CHAPTER FIVE

RELATIONS BETWEEN LI AND THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL FACTIONS

There had been continuing internal conflicts within the GMD from the moment of
its establishment. The conflicts, particularly after the Northern Expedition, concentrated
either on the struggle for power between the Central Government at Nanjing and the
regions, or on differences of political lines and policies; sometimes it was a mixture of
both. Hence, these conflicts had a great impact on the rise and fall of some GMD factions,
and on the policy-making of different parties and factions. All this suggests that a priority
for internal political unity of the GMD was to settle the debates and conflicts over domestic
and external affairs with other parties and factions outside the GMD.
As leader of a strong faction with military power, Li Zongren had been voluntarily
or involuntarily involved in these conflicts since he came to power in Guangxi. Thus, his
relations with other factions and leading figures of the GMD, particularly with Guangxi’s
neighbouring provinces, the southwest regional factions, had a great effect on both his and
the Guangxi Clique’s fortunes in central and regional power structures, and also affected
his relations with Jiang Jieshi. The fact that the Clique revived its force after it was
defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929 and became the major opposition to Jiang after
then shows the importance of such relations in factional conflicts.
The aim of this chapter is to analyze and account for Li’s and the Clique’s relations
with the southwest regional factions within the GMD. It also studies the impact of these
relations on the Clique’s actions in the decade before the War of Resistance and the role of
such relations in the approach to internal political unity of the GMD, an essential
prerequisite to national political unity when China was seeking a way to resist Japanese
aggression.

144
The Role of Relations between Li and the Southwest Regional Factions in the Process
of the Internal Political Unity of the GMD

1. Definition of the Southwest Regional Faction

Factional struggles had existed throughout the Republican era. Before the Northern
Expedition, these struggles concentrated on control over the Central power in Beijing.1
During the Nanjing period, the struggles between central and regional factions were very
sharp. The so-called region (difang), in plain terms, is the opposite of the center
(zhongyang). In this sense, the region mainly means provinces. Therefore, the regional
faction was made up of the military and political leaders and cliques who controlled
particular territories (usually one or more provinces) and military forces with certain power.
Many writers trace regional factions of modern China back to the Taiping Rebellion, and
some suggest the regionalism created by the Beiyang warlords group created by Yuan
Shikai.2 Whatever the case, regional factions had existed before the establishment of the
Republic. However, regional factions which claimed to believe in a certain ideology, and
to have a concern with both national and regional affairs and interests, was the phenomenon
typical in the Republican era, particularly in the Nanjing decade. Therefore, regional
factions of the GMD originated, not during the Sino-Japanese War period as some Chinese
scholars have suggested,3 but during the Expedition, and grew in the Nanjing decade. First,
before the Expedition, China was dominated by different warlords (or militarists), who
supported different regimes in both the north and south. But regional factions, particularly
those in the Southwest, grew from the chaos and wars of this area caused by the fall of the

1
For a thorough discussion of the formation of factions and their conflicts in modern
China during 1918-1928, see Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism in
Chinese Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 27-90.
2
See Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972; Ernest P.
Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k’ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early
Republican China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977; Andrew Nathan,
Peking Politics; and Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai,
Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1990.
3
Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai, p. 2.

145
Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic in 1911,4 and they only accepted the
GMD’s regime nominally following the launching of the Expedition in 1926.5 In other
words, the feeling of political regionalism was stronger in the Southwest.6 This area also
was the main base of the GMD before the Expedition.7 Secondly, these factions
maintained semi-independence from the Nanjing regime under the slogans of power
sharing in the region and opposing Jiang’s centralization or dictatorship. They differed
from the warlords or militarists in the Beiyang period who usually attempted to control the
Central government in Beijing. In appearance, the state of semi-independence was similar
to the federalist movement popular in the early 1920s in the Southwest.8 But the factions in
this area claimed Sun Yatsen’s ideas of regional self-government (difang zizhi) as the
guideline of their actions and actually, to some extent, carried out policies for that,
particularly at the levels of county and township, as in Guangxi.9 Furthermore, regional

4
For detailed discussion of the origin and development of these factions, see Guo Xuyin
(ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992; and Mo Shixiang,
Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.
5
For details of relationship between the Southwest regional factions and the Nationalist
Government at Guangzhou and Nanjing later, see Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang
Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai.
6
Guo Jianlin, “Luelun xi’nan gesheng ‘zizhi’ chaoliu he ‘feidu caibing’ de husheng”,
XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.
7
For details see Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi.
8
The Federalist Movement was for a federation of autonomous provinces and was
practised in the provinces in the Southwest, particularly in Hunan, following the first world
war when China seemed lost in anarchy. This movement was similar to that of the
Southwest’s semi-independence from Nanjing in regional autonomy, but different from
their origins and purposes. The former wanted to get China into a united nation through the
way of federation and was a reflection of national anarchy. The Southwest’s semi-
independence or regional self-government was the result of the Central Government’s
impotent control over this area and was aimed at sharing power with the Jiang group in the
region and sharing the leadership of the Central Government by overthrowing Jiang’s rule
if any opportunity came, such as the Guangxi Clique did so. For details of the Federalist
Movement, see Jean Chesneaux, “The Federalist Movement, 1920-23”, in Jack Gray (ed.),
Modern China’s Search for a Political Form, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.
96-137. Also see Guo Jianlin, “Luelun xi’nan gesheng ‘zizhi’ chaoliu he ‘feidu caibing’
husheng”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3, pp. 48-67.
9
For a thorough discussion of the achievements of Guangxi in regional self-government,
see Chu Hongyuan, “Woguo jindai minzhu zhengzhi de ge’an yanjiu: Guangxi sheng de

146
factions in the Nanjing decade were concerned with not only regional economic
reconstruction but also national affairs, particularly the issue of Japanese aggression. This
phenomenon was particularly typical in the Southwest.
It can be seen from the above that the Southwest Regional Faction means that: 1)
they were groups with political and military power which originated in the regions in the
Republican period and developed and strengthened in the Nanjing decade; 2) those groups
had long historical relations with the GMD for they were its main supporters from its
inception, and it relied on the regions as a base to expand its influence over the country; 3)
these groups were semi-independent from the GMD regime since its establishment in
Guangzhou in the early 1920s; and 4) these groups were to oppose Jiang over power
sharing (junquan) with the Jiang group in the regions, and to differ with Jiang over his
response to Japanese aggression.
The Southwest regional factions in the Republic comprised the ruling groups based
on the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangxi, and sometimes Hunan and
Guangdong as well. They held political power and military forces in these provinces. They
also maintained semi-independence from Nanjing in opposing Jiang. The Southwest is
traditionally a geographic term. Its provinces have always had close connections in
economics and geopolitics as they border on each other. The Southwest also embraces a
distinctive culture. Most of the provinces in this region have similar dialects and cultural
traditions. Guangxi is in the intermediary position, sharing both Cantonese and Sichuan-
Guizhou-Yunnan dialect (xi’nan guanhua) - the Southwest Mandarin, which gives Guangxi
a favourable advantage through links with speakers of both. Culture and geopolitics in the
Southwest determined to a great extent its closer internal relations and cooperation, as well
as opposition to Jiang.

2. The Role of the Southwest Regional Factions in the Internal Political Unity of the GMD
After 1912 China experienced a period of instability and chaos following the
destruction of the Qing regime. The Central Government failed to win loyalty from the

xuebu minzhu, 1907-1937”, Zhengzhi kexue luncong (Taipei), No. 1 (March 1990), pp. 89-
124; Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17B (December 1988), pp. 307-53; and Chu Hongyuan, “Woguo
sifa xiandaihua de ge’an yanjiu: Guangxi sifa de chuqi xiandaihua, 1907-1937”, Keji
zhenghe xuebao, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-33.

147
regions and had only weak control over the country. In such circumstances, political
separatism and a strong feeling of political regionalism gradually developed, particularly in
the Southwest, which led to an upsurge of regional militarism.10 In a sense, this was a
reflection of the struggle for power between different political and interest groups after the
collapse of the Qing. As a result, the government, made up of these groups, was unable to
exert effective control over national affairs.11 Although they maintained a lukewarm
political relationship with the Central Government before 1935, when Nanjing started to
pursue a policy of peaceful reunification in the Southwest, militarists in this area had long
had a great impact on China’s political situation and its development. During the early
Republican period, for example, Southwest militarists were actively involved in such
important domestic events as the huguo (the National Protection) and the hufa (the
Constitution Protection) movements. A reason why they were so active in that period was
that they aspired to make themselves national leaders, because most of them were members
of the Tongmenghui, and the Southwest was the base of the Tongmenghui, which had
endeavoured to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. It was also because they were dissatisfied
with their positions in national affairs, for Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang warlords (or
militarists) had successively dominated the Beijing regime after the fall of the Qing. This
was very important for the Southwest militarists because it planted the seeds of their later
struggle with Jiang, who controlled the GMD authorities and the Nanjing Government.
Meanwhile, it became a process in which all parties and factions were being continually
divided and recombined.12 That is to say, this was a preparatory period for political
unification of the country. The Northern Expedition was a significant expression of the

10
For a detailed discussion of provincial politically centrifugal force emanating from the
Central Government, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong Kong:
SLSD, 1979, pp. 16-23.
11
For a thorough discussion of the struggle for power in the Beiyang warlord regime, see
Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics,; and Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-
1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. On the situation of the Guangzhou
regime before the Northern Expedition in 1926, see Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao
qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; and Mo shixiang, Hufa
yundong shi.
12
For a detailed analysis of this process, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China,
1916-1928, Chapter 9.

