Civil Procedure Digest

JUDICIAL POWER CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION PRESCRIBED JURISDICTION i.e. OVER SUBJECT MATTER, BY LAW SINDICO V DIAZ 440 SCRA 50 CARPIO-MORALES; October 1, 2004
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the RTC of Iloilo FACTS -Virgilio Sindico, is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which he let the spouses Eulalio and Concordia Sombrea cultivate, without him sharing in the produce, as his "assistance in the education of his cousins" including defendant Felipe Sombrea -After the death of the Eulalio Sombrea, Felipe continued to cultivate the lot -On June 20, 1993, Sindico requested Felipe’s wife for the return of the possession of the lot but the latter requested time to advise her husband -Repeated demands for the return of the possession of the lot remained unheeded, forcing Sindico to file a civil case before the RTC against the spouses Sombrea for Accion Reivindicatoria with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction -The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC has no jurisdiction over their person and that as the subject matter of the case is an agricultural land which is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, the case is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DARAB in accordance with Section 50 of Republic Act 6657 (THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988) -The plaintiff filed an Opposition alleging that the case does not involve an agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship or leasehold agreement with the defendants. -The RTC of Iloilo granted the Motion to Dismiss -As their Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners, lodged the present Petition for Review on Certiorari

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ISSUE WON the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar HELD No. Ratio. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas set up by the defendant in his answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, jurisdiction would be dependent on his whims. Reasoning.The allegations in petitioner’s complaint show that the action is one for recovery of possession, not one which involves an agrarian dispute. -Section 3(d) of RA 6657 or the CARP Law defines "agrarian dispute" over which the DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction as: (d) any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements including any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. -Since petitioners’ action is one for recovery of possession and does not involve an agrarian dispute, the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Disposition Petition is granted.

Prof. Victoria A.

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ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter FACTS - On Dec 1907, Mla Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This is for construction of a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in Tarlac," as authorized by law. - Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had caused to be made a thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located in Tarlac. - After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation. - On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. ISSUE/S 1. WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another province 2. WON Sec. 3771 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
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JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. GENERAL 20 PHIL 523 MORELAND; December 11, 1911
NATURE Appeal from CFI Tarlac’s judgment dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the

SEC. 377. Venue of actions. Actions to confirm title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts from the title to real estate, or to obtain possession of real estate, or to recover damages for injuries to real estate, or to establish any interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or actions for the condemnation of real estate for public use, shall be brought in the province were the lands, or some part thereof, is situated; actions against executors, administrators, and guardians touching the performance of their official duties, and actions for account and settlement by them, and actions for the distribution of the estates of deceased persons among the heirs and distributes, and actions for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the province in which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all actions not herein otherwise provided for may be brought in any province where the

Civil Procedure Digest
Act. No. 1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction HELD 1.YES Ratio Sections 55 and 562 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate in the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned. JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF
defendant or any necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff, except in cases were other special provision is made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resides within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to seize or obtain title to property of the defendant within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be brought in the province where the property which the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is situated or is found: Provided, that in an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate, when the service upon the defendant is not personal, but is by publication, in accordance with law, the action must be brought in the province where the land lies. And in all cases process may issue from the court in which an action or special proceeding is pending, to be enforced in any province to bring in defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the court. The failure of a defendant to object to the venue of the action at the time of entering his appearance in the action shall be deemed a waiver on his part of all objection to the place or tribunal in which the action is brought, except in the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of this section relating to real estate, and actions against executors, administrators, and guardians, and for the distribution of estates and payment of legacies.

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- Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached. 2. NO Ratio Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. The plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial. JURISDICTION OVER PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF - That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice - that is, by the process of the court - but also by consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff submitted

Prof. Victoria A.

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itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. *DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE - The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes merely a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant. If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controlling reason why such a course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law, entirely within the control of either party. The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such selection is not in accordance with section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a result, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law. - Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.

SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2. Appellate. SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: 2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or assessment, except actions of forcible entry into, and detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon courts of justice of the peace.
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Civil Procedure Digest
Disposition The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.

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jurisdiction over the civil case and that said case was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CFI of Sulu: petition dismissed without cause -“petitioner has not presented any proof or showing of landlord and tenant relationship between the parties" to bring the case within the jurisdiction of the CAR, and that upon the allegations of the complaint, the case is "clearly one of ejectment." ISSUE WON the JOTP Court has jurisdiction over the case filed by Chua HELD NO Ratio. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. And in Gomez vs. Concepcion, this Court quoted with approval the following from Freeman on Judgments: "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress." Since the judgment here on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment in Rule 38 are inapplicable. That judgment is vulnerable to attack "in any way and at any time, even when no appeal has been taken." Reasoning. The provisions of Sec. 21 of RA 1199 (approved August 30, 1954), known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, read: "SEC. 21. Ejectment; violation; jurisdiction. — All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landholder and tenant, as well as the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations anddisputes."

Prof. Victoria A.

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JURISDITION VOID ABBAIN V. CHUA 22 SCRA 748 Sanchez; February 26, 1968
NATURE Direct appeal to the SC FACTS March 12, 1958: Tongham Chua commenced suit for forcible entry and illegal detainer against Hatib Abbain with the Justice of the Peace (JOP) Court of Bongao, Sulu. Chua's averred that he is the owner of a 4-hectare land together with the improvements thereon mostly coconut trees located in Maraning, Bongao, Sulu; that this land was donated to him by his father, Subing Chua, in 1952 and from that date he has assumed ownership thereof, taken possession of the land and paid the corresponding taxes yearly; that from 1952-1958, Abbain has been his tenant and the two divided the fruits or copra harvested therefrom on 50-50basis; that in 1957, Abbain by means of force, strategy and stealth unlawfully entered and still occupies the land in question after Chua have repeatedly demanded of him to vacate the premises due to his failure to give chua’s share of the several harvests. LC: JOP Managula rendered judgment directing Abbain to vacate the premises and place Chua in possession of the plantation, with costs. This judgment was predicated upon the findings that sometime before WWII, Abbain, because of financial hardship, sold for P225 to Subing Chua the coconut plantation; that after the sale, Abbain became the tenant of Chua, the harvests of the land divided on a 50-50 basis; that subsequently, Subing Chua donated the plantation to his son, Tongham Chua, and Abbain, the same tenant of the father, continued to be the tenant on the land. - Abbain filed a petition in the CFI of Sulu against Tongham Chua and Judge Managula, seeking relief from the judgment of the JOTP Court anr/or annulment of its decision with preliminary injunction. He averred that the JOTP Court did not have

Sec. 7, RA 1267, creating the First Court of Agrarian Relations, effective June 14, 1955, as amended by Republic Act 1409 which took effect on September 9, 1955,provides: "SEC. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. — The Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." - Chua's complaint was filed on March 12, 1958 — long after RA’s 1199, 1267 and 1409 were incorporated in our statute books. Chua's complaint positively averred that Hatib Abbain is his tenant on a 50-50 sharing basis of the harvest; and that he seeks ejectment of Hatib Abbain "due to his noncompliance of our agreement of his giving my share of the several harvests he made." The JOTP Court itself found that Abbain continued to be the tenant of Chua after the latter became owner of the plantation which he acquired from his father by virtue of a donation; and that Abbain refused to give "the share of his landlord of the harvest." - If both the complaint and the inferior court's judgment have any meaning at all, it is that the JOTP Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Right at the outset, the complaint should have been rejected. Failing in this, the case should have been dismissed during the course of the trial, when it became all the more evident that a landlord-tenant relationship existed. The judge had no power to determine the case. Because Chua's suit comes within the coverage of Sec. 21, R.A. 1199 - that "cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder," shall be under the "original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes", and the broad sweep of Section 7, RA 1267, which lodged with the CAR "original and exclusive jurisdiction . . . to consider, investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land." Jurisprudence has since stabilized the jurisdiction of the CAR over cases of this nature. Such exclusive authority is not divested by a mere averment on the part of the tenant that he asserts ownership over the

