Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a

c





 



 
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino
[GR L-21289, 4 October 1971]
citizen.
En Banc, Barredo (J): 4 concur, 1 reserves right to file
separate concurring opinion, 1 concurs except as the 
 Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
interpretation accorded some American decisions as an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
to which he is not fully persuaded, 1 dissents in naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
separate opinion she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Œ
 On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that
Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
to visit her great granduncle Lau Ching Ping for a
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
period of one month. She was permitted to come
widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino,
into the Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
permitted to stay for a period of one month which
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to
would expire on 13 April 1961. On the date of her
be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau
denied the same privilege. This is plain common
Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the
authorized period of stay in this country or within
laws of our country, both substantive and
the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure
Immigration or his authorized representative might
(a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable
properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen
the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
matter of her own citizenship settled and
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
established so that she may not have to be called
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
upon to prove it every time she has to perform an
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of
act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise
the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date
arrest and immediate deportation, after the
of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At
the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos.
the hearing which took place one and a half years
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or
after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case,
Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
Except for a few words, she could not speak either
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
generally not considered as res adjudicate, hence it
neighbour, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa.
has to be threshed out again and again as the
She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law,
occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was
or sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of
declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and
Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for
by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
Yeung appealed.
January 1962.
Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the
Fact of the case: On 8
February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a widow of an applicant for naturalizations Filipino,
passport visa to who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
Enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a go through naturalization proceedings, in order to be
temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, denied the same privilege. Every time the citizenship
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1, 000.00 to of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung administrative case, Whatever the corresponding
would actually depart from the Philippines on or court or administrative authority decides therein as
before the expiration of her authorized period of to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
stay in this country or within the period as in his adjudicate, hence it has to be threshed outgain and
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino January 1962.
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Ipso Facto- by the fact itself
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate deportation,
after the expiration of her authorized stay, she
brought an action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil
Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction. Maya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung
appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a
Filipino citizen upon her marriage
To a Filipino citizen.
Held:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act
473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to
- 

 


 

 

restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or


c

!""#
any other resolution that would stay the finality
 


 

  and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The
[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]; also Velez vs. Poe [GR
161823] and Fornier vs. Commission on Elections [GR
151824]
En Banc, 1 concurs, 5 concur in separate opinions, 1
on leave but allowed to vote, 1 on official leave, 3
dissent in separate opinions to which 2 joined
Œ
 On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of
 Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be
"Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to
be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824)
initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003)
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was
a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ
on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23
January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003
for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the
COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the
Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation
to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary
other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824,
would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
basic issue on the case.
 Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as
to be allowed to run for the office of the President of
the Philippines.

expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such election." The term
"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the
date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be
20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res
judicata and jus sanguinis ʹ had been in vogue. Only
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a ͞natural-born͟ citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan
Chong vs. Secretary of Labour (1947), jus sanguinis
or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the
reservations made by the parties on the veracity of
some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ
and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree
of certainty from the documents would be that (1)
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
(3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of
Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of
his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was
84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The
documents have been submitted in evidence by both
contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand
still would preponderate in his favour enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
-

Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence,
and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and wilful. The petitions were
dismissed.
would have received either the second or third
highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election
scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or
vice-presidency before the elections are held.
&'
The case at bar is a consolidated case filed by
petitioners questioning the certificate of candidacy
of herein private respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) party. He represented
 


$c



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!""
himself in said certificate as a natural-born citizen of
FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the
citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They
asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue of the case.
ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) ,
does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of presidential candidates?
RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in
Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the
Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of
the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. In such context, the election
contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
the Philippines, which reason that petitioners filed a
petition before the Comelec to disqualify private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on
the ground that the latter made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino when in truth
his parents were foreigners and he is an illegitimate
child. The Comelec dismissed the petition. Hence,
this appeal.
--


The controversy in the case at bar centers on the
citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr. as to whether or not
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

