis-à-vis thc sub|cct. Atits cxtrcmc,
idcntitvbccomcsthcagcntofthcnonidcntical.Whilcthclimits
that prcvcntcd thisstcpfrombcingtakcncxplicitlvwcrchrmlv
cstablishcdin Hcgcl'sphilosophv,ncvcrthclcssthcstcprcmains
crucialforcontcntofhisphilosophv. Lcft-Hcgclianismwasnot
a dcvclopmcnt in intcllcctual historv that wcnt bcvond Hcgel
anddistortcdhimthroughmisundcrstanding, tructothcdialcc-
tic,itwasapicccofthcsclf-rcßcctionthathisphilosophvhadto
dcnvitsclfinordcrtorcmainphilosophv.
ForthisrcasoncvcnthcidcalistfcrmcntinHcgclshouldnot
bchastilv dismisscd as prcsumptuousncss. Itdrawsits strcngth
fromwhatthcso-callcdprcscicntihcmindsccsinscicncc, somc-
thingscicnccglosscsovcrinitscomplaccncv.Inordcrtobcablc
to opcratc with thcclcan, clcar conccptsitbrags about, scicncc
cstablishcs such conccpts and makcs its|udgmcnts without rc-
gardforthcfactthatthclifcofthcsub|cctmattcrforwhichthc
conccptisintcndcd docs notcxhaustitsclfinconccptual spcci-
hcation. Whatfurnishcs thccanon for Hcgclian idcalismisthc
rcsistanccto practical, mcrclvvcrbaldchnitionsshownbv aspirit
thathasnotvctbccn proccsscdanddrcsscdbvscicncc,thcnccd
to grasp~as thc Ccrman word Beg:]] 'conccpt, from g·e
n
en,
grasp] implics~what thc mattcr at hand actuallv is and what
csscntialandbvnomcansmutuallvharmoniousmomcntsitcon-
tains,rathcrthanmcrclvmanipulatingconccptsastokcns.That
idcalism, which is rcproachcd with bcing unrcßcctivclv arro-
gant,wantsto fullvdiscloscthcmattcrathandthroughitscon-
ccpt bccausc in thc lastanalvsis thc thingitsclfand its conccpt
arconcandthcsamc. OnthcsurfaccitwouldsccmthatHcgc-
lian philosophv nowhcrc distanccs itsclf morc from thc prc-
70
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
dialccticalconccptofcxpcricnccthanhcrc.whathappcnstospirit
is ascribcd to spirit, rathcr than spirit simply arranging it, bc-
causc aftcr allit is nothing butspirit. But cvcn this most anti-
cmpiricalpointinHcgcl's philosophyisnotwithoutanob|cct.It
rcgistcrs thc distinction bctwccnthcmattcrathand,thcob|cct
of knowlcdgc, and thc scicntihc copy ofit, withwhich a sclf-
criticalscicncc cannot bcsatishcd. But thcconccptcannot tran-
sccnd its own arbitrary naturc, which abstracts, classih cs, and
dclimits.Hcgcldctcstcdattcmptstodoso-suchas,atthattimc,
Schclling'sandwithgood rcason. Thcybctraycd whathc carcd
mostabout, his drcam ofthc truth ofthc mattcritsclf, for thc
sakcofanintcllcctualintuitionthat docs notgobcyondthccon-
ccpt butrathcrfalls shortofitand, byusurpingthc ob|cctivity
ofthcconccpt,rcgrcsscstothcsub|cctivityofmcrcopinion.Thcrc
isnothingthatphilosophicalthoughtismorc touchy aboutthan
somcthingvcryclosctoitthatcompromiscsitbyhidingthcdif-
fcrcncc that makcs all thc difIcrcncc in an inconspicuous nu-
ancc. HcnccHcgcltaughtthatthcmcamngsofconccptsarcboth
to bc pinncddown,more scientifco, sothatthcycanrcmaincon-
ccpts, and also to bc ºsct in motion," altcrcd according to thc
dictatcs ofthc ob|cct, inordcrnotto distortit. Thcdialccticis
cxpcctcd to claboratc this postulatc, which would othcrwisc bc
mcrclyparadoxical.Contrarytowhatithasbccomc,bothinpar-
ody and in its dogmatic pctrihcation, dialcctic docs not mcan
rcadincss to rcplacc thc mcaning ofonc conccpt with anothcr
oncillicitlyobtaincd. Notthatonc is supposcdto climinatc thc
lawofcontradiction,assccms to bc cxpcctcd ofHcgclianlogic.
Rathcr, contradictionitsclf-thccontradictionbctwccnthchxcd
conccpt and thc conccptin motion-bccomcs thcagcntofphi-
losophizing. Whcnthcconccptis pinncddown, thatis,whcnits
mcaningisconfrontcdwith whatis cncompasscdby it, its non-
idcntity-thc fact that thc conccpt and thc thing itsclfarc not
7I
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
oncandthcsamc~bccomcscvidcntwithinthcidcntitvofcon-
ccptandthingthatisrcquircdbvthclogicalformofdchnition.
Hcncc thcconccpt that rcmains truc to its own mcaning must
changc, ifitis to followits own conccption, a philosophv that
holdsthcconccpttobcsomcthingmorcthanamcrcinstrumcnt
ofthcintcllcctmustabandondchnition,whichmighthindcrit
in doing so. Thcmovcmcntofthcconccptis nota sophistical
manipulation thatwouldinscrtchangingmcaningsintoitfrom
thcoutsidcbutrathcrthccvcr-prcscntconsciousncssofboththc
idcntitvofand thcincvitablcdiffcrcnccbctwccnthcconccptand
whatitissupposcdtocxprcss, aconsciousncssthatanimatcsall
gcnuincknowlcdgc. Bccauscphilosophvwillnotrclinquishthat
idcntitv,itmustacccptthisdiffcrcncc.
All sclf-rcßcction notwithstanding, howcvcr, thc words ¨rc-
ßcction" and "Reexionsphilosophie" |philosophv ofrcßcction] and
thcir svnonvms oftcn havc adcrogatorv tonc in Hcgcl. Ncvcr-
thclcss, hiscritiqucofrcßcction, in which cvcn Fichtc was not
sparcd,wasitsclfrcßcction.Thisisstrikinglvcvidcntinthcsplit-
tingofthcconccptofthcsub|cctthatdistinguishcshimandhis
spcculativc-idcalistprcdcccssorssodrasticallvfromKant.In

Kant,
philosophvwas cngagcd in thc critiquc ofrcason, a somcwhat
naivcscicntihcconsciousncss,asscssmcntintcrmsofthcrulcsof
logic~what is currcntlvcallcd ¨phcnomcnologvº~was applicd
to consciousncss as aconditionofknowlcdgc. In Hcgcl thcrc-
lationship bctwccn thc two, bctwccn thc philosophical, critical
consciousncss and thc consciousncss cngagcd in dircct knowl-
cdgcofitsob|cct,thcconsciousncssthatisthcobjcctofcriticism,
arclationshipthatKantdidnotconsidcr, bccomcsthcmatic,thc
ob|cctofrcßcction. In thc proccss, consciousncss as ob|cct, as
somcthingtobcgraspcdphilosophicallv,bccomcsthchnitc,lim-
itcd,and falliblc thingithadalrcadvtcndcdtobcconccivcdas
in Kant,whobccauscofthishnitcncssforbadcconsciousncssto
72
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
wandcr of1into intclligiblc worlds. Kant's dclimitation ofcon-
sciousncss as a scicntihc consciousncss that makcs straightfor-
ward judgmcnts rcturns in Hccl as thc ncgativity of
consciousncss, as somcthing that n�bcHi¢d. Con-
vcrscly,thcconsciousncssthatgraspsthchnitcncssofconscious-
ncss,thccontcmplatingsub|cctivitythat¨posits"thccontcmplatcd
sub|cct,alsothcrcbypositsitsclfasinhnitcand~orsoisHcgcl's
intcntion~whcnhisphilosophyisfullyclaboratcd,provcsitsclf
initsinhnitcncsstobcabsolutcspirit,towhichnothingiscxtcr-
nalandin whichthcdiffcrcnccbctwccnsub|cctandob|cctdis-
appcars. Howcvcr dubious this claim may bc, thcrcßcctionof
rcßcction, thcdoublingofphilosophicalconsciousncss,isnomcrc
playofthoughtunlcashcdandasitwcrcdivcstcdofitsmatcrial,
itissound.Inthatconsciousncssrccalls,throughsclf-rcßcction,
howithas failcd to capturcrcality, howithas mutilatcdthings
with its ordcring conccpts andrcduccd thcm to thccontingcnt
statusofwhatiscloscsttohandinits¨data,"scicntihcconscious-
ncsscomcsfacctofaccinHcgclwithwhatacausal-mcchanistic
scicncc, as a scicncc ofthc domination ofnaturc, has donc to
naturc. In this Hcgcl was not so diLcrcnt from Bcrgson, who
likchim uscdcpistcmologicalanalysistocxposcthcinadcquacy
ofanarrow-mindcd,rcifyingscicncc,itslackofcongrucnccwith
rcality~whilc unrcßcctivc scicncc lovcs to rant and ravc about
consciousncss of this inadcquacy bcing mcrc mctaphysics.
Crantcd, in Bcrgsonthccritiqucofthcscicntihcspiritwascar-
ricd out by thc scicntihc spirit without much conccrn for thc
contradictioninthissclf-criticism.ThisiswhyBcrgsoncouldbc
athcoristofknowlcdgcandanirrationalistatthcsamctimc.his
philosophydidnotsucccssfullycomctotcrmswiththcrclation-
shipsofthctwoaspccts. Hcgcl, ahundrcd ycars oldcr, did. Hc
kncw that any critiquc of a rcifying, divisivc, alicnating con-
sciousncss that mcrclyscts up a diffcrcntsourcc ofknowlcdgc
73
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
fromthcoutsidcasacontrasttoitisimpotcnt,thataconccption
ofrcasonthatsupcrscdcsrcasonmustfail hopclcsslybyitsown
critcria. Hcncc Hcgcl madc thc contradiction bctwccn thc sci-
cntihcspiritand thccritiqucofscicncc, whichin Bcrgsonisan
unmcdiatcd contradiction, thc motor ofphilosophical activity.
Onlythroughrcßcctioncanrcßcctivcthoughtgctbcyonditsclf.
Contradiction, proscribcdbylogic,bccomcs anorgan ofthought.
ofthctruthofLogos.
Hcgcl'scritiqucofWisenschaf 'scicnccandscholarship],aword
hc uscsrcpcatcdly and with cmphasis,is not intcndcd tobcan
apologcticrcstorationofprc-Kantianmctaphysicsasopposcdto
thc scicntihc thought that has snatchcd morc and morc of its
sub|cctmattcr andthcoricsfromit. Hcgclhasathoroughlyra-
tional ob]cction to rational scicncc. thatrational scicncc, which
imagincsitsclftobcthcbasisoftruth'slcgitimacy,trimsob|ccts
down to sizc and proccsscs thcmuntilthcy htinto thc institu-
tionalizcd,¨positivcºdisciplincs,anddocssointhcscrviccofits
own ordcringconccpts and thcir immancnt practicability and
lack ofcontradiction. What motivatcs Hcgcl's conccpt ofrcih-
cation is thcidca thatscicncc is conccrncd lcss with thc lifc of
thingsthatwiththcircompatibilitywithitsownrulcs. whatacts
as though it wcrc irrcproachablc, irrcduciblc truth is itsclf a
productofaprcliminary proccssing, somcthingsccondaryand
dcrivativc. Notthclcastofthctasksofphilosophicalconscious-
ncss is that ofdissolving, through sclf-rcßcction, what has bc-
comccongcalcdandfrozcn through scicncc, rcturningittowhat
scicncc has rcmovcd it from. Thc vcry ob]cctivity ofscicncc is
mcrclysub|cctivc. Hcgcl'sob|cctionto thcunrcßcctivclaborof
thcintcllcctis as rational as hiscorrcctivc to it.Thccritiqucof
thcinstitutionofpositivistscicncc, which incrcasingly prcscnts
itsclfthcworldovcrasthcsolclcgitimatcformofknowlcdgc,is
alrcadyfullydcvclopcdinHcgcl.Longbcforcmattcrshadgonc
74
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
sofar,Hcgclhadrccognizcditforwhatithasnow,ininnumcr-
ablc dull and cmpty studics, rcvcalcd itsclftobc~thcunityof
rciFcation,thatis,ofafalsc~in Hcgcl's tcrms, abstract÷b|cc-
tivitycxtcrnaltothcthingitsclf,andanaivctéthatconfuscsfacts
andhgurcs, thcplastcrmodclofthcworld,withitsfoundation.
Usingthclanguagcofcpistcmologyandthclanguagcofspcc-
ulativcmctaphysics cxtrapolatcd from it, Hcgcl cxprcsscd thc
idca that thc rcihcd and rationalizcd socicty of thc bourgcois
cra, thcsocictyinwhichanaturc-dominatingrcasonhadcomc
to fruition, could bccomc a socicty worthy ofhuman bcings~
notbyrcgrcssingto oldcr,irrationalstagcspriortothcdivision
oflabor but only by applying its rationality to itsclf, in othcr
words, onlythroughahcalingawarcncssofthcmarksofunrca-
soninitsownrcason, and thctraccsofthcrationalin thcirra-
tional as wcll. Sincc thcn thc clcmcntofunrcason has bccomc
cvidcntinthcconscqucnccsofmodcrnrationality,whichthrcatcn
univcrsalcatastrophc.InParsial RichardWagncr,thcSchopcn-
haucrian,putHcgcl'scxpcricnccintcrmsofthcancicnttopos.
onlythcspcarthatinßictcdthcwoundcanhcalit.Vcgcl'sphilo-
sophical consciousncss suffcrcd morc from thc cstrangcmcnt
bctwccn sub|cctand ob|cct,bctwccn consciousncss and rcality,
thanhadanyprcvious philosophicalconsciousncss.Buthisphi-
losophyhadthcstrcngthnottoßccfromthissuffcringbackinto
thcchimcraofaworld andasub|cctofpurcimmcdiacy. Itdid
notlctitsclfbcdistractcdfromitsawarcncss thatonlythrough
thcrcalizcdtruthofthcwholcwouldthcunrcasonofamcrcly
particularrcason, thatis, arcasonthatmcrcly scrvcsparticular
intcrcsts, disintcgratc.Thissaysmorcabouthisrcßcctionofrc-
ßcction than thcirrationalist gcsturcs into which Hcgcl somc-
timcs lcthimsclfbc mislcdin his dcspcratc attcmpts to rcscuc
thc truthofa socicty thathad alrcadybccomc untruc. Hcgcl's
75
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
sclf-rcßcctionofthcsub|cctinphilos�hicalconsciousncssisac-
tuallysocicty'sdawningcriticalconsciousncssofitsclf.
Thc motifofcontradiction, and with it that ofarcality that
confronts thc sub|cctas harsh, alicn, and cocrcivc~a motifin
whichHcgclanticipatcdBcrgson,thcmctaphysicianofßow~is
gcncrallyconsidcrcd thc ovcr-archingprinciplcofHcgcl's phi-
losophy. Itis thc basis ofthc dialcctical mcthod. But itis prc-
cisclythisprinciplcthatrcquircstranslationintothcintcllcctual
cxpcricncc it cxprcsscs. It vcry casily congcals to bccomc thc
tradcmarkofavicw,formulatcdsolclyintcrmsofthchistoryof
philosophy, that subsumcs thc stagcs of spirit undcr binding
highcr-lcvcl conccpts. Thc dialcctic is rcduccd to thc kind of
clcctivcwcltanschauungagainstwhichthccriticalphilosophyof
whichHcgclwasapartdircctcdsuchadcvastatingcritiquc.Hcncc
onc cannot cvadc thc qucstion ofwhat|ustihcd Hcgcl in sub-
|cctingcvcrythingthatconfrontcd thought, as wcllas thought
itsclf, tothcprinciplcofcontradiction. Itis cspcciallyatthispoint
inHcgcl,whowantcdtosurrcndcrtothcmovcmcntofthcmat-
tcrathand and curc thought ofits arbitrarincss, thatonc sus-
pcctshimofamomcntofarbitrarincss,ofthcolddogmatism~
andinfactspcculativcphilosophysinccSalomonMaimonhasin
many rcspccts fallcn back upon prc-Kantian rationalism. Thc
factthatHcgclcxprcsscdthcmostcuttingob|cctionstothcclap-
trapschcmcofatriplicityofthcsis,antithcsis,andsynthcsisasa
mcrcmcthodologicalschcma, andthathcsaysinthcprcfaccto
thcPhenomenolo
g
that aslongasitrcmainsaschcma, that is, is
mcrcly imprcsscd upon ob|ccts from thc outsidc, onc acquircs
thc¨knackºquickly,²³isnotsufhcicnttoallaythissuspicion. Nor
is onc likcly to bc satishcd with thc statcmcnt that no isolatcd
principlc, whcthcritbcthatofmcdiation, ofbccoming, ofcon-
tradiction, or ofthc dialcctic itsclf, is, as a scparatc principlc,
76
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
absolutcandthckcytothctruth,thattruthconsistssolclyinthc
rclationshipofmomcntsthatcmcrgcfromoncanothcr.Allthat
couldbcmcrcasscrtion.Suspicionofthcdialccticasanisolatcd,
ºabstractlyº positcd maxim, as Hcgcl puts it, currcntly rcccivcs
conhrmationfromthcwaythcHcgclian-dcrivcdmatcrialistvcr-
sionofthcdialcctic, ofdynamic thoughtko¢ eéo+¬v, has bccn
distortcd in thc Eastcrn zonc, in thc abominablc abbrcviation
Diamat, to alitcral, static dogma. Nowasthcn, appcal toitsin-
augurators, who havc bccn dcgradcd to thc status ofclassics,
prcvcntsanyob|cctivcrcßcction, callingitob|cctivistdcviation,
in Diamat, Hcgcl's movcmcnt ofthc conccpt has bccn frozcn
into an articlc offaith. Bycontrast, somcthing that Nictzschc
cxprcsscdlongaftcrHcgclhasmorcincommonwiththccxpc-
ricnccthatmotivatcsthc dialcctic. ºThcrcis nothingin rcality
that would corrcspondstrictlywith logic.''²¹ButHcgcl did not
simply proclaim that, hc achicvcd it, through immancnt criti-
cismoflogicanditsforms.Hcdcmonstratcdthatconccpt,|udg-
mcnt,andconclusion,unavoidablcinstrumcntsforasccrtaining
throughconsciousncsssomcthingthatcxists,alwayscndupcon-
tradictingthat cxistingthing, thatall individual|udgmcnts, all
individual conccpts, all individual conclusions, arc falscby thc
critcrionofancmphaticidcaoftruth.InthiswayKant,thcmor-
tal cncmy of a mcrcly ºrhapsodisticº thought that absolutizcs
contingcnt individual dchnitions, camc into his own in Hcgcl,
his critic. Hcgcl attacks thc Kantian doctrinc of thc limits of
knowlcdgcandyctrcspcctsit.Fromithcdcvclopsthcthcoryof
adiffcrcncc bctwccn sub|cctand ob|cctthat manifcsts itsclfin
cvcry particular. This diffcrcncc, which acts as its owncorrcc-
tivc, movcs outbcyond itsclfto bccomc morc adcquatc knowl-
cdgc. Accordingly, thc|ustihcation ofthc primacy ofncgation
in Hcgcl's philosophyisthatthclimitsofknowlcdgctowhichits
criticalsclf-rcßcctionlcadsarcnotsomcthingcxtcrnaltoknowl-
77
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
cdgc, notsomcthingtowhichitismcrclycondcmncdfromthc
outsidc,rathcr,thcyarcinhcrcntinallmomcntsofknowlcdgc.
Allknowlcdgc,andnotmcrclyknowlcdgcthatvcnturcsoutinto
thcinhnitc, aims, through thc mcrcform ofthc copula, atthc
wholc truth, andnoncachicvcsit. HcnccinHcgclthcKantian
limitsofknowlcdgcbccomcthcprinciplcofcpistcmologicalad-
vancc. ¨A thingis whatitis, onlyiri and byrcasonofits limit.
Wccannotthcrcforcrcgard thclimitas onlycxtcrnaltobcing
whichisthcnandthcrc.Itrathcrgocsthroughandthroughthc
wholcofsuchcxistcncc.º²°Thcunivcrsalityofncgationisnota
mctaphysicalpanaccathatissupposcdtoopcnadoorsbutmcrcly
thcconscqucnccofthc critiquc ofknowlcdgc, now maturcd to
sclf-awarcncss, that dcmolishcd panaccas. In othcrwords, Hc-
gcl'sphilosophyiscmincntlycriticalphilosophy,andthccxam-
inationtowhichitsub|ccts its conccpts, bcginningwith thatof
bcing,alwaysaccumulatcswithinitsclf,likcanclcctricalchargc,
thc spccihcob|cctions thatcanbc madc to it. Ofallthc distor-
tions pcrpctratcd on Hcgcl by a dim-wittcd intclligcntsia, thc
mostpitifulis thcnotionthatthcdialcctichasto admitasvalid
cithcr cvcrything whatsocvcr or nothing whatsocvcr. In Kant,
critiqucrcmainsacritiqucofrcason, inHcgcl,whocriticizcsthc
Kantianscparationofrcasonfromrcality,thccritiqucofrcason
is simultancously a critiquc ofthc rcal. Thc inadcquacy ofall
isolatcd particular dchnitions is always also thc inadcquacy of
thcparticularrcalitythatisgraspcdinthoscdchnitions.Evcnif
thcsystcmultimatclycquatcsrcasonandrcalityandsub|cctand
ob|cct, thcdialccticturnsitspolcmicagainstthcirrationalityof
mcrc cxistcncc, thccnduringstatcofnaturc, byconfrontinga
spccihc rcalitywithitsownconccpt,itsownrationality.Aslong
as itrcmainsunrcconcilcdandnotyctfullyrational,rcalityrc-
vcalsitsclftobcarcalityplcdgcd to dcath. Withthcconccptof
dctcrminatc ncgation, which scts Hcgcl off from Nictzschc's
78
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
statcmcntaswcllasfromallirrationalism,Hcgcldocsmorcthan
mcrclyopposcabstractsubsumptivc conccpts, includingthatof
ncgationitsclf.Foratthcsamctimcncgationintcrvcncsinthc
rcalitythatisthccontcntofthcsclf-criticizing conccpt. socicty.
ºOnc thing may bc obscrvcd with rcfcrcncc to thc immcdiatc
knowlcdgcofCod,oflcgalandcthicalprinciplcsº.thcyºarcstill
on cvcry sidc conditioncd by thc mcdiating proccss which is
tcrmcddcvclopmcnt,cducation,training.
,,
²
³
Dialcctical contradiction is cxpcricnccd in thc cxpcricncc of
socicty. Hcgcl's own construction, formulatcd in tcrms ofthc
philosophyofidcntity,rcquircsthatcontradictionbcgraspcdas
muchfromthcsidcofthcob|cctasfromthcsidcofthcsub|cct,
itisin thcdialccticalcontradictionthatthcrccrystallizcsacon-
ccptofcxpcricnccthatpointsbcyondabsolutcidcalism. Itisthc
conccptofantagonistictotality.|ustasthcprinciplcofunivcrsal
mcdiation, as opposcd to thc immcdiacy ofthc mcrc sub|cct,
gocsbackto thc factthatinallcatcgoricsofthoughtthcob|cc-
tivity ofthcsocialproccssis priorto thccontingcncyofthcin-
dividualsub|cct,sothcmctaphysical conccption ofarcconcilcd
wholc as thc quintcsscncc ofall contradictions is bascd on thc
modclofasocictythatisdividcdandncvcrthclcssunitcd.Truly
a modcl ofsocicty, for Hcgcl is not contcnt with thc gcncral
conccptofan antagonisticrcality, thc notionofur-polaritics of
bcing, for instancc. InthcPhenomenolog of Spirt, takingas his
critical pointofdcparturc whatis closcst to hand, unmcdiatcd
human consciousncss, hc accomplishcs thc mcdiation of that
consciousncss in and through thchistorical movcmcntofwhat
cxists, amovcmcntthattakcsitbcyondallmcrcmctaphysicsof
bcing. Oncc sctinmotion,thcconcrctizationofphilosophycan-
notbc stoppcd for thcsakcofphilosophy'sillusorydignity. ºIt
is part ofthc cowardicc ofabstract thought that it shuns thc
scnsuous prcscntin amonkishfashion, modcrnabstraction takcs
79
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
upthìsattìtudcottastìdìousµcntìIìtytowardsthcmomcntotthc
scnsuous prcscnt."´' Jhat concrctcncss cnabIcs HcµcI to com-
pIctcIy pcrmcatc thc ìdcaottotaIìty, whìch ìs dcrìvcd tromthc
ìdcaIìst systcm, wìth thc ìdca otcontradìctìon. Dccìphcrcd, thc
IoµìcaI-mctaphysìcaIthcoryottotaIìtyas thc cpìtomc otcontra-
dìctìons mcans thatsocìctyìs notmcrcIyrìvcnanddìsturbcdby
contradìctìonsand dìsproportìonaIìtìcs, rathcr,socìctybccomcs
atotaIìtyonIybyvìrtucotìts contradìctìons. JhcsocìctaIìzatìon
otsocìcty, ìts consoIìdatìonìntowhat-ìnvìndìcatìonotHcµcI-
ìs truIy morcIìkcasystcm than an orµanìsm, has rcsuItcdtrom
thc prìncìpIc otdomìnatìon, thc prìncìpIc otdìvisìonìtscIt, and
ìt pcrpctuatcs ìt. 5ocìcty has survìvcd, rcproduccd, and cx-
tcndcd ìtscIt, and has dcvcIopcd ìts torccs, onIy throuµh ìts dì-
vìsìon ìnto thc opposìnµ ìntcrcsts otthosc who command and
thosc who producc. HcµcI maìntaìncd hìs awarcncss otthìs ìn
thc tacc otaII scntìmcntaIìty, aII romantìcìsm, aII rcµrcssìvc rc-
turnotthouµhtand rcaIìtytopaststaµcs.IìthcrthctotaIìtycomcs
ìnto ìts ownby bccomìnµ rcconcìIcd, that ìs,ìtaboIìshcs ìts con-
tradìctoryquaIìtybycndurìnµ ìtscontradìctìons to thc cnd,and
ccascs to bc a totaIìty, or what ìs oId and taIscwìII contìnuc on
untìIthccatastrophcoccurs.Assomcthìnµcontradìctory,socìcty
as awhoIcmovcsbcyondìtscIt. JhcGocthcan-McphìstophcIìan
prìncìpIc thatcvcrythìnµthatcomcs ìntobcìnµdcscrvcs to pcr-
ìsh mcans ìnHcµcIthatthcdcstructìonotcachìndìvìduaIthìnµ
ìsdctcrmìncdbyìndìvìduaIìzatìonìtscIt,bypartìcuIarìty, thcIaw
otthc whoIc. ¨Jhc ìndìvìduaI by ìtscItdocs not corrcspond to
ìts conccpt. Itìs thìsIìmìtatìon otìts cxìstcncc whìch constìtutcs
thc hnìtudc andthcruìnotthcìndìvìduaI."´ºAssomcthìnµspIìt
ottanddctachcd, thcìndìvìduaIìsìnthcwronµwhcnrcµardcd
tromthc poìnt otvìcwot]ustìcc and apcaccthatwouIdbc trcc
ot thc prcssurc otthc whoIc. ßy attcndìnµ onIy to thcìr own
advantaµc, ìndìvìduaIsarcdcIìvcrcdovcrtoIìmìtatìon,stupìdìty,
80
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
and ìnsìµnìhcancc, a socìcty that ìs hcId toµcthcr and survìvcs
onIy throuµh thc unìvcrsaI momcntìn thc partìcuIaradvantaµc
taìIscompIctcIyas aconscqucncc otìts drìvìnµtorcc. thcsctor-
muIatìons arc not mctaphorìcaI dìaIcctìcaI ways ot cxprcssìnµ
sìmpIc statcmcnts about tactuaI mattcrs, not mcrcIy a bìrtatìon
wìth HcµcI, as Marx says Iatcr ìn accIcbratcdpassaµc. Instcad,
ìn a ccrtaìnscnsc thcy transIatc HcµcIìanphìIosophy back ìnto
whatìthadpro]cctcdìntothcIanµuaµcotthcabsoIutc. As thouµh
thc dìaIcctìc had bccomctrìµhtcncd otìtscIt, ìnthcPhilosophy of
Right HcµcI brokc ott such thouµhts by abruptIy absoIutìzìnµ
onc catcµory-thc statc. Jhìs ìs duc to thc tact that whìIc hìs
cxpcrìcncc dìd ìndccd asccrtaìn thc Iìmìts otbourµcoìs socìcty,
Iìmìts contaìncd ìnìts own tcndcncìcs, as abourµcoìsìdcaIìsthc
stoppcdatthatboundarybccauschc sawnorcaIhìstorìcaItorcc
on thc othcr sìdc otìt. Hc couId not rcsoIvc thc contradìctìon
bctwccn hìs dìaIcctìc and hìs cxpcrìcncc. ìt was thìs aIonc that
torccd �cµcI thccrìtìcto maìntaìnthcaHrmatìvc.
Jhc ccntraI ncrvc otthcdìaIcctìcas a mcthod ìs dctcrmìnatc
ncµatìon. It ìs bascd on thc cxpcrìcncc ot thc ìmpotcncc ota
crìtìcìsm that kccps to thc µcncraI and poIìshcs ott thc ob]cct
bcìnµcrìtìcìzcd bysubsumìnµìttrom abovc undcraconccptas
ìtsrcprcscntatìvc. OnIythccrìtìcaIìdcathatunIcashcsthctorcc
storcd upìnìtsownob]cctìstruìttuI,truìttuIboth torthcob]cct,
by hcIpìnµ ìt to comc ìnto ìts own, and aµaìnstìt, rcmìndìnµ ìt
that ìtìs notyct ìtscIt. HcµcI tcIt thcstcrìIìtyotaII so-caIIcdìn-
tcIIcctuaI work thattakcs pIaccwìthìn thc µcncraIsphcrc wìth-
outdìrtyìnµìtscItwìththcspccìhc, butrathcrthan Iamcntìthc
µavcìtacrìtìcaIandproductìvcturn.JhcdìaIcctìccxprcsscsthc
tact that phìIosophìcaI knowIcdµc ìs not at homc ìn thc pIacc
whcrc tradìtìon has scttIcd ìt, a pIacc whcrc ìt bourìshcs aII too
casìIy, unsaturatcd, as ìtwcrc, wìth thc hcavìncss and thc rcsìs-
tanccotwhatcxìsts. ÎhìIosophìcaIknowIcdµcbcµìnsonIywhcrc
8I
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
ìtopcnsupthìnµsthattradìtìonaI thouµhthasconsìdcrcdopaquc,
ìmpcnctrabIc, and mcrc products otìndìvìduatìon. HcµcI's dìa-
IcctìcaI statcmcnt, ¨Jhc rcaI ìs nothìnµ but an ìdcntìty ot thc
µcncraI and thc partìcuIar,"´"rctcrs to thìs. ßutthìs shìttìsnot
ìntcndcd to rcward phìIosophytor ìts cttort by rcturnìnµ ìt to
asccrtaìnìnµthcdataotanìncohcrcntcxìstcncc, and uItìmatcIy
to posìtìvìsm. lo doubtthcrc ìs asccrct posìtìvìstìmpuIscatwork
ìnHcµcIìnhìsdcìhcatìonotthcquìntcsscnccotwhatìs. ßut thc
torcc thatspccìhcìndìvìduaI knowIcdµc rcvcaIsìsaIways thatot
thc ìnadcquacyotìts mcrc ìndìvìduaIìty. Watìtìsìs aIways morc
than ìtscIt. Jo thc cxtcnt to whìch thc whoIc ìs at work ìn thc
mìcrocosmotthc ìndìvìduaI, onchas µroundstorspcakìnµabout
arcprìscotLcìbnìz ìn HcµcI, howcvcrdccìdcdIy HcµcI opposcs
thcabstractncssotthcmonadìnothcrrcspccts. JocxpIaìnthat
ìntcrmsotunrcbcctcdìntcIIcctuaIcxpcrìcncc.ìtsomconcwants
to µaìn knowIcdµc ot somcthìnµ rathcr than covcr ìt up wìth
catcµorìcs, hc wìII havc to surrcndcr to ìt wìthout rcscrvatìon,
wìthoutthccovcrotprcconccptìons,buthcwìIInotsuccccdun-
IcssthcpotcntìaItorthcknowIcdµcthatìsactuaIìzcdonIythrouµh
ìmmcrsìon ìn thc ob]cctìs aIrcady waìtìnµìn hìm as thcory. Jo
thìscxtcntthcHcµcIìandìaIcctìctoIIows,wìthphìIosophìcaIscIt-
conscìousncss, thc path ot aII productìvc thouµht, that ìs, aII
thouµht that docs not sìmpIy rcconstruct or rccapìtuIatc what
hascomcbctorc.Jhatpath, tobcsurc, ìsconccaIcdtromìt, onc
mìµht aImost bcIìcvc, wìth HcµcI, thatìthas tobc hìddcn trom
ìt ìn ordcrtor thouµht to bc productìvc. Itìs ncìthcr a thcory
arrìvcdatbyìnductìon noronctromwhìchonccouIdmakcdc-
ductìons. What mostshocks thc ìnnoccntrcadcrotthcPhenom­
enolo
g
of Spirit, thc suddcn bashcs otìIIumìnatìon thatIìnk thc
hìµhcst spccuIatìvc ìdcas wìth thc actuaI poIìtìcaI cxpcrìcncc ot
thc Îrcnch KcvoIutìon and thc aµc otlapoIcon, ìs what ìs ac-
tuaIIy dìaIcctìcaI. It Iìnks thc µcncraI conccpt and thc aconccp-
82
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
tuaI ¬ôce:-aspcrhapsArìstotIc dìd thc ¬pó¬n ouoío-cachìn
ìtscIt, to ìts opposìtc, akìnd otpcrmancntcxpIosìonìµnìtcdby
thccontactotcxtrcmcs. Jhc HcµcIìan conccptotthc dìaIcctìc
acquìrcsìtsspccìhccharactcr, anddìstìnµuìshcsìtscIttromshaI-
Iow vcrsìons ìn vìtaIìst phìIosophy Iìkc that otDìIthcy, throuµh
ìts movcmcntìnandthrouµhthccxtrcmcs. dcvclopmcntas dìs-
contìnuìty. ßut ìt too arìscs trom thc cxpcrìcncc otan antaµo-
nìstìc socìcty, ìt docs not orìµìnatc ìn somc mcrc conccptuaI
schcma. Jhc hìstoryotan unrcconcìIcd cpoch cannot bc a hìs-
toryotharmonìous dcvcIopmcnt. ìtìsonIyìdcoIoµy, dcnyìnµìts
antaµonìstìc charactcr, that makcs ìt harmonìous. Lontradìc-
tìons, whìch arcìts truc and onIyontoIoµy, arcatthc samc tìmc
thc tormaI Iaw ota hìstory that advanccs onIy throuµh contra-
dìctìon and wìth unspcakabIc suttcrìnµ. HcµcI rctcrrcd to hìs-
toryas a "sIauµhtcrbcnch,
,,
º
¹
anddcspìtchìs much-cìtcd optìmìsm
about hìstory-5chopcnhaucrcaIIcdìtvìIc-thchbcrotHcµcI's
phìIosophy, thc conscìousncss that cvcrythìnµ that cxìsts both
ncµatcsìtscItìncomìnµìntoìtsownandpcrìshcsìsbynomcans
sodìttcrcnttrom5chopcnhaucr'sEin Gedanke asthcoHcìaIhìs-
tory otphìIosophy, rcpcatìnµ 5chopcnhaucr's ìnvcctìvcs, wouId
havcìt.
HcµcI's notìon thatìtìs onIythcìdcathatsaturatcs ìtscItwìth
thcwcìµhtotìts ob]cctrathcr thanshootìnµ out bcyond ìtwìth-
outdcIay that, as "dctcrmìnatc ncµatìon," ìsworthanythìnµ, has,
otcoursc, cntcrcd thcscrvìccotthcapoIoµctìc aspcct, thc Icµìt-
ìmatìon otwhat cxìsts. Jhc ìdca, whìch bccomcs truth onIy by
compIctcIy absorbìnµ what opposcs ìt, rcpcatcdIy succumbs to
thc tcmptatìon to cxpIaìn thatwhatrcsìstsìtìsìtscItìdca, truth.
ÎorthatthcoryotHcµcI'shas rcccntIybccncìtcdbyGcorµLu-
kács, º'notonIyìnordcrto dctamc Iìtcraturcthatdcvìatcstrom
cmpìrìcaI rcaIìty, but abovc and bcyond that to rcvìvc onc ot
HcµcI's most dubìous thcscs,thatotthcratìonaIìty otthc rcaI.
83
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
Accordìnµ to HcµcI's dìstìnctìon bctwccn abstractand rcaI pos-
sìbìIìty, onIysomcthìnµthathasbccomcrcaIìsactuaIIypossìbIc.
Jhìs kìnd otphìIosophy sìdcs wìth thc bìµ µuns. It adopts thc
]udµmcntotarcaIìtythataIwaysdcstroyswhatcouIdbcdìttcr-
cnt. Ivcn,hcrc, howcvcr, onc shouId not]udµc HcµcIsoIcIyon
thcbasìsotonc'sconvìctìons. ÎcrsìstcntìnvoIvcmcntwìthHcµcI
tcachcs onc-and thìs ìs probabIy truc otcvcry µrcat phìIoso-
phy-thatonccannotscIcctwhatoncIìkcs tromhìs phìIosophy
and rc]cctwhatonchndsìrrìtatìnµ. Itìsthìs µrìm ncccssìtyand
notanìdcaIotcompIctcncssthatmakcs HcµcI'scIaìmto systcm
a scrìous and substantìaI onc. Jhc truth otthatcIaìmIìcsìnthc
skndlon, not ìn ìts pIausìbìIìty. Hcncc rcscuìnµ HcµcI-and onIy
rcscuc, not rcvìvaI, ìs approprìatctorhìm-mcans tacìnµ up to
hìs phìIosophywhcrcìtìsmostpaìntuIandwrcstìnµtruth trom
ìtwhcrcìtsuntruthìsobvìous. AcsthctìccxpcrìcnccmayhcIpus
to do thìswìth thc doctrìnc otabstract and rcaIpossìbìIìty. Lct
mc quotc trom ; Icttcr about Jhomas Mann's IatcnovcIIa The
Black Swan [Die Betrogene], trom I954.
IfI am not mistaken, the hgure ofKen has all the earmarks ofan
Americanfrom thelate fortiesorthehfties andnotfrom thedecade
following the FirstWorldWar. . . . Now, one might say that this is a
legitimateexerciseofartisticfreedom, andthatthedemandforchro-
nological hdelity is secondary, even when it is a question ofextreme
precisionintheportrayalofhumanbeings. But I doubtwhetherthis
argument,whichcomesupasthoughitwereself-evident,istrulyvalid.
Ifyou seta work in the I920s and have it take place after the First
rather than the Second World War, then you havegood reasons for
doingso~themostobviousbeingthatsomeonelikeFrauvonTümmler
isunimaginabletoday,atadeeperleveltheattempttodistancewhatis
closesttohandisprobablyinvolved~totransposeitmagicallytoapre-
historic world, the same worldwithwhose special patinaKrl is also
concerned.Butwiththiskindoftranspositionofthedatesoneassumes
akindofobligation,asinthehrstmeasureofapieceofmusic,whose
desiderataremainwithoneuntilthelastnote,whichachievesequilib-
84
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
rium.Idonotmeantheobligationofexternalhdelitytoºperiodcolorº
butrather thattheimages theworkofartconjuresupmustmanifest
themselvesashistoricalimagesatthesametime,anobligationthatfor
immanentaestheticreasonscan hardlydispensewiththatexternalob-
ligation. ForifIamnotmistaken,onerunsupagainst theparadoxical
stateofaffairs thattheevocationofsuch images, thatis,thatwhichis
actuallymagical aboutthe artobject,is moresuccessful, themoreau-
thentictheempiricaldetailsare. Onewouldalmostthinkthatthereis
notasimpleoppositionbetween thepermeationoftheworkwithsub-
jectivityandthe demands ofrealism, whichinacertain sense resound
throughoutthewhole ofyouroeuvre, such as oureducation and his-
torywouldleadusto thinkbutthatinsteadthegreatertheprecision
onemaintainswithregard tothehistorical details, includingthosere-
gardingtypesofhuman beings, themorelikelyoneis toachievespiri-
tualization and attain the world ofthe imago. I hrst arrived at these
eccentric thoughts by way ofProust, who in this regard reacted with
idiosyncraticexactness,andtheycametomeagaininreadingtheBlack
Swan. Atthe moment it seems to me as though this kindofprecision
canatoneforsomeoftheburdenofsinunderwhicheveryartistichc-
tionlabors,itisasthoughthathctioncouldbehealedofitselfthrough
exactimagination.³²
5omcthìnµsìmìIar Iìcs bchìnd HcµcI's thcorcm. Ivcn ìnthc work
otart, whìchìscsscntìaIIydìticrcnttromaIImcrccxìstìnµthìnµs
byvìrtucotìtsowntormaIIaw,thctuIhIImcntotthìstormaIIaw,
ìts own csscntìaI naturc, ìts ¨possìbìIìty" ìn thc cmphatìc scnsc,
dcpcnds on thcdcµrcc otrcaIìty ìt has absorbcd ìnto ìtscIt, no
mattcrhow transtormcd and rcconhµurcd thatrcaIìty may bc.
IvcnthcìdcathatopposcsrcaIìtyìnhoIdìnµtastto apossìbìIìty
thatìsrcpcatcdIydctcatcddocssoonIybyrcµardìnµthatpossì-
bìIìtytromthcpoìntotvìcwotìts rcaIìzatìon, as apossìbìIìtytor
rcaIìty, somcthìnµ that rcaIìty ìtscIt, howcvcr wcakIy, ìs puttìnµ
outtccIcrs to, and notsomcthìnµ mat¨wouIdhavcbccn so nìcc,"
thc tonc otwhìch rcsìµns ìtscItto taìIurctromthc outsct. Jhat
ìs thc truth contcnt otHcµcI's phìIosophy, cvcn ìn thosc Iaycrs
otìt whcrc, as ìn hìs phìIosophy ot hìstory and cspccìaIIy thc
85
ExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
prctacc to thcPhilosophy of Right, hcrcsìµnshìmscIIto rcaIìtyor
appcarstovìndìcatcìtwhìIcsnccrìnµatthoscwhowouIdrctorm
thc worId. It was thc mostrcactìonary and not at aII thc IìbcraI
proµrcssìvc cIcmcnts ìn HcµcI that pavcd thc way tor a Iatcr
socìaIìst crìtìquc otabstractutopìanìsm-onIy, otcoursc, ìn thc
turthcr hìstory otsocìaIìsm to provìdc ìn turn thc prctcxt tor a
rcncwcdrcprcssìon.JhcdctamatìonotaIIthouµhtthatprotcsts
thc µrìm ìmmcdìacy otwhatµocs onìn thc Iastcrn zonc undcr
thcnamcotpraxìs,adctamatìonthatìscustomarythcrcnowa-
days, ìs thc most cxtrcmc cvìdcncc otthìs. ßut onc shouId not
hoId HcµcI rcsponsìbIc tor thcmìsusc othìsmotìts todrapca
mantIc otìdcoIoµy ovcr thc onµoìnµ horror. DìaIcctìcaI truth
Iays ìtscItopcn tosuch mìsusc. ìtìstraµìIcbynaturc.
Atthc samc tìmc, thcrc ìs no dcnyìnµ thc untruth otHcµcI's
]ustìhcatìon ot what cxìsts-somcthìnµ thc Lctt-HcµcIìans rc-
bcIIcd aµaìnst ìn thcìr day and whìch ìn thc mcantìmc has ìn-
crcascd to thc poìnt otabsurdìty. Morc than any othcr othìs
tcachìnµs, that otthcratìonaIìtyotthc rcaI sccms to contradìct
thc cxpcrìcncc otrcaIìty, ìncIudìnµ that otìts so-caIIcd ovcraII
tcndcncy. ßut that ìdca ìs ìdcntìcaI wìth HcµcIìan ìdcaIìsm. A
phìIosophytorwhìchaIIthatcxìstsdìssoIvcsìntospìrìtasarcsuIt
otìtsmovcmcntandas thctotaIìtyotthatmovcmcnt,andwhìch
thcrctorc procIaìmsthcìdcntìtyotsub]cctand ob]cctìnthcwhoIc
whcn ìt ìs thcìr nonìdcntìty ìn thc partìcuIar that ìnspìrcs ìt-
such aphìIosophywìIIapoIoµctìcaIIytakcthcsìdcotwhatcxìsts,
whìch ìs supposcd to bc ìdcntìcaI wìth spìrìt. ßut]ust as rcaIìty
provcd thc thcsìs otthc ratìonaIìty otthc rcaI to bc wronµ, so
thc conccptìon thatcharactcrìzcs thc phìIosophy otìdcntìty

has
taìIcd to hoId up phìIosophìcaIIy. Jhc dìttcrcncc bctwccn sub-
]cctandob]cctcannotbc cradìcatcd ìnthcoryanymorc than ìt
hasbccnrcsoIvcd ìnthccxpcrìcncc o!rcaIìty tothcprcscnt. It
thc hìstory otHcµcIìan phìIosophy attcr HcµcI sccms a wcak�
86
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
cnìnµ,arcsìµnatìonotthcpowcrtocomprchcndandconstruct,
whcncomparcd wìththccttorts otspìrìt, whìchwcrcncvcr morc
powcrtuI than ìn HcµcI's comprchcnsìon otthc rcaI, ncvcrthc-
Icss, thc proccss that brouµht ìt to that poìnt ìs ìrrcvcrsìbIc. It
cannot bc attrìbutcd soIcIy to ìntcIIcctuaI shortsìµhtcdncss, tor-
µcttuIncss, and an untortunatcIy rccmcrµcnt naìvctó. In µood,
and trìµhtcnìnµ, HcµcIìan tashìon, thc Ioµìc otthc mattcrìtscIt
ìs atworkìn thatproccss. Jhc phìIosophìcaIìdcathatwhatpcr-
ìshcs mcrìts ìts tatc provcs truc, cvcn tor HcµcI hìmscIt, as thc
ur-bourµcoìs thìnkcr, HcµcI ìs sub]cct to Anaxìmandcr's ur-
bourµcoìs maxìm. Kcasonbccomcs ìncapabIcotcomprchcndìnµ
rcaIìtynotmcrcIybccauscotìtsownìmpotcnccbutbccauscrcaI-
ìtyìs not rcason. Jhc dcbatc bctwccn Kant and HcµcI, ìn whìch
HcµcI'sdcvastatìnµarµumcnthadthcIastword,ìsnotovcr,pcr-
haps bccausc what was dccìsìvc, thc supcrìor powcr ot IoµìcaI
strìnµcncy, ìs untruc ìn thc tacc otthc Kantìan dìscontìnuìtìcs.
Jhrouµh hìscrìtìqucotKant, HcµcIachìcvcdamaµnìhccntcx-
tcnsìon otthc practìccotcrìtìcaI phìIosophybcyondthctormaI
sphcrc, at thc samc tìmc, ìn doìnµ so hc cvadcd thc suprcmc
crìtìca! momcnt, thccrìtìquc ottotaIìty, otsomcthìnµ ìnhnìtc and
concIusìvcIy µìvcn. Jhcn hc hìµhhandcdIy dìd awav wìth thc
barrìcr attcr aII, wìth thc cxpcrìcncc ot somcthìnµ that cann�
bc dìssoIvcd ìn conscìousncss, whìch was thc ìnDcrmo�t cxpcrì-
cncc ot Kant's transccndcntaI phìIosoph_, and hc stìpuIatcd a
�unanì
¬
ty otknowIcdµc that bccomcs scamIcss throuµh ìts dìs-
coWcsanÔtDathassomcthìnµ�

