1. Lolita Lopez et.,al v. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc. (QCSC) G.R. No.

164032, January 19, 2009 Facts : The Kasapiang Manggatgawa sa Quezon City Sports Club (Union) filed a compliant for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against QCSC. On July 1997, the union wrote to the management for the release of the members’ salaries and for the implementation of wage increase mandated by CBA. When the letter was unanswered, the union filed a notice of strike. QCSC placed some of its employees under lay-off status due to redundancy and likewise filed a petition for cancellation of registration against union. QCSC contended that the union was not a legitimate labor union as it had a pending complaint for cancellation of certificate of registration, that there was no valid CBA and staged an illegal strike. The Labor Arbiter (LA) decides finding QCSC guilty of ULP. In turn, the union filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal for non-perfection due to failure to post the appeal bond. The QCSC filed a Supplement to its appeal. The NLRC in its decision, granted the appeal and reversed the LA decision. Issue: Whether the simultaneous filing of the matter to reduce the appeal bond and posting of the reduced amount of bond within the reglementary period for appeal constitute substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code. Ruling: It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, it is merely a statue of privilege and may be exercise only if in manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The party when seeks to avail himself of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. In case a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond raised by a reputable bonding company and admitted by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment applied for. Appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon compliance with the following mandatory requisites, namely: (1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the memorandum of appeal ; and (3) payment of the required cash or surety bond. Thus, the posting of the bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the labor arbiter 2. Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL) G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009 Facts: Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees –herein petitioners for allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom Section. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing company’s Code of Discipline prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision ruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who subsequently replaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit.

Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of his decision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action. On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the petition and effectively reinstated the NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed the Court that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings. Issue: Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the period between the LA’s Order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that of the LA, now that PAL has exited from rehabilitation proceedings. Ruling: A dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to comply therewith. The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the LA is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view that the LA’s order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that filing to exercise the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s salaries. When reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive. 3. General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phls., Inc. (General Santos City) G.R. No. Facts: In 1990, the Company experienced a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis. To curve the negative effect, it implemented three (3) waves of an Early Retirement Program (ERP). Meanwhile, there was a memorandum issued mandating to put on hold all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary positions. Because several availed of the ERP, vacancies were created. This prompted the Union to negotiate with the Labor Management Committee (LMC) for filing up of the vacancies. No resolution was reached on the matter. Faced with the freeze hiring, the company engaged the services of JLBP Services Corporation that provides manpower services. Union filed in 2002 with the Nat’l Conciliation and Mediation Board (MCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of ULP for contracting-out services regularly performed by union members. Parties failed to file an amicable settlement. The Company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with DOLE. On 2003, the NLRC ruled that the Company is not guilty of ULP. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision and found that contract out jobs was a valid exercise of management prerogative to meet exigent circumstances. Hence, this petition. Issue:

Whether contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to ULP. Ruling: Unfair Labor Practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor practice. Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove its charge of unfair labor practices. It was the Union that had the burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair labor practice, which burden it failed to discharge. Wherefore, petition is denied. 4. Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa SAMMA-LAKAS sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) v. SAMMA Corporation G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009 Facts : Petitioner, SAMMA-LIKHA, filed a petition for certification election in DOLE. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition. In an Order of Med-Arbiter, the petition was dismissed on the ground of (i) lack of legal personality; (ii) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees; and (iii) failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner registration. The Secretary of Labor, treating petitioner’s MR as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter. Meanwhile, the DOLE revoked the charter certificate of petitioner’s local chapter. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed the decision of Secretary of Labor. Hence, this petition was filed by petitioner. Issue: Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election. Ruling: Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election among its rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that, in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail the certification election. The petition is granted. The record of the case is remanded to the office of origin for determination of the status of petitioner’s legal personality. 5. Jackbilt Industries, Inc. v. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU G.R. Nos. 171618-19, March 13, 2009 Facts: Due to economic crisis on construction industry, petitioner decided to temporarily stop its business of producing concrete hollow blocks compelling most of its employees to go on leave for six months. Respondent protested the temporary shutdown and later on went on strike.