After a trial on the merits. Respondent issued several checks as payment for interests for 5 months but thereafter refused to pay its principal obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands. plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. The judgment of the JOTP Court is not merely a voidable judgment. the court ordered respondent to pay the amount of the loan plus interest and attorneys fees. deleted attorney’s fees and actual damages -SEAFDEC-AQD filed MFR. It alleged that respondent. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction (immune from legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found) that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization. 3 weeks later. 2004 NATURE -petition for review on certiorari FACTS -Petitioner Marie Antoinette Soliven filed a complaint for P195. pursuant to RA 7691. However. -In their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM. 2. he was terminated allegedly due to financial constraints being experienced by SEAFEC-AQD..155) did not exceed P200k. It may be attacked directly or collaterally. obtained a loan from petitioner (P170k) payable within 21 days with 3% interest. -Respondent filed a MFR questioning the court’s jurisdiction alleging that since the principal demand (P195. no agreement of the parties can provide one. which should be lopped of' or wholly disregarded as the circumstances require. Victoria A. YES Ratio. the complaint should have been filed with the MTC. Prof. Escobar. On appeal. respondent denied obtaining the loan and that it did not authorize Escobar to secure said loan or issue checks as payment for interests. Here. the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center.11 and that Lazaga was not entitled to the accrued sick leave benefits due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment -LA: for Lazaga -NLRC: affirmed LA. he also sought to enjoin enforcement of that judgment. to which the latter agreed. In varying language. -The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. -In its counterclaim." The judgment and proceedings of the Justice of the Peace Court are null and void. Being an intergovernmental organization. The TC denied the MFR since the totality of the claim exceeded 200k and since respondent was estopped from questioning jurisdiction. the attack is direct. It is void on its face.155 as actual damages with P200k as moral damages. but moral and exemplary damages as well as the counterclaim were dismissed. P100k as exemplary damages and P100k as attorney’s fees against respondent Fastform Phils. Such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. 532. as he brought. WON SEAFEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character 2. denied ISSUES 1. 1994 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC FACTS -SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization. A2010 Avena separation benefits. On the same day. Abbain sought to annul the judgment. "since the law does not exclude from the jurisdiction" of the CAR. Reasoning.Civil Procedure Digest land. Escobar advised petitioner not to deposit the check as the account from where it was drawn had insufficient funds and instead proposed that the P175k be rolled-over with 5% monthly interest. More. -The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel 4 Exception: SOLIVEN vs FASTFORMS PHILS. appellant could bring. the CA reversed the TC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and that respondent may assail JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL General rule: SEAFDEC V NLRC (LAZAGA) 206 SCRA 283 NOCON. SEAFDEC including its departments enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. WON SEAFDEC-AQD is estopped from claiming that the court had no jurisdiction HELD 1. Private Respondent Lazaga was hired as a Research Associate and eventually became the Head of External Affairs Office of SEAFDEC-AQD. the Court has expressed its reprobation for judgments rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Even after the time for appeal or review had elapsed. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Disposition The decision of the JOTP Court of Sulu is annulled. Such a judgment is held to be a dead limb on the judicial tree. He was supposed to receive separation benefits but SEAFDEC-AQD failed to pay private respondent his separation pay so Lazaga filed a complaint for non-payment of . respondent issued a postdated check for P170k + P5k int. even on appeal. through its president Dr. (2) Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid (and clearances has not been paid) COUNTERCLAIM: Lazaga had property accountability and outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD amounting to P27. with the Makati RTC. SEAFDEC alleged that NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case because: (1) It is an international organization. Where there is none. October 18. "cases in which a tenant claims ownership over the land given to him for cultivation by the landlord. 440 SCRA 389 Sandoval-Gutierrez. February 14. such an action. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. NO Ratio.

Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect. its manager . hence prejudicial to the orderly administration of justice. 1367 (May 1. if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law. 1980 – The court in Civil Case deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial. ONCE ATTACHED.Laurente filed a complaint for illegal dismissal (labor case). 5 and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual.January 1980 . The damages being claimed are merely incidental and are thus not included in determining the jurisdictional amount. Thus. Reasoning. exemplary and other forms of damages arising from an employeremployee relationship. an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. In the instant case. 1978) which provides that Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. Inciong) Reasoning Prof. hence this petition.August 1979 . atty’s fees. -Administrative Circular 09-94 specifies guidelines in the implementation of RA 7691. . The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.July 1979 – Private respondent Laurente (former sale supervisor of petitioner corporation) was notified and advised of his immediate termination for gross neglect of duty and/or dishonesty . WHEREFORE. the main cause of action is the collection of the debt amounting to P195k. There is. it is estopped from challenging the TC’s jurisdiction. b. damages of whatever kind. . repudiate that same jurisdiction. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.Civil Procedure Digest jurisdiction of the TC anytime even for the first time on appeal.Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on Civil Case. Par 2 of the Circular provides that the term “damages of whatever kind” applies only to cases where damages are merely a consequence of the main action. Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. HELD NO. As to the subject matter. ISSUE (Members of religious group) WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case HELD NO. this petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Section 3 of RA 7691 provides that where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed P200k. where the same law does not expressly so provide. the applicable law then was Article 217 (a) (3) of the Labor Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. Disposition. 1992 a.Laurente instituted a civil action for damages against SFSC and Siao. exclusive of interest. Since respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the TC and even sought affirmative relief. the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial court. the instant petition is GRANTED A2010 Avena NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS . Petitioner filed an MFR which was denied by the CA. Now they are assailing the jurisdiction of CFI Tarlac. Disposition. of course. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief. claiming that the jurisdiction should be vested with the NLRC. 6715 clearly provides that the labor arbiter shall have original . To require the private respondent to file a single suit combining his actions for illegal dismissal and damages in the NLRC would be to sanction the retroactivity of Republic Act No. its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. JURISDICTION NOT OUSTED BY SUBSEQUENT STATUTE UNLESS SO PROVIDED SOUTHERN FOOD SALES CORPORATION vs. Victoria A. ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Of the plaintiff MANILA RAILROAD V ATTY. it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised.Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. 1989. ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred the determination or resolution of the motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the court over claims for damages. 1980 it was found that the termination of the complainant was for a just and valid cause February 28. especially since an adverse judgment had been rendered. 6715 which took effect on March 21." (Bengzon v. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides. To be sure. While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Ratio "(t)he rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy. Ratio. GENERAL (page 1) FACTS -Manila Railroad filed an action for condemnation proceedings in CFI of Tarlac when they knew that the lands concerned are found in Nueva Ecija. in certain cases. litigation expenses and costs. when the civil case for damages was instituted in 1979. it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However. moral. purely. ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON Of the plaintiff: Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. February 5. or does not intend to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Feb 18. SALAS 206 SCRA 333 MEDIALDEA.

It is clearly guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its complaint. however. Federico & Felisa Tolentino. Robellado. It was hit at the rear by another Bedford truck owned by Manuel Chu and driven by Jaime Sigua while loaded with logs and parked properly by the driver Maximo Dalangin at the shoulder of the national highway. immediately agreed to this proposal. to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit. attorney’s fees and cost against Sps. by an objection. Boticano filed a FACTS -Petitioner Rodriguez filed a case for recovery of the sum of P5.but also by consent expressly given.That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the parties is indisputable. HELD YES -The contention of the CFI that the dispositive portion of the judgment of the City Court does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentinos to pay jointly and severally with the Rebellados the amount due to the plaintiff. The Tolentinos brought an action for certiorari with the Court of First Instance of Manila. defective process or even absence of process may be waived for failure to make seasonal objections. be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached. ISSUE/S 1. Jurisdiction over the person. NO Ratio The defects in jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings. or it may. made to defend on the consent or objection. On the other hand.Boticano filed a MTD the appeal and for execution. The defendants are now in this court asking that the action be not dismissed but continued. thus prompting petitioner Rodriguez to request the City Court for a writ of execution on the properties of the Robellados and also of the Tolentinos. on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. June 25. . WON the question of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant cannot be raised for the first time on appeal 2. by voluntary submission RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA 57 SCRA 455 CASTRO. he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction. Ratio Under Sec 23. but the appeal was still approved. 1987 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside CA ruling of denying MFR. is erroneous. March 16. ISSUE WON the CFI erred in excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution. The plaintiff submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning the action. Disposition The assailed decision and resolution of CA are reversed and set aside. . Nor is the plaintiff in any position to asked for favors. That jurisdiction was obtained not only by the usual course of practice . That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. JR 148 SCRA 541 PARAS. The decision of the CFI (now RTC) is reinstated. It has been held by the court that the defect of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance by the appearance of the defendant. The case was brought to the CA. to bind themselves jointly and severally with the Robellados. Sps Robellado pleaded to the Rodriguez for time before the attachment to be effectively enforced. The Court granted the motions and adduced from evidence that Chu is responsible for the fault and negligence of the driver under Art 2180 CC. Rule 14 ROC. -A writ of preliminary attachment was issued and served to Fe Robellado at their store in Divisoria. but failed to comply with the agreement.Eliseo Boticano is the registered owner of a Bedford truck which is used in hauling logs for a fee. The CFI rendered judgment excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution. A2010 Avena complaint at the CFI at Cabanatuan against Chu and Sigua. and that the City Court never acquired jurisdiction over Tolentinos and therefore cannot be bound by the judgment rendered by said court. 2.Chu filed with the TC a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file record on appeal.Civil Procedure Digest nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. Reasoning The circumstances appear to show that there was waiver by the defendant to allege such defect when he failed to raise the question in the CFI and at the first opportunity. . being present.that is. WON CA erred in holding that Chu did not voluntarily submit himself to the jurisdiction of the TC despite his voluntary appearance HELD 1. . -A compromise agreement was then entered to by the parties. 3. The Rebellados subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement.00 plus interest. the now respondents. in some instances.320. the jurisdiction of the court over the person is. is apparent. .Chu acknowledged ownership and agreed to shoulder the expenses of the repair. Felisa Tolentino. rather. .Boticano filed an MFR with the CA to which CA denied. Summons were issued but one was returned unserved for Sigua wile the other served thru Chu’s wife. Rodriguez agreed to the suspension of the judgment on the condition that Fe Robellado’s parents. The request was granted by the City Court. Thus this appeal. the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court shall be equivalent to service. CA set aside the TC decision for being null and void. expressly or impliedly given. Prof. Victoria A.Boticano moved to dismiss the case against Sigua and to declare Chu in default. Court granted the motions. by voluntary appearance BOTICANO V CHU. FACTS . YES. They are not only nor objecting to the jurisdiction of the court but. may be conferred by consent. are here on this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that very jurisdiction over them. . 1974 NATURE Petition for certiorari 6 Of the defendant 1. if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it now asserts. by service of summons 2. by the process of the court .