m\u_
_t̯ÏcµcI tnouµbt away thc dìttcrcncc bctwccn thc condì-
tìoncd and thc absoIutc and cndowcd thc condìtìoncd wìth thc
scmbIanccotthcuncondìtìoncd. In thc IastanaIysìs,bydoìnµso
hc dìd an ìn]ustìcc to thc cxpcrìcncc on whìch hc drcw. Jhc
coµnìtìvc powcr ot hìs phìIosophy vanìshcs aIonµ wìth ìts
87
TheExperientialContentof Hegel'sPhilosophy
µroundìnµìncxpcrìcncc.JhccIaìmthathc dìscIoscsthcpartìc-
uIaraIonµwìththcwhoIcbccomcsìIIcµìtìmatc,bccauscthatwhoIc
ìtscItìs not, asthc tamousscntcncctromthcPhnomnolo
g
wouId
havc ìt, thc truc, and bccausc thc athrmatìvc and scIt-assurcd
rctcrcncc to thatwhoIc as thouµhonc had a hrm µrasp otìtìs
hctìtìous.
Jhcrcìsnoway to makcthìscrìtìcìsmIcssharsh, butcvcnso,
ìtshouIdnotdcaIsummarìIywìthHcµcI.IvcnwhcrcHcµcIbìcs
|n thc tacc ot cxpcrìcncc, ìncIudìnµ thc cxpcrìcncc that motì-
vatcs hìs own phìIosophy, cxpcrìcncc spcaks trom hìm. Itthc
sub]cct-ob]ccttowardwhìchhìsphìIosophydcvcIopsìsnotasys-
tcmotrcconcìIcdabsoIutcspìrìt, spìrìtncvcrthcIcsscxpcrìcnccs
thcworIdasasystcm. Jhcword ¨systcm,"bcìnµmorcìrratìonaI
than thc word ¨Iìtc," capturcs thc icmorscIcss consoIìdatìon ot
aII partìaI momcnts andacts otcìvìIsocìctyìntoawhoIcthrouµh
thc prìncìpIcotcxchanµcmorcaccuratcIy,cvcnìt¨Iìtc"ìsmorc
approprìatc to thcìrratìonaIìtyotthc worId, ìtsIackotrcconcìI-
ìatìon wìth thc ratìonaI ìntcrcsts ota scIt-conscìous humanìty.
ßut thc ratìonaIìty otthat consoIìdatìon ìnto a totaIìty ìs ìtscIt
ìrratìonaIìty, thc totaIìty otthc ncµatìvc. ¨Jhc whoIc ìs thc un-
truc," notmcrcIybccausc thc thcsìs ottotaIìty ìsìtscItuntruth,
bcìnµ thc prìncìpIc otdomìnatìonìnbatcd to thc absoIutc, thc
ìdca ot a posìtìvìty that can mastcr cvcrythìnµ that opposcs ìt
throuµh thc supcrìor powcr ot a comprchcndìnµ spìrìt ìs thc
mìrror ìmaµc otthc cxpcrìcncc otthc supcrìorcocrcìvc torcc
ìnhcrcnt ìn cvcrythìnµ that cxìsts by vìrtuc otìts consoIìdatìon
undcrdomìnatìon.JhìsìsthctruthìnHcµcI'suntruth. Jhctorcc
ot1hc whoIc, whìch ìt mobìIìzcs, ìs not a mcrc tantasy on thc
partotspìrìt, ìt ìs thc torcc otthc rcaI wcb otìIIusìon ìnwhìch
aII ìndìvìduaI cxìstcncc rcmaìns trappcd. ßy spccìtyìnµ, ìn op-
posìtìon to HcµcI, thc ncµatìvìty otthc whoIc, phìIosophy satìs-
88
TheExperientialContentofHegel'sPhilosophy
hcs,torthcIasttìmc,thcpostuIatcotdctcrm¡natcncµatìon, wmch
ìsaposìtìnµ. Jhc ray otIìµht that rcvcaIs thc whoIctobc untruc
ìn aII ìts momcnts ìn nonc othcr than utop:a, thc utopìa otthc
whoIctruth,whìchìsstìIItobcrcaIìzcd.
Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel
Ichhabe nichtsalsRauschen.
Ihavenothingbutmurmuring.
Rudol Borchardt'
Jhcwaysìnwhìch HcµcI's µrcatsystcmatìcworks,cspccìaIIythc
Science of Logc, rcsìst undcrstandìnµ arc quaIìtatìvcIy dìttcrcnt
trom thoscotothcr ìntamous tcxts.WìthHcµcIthctaskìs not
sìmpIy to asccrtaìn, throuµh ìntcIIcctuaI cttort and carctuI cx-
amìnatìonotthcwordìnµ,amcanìnµotwhosccxìstcncconchas
nodoubt. Kathcr, atmany poìntsthc mcanìnµìtscItìsunccrtaìn,
and no hcrmcncutìc art has yctcstabIìshcd ìt ìndìsputabIy, and
ìnanycasc thcrc ìs no HcµcI phìIoIoµyandnoadcquatc tcxtuaI
crìtìcìsm. ÎoraIIthcìrpcttìncss andressentiment, 5chopcnhaucr's
tìradcs about HcµcI's aIIcµcd bombast cvìdcnccd arcIatìonshìp
to thcmattcrìtscIt, atIcastncµatìvcIy,IìkcthcchìIdandthccm-
pcror'sncwcIothcs,ìn asìtuatìonwhcrcrcspccttorcuIturcand
tcar otcmbarrassmcnt mcrcIy dodµc thc ìssuc. In thc rcaIm ot
µrcatphìIosophyHcµcI ìs nodoubtthconIyoncwìthwhom at
tìmcsoncIìtcraIIy docs notknowand cannotconcIusìvcIydctcr-
mìnc what ìs bcìnµ taIkcd about, and wìth whom thcrc ìs no
µuarantcc that such a]udµmcntìs cvcn possìbIc. Onc cxampIc
90
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
otthìs ìnmattcrsotprìncìpIc ìs thcdìstìnctìonbctwccn thc cat-
cµorìcsotµround andcausaIìtyìn thcsccondbookotthcLogc;
adctaìIcd cxampIcìs provìdcdby somc scntcnccs trom thc hrst
chaptcrotthatbook.
Consequently, becoming is essence, its reßective movement, is the
movementofnothingto nothing, andsobacktoitself.The transition,
orbecoming,sublatesitselfinitspassage, theotherthatin thistransi-
tion comes tobe,isnotthe non-beingofabeing, butthenothingness
ofanothing,andthis,tobethenegationofanothing,constitutesbeing.
Beingonlyi asthemovementofnothingtonothing,andassuchitis
essence, and thelatterdoesnothave thismovementwithin it,butisthis
movementasabeingthatisitselfabsolutelyillusory,pure negativity,
outsideofwhichthereisnothingforittonegatebutwhichnegatesonly
itsownnegative,whichlatteri onlyinthisnegating.I
Jhcrc arc anaIoµous thìnµs ìn thc carIy HcµcI, cvcn ìn hìsDi­
ference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, thcDi­
ferenzschrift, whìch ìs cxtrcmcIy cIcar as a prospcctus. Jhc
concIusìon ot thc scctìon on thc rcIatìonshìp otspccuIatìon to
commonscnsc rcads,
Theonlyaspectofspeculationvisibletocommonsenseisitsnullifying
activity, and even this nullihcation is not visible in its entire scope. If
commonsensecouldgraspthisscope,itwouldnotbelievespeculation
to be its enemy. For in its highest synthesis ofthe conscious and the
non-coscious,speculationalsodemandsthenullihcationofconscious-
nessitself. Reasonthusdrownsitselfand itsknowledgeanditsreßec-
tionoftheabsoluteidentity,initsownabyss. andinthisnightofmere
reßection and of the calculating intellect, in this night which is the
noo
9
dayoflife,commonsenseandspeculationcanmeetoneanother.²
OnIy thc ìnµcnìous and prccìsc ìmaµìnatìon otan ìmpassìoncd
mcmbcrotaphìIosophìcaIscmìnarwìIIbcabIctoìIIumìnatcthc
mcanìnµ otthc Iast scntcncc, whìch ìs a match tor HöIdcrIìn's
mostadvanccd prosc otthc samc ycars, wìthoutdoìnµvìoIcncc
9I
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
to ìt. thatthc¨nìµhtotmcrcrcbcctìon"ìsnìµhttormcrcrcbcc-
tìon, butIìtc, whìch ìs conncctcd wìth noon, ìs spccuIatìon. Îor
ìnHcµcIthcconccptotspccuIatìon,rcmovcdtromìtstcrmìnoI-
oµìcaI shcII, mcans ìn turn nonc othcr thanIìtc torccd to turn
ìnward, º ìn thìs, spccuIatìvc phìIosophy, 5chopcnhaucr's ìn-
cIudcd, and musìcarcìntìmatcIyrcIatcd. Jhc passaµcbccomcs
susccptìbIc otìntcrprctatìon ìn thc Iìµht otknowIcdµc ot thc
µcncraItraìnotHcµcI'sthouµht,cspccìaIIythcconccptuaIstruc-
turcotthcchaptcr,butìtcannotbcìntcrprctcdtromthcword-
ìnµotthc paraµraph aIonc. Jo thc pcrsonwho hoIds doµµcdIy
to thc wordìnµ and thcn ìn dìsappoìntmcnt rctuscs to µct ìn-
voIvcdwìth HcµcIbccausc othìsuntathomabIcquaIìty, onc can
ottcrIìttIcbutµcncraIìtìcs,wìththcìnadcquacyotwhìch HcµcI
rcproachcdthcmcrcIyrcbcctìvcundcrstandìnµ,ashccaIIsìt,ìn
thattcxt. Onc cannot sìmpIy skìp ovcrthcpassaµcs ìnwhìchìt
rcmaìnsuncIcarwhatìsbcìnµdcaItwìth,thcìrstructurcmustbc
ìntcrrcd trom thcsubstancc otHcµcI's phìIosophy. Jhcrc ìs a
sort otsuspcndcd quaIìty assocìatcd wìth hìs phìIosophy, ìn ac-
cordancc wìth thc ìdca that truth cannot bc µraspcd ìn any ìn-
dìvìduaIthcsìsoranydcIìmìtcdposìtìvcstatcmcnt.ÎormìnHcµcI
toIIows thìs ìntcntìon. lothìnµ can bc undcrstood ìn ìsoIatìon,
cvcrythìnµìstobcundcrstood onIyìnthccontcxtotthcwhoIc,
wìth thcawkwardquaIìhcatìonthatthc whoIcìn turn Iìvcs onIy
ìn thc ìndìvìduaI momcnts. In actuaIìty, howcvcr, thìs kìnd ot
doubIcncssotthcdìaIcctìccIudcsIìtcraryprcscntatìon,whìchìs
otncccssìty hnìtc whcn ìt uncquìvocaIIy statcs somcthìnµ un-
cquìvocaI. Jhìs ìswhyonchas to makc so many aIIowanccs tor
ìtìn HcµcI. Jhat ìt cannot ìnprìncìpIc achìcvc thc unìty otthc
whoIc and ìts parts at onc bIow bccomcs ìts wcak spot. Ivcry
sìnµIcscntcnccìnHcµcI'sphìIosophyprovcsìtscItunsuìtabIctor
that phìIosophy, and thc torm cxprcsscs thìs ìn ìts ìnabìIìty to
µrasp any contcntwìth compIctc adcquacy. Itthìs wcrc not thc
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
casc, thc tormwouIdbc trccotthc povcrtyand thctaIIìbìIìtyot
conccptsthatHcµcItcIIsusabout.Jhìsìswhyundcrstandìnµot
HcµcI dccomposcs ìnto momcntsthat arc mcdìatcd by onc an-
othcrandyctcontradìctory. HcµcImakcshìmscItìnacccssìbIcto
anyoncwhoìsnottamìIìarwìthhìsovcraIIìntcntìon.Jhatìntcn-
tìonìs tobc µIcancd hrstand torcmosttromhìscrìtìqucotcar-
IìcrphìIosophìcsandtromhìscrìtìqucothìsowntìmcs.Atcvcry
poìntoncmustbcarìn mìnd, howcvcrprovìsìonaIIy,whatHcµcI
ìs attcr, onc must ìIIumìnatc hìm trombchìnd, soto spcak. Hc-
µcI rcquìrcs rcpcatcd rcadìnµs, and rcquìrcs thcm ob]cctìvcIy
andnotmcrcIytotamìIìarìzconcscItwìthhìssub]cctmattcr.ßut
ìtoncstakcs cvcrythìnµ on thìs onccantaIsìty hìmaµaìn. Onc
thcncasìIycrcatcswhathasthustarbccnmostìn]urìoustoìntcr-
prctatìon, namcIy an cmpty conscìousncss otthc systcm that ìs
ìncompatìbIcwìththctactthatthcsystcmìs notìntcndcdto torm
anabstracthìµhcr-ordcrconccptwìth rcµardtoìtsmomcntsbut
rathcrtoachìcvcìtstruthonIyìnand throuµhthcconcrctc mo-
mcnts.
An csscntìaI cIcmcnt ìn HcµcI hìmscItIurcs onc ìnto thìs ìm-
povcrìshcdundcrstandìnµtrom abovc. What ìs supposcd to bc
thc whoIc and thc outcomc otthc whoIc-thc constructìon ot
thc sub]cct-ob]cct, thc dcmonstratìon that truth ìs csscntìaIIy
sub]cct-ìs ìn tact prcsupposcd by cvcry dìaIcctìcaI stcp, ìn ac-
cordancc wìth HcµcI's own ìdcathat thc catcµorìcs otbcìnµ arc
aIrcady ìn thcmscIvcs what hìs phìIosophy otthc conccpt uItì-
matcIy rcvcaIs thcìr naturc to bc ìn and tor ìtscIt. Jhìs ìs cx-
prcsscdmostopcnIyìnHcµcI'sµrcatEncclopedia of the Philosophical
Sciences:
ThishnitudeoftheEndconsistsinthecircumstance, that,inthepro-
cessofrealizingit, thematerial,whichisemployedas a means, isonly
externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But, as a
matter offact, the objectis the concept implicitly. and thus when the
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
concept,intheshapeofEnd,isrealisedintheobject,wehavebutthe
manifestationoftheinnernatureoftheobjectitself.Objectivityisthus,
a itwere,onlyacoveringunderwhichtheconceptliesconcea!ed.Within
therangeofthehnitewecanneverseeorexperience thattheEndhas
beenreallysecured.Theconsummationoftheinhnite End, therefore,
consists merelyinremovingtheillusionwhichmakesitseemyetunac-
complished.TheGood, theabsolutelyGood,iseternallyaccomplishing
itselfintheworld.andtheresultis thatitneedsnotwaituponus,but
isalreadybyimplication,aswellasinfullactuality,accomplished.This
is the illusionunderwhichwelive. Italonesupplies atthe same time
theactualizingforceonwhichtheinterestintheworldreposes. Inthe
courseofitsprocessthe Ideacreatesthatillusion,bysettinganantith-
esis toconfrontit, andits actionconsists in gettingrid oftl:eillusion
whichithascreated.Onlyoutofthiserrordoesthetrutharise. Inthis
factliesthereconciliationwitherrorandwithhnitude.Errororother-
being, whensuperseded, isstillanecessarydynamicelementoftruth.
fortruthcanonlybewhereitmakesitselfitsownresult.¹
Jhìs µcts ìnthcwayotthatpurc abandonmcntto thc mattcrat
hand and ìts momcnts ìnwhìchthcìntroductìon tothcPhenom­
enolo
g
pIaccs ìts trust. HcµcI docs not opcratc so concrctcIy as
that ìntroductìon wouId havc ìt. Jhc ìsoIatcd momcnts µo bc-
yond thcmscIvcs,ìntact, onIy bccausc thcìdcntìtyotsub]cctand
ob]cctìs prcconccìvcd. Jhc rcIcvancc otthcìndìvìduaIanaIyscs
ìs rcpcatcdIy dìsruptcd by thc abstract prìmacy ot thc whoIc.
Mostotthccommcntarìcs, howcvcr, McJaµµart's ìncIudcd, taìI
bccausc thcy rcIy on thc whoIc.º Jhc ìntcntìon ìs takcn tor thc
dccd, andorìcntatìonto thc µcncraI dìrcctìon otthcìdcas ìstakcn
torthcìrcorrcctncss, to toIIow thcm throuµhwouId thcnbcsu-
pcrbuous. HcµcI hìmscItìs byno mcans ìnnoccntotthìsìnadc-
quatcwayotprocccdìnµ. IttoIIowsthcIìncotIcastrcsìstancc, ìt
ìsaIwayscasìcrtohndonc'sbcarìnµsìnanìdcaasonamapthan
to cxamìnc thc coµcncy otìts cIaboratìon. Jhus HcµcI hìmscIt
somctìmcstaItcrsandmakcsdowìthtormaIdccIaratìons,thcscs
that say that somcthìnµ ìs so whcn thc work has not yct bccn
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
donc. Amonµ thc ìntcrprctìvc tasks whosc tìmc ìs rìpc not thc
IcastandnotthcsìmpIcstìsthcscparatìonotsuchpassaµcstrom
thoscìnwhìch thìnkìnµìsrcaIIyµoìnµ on. LcrtaìnIyìn compar-
ìsonwìthKantthc schcmatìccIcmcnts arc Icsspromìncntìn Hc-
µcI. ßutthcsystcmottcntorcctuIIyìntcrtcrcswìththcproµram
ot¨sìmpIy Iookìnµ on" [reines Zuehen] . Jhatwas unavoìdabIc ìt
thc whoIc wcrc not to bccomc hopcIcssIy tanµIcd. In ordcr to
prcvcnt that, HcµcI somctìmcs cnµaµcs ìn pcdantry, somcthìnµ
thatìII bccomcs onc who has contcmptuous thìnµs to say about
vcrbaIdchnìtìons and thcìr Iìkc. Kcµardìnµ thc transìtìon trom
cìvìIsocìctyto thc statc, wc rcad ìn thcPhilosophy of Right,
Theconceptofthis Ideahasbeingonlyasmind,assomethingknowing
itselfandactual,becauseitistheobjectihcationofitself,the movement
running through the form ofits moments. Itistherefore (A) ethical
mindinitsnaturalorimmediatephase~theFamily.Thissubstantiality
losesitsunity, passesoverintodivision, andintothephaseofrelation,
i.e. into (B) CivilSociety~an associationofmembersasself-subsistent
individualsinauniversalitywhich, becauseoftheirself-subsistence, is
onlyabstract. Theirassociationisbrought aboutbytheirneeds,bythe
legalsystem~themeanstosecurityofpersonandproperty~andbyan
externalorganizationforattainingtheirparticularand common inter-
ests. Thisexternalstate (C)isbroughtbacktoandwelded intounityin
the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality ofboth the
substantialuniversalorderandthepubliclifedevotedthereto.ª
Intcrmsotcontcnt, thcconhµuratìonotthcdynamìc-dìaIcctìcaI
and thc conscrvatìvc-athrmatìvc momcnts ìs as much a dctcr-
mìnantotthccxccssotrìµìdµcncraIìtyìn cvcrythìnµpartìcuIar
that comcs ìnto bcìnµ as ìt ìs dctcrmìncd by ìt, and notonIy ìn
thcPhilosophy of Right. HcµcI's Ioµìc ìs notonIy hìs mctaphysìcs,
ìtìsaIso hìs poIìtìcs. Jhcart otrcadìnµhìm shouIdtakcnotcot
whcrcsomcthìnµ ncwbcµìns, somc contcnt, and whcrc a ma-
chìnc that was not ìntcndcd to bc a machìnc ìs sìmpIy runnìnµ
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
and ouµhtnotto kccpondoìnµ so. Atcvcry momcntoncnccds
to kccp twosccmìnµIy ìncompatìbIc maxìmsìnmìnd. paìnstak-
ìnµ ìmmcrsìon ìndctaìI, and trcc dctachmcnt. Jhcrc ìs noIack
othcIpavaìIabIc. What common scnscwouIdconsìdcrmadncss
has ìts momcnts ot cIarìty ìn HcµcI, cvcn tor common scnsc.
Lommon scnsc can usc thcm to approach HcµcI ìtìt docs not
torbìd ìtscItto do so out ot hatrcd-hatrcd bcìnµ, ot coursc,
somcthìnµHcµcIhìmscIt, ìnthcDiferenzchrift, dìaµnoscdasìn-
hcrcnt ìn common scnsc.' Ivcn thc cryptìc chaptcrs havc scn-
tcnccsIìkcthoscìnthcdìscussìonotìIIusorybcìnµ[Schein] whìch
cxprcss,attcrthctact,thatsub]cctìvcìdcaIìsmandphcnomcnaI-
ìsmarcìntcndcdpoIcmìcaIIy. ¨Jhusilluor being ìsthcphcnom-
cnonotsccptìcìsm, and thcAppcaranccotìdcaIìsm, too,ìssuch
animmediacy, whìchìsnotasomcthìnµorathìnµ,ìnµcncraI,not
an ìndìttcrcntbcìnµ thatwouId stìIIbc, aparttromìts dctcrmì-
natcncssand conncxìonwìth thcsub]cct."°
Jhc pcrson who rctrcats to HcµcI's ovcraII conccptìon whcn
taccdwìthHcµcI'scIaboratìonothìsthouµhts,substìtutìnµadc-
tcrmìnatìon otthc posìtìon otthc dctaìI wìthìn thc systcm tor
transparcncy ín thc ìndìvìduaI anaIysìs, has aIrcady rcnounccd
rìµorous undcrstandìnµ, has capìtuIatcd bccausc HcµcI sìmpIy
cannotbc undcrstood rìµorousIy. WhcrcHcµcI ìs cmphatìcaIIy
rc]cctcd-ìn posìtìvìsm ìn partìcuIar-hc ìs hardIy cvcn µìvcn
consìdcratìon nowadays. Instcadotbcìnµsub]cctcdto crìtìcìsm,
hc ìs rc]cctcd as dcvoìd ot mcanìnµ. Sinnleere, or abscnsc ot
mcanìnµ, ìsamorccIcµantwordtorthcoIdaccusatìonotìnsut-
hcìcntcIarìty. 5omconcwhocannotstatcwhathcmcanswìthout
ambìµuìty ìs notworth wastìnµ tìmc on. Lìkc thc dcsìrc torcx-
pIìcìtdchnìtìons, towhìchìtìsrcIatcd, thìsconccptotcIarìtyhas
survìvcd thc phìIosophy ìnwhìch ìtorìµìnatcdand has bccomc
autonomous. JhcconccptotcIarìtyìstakcntromìndìvìduaIdìs-
cìpIìncsìnwhìchìthasbccn prcscrvcd as doµmaand rcappIìcd
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
to a phìIosophy that Ionµ aµo sub]cctcd ìt to crìtìcaI rcbcctìon
and thcrctorc ouµht not to havc to compIy wìth ìt unqucstìon-
ìnµIy. Jhc Lartcsìan conccpts otcIarìty and dìstìnctncss, stìII
coupIcd wìth onc anothcr as Iatc as Kant, arc trcatcd ìn thc
µrcatcstdctaìIìn Dcscartcs'sPrinciples of Philosophy:
Indeed, in theirwholelives,many menneverperceiveanythingwhat-
ever accurately enough to make a surejudgment about it, because a
perception upon which a sure and unquestionablejudgment canrest
mustnotonlybeclear,itmustalsobedistinct.Icall'clear'thatpercep-
tion whichis presentand manifest toanattentive mind.justaswe say
thatweclearlyseethosethingswhicharepresenttoourintenteyeand
actuponitsufh cientlystronglyand manifestly. On the otherhand, I
call'distinct'thatperceptionwhich,whileclear,issoseparatedandde-
lineatedfromallothersthatitcontainsabsolutelynothingexceptwhat
isclear."
Jhcsc scntcnccs, whìch arc otµrcat conscqucncc hìstorìcaIIy, arc
by no mcans as cpìstcmoIoµìcaIIy unprobIcmatìc as sound com-
monscnsc, now as thcn, mìµht wìsh thcm to bc. Dcscartcs prc-
scnts thcm as tcrmìnoIoµìcaIstìpuIatìons. "cIaram vocoì!Iam . . .
pcrcc¡tìoncm. "Hcdchncs cIarìtyanddìstìnctncsstor purposcs
otrcachìnµaµrccmcnt.WhcthcrthcknowIcdµcìtscIt,ìnìtsown
charactcr,satìshcs thc two crìtcrìarcmaìns undctcrmìncd-tor
thc sakc otthc mcthod.* Lartcsìan doctrìnc docs not bothcr wìth
* A philosophical history of clarity would need to refect on the fact that origi­
nally clarity was both an attribute of the divine when contemplated and its mode
of manifestation, the radiant aura of Christian and Jewish mysticism. With the
ongoing process of secularization clarity becomes something methodological, a
mode of knowledge made absolute-knowledge that satisfes its methodological
rules, without regard to the derivation and aim of the ideal and without regard
to the content. Clarity is the hypostatized form of accessible subjective conscious­
ness of some object. It becomes a fetish for consciousness. Its adequacy to its
objects suppresses the objects themselves and ultimately transcendent meaning
as well; at that point philosophy is to be only a "striving for ultimate clarity." The
word enlightenment probably marks the height of this development. Its depoten-
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
thc phcnomcnoIoµyotcoµnìtìvcacts-asthouµhthoscactswcrc
tobcdcaItwìthIìkcmathcmatìcaIaxìomatìcs, wìthoutrcµardto
thcìrown structurc. ßut ¡t ìs thìsmathcmatìcaIìdcaI thatdctcr-
mìncs thc twomcthodoIoµìcaInorms, wìthrcspcctto contcntas
wcII. Dcscartcsknows noothcrway to cxpIaìn thcm thanthrouµh
comparìsonwìththcscnsoryworId. ¨sìcutcacIarcanobìsvìdcrì
dìcìmus, quac, ocoIo ìntucntì pracscntìa, satìs tortìtcr ct apcrtc
ìIIum movcnt" qust as wc say that wc cIcarIy scc thosc thìnµs
whìch arc prcscnt to our ìntcnt cyc and actupon ìtsuthcìcntIy
stronµIy andmanìtcstIy| . '°OncshouIdnotassumc thatprccìscIy
hcrc, ìn thc dìscussìon otcIarìty, Dcscartcswas makìnµdo wìth
amcrcmctaphor-¨sìcut"-thatotncccssìtydìvcrµcstromwhat
ìtìs supposcd to cxpIaìnand ìsìtscItthcrctorc anythìnµbutcIcar.
Hc must havc dcrìvcd thc ìdcaI otcIarìty trom scnsc ccrtaìnty,
towhìch thc taIk aboutthccycaIIudcs. ßutaswc know, ìnDcs-
cartcsìtssubstratum,thcscnsory-spatìaIworId, thcres extensa, ìs
ìdcntìcaI wìth thc ob]cct otµcomctry, compIctcIy dcvoìd otdy-
namìcs. Dìssatìstactìon wìth thìs ìdca produccd Lcìbnìz's thcory
otanìnhnìtcsìmaIcontìnuumIcadìnµtromrcprcscntatìonsthat
arc obscurc and contuscd to rcprcscntatìons that arc cIcar, an
ìdcatakcnupby Kantìnopposìtìonto Dcscartcs.
Clearnessisnot,asthelogiciansassert,theconsciousnessofarepresen-
tation. Acertaindegreeofconsciousness, thoughitbe insufhcientfor
recollection, mustbe metwitheven in manyobscurerepresentations,
sinceintheabsence·ofallconsciousnessweshouldmakenodistinction
betweendifferentcombinations ofobscurerepresentations, which yet
tiation is no doubt connected with the fact that memory of the prototype of
clarity, light, which the pathos of clarity continues to presuppose, has since died
out. As though looking back to the past, the jugendtil, a paradoxical truce be­
tween romanticism and positivism, formulated the double nature of clarity; a
motto of jacobsen's reads, "Light over the land! that is what we wanted." When
Husserl discusses "levels of clarity," he is involuntarily using a metaphor from
the temple precincts of the jugendtil, the profane sacred sphere.
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
weareabletodoinrespectofthecharactersofmanyconcepts,suchas
thoseofrightorequity,oraswhenthemusicianinimprovisingstrikes
severalkeysatonce. Butarepresentationisclear,whentheconscious-
nesssufhcesfor theconciousness ofthe distinction ofthisrepresentation
fromothers.
In othcr words, ìt ìs "dìstìnct" ìn thc Lartcsìan scnsc, wìthout
thatµuarantccìnµìts truth. Kantcontìnucs,
Ifitsufhcesfordistinguishing,butnotforconsciousnessofthedistinc-
tion,therepresentationmuststillbeentitledobscure.Therearethere-
fore inhnitely many degrees ofconsciousness, down to its complete
vanishing.
I I
KantwouId nothavc thouµhtotdcvaIuìnµaII thcscIcvcIs othcr
than thcìdcaIhìµhcstIcvcI, any morc than LcìbnìzwouIdhavc.
that hìµhcst IcvcI, howcvcr, ìs scìzcd upon as cIarìtyby thc scì-
cntìhc conccpt otknowIcdµc,]ust as thouµh ìt wcrc a thìnµ ìn
ìtscItthatwasavaìIabIcatanytìmca�datwìII,and]ustasthouµh
ìthad not, ìn thc cra attcrDcscartcs, shownìtscIttobcahypos-
tasìs. KatìonaIìst ìn thc hìstorìcaI scnsc, thc ìdcaI otcIarìty dc-
mandsmatknowIcdµctrìmandshapcìtsob]cctaprìorì,as thouµh
thc ob]cct had to bc a statìc mathcmatìcaI ob]cct. Jhc norm ot
cIarìty hoIds onIy whcrc ìtìs prcsupposcd that thcob]cctìtscItìs
such that thc sub]cct's µazc can pìn ìt down Iìkc thc hµurcs ot
µcomctry.WhcnthatìdcaIìsdccIarcdtobcµcncraIIyvaIìd,ana
prìorì dccìsìon ìsmadcaboutthc ob]cct,and knowIcdµc, undcr-
stood ìn thc sìmpIcst scnsc otthc schoIastìc and Lartcsìan ade­
quatio, ìs supposcd to orìcnt ìtscIt accordìnµIy. LIarìtv can bc
dcmandcd otaII knowIcdµc onIy whcn ìthas bccn dctcrmìncd
th
n
tthcob(cctsundcrìnvcstìuatìonarctrccotaIId_namìcquaI-
ìtìcsthatwouIdcauscthcmto cIudcthcµazcthattrìcstocapturc
and hoIc thcm unambì���Jhc dcsìdcratum otcIarìty bc-
comcsdoubIyprobIcmatìc whcnconsìstcnt thouµht dìscovcrs that
thcob]cctotìtsphìIosophìzìnµnotonIyrunsrìµhtovcrthcknowcr
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Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
as thouµh onsomc vchìcIc butìsìnhcrcntIy ìnmotìon, thcrcby
dìvcstìnµ ìtscItotìtsIastsìmìIarìtywìth thc Lartcsìanres extensa,
mattcrcxtcndcdìn spacc.JhccorrcIatcotthìsìnsìµhtìs that thc
sub]cct too ìs not statìc Iìkc a camcra on a trìpod, rathcr, thc
sub]cctìtscItaIsomovcs,byvìrtucotìtsrcIatìonshìpto thcob]cct
thatìsìnhcrcntIyìnmotìon-oncotthcccntraItcnctsotHcµcI's
Phenomenolo
g
. Îaccd wìth thìs, thc sìmpIc dcmand tor cIarìty
and dìstìnctncss bccomcs obsoIctc. JhctradìtìonaIcatcµorìcsdo
not rcmaìn ìntact wìthìn thc dìaIcctìc, thc dìaIcctìc pcrmcatcs
cachotthcmandaItcrsìtsìnhcrcntcompIcxìon.
Dcspìtc thìs, thc praxìs otknowIcdµc cIìnµs to thc prìmìtìvc
dìstìr¡ctìonbctwccnwhatìscIcarandwhatìsuncIcar,acrìtcrìon
thatwouIdbcsuìtabIconIytorastatìcsub]cctandastatìcob]cct.
It docs so, no doubt, out otcxccssìvc zcaI tor thc spccìaIìzcd
actìvìtìcs otthc ìndìvìduaI dìscìpIìncs, whìch cstabIìsh thcìr ob-
]ccts and thcìr ob]cct domaìns wìthout rcbcctìon and sct doµ-
matìcnormstorthcrcIatìonshìpotknowIcdµctoìtsob]ccts.LIarìty
anddìstìnctncsstakcasthcìrmodcIahxcdconscìousncsso!thìnµs,
and ìn tact, ìn an carIìcr dìscussìon otthc ìdcaI ot cIarìty, Dcs-
cartcs,ìnthcspìrìtothìssystcm,taIksaboutthcthìnµìnanaìvc-
rcaIìstìcmanncr.
AndasIobservedthatinthewordsIthink,henceIam,thereisnoth-
ingatallwhichgivesmeassuranceoftheirtruthbeyondthis,thatIsee
veryclearly thatin orderto thinkitis necessarytoexist, I concluded
that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things
whichwe veryclearlyanddistinctlyconceivearetrue,onlyobserving,
however,thatthereissomedifhcultyinrightlydeterminingtheobjects
whichwedistinctlyconceive.
'
²
In thc dìthcuIty Dcscartcs notcs, that o!corrcctIy dctcrmìnìnµ
whatìtìs thatwcconccìvc dìstìnctIy, thcrcstìrsa taìntmcmory
ot thc tact that ìn thc coµnìtìvc acts ot thc sub]cct thc ob]ccts
thcmscIvcsdonot sìmpIy accommodatc to thatdcmand. Itthcy
I00
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
dìd, cIarìty and dìstìnctncss, whìch tor Dcscartcs arc attrìbutcs
ottruth, couId not prcscnt dìthcuItìcs ìnturn. ßut oncc ìtìs ac-
knowIcdµcdthatcIarìtyand dìstìnctncss arcnotmcrccharactcr-
ìstìcs otwhatìs µìvcn, and arc not thcmscIvcs µìvcn, onccan no
Ionµcr cvaIuatc thcworth otknowIcdµc ìn tcrms othowcIcarIy
and uncquìvocaIIyìndìvìduaIìtcms otknowIcdµc prcscntthcm-
scIvcs. Whcn conscìousncss docs not conccìvc thcm as pìnncd
down and ìdcntìhcd Iìkc thìnµs-photoµraphabIc, as ìtwcrc-ìt
hnds ìtscItotncccssìty ìn conbìct wìth thc Lartcsìan ambìtìon.
Kcìhcd conscìousncsstrcczcsob]cctsìntothìnµsìnthcmscIvcsso
thatthcycanbcavaìIabIctoscìcnccandpraxìsas thìnµstoroth-
crs. OtcoursconccannotµrossIyncµIcctthcdcmandtorcIarìty,
phìIosophy shouId not succumb to contusìon and dcstroy thc
vcrypossìbìIìtyotìts cxìstcncc. Whatwc shouId takctromthìsìs
thcurµcnt dcmand thatthc cxprcssìon htthc mattcrcxprcsscd
prccìscIy, cvcn whcrc thc mattcr at hand tor ìts part docs not
contorm to thccustomary notìon otwhatcanbc ìndìcatcd cIcarIy.
HcrctoophìIosophyìstaccdwìthaparadox. tosaycIcarIysomc-
thìnµ that ìs uncIcar, that has nohrm outIìnc, that docs notac-
commodatc to rcìhcatìon, tosayìtìnsuchaway, thatìs, thatthc
momcnts thatcIudcthccyc'shxatìnµµazc,orthatarcnotacccs-
sìbIcataII, arcìndìcatcdwìththcutmostdìstìnctncss.Jhìs,how-
cvcr, ìs not a mcrcIy tormaI dcmand but rathcr a part otthc
vcry substancc phìIosophy ìs attcr. Jhìs dcmand ìs paradoxìcaI
bccausc Ianµuaµc and thc proccss otrcìhcatìonarcìntcrIockcd.
Jhc vcry torm otthc copuIa, thc ¨ìs," pursucs thc aìm otpìn-
poìntìnµìtsob]cct,anaìmtowhìchphìIosophyouµhttoprovìdc
a corrcctìvc, ìn thìs scnsc aII phìIosophìcaI Ianµuaµc ìs a Ian-
µuaµc ìn opposìtìon to Ianµuaµc, markcd wìth thc stìµma otìts
own ìmpossìbìIìty. Jhc posìtìon thatwouId postponc thc tuIhII-
mcnt ot thìs dcmand-thc ìdca that thc rcquìrcmcnt otcIarìty
docs nothoIdìmmcdìatcIyortorthc ìsoIatcdìndìvìduaIpartbut
I 0I
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ìs achìcvcd throuµh thc whoIc-docs not µo tar cnouµh. As a
systcmatìcphìIosophcrHcµcImayhavchopcd to dothìs,buthc
dìd not tuIIy rcdccmthc promìsc. In actuaIìty, phìIosophy cIudcs
thatdcmand,butìtdocssoìnthctormotdctcrmìnatcncµatìon.
Ithastotakcupthatcausccvcnwìthrcµard to prcscntatìon, to
sayconcrctcIywhat ìtcannot say, to try to cxpIaìnthcIìmìts ot
cIarìty ìtscIt. ÎhìIosophy docs bcttcr to statc that ìt wìII dìsap-
poìntthccxpcctatìonthatìtwìIItuIbIIìtsìntcntìoncompIctcIyìn
cvcrymomcnt,cvcryconccpt, andcvcryscntcncc, than,ìntìmì-
datcd by thc succcss otthc ìndìvìduaI dìscìpIìncs, to borrow a
norm trom thcm ìntcrms otwhìch ìtmustdccIarcbankruptcy.
ÎhìIosophyìsconccrncdwìthsomcthìnµthathasnopIaccwìthìn
a prcµìvcnordcr otìdcas and ob]ccts such as thc naìvctó otra-
tìonaIìsmcnvìsìons,somcthìnµthatcannotsìmpIyuscthatordcr
as ìtssystcmotcoordìnatcsandbcmappcdontoìt. Inthcnorm
otcIarìty, thc oId copy thcory otrcaIìsm has cntrcnchcd ìtscIt
wìthìnthc crìtìqucotknowIcdµc,unconccrncdwìththc Iattcr's
actuaIrcsuIts. OnIy thatrcaIìsmaIIowsonctobcIìcvcthatcvcry
ob]cctcan bc rcbcctcd wìthout qucstìon or dìsputc. ßut phìIos-
ophyhastorcbcctonmatcrìaIconcrctcncss,dcbnìtìon,and tuI-
hIImcnt]ustas ìt has to rcbcct on Ianµuaµc and ìts rcIatìonshìp
tothcmattcrathand.JothccxtcnttowhìchphìIosophymakcs
anonµoìnµcttorttobrcakoutotthcrcìhcatìonotconscìousncss
and ìts ob(ccts, ìt cannot compIy wìth thc ruIcs otthc µamc ot
rcìhcd conscìousncsswìthoutncµatìnµìtscIt,cvcnthouµh ìnothcr
rcspccts ìt ìs not pcrmìttcd sìmpIy to dìsrcµard thosc ruIcs ìtìt
docs not want to dcµcncratc ìnto cmpty words. Wìttµcnstcìn's
maxìm, ¨Whcrcot onc cannot spcak, thcrcotonc must bc sì-
Icnt,"'³ ìn whìch thc cxtrcmc otposìtìvìsm spìIIs ovcr ìnto thc
µcsturc otrcvcrcnt authorìtarìan authcntìcìty, and whìch tor that
rcason cxcrts a kìnd ot ìntcIIcctuaI mass suµµcstìon, ìs uttcrIy
antìphìIosophìcaI. It phìIosophy can bc dcbncd at aII, ìt ìs an
I 02
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
cttort to cxprcss thìnµsonccannotspcakabout, to hcIpcxprcss
thcnonìdcntìcaI dcspìtc thc tactthatcxprcssìnµìtìdcntìhcsìtat
thc samc tìmc. HcµcI attcmpts to do thìs. ßccausc ìt can ncvcr
bc saìd dìrcctIy, bccausc cvcrythìnµ dìrcct and unmcdìatcd ìs
taIsc-and thcrctorc ncccssarìIy uncIcar ìn ìts cxprcssìon-hc
tìrcIcssIy says ìtìn mcdìatcdtorm. Jhìs ìs onc rcason whyHcµcI
ìnvokcs totaIìty, howcvcr probIcmatìc that conccpt may bc. A
phìIosophy that rcIìnquìshcs thìscÜortìn thc namc otatcmpt-
ìnµIy mathcmatìcìzcd tormaI Ioµìc dcnìcs ìts own conccpt a
prìorì-ìts ìntcntìon-and aconstìtutìvc partotthatìntcntìon ìs
thcìmpossìbìIìtythatWìttµcnstcìnandhìstoIIowcrshavcturncd
ìntoataboootrcasononphìIosophy, ataboo thatvìrtuaIIyaboI-
ìshcs rcason ìtscIt.
KarcIy has anyonc Iaìd out a thcory otphìIosophìcaI cIaruy,
ìnstcad, thc conccpt otcIarìty has bccn uscd as thouµh ìtwcrc
scIt-cvìdcnt.* In HcµcI cIarìty ìs ncvcr madc thcmatìc, at most,
thìsoccurse contrro, whcnHcµcIdctcndsHcracIìtus. ¨Jhcob-
scurìty otthìs phìIosophy, howcvcr, chìcby consìsts ìn thcrcbcìnµ
protound spccuIatìvc thouµht contaìncd ìn ìt, thc conccpt, thc
ìdca, ìs torcìµn to thc undcrstandìnµand cannotbc µraspcd by
ìt, thouµh ìt may hnd mathcmatìcs quìtc sìmpIc."'º In tcrms ot
ìts mcanìnµ, ìtnot IìtcraIIy, thc dcsìdcratum otcIarìty ìstrcatcd
*Alfred North Whitehead probably came closest in his metaphysical speculations
in Adventures ofIdeas (New York, MacMillan, 1932). Clarity and distinctness, he
says, can exist only if the "subject" is posited as being strictly identical with the
"knower" and the "object" with the "known": "No topic has suffered more from
this tendency of philosophers than their account of the object-subject structure
of experience. In the first place, this stru.cture has been identified with the bare
relation of knower to known. This subject is the knower, the object is the known.
Thus, with this interpretation, the object-subject relation is the known-knower
relation. It then follows that the more clearly any instance of this relation stands
out for discrimination, the more safely we must utilize it for the interpretation
of the status of experience in the universe of things. Hence Descartes' appeal to
clarity and distinctness" (p. 225).
I03
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ìnHusscrI'sIea; thcconccptotcxactncssìnthattcxtshouIdbc
cquatcdwìththctradìtìonaIconccptotcIarìty. HusscrIrcscrvcs
ìttormathcmatìcaIordchnìtcmanìtoIds'°andaskswhcthcrhìs
own phcnomcnoIoµìcaImcthodmustorcanbcconstìtutcdas a
¨µcomctryotcxpcrìcnccs". 'º¨HavcwchcrcaIsoto scckattcra
dchnìtc systcm otaxìoms and to crcctdcductìvc thcorìcs upon
ìt?"'' HusscrI's answcr µocs bcyond that mcthod. Hchas rcaI-
ìzcd that thc possìbìIìty ot dcrìvìnqdcductìvc thcorìcs trom a
dchnìtc systcm otaxìoms cannot bc dctcrmìncd mcthodoIoµì-
caIIy, but onIy on thc basìs otcontcnt. Jhìs touchcs on thc so-
caIIcdcxactncss otconccpt tormatìon,whìchaccordìnµto Hus-
scrIìsacondìtìonotdcductìvc thcory. Itìs
innosenseamatterofourarbitrarychoiceandoflogicaldexteritybut
inrespectoftheassumedaxiomaticconcepts,which musthoweverbe
presentable in immediate intuition, presupposes exactness in the ap-
prehended essence itself But to what extentºexactºessencescan be
foundinanessence-domain,andwhetherexactessenceshgureinthe
substructure ofall essences apprehendedinreal intuition, and there-
fore alsoofall the components ofthe essence, these are matters that
depend throughoutonthepeculiarnatureofthedomain.
I S
In thc ncxt paraµraph HusscrI dìstìnµuìshcs dcscrìptìvc trom
cxactscìcnccs and says otthc tormcr,
Thevageness oftheconcepts,thecircumstancesthattheyhavemobile
spheresofapplication,isnodefectattachingtothem,fortheyareßatly
indispensabletothesphereofknowledgetheyserve,or,aswemayalso
say,theyarewithinthisspheretheonlyconceptsjustihed. Ifitbehoves
us to bringto suitable conceptual expression theintuitablecorporeal
dataintheirintuitivelygivenessentialcharacters,wemustindeedtake
themaswehndthem.Andwedonothndthemotherwisethaninßux,
andtypicalessencescaninsuchcasebeapprehendedonlyinthatessen-
tialintuitionwhichcanbeimmediatelyanalysed.Themostperfectge-
ometryanditsmostperfectpracticalcontrolcannothelpthedescriptive
student ofnature to express precisely (in exactgeometricalconcepts)
I 04
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
thatwhichinsoplain,sounderstanding,andsoentirelysuitableaway
he expresses in the words. notched, indented, lens-shaped, umbelli-
form,andthelike~simplyconceptswhichareessentiallyandnotacci-
dentallyinexact,andarethereforealsounmathematical. ' "
AccordìnµIy,phìIosophìcaIconccpts,asmobìIcconccpts,arcdìs-
tìnµuìshcd trom cxact conccpts byvìrtuc otthc naturc otwhat
thcy attcmpt to µrasp. Atthcsamc tìmc, thìs scts Iìmìts to Hus-
scH's ìnsìµht. It acquìcsccs ìn thc dìstìnctìon bctwccn thc hxcd
and thc mobìIc, a dìstìnctìon dcrìvcd trom thc phìIosophy ot
rcbcctìon, whcrcas HcµcI's dìaIcctìc dch ncs cach as ìnhcrcntIy
mcdìatcd by thc othcr. ßut whìIc HusscrI ìs ìn othcr rcspccts
happy to]oìn ìn thc chorus that ccnsurcs HcµcItorhìs crìtìquc
otthcIaw otcontradìctìon, as aIoµìcìanHusscrIconccdcssomc-
thìnµ thatìsccrtaìnIy trucotHcµcIhìmscIt,who trìcd tar morc
vìµorousIythan HusscH toconstructconccptsìnsuchawaythat
thc Iìtc otthc thìnµ ìtscItwouId bc manìtcstcd ìn thcm, rathcr
than constructìnµ thcm ìn accordancc wìth thc abstract cpìstc-
moIoµìcaI ìdcaIotcIarìty. "WhoIIy ìmmcrscd ìn thc sub]cct aIonc,
hc sccmcd to dcvcIop ìt onIy out otìtscIt and tor ìts own sakc,
scarccIyoutothìsownspìrìttor thcsakcotthoscIìstcnìnµ, and
yct ìt spranµ trom hìm aIonc, and an aImost patcrnaI carc tor
cIarìtyattcnuatcd thc rìµìdscrìousncssthatmìµhthavc rcpcIIcd
thc acccptanccotsuchtroubIcsomcthouµhts.
,,
´
¹
ItthcdcmandtorcIarìtyµctstanµIcdupIìnµuìstìcaIIybccausc
IanµuaµcdocsnotactuaIIypcrmìtthcwordsthcmscIvcscIarìty-
cvcn ìnthìs rcµard thc ìdcaI otcIarìtyconvcrµcswìth thc math-
cmatìcaI-at thc samc tìmc, ìn Iìnµuìstìc tcrms cIarìty ìs dcpcn-
dcntonthcattìtudcotthouµhttoob]cctìvìtyìnsotarasonIywhat
ìs truc canbcsaìdwìthcompIctccIarìty. LompIctc transparcncy
ot cxprcssìon dcpcnds not onIy on thc rcIatìonshìp bctwccn
cxprcssìon and thc mattcr rcprcscntcd but aIso on thc sound-
ncss otthc]udµmcnt. Itìt ìs untoundcd or rcprcscnts a taIsc
I05
Skoteinos,orHow to ReadHegel
concIusìon,ìtwìIIrcsìstadcquatctormuIatìon, ìtìtdocsnottuIIy
µrasp thc mattcr at hand, ìtwìII bc vaµuc ìn rcIatìon to ìt. Lan-
µuaµc, whìch ìs not an ìndcx ottruth, ìs ncvcrthcIcss an ìndcx
ottaIschood. ßut ìtHcµcI'svcrdìctthat noìndìvìduaIscntcncc
canbc phìIosophìcaIIytruchoIds outsìdchìsownwork,thcncach
scntcncc shouId aIso bc controntcd wìth ìts Iìnµuìstìc ìnadc-
quacy. In HcµcIìan tcrms onc couId say-µrantcd, wìthout rc-
µard to HcµcI'sown Iìnµuìstìc praxìs-thatthcuncIarìtytor whìch
hc ncvcr ccascs to bc rcproachcd ìs not sìmpIy a wcakncss, ìt ìs
aIso thc torcc that drìvcs hìm to corrcct thcuntruthotthc par-
tìcuIar, an untruth that acknowIcdµcs ìtscItìn thc uncIarìty ot
thcìndìvìduaIscntcncc.
ßcstabIcto mcct thc dcmandsotthìsprcdìcamcntwouIdbc
aphìIosophìcaIIanµuaµcthatwouIdstrìvctorìntcIIìµìbìIìtywìth-
outcontusìnµìtwìthcIarìty. AsancxprcssìonotthcthìnµìtscIt,
Ianµuaµc ìs not tuIIy rcducìbIc to communìcatìon wìth othcrs.
lor, howcvcr-and HcµcI kncw thìs-ìs ìtsìmpIy ìndcpcndcnt
otcommunìcatìon.OthcrwìscìtwouIdcIudcaIIcrìtìquc,cvcnìn
ìts rcIatìonshìp to thc mattcr at hand, and wouId rcducc that
rcIatìonshìp to an arbìtrary prcsumptìon. Lanµuaµc as cxprcs-
sìonotthcthìnµìtscItandIanµuaµcascommunìcatìonarcìntcr-
wovcn.JhcabìIìt·to namcthc mattcrathandìs dcvcIopcdundcr
thccompuIsìon tocommunìcatcìt, andthatcIcmcntotcocrcìon
ìsprcscrvcdìnìt, convcrscIy,ìtcouIdnotcommunìcatcanythìnµ
that ìt dìd not havc as ìts own ìntcntìon, undìstractcd by othcr
consìdcratìons. Jhìs dìaIcctìc pIaysìtscItoutwìthìnthc mcdìum
otIanµuaµc ìtscIt, ìtìs notmcrcIy ataII tromµracconthc part
otanìnhumancsocìaIzcaIthatwatchcstomakcsurcthatnoonc
thìnksanythìnµthatcannotbccommunìcatcd.IvcnaIìnµuìstìc
approachotthc utmostìntcµrìtycannotdoawaywìththcantaµ-
onìsmbctwccn whatìs ìnìtscItand whatìstorothcrs. WhìIc ìn
Iìtcraturc thìs antaµonìsm may µo on bchìnd thcbacks ot thc
I 06
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
tcxts,sotospcak, phìIosophyìscompcIIcdtotakcìtìntoaccount.
Jhìs ìs madc morc dìtbcuItby thc hìstorìcaI momcnt, ìnwhìch
communìcatìon dìctatcdbythcmarkct-thc rcpIaccmcntotIìn-
µuìstìcthcorybycommunìcatìonthcoryìssymptomatìcotthìs-
wcìµhs upon Ianµuaµc to such an cxtcnt that Ianµuaµc torcìbIy
puts a stop to communìcatìon ìn ordcr to rcsìst thc contormìty
otwhat posìtìvìsm caIIs ¨ordìnary Ianµuaµc. " Lanµuaµc wouId
rathcr bccomc unìntcIIìµìbIc than dìshµurc thc mattcr at hand
throuµhacommunìcatìonthatµctsìnthcwayotcommunìcatìnµ
ìt. ßut thc Iìnµuìstìccttorts otthc thcorctìcìan run up aµaìnsta
Iìmìt that thcy havc to rcspcct ìtthcy do not want to sabotaµc
thcmscIvcs as much throuµh bdcIìty as throuµh ìnbdcIìty. Jhc
momcntotunìvcrsaIìty ìn Ianµuaµc, wìthout whìchthcrc wouId
bcno Ianµuaµc, docs ìrrcvocabIcdamaµcto thc compIctc ob]cc-
tìvcspccìbcìtyotthcpartìcuIarthìnµìtwantstodcbnc.Jhccor-
rcctìvc to thìs Iìcs ìn cttorts to achìcvc ìntcIIìµìbìIìty, howcvcr
unrccoµnìzabIc thosc cttorts may bc. Jhìs ìntcIIìµìbìIìty ìs thc
opposìtc poIcto purc Iìnµuìstìc ob]cctìvìty. Jhctruthotcxprcs-
sìonbourìshcsonIyìnthctcnsìonbctwccnthctwo.Jhìstcnsìon,
howcvcr, ìs not thc samc thìnµ as thc vaµuc and brutaI com-
mandmcnt otcIarìtv, whìch tor thc most part amounts to thc
ìn]unctìon that onc spcak thc way othcrs do and rctraìn trom
anythìnµthatwouId bc dìÜcrcntand couId onIybc saìd dìttcr-
cntIy. Jhc rcquìrcmcnt ot cIarìty ìmposcs a tutìIc dcmand on
Ianµuaµc, adcmand ìtwants tuIm!cd contìnuousIy, hcrcandnow,
ìmmcdìatcIy. ItaskssomcthìnµIanµuaµccannotµrantìnthcìm-
mcdìacy otìts words and scntcnccs-somcthìnµ ìtcan µrantonIy,
and traµmcntarìIy at that, ìn thcìr conhµuratìon. ßcttcr wouId
bcan approach thatcarctuIIyavoìdcddcbnìtìonsas mcrcstìpu-
Iatìons and modcIcd conccpts as taìthtuIIy as possìbIc on what
thcy say ìn Ianµuaµc, makìnµ thcm vìrtuaIIy namcs. Itnothìnµ
cIsc, thc Iatcr, ¨matcrìaI" phcnomcnoIoµy was prcparatìon tor
I07
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
that. Jhc ctiortthc !ìnµuìstìc scnsorìum has to makc to achìcvc
prccìsìon ìs tar µrcatcr than thc mcchanìca! cttort to capturc
ordaìncddcbnìtìons. hcwhomakcshìmsc!tthcs!avcothìsown
words makcs thìnµs casìcr tor hìmsc!tby shovìnµ thc words ìn
tront otthc thìnµìtsc!t, howcvcr much hc battcrs hìmsc!tthat
hc ìs makìnµìthardcr. lcvcrthc!css, thatwayotprocccdìnµ ìs
ìnadcquatc. Îorthcwords ìn cmpìrìca! !anµuaµcsarcnot purc
namcsbuta!ways 0€oe:,posìtìnµs,aswc!!, productsotsub]cctìvc
conscìousncsswhìch to thatcxtcnta!sorcscmb!cdcbnìtìons. Hc
who dìsrcµards thìs dc!ìvcrs hìmsc!t ovcr to a sccond kìnd ot
rc!atìvìtyìntcarìnµwords awaytrom thc rc!atìvìtyotdcbnìtìon,
a sccond rc!atìvìty that ìs a rcsìduc otthc arbìtrarìncss othow
wcarcto undcrstand thcm.Îhì!osophìca!!anµuaµchasnorcm-
cdy tor thìs but to takc carc to usc thosc words, whìch wou!d
ncccssarì!ytaì!ìtthcywcrcuscd!ìtcra!!yasnamcs,ìnsuchaway
thatthcìrarbìtrarìncssìsdccrcascdthrouµhthcìrposìtìon. Jhc
!ìnµuìstìc conbµuratìon and thc µazc tocuscd ìntcnsc!y on thc
ìndìvìdua! word comp!cmcnt onc anothcr. Joµcthcr thcy cx-
p!odcthc !aycrotmcdìocrc tacìtaµrccmcnt, thcstìcky!aycrbc-
twccnundcrstandìnµandthcmattcrathand.Jhctruc!ìnµuìstìc
mcthodcou!d bc comparcdwìth thc way thc cmìµró!carns!an-
µuaµc. Impatìcntandundcrprcssurc,hcmaynotuscthcdìctìo-
naryas muchasrcadwhatcvcrhccanµctacccssto. ßythatmcans,
numcrouswordswì!!bcrcvca!cdìncontcxtbutwì!!bc!onµsur-
roundcd by an outcr arca otìndctcrmìnatcncss, pcrmìttìnµ rì-
dìcu!ous contusìons, untì!thcwords dccìphcr thcmsc!vcs throuµh
thcabundancc otcombìnatìonsìnwhìch thcy appcarand do so
bcttcr and morc tu!!y than wou!d havc bccn possìb!c wìth thc
dìctìonary, whcrccvcn thcchoìcc otsynonymsìsattcctcdby thc
!cxìcoµraphcr's narrowncss and !ackot1ìnµuìstìcsophìstìcatìon.
Oncnotìnsìµnìbcantrcason tor thc rctractorìncss otHcµc!'s
tcxtsìsprobab!ythat Hcµc!, wìthhìscxccssìvcconbdcnccìnthc
I08
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ob]cctìvc spìrìt, bcIìcvcd thathccouId avoìd thìs kìnd otadmìx-
turc otthc aIìcn, thathccouIdsaythcunsayabIc ìnhìsordìnary
manncr otspccch. Dcspìtc thìs, thc cIcmcnts asscmbIcd ìn hìs
work-onccpts,]udµmcnts, syIIoµìsms-arc not unìntcIIìµìbIc.
It ìs onIy that thcy poìnt bcyond thcmscIvcs and cvcn ìn tcrms
otthcìrownìdca arc no morccapabIcottuIhIImcntìnìsoIatìon
thanarc thccomponcntsotcxtraphìIosophìcaIIanµuaµc, whìch
arc not aw�rc thatthìs ìs truc otthcm. Îrom thìs poìnt otvìcw,
thc task ot undcrstandìnµ phìIosophy, and cspccìaIIy HcµcI's
phìIosophy,wouIdbc that otundcrstandìnµthcthìnµsthatwouId
not hoId upbctorc thc currcnt norm otcIarìty. thìnkìnµwhatìs
mcant cvcn whcrc not cvcrythìnµ ìmpIìcd ìn ìt can bc rcprc-
scntcd clare et ditincte. 5ccn trom thc poìnt otvìcw otscìcncc
and schoIarshìp, thcrc ìs a momcntotìrratìonaIìty ìn thcmakcup
otphìIosophìcaI ratìonaIìty, andìtìsup to phìIosophy to absorb
thìsmomcntwìthoutthcrcby sìµnìnµìtscItovcrtoìrratìonaIìsm.
JhcdìaIcctìcaImcthodasawhoIcìsan attcmpttocopcwìththìs
dcmand by trccìnµ thouµht trom thc spcII ot thc ìnstant and
dcvcIopìnµ ìt ìn tar-rcachìnµ conccptuaI structurcs. IhìIosophì-
caI cxpcrìcncc cannot dìspcnsc wìthcxcmpIary obvìousncss, wìth
thc ¨thìs ìs thc way ìt ìs" wìthìn thc horìzon ot ìncradìcabIc
vaµucncss. It cannot stop thcrc, but thc pcrson tor whom such
obvìousncss docs notbash outìnanywaydurìnµthcrcadìnµot
thìs or that wcìµhty passaµc ìn HcµcI's Logc, thc pcrson who
docs not notìcc what has bccn capturcd thcrc, cvcn ìtìt ìs not
tuIIyartìcuIatcd,wìIIundcrstand no morc than apcrsoncnrap-
turcd wìth thc vaµucncss otphìIosophìcaI tccIìnµ. Îanatìcpro-
poncnts otcIarìtywouId Iìkc to cxtìnµuìshsuch suddcn bashcs
otìIIumìnatìon. IhìIosophy ìs supposcd to pay ìncash, and on
thcspot,ìnvoIvcmcntìnphìIosophyìscvaIuatcdbymcansotthc
baIanccshcct, onthc modcIotancxpcndìturc otIabor that has
to havc ìts cquìvaIcntìn waµcs. ßut phìIosophy ìs aprotcstaµaìnst
I09
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
thcprìncìpIcotcquìvaIcncc,andìnthatrcµardìtìsunbourµcoìs
cvcnas bourµcoìs phìIosophy. Jhc pcrsonwhodcmands a pay-
otttromìt-¨Why shouId I bc ìntcrcstcd ìn thìs?"-ìs chcatìnµ
hìmscItotìts IìtcbIood, thc rhythm otcontìnuìty and ìntcrmìt-
tcncyìnìntcIIcctuaIcxpcrìcncc.
JhcspccìhcìtyotphìIosophyasaconhµuratìonotmomcntsìs
quaIìtatìvcIy dìttcrcnt trom aIackotambìµuìtyìncvcrypartìc-
uIar momcnt, cvcnwìthìnthcconhµuratìon,bccauscthcconbµ-
uratìon ìtscIt ìs morc, and othcr, than thc quìntcsscncc otìts
momcnts. LonstcIIatìon ìs not systcm. Ivcrythìnµ docs not bc-
comcrcsoIvcd, cvcrythìnµdocs notcomc outcvcn, rathcr,onc
momcntshcdsIìµhtonthcothcr,andthcbµurcs thatthcìndì-
vìduaI momcnts torm toµcthcr arc spccìhc sìµns and a IcµìbIc
scrìpt. Jhìs ìs not yctartìcuIatcd ìn HcµcI, whosc modc otprc-
scntatìon ìs charactcrìzcd by a sovcrcìµnIy ìndìttcrcnt attìtudc
towardIanµuaµc, atanyratcìthas notpcnctratcdìnto thcchc-
mìsmothìsownIìnµuìstìctorm.InìtsaII-too-sìmpIcmìndcdcon-
hdcncc ìn thc totaIìty, thc Iattcr Iacks thcsharpncss dcrìvcd trom
thccrìtìcaIscIt-awarcncssthat,ìncombìnatìonwìthrcbcctìonon
thc ncccssary dìsproportìon, couId brìnµ thcdìaIcctìcìnto Ian-
µuaµc. Jhìs ìsdcadIy, bccausc HcµcI's tormuIatìons, whìch ncì-
thcrcanbcnorarcìntcndcdtobcconcIusìvc,ncvcrthcIcssottcn
soundas thouµhthcywcrc.HcµcI'sIanµuaµchasthcdcmcanor
otthcIanµuaµcotdoctrìnc. Whatµìvcsìtthataìrìsthcprcpon-
dcrancc otquasì-oraIdcIìvcryovcr thcwrìttcntcxt. Vaµucncss,
somcthìnµthatcannotbccIìmìnatcdìndìaIcctìc, bccomcs a dc-
tcctìn HcµcI bccausc hcdìd notìncIudcan antìdotc to ìtìn hìs
Ianµuaµc,aIthouµhìnothcrrcspccts,ìnthcsub]cctmattcrothìs
phìIosophy, wìth ìts cmphasìs on and uItìmatcIy ccIcbratìon ot
aIIkìnds otob]cctìvìty, hc provìdcd ìtIìbcraIIy. Hc wouId havc
prctcrrcdtowrìtcìnthctradìtìonaIphìIosophìcaImanncr,wìth-
out thc dìttcrcncc bctwccn hìs and tradìtìonaI thcorybcìnµ rc-
I I0
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
bcctcd ìn hìs Ianµuaµc. Jhc IoyaI ìntcrprctcr ot HcµcI has to
takc accountotthìs dchcìcncy. It ìs up to hìm todo what HcµcI
taìIcd to do. to producc as much concìscncss ottormuIatìon as
possìbIcìn ordcr torcvcaIthcrìµorotthcdìaIcctìcaImovcmcnt,
arìµorthatìsnotcontcntwìthsuch concìscncss. Jhcrcìs prob-
abIy no onc tor whom thc phìIoIoµìcaI norm-probIcmatìc ìn
any casc-ot tcasìnµ out thc author's sub]cctìvcIy ìntcndcd
mcanìnµìs Icss approprìatc than HcµcI. Îor hìs mcthod, whìch
cannotbc scparatcd tromthc mattcrat hand, ìs ìntcndcd to sct
ìts ob]cctìn motìon, not to dcvcIop hìs own thouµhts. Hìs tcxts
arc not tuIIy workcd out-whìch ncccssarìIy mcans ìndìvì-
duatcd-bccauscthcìrìntcIIcctuaImcdìumìsaIsonottuI!yworkcd
outìnthcwaywc havc comcto takc tor µrantcd¡nthc hundrcd
and htty ycarssìncc thcn. Atthattìmconc provìdcd kcywords
torthc rcadcr, cntranccs, as ìt wcrc, such as occur ìn musìc. In
thcScience of Logc, thìs kìnd otaprìorìstìccommunìcatìon thcn
bccomcs thc tcrmcntota noncommunìcatìvc tcxt and makcs ìt
hcrmctìc.
Jhcmostwìdcsprcadob]cctìonto HcµcI'saIIcµcdIackotcIar-
ìtyìs thatotcquìvocatìon, wcbndìtcvcnìn\bcrwcµ'sHistory of
Philosophy. 21 HcµcI's phìIosophytccmswìthcxampIcsotcquìvo-
catìon. At thcbcµìnnìnµ otthcSubjective Logic, torìnstancc.
Whatthenatureoftheconceptis,cannomorebestatedoffhandthan
cantheconceptofanyotherobject.. . . Nowa|thoughitistruethatthe
conceptistoberegarded,notmere|yasasubjectivepresuppositionbut
astheabso|utefoundation,yetitcanbesoon|yinsofarasithasmade
itse|fthe foundation.Abstractimmediacyisnodoubtahrst, yetinso
farasitisabstractitis,onthecontrarymediated,andthereforeifitis
tobegraspedinitstruthitsfoundationmusthrstbesought.Hencethis
foundation, though indeed an immediate, must have made itse|fim-
mediatethroughthesub|ationofmediation.
22
Wìthoutqucstìon, thc conccpt otthc conccpt [Begriff ìs uscd
dìticrcntIyatthctwodìÜcrcntpoìnts.InonccasccmphatìcaIIy,
I I I
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
as "absoIutc toundatìon," that ìs, ob]cctìvcIy, ìnthc scnsc otthc
thìnµìtscIt,whìchìscsscntìaIIyspìrìt, butconccptsarc tobcnot
onIy that but aIso thc "sub]cctìvc prcsupposìtìon," somcthìnp
madc, undcrwhìchthouµhtsubsumcsìts Othcr. Jhc tcrmìnoI-
oµyìscontusìnµbccausccvcnìnthcsccondcascìtìsthcsìnµuIar
and not, as oncwouId cxpcct, thc pIuraI that ìs uscd, probabIy
bccausc ìn prìncìpIc thc ìdca that thc conccpt ìs thc rcsuIt ot
sub]cctìvc synthcsìs ìs as much a part otHcµcI's conccpt otthc
conccpt as thc ìdca thatìtcxprcsscs thc ìnhcrcnt naturc otthc
mattcr at hand. In contrast to many othcr HcµcIìan cquìvoca-
tìons, thc undcrstandìnµ otthìs onc ìs madc casìcr by thc tact
thatthcdìttcrcnccsìnthctwo conccptsotthcconccptarcmadc
thcmatìc ìn thc chaptcr "Jhc Lonccptìn GcncraI. " HcµcI pro-
vìdcsthc]ustìhcatìon tor thìscquìvocatìon atcw paµcsIatcr, whcn
hc cxpounds on thc unìty ot thc two conccpts. "I wìII conhnc
myscIthcrctoarcmarkwhìchmayhcIponctoµraspthcnotìons
hcrcdcvcIopcdandmaymakcìtcasìcrtobndonc'sbcarìnµs ìn
thcm. Jhc conccptwhcn ìt has dcvcIopcd ìnto aconcrctccxìs-
tcncc that ìs ìtscIt trcc, ìs nonc othcr than thc I or purc scIt-
conscìousncss. "´ºJhcob]cctìvcconccpt,whìchaccordìnµto Hc-
µcIìsthcconccptotthcthìnµìtscIt,whìchdcvcIopcd

tobccomc
ìts cxìstcncc, somcthìnµ cxìstìnµ ìn ìtscIt, ìs at thc samc tìmc,
accordìnµ to thc µcncraI thcsìs ot HcµcI's systcm, sub]cctìvìty.
HcnccìnthcIastanaIysìsthcnomìnaIìstìcsìdcotthcconccpt,as
somcthìnµsub]cctìvcIy tormcd, coìncìdcswìththc rcaIìstìc sìdc,
thc conccpt as somcthìnµcxìstìnµ ìnìtscIt, whìch ìn thccoursc
otthc mcdìatìons otthcLogc ìsìtscItshown to bc sub]cct, cµo.
JhìsstructurcìsprototypìcaItorthcmcdìocrcquaIìtyotthcob-
]cctìonsto HcµcI'scquìvocatìons.WhcrcHcµcIìstormaIIyµuìIty
otcquìvocatìon, ìt ìs usuaIIy a qucstìon otpoìnts hc ìs makìnµ
thatarc µcrmanc to thc contcnt, ancxpIìcatìonothow two dìs-
tìnctmomcnts arcboth dìttcrcntand onc and thc samc. Ob]cc-
tìons thatarc transccndcnt to HcµcI scarccIy touch hìm. 5uch
I I 2
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ob]cctìons assumc thc prìncìpIc otìdcntìty. tcrms must rcmaìn
wìthìn thc mcanìnµ oncc µìvcn thcm by dcbnìtìon. Jhìs ìs purc
nomìnaIìsm, conccpts shouId bc nothìnµ but ìdcntìbcatìon taµs
torthc unìtyìnµ charactcrìstìcs ota manìtoId. Jhc morc sub]cc-
tìvcthcìr tormatìon, thc Icss oncshouIdattackthcm, as ìtthcìr
cxtcrnaI, artìbcìaIquaIìty wouId thcrcbybc rcvcaIcd. Lommon
scnsc ratìonaIìzcs thìsbysayìnµthatvìoIatìnµ thc dchnìtìon wouId
dcstroy ordcrìn thìnkìnµ. Jhìs protcstsccms so unamcnabIc to
chaIIcnµc bccausc ìtìsbascd onaconccptìon thatdocsnotwant
to know about anythìnµ ìn thc ob]cct that couId µìvc thc Iìc to
what sub]cctìvc spìrìt has ìmposcd on ìt. Jhat conccptìon cncr-
µctìcaIIy rcsìsts thc cxpcrìcncc that wants to Ict thc mattcr at
hand spcaktorìtscIt, pcrhapssuspcctìnµthatìnthctaccotthat
cxpcrìcnccìtsownsccmìnµIyìncorruptìbIcconccptottruthwouId
bcIcdtocontcssìtsuntruth.lomìnaIìsmìspartotthcbourµcoìs
bcdrock, ìtaccompanìcs thcconsoIìdatìonoturbanìsmacrossaII
ìts phascs, and ìn thc most dìvcrsc natìons thc ambìvaIcncc ot
that proccss ìs scdìmcntcd ìn ìt. lomìnaIìsm hcIps to trcc con-
scìousncsstromthcprcssurcotthcauthorìtyotthcconccptthat
hadcstabIìshcd ìtscItas unìvcrsaIìty, ìtdocssobydìscnchantìnµ
thc conccptand makìnµìtamcrc abbrcvìatìon torthc partìcu-
Iarìtìcsìtcovcrs. ßut such cnIìµhtcnmcntìsaIwaysaIsoìtsoppo-
sìtc. hypostasìs ot thc partìcuIar. Jo thìs cxtcnt nomìnaIìsm
cncouraµcs thc bourµcoìsìc to bc suspìcìous otcvcrythìnµ that
wouId rcstraìn ìsoIatcd ìndìvìduaIs ìn thcìr ¨pursuìt ot happì-
ncss," thc unrcbcctìvc pursuìt otthcìr own advantaµc, as bcìnµ
mcrc ìIIusìon. lothìnµunìvcrsaIshouIdcxìstthatwouIdrcmovc
thcbIìndcrsotthcpartìcuIar, thcbcIìctthatìtscontìnµcncyìsìts
Iaw. ¨What's a conccpt anyway?"-thìs µcsturc aIways cxprcsscs
somcthìnµ cIsc as wcII. that thc ìndìvìduaI has moncy to carn
and that ìs morc ìmportant than anythìnµ cIsc. Itthc conccpt
wcrc to bc autonomous ìn such a way that ìt dìd not cxhaust
I I3
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ìtscItìn thc partìcuIars otwhìch ìt ìs composcd, thc bourµcoìs
prìncìpIc otìndìvìduatìon wouId bc shakcn to ìts corc. ßut that
prìncìpIc ìs aII thc morc spìtctuIIy dctcndcd torbcìnµ ìIIusìon,
aII thcmorcsoìnthatunìvcrsaIìtyìnthcbadscnscrcaIìzcsìtscIt
throuµh ìndìvìduaI ìntcrcsts and burìcsìndìvìduaIìntcrcsts bc-
ncathìt ìnturn. JhìsìIIusìonìs stubbornIy maìntaìncdbccausc
othcrwìscthoscwhoarcundcrìtsspcIIcouIdnoIonµcrcontìnuc
on unchaIIcnµcd, norcouId thcycontìnuc to bcIìcvcìn thc mc-
taphysìcsot¨what's mìncìs mìnc," thcsacrcdncssotposscssìon
as such. Îrom thìs poìntotvìcw, ìndìvìduaIìtyìs thc sub]cctbc-
comc propcrty. lomìnaIìsm, whìchìs antì-ìdcoIoµìcaI, has bccn
ìdcoIoµy trom thc vcry bcµìnnìnµ. HcµcI'sLogc wantcd to dc-
vcIop thìs dìaIcctìc wìth ìts own mcans,whìcharcnotobvìousIy
rcbcctìons otsocìcty-Icavìnµ an ìdcoIoµìca! rcsìduc, namcIythat
torthcIìbcraIthcunìvcrsaIìtythatruIcsìnandabovcìndìvìduaIs
wouId bc transbµurcd and wouId bccomc somcthìnµ posìtìvc.
OnIy thìs kìnd otìdcoIoµìcaI turn pcrmìts HcµcI to ncutraIìzc
thc socìaI dìaIcctìc otthc µcncraI and thc partìcuIarby makìnµ
ìta IoµìcaI onc. In bcìnµ procIaìmcd rcaIìty, thc conccpt, whìch
torHcµcIìstobcrcaIìty,rcmaìnsconccpt. ßuttorHcµcI, as tor
ÎIato, thc mcasurc ot thc conccptìs thc cIaìmmadcby thc mat-
tcrathandandnotthcsub]cct'sdchnìtoryactìvìty.HcnccHcµcI
suspcnds thcìdcntìtyotthc conccpt as acrìtcrìonoÍtruth. Itìs
onIythatcrìtcrìon,howcvcr,thatdcµradcstothcstatusotcquìv-
ocatìonsomcthìnµthatchanµcsthcmcanìnµotconccpts torthc
sakcotthcìrownsubstancc.
5tìII, HcµcI dìd not sìmpIy ovcrturn thc prìncìpIc otìdcntìty,
rathcr, hc rcstrìctcd ìt, dcspìsìnµ and rcspcctìnµ ìt at thc samc
tìmc ìn hìs way. OnIy by vìrtuc otthat prìncìpIc, that ìs, onIy
whcnthcIìtcotthcthìnµcxprcsscdbythcconccptìscomparcd
wìththcmcanìnµspccìhcoandwhcnthcoIdmcanìnµìsthcrcby
dìshonorcd asìnvaIìd, ìsthc

othcr mcanìnµconstìtutcd. Onthc
I I4
Skoteinos,orHowtoRead Hegel
onc hand, HcµcI handIcs tcrms thc way nonphìIosophìcaI Ian-
µuaµc unthìnkìnµIy trcats many otìts words and word cIasscs.
as thc occasìon rcquìrcs. WhìIcsomcIaycrsotmcanìnµ rcmaìn
constant ìn such words, othcrs arc acquìrcd accordìnµ to thc
contcxt. ÎhìIosophìcaI Ianµuaµc ìs pattcrncd onnaìvc Ianµuaµc
to thc cxtcntthat, skcptìcaIotscìcntìbcIanµuaµc, ìtuscscontcxt
to sottcn thc rìµìdìty otìts systcm otdchnìtìon. In HcµcI such
occasìonaI cquìvocatìons occurwìth cxprcssìons Iìkc thc "unmit­
telbar" 'unmcdìatcdorìmmcdìatc|hcuscssoIavìshIy. Whcn Hc-
µcI wants to saythat thc mcdìatìonìs ìn thc thìnµìtscItand not
bctwccnscvcraIthìnµs,hco!tcnuscs"unmittelbar" torthìnµsthat
arc mcdìatcd [ "mittelbar"] : to saythatacatcµoryìsunmittelbar ìts
opposìtc thus mcans somcthìnµ Iìkc, ìt ìs ìts opposìtc ìn ìtscIt,
rathcr than onIy throuµh rcIatìonshìp to somcthìnµ cxtcrnaI to
ìt. "Jhc cxcIusìvc rcbcctìon ìs thus a posìtìnµ otthc posìtìvc as
cxcIudìnµ ìts opposìtc, so that thìs posìtìnµ ìs ìmmcdìatcIy thc
posìtìnµ otìts opposìtc whìch ìt cxcIudcs. "´' AccordìnµIy, mc-
dìatìonìsìtscItìmmcdìatc,bccausc what ìs posìtcd, mcdìatcd, ìs
nothìnµdìttcrcnttromwhatìsprìmary,bccauscthìsìtscItìspos-
ìtcd. 5ìmìIarIy, and cvcn morcbIatantIy, hc says ìnaIatcr notc,
"Itìs vcry ìmportant to notìcc that thc un mcdìatcd ìdcntìty oÍ
torm ìs posìtcd hcrc wìthout thc movcmcnt otthc tact ìtscIt, a
movcmcnt prcµnantwìth contcnt. Itoccurs ìnthc tactas thìsìs
ínìtsbcµìnnìnµ.JhuspurcbcìnµìsìmmcdìatcIynothìnµ."´ºHcrc
"ìmmcdìatcIy" sounds sìmpIy paradoxìcaI, but what ìs mcant ìs
that nothìnµ ìs not a catcµory addcd to purc bcìnµ trom thc
outsìdc, ìnstcad, as somcthìnµuttcrIyunspccìbcd, purc bcìnµ ìs
ìn ìtscIt nothìnµ. A thorouµhµoìnµ tcrmìnoIoµìcaI anaIysìs ot
HcµcI'sIanµuaµccouIdmakcacompIctcIìstìnµotsuch cquìvo-
catìonsand prcsumabIycIarìtythcm. ItwouIdhavc to dcaIwìth
tcchnìcaItcrmsIìkcRefexion 'rcbcctìon| aswcII. ÎoIIowìnµadìs-
tìnctìon currcnt ìn post-Kantìan ìdcaIìsm, that word covcrs thc
I I5
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
bnítc, rcstríctcd usc otth� íntcIIcct and, somcwhatmorcbroadIy,
thc posítívístíc scícntíhc attítudc as a whoIc, but ít aIso covcrs,
wíthínthcovcraIIarchítccturcotthcLogc, thc "Refexionsbestim­
mungen, " thc dctcrmínatíonsotrcbcctíon, thatís, thc crítícaIrc-
bcctíon otthc ob]cctívc, ínítíaI, quasí-ArístotcIíanthcoryotthc
catcµorícs, whíchís thcnconvíctcd ín turnotbcínµíIIusoryand
ísIcdonwardto thccmphatícconccptotthcconccpt.
Onthcothcrhand, thccquívocatíons mayrcaIIybccquívoca-
tíons. a phíIosophícaI tcchníquc throuµhwhích thc díaIcctíc ot
thouµht hopcs to rcaIízc ítscItín Ianµuaµc, occasíonaIIy wíth a
somcwhat hcavy�handcd tcndcncy, antícípatínµ Hcídcµµcr, to
µívc Iínµuístícstatcsotattaírs autonomyvís-à-vís what ís mcant,
IcsscmphatícaIIythanínHcídcµµcr,ccrtaínIy,andthcrctorcmorc
ínnoccntIy. In thc Phenomenolo
g
, tor ínstancc, HcµcI ís aIrcady
]uµµIínµ thc mcanínµ ot ''rinnerung'' [rccoIIcctíon or ínwardí-
zatíon| .
Asitsfulhllmentconsistsinperfectlyknowingwhatitis,inknowingits
substance,thisknowingisitswithdrawalintoitselfinwhichitabandons
its outerexistence and gives its existential shape overto recollection.
Thusabsorbedinitself,itissunkinthenightofitsself-consciousness,
but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this
transformedexistence~theformerone, butnowrebornoftheSpirit's
knowledge~isthenewexistence,anewworldandanewshapeofSpirit.
Intheimmediacyofthisnewexistence the Spirithastostartafreshto
bringitselftomaturityasif,forit,allthatprecededwerelostandithad
learnednothingfromtheexperienceoftheearlierSpirits.Butrecollec-
tion, the inwardizing, ofthat experience, has preserved itand is the
innerbeing,andinfactthehigherformofthesubstance.Soalthough
thisSpiritstartsafreshandapparentlyfromitsownresourcestobring
itselftomaturity,itisnoneofthelessonahigherlevelthatitstarts.²ª
JhcmosthackncycdtunctíonaIcquívocatíonísthatwíth"aufhe­
ben" [canccI, prcscrvc, subIatc|, but thís tcchníquc can bc ob-
scrvcdínmorcsubtIccascsas wcII, sccrctpIaysonwords, HcµcI
I I6
Skoteinos, orHowtoReadHegel
p!aystrìcks wìth thc conccptotnothìnµncss ìn partìcu!ar. 5uch
!ìnµuìstìc hµurcs shou!d bc takcn not!ìtcra!!y but ìronìca!!y, as
too!cry. Wìthoutbattìnµan cyc, Hcµc! uscs !anµuaµc to convìct
!anµuaµcotthccmptyprctcnscotìtssc!t-satìsbcdmcanìnµ. Jhc
tunctìonot!anµuaµc ìn such passaµcs ìs notapo!oµctìcbutcrìt-
ìca!. It dìsavows thc hnìtc]udµmcntthatìn ìts partìcu!ar!ìtyacts
as thouµh ìt had thcabso!utc truth, ob]cctìvc!y and wìthoutbcìnµ
ab!c to do anythìnµ about ìt. Iquìvocatìon ìs ìntcndcd to dcm-
onstratc,wìth!oµìca!mcans,thcìnapproprìatcncssotstatìc!oµìc
torsomcthìnµ thatìs ìnhcrcnt!y mcdìatcd and thatby vìrtuc ot
cxìstìnµ ìs ìn thc proccss otbccomìnµ. Jurnìnµ !oµìc aµaìnst ìt-
sc!tìs thcdìa!cctìca!sa!tìnsuch cquìvocatìons.
Jhccurrcnt undcrstandìnµ otcquìvocatìonshou!d notbcac-
ccptcd uncrìtìca!!y. A scmantìc ana!ysìs that dìssccts cquìvoca-
tìons scìcntìbca!!y ìs a ncccssary but by no mcans sutbcìcnt
condìtìon ota !ìnµuìstìc stocktakìnµ otphì!osophy. +o bc surc,
onc cannot undcrstand phì!osophy wìthout scparatìnµ thc
mcanìnµsotthctcrms"ìmmancnt"andìtscorrc!atìvc"transccn-
dcnt". thc!oµìca!mcanìnµ, whìch has todowìthwhcthcrornot
thouµhtrcmaìnswìthìnthc prcsupposìtìonsotthcthcorcmwìth
whìch ìt ìs conccrncd, thc cpìstcmo!oµìca! mcanìnµ, whìch has
to do wìth whcthcr thc ìdca procccds trom thc ìmmancncc ot
conscìousncss, thcso-ca!!cd contcxtotthcµìvcnwìthìnthcsub-
]cct,andthc mctaphysìca! mcanìnµ, whìchhasto dowìth whcthcr
know!cdµc rcmaìns wìthìn thc boundarìcs ot possib!c cxpcrì-
cncc. Jhc choìcc ot thc samc word tor thc dìttcrcnt ;eru, or
µcncra, howcvcr,ìsnotaccìdcnta!,cvcnìnthccurrcnttcrmìno!-
oµy. Jhus thc cpìstcmo!oµìca! and mctaphysìca! mcanìnµs ot
"transccndcnt"arcconncctcd, thatwhìchìsabso!utc!ytransccn-
dcntìncpìstcmo!oµìca!tcrms,thc Kantìanthìnµ-ìn-ìtsc!t,thatìs,
that whìch cannotbctoundwìthìnthcstrcamotconscìousncss,
wou!da!sobcmctaphysìca!!ytransccndcnt.Hcµc!cxtcndcdthat
I I7
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
to thc thcsìs that Ioµìc and mctaphysìcsarc onc and thc samc.
Ivcnìn prcdìaIcctìcaI Ioµìc, cquìvocatìons do notµIossovcrab-
soIutcdìttcrcnccsbut rathcrbcarwìtncsstotbc unìtyotwhatìs
dìttcrcnt. IIIumìnatìnµ thcm rcquìrcs ìnsìµht ìnto that unìty as
much as ¡t rcquìrcs notìnµ thc dìttcrcnccs. DìaIcctìcaI phìIoso-
phy mcrcIy hcIpcd to scIt-conscìousncss a statc otattaìrs that
prcvaìIcd ìn tradìtìonaI tcrmìnoIoµy and ìts hìstory aµaìnst ìts
wìII. HcµcI'scquìvocatìons tccdonthìsstatcotattaìrs,cvcnìtìn
hìsthouµhtthcmomcntotdìstìnctìonoccasìonaIIyIanµuìshcsìn
tavorotthcmomcntotundìttcrcntìatcdsamcncss.
5uch Iaxìtìcs notwìthstandìnµ, wcbnd supcrIatìvcs appIìcd to
Ianµuaµc throuµhout HcµcI's wrìtìnµs. Lanµuaµc ìs saìd to bc
thc¨pcrtcctcxprcssìon. . . torthcmìnd,"´'thc¨hìµhcstpowcr
posscsscd by mankìnd." ´º lordocs thcLogc dcvìatc trom thìs.
It dcaIs wìth thc ¨cIcmcnt otcommunìcatìon". ¨Inthc matcrìaI
worIdwatcrtuIhIIsthctunctìonotthìs mcdìum, ìnthc spìrìtuaI
worId,sotarasthcanaIoµucotsucharcIatìonhasapIaccthcrc,
thc sìµn ìn µcncraI, and morc prccìscIy Ianµuaµc, ìs to bc rc-
µardcdas tuIhIIìnµthattunctìon."´°JhcPhenomenolo
g
, accord-
ìnµ to whìch Ianµuaµc bcIonµs to thc staµc otcuIturc, tcnds ìn
thcsamcdìrcctìon. ¨Inspccch,scIt-conscìousncss,quaìndcpcn-
dcntscparatcìndìvìduaIìty,comcsassuchìntocxìstcncc,sothat
ìt cxìsts tor othcrs. "º° AccordìnµIy ìt appcars that HcµcI, rc-
markabIycnouµh,dìdnotadmìtIanµuaµc,whìchhc accordcda
pIacc ìn thc thìrd book otthcLogc, to thc sphcrc otob]cctìvc
spìrìt but csscntìaIIy conccìvcd ìtas a ¨mcdìum," or somcthìnµ
¨tor othcrs, " as thc bcarcr otcontcnts otsub]cctìvc conscìous-
ncssrathcrthanancxprcssìonotthcIdca.lomìnaIìstìctcaturcs
arc nowhcrc abscnt ìn HcµcI's systcm, whìch protcsts thc cus-
tomary dìchotomy andconsìdcrs ìtscItcompcIIcdtoabsorbwhat
ìs contrary to ìt, andwhosc tcnorrcsìsts thc tutìIc cttortto sìm-
pIyrcscìnd thccrìtìqucotthcautonomyotthcconccpt.Jo thc
I I8
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
cxtcnttowhìchhcdcvotcdhìsattcntìontoìt-andtoracontcm-
poraryotHumboIdtìtìsstrìkìnµhowIìttIchcconccrncdhìmscIt
wìthIanµuaµc-HcµcIwantcd to sccIanµuaµcmorcaswhatwc
wouId now thìnk otas a mcans otcommunìcatìon than as thc
manìtcstatìonottruth that, strìctIy spcakìnµ, Ianµuaµc, Iìkc art,
ouµhttohavcbccntorhìm. Hìsavcrsìontoornatcandcmphatìc
tormuIatìons ìs ìn harmony wìth thìs, hc has unkìnd thìnµs to
say about thc ¨wìtty taIk" otthc spìrìt aIìcnatcd trom ìtscIt, ot
mcrc cuIturc. º' Gcrmans hadIonµ rcactcd thìs way toVoItaìrc
and Dìdcrot. Jhcrc Iurks ìn HcµcI thc acadcmìc rcscntmcnt ot
aIìnµuìstìc scIt-rcbcctìon thatwouId dìstancc ìtscItaII too much
trom mcdìocrc compIìcìty, hìs styIìstìc ìndìttcrcncc cvokcs hìs
dcadIy rcadìncss to makc common causc wìth prccrìtìcaI con-
scìousncss throuµh thc rcbcctìon otrcbcctìon,totortìtythc na-
ìvc ìnthcìrcompIaìsancc throuµh unnaìvctó. HcµcI wouId hardIy
havc wìshcdtorIanµuaµctoopposcthatcompIìcìty,pcrhapsbc-
causchìsownIìnµuìstìccxpcrìcncc,ordchcìcncy, ìsprccìpìtatcd
ìnìt. HìsIìnµuìstìcpraxìstoIIows asIìµhtIyarchaìcconccptìon ot
thc prìmacy otthc spokcn ovcr thc wrìttcn word, thc kìnd ot
notìon hcId by thoscwhocIìnµstubbornIy tothcìr dìaIcct. Jhc
ottcn-rcpcatcd rcmark, orìµìnaIIy Horkhcìmcr's, that onIy
somconcwhoknows5wabìancanrcaIIyundcrstand HcµcI,ìsno
mcrcapcru about Iìnµuìstìcìdìosyncrasìcs, ìtdcscrìbcs thcvcry
µcsturcotHcµcI's Ianµuaµc. HcµcIdìd notstop atscorntorIìn-
µuìstìc cxprcssìon, dìd not wrìtc protcssorìaIIy, unconccrncd wìth
cxprcssìon-that practìcc dìd not bccomc cstabIìshcd untìI thc
cra ot thc dccIìnc ot thc unìvcrsìtìcs, ìnstcad, cvcn ìt uncon-
scìousIy, hc raìscd hìs skcptìcaI rcIatìonshìp to Ianµuaµc, whìch
ìncIìncdto Iackotcoµcncy, toastyIìstìcprìncìpIc. Hcwastorccd
ìntothìsbyanaporìa. Hcdìstrustcd hìµh-handcd,ìnsomcscnsc
brutaI, Iìnµuìstìccxprcssìon andyctwas torccd to a spccìhcIìn-
µuìstìc torm by thc spccuIatìvcnaturcothìs phìIosophy, whìch
I I9
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
was thorouµhIy dctachcd trom thc common scnsc otcvcryday
Ianµuaµc. In ìts ìnconspìcuous way, hìs soIutìon was quìtc radì-
caI. As onc who dcspìscdtuI!yartìcuIatcdIanµuaµc, hc dìd not
cntrust hìmscIt to thc Ianµuaµc otcuIturc, thc currcnt phìIo-
sophìcaI(arµon, as somcthìnµprcµìvcnand mcchanìcaI, butìn-
stcad, paradoxìcaIIy, hc chaIIcnµcd thc prìncìpIc otbxcdncss,
whìch ìs ìndìspcnsabIc tor thc cxìstcncc otanythìnµ Iìnµuìstìc.
Jodaywcspcakotantìmattcr, HcµcI'stcxtsarcantìtcxts.WhìIc
thc cxtrcmc abstractìon achìcvcd and rcquìrcd by thc µrcatcst
othìs tcxts ìnvoIvcscxtrcmccttorts onthcpartotanob(cctìvat-
ìnµthouµht thatìsdctachcd