Petitioner filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of TRO in NLRC which NLRC issued. Reports of both the implementing officers and Labor Arbiter revealed that respondent violated the TRO. Respondent wrote letters to respondent participated in strike to explain why they should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike. Failure of respondent to comply despite the extensions granted, petitioner dismissed the concerned employees. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for illegal lockout, runaway shop and damages. In its decision, LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, because the petition did not declare the strike illegal before terminating some employees, the company is found guilty of illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of LA and held that petitioner should be held liable for monetary awards granted to respondent. Petitioner appeal before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition but modified the NLRC decision and held that the temporary shutdown was moved by anti-union sentiments. Petitioner was guilty therefore of unfair labor practice. Issue: Whether the filing of a petition with the LA to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine qua non for the valid termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of strike. Ruling: The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary. Consequently, we uphold the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts in the course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate respondent. The petitioner is granted. 7. De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) G.R. No. 177283, April 7, 2009 Facts : In 2001, a splinter group of respondent filed a petition for conduct of elections with the DOLE alleging that the then incumbent officers of respondent had failed to call for a regular election since 1985. Respondent’s officers claimed that by virtue of RA 6715, which amended the Labor Code, the term of office of its officers was extended to five years or until 1992 during which a general assembly was held affirming their hold-over tenure until the termination of collective bargaining negotiations. Acting on the petitioner, the DOLE-NCR held that the holdover authority of respondent’s incumbent set of officers had been extinguished by virtue of the execution of the CBA and ordered the conduct of elections subject to pre-election conferences. Respondent wrote a letter to DLSU President to put on escrow all union dues/agency fees and whatever money considerations deducted from salaries of concerned co-academic personnel until the election of union officials has been scheduled and been held. Petitioner in response, to do the following: (1) establish a savings account for the Union where all collected union dues and agency will be deposited and held in trust; and (2) discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of officers. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) claiming that petitioner unduly interfered with its internal affairs. During the pendency of this complaint, respondent file a notice of strike. LA dismissed the respondent ULP complaint. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On respondent’s petition for certiorari before the CA, the Court set aside the decision of NLRC. Hence, petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether the NLRC gravely abuse its discretion when it held that petitioner were not guilty of ULP considering that the temporary measures implemented by the University were undertaken in good faith and only to maintain its neutrality amid the intra-union dispute. Ruling: It bears noting that at the time petitioners’ questioned moves were adopted, a valid and existing CBA had been entered between the parties. It thus behooved petitioners to observe the terms and conditions thereof bearing on union dues and representation. It is axiomatic in labor relations that a CBA entered into by a legitimate labor organization and an employer become the law between the parties, compliance with which is mandated by express policy of the law. 8. UST Faculty Union v. University of Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 180892, April 7, 2009. Facts : The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) informed its members of a General Assembly. One of its agenda is the election of officers. The Secretary General of UST issued a Memorandum allowing the request of Faculty Clubs to hold a convocation which the members of the faculty including members of USTFU attended without the participation of UST administration. Also, an election of USTFU was conducted by a group called Reformist Alliance. Learning that the convocation was intended for election, some members walked out but the election was conducted among those present (Gamilla Group). Thus, two (2) groups claim to be USTFU namely; (1) Marino Group; and (2) Gamilla Group. Marino group filed a compliant for ULP against UST with the Arbitration Branch. It also filed a complaint before Med-Arbiter praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group. A CBA was entered between Gamilla Group and UST superseding the existing CBA of UST and USTFU. The Med-Arbiter declared the election of Gamilla Group as null and void. On appeal, the BLR affirmed the decision of Med-Arbiter. On appeal before this Court, the Court upheld the ruling of BLR. With the decision of this Court, the case before the Arbitration Branch of NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit. USTFU appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. When the case is elevated to CA, the Court affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition despite abundance of evidence showing that Unfair Labor Practices were indeed committed. Ruling: The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While, there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of proving such ULP. Thus, we ruled in De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC that “a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due processs.” “In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 9. Januaria Rivera v. United Laboratories, Inc.