148
aspirations of the various groups and influences towards national reunification under one
central government, the symbol of political unity of the nation.
The Expedition achieved nominal national reunification under the Nationalist
regime, but failed in the issue of political unity in the country. One main reason was
Jiang’s pursuit of centralization. Under Jiang’s centralization, the interests of regional
leaders and regional development were not served. As a result, there was poor motivation
for the internal political unity of the GMD and national political unity in much of the
country. The other reason was the GMD’s failure to ward off foreign imperialism after the
establishment of the Nanjing Government. The nation was soon confronted with renewed
Japanese aggression, and in response to the national crisis, Jiang carried out a policy which
did not lead the nation to resist Japan first, but which insisted on eliminating the opposition
factions within and outside the GMD first - the policy of “domestic pacification before
external war”. Whether the policy was correct or incorrect is beyond the scope of this
thesis. But it is clear that the policy did not meet the needs of the national political situation
at that time. Even some pro-GMD historians in Taiwan, such as Guo Tingyi, admit that the
policy "was not allowed to be carried out by the circumstances".13 The regionalist
development in the 1930s, particularly that of the Clique, was actually, to some extent,
based on opposition to the policy and on common demands for regional cooperation and
reconstruction.
However, this is not to say that regionalism was of no benefit at all to the internal
political unity of the GMD. It at least moved slowly towards that goal in two important
aspects. First, the political and military regionalists in each province focused on provincial
reconstruction in economic, political, and other fields, for which they worked out a series of
reconstructive plans. To a certain extent the achievements of some provinces such as
Shanxi, Guangxi and Guangdong were remarkable.14 The efforts of regionalists led local

13
Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1982, p. 623.
14
For detailed discussion of the achievements of Shanxi province under Yan Xishan in
reconstruction, see Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949,
Princeton University Press, 1967; and for details of the same issue of Guangdong under
Chen Jitang, see John Fitzgerald, “Increased Disunity: The Politics and Finance of
Guangdong Separatism, 1926-1936”, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October
1990), pp. 745-75.

149
people to a belief in regional reconstruction and laid a foundation for national political and
economic development with measures applicable to local conditions.
Secondly, these regionalists paid great attention to regional or provincial
cooperation. In particular, they created political and military allies in the Southwest to
ensure implementation of their own policies in both economic and cultural development of
the provinces. It forced Jiang to pay attention to what was going on with regional interests
and to start to acknowledge regional characteristics. As a result, in dealing with
regionalists, Jiang gradually carried out a policy of compromise with other factions within
the GMD instead of that of his centralization. These factors created an atmosphere for the
Southwest regional factions to form their own policies and to look after their common
interests in the regions through strengthening relations between them. Mass mobilization
in the regions and regional military cooperation between the provinces in the Southwest
strengthened and supported these factions in this area to vie with Jiang for power.
Meanwhile, they awakened the political consciousness of the masses which was
transformed from regionalism to nationalism. With the promotion of anti-imperialism and
national salvation, once the regionalists accepted conciliation with the main faction in the
Central government, regionalism began to support internal unity for the GMD and then
national political unity. In so doing, a common interest and the demand for national action,
such as resistance against external aggression and the formation of a sub-national political
system which involved regional cooperation and some new policies applied to the local
conditions (and in this, Guangxi was a good example), served to promote the internal
political unity of the GMD.

3. The Impact of Relations between Regional Factions on the Li-Jiang Conflict

A good relationship with the Southwest first gave Li a chance to revive his fortunes
in Guangxi after he was defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929. Freed from the military
threat from the factions in neighbouring provinces, Li found enough time to consolidate
and reconstruct his base - Guangxi, a popular “model province” in the 1930s. This region
then became the weapon which Li and the Clique used to criticize Jiang’s slow progress

150
towards reconstruction.15 In a sense, reconciliation between Li and Jiang in 1936, in the
eyes of the public, meant the end of open internal conflict in the GMD. A good
relationship with the Southwest contributed to strengthening Li in both his conflict and
reconciliation with Jiang.
This stability in the region formed by mutual cooperation, particularly in Guangxi,
created a favourable environment in which Li could safely introduce his policies in
Guangxi. The policies were worked out by Li and other leaders of the Clique, as they
pursued their own reconstruction and mass mobilization in the province in accordance with
the local conditions without attracting any physical GMD pressure as Nanjing left Guangxi
alone. It contributed to a great extent to Guangxi’s achievements in political, economic,
military, educational, and social reconstruction and development, and ensured continuity of
the policies.16
Furthermore, Li’s relations with other regional factions in the Southwest disturbed
the rapid spread of Jiang’s influence in this region, and made Jiang’s policy to eliminate
regionalists and to centralize under himself more difficult. However, Li’s cooperation with
the Southwest militarists was also based on concern for the serious national crisis. Li and
the Clique were genuinely committed to saving their nation through regional development
and cooperation, even though they to some extent paid lip service to the wishes of the
central government, and certainly aimed at retaining power in their own regions or
province.

15
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 196. Eugene Levich also points out that
Guangxi leaders planned to create a model of national resistance and development as an
example for the rest of China to follow, which was to be, the Clique seemed to hope, a
source of fatal embarrassment for Jiang Jieshi. See Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 28.
16
For detailed discussion and revaluation of Guangxi’s reconstruction in the 1930s, see
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 164-93; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way; Chu
Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”, ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b;
Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1991; and Shen
Xiaoyuan, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992. Also see Guangxi sheng
zhengfu shinian jingji jianshe bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Guizheng jishi, Guilin, 1946; Hu
Lin (Leng Guan) et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935;
Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Li
Zongren (et al), Guangxi zhi jianshe, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1939.

151
 With the motive force of national salvation and anti-Japanese imperialism, regional
cooperation gradually constructed a sub-national political system under the banner of the
political unity for the nation, which drove Jiang to abandon the policy of reunifying the
Southwest militarily and to carry out peaceful reunification or conciliation instead. In
return for this concession, the Southwest militarists including Li and the Guangxi leaders
accepted Jiang’s leadership of the country and of the War of Resistance. Jiang’s new
rapport with the Southwest militarists ended the open internal conflict in the GMD. This
was a prelude to national conciliation and led to the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front (AJNUF), a prerequisite to political unity in the whole nation.
Clearly, the good relationship between Li and the other powerful Southwest militarists was
an important factor in forcing Jiang to seek conciliation on the internal unity of the GMD,
and allowing progress towards the political unity of the entire country.

Factors Affecting the Relationship between the Southwest Regional Factions

Guangxi borders on Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. Since its
formation, the Guangxi Clique had paid considerable attention to its relations with the
neighbours, towards whom it carried out a policy of mutual aid and cooperation to
strengthen its position on the Chinese political stage or to implement its political plans
within and outside the province.17 Such a relationship was extremely important to the
Clique after 1929, when it was defeated by Jiang in its struggle for Central power and was
then forced to return to Guangxi. Having the support and cooperation from its
neighbouring provinces was an important factor for Li and the Clique to continue to
challenge Jiang's power and to carry out their own policies in the province.
Several factors contributed to Li’s relationships with the other Southwest regional
factions. On the one hand, since 1932 there were the two organizations - the Southwest
Branch of the Central Executive Committee and the Southwest Political Council of the
Nationalist Government - which existed in Guangzhou until 1936 (also called “Xi’nan
liang jiguan” - the two Southwest organizations), with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces
as its mainstays. The two organizations became the opposition to Jiang. Through the

17
See Cheng Siyuan, Zhengtan huiyi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1983, Chapter Four.

152
organizations, Guangxi gained “legal” protection in the GMD and made itself semi-
independent of Nanjing. Seizing the chance, Li and other leaders of the Clique worked on
internal consolidation and reconstruction in Guangxi, so the policy of “goodwill with
neighbours and absolute sincere unity with them” became an important aspect of the
Clique’s reconstruction and development in the province.18 On the other hand, although
Guangxi ended its open revolt against Nanjing in 1929-1931, it was still on its guard
against Jiang, who was widely believed to have plans to wipe out those factions and
political figures who held different views from him in the GMD. Furthermore, owing to
differences between the Clique and the Jiang group in internal and external affairs, the
conflict between the two parties had never ceased. Naturally, there was a need to
strengthen association and cooperation with all forces for Li’s struggle against Jiang. In
addition, maintaining friendly relations with the neighbouring provinces could frustrate
Jiang’s attempts to blockade and isolate Guangxi.
Apart from the possibility of conflict with Jiang on the national level, several
reasons committed Li to carry out the policy of goodwill with neighbours. First, since
Guangxi was a relatively poor province, it could not maintain a massive military force.
Rapid expansion of troops would obstruct Guangxi’s economic development and create
turmoil, such as had occurred in 1921-1925 after the fall of the Lu Rongting group and
frequent invasion by the neighbouring provincial troops.19 Bai Chongxi repeatedly warned
of such possibilities in those years.20 After 1932, Guangxi maintained only two armies
(jun) with fourteen regiments (totalling less than 20,000 men). Even so, its expenditure on
armaments was still more than 50% of the total of the provincial budget.21 Hence, a good
relationship with neighbours to a great extent helped to reduce Guangxi’s expenditure on
armaments.

18
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiaogong he qinren shanlin”, Bai fuzongsiling yanjiang ji,
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 52.
19
For details of the situation of Guangxi at that time, see Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.),
Xin Guixi shi, pp. 1-105. Also see Huang Zongyan, “Lun Sun Zhongshan 1921 nian yuan-
Gui tao-Lu zhizhan”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1986, pp. 52-67.
20
See Xiao Yuan (pseud.), “Ji Lu Rongting”, GWZB, Vol. XIII, Nos. 12-14 (30 March, 6
April, and 13 April, 1936); and Bai Chongxi, “Sanyu zhengce”, Bai Chongxi xiansheng
zuijin yanlun ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, p. 174.
21
Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 622.

153
 Secondly, in the early Republican period the mood of excluding outsiders was in
vogue. Under the slogan of “natives of the province ruling their own provincial affairs”,
outsiders or outside influences (or armies) found it very difficult to set foot in provinces
other than their own, particularly in the Southwest.22 Lu Rongting’s failure in Guangdong
in 1917-1920 had given the Clique a warning.23 Therefore, Li and Guangxi leaders had
long realized the importance of maintaining friendly relationships with their neighbours and
were careful not to take any action to destroy it.24
Thirdly, the southwestern provinces, in particular, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan,
were the main sources of the opium products for the South China market.25 Guangxi was
not an opium growing area because weather and geographical conditions were not suitable
and the sale of opium in Guangxi was very small.26 Nevertheless Guangxi provided a
much safer route along which to transport opium from Yunnan and Guizhou via
Guangdong to Hong Kong and southeast Asia than others, such as the Yangzi River opium
route. Guangxi could have earned a large revenue from opium.27 The Clique greatly
benefited from levying taxes on the transit of this opium. It was interested in ensuring that
the opium trade flourished because “the rise and fall of the ‘tehuo’ (special goods, i.e.
opium) business was sufficient to determine the prosperity or depression of the commercial

22
Sichuan province is a good example. For details of “natives of Sichuan ruling their
own provincial affairs”, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong
Kong: SLSD, 1979; Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987; and
Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central
Power, 1911-1938, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973.
23
For details see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: Guangxi
minzu chubanshe, 1987; and Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.
24
See Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 70.
25
See Kuang Jishan and Yang Shurong, “Sichuan junfa yu yapian”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3,
pp. 250-62.
26
H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), The China Year Book, Vol. 13 (1931), Nedeln/Liechtenstein
Krans Reprint, 1969, p. 599.
27
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi yu yapian yan”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 1-20; Wang
Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 91-103;
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi ‘jinyan’”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 2, pp. 71-82; and Edmund Clubb, The Opium Traffic in China, 24 April 1934, 893.114
Narcotics/738, National Archives, Washington.