tromthcìmmcdìacyotthc cxpcrì-
cncìnµ sub(cct, hìs books arc not actuaIIy books but rathcr
annotatcd Iccturcs, ottcn thcy arc mcrc rcvcrbcratìons, not ìn-
tcndcd to bccoµcntcvcnìn pubIìshcdtorm. Icccntrìcìtìcs such
as thc tactthat hc cdìtcd onIy a smaII portìonothìs work, that
mostìtìt, cvcn thctuIItorm othìscompIctc systcm, cxìsts onIy
ìnthcnotcbooksothìsIìstcncrs oras asortotmanuscrìptdratt
that can bc tuIIy concrctìzcd onIy on thc basìs ot thc notcs-
thcsc tcaturcs arc ìnhcrcnt ìn hìs phìIosophy. Jhrouµhout hìs
Iìtc HcµcIwas anArìstotcIìanìnwantìnµtorcduccaII phcnom-
cna tothcìrtorm.Jhìs ìs howhcprocccdcdcvcnwìth thccon-
tìnµcnt phcnomcnon otthc acadcmìc Iccturc. Hìs tcxts arc ìts
ÎIatonìcìdca.JhatathouµhtthatmadcsuchcxtravaµantcIaìms
shouId havc torcµonc transmìssìon ìn spccìbc, dcbnìtìvc torm
can bc cxpIaìncd onIy ìn tcrms otìts ìdcaI otprcscntatìon, thc
ncµatìonotprcscntatìon. Atthcsamctìmc, ìnthcIooscncssota
dcIìvcrythatcvcnwhcn mosthìµhIy cIaboratcdìscIoscrto spccch
thantowrìtìnµ, onccanIooktoracorrcctìvctothchubrìsotthc
concIusìvc and dcbnìtìvc otwhìchHcµcI'sworkwas accuscd cvcn
durìnµhìsIìtctìmc. ßy no mcans docs thìs dcmcanorcharactcr-
ìzconIythoscpartsotHcµcI'ssystcmthatcxìstmcrcIyasaìdsto
mcmory and that hc dìd not pubIìsh or pubIìshcd onIy ìn con-
I20
Skoteinos,orHowtoRead Hege|
dcnscd torm, on thc contrary, ìtcIcarIybccomcs morc cxtrcmc
ovcr thc ycars. Itprcsscd, oncmayrcµard thcPhenomenology as
abook, wìth thc Science of Logc thìsìs noIonµcrpossìbIc. Kcad-
ìnµ thcLogic caIIsto mìnd H. G. Hotho'sdcscrìptìonotthcDoz­
ent HcµcIdurìnµhìs ßcrIìnpcrìod.
Exhausted, morose, hesat thereasifco||apsed into himse|f, his head
bentdown,andwhi|espeakingkeptturningpagesandsearchinginhis
|ong fo|io notebooks, forward and backward, high and |ow. His con-
stantc|earingofhisthroatandcoughinginterruptedanyßowofspeech.
Everysentencestooda|oneandcameoutwitheffort,cutinpiecesand
jumb|ed. Every word, everysy||ab|edetacheditse|fon|yre|uctant|yto
receive a strange|y thorough emphasis fromthe meta||ic-empty voice
with itsbroadSwabian dia|ect, asifeachwere the mostimportant . . . .
E|oquence that ßows a|ong smooth|y presupposes that the speaker is
hnishedwiththesubjectinsideandoutandhasitbyheart,andforma|
ski||hastheabi|itytog|ideongarru|ous|yandmostgracious|yinwhat
is ha|f-baked and superhcia|. Thisman,however, had toraiseup the
mostpowerfu|thoughtsfromthedeepestgroundofthings,andifthey
weretohavea|ivingeffectthen,a|thoughtheyhadbeenponderedand
workedoveryearsbeforeandeveragain,theyhadtoregeneratethem-
se|vesinhiminanever|ivingpresent.³²
HcµcIthcIccturcrrcbcIIcdaµaìnstthc hardcncdìmmancnccot
Ianµuaµc, and ìnthc proccss hìs ownIanµuaµc ranìntoa brìck
waII.JhchrstchaptcrotthchrstbookotthcLogic ìsamcmorìaI
to thìsìntcntìon, "ßcìnµ, purc ßcìnµ, wìthoutanyturthcrdctcr-
mìnatìon,"ººananacoIuthonthattrìcswìthHcbcIìancunnìnµto
hnd away out otthc prcdìcamcnt that"ìndctcrmìnatcìmmcdì-
acy," cvcn ìtcIothcdìnthc torm ota prcdìcatìv
5
statcmcntIìkc
"ßcìnµìs thc most µcncraI conccpt, wìthout any turthcr dctcr-
mìnatìon,"wouIdthcrcbyrcccìvcadchnìtìonthrouµhwhìchthc
scntcnccwouIdcontradìctìtscIt. Itoncopposcdthìstrìck,sayìnµ
that, strìctIy spcakìnµ, purc namcs cannot bc undcrstood and
ccrtaìnIy cannot ìnvoIvc thcìr contradìctìons, sìncc onIy propo-
I2I
Skoteinos,orHowt oReadHegel
sìtìons, not mcrc conccpts, contradìct thcmscIvcs, HcµcI mìµht
shrcwdIy aµrcc, notìnµ thatthc ob]cctìon motìvatcs thc brstan-
tìthcsìs to hìs brst thcsìs, and thathc hìmscItcxpIaìns that such
bcìnµìsnothìnµ. ßutìnsuchsophìstrìcsaphìIosophyotìdcntìty
thatwantstohavcthcIastwordcvcnìnthchrst,andatanyprìcc
ìncIudìnµthcshabbìcst,ìs notmcrcIypIayìnµdumb.JhcdìaIcc-
tìc'sprotcstaµaìnstIanµuaµccannotbcvoìccddìrcctIycxccptìn
Ianµuaµc. Hcncc that protcst ìs condcmncd to ìmpotcnt para-
dox, andìtmakcs avìrtuc outotthatncccssìty.
Jhc ìnsìµhts ìn Hotho's dcscrìptìon µo rìµht to thc corc ot
HcµcI's Iìtcrary torm. Jhat torm ìs thc compIctc opposìtc ot
lìctzschc'smaxìmthatonccanonIywrìtcaboutwhatoncìsbn-
ìshcdwìth,whatìsbchìndonc.JhcsubstanccotHcµcI'sphìIos-
ophy ìs proccss, and ìt wants to cxprcss ìtscIt as proccss, ìn
pcrmancntstatu nacendi, thcncµatìonotprcscntatìonassomc-
thìnµconµcaIcd, somcthìnµthatwouId corrcspond to whatwas
prcscntcd onIyìtthcIattcrwcrcìtscItsomcthìnµconµcaIcd. Jo
makc an anachronìstìc comparìson, HcµcI'spubIìcatìonsarc morc
Iìkc bIms ot thouµht than tcxts. Jhc untutorcd cyc can ncvcr
capturcthc dctaìIs otahImthcwayìtcan thoscotastìII ìmaµc,
andsoìtìswìth HcµcI'swrìtìnµs. JhìsìsthcIocusotthctorbìd-
dìnµquaIìtyìnthcm, andìtìsprccìscIyhcrcthatHcµcIrcµrcsscs
bchìndhìs dìaIcctìcaIcontcnt.Jobcconsìstcnt,thatcontcntwouId
rcquìrcaprcscntatìonantìthctìcaI to ìt. JhcìndìvìduaImomcnts
wouId nccd to bc so sharpIy dìstìnµuìshcd IìnµuìstìcaIIy, so rc-
sponsìbIy cxprcsscd, that thc sub]cctìvc proccss otthouµht and
!tsarbìtraryquaIìtywouId drop awaytromthcm. Itonthc con-
trary thc prcscntatìon ìs assìmìIatcd wìthout rcsìstancc to thc
structurc otthc dìaIcctìcaI movcmcnt, thc prìcc that thc spccu-
Iatìvcconccpt'scrìtìqucottradìtìonaIIoµìchas to payto thcIat-
tcrìsscttoo Iow. HcµcI dìd not dcaIwìththìsadcquatcIy. AIack
otscnsìtìvìty to thc Iìnµuìstìc stratumasawhoIcmaybcrcspon-
I22
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
sìbIcIorthìs,thccrudcncssoIsomcthínµsmhìsacsthctìcsarouscs
that suspìcìon. Îcrhaps, howcvcr, thc antìIìnµuìstìc ìmpuIsc ìn
hìs thouµht, whìch pcrccìvcsthcIìmìtsoIanypartìcuIarcxìstìnµ
thìnµ as Iìmìts oIIanµuaµc, was so dccp that as a styIìst HcµcI
sacrìbccdthcprìmacyoIob]cctìbcatìonthatµovcrncdhìsocuvrc
as a whoIc. Jhìs man who rcbcctcd on aII rcbcctìon dìd notrc-
bcct on Ianµuaµc, hc movcd about ìn Ianµuaµc wìth a carcIcss-
ncss thatìs ìncompatìbIc wìth what hc saìd. ¡n thc prcscntatìon
hìswrìtìnµsattcmptadìrcctrcscmbIancctothcsubstancc.Jhcìr
sìµnìbcatìvccharactcrrcccdcs ìn IavoroIamìmctìc onc, akìnd
oIµcsturaIorcurvìIìncarwrìtìnµstranµcIyat odds wìth thc soI-
cmn cIaìms oI rcason that HcµcI ìnhcrìtcd Irom Kant and thc
InIìµhtcnmcnt. DìaIccts arc anaIoµous, Iìkc thc 5wabìanwìthìts
untransIatabIc "Hano,"rcposìtorìcsoIµcsturcsthatIìtcraryIan-
µuaµcs havc µìvcn up. Jhc romantìcìsm that thc maturc HcµcI
trcatcd wìth contcmpt, but whìch was thc Icrmcnt oI hìs own
spccuIatìon, may havc takcn ìts rcvcnµc on hìm by takìnµ ovcr
hìs Ianµuaµc ìnìts IoIksy tonc. AbstractIy bowìnµ, HcµcI's styIc,
Iìkc HöIdcrIìn's abstractìons, takcs on a musìcaI quaIìty that ìs
abscnt Irom thc sobcr styIc oIthc romantìc 5chcIIínµ. At tìmcs
ìt makcs ìtscIIIcItìnsuch thìnµs as thc usc oIantìthctìcaI partì-
cIcsIìkc "abcr" 'but| Ior purposcs oImcrcconncctìon.
Nowbecauseintheabsolute,theformis onlysimpleself-identity, the
absolutedoesnotdetermine itselF, for determination isaformofdif-
ferencewhich, in thehrstinstance,countsas such. Butbecauseatthe
sametimeitcontainsalldifferencesandform-determinationwhatever,
orbecauseitisitselftheabsoluteformandreßection,thedifferenceof
thecontentmustalso appearin it.But, 'emphasis added by Adorno]
theabsoluteitselfis absoluteidentity, thisisitsdetermination,forinit
allmanifold nessoftheworld-in-itselfandtheworldofAppearance,or
ofinnerandoutertotality,issublated.³¹
lodoubtHcµcI'sstyIcµocsaµaìnstcustomaryphìIosophìcaIun-
dcrstandìnµ, yctìnhìswcakncsscshc pavcs thcwayIoradìIIcr-
I23
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
cnt kìnd otundcrstandìnµ, onc mustrcad HcµcIby dcscrìbìnµ
aIonµwìth hìmthccurvcsothìsìntcIIcctuaImovcmcnt,bypIay-
ìnµhìsìdcaswìth thcspccuIatìvc caras thouµhthcywcrcmusì-
caI notcs. ÎhìIosophy as awhoIcìs aIIìcdwìthartìn wantìnµto
rcscuc,ìnthcmcdìumotthcconccpt,thcmìmcsìsthatthccon-
ccpt rcprcsscs,ºº and hcrc HcµcI bchavcs Iìkc AIcxandcr wìth
thc Gordìanknot. HcdìscmpowcrsìndìvìduaIconccpts,uscsthcm
as thouµh thcy wcrc thc ìmaµcIcss ìmaµcs otwhat thcy mcan.
HcnccthcGocthcan"rcsìducotabsurdìty"ìnthcphìIosophyot
absoIutc spìrìt. What ìt wants to usc to µctbcyond thc conccpt
aIwaysdrìvcsìtbackbcncaththcconccptìnthcdctaìIs.JhconIy
rcadcr who docs]ustìcc to HcµcI ìs thc onc who docs not dc-
nouncchìmtorsuchìndubìtabIcwcakncssbutìnstcadpcrccìvcs
thc ìmpuIsc ìnthatwcakncss. who undcrstandswhythìsorthat
mustbcìncomprchcnsìbIcandìntactthcrcbyundcrstandsìt.
HcµcIhasatwotoIdcxpcctatìonotthcrcadcr,notìIIsuìtcdto
thc naturc ot thc dìaIcctìc. Jhc rcadcr ìs to boat aIonµ, to Ict
hìmscItbcborncbythccurrcntandnottotorccthcmomcntary
to Iìnµcr. Othcrwìsc hc wouId chanµc ìt, dcspìtc and throuµh
thc µrcatcst hdcIìty to ìt. On thc othcr hand, thc rcadcr has to
dcvcIopanìntcIIcctuaIsIow-motìonproccdurc,tosIow down thc
tcmpo at thccIoudypIaccs ìn such away that thcy do notcvap-
oratcandthcìrmotìoncanbcsccn. Itìsrarcthatthc two modcs
otopcratìon taII to thc samc actotrcadìnµ. Jhc actotrcadìnµ
has to scparatcìntoìtspoIarìtìcsIìkcthccontcntìtscIt. In accr-
taìnscnscMarx'sstatcmcntthatphìIosophypasscsovcrìntohìs-
toryaIrcadycharactcrìzcsHcµcI. * WìthHcµcIphìIosophybccomcs
*"When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge
loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a sum­
ming-up of the most general results, abstractions which arise from the observa­
tion of the historical development of men. Viewed apart from real hi�tory, these
abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to
facilitate the arrangement of historical material, to indicate the sequence of its
I24
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
thc actívíty otIookínµ at and dcscríbínµ thc movcmcnt otthc
conccpt, and ín thís scnsc thc Phenomenology of Spirit outIíncs a
vírtuaI hístoríoµraphy otspírít. Itísas thouµh HcµcIhadhastíIy
trícdto modcI hís prcscntatíon onthís, to phíIosopbízcas thouµh
onc wcrc wrítínµ hístory, as thouµh throuµh onc's modc ot
thínkínµonc couId torcc thcunítyotthc systcmatíc and thchís-
torícaI that ís conccívcd ín thc díaIcctíc. Îrom thís pcrspcctívc
thcIackotclarte ínHcµcI's phíIosophywouIdbcthcrcsuItotthc
hístorícaI dímcnsíoníntrudínµ ínto ít.Jhc traccs otthc cmpírí-
caI cIcmcnt that ís íncommcnsurabIc wíth thc conccpttakc rct-
uµc ín thc prcscntatíon. ßccausc that cIcmcnt cannot bc tuIIy
pcrmcatcd by thc conccpt, ítís ínhcrcntIyrcsístantto thc norm
otclarte, whích, athrstcxpIícítIyandIatcrwíthoutrcmcmbcrínµ
ít,was dcrívcdtromthcídcaIotasystcm thatísopposcdto hís-
torícaIrcaIíty as toaIIcmpírícaI rcaIíty.WhíIc HcµcIístorccdto
íntcµratc thc hístorícaI momcntínto thc IoµícaI, and vícc vcrsa,
hís attcmptto dosoturnsíntoacrítíqucothísown systcm. Jhc
systcm has to acknowIcdµc thc conccptuaI1rrcducíbíIíty otthc
conccpt, whích ís ínhcrcntIy hístorícaI. ín tcrms otIoµícaI-sys-
tcmatíccrítcríathchístorícaI,aIIcIscnotwíthstandínµ,ísdísturb-
ínµ, ít ís a bIínd spot. HcµcI ccrtaínIy saw thatín thcPhilosophy
of Right, aIthouµh otcoursc hc thcrcby dísavowcd onc ot hís
ccntraIíntcntíonsandoptcdtorthccustomaryscparatíonottbc
hístorícaIandthcsystcmatíc.
To consider particu|ar |aws as they appear and deve|op in time is a
pure|yhistorica|task. Likeacquaintancewithwhatcanbe|ogica||yde-
separate strata" (Karl Marx, The German Ideolog, in The Mar-Engels Reader, ed.
Robert Tucker, New York: Norton, 1972, p. 1 19). A variant is even more pointed:
"We know only a single science, the science of history. History can be regarded
from two perspectives and can be divided into the history of nature and the
history of mankind. The two cannot be separated; as long as human beings exist,
the history of nature and the history of human ,beings determile one another"
(Mar-Engels Gesamtausgabe, ed. D. Ryazonov, vol. 5, section 1 , Berlin, 'Marx-En­
gels Archiv, 1932, p. 567).
I25
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
duced froma comparison ofthese laws withpreviouslyexistinglegal
principles, thistaskisappreciatedandrewardedinitsownsphereand
has no relation whatever to the philosophical study ofthe subject-
unlessofcoursethederivationofparticularlawsfromhistoricalevents
is confused with theirderivationfromtheconcept, and thehistorical
explanationandjustihcationisstretchedto becomeanabsolutelyvalid
justihcation. This difference, which isvery important and should be
hrmlyadheredto,isalsoveryobvious.Aparticularlawmaybeshown
to be wholly grounded in and consistent with the circumstances and
with existinglegally established institutions, and yetitmay be wrong
and irrationalinitsessentialcharacter, like anumberofprovisions in
Romanprivatelawwhichfollowedquitelogicallyfromsuchinstitutions
asRomanmatrimonyandRomanpatriapotestas.Butevenifparticular
lawsarebothrightandreasonable,stillitisonethingtoprovethatthey
have thatcharacter~which cannotbe trulydone except by means of
theconcept~andquiteanothertodescribetheirappearanceinhistory
orthecircumstances, contingencies, needs,andeventswhichbrought
abouttheirenactment.Thatkindofexpositionand(pragmatic)knowl-
edge,basedonproximateorremotehistoricalcauses,isfrequentlycalled
ºexplanationºorpreferablyºcomprehensionºby those who think that
toexpoundhistoryinthiswayistheonlything,orrathertheessential
thing,theonlyimportantthing, tobedoneinordertocomprehendlaw
oran established institution, whereas whatis reallyessential, the con-
ceptofthething, theyhavenotdiscussedatall.³ª
In thc conccptuaI aspcct that rcsìsts thc HcµcIìan movcmcnt
otthc conccpt, nonìdcntìty µaìnsthcuppcrhand ovcr thc con-
ccpt.Wìthìnthatsystcm,whatwouIduItìmatcIybcthctruththat
wouId hoId out aµaìnstthc systcmotìdcntìtybccomcsìtsbIcm-
ìsh, that whìch cannotbc rcprcscntcd. HcµcI's rcadcrs havc aI-
waysbccnupsctbythìs. HcµcI,thcrcstoratìonìstIìbcraI,ìsvìoIatìnµ
abourµcoìs taboo. What ìsdìspIaycd ìssupposcdto bchnìshcd,
concIudcd, ìn accordancc wìth thc morcs ot thc cxchanµc ot
commodìtìcs, whcrc thc customcrìnsìsts thatwhat ìs dcIìvcrcd
to hìm attuIIprìcc shouId cmbodythc tuIIquantìtyotIabortor
whìch hcìs payìnµ thc cquìvaIcnt. Itthcrc ìsanythìnµIctttobc
donc on what hc buys, hc tccIs chcatcd. Jhc conccptuaI Iabor
I26
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
and cttort that HcµcI's phìIosophy cxpccts not mcrcIy otìtscIt
butaIsootthcrcadcr, ìnascnscthatquaIìtatìvcIy surpasscs cvcry
customarystandard otrcccptìon, ìs hcId aµaìnsthìm,asthouµh
hc had not cxpcndcd cnouµh swcat. Jhc taboo cxtcnds to thc
markctpIacc'sìdìosyncratìccommandmcntthatthctraccsotthc
human ìn thc product bc crascd, that thc product ìtscIt cxìst
purcIy ìn ìtscIt. Jhc tctìsh charactcr otthc commodìty ìs nota
mcrc vcìI, ìtìsan ìmpcratìvc. LonµcaIcdIaborìnwhìch onc no-
tìccs that thcIaborìsthatothumanbcìnµsìswardcdottìndìs-
µust. ItshumansmcIIrcvcaIsìtsvaIuctoconsìstìnarcIatìonshìp
bctwccn sub]ccts rathcrthan somcthìnµ adhcrìnµ to ob]ccts, as
ìt ìs pcrccìvcd. Îropcrty, thc catcµory undcr whìch bourµcoìs
socìcty subsumcs ìts spìrìtuaI µoods as wcII, ìs notabsoIutc pos-
scssìon. Whcn thatbccomcscvìdcnt,ìtsccms as thouµhwhatìs
mosthoIyhasbccnvìoIatcd. 5choIarsarc tondotbccomìnµout-
raµcd about thcorcms and ìdcas thcy cannot takc homc tuIIy
provcn. Dìscomtort wìth thc conccptuaI charactcr ìnhcrcnt ìn
HcµcI's phìIosophy ìs thcn ratìonaIìzcd to bccomc thc snccrìnµ
asscrtìon that thc onc ìncrìmìnatcd cannot hìmscItaccompIìsh
whathchoIdsothcrsto.HcnccthcwcII-knownaccountotHcµcI
by Gustav KümcIìn, thc chanccIIor otJï\bìnµcn \nìvcrsìty. Wìth
undaµµìnµIychcapìrony, Kï\mcIìnasks, "DO you undcrstandìt?
Docs thcconccptmovc around on ìts own ìn you, wìthout any
contrìbutìon trom you?Docs ìtchanµc ìntoìtsopposìtc,anddocs
thchìµhcrumtyotthccontrarìcscmcrµctromthat?"º'Asthouµh
ìtwcrcaqucstìonotthcmuch-ìnvokcd-whcthcrìnadmìratìon
ordcroµatìon-"spccuIatìvcmìnd"sub]cctìvcIytakìnµsomcspc-
cìaI Icaps ìn ordcr to brìnµottsomcthìnµthat HcµcI ascrìbcs to
thc conccptìtscIt, as thouµh spccuIatìonwcrcan csotcrìc capac-
ìty and not rcdcctìon's crìtìcaI scIt-awarcncss, antaµonìstìcaIIy and
ìntìmatcIyrcIatcd to rcdcctìon thc wayrcasonwas rcIatcd to thc
ìntcIIcct ìn Kant. Jhc hrst rcquìrcmcnt tor rcadìnµ HcµcI cor-
I27
Skoteinos,orHowtoRead
rcctIy ìs to rìd oncscItotdccpIy rootcd habìts Iìkc thcsc, whìch
thccontcntotHcµcI's phìIosophyshows tobctaIsc. It ìsuscIcss
tostruµµIcandtwìtchIìkcthccaIìphandthcµrandvìzìcrìnthc
torm otstorks, vaìnIy pondcrìnµ thc word mutabor. Jhc trans-
tormatìon otbnìtcìnto ìnbnìtc dctcrmìnatìons thatHcµcI tauµht
ìs ncìthcr a tact otsub]cctìvc conscìousncss, nor docs ìt rcquìrc
anyspccìaI act. Whatìs mcantìs aphìIosophìcaIcrìtìqucotphì-
Iosophy, acrìtìquc]ust asratìonaIas phìIosophyìtscIt. Jhc onIy
sub]cctìvc dcsìdcratum ìs not to bccomc obstìnatc but rathcr to
undcrstand motìvatìons,aswìth Kantand Îìchtc, nordocs any-
onc capabIc ot doìnµ so nccd crcduIousIy to acccpt thc movc-
mcnt otthcconccptas arcaIìtysuìµcncrìs.
JhcscdcsìdcrataotarcadìnµotHcµcI,howcvcr,canbc pro-
tcctcdtrom dìvaµatìon onIy ìtthcy arc suppIcmcntcd throuµh
thc most acutc and pcrsìstcnt attcntìon to dctaìI. GcnctìcaIIy,
pcrhaps, thc !attcr comcs hrst, onIy whcn ìt taìIs catcµorìcaIIy
may thc rcadcr's dynamìcaIIy dctachcd attìtudc provìdc a cor-
rcctìvc.WhatIcads onctomìcroIoµyìsprccìscIythcìndìsputabIc
Iackotdìttcrcntìatìonbctwccn conccptsandrcbcctìons.thcIack
otµraphìc powcr.^ttìmcscvcnthcIcµcndarysympathctìcrcadcr
otthc carIy nìnctccnthccnturymusttccIhìshcadspìnnìnµ.Jhc
rcIatìonshìp otthc catcµorìcs to thc whoIc ìs hardIy cvcr cm-
phatìcaIIy dìstìnµuìshcd trom thcìr spccìhc rcstrìctcd mcanìnµ
ìn a spccìhc passaµc. "Ide" 'Idca| mcans on thc onc hand thc
absoIutc, thc sub]cct-ob]cct, but onthc othcr hand, as thc ìntcI-
IcctuaI manìtcstatìon ot thc absoIutc ìt ìs supposcd to bc somc-
thìnµothcrthanthcob]cctìvctotaIìty.ßothappcarìnthcSubective
Logc. Jhcrc "Idca¨ ottcn mcans thc sub]cct-ob]cct. "thc abso-
Iutc Idca aIonc ìs bcìnµ, ìmpcrìshabIc Iìtc, scIt-knowìnµ truth,
andìsaIItruth,¨ººor. "thc IdcahasnotmcrcIythcmorcµcncraI
mcanìnµ otthc truc bcìnµ, otthc unìty otconccpt and rcaIìty,
butthc morc spccìbc onc otthcunìtyotsub]cctìvc conccpt and
I28
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ob]cctìvìty.
..
º°Onthcothcr hand, c!scwhcrcìnthcsamc scctìon
ot thc Subjective Logic, thc thìrd, Hcµc! dìstìnµuìshcs thc Idca
tromthcob]cctìvc tota!ìty.
NowtheIdeahasshownitselftobe theconceptliberatedagainintoits
subjectivityfromtheimmediacyinwhichitissubmergedintheobject,
to be theconceptthat distinguishes itselffrom its objectivity, which
howeverisnolessdeterminedbyitandpossessesitssubstantialityonly
in thatconcept. . . . Butthis must be understood more precisely. The
concept,havingtrulyattaineditsreality,istheabsolutejudgementwhose
subject,asself-related negativeunity,distinguishesitselffromitsobjec-
tivityandisthelatter'sbeing-in-and-for-self,butessentiallyrelatesitself
toitthroughitself.» » » ¹º
Andcorrcspondìnµ!y,
NowthedeterminatenessoftheIdeaandtheentirecoursefollowedby
thisdeterminatenesshasconstitutedthesubjectmatterofthescienceof
logic,fromwhichcoursetheabsoluteIdeaitselfhasissuedintoanex-
istenceofitsown,butthenatureofthisitsexistencehasshownitselfto
bethis,thatdeterminatenessdoesnothavetheshapeofacontent,but
existswhollyas form, and that accordingly the Ideais the absolutely
universalIdea'
Îìna!!yhcuscsbothìn thcsamcarµumcnt.
The Idea,namely, inpositingitselfas absoluteunityofthepurecon-
cept and its reality and thus contractingitselfinto the immediacyof
being,is the totality in this form~nature. Butthisdeterminationhas
notissued from a processofbecoming,norisitatransition,aswhen
above,thesubjectiveconceptinitstotalitybecomesobjectivity,andthe
subjective end becomes life. On thecontrary,the pure Ideainwhich
the determinateness or reality ofthe conceptis itselfraised into con-
cept, isanabsoluteliberationforwhichthereisnolongeranyimmedi-
atedeterminationthatisnotequallypositedanditselfconcept, inthis
freedom,therefore,notransitiontakesplace,thesimplebeingtowhich
theIdeadeterminesitselfremainsperfectlytransparenttoitandisthe
concept that, in its determination, abides with itself. The passage is
I?9
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
therefore tobe understood hereratherin this manner, thatthe Idea
freelyreleasesitselfinitsabsoluteself-assuranceandinnerpoise.¹²
Justas ìn HcµcI"touI"cxìstcncc ìs scparatcd tromthcrcaIthat
ìs ratìonaI, so dcspìtc cvcrythìnµthcìdcaìncvìtabIyrcmaìnsXWpt<
trom rcaIìty, sct apart trom ìt, ìn thatrcaIìty ìs aIso "touI" cxìs-
tcncc. 5uchìnconµruìtìcsarcscattcrcdthrouµhoutHcµcI'smost
ìmportanttcxts. Hcnccthctaskìsthcdìs]unctìonotwhatìsspc-
cìbctromwhatìsmorcµcncraI,whatìsnotducandpayabIchie
et nunc; thc two arc ìntcrtwìncd ìn thc Iìnµuìstìc hµurcs HcµcI
Iìkcstousc. Hcwas tryìnµ towardottthc danµcrota bìµht ìnto
thc µcncraI whcn hc toId a Iady at a tca party who had askcd
hìmwhatoncshouIdbcthìnkìnµatthìsorthatpoìntìnhìstcxt,
"prccìscIy that." ßut thc qucstìon was not as sìIIy as thc way ìt
was dcaItwìthmakcs ìtsccm.Jhcqucstìoncrmay havc notìccd
that cmpty conscìousncss, that ìs, what a paraµraph accom-
pIìshcsìn tcrms otìtsIoµìcalcohcrcncc, usurps thc pIacc otac-
tuaI accompIìshmcnt, whcrcas whcthcrìtrcquìrcs that Ioµìc or
notdcpcndsonwhatìsaccompIìshcd.Jhcqucstìonotwhatonc
shouIdbcthìnkìnµatanypartìcuIarpoìntvoìccsataIscdcmand
ìnsotarasìtrcportsamcrcIackotcomprchcnsìonandhopcsto
bcrcscucdthrouµhìIIustratìons,whìch,asìIIustratìons,mìssthc
mark, but ìtquìtc propcrIymcans thatcvcryìndìvìduaIanaIysìs
hastobctoIIowcdthrouµh, thatìnrcadìnµoncmustµcthoIdot
statcs ot attaìrs that arc dìscusscd and accuratcIy statcd and
undcrµo transtormatìon, not mcrc µuìdcIìncs. Jhc most trc-
qucntwcakncss ìnìntcrprctatìons otHcµcIìsthatthcanaIysìsìs
nottoIIowcd throuµhìntcrmsotthccontcnt, ìnstcad, thcword-
ìnµìsmcrcIy paraphrascd. Îorthcmostpartsuchcxcµcsìsthcn
bcarsthcsamcrcIatìonto thcthìnµìtscItas thcroadsìµntothc
road onc has travcIcd, as 5chcIcr(okìnµIy putìt. Inmanycascs
HcµcIhìmscItdìdnotcarryoutthcactìvìtyottoIIowìnµthrouµh
butrcpIaccdìtwìthcìrcumIocutìousdccIaratìonsotìntcntìon.In
I30
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
thcPhilosophy of Right, torìnstancc, HcµcImakcsaprctcnscota
spccuIatìvcdcductìonotmonarchybutdocsnotcarryìtout,and
torthat rcason thc rcsuIts arc vuIncrabIc to aII manncr otcrìtì-
ctsm.
Thisultimateselfinwhichthewillofthestateisconcentratedis,when
thustakeninabstraction,asingleselfand thereforeisimmediateindi-
viduality.Henceitsºnaturalºcharacterisimpliedinitsveryconception.
The monarch, therefore, isessentiallycharacterizedasthisindividual,
in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and thisindividualis
raisedtothedignityofmonarchyinanimmediate,natural,fashion,i.e.
throughhisbirthinthecourseofnature.Thistransitionoftheconcept
ofpureself-determinationintotheimmediacyofbeingandsointothe
realmofnatureisofapurelyspeculativecharacter,andapprehension
ofitthereforebelongstologic.Moreover,thistransitionisonthewhole
thesame as thatfamiliartousin the natureofwilling, and there the
process is to translate something fromsubjectivity (i.e. some purpose
heldbeforethemind)intoexistence(seeParagraph8).Buttheproper
formofthe Idea andofthetransitionhereunderconsiderationisthe
immediateconversionofthepureself-determinationofthewill(i.e.of
thesimpleconceptitself)intoasingleandnaturalexistentwithoutthe
mediationofaparticularcontent(likeapurposeinthecaseofaction).
.. . Addition. It is often alleged against monarchy that itmakes the
welfareofthestatedependentonchance,foritisurged, themonarch
maybeill-educated, hemayperhapsbeunworthyofthe highestposi-
tionin the state, and itis senseless thatsuch astateofaffairs should
existbecauseitissupposedtoberational.Butallthisrestsonapresup-
position which is nugatory, namely that everything depends on the
monarch's particular character. In acompletely organized state, it is
onlyaquestionoftheculminatingpointofformaldecision. . . , hehas
onlytosayºyesºanddottheºi,ºbecausethethroneshouldbesuchthat
the signihcant thing i its holder is not his particular make-up. . . .
Whateverelsethemonarchmayhaveinadditiontothispowerofhnal
decisionispartandparcelofhisprivatecharacterandshouldbeofno
consequence. Ofcourse there maybe circumstancesinwhichitis this
private character alone which has prominence, but in that event the
stateiseithernotfullydeveloped,orelseisbadlyconstructed.Inawell-
I 3I
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
organizedmonarchy,theobjectiveaspectsbelongstolawalone,andthe
monarch'spartismerelytosettothelawthesubjectiveºIwill.¨¹³
IìthcraIIthcbadcontìnµcncytbatHcµcIdìsputcsìscondcnscd
ìntothìs"IwìII"attcraII,orthcmonarchìstruIyonIyayca-saycr
who couId bc dìspcnscd wìth. ÎrcqucntIy, howcvcr such wcak-
ncsscsaIsocontaìncrucìaIaìdstoundcrstandìnµ. Inbcttcrcascs
than thcawkwardIyìdcoIoµìcaIPhilosophy of Right, ìmmancntb-
dcIìtyto HcµcI'sìntcntìonrcquìrcsoncto suppIcmcntorµo bc-
yond thc tcxt ìn ordcr to undcrstand ìt. Jhcn ìt ìs uscIcss to
pondcrcryptìcìndìvìduaItormuIatìonsandµctìnvoIvcd¡nottcn
unrcsoIvabIc controvcrsìcs about what was mcant. Kathcr, onc
mustuncovcrHcµcI'saìm, thc sub]cct mattcr shouId bcrccon-
structcd trom knowIcdµc otìt. Hc aImostaIways has ccrtaìn ìs-
sucs ìn mìnd cvcn whcn hìs own tormuIatìons taìI to capturc
thcm.WhatHcµcIwas taIkìnµaboutìsmorcìmportantthanwhat
hcmcant.JhccìrcumstanccsandthcprobIcmhavctobc dcvcI-
opcdtrom HcµcI's proµramandthcn thouµhtthrouµh on thcìr
own. ¡n HcµcI's phìIosophy thc prìmacy otob]cctìvìty ovcr thc
ìntcndcd traìn ot thouµht, thc prìmacy otthc spccìhc statc ot
attaìrs undcrconsìdcratìon, constìtutcs an authorìty ìn opposì-
tìon to hìs phìIosophy. Itwìthìn a paraµraph thcprobIcmatìs-
sucstandsoutasbcìnµoutIìncdandrcsoIvcd-and thcsccrctot
thc phìIosophìcaI mcthod mayIìcìnthctactthatto undcrstand
aprobIcmand to soIvc ìtarc actuaIIyoncand thcsamc thìnµ-
thcn HcµcI's ìntcntìon bccomcs cIcar too, whcthcr ìtìs that thc
cryptìc contcnt othìs thouµht now dìscIoscs ìtscItotìts ownac-
cordorthat hìs thouµhtsbccomcartìcuIatcd throuµh what thcy
thcmscIvcsmìsscd.
JhctaskotìmmcrsìonìnthcdctaìIrcquìrcs consìdcratìonot
thc ìntcrnaI structurc otHcµcI's tcxts. Itìs notthccustomary
proµrcssìvc Iìncar dcvcIopmcnt otìdcas, any morc than ìt ìs a
I32
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
scqucncc otdíscrctc, díttcrcntíatcd índcpcndcnt anaIyscs. Jhc
comparísonwíthawcb that thcstructurcsomctímcs provokcs ís
aIso ínaccuratc. ít íµnorcs thc dynamíc momcnt. What ís char-
actcrístíc, howcvcr, ís thc tusíon otthc dynamíc momcnt wíth
thc statíc. HcµcI'swcíµhtychaptcrs rcsístthcdístínctíonbctwccn
conccptuaIanaIysís,"commcntary,"andsynthcsísasproµrcssíon
to somcthínµncwthatísnotcontaíncdwíthínthc conccptítscIt.
Jhísmakcs ítdítbcuItto dccídc whcrc to stop.
Hefaltered eveni nthe beginning, tried to goon, startedonce more,
stoppedagain,spokeandpondered, therightwordseemedtobemiss-
ingforever,butthenitscoredmostsurely, itseemedcommonandyet
inimitablyhtting,unusualandyettheonlyonethatwasright . . . . Now
onehadgraspedtheclearmeaningofasentenceand hoped mostar-
dently to progress. In vain. Instead ofmoving forward, the thought
keptrevolvingaround thesame pointwithsimilarwords. Butifone's
wearied attention wandered and strayed afew minutesbeforeit sud-
denlyreturned with a start to the lecture, itfounditselfpunished by
havingbeen torn entirely out ofthe context. For slowly and deliber-
ately, making use ofseemingly insignihcant links, some full thought
hadlimiteditselfto thepointofone-sidedness,hadsplititselfintodis-
tinctionsandinvolveditselfincontradictionswhosevictorioussolution
eventuallyfound the strength to compel thereunihcationofthe most
recalcitrantelements. Thusalways takingupagaincarefullywhathad
gonebeforeinordertodevelopoutofitmoreprofoundlyinadifferent
formwhatcamelater, moredivisive and yetevenricherinreconcilia-
tion, the most wonderful stream ofthought twisted and pressed and
struggled, now isolating something, now very comprehensively, occa-
sionally hesitant, thenbyjerks sweepingalong, itßowedforward irre-
sistibly.¹¹
ßroadIy spcakínµ, oncmíµhtsay that ínthc HcµcIíansystcm,
as ínHcµcI'soraIdcIívcry,anaIytícandsynthctíc]udµmcnts arc
not as stríctIy dístínµuíshcd as ín thc Kantían ^ßL. In thís rc-
µard as wcII, HcµcI ís composínµsomcthínµanaIoµous to a mu-
sícaI rcprísc otprc-Kantían and cspccíaIIy Lcíbnízían ratíonaIísm,
I33
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
mcdìatcdbysub]cctìvìty, andthìs torms thc pattcrntorhìs prc-
scntatìon. Jhc prcscntatìon tcnds to takc thc torm otthc ana-
Iytìc]udµmcnt,IìttIcasHcµcIIìkcdthatIoµìcaItorm,thcabstract
ìdcntìtyotthcconccpt.Jhcmovcmcntotthouµht, thccntrancc
ot somcthìnµ ncw, docs not add anythìnµ to thc µrammatìcaI
conccpt thattormsthc sub]cct, as ìtdocs wìth Kant. Jhcncwìs
thcoId.JhrouµhthccxpIìcatìonotthcconccpts,ìnothcrwords
throuµh what, accordìnµ to tradìtìonaIIoµìcand cpìstcmoIoµy,
ìs accompIìshcdbyanaIytìc]udµmcnts, thcconccpt's Othcr, thc
nonìdcntìcaI, bccomcs cvìdcnt wìthìn thc conccpt ìtscIt, somc-
thìnµìmpIìcd ìnìts mcanìnµ, wìthoutthc scopc otthc conccpt
bcìnµìntrìnµcd upon. Jhc conccptìsturncdthìsway and that
untìIìtbccomcs cIcarthatìtìsmorcthanwhatìtìs.Jhcconccpt
brcaks up whcn ìt ìnsìsts on ìts ìdcntìty, and yct ìt ìs onIy thc
catastrophcotsuchtcnacìtythatµìvcsrìsctothcmovcmcntthat
makcs ìtìmmancntIy othcr thanìtscIt. Jhc modcIotthìs struc-
turcotthouµhtìs HcµcI's trcatmcntotthcIawotìdcntìtyA¯ A,
whìch ìs outIìncd ìnthcDiferenzchrift and thcncarrìcd out cn-
crµctìcaIIyìnthcLogc. ¡nhcrcntìnthcmcanìnµota purc ìdcn-
tìcaI]udµmcntìs thc nonìdcntìty otìts mcmbcrs. ¡n an ìndìvìduaI
]udµmcntsamcncsscanbcprcdìcatcdonIyotthìnµs thatarcnot
thc samc, othcrwìsc thc cIaìm ìnhcrcntìnthc torm otthc]udµ-
mcnt-thatsomcthìnµìs thìs orthat-ìsnotmct. lumcrous rc-
bcctìons ot HcµcI's arc orµanìzcd ìna sìmìIar manncr, and onc
musthavcacIcarµraspotthìswayotprocccdìnµtoavoìdbcìnµ
rcpcatcdIycontuscdbyìt. ¡nìts mìcrostructurcHcµcI'sthouµht
andìtsIìtcrarytormsarcwhatWaItcrßcn]amìnIatcrcaIIcd"dì-
aIcctìcsatastandstìII," comparabIctothccxpcrìcnccthccychas
whcnIookìnµ throuµh a mìcroscopc atadrop otwatcr thatbc-
µìnsto tccmwìthIìtc, cxccptthatwhatthatstubborn, spcIIbìnd-
ìnµ µazc taIIsonìs notbrmIydcIìncatcdasanob]cctbuttraycd,
as ìtwcrc, atthc cdµcs. Onc otthcmost tamous passaµcs trom
I34
Skoteinos, orHowtoReadHege|
thcprctacctothcPhenomenolo
g
rcvcaIs somcthìnµotthatìntcr-
naIstructurc.
Appearance is the arisingand passingawaythat does not itse|farise
and passaway,butis'in itse|f' . . . andconstitutestheactua|ityandthe
movementofthe|ifeoftruth.TheTrueisthustheBacchana|ianreve|
in whichnomemberis notdrunk, yetbecauseeachmemberco||apses
assoonashedropsout,thereve|isjustasmuchtransparentandsimp|e
repose.|udgedinthecourtofthismovement,thesing|eshapesofSpirit
donotpersistanymorethanthedeterminate thoughtsdo,buttheyare
asmuch positiveandnecessarymoments,astheyarenegativeandeva-
nescent. Inthewho|eofthemovement,seenasastateofrepose, what
distinguishes itse|ftherein, andgives itse|fparticu|ar existence, ispre-
servedassomethingthatreco||ectsitse|f,whoseexistenceisse|f-know|-
edge,andwhosese|f-know|edgeisjustasimmediate|yexistence.¹³
Hcrc, to bc surc, and ìn anaIoµous pIaccs ìn thc Logc,46 thc
standstìII ìs rcscrvcdtorthc totaIìty, asìnGocthc'smaxìmabout
aIIstrìvìnµbcìnµctcrnaIrcst. ßutIìkccvcryaspcctotthcwhoIc
ìn HcµcI, thìs onc too ìssìmuItancousIy an aspcct otcvcryìndì-
vìduaI part, and ìts ubìquìty may havc prcvcntcd HcµcI trom
acknowIcdµìnµìt. HcwastoocIosc to ìt,ìtconccaIcdìtscIttrom
hìm,apìcccotunrcbcctcdìmmcdìacy.
ßut thcìntcrnaIstructurc aIsohas tar-rcachìnµconscqucnccs
torthcwaythcwhoIc hts toµcthcr. ìthasrctroactìvctorcc.Jhc
usuaI conccptìon otthc dynamìc ot HcµcI's thouµht-that thc
movcmcnt otthc conccpt ìs nothìnµ but thc advancc trom onc
to thc othcr byvìrtucotthcìnncrmcdìatcdncssotthctormcr-
ìs onc-sìdcd ìtnothìnµ cIsc. In that thc rcbcctìon otcach con-
ccpt, whìchìsIìnkcdwìththcrcbcctìonotrcbcctìon,brcaksthc
conccptopcnbydcmonstratìnµìtsìnconsìstcncy, thcmovcmcnt
otthcconccptaIwaysaIsoattcctsthcstaµctrom whìchìtbrcaks
away. Jhc advancc ìs a pcrmancnt crìtìquc ot what has comc
bctorc, and thìs kìnd ot movcmcnt suppIcmcnts thc movcmcnt
I35
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
ot advancc by synthcsìs. In thc dìaIcctìc otìdcntìty, thcn, not
onIyìs thcìdcntìty otthc nonìdcntìcaI, as ìts hìµhcr torm, thc
A=ß,thcsynthctìc]udµmcnt,attaìncd, ìnaddìtìon,thccontcnt
otthc synthctìc]udµmcnt ìs rccoµnìzcd as aIrcady a ncccssary
momcntotthcanaIytìc]udµmcntA=A. LonvcrscIy, thcsìmpIc
tormaI ìdcntìty otA=A ìs rctaìncd ìn thc cquìvaIcncc ot thc
nonìdcntìcaI.Ottcn,accordìnµIy,thcprcscntatìonmakcsaback-
ward Icap. VhatwouIdbc ncwaccordìnµ to thc sìmpIc schcma
ottrìpIìcttyrcvcaIs:tscIttobcthcconccptthattormcdthcstart-
ìnµ poìnt tor thc partìcuIar dìaIcctìcaI movcmcnt undcr dìscus-
sìon, modìbcd and undcr dìttcrcnt ìIIumìnatìon. Jhc "scIt-
dctcrmìnatìon ot csscncc as µround" trom thc sccond book ot
thcLogc provìdcscvìdcnccthatHcµcIhìmscItìntcndcdthìs.
Insofaras the determination ofa hrst, an immediate, is the starting
pointoftheadvancetoground(throughthenatureofthedetermina-
tionitselfwhichsublatesitselforfallstotheground),ground is,inthe
hrstinstance,determinedbythathrst. Butthisdeterminingis,onthe
onehand,asasublatingofthedetermining,onlytherestored,purihed
ormanifestedidentityofessencewhichthereßecteddetermination is
initself:ontheotherhanditisthisnegatingmovementasadetermin-
ingthathrstposits thatreßecteddeterminateness which appeared as
immediate,butwhichispositedonlybytheself-excludingreßectionof
groundandthereinispositedasonlyapositedorsublateddetermina-
tion.Thusessence,indeterminingitselfasground,proceedsonlyfrom
itself¹²
InthcSubjective Logc HcµcIdchncs,ìnµcncraItcrmsandaIìttIc
tormaIìstìcaIIy, thc "thìrd mcmbcr" otthc thrcc-part schcma as
thc hrst mcmbcr, ìn modìhcdtorm,otthcìndìvìduaIdìaIcctìcaI
movcmcntundcr dìscussìon.
I nthisturningpointof themethod,thecourseofcognitionatthesame
timereturnsintoitself.Asself-sublatingcontradictionthisnegativityis
the restoration ofthe hrstimmediacy, ofsimple universality: for the
I36
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
otheroftheother,thenegativeofthenegative,isimmediatelythepos-
itive,theidentical,theuniversal.Ifoneinsistsoncounting,thissecond
immediateis,inthecourseofthemethodasawhole,thethirdtermto
thehrstimmediateand themediated.Itisalso,however,thethirdterm
to the hrst formal negative and to absolute negativity or the second
negative,nowasthehrstnegativeisalreadythesecondterm,theterm
reckonedasthirdcanalsobereckonedasfourth,andinsteadofatripl-
icity,theabstractformmaybetakenasaquadruplicity,inthisway,the
negative or