and usually in addition thereto. To answer this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication. (II) that jurisdiction over the person is not acquired and is nonessential. By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case together with the Robellados. jurisdiction over the defendants can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court.The order of the court was entered directing that publication should be made in a newspaper. 921 STREET. 2. The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner. by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. upon proper conditions. RULING 1. it was necessary for the bank to give notice to him by publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. in its narrow application. to ascertain the amount due. A2010 Avena . and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. WON the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.In a foreclosure case. as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure. March 26. thru the voluntary appearance of the person before the court. And even assuming that estoppel lies. wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order. used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. if his residence is known. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished by his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court. some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner. The property was brought in by the bank. (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as can be enforced against the property itself. NO. as security for a debt owing to him to the bank. foreclosure.Payment was never made and the court ordered the sale of the property. -Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing of the complaint. and it was declared that in case of failure to satisfy the judgment. a motion was made by Vicente Palanca.About seven years after the confirmation of this sale. WON the supposed irregularity in the proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of due process of law. or other form of remedy. "action in rem' is. . 1918 FACTS .As Palanca was a nonresident. 260) .A mortgage was executed by Palanca. for in our opinion that jurisdiction rests upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country. Under the circumstances. as in all cases of foreclosure.Several principles: (1) That the jurisdiction of the court is derived from the power which it possesses over the property. whether by attachment.The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem. . we cannot set aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a party to a case may be acquired. ISSUE 1. PALANCA 37 Phil. Victoria A. .Civil Procedure Digest -The dispositive portion of the judgment of the City Court approving the compromise and enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties is adequate for the purpose of execution. and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. is everywhere recognized as essential. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant.Whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the clerk of the CFI to mail the proper papers to the defendant in China. As further evidence of this it may be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debt (sec. designated. The action quasi in rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant. . Palanca returned to China where he died. NO. -On lack of jurisdiction of the court over the Tolentinos: the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of judgment of the City Court.In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. . . The expression.This mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. the court directed that the clerk of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to Palanca at his last place of residence. the Tolentinos effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court. are in general way thus Prof. After the execution of this instrument. . It is clearly intended merely as compliance with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the defendant shall be required to pay it. the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public sale. It was ordered that Palanca should deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. for the mailing of notice to the defendant. in person or by . and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. . as administrator of the estate of the original defendant. . Judgment on a compromise need not specifically name a person to be subject of execution thereof in obvious avoidance of repetition. On the other hand. 2. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court.The cause proceeded in the CFI and Palanca not having appeared. 7 ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILINO v. judgment was taken against him by default. prescribing the time within which appearance must be made. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they invoked.

the spouses Alvaro Pastor. and Maria Elena Achaval.The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of real property and real rights. . caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. ISSUE/S WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her person. The suit also named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. Jr.Failure of the clerk to mail the notice. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident. In that case.. who were all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. Sps Gregorio indicated that if they would DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS 64 SCRA 23 AQUINO. It should be noted that the civil case filed by Quemada is related to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering the properties which in the understanding of Quemada. would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. Disposition.The fundamental idea of due process of law is that no man shall be condemned in his person or property without notice and an opportunity of being heard in his defense. Spain. Certiorari and contempt. It can bear no fruit to the plaintiff. The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned. 8 required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process."A judgment which is void upon its face. Petition is dismissed ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES SPS GONZAGA V CA (SPS ABAGAT) SCRA CALLEJO SR. When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of earnest effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. Parañaque issued in their names. in which Sps Gregorio undertook to secure an award of the land by the government in favor of Sps Gonzaga. They further alleged that earnest efforts toward a compromise have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family.February 22. The respondents were instructed to file their answer.Sps Gregorio sold house to Sps Gonzaga for P100. at their respective addresses in Alicante and Barcelona. dissent . under certain conditions. October 18. and Sofia Midgely. Victoria A.000 under a deed of conditional sale. he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. and which were held by De Midgely and her brother. HELD NO. if the power so to do exists. her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process.October 22. which should be lopped off. if proved. FACTS . Sr. 1975 NATURE Original Actions. belonged to the estate of the Late Pastor. 1973 > hut was gutted by fire and after that. it ruled that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential.Civil Procedure Digest agent. In an MOA." A2010 Avena Midgely and Pastor. The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. If the motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Sr. and which requires only in inspection of the judgment roll to demonstrate it want of vitality is a dead limb upon the judicial tree. Jr. Separate Opinion MALCOLM. and hence in our opinion that irregularity. as owners. and he may be safely held. to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale. 1991 > Sps Abagat filed complaint against Sps Gonzaga for recovery of possession of land in Baclaran. 2004 NATURE Petition for the Review of the Decision and resolution of CA FACTS . if in fact he did so fail in his duty. Sps Abagat filed a complaint for ejectment against Sps Gregorio but complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because in their answer to the complaint. it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court.De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court. . allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor. Sr. was appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of Cebu. Ratio. . .The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. . but is a constant menace to the defendant. which was then owned by the government . Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. The service of summons by publication is Prof.Quemada. .January 26. which effected the service of the summons through registered mail upon De .Quemada. Sps Abagat alleged in their complaint that they were the owners of a small hut (barong-barong) constructed on the lot. The suit was to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor. Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely. on his own. May 13. is not such as irregularity as amounts to a denial of due process of law. the Sps Gregorio claimed ownership over the house .Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are nonresidents. 1961 > Abagat filed an application for sales patent over the land . As such. Reasoning. Sps Gregorio built a two-storey house on the property without their consent. he filed a complaint against his half siblings. .

1986 > Bureau of Lands granted the application of Abagat for a sales patent over the property. Urbano et. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required pleading.00 paid by them to the Sps Gregorio. Disposition Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. Moreover. It also denied the MFR. Thus. Even after the trial court had granted leave to the Sps Gregorio to intervene as parties-defendants and the latter filed their Answer-in-Intervention. Victoria A. Reasoning . 1994. the appearance of the OSG in the PI would be in conflict with its role as the appellate counsel for the People . SC interpreted Sec. its officers and agents in any official investigation. this petition for review ISSUE/S 1. in favor of Sps Abagat . TCT No.000.there are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) and an civil action for damages arising from a felony (defamation through a published interview whereby Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close associate (crony?) of Marcos). the Office of the SolGen (OSG) entered its appearance for Chavez and the other accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as far as the Prelim Investigation is concerned.RTC denied the petition. its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation. CA ruled that a separate complaint should have been filed against the Sps Gregorio. but latter refused . 9 SPECIFIC JURISDICTION COURTS A. Petitioner Co objected to appearance of OSG as counsel.September 29. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils. 1990 NATURE Petition to review decision of RTC Pasig FACTS . 1997. thus allowing the appearance of OSG as counsel. the deed of final and absolute sale. not on the prayer. ISSUE WON RTC and CA erred in not ordering Sps Gregorio to refund to them the P90. 1992 > Sps Abagat filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the Sps Gregorio. the OSG likewise acted as counsel for Chavez. instead of appealing the decision of the TC. the issues made and the law.the OSG submits that since there is no qualification. they would return P90. Sps Gonzaga failed to file a cross-claim against the intervenors for specific performance for the refund of the P90.000 as payment for the house . Sps Abagat demanded that Sps Gonzaga vacate the property. Sps Gonzaga failed to assail the trial court’s order of denial in the appellate court. . Prof.January 2.OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public official even if the said official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of PD478 which defines the functions of OSG.Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin Code (Sec.000.00 the latter had received as payment for the house.Sps Gonzaga failed to file any pleading against Sps Gregorio for the enforcement of the deed of conditional sale. CA decision and resolution are AFFIRMED. proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer).Civil Procedure Digest not secure such. and afterwards filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. the agency responsible for the investigation of graft and corrupt practices of the Marcoses. WON the OSG has authority to appear for (a) a certain gov’t official in the PI of their case before the Ombudsman and (b) the SolGen in a suit for damages arising from a crime HELD 1. Sps Gonzaga did not include in their prayer that judgment be rendered against the third-party defendants to refund the A2010 Avena P90. contending that he is suing Chavez in his personal capacity. who was then the SolGen and counsel for PCGG. as well as EO300 which made OSG an independent agency under the Office of the President . NO Ratio The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony (applies to all public officials and employees in the executive. 1661 to embrace PI.CA > December 19. it can represent any public official without any qualification or distinction in any litigation. legislative and judicial branches). 1661: As principal law officer of the Gov’t. In Anti-Graft League v Ortega. filed a special civil action for prohibition in the SC to enjoin the SolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for Chavez in the PI. On the plea of Sps Gonzaga that the TC should have ordered the Sps Gregorio to refund to them the P90. A trial court would be acting beyond its jurisdiction if it grants relief to a party beyond the scope of the pleadings. Reasoning PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG: SEC1. proceeding. and appended thereto their third-party complaint for indemnity for any judgment that may be rendered by the court against them and in favor of the respondents. both against Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (among others) .in the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman). However.in the action for damages. Sps Gregorio.00 they had received from the petitioners under their deed of conditional sale. The contention is in the event that an information is filed against the accused. investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. and the Memorandum of Agreement executed by them. affirmed the decision of the trial court on.000. URBANO V CHAVEZ 183 SCRA 347 GANCAYCO. but on the scope of the pleadings. The petitioners filed their motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the intervenors. . al.Trial Court > October 10. x x x . TC no longer resolved the motion for leave to file a third-party complaint . March 19. . SUPREME COURT Question of law OF of the Phils (counsel at the first instance is the provincial/ state prosecutor). the SolGen shall have the authority to act for and represent the Gov’t . 128186 was issued by the Register of Deeds in his name. the right of a party to recover depends. However. the deed of final and absolute sale and the memorandum of agreement and pay filing and docket fees therefor.000 they had paid for the house and which the latter promised to do so under their Memorandum of Agreement HELD NO Ratio The rule is that a party is entitled only to such relief consistent with and limited to that sought by the pleadings or incidental thereto.