154
markets of the whole province”.28 As for the income of the Guangxi provincial
government, figures given in an agricultural survey indicated that opium taxes contributed
18,031,000 yuan (Chinese dollar) to a total of provincial revenue of 32,950,944 yuan
(about 54.7% of the whole revenue) in 1934.29 Statistics given in the Guangxi Year Book
also showed that the annual incomes from opium taxes exceeded at least 10 million yuan,
reaching nearly 20 million yuan in some years during the first half of the 1930s. This
contributed nearly a half of the revenue of the province in those years.30 This explained
why the Clique worked hard to maintain friendly relationships with its neighbours, even
when these provinces provoked a conflict with it.
As an example of extreme measures designed to preserve relations, after Tang
Jiyao’s defeat in his invasion of Guangxi in 1925, Huang Shaohong, Governor of the
Guangxi provincial government at that time, immediately sent a delegation to Yunnan to
promote and renew the relationship between the two provinces.31 On the other hand, Li
Zongren was determined to maintain the Guangxi opium route by using any means he
could. For instance, in the mid-1930s, Jiang ordered a change to the transportation route of
opium export from Yunnan and Guizhou, avoiding Guangxi in favour of the other province
(i.e. Hunan) in order to put economic pressure on the Clique. To defend its interests, Li
even sent troops disguised as bandits to Hunan. These troops raided and harassed the
opium transportation route, forcing the opium tradesmen to return to the former Guangxi
route.32 Thus it can be seen that the Clique’s relations with the Southwest militarists were
to a great extent determined by economic factors, and more precisely the issue of opium
revenues.

28
Qian Jiaju, Han Dezhang and Wu Bannong, Guangxi sheng jingji gaikuang, Shanghai:
SWYSG, 1936, p. 18.
29
Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,
Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, pp. 259-260.
30
Guangxi Nianjian (First Issue), 1933, pp. 621-630; and Guangxi nianjian (Second
Issue), 1935, p. 830.
31
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, p. 126.
32
Huang Bingdian, “Jiang-Gui zhengduo yanshui de yimu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 59-
61.

155
Li’s Relationships with the Southwest Regional Factions

As the political and economic situation in each province of the Southwest was
different, in dealing with relationships with the factions in the provinces of Yunnan,
Guizhou, Guangdong and Sichuan, Li Zongren’s strategy was different in each case.

1. Li’s Relations With Yunnan

In their studies on Yunnan’s relations with the Guangxi Clique, Chinese historians
have often assumed that the former was closer to Jiang Jieshi than to the latter.33 This was
not the case. In fact, Yunnan’s concern was, on the one hand, the balance of power
between Nanjing and Guangxi. The defeat of either would have been a severe threat to its
independence, apart from the economic tie between Yunnan and Guangxi in the opium
trade.34 On the other hand, Guangxi was interested not only in gaining a large income from
opium taxes in which Yunnan was a main source of opium products, but also in keeping
Yunnan at least neutral. However, relations between the two provinces underwent two
periods (i.e. the Tang Jiyao and Long Yun periods) as a result of changes in the political
situation.
In the first period, Li and the Clique were defending their base in Guangxi against
invasion by the Yunnan Army led by Tang Jiyao in 1925, as dealt with in Chapter Two.
Generally speaking, this was the period during which China was being reunified by the
GMD. The relationship between Li and Yunnan was subsequently to some extent
concentrated on how to approach reunification of the country. Tang Jiyao’s political
ambition left Yunnan in opposition to the GMD which was based on Guangzhou.35 As a
faction of the GMD and one of the main forces participating in the Northern Expedition, Li
and his Clique were naturally opposed to Tang and prevented a possible second invasion of

33
See, for example, Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai,
pp. 89-92.
34
See J. C. S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction 1927-1937, Canberra: Department of
Far Eastern History, The Australian National University, 1976, p. 179.
35
For a thorough discussion of Tang Jiyao’s role in Chinese politics, see Donald S.
Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-1925,
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.

156
Guangxi by the Yunnan Army under Tang’s command. But Guangxi also attempted to
resume economic cooperation in the transit of opium, sending delegations to Yunnan.36
This was an expression of the Clique’s dual policy towards its neighbouring Yunnan.
Long Yun, himself a Yi, a national minority in Southwestern China, came to power
in Yunnan after the death of Tang Jiyao in 1927. Long removed Yunnan’s hostile attitude
towards Guangxi and claimed his loyalty to the Nanjing regime, but chose Jiang Jieshi as
his political patron. Long’s choice was understandable: the Clique did not control central
power though it was one of the most powerful factions within the GMD. The Chinese
preferred to emphasize the “fatong” (orthodox legitimacy). In the GMD, emphasizing
“fatong” meant to carry on the cause of Sun Yatsen. In other words, anyone who upheld
“fatong” would have an opportunity to be successor to Sun. This was a key issue in the
struggle between Jiang Jieshi, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and other factions in the GMD.
Li Zongren did not have any advantage in this respect. Also, Long faced challenges from
several sub-factions in the province after he came to power but could call for support from
the central government when the latter vied with him for provincial power from time to
time. His right to support in suppressing rival sub-factions in the province was granted
under the “fatong”. Only Jiang could provide such support at that time. As relations
between the Clique and Jiang worsened, Long’s loyalty to the latter increased.37 This was
why Long, after the Jiang-Gui War broke out in the spring of 1929, commanded the
Yunnan troops to attack Guangxi via Guizhou in 1929-30, though this strategy ultimately
failed.38 However, Long’s invasion of Guangxi, apart from his interest in supporting Jiang,
was widely believed to be the result of his dissatisfaction with the state of the transit of
opium through Guangxi. In other words, it was touched off by a dispute over opium
revenues between the two provinces rather than an expression of more superficial politics

36
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p. 57.
37
Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shili pai, pp. 89-92; and
Jiang Nan (Liu Yiliang), Long Yun zhuan, Taipei: Tianyuan chubanshe, 1987, pp. 57-97.
38
For details of Long Yun’s military action against Guangxi in 1929-1930, see Archives
of the Editorial Committee for War History, The Nationalist Government, Nanjing. Also
see Huang Xuchu, “Nanning dierci weicheng zhan qinli ji”, CQ, No. 46 (1 June 1959), pp.
4-6.

157
in which Yunnan was nominally on the side of Nanjing under Jiang.39 Certainly, economic
reasons also brought the two provinces together after Long’s defeat in the invasion of
Guangxi in 1930 and ensured their cooperation in the opium trade again.40
After 1931 the Clique again firmly took control of the province. Relations between
Guangxi and Yunnan entered a relatively peaceful period but were never entirely
harmonious. To improve relations between the two provinces, Li not only sent the Clique’s
senior officers, such as Ye Qi, then Chief of General Staff of the 4th Group Army (the
Guangxi Army), to call on Long occasionally,41 he also requested Hu Hanmin, the spiritual
leader of the two Southwest organizations, to write Long a letter expressing the desire of Li
himself and other leaders of the two Southwest organizations for closer and better relations
with Yunnan.42 It can be seen from the above that Li genuinely tried to establish a
friendship with Long.
However, Long played a dual role during the period of Li’s promotion, on his own
initiative, to achieve a better relationship for the Clique with Yunnan. He predicted that, in
this role, Yunnan also needed the practical cooperation of Guangxi, particularly in the
opium trade.
Long became a secret agent keeping watch on the Clique’s actions to show his
loyalty to Jiang. He frequently sent Nanjing secret reports on the Clique’s military
movements. There are indications that Long sent numerous confidential telegrams to Jiang
reporting activities of the Guangxi army, such as information about the army’s
concentration in Longzhou, a town near the border of Vietnam, and Li’s purchase of

39
PRO.FO371/14692 F3680/93/10, 22/5/1930; Shenbao, 31/7/1930; and E. Snow,
Journey to the Beginning, New York: Vintage Books, 1958, p. 49.
40
For details of Long Yun’s invasion of Guangxi in 1930 and resuming the cooperation
with Guangxi in the opium trade, see J.C.S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction, chapters
4-5, and 7.
41
“Long Yun to Li Zongren etc, 18/1/1935, 17/4/1935”, YNLSDA, No. 6 (1984), pp. 58-
9.
42
“Hu Hanmin to Long Yun”. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-
Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 106.

158
armaments from the French in the 1930s.43 In addition, he also spied on the Clique’s
political movements.44
The second role played by Long was to become a mediator between Li and Jiang,
though he worked mainly for Jiang. This is understandable, partly because Long was closer
to Jiang than were other leaders of Southwest provinces, who were semi-independent of
Nanjing before 1935, and because Long’s position had been more secure than his
neighbours, such as Wang Jialie and Liu Xiang, Chairmen of Guizhou and Sichuan
provinces respectively, who faced challenges in their provinces from time to time when
they were in power. In 1935, Jiang started to carry out the policy of peaceful reunification
in Yunnan and other Southwest provinces. Although he knew Long was a “tu huangdi”
(local Lord), Jiang had to rely temporarily on him because Long had firm control over the
province, where economy, law and order were well maintained. Also, Yunnan officers of
military and civil administration from high to low ranks were all Long's trusted followers.45
Thus, Long’s actions naturally carried a lot of weight with both Jiang and Li. In the role of
mediator, Long told Li about Jiang’s conciliatory attitude and passed the former and the
Clique's opinions back to the latter.46
Long’s actions had much to do with his attempts to expand Yunnan’s sphere of
influence into Guizhou by seizing chances as his predecessor and ex-superior Tang Jiyao
had attempted to do. Earlier in 1935 Long ordered his subordinate commanders to wipe out
Wang Jialie’s troops in Guizhou and to annex the province by seizing any chance they
could during their action to intercept the Red Army in Guizhou.47 He even sent numerous
confidential telegrams to Chen Bulei, Jiang’s private secretary, emphasizing that while
“Yunnan and Guizhou nominally are two provinces, they are, in fact, an integrated

43
For details of Long Yun’s confidential report on Guangxi’s activities, see Archives of
Guangxi Provincial Government, No. L4-1-6, Nanning.
44
Such as, “Long Yun to Jiang Jieshi, March 1935”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 44.
45
Jiang Nan, Long Yun zhuan, pp. 112-3; and Wang Taidong, Chen Bulei waizhuan,
Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1987, p. 98.
46
For details see YNLSDA, No. 6, p. 59, and No. 7, p. 45.
47
Sun Du, “Dianjun ru-Qian fangdu hongjun changzheng qinli ji”, WSZLXJ, No. 62.