(

Before discussing on the issue at hand it is worth
stressing that since private respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr. was born on August 20, 1939, the applicable
law then controlling was the 1935 constitution. The
issue on private respondent͛s citizenship is so
essential in view of the constitutional provision that,
͞No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.͟ Natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo
Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father
of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates
that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe was
stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. Considering that the
allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with
proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been
benefited from the ͞en masse Filipinization͟ that the
Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt
that Allan Poe father of private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since
the latter is governed by the provisions of the 1935
Constitution which constitution considers as citizens
of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of
the Philippines, Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of
whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
In re Ching, Bar Matter No. 914
Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar.
FACTS:
April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the
legitimate son of sps Tat Ching, Chinese
Citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union.Since
birth, Ching has resided
In the Phils
July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St.
Louis University in Baguio City, filed
An application to take the ͛98 Bar Examinations.
Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the
exams provided he must submit
Proof of his Phil citizenship
Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that
he is CPA, Voter Cert from
COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tubao, La
Union also from COMELEC.
April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released
and Ching passed. He was
Further required to submit more proof of citizenship.
July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/
Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship
And his Oath of Allegiance.
OSG commented that Ching being the
͞legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was
a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil
citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it
would already be beyond the reasonable time
allowed by present jurisprudence.
Two conditions of an effective election of Phil
citizenship (from OSG):
1st ʹ the mother of the person making the election
must be a Phil citizen
2nd ʹ election must be made upon reaching the age
of majority (w/c means a reasonable time
interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the
Velayocase, and may be extended up to 7 yrs, from
the Cuenco case
ISSUES:
1)WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a
reasonable time
2)if affirmative, WON his citizenship has retroacted
to the time he took the bar.
HELD: Court denies Vicente D Ching͛s application for
admission to the Philippine Bar
(Ouch!)
RATIO:
1& 2) No, Ching͛s election was clearly beyond, by
any reasonable yardstick, the allowable pd w/in
which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April
1964, he was already 35 yrs old when he complied
w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June ͛99.He
was already more than 14 yrs over the age of
majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight,
controlling statues and jurisprudence compel the
Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Phil
citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and
painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. It
should be availed of with fervour,
enthusiasm and promptitude.
Moya Lim Yaoalias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, and Lau
Yuen Yeung v.
Commissioner of Immigration(1971)
Appeal from a decision of CFI of Manila
FACTS:
Feb 1961: Ms Lau Yuen Yeung, HK Chinese,
applied for a passport temporary
visa to enter Phils as non-immigrant. Purpose of
pleasure trip was to visit her
great grand uncle Lau Ching Ping for a month.
March 1961: Visa granted. Expiration date
after 1 month ʹ April 13, 1961. Visa͛s
expiry extended many times.
Date of her arrival: bond of P1,000 filed by
Asher Cheng to ensure her departure
before visa expires.
Jan 25, 1962: Lau Yuen Yeung married Moya
Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen.
Feb 28, 1962: Final date of visa expiration.
Commissioner of Immigration ordered plaintiff
Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Phils, cause her arrest and immediate deportation.
Plaintiff brings this action to court for issuance
of writ of injunction.
 Court hearing 10 months after the marriage:
Plaintiff is 7 mos pregnant.
Furthermore, she was found unable to write either
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbour except for one, Rosa. She did not know
the names of her bros/sisters-in-law.
ISSUES:
1)WON plaintiff may be deemed a Phil citizen by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino
2)If affirmative, WON her marriage to co-plaintiff
justified or excused her failure to
depart from the Phils before date of expiration of
visa.
HELD: Judgment dismissing petition for injunction
reversed and set aside. Lau Yuen Yeung declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to Moya Lim.
RATIO:
1)Alien woman who marries a Fil citizen, native-born
or naturalized, ipso facto
becomes a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to
be a citizen of the Philsunder Sec 4 of C.A.
473.Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Phil citizenship of her husband the moment he takes
his oath as Fil citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under Sec.4.
The basis of the judgment is Sec 15 of the
Naturalization Law, w/c in turn was
taken directly, copied verbatim and adopted from its
American counterpart. From
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
the history of the law traced in the case, it is shown
that the American provision shows intent to remove
racial requirements for naturalization. Hence, settled
is the rule in statutory construction that laws if
modelled and copied from another state law must
be understood and construed in the jurisdiction
which they were taken.
2)Yes, there is no reason why an alien who has been
in the Phils as a temporary
Visitor but who has in the meanwhile become
Filipino should be required to still leave the Phils for
a foreign country, only to apply for a re-entry and
undergo the same process of showing that he is
entitled to come back. Consider the case of minor
children of an alien who is naturalized: It is obvious
that they become ipso
Facto citizens of the Phils. It is unreasonable that
they still have to be taken
Abroad so that they have a right to have permanent
residence here.
Naturalization of an alien visitor as a Phil citizen
logically produces the effect of conferring upon the
person ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including entitlement to permanently stay in the
Phils outside the orbit of authority of the Comm of
Immigration because the Immigration Law is a law
only for aliens and is inapplicable to Phil citizens.
In reference, Sec 9 of the Immigration Act states:
An alien who is admitted as a non-
immigrant cannot remain in the Philspermanently.To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien
must first depart voluntarily to some foreign country
& procure from the appropriate Phil consul the
proper visa & thereafter undergo examination by the
officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Phil port of
entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance w/ the requirements of this Act.
IMPLICATIONS OF MOYA LIM YAO RULING:
It finally settled the long drawn
controversy over the citizenship status of alien
women who marry Philippine citizens. It reversed
former rulings (i.e. Burcaruling) wherein alien
women who marry Filipino citizens do not
acquireautomatically Philippine citizenship.
Under the new doctrine, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino citizen should not be
disqualified from becoming a citizen. Moreover, she
need not prove that she possesses all the
qualifications.
Moreover, this ruling is more consistent
with the spirit of family solidarity as manifested in
the CC (Art 52) unlike the Burca ruling which in effect
divides and separates H from W in giving all the
qualifications and requirements to become a
naturalized citizen.
However, this new ruling might be used
as a convenient means ofcircumventing the
restrictive policies of the Phil Naturalization Law. But
in case of doubt, the naturalization law should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
govt and against the applicant for citizenship.
Dissenting Opinion, J Reyes:
The adoption of similar rulings in the American
courts is tenable if and only if the Phil
Statute had been in its entirety a reproduction of the
American model. The spirit of the American law,
decidedly favourable to the absorption of
immigrants is not in our Consti and laws.
 [1]