G.R. No. 155639, April 22, 2009. Facts : Rivera commenced employment with the Company as senior manufacturing pharmacist and later became Director of the Manufacturing Division. In 1959, the Company adopted a comprehensive retirement plan. The parties do not dispute that under the plan, a member is compulsorily retired upon reaching the normal retirement date which is the age 60 or has completed the service of 30 years of service. In 1988, Rivera completed 30 years of service and the Company retired her pursuant to the terms of the plan effective in December 1988. At Rivera’s request, the company allowed her to continue working and even promoted to the position of AVP in 1989 until 1992. Rivera then retired from the company. From 1993 to 1994, Rivera worked as a personal consultant under contract with the Company’s sister companies which assigned her to the Company. The Company amended its retirement plan in 1992. Rivera wrote the company to increase her retirement benefits in accordance with the amendments. The company denied her request because she compulsory retired in 1988. Rivera sought relief for recovery of unpaid retirement pay differential. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Rivera elevated the case to CA and CA ruled in favor of her and set aside the NLRC decision but remanded the case to LA for hearing on the merits finding the claim had not yet prescribed at the time of its filing. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that Rivera’s claim for additional retirement benefits had not prescribed. Ruling: It should be noted in this regard that Articles 1139 to 1155 of the Civil Code provide the general law on prescription of actions. Under Article 1139, actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time prescribed by law. That law may either be the Civil Code or special laws as specifically mandated by Article 1148. In labor cases, the special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor Code. The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues. Thus, again the general law on prescription applies -- Article 1150 of the Civil Code. The day the action may be brought is the day a claim started as a legal possibility. In this case, this date came when Rivera learned that she was being paid on the basis of her December 1988 retirement computations for the retirement that she claimed to have occurred on December 1992. Thus, by strict standards of law, we cannot grant Rivera’s petition. Interestingly, the same conclusions obtains if the case were to be viewed solely from the ordinary norms of fairness. We go out of our way to say this in light of what Rivera stated in her demand latter to UNILAB; she felt aggrieved because the retirement benefits she received were less than what other employees – with less years of service, with lower rates of pay, or with lower rank – received. Apparently, Rivera failed to realize that she cannot compare herself with these other employees because she and they were not in the same situation; these other employees retired later and under retirement plan terms that, by then and for various reasons not attributable to any company wrongdoing, had been enhanced. Both in law and under the common concept of fairness, there is inequitable treatment only if persons under the same situation or circumstances are treated differently. Rivera was not so treated by UNILAB; rather, she was given her just due under the specific rules that applied to her. Hence, we cannot likewise recognize the validity of Rivera’s claim even from the point of view of justice administered according to ordinary norms of fairness. 10. Herminigildo Inguillo et., al. v. First Philippine Scales, Inc. G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009.

Facts : The Company employed Bergante and Inguillo as assemblers on August 1977 and September 1986, respectively. In 1991, the Union, FPSSILU, entered into a CBA which duration is for 5 years from 1991 to 1996. During the lifetime of the union, Begante and Inguillo and other members of the union join another union, NLM. Subsequently, NLM filed with DOLE an intra-union dispute against the Union and Company. The Med-Arbiter decided in favor of Union. Meanwhile, the Union filed a petition with the Company seeking the termination of the services of the employees on the ground of disloyalty to the Union and others. On May 1996, Inguillo filed with the NLRC a complaint against the Company for illegal withholding of salary and damages. Also, on May 1996, the company terminated the services of the employees mentioned in the petition. The following day, separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by NLM and Inguillo which were consolidated. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaints against the complainants entered in amicable settlement. The remaining complainants were Bergante and Inguillo. In its decision, LA dismissed the complaints and declared that Bergante and Inguillo were not illegally dismissed, that the two clearly violated the Union Security Clause of the CBA when they joined NLM. On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. On Motion for Reconsideration, NLRC set aside its decision and held that Bergante and Inguillo were not illegally dismissed. On petition, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the legality of the dismissal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the dismissal of Bergante & Inguilla is legal. Ruling: The Labor Code has several provisions under which an employee may be validly terminated, namely (1) just causes under Article 282; (2) authorized causes under Article 283; (3) termination due to disease under Article 284; and (4) termination by the employee or resignation under Article 285. While the said provisions did not mention as ground the enforcement of the Union Security Clause in the CBA, the dismissal from employment based on the same is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. “Union Security” is a generic term, which is applied to and prehends “closed shop,” “union shop,” “maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition of employment. The Petition is denied. 11. Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc. v. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel and Restaurant and Allied Industries G.R. No. 165756, June 5, 2009 Facts : The respondent union is a certified collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Hyatt Regency Manila (HRM), a hotel owned by petitioner (Company). In 2001, the company suffered a slump due to the local and international economic slowdown aggravated by the 9/11 incident in the USA. The company decided to cost-cut by implementing among others reducing work weeks in some hotel departments. In August 2001, the union filed a notice of strike due to a bargaining deadlock before the Nat’l Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB). In the course of the proceedings, the union accepted the economic proposal. Hence, a new CBA was signed. Subsequently, the company decided to implement a downsizing scheme which the union opposed. Despite the opposition, a list of the