159
whole”.48 This confirmed Long’s eagerness to expand his influence into Guizhou.
Probably Long had reason to know that the Nanjing Government would like to strengthen
his power in both Yunnan and Guizhou as the Government's mainstay in the two provinces
- that of Jiang’s policy to use Yunnan against Guangxi.49 Perhaps he also knew that Li’s
interest was to keep Yunnan at least neutral in the struggle between the Clique and the
Jiang group. Li must have hoped that Yunnan’s influence in Guizhou would
counterbalance that of Jiang's influence. Whether for regional cooperation and
development or as a factor in the political struggle with Jiang, Yunnan’s counterbalancing
position could benefit the Clique before Li and Jiang reached a compromise. According to
a Dagong Bao editorial on April 28, 1936, Li sent a number of telegrams to Jiang urging
him to give Long authority for “pacification” in Guizhou. It is obvious from the above that
Long attempted to extend his own influence in Guizhou by using his special position in
overtly bringing a closer relationship between the Clique and the Jiang group.
In sum, Long had taken advantage of his position as a mediator to gain favour from
both Jiang and Li. According to Long himself, until the outbreak of the “June 1
Movement” of Guangxi in 1936, “I still act as a mediator to both parties in accordance with
my previous ideal, and give them (i.e. Jiang and Li) sincere advice and repeatedly send
telegrams to mediate between them.”50 It is a matter of history that Long did not join
Jiang's 400,000 troops used to besiege Guangxi during the June 1 Movement. This
naturally weakened the pressure that Jiang could bring to bear on Guangxi to some extent.
This could have been a result of Li’s careful efforts to keep Yunnan neutral in his conflict
with Jiang. In fairness it must be said that Long also played a positive role in compelling Li
and Jiang to reach a reconciliation within the GMD.

2. Li’s Relations With Guizhou

While Li's relations with Yunnan were not always satisfactory, his relations with
Guizhou were good. The Guizhou faction became one of the Clique's most important allies

48
“Long Yun to Chen Bulei, 20/11/1934, and 21/1/1935”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 51.
49
Yan Daogang, “Zhuidu changzheng hongjun de bushu jiqi shibai”, in Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng
qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990, p. 22.
50
“Long Yun to Lu Daoyuan, 17 July 1936”, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 57.

160
in the Nanjing decade. Unlike its relations with Yunnan, the Clique had kept the Guizhou
Tongzi Faction as its ally since its rise to power. Relations between the two parties were
based on interdependence.
Guizhou was ruled by the so-called Tongzi Faction for ten years (1926-35), with
Zhou Xicheng and Wang Jialie as its leaders successively, the former from 1926 to 1929,
the latter from 1932 to 1935. Between them was Mao Guangxiang from 1929 to 1931.
Mao also was a leader of the Tongzi Faction, but, his rule of Guizhou coincided with the
period of the Guangxi Clique's struggle for survival and revival in its base - Guangxi.51 For
this reason, the discussion of the Guangxi Clique’s relations with the Guizhou Tongzi
Faction will mainly focus on the periods of both Zhou and Wang, but not that of Mao.52
Several factors contributed to Zhou Xicheng’s decision to ally with the Clique.
Politically, He Yingqin and Wang Boqun, leaders of another Guizhou faction, who were
rivals of the Tongzi Faction and who had bad relations with Zhou and his followers, were
repeatedly defeated in previous battles for provincial power in Guizhou in the early
1920s.53 Unlike Zhou, He Yingqin and others not only had joined Jiang for lengthy
periods, but also had close relations with the latter since the establishment of the
Guangzhou revolutionary government. In the view of Zhou, they would make trouble if he
also joined Jiang who was then rising to power. After Guizhou joined the Expedition in
mid-1926, the troops under the command of Wang Tianpei, a general of the Tongzi
Faction, were under Li Zongren’s command most of the time before they were disarmed by
Jiang in the autumn of 1927. On the defeat of the Expedition Army under his command in
a campaign in Shandong by the northern militarists and the strong pressure from both the
Wuhan and Nanjing regimes during the same time, Jiang had to announce his retirement in
August 1927. When he left Nanjing, Jiang had Wang killed on the excuse that the latter

51
For details of Guizhou under the rule of militarists in Republican China, see Zhou
Suyuan, “Guizhou junfa shi shuyao”, GZWSZLXJ (Guizhou), No. 1, pp. 1-43; and Guizhou
junfa shi yanjiuhui and Guizhou sheng shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, Guizhou junfa
shi, Guiyang: GZRMCBS, 1987.
52
For details of Zhou Xicheng's rule of Guizhou, see Fan Tongshou, “Shilun Zhou
Xicheng jiqi dui Guizhou de tongzhi”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 1, pp. 182-202.
53
Liu Shenyuan, “Diwulu Qianjun yuanzhu xin Guixi qijia jilue”, GXWSZL, No. 15, pp.
35-39.

161
was responsible for the defeat of the Northern Expedition Army.54 This indicated that
Jiang had closed the door on Zhou. Thus, maintaining a friendly relationship with the
Clique, neighbour of Guizhou, would both protect and benefit Zhou in consolidating his
power over the province. Economically, Guizhou was a major producer of opium, and, as
mentioned earlier, the opium route via Guangxi was a more important route for transporting
opium from Guizhou to South China and overseas markets than any other. Militarily, Zhou
wanted to wipe out his rivals in the province. To achieve this, he needed arms supplies. It
was much more convenient for him to purchase weapons from the British munitions
merchants through Guangxi and Guangdong. For these reasons, Zhou strengthened his
relations with both Guangxi and Guangdong.
A further cementing of relations was the signing of a secret “Guizhou-Guangxi
Agreement”,55 the exact contents of which are still unknown. However, when the Jiang-
Gui War broke out in early 1929, Zhou stood firmly on the side of the Clique.56 Jiang
issued orders on April 14, 1929 to attempt to wipe out Li’s remnant armies in Guangxi
from three routes - Yunnan, Hunan, and Guangdong but not from Guizhou. That province
was left to Long Yun who could satisfy his ambitions of securing Guizhou by passing
through that province to attack Guangxi. Zhou Xicheng commanded the Guizhou troops in
the attempt to intercept the Yunnan army and he died in this battle.57 In his memoirs,
Zhang Renmin, a senior officer of the Clique, also gave evidence to prove the close
relations between the two provinces at that time.58 The facts given above may partly

54
For details of the execution of Wang by Jiang, see GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 32 (21/8/1927);
Mi Xi, “Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou”, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji, No. 23
(1982), pp. 27-8. Also see Zhang Yingzhi, “Luelun Wang Tianpei”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 1,
pp. 203-17.
55
Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No.
9, p. 94. Guangdong was also included in this agreement because Li Jishen was leader of
the Guangdong Faction at that time. More detailed discussion of Guangdong’s relations
with Guangxi will appear in next section.
56
Ibid, pp. 94-5.
57
Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government,
Nanjing. Also see Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 95.
58
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author himself, 1987, p.90.
According to recollections of Zhang Renmin, “Guizhou had long had a firm friendship with

162
explain the essence of the Agreement. Unfortunately, with the Clique’s rapid defeat and
Zhou’s death, the alliance between the two provinces collapsed.
The alliance was not resumed until 1932 when Li and his Clique firmly regained
control over Guangxi. If the earlier alliance with Guizhou was mostly part of Li’s power
struggle with Jiang, the present reunion of alliance with Guizhou became part of Li’s
continued conflict with Jiang and Guangxi’s semi-independence from Nanjing. Jiang
attempted to prevent regional cooperation between the Southwest militarists, and this was
one aspect of his campaign to achieve centralization under his direct control. In resisting
Jiang, Li took the initiative to win over Wang Jialie, Chairman of Guizhou province and
leader of the Tongzi Faction after Zhou Xicheng.
Wang Jialie’s choice of Li and the Clique as his ally was clearly determined by the
internal struggle in the province and his own external conflict with Jiang. Wang came to
power in Guizhou in 1932. However, he was challenged by his rivals in the province from
time to time. This is partly because Long Yun helped General You Guocai, a Divisional
Commander of the Guizhou armies, and partly because Liu Xiang also supported General
Jiang Zaizhen, another Divisional Commander of the Guizhou armies. The two Guizhou
Generals were separately fostered by Long and Liu in their attempts to take over Wang’s
position in the province.59 Moreover, in order to gain control over Guizhou, Jiang also
supported all of Wang’s rivals. Thus, Wang felt a serious threat to his position and it is
understandable that he followed in his ex-superior Zhou Xicheng’s footsteps in standing on
the Clique’s side, as he wrote in his memoirs several decades later.60 As a result, Li
succeeded in reaching a secret agreement with Wang in 1934. It was entitled “The Military
Agreement of Guangdong, Guangxi and Guizhou Provinces”, with the main provisions as
follows:

us. It showed tacit sympathy towards Guangxi’s sufferings, never doing anything to harm
Guangxi province:. The other confidential report also said that Zhou Xicheng was
affiliated with Guangxi. See U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No.
7507 (May 8, 1929).
59
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No. 8848 (June 9, 1934).
60
Wang Jialie, “Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No.
9, p. 99.