the difference is countedasaduality. . . . Now more pre-
ciselythethirdistheimmediate,buttheimmediateresultingfromsub-
lationofmediation, the simple resultingfromsublationofdiBerence,
the positiveresultingfromsublationofthe negative, the concept that
hasrealizeditselfbymeansofitsothernessandbythesublationofthis
realityhasrestored. . . itssimplerelationtoitself.This resultisthere-
forethe truth. Itisequallyimmediacy andmediation, butsuchforms
ofjudgmentas.thethirdisimmediacyandmediation,or.itistheunity
ofthem, are notcapableofgraspingit, foritis nota quiescent third,
butpreciselyas theunity,isself-mediatingmovementandactivity. . . .
Now this result, as thewhole thathaswithdrawnintoand is identical
withitself,hasgivenitselftheformofimmediacy.Henceitisnowitself
thesamethingasthestarting-pointhaddetermineditselftobe.¹
°
Musìc otßccthovcn's typc, ìnwhìch ìdcaIIy thc rcprìsc, thc rc-
turnìnrcmìnìsccnccotcompIcxcscxpoundcdcarIìcr, shouIdbc
thc rcsuIt ot dcvcIopmcnt, that ìs, ot dìaIcctìc, ottcrs an ana-
Ioµuc to thìs that transccnds mcrc anaIoµy. HìµhIy orµanìzcd
musìctoomustbchcardmuItìdìmcnsìonaIIy,torward andback-
ward at thc samc tìmc. Its tcmporaI orµanìzìnµ prìncìpIc rc-
quìrcs thìs. tìmc can bc artìcuIatcd onIy throuµh dìstìnctìons
bctwccn what ìs tamìIìar and what ìs not yct tamìIìar, bctwccn
what aIrcady cxìsts and what ìs ncw, thc condìtìon ot movìnµ
torward ìs arctroµrcssìvcconscìousncss. Onchas to knowawhoIc
movcmcnt andbc awarc rctrospcctìvcIyatcvcry momcnt otwhat
has comcbctorc. Jhc ìndìvìduaIpassaµcs havc to bc µraspcd as
conscqucnccs otwhat has comc bctorc, thc mcanìnµota dìvcr-
I37
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
µcntrcpctìtìonhasto bc cvaIuatcd, andrcappcarancchas to bc
pcrccìvcd not mcrcIy as archìtcctonìc corrcspondcncc but as
somcthìnµthathas cvoIvcd wìthncccssìty. VhatmayhcIpboth
ìnundcrstandìnµthìsanaIoµyandìnundcrstandìnµthccorc ot
HcµcI'sthouµhtìsrccoµnìzìnµthatthcconccptìonottotaIìty as
anìdcntìtyìmmancntIymcdìatcdbynonìdcntìtyìsaIawotartìs-
tìc torm transposcd ìnto thc phìIosophìcaI domaìn. Jhc trans-
posìtìon ìs ìtscItphìIosophìcaIIy motìvatcd. AbsoIutc ìdcaIìsm had
no morc dcsìrc to toIcratc somcthìnµ aIìcn and cxtcrnaI to ìts
own Iaw than dìd thc dynamìc tcIcoIoµy otthc art otìts tìmc,
cIassìcìstìc musìc ìn partìcuIar. VhìIc thc maturc HcµcIdìspar-
aµcd 5chcIIìnµ's ¨ìntcIIcctuaI ìntuìtìon" as an cxtravaµant rap-
turcthatwassìmuItancousIyaconccptuaIand mcchanìcaI, mtorm
HcµcI's phìIosophy ìs ìncomparabIy cIoscr to works ot art than
5chcIIìnµ's, whìchwantcdtoconstructthc worIdusìnµthcwork
otartas ìts prototypc. AssomcthìnµsctotttromcmpìrìcaIrcaI-
ìty, art rcquìrcs torìtsconstìtutíon somcthìnµìndìssoIubIc, non-
ìdcntìcaI, artbccomcsartonIythrouµhìtsrcIatìontosomcthìnµ
thatìsìtscItnotart.JhìsìspcrpctuatcdìnthcduaIìsmot5chcII-
ìnµ's phìIosophy, whìch dcrìvcs ìts conccpt ottruth trom art, a
duaIìsmhcncvcrdìdawaywìth. ßutìtartìsnotanìdcascparatc
trom phìIosophyand µuìdìnµ ìtas a prototypc, ìtphìIosophyas
suchwants tD accompIìsh whatìs notaccompIìshcdìnart, as ìI-
Iusìon, thcnthcphìIosophìcaItotaIìtythcrcbybccomcsacsthctìc,
anarcnatorthcscmbIanccotabsoIutcìdcntìty. JhìsscmbIancc
ìsIcssharmtuIìnartìnsotarasartposìtsìtscItasscmbIanccand
notas actuaIìzcdrcason.
Justasthcrcìsatcnsìonbctwccncxprcssìonandconstructìon
ìn works otart, so ìn HcµcI thcrc ìs a tcnsìon bctwccn thc cx-
prcssìvc and thc arµumcntatìvc cIcmcnts. AII phìIosophy that
docs notmakc dowìthanunrcbcctìvcìmìtatìonotthc scìcntìbc
ìdcaIìsotcoursc tamìIìarwìththìstcnsìon maIcsscxtrcmc torm.
I38
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
InHcµcIthccxprcssìvccIcmcntrcprcscntscxpcrìcncc,thatwhìch
actuaIIy wants to comcout ìnto thc opcnbutcannot, ìtìtwants
to attaìn ncccssìty, appcar cxccpt ìn thc mcdìum otconccpts,
whìchìs tundamcntaIIy ìts opposìtc. Jhìsnccdtorcxprcssìonìs
by no mcans, and Icast otaII ìn HcµcI, a mattcr otsub]cctìvc
wcItanschauunµ.Kathcr,ìtìsìtscItob]cctìvcIydctcrmìncd. Ithas
to do, ìnaII phìIosophythatìsphìIosophy, wìth hìstorìcaIIy man-
ìtcstcdtruth. In thcattcrIìtcotphìIosophìcaI works,thcuntoId-
ìnµ ot thcìr substancc, what thc works cxprcss ìs µraduaIIy
cxtrìcatcd trom whatìnthcm was mcrcIy thouµht. ßutthc vcry
ob]cctìvìtyotthc cxpcrìcntìaI contcnt whìch, asunconscìoushìs-
torìoµraphy ot thc spìrìt, ovcrµrows what ìs sub]cctìvcIy ìn-
tcndcd, brst stìrs wìthìn phìIosophy, as thouµh ìt wcrc thc
sub]cctìvc momcnt ìn ìt. Hcncc ìt µaìns strcnµth trom prccìscIy
thc actìvìtyotthouµhtthatìsuItìmatcIycxtìnµuìshcd ìnthc cx-
pcrìcntìaI contcnt thatbccomcs cvìdcnt. 5o-caIIcd toundatìonaI
orur-cxpcrìcnccs thatwouId attcmpt to cxprcss thcmscIvcs dì-
rcctIy as much, wìthoutsub]cctìnµ thcmscIvcs to rcbcctìon, wouId
rcma¡n ìmpotcnt ìmpuIscs. 5ub]cctìvc cxpcrìcncc ìsonIy thc outcr
shcII otphìIosophìcaIcxpcrìcncc,whìch dcvcIopsbcncathìtand
thcnthrowsìtotIJhcwhoIc otHcµcI's phìIosophyìsancttort
totransIatcìntcIIcctuaIcxpcrìcnccìntoconccpts. Jhccxpansìon
otthcapparatusotthouµht,ottcnccnsurcdasbcìnµmcchanìcaI
andcocrcìvc,ìsproportìonaItothctorccotthccxpcrìcncctobc
mastcrcd. InthcPhenomenolo
g
HcµcIstìIIwantcdtobcIìcvcthat
thc cxpcrìcncc couId sìmpIy bc dcscrìbcd. ßut ìntcIIcctuaI cx-
pcrìcncc can bc cxprcsscd onIy by bcìnµ rcbcctcd ìn ìts mcdìa-
tìon-that ìs, actìvcIy thouµht. Jhcrc ìs no way to makc thc
ìntcIIcctuaI cxpcrìcncc cxprcsscd and thc mcdìum ot thouµht
ìrrcIcvant to onc anothcr. What ìs taIsc ìn HcµcI's phìIosophy
manìtcstsìtscItprccìscIyìnthcnotìonthatwìthcnouµhconccp-
tuaI cttort ìt couId rcaIìzc thìs kìnd ot ìrrcIcvancc. Hcncc thc
I39
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
ìnnumcrabIcµapsbctwccnthcconccptandwhatìscxpcrìcnccd.
HcµcI has tobc rcad aµaìnst thc µraìn, andìn such a way that
cvcry IoµìcaI opcratìon, howcvcr tormaI ìt sccms to bc, ìs rc-
duccdtoìtscxpcrìcntìaIcorc.JhccquìvaIcntotsuchcxpcrìcncc
ìnthcrcadcrìsthcìmaµìnatìon. Itthcrcadcrwantcd mcrcIyto
dctcrmìnc what a passaµc mcant or to pursuc thc chìmcra ot
hµurìnµ out what thc author wantcd to say, thc substancc ot
whìchhcwantstoattaìnphìIosophìcaIccrtaìntywouIdcvaporatc
tor hìm. loonc can rcad any morc outotHcµcI than hc puts
ìn.JhcproccssotundcrstandìnµìsaproµrcssìvcscIt-corrcctìnµ
otsuch pro]cctìonsthrouµhcomparìsonwìth thctcxt. Jhccon-
tcntìtscItcontaìns, as a Iaw otìts torm, thccxpcctatìonotpro-
ductìvc ìmaµìnatìon on thc part otthc onc rcadìnµ. Whatcvcr
cxpcrìcnccthcrcadcrmayrcµìstcrhastobcthouµhtoutonthc
basìsotthcrcadcr'sowncxpcrìcncc. \ndcrstandìnµhastohnd
a toothoId ìn thc µap bctwccn cxpcrìcncc and conccpt. Whcrc
conccptsbccomc anautonomousapparatus-andon!yatooIìsh
cnthusìasm couId cIaìm that HcµcI aIways rcspccts hìs own
canon-thcy nccd tobcbrouµhtbackìntothcìntcIIcctuaIcxpc-
rìcnccthatmotìvatcsthcmandbcmadcvìtaI,asthcywouIdIìkc
to bcbutarccompuIsìvcIyìncapabIc otbcìnµ.Onthcothcrhand,
thc prìmacy otìntcIIcctuaI cxpcrìcncc ìn HcµcI aIso attccts thc
conccptuaI torm. HcµcI, who ìs accuscd ot panIoµìsm, antìcì-
patcs a tcndcncy that dìd not bccomc cxpIìcìtmcthodoIoµìcaIIy
untìI thc phcnomcnoIoµy otHusscrI and hìs schooI a hundrcd
ycars Iatcr. Hìs ìntcIIcctuaI modc otprocccdìnµ ìs paradoxìcaI.
WhìIc ìt rcmaìns, to an cxtrcmc dcµrcc, wìthìn thc mcdìum ot
thc conccpt-at thc hìµhcst IcvcI otabstractìon ìn tcrms otthc
hìcrarchyotcomprchcnsìvcIoµìc-ìt docs notactuaIIyarµuc as
thouµh ìt wantcd thcrcby to cconomìzc onthc ob]cctìvc contrì-
butìon ot thouµht as opposcd to that otcxpcrìcncc, whìch on
thcothcrhandìsìntcIIcctuaIcxpcrìcnccandcvcnìtscItthouµht.
I40
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
Jhcproµramotpurcon!ookínµout!íncdínthcíntroductíon to
thcPhnomnolo
g
carrícs morc wcíµhtm Hcµc!'s chíctworks than
naívc phí!osophíca! conscíousncss bc!ícvcs ít to. ßccausc as Hc-
µc!conccívcs ít a!! phcnomcna-andtorHcµc!'sLogc thccatc-
µorícsot!oµícarc a!so phcnomcna, thínµsthat arc manítcstcd,
µívcn, and ín that scnsc mcdíatcd, somcthínµ that had a!rcady
bccn í!!umínatcd ín a passaµc ín Kant's dcductíon¹-arc ínhcr-
cnt!yspírítua!!ymcdíatcd, whatísnccdcdínordcrtoµraspthcm
ísnotthouµhtbutrathcrthcrc!atíonshíptorwhíchthcphcnom-
cno!oµy ot a hundrcd ycars !atcr ínvcntcd thc tcrm "sponta-
ncous rcccptívíty." Jhc thínkínµ sub]cct ís to bc rc!cascd trom
thouµht, síncc thouµht wí!! rcdíscovcr ítsc!tm thc ob]cctthouµht,
íthason!y tobcdcvc!opcd outotthcob]cctandtoídcntítyítsc!t
m ít. Howcvcr sub]cct to crítícísm thísvícwmaybc,Hcµc!'smodc
otprocccdínµís orµanízcd ín accordancc wíth ít. Hcncc hc can
bcundcrstoodon!ywhcnthcíndívídua!ana!yscsarcrcadnotas
arµumcnts butas dcscríptíons ot"ímp!ícd mcanínµs."Ixccpt that
thc !attcr arc conccívcd not as hxcd mcanínµs, ídca! unítícs, ín-
varíants, as ín thc schoo! otHusscrI, but rathcr as ínhcrcnt!yín
motíon.Hcµc!dístrustsarµumcntdccp!y,andwíthµoodrcason.
Îrímarí!ybccauscthcdía!cctícíanknowssomcthínµthat5ímmc!
!atcr rcdíscovcrcd. that anythínµ that rcmaíns arµumcntatíon
cxposcsítsc!ttorctutatíon.ÎorthísrcasonHcµc!ncccssarí!ydís-
*"They are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in
thought, consists, that is, in the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold,
given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception-a faculty,
therefore, which by itself knows nothing whatsoever, but merely combines and
arranges the material of knowledge, that is, the intuition, which must be given
to it by the object. This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce a
priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such
and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these
and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only forms
of our possible intuition" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reaon, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith, London: MacMillan, 1963, p. 161 [BI45fJ).
I4I
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
appoíntsanyoncwhoIookstorhísarµumcnts.Ivcnthcqucstíon
why, whích thc unarmcd rcadcr ottcn tccIs hímscItobIíµcd to
askotHcµcI'stransítíonsanddcductíons,whcrcothcrpossíbíIí-
tícs than thc onc HcµcI puts torth sccm opcn, ísínappropríatc.
Jhc µcncraIorícntatíoníssctbythcovcraIIíntcntíon, butwhat
ís saíd about thc phcnomcna ís dcrívcd trom thc phcnomcna
thcmscIvcs, orísatIcast supposcd to bc. Latcµorícs Iíkc ¨toun-
datíonaIrcIatíons" thcmscIvcs taII ínto thc HcµcIían díaIcctíc ot
csscnccandshouIdnotbcprcsupposcd.JhctaskHcµcIímposcs
ísnotthatotaníntcIIcctuaItorccdmarch,ítísaImostthcoppo-
sítc. Jhc ídcaI ís nonarµumcntatívc thouµht. Hís phíIosophy,
whích, as a phíIosophy otídcntíty strctchcdtothcbrcakínµ poínt,
dcmands thc mostcxtrcmccttortsonthcpartotthouµht, ísaIso
díaIcctícaIínthatítmovcswíthínthcmcdíumotathouµhttrccd
tromtcnsíon.WhcthcrhísphíIosophyístoIIowcdthrouµhtothc
cnd dcpcnds on whcthcr thís rcIaxatíon ís attaíncd or not. In
thís HcµcI díttcrs protoundIy trom Kantand Îíchtc, aIso,tobc
surc, trom thc íntuítíonísm hc attackcd ín 5chcIIínµ. Hcbrokc
up thc díchotomy bctwccn thcsís and arµumcnt as hc díd aII
ríµíd díchotomícs. Îor hím arµumcntís not somcthínµ subsídí-
ary, as ísottcn thc casc ín phíIosophy, somcthínµ thatbccomcs
díspcnsabIc as soonas thc thcsíshasbccnbrmIycstabIíshcd. In
hís works thcrc arc ncíthcr thcscs nor arµumcnts, HcµcI madc
tunotthcscs, caIIínµ thcm ¨dícta."Jhconc ís,vírtuaIIy, aIways
thc othcraswcII. thcarµumcntísthcprcdícatíonotwhatsomc-
thínµ ís, hcncc thcsís, thc thcsís ís synthcsís throuµh]udµmcnt,
hcnccarµumcnt.
KcIaxatíon otconscíousncssas anapproachmcans notward-
ínµottassocíatíonsbutopcnínµthcundcrstandínµto thcm. Hc-
µcIcanbcrcadonIyassocíatívcIy. Atcvcrypoíntoncmust try to
admít as many possíbíIítícs tor what ís mcant, as many conncc-
tíons to somcthínµcIsc, as may arísc. A ma]orpart otthcwork
I42
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
otthc productìvc ìmaµìnatìon consìstsìnthìs. AtIcasta portìon
otthccncrµywìthoutwhìchonccannomorcrcad thanonccan
wìthout rcIaxatìon ìs uscd to shakc oÜthc automatìc dìscìpIìnc
that ìs rcquìrcd tor purc conccnt�atìon on thc ob]cct and that
thcrcby casìIy mìsscs thc ob]cct. Îor HcµcI, assocìatìvcthouµht
ìs µroundcd ìn thc thìnµ ìtscIt. Dcspìtc hìs dccIaratìons to thc
contrary ìn thc Philosophy of Right, both HcµcI's conccptìon ot
thc truth as somcthìnµ ìn thc proccss otbccomìnµ and hìs ab-
sorptìon ot cmpìrìcaI rcaIìty ìnto thc Iìtc ot thc conccpt tran-
sccndcd thc dìvìsìon ot phìIosophy ìnto systcmatìc phìIosophy
andhìstorìcaIphìIosophy. Aswcknow, spìrìt, thcsubstratumot
hìsphìIosophy, ìs notìntcndcdto bcascparatc, sub]cctìvc ìdca,
ìt ìs ìntcndcd to bc rcaI, and ìts movcmcnt to bc rcaI hìstory.
lcvcrthcIcss, wìthìncomparabIc tact, cvcn thcIatcrchaptcrsot
thcPhenomenolo
g
rctraìn trom brutaIIy compactìnµ thc scìcncc
otthc cxpcrìcncc otconscìousncss and that othuman hìstory
ìnto onc anothcr. Jhc two sphcrcs hovcr, touchìnµ, aIonµsìdc
onc anothcr. In thcLogic, ìnaccordancc wìth ìts thcmatìcs and
nodoubtaIsoundcrthc prcssurcotthcIatcrHcµcI'sìncrcasìnµ
rìµìdìty,cxtcrnaIhìstoryìsswaIIowcdupìnthc ìnncrhìstorìcìty
otthc cxposìtìon otthc catcµorìcs. ßut at Icast thc cxposìtìon
aImost ncvcr torµcts ìntcIIcctuaIhìstory ìn thcnarrowcrscnsc.
WhcnthcLogc dcIìmìtsìtscIttromothcrvìcwsotthcsamcsub-
]cct mattcr, ìt aIways makcs rctcrcncc to thc thcscs that havc
bccn handcd down as part otthc hìstory otphìIosophy. In ob-
scurc scctìons ìtìs µcncraIIy advìsabIc to cxtrapoIatc such Iìnk-
aµcs. IarIìcr HcµcIìan tcxts, such as thc Diferenzchrift or thc
JcnaLogic, shouId bc adduccd. Ottcn thcy ottcr proµrammatìc
tormuIatìons otthìnµs thc Logic wìII try to carry out, and thcy
aIIow thcmscIvcs thcrctcrcnccsto thchìstoryotphìIosophythat
arc Iatcr supprcsscd ìn thc ìntcrcsts otthc ìdcaI ot thc movc-
mcntotthcconccpt. Jobcsurc, ashadowotambìµuìtyIìcsacross
I43
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
thísIaycrotHcµcI'sworkaswcII.ßut]ustasthcµrcatsystcmatíc
rcdcctíonstccdonímpuIscstromthchístorícaI,sothcIattcrar�
índucnccd ín thcír coursc by thc systcmatíc. Jhcy arc scIdom
tuIIy cxhaustcd by thc phíIosophícaIídca to whích thcy aIIudc.
Jhcyarcorícntcdmorcbyob]cctívcíntcrcstthanby aníntcrcst
ínso-caIIcd ¨cncountcrs"wíthbooks. IvcnínthcDiferenzchrift
onc docs not aIways know tor ccrtaín what ís dírcctcd aµaínst
KcínhoId, whataµaínstÎíchtc, and whataIrcadyaµaínst 5chcII-
ínµ,whoscstandpoínt,whíIcstíIIoHcíaIIydctcndcd,hasaIrcady
bccn transccndcd íntcIIcctuaIIy. 5uch qucstíons couId bc rc-
soIvcdby HcµcI phíIoIoµy ítthcrc wcrc such a thínµ. \ntíI that
timc íntcrprctatíon ín tcrms otthc hístory otphíIosophy ouµht
to strívc tor thc samc cathoIícíty otíntcrprctatíon as systcmatíc
íntcrprctatíon.
HístorícaI assocíatíons, morcovcr, arc byno mcans thc onIy
oncsthataríscínconncctíon wíthHcµcI. Lctmc suµµcstatIcast
onc othcr dímcnsíon otassocíatíons. HcµcI's dynamíc ís ítscIta
dynamíc othxcd and dynamíc cIcmcnts. Jhís scparatcs hímír-
rcconcíIabIy trom thc kínd otvítaIíst ¨bow" to whích DíIthcy's
mcthod díIutcs hím. Jhc conscqucnccs otthístor hís structurc
shouIdbccxpIorcd. Muchmorcínvaríancchndsítswayíntothc
conccptínmotíonthan anyoncwhohas tooundíaIcctícaIacon-
ccptíon otthc notíon otthcdíaIcctícítscItwouId cxpcct. How-
cvcrmuch thc doctrínc otthccatcµorícsísncµatcdínítsdctaíIs,
HcµcI's conccptíon otan ídcntíty wíthín thc whoIc, otthc sub-
]cct-ob]cct, rcquírcs that doctrínc. Îor aII thc ríchncss otwhat
Marx,ínamusícaI mctaphor, caIIcdHcµcI'sµrotcsquccraµmcI-
ody,'°thc numbcr othísmotítsíshnítc. Howcvcr paradoxícaIít
maybc, thc task otcstabIíshínµacataIoµucotthcínvariantcIc-
mcnts ín HcµcIandworkínµout thcírrcIatíonshíp to thosc that
arcínmotíonísan'urµcntonc. ItwouIdscrvc undcrstandínµas
wcII as provídc a pcdaµoµícaI aíd, aIthouµh otcoursc ít wouId
I44
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
do so onIy ìn undìmìnìshcd conscìousncss otthc onc-sìdcdncss
thataccordìnµ to HcµcI ìsìtscItuntruth. Jhc rcadìnµotHcµcI
must makc a vìrtuc otapproprìatìon out otthc ncccssìty otthc
dìsturbìnµcIattcr about whosc prcscncc ìn cIassìcaI musìc Kìch-
ard Waµncr madc an anaIoµouscompIaìnt. In thc mostdìthcuIt
passaµcs ìtìs hcIptuI to assocìatc trom onc's knowIcdµc otHc-
µcI's ìnvarìants, whìch hc ccrtaìnIy dìd not poìnt outand whìch
may bc cmbcddcd ìn hìs work aµaìnst hìs wìII, to thc possìbIc
basìs otthc ìndìvìduaI rcmarkat hand. Ottcna comparìson bc-
twccn thc µcncraI motìt and thc spccìbc wordìnµ suppIìcs thc
mcanìnµ. JhcunorthodoxovcrvìcwotthcwhoIc wìthoutwhìch
onc cannot do thìs rcquìtcs HcµcI tor bcìnµ unabIc to opcratc
orthodoxIy hìmscIt. Whcrcas HcµcI, Iìkc trcc thouµht ìn µcn-
craI, ìs ìnconccìvabIcwìthouta pIaytuI cIcmcntto whìchoncowcs
thc assocìatìons, thcIattcrarc onIy a partìaI momcnt. Jhcìr op-
posìtc poIcìsthccxactwordìnµ. JhcsccondIcvcIotapproprìa-
tìon ìnvoIvcs tryìnµ thc assocìatìons out on thc wordìnµ,
cIìmìnatìnµthoscthatcontradìctìt,andIcavìnµthoscthatarcìn
accordanccwìthìtandthatìIIumìnatcthc dctaìIs. In addìtìonto
thìskìndottruìttuIncss,thccrìtcrìon torcvaIuatìnµassocìatìons
ìs that thcy arc compatìbIc not onIy wìthwhatìs thcrc butwìth
thc contcxt as wcII. In thcsc tcrms, rcadìnµ HcµcI ìs an cxpcrì-
mcntaI proccdurc. onc aIIows possìbIc ìntcrprctatìons to comc
to mìnd, proposcs thcm, and comparcs thcm wìth thc tcxt and
wìthwhathasaIrcadybccnrcIìabIyìntcrprctcd. Jhouµht, whìch
ncccssarìIy movcs away trom thc tcxt, tromwhatìs saìd, has to
rcturntoìtandbccomccondcnscd wìthìnìt.JohnDcwcy, acon-
tcmporary thìnkcr who tor aII hìs posìtìvìsm ìs cIoscr to HcµcI
thanthcìrtwoaIIcµcdstandpoìntsarctooncanothcr,caIIcdhìs
phìIosophy "cxpcrìmcntaIìsm. " 5omcthìnµ otthìs stancc ìs ap-
proprìatc tor thc rcadcr otHcµcI. Atthc currcnt staµc otHc-
µcI's hìstorìcaIuntoIdìnµ, such sccond-ordcr cmpìrìcìsm wouId
I45
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHege|
brínµ out thc Iatcnt posítívístíc momcnt contaíncd, tor aII Hc-
µcI'sínvcctívcsaµaínstnarrow-míndcd rcbcctívcthouµht,ínhís
phíIosophy's stubborn ínsístcncc on what ís. Uc who prcsumcs
toscck spírítín thcquíntcsscnccotwhatís thcrcbybows to thc
Iattcr morc dccpIy than hc admíts. HcµcI'sídcaI otrcconstruc-
tíonísnotabsoIutcIydístíncttromthcscícntíbcídcaI. amonµthc
unrcsoIvcd contradíctíons ín thc HcµcIían díaIcctíc, thís ís pcr-
haps thc oncríchcstínímpIícatíons. HcµcIprovokcs thc cxpcr-
ímcntaImcthod,whíchísothcrwíscrccommcndcdonIybypurc
nomínaIísts. Jo rcad hímcxpcrímcntaIIyís to]udµc hím by hís
owncrítcríon.
ßut what thís says ís that no rcadínµ ot HcµcI can do hím
]ustícc wíthout crítícízínµ hím. Jhc notíon thatcrítíquc ís a scc-
ondIcvcIcrcctcdonatoundatíonotundcrstandínµ,anídcadc-
rívcd trom pcdaµoµícaI pIatítudcs and authorítarían prc]udícc,
ís ín µcncraI taIsc. ÎhíIosophy ítscIttakcs pIacc wíthín thc pcr-
mancntdís]unctíonbctwccnthctrucandthctaIsc.\ndcrstand-
ínµtakcs pIaccaIonµwíth ítand accordínµIy aIways aIso bccomcs,
íncttcct,acrítíquc otwhatístobcundcrstoodwhcnthcproccss
ot undcrstandínµ compcIs a díttcrcnt]udµmcnt than thc onc
thatístobcundcrstood. IIísnotthcworstrcadcrwhoprovídcs
thcbookwíthdísrcspccttuI notcs ín thc marµín. Jhcrc ísnonccd
to dcny thc pcdaµoµícaI danµcr that ín doínµ so studcnts may
µct ínvoIvcd ín cmpty words and ídIc spccuIatíon and cIcvatc
thcmscIvcs abovc thcmattcrathandínnarcíssístíccomtort, but
thathasnothínµto dowíthwhatísthccasccpístcmoIoµícaIIy. It
ís up to thc tcachcr to protcctthc íntcrpIay otundcrstandínµ
andcrítícísmtromdcµcncratínµíntoprctcntíouscmptíncss.Whcn
ítcomcs to HcµcI, a partícuIarIy híµh dcµrcc otsuch íntcrpIay
mustbcdcmandcd. Indícatíons abouthowtorcadhímarcncc-
cssaríIyímmancnt.JhcyarcaímcdathcIpínµto cxtractthcob-
]cctívc substancc trom hís tcxts ínstcad otphíIosophízínµ about
I46
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
hís phí!osophy trom thc outsídc. Jhcrc ís no othcr way to µct
ínto contact wíth thc mattcr at hand. Jhc ímmancnt approach
nccd nottcarthc ob]cctíon thatítíswíthouta pcrspcctívc, mo!-
!usk!íkcandrc!atívístíc. Idcas thathavcconbdcncc ín thcírown
ob]cctívíty havc to surrcndcrva banque, wíthoutmcnta!rcscrva-
tíons, to thc ob]cct ín whích thcy ímmcrsc thcmsc!vcs, cvcn ít
that ob]cct ís anothcr ídca, thís ís thc ínsurancc prcmíum thcy
pay tor not bcínµ a systcm. Jransccndcnt crítíquc avoíds trom
thcoutsctthccxpcrícnccotwhatísothcrthanítsownconscíous-
ncss. Itwas transccndcnt and not ímmancntcrítíquc that took
upthc standpoíntaµaínstboththcríµídítyand thcarbítraríncss
otwhíchphí!osophyturncdíncqua!mcasurc. Jransccndcntcrí-
tíquc sympathízcs wíth authoríty ín íts vcry torm, cvcn bctorc
cxprcssínµanycontcnt, thcrc ís amomcntotcontcnt to thc torm
ítsc!t. Jhc cxprcssíon ¨as a . . . , I . . . ," ín whích onc can ínscrt
anyorícntatíon, tromdía!cctíca!matcría!ísmto Îrotcstantísm,ís
symptomatícotthat. Anyoncwho]udµcssomcthínµthathasbccn
artícu!atcd and c!aboratcd-art or phí!osophy-by prcsupposí-
tíonsthatdonotho!dwíthínítísbchavínµínarcactíonaryman-
ncr, cvcn whcn hc swcars by proµrcssívc s!oµans. In contrast,
thc c!aím Hcµc! makcs tor hís ímmancnt movcmcnt-that ít ís
thctruth-ís notaposítíon.Jothíscxtcntthatmovcmcntísín-
tcndcdto!cadoutbcyondíts purcímmancncc, a!thouµhtor íts
partthc!attcrtoohas to bcµínwíthínthc!ímítatíonsotastand-
poínt.Hcwhocntrustshímsc!ttoHcµc!wí!!bc!cdtothcthrcsh-
o!d at whích a dccísíon must bc madc about Hcµc!'s c!aím to
truth. Hcbccomcs Hcµc!'scrítícbyto!!owínµhím. Îrom thc poínt
otvícw otundcrstandínµ, thcíncomprchcnsíb!c ín Hcµc! ís thc
scar!cttbyídcntíty-thínkínµ. Hcµc!'s día!cctíca!phí!osophy µcts
ínto a día!cctíc ít cannot account tor and whosc so!utíon ís bc-
yond íts omnípotcncc. Wíthín thc systcm, and ín tcrms otthc
!aws otthc systcm, thc truth otthc nonídcntíca! manítcstsítsc!t
I47
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
as crror, as unrcso!vcd, ìnthcothcrscnscotbcìnµunmastcrcd,
as thc untruth otthc systcm; and nothìnµthatìsuntruc can bc
undcrstood. Jhus thc ìncomprchcnsìb!ccxp!odcsthcsystcm. ¡or
a!! hìs cmphasìs on ncµatìvìty, dìvìsìon, and nonìdcntìty, Hcµc!
actua!!y takcs coµnìzancc otthatdìmcnsìon on!ytorthc sakc ot
ìdcntìty, on!yasanìnstrumcntotìdcntìty.Jhcnonìdcntìtìcsarc
hcavì!y strcsscd, but not acknow!cdµcd, prccìsc!y bccausc thcy
arcsocharµcdwìthspccu!atìon.Asìt ìnaµìµantìccrcdìtsystcm,
cvcry ìndìvìdua! pìccc ìs to bcìndcbtcd to thc othcr-nonìdcn-
tìca!-and yct thc who!c ìs to bc trcc otdcbt, ìdcntìca!. Jhìs ìs
whcrc thc ìdca!ìst dìa!cctìc commìts ìts ta!!acy. It says, wìth pa-
thos, nonìdcntìty. lonìdcntìtyìs to bc dcbncd torìts own sakc,
assomcthìnµhctcroµcncous. ßutbydchnìnµìtnoncthc!css, thc
dìa!cctìcìmaµìncs ìtsc!tto havcµoncbcyondnonìdcntìtyandto
bc assurcd otabso!utc ìdcntìty. Lcrtaìn!y what ìs nonìdcntìca!
and unknownbccomcs ìdcntìca! as wc!!ìn bcìnµ known; and ìn
bcìnµ comprchcndcd, thc nonconccptua! bccomcs thc conccpt
otthcnonìdcntìca!. ßut thc nonìdcntìca!ìtsc!tdocs notmcrc!y
bccomc a conccpt by vìrtuc ot such rcbcctìon; ìt rcmaìns thc
contcnt otthc conccpt, dìstìnct trom thc conccpt. Onc cannot
movc trom thc!oµìca! movcmcnt otconccpts to cxìstcncc. Ac-
cordìnµtoHcµc!th�rcìsaconstìtutìvcnccdtorthcnonìdcntìca!
ìn ordcrtorcouccpts, ìdcntìty, to comc ìnto bcìnµ;]ustas con-
vcrsc!ythcrcìsanccdtorthcconccptìnordcrtobccomcawarc
otthc nonconccptua!, thc nonìdcntìca!. ßut Hcµc! vìo!atcs hìs
ownconccptotthc dìa!cctìc, whìch shou!d bc dctcndcd aµaìnst
hìm, by notvìo!atìnµ ìt, by Oosìnµ ìtottand makìnµ ìt thc su-
prcmc unìty, trcc otcontradìctìon. Summum ius summa iniuria.
Jhrouµh thc sub!atìon ot thc dìa!cctìc, rccìprocìty ìs rcstruc-
turcd to bccomc onc-sìdcdncss. lor can onc sìmp!y !cap trom
rccìprocìty to thc nonìdcntìca!; that wou!d mcan that dìa!cctìc
hadtorµottcnìtsundcrstandìnµotunìvcrsa!mcdìatìon.ßuton!y
I48
Skoteinos,orHowtoReadHegel
by a Mï\nchhauscn trìck, by puIIìnµ ìtscIt up by ìts own boot-
straps, couId ìt cIìmìnatc thc momcnt that cannot bc tuIIy ab-
sorbcd, a momcnt thatìs posìtcd aIonµwìthìt. Whatcauscsthc
dìaIcctìcprobIcms ìs thc truth contcnt that nccds to bcdcrìvcd
tromìt.JhcdìaIcctìccouIdbcconsìstcntonIyìnsacrìbcìnµcon-
sìstcncyby toIIowìnµìts ownIoµìcto thc cnd. Jhcsc, and noth-
ìnµIcss, arcthcstakcsìn undcrstandìnµHcµcI.
Notes
References to Hegel's works are noted as follows: the reference to the German
edition cited by Adorno is given first, followed by the reference to the published
English translation, if one has been used in the text. Where no reference to an
English-language publication is given, the translation in the text is my own. Adoro
cites the JubiHiumsausgabe of Hegel's works reissued under the editorship of
Hermann Glockner and published by the Friedrich Frommann Verlag between
1927 and 1965. In these notes the following abbreviations have been used:
.
WW 1: Aufsatze aus dem kritischenJournal der Philosophie (und andere Schrif­
ten aus der Jenenser Zeit)
WW 2: Phanomenologie des Geistes
WW 3: Philosophische Propadeutik
WW 4: Wissenschaft der Logik, 1 . Teil
WW 5: Wissenschaft der Logik, 2. Teil
WW 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts
WW 8: System der Philosophie, I. Teil
WW 9: System der Philosophie, II. Teil
WWl O: System der Philosophie, III. Teil
WWl l : Vorlesungen fiber die Philosophie der Geschichte
I50
Notes
W12: Vorlesungen liber die Aesthetik, 1. Bd.
W15: Vorlesungen liber die Philosophie der Religion, 1. Bd.
W16: Vorlesungen liber die Philosophie der Religion, 2. Bd.
W17: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie, 1. Bd.
W18: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie, 2. Bd.
W19: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie, 3. Bd.
For references to published English translations of Hegel's works, the following
abbreviations have been used:
Difference: The Diference between Fichte's and Schelling's System ofPhilosophy, trans.
and ed. W. Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1977).
Phenomenology: The Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977).
Propaedeutic: The Philosophical Propaedeutic, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Black­
well, 1986).
Logic: The Science ofLogic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin;
New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
Right: The Philosophy ofRight, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1942).
LogidEncyclopedia I: Logic: Part One ofthe Encclopaedia ofthe Philosophical Sci­
ences, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
Nature/Encyclopedia II: Philosophy ofNature: Part Two ofthe Encylopaedia ofthe
Philosohical Sciences, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
Mind/Encyclopedia III: Philosophy ofMind: Part Three ofthe Encclopaedia ofthe
Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace and A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971).
Philosophy of History: Lectures on the Philosophy ofHistory, trans. J. Sibree (Lon­
don: George Bell & Sons, 1894).
Aesthetics: Hegel's Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1975).
I 5I
NotestoPagesxi~I6
Philosophy of Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy ofReligion, trans. E. B. Speirs
andJ. B. Sanderson, in three volumes (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962).
History of Philosophy: Lectures on the History ofPhilosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane
and Frances H. Simson (New York: The Humanities Press, 1955).
The translation of the German word Begrffhas been consistently changed from
"notion" to "concept" in quoted passages.
Introduction
1. These studies include Marcuse's Hegel's Ontology and the Foundations ofa Theory
ofHistorcity, his Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rie ofSocial Theor, his anal­
yses of Marx's early writings, and his Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry
. into Freud; Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests, which deals with Kant,
Hegel, Marx, Peirce, Dilthey, and Nietzsche, and his Theory ofCommunicative Ac­
tion, which deals with Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Mead, Parsons, Adorno, Hork­
heimer, and Lukacs; and Adorno's Kierkegaard, Metacritique of Epistemology
(Husserl),jargon ofAuthenticity (Heidegger), Negative Dialectics (Kant, Hegel, Hei­
degger), and Hegel: Three Studies.
2. This is the basis on which Fredric Jameson in his Late Marism: Adoro, or, the
Persistence ofthe Dialectic, has recently proposed Adorno as a model dialectical
thinker for the 1990s and predicted a revival of an "unfamiliar materialist-math­
ematical" Hegel as well.
Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy
1. Hegel, WW 19, p. 61 1 ; History of Philosophy III, p. 479.
2. Ibid., p. 613; History ofPhilosophy III, p. 481 [translation altered].
3. Ibid., p. 615; Histor of Philosophy III, p. 483.
4. Richard Kroner, Von Kant bi Hegel, vol. 2 (Tibingen: Mohr, 1924),
p. 279.
5. Cf. J. G. Fichte, Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre), trans. Peter Heath
and John Lachs, frst and second introductions (New York: Appleton-Century­
Crofts, 1970).
6. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Bais ofMorality, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indian­
apolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 63.
I52
NotestoPages I7~37
7. Hegel, W 10, p. 305; Mind/Encyclopedia III, p. 187.
8. Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. and ed. T. B. Bottomore (New York: Mc­
Graw-Hill, 1964), p. 202.
9. Cf. Hegel, W 4, p. 588f. ; Logic, p. 472f.
10. Cf. the conclusion of the essay "Skoteinos," in this volume.
1 1 . Hegel, W 2, p. 30; Phenomenology, p. 15.
12. Ibid., p. 1 71 ; Phenomenology, p. 130.
13. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," in The Mar-Engel Reader, ed.
Robert Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 382-383.
14. Cf. Kroner, p. 404f.
15. Hegel, W 2, p. 531 ; Phenomenology, p. 421 .
16. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adprno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 25-26.
17. Hegel, W 7, p. 319f. ; Right, pars. 245 and 246, p. 151.
18. Ibid., p. 322f.; Right, par. 249. p. 152.
19. Ibid., p. 396; Right, par. 288, p. 1 89.
20. Hegel, W 2, p. 23; Phenomenology, p. 10.
21 . Hegel, W 4, p. 87; Logic, p. 81.
22. Ibid., p. 87f.; Logic, p. 82.
23. Hegel, W 8, p. 204; LogiclEncclopedia I, p. 158.
24. Hegel, W 4, p. 1 10; Logic, p. 99.
25. Ibid., p. 107; Logic, p. 97.
26. Hegel, W 8, p. 91 ; LogiclEncclopedia I, p. 53.
27. Ibid., p. 35.
28. Hegel, W 2, p. 25; Phenomenolog, pp. 1 1-12.
I53
NotestoPages
29. Ibid., p. 46; Phenomenolog, p. 28.
30. Ibid., p. 22; Phenomenology, pp. 9-10.
31. Hegel, W 10, p. 17; Mind/Encclopedia III, p. 6.
32. Hegel, W 8, p. 372; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 305.
33. Hegel, W 4, p. 46; Logic, p. 50.
34. Hegel, W 2, p. 38f.; Phenomenolog, pp. 22-23.
35. Hegel, WW 7, p. 387f. ; Right, par. 280, p. 184-185.
36. Cf
.
Kroner, p. 386.
37. Hegel, WW 2, p. 479; Phenomenolog, pp. 379-380.
38. Kuno Fischer, Hegets Leben, Werke und LeIwe, Part 1 (Heidelberg: C. Winter,
1901), p. 87; English in Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Com­
mentary (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 329.
The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy
1. Martin Heidegger, Hegel's Concept ofExperience (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1970), p. 1 13.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
3. Hegel, WW 2, p. 613; Phenomenology, p. 487.
4. Ibid., p. 78; Phenomenology, p. 55.
5. Cf. this volume, pp. 9-10.
6. Hegel, W 9, p. 58; Nature/Encclopedia II, p. 19.
7. Hegel, W 15, p. 1 74; Philosophy ofReligion I, p. 162.
8. Hegel, W 19, p. 283; History ofPhilosophy III, p. 176.
9. Hegel, W 8, p. 5c; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 12.
1 0. Ibid., p. 172; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 130.
I 54
NotestoPages59~82
1 1 . Ibid., p. 1 81 ; Logic/Encyclopedia I, p. 138.
12. Cf. Hegel, W 8, par. 213, p. 423f; d. Logc/Encclopedia I, par 213,
p. 352f
.
13. Hegel, W 1 , p. 54f; Diference, pp. 97-98.
14. Hegel, WW 1 2, p. 207; Aesthetics, p. 149.
15. Hegel, W 17, p. 69; History ofPhilosophy I, p. 40.
16. Hegel, W 8, p. 57; Logc/Encyclopedia I, p. 20.
17. Cf
.
Hegel, W 19, p. 606; d. Histor ofPhilosophy III, p. 473.
18. Hegel, W 3, p. 125; Propaedeutic, p. 84.
19. Hegel, W 18, p. 341 .
20. Hegel, W 8, p. 47; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 9.
21. Immanuel Kant, T Crtique ofPure Reason, preface to the 2nd edition, trans.
Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 29.
22. Hegel, W 8, p. 36.
23. Cf. Hegel, W 2, p. 46ff; cf. Phenomenology, p. 30.
24. Friedrich Nietzsche, Aus der Zeit der Morgenrithe und der frihlichen Wissenschaft
1880-1882, Gesammelte Werke, Musarionsausgabe, vol. 1 1 (Munich: Musarion
Verlag, 1924), p. 22.
25. Hegel, W 8, p. 220; Logic/Encyclopedia I, p. 173.
26. Ibid., p. 173; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 130.
27. Hegel, W 16, p. 309; Philosophy ofReligion III, p. 1 01 .
28. Hegel, W 8, p. 423; Logic/Encclopedia I, p. 353.
29. Hegel, W 1, p. 527.
30. Cf. Hegel, W 1 1 , p. 49; Philosophy ofHistor, p. 22.
31. Cf Georg Lukacs, Realism in Our Time, trans. John and N ecke Mander (New
York: Harper and Row, 1964); and Theodor W. Adorno, "Extorted Reconcilia-
I55
NotestoPages84~I03
tion: On Georg Lukacs' Realism in Our Time," i n Notes t o Literture I, trans. Shierry
Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 216ff.
32. Theodor W. Adorno, "From a Letter to Thomas Mann on His Die Betro­
gene, " in Notes to Literture, vol. 2, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 320-321.
Skoteios
1. Hegel, WW 4, p. 493; Logic, p. 400.
2. Hegel, WW 1 , p. 60; Diference, pp. 102-103.
3. Cf. this volume, pp. 50-51 .
4. Hegel, WW 8, par. 2 12, addition p. 422; Logc/Encclopedia I , pp. 351-352.
5. Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart, A Commentar on Hegel's Logc (Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press, 1931).
6. Hegel, WW 7, par. 157, p. 236f.; Right, p. 1 l 0.
7. Cf. Hegel, WW 1, p. 56f; cf. Difference, pp. 99-100.
8. Hegel, WW 4, p. 488; Logic, p. 396.
9. Rene Descartes, Prnciples of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and
Reese P. Miller, (Dordrecht: Dr. Reidel, 1984), p. 20.
.
10. Descartes, Oeuvres, Principia Philosophiae, vol. 3 (Paris, 1905, frst part), p.
2lf.
1 1 . Immanuel Kant, The Crtie ofPure Reason, preface to the 2nd edition, trans.
Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 373 (B415).
12. Descartes, "Discourse on Method," trans. by John Veitch, in The Rationalists
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), p. 63.
13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1922), p. 1 89.
14. Hegel, WW 1 7, p. 348; Hitory of Philosophy I, pp. 281-282.
15. Cf. Edmund Husser!, Idea: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans.
W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 1 88.
I56
NotestoPages I03~I25
16. Ibid., p. 185.
17. Ibid. , p. 189.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 1 90.
20. H. G. Hotho, Vorstudien fur Leben und Kunst (Stuttgart and Tiibingen, 1835),
p. 386; English in Walter Kaufmann, Hegel (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965),
p. 351 .
21 . Cf. Friedrich Uberweg, Grndriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 4, revised
by T. K. Oesterreich (Berlin: Mittler, 1 923), p. 87.
22. Hegel, WW 5, p. 5; Logic, p. 577.
23. Ibid., p. 13f; Logic, p. 583.
24. Hegel, WW 4, p. 536; Logic, p. 432.
25. Ibid., p. 658f; Logic, p. 526.
26. Hegel, WW 2, p. 619; Phenomenolog, p. 492.
27. Hegel, WW 10, par. 41 1 , p. 246f; Mind/Encyclopedia Ill, p. 147.
28. Hegel, WW 3, p. 2 1 1 ; Propaedeutic, p. 157.
29. Hegel, WW 5, p. 203; Logic, p. 729.
30. Hegel, WW 2, p. 390; Phenomenology, p. 308.
31 . Ibid., p. 405; Phenomenology, p. 321 .
32. Hotho, p. 384f; English i n Kaufmann, Hegel, p. 351 .
33. Hegel, WW 4, p. 87; Logc, p. 82.
34. Ibid. , p. 665; Logc, p. 531 .
35. Cf. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment,
(New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 25ff.
36. Hegel, WW 7, par 3, p. 43f; Right, pp. 16-17.
I57
NotestoPages I 26~I43
37. Gustav Riimelin, Reden und AuJitze (Tiibingen, 1875), p. 48f, quoted in
Uberweg, p. 77.
38. Hegel, W 5, p. 328; Logic, p. 824.
39. Ibid., p. 240; Logic, p. 758.
40. Ibid., p. 240f; Logic, p. 758.
41 . Ibid., p. 329; Logic, p. 825.
42. Ibid., p. 352f; Logic, p. 843.
43. Hegel, W 7, par. 280, p. 387ff; Right, pp. 184, 288-289.
44. Hotho, p. 386f; English in Kaufmann, Hegel, pp. 351-352 (translation
amended).
45. Hegel, W 2, p. 44f; Phenomenolog, pp. 27-28.
46. Cf. Hegel, WW 4, p. 665f and W 5, p. 212; cf. Logic, pp. 53lf and 736.
47. Hegel, W 4, p. 552; Logic, pp. 444-445.
48. Hegel, W 5, p. 343ff; Logic, pp. 836-838.
49. Cf. Karl Marx, Die Fchrifen, ed. Siegfried Landshut (Stuttgart: A. Kroner,
1953), p. 7.
Name Index
Adorno, Theodor W., ix-xxxiii
Anaximander, 86
Aristotle, 18, 54, 82
Beethoven, Ludwig van, 136
Benjamin, Walter, xvi, xxxii, 133
Bergson, Henri, 55, 72-73, 75
Borchardt, Rudolf, xxix
Carnap, Rudolf, x, xiii
Croce, Benedetto, x, 1
Descartes, Rene, xiii, xxv-xxvii, 96-
100, 102n
Dewey, John, x, 28, 144
Diderot, Denis, 1 18
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 60, 82, 143
Duns Scotus,.John, 35
Durkheim, Emile, 63
Eckermann, Johann Peter, 43
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 3, 8, 1 1-16,
19, 45-46, 60, 62, 64-65, 66, 71,
127, 141, 143
Freud, Sigmund, x
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 43,
50, 62, 66, 134
Habermas, Jirgen, ix, xii
Heidegger, Martin, x, 32, 35, 53, 56,
1 15
Heine, Christian Johann Heinrich,
46
Heraclites, xxv, 102
Hitler, Adolf, 10
Holderlin, Johann Christian Fried­
rich, 68, 90, 122
Horkheimer, Max, ix, xii, xviii, xxxv,
.43, 1 18
Hotho, H. G., xxx-xxxi, 120-121
Humboldt, Karl Wilhelm von, 1 18
Hume, David, 57
Husserl, Edmund, x, xiii, 7, 14, 34,
35, 55, 97n, 103-104, 139-140
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 34
Kant, Immanuel, ix, x, xiii, xviii-xix,
xx, 1 , 6, 8, 9, 1 1 , 14-19, 32, 36,
41, 44, 54, 59, 62, 64-65, 66-67,
68, 71-72, 76-77, 86, 94, 96, 97-
9� 122, 1 26-127, 133, 140-141
Kierkegaard, Soren, ix, x, xxviii, 8,
49, 51
Kohler, Wolfgang, 4
Kroner, Fchard, 3, 14, 36, 41, 47
Lask, Emil, 36
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 9, 68, 81,
97
Lukacs, Georg, xiv, 82
McTaggart, J. M. E., 93
Maimon, Salomon, 75
I60
Index
Mann, Thomas, 83
Marcuse, Herbert, ix, xi-xiv, xvii, xx
Marx, Karl, ix, x, xi, xiii, xiv, xxi,
xxiv, 18, 23, 80, 123, 143
Nietzsche, Friedrich, ix, x, 35, 47,
76-78
Parmenides, 41
Plato, 6, 9, 54, 1 1 3
Proust, Marcel, 84
Reinhold, Karl Leonhard, 143
Rimeiin, Gustav, 126
Santayana, George, 28
Sartre, Jean-Paul, x
Scheier, Max, 5, 129
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph
von, ix-x, 3, 5, 8, 60, 62, 70, 122,
137, 141, 143
Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich
von, ix, x
Schopenhauer, Arthur, ix, x, 16, 45,
49, 63, 64, 82, 89, 91
Tucher, Maria von, 51
Uberweg, Friedrich, 1 10
Veblen, Thorstein, 28
Voltaire, Fran<ois-Marie Arouet de,
1 18
Wagner, Richard, 62, 74, 144
Weber, Max, x
Whitehead, Alfred North, 102n
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, x, xii, xix,
101-102
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Pragmatic Perspective
Sey|aBenhabibandFredDa||mayr,editors,The Communicative Ethics
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Theory
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DavidFrisby,Fragment of Moderity: Theories of Moderity in the Work of
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szon

Hegel

Three Studies

Theodor W. Adorno.
translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen with an introduction by Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jeremy]. Shapiro

\ Imi\�\\�\i\il\"t�m
39001101483082 .

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The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England

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This edition © 1993 Massachusetts Institute of Technology This work originally appeared in German under the title Drei Studien zu Hegel, © 1963, 1971 Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in Baskerville by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group and was printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969. [Drei Studien zu Hegel. English] Hegel: three studies I Theodor W. Adorno ; translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen ; with a n introduction by Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jeremy J. Shapiro. p. cm.-(Studies in contemporary German social thought) Translation of: Drei Studien zu Hegel. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-0 1 13 1 -X 1 . Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770- 1831. 1. Title. 11. Series. B2948.A32 13 1993 92-23 1 6 1 193----dc20 CIP

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Shapiro Preface A Note on the Text Editorial Remarks from the German Edition Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy Skoteinos.Contents Introduction by Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jeremy J. or How to Read Hegel IX XXXv xxxvii XXXIX 1 53 89 149 159 Notes Name Index .

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and Jiirgen Habermas. they had to pry the earlier philosophers' thought out of traditional academic. elab­ orated their own theoretical oeuvre and reinterpreted the trends and contradictions of the present historical period through the perspective provided by these nineteenth-century philosophers. they made important contributions to our un­ derstanding of these thinkers. Adorno and the Frankfurt School. Schiller. From your fingers flows the sap of trees in flower. has been intimately linked with the appro­ priation and reinterpretation of the thinkers of German Ideal­ ism. dog- . Kierkegaard. most notably. Max Horkheimer. through a critical hermeneutic dialogue with Kant. Ode to Charles Fourier The development of critical philosophy and social theory in the twentieth century.Introduction Shierry Weber Nicholsen Jeremy J. Hegel. At the same time. Andre Breton. Schopenhauer. Shapiro I salute you from the Petrified Forest of human culture Where nothing is left standing But where roam great swirling lights Which call for the deliverance of foliage and bird. especially that of Theodor W. Marx. To do so. Herbert Marcuse. Hegel. Schelling. Such thinkers as Adorno. and Nietzsche.

I-Ience the Frankfurt :. Carnap. It was undertaken with the explicit conviction that positivistic and one-dimensional thinking was in­ herent in the ap paratus of domination in advanced industrial society and that the major nineteenth-century German philoso­ phers. The core of the critical theorists' approach is the immanent critique of ideology.x Introduction matic. This leads to a historically relativized truth that is maximally universal precisely through awareness of its historical' and social situation and limitations.:. This hermeneutic was continuously elaborated as part of a radical political. cul­ tural. and Kierkegaard. esp-eciall}' in their critigue of narrow Enlightenme!!� and positiYisLthinkil1g. including Husserl. Schelling. as well as of Freud and Max Weber. and Wittgenstein. Schopenhauer. and that their later works include studies of Hegel. Sartre. whom the critical theorists saw as the bridge between the philosophical tradition and the social sciences. Dewey. they analyzed major twentieth-cen­ tury thinkers. and social critique of advanced capitalism and authoritar­ ian political tendencies. as philosopher-ideologists. most of which are important both as philosophical and sociological works in their own righi: .!!!c::�d industrial soc::iety. and ideological interpretations in order to unfold the core concepts and critique contained in their work. In addition. Marx. Heidegger. Schiller. The critique of ideology means ' taking theory at its word and at its deed. It is quite char­ acteristic that the earliest works of the major thinkers of the Frankfurt School (if we include their doctoral dissertations and f Habilitationsschri ten) include major studies of Kant. m1l1dh<::lp-J�ythe foundations for a new crit­ ical relationsh1P-!oy:dv.' . Hegel. School produced an imposing series of critical hermeneutic studies of social theory and philosophy. Truth is attained by unfolding both the truth content and the contradictions of thought through linking it to Jhe truth content and contradictions of its social context and commitments. and Nietzsche.

The critical theorists aimed at a dialectical method that was not embroiled in the vagaries of socialist party politics and positivistic or metaphysical interpretations of Marx. and this made his thought an appro­ priate focus for the critique of Western civilization. Marcuse.-an intellectual situation that in some ways parallels that of the juxtaposition of twentieth­ century positivism and pragmatism on the one hand and phe­ nomenology. as the true revolutionary thinker­ perhaps more so than Marx-if the negative and dialectical core of this thought could be rescued from its embeddedness in a doctrine of undialectical affirmation. 1 No other thinker was as important to this critical her­ meneutics as Hegel. and Marcuse as well. And the systematic character of Hegel's thinking promised a possible unification of the human sciences that the critical theorists sought to bring about for the radical understanding of contemp orary society through the integration of sociologJ'i. regarded Hegel. In both Hegel and Marx. Above all. p olitical science. Hegel's own critique of the limitations of the scientific worldview on the one hand and its romantic alternative on the other. despite his ob­ . existentialism. eco­ nomics.. published a half-century _ .Y�chology.. �el's focus on the negative and the power of negation and _ contradiction inherent in thought and reality seemed a key to rescuing the negative from the overwhelming affirmative power of advanced industrial society . and intended. and unifi­ cation. vious conservative tendencies. in Reason and Revolution. andJ>l!!!��OJ>Jly. the dialectical method claimed to pro­ vide a unity of theoretical and practical reason that seemed torn asunder in contemporary civilization and philosophy.. Hegel claimed. to be the culmination of Western rationalism. Adorno.Xl Introduction and as valuable contributions to the understanding of other the­ orists. reconciliation. and hermeneutics on the other­ suggested an analogous critique of these contemporary schools of thought.

from the terror world of the concentra­ tion camp. both Marcuse and Adorno attempt to provide a philosophical basis for "negative thinking": for thought that desires to free itself from the shackles of the "logos of domination" and to serve as a basis for and interpre­ tation of emancipation in the broadest historical sense-eman­ cipation from class domination. Rea­ son and Revolution looked toward this humanistically and dialectically regenerated Marxism as a historical possibility after the defeat of Nazism. In their interpretations of Hegel. from the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality. administered culture. writing after World War II and the stabilization of the domination structure of advanced indus­ trial society following the defeat of Nazism. which focuses on capitalist industrialism's ability to eliminate all opposition to the domination of both internal and external nature. attempted to articulate the negative. and the dialectical analysis contained in Marx's mature economic theory. critical. skeptical of the revolutionary poten­ tial of either social democracy or Leninist communism. the historical materialism of the German Ideology. and after his and Max Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. Marcuse. Adorno. Published during World War II. and dialectical core of Hegel's thought and to preserve it in a properly under­ stood Marxism: a Marxism that synthesizes the humanistic core of Marx's early writings. and despite ongoing emancipatory ." and from one­ dimensional thought. Over the half century since the publication of Mar­ cuse's Reason and Revolution. that which is beyond the domination of reason.xii Introduction ago. sought to re­ cuperate in Hegel the basis for a dialectic of resistance to that power of domination by concentrating on the nonidentical. and deformed experience. from the "performance principle. never­ theless saw in Hegel a dialectical method that could be the basis for a socialism appropriate to the historical situation of ad­ vanced industrial society.

and the grounding of knowledge and truth in the subject are . the ability of the universal market society. It describes the way the world actually is. combined with powerful state formations. and hence for a renewed understanding of Hegel. it must be "determinate negation. not in historical perspective but in essence." through the exchange rela­ tionship." a world integrated through "production. in this regard the' desperate impotence of every single individual now verifies Hegel's extravagant conception of the system . . depends in all its moments on the social conditions of its pro­ duction. The self-forgetfulness of production. all of modern philosophy was marked by a struggle for method. But as Adorno says in "As­ pects of Hegel's Philosophy. to use the concept that both Marcuse and Adorno identified as central to Hegel. And this method of thought and analysis cannot be simply an opposition or negation from the outside. logical foundation. This continuity in "the way the world actually is" calls for re­ newed negative or dialectical thinking. .. and that is part of its very essence. That is why negative thinking. Prior to recent currents of antifoundationalism. is reflected in Hegelian metaphysics. He­ gel's Phenomenology and Logic. the insatiable and destructive expansive principle of the exchange society." negation that emerges out of and is specific to what it negates. . '.xiii Introduction undercurrents and outbreaks of emancipatory movements. and in that sense actually· realizes the primacy of the whole over its parts. This impetus extends from Descartes's Discourse through Kant's Critique. to control or absorb opposition and cut off al­ ternatives appears tQ have increased. Rather. and Marx's German Ideology to Husserl's Ideas and the writings of the early Wittgenstein and Carnap. or dialectical think­ ing. The priority of method is intimately linked with the idea of the su bject-epistemological method. who was its founder in an emphatic sense. is both a method and not a method.

The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. Even the critique of the bour­ geois notion of the subject in Marx and critical theory is carried out in the interest of a less restrictive. And his dialectical thought cannot merely attempt to resurrect . and cultural analysis. Hence neither Marcuse nor Adorno could any longer "transcend" Hegel. as Marx had. the critical theorists' economic. in the light of the lapsing of the revolutionary working class as a historical sub ject. the development of Marxian so­ cial theory has been bound up with the question of the nature of this method and the related question of the historical subject. and his interpretation of Hegel in particular. combined with the course of political events. sets itself an ironic task: that of developing a dia­ lectical method. the liquidated subject. Whereas Lukacs identified the subject with the working class and the Communist party. Adorno's thought in general. that orthodoxy in Marxism is a matter of method rather than of content. Since Lukacs's announcement. negative dialectic must strive to attain precisely that otherness that is denied by a subject-ori­ ented dialectic. in History and Class Consciousness. in a context defined as one in which the subject has been liqui­ dated by its own attempt to liquidate everything outside of itself. In a telling and paradoxical formulation that . That is why Adorno differentiates himself from Hegel most emphatically in relation to the concepts of identity and nonidentity. and less repressed subject. were preoccupied with this question. by projecting Hegel's categories onto social categories (although Marcuse con­ tinued to be concerned with the question of an emergent histor­ ical subject): To the contrary. less repressive. For a true. in particular. critical theory returned to Hegel partly out of the bankruptcy of precisely this Marxian "overcom­ ing" and projection of Hegel. could not support this identification.XIV Introduction part of a single historical project. with its connections to a self-reflective subject. sociological.

or outside. looking . in those very accomplishments in which they have most recognized what is beyond or outside them. the subject and the concept is conceived as a moment of an under­ lying unity that is itself subject and concept. the dialectical method cannot be reduced to a set of axioms or formulas. in what it says as well as in what it tries to say but cannot. as in "dialectical materialism"). Even that which is most resistant to. thus converting rec­ ognition of the limitation of rationality into a hidden affirmation of it." recognizing that it is really beyond-yet without thereby reducing themselves to slavish heteronomy or self-effacement. If dialectical thinking is to avoid this idealistic pre� sumption (which can easily take on a materialistic form. Hegel argued for the identity of identity and nonidentity. in what it points to beyond itself as well as in what keeps it from grasping that to which it points. then it must shape itself to the con­ tours of the object-not as an irreducible given but as something with its own tensions and contradictions. Hence Adorno's �nsistence on the experiential content of Hegel's philosophy and on the imperative that a dialectical phi­ losophy immerse itself in the experience of the objec�. . Method in that sense is inherently subjectivistic. for Adorno. in that it presumes that reality conveniently ar­ ranges itself in accordance with the postulates and prefererices of thought. must strain toward one further dimension of the "beyond­ ness" of this "beyond.xv Introduction fully expresses German Idealism's attempt to reduce everything to subjectness. That is why. Adorno's own approach to "standing Hegel on his head" was to argue precisely for the "nonidentity of identity and non­ identity": subjectness and mind. This approach holds equally for the understanding of Hegel's own thought. which include those of the thought that tries to comprehend it. for its truth both in what it grasps and in what it conceals.

and their unity. which re-. is the first articulation of the saturation of experience with neg. _perverted world..k that is most radical and. ativity that Adorno asserts that "these days it is hardly possible for a theoretical idea of any scope to do justice to the experience of consciousness. This is perhaps what most distinguishes Adorno's critical theory from other currents of neo-Marxian theory. an upside-down. . development. lates to what is by relating to what is not. like all his work..".. Not only should it not be understood as mere theory. It-is this aspect of his . with­ out having incorporated something of Hegel's philosophy. to some.· and transmission of a specific relation to experience. antagonistic society. That is why Adorno's intention in Hegel and his other work is in large part the preservation.y. and in fact not only the experience of con­ sciousness but the bodily experience of the human being. And it is because Hegelian philosophy . along with that of Benjamin. It is also.te. the orien­ tation of practice. is defective-precisely because of and to the extent of its neglect of experience. from Negative Dialectics and these essays on Hegel through his analyses of musical and literary works to his personal reflections and aphorisms.PIilctice. It is an exp-licit and implicit argEment that �ative exp-erience is the authentic form of experience for those who live in a contradicto!:)':. His method is an indissoluble unity of thinking and experiencing: this is the unifying thread that runs through all his work. and experience and sensibility. as found in the Marxian tradition. it is not an attempt (however fawed) l it intends to be an ensemble that integrates theory. not by relating to what is. is il:! part an argum<:�t that the notion oLtl. indigestible.<:>!.'(>!. .Introduction { Adorno's Hegel is not merely a lesson in negative thinking. Adorno's work is thus a model of a particular way of experi­ encing the world.Q) Ador­ no's work. and relates to what is. •. a lesson in negative experience.. Inde�." ( "Aspects") '' .

can maintain a true identity only through the negation of all the giv­ ens of the surrounding society and culture. and'the beautiful through their deformations-as the negation of the latter. Such an existence is governed by orientation to the tru�h. to the essence of things. and the justification for transcending the perverted world. them to carry out the difficult tasks involved in the critical analysis of the world and of thought. and as real in this negation.XVll Introduction . alienation. It pursues the life of a critical intellect without suffering the defor­ mation and rigidifcation of experience that is the normal form of intellectual life in capitalist society. the true. For an individual living in a contradictory. who recognizes 'that nothing within that society escapes contamination by domination and the commodity principle. But while the expresSion of this negation is a part of the truth. the desire. It must go beyond the merely dialectical to what Hegel calls the speculative. perverted society. and despair. It is true that much of the modern experience of the perverted world takes the form of immediate negation. shock. Marcuse and Adorno . practice. of nausea. and experience." " . It pursues freedom and happiness in a repressive and oppressive society without ideologically denying this repression and oppression. For the real truth about reality includes awareness of the potentiality. B9th Marcuse's Reason and Revolution and Adorno's Hegel: Three Studies are works of the critical theorists as teachers who want to pass on to actual or potential students the tools of thought that will enable. dissonance. The individual in advanced capitalist s'o­ ciety. dialectical experience is an essential vehicle for the preservation not only of the truth-the cognitive truth about that society­ but of his or her own identity. That is why negative experience is an expcrience not only of negation but also of affirm<ltion. it discerns and experiences the good. in which the antagonisms of the' dialectic are resolved. It reiates. But through this relation. it is only a partially developed form of it. through dialec­ tical thought.

and Adorno (and Max Horkheimer when he was still participat- . or the way craftspeople may look at the specialized knowledge that is lost in mass production and automation. Of Adorno's writings it is perhaps the closest to representing the intellectual atmosphere and style of working of Adorno's Philo­ sophisches Hauptseminar (Philosophy Seminar) at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt during the last decade of Adorno's life. The Philo­ sophisches Hauptseminar was given every semester and was de­ voted almost exclusively to the primary works of Kant and Hegel. In both works one detects the pathos of teachers who are concerned lest rare and precious tools that can accom­ plish marvels fall into disuse such that future generations may no longer be able to match their ancestors' achievements. but as in­ terpreters of texts that are among the most difficult and contra­ dictory of modern thought: texts that. it is also a work of pedagogy. occasionally un­ decipherable. as Adorno states. when he had become one of postwar Germany's philosophical luminaries and influential teachers. however.Introduction are teachers not as expounders of doctrine." The features of Adorno's philosophical seminars that stand out in recollection figure prominently in the Hegel essays as well. despite their emphasis on reason. A frequently told student joke°in Frankfurt went. the way perhaps late-Roman literati may have viewed the tradition of rhetoric. It was in these seminars-as well as in related lectures at the University-that Adorno philosophically elaborated the nega­ tive dialectics of his later thought. These seminars and lectures were a primary influence on the intellectual leaders of the Ger­ man New Left. appear hermetic and. "The Revolution is breaking out on the street? Too bad-I can't miss Adorno's lecture. Hegel. The first was a dialogue among three participants: Kant. Thus while Hegel: Three Studies is certainly a work of Hegel scholarship and interpretation.

of which the essay "Skoteinos" gives some examples. and intellectual-they are his­ torical through and through. The aim of dia­ lectical thinking is to think not abstractly but concretely. And typically the semester-long seminar de­ voted. and ready for a different work the following term. in which Adorno attempted to bring out both the relative truth content and the relative limitation of Kant and Hegel in relation to one another. by under­ standing ideas and realities in the contradictions of their specific contexts and processes rather than in "abstraction" from these contexts and processes-to put the ladder back into the thought. against the background of Marxian. to Hegel's Phenomenology ofMind would have arrived at the eighth or tenth page by the end of the term-with a sense of exhausted achievement. through meticulous dialectical explication de texte. for example. to use Wittgenstein's phrase. Not only did the critical theorists endeavor to find the truth content of the philosophical tradition through a critical compre­ hension of it that takes account of its enmeshment in a concrete . psychological. And for the critical theorists the relevant contexts and processes are social. cultural. principles or entities that are in fact the results of abstraction or moments in processes outside themselves·that they do not take into account-the ladder that they have climbed up and thrown away. as absolutes or irreduci. Most of the philosophical currents and schools of thought of both Hegel's day and our own posit. ble givens. materialist assumptions.xix Introduction ing in the seminar). In the seminars the study of Kant and Hegel was carried out in this very way. Adorno vindicated both Hegel's argument against Kant-that the limitations of reason set by Kant already implied the transcendence of these limits-and Kant's argument for the necessity of something outside the totalizing tendency of thought. The second was the centrality of the He­ gelian category of mediation to every aspect of dialectical think­ ing.

We hope that this publication in En­ glish of Adorno's Hegel essays. Yet both taught works of Kant and Hegel in the universities. eman­ cipation. will contribute to the perpetuation and elaboration of dialectical thinking and experience across yet another historical divide. not revival. In many ways. and Adorno taught to a generation of German students distanced from his own by the Third Reich. Certainly those views of Hegel persist. Writing in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Adorno defends Hegel not only against the dismissals and distortions then current-the positivist's dismissal of him as unintelligible or the Soviet Marx­ ist's ideological version of the dialectic-but also against the lib­ eral's lukewarm homage to Hegel's sense of historical reality. also. across great historical chasms: Marcuse taught Hegel to students in America in a philosophically alien environment. to learn and teach how to read and understand the philosophical tradition itself. work. "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy" Adorno's Hegel: Three Studies takes the form of an extreme and provocative defense of the truth content in Hegel's philosophy. Rescuing Hegel-and only rescue. happiness.xx Introduction history that is the history of conflicts about domination. terror. and utopian strivings. The first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists stood in a far different re­ lation to the philosophical tradition of German Idealism than do those who are first encountering it today. freedom. in the last decade of the century. Mar­ cuse's and Adorno's intellectual environment and training were as close to those of Kant and Hegel as to those of the present. They wanted. is appropriate for him­ means facing up to his philosophy where it is most painful and wresting truth from it where its untruth is obvious. But today Adorno's pre­ sentation of Hegel is startling even within the context of the con- . reason.

is to prepare "a new conception of the dialectic." The dialectic works through immanent criticism. and this is the approach Adorno takes in his defense of Hegel. when the first of these essays was given as a lecture. and in some respects Adorno's Hegel serves to articulate Adorno's own philosophical enterprise as well. The negative dialec­ tic is won by "wresting. Adorno tells us in his preface. More important. so Adorno's work is a self-reflection of that in Hegel which had not been brought to consciousness within Hegel's own work. The Frankfurt School's critical theory of society represented in some respects a return to Hegel from Marx. will lead thought to that new conception of the dialectic. through im­ manent criticism.XXI Introduction temporary wave of interest in Hegel initiated by the Frankfurt School's own popularity in this country and then reinforced by the French via deconstruction. unsur­ passed by any twentieth-century philosophy. Adorno's Hegel reminds us that now as much as in 1956. Gestalt psychology. he argues. but a Hegel who is still. it is not a question of what is living and what is dead in Hegel-the question with :which Croce initiated the twentieth­ century Hegel revival-but a question of "what the present means in the face of Hegel. Hegel serves as a defense of the contemporary relevance of Adorno and the Frankfurt School. the "negative dialectics" Adorno expounded in the work of that name published shortly after Hegel. the truth content from . phenomenology. The aim of Hegel: Three Studies." as Adorno says. existential ontology. Just as Hegel's philosophy attempts to bring to self-conscious­ ness the labors of spirit up to his time." Adorno presents a Hegel read against the grain and from the perspective of a critique of philosophy as an isolated discipline. Hegel himself. In this respect as well. dialectical materialism-that claim to have surpassed Hegel. It is through immanent criticism that Adorno attacks the truth claims of the various schools of thought-positivism.

the nonidentical. are produced by speculation": Because of his idealism. Accordingly. to serve as a starting point-an error that. both empiricism and its irrationalist critics make-a subject conceived in opposition to empirical reality is also impossible. . Hegel's "substantive insights . the particular. it is also concrete. It is neither a middle between extremes nor a subsumption of the component part under a synthetic whole (for this reason too. Adorno tells us. and not because his speculative imagination was balanced by a sense of reality but by virtue of the approach his philosophy takes-by virtue. The movement of thought is pow- . one might say. of the experiential character of his speculation itself. even a sort of philosophical kitsch­ that Adorno turns to find a dialectic that makes room for the contingent. on the contrary. most dis­ credited. of particular and whole.xxii Introduction Hegel's philosophy precisely where its untruth is most obvious. . Hegel has been reproached with being abstract in comparison with the concreteness of the phenomenological. All interpretations of Hegel that end by dismissing him fail to accommodate this nonhierarchical conception of the dialectic. If truth is process in this sense. the pure empirical datum. anthro­ pological. it is to the "skandalon" of Hegel's philosophy-its speculative absolute idealism. ("Experiential Content") How can this be so? One of Adorno's answers is that the di­ alectic in absolute idealism is conceived nonhierarchically. Speculation is not. Truth emerges from a dialectical interplay of subject and object. a mere empty subjectivism. most outmoded in it. the dialectic is not a method nor is Hegel's work a system). and ontological schools. that which is most faded. some kind of "troublesome ornamentation". of mediated and unmediated. Although there is no such thing as the pure given or immediate. But he brought infinitely more con­ creteness into this philosophical idea than those approaches. as Adorno points out.