position declared redundant and to be contracted out was given to the union. A notice of termination was also committed by the company to the DOLE. Thereafter, the company engaged the services of independent job contractors. The union filed a notice of strike. A conciliation proceeding was again conducted but to no avail. The union went on strike. The Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. The NLRC orders the suspension of the conciliation proceedings. However, the LA already issued decision declaring the strike legal. On appeal by the company, the NLRC reversed the LA decision and declared the strike to be illegal. On petition, the CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and declared the strike legal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the CA’s decision declaring the strike legal is accordance with law and established facts. Ruling: A valid and legal strike must be based on “strikeable” grounds, because if it is based on a “non-strikeable” ground, it is generally deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be groundless. Here, the union went on strike in the honest belief that petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties under a CBA. Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that petitioner’s retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining power of the union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal. 12. Teodorico Miranda, Jr. v. Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) G.R. No. 174316, June 23, 2009 Facts : Petitioner was employed by respondent as Checker I and a member of the company union. On April 1992, petitioner was then the VP of the union and appointed to the position of Shop Steward which is a union position under the payroll of the company. The CBA between the union and company provided for the appointment of a Shop Steward from among the union members upon recommendation of the union president. The Shop Steward is a field representative of both the company and the union and acts as an independent arbiter of all complaints brought to his attention. On December 1993, the union president wrote a letter to the petitioner regarding his recall as a Shop Steward due to loss of trust and confidence. After investigation, the company recommends the recall of the petitioner as Shop Steward and reversion to his former position as Checker I in accordance with CBA. Petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE. In an order, the Med Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of petitioner as Shop Steward. The order of Med-Arbiter was affirmed by the Secretary of Labor. Petitioner again filed a complaint with Med-Arbiter involving money claims in the form of allowances, etc., The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a series of complaints with NLRC one of which is for ULP which later amended to illegal demotion. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. While the cases filed were pending, a second complaint for ULP was filed, the LA dismissed the same for lis pendencia. On third complaint, the

same is dismissed for res judicata. the case.

Petitioner appealed the decision to NLRC which NLRC remanded

Upon remand, the LA ruled that the demotion was for cause but was effected without observance of procedural due process and ordered the respondent to pay petitioner indemnity. Confusion followed, petitioner filed a motion to be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward which was resolved in his favor. Respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition, Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Permanent Injunction claiming that petitioner should be reinstated to his previous position of Checker I. The NLRC issued a TRO. Petitioner filed a petition before the CA. The CA took note of the reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of Checker I. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the petitioner should be reinstated to the position of Shop Steward. Ruling: Since the Shop Steward is a union position, the controversy surrounding his recall from his position as Shop Steward becomes a dispute within the union. As “Internal Union Dispute” or intraunion conflict refers to a conflict within or inside a labor union. It includes all disputes or grievances arising from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of the constitution and by-laws of a union, including any violation of the rights and conditions of union membership provided for in the Code. The Med Arbiter, as affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, ruled that there was neither cause nor due process in the recall of the petitioner from the position of union Shop Steward. He found that the claim of loss of trust and confidence due to the petitioner’s alleged absenteeism was not substantiated and that the recall was not approved by the Board of Directors of the union, as required by the APCWU Constituion and By-Laws. The Petion is dismissed for being moot and academic. 13. Eduardo Mariño, et.,al. v. Gil Gamilla et.,al. G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009 Facts : Petitioners were among the executive officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU), the bargaining representative of the faculty members of the university. Respondents were professors and likewise members of USTFU. The 1986 CBA expired on May 1988. Thereafter, a bargaining negotiations unsued between UST and the petitioners. As the parties were not able to reach agreement, a deadlock was declared by USTFU and filed a notice of strike. The DOLE issued order laying the terms and conditions for a new CBA and said CBA were entered in 1991 effective June 1988. Subsequently, a MOA was executed whereby faculty members belonging to the CBA will be granted additional economic benefits. Respondent filed a complaint with the Med Arbiter for the explusion of the petitioner’s group that they violated the rights and conditions of membership of USTFU. ….. 14. Club Filipino, Inc. v. Benjamin Bautista et.,al. G.R. No. 168406, July 13, 2009 Facts : Petitioner and the union had a CBA which expired on May 31, 2000. Within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. In order to compel the company to

negotiate, union filed a request for preventive mediation with NCMB but again failed. a notice of strike was filed by the union and thereafter, a strike was held.