163
 The three provinces shall have mutual military cooperation, should Jiang Jieshi
launch an attack on any of them. Should Guizhou need ammunition, purchase can
be made through negotiation with Guangdong and Guangxi.61
Partly as a consequence of drawing the Tongzi Faction into rejoining the former
Guizhou-Guangxi-Guangdong alliance and signing the above agreement, the Clique was
free of military threat from the neighbouring provinces of sort that had occurred in 1929-
1930. It was, to a certain extent, helpful to the Clique’s control over provincial situation
and implementation of economic reconstruction in Guangxi. The existence of the
Agreement partly explains why Jiang tolerated Guangxi’s semi-independence from Nanjing
for years.62 In 1935, Jiang finally dismissed Wang when the Central army entered Guizhou
attempting to intercept the Long March of the Red Army.63
That Li allied with the Guizhou faction strengthened the Clique itself and helped in
his rivalry with Jiang for years. There are several reasons for this alliance: the most
important one is that the factions of Guizhou had depended militarily and economically on
other powerful forces outside the province. In comparison with the factions of its
neighbours, the Guizhou faction was one of the weakest at that time. The revenues of the
province were very low.64 For example, its total revenues were only 2,908,399 yuan in
1932,65 and 2,902,079 yuan the following year.66 This was much lower than its
neighbours, but served military expansion of Guizhou militarists only, which further

61
Ibid, p. 101. Guangxi’s relations with Guangdong will be discussed in next section.
62
According to Wang, Jiang had already known such a military alliance existed between
Guizhou, Guangxi and Guangdong, because General Yu Hanmou, a subordinate
commander of Chen Jitang, secretly passed the information to Jiang. For this reason, Jiang
hated Wang intensely and had attempted to dismiss him from his post. Wang Jialie,
“Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 101.
63
Chen Jiren and Qiao Yunsheng, “Junfa Wang Jialie de kuatai”, XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.
64
For details of Guizhou’s economic and social situations under the rule of militarists,
see Hu Keming, “Guizhou junfa tongzhi shiqi de shehui jingji gaikuang”, XNJFSYJCK,
No. 1, pp. 218-256.
65
Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 671.
66
Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, p. 885.

164
worsened the provincial economics and increased the tax load on the masses.67 Moreover,
the internal struggle in the province had been going on within the Guizhou faction since
1911. Each group in the Guizhou faction vied with the others for power and each
succeeding militarist who came to power faced antagonistic powerful rivals. For example,
Zhou Xicheng fought against Li Shen, a Guizhou General supported by Long Yun; and in
the Wang Jialie period, the active opposition came from Generals You Guocai and Jiang
Zaizhen. To keep leadership in Guizhou meant reliance on outside political, military and
financial support.68 The need to transport opium to markets via neighbouring provinces
further increased the dependence of a weak province on external assistance.
After Guizhou was brought under Jiang’s direct control in 1935, the already
strained relations between the Clique and the Jiang group became even further strained.
Indeed, along with the growing differences in internal and external policies, Jiang’s
economic pressure on Guangxi speeded up the outbreak of conflict between the two parties.
Jiang used his power in Guizhou to undermine the Clique by cutting off its most important
sources of revenue. He placed a heavy levy on opium in Guizhou and prevented it from
passing through Guangxi. A measure taken by Jiang was the “Regulations for Levying the
Provincial Tax on Special Goods of the Guizhou General Opium Prohibition Bureau”,
published on 30 June 1936.69 Consequently, Guangxi’s incomes from opium taxes in 1936
were reduced to less than one third, as against 1934.70 To break Jiang's economic and
military blockade, the Clique during the “June 1 Movement” gave energetic support to
those pro-Clique and anti-Jiang figures in Guizhou to organize the Guizhou Anti-Japanese
and National Salvation Army, about 20,000 men active on the border of Guizhou and

67
See Wu Duanjun, “Wei junshi kuozhang fuwu de Guizhou caizheng”, XNJFSYJCK,
No. 3, pp. 354-371.
68
See Liu Yixiang, “Shilun Qianxi junfa de yifuxing he lueduoxing”, XNJFSYJCK, No.
3, pp. 326-338.
69
Zhang Xiaomei, Guizhou jingji, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1938, p. Q30.
70
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi ‘jinyan’”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 2, p. 79.

165
Guangxi. It broke down to some extent the Central army’s encirclement of Guangxi during
the Movement.71
Although Jiang finally broke the Guangxi and Guizhou alliance through military
occupation of the latter, Li won precious time to reconstruct and mobilize his base -
Guangxi, and formed a regional cooperation which was favourable to force the internal
political unity on the GMD.

3. Li’s Relations with the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi)

In Guomindang China, Guangdong was the birthplace of several main military and
political factions, such as those of Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, Sun Ke and
others, who to a great extent had an impact on the political development in Guangdong, and
even China. Jiang Jieshi himself originated from Guangdong also as he began his
successful political and military careers from the Guangzhou Military Government which
existed in the late 1910s and the early 1920s, first as Sun Yatsen’s military aide and then
Chief of Staff of the Guangdong Army. Those were steps made by Jiang as he was
gradually promoted to the position of Commander in Chief of the Northern Expedition
Army of the NRA in 1926, before he left this province. The men who really had control
over Guangdong and had influence on the province for years, however, were Li Jishen and
Chen Jitang successively, leaders of the so-called Guangdong Faction (or Yuexi), as it was
called after 1926. Their actions had more impact than any others on the Guangxi Clique’s
rise and fall in the GMD.
Apart from close connections between Guangdong and Guangxi in culture and
geography, several factors affected their relations. Politically, Guangdong enjoyed high
prestige in its political role in the early Republic. It was a major source of the Nationalist
Revolution under Sun Yatsen, particularly before the Expedition, as the province was Sun’s
birth place. It also was an area where all political and military groups over the country
assembled and debated with each other, even those factions and parties in opposition to the
GMD.72

71
Chen Jiren, “Liangguang shibian qijian Guizhou kangri jiuguojun jishi”, GZWSZLXJ
(Guizhou), No. 23 (October 1986), pp. 237-255.
72
See Chen Zhirang, Junshen zhengquan, pp. 153-162.

166
 Militarily, Guangdong was a traditional supplier of ammunition to Guangxi. In the
early Republic, Guangxi did not have an arsenal, but Guangdong had a number of big
munitions factories able to meet the needs of both Guangdong itself and the South China
market.73 For the Clique, it was convenient to obtain ammunition supplies from
Guangdong for geographic reasons. More importantly, bordering the two western colonies
- Hong Kong and Macao - Guangdong never ran short of foreign arms supplies. There is
evidence that the large purchases of foreign firearms by the Clique were made via
Guangdong in the 1920s and 1930s.74
Economically, until recently Guangdong has been the major market for Guangxi’s
rural products. For this reason, a good relationship with Guangdong enabled the Guangxi
authorities to levy taxes on these goods, including opium,75 and to gain certain financial
support for the Clique.76 This partly explains why, after the reunification of the province,
the Clique brought itself under the Nationalist Government in 1925.77 Li Zongren wrote on
May 13, 1932, in a letter to Xiao Focheng, a native of Guangdong and a veteran member of
the two southwestern organizations, "Guangxi’s policy towards the current political
situation should, in the future, be under the leadership of the Political Council and follow
Guangdong’s lead”.78 This indicates that the Clique had pursued a cooperative policy with
Guangdong since the early 1920s.

73
For details of arsenals in Guangdong, see GZWSZLXJ (Guangzhou), No. 37, pp. 161-
167. Also see Lu Dayue, “Jiuyiba shibian hou guomin zhengfu tiaozheng binggong shiye
shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1993, pp. 102-116.
74
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, pp. 26-7; Archives of the
Nationalist Government, Nanjing; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua
minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Vol. 4. Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, p. 902.
75
Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi de juanxiang”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p. 55.
76
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou:
Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 33. Also see Kan Zonghua, “Cheng Jitang, Li
Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian de jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 29, p.
379.
77
See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao
huibian, Vol. 4, pp. 887-912; and GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 31 (16 August 1925).
78
Quoted in Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, p. 183.

167
 Relations between Li and the Guangdong Faction can be traced back to 1923, when
the former’s sphere of influence was limited to a small area - Yulin fu only. Li had a
chance to expand his influence in the summer of the same year, when the Clique captured
Wuzhou with the assistance of the First Division of the Guangdong Army (FDGDA). This
was the province’s richest area as well as the closest area to the Guangzhou Military
Government (GMG) under the leadership of Sun Yatsen. Through the assistance of the
FDGDA, Li and the Clique built up its close relations with the GMG. The occupation of
Wuzhou became a turning point for a new relationship between the two provinces, which
had experienced some enmity after Lu Rongting’s group and Guangdong became enemies
in 1920.79
FDGDA was a powerful troop under the leadership of Li Jishen. After the
occupation of Wuzhou, relations between Guangxi and Guangdong developed into a close
friendship, which laid a foundation for the Clique’s alliance with the Guangdong Faction in
the future. FDGDA’s financial and military support was even more important, for it
enabled Li to reunify Guangxi in the following two years.80
Several factors contributed to the good relationship between the two parties. First,
their leading officers were all aged between 20-30, and had experienced political
movements since 1911, such as the Revolution of 1911, the National Protection Movement
and War in 1916 and the Constitution Protection Movement and War in the following
years. They were imbued with patriotic enthusiasm. Secondly, they had similar
educational backgrounds for they mostly graduated from military schools, i.e. four different

79
For details of earlier relationship between the Clique and Guangdong, see Huang
Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52; Huang Shaohong, “Jiu Guixi de
xingmie”, WSZLXJ, No. 16; and Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de
bianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43. Also see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi
youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921.
80
For details of the Guangdong Faction’s support of the Guangxi Clique financially and
militarily, see Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 26, and Wushi
huiyi, 1946, p. 110; Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”,
GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu
ziliao, p. 33. And for detailed story of battles in reuniting Guangxi and the support from
the Guangdong Faction, see memoirs of Huang Shaohong, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Chen
Xiong, Huang Xuchu, Li Jiezhi etc, in the Bibliography of the thesis. Also see Shenbao,
March and April 1924; and Chen Jitang, Chen Jitang zizhuan, Taipei: ZJWXS, 1974, pp.
15-22; GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 3 (18 January 1925).