In the case of Co vs. Electoral Tribunal the major
issue was whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural-born
Filipino citizen in contemplation of Section 6, Article
VI in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the
1987 Constitution.
Records show that Ong Te, the grandfather of
Jose Ong, Jr., arrived in the Philippines in 1895. He
established his residence in Laoang, Samar. As such,
he was able to obtain a certificate of residence from
the Spanish colonial administration.
Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr.͛s father, was
born in China in 1905. In 1915, he was brought by
Ong Te to Samar where he grew up. He was baptized
into Christianity. He married a natural-born Filipina,
Agripina Lao. He also established his residence in
Laoang, Samar. In 15 February 1954, he filed with
the Court of First Instance of Samar an application
for naturalization. He was declared a Filipino citizen
on 28 April 1955; the declaration was made final and
executory on 15 May 1957. He took his Oath of
Allegiance and was issued a corresponding
certificate of Naturalization.
Jose Ong, Jr. was then a minor, nine years of
age, and still finishing his elementary education
in Samar when his father took his oath. After
completing his elementary education, he went
to Manila to complete his higher education and
eventually found employment there. He, however,
frequently went home to Samar where he grew up.
In 1971, his elder brother was elected a
delegate of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
Emil͛s status as a natural-born citizen was
challenged. The Convention, however, declared Emil
as a natural-born Filipino.
In 1984 and 1986, Jose Jr. registered and
voted in Samar. He ran and won in the 1987
elections for representative in the second district of
Northern Samar. His opponents protested his
election to the post on the grounds that he is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. The Court
affirmed the decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal declaring Jose
Ong, Jr. a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines
natural-born citizens as ͞those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
[2]
citizenship,͟ as well as ͞those born before 17
January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
[3]
majority.͟
Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was
interpreted by the Court as applying to those who
elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2 February
1987 but also to those who elected citizenship
before that date. It was intended to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino
father and an alien mother was automatically
granted the status of natural-born citizen while one
born of Filipino mother and an alien father would
still have to elect Philippine citizenship, whereby
under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born
citizen.[4]
The Court͛s based its resolution of the issue
by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his mother who
was a natural-born Filipina. What is material to the
case is whether he elected Filipino citizenship when
he reached the age of majority as provided for by
Section 1 (4) Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
which was the operative law when he was born.
Under the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can
only be accorded to individuals who elected
citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of
the Court it is not necessary for Ong, Jr. to formally
or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age
as he was already a citizen since he was nine by
virtue of his mother being a natural-born citizen and
his father a naturalized Filipino.[5]
Furthermore, election can be both formal and
informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) it was
held that the exercise of the right of suffrage when
one comes of age constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in
the Mallare case was applied whereby Jose Ong͛s
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises were considered positive acts of
electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election,
running for public office, and other categorical acts
of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice. These, according to the
court, cannot be less binding than the filing of a
sworn statement or formal declaration.[6]