On April 2001,

Petitioner filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The LA, in its decision, declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC decision is affirmed the LA decision. Upon elevation to CA, the court set aside the ruling of the LA and NLRC as far as other respondent but dismissed the other respondent. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the strike staged by respondent is legal. Ruling: The court ruled in affirmative. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was filed by the union without attaching the counter-proposal of the company. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicable. Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board. The union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counterproposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counterproposal. The union filed a notice of strike, after several request for negotiation proved futile. It was only after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Nowhere in the ruling of the LA can we find any discussion of how respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis. The petitioner is denied. 15. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. University of San Agustin Employees Union-FWW G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009 Facts: On July 2000, petitioner forged with the union a CBA effective for five (5) years or until July 2005. Among agreed was to include a provision on salary increase based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and pursuant to RA 6728, Tuition Fee Law. The union refused to accept the proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500.00 per month. Likewise, union rejected petitioner’s interpretation of term “salary increase” as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration (VA). By decision, the VA held that the salary increase shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP should be same be higher than P1,500.00. On appeal, CA sustained the VA’s interpretation of the questioned CBA but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence, the present petition seeks only the review of the appellate court ‘s interpretation of the questioned provision of CBA. Issue: Whether appellate court erred in interpreting the questioned provision of the CBA.

Ruling: It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employees benefits only mandate the minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnel’s share in the tuition fee increase, petitioner’s remedy lies not in the Court’s invalidating the provision, but in the parties’ clarifying the same in the subsequent CBA negotiations. The decision of CA is affirmed. 16. National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries – Manila Pavilion Hotel Chapter v. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009 Facts: A certification election was conducted on June 2006 among the rank-and-file employees of Holiday Inn. Petitioner and another union (HIMPHLU) refer the case back to Med Arbiter to decide which among those votes be opened and tallied. 22 votes were segregated because; (1) eleven were cast by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal is still pending before CA, (2) six were cast by those already occupying supervisory positions; and (3) five were cast by probationary employees, and pursuant to the CBA, such employees cannot vote. The Med Arbiter ruled to open the votes cast by dismissed and by those holding supervisory employees. The union appealed to SOLE, arguing that the vote of probationary employees should likewise be opened and tallied. The SOLE affirmed the decision of Med Arbiter. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the certification election should be allowed to vote. Ruling: The court ruled in affirmative. The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also have been counted. As Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. FErrer-Colleja, 180 SCRA 749, holds: In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. Petition is granted. The decision of CA is annulled and set aside. 17. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009 Facts:

On February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of petitioner and its affiliates. The Med Arbiter ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. In the meantime, CLUP-Sta. Lucia, reorganized itself and re-registered itself as CLUP-SLECCAWA and filed a petition. The company filed a motion to dismiss and averred that its recognized the CLUP- Sta. Lucia and as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-file employees and that the collective bargaining negotiation already commenced. On November 2001, a CBA was ratified between the company and the CLUP-Sta. Lucia. CLUP-SLECCAWA opposed the execution of CBA as the same is tainted with malice, collusion and conspiracy. Med Arbiter dismissed CLUP-SLECCAWA’s petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. On appeal, SOLE reversed and set aside Med Arbiter’s decision. The company filed a petition before the CA, the CA affirmed the ruling of SOLE. Hence, this petition. Issue: Wether the CA erred in affirming the SOLE decision. Ruling: The petition has no merit. The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c ) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. Thus, CLUP-Sta. Lucia and its Affiliates Workers Union, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for the company is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration and not to immediately commence voluntary recognition proceedings. The petition is denied. 18. A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation Cooperative G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009 Facts: On May 1997, petitioner and respondent entered into a CBA effective until December 1999. The CBA included “No-Strke, No-Lock-out” clause. On several dates, which were legal holidays and peak season, some of the members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal as a concerted action which is a violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause. Thus, it meted the workers 30-day suspension and filed an illegal strike against them. The attempted settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Despite the conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on strike. The company filed a motion to re-open the case which was granted by LA. In its decision, LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed it in per curiam decision. In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike on the ground of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declare the second strike illegal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA’s decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position. Issue: Whether the strike staged by respondent is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the No-Strike, No-Lockout” clause of the CBA. Ruling:

While the strike is the most preeminent weapon of workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not only the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly and within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public welfare. The petition is granted. 19. Oldarico Traveño v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative G.R. No. 164205, September 3, 2009 Facts: Petitioner was hired by TACOR and DFI to work at a banana plantation in Davao Del Norte. Petitioner asseverated that while they worked under the direct supervision of TACOR and DFI, these companies used different schemes to make it appear that petitioner were hired through independent contractors, that they are required to join cooperative and be member of the respondent. Sometime in 2000, the respondent began utilizing harassment tactics to ease them out of their jobs. Without seeking approval from DOLE, they changed the compensation package to pakyawan rate. One after another, three (3) separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed by petitioners with the NLRC against respondent including TACOR and DFI. In a consolidated decision, LA found respondent guilty of illegal dismissal. On partial appeal, petitioner questioned the LA denial of their money claims and dropping their complaints against TACOR and DFI. The NLRC sustained the decision of the LA. On appeal, CA dismissed petition on the ground that the verification and certification for forum shopping is defective. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether DFI wich TACOR had been merged and DPI should be held solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioner’s illegal dismissal and money claims. Ruling: To be sure, the matter of whether the Cooperative is an independent contractor or a labor-only contractor may not be used to predicate a ruling in this case. Job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside .the premises of the principal. The present case does not involve such an agreement. There being no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and the Cooperative’s corespondents, the latter are not solidarily liable with the Cooperative for petitioners’ illegal dismissal and money claims. The petition is dimissed. 22. Patrcia Halagueña et,al. v. PAL G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009. Facts: Petitioners were employed as flight attendants of respondent on different dates prior to November 1996. They are members of FASAP union exclusive bargaining organization of the flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers. On July 2001, respondent and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005 (compulsory retirement of 55 for female and 60 for males).

In July 2003, petitioner and several female cabin crews, in a letter, manifested that the provision in CBA on compulsory retirement is discriminatory. On July 2004, FASAP president submitted their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations at the soonest possible time. On the same month, petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief with issuance of TRO with the RTC Makati. The RTC issued a TRO. After the denial of the respondent on its motion for reconsideration for the TRO, it filed a Petition with the CA. CA granted respondent’s petition and ordered lower court to dismiss the case. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the provision on compulsory retirement in CBA is unlawful and unconstitutional. Ruling: The petitioners’ primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exlusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals. The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction. In Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani, this Court held that not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to dispute arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. 24. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Ferrer Antonio G.R. No. 171587, October 13, 2009 Facts: Respondent was hired by petitioner to work as a seaman on board its various vessels. Petitioner took the licensure examination for 2nd Engineer while petitioner’s vessel was dry docked for repairs. On February 1996, while in Japan, and in the employ of petitioner, respondent suffered a fractured left transverse process of the fourth lumbar vertebra. He was advised to rest for a month. He was later examine and declared fit to work. However, he was not admitted back to work In dire for financial need, he applied for an optional retirement on January 1997. Petitioner disapproved on the ground that his shipboard employment history and track record as a seaman did not meet the standard required in granting the optional retirement benefits. Respondent filed a complaint with the DOLE, for failure to reach amicable settlement, the case was forwarded to NLRC for proper proceedings. The LA in its decision, rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. On appeal to CA, it affirmed the decision of NLRC but modified the award of moral damages in the reduced amount. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether CA erred in awarding the respondent of the optional retirement benefit being applied for in US Dollars under the gratuity plan of petitioner. Ruling:

The petition is meritorious. Respondent is not entitled to optional retirement benefits under the Labor Code. Clearly, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or employment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under the law, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. In the case at bar, there is a retirement gratuity plan between the petitioner and the respondent. Under paragraph B of the plan, a shipboard employee, upon his written request, may retire from service if he has reached the eligibility age of 60 years. In this case, the option to retire lies with the employee. Records shows that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optional retirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim optional retirement benefits as a matter of right. Due to foregoing findings of facts of the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by this Court if the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion and when the judgment of the CA is premised on misapprehension of facts. The CA erred in affirming the rulings of L and the NLRC, as the availment of the optional retirement benefits is subject to the exclusive prerogative of the sole option of the petitioner. The petition is granted. 25. Continental Steel V. Mariano G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Hence according to the oetitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Labor arbiter Montaño argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s resolution. Hence this petition. Issues: 1. 2. 3. Held: 1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. 2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. 3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)]) Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee

26. “G” Holdings, Inc., v. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Local 103 (NAMAWU) G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009 Facts: NAMAWU was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC), an entity operating a copper mine and mill complex. MMC was incorporated by the DBP and PNB on account of their foreclosure of MMC’s assets. Later, DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-performing asset. On October 1992, pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) executed between petitioner and APT, petitioner brought 90% of MMC’s shares and financial claims. Upon signing of PSA and full satisfaction of the stipulated down payment, petitioner immediately took physical possession of the mine and its facilities and took full control of the management and operation of MMC. Four years after, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU with the latter filing with the NCMB of a notice of strike. LA ruled in favor of NAMAWU. It ruled that the lay-off implement by MMC is illegal and it committed ULP. On petition with this Court, we sustained the decision of LA. A partial writ of execution was issued. The writ was not fully satisfied because of MMC’s resisted its enforcement. On October 2002, GHI filed with RTC a Special Civil Action for Contempt with issuance of TRO. GHI contented that the property were subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage executed MMC in favor of petitioner. RTC issued a TRO. On appeal to CA, CA set aside the RTC issuance of writ. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether RTC can validly issued TRO to prevent the execution issued by labor tribunal. Ruling: It is settled that a RTC can validly issue a TRO and, later, a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of a writ of execution raised by a labor tribunal on the basis of a third-party’s claim of ownership over the properties levied upon. While, as a rule, no temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court – where the writ of execution issued by a labor tribunal is sought to be enforced upon the property of a stranger to the labor dispute, even upon a mere prima facie showing of ownership of such claimant – a separate action for injunctive relief against such levy may be maintained in court, since said action neither involves nor grows out of labor disputes insofar as the third party is concerned. Petition is granted. 42. Marival Trading, Inc. (MTI) v. NLRC 525 SCRA 708 Facts: Ma. Vianney Abella worked as a chemist/quality controller at MTI for almost 8 years. The petitioner was engaged in veterinary products, by which the Manuel’s held business. On July 14, 2000, a staff meeting was held. After the meeting, Abella went out of the room and left her belongings. While she was out of the room, the VP Gen. Manager of the company requested two (2) male employees to move some tables so they could conduct an officer’s meeting. Abella’s belongings were placed on one of the tables. When she returned to the room, she attended to her belongings, when her shoulder bag felt badly on the floor, disputing the officer’s meeting. The VP General