When Tan failed to pay Zhandong. ORTIGAS V. OSG provides assurance against timidity in that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI. a public official who is sued criminally is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal (the State) can never the author of a wrongful act. NO. praying that judgment be rendered 1. 45 of the CC is real property. the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The same applies to a suit for damages arising from a felony. It is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court. The hardboards apparently belonged to Zhandong. ** Re: Question of Law (copied verbatim. whatever it says or does is lawful. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo Belmonte in the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal. WON the CA has appellate jurisdiction over this case 2.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI.) declaring the residential building constructed on the lot by defendant as forfeited in favor of plaintiff.Civil Procedure Digest should an info be filed after. . Trial Court ruled in favor of Zhandong The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. 2. the case is brought on appeal to the appellate courts. December 8. Josefa paid all his obligations to Tan. jurisdiction over the case belongs to the CFI not the MC in an ejectment case. then the issue is a pure question of law (Torres v Yu). and threats of criminal prosecution could stay the hand of the public official. 3. WON the MC had jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the original complaint HELD 1. as appellate counsel of the People.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC. Disposition. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and allowed by the law. where the OSG. As such. The issues raised before the inferior court did not only involved the possession of the lot but also rights and obligations of the parties to the residential building which under Art. -A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it under SECII Rule 40 where one of the parties objected to its jurisdiction. and one which smacks of ethical considerations. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject the lot buyer who defaulted in his Prof. and 3. Ortigas and Co. The OSG. it is apparent that the decision under review rendered by the CA without jurisdiction should be set aside. the decisions of the CA. it sent a demand letter for the payment of the hardboards to both Tan and Josefa. holding that the MC has no jurisdiction. in the event of a judgment of conviction. is expected to take a stand against the accused. then OSG can no longer act as counsel.another reason why the OSG can’t represent an accused in a crim case: the State can speak and act only by law. Aslo. -Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MC. JOSEFA V ZHANDONG GR 150903 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. Since the original case was decided by the MC without jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. The Ruled in favor of plaintiff and granted the relieves prayed for. 2. and 3. it does. Disposition Petition is granted. together with attorney's fees and exemplary damages.000 from July 18.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI. Victoria A. as the appellate counsel of the People. 10 payments but also prays that the residential building constructed by the buyer be forfeited in plaintiff's favor. The anomaly in this ruling becomes obvious when. 1981 . there is a clear conflict of interest here. and that which is unlawful is not the word or deed of the state. 17 of the Judiciary Act (RA 296). the CFI should have dismissed the cases when it was brought before it on appeal.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC. NO. CFI denied motion and affirmed in totot the MC judgment. the Court resolved to consolidate both Petitions and to treat them as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. the state is not liable. defends the latter in the PI. 1971 up to the time he vacates. assiling the 1. 2. 2003 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS Tan represented himself to be the owner of hardboards and sold them to Josefa. The said court also issued a writ of execution. the SC held that the same are purely legal in nature. Reasoning. Petitioner ascribes to the CA the error in affirming the ruling of the trial court that Josefa is liabe to Zhandong despite “THE MOUNTAIN OF EVIDENCE” showing that they had no business transaction with each other and that it was Tan who was solely responsible to Zhandong for the payment of the goods. represents the prosecution when the case is brought on appeal. Thus. where the public official is held accountable for his act. 2. and where the same office. Moreover.) the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC. A2010 Avena NATURE Petition for review of the decision of the CA FACTS -In 1974.0 condeming defendant to pay monthly rent of 5. Hence the present petition. More often than not. Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper action in the proper court. This is all that is mentioned) -both issues raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be evaluated by this Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. ISSUES 1. The rationale given was that public officials are subjected to numerous suits. plaintiff's claim to the bldg raises question of ownership. namely 1. The Ca ruled in favor of Belmonte. CA 106 SCRA 121 ABAD SANTOS.However. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the CA.) the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC. Belmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminsry injunction in the CA. Reasoning. Accordingly. CFI and MC of San Juan Rizal are set aside. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in the SC by Sec.) ordering the defendant his successors-in-interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff. . as counsel for the public official. if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

the Court contented itself with the fact that the Solicitor General has authority to raise this Change of venue PEOPLE v. Alfredo Perez. Negros Occidental. of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. -In a parallel development. with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision. Indeed. and (C) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail. (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. -March 15. 1981: this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (A) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds. General Rule : Only questions of law may be entertained by the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari Exceptions: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations. presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya. (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that. presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya. . -The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5. MAYOR PABLO SOLA 103 SCRA 393 (1981) FERNANDO. Mateo Olimpos. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. -September 23 and October 1. (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based. Francisco Garcia. Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado. (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record. Disposition Petition is granted. Jose Bethoven Cabral. sold them to petitioner. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez. respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11. and Jose Bethoven Prof. Negros Occidental. Kabankalan. there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. (CJ Fernando’s prefatory statement states that the two have no legal standing to raise this petition." Cabral availed themselves of this right and have since been released from detention. 1981. namely a change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds. by certiorari. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Evidence indicate that Tan bought the hardboards from Zhandong and. the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan.Civil Procedure Digest ISSUE 1. adopting the plea of the petition. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors is that they are instituting the action `subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal. (5) the findings of fact are conflicting. their safety could be jeopardized. granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above. NATURE petition in behalf of the People of the Philippines) The Solicitor General adopted a two-pronged thrusts in this petition: 1. NO Reasoning. Isabel. without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan. elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. THE ISSUE OF A CHANGE OF VENUE HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC. if properly considered. Ricardo Garcia. the setting aside. A2010 Avena Petition for certiorari3 FACTS -September 15. 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan. (1) the setting aside. 1980: the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola. (B) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. and 2. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence. by certiorari. 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16. the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. surmises or conjectures. (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case. absurd or impossible. (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken. both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored this glaring reality and instead held that petitioner purchased the boards directly from respondent. Negros Occidental. considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance. (3) there is grave abuse of discretion. WON Josefa is liable to Zhandong for the payment of the merchandise HELD 1. -September 16. Custodio Juanica. most of the accused remained at large. Arsolo Juanica. in turn. the CFI of that province issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the possession of the accused MAYOR Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta." THUS. 1981. C. would justify a different conclusion. Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12. -However. the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other persons of unknown names. Since Sol Gen Mendoza never bothered to question their legal standing." The facts alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought. 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran. However. The accused Pablo Sola. Victoria A. (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution. Such comments were considered as answers. presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio. In addition. dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds.J. granting bail to the accused (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 11 3 The one who filed this appeal which partakes of a nature of certiorari are private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu. 1980: armed with warrant. Francisco Garcia. It thus issued an order for their arrest. namely.

The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing. prior to bail being granted. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives.B. Martin's Funeral Home. it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. as asserted herein. hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 1981. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed. This decision is immediately executory. As a consequence.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. may. and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong.000. the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present. Cardozo: "THE LAW. We are to keep the balance true. asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. 130866 REGALADO. 1995. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution." -J. who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker." -the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. No. Gutierrez. NATURE Prof.Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On June 13. that the A2010 Avena questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. IS DUE TO THE ACCUSER ALSO. COURT OF APPEALS ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC G. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. J. -The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. to whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March 5. There being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. It does not suffice. Martin Funeral Home on February 6. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. . THOUGH DUE TO THE ACCUSED. No costs. PRIVILEGES SO FUNDAMENTAL AS TO BE INHERENT IN EVERY CONCEPT OF A FAIR TRIAL THAT COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE THOUGHT OF REASONABLE MEN WILL BE KEPT INVIOLATE AND INVIOLABLE. -there may be cases where the fear.In January 1996. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees. whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. 12 Petition for certiorari which stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the NLRC FACTS . the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. within a reasonable time. so the latter then took over the management of the business. as an indication of gratitude. 1996. Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. -Justice Capistrano: "The question presented before us is. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18. although the records purported to show that the same were already paid. the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.L. HOWEVER CRUSHING MAY BE THE PRESSURE OF INCRIMINATING PROOF. the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity. BUT JUSTICE. Ratio. In case of doubt. he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly misappropriating P38. 1997 for lack of merit. is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents. there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. there would be a violation of procedural due process. On January 22. -The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. 1997. Because of this fear. as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character.R. IS SEDULOUS IN MAINTAINING FOR A DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH CRIME WHATEVER FORMS OF PROCEDURE ARE OF THE ESSENCE OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND. private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit.. . That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. Sometime in 1995. Victoria A. San Diego. Dispositive. be less than terrifying. private respondent. Reyes: "…to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process. However." -People v. but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. If. AS WE HAVE SEEN. 1998 . The answer is in the affirmative.Civil Procedure Digest ISSUE Whether or not the bail bonds of respondents should be cancelled HELD YES. the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified. Sept 16. and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established. set aside. Since then. objectively viewed. the mother of Amelita passed away. Reasoning. ISSUE WON the SC should entertain the present petition B. and declared to be without force and effect. to some individuals. WHEREFORE. must be decided in favor of petitioner. the owner of petitioner St.