Introduction

ered by the self-reflection of the subject attempting to conceive reality, and ultimately the absoluteness of idealism obliterates the distinction betwe�n subject and object: " If, as in Hegel, in the totality everything ultimately collapses into the subject as ab­ solute spirit, idealism thereby cancels itself out, because no dif­ ference remains through which the subject coulsl be identified as something distinct, as subject," ("Experiential Content"). Still, Hegel had attempted to formulate the dialectic and the subject­ object as absolute subject. Hence the nonsubsumability of the particular becomes apparent at the same time Hegel's philoso­ phy denies it. Hegel's philosophy is thus self-contradictory by its own criterion, and it is the criterion, the dialectic, that Adorno holds out, against Hegel, as the bearer of the truth content. Another of Adorno's answers to the question of how specula­ tion can itself be the experiential content of Hegel's philosophy and can accommodate concreteness takes the form of his devel­ opment of Hegel's notion of the "Arbeit des Begrif the labor of fs," the concept. The labor of the spirit-the struggles of truth in process, the exertions of intellectual activity, the efforts involved in wresting Hegel's truth from his untruth-is a form of labor in itself. It is also, Adorno indicates, social labor presented in the guise of logic, and Hegel's absolute spirit is none other than so­ ciety: "The mystery behind synthetic apperception . . . is none other than social labor" ("Aspects"). While this answer might easily be seen as "sociologism," a neo-Marxist standing of Hegel on his head, Adorno rescues it and gives it a further twist. In a tour de force through which he wrests truth even from Hegel's most notorious work, with its most notorious thesis-the Philosophy of Right and its notion that what is real is rational-Adorno devel­ ops the notion of antagonistic totality. The ultimate truth of what is most patently false and ideological in Hegel-his equation of reason with reality and in particular with the state-is that, as

XXIV

Introduction

history has shown, reality has become precisely the kind of sys­ tem and totality Hegel proposed it to be.2 It is an antagonistic totality, a totality only by virtue of its contradictions, and a sys­ tem in which the individual is everywhere governed by the invis­ ible totalizing "web of guilt" that is the persistence of unreason. In this light, Hegel's philosophy becomes critical not only of the details but of the negative whole:
Hegel's philosophy is indeed essentially negative: critique. In extending the transcendental philosophy of the Critique ofPure Reason through the thesis of reason's identity with what exists and making it a critique of what exists, a critique of any and every positivity, Hegel denounced the world, whose theodicy constitutes his program, in its totality as well; he denounced it as a web of guilt [Schuldzusa11l11lenhang] in which, as Meph­ istopheles says in Faust, everything that exists deserves to perish. ("As­ pects")

The distinction between labor and nature, between producers and owners, is what produces society as antagonistic totality. Adorno's notion turns on the idea that labor itself has, in this sense, an oppressive aspect, that it is not-and here Adorno takes issue with Marx's celebrated critique of Hegel-the sole pro­ ducer of value. If Hegel presented a false reconciliation in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel's philosophy, in at least aiming toward a genuinely reconciled whole, contains a moment of utopian hope that is elsewhere lost: "The ray of light that reveals the whole to . be untrue in all its moments is none other than utopia, the uto­ pia of the whole truth, which is still to be realized" ("Experiential Content"). The notion of spirit's labor is in fact the key to Adorno's inter­ pretation of Hegel and his defense of Hegel's truth. Spirit's la­ bor is the dialectical motor, the reflection of each state of consciousness in its limitation, that forces philosophy to become concrete and ends by permeating, as Adorno says, the idea of

xxv

Introduction

totality with the idea of contradiction. And it is that labor that leads philosophy out of its abstract separation from empirical reality and the contingent: "In the Phenomenology of Spirit, taking as his critical point of departure what is closest to hand, unme­ diated human consciousness, [Hegel] accomplishes the media­ tion of that consciousness in and through the historical movement of what exists, a movement that takes it beyond all mere meta­ physics of being. Once set in motion, the concretization of phi­ losophy cannot be stopped for the sake of philosophy's illusory dignity" ("Experiential Content"), Labor, the theme of Adorno's immanent criticism of Hegel, is also the. theme of "Skoteinos," �!"te third of his three essays on Hegel. "Skoteinos"-the title al­ ludes to Adorno's defense of the "obscure" Heraclites as op­ posed to the "clear" Descartes-has an explicitly pedagogical aim. It draws, as Adorno tells us in his preface, directly on his expe­ rience teaching Hegel at the University in Frankfurt and is a kind of prolegomenon to reading Hegel-not a reading of Hegel so much as a discussion of what is involved in that reading. The issue in reading Hegel, as Hegel himself had pointed out in the preface to the Phenomenology, which serves in its way as a model for "Skoteinos," is that intelligibility (for Adorno, clarity) is not readily attained by true philosophy. The question is what to make of Hegel's lack of clarity, how to understand the truth content of that very unclarity. The complementary question is how to read Hegel productively, in the way that truth content requires, so that the labors that have gone into the writing, and must go into the reading, of Hegel's philosophy are not in vain. Adorno uses the difficulties of reading Hegel-that at times it is impossible to decipher a passage, that Hegel was not careful in his use of language, that he often made assertions without actually following through on the argumentation, and so on-to point up a problem that goes far beyond any empirical or sub-

xxvi Introduction

jective weakness on Hegel's part. For the difficulties in under­ standing Hegel are objective, and they derive primarily from the nature of thought and its relation to language. Hence much of "Skoteinos" is an attack on the desideratum of clarity as we find it in Descartes. The demand for clarity presupposes that the ob­ ject of thought has been tacitly preformed to allow the corre­ spondence of thought and its object. If Hegel's texts differ from traditional philosophical texts, which at least make a pretense of logical exposition that is clear at every point, it is in an effort to do justice to a matter that by its very nature evades this kind of clarity; philosophy, in Adorno's formulation, is "faced with a paradox: to say clearly something that is unclear, that has nO firm outline, that does not accommodate to reification." The di­ alectic to which philosophy must submit in this attempt is the dialectic of language itself, which has both an expressive and a communicative element. The communicative aspect, which can­ not be renounced, can never be fully adequate to a dialectical truth, and Adorno defends Hegel's texts on this basis:
In Hegel nothing can be understood in isolation, everything is to be understood only in the context of the whole, with the awkward qualifi­ cation that the whole in turn lives only in the individual moments. In actuality, however, this kind of doubleness of the dialectic eludes liter­ ary presentation, which is of necessity finite when it unequivocally states something equivocal. This is why one has to make so many allowances for it in Hegel. That it cannot in principle achieve the unity of the whole and its parts at one blow becomes its weak spot. Every single sentence in Hegel's philosophy proves itself unsuitable for that philosophy, and the form expresses this in its inability to grasp any content with com­ plete adequacy. ("Skoteinos")

As a consequence of these dialectics, Hegel's works, with their equivocations, their lack of consistent argumentation, and their lack of full editing by their author, become "antitexts"-"if

xxvii Introduction

pressed, one may regard the Phenomenology as a book; with the Science of Logic this is no longer possible," says Adorno-repre­ senting by their very form a critique of a falsely harmonious notion of presentation:
That a thought that made such extravagant claims should have fore­ gone transmission in specific, definitive form can be explained onlr in terms of its ideal of presentation, the negation of presentation. At the same time, in the looseness of a delivery that even when mo;£ highly elaborated is more spoken than written, one can look for a corrective to the hubris of the conclusive and definitive of which Hegel's work was accused even during his lifetime. ("Skoteinos")

In illuminating the concept of the nonidentical within Hegel's work, Adorno tacitly explicates and justifies his own dialectical­ critieal method and his own commitment to the nonidentical. He ,illuminates those aspects of Hegel that most resemble his o�n . thought and from which he has learned the most. Adorno's defense of Hegel's texts in "Skoteinos" echoes his discussion of the essay form and his critique of the Cartesian notion of clarity in "The Essay" as Form," the lead essay'in his Notes to Literature� which dates from the same period as the first of his Hegel essays. Hegel: Three Studies as a whole, in fact, is roughly contempora­ neous with the majority of the essays collected in Adorno's Notes to Literature, the period immediately preceding and overlappi�g' with the-production of his last; larger-scale works, Negative Di-' alectics and Aesthetic Theory. Adorno's discussion of the demands Hegel's texts make upon the reader r<;v�als in still greater riche ness the kinship between Adorno and Hegel. Adorno's essayistic work on literary and musical texts and aesth�tic issues is formu- ' lated in terms of the same dialectic of thought and language we see in "Skoteinos." In that body of work-the essay "Presuppo­ sitions," in the second volume of Notes to Literature, is a good example-Adorno elaborates a conception of the critical recipi-

xxviii Introduction

ent's stance toward aesthetic or intellectual objects, or geistige Gebilde. It is a stance characterized by the search for intelligibility as opposed to a strict understanding based on clarity, just as Adorno proposes for the reader of Hegel. What Adorno says about reading Hegel is in fact quite close to what he says in other contexts about the experiential activity of the subject of aesthetic experience:
No doubt Hegel's style goes against customary philosophical under­ standing, yet in his weaknesses he paves the way for a different kind of understanding; one must read Hegel by describing along with him the curves of his intellectual movement, by playing his ideas with the spec­ ulative ear as though they were musical notes. Philosophy as a whole is allied with art in wanting to rescue, in the medium of the concept, the mimesis that the concept represses. ("Skoteinos")

Reading with the speculative ear-the phrase derives origi­ nally from Kierkegaard-is a formulation for a kind of aesthetic "participatory following through," or Mitvollzug, that demands a dual activity on the part of the reader. On the one hand, the reader must engage in a kind of contemplative passivity-Adorno uses the phenomenological term "spontaneous receptivity"-in which she simply floats along, using what seems to. be the inten­ tion of the whole as a guide to understanding. This corresponds to the "simply looking on" or "reines Zusehen, " of the introduc­ tion to Hegel's Phenomenology, which Adorno invokes repeatedly. At the same time, the reader's activity is one of immersion in the precise wording, a kind of self-forgetful immersion in details in which, paradoxically, the reader's subjective associations, which are subsequently checked against the text, are of the utmost im­ portance: "Hegel has to be read against the grain, and in such a way that every logical operation, however formal it seems to be, is reduced to its experiential core. The equivalent of such expe­ rience in the reader is the imagination. ... The content itself

XXIX

Introduction

contains, as a law of its form, the expectation of productive imagination on the part of the one reading" ("Skoteinos"). This kind of imaginative activity, common to both philosophy and art, is the counterpart both of spirit's mimetic labors and of the equivocations within the work that reflect nature. Spontaneous receptivity requires an openness to the di­ alectical processes inherent in the object-the "labor of the con­ cept" is both the labor inherent in thought, which is by nature dialectical, and the labor inherent in following an object that is by nature dialectical. Thought imitates the dialectical noniden­ tity of reality, in which the subject participates. Language, which in its communicative aspect participates in the clarity of concep­ tual logic, also participates in the mimesis of the nonidentical. ' The word that Adorno uses as a virtual figure for this mim�sis appears in the epigraph for "Skoteinos" as well: " Ich habe nichts als Rauschen," a line from the poet Rudolf Borchardt, for a se­ lection of whose work Adorno later published an introduction, now found in the second volume of Notes to Literature. Rauschen (which also, as Rausch, means ecstasy or intoxication) is the word used for the murmuring of a rushing brook or the rustling of the wind in the trees or the surging of waves on a beach. It refers to language's sensuous aspect and beyond that to the way in which language's intelligible but indistinct activity-what Adorno else� where calls "logicity"-imitates the movement of concrete non­ identical reality. The intimate mimetic relationship between the nonidentical and the labor of spirit is embodied in the most poignant moment of Adorno's Hegel, a moment that is also a tour de force: Adorno's defense of Hegel against the charge of being the ultimate bour­ geois philosopher and his simultaneous justification of the bour­ geois soberness in Hegel, a defense and a justification that, like Adorno's critique of the notion of clarity, is also Adorno's self-

Adorno practices his own self-divestiture. Hegel with his Swabian dialect and his plain bourgeois face. . high and low. the thought kept revolving around . . his head bent down. is also the locus of the interplay of spirit and fesh." In evoking the speaking person of Hegel. feshly l is in fact the activity of spirit itself within the individual con­ sciousness: it is thought in action we are seeing. spoke and pondered. at length. forward and backward. exertions that are at the same time a deliberate divestiture of the self. tried to go on. Hotho.Introduction defense through the medium of Hegel. This notion of the divested self is the al­ tered concept of experience that takes the place of what we think of as "subjective experience. but then it scored most surely. morose. Adorno evokes what is most contingent and most nonidentical: Hegel in the flesh. It is unusual for him to cite anyone but Hegel in the book. he sat there as if collapsed into himself. Hotho speaks again: He faltered even in the beginning. l of the spirit. . Every sentence stood alone and came out with effort. mortal. and while speaking kept turning pages and searching in his long folio notebooks. G. stopped again. Instead of moving forward. cut in pieces and jumbled. Every word. started once more. who heard Hegel lecture in Berlin and who de­ scribes him as follows (here in Walter Kaufmann's rendering): Exhausted. speaking. but here he gives the floor. the right word seemed to be miss­ ing forever. But what is most contingent and most nonidentical. ("Skoteinos") What one sees here in the contingent. His con­ stant dearing of his throat and coughing interrupted any flow of speech. every syllable detached itself only reluctantly to receive a strangely thorough emphasis from the metallic-empty voice with its broad Swabian dialect. Now one had grasped the clear meaning of a sentence and hoped most ardently to progress. In vain. to H. the person of Hegel.

the philoso­ pher's self effaces itself in the truth of its object. . . By all the subjective means available to it. and his philosophy too "rauscht". . ex­ ertion. . which is the negation of self in the matter at hand. the element of labor. . the life of his spirit is all of life again within itself " ("Aspects"). bear witness to this self­ divestiture" ("Aspects"). In no sense does Adorno's evocation of the person of Hegel represent a bio­ graphical interpretation of his thought. " Hegel's demeanor. . We may think of Hegel as having an "intellectual body. rather than the thought expressing the man. the life of the spirit has a kinship with mortality and death. ("Skoteinos") In this sense what we think of as subjective experience is in fact the opposite. and its relation to mortality is clearly present. Thus always taking up again carefully what had gone before in order to develop out of it more profoundly in a different form what came later." says Adorno. . the most wonderful stream of thought twisted and pressed and struggled. It is important that this not be understood as simply a matter of sublimation or self-transcendance. it murmurs and rustles in mi­ mesis of the nonidentical. . . . philosophy is the expression of spirit. . If experience is the core of Hegel's phi. the face of one who has literally consumed him­ self until he is no more than ashes. the man Hegel had absorbed both subject and object into himself in spirit. . limited itself to the point of one-sidedness . his countenance ravaged by thought. making use of seemingly insignificant links. In Adorno's words. Slowly and deliberately. a personhood utterly devoted to the objectivity of its work. split itself into distinctions and in­ volved itself in contradictions whose victorious solution eventually found the strength to compel "the reunification of the most recalcitrant ele­ ments.xxxi Introduction the same point with similar words . full of suffering. some full thought . Self-divest­ iture in the activity of spirit is akin to death. It is in this sense that Hegel's philos­ ophy is an expression of experience. the life of the man himself becomes the life of spirit: "Like the subject of his theories.

Quentin Smith. it is both the distilled experience of life and the experience of thought at work with all its strains and contradic­ tions. in an age in which the individual is increasingly endangered. As Adorno says. as in Adorno's own effort to wrest Hegel's truth from his untruth. who was repeatedly accused of bourgeois elitism but whose countenance remained clear and whose speech was "druckfertig"-"print-ready"-speaking on his own behalf here as well." then the effacement of self that gives him this bourgeois plainness-the Nilchternheit that Walter Ben­ jamin created his Deutsche Menschen to honor-is the self-divest­ iture that makes philosophical experience possible. Adorno's rejection of the notion of paying homage to the great man not­ withstanding. And is not Adorno himself. none held so unswervingly to the experience to which it had entrusted itself without reservation. expressing the effacement of self and the surrender to mortality that informed his own attempt to im­ merse the self without reservation in its object? And is this di­ alectic of self-effacement and the ravaging travail of spirit in the individual not itself the new conception of the dialectic toward which Hegel: Three Studies labors. in a dif­ ferent tonality. And if the ultimate crit­ icism of Hegel is that he is the bourgeois philosopher par excel­ lence. it is this sober dryness "to which the most extreme pathos shrivels in Hegel" that gives thought its dignity.XXXll Introduction losophy. just as. then. we hope. continue to sound across historical chasms? The translator would like to thank Jeremy Shapiro. the "comfortable professor lecturing unconcernedly on the sufferings of mankind. and Andrew Buchwalter for advice on difficult points in . a conception whose energies will. it gives Adorno's appreciation its poignancy. Pain and struggle are inseparable from it. Even the marks of its failure were struck by truth itself " {"Aspects"}. his ultimate tribute to Hegel is the notion that he endured these efforts: "No philosophy was so profoundly rich.

As in her other translations of Adorno's work. For any resulting awkward­ nesses (Adorno's word was "inconcinnities") she alone is responsible.xxxiii Introduction the text. Tom McCarthy and Larry Cohen for their unflagging support of the project. Nicholsen for a careful and appreciative r. and Arden H.eading of the manuscript in progress. the translator has attempted to preserve as many of the features of Adorno's prose as are con­ sistent with intelligibility in English. . Jan Miller of the Antioch College library staff deserves special thanks for literally going the extra mile to procure texts.

.

without dispensing anyone from the efforts involved in con� . something that is long overdue. my intention was to use what I had observed in the teaching situation as a point of departure. Given the unity of the philosophical t hought of the two of us respon­ sible for the relevant interpretations. even if it is. in accordance with a long-cherished plan. What impelled me to go beyond this was the analogy with the saying tres homir1. it was possible to forgo in­ dividual references. at best it hazards guesses about how one would arrive at an understand­ ing. a short one. Over many years Max Horkheimer and I have often been con­ cerned with Hegel there. To avert disappointment. let me emphasize that "Skoteinos" does not claim to accomplish of itself the illumination of Hegel's main works.Preface When it came time for a new edition of Aspects of Hegel's Philoso­ phy.es faciunt collegium: three monographs make a book. I set down my thoughts on questions of understanding Hegel. Hence. I wanted to supplement that text with the monograph on the experiential content of Hegel's philosophy that I had pub­ lished in the meantime. It merely formu­ lates considerations of principle bearing on this task. They spring from my work in the Philosophisches Seminar at the University of Frankfurt.

from being wasted. The limits that the au­ thor of a propaedeutic must set for himself would thereby be transgressed. summer 1963 . The work as a whole is intended as preparation for a revised conception of the dialectic. Theodor W. now as then. Adorno Frankfurt. Something that Hegel reminds epistemology about should be applied to instructions about how to read Hegel as well: the instructions can prove successful only in the course of carrying out individual interpretations. The fact that I have stopped precisely where I ought to begin may excuse some of the obvious inadequacies that dis­ please me. The issue is not to make the reading of Hegel easier but to prevent the extraordinary exertions that Hegel requires.xxxvi Preface cretizing those considerations with regard to the texts.

is unpublished. of course. . I then brought them together. for the Berlin talk and to deal with other motifs in a lecture broadcast on Hessian radio. It was printed in the Archiv fur Philosophie 1959. certain motifs are repeated. I delivered it again shortly afterwards in French at the Sor­ bonne. "Skoteinos. But since the elements had been conceived as a whole. "The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy" is a greatly expanded version of a lecture I gave at the meetings of the German Hegel Society in Frankfurt on October 25. in a monograph. albeit a central one. 1956. from dif­ ferent perspectives. with important addi­ tions. Similarly. 1958. always." written in the winter of 1962-63. I was forced to select one complex. 9: 1-2. Since the three complementary parts of the book had been given fixed literary form somewhat independently of one an­ other.A Note on the Text "Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy" grew out of a talk I gave at the Free University of Berlin on November 14. The preliminary work was too extensive to be adequately incorporated into that talk. commemorat­ ing the 1 25th anniversary of Hegel's death. vol.

Theodor W . especially Professor Hermann Schweppenhauser.xxxviii A Note on the Text I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to the assistants at the Philosophisches Seminar at the University of Frankfurt. and Dr. Adorno . Werner Becker. Dr. Herbert Schnadelbach. Alfred Schmidt. Dr.

" The three studies were put together as Drei Studien zu Hegel for the series "edition suhrkamp. with the exception of the last paragraph. That edition contains a motto taken from Adorno's Minima Moralia: "Das Ganze ist das Unwahre" [the whole is the untrue].Editorial Remarks from the German Edition The notes Adorno himself provided on the genesis of Hegel: Three Studies require few additions. un­ der the title Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy. The citations have been checked and corrections made where necessary. in 1957. which reads: "A publication about Hegel offers an opportunity to re­ peat that the philosophical thought of the author and that of Max Horkheimer are one and the same. Berlin and Frankfurt am Main. . Four textual notes in "Skoteinos" have been . The first of the three studies was published separately by Suhrkamp Verlag." and the first edition was pub­ lished in 1963. A few cor­ rections have b<:<en made on the basis of indications in the au­ thor's copy. into the "Note" in Hegel: Three Studies. For this reason it has been possible to forgo individual references. the last to appear during the author's lifetime. The text of Hegel: Three Studies is based on the third edition of 1969. A "note" to that edition dated January 1957 was incorporatep.

Oth­ erwise the form of the notes follows that of the original as far as possible. January 197 1 .xl Editorial Remarks from the German Edition moved from the endnotes to the pages to which they refer. even the points in which they are inconsistent are an expression of Adorno's antipathy to unified systematic thought.

Hegel Three Studies .

.

and be �ause one has a professional interest in the person one is to talk about.. All appreciations are subject to the judgment passed iii Hegel's preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit on those who ar� above something only because they are not in it. Appreciations ' . and now Hegel as . when Hegeli �n reason ' 'tried to set the burden 6'£ existence in motion through the reason that obtains eve' in whal n exists." But that con:' cept has become untenable. This arrogance echoes in the loathsome question of what in Kant. The converse question is not even raised: what the present means in the face of Hegel. thereby in some sense elevating oneself above him.:( merely e �ists.Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy A historical occasion like the 125th anniversary of Hegel's death could have elicited what we call an "appreciation. It makes the impudent claim that oecause one has the dubious good fortune to live later. if indeed it ever had any value..sell. whether perhaps the reason one imagines · one has attained sirl:c e Hegel's absolu�e 'reas 'has not in fat{ on long since regressed b�hincl the latte�·and accommodated to wha. one can sovereignly assign the' dead person his place. has any meaning for the present-and even the so-called Hegei reriaissance began half a century ago with a book by Benedetto Croce that undertook to distinguish between what was living and what was dead in Hegel.

.' itself of the dubious advantage of not having to allow any criti­ cism whatsoever." and ignores the fundamental motif of Hegelian philosophy: that it cannot be distilled into any "maxim" or general principle and proves its worth only as a to� tality. go after the whole. however inadequately. which makes criticism seem false no matter what. a philosophy of perspectives. and thereby from below. All criticism of the details. which in any case takes this criticism into account. remains partial and misses the whole.· These days it is hardly possible for a theoretical idea of any scope to do justice to the experience of consciousness.2 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy fail from the start to capture the seriousness and cogency of He­ gel's philosophy by practicing'on him what he called. Hegel's substantive insights. . and in fact not only the experience of consciousness but the embodied ex­ perience of human beings. one must con­ front. the absolute ide­ alist. But this cannot be explained in terms of the trivial apen. the only way to honor Hegel is to refuse to allow on:eself to be intimidated by the virtually mythological complexity of hIS critical m�thod. the claim his philosophy makes to truth. which is what Hegel himself was after. according to Hegel. rather than merely discussing his philosophy from above. . Like other closed systems of thought. "unmediated. in the concrete interconnections of all its moments. with ap­ propriate disdain. cannot be sepa­ rated from speculation-the vulgar notion of which has nothing to do with the Hegelian notion-as though it were some kind of . Hegel's philosophy avails .:u according to which Hegel. If one does not want to miss Hegel with one's very first words. criticizing the whole as a whole is abstract. which extended to the irreconcila­ bility of the contradictions in bourgeois society. Conversely. and instead of graciously or ungraciously listing or denying his ' merits. without having incorporatt:!d some­ thing of Hegel's philosophy. Ac­ cordingly. was a great realist and a man with a sharp historical eye.

however. The idea that the a priori is also the a posteriori. icaI imp u�he dynamic of the Phenomenology of Spirit begins in epistemology and then goes on. On the contrary. being's inwardization and self-possession [das in sich Hineingehen. or. as the introduction already indicates. in Hegelian terms. abstract epistemology. Accordingly. spirit's immersion in itself. the abun­ dance of experiential concreteness [das Gegenstandliche] that is interpreted by thought in Hegel and Q.malQg=�� . it is the mainspring of Hegel's thought: it inspires both his criticism of a grim empirical reality and his critique of a static apriorism Where Hegel compels his material to speak.ourishes thought in turn. is also of a completely different order than / . to explode the position of an isolated or.3 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy troublesome ornamentation. If one tried to rescue the material substance of Hegelian philosophy from its allegedly outmoded and arbitrary speculation by eradicating its idealism. is due not so much to a realistiC frame of mind on Hegel's part as to his method of anamnesis. in Hegel's words. and they lose their substance as soon as they are conceived as merely empirical. those insights are produced by speculation." an identity that becomes divided and then reunites. Richard Kroner rightly opposed describing the history of Ger�an Idealism as advancing directly from Schelling to Hegel. an idea that was programmatic in Fichte and was then fully elaborated by Hegel.sop-hy of nature through recourse to a Fichtean. of course. and thus prephilo­ sophical. What Hegel .remain either a mere accumulation of facts. the idea of an original identity of subject and object :'in spirit. Hegel re­ �sted the dQgmatic moment in Schelling�p-hilQ. sich Zusammenziehen des Seins]. and even Kantia�pjsie. or merely dogmatic and without rigor. is not an auda­ cious piece of bombast. thought. is at work. Otherwise the inexhaustibly rich content of his system would . Rather. one would have nothing but positivism on the one hand and superficial intellectual history on the other.

which always point bey()rid themselves and are generated from"one another. only through discontinuity. His sytem is not an overarching sci­ entific system any more than it is an agglomeration of witty ob­ servations. connection is not a matter of unbroken tran� sition but a matter of sudden change. It is incompatible with any kihd of tendency to harmony. Think. it sometimes seems as though the progress that spirit imagines itself to have made. and the process takes place not through the moments approachIng one another but through . for instance. is all a regression. alienation. at the same time. it does not ex­ ist as something beyond themS This is what his category of total­ ity is intended to convey. since He­ gel's death and in opposition to him. But he nei­ ther derived a metaphysics from the abstract principle of totality nor glorified the whole as such in the name of the "good Ge­ stalt. as a critic of romanticism. he knows that the whole' realizes itself only in and through the parts. and reflection-through. in him. Hegel recognized the primacy of the whole over its finite part's. When one studies his work. His critical thought goes beyond both the stating of the unconnected and the principle of continuity." He does not make the parts. which are inadequate and. in short. through clear methodology and iron-clad empiricism. of Gestalt theo�y. no matter how much the late Hegel may subjectively have had such tendencies. autonomous in opposition to it. iIf Hegel's whole exlsts at all it is only as the quin­ tessence of th � partial moments. in their confrontation with the whole. which Kohler ex­ panded to a kind of philosophy.. everything tha( is anathema to Gestalt theory. while the philosophers who think they are maintaining something of He­ gel's legacy have for the most part missed the concrete content on which Hegel's thought first proved itself. as elements of the whole.4 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy that of embeddedness in relationships to which the individual disciplines closed their eyes. contradictory.

Hegel. Even the point of most extreme idealism in Hegel's thought. it is not something heterogeneous to it. beings.­ . Modern Gestalt theory as interpreted by Max Scheler challenges traditional epistemological subjectivism and inter­ p the chaotic material of the senses.t that helped him to say somethi�g essential not merely about the instruments of knowledge but about i"ts essential objects. empha': sized precIsely thIS specification of the object. -not only the subject but also the object are pre-. now expanded to become infinite. sented as substantial and making the full demands of their own.. On� consequence of the unrestrained expansion of the subject to absolute spirit in Hegel is �hat.in� tuition. without in the pro­ cess idolizing the sense certainty with the critique of which the Phenomenology of Spirit begins. All later criticism of the so-called formalism of episte­ mology and ethics can be found explicitly formulated in Hegel. It was his speculative thougp. the givenness of the eherets nomenon. but he did not therefore leap with a bound into the allegedly concrete as did Schelling before him and existential ontology today. without ever suspending consciousness's critical self-reflection: To the extent to which one can speak of realism in Hegel. to say nothing of intellectuaI. but instead sweeps everythIng along with it into the cur� renF of immanence. which permits nothing to remain outside the subject. that the opposition between mere matter and a consciousness that bestows form and meaning is extin­ guished. the subject-object construction. it ' is to be found in the path followed by his idealism. Hegel's much-admired material richness is itself a func­ tion of his speculative thought. It is precisely through absolute idealism. In Hegel the tendency of idealism is to mo�e beyond itself. as moments inheren:t in this spirit. should by no means be dismissed . which the whole Kintian traditkw.. however.had disgualifisQl_ as already specified and structured.5 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy rupture.

as it were. is driven by the idea that knowledge. only because by virtue of the system the matter at hand is referred to its identity with absolute subject. Hegel. Things themselves speak in a philosophy that focuses its energies on proving that it is itself one with them. rather. only absolute idealism gives free rein to the method that the introduction 'to the Phenomenology o Spirit calls "simply looking on" [reines Zuse­ j hen]. historically. Hegel adds an un. to surrender passively. !:>. is by its very idea total knowl-' edge. !I . by its very form. that every one-sided judgment intends. Hegel is able to think from the thing itself out.Kantian element to that: the idea that in grasping. the world in which. we are involved only with phenomena. thaUi}t !�_!9.' jective transcencle'nt(ll "philosophy in Hegel n proper HegeliaIi­ t�rms one might say-at the same time altering him in crucial respects through interpretation that subjects him to a further round of refiection-:-that it is precisely the construction of the absolute subject in Hegel that does justice to an objectivity indis­ soluble in subjectivity. the block. the limit that is set to subjectivity. who in many respects is a Kant come into his own. conceptually. In Kant. already forms the secret source of energy. as prisoners of our own constitution. Paradoxically.e knowl��<:! at all and not a mere duplication 'of the subject.th�n merely �ubjectiv �. and does not rest until it has been sublated in it.e. Speculative idealism does not recklessly disregard the limits of the possibility of knowledge. knowledge is mo. the absolute. it is obX��ti�itY'Tlke-the obJective­ "reason in Plato. to its authentic substance. if there is such a thing. is not the ultimate world. the legacy of which ch �micaily permeates" sub. the idea that a world divided into subject and object. in understanding subjectivity as "mere" subjectiv­ ity. we have already passed beyond that limit.6 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy as the arrogance of the unrestrained concept. it searches for words to ex� press the idea that a reference to truth as such is in fact inherent in all knowledge that is knowledge.

. comes from Hegel's system.Qg � in t() . �!ySi�acceRted logic of science takes for granted.staiic ' of J<:!:lQ�I�. .l�·itulays a role in "'HUSSerl's phenomenology. hut' it is precisely this kind of subordination to the disci-: . The insight that in the realm of the so-called Geisteswissenscha n [hu­ fte m. pline ti the thing itself that requires the most intense efforts on . �uth a��o �d i 't� '�hi�h t h � t! i� . while �g . That insight makes his system scientifically sU:­ perioz: to the institution of science and scholarship. through all its impulses and experiences-this insight. literally." ject. bj ���� � �i . ity and objectivity.." of generation through spirit.7 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy No matter how much Hegel the Fichtean emphasizes the idea of "positing.l:1rL�!l!lY. sciences of the spi'rit].���Il �Jil!limlted. th�� so-called sub lve facto�s h<!Y�.s!1bj�fL Tlg. co �pre­ lli lla. no matter how thor!. w herever the object itself is mediated by "spirit. the residual theory ' .: hlJ:Us)�f �_ [1:. and the bi�. ow � nature.' oughly ac tive and practical "his concept of development is..�. which. he strikes is so dead'iy because he-aoes not set u p an irrational unity of subject and object i� opposition to that analysis but in­ stead preserves the distinct moments of the subjective and the objective while grasping them as mediated by one another. Those efforts succeed at the moment In which the intentions o'f' the subject are extinguished in the ob.. which everywhere becomes something immediate for hiih again. obj �Ltl:l<!uh� �.Q�n'�:Ol1=·­ Rending wliiCli means notnmg ... Hegel everywhere yields to the object's. which self-reflec­ tion is now forcing upon the resistant social sciences. the part of the concept. Hegel's_�IitL �itrikes_ Cl!:! '!Lth�_�mply_c_enteLoLthe . he is ' at the same time passive in his respect for the specific.ri ob�y�@:g:i. <!.. it develops at all levels of both subjecti'v� . This idea too is Hegelian through and through.() �ff o sp cept':-The"iiOtiO." jec-': ' . except tnatinHgel it is not limifed to a specific type': e of act of consciousness." knowledge becomes fruitful not by excluding the subject but through its utmost exertions.� sciences.t.f onta�eoiis--recei.

�.9-I. For Hegel's idealism--. j�§�!f����.S. i .��c::�ci�.li.!.a�v�. the dialectic is as well stilted to dogmatism as the immediacy of Schelling's intellectual intuition..ft st!'!!l _ di:gg_ �l � !!im�i.1tl}' a�.�g3.�.'!!l:Q�p!!l t.­ !L<! non-are all permeated through an�J.8 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy raging against the subject. a deadly misunderstanding has depicted it as being. na_t.eTween extremes..g_ th�. regresses to a prescientific recording of mere unrelated facts.JQ �1fill!'. a recording of what is most inadequately and contingently subjective. and opinions. which extends into all substantive knowledge.-mes a critical re�iilaSen� that criticizes Kant once t nts andfJ!.�bi!��y'.��""n hai�ti� �e�� t�� sets them in motion. Once divested of its critical ferment..i!!}g. Hegel helped Kant's critical phi­ loso h come into its own by criticizing the Kantian dualism of form and content.-r eaSo�.�he m o­ ments to a flat. e i�� � . unmediated identity.!hing j. This needs to be �e­ membered at a time when those who administer the dialectic in its materialist version. against which Hegel's polemic was directed. The poles that Kant opposed to one an­ s. In order to be thoug. by virtue of his conception of the relationshi'p between subject and object. the official thought of the East bloc.theoiY �������!Il9 !lec���. since Kierkegaard. have debased it to an unreflected copy theory. rother-form and content. by drawing t e rigid determinations of dif­ In Hegel'SinterpretatlOn. to the temptation to accept the facade uncritically: there are good reasons why the dialectic of essence and appear� ance is moved to the center of the Logic. events. as.u�ome-::.oughJw_�n-riC" h a way that none of t l!ati?ns are h. Hence for Hegel me­ ' diation is �:.Cl�"� . iii'e i1e� .��_.!!�J. requires the'other thaIKanioppo�ed to it.l:}nl!er�l.era-�iddi�" efementl. Fichte as wellth� �YE..Q. �. Although Hegel surrenders without reservation to the specificity of his ob­ ject-actually to the objective dynamic of society-he is thor­ oughly immune.lll.��<::!.�.

li..of this insistent response. . .. no constitutum... � . mediation takes place in and through the extremes.. .!:l!>j�S�. self-reflectiDn of idealism.. as many contemporary interpreters of Hegel would like to do. In Kant's sense no world. .���b-... . and the re­ lationship .t msr�!Y�W.. each of them requires its opposite. .. •. became ' meaningless for Hegel.."Jrom... " " .9 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy � instead.!!!rl a.Jh(!.E.t �3.9=t3. .of all of them to one another is one of process.t�L fmm. . and H�gel . Hence the dialectic. '-.."_­ I£l the "world. ' -... .U��. in the extremes themselves.-.. -..ens �d �-gen�e?a:ti�� co�ditions of .f[2. But this alters the meanin'g of ontology so decisively that it seems futile to apply the word. to a so-called fundamental structure whose very nature is not to be a fundamental structure.QJ1..tjxe.... similarly. ed �!:! �� !. �Q!U!. Hegel shows that the fundamental ontological coiltents that traditional phi': losophy hoped to distill �re not ideas discretely set off from one another. which is incompatible with any advocacy of moderation. �tte !. nDt to be ' fJ7TOX€/.. -.. " . he CiJriSiituens.. is pDssible withDJ.---:. the deadly leg­ tra ditiDnal metaphysics. can­ not be likened to a methodological or ontDlogical principle that . .rJ:!by ...... .ClsQn. .. Dialectic is the unswerving effort to conjoiri _ .. . .· n��. the question '-of an ultimate principle from which everythi �g must be derivable... .i. so there is no definition that fits it. .. .. . the permanent con­ frontation of the object with its concept-nDr is it a weltan­ schauung into whose schema one has to squeeze reality. would characterize his philosophy the way the doctrine of ideas characterizes Plato in his middle period or the monadology characterizes Leibniz� The dialectic is neither a mere method by ' which spirit might elude the cogency of its object-in Hegel the dialectic literally accomplishes the opposite. the epitome of Hegel's philosophy. ...""-.�LQfn:.!_� s!:!Qjective cOlld. rather. " ._".. ' .. . ..��I��. .'''''''_• ..thi!!g_that i� ng..JL€VOV.l!!_�� �. .�.. that th�... ..eng. add � . .!:J?str�<:. .. This is the radical aspect of Hegel... . "" '''-. Just as the dialectic does not favor individual definitions...' By virtue .. or substratum.t ..

lO Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy reason's critical consciousness of itself and the critical experience of objects . the reflection of the immediate and then the sublation of reflection. on which Hegel declared war. And it has done so to an extent that passes judgment on any 'attempt to orient oneself in terms of what simply is the case and to do without the alleged arbitrar­ iness of the dialectical construction: in terms of his own ideol­ ogy. it was the constructive force that enters fully into what is. however. and although the dialectic demonstrates the impossibility of reducing the world to a fixed subjective pole and methodically pursues the reciprocal negation and produc­ tion of the subjective and objective moments.: Only the doctrine of the identity of subject and object inherent in idealism-an identity that amounts in terms of form to the primacy of the subject-gives it the strength of totality that performs the nega­ tive labor-the dissolution of individual concepts. whereas it was his war that brought the giant shadow of the Slavic world down on Europe­ that same Slavic world of which Hegel had already made the ominous statement that it had not yet entered history. The most extreme formulations of this are to be found in Hegel's history . that the most recent phase of history has verified. however. But it was not a prophetic historical gaze-something for which he would have had nothing but contempt-that enabled Hegel to say this. without sacrificing itself as reason. If. Hitler attempted to eradicate bolshevism. and as the henchman of more powerful interests. The scientific concept of verification makes its home in that realm of separate. rather. held fast to idealism. critique. Hegel's philoso­ phy. rigid concepts. which the ignora l!t tend to dismiss as a conceptual straitjacket. then it is precisely Hegel's conception of the dialectic. such as those of theory and experience. a philosophy of spirit. and the awareness of possibility. one were to make precise inquiries into its own verification. For all that.

or. to construct the whole world. a more consis­ tent presentation of Kantian philosophy. Hegel praised the greater consist�ncy of Kant's successors in comparison with the abysmal discontinu� ities of the Kantian system. through ' which speculative unity was lacking to the who ie system. from which all determinations are necessarily derived. The important point is this unity of principle and the attempt to develop from it in a scientifically consist!!nt way the whole content of consciousness." 1 Like Fichte. "In addition to these [that is." g There is little that could demonstrate Hegel's self-contradictory relation­ ship to idealism. For the con­ tent of Hegel's philosophy is the notion that truth�which in He­ gel means the system--cannot be expressed as a fundamental . there are none. he passes this judgment on Fichte: "The shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy was its unthinking inconsistency. as Fichte himself had repeatedly as­ serted. and in particular." 2 His agreement with Fichte extends still farther: "The Fichtian philosophy has the great advantage of having set forth the fact that Philosophy must be a science . whose highest peak and whose turning point he attained. as has been said. the given moment of reality-into a pos­ iting by the infinite subject. . In'­ stead. and this ' shortcoming was removed by Fichte. Kant's and ' Fichte's] systems of philosophies. Fichte's philosophy is thus the development of form in itself (reason is in itself a syn­ thesis of concept and actuality). more incisively than these sentences. . and that of Schelling. . It did not occur to him that the Kantian discontinuities register the very moment of nonidentity thafis an indispensable part of his own conception of the philosophy of identity. but. and he even outdid them in this re­ gard. Not only is Fichtean philosophy the completion of Kantian philosophy.derived from one supreme principle.11 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy of philosophy. Hegel attempted to outdo Kant in idealism by dissoiving anything not proper to conscious­ ness-in other words. Hegel goes so far as to say.

With this. from the one original positing. Despite this. to eliminate every particle of a determination of difference. Hegel rec­ ognized the inadequacy of an abstract principle beyond the di­ alectic. But this is the exact opposite of Fichte's attempt to derive the world from pure identity. The individual Fichtean principles thereby lose' their conclusi�e significance. a principle from which all else is to follow. is a matter of indifference in Hegel's philoso­ phy. from absolute subject. In his decision ' to tolerate no limits. Correctly understood. his philosophy does not recognize a first something of this kind as a fixed principle that remains inalterable and identical with itself as thought progresses. Hegel leaves all tra­ ditional metaphysics.12 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy principle of this kind. he could have the movement of thought begin with being. Hegel considers the Fichtean postulate of the deduc­ tive system emphatically valid. if you like. concrete reality itself is something constructed through the process whereby thought grasps the opposition of content to form and the opposing content. that Fichte took up and that is to enclose reality within it .. the choiCe of a starting point. but is the dynamic totality of all the propositions that can be generated from one another by virtue of their contradictions. and the prespeculative notion of idealism . instead. Matters do not rest with the "absolute form. Something that was implicit in Fichte but not yet developed now becomes the driving force of Hegel'S philosophical activity. Hence in the Phenomenology Hegel cbuld start with the subject and grasp all concrete content in the con­ templation of the subject's self-movement while on the other hand. He­ gel literally oudid Fichtean idealism. an ur-principle." to use Hegel's language. . in the Logic. The conse­ quence of the principle negates the principle itself �nd destroys its absolute primacy. however. of what comes first. It was only that he accorded its second principle much more weight than Fichte did in his Science ofKnowledge. is devel­ oped out of the form itself.

suspended quality of Hegelian philosophy. of something utterly detached. far behind. just as conversely the object is defined as subject: " When the contemplating spirIt presumes to show that everything that exists is commensurable with spirit itself. The absolute rigor and closed quality of the argument that he and Fichte strove for in opposition to Kant already establishes the priority of spirit. is literally the name of that suspended quality. even if. The Hegelian subject-object is subject. according to Hegel. The Hegelian skandalon cannot be ascribed to any confusion or lack of clarity. even if at the safue time it grasps the untru'ih in this. This illuminates something that from the point of view of Hegel's own demand for complete consistency is an unresolved contradiction. which comes up against the limits of consistent thought without being able to do away with them. which involves no abstract higher­ level concept. as the theodicy of self-consciousness. it is the price Hegel has to pay for absolute consistency. s pirit sets itself up as an on­ tological ultimate. with Logos and the determinations of thought. In the objectivity of the Hegelian dialectic. which quashes all mere subjectivism. The quintessence of the con­ ditioned. that of the abstract a priori. the fact that the subject-object dialectic. its quality of being up in the air. rather. " " � . that gives rise to the hovering. and attempts to do away with" its own fundamental thesis. that of its own impossibility. that of the absolute. Hegelian dialectic finds its ultimate truth. there is some­ thing like a will on the part of the subject to jump over its own shadow. Nevertheless he does not abandon idealism. not least of all. itself constitutes the whole and yet is realized in turn as the life of absolute spirit. it has no awareness of this. is the unconditioned. its per­ manent skandalon: the name of the highest speculative concept.13 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy as well. in its unresolved and vulnerable quality. even if the subject is defined as object at every stage. It is this.

Just as on the one hand ' the categorial forms of the "I think" need a supplementary con­ tent that does not arise out of them themselves in order to make truth. is taken to be pure in the emphatic Kantian sense. it cannot be used to ground the absolute. It already presupposes-as the Kantian constitutum. possible. in the last analysis the Kantian distinction between the "I" as the substratum of empirical psychology and the transcendental "I think. that extent it belongs instead to what it is opposed to. is."4 German Idealism's response to this insight into the conditioned nature of the "I. He himself reached its threshold. the Fichtean distinction between the individ­ ual and the subject.en­ dental philosophy is to explain.14 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy With this." another of the insights that the philosophy of reflection in its modern scientific form has only laboriously re­ gained. pure identity. the moments of its activity. Itself tainted �ith relativity. in­ dependent of all spatiotemporal facticity � Only in this way can everything that exists dissolve without remainder in its concept. he acknowledges the relationship--and not only in their application but in their ori- . Hegel renders himself vulnerable to the critique of idealism: an immanent criticism. In the "uns:' [us] that Kant. to what is posited. In Kant' this step had not yet been taken." in contrast. as Husserl said of it. continues to use unreflectively. that which is constituted-what transc. knowledge of nature. :rhe "I think. in his introspec­ tive naivete. Richard Kroner characterizes Hegel's relation to Fichte in words that in a certain sense already fit Fichte: "Insofar as the 'I' is opposed to all else through reflection. such as he required all criticism to be. so on the other hand the "I think" itself and the categorial forms are respected by Kant as a species of givens. a part of the world. however. to the contents of thought. roughly. that is." The finite subject is. to this extent at least the Critique of PUTe Reason is more a phenomenology of subjectivity than a /Speculative system.

because the abstractum remains applicable to' that which is subsumed within it. which did away with all fetishes. then ' the cQncept itself can �Q IQnger be made gQQd.5 Nevertheless. the p. Qtherwise ' t�at . were mQst careful to. aVQid calling it: an abstractiQn. preserved in it at the same time. Hence if the fQrmatiQn Qf the cQncept Qf the transcenden­ tal subject Qr the absQlute spirit sets itself cQmpletely Qutside in­ dividual consciQusness as sQmething spatiQtempQnil? when in f<l:ct the cQncept is achieved thrQugh individual cQnsciQusness. but Fichte also. He calls it sQmething that all later idealists. Fichte's radicalism thereby revealed sQmething that in Kan� was hidden in the twilight Qf transcendental phenQmenQIQgy.nQmQUS vis a vis what it is abstracted frQm. thereby invQluntarily revealed the dubiQUS na­ ture Qf his Qwn absQlute subject. that arises in turn ' frQm the interplay Qf the fQrms with sensQry material. and because Qf the irrecQncilability Qf the twO.15 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy gin-of the categQrical fQrms to' sQmething existing. Fichte hYPQstatized the " I" that had been abstracted. becQmes a fetish itself" and speculative philQSQphy since Fichte has failed to' see that. Fichte was nQt cQnten't with this. thereby bearing witness to' the irreducibility Qf the empiricaI 'tQ spirit. the quality Qf what it has been abstracted frQm is always. and certainly the QntQIQgists amQng them. he tried to' extricate the prin­ ciple Qf the " I" frQm facticity and thereby justify idealism in the absQluteness that then became the medium Qf the Hegelian sys­ tem. even if in an extremely general fQrm. Kant's reflectiQns brQke Qff at this PQirit. namely hu­ man beings.hat its very cQncept cannQt be thQught withQut such abstraction. and in this . in t. cQncept. in a certain sense. determine what it is abst"i-act��CfrQm and what it itself is determined by. He relentlessly drQve the distinctiQn between the tran­ �cendental and the empirical subject beyQnd Kant. the interweaving Qf the mQments. What results frQm abstractiQn can never be made absQlutely auto.ure " I" is to. and because return is to' be PQssible.

namely "I." as an abstraction from the empirical "I. is something so near to his heart. by thinking away without authority what belongs to this species in order to form the genus.16 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy respect Hegel adhered to what he did. Kant's pure reason i� " " taken . if it were no longer at all what it was abstracted from.' I say. Giving an an­ thropological-materialist turn to this polemic. we should perhaps remove the very condi­ tion of the possibility of the· remaining attributes that are hypostasized . that we are never entitlea to set up a genus that is given to us only in a single species." whether it is the pure transcendental I or the empirical. that homeland 'of . though it is indeed noth­ ing but this. not as an intellectual faculty of man. Both Fichte and Hegel skipped over the fact that the expression "I. on the contrary." may erase the latter's specific contents. it would no longer be that being-with-itself of spirit.6 But even in Hegel the most emphatic expressions. this laying down of morals not for men as men. as genus. unmediated "I. At least in moral philosophy. However. and the deplorable philosophy of our times can serve as an illustration of the results of that most pernicious ex­ ample and precedent. Hegel too is unable to cut the tie binding absolute spirit to the empirical person. No matter how thoroughly the Fichtean or Hegelian absolute "I. Schopenhauer had already insisted on that in his critique of Kant. are derived· from the finite subject's ex­ perience of itself and trudly do not stem from linguistic sloppi­ ness. On the other hand. he says. for into the concept of that genus we could bring absolutely nothing 'but what we had taken from this one species. such a favorite potion of his. but for all rational beings as such." if it completely divested itself of the facticity contained in its concept. on the contrary. it is hypostasized as something existing by itself. without any authority." must necessarily designate some consciousness or other. . . and thus what we stated about the genus could always be understood orily of the one species. such as spirit and self-consciousness. that Kant is never tired of repeating it on every occasion.

. which _ is virtually equated with constitutive identity in the synthetic unitY of apperception::-Kant's concept of the -"I think" was the for­ mula for the lack of<IlSiiiiOrlbetween proouctive spontaneITY' iCt andlOgicili&niliL lJ�f()!!l. a momenl that · d6drines ofth. would be nonsense. originally it is not a sphere of particular objects. Rather."ge�·oppose·s producttonaiid deed to mat� ter as subjective accomplishments but rather looks for them in .'-totality it becomes a ErinCiple of being no less than-a -prhiClple of thought. That is spirit. however. According to the definition in the Encyclopedia. it ls uilqualified and absol. Spirit is not placed in absolute con� trast to something nonspiritual. nonidentical �tTn-It.. it is explicitly called gel. those of the later Geisteswis­ t nce senschaften.�ting its­ '�l?j�ct.c:� �()�aT iIl_ : Ii�gel. idealistsystems··o:(jc:leniity�··are not permitted to acknowledge �s indissoluble. In this sense Hegel's philosophy is untrue when measured against its own concept." the deed. An "I" that was no longer "I" in any sense at all.!2�QiJl�· �Qb}�L. theless true? To answer this question one must elucidate something that dominates the whole of Hegel's philosophy without ever being made tangible. in addition. an "I. Analysis of the_absolute subject has_ to acknowledge the indissolubility· of�n e�pirical.. as a-legacy of Kan 's '-p free.." that is. of being. But whe�-Heg�i �o io�.. e-: "i]e -iil lre:: t ractical reason.C=_<l.17 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy knowledge from which the primacy of sub ectivity in the great j idealist systems depends. . its counterconcept. productive. It would riot only be as free-floating and indete�­ minable as Hegel accused being. something material. it is "essentially active. anc:l inthr. without any relation to individuated consciousness and tliereby to the spatiotemporal person. In what sense is it then never." as something mediated by consciousness. Th." 7 just as Kant's practical reason is essentially distinguished from theo retical reason in Z.J. K��ti�� �oment of spontaneity. it could no longer be grasped as an "I.

Rather. . The -reference of the productive moment o(spirit back to a universal subject rather than to an individual who labor's is what defines labor as something organized.18 Aspects o f Hegel's Philosophy specific objects. as Kant's critic. transcendental subject as opposed to the merely empirical. isolated. and conceives objective man (true. discovered in 1932. because real man) as the result of his own labour. One could show in detail how Hegel. he comes close to the mystery behind synthetic apperception and takes it out of the mere arbitrary hypostasis of the abstract concept. . labor only becomes labor as some­ thing for something else. In the' economic -. that he . that the self­ . grasps the nature of labour." 8 The moment of uni­ versality in the active. is no more a fantasy than is the validity of logical propositions as opposed to the empirical course of individual acts of -thought. something commensurable with other things. iS� �I!C: QtI-1_e than ��iaIJ'lbo_r-. Translating Hegel's concept of spirit into social labor elicits the reproach of a sociologism · that confuses the genesis and in­ fluence of Hegel's philosophy with its substance.!" and philosophical manuscripts of the young Marx. The mys­ tery. something that transcends the contingency of the indi­ vidual subject. . this was recognized for the first time: "The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology-the dialectic of negativ­ ity as the moving and creating principle-is . an expression both precise and concealed from itself for the sake of the general idealist thesis. . is a sodal relationship. something social. · its own "ratio­ nality. this universality is an expression of the social nature of labor. Aristotle's Politics already tells us . sought to do justice to Kant's intentions by going beyond the . in concrete material reality." the ordering of functions. and contingent subject. There is no question that Hegel was a transcendental analytic philosopher like Kant. however. preservation of individual subjects depends a-s-much on the la­ ho�:()(oiI:t_er:s a� society depends on the deeasofliidiVid�als.

1 0 Immanently. accordingly. Society is allotted precisely what Hegel re­ serves for spirit as opposed to all the isolated individual moments of empirical reality.. society. a thought that is abstract in Hegel's sense. something that his philosophy. and his pl:lilosophy attests to that itself. The Hegelian categories. something that cannot be melted down. Those moments are mediated by society.�iJi!i�Ii?:i:o--bef�g9 ---1s-i�--t�. would the relationship of spirit and society be a transcendental-logical relationship between consti­ tuens and constitutum.li. fall within the domain of transcendental constituents. could show that he was not successful in that deduction.into identity. But in Hegel. constituted the way things are constituted b� spirit for an ideal_ - . The linguistic expression "existence. aAAO yivot. appears to be a JL€"a{301. of course. would be what Kant calls a constitutum.19 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy Critique of Pure Reason. The interpretation of spirit as society." which is necessarily conceptual! is confused with what it designates.� devei­ !as-:SQ oped out of the absolute that Hegel says is spirit. a part of the existenctih!!Lin Il{!gcl's LQgic­ in Hegel's doctrine of the absolutely unconditioned and of exis­ tence as SO_��!:lg. Explicit critique of Hegel. at least insofar as it never finds the absolute except in the totality of disunity. which is nonconceptual. as the functional complex of empirical persons. however. not mere fact: Only for a thought that works through external antitheses. €lt. a shift ' to something of a different kind incompatible with the sense of Hegel's philosophy if only because it does not satisfy the precept of immanent criticism and attempts to grasp the truth content of Hegelian philosophy' in terms of something external to it. Hegel cannot main­ tain the absoluteness of spirit. society for its part is not mere existence.(Ttt. and especially the category of spirit. within its own framework. in unity with its other. Conversely. just as Fichte's Science of Knowledge had pushed the limits of Kant's concept of the pure. would have derived as conditioned qr posited.

and no step can pin it down as such. what the transcendental synthesis was after could not be. � society in Its modern bourg�ois sense both something abstract · �E_(:U£����st real thing of all. The systematically reg­ ulated activity of reason turns labor inward. as one thing among other things. itself unconscious. But the brute fact that disappears in the totalized notion of spirit returns in that notion as a logical compulsion. No other expressions could be fuund. For the subject reflecting on it.abstract of labor tak�� ori lliaglcai""form. essence is manifested in them. because in terms of its own mean­ ing. a pure deed of spirit. The individual fact can no more avoid it than the individual person can avoid the contrainte sociale.. Society is essen!ia!!Y �. and thereby to sublimate the brutality of the factual into spirit and legitimate it. things come into being within society objectively. For nothing is to be external to spirit. without re­ gard to the specific qualities of those who labor or the products of labor. just what Hegel says of the-��� phatic ll()tion of the concept.<=��j� as seirit is. the expressions through which spirit was defined as original production in idealist systems were all with­ out exception derived from the sphere of labor. for Hegel. As the unity of human subjects who reproduce the life of the species through their labor.<?_fl. The principle of the equivalence of social 1'!l:>Q!. Even before Hegel. For that subject. the burdensome. Hence every step thought-takes comes up against society. . prior to any particular influence exerted by society on phe­ nomena: society is manifested in phenomena the way.20 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy ist. It is only this brutality of coercion that creates the semblance of rec­ onciliation in the doctrine of an identity that has been produced. labor becc)ines its owIi" �eflected form. spirit's productive unity. . What permits Hegel the dialecti­ cian to preserve the concept of spirit from contamination with brute fact. separated from its connection with labor. independent of reflection. the experience. is itself secondary.

___. modeling efforts that knowledge directs toward its "object. . " .. '__ _ . as it were. the understanding does some­ thing: what is given through the senses is simply there. __ _ . is the non-spiritual. _ .o. The path natural consciousness follows to the identity of abiOlute-Tno. �ly given by sensibility.." ---. Hence talk about thought is always accompa­ nied by talk about a material that thought knows to be distinct from itself. . For thought is always accompanied by the moment of violent exerclon-a reflection of the dir enecesSltIes o{fite�that--­ characterIze Iabor... is a confrontation with nature that has become habitual and has been internalized. The primacy of Logos has always been part of the work ethic. _ . a process of labor: "Knowledge in its first phase.l()GY. sense-consciousness. a material it processes the way labor processes its raw materials. In order to become genuine knowledge.21 Aspects o f Hegel's Philosophy _ ness and coerciveness of outwardly directed labor has perpetuated itself in the reflective. _ .-if riot in 'theory �� !���!�1�'his lan­ ne . _ . but the operations of the understanding are subject to volition. in whom the consciousness . _. As that through which human beings form something that then confronts them. i. guage. Even the traditional distinction between sensibility and understanding:Sin:�iici!k�ii arLd:._" ____ .--.ledge[W usenjIS ltseftTlbor._ � ___ __. without compensation.'tne s -strainsand 'toils of the concepi arenoC ..e.--u -'t(-T� Hegel of the Phen9"!erl. __ ____. u. . to beget the element of ." efforts that are again required for the pro� gressive domination of nature.wnatTs m. . I of spirit as living activity and its identity with the real social subJect was' less affo pliieo'tlian-in tne-later'Heg€{ recogriized the sponta ouS-spirit as labor. like the fruits of the field.' ..j{�rstand" indicates 'ihaCin-coiitrasCto. those operations can occur or not occur. liieThphonr::llt:-:-=:--'=-. . an intervention and not a mere reception.The-iefa:tionsJiip' of ' spirit to what' is given manlfesii itselfoii. regardless of its�o�ient.-the model of a social process. or im­ mediate Spirit. Tlie'stance adopted by thought as such.

i:ion · tliis coi:isClousness will have with its incarnate beyond: fii-st._� � third: as consciousness th. then its labor is certainly real.. :vhich it in turn negates: it satisfie� the needs of human beings on all levels. reproduces human life. labor provides a longer arm with which to procure the means of life. Even in its intellectual form. "is itself threefold in accordance WIth · the thre�holci -�el. as pure con�ciousness. helps them in their dif­ ficulties. "The movement in which the unessential consciousness strives to attain this one­ ness." Hegels says in a later passage in the Phenomenology. and for good reasons. as a dialectic of the subject-object identity. second. and demands sacrifices of them in return. as philosophy... has an objective form that confronts human beings and yet remains the labor of human beings. "looking on. what. But that is certainly also true of the concept of labor as a relationship to reality: for the dialectic as such. which has become autonomous and �� - ." 1 1 This is by no means a figure of speech: if spil1tiSio be real. it must travel a long way and work its passage. who aR�­ proach��-ili� i<::�uClL�2J:!d in the form of desire and ��!I. Hegel always represents the latter. The philosopher's labor actually aims solely at helping to express what is active in the material itself.i: is aware of its ow� b�i!lg:[ L � Q� itself. The crucial connection between the concepts of desire and labor removes the latter from the position of a men analogy to the abstract activity of abstract spirit. The Hegelian "labor of the concept" is not a loose circumlocu­ tion for the activity of the scholar. as passive. Labor in the ful: sense is in fact tied to desire.T2 ---·· �erpreters of Hegel have rightly insisted that each of the primary moments distinguished within his philosophy is at the same time the whole as well. as a particular individual . is precisely such a relationship. as social labor. - .22 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy Science which is the pure Notion of Science itself. it is the principle of the domination of nature." as well.

But physical labor is necessarily dependent on something otne"i:. on nature. along with labor itself." to which he counters.0�.!l!:g�Qis phT!l�.:--. Labor-and in the last analysis its reflective form. . - Labor is not the source of all wealth. The above phrase is to be found in all children's primers and is correct in so far as it is implied that labor is performed with the appurtenant subjects and instruments. which is the suf­ fering of human beings. And in so far as man from the beginning behaves towards nat�re. Marx's CritiqY&2i the Gotha Progr. into the actus purus of spirit. into something eternal and right. But a socialist program cannot allow SE-ShJ. Marx is discussing the familiar saying "labor is the source of all wealth and all culture.tJO becom�_�Q�jityis tl1C:! i� Verslon-ofi:he EeCQgl1ition that spirit is precisely not an jsolated prmcipIe:-��t some self-sufficient substance. any more than can nature without labor: the two are distinct fromand mediated by one another at the same time .?!E':l.23 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy thereby alienated from its knowledge of itself.�mLdescribes a state of af­ fairs hidden deep within Hegel's philosophy._.����� h. treats her as belonging to him. Nature is just as much the source of use values (and it is surely of such that material wealth consists!) �_ .­ ment of social l�6Qr.!:l_f!1.!9. as an owner.�:'!TIg:§!!lr­ jects of labor. which itselfi�?E. If on� were permitted to sRe�!!late ab C:!gel's specu!!ltion.<':r.�I1_ labor E. and does so all the more precisely in that it was not intended as a polemic against Hegel. one mlght _ol!t f{ Sli-rmise that the extension of spiri.than itself.e�_ �o pass over in silence the conditions that alone give them meaning. as well--cannot be conceived without the concept of nature.. his labor becomes the source of use valu es:thereforeaIso-ofweaIth.. spirit. But idealism be­ comes false when it mistakenly turns the totality of labor into something existing in itself. when it sublimates its principle into a metaphysical one. but rather a mo.. �. and tendentially transfigures something produced by human beings. something fallible and conditioned. The bour-------_.!r the �':l�fe�t_':l��on_�f_a f��. the moment th�t-Ts separa:te-fr�mp1iyslcal labor.. - . the primary source oIaltI}:1�trtlIIl�I1t.

K�llper. Those who have at their disposal the labor of others ascribe to it inherent value-:Consider itabsolute and primary." p�. Apart from the chapt�r on lordship and bondage. . conversely. precisely because labor is-only labor f� others. be il1e sla ve of other men who have made themselves the-owners of the material conditions of Iabor.:i�iI1. 1 3 ' ".29w�Lto labor. labor becomes ideology. most gr hically in the material on "natural religion.. This social relationship dic­ tates the untruth in Hegel. since precisely from the fact that labor depends on na­ .e-s no other property aii1lls -th labor power must. ..tS action whereby it produces itself as object but without having yet grasped the thought of itself is ::m instinctive operation..ci��t ofhu=­ man labor": 14 "Spirit.. Detached from what is not identical with it. in the Phe­ nomenology of Spirit the nature of H�gel's productive spirit as la­ bor appears. here appears as �n a�tificer: aiia­ I. in all conditions of society and culture. like the building of a honeycomb by bees .d� fQT fal�e!y a�cr. surprisingly. .. follows thai:' the manwho j:lOsse. But because of this Hegel cannot afford to express the separa­ tion of mental and manual labor. are the works of this artificer of rigid form. . and he does not read spirit as an isolated aspect of labor but instead. The metaphysics of labor and the appropriation of the L labo� of others are complementary.p . as a.24 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy Keois have very good grouI!. one might say he takes therhet ori­ cal figure pars pro toto as his maxim. . ." at the third stage of which the spiritual be­ comesreligi�us content for the first time. the denial of the nonidentical in the totality. no matter how much the nonidentical receives its due in the reflection�of any particular judgment. The crystals of pyra­ mids and obelisks . the masking of the subject as subject­ object. therefore. dissolves la­ bor into a moment of spirit.:Il:atural creative J." 15 In not simply opposing fetish worship to religion as a primitive or degenerate stage but instead defining it as a: neces- .!llE�)_t .

25 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy

sary moment in the formation of the religious spirit and thereby, in the sense of the Phenomenology's subject-object dialectic, as a necessary moment in the formation of religion itself and ulti­ mately of the absolute, Hegel include_s-human_labOI:.inits_con,�:r<:!�,_!.llilterial form !�e .IO!�,�c:!.t.I�i,�!.,.���:r<;l��!:��tic�_of s�ir� as the absolute. Only a little more woul� be needed-remenibrance ortile�fmultaneously mediated and irrevocably natural moment in labor-and the Hegelian dialectic would reveal its identity and speak its own name . . Wi!h the separation of mental and manual labor, privilege re­ serves mental labor, which despite all assertions to the contrary is the easier, for itself. But at the same time manual labor always reapp�?rs in warning in the spiritual process, which is an imita­ tiOn- of physical action mediated by the imagination; spirit can never get completely free of its relationship to the nature it is to dominate. Spirit obeys nature in o'rder to master it; even its proud sovereignty is purchased with suffering. 1 6 The metaphysics of spirit, however, which makes spirit, as labor unconscious of it� self, an absolute, is the affirmation of its entanglement, an at­ tempt on the part of a self-reflective spirit to reinterpret the curse to which it submits as a blessing by passing it on, and thereby to justify it. In this regard, e'specially, Hegel's philosophy can be accuse fbeing Ideol()_gic�l�-ht- it� �:Xposition, taken to the ex­ _ treme, of the bourgeois celebration of labor. It is precisely in this most elevated point of the idealist system, the 'absolute pro­ claimed ecstatically at the end of the Phenomenology, that the sober realistic features of Hegel take refuge. :At the same time, even �0ece�1:! jgelltifil:ati()!1. ofJ�()!jyiththe abs�!!i�,1l.id _ i�a­ basis. To the extent to which the world forms a system, it be­ COrIleS bne precisely through the closed universality' of social la­ bor; social labor is in fact radical mediation, both between man and nature and also within spirit, W;hich exists for itself, which

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26 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy

tolerates nothing outside itself and forbids remembrance of any­ thing outside it. There is nothing in the world that shall not manifest itself to human beings solely through social labor. Even where labor has no power over it, pure nature is defined through its relationship to labor, even if that relationship is a negative one. Only awareness of all that could lead the H �gelian_"dialeci:i.c Q�yond itself, and it is precisely this awareness that is forbidden r to it: it would pronounce the name that holds it in its spell. Be- cause nothing is known but what has passed through labor, la­ bor, rightly and wrongly, becomes something absolute, and disaster becomes salvation; this is why the whole, which is the part, compulsively and unavoidably occupies the position of truth 0n the science of manifesting consciousness. For the absolutiza­ - tion of labor is that of the class relationship: a humankind free of labor would be free of domination. Spirit knows that without being permitted to know it; this is the poverty of philosophy. But the step by which labor sets itself up as the metaphysical princi­ ple pure and simple is none other than the consistent elimina­ tion of the "material" to which all labor feels -itself tied, the materiaI that defines its bouiidary for it, reminds it of what is below it, and relativizes its sovereignty. This is why epistemology juggles things until the given gives the' illusion of having been produced by spirit. The fact that spirit too stands under the compulsio!l of labor and 'i�"itselflaboiTs to dIsappear; the grea.t classical philos- ­ ophy lit�raiIy-passes-tlie quintessence of coercion"of[as-freedo�. It gets ref� ed becausethe reduction of what e".iiists"to sprri:iCai}: t not succeed, because that epistemological position, as Hegel himself knew, must be abandoned in the course of its own de­ velopment. But it has its truth, in that no one is capable of step­ ping out of the world constituted by labor into another and unmediated one. The identification of spirit with labor can be

27 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy

criticized only in confronting the philosophical concept of spirit with what th;:tt concept actually accomplishes and not through recourse to something transcendent, however positive its nature. r Spirit did not accomplish this. We know that in its emphatic Hegelian version, the concept of spirit is to be understood or� ganically; the partial mom�nts are to grow into and be interpe­ netrated by one another by virtue of a whole that is already �_inherent in every one of them. This concept of system implies the identity of subject and object, which has developed into the sole and conclusive absolute, and the truth of the system col­ lapses when that identity collapses. But that identity, full recon­ ciliation through spirit in a world which is in reality antagonistic, is a mere assertion. The philosophical anticipation of reconcili­ ation is a trespass against real reconciliation; it ascribes anything that contradicts it to "foul" existence as unworthy of philosophy� But a seamless system and �m achieved reconciliation are not one and the same; rather, they are contradictory: the unity of tfH'! system derives from unreconcilable violence. Satanically, the world as grasped by the Hegelian system has only now, a hundred and fifty years later, proved itself to be a system in the literal sense, namely that of a radically societ;:tlized society. One of the most remarkable aspects · of Hegel's accomplishment is thai he iii� fer-recl that systematic diara:cter of society from the concept lorlg · 'before it could gain ascendancy in the sphere of Hegel's own experf c�, that of a Germany f�i behind in its bourgeois devei­ en opmen"i:: -A"World integrated through "production," through the ex- hange relationship, depends in all its moments on the social c conditions of its production, and in that sense actually realizes the primacy of the whole over its parts; in this regard the des­ perate impotence of every single individual now verifies Hegel's extravagant conception of the system. Even the cult of produc-

_

28 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy

tion is more than the ideology of human beings who dominate nature and pursue their own interests without restraint. In that cult is sedimented the fact that the universal exchange relation­ ship in which everything that exists, exists only for something else, stands under the domination of those who hold social pro­ duction at their disposal; this domination is worshipped philo­ sophically. Even the being-for-something-else that is the official justification for the existence of all commodities is only second­ ary to production., The very world in which nothing exists for its own sake is also the world of an unleashed production that for­ gets its human aims. The self-forgetfulness of prQQ.!.I.<:t.L the on, insatiable and destructive expansive principle of the exchange society, is reflected in Hegelian metaphysics. It describes the way the world actua is, not in historical perspective bu(ig�sience; lly without creating any blue smoke in the process with the q!:!�stion of authenticity. -CiviT �ociety ·is an antagonistic totality. It survives only in and through its antagonisms and is not able to resolve them. In the work by Hegel that is most notorious for its re!�_t()!�tionist ten­ dencies,Ifs-apOlogy for the sta6is ·quo, and ·its cult of the state, the Philosophy of Rt ght, that is stated bluntly. Thevery e"��lc-'::­ itie�-an(r-provocatlve passages that are responsible for the fact that important thinkers in the West like Veblen, Dewey, and even Santayana have lumped Hegel together with German imperial­ ism and fascism should themselves be seen as derived from He­ gel's consciousness of the antagonistic character of the totality. This is why Hegel's idolization of the state should not be trivial­ ized by being treated as a mere empirical aberration or an irrel­ evant addendum. Rather, that idolization is itself produced by insight into the fact that the contradictions of civil society cannot be resolved by its self-movement. Passages like this one are crit­ ical:

increases with social wealth. and its control takes the form of an external system and orga­ nization for the protection and security of particular ends and interests en masse.29 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy It hence becomes apparent that despite an excess of wealth civil society is not rich enough. a tour de force because it suspends the dialectic under the aegis of a principle to which Hegel's own critique of the abstract could be applied. . its own resources are insufficient to check exces­ sive poverty and the creation of a penurious rabble. has no antidote for the fact that poverty. as Hegel at least suggests. a principle whose locus. still less could Hegel envision an increase in production that would make a mockery of the asser­ tion that society is not rich enough in goods. is by no means outside the play of social forces: . . inasmuch as these interests subsist only in this universal. . or else generally backward in indus" try. i. 1 8 It is intended to allay something that could not otherwise be smoothed over. The beginning of that paragraph reads. This inner di­ alectic of civil society thus drives it-or at any rate drives a specific civil society-to push beyond its own limits and seek markets. &c.e. Hegel's philosophy of the state is a necessary tour de force. its primary purpose is to actualize and maintain the universal contained within the particularity of civil society. whose liberal eco­ nomic theory Hegel had accepted. and so its nec­ essary means of subsistence. Paragraph 249 expressly refers to the extremely ad­ vanced passage just quoted.17 The free play of forces in capitalist society. in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has over-produced. "pauperism" in Hegel's old-fashioned terminology. While the public authority must also undertake the higher directive function of providing for the interests which lead beyond the borders of its society (see Paragraph 246). The state is ap­ pealed to in desperation as a seat of authority beyond this play of forces.

whose theodicy constitutes his prog -. Even the false claim that il1e-woTldTs-uonetlieless a good '­ world contains within it the legitimate demand that the empiri­ cal world become a good and a reconciled world. The administration of these is in the hands of Corporations (see Paragraph 251). as a self- . as Mephistopheles says in Faust. Nowhere does that philosophy come closer to the truth about its own substratum. that where it turns into nonsense when confronted with it. Hegel's philosophy is indeed esse�tiall� negative: critique. &c. their authority rests on the confidence of their commonalties and professional equals. If in the last analysis Hegel's system makes the transition into untruth by following its own logic. In extending the tr-anscendentifphlloso'phy of the Critique of Pure Reason through the thesis of reason's identity with what exists and making it a critique of what exists. will generally be ef­ fected by a mixture of popular election by those interested with ap­ pointment and ratification by higher authority. these circles of particular interests must be subordinated to the higher interests of the state. from that point of view. commercial and professional as well as municipal. society. On the other hand. Hegel denounced the world. however. and their officials. directors. he de­ ��II. managers and the like. It is the business of the officials to manage the private property and interests of these particular spheres and. that is the core of Hegel's philoso­ phy. this is a judgment not simply on Hegel.. everything that exists deserves to J>e!!sh. a critique of any and every positivity. and hence the filling of positions of responsibility in Corporations.1 nounced it as a web of guilt [Schuldzusammenhang] in which. Tn-ltS to·t�lity as well.30 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy Particular interests which are common to everyone fall within civil so­ ciety and lie outside the absolutely universal interest of the state proper (see Paragraph 256). 1 9 But the tour de force was necessary because otherwise the dia­ lectical principle would have extended beyond what exists and thereby negated the thesis of absolute identity-and it is only absolute in that it is realized. not merely in the Idea that is its opposite but in the flesh.

and not through the contradiction becoming alleviated in the absolute. its own. through which it is more than its positivity. But in reality this very nonidentity has the form of identity. Hegel's scornful "so much the worse for the facts" is invoked against him so automatically only because it ex­ presses the dead serious truth about the facts. the absolute op­ posite ofjustice. Hegel did not simply reconstruct them in thought. reconciling element. could it disintegrate and perhaps find its way to that reconciliation that must have misled Hegel because its real possibility was still con­ cealed from him. concept and thing. it thereby acknowledges the negativity of its object. the central idealist motor of Hegel's thought. of socially necessary illusion. in that it ultimately disintegrates . a nonidentity it runs up against and laboriously pulls together. It is the subject's critique of a reality that idealism equates with the absolute subject. but rather a judg­ ment on reality. namely consciousness of contradiction within the thing itself. In all its particular moments Hegel's philoso­ phy is intended to be negative. an all-inclusiveness that is not governed by any third. idea and society. in his philosophy. is at the same time anti-idealist. The nonidentity of the antagonistic. contrary to his intentions. This kind of deluded identity is the essence of ideology. it thereby also proves itself true. The principle of reality's becoming. a force with which the latter turns against itself. is the nonidentity of a whole that is not the true but the untrue. In that ultimately the nonidentity of subject and object. and thereby the force of theory. he grasped them and criti­ cized them by producing them in thought: their negativity al­ ways makes them into something other than what they merely are and claim to be. If Hegel's philosophy fails in terms of the highest criterion. it becomes negative as a whole as well. emerges. Only through the pro­ cess whereby the contradiction becomes absolute. that is.31 Aspects o f Hegel's Philosophy righteous positivist science would like to think. un pacifiable. but if.

it owes that reconciliation. the restitution of the speculative metaphysics that had been shattered by Kant's critical philosophy. reflected. criticized moment of the dialectic. even in Hegel the quiescence of movement. Scarcely anywhere does his philosophy have more contemporary relevance than where it dismantles the concept of being. Hegel's theory of being becomes incompatible with the contemporary theologization of being. Hence the locus of Hegel's truth is not outside the system. something it imagines it has overcome through the pathos of being.32 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy in absolute negativity. From this claim one can learn something that existential ontology is currently reluctant to hear­ existential ontology's affinity with transcendental idealism. however. that the most recent resurrection of metaphysics hopes to secure. Heidegger's interpretation of the introduction to the Phenomenology in Holzwege is the most well known if by no means the first testimony to that. the life of the pacified drive that no longer knows either deficiency or the labor to which alone. For this untruth is none other than the untruth of the system of the society that constitutes the sub­ stratum of his philosophy. Hegel denies being the very absoluteness. Even the definition of being at the beginning of the Phenomenology says the precise opposite of what the word . the absolute. it is as inherent in the system as his untruth. In the last analysis. a restitution that restores concepts like that of being and that wants to salvage even the ontological proof of God-all of this has encouraged people to claim Hegel for exis­ tential ontology. But while what now goes under the name of the question of being has a place as a moment in Hegel's system. means simply the reconciled life. the very priority over all thought or concept. rather. The objective turn that idealism took in Hegel. By virtue of its definition of being as an essentially negative. it nevertheless also redeems its promise and truly becomes identical with its ensnared subject matter.

or it is equally only this empty thinking. Hegel's Logic. however. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. the mediation of its self-othering with itself. 2o The distinction between being as subject and the being [Seyn] written with the y that for Hegel was still orthographic but today is archaic. There is nothing to be in­ tuited in it. Hegel's being is the opposite of a primordial entity. develops the categories of thought itself from one another in their objectivity and in doing so begins with the con­ cept of being.. it is being's negativity. Hegel does not credit the concept of being. and neither more or less than nothing. with immediacy. is "indeterminate immediacy. instead. it is only pure intuiting itself. the indeterminate immediate. In contrast to taking subjective consciousness as a point of departure. or is . what is the same. or. or. however. this very immediacy to which existen­ tial ontology clings becomes for Hegel. . the illusion that being is logically and geneti­ cally prior to any reflection. Being." 22 This emptiness. if one can speak here of intuiting. 2 1 and because of its indeterminateness. Being. is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself. serves as the title. "If we enunciate Being as a predicate of the .. he says at the beginning of the section of the Logic for which the word being . . does not found any prima philosophia. as we know. who understood the me­ diatedness of everything unmediated. . is in fact nothing. just as little is anything to be thought in it. any division between subject and object. This beginning. pure and simple.33 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy is intended to suggest today: "Further. an objection to the dignity of being. that motivates the dialectical step that equates being with nothingness: "In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. is the distinction that makes all the difference. is not so much an ontolog­ ical quality of being as a deficiency in the philosophical idea that terminates in being. as a primordial value. he eradicates immediacy. the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject.

he says inwardly only Om. . it is altogether the same as what the Indian calls Brahma. physically motionless and equally unmoved in sensation. in the Encyclopedia. . and so on. as absolute immedi­ acy. This dull. and so for that reason alone is abstract negativity. . the most ab­ stract and stinted. in a certain sense it is the most thinglike concept of all. is left behind . fantasy. But one can see from statements in the Logic di­ rected specifically against Jacobi that Hegel is not engaging in sublime play with ur-words here. or else nothing at all. it is indifferent whether this abstraction is called space. rather. The Absolute is Being. or pure thinking. Om. for all the talk of the concrete. conception. when for years on end. "we get the first definition of the latter.34 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy absolute. He knew something that has currently been falsified and lost." 24 he writes at a somewhat later point in the Logic. that is. pure intuiting. the ultimate legacy of Husserl's "originary intuition.25 I Hegel heard the evocation of being in its manic rigidity as the formulaic clattering of the prayer wheel. the recollection that it is the result of complete abstraction. looking only at the tip of his nose. is-being. nothing. "When being is taken in this simplicity and immediacy. empty consciousness." is currently being celebrated as something removed from all reification." writes Hegel at his most mature. de­ sire. understood as consciousness. Hegel not only saw that it is incapable of being grasped in­ tuitively because of that indeterminateness and emptiness. he also saw that it is a concept that forgets it is a concept and mas­ querades as pure immediacy. the critique of being is in fact intended as a critique of any and every emphatic use of this concept in philosophy: With this wholly abstract purity of continuity. indeterminateness and vacuity of conception. This is (in thought) the absolutely initial definition. Om." 23 The concept of being. lost precisely in the magic of the undefined concrete­ ness that has no substance but its own aura: that philosophy is .

from consciousness. over and over again. which inflates itsdf into a something that exists in and for itself and in so doing sinks down into something utterly with­ out content. into tautology. "Sage.35 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy not permitted to look for its subject matter in the most supreme universal concepts-which are then ashamed of their own uni­ versal conceptual character-for the sake of their presumed eternity and immutability. they are trapped within ide­ alism without being aware of it." now more than ever falls prey to the dialectic: it is ab­ straction. There is nothing that demon­ strates this more strikingly than the speculations of the arch­ idealist Hegel. contemporary philosophies of being have re­ volted against idealism. and located truth in the very specificities with which traditional metaphysics was too refined to dirty its hands. Hegel rejected the equation of philosophi­ cal substance-truth-with the highest abstractions. Since Husserl. namely with respect to an overall conception of Western metaphysics that they hope to get free of later. those who want to restore on­ tology feel themselves largely in agreement with Hegel. being. But they thereby hy­ postatize the supreme result of subjective-conceptual abstrac­ tion. What currently claims to rise above dialectics as an evocation of ur-words. and in fact in Hegel the ex- . Like only the Nietzsche of the Twilight of the Idols after him. which he carries out mag­ nificently in the close linking of stages of consciousness with so­ ciohistorical stages in the Phenomenology of Spirit. As we see already in Heidegger's early work on a work attributed to Duns Scotus. into being that says nothing about being. and thus. To this extent the irrevocable situation of historical consciousness is expressed in them: they register the fact that what is · cannot be developed or deduced from mere subjective immanence. In Hegel idealism transcends itself not least of all in this intention. as . both in terms of their stance on society and in their theoretical approach.