168
levels of military schools (sixiao - lujun xiaoxue, lujun yubei xuexiao, lujun zhongxue, and
Baoding junguan xuexiao - the Elementary Military School, the Army Preparatory School,
the Middle Military School, and Baoding Military Academy). They joined together
because they were discriminated against by old-style armies in each province.81 Li Zongren
gathered together a number of graduates of these schools, who were mostly natives of
Guangxi, as well as many in the FDGDA. When these schoolmates from the two provinces
met together, it was easy for them to form a strong force as they had much in common
ideologically.82 Furthermore, Li Jishen, Commander of FDGDA, then leader of the
Guangdong Faction, was a native of Guangxi. His high rank and key position in the
Guangdong Armies were esteemed by his fellow provincial colleagues - the Guangxi
Clique.83 It is quite possible that Li Jishen’s real purposes might have been to foster a
faction with his home province as his support base. This would have enabled him to play a
decisive role in the two provinces and to promote and expand his strength in his struggle
for power in the GMG, though basically his role was that of a mediator between the GMG
and Guangxi and his stated aim was to expand the Nationalist influence into Guangxi.84
In any case, the two parties, together with Guizhou as mentioned earlier, formed a
powerful political and military alliance in both the 1920s and 1930s. The Guangdong
Faction under Li Jishen (1926-29) and Chen Jitang (1929-36), in fact, played an extremely
important role in the alliance, which lasted until 1936 when Chen lost his influence in
Guangdong.
The first feature of the alliance was that the two provinces formed the base of the
most powerful opposition to Jiang in the GMD.85 They maintained semi-independence

81
For details of the way in which military school graduates were discriminated against by
the old-style armies, particularly the armies under Lu Rongting, see Yin Chenggang, “Li
Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7; and Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei:
Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-30.
82
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 20.
83
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 57.
84
Li Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No.
14, pp. 33-34; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.
85
Lai Huipeng, “Jiang Jieshi yu Li Jishen mingzheng andou jilue”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 31
(1981).

169
from Nanjing by firmly holding onto the two southwestern organizations, with Hu Hanmin
as spiritual leader, until Hu’s death in May 1936. With this power, the two provinces were
free to implement their ideas in their own provinces without intervention from Nanjing.
During the Nanjing decade, the two provinces had upheld a political policy of
“overthrowing Jiang and resisting Japan”. It also was the reason why the two southwestern
organizations could coexist. In the early phase of their relationship, the objective of the two
parties was to overthrow Jiang’s dictatorship.86 After the “September 18 Incident” they
held up the banner of resisting Japan to condemn Jiang’s policy of “domestic pacification
before external war”; but, the pre-condition of the two parties’ policy was to overthrow
Jiang if he still aimed at suppressing all of his rivals. Of course, the Clique particularly was
more eager than the Guangdong Faction to overthrow Jiang in the earlier 1930s.87 To
secure the anti-Jiang base, the two parties created a relationship of mutual assistance.88
This policy led to the outbreak of the “June 1 Movement” in 1936, which appealed for an
immediate launching of national resistance against Japan.
The second feature was that, while the two parties shared the same bed, they were
strange bedfellows. The Clique benefited from cooperation with the Guangdong Faction,
in particular, for its survival and revival after its defeat in 1929. Its main aim was to
promote its position in the GMD during the Li Jishen period and to overthrow Jiang’s rule
in order to restore its influence in the Central Government as well as to carry out its policies

86
For details of this policy, see Li zongsiling zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo
ribaoshe, 1931; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 78-
92.
87
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991.
88
For example, the Clique assisted Li Jishen to consolidate his rule in Guangdong by
victory over the CCP army under Generals He Long and Ye Ting who marched towards
Guangdong after the Nanchang Uprising in August 1927, and the “Guangzhou Incident”
launched by generals Zhang Fakui and Huang Qixiang, two subordinates of Li Jishen and
natives of Guangdong who aimed at overthrowing his rule in the province. See Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 187-190. For the detailed story of the “Guangzhou Incident”
(also called the “Zhang-Huang Incident”), which occurred in November and December
1927, see Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:
Pingshe, 1928.

170
in the nation during the Chen Jitang period.89 On the other hand, Li Jishen’s anti-Jiang
attitude was different from that of the Guangxi Clique. According to a report, Li Jishen’s
anti-Jiang stand was based on the principle of “Guangdong for the people of Guangdong”.90
Also, Chen Jitang’s main aim was to have firm control over Guangdong. Chen had always
indicated that he did not stand firmly together with the Clique. In other words, he did not
want to entirely break his relations with the Jiang group. For example, the two
southwestern organizations often sent Nanjing a circular telegram voicing their views on
the current national events and affairs, but Chen usually sent Nanjing another confidential
telegram to explain that though he was one of signatories it did not represent his personal
opinion.91
Another feature was that the Guangdong Faction’s frequent internal split had a
direct effect on the Clique’s rise and fall in Chinese politics. That is to say, the alliance
between the two parties was broken in some years, because of the Jiang-Gui War. The
Guangdong Faction turned out to be comprised of a very complicated political and military
group. With continuing victory in the Expedition, internal splits occurred in the
Guangdong Faction as internal conflicts in the GMD speeded up. General Zhang Fakui
first separated from the Guangdong Faction and showed his loyalty to Wang Jingwei rather
than to Li Jishen in 1927.92 Chen Mingshu, another subordinate commander of Li Jishen,
also joined Jiang when the Nanjing regime openly confronted the Wuhan regime earlier in
1927.93 On the other hand, as regionalist feeling grew and the cry for anti-territorial
expansion became louder at that time, rapid expansion of the Cliques sphere of influence
during the Expedition made itself a target of wider criticism, mostly from the Jiang faction,
Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin groups. Both of the latter then supported Jiang in

89
“Hu Hanmin to Lixiong”. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang
mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 120.
90
Chenbao, 26 July 1927; and GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 40 (16 October 1927).
91
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 124, p. 5.
92
For details of Zhang Fakui’s turning out of the Guangdong Faction, see Zhang Fakui,
“Fenggong, hui-Yue, hudang”, ZJWX, Vol. 33, No. 1. Also see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.),
Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.
93
Tang Degang and Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyi lu (Chinese version), p. 288.

171
opposition to the Clique.94 In these circumstances, Li Jishen was embarrassed by the
position he was in: he was leader of the Guangdong Faction, but a native of Guangxi. His
subordinates were mostly natives of Guangdong. However, the help and support that he
obtained to save his rule in Guangdong were from the Clique, not from his subordinates.95
Furthermore, Guangxi troops in the garrison of Guangdong received about 300,000 to
400,000 yuan monthly after 1927, which was endorsed by Li Jishen during his rule of the
province.96 The animosity between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction caused
by strong regionalist feelings was concealed by Li Jishen’s personal relationship with both
the Clique and natives of Guangdong at that time. Consequently, in spite of Li Jishen’s
detention at Nanjing in March 1929 at the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War, the Guangdong
Faction sided with Jiang. This is partly because its members were discontented with Li
Jishen’s favouritism towards the Clique.97 Of course, Jiang also tried to break the alliance
between the two parties by any means he could use.98 Once Jiang succeeded in causing a

94
For details that the three groups joined forces to oppose the Clique, see Zhongguo dier
lishi dangan guan (ed.), “1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”,
LSDA, No. 1, 1984. Also see Guangzhou pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,
1928.
95
For example, relying on the Clique’s support, Li Jishen overcame two crises in
Guangdong. One occurred when the Clique’s troops defeated the CCP’s troops led by He
Long and Ye Ting (an ex-subordinate commander of Li Jishen) in September and October
1927. In another, the Clique again drove Zhang Fakui’s troops out of Guangdong at the
end of the same year when Zhang and Huang Qixiang launched a mutiny in Guangzhou to
overthrow Li Jishen’s rule in the “Zhang-Huang Incident”. Huang Qixiang was also an ex-
subordinate of Li Jishen. See Huang Shaohong, “Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng”,
WSZLXJ, No. 24; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.
96
Some documents indicate that Guangxi's military expenditure for assistance was less
than 200,000 Yuan monthly. See Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai
huiyi, p. 63. According to Huang Shaohong, it was 400,000 Yuan monthly, and this
planted the seeds of the trouble between the two provinces in the following years. See
Huang Shaohong, “Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng”, WSZLXJ, No. 24, p. 180. In a
speech, Chen Jitang also expressed Guangdong natives’ resentment over Guangxi's
extortion of a huge military expenditure for assistance from Guangdong that was at least
more than 300,000 to 400,000 yuan monthly. See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.
97
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 33-34.
98
See, for example, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), “1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng
lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1984, pp. 62-64.

172
split between these senior commanders (i.e. Chen Mingshu, Chen Jitang and so on), they
immediately betrayed their leader. Having lost the rear base, the Guangxi Clique’s sphere
of influence and strong military power in central China soon collapsed.
However, common interest brought the two provinces to reconciliation and
cooperation again following the “Hu Hanmin Incident” which occurred in February 1931.99
In appearance, the incident was a turning point for reconciliation between the two
provinces. In fact, several factors indicated that the Guangdong Faction, particularly Chen
Jitang, had been unable to keep fighting with the Clique. 1) The Guangdong army had been
put in a tight spot for two years in fighting with the Clique. However, it could not see the
prospect of victory over Guangxi as the latter still held fast to its own base. If the
Guangdong Faction’s effective strength was worn down in the war, Chen’s power in
Guangdong would be lost. Should Jiang further weaken other rivals within the GMD,
Chen would then be a major target.100 2) The Guangdong Faction received an annual
military expenditure of 4.3 million yuan in 1929-30 from Nanjing. Chen expanded his
troops into a force of nearly 100,000 men by taking advantage of the war with the Clique.
Jiang urged him to disarm and to reduce his annual military expenditure to 2.5 million yuan
at the end of 1930. As Chen’s troops had suffered huge casualties in the war without any
supplements from Nanjing, disarmament and reduction threatened to further weaken
Chen’s influence, which resulted in a conflict between Chen and Jiang.101 3) The conflict
between Chen Jitang and Chen Mingshu, then Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial

99
The so-called “Hu Hanmin Incident” refers to Hu, President of the Legislative Council
of the Nationalist Government at Nanjing, being detained by Jiang, Chairman of the
Nationalist Government, in Nanjing in 28 February 1931. The Incident is usually regarded
as a result of the conflict between Jiang and Hu for the latter opposed the former as
President of the national government and drew up a provisional constitution. See Hu
Hanmin, "Hu Hanmin zizhuan", JDSYJ, No. 2 1981, and No. 2, 1983; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshi
nian dongluan Zhongguo, Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1955; Zhang Tongxin, Jiang-
Wang hezuo xia de guomin zhengfu, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1988; Zhongguo qingnian
junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Qingnian junrenshe, 1934, pp. 252-300;
and William Tze-fu Chu, Hu Hanmin: A Political Profile (1879-1936), unpublished PhD
dissertation, St. John’s University, 1978.
100
See Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992,
p. 192.
101
See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 39, p. 83, and
p. 95.