that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning: i. reiterate the judicial policy that the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 649 and No. of course.a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the resolution of the CA.P. These cases can. therefore..544 million. to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed. Jose B. since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions. 442. The challenged resolution. denied petitioners' MFR. and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED. as amended. . Reasoning. -While the SC does not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law. Jr. This means that the entire paid-in capital of the bank. among others. were "fictitious" as they were extended. be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. not being a trier of fact. RTC CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court.The instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED. Victoria A.the consolidation of the 2 cases was ordered: FIRST CASE. the Clerk of Court was also ordered to determine the amount of filing fees which should be paid by the plaintiffs within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. . or from taking the threatened appropriate alternative action and the Order in the same case denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and vacate said injunction.a petition for review directed principally against the decision of the CA dismissing the petition therein filed and sustained the various Orders of the respondent Judge. because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition. No." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. 751. It will be noted that paragraph (3). vs CB. be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. on the other hand. . as NATURE The common origin of these cases is Producers Bank of the Philippines and Producers Properties. JOSE B. JUDGE TEOFILO GUADIZ.e. INC. without pronouncement as to costs. C. it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals. Yet. JR. modified or reversed. Inc. and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code.P. The impugned decision upheld the Order of respondent Judge Guadiz granting the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CB. has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings. -This case therefore. All references in the amended Sec 9 of BP No. but directed the plaintiffs therein to amend the amended complaint by stating in its prayer the specific amount of damages which Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP) claims to have sustained as a result of losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses. FERNANDEZ. and Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe. On the contrary. Section 9 of B.. .Petitioners claim that during the regular examination of the PBP. without collateral. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Fernandez. but to this Court by necessary implication. and the Monetary Board filed before the Makati RTC. "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with . totalling approximately P300 million. Said loans were deemed to be anomalous particularly because the total paid-in capital of PBP at that time was only P 140. Fernandez and the Monetary Board from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions No. -Under such guarantee. VS CA. to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may. Consequently. all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. However. under such excepting clause literally construed. . Upon further examination. This is illogical and impracticable. 1992 13 HELD NO (should be remanded to CA) Ratio. SECOND CASE. PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and PRODUCERS PROPERTIES. CB examiners stumbled upon some highly questionable loans which had been extended by the PBP management to several entities. No. 129. the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. . on this score it adds the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which. and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor. Prof. FACTS . the provisions of B. orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter. 208 SCRA 652 DAVIDE. that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose. aside from the increased number of its component divisions. -Incidentally. was utilized by PBP management to fund these unsecured loans. May 8. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to therein except. Disposition. together with some P160 million of depositors' money. . resolutions. to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth. it was discovered that these loans. .Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Avena he commendably and realistically emphasized. .

000." FIRST CASE . These news items triggered a bank-run in PBP which resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank's demand deposit account with the CB.at the height of the controversy surrounding the discovery of the anomalous loans. the Central Bank will take appropriate alternative action on the matter. he issued an Order enjoining defendant-petitioners or any of their agents from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. .the respondent Judge handed down an Order denying the motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (a) the amended complaint alleges ultimate facts showing that plaintiff has a right and that such a right has been violated by defendant. The CB conservatorship over PBP may be lifted only after PBP shall have identified the new group of stockholders who will put in new capital in PBP and after the Monetary Board shall have considered such new stockholders as acceptable. Although said proposal was explored and discussed.CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. that the CB is guilty of promissory estoppel. (b) for being unauthorized by the party in whose name it purports to have been filed. it suffered losses. 649. 751 on 7 August 1987 instructing CB management to advise the bank that: a. no program acceptable to both the CB and PPI was arrived at because of disagreements on certain matters such as interest rates. the questioned MB Resolutions were issued arbitrarily and with bad faith. several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers. . the Board of Directors of such bank is not prohibited from filing a suit to lift the conservatorship and from questioning the validity of both the conservator's fraudulent acts and abuses and its principal's (MB) arbitrary action. the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP.00. Jr. with interest and penalty rates at MRR 180 days plus 48% per annum. .the MB approved the consolidation of PBP's other unsecured obligations to the CB with its overdraft and authorizing the conversion thereof into an emergency loan. Consequently. per Resolution No. but directed PBP to pay the emergency loan in 5 equal annual installments. . . under terms of reference to be determined by the Governor. ill-motivated. the MB issued Resolution No.Unable to accept the above Order. without responding to the communications of the CB. besides. PPI is now a party-plaintiff in the action. No other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years. and that by reason of the conservatorship.000. and (c) plaintiffs have paid the correct filing fees since "the value of the case cannot be estimated. On the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector. it then concluded that when the CB "peremptorily and illtimely announced" the conservatorship. . the Monetary Board (MB placed PBP under conservatorship. Subsequently. . and 2.PBP filed the Amended Complaint impleading PPI as an additional plaintiff. and liquidated damages of 5% for delayed payments. The complaint. that the appointment of the conservator was arbitrary. . that herein petitioners acted in bad faith. Department I of the CB. and the averments of legality or illegality of the conservatorship are relevant to the cause of action since the complaint seeks the lifting of the conservatorship. utterly unnecessary and unjustified. Prof.The case was raffled to Branch 147 of Makati RTC court which was then presided over by respondent Judge. 649 and 751 or from taking the threatened "appropriate alternative action" including exclusion of plaintiff bank from settlement of clearing balances at the Central Bank clearing house or any other action that will disturb the status quo or the viability of plaintiff bank during the pendency of this case conditioned upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P2. . PBP was not given an opportunity to be heard since the CB arbitrarily brushed aside administrative due process notwithstanding PBP's having sufficiently established its inherent corporate right to autonomously perform its banking activities without undue governmental interference that would in effect divest its stockholders of their control over the operations of . The stockholders of PBP have to decide whether or not to accept the terms of the rehabilitation plan as provided under Resolution No.PBP nonetheless requested that the same be lifted by the CB. the MB and CB Governor Jose B. CB and Fernandez filed with respondent CA a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the Orders of the respondent Judge.PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB. as a result thereof. . The same resolution authorized the CB Governor to lift the conservatorship and return PBP's management to its principal stockholders upon completion of the documentation and full collateralization of the emergency loan. penalties and liquidated damages.Civil Procedure Digest . 649 within one week from receipt of notice hereof and if such terms are not acceptable to them. Consequently. restrain the implementation of the same and nullify the writ of preliminary injunction. alleged that the conservatorship was unwarranted. and (c) for failure of the purported plaintiff to pay the required filing fees. on its face. No new allegations or causes of action for said plaintiff were made. . (b) While it is true that under Section 28-A of the Central Bank Act the conservator takes over the management of a bank. dismissible: (a) for failure to state a cause of action.the PBP.respondent Judge issued a TRO. to be secured by sufficient collateral (b) A comptroller for PBP and any number of bank examiners deemed necessary to oversee PBP's operations shall be designated by the CB. They contend therein that: 1. It prayed for a judicial review of the MB Resolutions and the issuance of a TRO. . "being a part of a scheme to divest plaintiff's present stockholders of their control of PBP and to award the same to the PDIC or its unknown transferees". and b.CB senior deputy Governor Gabriel Singson informed PBP that the CB would be willing to lift the conservatorship under the following conditions: (a) PBP's unsecured overdraft with the Central Bank will be converted into an emergency loan.There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan. the MB directed the principal stockholders of PBP to increase its capital accounts by such an amount that would be necessary for the elimination of PBP's negative net worth. Victoria A. The complaint filed was. filed a complaint against the CB. illegal. 14 . . Fernandez. ruling that the CB's sudden and untimely announcement of the conservatorship over PBP eroded the confidence which the banking public had hitherto reposed on the bank and resulted in the bank-run. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. that the CB-designated conservators committed bank frauds and abuses. its overdrafts with the CB continued to A2010 Avena accumulate. (c) A letter from the Management of PBP authorizing the CB to automatically return clearing items that would result in an overdraft in its CB account shall be submitted to the CB. The trial court's injunctive order and writ are anomalous and illegal because they are directed against CB acts and measures which constitute no invasion of plaintiff's rights.