In a pas­ sage cited by Kroner. idealism's intention points beyond itself. and that it presents the truth as it intrinsically and actually is. from all intention. But behind this formal consonance with "the ontological impulse are hidden dif­ ferences whose subtlety makes all the difference in the world. is not the idea of being but the idea of truth. this is the apex of Hegel's philosophy. which in Hegel is actually directed against traditional idealism. indeed. rather." knowing truth is for him nothing less than knowing the absolute: this is the intent of his critique of Kant's critical philosophy with its delimitations and its irrec­ oncilable separation of subjectivity and being-in-itself. "That the form of thought is the perfect form. it is intended to rise substantially above that. The Idea. Nothing is more welcome to su­ perficiality of knowledge and character. Hegel says that Kant's "so-called critical philosophy" has "soothed the conscience of ignorance of the eternal and divine by having proved that nothing can be known of the eternal and divine. whose assiduous concern with whether truth is true enough terminates in the abolition of truth. the delusory sphere of philosophical immanence. from all subjective "facts of consciousness". . . not a predicate of subjective thought. as something "in and for itself." 26 The absoluteness of spirit. in Hegel too. as the aim and result of all intellectual endeavor." 27 This kind of emphatic idea of truth gives the lie to subjectivism. as opposed to any­ thing merely finite. in which this superficial­ ity and shallowness is presented as excellence. To apply an expression of Emil Lask's to something more general. For him truth is not a mere relationship be­ tweenjudgment and objects. which is removed from mere opining. The content of consciousness that develops into truth is . nothing seized upon more readily than this doctrine of ignorance.36 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy tremes of idealism do indeed transcend mere subjectivity. is intended to vouch for the absoluteness of truth. is the general dogma of philosophy. .

Hegel emphasizes this in one formulation after another: "Truth is its own self-movement. is hidden. as Subject. current attempts to break out of subjectivism. .." 28 Perhaps nothing says more about the nature of dialec­ tical thought than that self-consciousness of the subjective mo­ ment in truth. the approach of the subject that produces its concepts nominalistically. it does so because its own principle. the moment of relativity. but equally . If the idealist dialectic turns against idealism. whether that subject be a transcendental one or not. attain­ able for him. is truth itself. are allied to a defamation of the subject. and is not grasped as a positive moment of the abso­ lute. in contrast. The idea of the objectivity of truth strengthens the subject's reason: it is to be possible. is surpassed in that it becomes aware of itself. "reason is. In Hegel's idea of truth. however. 3o But because the material that every individual . ." 29 This movement is elicited by the subject in the activity of thinking: "In my view . misunderstood when reflection is excluded from the True. however. The dialectic is a process in terms of the immanence of truth as much as in terms of the activity of consciousness: process. is to effect a reconciliation with the injustice that the operating subjectivity does to imma­ nent truth in merely supposing and positing as true something that is never wholly true. The idea is con­ tained in what is true. As an idea of reason. the subjective moment. reflection on reflection. everything turns on grasp­ ing and expressing the True. For Hegel truth in itself is not "being". it is precisely in being that abstraction. Hegel's Idea is distinguished from the resto­ ration of the absolute concept of being by being mediated within itself.37 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy not truth merely for the knowing subject. that is. is at the same time anti-ideal­ ist. whereas the method just described is the mode of cognition that remains external to its material. although it is not identical with it. because the very overextension of its idealist claim. therefore. not only as Substance.

Out of this distinguishing. Against this view it must be maintained that truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made. is itself still directly present in the True as such. Nor is there such a thing as the false. one here and one there. as in the traditional definition yet in secret oppo­ sition to it.. "to discard the prejudice that truth must be something tangible. with process. rather.33 Hegel's critique of the rigid separation of the moments of the judgment fuses truth. disparity. each standing fixed and isolated from the other. with its concept. But it is not truth as if the disparity had been thrown away. however. like dross from pure metal. as the negative. and this re­ sultant identity is the truth. the concept of truth is torn loose from predica­ tive logic and transposed into the dialectic as a whole.38 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy judgment is concerned with is confronted with its concept in that judgment and because every individual. . with which it has noth­ ing in common. not even like the tool which remains separate from the finished vessel. the subjective activity of re­ flection leads truth out beyond the traditional concept of the adaptation of the idea to its subject matter: truth can no longer be apprehended as a quality characterizing judgments. To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and its Substance. which is an essential moment [in knowing]. It is nec­ essary. It destroys the illusion that truth could consist in consciousness's measuring itself in terms of some individual thing confronting it: 'True' and 'false' belong among those . the self. . 31 it consists in "the coincidence of the object with itself. no finite judgment ever attains that agreement. of course. determinate notions which are held to be inert and wholly separate essences.34 .. insofar as it is con­ ceived as mere result." 32 Because. any more than there is something evil . . that is. finite judgment disin­ tegrates as untrue in that process. But this very disparity is the process of distinguishing in general. says Hegel. In Hegel truth is called. "agreement of the concept with its actuality". comes their identity.

which is the approach of a consistent nominalism awakened to self-consciousness. only when it negates the subjective adaequatio through self-reflection. something that is not merely "posited" . which customarily stops with the critique of Platonism : philosophical reason too has its cunning. in truth something always prevails that. Truth divests itself of its subjectiv­ ity: because no subjective judgment can be true and yet each and every one must want to be true. a doctrine parroted by the whole of philosophy. an approach that examines any and every concept in terms of its subject matter and in doing so convicts it of its inadequacy.39 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy Hegel breaks here with the doctrine of truth as an adaequatio rei . instead. cannot be reduced to the subject. rather. although it cannot be isolated. an idea that is no longer nominalistically reducible. that truth itself is not a mere qual­ ity ofjudgment. it is aroused in anticipation by the very insistence of intellectual labor. As something that makes the transi­ tion in this way. Only when the demand for truth refuses to honor the nevertheless inescapable claim to truth made in each and every limited and therefore untruejudgment. atque cogitationis. Hegel also al­ ways interprets the movement that is supposed to be truth as "self-movement" [Eigenbewegung] that is motivated as much by the state of affairs with which the judgment is concerned as by the synthesis effected by thought. truth transcends itself and be­ comes something in-itself. does truth make the transition of its own accord into an objective idea. however. Through the dialectic. This idea is not asserted as something ob­ vious and directly present to the intuition. something that traditional idealist epistemologies believe they can neglect as a mere unknown. a claim that at the same time cannot be dispensed with. That the subject may not sim­ ply content itself with the mere adequacy of its judgments to the states of affairs judged derives from the fact that judgment is not a mere sub jective activity. a Platonic idea of truth is adumbrated.

in Kantian terms." truth is also incompatible with what ontology hopes to discover through its inquiries. this Platonism is nevertheless healed of its static quality. Truth as process is a "passage through all moments" as opposed to a "proposition that contains contradictions. as nominalist truth was." and as such it has a temporal core. its mythic heritage. If Hegel's "movement of the concept" restores Platonism in a certain sense. as an unrestrained positivism would have it. nor is it above time in the ontological fashion: for Hegel time becomes a moment of truth itself. Its objectivity celebrates its triumph in a pathos-filled . is the consciousness of the schizo­ phrenic. stood in abso­ lute and unmediated opposition to one another. If. Thought that completely extirpated its mimetic impulse­ the kind of enlightenment that does not carry out the self-reflec­ tion that forms the content of the Hegelian system. but at a moment in the history of spirit when conformity chains spirit in a way that was not the case a hundred years ago. Thought that is absolutely without reference-the complete opposite of the philosophy of identity-thought that removes all participation on the subject's part and all anthropo­ morphism from the object. naming the relationship of the matter at hand to the idea-would end up in madness. Despite everything. and has absorbed into itself all the spontaneity of lib­ erated consciousness.40 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy any more than it is something merely "revealed. Hegel ultimately re­ mains tied to the identity thesis and therefore to idealism. there were no similarity between subject and object. then not only would there be no truth. This liquidates the hypostasis of abstraction and the self-identical concept that dominates traditional philosophy. if the two. Hegel's truth is no longer in time. there would be no reason and no ideas at all. the now cheap critique of idealism that at that time had to be won from the superior power of idealism needs to be reminded that there is a moment of truth in the identity thesis itself.

The speculative Hegelian concept rescues mimesis through spirit's self-reflection: truth is not adaequatio but affin­ ity. Hegel maintains deci­ sively that reason is one. stands opposed to reflec­ tion. and negativity. Even the movement that is to lead out beyond all finite conceptual deter­ minations is a self-critical movement on the part of thought: the speculative concept is neither intuition nor "categorial intui­ tion. If at one time the arrogance of the Hegelian doctrine of absolute spirit was . have tried to list Hegel among the irrationalists on the basis of his critique of finite and limited reflection. Here one could object that in hypostatizing spirit Hegel. But like Kant in the three critiques. in all its weakness. Some people. and there are statements by Hegel that can be adduced to support that argument. that success might be achieved anyway." might not be final.41 Aspects o f Hegel's Philosophy narcissism. limitations. the "limits of the pos­ sibility of experience. and in the decline of idealism reason's mindfulness of its mimetic nature is revealed by Hegel to be its human right. But a judgment that invoked this similarity would itself remain ab­ stract. thought. the Platonic realist and absolute idealist. Kroner included. ratio. resembles truth and is therefore suited for knowledge of truth. Even if abstract thought and abstract being are the same. as an admittedly disputed line from a poem by Parmenides claimed at the beginning of Western philosophy." The rigor of Hegel's attempt to rescue the ontological proof of God in opposition to Kant may be questioned. like unmediated belief. But what im­ pelled him to it was not a desire to eclipse reason but on the contrary the utopian hope that the block. Both categories participate in the dynamic of his­ tory. that it is reason. the ontological concept of being has a different status than the Hegelian con­ cept of reason. such as his statement that speculation. as in the concluding scene of Faust: that spirit. indulged in the same con­ ceptual fetishism that occurs in the name of being today.

succeeds by means of the blind. "In the so-called 'ontological' proof of the existence of God. This concept reveals something about the experiential core of Hegel's thought. and repeatedly functions as spokesperson for what is op­ posed to this subjective reason. when idealism is defamed by every­ one and most of all by the secret idealists. as though it were reason's natural subject matter. irrational passions of historical individuals. Hegel intro­ duced the cunning of reason into the philosophy of history in order to provide a plausible demonstration of the way objective reason. Human beings must appropriate even the powers that are hostile to them. although recently it has been declared inconceivable. of human beings. the realization of freedom. only through the world's domination. as it were. they must insinuate themselves into them. a wholesome correc­ tive becomes apparent in the notion of spirit's absoluteness. in his innermost core Hegel sensed that the nature and destiny of human beings can be realized only through what is estranged. nor does he merely warn that it is no use opposing what cannot be changed. so to speak. Hegel does not simply compel the obe­ dience of one who would rebel against this by making the het­ eronomous and estranged appetizing. it hopes to achieve victory over . we have the same conversion of the absolute concept into existence.42 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy rightly emphasized." 35 If Hegelian reason resists being merely subjective and nega­ tive. is ever ready to support the degradation done to it by the superior force of blind existence. since truth is simply the unity of concept and existence. It passes judgment on the paralyzing resignation in contemporary consciousness. which. Rather. today. even unearthing the rational in the irrational with gusto. This conversion has constituted the depth of the Idea in the modern world. His thought as a whole is cunning. with the result that knowledge of truth has been renounced. out of its own weakness.

He remained unfalteringly faithful to his origins. about which it has no illusions. the courage to be weak that gives the child the idea that it will ultimately overcome even what is most difficult. by turning this superior power against itself until it turns into something different. We know that throughout his life Hegel held to the Swabian dialect. an element of child­ hood. That kind of cunning is not an insubstantial element in the dialectic. whose ana­ logue in the system is the restoration of immediacy at all its lev­ els. in which he was unusually candid. Of course there is a residue of false positiv­ ity in this: Hegel focuses on the circumstances in which he finds himself. perhaps more dialectical than it itself imagined. as it were. But that naivete of the unnaive. even as an ostensible Prussian state philoso­ pher. walks a narrow line. like the person who believes he will reaffirm his value by letting one know. In a conversation with Goethe. a kind of grandiose peasant shrewdness that has learned to submit to the powerful and adapt to their needs until it can wrest their power from them: the dialectic of lordship and bondage lets that secret out. the precondition for a strong ego and any elevation of thought. of course. Hegel defined the dialectic as the organized spirit of contradiction. itself testifies to an ingenious craftiness. Hegel's philosophy. especially in contrast to the stupid. that he is an unimportant man. through gestures or words. as Horkheimer said. In the naivete of the idea that is so close to its object that it is on intimate terms with it. perfidious reproach of artificiality and exaggera­ tion that has been blabbered against every dialectical idea since then. For as little as it is willing to "renounce knowledge of truth.43 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy the superior power of the world." its ten- . and reports about him repeatedly note with amazement the surprising simplicity of the character of this man who was so exceptionally difficult as a writer. the otherwise so grown­ up Hegel preserved. handed down by Eckermann. In this regard too.

human beings' genuine self-determi­ nation. any more than one can remove its sub­ jective origins in the self-preserving reason of the individual. understands it from the point of view of self-consciousness and the self-emancipation of hu­ man beings. that what is real is rational. This alone enabled Hegel to define subjective reason. The real can be considered rational only insofar as the idea of freedom. Hegel de­ fends the positive-that which simply is-that he attacked in his youth. that is. in Hegel reason finds itself constellated with freedom. This much is true even in the other­ wise false doctrine of the idealists that sets up transcendental . shines through it. But to sit in judgment on him even in this regard would be a sign of a servile attitude. was not merely apologetic. a necessary moment in absolute spirit. Rather. self-preservation turns. Hegel's movement of the concept begins. It would like to justify what exists as rational and dispense with the reflection that opposes this. Freedom and reason are nonsense without one an­ other." into a true society. Even if it does not know it. by virtue of its own movement. is always already potentially the reason of the species. The most questionable. Even where. as something uni­ versal as well. the reason of the in­ dividual. in the dialectic of sense certainty.44 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy dency to resignation is undeniable. Anyone who tries to conjure away this legacy of the Enlightenment in Hegel and campaign for the idea that his Logic has nothing to do with a rational ordering of the world falsifies him. with a superior attitude that boasts about how difficult the world is and draws the moral that it cannot be changed. and therefore also the best known of Hegel's teachings. If any­ where. even in Kant's philosophy of history. One cannot remove the objective concept of reason from absolute idealism. with which. which understands what merely ex­ ists as more than merely existing. in his later period. it is here that Hegel was bourgeois. into "humanity. into objeCtivity. he appeals to reason.

the individual and society. The universal is always also the particular and the particular the universal.. Hegel sees through the moment of illusion in individuation as well as his antipode Schopenhauer does-the obstinacy of dwelling on what one merely is oneself. this expresses more than a complicity with the course of the world. as opposed to the frailty and weak­ ness of the individual. if one will. The categories of the partic­ ular and the general. The Janus character of Hegel's philosophy becom�s particularly obvious in the category of the individual. it actually understands the world as a whole as the product of labor-as commodity. ments actually are--can be discerned only in historical concre­ tion. the substantial. nor can the process that takes place between them be interpreted as a process between two poles that retain their individual identities: the contributions of the two moments-indeed. By analyzing this relationship. what those mo. at the same time Hegel gives an extremely sharp critique of subjectivity. the dialectic gives an account of the social force field in which everything individual is socially pre­ formed from the outset and at the same time nothing is realized except in and through individuals.45 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy consciousness. one that goes far beyond Fichte's distinction between the subject and . the narrowness and particularity of individual interests. While Hegel's philosophy draws the full consequences from bourgeois subjectivism. and ultimately the institutional are most strongly accentuated. which is an abstraction from individual con­ sciousness. Never­ theless Hegel did not dispossess objectivity or essence of their relationship to the individual and the immediate. as substantial and immanent despite its genetic and logical dependence on individual consciousness. more than the cheap consolation for the fragility of existence that reminds it that it simply is fragile. that is. cannot be put to rest any more than can those of subject and object. If nevertheless in the construction of Hegelian philosophy the universal.

virtually omnipotent. of becoming a rational reality. only if it indicates the pivotal point from which one can dislodge the age-old burden of myth. He thereby embodies. subjected to the dialectic.46 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy the individual. as unrestrained producer. the not-I. Because freedom would be the freedom of real. thus serving to delimit the subject. he makes this antinomy more intelligible than ever before and criticizes it even as he defends it. But this reflects the ambiguity of civil society. concretely. behaves as though he were already free and universal. which in the last analysis entrenches itself in the . Hegel ex­ plicitly and implicitly orders human beings. In unresolved opposition to the pathos of humanism. Whereas Heine. which truly attained self-consciousness in Hegel. so to speak. But by formulating it ruthlessly. is developed. For this reason. however. To civil society. in the process. is also con­ sidered completely impotent and insignificant at the same time. the anti­ nomy of the universal and the particular in bourgeois society. as those who per­ form socially necessary labor. the particular individual. heir of the divine legislator. in the midst of universal unfreedom. who in this society is truly a mere agent of the social process of production and whose own needs are merely ground down. to subject themselves to an alien necessity. at nu­ merous levels of the system. surely not the least judicious of Hegel's listeners. In Hegel. when it comes to individuality. Hegel disdains the illusion of freedom. particular individuals. the human being. Hegel's confidence that the­ oretical reason can still achieve its goals amounts to the knowl­ edge that reason has a hope of realizing itself. the individ­ ual who. in theoretical form. which in Fichte was abstractly posited. even with contempt. and hence not only in general terms but in its full specific content. appears to be autonomous. individuality itself finds itself dealt with roughly. could understand Hegel's teachings primarily as a validation of individuality. The burden is mere existence.

with specific inclina­ tions. that it continues.47 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy individual. a self-deception. But the purely moral action in which the individual thinks he is himself and only himself. formulations like the one in the Phenomenology about the "hard heart" that insists on the purity of the moral commandment still fall within the con­ text of the post-Kantian Schillerian critique of rigorous Kantian ethics.36 Hegel knew early on that the individual himself is both something socially functioning. and also something that exists for itself. by his labor. and that these two moments point in different directions. namely. thereby becomes ambiguous. its pivot point is reason. on into the individual and divides him in accordance with the objective and subjective rationality of his will and his deeds. something defined by the matter at hand. acting autono­ mously. in the Phenomenology. the idea that the rift between self and world passes in turn through the self. Historically. Hegel derived the transition from pure moral self-consciousness to hypocrisy-which then became the focus of Nietzsche's critical attack on philosophy-from its moment of objective untruth. It is a moment in his critique of the category of individuality as such. as the reason of existence itself." Hegel's state­ ment that there is nothing morally real is not a mere moment in . but at the same time they represent a prelude to Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment. of course. He was probably the first to express. as Kroner says. interests. of morality as "revenge. How little Hegel's philosophy can be reduced to bourgeois civility is perhaps most ObVIOUS in his stance on morality. Modern analytical psychology's recognition that what the individual hu­ man being thinks about himself is illusory and to a large extent mere "rationalization" has provided a home for one piece of He­ gelian speculation. to avoid remaining impotent. and talents. Hegel's apologetics and his resignation are the bourgeois mask that utopia has put on to avoid being immediately recog­ nized and apprehended.

In it the recognition that the moral can by no means be taken for granted. that conscience does not guarantee right action. and has therefore only an arbitrary basis. that happiness simply as such should not have been the lot of some individuals. but instead links it through its own content to the production of a true totality-to precisely what appears under the name of humanity in the Critique of Practical Reason. from the objectivity of society. as something that although unconditionally binding is valid only for the subject. He does not oppose the good to empirical life as an abstract princi­ ple. His critique of morality cannot be reconciled with that apology for . The reason. which is os­ tensibly merely empirical. which grants and wishes them. The bourgeois glorification of what exists is always accompanied by the delu­ sion that the individual-that which exists purely for itself. The incisiveness of his formulation takes us by surprise: The designation of an individual as immoral necessarily falls away when morality in general is imperfect. and that pure immersion of the self in the question of what to do and what not to do entangles one in contradiction and futility. why so­ called good luck should fall to the lot of others. a self-sufficient idea. the sense and content of the judgement of experience is solely this. Therefore. which is how the subject necessarily appears to himself in the existing order-is capable of the good. This is one of the most remarkable perspectives provided by Hegel's mediation of the a priori and the a posteriori. Hegel thereby transcends the bourgeois separation of ethos. however. too.37 No mere bourgeois would have talked this way. is good friendship.48 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy the transition to his notion of concrete ethical life [Sittlichkeit]. i.e. and itself. Hegel takes an impulse of the radical Enlightenment farther. Hegel destroyed this illusion. this lucky chance. the judgment is an expression of envy which covers itself with the cloak of morality.

who dismiss Hegel as a person as conformist and insignificant and derive their negative verdict on his philosophy not least from that. one will no longer succumb to the suggestion made by Schopenhauer and then Kierkegaard. he was not an existential thinker in the sense that was inaugu­ rated by Kierkegaard and has now degenerated to a self-satisfied cliche. full of suffering. uncon­ cerned. which needs a moral ideology of the individual and his renunciation of happiness to sustain itself in its own injustice. man the philosopher and his authenticity. But rather. Once one has seen through the cliche of Hegel's bourgeois civility. In fact. To Hegel's credit. had begun to give it­ self airs and then become established in academia as well.49 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy society. an idea's claim to truth does not lie in its adequacy as an illustration of the thinker. in a foolish debate. in that in which the individual human being divests himself of himself so that he may finally reach his goal. on the sufferings of mankind. The fact that the most recent-and already threadbare­ version of the cult of personality does not fit him does not de­ grade Hegel to the comfortable professor lecturing. the picture with which Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer so successfully defamed him to posterity. Schopenhauer showed infinitely less humanity and generosity to Hegel than the older man had shown him. Hegel granted Schopenhauer his Habilitation despite the fact that Schopenhauer. this claim is proven in that which goes beyond entangle­ ment in mere existence. had arrogantly played him� self off against Hegel as a high-principled researcher who was expert in the natural sciences. Hegel's critique had gone beyond the notion of existence that opposed him long before existence. Just as the empirical person who thinks lags behind the power and ob­ jectivity of the idea he thinks whenever the idea is an idea. in the paltry repetition of what he is anyway. his countenance rav- . Hegel's demeanor.

The wealth of experience on which thought feeds in Hegel is incomparable. in artists: sublimation. it is put into the ideas themselves. Hegel was in fact granted something praised. Hegel is almost without peer in following this path. just as mere ma­ terial is transformed through the path thought travels: one could show this in every sentence of the Phenomenology of Spirit. to think the unconditioned-an impossibility that Hegel's philosophy reflects within itself as the epitome of nega­ tivity. risk. bear witness to this self­ divestiture. a critique he shares with Goethe and which moves out beyond ide- . the abstract idea is transformed back into something living. that moment achieves legitimacy not in showing off but in shattering that self-positing through the discipline imposed on it by the thing itself and extinguishing itself within it. Through what is experienced. Hegel's bourgeois unpretentiousness worked to the benefit of his immeasurable efforts. In the face of that.50 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy aged by thought. Hegel's conception of self-divestiture. he truly possessed life in its colored reflection. it becomes a lie. never appear­ ing as mere "material. like the critique of a "vain" and deluded subjectivity existing for itself. if there can be no insight into the objectivity of the matter at hand without the element cur­ rently dealt with under the trademark of the existential. usually without justifica­ tion. in its recapitulation in spirit." to say nothing of example or evidence external to the ideas. and the boundary situation is a modest one. inscribed with their own im­ possibility. the face of one who has literally consumed himself until he is no more than ashes. the appeal to authenticity. If there is truly a need for the thinking subject in philosophy. But under no circum­ stances should one conceive sublimation in Hegel as equivalent to internalization. Hegel's hatred of those who ascribed the right of full truth to the immediacy of their experience is directed to this lie as well. But as soon as the existential moment asserts itself to be the basis of truth.

Like the subject of his theories. the thought in them was given a poeticized form: "Trachte ich denn nach Gluck? Ich trachte nach meinem Werke" [Do I covet happiness? I covet my work]. His bride. is making me even now.lrmurs and rustles. As sublimated spirit. Kierkegaard. took it amiss when he added these words to a letter she had written to his sister: "From this you can see how happy I can be with her for all the rest of my life. Even the marks of its failure were struck by truth itself. insofar as happiness is part of the des­ tiny of my life. and how happy the attainment of such love. . Later. for which I scarcely had any hope left in this world. and as a person Hegel shows hardly a trace of it. the man Hegel had absorbed both subject and object into himself in spirit. one could speak of an "in­ tellectual body" in him. the life of his spirit is all of life again within itself. But the almost tradesmanlike dryness and sobriety to which the most extreme pathos shrivels in Hegel gives the idea a dignity it loses when it provides its pathos with a fanfare. Hegel the person resounds with the outward and the physical the way great music does: Hegel's philosophy ml.51 Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy alism. none held so unswervingly to the expe­ rience to which it had entrusted itself without reservation." 38 The whole antiprivate Hegel is in these private words. in Zarathustra. the Baroness Maria von Tucher. Hence Hegel's withdrawal from life should not be confused with the ideology of scholarly renunciation. is the opposite of internalization. The meaning of He­ gel's life is tied to the substance of his philosophy. No philosophy was so profoundly rich. As with his devoted critic.

.

the concept of experience will be left unde­ flr �fined: only the presentation can concretize it. but is the truth of what is true. like the interpretation of Hegel in Heidegger's Holzwege. In Hegel being and . instead. l Accord­ ing to Hegel himself.. for He­ gel what experience is concerned with at any particular moment is the animating contradiction of such absolute truth: Nothing)] . trcan be known "that is not in experience 3-including. the Being of beings. or any particular being. nor. the Being into which existential ontology displaces the ground of what exists and is experienced. Initially.The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy I will be dealing here with some models of intellectual experi­ ence as it motivates Hegel's philosophy-motivates it objectively. not biographically or psychologically-and makes up its truth content. The concept is not intended to capture phenomenological "ur-experience". the appearance of appearance."2 Hegel would never have called that experience. the "Wort des Seins" [word of Being] or the "Sein des Seienden" [Being ofbeings]. His thought would never have ratified Heidegger's claim that "the new object that arises _ for consciousness in the course of its formation" is "not just any­ thing that is true. accord­ �hgly. is it in­ tended to get at something ontological. nothing of this sort is meant to be ex­ tracted from his train of thought.

something that has presubjectively "been appropriated as event" [ereignet] or "been elucidated" [gelichtet].4 Nor. I will try to translate into something as close to contemporary experience as possible what Hegel essentially understood. calls the "attitude of thought to objectivity"-the attitude of his own thought. not experiential content in Hegel's philoso­ phy. however. which had been static since Plato and Aristotle-or with those aspects of his work that have been absorbed into the individual scholarly disciplines . the compel­ 'ling force of the objective phenomena that have been reflected in his philosophy and are sedimented in it. what he saw about the world. in the intro­ duction to his System of Philosophy. What I am interested in is not how Hegel subjectively arrived at this or that doctrine but rather. prior to the traditional categories of philosophy. even the Hegelian categories. Nor will I be con­ cerned with what has been canonized as Hegel's historical achievement-his conception of the notion of development and its linking with metaphysics.54 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy ground are "determinations of reflection" [Reflexionsbestimmun­ gen] . What I have in mind is closer to what Hegel. I will not go into the controversy within intellectual history about the relative priority of theological and sociopolitical motifs in Hegel's biography. in the Hegelian spirit. My theme is the experiential substance of Hegel's philosophy.. categories inseparable from the subject. My inquiry is concerned with what his philosophy expresses as philosophy. The supposition that experience is a mode of being. and their critique. and . is simply incompatible with Hegel's con­ ception of experience as a "dialectical movement which con­ sciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object" inasmuch as the "new true object issues from it. as in Kant. does the concept of experience refer to isolated empirical observations that would be processed synthetically in Hegel's philosophy..

as aestheticist or psychologist views of the history of philos­ ophy like to portray it. become absolute spirit. In general.55 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy this has its substance not least of all in the fact that it is not ex­ hausted by the findings of individual disciplines. The less human immediacy is tolerated by the omnipresent mediating mecha­ nisms of exchange. This paradox must be endured and not concealed under a cry . or has at least become a mere cultural commodity. The tradition of at least the post-Kantian German Idealism that found its most compelling form in Hegel has faded. the more fervently a compliant philosophy asserts that it possesses the basis of things in the immediate. This kind of spirit has triumphed over speculation both in the positiv­ istic sciences and in their opponents. through the compulsion of critical reflection and out of necessity in the development of a society that has less and less fulfilled Hegel's prognosis that it would . is subject to the paradox that it has been rendered obsolete by science and scholarship while being at the same time more timely than ever in its opposition to them. Hegel's approach stands in oblique relationship to the program of unmediated accep­ tance of the so-called given as a firm basis of knowledge. and all dialectical thought. that it would be rational. both out of com­ pulsion and out of necessity. and for the most part its terminology seems far removed from us. It seems timely to appeal to this. Since Hegel's day that program has come almost to be taken for granted. It is not that there has been an arbitrary change in styles of thought or philosophical fash­ ions. Even ideas that· were at one time firmly established have a history of their truth and ·not a mere afterlife. and by no means merely in positivism but also in authentic op­ ponents of positivism like Bergson and Husserl. At the present time Hegelian philoso­ phy. idealism has been forgotten. they do not remain inherently indiffer­ ent to what befalls them. Instead.

Instead. cited by Heidegger as well. Whether we have only an academic renaissance of Hegel that it is itself long outdated or whether contemporary consciousness finds in Hegel a truth content whose time is due depends on whether that paradox is endured or not. " or an effort to divide the sheep from the goats within Hegel's philosophy. If one wishes to avoid halfheartedly preserving what people praise as Hegel's sense of reality while at the same time watering down his philosophy. The system is not to be con­ ceived in advance. which should be identical with its spirit. one has no choice but to put the very moments in him that cause consternation into relation to the experiences his philosophy incorporates. In a passage from the introduction to the Phenomenology. For He­ gelian philosophy claims to have gone beyond the opposition between rationalism and empiricism. abstractly. it is not to be an all-encompassing schema.56 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy of "back to . To do so is not to betray Hegel to empiricism but rather to keep faith with his own philosophy. . One is only taking his philosophy at its word when one virtually disregards its place in the history of philosophy and reduces it to its experiential core. but Hegel's own intention once again covers the objection. with the desideratum of im­ manent criticism. Hegel himself identifies experience with the dialectic. even if those experiences are en­ coded within it and their truth is concealed. when the system is supposed to be deci­ sive for all the individual elements in it. . it is supposed to be the effective center of force latent in the individual moments. as beyond all rigid opposi­ tions in the philosophical tradition: it claims both to capture spirit interpretively in its experiences of the world and to construct experience through the movement of spirit. which is a central piece in his method.5 One may object that it is primarily individual categories and ideas that have been selected and the fully elaborated system is not given im­ mediate consideration. They are supposed to crystal- .

there is nothing between heaven and earth that is not "vennittelt" [mediated]. immediately given. The concept. in order to do away with the Kantian separation of form and content. however.c:e�_�:�yl�Cl���_t."7 If Kantian philosophy. Ht!gt:!l'� philos­ ophy.gh its sublation of mediation. In schools of philosophy that make emphatic use of the concept of experience. tries to tease out the forms of the spirit as constituents of all valid knowledge. into a whole that does not exist outside of its particular deter­ minations. Perhaps the reduction will prove fatal to the claim of identity. interprets any and every existing thing as some­ thing that is at the same time spiritual. nothing. presupposes.t�edi<l:��d is often held to be superior. challenges this concept of immedia�Y2� with nd it the customary�g!l:cept o� exp��ien. therefore. has both aspects: it is mediation thm!!. then Hegel. as it were. in the tradition of Hume. something that exists. which Hegel. the reflection of its mere existence. merely by being defined as." A simple illustration of this is that . free. that does not contain. on their own and by virtue of their motion and direction. Not the least significant of Hegel's epistemological findings is the idea that even the ele­ ments in which knowledge imagines itself to possess its ultimate and irreducible basis are in turn always the products of abstrac­ tion and thereby of "spirit. There is no guarantee. however."6 Ac­ cording to Hegel. for all his polemics. of course. Experience is supposed to be something immediately present.57 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy lize. and so is immediacy. the character of im­ mediacy-immediacy in relation to the subject-is itself the cri­ terion of that concept. of any admixture of thought and therefore indubitable. a spiritual moment: "Imme­ diacy itself is essentially mediated. The difficulty specific to beginning should not be minimized. that reduction to experiences will confirm the identity of opposites within the whole that is both a presupposition and a result of the Hegelian method. the mediated being thought of as de­ pendent.

58 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy the so-called sense impressions to which the older epistemology reduces all knowledge are themselves mere constructions and do not appear as such in pure form in living consciousness. Now because it does this. that except in the artificial conditions of the laboratory. which fall within the Gestalt concept that is accepted from the outset. for it really sets to work to find the species. so for Gestalt theory its unity with form is unmediated. It is characteristic of his method that he eval­ uated immediacy by its own criterion and charged it with not . . etc. no red at all is perceived from which the so-called higher syntheses would then be composed. That form and givenness. unqualified sensory "this thing here". between which classical epistemology made a sharp distinction. and thus the sensory and the categorial moments cannot be clearly distinguished from one another as "layers. But Gestalt theory did not upset the primacy of the given. feel­ ing. the belief in its precedence over the contribution made by subjectivity. in distinctions like that between the good and the bad Gestalt. and thereby harmonize knowledge: just as for positivism the given was unmediated.. to discover laws. . it is always already structured. a kind of thing in itself amid the immanence of consciiJusness. are not fully equivalent is only peripherally acknowl­ edged by Gestalt theory. it comes within the territory of the concept . hearing. estranged from living knowledge. Hegel had already gone far beyond this in the Phenomenology of Spirit." "Empiricism is not merely an observing. Those al­ legedly elementary qualities of immediacy always appear already categorically formed. the universal. "8 Hegel's antipositivist insight has been redeemed by modern sci­ ence only to the extent that Gestalt theory has shown that there is no such thing as an isolated. a perception of the individual. He demolished the thesis of mere immediacy as the basis of knowledge and opposed the em­ piricist concept of experience without glorifying the given as the bearer of meaning.

": But Hegel does not simply sacrifice the concept of immediacy. "Immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation. It is most difficult to get hold of the experiential content of Hegel's philosophy where it sets itself off from philosophies that take experi�nce as their principle. Hegel energeti­ cally accentliates the moment of not-I in spirit."I l But with this. that the two things are linked together. He criticizes immediacy in principle and not merely as being atomistic and mechanical. the intention of deriving Hegel's philosophy from experience seems itself condemned by the verdict it pronounces when it takes Kant's critical philosophy to the extreme. They produce and reproduce one another reciprocally. one can find something immediate that is not mediated. his own idea of experience would lose its rational meaning.-immediate knowledge being actually the product and result of mediated knowledge. that we must find the fact united and combined with the certainty of our own selves. immediacy always al­ ready contains something other than itself-subjectivity-with­ out which it would not be "given" at all. The only "experience" of which it can be a question in and with respect to Hegel alters the usual concept of experience decisively. or. and by that token it is already not objectivity. reconciled. con­ versely. in point of fact. But in Hegel the two moments are no longer rigidly contrasted. in order to accept and believe any fact. only in the unity of the whole. in more exact terms. · are formed anew at each stage. if he did. But to dispute . 'This principle of Experience carries with it the unspeakably important condition that. there is a knowledge which advances neither by unmixed im­ mediacy nor by unmixed mediation. we can point to the ex­ ample of Logic and the whole of philosophy. As we know.. and are to vanish.59 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy being immediate. we must be in contact with it."lo One can no more speak of mediation without something immediate than. "And to show that.

it may even have worked against a concern for inCisive for­ mulation . idealism was less something strictly individuated than a collective movement: in Hegel's terminology . They would have to reduce his statement that truth is essentially subject12 to an irrelevant statement that in the last analysis would leave no dif erentia specifica in Hegel's system. These writers do not operate with fixed concepts in the manner of a later philosophy modeled on the science the idealist generation opposed. Instead . The ideas were neither attached exclusively to one system or the other nor always fully articulated by the individual thinker. and especially with Fichte and Schelling. "rhyme or I'll eat you". the content of the collective understanding by producing it explicitly. The climate of collective agreement permitted one to express one's opinion even when the individual formulation did not achieve complete lucid­ ity. to clear up a number of difficulties. Even after the split between Schelling and Hegel one finds in both of them-in the Ages of the Wodd in Schelling's case . incidentally . "come out right or there will be trouble"] when they see a chance to exploit the authority of a great name for propaganda purposes. But that is something he shares with the movement of the post-Kantian systems in Germany as a whole . that period continues to be forced too narrowly into the per­ spective of individual thinkers and their differences. one ought to look f for the experiential content of Hegelian idealism itself. In actual­ ity . in other words . as though such formulation would violate. By no .60 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy that he is an idealist must remain the prerogative of interpretive arts that follow the maxim "Reim dich odeI' ich fress dich" [lit­ erally . Perhaps under the tenacious suggestion of Dilthey . in the Phenomenology in Hegel's-formulations and whole trains of thought in which it is just as difficult to identify the author as it was in the writings of their youth. in the decades from Fichte's Science of Knowledge to Hegel's death . That ought. an intellectual at­ mosphere.

an organization of cognitions. in the identity of concept and being. Hence single concepts by themselves and singular cognitions (Erlwnntnisse) must not be called knowledge. i. reflection's work passes away. nor has speculation recognized the absolute identity in them." which ultimately made it suspect of hubris. how­ ever deluded. Hegel's total idealism has its timeliness: against something else. . There is therefore no truth in isolated reflection. relative identity. Within this organization. Precisely for this reason. As known from experience they exhibit their justification in experience. a whole of knowledge. Through this connection with the Absolute. There can be plenty of singular empirical known items (Kenntnisse). for its standing is its connection with the Absolute. draws its strength from a resistance to dead . however. The pathos in the word "spirit. and is only through the others. As a part that has other parts outside of it. it is something limited. their connection with the Absolute.e. meaning and significance it has solely through its coher­ ence with the whole. 13 As a critique of the institutionalized science that is as dominant now as it was then. They do not justify themselves as necessary parts of a totality of cognitions organized in consciousness. Isolated in its limitation the part is defective. in pure thinking. the Dif erenzschri t: f f Only so far as reflection has connection with the Absolute is it Reason and its deed a knowing. and it is the sole reality of the cognition. The impulse to elevate spirit. they are not scientific knowledge: they find their justification only in a limited.61 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy means does the experiential content of idealism simply coincide with its epistemological and metaphysical positions. not in itself. it becomes thereby an objective totality. That impulse can be sensed even in passages like this one from the Dif erence Between Fichte's and f Schelling's System of Philosophy.. of subject and object. save the truth of its nullification. resisted the first symptoms of the type of science-which in­ cludes scholarship-that has since seized power even where it supposedly deals with spirit. But because in philosophizing the Absolute gets produced by reflection for consciousness. every part is at the same time the whole. only the connection persists. that is.

In this regard even seemingly peripheral. practical texts like Fichte's Deduzierte Plan and Schell­ ing's Einleitung ins Akademische Studium have philosophical im­ port." which flowed so easily from all their pens as it had not from Kant's. In the early Idealist period.�s!J�. . Goethe's "fehlt nur das geistige . Only when the likes of that Wagner had inherited idealism did it reveal itself to be the particularity that Hegel had recog­ nized.�9wl�dge in accor­ dance with the divisio. idealism attacked Faust's famulus Wag­ ner. The experience of post-K�ntian _Q_�r!!!�n Icl('!�lism reacts against philistine narro� Ees� <lnd contentrn�I1t with the compartmentalization of life and or�iz. At one time. In the theoretical sphere. The watchword "infinity. totality becomes radical evil. In a total society.rLQJJ�lbor. takes on its specific colora­ tion only in relation to what were for them the privations of the finite. at least in Fichte. that the best of both knowledge and human potential slipped through the meshes of the division of labor. talk about wholeness has been divested of its polemical meaning and has become nothing more than anti-intellectualist ideology. of entrenched self-interest and the dreary specialization of knowledge in which that self-interest was reflected.62 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy knowledge: a resistance to the reified consciousness that Hegel both dissolved and.Band" ["But the spiritual bond is missing"-Faust] gives that sententious for­ mulation. idealism represented the insight that the sum total of specific knowledge was not a whole. in opposition to romanticism. salvaged as inescapable. the critique of the particular had a different kind of dignity. when bourgeois society had not yet really taken shape as a totality in underdeveloped Germany. Since then. What resonates in Hegel along with the need for a progres­ sive integration is the need for a reconciliation-a reconciliation the totality has prevented ever since it achieved the reality Hegel enthusiastically anticipated for it in the concept.

but it is not refutable."14 Taking as one's point of departure the pure immediacy of the "this thing here. the JQgj.. Experience's advance to co.k!!l�kwh() considers himself th�kgjtimate basis of truth �y virtue of what is sUEposed to be immediateluiven for him. which was analyzed by traditional epistemology. 9J)�y_s_t:h. A mode of J:J!i!1l<�I!K�llat understands the individual as zoon J!. always also social in nature. but from something else.ily thinks of itself as individualistic. is. Not only does the bearer of personal consciousness owe his existence and the reproduc­ tion of his life to society. everything through which he is §. hence. as the school of .olitikon aI). What the individual holds to be primary and irrefutably absolute is derived and secondary. longer cling to a notion of experience that hY.postatizes th�jn­ dividual.d. "Therefore the indi­ vidual as he appears in thIs world of prose and everyday is not active out of the entirety of his own self and his resources. what has immediate certainty for him. a society that falsely but neces§. solipsism may be curable.p-ecifi<:ally constituted as a cognitive subject. even if involuntarily. down to every individual piece of sensory data.� \V.63 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy One does not need the speculative concept to understand this motif in the critique of science: that what lies closest to the indi­ vidual subject. The !ndiv.iQ� of. In fact. does not get one beyond the contingency of the individual person who simply exists. . that is." which is presumably what is most certain.(�!:U)fc!!=llls.lhe cat�g()ries of �ective consciousness as illl:plicitly social will no �l!. This is the price in insanity paid for that web of delusion.n­ sciousness of its interdependence with the experience of all hllm<ln .L!:lDiversality that governs his thinking.?s.fq. is not the ground of truth and not absolutely certain. does not get beyond solipsism. can be seen to be illusion.Iturkheim in particular has shown. and he is intelligible not from himself. As Schopen­ hauer said. The personal con­ sciousness of the individual.

by a new expressive need. 16 Like Schopenhauer.. immediately before US. His critique of immediacy gives an account of how what naive con­ sciousness trusts as immediate and most intimate is. to become an echo of the hour that has struck for it. Having matured. He­ gel would like to rend the veil: hence his polemic against Kant's doctrine of the unknowability of the thing in itself.64 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy beings acts as a retroactive correction to its startinS"-p-oint in mere individual exp-erience. and Hegel in particular. With Kant. objectively. the emphatic incorporation of the concrete subject and the historical world. his antipode. and the first is poorer in determinations. theoretical philosophy at least still drew its canon from the positive sciences with its examina- . from the Enlightenment. the more concrete and richer comes later. The layer of thought touched on here is distinguished from Kant and the whole eighteenth century. This difference is more important even than Enlightenment's self-critique. more than what the official history of philosophy has designated as the difference. even though his philosophy itself is unaware of it. or the dynamization of philosophical activity. Hegel destroys the very mythology of something "first" : "That which first commences is implicit. 17 This is cer­ tainly one of the deepest motives of Hegel's philosophy. " 1 5 Seen i n terms of this kind of demythologization. Hegelian phi­ losophy becomes the figure of a comprehensive commitment to a lack of naivete . no more immediate and primary than any other kind of posses­ sion. immediate. general-it is what has not yet advanced . thought wants to do something it had previously done only uncon­ sciously : it wants to write the history of spirit. an early answer to a state of the world that incessantly participates in weaving its own veil of illusion. It is this. thinking is always the negation of what we have . "As a matter of fact. as is indeed already the case in Fichte. that distinguishes German Idealism. abstract. Hegel's philosophy formulated this.

���e -eplsit:riiology��£s Q ini _thit-th�-fol § ." mological possibilities. dug the trench between matter and form. rather than restrict himself to a propaedeutic.!liQ. This. episte� h� :!ri mology-considers to onstitute knowledge depend as much on -c 0fi�ni:_9Lkn�l�dge -as vIce-v(frsa�" Th��'e.!hat. unreflected thinking. that is. to the task of giving cogent expression to something that is perceived as central in reality but slips through the meshes of the individual disci{."18 In order to demonstrate that. the modern climate of Heg�l as contrasted with Kant and now Fichte as well. If epistemology. ------. Matter and form generate each other reciprocally.es.65 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy tion of their validity. heC' . when thought lost the inordinate span of its self-reflection. is what motivates philosophy's turn to content. he led philQsQPl1y_ to essenti<t. examination of episte. Hegel went beyond the limits of a science that merely ascertained and arranged data. Hegel himself makes use of a more consistent episte­ mology. It at­ tacks n. Now philosophy turns. the question of how scientific knowl­ edge is possible. either in the form of naive-realistic thought or in the form of what is popularly called unbridled speculation.l insights t�2:��gh critical self-reflection of critical-Enlightenment philos­ ophy and the scientific rneth()�L Trained in science and using its meth�d�. with its whole armature of self-reflection on the theory of science.i� n� f�rm at all t without matter and no matter without form. a science that aimed at the pro­ cessing of materials. however. Hegel's philosophy is both a philosophy of reason and an antipositivist philo�()phy. the kind of science that predominated be­ fore Hegel and then again after him. Instead. and not a greater abundance of material. Hegel extends epistemol­ ogy until it becomes obvious that it is not its place to dig trenches. the doctrine of the contingency and impenetrability of content and the indispensability of forms.. But Hegel did not make philosophy into a consistent intellectual treatment of ex­ periences of reality through spontaneous.

such as epistemology sets forth. however. philosophy must break epis­ temology open. They would in fact be forms. This means. however. they would hav<:! _Ilo content. how form and content meet and p. tautolo­ gies in which knowledge does not add anything new or different to itself. if they are gen­ uine knowledge and not mere reduplications of the subject. the separation of the a priori from the empirical world. Canonic for Hegel is Goethe's statement that every­ thing perfect points beyond its own kind-and Hegel has far more in common with Goethe than one might suspect from the superficial difference between the doctrine of the ur-phenome­ non and that of a self-moving absolute. they are synthetic. then they need the content that Kant wanted to banish from their sphere as contingent and merely empirical. If. that is.66 Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy that in setting limits. But there is a deep. that a merely formal theory of knowledge. one that tries to formulate experiences in their necessity and co­ gency. becomes an enigma. how the knowledge whose validity Kant wanted to justify is achieved. Kant "anchored" philosophy in synthetic a priori judgments.t together. consciousness necessarily transcends what it delimits. pure logical propositions. Given this radical discontinuity. is brought about precisely by the self-reflection of a for­ mal philosophizing that had rejected it and prohibited it as dogmatic. is abolished: "The em- . a separation that had been maintained in the whole Platonic-Aristotelian tradition through Kant and was first questioned by Fichte. If they were a priori in the strict Kantian sense.contradiction running through synthetic a priori judgments. Hence a philosophizing focused on content. Hegel's response is that form and content are essentially mediated by one another. they epitomized. it is not possible. In order to attain the cogency epistemology yearns for. what was left of the old metaphys­ ics after the critique of reason. so to speak. With this transition to content. negates itself.

and ontological schools. But he brought infinitely more concreteness into his philosophical ideas than those ap­ proaches. must come to understand that "its content is no other than actuality. He­ gel asserts. . Because of his idealism. and not because his speculative imagination was bal­ anced by a sense of reality and historical perspective but by virtue of the approach his philosophy takes-by virtue. The dog­ matism of metaphysics. is the source of all that unbelief. the preconception that it is pos­ sible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason.67 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy 'k . At first we become aware of these contents in what we call Experience.. that is. of the experiential character of his speculation. "The sealed essence of the universe has no power that . Philosophy. Hegel has been reproached for being abstract in comparison with the concreteness of the phenomenological. 21 Hegel's antithesis to this reads.-*it. dogmatic. which wars against morality. Hegel sensed the regressive and tyrannical moment in Kant's modesty and op­ posed the famous saying with which Kant's Enlightenment en­ deared itself to obscurantism: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge. no matter how much that metaphysics mistakenly considers itself to be more advanced than his idealism . The artificially resurrected metaphysics of today. pIncaI. regresses behind Hegel when it comes to what is crucial. IS the specuIatlVe conceRt. in order to make room for faith. always very . to renounce the hope of coming to know that whole of reality and its contents to which the institution of science and scholarship bars access in the name of valid. grasped III Its syntheSIs."2o Philosophy refuses to be intimidated. an­ thropological. which castigates that as a descent into mere facticity and claims to protect the being of beings from beings. water-tight findings. one might say. · · · · · -. 19 Ph·1losophy acquires the right and accepts the duty to appeal to material moments originating in the real life process of social­ ized human beings as essential and not merely contingent.

Such relationships are strikingly evident in the problem of the so-called noncapitalist areas. on comprehending his subject matter from the inside out. as in Hegel. It feeds on the experi­ ence that nothing whatsoever exists outside of what is produced by human beings. Leibniz's claim to have constructed the world on the basis of its inner principle. condemned a spirit pledged to "utility" and thus unfaithful to itself. which according to the theory of imperialism are a function of the capitalist areas : the latter need the former for the valorization of capital.68 Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy could withstand the spirit of knowledge. in the totality everything ultimately collapses into the subject as absolute spirit. The farther Hegel takes idealism. this impulse establishes Hegel's true contemporary relevance. that nothing whatsoever is completely inde­ pendent of social labor. the natural moment disap­ pearing within labor. the Baconian pathos of the early bourgeois period is extended to become that of a mature humankind : we may yet succeed. even epistemologically. Spir­ it's confidence that the world "in itself" is spirit is not only a narrow illusion of its own omnipotence. is defined as nature by labor and to this extent is mediated by it. They disappear when this kind of extreme idealism makes an alliance with what was later called realism. without. idealism . however."22 In formulations like this. the more he insists. against Kant. the closer he comes to social materialism. Seen against the res­ ignation of the current era. If. when spirit adapts-and of course it was made abundantly clear to spirit that it could not actualize itself except by adapting. Even nature. What exists comes to approximate the product of labor. has its materi­ alist implications. seemingly untouched by labor. the criterion by which the early Hegel. it is compelled to open itself to it and lay out its riches and its depths and offer them for its enjoyment. like Holderlin. returns in Hegel as its opposite. The extreme of idealism. a claim that Kant rejected as dogmatic metaphysics.

wants to fully disclose the matter at hand through its con­ cept because in the last analysis the thing itself and its concept are one and the same. f grasp] implies-what the matter at hand actually is and what essential and by no means mutually harmonious moments it con­ tains. What furnishes the canon for Hegelian idealism is the resistance to practical. because no difference remains through which the subject would be identified as something distinct. from f51'eifen.69 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy thereby cancels itself out. Once the object has become subject in the absolute. true to the dialec­ tic. as subject. it was a piece of the self-reflection that his philosophy had to deny itself in order to remain philosophy. identity becomes the agent of the nonidentical. science establishes such concepts and makes its judgments without re­ gard for the fact that the life of the subject matter for which the concept is intended does not exhaust itself in conceptual speci­ fication.-vis the subject. which is reproached with being unreflectively arro­ gant. At its extreme. Left-Hegelianism was not a development in intellectual history that went beyond Hegel and distorted him through misunderstanding. clear concepts it brags about. It draws its strength from what the so-called prescientific mind sees in science. On the surface it would seem that Hege­ lian philosophy nowhere distances itself more from the pre- . merely verbal definitions shown by a spirit that has not yet bee. That idealism. While the limits that prevented this step from being taken explicitly were firmly established in Hegel's philosophy. rather than merely manipulating concepts as tokens. the need to grasp--as the German word Bef51if [concept. the object is no longer inferior vis-a. For this reason even the idealist ferment in Hegel should not be hastily dismissed as presumptuousness. nevertheless the step remains crucial for content of his philosophy.n processed and dressed by science. some­ thing science glosses over in its complacency. In order to be able to operate with the clean.

his dream of the truth of the matter itself. But even this most anti­ empirical point in Hegel's philosophy is not without an object. and als() to be "set in motion. that is." altered according to the dictates of the object. There is nothing that philosophical thought is more touchy about than something very close to it that compromises it by hiding the dif­ ference that makes all the difference in an inconspicuous nu­ ance. be­ cause after all it is nothing but spirit. They betrayed what he cared most about. for the sake of an intellectual intuition that does not go beyond the con­ cept but rather falls short of it and. at that time.70 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy dialectical concept of experience than here: what happens to spirit is ascribed to spirit. as seems to be expected of Hegelian logic. Not that one is supposed to eliminate the law of contradiction. Rather. and delimits. classifi e s. which would otherwise be merely paradoxical. The dialectic is expected to elaborate this postulate. both in par­ ody and in its dogmatic petrification. and the scientific copy of it. contradiction itself-the contradiction between the fixed concept and the concept in motion-becomes the agent of phi­ losophizing. its non­ identity-the fact that the concept and the thing itself are not . the object of knowledge. Hence Hegel taught that the meanings of concepts are both to be pinned down. so that they can remain con­ cepts. Contrary to what it has become. But the concept cannot tran­ scend its own arbitrary nature. It registers the distinction between the matter at hand. in order not to distort it. when its meaning is confronted with what is encompassed by it. by usurping the objectivity of the concept. Schelling's-and with good reason. with which a self­ critical science cannot be satisfied. rather than spirit simply arranging it. regresses to the subjectivity of mere opinion. dialectic does not mean readiness to replace the meaning of one concept with another one illicitly obtained. When the concept is pinned down. more scientifico. Hegel detested attempts to do so-such as. which abstracts.

In the process. a relationship that Kant did not consider. In Hegel the re­ lationship between the two. becomes thematic. in which even Fichte was not spared. which might hinder it in doing so.71 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy one and the same-becomes evident within the identity of con­ cept and thing that is required by the logical form of definition. a consciousness that animates all genuine knowledge. it must accept this difference. the object of reflection. was itself reflection. consciousness as object. the words "re­ flection" and "Reflexionsphilosophie" [philosophy of reflection] and their synonyms often have a derogatory tone in Hegel. Hence the concept that remains true to its own meaning must change. This is strikingly evident in the split­ ting of the concept of the subject that distinguishes him and his speculative-idealist predecessors so drastically from Kant. assessment in terms of the rules of logic-what is currently called "phenomenology"-was applied to consciousness as a condition of knowledge. between the philosophical. critical consciousness and the consciousness engaged in direct knowl­ edge of its object. the consciousness that is the object of criticism. his critique of reflection. In · Kant. a somewhat naive scientific consciousness. if it is to follow its own conception. Because philosophy will not relinquish that identity. All self-reflection notwithstanding. as something to be grasped philosophically. who because of this finiteness forbade consciousness to . becomes the finite. however. The movement of the concept is not a sophistical manipulation that would insert changing meanings into it from the outside but rather the ever-present consciousness of both the identity of and the inevitable difference between the concept and what it is supposed to express. lim­ ited. philosophy was engaged in the critique of reason. a philosophy that holds the concept to be something more than a mere instrument of the intellect must abandon definition. Never­ theless. and fallible thing it had already tended to be conceived as in Kant.

Kant's delimitation of con­ sciousness as a scientific consciousness that makes straightfor­ ward judgments returns in Hegel as the negativity of consciousness. the doubling of philosophical consciousness. He knew that any critique of a reifying.72 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy wander off into intelligible worlds. This is why Bergson could be a theorist of knowledge and an irrationalist at the same time: his philosophy did not successfully come to terms with the relation­ ships of the two aspects. did. However dubious this claim may be. as something that n�becntkized." scientific conscious­ ness comes face to face in Hegel with what a causal-mechanistic science. in Bergson the critique of the scientific spirit was car­ ried out by the scientific spirit without much concern for the contradiction in this self-criticism. also thereby posits itself as infinite and-or so is Hegel's intention-when his philosophy is fully elaborated. the reflection of reflection. how it has failed to capture reality. to which nothing is exter­ nal and in which the difference between subject and object dis­ appears. who like him used epistemological analysis to expose the inadequacy of a narrow-minded. In that consciousness recalls. proves itself in its infiniteness to be absolute spirit. Con­ versely. Hegel. as a science of the domination of nature. how it has mutilated things with its ordering concepts and reduced them to the contingent status of what is closest to hand in its "data. Granted. a hundred years older. alienating con­ sciousness that merely sets up a different source of knowledge . its lack of congruence with reality-while unreflective science loves to rant and rave about consciousness of this inadequacy being mere metaphysics. reifying science. divisive. has done to nature. In this Hegel was not so different from Bergson. it is sound. through self-reflection. is no mere play of thought unleashed and as it were divested of its material. the consciousness that grasps the finiteness of conscious­ ness. the contemplating subjectivity that "posits" the contemplated subject.

The critique of the institution of positivist science. which in Bergson is an unmediated contradiction. is not intended to be an apologetic restoration of pre-Kantian metaphysics as opposed to the scientific thought that has snatched more and more of its subject matter and theories from it. that a conception of reason that supersedes reason must fail hopelessly by its own criteria. What motivates Hegel's concept of reifi­ cation is the idea that science is concerned less with the life of things that with their compatibility with its own rules: what acts as though it were irreproachable. Hegel's critique of Wissenscha [science and scholarship]. The very objectivity of science is merely subjective: Hegel's objection to the unreflective labor of the intellect is as rational as his corrective to it. Only through reflection can reflective thought get beyond itself.73 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy from the outside as a contrast to it is impotent. what has be­ come congealed and frozen through science. through self-reflection. and does so in the service of its own ordering concepts and their immanent practicability and lack of contradiction. Long before matters had gone . is already fully developed in Hegel. returning it to what science has removed it from. proscribed by logic. Hegel has a thoroughly ra­ tional objection to rational science: that rational science. the motor of philosophical activity. irreducible truth is itself a product of a preliminary processing. which increasingly presents itself the world over as the sole legitimate form of knowledge. "positive" disciplines. Not the least of the tasks of philosophical conscious­ ness is that of dissolving. something secondary and derivative. which imagines itself to be the basis of truth's legitimacy. Hence Hegel made the contradiction between the sci­ entific spirit and the critique of science. trims objects down to size and processes them until they fit into the institu­ tionalized. Contradiction. becomes an organ of thought: of the truth of Logos. a word ft he uses repeatedly and with emphasis.