Manager approached Abella to ask what the problem was and the latter expressed her resentment over the fact that the employee’s were not informed first before their tables were moved. Three (3) days later, Abella received a memo from the VP General Manager directing her to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be imposed for her disrespectful insubordination & unprofessional conduct. In her response, she denied the accusation against her and clarified that her shoulder bag accidentally fell to floor and such should not have caused any offense to the officers present at the meeting. She maintained that she aired her side regarding the table rearrangement in a tactful & courteous manner. Abella filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA) alleging that she was dismissed from work without just cause and without due process. She prayed for reinstatement with full backwages and without loss of seniority right and other benefits. The LA held that Marival had grounds to take disciplinary action against Abella but since this was her first offense, the LA considered the penalty of dismissal too severe & ordered her reinstatement to former position. However, she was not awarded backwages. Abella appeal with the NLRC which affirmed the order of the LA. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether Abella was entitled to backwages and attorney’s fees. Ruling: Serious misconduct, as a ground for dismissal under Art. 2282 of the Labor Code must be serious, must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties and must show that the employee has income unfit to continue working for the employer. In this case, the acts complained of, under the circumstances that were done did not in any way pertain to Abella’s duties as chemist/quality controller. In previous cases, the SC held that grave & insulting language as tantamount to gross misconduct but in Abella’s case, the utter back of respect for her supervisor was not patent. 43. Philippines Transmarine Carriers (PTC) v. Carella 525 SCRA 586 Facts: Felicisimo Carella was hired by PTC, a manning agent, in behalf of its principal AngloEastern Ship Mngt., Ltd. to work as master on board MV handy cam azobe for 12 months. They approved the POEA contract, they would get US$170,000.00 as basic monthly pay, fixed monthly overtime as US$765.00, master allowance of US$170.00 and leave with pay of six (6) days per month or US$340.00 or a total of US$2,975.00 a month. While the vessel was in Bombay, India, Carella was dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines. On August 1995, he field with DOLE the illegal dismissal with claims for salaries and other benefits for the unexpired portion of its contract as well as unremitted allotments and damages. He alleged that he was dismissed without notice and hearing and without valid reason. Issue: Whether Carella’s dismissal is illegal. Ruling: No it was not. According to the SC, CArella’s overtime and leave pays should not be included in the computation of the unexpired portion since he was no longer rendering services during that period of time, as he had already been repatiated. Overtime pay is granted only if the worker actually rendered service in excess of the number of his regular work hours. It was incorrect to

include that even without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, Carella would automatically be entitled to overtime pay. As regards, leave pay, the Court stated that the claim for days leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract was unwarranted since the same was given during the actual service of the seaman. Hence, the Court partially granted the petition and ordered that the award for overtime pay and leave be deducted from the total monetary award of the LA. 44. PILTEL v. PILTEA 525 SCRA 361 Facts: The CBA between PILTEA and PILTEL, was due to expire on December 1997. On October 1997, the union submitted to the company its proposal for the renegotiation of the non-representation aspects of their CBA. As there was a standstill on several issues, the parties submitted their dispute to the NCMB, for preventive mediation. The conciliation proceedings before the NCMB failed. On July 1998, the union filed a notice of strike with NCMB for ULP due to the alleged acts of “restraint & coercion of union members & interference with their right to self-organization” committed by the company’s managers. The company filed a petition for consolidated assumption of jurisdiction with the office of the Sec. of Labor on August 1998 and the assumption order was issued. On September 1998, the union filed a second notice of strike with the NCMB. On September 1998, the Secretary directed the striking union officers & members to return to work within 24 hours where the union complied. On December 1998, the company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the union strike illegal. The LA issued a decision declaring the strike as illegal. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. The CA reduced the penalty of the union from dismissal to suspension of 6 months. Issue: Whether the strike was valid. Ruling: The strikes was illegal for the following reasons: (i) the union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its 2nd notice of strike and thus violated the 7-day strike ban. This requirement should be observed to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carried the approval of the majority of the union members. 45. Faculty Association of Mapua v. CA 524 SCRA 709 Facts: On January 2001, in the 5th CBA negotiation meeting, MIT presented the new faculty ranking instrument developed by Andersen to Faculty Assoc. of Mapua. They agreed to the adoption of the same with the reservation that there should be no diminution in rank and pay. FAMIT and MIT entered into a new CBA. It incorporated the new ranking for the alleged faculty, however, there shall be no diminution in the existing rank and the policy “same rank, same pay” shall apply. After a month, MIT called FAMIT attention to what it perceived to be flows or omissions in the CBA signed by the parties. It argued that the CBA failed to include the faculty ranking point range sheet of the new faculty ranking instrument. FAMIT rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the high school faculty.

Upon learning the changes, FAMIT opposed the formula. It averred that MIT had not been implementing the relevant provisions of the 2001 CBA, particularly the general welfare clause. The parties then met to settle the issue but were unable to reach a settlement. FAMIT brought the matter to the NCMB for mediation and ruled in favor of FAMIT. appeal, the CA reversed the decision. Issue: Whether the MIT’s new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA. Ruling: The SC held that the new point range system proposed by MIT was an unauthorized modification of Annex C of the 2001 CBA. It was made up of a faculty classification that was substantially different from the one originally incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravene the existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties. Until the new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are duty bound to keep the status quo & to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement. The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on which economic provisions of the existing agreements are to retain its force and effect. Therefore, it must understood as encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement. On

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