173
Government who was supported by Jiang, became more and more critical.102 4) Hu
Hanmin was Chen Jitang’s political patron. It was self-evident that Hu’s fall in the Central
Government would directly affect Chen’s position. Therefore, once Chen Jitang changed
his force to the anti-Jiang front, he could win a reputation in “defence of the GMD’s law
and discipline” and expand his political influence and military strength. Also, he could
drive Chen Mingshu away and make himself sole ruler over the province.103 5) The Clique
was the only surviving group which still upheld the anti-Jiang policy after all other anti-
Jiang factions within the GMD were defeated by Jiang in a series of civil wars during 1929-
30. If Chen took the anti-Jiang policy, he would obtain support from the Clique and make
it follow his lead, which was better than maintaining an enemy in the neighbour of
Guangdong. Chen believed that “Guangdong and Guangxi could coexist when they
cooperated and would suffer from each other if they split”; this also was a continuation of
FDGDA’s policy towards the Clique after 1923. The current war between the two
provinces also provided an illustration of this view. When he cooperated with the Clique,
Chen could obtain more external support to maintain his rule in Guangdong.104 In this
sense, the “Hu Hanmin Incident” occurred at the right time. It provided both Chen Jitang
and the Clique with a great opportunity to reach reconciliation.
However, the Guangdong Faction was continually split into two groups: one headed
by Chen Jitang which was still called the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi) with its sphere of
influence in Guangdong, the other the Chen Mingshu group (i.e. the 19th Route Army),
which split from the Guangdong Faction in 1931, when Chen Jitang became reconciled
with the Clique and showed his anti-Jiang attitude openly. The group demonstrated its
loyalty to Jiang before 1931 and then built up its sphere of influence in Fujian in 1932.
Chen Mingshu’s separation from the Guangdong Faction was the result of a fierce struggle
with Chen Jitang for power over the province, rather than his quest for favour with Jiang
before 1931. After the “September 18 Incident” Chen Mingshu had conflicting views from

102
Ibid, pp. 387-389.
103
Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 192-193.
104
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 387.

174
Jiang’s on a series of internal and external policies, particularly on the policy towards the
Japanese invasion.105
Li and the Clique cooperated equally with each of them, but had to follow Chen
Jitang’s policies in dealing with many affairs related to the two provinces, for geographical
reasons. Their attitude towards “the Fujian Incident”, which was launched by the 19th
Route Army under Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai in November
1933,106 was a good example. In mid-1933 the three provinces (Fujian, Guangdong and
Guangxi) signed a secret military agreement, which called for mutual military assistance if
any one of them was attacked by the Jiang group.107 After the outbreak of the Fujian
Incident, Chen Jitang broke his promise to Chen Mingshu. Li found it difficult for the
Clique to react to the incident though he tried to form a united government which included
the three provinces by persuading Chen Jitang to join them in facing the incident.108 As a
result, Chen Mingshu’s group was wiped out by Jiang soon after the incident.109 The
Guangdong Faction also collapsed following its further internal split during the June 1

105
For details of changes of Chen’s attitude towards Jiang, see Chen Mingshu, “‘Jiuyiba’
disi zhounian jinian ganyan”, Giu Guo Sh Bao, December 9, 1935 to February 4, 1936.
106
The Fujian Incident was launched in November 1933 by Chen Mingshu, Li Jishen, Cai
Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai and others, most of them were former members of the Guangdong
Faction. They aimed at overthrowing the Nanjing Government under the leadership of both
Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei and appealed for immediate resistance against Japan. They
claimed themselves to be separated from the GMD and formed a new party
“Shengchandang” (the Production Party) instead. They also established their own national
government - Fujian renmin zhengfu (The People’s Government of Fujian). But the
Incident was soon suppressed by Jiang in January of the following year. For details of the
Incident, see Wang Shunsheng and Yang Dawei, Fujian shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin
chubanshe, 1983; and Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao
xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983.
107
See Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), “Fujian shibian” ziliao xuanbian, pp.
51-54. Also see Jiang Guangnai, “Dui shijiu lujun yu ‘Fujian shibian’ de buchong”,
WSZLXJ, No. 59; Cai Tingkai. “Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo”, ibid,
No. 59; and Yin Shizhong, “Fujian shibian zhong wo daibiao Li Jishen Chen Mingshu fu
Guangxi dao Ruijin qiatan jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.
108
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 73-77. Also see SHXW, Vol. 5, No. 27, and No.
29; and Vol. 6, No. 1-2.
109
See Xu Xiqing, “‘Fujian renmin zhengfu’ yundong”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1; and
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 653-689.

175
Movement in 1936, when General Yu Hanmou, senior subordinate commander of Chen
Jitang, turned to Jiang and took over the latter’s position in Guangdong. This marked the
end of a long-term cooperation between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction.

4. Li’s Relations With Sichuan

Sichuan is in the southwest area, but not on the border of Guangxi. Li had no
special relations with Sichuan militarists in the early GMD period. Even Liu Xiang, the
most powerful Sichuan militarist and Chairman of the province, usually supported Jiang in
many domestic affairs during this period.110 It seems that Liu was unlikely to create a close
relationship with Li and the Clique. However, common interests brought the two provinces
into an alliance in the last few years prior to the Sino-Japanese War. The form of such an
alliance was expressed as the Sichuan, Guangxi and Red Army Agreement signed by Li
and Liu, with the CCP together, in around the spring and summer of 1937.111 Detailed
provisions of the agreement are unknown. According to memoirs of the persons who took
part in signing the agreement on behalf of Liu, the main points of the agreement appear to
be that
The three parties united to resist Japan. Should Jiang ignore the resistance against
Japan and still focus on civil war the three parties would join forces to fight against
Jiang.112
Although Guangxi leaders never mentioned this agreement in their memoirs, there
is evidence that it did exist in 1937. According to a record held by the CCP in Guangxi,
General Zhang Yunyi, former Commander of the Red 7th Army in Guangxi Soviet Area
(1929-31) and then representative of the CCP and the Red Army, visited Guangxi in around
June and July 1937 and met Guangxi leaders. As a result of this visit, they signed an

110
For details of Liu’s support to Jiang in the early GMD period, see Archives of the
Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing; and Qiao
Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, p. 99.
111
See recollections of Deng Hanxiang, “Liu Xiang yu Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao”,
WSZLXJ, No. 5; and Gan Jipi, “Chuan-Kang zhengjun huiyi de xingxing sese”, WSZLXJ,
No. 33; and Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 255-256.
112
Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, p. 225.

176
agreement with its main points similar to the above.113 In his diaries, Huang Xuchu, then
Chairman of Guangxi and one of the Clique’s top leaders, also recorded that Li Zongren
convened a meeting with leading officers of the Clique in early July to discuss matters
brought up by Zhang’s visit, including perhaps the agreement with the Red Army.114 Also,
Guangxi allied with Guizhou, Guangdong and Fujian for regional military cooperation. It
would be wise for the Clique to ally itself with other regional factions, especially to form an
alliance with Sichuan, even the Red Army. This would fit the requirements for cooperation
with the Clique’s policy of “goodwill with the neighbourhood”, as discussed earlier.
This agreement, as usual, was in line with the policy of the Clique and met its needs
at that time as well. It coincided with the Clique’s policy of resisting Japan and promoting
cooperation with regional factions politically and militarily. During the “June 1
Movement”, Li Zongren proposed a number of provisions, which provided the pre-
condition for reconciliation with Jiang: freedom of the resistance against Japan, freedom of
patriotic speech by the common people, freedom of assembly and association; movement of
the Central armies from the south towards the north to resist Japan; a plan and the time to
resist Japan and so on.115 In comparison with Li’s provisions, the Sichuan, Guangxi and
Red Army Agreement was a further development of his proposal in the Movement. Li’s
provisions also were a product of the current national demands. As the Clique knew, an
open anti-Jiang policy was unlikely to win over the sympathy of the country because
resistance against Japan and national salvation had become the Chinese people’s major
concern at that time. To seek a political solution, the Clique carried out the policy of
sharing power with Jiang in the region internally, and of keeping up resistance against
Japanese aggression externally.116 The Clique’s internal policy aimed at maintaining its
strength. Of course, it also indicated that the Clique was gradually removing its previous
open anti-Jiang attitude, thus laying the foundation for reconciliation with Jiang later. But,
its external policy met the national current political demands also. It would ease Jiang’s

113
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, Nanning: GXWSZLXJ, 1989, pp. 111-112.
114
Diary of Huang Xuchu, 5 July 1937, quoted in Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 108.
115
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.
116
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 126, p. 15.

177
pressure on Guangxi and also strengthen regional cooperation between Guangxi and the
Southwest. In so doing, the Clique would be able not only to continue to have a share of
political power with Jiang in the region within the GMD, but also to claim a major victory
for its tenacity in insisting on resistance against Japan. The policy became one of Li’s
powerful weapons in regional political and military cooperation and in its conflict with
Jiang. Of course, the agreement which was signed before the outbreak of nationwide
resistance against Japan was also determined by the internal and external factors of Sichuan
and the Red Army.
Sichuan witnessed frequent civil wars for over seventeen years, from 1916 to 1933.
The Central government found it difficult to intervene in their provincial affairs. However,
the year 1935 saw a chance to change the situation in the province, for the GMD
headquarters formally formulated, at the 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the 4th
Party National Congress held in December 1934, a policy of peaceful reunification, but one
which still amounted to centralization under Jiang. Sichuan was high on the agenda of the
GMD.117 However, Sichuan had adopted the policy of “closing the province and excluding
the outsiders”, for a long time. In theory, the policy of peaceful reunification benefited the
internal political unity in the GMD, but Jiang's centralization also hurt the interests of
Sichuan militarists including Liu Xiang. Therefore, a conflict between Liu and Jiang
suddenly flared up. Liu abandoned his previous pro-Jiang policy, which aimed at obtaining
Jiang’s political and financial assistance for strengthening his position in the province, and
started to get in touch with other factions in opposition to Jiang. The Clique certainly was
one which he wanted to contact.118 At the same time, Li and the Clique met Liu’s needs
after the Guizhou province was brought into Jiang’s centralization in 1935. As a result, the
two parties formed an alliance. For example, during the “June 1 Movement”, Liu rejected
Jiang’s demand that he denounced Li’s action in Guangxi. Moreover, Liu also secretly
prepared for consistent action with Li by moving his troops to respond to the Movement.119

117
Yan Daogang, “Zhuidu changzheng hongjun de bushu jiqi shibai”, in Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji,
p. 11.
118
For details see Deng Hanxiang, “Liu Xiang yu Jiang Jieshi de gouxin doujiao”,
WSZLXJ, No. 5.
119
Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 193-194.