This says more about his reflection of re­ flection than the irrationalist gestures into which Hegel some­ times let himself be misled in his desperate attempts to rescue the truth of a society that had already become untrue. in innumer­ able dull and empty studies. in other words. only through a healing awareness of the marks of unrea­ son in its own reason. Hegel had recognized it for what it has now. than had any previous philosophical consciousness. But his phi­ losophy had the strength not to flee from this suffering back into the chimera of a world and a subject of pure immediacy. of a false-in Hegel's terms. Hegel's . It did not let itself be distracted from its awareness that only through the realized truth of the whole would the unreason of a merely particular reason. Using the language of epistemology and the language of spec­ ulative metaphysics extrapolated from it. the plaster model of the world. and a naivete that confuses facts and figures. revealed itself to be-the unity of reification. disintegrate. a reason that merely serves particular interests. Hegel's philo­ sophical consciousness suffered more from the estrangement between subject and object. Hegel expressed the idea that the reified and rationalized society of the bourgeois era.74 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy so far. Since then the element of unreason has become evident in the consequences of modern rationality. that is. In Parsifal Richard Wagner. the Schopen­ hauerian. with its foundation. irrational stages prior to the division of labor but only by applying its rationality to itself. which threaten universal catastrophe. abstract--objec­ tivity external to the thing itself. and the traces of the rational in the irra­ tional as well. between consciousness and reality. could become a society worthy of human beings­ not by regressing to older. the society in which a nature-dominating reason had come to fruition. put Hegel's experience in terms of the ancient topos: only the spear that inflicted the wound can heal it. that is.

the metaphysician of flow-is generally considered the over-arching principle of Hegel's phi­ losophy. who wanted to surrender to the movement of the mat­ ter at hand and cure thought of its arbitrariness. The motif of contradiction. It is the basis of the dialectical method. this principle that requires translation into the intellectual experience it expresses. that One sus­ pects him of a moment of arbitrariness.ing. and coercive-a motif in which Hegel anticipated Bergson. It is especially at lhi:s point in Hegel. or of the dialectic itself. is merely impressed upon objects from the outside. and with it that of a reality that confronts the subject as harsh. to the principle of contradiction. Nor is One likely to be satisfied with the statement that no isolated principle. that is. alien. antithesis. One acquires the "knack" quickly. formulated solely in terms of the history of philosophy. But it is pre­ cisely. Hence One cannot evade the question of what justified Hegel in sub­ jecting everything that confronted thought. as a separate principle. of COn­ tradiction. of the old dogmatism­ and in fact speculative philosophy since Salomon Maimon has in many respects fallen back upon pre-Kantian rationalism.23 is not sufficient to allay this suspicion. and synthesis as a mere methodological schema. as well as thought itself. The fact that Hegel expressed the most cutting objections to the clap­ trap scheme of a triplicity of thesis. that subsumes the stages of spirit under binding higher-level concepts. The dialectic is reduced to the kind of elective weltanschauung against which the critical philosophy of which Hegel was a part directed such a devastating critique.75 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy self-reflection of the subject in philos hical consciousness is ac­ tually society's dawning critical consciousness of itself. and that he says in the preface to the Phenomenology that as long as it remains a schema. It very easily congeals to become the trademark of a view. is. whether it be that of mediation. of becOIp. � .

All that could be mere assertion. Accordingly. has been distorted in the Eastern zone. the justification of the primacy of negation in Hegel's philosophy is that the limits of knowledge to which its critical self-reflection leads are not something external to knowl- . all individual conclusions. currently receives confirmation from the way the Hegelian-derived materialist ver­ sion of the dialectic. came into his own in Hegel. through immanent criti­ cism of logic and its forms. prevents any objective reflection. and conclusion. that all individual judgments.. who have been degraded to the status of classics. From it he develops the theory of a difference between subject and object that manifests itself in every particular. his critic. appeal to its in­ augurators.76 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy absolute and the key to the truth. static dogma. Hegel attacks the Kantian doctrine of the limits of knowledge and yet respects it. he achieved it. This difference. "abstractly" posited maxim. moves out beyond itself to become more adequate knowl­ edge. judg­ ment. By contrast. of dynamic thought Kod EgOx1]v. that truth consists solely in the relationship of moments that emerge from one another. which acts as its own correc­ tive. He demonstrated that concept. to a literal. calling it objectivist deviation. Suspicion of the dialectic as an isolated. always end up con­ tradicting that existing thing. as Hegel puts it. something that Nietzsche expressed long after Hegel has more in common with the expe­ rience that motivates the dialectic: "There is nothing in reality that would correspond strictly with logic. in the abominable abbreviation Diamat. in Diamat. Hegel's movement of the concept has been frozen into an article of faith.24 But Hegel did not simply proclaim that. unavoidable instruments for ascertaining through consciousness something that exists. In this way Kant. all individual concepts. the mor­ tal enemy of a merely "rhapsodistic" thought that absolutizes contingent individual definitions. are false by the criterion of an emphatic idea of truth.. Now as then.

All knowledge. In other words. the most pitiful is the notion that the dialectic has to admit as valid either everything whatsoever or nothing whatsoever. the enduring state of nature. With the concept of determinate negation.77 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy edge. like an electrical charge. We cannot therefore regard the limit as only external to being which is then and there. Of all the distor­ tions perpetrated on Hegel by a dim-witted intelligentsia. who criticizes the Kantian separation of reason from reality. and the exam­ ination to which it subjects its concepts. It rather goes through and through the whole of such existence. In Kant. The inadequacy of all isolated particular definitions is always also the inadequacy of the particular reality that is grasped in those definitions. and none achieves it. only iIi and by reason of its limit. Hence in Hegel the Kantian limits of knowledge become the principle of epistemological ad­ vance. rather. beginning with that of being. aims. Even if the system ultimately equates reason and reality and subject and object. not something to which it is merely condemned from the outside. reality re­ veals itself to be a reality pledged to death. through the mere form of the copula. the dialectic turns its polemic against the irrationality of mere existence. its own rationality. now matured to self-awareness. in Hegel. at the whole truth. and not merely knowledge that ventures out into the infinite. He­ gel's philosophy is eminently critical philosophy. they are inherent in all moments of knowledge. that demolished panaceas. which sets Hegel off from Nietzsche's . "A thing is what it is. As long as it remains unreconciled and not yet fully rational. critique remains a critique of reason. always accumulates within itself."25 The universality of negation is not a metaphysical panacea that is supposed to open all doors but merely the consequence of the critique of knowledge. by confronting a specific reality with its own concept. the specific objections that can be made to it. the critique of reason is simultaneously a critique of the real.

the concretization of philosophy can­ not be stopped for the sake of philosophy's illusory dignity. for instance.78 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy statement as well as from all irrationalism. unmediated human consciousness. modern abstraction takes . he accomplishes the mediation of that consciousness in and through the historical movement of what exists. so the metaphysical conception of a reconciled whole as the quintessence of all contradictions is based on the model of a society that is divided and nevertheless united.. as opposed to the immediacy of the mere subject. Truly a model of society. In the Phenomenology of Spirit. "It is part of the cowardice of abstract thought that it shuns the sensuous present in a monkish fashion. "One thing may be observed with reference to the immediate knowledge of God. for Hegel is not content with the general concept of an antagonistic reality. formulated in terms of the philosophy of identity. Hegel does more than merely oppose abstract subsumptive concepts. of legal and ethical principles": they "are still on every side conditioned by the mediating process which is . Once set in motion. For at the same time negation intervenes in the reality that is the content of the self-criticizing concept: society. including that of negation itself. Just as the principle of universal mediation. 26 Dialectical contradiction is experienced in the experience of society. taking as his critical point of departure what is closest to hand. training. requires that contradiction be grasped as much from the side of the object as from the side of the subject. education. termed development. it is in the dialectical contradiction that there crystallizes a con­ cept of experience that points beyond absolute idealism. the notion of ur-polarities of being. a movement that takes it beyond all mere metaphysics of being. It is the concept of antagonistic totality. goes back to the fact that in all categories of thought the objec­ tivity of the social process is prior to the contingency of the in­ dividual subject. Hegel's own construction.

Deciphered. that is. individuals are delivered over to limitation. Hegel maintained his awareIl:ess of this in the face of all sentimentality."28 As something split off and detached. stupidity. has resulted from the principle of domination. or what is old and false will continue on until the catastrophe occurs. all romanticism. it abolishes its con­ tradictory quality by enduring its contradictions to the end. The Goethean-Mephistophelian principle that everything that comes into being deserves to per­ ish means in Hegel that the destruction of each individual thing is determined by individualization itself. by particularity. and ceases to be a totality. the individual is in the wrong when regarded from the point of view of justice and a peace that would be free of the pressure of the whole. and has developed its forces. society becomes a totality only by virtue of its contradictions.79 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy up this attitude of fastidious gentility towards the moment of the sensuous present."27 That concreteness enables Hegel to com­ pletely permeate the idea of totality. its consolidation into what-in vindication of Hegel­ is truly more like a system than an organism. As something contradictory. It is this limitation of its existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual. the law of the whole: "The individual by itself does not correspond to its concept. The societalization of soCiety. the principle of division itself. By attending only to their own advantage. which is derived from the idealist system. rather. with the idea of contradiction. and it perpetuates it. and ex :­ tended itself. reproduced. society as a whole moves beyond itself. all regressive re­ turn of thought and reality to past stages. Either the totality comes into its own by becoming reconciled. only through its di­ vision into the opposing interests of those who command and those who produce. the logical-metaphysical theory of totality as the epitome of contra­ dictions means that society is not merely riven and disturbed by contradictions and disproportionalities. . Society has survived.

as a bourgeois idealist he stopped at that boundary because he saw no real historical force on the other side of it. fruitful both for the object. limits contained in its own tendencies. Hegel felt the sterility of all so-called in­ tellectual work that takes place within the general sphere with­ out dirtying itself with the specific. a place where it flourishes all too easily.80 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy and insignificance. Only the critical idea that unleashes the force stored up in its own object is fruitful. Philosophical knowledge begins only where . with the heaviness and the resis­ tance of what exists. The dialectic expresses the fact that philosophical knowledge is not at home in the place where tradition has settled it. not merely a flirtation with Hegel. in the Philosophy of Right Hegel broke off such thoughts by abruptly absolutizing one category-the state. a society that is held together and survives only through the universal moment in the particular advantage fails completely as a consequence of its driving force: these for­ mulations are not metaphorical dialectical ways of expressing simple statements about factual matters. It is based on the experience of the impotence of a criticism that keeps to the general and polishes off the object being criticized by subsuming it from above under a concept as its representative. as it were. in a certain sense they translate Hegelian philosophy back into what it had projected into the language of the absolute. He could not resolve the contradiction between his dialectic and his experience: it was this alone that forced �egel the critic to maintain the affirmative. as Marx says later in a celebrated passage. reminding it that it is not yet itself. This is due to the fact that while his experience did indeed ascertain the limits of bourgeois society. Instead. The central nerve of the dialectic as a method is determinate negation. but rather than lament it he gave it a critical and productive turn. by helping it to come into its own. and against it. unsaturated. As though the dialectic had become frightened of itself.

What most shocks the innocent reader of the Phenom­ enology of Spirit. is what is ac­ tually dialectical. to be sure. No doubt there is a secret positivist impulse at work in Hegel in his deification of the quintessence of what is: But the force that specific individual knowledge reveals is always that of the inadequacy of its mere individuality. that it has to be hidden from it in order for thought to be productive. and ultimately to positivism.81 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy it opens up things that traditional thought has considered opaque."29 refers to this. however decidedly Hegel opposes the abstractness of the monad in other respects. It links the general concept and the aconcep- . the sudden flashes of illumination that link the highest speculative ideas with the actual political experience of the French Revolution and the age of Napoleon. without the cover of preconceptions. It is neither a theory arrived at by induction nor one from which one could make de­ ductions. "The real is ' nothing but an identity of the general and the particular. What it is is always more than itself. with Hegel. is concealed from it. Hegel's dia­ lectical statement. all thought that does not simply reconstruct or recapitulate what has come before. with philosophical self­ consciousness. one has grounds for speaking about a reprise of Leibniz in Hegel. impenetrable. that is. But this shift is not intended to reward philosophy for its effort by returning it to ascertaining the data of an incoherent existence. To this extent the Hegelian dialectic follows. one might almost believe. he will have to surrender to it without reservation. but he will not succeed un­ less the potential for the knowledge that is actualized only through immersion in the object is already waiting in him as theory. To explain that in terms of unreflected intellectual experience: if someone wants to gain knowledge of something rather than cover it up with categories. That path. To the extent to which the whole is at work in the microcosm of the individual. and mere products of individuation. the path of all productive thought.

truth. . through its movement in and through the extremes: devetopment as dis­ continuity. Contradic­ tions. The Hegelian concept of the dialectic acquires its specific character." is worth anything. a kind of permanent explosion ignited by the contact of extremes. which becomes truth only by completely absorbing what opposes it.. that makes it harmonious. are at the same time the formal law of a history that advances only through contra­ diction and with unspeakable suffering. which are its true and only ontology.82 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy tual 'roBe 'T/. tory as a "slaughterbench. as "determinate negation. it does not originate in some mere conceptual schema. 30 and despite his much-cited optimism about history-Schopenhauer called it vile-the fiber of Hegel's philosophy.-as perhaps Aristotle did the 7TPW'rTJ aVo-La-each in itself. Hegel's notion that it is only the idea that saturates itself with the weight of its object rather than shooting out beyond it with­ out delay that. but above and beyond that to revive one of Hegel's most dubious theses. the consciousness that everything that exists both negates itself in coming into its own and perishes is by no means so different from Schopenhauer's Ein Gedanke as the official his­ tory of philosophy. repeating Schopenhauer's invectives. has. and distinguishes itself from shal­ low versions in vitalist philosophy like that of Dilthey. The idea. denying its antagonistic character. repeatedly succumbs to the temptation to explain that what resists it is itself idea. to its opposite. For that theory of Hegel's has recently been cited by Georg Lu­ kacs. entered the service of the apologetic aspect. The history of an unreconciled epoch cannot be a his­ tory of harmonious development: it is only ideology. Hegel referred to his­ . that of the rationality of the real. But it too arises from the experience of an antago­ nistic society. the legit­ imation of what exists.31 not only in order to defame literature that deviates from empirical reality. of course. would have it.

whose desiderata remain with one until the last note. Persistent involvement with Hegel teaches one-and this is probably true of every great philoso­ phy-that one cannot select what one likes from his philosophy and reject what one finds irritating. . . not in its plausibility. Now. the same world with whose special patina Krull is also concerned. however. and that the demand for chro­ nological fidelity is secondary. even when it is a question of extreme precision in the portrayal of human beings. The truth of that claim lies in the skandalon. one might say that this is a legitimate exercise of artistic freedom. This kind of philosophy sides with the big guns. here. If you set a work in the 1920s and have it take place after the First rather than the Second World War. But I doubt whether this argument. Hence rescuing Hegel-and only rescue. It is this grim necessity and not an ideal of completeness that makes Hegel's claim to system a serious and substantial one. at a deeper level the attempt to distance what is closest to hand is probably involved-to transpose it magically to a pre­ historic world. from 1954: If I am not mistaken. the figure of Ken has all the earmarks of an American from the late forties or the fifties and not from the decade following the First World War. only something that has become real is actually possible.83 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy According to Hegel's distinction between abstract and real pos­ sibility. one should not judge Hegel solely on the basis of one's convictions. Even. is appropriate for him-means facing up to his philosophy where it is most painful and wresting truth from it where its untruth is obvious. not revival. which achieves equilib- . Aesthetic experience may help us to do this with the doctrine of abstract and real possibility. Let me quote from . as in the first measure of a piece of music. It adopts the judgment of a reality that always destroys what could be differ­ ent. which comes up as though it were self-evident.:t letter about Thomas Mann's late novella The Black Swan [Die Betrogene]. But with this kind of transposition of the dates one assumes a kind of obligation. is truly valid. . then you have good reasons for doing so-the most obvious being that someone like Frau von Tummler is unimaginable today.

the fulfillment of this formal law. the more au­ thentic the empirical details are. that which is actually magical about the art object. One would almost think that there is not a simple opposition between the permeation of the work with sub­ jectivity and the demands of realism. I do not mean the obligation of external fidelity to "period color" but rather that the images the work of art conjures up must manifest themselves as historical images at the same time. its own essential nature. as in his philosophy of history and especially the . is putting out feelers to. Even the idea that opposes reality in holding fast to a possibility that is repeatedly defeated does so only by regarding that possi­ bility from the point of view of its realization. something that reality itself. which in a certain sense resound throughout the whole of your oeuvre. including those re­ garding types of human beings.84 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy rium. I first arrived at these eccentric thoughts by way of Proust. and they came to me again in reading the Black Swan. such as our education and his­ tory would lead us to think-but that instead the greater the precision one maintains with regard to the historical details. one runs up against the paradoxical state of affairs that the evocation of such images. that is. however weakly. it is as though that fiction could be healed of itself through exact imagination. an obligation that for immanent aesthetic reasons can hardly dispense with that external ob­ ligation. For if I am not mistaken. which is essentially different from all mere' existing things by virtue of its own formal law. the more likely one is to achieve spiri­ tualization and attain the world of the imago. and not something that "would have been so nice. its "possibility" in the emphatic sense.32 Something similar lies behind Hegel's theorem. depends on the degree of reality it has absorbed into itself. who in this regard reacted with idiosyncratic exactness. At the moment it seems to me as though this kind of precision can atone for some of the burden of sin under which every artistic fic­ tion labors. no matter how transformed and reconfigured that reality may be. Even in the work of art. even in those layers of it where. That is the truth content of Hegel's philosophy. as a possibility for reality. is more successful." the tone of which resigns itself to failure from the outset.

The difference between sub­ ject and object calmot be eradicated in theory any more than it has been resolved in the experience of reality to the present. a defamation that is customary there nowa­ days.85 Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy preface to the Philosophy of Right. But that idea is identical with Hegelian idealism. there is no denying the untruth of Hegel's justification of what exists-something the Left-Hegelians re­ belled against in their day and which in the meantime has in­ creased to the point of absurdity. Dialectical truth lays itself open to such misuse: it is fragile by nature. and which therefore proclaims the identity of subject and ob ject in the whole when it is their nonidentity in the particular that inspires it­ such a philosophy will apologetically take the side of what exists. he resigns himself to reality or appears to vindicate it while sneering at those who would reform the world. of course. that of the rationality of the real seems to contradict the experience of reality. has failed to hold up philosophically. in the further history of socialism to provide in turn the pretext for a renewed repression. which is supposed to be identical with spirit. including that of its so-called overall tendency. It was the most reactionary and not at all the liberal progressive elements in Hegel that paved the way for a later socialist critique of abstract utopianism--only. At the same time. is the most extreme evidence of this. A philosophy for which all that exists dissolves into spirit as a result of its movement and as the totality of that movement. But just as reality proved the thesis of the rationality of the real to be wrong. More than any other of his teachings. But one should not hold Hegel responsible for the misuse of his motifs to drape a mantle of ideology over the ongoing horror. If the history of Hegelian philosophy after Hegel seems a weak� . The defamation of all thought that protests the grim immediacy of what goes on in the Eastern zone under the name of praxis. so the conception that characterizes the philosophy of identity .

for­ getfulness. in which Hegel's devastating argument had the last word. The philosophical idea that what per­ ishes merits its fate proves true. Reason becomes incapable of comprehending reality not merely because of its own impotence but because real­ ity is not reason. and an unfortunately reemergent naivete. Hegel is subject to Anaximander's ur­ bourgeois maxim. The cognitive power of his philosophy vanishes along with its . by doing so he did an injustice to the experience on which he drew. even for Hegel himself. with the experience of something that cann� be dissolved in consciousness. and he sti). in doing so he evaded the supreme critical moment. In good. which was the in!lermo�. which were never more powerful than in Hegel's comprehension of the real. In the last analysis.t experi­ ence of Kant's transcendental philosophy. as the ur-bourgeois thinker. the logic of the matter itself is at work in that process. is untrue in the face of the Kantian discontinuities. and frightening. Hegel achieved a magnificent ex­ tension of the practice of critical philosophy beyond the formal sphere. Through his critique of Kant. Hegelian fashion. the critique of totality.86 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy ening. when compared with the efforts of spirit. at the same time. of something infinite and conclusively given. neverthe­ less. the superior power of logical stringency. It cannot be attributed solely to intellectual shortsightedness. a resignation of the power to comprehend and construct.ry� )0 If-Hegel tnought away the difference between the condi­ tioned and the absolute and endowed the conditioned with the semblance of the unconditioned. The debate between Kant and Hegel. Then he highhandedly did away with the barrier after all. per­ haps because what was decisive.!ulated a �� unanirnIty of knowledge that becomes seamless through its dis­ fa continuities and tfiat nassomething� mY�!!22. the process that brought it to that point is irreversible. is not over.

The force of the whole. and because the affirmative and self-assured reference to that whole as though one had a firm grasp of it is fictitious. is not a mere fantasy on the part of spirit. it is the force of the real web of illusion in which all individual existence remains trapped. If the sub ject-ob ject toward which his philosophy develops is not a sys­ tem of reconciled absolute spirit. it should not deal summarily with Hegel. experience speaks from him. the true. in op­ position to Hegel. By specifying. being the principle of domination inflated to the absolute. because that whole itself is not. the totality of the negative. including the experience that moti­ v. the negativity of the whole.ates his own philosophy. its lack of reconcil­ iation with the rational interests of a self-conscious humanity. even if "life" is more appropriate to the irrationality of the world. the idea of a positivity that can master everything that opposes it through the superior power of a comprehending spirit is the mirror image of the experience of the superior coercive force inherent in everything that exists by virtue of its consolidation under domination. This is the truth in Hegel's untruth. "The whole is the un­ true. The word "system." captures the remorseless consolidation of all partial moments and acts of civil society into a whole through the principle of exchange more accurately. which it mobilizes. But the rationality of that consolidation into a totality is itself irrationality. spirit nevertheless experiences the world as a system. as the famous sentence from the Phenomenology would have it. philosophy satis- . There is no way to make this criticism less harsh. Even where Hegel flies in the face of experience." not merely because the thesis of totality is itself untruth. but even so. The claim that he discloses the partic­ ular along with the whole becomes illegitimate.87 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy grounding in experience." being more irrational than the word "life.

which is still to be realized. for the last time.88 The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy fies. which is a positing.a. . the utopia of the whole truth. The ray of light that reveals the whole to be untrue in all its moments in none other than utopi. the postulate of determinate negation.

One example . resist understanding are qualitatively different from those of other infamous texts. RudolfBorchardt' The ways in which Hegel's great systematic works. at least negatively. through intellectual effort and careful ex­ amination of the wording. and with whom there is no guarantee that such a judgment is even possible.Skoteinos. Schopenhauer's tirades about Hegel's alleged bombast evidenced a relationship to the matter itself. like the child and the em­ peror's new clothes. in a situation where respect for culture and fear of embarrassment merely dodge the issue. and in any case there is no Hegel philology and no adequate textual criticism. With Hegel the task is not simply to ascertain. especially the Science of Logic. In the realm of great philosophy Hegel is no doubt the only one with whom at times one literally does not know and cannot conclusively deter­ mine what is being talked about. Rather. I have nothing but murmuring. a meaning of whose existence one has no doubt. For all their pettiness and ressentiment. or How to Read Hegel Ich habe nichts als Rauschen. and no hermeneutic art has yet established it indisputably. at many points the meaning itself is uncertain.

in this night which is the noo?day of life. but is this movement as a being that is itself absolutely illusory. which is extremely clear as a prospectus. becoming is essence. The f conclusion of the section on the relationship of speculation to common sense reads. its reflective movement. pure negativity. The transition. or How to Read Hegel of this in matters of principle is the distinction between the cat­ egories of ground and causality in the second book of the Logic. it would not believe speculation to be its enemy. common sense and speculation can meet one another. and as such it is essence. the Dif­ ferenzschri t. and this. in its own abyss: and in this night of mere reflection and of the calculating intellect. For in its highest synthesis of the conscious and the non-c. Being only is as the movement of nothing to nothing. without doing violence . speculation also demands the nullification of conscious­ ness itself.:mscious. and so back to itself. the other that in this transi­ tion comes to be. a detailed example is provided by some sentences from the first chapter of that book: Consequently. but the nothingness of a nothing.90 Skoteinos. is the movement of nothing to nothing. sublates itself in its passage. or becoming. 2 Only the ingenious and precise imagination of an impassioned member of a philosophical seminar will be able to illuminate the meaning of the last sentence. to be the negation of a nothing. The only aspect of speculation visible to common sense is its nullifying activity. constitutes being. which latter is only in this negating. even in his Dif­ ference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy. and even this nullification is not visible in its entire scope. I There are analogous things in the early Hegel. is not the non-being of a being. Reason thus drowns itself and its knowledge and its reflec­ tion of the absolute identity. outside of which there is nothing for it to negate but which negates only its own negative. which is a match for Holderlin's most advanced prose of the same years. If common sense could grasp this scope. and the latter does not have this movement within it.

this kind of doubleness of the dialectic eludes literary presentation. with the inadequacy of which Hegel reproached the merely reflective understanding. or How to Read Hegel to it: that the "night of mere reflection" is night for mere reflec­ tion. in that text. 3 in this. their structure must be inferred from the substance of Hegel's philosophy. If this were not the . is speculation. removed from its terminol­ ogical shell. however. Nothing can be understood in isolation. but life. as he calls it. Form in Hegel follows this intention. which is connected with noon. Every single sentence in Hegel's philosophy proves itself unsuitable for that philosophy. and the form expresses this in its inability to grasp any content with complete adequacy. For in Hegel the concept of speculation. Schopenhauer's in­ cluded. speculative philosophy.91 Skoteinos. There is a sort of suspended quality associated with his philosophy. This is why one has to make so many allowances for it in Hegel. which is of necessity finite when it unequivocally states something un­ equivocal. with the awkward qualification that the whole in turn lives only in the individual moments. In actuality. and music are intimately related. That it cannot in principle achieve the unity of the whole and its parts at one blow becomes its weak spot. means in turn none other than life forced to turn inward. The passage becomes susceptible of interpretation in the light of knowledge of the general train of Hegel's thought. one can offer little but generalities. everything is to be understood only in the context of the whole. in ac­ cordance with the idea that truth cannot be grasped in any in­ dividual thesis or any delimited positive statement. One cannot simply skip over the passages in which it remains unclear what is being dealt with. especially the conceptual struc­ ture of the chapter. To the person who holds doggedly to the wording and then in disappointment refuses to get in­ volved with Hegel because of his unfathomable quality. but it cannot be interpreted from the word­ ing of the paragraph alone.

the demonstration that truth is essentially subject-is in fact presupposed by every dialectical step. is only externally subsumed under it and made conformable to it. He­ gel requires repeated readings. or How to Read Hegel case. the form would be free of the poverty and the fallibility of concepts that Hegel tells us about. Hegel makes himself inaccessible to anyone who is not familiar with his overall intention. An essential element in Hegel himself lures one into this im­ poverished understanding from above. But if one stakes everything on this one can falsify him again. At every point one must bear in mind. what Hegel is after. which is employed as a means. one must illuminate him from behind. and requires them objectively and not merely to familiarize oneself with his subject matter. This is why understanding of Hegel decomposes into moments that are mediated by one an­ other and yet contradictory. so to speak. in ac­ cordance with Hegel's own idea that the categories of being are . That inten­ tion is to be gleaned first and foremost from his critique of ear­ lier philosophies and from his critique of his own times.92 Skoteinos. But. What is supposed to be the whole and the outcome of the whole-the construction of the subject-object. already in themselves what his philosophy of the concept ulti­ mately reveals their nature to be in and for itself. in the pro­ cess of realizing it. the object is the concept implicitly: and thus when the . as a matter of fact. This is ex­ pressed most openly in Hegel's great Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences: This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance. that. however provisionally. the material. namely an empty consciousness of the system that is incompatible with the fact that the system is not intended to form an abstract higher-order concept with regard to its moments but rather to achieve its truth only in and through the concrete mo­ ments. One then easily creates what has thus far been most in jurious to inter­ pretation.

it is always easier to find one's bearings in an idea as on a map than to examine the cogency of its elaboration. however. The Good. fail because they rely on the whole. as well as in full actuality. only a covering under which the concept lies concealed. is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result. therefore. Within the range of the finite we can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. Thus Hegel himself sometimes falters and makes do with formal declarations. theses that say that something is so when the work has not yet been . in the shape of End. but is already by implication. by setting an antith­ esis to confront it. It follows the line of least resistance. in fact. The isolated moments go be­ yond themselves. Most of the commentaries. we have but the manifestation of the inner nature of the object itself. and orientation to the general direction of the ideas is taken for their correctness. It alone supplies at the same time the actualizing force on which the interest in the world reposes. Hegel himself is by no means innocent of this inade­ quate way of proceeding. McTaggart's included. the absolutely Good. is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it needs not wait upon. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion. accomplished.93 Skoteinos. is realised in the object.us. or How to Read Hegel concept. only because the identity of sub ject and object is preconceived. consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unac­ complished. This is the illusion under which we live. as it were. to follow them through would then be su­ perfluous. and its action consists in getting rid of tl1e illusion which it has created.5 The intention is taken for the deed. Error or other­ being. Only out of this error does the truth arise'. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Hegel does not operate so concretely as that introduction would have it. The consummation of the infinite End. The relevance of the individual analyses is repeatedly disrupted by the abstract primacy of the whole. Objectivity is thus. when superseded.4 This gets in the way of that pure abandonment to the matter at hand and its moments in which the introduction to the Phenom­ enology places its trust.

The concept of this Idea has being only as mind.e. Their association is brought about by their needs. is only abstract. Hegel's logic is not only his metaphysics. passes over into division. This substantiality loses its unity. Regarding the transition from civil society to the state. or How to Read Hegel done. by the legal system-the means to security of person and property-and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common inter­ ests.6 In terms of content. it is also his politics. Certainly in compar­ ison with Kant the schematic elements are less prominent in He­ gel. we read in the Philosophy of Right. The art of reading him should take note of where something new begins. It is therefore (A) ethical mind in its natural or immediate phase-the Family. Hegel sometimes engages in pedantry. some content. Among the interpretive tasks whose time is ripe not the least and not the simplest is the separation of such passages from those in which thinking is really going on. That was unavoidable if the whole were not to become hopelessly tangled. and not only in the Philosophy of Right. into (B) Civil Society-an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which.94 Skoteinos. i. something that ill becomes one who has contemptuous things to say about verbal definitions and their like. In order to prevent that. and where a ma­ chine that was not intended to be a machine is simply running . because it is the objectification of itself. as something knowing itself and actual. the movement running through the form of its moments. This external state (C) is brought back to and welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and the public life devoted thereto. the configuration of the dynamic-dialectical and the conservative-affirmative moments is as much a deter­ minant of the excess of rigid generality in everything particular that comes into being as it is determined by it. and into the phase of relation. because of their self-subsistence. But the system often forcefully interferes with the program of "simply looking on" [reines Zusehen].

or absense of meaning. substituting a de­ termination of the position of the detail within the system for transparency in the individual analysis. What common sense would consider madness has its moments of clarity in Hegel. too. Sinnleere. after the fact. which is not a something or a thing. he is rejected as devoid of meaning.95 Skoteinos. or How to Read Hegel and ought not to keep on doing so." s The person who retreats to Hegel's overall conception when faced with Hegel's elaboration of his thoughts. Common sense can use them to approach Hegel if it does not forbid itself to do so out of hatred-hatred being. Instead of being sub jected to criticism. of course. something Hegel himself. that subjective idealism and phenomenal­ ism are intended polemically: "Thus illusory being is the phenom­ enon of scepticism. Someone who cannot state what he means without ambiguity is not worth wasting time on. At every moment one needs to keep two seemingly incompatible maxims in mind: painstak­ ing immersion in detail. in general. Where Hegel is emphatically rejected-in positivism in particular-he is hardly even given consideration nowadays. diagnosed as in­ f f herent in common sense. this concept of clarity has survived the philosophy in which it originated and has become autonomous.7 Even the cryptic chapters have sen­ tences like those in the discussion of illusory being [Schein] which express. in the Dif erenzschri t. There is no lack of help available. and free detachment.!xion with the subject. and the Appearance of idealism. is a more elegant word for the old accusation of insuf­ ficient clarity. not an indifferent being that would still be. apart from its determi­ nateness and connt. has capitulated because Hegel simply cannot be understood rigorously. is such an immediacy. even for common sense. has already renounced rigorous understanding. The concept of clarity is taken from individual dis­ ciplines in which it has been preserved as dogma and reapplied . Like the desire for ex­ plicit definitions. to which it is related.

. It becomes a fetish for consciousness. while clear. satisfies the two criteria remains undetermined-for the sake of the method. now as then. perceptionem. I call 'clear' that percep­ tion which is present and manifest to an attentive mind: just as we say that we clearly see those things which are present to our intent eye and act upon it sufficiently strongly and manifestly. are by no means as epistemologically unproblematic as sound com­ mon sense. a mode of knowledge made absolute-knowledge that satisfies its methodological rules. Clarity is the hypostatized form of accessible sub jective conscious­ ness of some ob ject. might wish them to be." The word enlightenment probably marks the height of this development. because a perception upon which a sure and unquestionable judgment can rest must not only be clear. which are of great consequence historically. in its own character. is so separated and de­ lineated from all others that it contains absolutely nothing except what is clear. in their whole lives. or How to Read Hegel to a philosophy that long ago subjected it to critical reflection and therefore ought not to have to comply with it unquestion­ ingly. Its adequacy to its ob jects suppresses the ob jects themselves and ultimately transcendent meaning as well. the radiant aura of Christian and Jewish mysticism. it must also be distinct. are treated in the greatest detail in Descartes's Principles of Philosophy: Indeed. The Cartesian concepts of clarity and distinctness. With the ongoing process of secularization clarity becomes something methodological. Its depoten- .96 Skoteinos. without regard to the derivation and aim of the ideal and without regard to the content. On the other hand. many men never perceive anything what­ ever accurately enough to make a sure judgment about it. . * Cartesian doctrine does not bother with *A philosophical history of clarity would need to reflect on the fact that origi­ nally clarity was both an attribute of the divine when contemplated and its mode of manifestation. I call 'distinct' that perception which.9 These sentences. at that point philosophy is to be only a "striving for ultimate clarity. Descartes pre­ sents them as terminological stipulations: "claram voco illam ." He defines clarity and distinctness for purposes of reaching agreement. still coupled with one another as late as Kant. Whether the knowledge itself.

formulated the double nature of clarity. But as we know." he is involuntarily using a metaphor from the temple precincts of thejugendstil. A certain degree of consciousn. must be met with even in many obscure representations. a motto of jacobsen's reads. in Des­ cartes its substratum. "Light over the land! that is what we wanted. He must have derived the ideal of clarity from sense certainty.lo One should not assume that precisely here. which yet tiation is no doubt connected with the fact that memory of the prototype of clarity. Descartes knows no other way to explain them than through comparison with the sensory world: "sicut ea clare a nobis videri dicimus. But it is this mathematical ideal that deter­ mines the two methodological norms. since in the abs'ence.97 Skoteinos. has since died out. Dissatisfaction with this idea produced Leibniz's theory of an infinitesimal continuum leading from representations that are obscure and confused to representations that are clear. an idea taken up by Kant in opposition to Descartes: Clearness is not. the consciousness of a represen­ tation. quae. . to which the talk about the eye alludes. satis fortiter et aperte illum movent" [just as we say that we clearly see those things which are present to our intent eye and act upon it sufficiently strongly and manifestly] . completely devoid of dy­ namics. the res extensa. in the discussion of clarity. ocolo intuenti praesentia.ess." When Husserl discusses "levels of clarity. as the logicians assert. the profane sacred sphere. the jugendstil. though it be insufficient for recollection. As though looking back to the past. is identical with the object of geometry. Descartes was making do with a mere metaphor-"sicut"-that of necessity diverges from what it is supposed to explain and is itself therefore anything but clear. the sensory-spatial world. which the pathos of clarity continues to presuppose. with respect to content as well. a paradoxical truce be­ tween romanticism and positivism. or How to Read Hegel the phenomenology of cognitive acts-as though those acts were to be dealt with like mathematical axiomatics. light. without regard to their own structure.of all consciousness we should make no distinction between different combinations of obscure representations.

or How to Read Hegel we are able to do in respect of the characters of many concepts. is supposed to orient itself accordingly. Kant continues. There are there­ fore infinitely many degrees of consciousness. however. Rationalist in the historical sense. as though the object had to be a static mathematical object. or as when the musician in improvising strikes several keys at once. the ideal of clarity de­ mands that knowledge trim and shape its ob ject a priori. is seized upon as clarity by the sci­ entific concept of knowledge. under­ stood in the simplest sense of the scholastic and Cartesian ade­ quatio. and just as though it had not. when the conscious­ ness suffices for the consciousness of the distinction of this representation from others.98 Skoteinos. down to its complete vanishing. shown itself to be a hypos­ tasis. such as those of right or equity. But a representation is clear. without that guaranteeing its truth. but not for consciousness of the distinc­ tion. it is "distinct" in the Cartesian sense. Clarity can be demanded of all knowledge only when it has been determined that the ob jects under investigation are free of all dynamic qual­ ities that would cause them to elude the gaze that tries to capture and hole them unambi���_ Ihe desideratum of clarity be­ comes doubly problematic when consistent thought discovers that the ob ject of its philosophizing not only runs right over the knower . The norm of clarity holds only where it is presupposed that the object itself is such that the subject's gaze can pin it down like the figures of geometry. In other words. in the era after Descartes. I I Kant would not have thought o f devaluing all these levels other than the ideal highest level. the representation must still be entitled obscure. When that ideal is declared to be generally valid. an a priori decision is made about the object. that highest level. just as though it were a thing in itself that was available at any time a�d at will. any more than Leibniz would have. If it suffices for distinguishing. and knowledge.

The traditional categories do not remain intact within . which we distinctly conceive. rather. and in fact. or How to Read Hegel as though on some vehicle but is inherently in motion. the praxis of knowledge clings to the primitive distiriction between what is clear and what is unclear. thereby divesting itself of its last similarity with the Cartesian res extensa. Faced with this. in the spirit of his system. the principle. only observing. It does so. hence I am. Clarity and distinctness take as their model a fixed consciousness of things. the sub ject itself also moves. the dialectic permeates each of them and alters its inherent complexion. out of excessive zeal for the specialized activities of the individual disciplines. there is noth­ ing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this. matter extended in space. the simple demand for clarity and distinctness becomes obsolete. which establish their ob­ jects and their object domains without reflection and set dog­ matic norms for the relationship of knowledge to its ob jects. by virtue of its relationship to the ob ject that is inherently in motion--one of the central tenets of Hegel's Phenomenology .99 Skoteinos. that of correctly determining what it is that we conceive distinctly. that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects . Despite this. a criterion that would be suitable only for a static subject and a static object. If they . The correlate of this insight is that the sub ject too is not static like a camera on a tripod. the dialectic. that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist. talks about the thing in a naive­ realistic manner: And as I observed that in the words I think. there stirs a faint memory of the fact that in the cognitive acts of the subject the objects themselves do not simply accommodate to that demand. however. Des­ cartes. that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true. as a general rule. 1 2 In the difficulty Descartes notes. no doubt. in an earlier discussion of the ideal of clarity. I concluded that I might take.

100 Skoteinos. to say it in such a way. as it were-it finds itself of necessity in conflict with the Cartesian ambition. This demand is paradoxical because language and the process of reification are interlocked. are indicated with the utmost distinctness. Here too philosophy is faced with a paradox: to say clearly some­ thing that is unclear. in this sense all philosophical language is a lan­ guage in opposition to language. This. the "is. When consciousness does not conceive them as pinned down and identified like things-photographable. how­ ever. that is. or How to Read Hegel did. or that are not acces­ sible at all. philosophy should not succumb to confusion and destroy the very possibility of its existence. Of course one cannot grossly neglect the demand for clarity. clarity and distinctness. even where the matter at hand for its part does not conform to the customary notion of what can be indicated clearly. could not present difficulties in turn. that does not ac­ commodate to reification. Reified consciousness freezes objects into things in themselves so that they can be available to science and praxis as things for oth­ ers. and are not themselves given. is not a merely formal demand but rather a part of the very substance philosophy is after. marked with the stigma of its own impossibility. that the moments that elude the eye's fixating gaze. What we should take from this is the urgent demand that the expression fit the matter expressed precisely. which for Descartes are attributes of truth. that has no firm outline. The position that would postpone the fulfill­ ment of this demand-the idea that the requirement of clarity does not hold immediately or for the isolated individual part but . But once it is ac­ knowledged that clarity and distinctness are not mere character­ istics of what is given." pursues the aim of pin­ pointing its object. an aim to which philosophy ought to provide a corrective. one can no longer evaluate the worth of knowledge in terms of how clearly and unequivocally individual items of knowledge present them­ selves. The very form of the copula.

o r How to Read Hegel is achieved through the whole-does not go far enough. Philosophy is concerned with something that has no place within a pregiven order of ideas and objects such as the naivete of ra­ tionalism envisions. is utterly anti philosophical. and every sentence. but he did not fully redeem the promise. intimi­ dated by the success of the individual disciplines. Only that realism allows one to believe that every object can be reflected without question or dispute. to say concretely what it cannot say. If philosophy can be ·defined at all. To the extent to which philosophy makes an ongoing effort to break out of the reification of consciousness and its objects. even though in other respects it is not permitted simply to disregard those rules if it does not want to degenerate into empty words. and ful­ fillment just as it has to reflect on language and its relationship to the matter at hand. In actuality. In the norm of clarity. "Whereof one cannot speak. it is an . it cannot comply with the rules of the game of reified consciousness without negating itself." 13 in which the extreme of positivism spills over into the gesture of reverent authoritarian authenticity.101 Skoteinos. unconcerned with the latter's actual results. It has to take up that cause even with regard to presentation. but it does so in the form of determinate negation. every concept. thereof one must be si­ lent. But philos­ ophy has to reflect on material concreteness. As a systematic philosopher Hegel may have hoped to do this. to borrow a norm from them in terms of which it must declare bankruptcy. the old copy theory of realism has entrenched itself within the critique of knowledge. Wittgenstein's maxim. philosophy eludes that demand. to try to explain the limits of clarity itself. and which for that reason exerts a kind of intellectual mass suggestion. Philosophy does better to state that it will disap­ point the expectation that it will fulfill its intention completely in every moment. definition. something that cannot simply use that order as its system of coordinates and be mapped onto it. than.

the ob ject-sub ject relation is the known-knower relation. It then follows that the more clearly any instance of this relation stands out for discrimination. the ob ject is the known. when Hegel defends Heraclitus: "The ob­ scurity of this philosophy. a taboo that virtually abol­ ishes reason itself. the concept. is foreign to the understanding and cannot be grasped by it.cture has been identified with the bare relation of knower to known. Hegel attempts to do this. though it may find mathematics quite simple. this stru. the more safely we must utilize it for the interpretation of the status of experience in the universe of things. can exist only if the "sub ject" is posited as being strictly identical with the "knower" and the "ob ject" with the "known": "No topic has suffered more from this tendency of philosophers than their account of the ob ject-sub ject structure of experience. he says. or How to Read Hegel effort to express things one cannot speak about. if not literally. 1932). Thus. MacMillan.1 02 Skoteinos. this occurs e contrario. Clarity and distinctness. because everything direct and unmediated is false-and therefore necessarily unclear in its expression-he tirelessly says it in mediated form. to help express the nonidentical despite the fact that expressing it identifies it at the same time. however. This is one reason why Hegel invokes totality. at most. Rarely has anyone laid out a theory of philosophical clarl'ty. In the first place. with this interpretation." 14 In terms of its meaning. This sub ject is the knower. Hence Descartes' appeal to clarity and distinctness" (p. chiefly consists in there being profound speculative thought contained in it. the desideratum of clarity is treated *Alfred North Whitehead probably came closest in his metaphysical speculations in Adventures of Ideas (New York. however problematic that concept may be. instead. * In Hegel clarity is never made thematic. Because it can never be said directly. A philosophy that relinquishes this effort in the name of a tempt­ ingly mathematicized formal logic denies its own concept a priori-its intention-and a constitutive part of that intention is the impossibility that Wittgenstein and his followers have turned into a taboo of reason on philosophy. 225). the concept of clarity has been used as though it were self-evident. the idea. .

It is in no sense a matter of our arbitrary choice and of logical dexterity but in respect of the assumed axiomatic concepts. and there­ fore also of all the components of the essence. The most perfect ge­ ometry. or. and typical essences can in such case be apprehended only in that essen­ tial intuition which can be immediately analysed. as we may also say. the concept of exactness in that text should be equated with the traditional concept of clarity. is no defect attaching to them. This touches on the so­ called exactness of concept formation. If it behoves us to bring to suitable conceptual expression the intuitable corporeal data in their intuitively given essential characters. He has real­ ized that the possibility of deriving' deductive theories from a definite system of axioms cannot be determined methodologi­ cally. which according to Hus­ serl is a condition of deductive theory. which must however be presentable in immediate intuition. presupposes exactness in the ap­ prehended essence itself. but only on the basis of content. I S In the next paragraph Husserl distinguishes descriptive from exact sciences and says of the former. The vagueness of the concepts. But to what extent "exact" essences can be found in an essence-domain. Husserl reserves it for mathematical or definite manifolds 15 and asks whether his own phenomenological method must or can be constituted as a "geometry of experiences": 16 "Have we here also to seek after a definite system of axioms and to erect deductive theories upon it?" 17 Husserl's answer goes beyond that method. for they are flatly indispensable to the sphere of knowledge they serve. we must indeed take them as we find them. And we do not find them otherwise than in flux.103 Skoteinos. they are within this sphere the only concepts justified. the circumstances that they have mobile spheres of application. and its most perfect practical control cannot help the descriptive student of nature to express precisely (in exact geometrical concepts) . and whether exact essences figure in the substructure of all essences apprehended in real intuition. or How to Read Hegel in Husserl's Ideas. these are matters that depend throughout on the peculiar nature of the domain.

rather than constructing them in accordance with the abstract episte­ mological ideal of clarity: "Wholly immersed in the subject alone.. as mobile concepts. scarcely out of his Own spirit for the sake of those listening.19 Accordingly. in linguistic terms clarity is depen­ dent on the attitude of thought to objectivity insofar as only what is true can be said with complete clarity. this sets limits to Hus­ sed's insight. the acceptance of such troublesome thoughts. If it is unfounded or represents a false . are dis­ tinguished from exact concepts by virtue of the nature of what they attempt to grasp. 20 If the demand for clarity gets tangled up linguistically because language does not actually permit the words themselves clarity­ even in this regard the ideal of clarity converges with the math­ ematical-at the same time.1 04 Skoteinos. lens-shaped. and are therefore also unmathematical. indented. Complete transparency of expression depends not only on the relationship between expression and the matter represented but also on the sound­ ness of the judgment. At the same time. he seemed to develop it only out of itself and for its OWn sake. or How to Read Hegel that which in so plain. whereas Hegel's dialectic defines each as inherently mediated by the other. But while Husserl is in other respects happy to join in the chorus that cenSures Hegel for his critique of the law of contradiction. umbelli­ form. philosophical concepts. who tried far more vigorously than Hussed to construct concepts in such a way that the life of the thing itself would be manifested in them. so understanding. and an almost paternal care for clarity attenuated the rigid seriousness that might have repelled . It acquiesces in the distinction between the fixed and the mobile. and the like-simply concepts which are essentially and not acci­ dentally inexact. and so entirely suitable a way he expresses in the words: notched. as a logician Husserl concedes some­ thing that is certainly true of Hegel himself. a distinction derived from the philosophy of reflection. and yet it sprang from him alone.

language is not fully reducible to communication with others. or How to Read Hegel conclusion. without re­ gard to Hegel's own linguistic praxis-that the unclarity for which he never ceases to be reproached is not simply a weakness. conversely. and that element of coercion is preserved in it. Even a linguistic approach of the utmost integrity cannot do away with the antag­ onism between what is in itself and what is for others. it will be vague in relation to it. however-and Hegel knew this-is it simply independent of communication.105 Skoteinos. Nor. is nevertheless an index of falsehood. it is also the force that drives him to correct the untruth of the par­ ticular. Best able to meet the demands of this predicament would be a philosophical language that would strive for intelligibility with­ out confusing it with clarity. This dialectic plays itself out within the medium of language itself . As an expression of the thing itself. it could not communicate anything that it did not have as its own intention. In Hegelian terms one could say-granted. undistracted by other considerations. then each sentence should also be confronted with its linguistic inade­ quacy. and would reduce that relationship to an arbitrary presumption. even in its relationship to the matter at hand. Otherwise it would elude all critique. But if Hegel's verdict that no individual sentence can be philosophically true holds outside his own work. Lan­ guage. it will resist adequate formulation. Language as expres­ sion of the thing itself and language as communication are inter­ woven. it is not merely a fall from grace on the part of an inhumane social zeal that watches to make sure that no one thinks anything that cannot be communicated. which is not an index of truth. The ability to name the matter at hand is developed under the compulsion to communicate it. While in literature this antagonism may go on behind the backs of the . if it does not fully grasp the matter at hand. an untruth that acknowledges itself in the unclarity of the individual sentence.

" Language would rather become unintelligible than disfigure the matter at hand through a communication that gets in the way of communicating it. and fragmentarily at that. does irrevocable damage to the complete ob jec­ tive specificity of the particular thing it wants to define. The truth of expres­ sion flourishes only in the tension between the two. Better would be an approach that carefully avoided definitions as mere stipu­ lations and modeled concepts as faithfully as possible on what they say in language. the later. without which there would be no language. The requirement of clarity imposes a futile demand on language. This is made more difficult by the historical moment. so to speak. The cor­ rective to this lies in efforts to achieve intelligibility. in their configuration. here and now. This tension. But the linguistic efforts of the theoretician run up against a limit that they have to respect if they do not want to sabotage themselves as much through fidelity as through infidelity. making them virtually names. however. If nothing else. It asks something language cannot grant in the im­ mediacy of its words and sentences--something it can grant only. philosophy is compelled to take it into account. is not the same thing as the vague and brutal com­ mandment of clarity. This intelligibility is the opposite pole to pure linguistic objectivity. a demand it wants fulfilled continuously. or How to Read Hegel texts. The moment of universality in language. which for the most part amounts to the injunction that one speak the way others do and refrain from anything that would be different and could only be said differ­ ently. however unrecognizable those efforts may be.1 06 Skoteinos. "material" phenomenology was preparation for . in which communication dictated by the market-the replacement of lin­ guistic theory by communication theory is symptomatic of this­ weighs upon language to such an extent that language forcibly puts a stop to communication in order to resist the conformity of what positivism calls "ordinary language. immediately.

positings. products of sub jective consciousness which to that extent also resemble definitions. The effort the linguistic sensorium has to make to achieve precision is far greater than the mechanical effort to capture ordained definitions: he who makes himself the slave of his own words makes things easier for himself by shoving the words in front of the thing itself. with his excessive confidence in the . The true linguistic method could be compared with the way the emigre learns lan­ guage. that way of proceeding is inadequate. Philosophical language has no rem­ edy for this but to take care to use those words. of the arbitrariness of how we are to understand them. however much he flatters himself that he is making it harder. in such a way that their arbitrariness is decreased through their position. where even the choice of synonyms is affected by the lexicographer's narrowness and lack oflinguistic sophistication. the sticky layer be­ tween understanding and the matter at hand. or How to Read Hegel that. Impatient and under pressure. numerous words will be revealed in context but will be long sur­ rounded by an outer area of indeterminateness. Together they ex­ plode the layer of mediocre tacit agreement. until the words decipher themselves through the abundance of combinations in which they appear and do so better and more fully than would have been possible with the dictionary.107 Skoteinos. a second relativity that is a residue . One not insignificant reason for the refractoriness of Hegel's texts is probably that Hegel. The linguistic configuration and the gaze focused intensely on the individual word complement one another. By that means. as well. permitting ri­ diculous confusions. Nevertheless. For the words in empirical languages are not pure names but always (J€O"Et. which would necessarily fail if they were used literally as names. he may not use the dictio­ nary as much as read whatever he can get access to. He who disregards this delivers himself over to a second kind of relativity in tearing words away from the relativity of definition.

From this point of view. or How to Read Hegel objective spirit. and especially Hegel's philosophy. believed that he could avoid this kind of admix­ ture of the alien. The dialectical method as a whole is an attempt to cope with this demand by freeing thought from the spell of the instant and developing it in far-reaching conceptual structures. Seen from the point of view of science and scholarship. with the "this is the way it is" within the horizon of ineradicable vagueness. Fanatic pro­ ponents of clarity would like to extinguish such sudden flashes of illumination. but the person for whom such obviousness does not flash out in any way during the reading of this or that weighty passage in Hegel's Logic. and it is up to philosophy to absorb this moment without thereby signing itself over to irrationalism. the elements assembled in his work--concepts. the task of understanding philosophy. and on the spot. that he could say the unsayable in his ordinary manner of speech. Philosophy is supposed to pay in cash. the person who does not notice what has been captured there. involvement in philosophy is evaluated by means of the balance sheet. syllogisms-are not unintelligible. which are not aw�re that this is true of them. But philosophy is a protest against . It is only that they point beyond themselves and even in terms of their own idea are no more capable of fulfillment in isolation than are the components of extraphilosophical language. Philosophi­ cal experience cannot dispense with exemplary obviousness. would be that of understanding the things that would not hold up before the current norm of clarity : thinking what is meant even where' not everything implied in it can be repre­ sented clare et distincte. there is a moment of irrationality in the makeup of philosophical rationality. It cannot stop there. Despite this. judgments.108 Skoteinos. on the model of an expenditure of labor that has to have its equivalent in wages. will understand no more than a person enrap­ tured with the vagueness of philosophical feeling. even if it is not fully articulated.

This is deadly. He would have preferred to write in the traditional philosophical manner. nevertheless often sound as though they were. the latter lacks the sharpness derived from the critical self-awareness that. This is not yet articulated in Hegel. everything does not come out even. which nei­ ther can be nor are intended to be conclusive. The specificity of philosophy as a configuration of moments is qualitatively different from a lack of ambiguity in every partic­ ular moment. even within the configuration. one moment sheds light on the other. at any rate it has not penetrated into the che­ mism of his own linguistic form. although in other respects. What gives it that air is the prepon­ derance of quasi-oral delivery over the written text. something that cannot be eliminated in dialectic. he provided it liberally. than the quintessence of its moments. and the figures that the indi­ vidual moments form together are specific signs and a legible script. In its all-too-simpleminded con­ fidence in the totality. with its emphasis on and ultimately celebration of all kinds of ob jectivity. because the config­ uration itself is more. in the subject matter of his philosophy. or How to Read Hegel the principle of equivalence. Everything does not be­ come resolved. Constellation is not system. and other. and in that regard it is unbourgeois even as bourgeois philosophy. whose mode of pre­ sentation is characterized by a sovereignly indifferent attitude toward language. the rhythm of continuity and intermit­ tency in intellectual experience. could bring the dialectic into lan­ gmtge. Hegel's language has the demeanor of the language of doctrine.109 Skoteinos. because Hegel's formulations. rather. with­ out the difference between his and traditional theory being re- . becomes a de­ fect in Hegel because he did not include an antidote to it in his language. Vagueness. The person who demands a pay­ off from it-"Why should I be interested in this?"-is cheating himself of its lifeblood. in combination with reflection on the necessary disproportion.

or How to Read Hegel fleeted in his language. In the Science of Logic. on the contrary mediated. is intended to set its object in motion. His texts are not fully worked out-which necessarily means indivi­ duated-because their intellectual medium is also not fully worked out in the way we have come to take for granted in the hundred and fifty years since then. though indeed an immediate. For his method. which cannot be separated from the matter at hand. 22 Without question. a rigor that is not content with such conciseness. At the beginning of the Sub jective Logic. and therefore if it is to be grasped in its truth its foundation must first be sought. entrances. this kind of aprioristic communication then becomes the ferment of a noncommunicative text and makes it hermetic. the concept of the concept [Begri fJ is used f differently at the two different points. . The loyal interpreter of Hegel has to take account of this deficiency. for instance: What the nature of the concept is. as it were. we find it even in Uberweg's History of Philosophy. yet it can be so only in so far as it has made itself the foundation. There is prob­ ably no one for whom the philological norm-problematic in any case-of teasing out the author's subjectively intended meaning is less appropriate than Hegel. must have made itself im­ mediate through the sublation of mediation. can no more be stated offhand than can the concept of any other object. It is up to him to do what Hegel failed to do: to produce as much conciseness of formulation as possible in order to reveal the rigor of the dialectical movement. In one case emphatically. . yet in so far as it is abstract it is. Abstract immediacy is no doubt a first. The most widespread objection to Hegel's alleged lack of clar­ ity is that of equivocation . not merely as a subjective presupposition but as the absolute foundation.21 Hegel's philosophy teems with examples of equivo­ cation. not to develop his own thoughts. Hence this foundation. Now although it is true that the concept is to be regarded. . . such as occur in music. At that time one provided key words for the reader.1 10 Skoteinos.

In contrast to many other Hegelian equivoca­ tions. which in the course of the mediations of the Logic is itself shown to be subject. the concept as something existing in itself. Where Hegel is formally guilty of equivocation. which developed to become its existence. or How to Read Hegel as "absolute foundation. Such . in the sense of the thing itself. " 23 The ob jective concept. it is usually a question of points he is making that are germane to the content. is none other than the I or pure self­ consciousness.111 Skoteinos. as one would expect. when he expounds on the unity of the two concepts: "I will confine myself here to a remark which may help one to grasp the notions here developed and may make it easier to find one's bearings in them. probably because in principle the idea that the concept is the result of subjective synthesis is as much a part of Hegel's concept of the concept as the idea that it expresses the inherent nature of the matter at hand. but concepts are to be not only that but also the "subjective presupposition. under which thought subsumes its Other. subjectivity. The concept when it has developed into a concrete exis­ tence that is itself free. The terminol­ ogy is confusing because even in the second case it is the singular and not." that is. Hence in the last analysis the nominalistic side of the concept." Hegel pro­ vides the justification for this equivocation a few pages later." something made. which according to He­ ' gel is the concept of the thing itself. as something subjectively formed. ego. an explication of how two dis­ tinct moments are both different and one and the same. is at the same time. the understanding of this one is made easier by the fact that the differences in the two concepts of the concept are made thematic in the chapter "The Concept in General. the plural that is used. coincides with the realistic side. something existing in itself. Objec­ tions that are transcendent to Hegel scarcely touch him. This structure is prototypical for the mediocre quality of the ob­ jections to Hegel's equivocations. objectively. according to the general thesis of Hegel's system. which is essentially spirit.

" the unreflective pursuit of their OWn advantage. or How to Read Hegel objections assume the principle of identity: terms must remain within the meaning Once given them by definition. it accompanies the consolidation of urbanism across all its phases. and in the most diverse nations the ambivalence of that process is sedimented in it. Common sense rationalizes this by saying that violating the definition would destroy order in thinking. This protest seems so unamenable to challenge because it is based On a conception that does not want to know about anything in the object that could give the lie to what subjective spirit has imposed On it. But such enlightenment is always also its oppo­ site: hypostasis of the particular. perhaps suspecting that in the face of that experience its OWn seemingly incorruptible concept of truth would be led to confess its untruth.112 Skoteinos. the less one should attack them. the belief that its contingency is its law. Nominalism helps to free con­ sciousness from the pressure of the authority of the concept that had established itself as universality. concepts should be nothing but identification tags for the unifying characteristics of a manifold. "What's a concept anyway?"-this gesture always expresses something else as well: that the individual has money to earn and that is more important than anything else. it does so by disenchanting the concept and making it a mere abbreviation for the particu­ larities it covers. as if their external. To this extent nominalism entourages the bourgeoisie to be suspicious of everything that would restrain isolated individuals in their "pursuit of happi­ ness. This is pure nominalism. That conception ener­ getically resists the experience that wants to let the matter at hand speak for itself. artificial quality would thereby be revealed. If the concept were to be autonomous in such a way that it did not exhaust . as being mere illusion. The more subjec­ tive their formation. Nominalism is part of the bourgeois bedrock. Nothing universal should exist that would remove the blinders of the particular.

But for Hegel. Only by virtue of that principle. Only this kind of ideological turn permits Hegel to neutralize the social dialectic of the general and the particular by making it a logical one. But that principle is all the more spitefully defended for being illusion. that is. however. Hence Hegel suspends the identity of the concept as a criterion of truth. or How to Read Hegel itself in the particulars of which it is composed. he restricted it. has been ideology from the very beginning. Still." the sacredness of possession as such.1 13 Skoteinos. rather. which for Hegel is to be reality. On the . as for Plato. It is only that criterion. only when the life of the thing expressed by the concept is compared with the meaning specified and when the old meaning is thereby dishonored as invalid. is the. Nominalism. From this point of view. other meaning constituted. all the more so in that universality in the bad sense realizes itself through individual interests and buries individual interests be­ neath it in turn. Hegel's Logic wanted to de­ velop this dialectic with its own means. Hegel did not simply overturn the principle of identity. nor could they continue to believe in the me­ taphysics of "what's mine is mine. which is anti-ideological. which are not obviously reflections of society-leaving an ideological residue. In being proclaimed reality. the measure of the concept is the claim made by the mat­ ter at hand and not the subject's definitory activity. the bourgeois principle of individuation would be shaken to its core. that degrades to the status of equiv­ ocation something that changes the meaning of concepts for the sake of their own substance. namely that for the liberal the universality that rules in and above individuals would be transfigured and would become something positive. the concept. despising and respecting it at the same time in his way. individuality is the subject be­ come property. remains concept. This illusion is stubbornly maintained because otherwise those who are under its spell could no longer continue on unchallenged.

" 24 Accordingly." 25 Here "immediately" sounds simply paradoxical. skeptical of scientific language. Similarly. In Hegel such occasional equivocations occur with expressions like the "unmit­ telbar" [unmediated or immediate] he uses so lavishly. It occurs in the fact as this is in its beginning.1 14 Skoteinos. instead. or How to Read Hegel one hand. "The exclusive reflection is thus a positing of the positive as excluding its opposite. Hegel handles terms the way nonphilosophical lan­ guage unthinkingly treats many of its words and word classes: as the occasion requires. It would have to deal with technical terms like Re flexion [reflection] as well. it uses context to soften the rigidity of its system of definition. he says in a later note. as something utterly unspecified. he often uses "unmittelbar" for things that are mediated ["mittelbar"]: to say that a category is unmittelbar its opposite thus means something like. mediated. rather than only through relationship to something external to it. it is its opposite in itself. is nothing different from what is primary. others are acquired according to the context. because what is posited. pure being is in itself nothing. Thus pure being is immediately nothing. Philosophical language is patterned on naive language to the extent that. "It is very important to notice that the unmediated identity of form is posited here without the movement of the fact itself. but what is meant is that nothing is not a category added to pure being from the outside. that word covers the . A thoroughgoing terminological analysis of Hegel's language could make a complete listing of such equivo­ cations and presumably clarify them. Following a dis­ tinction current in post-Kantian idealism. so that this positing is immediately the positing of its opposite which it excludes. a movement pregnant with content. While some layers of meaning remain constant in such words. and even more blatantly. because this itself is pos­ ited. me­ diation is itself immediate. When He­ gel wants to say that the mediation is in the thing itself and not between several things.

the inwardizing. certainly. less emphatically than in Heidegger. of that experience. Hegel is already juggling the meaning of ''Erinnerung'' [recollection or inwardi­ zation] : As its fulfillment consists in perfectly knowing what it is. quasi-Aristotelian theory of the categories. restricted use of th� intellect and. So although this Spirit starts afresh and apparently from its own resources to bring itself to maturity. In the immediacy of this new existence the Spirit has to start afresh to bring itself to maturity as if. sublate]. this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness. which is then convicted in turn of being illusory and is led onward to the emphatic concept of the concept. preserve. a new world and a new shape of Spirit. it is none of the less on a higher level that it starts. In the Phenomenology. and this transformed existence-the former one. the "Reflexionsbestim­ mungen. the equivocations may really be equivoca­ tions: a philosophical technique through which the dialectic of thought hopes to realize itself in language. but this technique can be ob­ served in more subtle cases as well. and therefore more innocently. to give linguistic states of affairs autonomy vis-a-vis what is meant.1 15 Skoteinos. Thus absorbed in itself. that is. has preserved it and is the inner being. anticipating Heidegger. Hegel . the critical re­ flection of the ob jective. within the overall architecture of the Logic. in knowing its substance. and in fact the higher form of the substance. but it also covers.26 The most hackneyed functional equivocation is that with "aufhe­ ben" [cancel. somewhat more broadly. initial. the positivistic scientific attitude as a whole. for it. for instance. " the determinations of reflection. But recollec­ tion. but now reborn of the Spirit's knowledge-is the new existence. On the other hand. or How to Read Hegel finite. but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved. all that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. secret plays on words. occasionally with a somewhat heavy�handed tendency.

The current understanding of equivocation should not be ac­ cepted uncritically. Without batting an eye. The function of language in such passages is not apologetic but crit­ ical. which has to do with whether knowledge remains within the boundaries of possIble experi­ ence. Turning logic against it­ self is the dialectical salt in such equivocations. which has to do with whether or not thought remains within the presuppositions of the theorem with which it is concerned.1 16 Skoteinos. A semantic analysis that dissects equivoca­ tions scientifically is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition of a linguistic stocktaking of philosophy. with logical means. which has to do with whether the idea proceeds from the immanence of consciousness. Such linguistic figures should be taken not literally but ironically. the epistemological meaning. however. the inappropriateness of static logic for something that is inherently mediated and that by virtue of existing is in the process of becoming. would also be metaphysically transcendent. the Kantian thing-in-itself. that which cannot be found within the stream of consciousness. The choice of the same word for the different 'YEV'Y/. the so-called context of the given within the sub­ ject. is not accidental. one cannot understand philosophy without separating the meanings of the terms "immanent" and its correlative "transcen­ dent": the logical meaning. ob jectively and without being able to do anything about it. Hegel uses language to convict language of the empty pretense of its self-satisfied meaning. Hegel extended that . as foolery. It disavows the finite judgment that in its particularlity acts as though it had the absolute truth. that is. Thus the epistemological and metaphysical meanings of "transcendent" are connected. even in the current terminol­ ogy. or How to Read Hegel plays tricks with the concept of nothingness in particular. and the metaphysical meaning. that which is absolutely transcen­ dent in epistemological terms. Equivocation is intended to dem­ onstrate. To be sure. or genera.

is to be re­ garded as fulfilling that function. and more precisely language. Even in predialectical logic. which protests the cus­ tomary dichotomy and considers itself compelled to absorb what is contrary to it. which he accorded a place in the third book of the Logic. to the sphere of objective spirit but essentially conceived it as a "medium. so that it exists for others. Dialectical philoso­ phy merely helped to self-consciousness a state of affairs that prevailed in traditional terminology and its history against its will. " 3o Accordingly it appears that Hegel. so far as the analogue of such a relation has a place there. or How to Read Hegel to the thesis that logic and metaphysics are one and the same. Language is said to be the "perfect expression . . did not admit language. Hegel's equivocations feed on this state of affairs. Nominalistic features are nowhere absent in Hegel's system. To the . . and whose tenor resists the futile effort to sim­ ply rescind the critique of the autonomy of the concept." 28 Nor does the Logic deviate from this. comes as such into existence. equivocations do not gloss over ab­ solute differences but rather bear witness to the unity of what is different. self-consciousness. qua indepen­ dent separate individuality. even if in his thought the moment of distinction occasionally languishes in favor of the moment of undifferentiated sameness.1 17 Skoteinos. accord­ ing to which language belongs to the stage of culture. for the mind. It deals with the "element of communication" : "In the material world water fulfills the function of this medium." as the bearer of contents of sub jective conscious­ ness rather than an expression of the Idea. Illuminating them requires insight into that unity as much as It requires noting the differences. tends in the same direction: "In speech. we find superlatives applied to language throughout Hegel's writings." or something "for others." 27 the "highest power possessed by mankind. in the spiritual world. re­ markably enough. Such laxities notwithstanding." 29 The Phenomenology. the sign in general.

the kind of notion held by those who cling stubbornly to their dialect. is precipitated in it. or deficiency. Hegel would hardly have wished for language to oppose that complicity. is no mere apen. like art. instead. The often-repeated remark. He distrusted high-handed. which inclined to lack of cogency. He was forced into this by an aporia. he raised his skeptical relationship to language. which . His linguistic praxis follows a slightly archaic conception of the primacy of the spoken over the written word. did not write professorially. it describes the very gesture of Hegel's language. Hegel did not stop at scorn for lin­ guistic expression. linguistic expression and yet was forced to a specific lin­ guistic form by the speculative nature of his philosophy. perhaps be­ cause his own linguistic experience.1 18 Skoteinos. His aversion to ornate and emphatic formulations is in harmony with this. ought to have been for him. originally Horkheimer's. in some sense brutal. of mere culture.31 Germans had long reacted this way to Voltaire and Diderot. his stylistic indifference evokes his deadly readiness to make common cause with precritical con­ sciousness through the reflection of reflection. language. to a stylistic principle.:u about linguistic idiosyncrasies. to fortify the na­ ive in their complaisance through unnaivete. strictly speaking. or How to Read Hegel extent to which he devoted his attention to it-and for a contem­ porary of Humboldt it is striking how little he concerned himself with language-Hegel wanted to see language more as what we would now think of as a means of communication than as the manifestation of truth that. There lurks in Hegel the academic resentment of a linguistic self-reflection that would distance itself all too much from mediocre complicity. unconcerned with expression-that practice did not become established until the era of the decline of the universities. that only someone who knows Swabian can really understand Hegel. even if uncon­ sciously. he has unkind things to say about the "witty talk" of the spirit alienated from itself.

often they are mere reverberations. but in­ stead. the negation of presentation. exists only in the notebooks of his listeners or as a sort of manuscript draft that can be fully concretized only on the basis of the notes­ these features are inherent in his philosophy. that most if it. paradoxically. While the extreme abstraction achieved and required by the greatest of his texts involves extreme efforts on the part of an objectivat­ ' ing thought that is detached from the immediacy of the experi­ encing subject. or How to Read fIegei was thoroughly detached from the common sense of everyday language. Eccentricities such as the fact that he edited only a small portion of his work. In its inconspicuous way.1 19 Skoteinos. the current philo­ sophical jargon. his solution was quite radi­ cal. one can look for a corrective to the hubris of the conclusive and definitive of which Hegel's work was accused even during his lifetime. By no means does this demeanor character­ ize only those parts of Hegel's system that exist merely as aids to memory and that he did not publish or published only in con- . Hegel's texts are antitexts. That a thought that made such extravagant claims should have foregone transmission in specific. as something pregiven and mechanical. definitive form can be explained only in terms of its ideal of presentation. Throughout his life Hegel was an Aristotelian in wanting to reduce all phenom­ ena to their form. in the looseness of a delivery that even when most highly elaborated is closer to speech than to writing. even the full form of his complete system. which is indispensable for the existence of anything linguistic. his books are not actually books but rather annotated lectures. he did not entrust himself to the language of culture. Today we speak of antimatter. he challenged the principle of fixedness. At the same time. His texts are its Platonic idea. not in­ tended to be cogent even in published form. This is how he proceeded even with the con­ tingent phenomenon of the academic lecture. As one who despised fully articulated language.