plaintiffs in the original case should be given a reasonable time to amend their complaint. and to publish the alleged "suspense accounts" contrary to Section 28-A of R.A. not setting aside the Order of the trial court granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which unlawfully restrained the CB from exercising its mandated responsibilities and effectively compelled it to allow the PBP to continue incurring overdrafts with it. No. (2) .On several occasions thereafter. however.Civil Procedure Digest the bank.A. SECOND CASE A2010 Avena . more particularly." . contrary to his own writ of preliminary injunction and earlier order to make the bank viable. the writ of preliminary injunction and her constitutional right to silence.On the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct filing fees. It also held that the Manchester case "has been legally construed in the subsequent case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd. she started reorganizing the bank's personnel and committees. without. . conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion caused the publication of PBP's financial statement as required by regulations. not holding that the amended complaint should have been dismissed because it was filed in the name of PBP without the authority of its conservator. said that "the instant case is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the value of the losses incurred by the respondent bank cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the community.2 million in filing fees. No. . respondent Court merely adopted with approval the ruling of the respondent Judge on the question of jurisdiction. Court of Appeals. and (c) to hold. (b) enjoining the lease of any portion of the bank's space in Producers Bank Centre building to third parties and the relocation of departments/offices of PBP as was contemplated. the respondent Court found the same to be "partly" meritorious. Torres and Evangelista. instituted reforms aimed at making PBP more viable. 265. . . it is further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is neither appealable nor be made the proper subject of a petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. it was filed after the ten (10) day period prescribed by Section 29 of R. as Prof. pursuant to Manchester Development Corp. as amended. . Henry L. Tansinsin-Encarnacion filed a petition for certiorari against respondent Judge. 265. it ruled that the Section does not apply because the complaint essentially seeks to compel the conservator to perform his duties and refers to circumstances and incidents which transpired after said 10-day period. of which she was found guilty. No. as amended. .Pursuant to the powers and authority conferred upon her by the Central Bank.A second Order directed Tansinsin-Encarnacion to publish the financial statement of PBP . et al. Co and the law firm of Quisumbing. in her capacity as conservator. the damages inflicted on PBP due to losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses were in fact pegged at P108. No." On the issue of the non-payment of the correct docket fees. 265. sustaining the respondent Judge's ruling. together with said subsequent thereto (sic). .. declaring null and void all his orders.private respondents argue that the Manchester rule is not applicable in the case at bar because what is primarily sought for herein is a writ of injunction and not an award for damages. . This specific amount." It further held that the challenged resolutions of the MB are not just advisory in character "because the same sought to impose upon the respondent bank petitioners' governmental acts that were specifically designed and executed to devise a scheme that would irreparably divest from the stockholders of the respondent bank control of the same. With this purpose in mind. hence. . Atty. contempt charges were filed against her.479. 265. and the correct docket fees were not paid. to state in their prayer in the amended complaint the specific amount of damages ." . et al. to the effect that applying the doctrine initiated in the case of Manchester. the said court. vs.. It agreed with petitioner that while the other losses and damages sought to be recovered are incapable of pecuniary estimation. An opposition to the contempt charge was later filed by said petitioner. Leonida Tansinsin-Encarnacion. and (b) restraining her from leasing out to third parties any portion of PBP's space in the Producers Bank Centre building. in violation of her right to due process of law. PBP filed an Omnibus Motion asking the trial court for an order: (a) reinstating PBP officers to their original positions and restoring the bank's standing committees to their respective compositions prior to said reorganization.00 in paragraph 26 of the amended complaint." Consequently.In her Memorandum submitted to the CA. in ruling that the correct amount was paid. (3) . .A. 15 amended. and finding respondent Judge and respondent lawyers guilty of violating their respective oaths of office.petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for review. (3) respondent Judge erred in declaring her in contempt of court notwithstanding his lack of jurisdiction over the case and failure to set any date for the hearing and reception of evidence. .respondent Judge issued an Order (a) requiring conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion to reinstate PBP officers to their original positions prior to the reorganization of the bank's personnel and restore PBP's standing committees to their original compositions. said conservator in contempt of court for disobedience of and resistance to the writ of injunction. should have been stated in the prayer of the complaint.771. It is alleged therein that the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) Ignoring petitioners' contention that since PBP did not pay the correct filing fees. the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.In disposing of the issues raised. carrying the items enumerated by the trial court as "suspense accounts. and the case of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. Victoria A. ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the conservatorship as a basis for determining the existence of a cause of action since the amended complaint does not seek the annulment or lifting of the conservatorship. . (2) respondent Judge illegally ordered her to return to PPI the administration of the bank's three (3) properties. and (4) respondents Judge and lawyers are administratively liable for their grossly illegal actuations and for depriving the Government of at least P13. She prays therein for judgment declaring respondent judge to be without jurisdiction to entertain both the complaint and amended complaint. TansinsinEncarnacion alleged that: (1) respondent Judge has no jurisdiction because the filing of the case was not authorized by the petitioner or the conservator in violation of Section 28-A of R. however. after an opportunity to be heard is given her. and (4) . . . As to the filing of the complaint after the lapse of the 10-day period provided for in Section 29 of R.In order to prevent her from continuing with the reorganization. specially the contempt orders. the complaint should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court.A. . to which an exception was made in the dispositive portion.

. Hence. but the payment of the prescribed docket fee. decisions upon or questions pertinent to the cause are decisions within its jurisdiction.Civil Procedure Digest . This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. irregular or erroneous they may be. ruled that PBP and PPI are liable for the filing fees on the claim for damages. as computed by petitioner on the basis alone of the specified losses of P108. respondent Court. Salvador Salenga and Ulipia Fernandez (lessees) filed a complaint with the MetroTC alleging that petitioner Ascue (lessor) refused to collect their rentals." and the "arbitrary" appointment of a conservator. they sought consignation of the payments with the MetroTC. pursuant to Manchester. deliberately omitting the claim for damages as a specific cause of action. said that "the value of the case cannot be estimated" since what is sought is an injunction against the enforcement of the challenged resolutions of the MB. much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. first accrued in 1984 and continued until 1987. on the administrative liability of the respondent Judge and the lawyers. ASCUE v CA (ANTONIO) GR No. but perhaps unaware of its earlier Resolution. Even granting for the sake of argument that Sun Insurance and Pilipinas Shell may apply in this case. Victoria A. Where the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee. the petitions are GRANTED. nothing can save the case from being dismissed.479. All proceedings undertaken and all orders issued by respondent Judge are hereby SET ASIDE for being null and void. Since the damages arose out of the alleged unwarranted.There can be no question that in the instant case." Both conclusions are unfounded and are the result of a misapprehension of the allegations and causes of action in both the complaint and amended complaint. . HELD Ratio The action must be dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs therein to pay the correct docket fees. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court. the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. which were. 16 the action. . Respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case. the action therefor must be initiated within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued.These are the very damages referred to in the prayer: “to fully repair the damages inflicted on PBP consisting of losses of operation and the conservators' bank frauds and abuses” but not specified therein. the cause of action. that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of Prof. .On the orders of contempt and the reasons therefor. A2010 Avena . when the original complaint was filed. in its Resolution. the Court categorically stated: It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading. Reasoning The respondent Judge. 1991 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . The pronouncements in the Manchester case should thus be reiterated: The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. in ruling that PBP and PPI had paid the correct docket fee of P102. and however.771.00. Pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code. Generally.While PBP cleverly worded its complaint to make it appear as one principally for injunction. as stated earlier.00. would amount to about P 437. It was ruled therein that: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. a careful examination thereof bears that the same is in reality an action for damages arising out of the alleged "unwarranted. the claim for damages is merely incidental. this was done to evade the payment of the corresponding filing fees which. . Upon the other hand.Finally. unnecessary and unjustified conservatorship. . Hence.Private respondents Ramon Antonio. It means that in every case. The decision and resolution of the CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. PBP's claims for damages arise out of an injury to its rights. ill-motivated and illegal conservatorship. Court of Appeals. if any.respondent Court applied the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office and Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. ISSUE WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing the Civil Case on the ground of nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fee in violation of the rule enunciated in Manchester Development Corp. There is no showing that PBP paid the correct filing fee for the claim within the prescribed period. ." or a conservatorship which "was utterly unnecessary and unjustified.000. et al. already overturned by Manchester. illmotivated. the court may allow the payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the person. illegal. the respondent Court declared the claim to be without merit. by then. The said case was decided by this Court on 7 May 1987. 84330 Padilla. ruled that the case is "incapable of pecuniary estimation" because the value of the losses incurred by the PBP "cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the community.The respondent Court itself. Thus. . they cannot be corrected by certiorari.00. respondent Court merely stated: . exactly 3 months and 20 days before the filing of the original complaint and 5 months and 18 days before the filing of the Amended Complaint. it devoted the bulk of its petition to detailed events. in short. . The PBP then clearly acted with manifest bad faith in resorting to the foregoing clever strategy to avoid paying the correct filing fees. DISPOSITION PREMISES CONSIDERED. .The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. confronted by the same issue. To this Court's mind. May 8. . occurrences and transactions in support thereof and patiently enumerated the losses it sustained and suffered. vs.Ascue filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground that it is the RTC not MTC which has jurisdiction over consignation cases. . the subject matter of litigation being incapable of pecuniary .