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Furthermore, when the “Xi’an Incident” occurred on December 12, 1936,120 Liu firmly
backed Li in proclaiming support for Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, who
launched the Incident and called for immediate resistance to Japan. Meanwhile, Liu and Li
also issued a joint circular telegram opposing Nanjing’s policy of dispatching troops to
attack the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu, which were occupied by both the Northeast
troops (Dongbeijun) and the Northwest troops (Xibeijun) under the command of Zhang and
Yang respectively, in response to the Incident.121
On the other hand, the CCP headquarters and the Red Army arrived and captured
north Shaanxi after 1935. For survival and in response to the political demands of national
salvation, the CCP needed a reconciliation with all parties and factions throughout the
country, even including the Jiang faction. In short, the CCP could cooperate with any
faction and party for those purposes.
The CCP’s contact with the Guangxi Clique can be traced back to the period of the
“June 1 Movement” or even earlier. During the Movement, Li sent a delegation on his
behalf to North Shaanxi to explore the prospects of establishing an association with the
CCP. It is likely that Li made an agreement with the CCP.122 The exact points of the
agreement are still unknown. But, judging from Li’s positions in the Movement and the
main provisions of the agreement with the Red Army and Liu Xiang in 1937, Li’s draft
agreement with the CCP in 1936 might have provided a basis for that of the final
document. According to the CCP’s documents, Zhang Yunyi’s visit of Guangxi in 1937
was for normal signature of the agreement with the Clique, which Li had drafted one year
before.123
After the settlement of the “June 1 Movement”, Li and the Clique moved the capital
of Guangxi from Nanning to Guilin as part of their preparation for starting the Sino-

120
For details of the “Xi’an Incident”, see James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story
of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking Press, 1938.
121
Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan et al (eds.), “Xi’an shibian” dangan ziliao xuanbian,
Beijing: DACBS, 1986, pp. 122-3.
122
“Mao Zedong to Li Jishen, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, September 22, 1936”, Mao
Zedong shuxin xuanji, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, pp. 70-72.
123
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, p. 111-2.

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Japanese War, and Jiang also promised to lead the national resistance against Japan when
the Movement was settled peacefully.124 However, Jiang still did not state that China’s fate
had been at its most critical moment, though he actually speeded up his preparation for the
war of resistance.125 Despite his new position, large numbers of troops in Shaanxi and
Gansu mustered by Jiang were for the purpose of continuing civil war, not for the resistance
war in Suiyuan province against Japanese invasion, which occurred in the second half of
1936.126 After the “Xi’an Incident”, large numbers of the Central Army were still gathered
in the provinces of Henan, Shaanxi and Gansu, in an attempt to eliminate the Northwest
troops and the Northeast troops under Generals Yang and Zhang respectively. It seemed
that the crisis of civil war still existed. In these circumstances, not surprisingly, the
Guangxi Clique, Sichuan and the Red Army strengthened their contact, and then signed the
above agreement. Each side in the agreement was concerned with its own interests; but the
agreement also achieved a wider political unity among these groups with different interests,
policies and even ideologies. To a great extent, the main provision and theme of the
“Sichuan, Guangxi and Red Army Agreement” and the subsequent compromise with Jiang
showed that all parties and factions, however concerned for their own interests, still cared
for a larger cause - the AJNUF to save the nation.
The agreement also indicated that regional militarists were not always enthusiastic
about power sharing with the central factions, particularly with the Jiang group, on the one
hand, but were aware of the necessity of preparing for resistance against Japan, on the
other. It was also a challenge to the validity of Jiang’s “domestic pacification before
external war” policy. It played a significant role in promoting further regional unity or

124
On Jiang’s promise to lead the resistance against Japan, see Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui
yiwang lu”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.
125
For a thorough discussion of Jiang’s preparation of the war against Japan, see Li
Yibin, “Huabei shibian hou Guomindang zhengfu duiri zhengce de bianhua”, MGDA, No.
1, 1989; and Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying, “Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing
zhengfu de kangri zhunbei”, FDXB, No. 5, 1987; and Chen Qianping, “Shilun kangzhan
qian Guomindang zhengfu de guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987.
126
For details of the war of resistance against Japan in Suiyuan province, see Quanguo
zhengxie wenshi yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Fu Zuoyi shenping, Beijing: ZGWSCBS,
1985. Also see Yu Zidao, “Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 64-85.

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cooperation towards national political unity under the promotion of the driving force of
national resistance against Japanese aggression.
However, the agreement was no longer necessary shortly after it was signed. The
“July 7 Incident” in 1937 led China to a national cooperation in the war of resistance
against Japanese aggression, which marked the formation of the AJNUF. After making
sure of Jiang’s determination to resist Japan, Li and Bai left their base Guangxi for the Fifth
War Zone in Central China and Nanjing immediately. Several hundred thousand Guangxi
troops, who had been trained by Li and Bai for the war, at once marched to the front in East
and Central China. During the Sino-Japanese War, Li, Bai and the Guangxi troops under
their command played their part bravely and were widely respected.127 Liu Xiang, in spite
of his prolonged illness, also led the Sichuan troops in person to the battlefield, and finally
died in his post of Commander of the Seventh War Zone in Wuhan.128 The Red Army,
which was reorganized as a group army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army under the
leadership of Jiang soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, immediately sent all
three of its main principal divisions (shi) to the Shanxi front and joined the battle array of
the Second War Zone under the command of General Yan Xishan.129 All these actions
should be regarded as implementations of the common goal that the three sides pursued
when signing the agreement above. Of course, all of their actions depended on Jiang’s
determination to lead the whole of China to resist Japanese aggression.

Conclusion

127
See Zhong Yueyun, Guangxi xueshengjun, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Zhao Yilin, Li
Zongren jiangjun zhuan, Shanghai: Dashidai shuju, 1938; Zhang Guoping, Bai Chongxi
jiangjun zhuan, Hankou: Zhandou chubanshe, 1938; Tuo Huang (ed.), Jinri de jiangling,
Shanghai: Tongyi chubanshe, 1939; Pin Zhi, Guibing jiahua, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938; Lu
Keng, Guangxi jun yuanzheng ji, Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe, 1938; Feng Jupei,
Kangzhan zhong de diwulujun, Hankou: Jianguo shudian, 1938; and Li Jiajun, Li Zongren
xiansheng zhuan, Shanghai: Housheng shuju, 1948.
128
See Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, Liu Xiang, pp. 227-256.
129
Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? - Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: The Guangxi
Teachers University Press, 1992, pp. 55-59. Also see Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao
chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi: de bian - zhonggong huodong zhenxiang, Vol. 1, edited by
Qin Xiaoyi and published by Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi
yanjiuhui, Taipei, 1985.

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 Li Zongren’s relations with the Southwest regional factions showed that the
regionalist development in the Nanjing decade had a dual character. On the one hand, the
regional interrelations assured the Cliques interests in the region, and this enabled Li and
his Clique to challenge Jiang. It was under the slogan of “sharing power with others in both
the Central government and the region” that the regional factions opposed Jiang’s
centralization in order to defend their own interests. On the other hand, the interrelations
promoted regional cooperation. In a sense, this regional cooperation was a wider regional
unity in political, economical and psychological terms, when China had not yet reached
national political unity as all factions and parties had differences on domestic and external
affairs. Such regional unity usually appeared in the form of the military and political
cooperation or alliance between factions in the regions. However, the cooperation or
alliance between regional factions was affected by the current political tendency of resisting
Japan, which also became the motive force to develop and strengthen Li and his Clique’s
relations with the neighbouring factions. As a result, the development of such regionalism
carried a political coloration. It naturally conflicted with Jiang's centralization or
dictatorship at home and policy of “domestic pacification before external war”, namely, the
policy of non-resistance against Japan. In short, through military and economic cooperation
or alliance, regional militarists were able to maintain their own powers in the region and to
prevent Jiang’s influence penetrating into their territories for which they shared power in
regional structures with the Jiang faction by maintaining the state of semi-independence
from Nanjing. Meanwhile, cooperation and alliance enabled some factions in the region
such as the Clique to seek an opportunity to return to the centre to replace Jiang or to share
power with him. Furthermore, the fact of the Clique maintaining good relations with other
factions in the Southwest indicates that it was to a great extent going with the tide of the
current national feelings to justify their actions.
In the Clique’s relations with regional factions the dual character had interacted,
sometimes showing its own interests stronger, sometimes indicating a stronger response to
the current political tide of the nation. In short, in terms of its relations with its neighbours,
the Clique was concerned with its own survival, when its base was not firm such as in
1929-1931; and it paid more attention to regional cooperation in military and politics, when
the national crisis was more and more critical. This was the main reason why Li was able

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to bring about reconciliation with Jiang for the purpose of resisting Japan, the most urgent
task for China in the 1930s. In other words, regional cooperation or alliance did contribute
to the internal unity of the GMD and the political unity of the nation under those
circumstances.
For Guangxi, cooperation or alliance with its neighbours provided favourable
conditions to work on political, military, economic and educational reconstruction in the
province by freeing it from the Jiang group’s direct pressure, both economic and military.
The Clique was able to use it to vie with Jiang for power and to make itself an formidable
anti-Jiang group in the GMD, on the one hand, and to devote itself to reconstruction of
Guangxi physically and spiritually as a “model province” for its achievements, on the other.
Meanwhile, it also forced Jiang to promise to lead national resistance against Japan, and
contributed finally to the formation of the AJNUF. In this sense, the “June 1 Movement”
marked the appearance of an embryonic form of such a united front.130 From then on, the
Clique abandoned its open anti-Jiang policy and shifted to support Jiang’s leadership for
resistance against Japan. That is to say, relations with the Southwest regional factions were
very important to the Clique for its development politically and militarily. In short, Li’s
relations with the Southwest regional factions were of considerable significance.

130
This issue will be discussed in Chapter Eight.

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