This man. forward and backward.32 Hegel the lecturer rebelled against the hardened immanence of language. . Eloquence that flows along smoothly presupposes that the speaker is finished with the subject inside and out and has it by heart. Every word. cut in pieces and jumbled. they had to regenerate them­ selves in him in an ever living present. If one opposed this trick. . and formal skill has the ability to glide on garrulously and most graciously in what is half-baked and superficial. one may regard the Phenomenology as a book. since only propo- . his head bent down. as if each were the most important." 33 an anacoluthon that tries with Hebelian cunning to find a way out of the predicament that "indeterminate immedi­ acy. had to raise up the most powerful thoughts from the deepest ground of things. and in the process his own language ran into a brick wall. Every sentence stood alone and came out with effort. morose. G. although they had been pondered and worked over years before and ever again. His con­ stant clearing of his throat and coughing interrupted any flow of speech. and while speaking kept turning pages and searching in his long folio notebooks. on the contrary. pure Being." even if clothed in the form of a predicativtj statement like "Being is the most general concept. Read­ ing the Logic calls to mind H. . "Being. it clearly becomes more extreme over the years. or How to Read Hegel densed form. high and low. however.120 Skoteinos._ Hotho's description of the Doz­ ent Hegel during his Berlin period: Exhausted. pure names cannot be understood and certainly cannot involve their contradictions. and if they were to have a living effect then. The first chapter of the first book of the Logic is a memorial to this intention. saying that. If pressed. without any further deter­ mination. without any further deter­ mination. with the Science of Logic this is no longer possible. strictly speaking. he sat there as if collapsed into himself. every syllable detached itself only reluctantly to receive a strangely thorough emphasis from the metallic-empty voice with its broad Swabian dialect." would thereby receive a definition through which the sentence would contradict itself.

is not merely playing dumb. Hence that protest is condemned to impotent para­ dox. what is behind one.first an­ tithesis to his first thesis. The untutored eye can never capture the details of a film the way it can those of a still image. Hegel did not deal with this adequately. or How to Read Hegel sitions. contradict themselves. The individual moments would need to be so sharply distinguished linguistically. and that he himself explains that such being is nothing. Hegel's publications are more like films of thought than texts. noting that the objection motivates the . and it makes a virtue out of that necessity. Hegel migh:C. To make an anachronistic comparison. The substance of Hegel's philos­ ophy is process. the negation of presentation as some­ thing congealed. not mere concepts. that the subjective process of thought and its arbitrary quality would drop away from them. something that would correspond to what was presented only if the latter were itself something congealed. so re­ sponsibly expressed. that content would require a presentation antithetical to it. If on the con­ trary the presentation is assimilated without resistance to the structure of the dialectical movement. This is the locus of the forbid­ ding quality in them. and at any price including the shabbiest. But in such sophistries a philosophy of identity that wants to have the last word even in the first. The insights in Hotho's description go right to the core of Hegel's literary form. in permanent status nascendi. and so it is with Hegel'S writings. A lack of sensitivity to the linguistic stratum as a whole may be respon- . and it wants to express itself as process. the price that the specu­ lative concept's critique of traditional logic has to pay to the lat­ ter is set too low. That form is the complete opposite of Nietzsche's maxim that one can only write about what one is fin­ ished with.121 Skoteinos.­ shrewdly agree. The dialec­ tic's protest against language cannot be voiced directly except in language. To be consistent. and it is precisely here that Hegel regresses behind his dialectical content.

is sublated. But. which perceives the limits of any particular existing thing as limits of language. takes on a musical quality that is absent from the sober style of the romantic Schelling. like the Swabian with its untranslatable "Ha no. At times it makes itself felt in such things as the use of antithetical parti­ cles like "aber" [but] for purposes of mere connection: Now because in the absolute. the form is only simple self-identity. the absolute does not determine itself.34 No doubt Hegel's style goes against customary philosophical un­ derstanding. in the first instance. this is its determination. or How to Read Hegel sible for this. for in it all manifoldness of the world-in-itself and the world of Appearance. may have taken its revenge on him by taking over his language in its folksy tone. the antilinguistic impulse in his thought. Their significative character recedes in favor of a mimetic one. or of inner and outer totality. Abstractly flowing. however. the difference of the content must also appear in it. Hegel's style. like HolderIin's abstractions. yet in his weaknesses he paves the way for a differ- . he moved about in language with a careless­ ness that is incompatible with what he said. the crudeness of some things in his aesthetics arouses that suspicion. The romanticism that the mature Hegel treated with contempt. for determination is a form of dif­ ference which. This man who reflected on all reflection did not re­ flect on language. but which was the ferment of his own speculation. Perhaps. was so deep that as a stylist Hegel sacrificed the primacy of objectification that governed his oeuvre as a whole. [emphasis added by Adorno] the absolute itself is absolute identity. In the presentation his writings attempt a direct resemblance to the substance.122 Skoteinos. counts as such. a kind of gestural or curvilinear writing strangely at odds with the sol­ emn claims of reason that Hegel inherited from Kant and the Enlightenment." repositories of gestures that literary lan­ guages have given up. But because at the same time it contains all differences and form-determination whatever. Dialects are analogous. or because it is itself the absolute form and reflection.

the mimesis that the con­ cept represses. Hegel has a twofold expectation of the reader. these abstractions have in themselves no value whatsoever. Hence the Goethean "residue of absurdity" in the philosophy of absolute spirit. They can only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material. The reader is to float along. by play­ ing his ideas with the speculative ear as though they were musi­ cal notes. The act of reading has to separate into its polarities like the content itself. At the best its place can only be taken by a sum­ ming-up of the most general results. the reader has to develop an intellectual slow-motion procedure. in the medium of the concept. not ill suited to the nature of the dialectic. one must read Hegel by describing along with him the curves of his intellectual movement. to indicate the sequence of its . despite and through the greatest fidelity to it.35 and here Hegel behaves like Alexander with the Gordian knot. Otherwise he would change it.123 Skoteinos. He disempowers individual concepts.* With Hegel philosophy becomes *"When reality is depicted. to slow down the tempo at the cloudy places in such a way that they do not evap­ orate and their motion can be seen. It is rare that the two modes of operation fall to the same act of reading. uses them as though they were the imageless images of what they mean. to let himself be borne by the current and not to force the momentary to linger. philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. On the other hand. abstractions which arise from the observa­ tion of the historical development of men. What it wants to use to get beyond the concept always drives it back beneath the concept in the details. Viewed apart from real hi�tory. In a cer­ tain sense Marx's statement that philosophy passes over into his­ tory already characterizes Hegel. or How to Read Hegel ent kind of understanding. The only reader who does justice to Hegel is the one who does not de­ nounce him for such indubitable weakness but instead perceives the impulse in that weakness : who understands why this or that must be incomprehensible and in fact thereby understands it. Philosophy as a whole is allied with art in wanting to rescue.

5. The traces of the empiri­ cal element that is incommensurable with the concept take ref­ uge in the presentation.beings determil}e one another" (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe. Ryazonov. Hegel certainly saw that in the Philosophy of Right. vol. to philosophize as though one were writing history. Robert Tucker. all else notwithstanding. and in this sense the Phenomenology of Spirit outlines a virtual historiography of spirit. ed. 'Marx-En­ gels Archiv. is disturb­ ing. 1972. it is inherently resistant to the norm of clarte. or How to Read Hegel the activity of looking at and describing the movement of the concept. The system has to acknowledge the conceptual irreducibility of the concept. 1932. The two cannot be separated. although of course he thereby disavowed one of his central intentions and opted for the customary separation of the historical and the systematic: To consider particular laws as they appear and develop in time is a purely historical task. Because that element cannot be fully permeated by the concept. D.124 Skoteinos. From this perspective the lack of clarte in Hegel's philosophy would be the result of the historical dimension intruding into it. and vice versa. Berlin. which is inherently historical: in terms of logical-sys­ tematic criteria the historical. as though through one's mode of thinking one could force the unity of the systematic and the his­ torical that is conceived in the dialectic. the history of nature and the history of human . which. It is as though Hegel had hastily tried to model his presentation on this. in The Marx-Engels Reader. A variant is even more pointed: "We know only a single science. The German Ideology. at first explicitly and later without remembering it. it is a blind spot. p. . was derived from the ideal of a system that is opposed to his­ torical reality as to all empirical reality. While Hegel is forced to integrate the historical moment into the logical. the science of history. 567). his attempt to do so turns into a critique of his own system. section 1 . ed. Like acquaintance with what can be logically deseparate strata" (Karl Marx. p. as long as human beings exist. 1 1 9). New York: Norton. History can be regarded from two perspectives and can be divided into the history of nature and the history of mankind.

and events which brought about their enactment. is also very obvious. Within that system. needs. concluded. the only important thing. is violating a bourgeois taboo. Hegel. contingencies.125 Skoteinos. what would ultimately be the truth that would hold out against the system of identity becomes its blem­ ish. That kind of exposition and (pragmatic) knowl­ edge. the restorationist liberal. But even if particular laws are both right and reasonable. he feels cheated. based on proximate or remote historical causes. A particular law may be shown to be wholly grounded in and consistent with the circumstances and with existing legally established institutions. 36 In the conceptual aspect that resists the Hegelian movement of the concept. this task is appreciated and rewarded in its own sphere and has no relation whatever to the philosophical study of the subject­ unless of course the derivation of particular laws from historical events is confused with their derivation from the concept. still it is one thing to prove that they have that character-which cannot be truly done except by means of the concept-and quite another to describe their appearance in history or the circumstances. or How to Read· Hegel duced from a comparison of these laws with previously existing legal principles. The conceptual labor . where the customer insists that what is delivered to him at full price should embody the full quantity of labor for which he is paying the equivalent. and the historical explanation and justification is stretched to become an absolutely valid justification. they have not discussed at all. like a number of provisions in Roman private law which followed quite logically from such institutions as Roman matrimony and Roman patria potestas. in accordance with the mores of the exchange of commodities. This difference. that which cannot be represented. the con­ cept of the thing. whereas what is really essential. to be done in order to comprehend law or an established institution. Hegel's readers have al­ ways been upset by this. and yet it may be wrong and irrational in its essential character. What is displayed is supposed to be finished. If there is anything left to be done on what he buys. or rather the essential thing. which is very important and should be firmly adhered to. nonidentity gains the upper hand over the con­ cept. is frequently called "explanation" or preferably "comprehension" by those who think that to expound history in this way is the only thing.

When that becomes evident. antagonistically and intimately related to reflection the way reason was related to the intellect in Kant. The taboo extends to the marketplace's idiosyncratic commandment that the traces of the human in the product be erased. is not absolute pos­ session. Hence the well-known account of Hegel by Gustav Rilmelin. Its human smell reveals its value to consist in a relationship between subjects rather than something adhering to objects. Scholars are fond of becoming out­ raged about theorems and ideas they cannot take home fully proven.126 Skoteinos. it seems as though what is most holy has been violated. Property. The first requirement for reading Hegel cor- . without any contribution from you? Does it change into its opposite. "Do you understand it? Does the concept move around on its own in you. in a sense that qualitatively surpasses every customary standard of reception. The fetish character of the commodity is not a mere veil. the chancellor of Tilbingen University. With unflaggingly cheap irony. as it is perceived. Congealed labor in which one no­ tices that the labor is that of human beings is warded off in dis­ gust. that the product itself exist purely in itself. it is an imperative. as though he had not expended enough sweat. is held against him. Rilmelin asks. the category under which bourgeois society subsumes its spiritual goods as well. as though speculation were an esoteric capac­ ity and not reflection's critical self-awareness. and does the higher unity of the contraries emerge from that?" 37 As though "it were a question of the much-invoked-whether in admiration or derogation-"speculative mind" subjectively taking some spe­ cial leaps in order to bring off something that Hegel ascribes to the concept itself. Discomfort with the conceptual character inherent in Hegel's philosophy is then rationalized to become the sneering assertion that the one incriminated cannot himself accomplish what he holds others to. or How to Read Hegel and effort that Hegel's philosophy expects not merely of itself but also of the reader.

127 Skoteinos, or How to Read
rectly is to rid oneself of deeply rooted habits like these, which the content of Hegel's philosophy shows to be false. It is useless to struggle and twitch like the caliph and the grand vizier in the form of storks, vainly pondering the word mutabor. The trans­ formation of finite into infinite determinations that Hegel taught is neither a fact of sub jective consciousness, nor does it require any special act. What is meant is a philosophical critique of phi­ losophy, a critique just as rational as philosophy itself. The only subjective desideratum is not to become obstinate but rather to understand motivations, as with Kant and Fichte; nor does any­ one capable of doing so need credulously to accept the move­ ment of the concept as a reality sui generis. These desiderata of a reading of Hegel, however, can be pro­ tected from divagation only if they are supplemented through the most acute and persistent attention to detail. Genetically, perhaps, the hitter comes first; only when it fails categorically may the reader's dynamically detached attitude provide a cor­ rective. What leads one to micrology is precisely the indisputable lack of differentiation between concepts and reflections: the lack of graphic power. At times even the legendary sympathetic reader of the early nineteenth century must feel his head spinning. The relationship of the categories to the whole is hardly ever em­ phatically distinguished from their specific restricted meaning in a specific passage. "Idee" [Idea] means on the one hand the absolute, the subject-object; but on the other hand, as the intel­ lectual manifestation of the absolute it is supposed to be some­ thing other than the ob jective totality. Both appear in the Subjective Logic. There "Idea" often means the subject-object: "the abso­ lute Idea alone is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and is all truth," 38 or: "the Idea has not merely the more general meaning of the true being, of the unity of concept and reality, but the more specific one of the unity of subjective concept and

128 Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel
,, objectivity. 39 On the other hand, elsewhere in the same section of the Sub jective Logic, the third, Hegel distinguishes the Idea from the objective totality:

Now the Idea has shown itself to be the concept liberated again into its subjectivity from the immediacy in which it is submerged in the object; to be the concept that distinguishes itself from its objectivity, which however is no less determined by it and possesses its substantiality only in that concept . . . . But this must be understood more precisely. The concept, having truly attained its reality, is the absolutejudgement whose subject, as self-related negative unity, distinguishes itself from its objec­ tivity and is the latter's being-in-and-for-self, but essentially relates itself to it through itself. 40
. . .

And correspondingly,

Now the determinateness of the Idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute Idea itself has issued into an ex­ istence of its own; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of a content, but exists wholly as form, and that accordingly the Idea is the absolutely universal IdeaY
Finally he uses both in the same argument:

The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute unity of the pure con­ cept and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of being, is the totality in this form-nature. But this determination has not issued from a process of becoming, nor is it a transition, as when above, the subjective concept in its totality becomes objectivity, and the subjective end becomes life. On the contrary, the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the concept is itself raised into con­ cept, is an absolute liberation for which there is no longer any immedi­ ate determination that is not equally posited and itself concept; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and is the concept that, in its determination, abides with itself. The passage is

129 Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise.42
Just as in Hegel "foul" existence is separated from the real that is rational, so despite everything the idea inevitably remains XWpt<; from reality, set apart from it, in that reality is also "foul" exis­ tence. Such incongruities are scattered throughout Hegel's most important texts. Hence the task is the disjunction of what is spe­ cific from what is more general, what is not due and payable hie et nunc; the two are intertwined in the linguistic figures Hegel likes to use. He was trying to ward off the danger of a flight into the general when he told a lady at a tea party who had asked him what one should be thinking at this or that point in his text, "precisely that." But the question was not as silly as the way it was dealt with makes it seem .. The questioner may have noticed that empty consCiousness, that is, what a paragraph accom­ plishes in terms of its logical coherence, usurps the place of ac­ tual accomplishment, whereas whether it requires that logic or not depends on what is accomplished. The question of what one should be thinking at any particular point voices a false demand insofar as it reports a mere lack of comprehension and hopes to be rescued through illustrations, which, as illustrations, miss the mark; but it quite properly means that every individual analysis has to be followed through, that in reading one must get hold of states of affairs that are discussed and accurately stated and undergo transformation, not mere guidelines. The most fre­ quent weakness in interpretations of Hegel is that the analysis is not followed through in terms of the content; instead, the word­ ing is merely paraphrased. For the most part such exegesis then bears the same relation to the thing itself as the road sign to the road one has traveled, as Scheler jokingly put it. In many cases Hegel himself did not carry out the activity of following through but replaced it with circumlocutious declarations of intention. In

130 Skoteinos, or How to Read Hegel
the Philosophy of Right, for instance, Hegel makes a pretense of a speculative deduction of monarchy but does not carry it out, and for that reason the results are vulnerable to all manner of criti­ CIsm:

This ultimate self in which the will of the state is concentrated is, when thus taken in abstraction, a single self and therefore is immediate indi­ viduality. Hence its "natural" character is implied in its very conception. The monarch, therefore, is essentially characterized as this individual, in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and this individual is raised to the dignity of monarchy in an immediate, natural, fashion, i.e. through his birth in the course of nature. This transition of the concept of pure self-determination into the immediacy of being and so into the realm of nature is of a purely speculative character, and apprehension of it therefore belongs to logic. Moreover, this transition is on the whole the same as that familiar to us in the nature of willing, and there the process is to translate something from subjectivity (i.e. some purpose held before the mind) into existence (see Paragraph 8). But the proper form of the Idea and of the transition here under consideration is the immediate conversion of tqe pure self-determination of the will (i.e. of the simple concept itself) into a single and natural existent without the mediation of a particular content (like a purpose in the case of action). . . . Addition. It is often alleged against monarchy that it makes the welfare of the state dependent on chance, for it is urged, the monarch may be ill-educated, he may perhaps be unworthy of the highest posi­ tion in the state, and it is . senseless that such a state of affairs should exist because it is supposed to be rational. But all this rests on a presup­ position which is nugatory, namely that everything depends on the monarch's particular character. In a completely organized state, it is only a question of the culminating point of formal decision . . . ; he has only to say "yes" and dot the "i," because the throne should be such that the significant thing in its holder is not his particular make-up. . . , Whatever else the monarch may have in addition to this power of final decision is part and parcel of his private character and should be of no consequence. Of course there may be circumstances in which it is this private character alone which has prominence, but in that event the state is either not fully developed, or else is badly constructed. In a well-

however such weak­ nesses also contain crucial aids to understanding. Frequently. in Hegel's philosophy the primacy of objectivity over the intended train of thought. any more than it is a . Rather. Then it is useless to ponder cryptic individual formulations and get involved in often unresolvable controversies about what was meant. In better cases than the awkwardly ideological Philosophy of Right. The circumstances and the problem have to be devel­ oped from Hegel's program and then thought through on their own. constitutes an authority in opposi­ tion to his philosophy. the objective aspects belongs to law alone. the subject matter should be recon­ structed from knowledge of it.131 Skoteinos. immanent fi­ delity to Hegel's intention requires one to supplement or go be­ yond the text in order to understand it. the primacy of the specific state of affairs under consideration."43 Either all the bad contingency that Hegel disputes is condensed into this "I will" after all. He almost always has certain is­ sues in mind even when his own formulations fail to capture them. It is not the customary progressive linear development of ideas. The task of immersion in the detail requires consideration of the internal structure of Hegel's texts. one must uncover Hegel's aim. and the monarch's part is merely to set to the law the subjective "I Will. or How to Read Hegel organized monarchy. What Hegel was talking about is more important than what he meant. whether it is that the cryptic content of his thought now discloses itself of its own ac­ cord or that his thoughts become articulated through what they themselves missed. or the monarch is truly only a yea-sayer who could be dispensed with. If within a paragraph the problem at is­ sue stands out as being outlined and resolved-and the secret of the philosophical method may lie in the fact that to understand a problem and to solve it are actually one and the same thing­ then Hegel's intention becomes clear too.

occa­ sionally hesitant. some full thought had limited itself to the point of one-sidedness. "commentary. it found itself punished by having been torn entirely out of the context. tried to go on. but then it scored most surely. or How to Read Hegel sequence of discrete. For slowly and deliber­ ately.44 Broadly speaking. now isolating something. .132 Skoteinos. more divisive and yet even richer in reconcilia­ tion. however. spoke and pondered. making use of seemingly insignificant links. What is char­ acteristic. then by jerks sweeping along. . now very comprehensively. the most wonderful stream of thought twisted and pressed and struggled. it flowed forward irre­ sistibly." and synthesis as progression to something new that is not contained within the concept itself. is the fusion of the dynamic moment with the static. the right word seemed to be miss­ ing forever. analytic and synthetic judgments are not as strictly distinguished as in the Kantian ABC. unusual and yet the only one that was right. had split itself into dis­ tinctions and involved itself in contradictions whose victorious solution eventually found the strength to compel the reunification of the most recalcitrant elements. the thought kept revolving around the same point with similar words. started once more. Instead of moving forward. But if one's wearied attention wandered and strayed a few minutes before it sud­ denly returned with a start to the lecture. This makes it difficult to decide where to stop: He faltered even in the beginning. . differentiated independent analyses. . The comparison with a web that the structure sometimes provokes is also inaccurate: it ignores the dynamic moment. Thus always taking up again carefully what had gone before in order to develop out of it more profoundly in a different form what came later. In this re­ gard as well. stopped again. as in Hegel's oral delivery. one might say that in the Hegelian system. In vain. it seemed common and yet inimitably fitting. Hegel is composing something analogous to a mu­ sical reprise of pre-Kantian and especially Leibnizian rationalism. Hegel's weighty chapters resist the distinction between conceptual analysis. Now one had grasped the clear meaning of a sentence and hoped most ar­ dently to progress.

as it were. the concept's Other. little as Hegel liked that logical form. as it does with Kant. some­ thing implied in its meaning. Through the explication of the concepts. The new is the old. The movement of thought. according to traditional logic and epistemology." comparable to the experience the eye has when looking through a microscope at a drop of water that be­ gins to teem with life . except that what that stubborn. and this forms the pattern for his pre­ sentation. which is outlined in the Dif erenzschri t and then carried out en­ f f ergetically in the Logic. otherwise the claim inherent in the form of the judg­ ment-that something is this or that-is not met. at the edges. In its microstructure Hegel's thought and its literary forms are what Walter Benjamin later called "di­ alectics at a standstill. and yet it is only the catastrophe of such tenacity that gives rise to the movement that makes it immanently other than itself. Numerous re­ flections of Hegel's are organized in a similar manner. or How to Read Hegel mediated by subjectivity. is accomplished by analytic judgments. The model of this struc­ ture of thought is Hegel's treatment of the law of identity A A. in other words through what. the nonidentical. without the scope of the concept being infringed upon. spellbind­ ing gaze falls on is not firmly delineated as an object but frayed. and one must have a clear grasp of this way of proceeding to avoid being repeatedly confused by it. Inherent in the meaning of a pure iden­ tical judgment is the nonidentity of its members. the entrance of something new. the abstract identity of the concept. In an individual judgment sameness can be predicated only of things that are not the same. The presentation tends to take the form of the ana­ lytic judgment.133 Skoteinos. does not add anything to the grammatical concept that forms the subject. The concept is turned this way and that until it becomes clear that it is more than what it is. becomes evident within the concept itself. One of the most famous passages from = . The concept breaks up when it insists on its identity.

a piece of unreflected immediacy. whose existence is self-knowl­ edge. seen as a state of repose. He was too close to it. and in analogous places in the Logic. . or How to Read Hegel the preface to the Phenomenology reveals something of that inter­ nal structure: Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away. it concealed itself from him. to be sure. as in Goethe's maxim about all striving being eternal rest. but they are as much positive and necessary moments. what distinguishes itself therein. The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk. In the whole of the movement. which is linked with the reflection of reflection. The usual conception of the dynamic of Hegel's thought-that the movement of the concept is nothing but the advance from one to the other by virtue of the inner mediatedness of the former­ is one-sided if nothing else. But the internal structure also has far-reaching consequences for the way the whole fits together: it has retroactive force. breaks the concept open by demonstrating its inconsistency. the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than the determinate thoughts do. is pre­ served as something that recollects itself.45 Here. and its ubiquity may have prevented Hegel from acknowledging it. as they are negative and eva­ nescent. and this kind of movement supplements the movement . this one too is simultaneously an aspect of every indi­ vidual part. yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out.46 the standstill is reserved for the totality. and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth. but is 'in itself' . the movement of the concept always also affects the stage from which it breaks away.134 Skoteinos. Judged in the court of this movement. the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. But like every aspect of the whole in Hegel. . and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence. The advance is a permanent critique of what has come before. and gives itself particular existence. In that the reflection of each con­ cept.

But this determining is. accordingly. then. ground is. as its higher form. attained. the A = B. Conversely.47 In the Sub jective Logic Hegel defines. the content of the synthetic judgment is recognized as already a necessary moment of the analytic judgment A = A. on the other hand it is this negating movement as a determin­ ing that first posits that reflected determinateness which appeared as immediate. in addition. the synthetic judgment. What would be new according to the simple schema of triplicity reveals itself to be the concept that formed the start­ ing point for the particular dialectical movement under discus­ sion.135 Skoteinos. in general terms and a little formalistically. of the individual dialectical movement under discussion : I n this turning point o f the method. only the restored. but which is posited only by the self-excluding reflection of ground and therein is posited as only a posited or sublated determina­ tion. the "third member" of the three-part schema as the first member. proceeds only from itself. in the first instance. purified or manifested identity of essence which the reflected determination is in itself. modified and under different illumination. in determining itself as ground. In so far as the determination of a first. Thus essence. the course of cognition at the same time returns into itself. the simple formal identity of A = A is retained in the equivalence of the nonidentical. for the . not only is the identity of the nonidentical. In the dialectic of identity. as a sublating of the determining. determined by that first. is the starting point of the advance to ground (through the nature of the determina­ tion itself which sublates itself or falls to the ground). of simple universality. on the one hand. or How to Read Hegel of advance by synthesis. an immediate. Often. The "self­ determination of essence as ground" from the second book of the Logic provides evidence that Hegel himself intended this : . the presentation makes a back­ ward leap. As self-sublating contradiction this negativity is the restoration of the first immediacy. in modified form.

. the positive resulting from sublation of the negative. It is also. as the whole that has withdrawn into and is identical with itself. forward and back­ ward at the same time. the term reckoned as third can also be reckoned as fourth. the third term to the first immediate and the mediated. is immediately the pos­ itive.absolute negativity or the second negative. for it is not a quiescent third. between what already exists and what is new.ts simple relation to itself. and instead of a tripl­ icity. If one insists on counting. . however. in this way. now as the first negative is already the second term. are not capable of grasping it. but such forms ofjudgment as: the third is immediacy and mediation. or How to Read Hegel other of the other. in the course of the method as a whole. . should be the result of development. is self-mediating movement and activity. One has to know a whole movement and be aware retrospectively at every moment of what has come before. the negative of the negative.48 Music of Beethoven's type. . Its temporal organizing principle re­ quires this: time can be articulated only through distinctions between what is familiar and what is not yet familiar. the concept that has realized itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has restored . the re­ turn in reminiscence of complexes expounded earlier. of dialectic. . offers an ana­ logue to this that transcends mere analogy. . in which ideally the reprise. Now this result. The individual passages have to be grasped as consequences of what has come before. that is. . Now more pre­ cisely the third is the immediate. i. but precisely as the unity.136 Skoteinos. the meaning of a diver- . the universal. the third term to the first formal negative and to. Hence it is now itself the same thing as the starting-point had determined itself to be. the identical. the ' negative or the difference is counted as a duality . . It is equally immediacy and mediation. has given itself the form of immediacy. this second immediate is. Highly organized music too must be heard multidimensionally. the condition of moving forward is a retrogressive consciousness. the simple resulting from sublation of difference. but the immediate resulting from sub­ lation of mediation. This result is there­ fore the truth. or: it is the unity of them. the abstract form may be taken as a quadruplicity.

a dualism he never did away with. in form Hegel's philosophy is incomparably closer to works of art than Schelling's.137 Skoteinos. as il­ lusion. All philosophy that does not make do with an unreflective imitation of the scientific ideal is of course familiar with this tension in a less extreme form. The trans­ position is itself philosophically motivated. an arena for the semblance of absolute identity. But if art is not an idea separate from philosophy and guiding it as a prototype.. While the mature Hegel dispar­ aged Schelling's "intellectual intuition" as an extravagant rap­ ture that was simultaneously aconceptual and mechanical. so in Hegel there is a tension between the ex­ pressive and the argumentative elements. and reappearance has to be perceived not merely as architectonic correspondence but as something that has evolved with necessity. or How to Read Hegel gent repetition has to be evaluated. art requires for its constitutlon something indissoluble. This semblance is less harmful in art insofar as art posits itself as semblance and not as actualized reaSOn. if philosophy as such wants to accomplish what is not accomplished in art. non­ identical. which derives its concept of truth from art. tic form transposed into the philosophical domain. . As something set off from empirical real­ ity. which wanted to construct the world using the work of art as its prototype. This is perpetuated in the dualism of Schell­ ing's philosophy. Just as there is a tension between expression and construction in works of art. art becomes art only through its relation to something that is itself not art. then the philosophical totality thereby becomes aesthetic. Absolute idealism had no more desire to tolerate something alien and external to its own law than did the dynamic teleology of the art of its time. What may help both in understanding this analogy and in understanding the core of Hegel's thought is recognizing that the conception of totality as an identity immanently mediated by nonidentity is a law of artis. classicistic music in particular.

The expansion of the apparatus of thought. or How to Read Hegel In Hegel the expressive element represents experience. in all philosophy that is philosophy. without sub jecting themselves to reflection. In the afterlife of philosophical works. But the very objectivity of the experiential content which. overgrows what is subjectively in­ tended. What is false in Hegel's philosophy manifests itself precisely in the notion that with enough concep­ tual effort it could realize this kind of irrelevance. as though it were the subjective moment in it. a matter of subjective weltanschauung. Sub jective experience is only the outer shell of philosophical experience. the unfold­ ing of their substance. and least of all in Hegel. In the Phenomenology Hegel still wanted to believe that the experience could simply be described. It has to do. There is no way to make the intellectual experience expressed and the medium of thought irrelevant to one another. which develops beneath it and then throws it off. The whole of Hegel's philosophy is an effort to translate intellectual experience into concepts.138 Skoteinos. But intellectual ex­ perience can be expressed only by being reflected in its media­ tion-that is. This need for expression is by no means. Rather. Hence it gains strength from precisely the activity of thought that is ultimately extinguished in the ex­ periential content that becomes evident. that which actually wants to come out into the open but cannot. Hence the . actively thought. appear except in the medium of concepts. often censured as being mechanical and coercive. So-called foundational or ur-experiences that would attempt to express themselves di­ rectly as much. which is fundamentally its opposite. as unconscious his­ toriography of the spirit. would remain impotent impulses. is proportional to the force of the experience to be mastered. what the works express is gradually extricated from what in them was merely thought. with historically man­ ifested truth. first stirs within philosophy. if it wants to attain necessity. it is itself objectively determined.

His intellectual mode of proceeding is paradoxical. to an extreme degree.139 Skoteinos. is re­ duced to its experiential core. as they would like to be but are compulsively incapable of being. or How to Read Hegel innumerable gaps between the concept and what is experienced. the primacy of intellectual experience in Hegel also affects the conceptual form. Understanding has to find a foothold in the gap between experience and concept. Whatever experience the reader may register has to be thought out on the basis of the reader's own experience. the expectation of pro. The process of understanding is a progressive self-correcting of such projections through comparison with the text. If the reader wanted merely to determine what a passage meant or to pursue the chimera of figuring out what the author wanted to say. Where concepts become an autonomous apparatus-and only a foolish enthusiasm could claim that Hegel always respects his own canon-they need to be brought back into the intellectual expe­ rience that motivates them and be made vital. the substance of which he wants to attain philosophical certainty would evaporate for him.. antici­ pates a tendency that did not become explicit methodologically until the phenomenology of Husser! and his school a hundred years later. While it remains. who is accused of panlogism. Hegel. Hegel has to be read against the grain. as a law of its form. which on the other hand is intellectual experience and even itself thought. within the medium of the concept-at the highest level of abstraction in terms of the hierarchy of comprehensive logic-it does not actually argue as though it wanted thereby to economize on the ob jective contri­ bution of thought as opposed to that of experience. No one can read any more out of Hegel than he puts in. ductive imagination on the part of the one reading. and in such a way that every logical operation. On the other hand. however formal it seems to be. . The equivalent of such experience in the reader is the imagination. The con­ tent itself contains.

Critique of Pure Reason. However subject to criticism this view may be. but rather as inherently in motion. that is. and with good reason. something that had already been illuminated in a passage in Kant's deduction*-are inher­ ently spiritually mediated. For this reason Hegel necessarily dis* "They are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thought. which must be given to it by the ob ject. Primarily because the dialectician knows something that Simmel later rediscovered : that anything that remains argumentation exposes itself to refutation. ideal unities. London: MacMillan. in­ variants. given. since thought will rediscover itself in the ob ject thought. or How to Read Hegel The program of pure onlooking outlined in the introduction to the Phenomenology carries more weight in Hegel's chief works than naive philosophical consciousness believes it to. as in the school of HusserI. what is needed in order to grasp them is not thought but rather the relationship for which the phenom­ enology of a hundred years later invented the term "sponta­ neous receptivity. given to it from elsewhere in intuition. in the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold.140 Skoteinos. . Because as He­ gel conceives it all phenomena-and for Hegel's Logic the cate­ gories of logic are also phenomena. Hegel's mode of proceeding is organized in accordance with it. that it can produce a priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories. that is. is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment." The thinking subject is to be released from thought. but merely combines and arranges the material of knowledge. Hegel distrusts argument deeply. the intuition. Norman Kemp Smith. it has only to be developed out of the object and to identify itself in it. trans." Except that the latter are conceived not as fixed meanings. which by itself knows nothing whatsoever. things that are manifested. 1963. and only by such and so many. p. This peculiarity of our understanding. Hence he can be understood only when the individual analyses are read not as arguments but as descriptions of "implied meanings. consists. to the unity of apperception-a faculty. or why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition" (Kant. therefore. 1 6 1 [B I45fJ). and in that sense mediated.

from the intuitionism he attacked in Schelling. In his works there are neither theses nor arguments . something that becomes dispensable as soon as the thesis has been firmly established. demands the most extreme efforts on the part of thought. hence thesis. to be sure. His philosophy. virtually. The general orientation is set by the overall intention. or is at least supposed to be. hence argument. is inappropriate. At every point one must try to admit as many possibilities for what is meant. is also dialectical in that it moves within the medium of a thought freed from tension. For him argument is not something subsidi­ ary. which. but what is said about the phenomena is derived from the phenomena themselves." The one is. Relaxation of consciousness as an approach means not ward­ ing off associations but opening the understanding to them. as a philosophy of identity stretched to the breaking point. the thesis is synthesis through judgment. In this Hegel differs profoundly from Kant and Fichte. Hegel made fun of theses. as many connec­ tions to something else. The ideal is nonargumentative thought. The task Hegel imposes is not that of an intellectual forced march. Categories like "foun­ dational relations" themselves fall into the Hegelian dialectic of essence and should not be presupposed. also. which the unarmed reader often feels himself obliged to ask of Hegel's transitions and deductions. Even the question why. A major part of the work . as may arise. He broke up the dichotomy between thesis and argument as he did all rigid dichotomies. as is often the case in philosophy. always the other as well: the argument is the predication of what some­ thing is. where other possibili­ ties than the one Hegel puts forth seem open. Whether his philosophy is followed through to the end depends on whether this relaxation is attained or not. or How to Read Hegel appoints anyone who looks for his arguments.141 Skoteinos. calling them "dicta. it is almost the oppo­ site. He­ gel can be read only associatively.

even the later chapters of the Phenomenology refrain from brutally compacting the science of the experience of consciousness and that of human history into one another. external history is swallowed up in the inner historicity of the exposition of the categories. it is intended to be real. Nevertheless. spirit. the substratum of his philosophy. Despite his declarations to the contrary in the Philosophy of Right. such as the Dif erenzschri t or the f f Jena Logic. is not intended to be a separate. alongside one another. touching. both Hegel's conception of the truth p's something in the process of becoming and his ab­ sorption of empirical reality into the life of the concept tran­ scended the division of philosophy into systematic philosophy and historical philosophy. it always makes reference to the theses that have been handed down as part of the history of philosophy. As we know. associative thought is grounded in the thing itself. For Hegel. The two spheres hover. and its movement to be real history. When the Logic delimits itself from other views of the same sub­ ject matter. should be adduced. Earlier Hegelian texts. with incomparable tact. and they allow themselves the references to the history of philosophy that are later suppressed in the interests of the ideal of the move­ ment of the concept.142 Skoteinos. Often they offer programmatic formulations of things the Logic will try to carry out. or How to Read Hegel of the productive imagination consists in this. To be sure. in accordance with its thematics and no doubt also under the pressure of the later Hegel's increasing rigidity. a shadow of ambiguity lies across . In the Logic. At least a portion of the energy without which one can no more read than one can without relaxation is used to shake off the automatic discipline that is required for pure concent�ation on the object and that thereby easily misses the object. But at least the exposition almost never forgets intellectual history in the narrower sense. In ob­ scure sections it is generally advisable to extrapolate such link­ ages. subjective idea.

or How to Read Hegel this layer of Hegel's work as well. requires that doctrine. Much more invariance finds its way into the concept in motion than anyone who has too undialectical a con­ ception of the notion of the dialectic itself would expect. It would serve understanding as well as provide a pedagogical aid. moreover. called Hegel's grotesque crag mel­ ody. Let me suggest at least one other dimension of associations. Hegel's conception of an identity within the whole.143 Skoteinos. whose standpoint. and what already against Schell­ ing. The consequences of this for his structure should be explored. They are oriented more by ob jective interest than by an interest in so-called "encounters" with books. has already been transcended intellectually. are by no means the only ones that arise in connection with Hegel. the task of establishing a catalogue of the invariant ele­ ments in Hegel and working out their relationship to those that are in motion is an' urgent one. Such questions could be re­ solved by Hegel philology if there were such a thing. Even in the Dif erenzschri t f f one does not always know for certain what is directed against Reinhold. They are seldom fully exhausted by the philosophical idea to which they allude.49 the number of his motifs is finite. although of course it would . so the latter ar� influenced in their course by the systematic. in a musical metaphor. Historical associations. of the sub­ ject-ob ject. However paradoxical it may be. For all the richness of what Marx. while still officially defended. This separates him ir­ reconcilably from the kind of vitalist "flow" to which Dilthey's method dilutes him. Until that time interpretation in terms of the history of philosophy ought to strive for the same catholicity of interpretation as systematic interpretation. Hegel's dynamic is itself a dynamic of fixed and dynamic elements. what against Fichte. How­ ever much the doctrine of the categories is negated in its details. But just as the great systematic reflections feed on impulses from the historical.

proposes them. In the most difficult passages it is helpful to associate from one's knowledge of He­ gel's invariants. the latter are only a partial moment. In these terms. Their op­ posite pole is the exact wording. In addition to this kind of fruitfulness. like free thought in gen­ eral: is inconceivable without a playful element to which one owes the associations. which necessarily moves away from the text. a con­ temporary thinker whQ for all his positivism is closer to Hegel than their two alleged standpoints are to one another. Whereas Hegel. Often a comparison be­ tween the general motif and the specific wording supplies the meaning. called his philosophy "experimentalism. The unorthodox overview of the whole without which one cannot do this requites Hegel for being unable to operate orthodoxly himself. from what is said. John Dewey. and leaving those that are in accordance with it and that illuminate the details." Something of this stance is ap­ propriate for the reader of Hegel. The reading of Hegel must make a virtue of appropriation out of the necessity of the disturbing clatter about whose presence in classical music Rich­ ard Wagner made an analogous complaint. eliminating those that contradict it.144 Skoteinos. which he certainly did not point out and which may be embedded in his work against his will. Thought. reading Hegel is an experi­ mental procedure: one allows possible interpretations to come to mind. to the possible basis of the individual remark at hand. The second level of appropria­ tion involves trying the associations out on the wording. and compares them with the text and with what has already been reliably interpreted. the criterion for evaluating associations is that they are compatible not only with what is there but with the context as well. At the current stage of He­ gel's historical unfolding. has to return to it and become condensed within it. such second-order empiricism would . or How to Read Hegel do so only in undiminished consciousness of the one-sidedness that according to Hegel is itself untruth.

There is no need to deny the pedagogical danger that in doing so students may get involved in empty words and idle speculation and elevate themselves above the matter at hand in narcissistic comfort. for all He­ gel's invectives against narrow-minded reflective thought. a critique of what is to be understood when the process of understanding compels a different judgment than the one that is to be understood. The notion that critique is a sec­ ond level erected on a foundation of understanding. is in general false. a particularly high degree of such interplay must be demanded. He who presumes to seek spirit in the quintessence of what is thereby bows to the latter more deeply than he admits. They are aimed at helping to extract the ob­ jective substance from his texts instead of philosophizing about . in effect. Understand­ ing takes place along with it and accordingly always also becomes. To read him experimentally is to judge him by his own criterion. an idea de­ rived from pedagogical platitudes and authoritarian prejudice. Hegel's ideal of reconstruc­ tion is not absolutely distinct from the scientific ideal: among the unresolved contradictions in the Hegelian dialectic. When it comes to Hegel. this is per­ haps the one richest in implications. which is otherwise recommended only by pure nominalists. in his philosophy's stu1:>born insistence on what is. It is not the worst reader who provides the book with disrespectful notes in the margin.145 Skoteinos. It is up to the teacher to protect the interplay of understanding and criticism from degenerating into pretentious emptiness. but that has nothing to do with what is the case epistemologically. Hegel provokes the exper­ imental method. Indications about how to read him are nec­ essarily immanent. But what this says is that no reading of Hegel can do him justice without criticizing him. Philosophy itself takes place within the per­ manent disjunction between the true and the false. or How to Read Hegel bring out the latent positivistic moment contained.

He becomes Hegel's critic by following him. the incomprehensible in Hegel is the scar left by identity-thinking. It was transcendent and not immanent critique that took up the standpoint against both the rigidity and the arbitrariness of which philosophy turned in equal measure. although for its part the latter too has to begin within the limitations of a stand­ point. Within the system. even before expressing any content. From the point of view of understanding. is symptomatic of that. In contrast. I . . there is a moment of content to the form itself. this is the insurance premium they pay for not being a system. Transcendent cri­ tique sympathizes with authority in its very form. Transcendent critique avoids from the outset the experience of what is other than its own conscious­ ness. from dialectical materialism to Protestantism. . without mental reserva­ tions. even if that object is another idea. Hegel'S dialectical philosophy gets into a dialectic it cannot account for and whose solution is be­ yond its omnipotence. to the object in which they immerse themselves. The expression "as a . mol­ lusklike and relativistic. the claim Hegel makes for his immanent movement-that it is the truth-is not a position.146 Skoteinos." in which one can insert any orientation. The immanent approach need not fear the objection that it is without a perspective. He who entrusts himself to Hegel will be led to the thresh­ old at which a decision must be made about Hegel's claim to truth. Ideas that have confidence in their own objectivity have to surrender va banque. There is no other way to get into contact with the matter at hand. and in terms of the laws of the system. the truth of the nonidentical manifests itself . . Anyone who judges something that has been articulated and elaborated-art or philosophy-by presupposi­ tions that do not hold within it is behaving in a reactionary man­ ner. . To this extent that movement is in­ tended to lead out beyond its pure immanence. . or How to Read Hegel his philosophy from the outside. even when he swears by progressive slogans. .

distinct from the concept. But Hegel violates his own concept of the dialectic. free of contradiction. nonidentity. Hegel actually takes cognizance of that dimension only for the sake of identity. identity. Through the sublation of the dialectic. and in being comprehended. precisely because they are so charged with speculation. The nonidentities are heavily stressed. Certainly what is nonidentical and unknown becomes identical as well in being known. the nonidentical. But the nonidentical itself does not merely become a concept by virtue of such reflection. only as an instrument of identity. But only . that would mean that dialectic had forgotten its understanding of universal mediation. by not violating it. reciprocity is restruc­ tured to become one-sidedness. with pa­ thos. and nothing that is untrue can be understood. But by defining it nonetheless. Nonidentity is to be defined for its own sake. as the untruth of the system. Nor can one simply leap from reciprocity to the nonidentical. every individual piece is to be indebted to the other-noniden­ tical-and yet the whole is to be free of debt. One cannot move from the logical movement of concepts to existence. it remains the content of the concept. It says. division. but not acknowledged. As if in a gigantic credit system. Ac­ cording to Hegel th�re is a constitutive need for the nonidentical in order for concepts. This is where the idealist dialectic commits its fallacy. to corne into being. as unresolved. by dosing it off and making it the su­ preme unity. in the other sense of being unmastered. Thus the incomprehensible explodes the system. just as con­ versely there is a need for the concept in order to become aware of the nonconceptual. Summum ius summa iniuria.147 Skoteinos. For all his emphasis on negativity. and nonidentity. the dialectic imagines itself to have gone beyond nonidentity and to be assured of absolute identity. which should be defended against him. identical. or How to Read Hegel as error. as something heterogeneous. the nonconceptual becomes the concept of the nonidentical.

or How to Read Hegel by a Miinchhausen trick. and noth­ ing less.148 Skoteinos. . What causes the dialectic problems is the truth content that needs to be derived from it. by pulling itself up by its own boot­ straps. These. The dialectic could be consistent only in sacrificing con­ sistency by following its own logic to the end. a moment that is posited along with it. are the stakes in understanding Hegel. could it eliminate the moment that cannot be fully ab­ sorbed.

Teil WWl l : Vorlesungen fiber die Philosophie der Geschichte . if one has been used in the text. 2. Teil WW 9: System der Philosophie. Where no reference to an English-language publication is given. Adorno cites the JubiHiumsausgabe of Hegel's works reissued under the editorship of Hermann Glockner and published by the Friedrich Frommann Verlag between . Teil WW 5: Wissenschaft der Logik. 1927 and 1965. Teil WW l O : System der Philosophie. In these notes the following abbreviations have been used: WW 1 Aufsatze aus dem kritischen Journal der Philosophie (und andere Schrif­ : ten aus der Jenenser Zeit) WW 2: Phanomenologie des Geistes WW 3: Philosophische Propadeutik WW 4: Wissenschaft der Logik. 1 . the translation in the text is my own. II. I. followed by the reference to the published English translation. Teil WW 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts WW 8: System der Philosophie.Notes References to Hegel's works are noted as follows: the reference to the German edition cited by Adorno is given first. III.

1. 1969). S. Sibree (Lon­ don: George Bell & Sons. Bd. T. 1975). Knox. f Philosophy of History: Lectures on the Philosophy o History. Harris (Albany. 2. 1975). WW15: Vorlesungen liber die Philosophie der Religion. 1970). Miller (Oxford : Black­ well. M. V. 2. the following abbreviations have been used: Difference: The Dif erence between Fichte's and Schelling's System ofPhilosophy. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press. V. LogidEncyclopedia I: Logic: Part One o the Encyclopaedia o the Philosophical Sci­ f f ences. Nature/Encyclopedia II: Philosophy o Nature: Part Two of the Encylopaedia of the f Philosophical Sciences. trans. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1. 1. trans. 1942). Miller (Oxford : Oxford University Press. Bd. Cerf and H.150 Notes WW12: Vorlesungen liber die Aesthetik. trans. 1977). Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin. Bd. Aesthetics: Hegel's Aesthetics. Bd. Phenomenology: The Phenomenology of Spirit. trans. 1971). 1 (Oxford: Oxford Univer­ sity Press. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press. WW19: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie. 1977). WW 1 6: Vorlesungen liber die Philosophie der Religion. J. vol. NY: State University of New York Press. . trans. Propaedeutic: The Philosophical Propaedeutic. 3. Bd. V. M. A. WW18: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie. 1986). New York: Humanities Press. A. Mind/Encyclopedia III: Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. For references to published English translations of Hegel's works. W. trans. f and ed. WW17: Vorlesungen liber die Geschichte der Philosophie. trans. Bd. Logic: The Science of Logic. William Wallace (Oxford : Oxford University Press. A. V. trans. William Wallace and A. A. 1894). V. trans. trans. T. Right: The Philosophy of Right.

Adorno. and his Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry . History of Philosophy III. Weber. in three volumes (New York: The Humanities Press. Von Kant bis Hegel. and Lukacs. 483. has recently proposed Adorno as a model dialectical thinker for the 1990s and predicted a revival of an "unfamiliar materialist-math­ ematical" Hegel as well. Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy 1. p. Hegel. 6.151 Notes to Pages xi-16 Philosophy o f Religion: Lectures o n the Philosophy o Religion. his anal­ yses of Marx's early writings. or. trans. These studies include Marcuse's Hegel's Ontology and the Foundations of a Theory ofHistoricity. Payne (Indian­ f apolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Speirs f and J. p. Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests. B . Cf. 3.. E. Negative Dialectics (Kant. E. p. History of Philosophy III. 1955). Hei­ degger). Ibid. B. WW 19. On the Basis o Morality. This is the basis on which Fredric Jameson in his Late Marxism: Adorno. 1970). Peter Heath and John Lachs. 6 1 1 . G. p. and Hegel: Three Studies. p. trans. Sanderson. into Freud. his Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Hegel. which deals with Kant. Marx. Arthur Schopenhauer. 279. 5. The translation of the German word Begri f has been consistently changed from f "notion" to "concept" in quoted passages. and Nietzsche. 2. 615. Science of Knowledge (Wissenscha ftslehre). History ofPhilosophy III. 4. Fichte. p.. Hork­ heimer. Mead. the Persistence of the Dialectic. 48 1 [translation altered]. p. trans. Parsons. and his Theory of Communicative Ac­ tion. F. first and second introductions (New York: Appleton-Century­ Crofts. 479. Richard Kroner. S. 2 (Tiibingen: Mohr. and Adorno's Kierkegaard. Metacritique o Epistemology f (Husserl) . Durkheim. vol. 1924). 63. Hegel. trans. Ibid. History of Philosophy: Lectures on the History o Philosophy. which deals with Marx. 1962). p. Dilthey. J. Simson (New York: The Humanities Press. 6 1 3 . E .jargon ofAuthenticity (Heidegger). 1965). Haldane f and Frances H. . J. 2. Introduction 1. Peirce.

. Dialectic o Enlightenment f 16. LogiclEncyclopedia I. 25. p. Hegel. p. p. . 53 1 . 1 8 . 2 1 . 15. Hegel. 152. p. Cf. 3 1 9f. 25-26. Mind/Encyclopedia III. 8. Hegel. p. p . p. 1 1-12. p. 245 and 246. 20. 9 1 . Phenomenology. 187. Ad (New York: Herder and Herder. 97. par. and ed. 27. Cf. B.152 Notes to Pages 17-37 7. 25.. p. pp. Ibid.. LogiclEncyclopedia I. 10. p. 87. ed.. WW 2. Right. Logic. 28. p. p. 1 10 . Ibid. "Critique of the Gotha Program. p. 202. 42 1 . 305. 1972). 130. Logic. p. 1 5 1 .. Ibid . 15. Hegel. T. 10. pars. 1972).. 53. 14. 588f. Ibid. p . Hegel. Cf. Right. prno. Logic. . p. Hegel. Ibid. Karl Marx. Hegel. p. p. 99. 12. Robert Tucker (New York: Norton. pp. Right. 30. 35. par. Logic. p." in The Marx-Engels Reader. 158. 1 7 1 . p . trans. p. 17. Phenomenology. WW 4. 204. WW 4. 249. 82. Phenomenology." in this volume. . p . Phenomenology. 8 1 . Max Horkheimer and Theodor W . p. Karl Marx. WW 10. 288. p. 396.. Phenomenology. 9. WW 8. WW 4. Ibid. 1964). WW 2. 24. 23. 107. 23. 404f. p. Early Writings. 322f. 19. p. pp. Hegel. the conclusion of the essay "Skoteinos. Logic. Bottomore (New York: Mc­ Graw-Hill. 87f. p. 2 2 . WW 8. WW 2. 13. p.. Hegel. p. WW 2. Kroner. Cf. p. 1 1 . 382-383. 26. Hegel. 472f. WW 7. p. 1 89. p. Hegel. p. p.

Hegel: Reinterpretation. 120. 36. WW 10. 55. WW 8. Ibid. Cf. p. this volume. 28. p.. Ibid. Phenomenology. Martin Heidegger. Hegel's Concept o Experience (San Francisco: Harper & Row. p. p. p. 613. 372. 38. 87. p. WW 2. Mind/Encyclopedia III... pp. 12. 9. 479. WW 15. 7. Right. 4.153 Notes to Pages 29. Hegel. p. pp. 6. Logic/Encyclopedia I. Hegel. WW 9. Hegel. 31. Hegel. Hegel. . p. 176. p. f 8. 305. 6. 184-185. pp. Logic/Encyclopedia I. Hegets Leben. p. Hegel. p. par. 162. 387f. p. 172. p. 33. p. Philosophy o Religion I. 38f. Hegel. Cf. p. 19.10. New York: Doubleday. Texts. p. 283. WW 4. p. Hegel. p. p. 487. pp. 22-23. WW 7. f 1970). 379-380. p. WW 19. 329. 46. Hegel. 1965). Winter. 5. 22. p. Phenomenology. WW 8. The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy 1. History of Philosophy III. p.. Logic/Encyclopedia I. Phenomenology. 17. Ibid. p. English in Walter Kaufmann. Werke und LeIwe. 58. 1 1 3. 2. 9-10. . Hegel. 50. 1 74. 386. p. 9. 32. and Com­ mentary (Garden City. 30. p. 5 9 .. p. Phenomenology. . 34. Ibid. WW 2. 35. Kuno Fischer.. p. Phenomenology. Kroner. p. 3. 46. WW 2. 78. 130. Phenomenology. 190 1 ). Logic. p. Ibid. Hegel. p. p. Part 1 (Heidelberg: C. 37. 1 0. 280. p. Nature/Encyclopedia II.

WW 18. 16. WW 8. 27. pp. 130. 173. p. Ibid. Hegel. 12. Hegel. p. Logic/Encyclopedia I. 9. Hegel. 29. Hegel. p. Hegel. WW 8. Cf. 46ff. WW 1 2. 40. 57. p. 20. Logic/Encyclopedia I. WW 3. Cf. WW 8. Hegel. p. Philosophy of History. John and N ecke Mander (New York: Harper and Row. Hegel. 54f. 125. Logic/Encyclopedia I. p. 69. Adorno. 1 1 (Munich: Musarion Verlag. 15. 18. WW 8. trans. 30. WW 1 7. p. Hegel. p. 2 1 . Hegel. History of Philosophy I. p. 47. p. 1963). 2 1 3. p. Aesthetics. p. p. p. p. 13. WW 8. Phenomenology. Immanuel Kant. 84. Friedrich Nietzsche. The Critique o Pure Reason. p. Hegel. trans. p. p. 19. Cf. par 213. 28. Hegel. p . WW 1 . 31. p. 22. 1 38. p. 17. p. par. 352f. p. p. Cf. 24. Aus der Zeit der Morgenriithe und derfriihlichen Wissenscha ft 1880-1882. 25. Musarionsausgabe. Hegel. 97-98. 1964). Philosophy of Religion III. 309. Logic/Encyclopedia I . 173. 149. p. 207. 49. Hegel. d. p. 423f. 23.154 Notes to Pages 59-82 1 1 . 527. 30. Logic/Encyclopedia I. 473. 22.. 29. preface to the 2nd edition. Cf. p. 353. 1 8 1 . Dif erence. 606. p . p . f Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan.. p. cf. p. and Theodor W. Logic/Encyclopedia I. vol. Propaedeutic. "Extorted Reconcilia- . f 14. WW 2. 36. Hegel. 34 1 . 220. Hegel. Hegel. p. WW 1. Realism in Our Time. WW 1 1 . Ibid. History of Philosophy III. Gesammelte Werke. 26. p. 423. 1 0 1 . 1924). WW 8. p. d. WW 19. 22. 20. Logic/Encyclopedia I. WW 16. Georg Lukacs.

102-103. 1 88. trans. Hegel. W. 2 8 1 -282. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press. McTaggart. 2 1 2. 422. preface to the 2nd edition. 60. 1 1 . Valentine Rodger. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press. Immanuel Kant. 348. p. p. 32. Hegel. 63. p. Dif erence. 15. Right. 493. pp. p. Theodor W. 4 . 5. Rene Descartes." trans. Dif erence. Hegel. WW 1 . Cf. 1991). E. M. 50-5 1 . this volume. Cf. 1 89. 10. f 8. Norman Kemp-Smith (London: Macmillan. p. Edmund Husser!. first part). Miller and Reese P. 400. trans. 1931). 99-100. trans. 6. trans. 7.. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (New York: Harcourt Brace. History of Philosophy I. WW 7. f 3. 1992). 2 lf. 1905. by John Veitch. Principles of Philosophy. "From a Letter to Thomas Mann on His Die Betro­ gene. pp. (Dordrecht: Dr. Cf. A Commentary on Hegel's Logic (Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier. 2 1 6ff. p. Descartes. WW 1 7. 1962). Hegel. in The Rationalists (Garden City. 2. 320-32 1 . Oeuvres. The Critique of Pure Reason. "Discourse on Method." i n Notes to Literature I. p. Logic. Ludwig Wittgenstein. R. 14. Principia Philosophiae. 157. 20. 1 l 0. Reidel. 396. p. 236f. p. WW 1. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. WW 4. 3 (Paris. cf. p. 373 (B415). 351-352. 1963). Descartes. p. addition p. p. J. par. Hegel. Skoteinos 1. Miller." in Notes to Literature. p. WW 8 . . trans. 1984). vol. 1974). pp. pp. p. p. 2. 488. par. Logic. 56f. Logic/Encyclopedia I . Cf. p. NY: Doubleday. 12.155 Notes to Pages 84-103 tion: O n Georg Lukacs' Realism in Our Time. 1922). pp. pp. vol. Hegel. Hegel. 13. WW 4. Adorno. 9.

18.. Ibid. Ibid. 157. 35 1 . p. 1835). p. 32 1 . 3 1 . 35 1 . WW 2. Phenomenology. Hegel. 24. K. p . p. 665. p. p. Logic.. 87. Ibid. Friedrich Uberweg. p. Propaedeutic. English i n Kaufmann. WW 5. Hegel. Logic. p. 2 1 1 . NY: Doubleday. p. p. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. 87. p. p. Logic. p. 22. p. 185.. Hotho. 729. 147. p. par 3. 13f. 43f. Ibid.. 4 . p. p. 32. p. 27. 189. 2 1 . 26. p. Hegel. Cf. Ibid. p. 6 1 9 .156 Notes to Pages 103-125 1 6 . 1 6. WW 4. p. Dialectic o Enlightenment. 583. 384f. 526. 1965). 577. 29. Hegel. Hegel. 308. 19. revised by T. Hegel. p . 17. p . H. 432. p. WW 5. Hotho. Logic. 35. Hegel. 25ff. 246f. 1 90. Ibid. pp. . p. par. Logic. Cf. 405. 28. Phenomenology. p. Hegel. Hegel. 30. WW 3. 5. 1972). 386. Logic. 390. 492. Adorno. 33. 203. p. f (New York: Herder and Herder. WW 7. English in Walter Kaufmann. Vorstudien fur Leben und Kunst (Stuttgart and Tiibingen. p. p. WW 2. Ibid. p. WW 10.1 7. 20. WW 4 . p.. 4 1 1 . Max Horkheimer and Theodor W . Hegel. p. 36. Logic. 23. G. 53 1 . 34. 1 923).. 82. Right. Phenomenology. 658f. vol. Ibid. Hegel (Garden City. 536. 25. p.. p. Oesterreich (Berlin: Mittler. Mind/Encyclopedia Ill.

Right. Ibid. Ibid. 288-289. p. p. 43. Die Frilhschri en. p. 27-28. Karl Marx. . p. pp. Reden und Au Jsiitze (Tiibingen. 824. 48. 552. p. WW 2. Phenomenology. 2 1 2 . 758. ft 1953). 280. 240. Logic.. 387ff. WW 7. pp. p. Hegel. cf. 49. Logic. 329. pp. 48f. 843. WW 5.7. 44f. p. Siegfried Landshut (Stuttgart: A. p. Cf. Hegel. 38. WW 5.. Ibid. 42. Hegel. p. Hegel. p. 444-445. 45. 836-838. 5 3 l f and 736. 665f and WW 5. Hegel. p.. Hegel. 352f. WW 4. 4 1 . 77. p. pp.157 Notes to Pages 1 26-143 q. Hotho. Logic. Cf. 386f. par. 1875). pp. 825. Logic. Logic. 7. Logic. 328. 46. 758. Gustav Riimelin. 343ff. p. English in Kaufmann. p. 47. Hegel. p. WW 4. pp. p. quoted in Uberweg.. p. p. 184. 240f. Ibid. p. Kroner. Logic. ed. Logic. p. 351-352 (translation amended). 40. 44. 39.

.

1 18 Hotho. x. x Goethe. 8. M. 28. 36. 47 Lask. 7.Name Index Adorno. 86 Aristotle. 1 . 35 Durkheim. 86. 14. 60. xx. xxx-xxxi.43. J. 979� 122. 66. John. xxi. 75 Borchardt. 1 4 1 . xiii. ix. Immanuel. Adolf. 96. 1 Descartes. 66-67. 76-77. 53.1 4 1 Kierkegaard. David. 32. 122 Horkheimer. 144 Diderot. 1 1 8 Hume..1 04. 35. 56. 14. 1 39-140 Jacobi. xxviii. 66.John. 82. 68. 19. Emil. 103. 102n Dewey. Rudolf. 57 Husserl. xvi. 9. Martin. 134 Habermas. x. xxxii. Henri. 32. 8 1 . 10 Holderlin. 4 1 .. Wilhelm.. 1 26-127. Wolfgang. 82 McTaggart. xxv. Gottfried Wilhelm. Sigmund. ix. 140. 1 1 8 Dilthey. 35. 8. 14. 7 1 . 46 Heraclites. 4 Kroner. xxxv. . Rene. xviii-xix. Johann Wolfgang von. 93 Maimon. Walter. Karl Wilhelm von. 36 Leibniz. 97n. 75 . Denis. 43. 54. 1 1. 3. xiv. 63 Eckermann. xii. xxv-xxvii. ix-xxxiii Anaximander. Johann Peter. 82 Beethoven. xiii Croce. 68.19. 45-46. 133. Jiirgen. 62. 7 1-72. G. Friedrich Heinrich. 34 Kant. Theodor W. 97 Lukacs. 18. E. 120. Ludwig van. x. Edmund. xiii. Emile. x. x. 90. 133 Bergson. 6. 49. 8 . 127. 60.1 6. 55. 62. Benedetto. ix. xiii. 143 Duns Scotus. Georg. Johann Gottlieb. 43 Fichte. 44. H. 3. 55. 50. Soren. 54. FUchard. 9. 59.1 2 1 Humboldt. ix. 64-65. Salomon. 1 1 . 4 1 . 36. Johann Christian Fried­ rich. 136 Ben jamin. 64-65. 5 1 Kohler. 68. 96100. Christian Johann Heinrich. xii Heidegger. Max. 102 Hitler. x. 34. 72-73. xviii. 94.. 143 Freud. 62. Rudolf. 1 15 Heine. xxix Carnap.

ois-Marie Arouet de. 5. Marcel. 35. 9 1 Tucher. xxi. Maria von. x. 54. 18. xvii. 84 Reinhold. 49. Max. 74. x. 70. xi. ix. 1 1 3 Proust. 60. 143 Riimeiin. x Schopenhauer. 28 Sartre. 1 29 Schelling. 144 Weber. Jean-Paul. 16. George. 1 1 0 Veblen. 1 23. 45. ix-x. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. x Whitehead. 6 . 101-102 . 143 Nietzsche. 28 Voltaire. 9 . Gustav. 47. 82. ix. Alfred North. Fran<. 126 Santayana. 80. x Scheier. Arthur. 62. 1 18 Wagner. 4 1 Plato. Richard. 64. x. 89. 3. xii. xiii.160 Index Mann. xi-xiv. ix. 5. 5 1 Uberweg. ix. Thomas. 63. Herbert. 23. Thorstein. Max. Johann Christoph Friedrich von. 143 Schiller. 141. Karl Leonhard. xx Marx. 102n Wittgenstein. Ludwig. 76-78 Parmenides. Friedrich. xix. xiv. 8. x. Karl. 83 Marcuse. ix. 137. Friedrich. xxiv. 122. 62.

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