the allegations of the complaint clearly show: first. the financial resources of the person from whom support is sought. appellant moved for a judgment on the pleadings. falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the courts of first instance. An action for support does not only involve the determination of the amount to be given as support. hence. BAITO V SARMIENTO 109 Phil. -CFI Samar dismissed her complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction. but only up to the amount of P3.733. Reasoning.Civil Procedure Digest estimation. where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money. the amount of debt due is determinable.. to recover the sum of P3. Thus. where no debt is due and owing. Ratio In valid consignation cases. that the maritime contract binding the parties was breached by the carrier because through his fault and that of his agents and representatives the cargo became a total loss. . Resolving this motion. appellee moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the amount of the claim did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court. The MetroTC denied Ascue’s motion to dismiss and held that the inferior court had jurisdiction since the consigned amount was P5. as amended by Republic Act No. Two of the requisites of it valid consignation are (1) that there is a debt due.In the case at bar. the subject matter (i.78. the same must relate to the trade and business of the sea Admiralty Prof. 1966 NATURE Appeal FACTS On August 14. 17 jurisdiction. Reasoning. In replying thereto. An action for support falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance under section 44(a) of Republic Act No. -Moreover. 1960 NATURE Appeal from CFI Samar FACTS -Lucina Baito filed action for support against her husband Anatalio Sarmiento. it has also been held. the needs of the claimant. This amount sought to be consigned then determines the jurisdiction of the court.90. A2010 Avena NEGRE v CABAHUG SHIPPING 16 SCRA 655 DIZON. In a valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money. ISSUE/S WON the case falls within the jurisdiction of CFI (RTC) HELD YES Ratio.625 (well below 20K). inasmuch as the subject matter of litigation (the amount to be consigned) is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 148 PADILLA. and (2) the amount is placed it the disposal of the court. and second. 296. ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that consignation cases fall within the jurisdiction of the MetroTC and that the amount consigned determines said jurisdiction HELD No.000) HELD Ratio. extends to all maritime torts. 129. 2613. a common carrier engaged in the business of transporting persons and goods for a price within Philippine waters. CA decision AFFIRMED. 1961. Victoria A. as amended. the respondent metropolitan trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 33(1) of BP Blg.000 (now P5. The action was based upon an oral contract for the transportation of goods by water.e. the right to support created by the relation. irrespective of the amount or the value of the goods involved. pursuant to the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act. This is wrong. that the contract entered into between the parties had already been partially performed with the loading of the goods subject-matter thereof on board appellee's vessel and the acceptance thereof by said appellee. the amount of the debt due is determinable. This amount sought to be consigned determines the jurisdiction of the court. not the MTC. before it could be transported to its place of destination. all of which are not capable of pecuniary estimation. Consignation is the act of depositing the thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. the amount demanded as support being only P720 ISSUE WON the CFI has jurisdiction over an action for support if the amount claimed or demanded as support is only P720. Disposition Petition DENIED. It has been held that. Clearly. however. or not more than P2. . which has jurisdiction over the case. the amount due) in consignation cases is capable of pecuniary estimation.Ascue later appealed to the RTC but the same dismissed the appeal for being premature. to give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract. The CA then dismissed the petition and ruled that the jurisdiction of a court in consignation cases depends on the amount consigned.00. April 29. the amount consigned being P5. but also the relation of the parties. APR 25. Disposition The order appealed from is set aside . without prejudice to the right of appellant to file the same with the corresponding municipal court. consignation is not proper. Appellant maintains in this appeal that his action is one in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. the court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Ascue brought the case to the SC on direct appeal but the case was referred back to the CA. the subject matter is capable of pecuniary estimation. consignation being merely a form of payment and the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment. and which was totally destroyed on board thereof. which. representing the value of a cargo of dried fish belonging to him which was loaded on the latter's vessel. Disposition Reversed. Negre (appellant) filed his complaint against Cabahug Shipping & Co (appellee). Reasoning petitioner is of the belief that it is the RTC.774. due to the gross negligence of the officers and members of the crew of said vessel As Cabahug’s answer admitted liability for the loss of said cargo.625.

March 17.000). . 1987 . 1987 – LKT.This relief is available to a landlord. Cebu.The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to property. may file an action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. in depriving Reginaldo of physical possession of the room when the main door’s lock was changed without the knowledge and consent of Reginaldo. Inc.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit. .Civil Procedure Digest and the case is remanded A2010 Avena jurisdiction. commanding LKT. 18 D.00 (now P20. an MTC judge. . Inc. No costs.The complaint alleged that petitioners are coowners of that parcel of land in Liloan. METROPOLITAN. Inc. enjoining the enforcement of the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent judge and from further taking cognizance of said civil case. March 18. Laurilla.He requested for a new key from the OIC of the buiding but his request was not complied with. 1987 – Reginaldo was unable to enter the building because he did not have a key to the new lock.October 23.Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary Procedure.The original occupant of Room 103 was Lim Eng Piao. . the amount of the total claim does not exceed P10.Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof. the SC held that exemplary damages must be specified and if not.October 1. When Lim Eng Piao died. violence or terror.253. 1991 NATURE Petition to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals FACTS . the father of Reginaldo. and to pay damages in the amount of P1. The complaint was denominated as an action for damages with injunction but was subsequently dismissed for lack of ISSUE WON the action for specific performance in this case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC HELD NO Ratio In Vichanco vs. With regard to the issue of possession: Force was used by LKT. . before the Metropolitan Trial Court.000.000. 1987 – Another complaint was instituted in the MTC which had the same allegations.October 2.00. the occupancy was continued by Reginaldo.The issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership.The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. One of the rooms in the building (Room 301) is occupied by Reginaldo Lim. 1999 NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS .235. Reginaldo alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said room. . vendor and vendee and also to a tenant or lessee or any other person against whom the possession of any land or building. November 3. . Reginaldo was able to acquire a house and lot in Quezon City but he still used the room where he kept his books. . .Lim Kieh Tong. instituted the instant petition. Disposition Petition is denied. 1987 . P5. denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION. the motion to dismiss was correctly denied.September 1987 – LKT. or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession within 1 year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding possession. is unlawfully withheld. 1987 – Reginaldo instituted a civil case against Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong. changed the lock of the main door of the building which was commonly used by all the occupants of the building. . the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand.The Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order. . appliances and other important belongings. argued that when the amount of damages claimed is not specifically alleged in the complaint.LKT. Inc. .Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents. Reasoning . to deliver the appropriate keys to Reginaldo and to allow him to enter the premises and Room 301 of the building. jurisdiction over the case would fall under the RTC as the failure to so allege would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil and estate settlement proceedings/over provisional remedies Exclusive original jurisdiction in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases LIM V CA (PIZARRO) 00 SCRA 00 GANCAYCO. entitling him to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate key to the lock of the main building. Inc. Inc. owns a building in Manila.A temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge pending trial on the merits. but rather the nature of the action because the rents or damages are only incidental to the main action.In Singson vs. Eventually. prevented Reginaldo from using the room.September 30. it was held that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages involved. Victoria A. He was unable to get his law books for a case he was working on so he had to purchase new ones which cost him P1. if together with the other money claims. . MUNICIPAL. Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession of real property RUSSELL V VESTIL 304 SCRA 738 KAPUNAN. the municipal trial court could still grant it. a motion to dismiss being one of the prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure. Prof. With regard to the issue of jurisdiction: . or a part of it. documents.November 2." with the RTC of Mandaue City . It was through stealth that LKT. Inc. The . .00. Aragon. Inc.

the case falls within the jurisdiction of the MCTC of Liloan. SPECIAL RULES .Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the action is one for repartition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5. .500 pieces of plastifilm bags.000. Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION. the subject of the litigation being specific performance. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation.The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. seeking to compel Yu Siu Liong to accept delivery of 74. Disposition The petition was GRANTED.Respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners. cognizable by the RTC . or P50. Since then.000 plastifilm bags. annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission. INC.000. -Yu Sio Liong filed MTD on the ground that. If the value exceeds P20. 33(3) of B. . the value of the 100.The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE WON the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Inc.Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the complaint is for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION. JBL. plus 12% interest per annum thereon until fully paid. MANUFACTURER'S DISTRIBUTORS. saying: “Manufacturer’s Distributors's action before the MTC was one for specific performance… Whether refusal to accept delivery of said plastifilms was justified or not is not capable of pecuniary estimation and was. then.000. therefore. contracted for by Yu Sio Liong at a total price of P3.A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners . While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property. Branch III. this petition ISSUE WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case. Manuufacturer’s Distributors also prayed for such other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises." which is clearly one incapable of pecuniary estimation. the property was inherited by their legal heirs. or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20. and is therefore not within the jurisdiction of MTC HELD YES.00 as the case may be.. Cebu . the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. 19(2).Hence.00. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. thus.00. where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money. this is just incidental to the main action.00 or P50. -CFI affirmed the order of dismissal with costs. HELD YES. . to pay P3. However.00 in Metro Manila." -Manufacturer’s Distributors contend that the subject of the litigation were the 100.00.000. FACTS -Manufacturer's Distributors. V YU SIU LIONG 11 SCRA 680 REYES.376. and. the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION" . had filed action in MTC Manila. or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment. April 29 1966 19 NATURE Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI Manila sustaining and affirming an order of the MTC Manila dismissing the original complaint for want of jurisdiction. the principal relief sought. which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described.P. therefore. METC.000. and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance. for and as stipulated attorney's fees. Isabela Sawmill: In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. support. if located elsewhere. where the money claim is purely incidental to.000 pieces ordered by said Yu Sio Liong and supplied by the Manufacturer’s Distributors. A2010 Avena and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.00.Upon the death of said spouses. .376. herein petitioners and private respondents. irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.00. . . the same lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money. this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money.000 pieces of plastifilm bags ordered by him." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. Prof. the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC.Respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.By virtue of this deed. Ratio Singsong vs. Victoria A. not cognizable by the Municipal Court. which is a counterpart of specific performance. it was susceptible of pecuniary estimation. E. balance of 100.Civil Procedure Digest land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. While actions under Sec. or a consequence of. MTC upheld Yu Sio Liong and dismissed the complaint. Compostela. also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage. and to pay the amount of P844. it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec.

the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation.Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the CFI of Cebu. therefore. nor to those which involve the legality of any tax. sec44). praying that the latter be ordered to finish the construction of a house mentioned in the complaint. 15. one ABC Diesel Engine. -Speaking of the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts. impost or assessment. If no such liability is judicially declared. Inc. 88. 1950 NATURE Original action in the Supreme Court. -Subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. . in its sec88. Prof. exclusive of interest and costs.31. except in forcible entry and detainer cases. does not give a pecuniary estimation to the litigation. and is ordered to stop further proceedings by dismissing the case. and hence can not constitute a pecuniary estimation thereof.—CFI shall have original jurisdiction: (c) In all cases in which the demand.September 19. J. WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case. The alternative prayer meant that the A2010 Avena payment of the latter sum was a pecuniary estimation of the specific performance sought. FACTS .00. is not within the jurisdiction of the MTC. are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction. for lack of jurisdiction.October 12. the court dismissed the case for lack of interest of the parties on October 10. for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance primarily sought. 1949: respondent Yambao filed a motion praying that the trial of the case be set for November 14. as amended. nor to actions involving admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.31. Certiorari and prohibition with injunction. of Cebu. that defendants had warranted and assured him that all . of Manila and General Engineering Co. dismissing. In other words.376. the payment in money is not an alternative equivalent. In the present case. . 627) is inapplicable.. 1949 was received by petitioner’s counsel on October 12 (two days after)." Jurisdiction over the classes of cases thus excluded is conferred on the CFI (Judiciary Act. but to the class of cases. which was denied by the court.August 3. his complaint for rescission and damages against appellees Scandia. although the damages alleged for its breach.Within ten days from the receipt of the summons.31. for the alternative prayers would not have been made in the complaint if one was more valuable than the other. nor to actions for annulment of marriages. the specific performance alternatively prayed for is capable of pecuniary estimation at P644.B. SEC. Victoria A. exclusive of interest. LAPITAN V SCANDIA 24 SCRA 477 REYES. In said case. or to pay her the sum of P644. This matter plainly is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered cities. Judiciary Act of 1948 SEC. the purported subject of litigation. .. Hence. nor to matters of probate. Tan (87 Phil.. and. provides nevertheless in its par2 that "The jurisdiction of a justice of the peace and judge of a municipal court shall not extend to civil actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. 1963 he purchased from Scandia. but as the petitioner’s counsel received notice of the said motion on Oct. .00 plus interest and attorney's fees. .The case comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court or justice of the peace court. November 27. Original Jurisdiction in civil cases.31.Order setting the case for trial on October 10. 44. . not to the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular case. 20 CRUZ V TAN 87 SCRA 627 JUGO. the payment cannot be awarded. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court. Plaintiff avers that on April 17. Disposition CFI order affirmed. or the value of the property in controversy. HELD NO Ratio The jurisdiction of the respective courts is determined by the value of the demand and not the value of the transaction out of which the demand arose. the appointments of trustees or receiver. the plaintiff had made an alternative prayer: specific performance or payment of the sum of P644. as to the contractual price for the plastifilm bags. The motion was heard on October 15. SEC. Reasoning . which falls under the Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the Municipal Court. 1949: petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit—the demand contained in the prayer is only for P644. amounts to more than two thousand pesos. Original jurisdiction. that he bought the engine for running a rice and corn mill. but a consequence or result of the specific performance. ISSUE 1.The alternative prayer for specific performance is also of the same value. -That Manufacturer’s Distributors's complaint also sought the payment by Yu Sio Liong of P3. has reference. 86.Civil Procedure Digest -There is no controversy. the dispute is whether or not Yu Sio Liong was justified in its refusal to accept the delivery of the bags.L. such payment would be but an incident or consequence of Yu Sio Liong's liability for specific performance. DISPOSITION Judge of CFI is declared without jurisdiction to try the case. since it would equally satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs. and trial for the merits was also set. 1949: respondent Telesfora Yambao filed a complaint against the petitioner Manuel Cruz. the petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars. . 1949. Since the parties did not appear at the trial. -Cruz vs. . the Judiciary Act.— Xxx exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter or amount of the demand does not exceed two thousand pesos. he could not appear in the said hearing. after conferring original jurisdiction in Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts over cases where the value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed P5. the nature of the action and of the relief sought.— (b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their respective municipalities. if permitted. 1968 FACTS . -The [Municipal Trial] Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract. 1949. July 31. 1949. Inc. and not exclusively cognizable by the CFI.000.

They claim that the balance due is only P1260. this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money. and are cognizable A2010 Avena exclusively by theCFI. the amount sought to be recovered is P1520 plus interest and costs. Victoria A. therefore. 1976 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS . enabling him to avoid loss due to long periods of waiting. the value of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. 10 Jan. and in default of payment thereof. to accept a check in payment of a mortgage debt. and chattel mortgage of properties valued at P15340. Reasoning In the case at bar. Quezon City. 1963.Respondents file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since the petitioner only prays for P1520.000 secured by a mortgage on their two lots situated in Cubao. RURAL BANK OF LUCENA 81 SCRA 75 AQUINO. . Inc. or on August 22.Civil Procedure Digest spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores.Scandia. the San Pablo Colleges.000. It therefore comes under the jurisdiction of the original jurisdiction of the municipal court. which is under judicial liquidation. the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August 29. Inc. At the time that the check was issued. arguing (1) that rescission was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by the CFI. the action should be instituted before the CFI. besides the price of P3. Disposition Petition granted THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V TUTAAN 73 SCRA 189 CONCEPCION..00 or less. The CFI dismissed the case. However.00.For failure to plead. the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SCOPE AND CONSTRUCTION UNIFORM PROCEDURE ACTIONS NATURE Real/personal/mixed HERNANDEZ V. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena. where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.735.735. and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court. amending the Judiciary Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to civil cases involving P10. this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. and (2) that as he claimed moral and exemplary damages. . . The CFI dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. and that defendants would replace any part of the engine that might break within 12 months after delivery. Ratio.340) executed by the said respondents. . 1961. -Spouses Francisco S. under RA 3828. since the petitioner prays for foreclosure of chattel in Bulacan. a loan of P6. YES. 1978 FACTS -This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a distressed rural bank.00 attorneys' fees. Also. to order the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage (worth P15. Three months after that loan was obtained. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the total amount claimed was only P8. or a consequence of. P4. yet when said action involves foreclosure of chattel mortgage covering properties valued at more than P10. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. -Before the expiration of the one year term of the loan. Hernandez and Josefa U. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party defendants since they were co-makers of the promissory note. As the bank's executive vice-president was not available. Hernandez went to the Lucena bank and offered to pay the loan by means of a check for P6.000. WON the city court has jurisdiction HELD 1. the payment was not consummated.000 which was drawn against the bank by a depositor.The cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it stopped functioning. It is therefore within the jurisdiction of the CFI. Lapitan appealed directly to this Court. or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage. We. 21 Ratio Although the purpose of the action is to recover an amount plus interest which comes within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court. like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract and in actions for support. it should have been filed there where the deed of chattel mortgage is located. And no cogent reason appears why an action for rescission should be differently treated. ISSUE WON CFI had jurisdiction HELD YES. he sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay. Prof. the San Pablo Colleges had a deposit in the .00. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money. the Lucena bank became a distressed bank. ISSUE/S 1. in their answer claims that the loaned sued upon is only one of five loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they were charged usurious interest.000. rule that the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of pecuniary estimation. September 30. barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor material. and which was payable to Hernandez.Private respondents.000.A complaint was filed before the CFI of Rizal against private respondents Guillermo delos Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo for the recovery of the sum of P1520 plus interest and the sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due as attorney’s fees. Emperado was declared in default while the case against de la Cruz was dismissed w/o prejudice. so Lapitan notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale.00 actual damages. the principal relief sought. . or where the money claim is purely incidental to. and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the CFI would depend on the amount of the claim. and P1.

the vice-president did not take the trouble of asking the Central Bank examiners whether the payment by check made by Hernandez could be accepted. 1961 the operations of the Lucena bank were suspended. Hernandez himself who should have known that the bank was a distressed bank which had suspended operations and which was under the supervision of Central Bank examiners. Hernandez wrote a letter dated January 11. WON the action of the Hernandez spouses to compel them to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage on their two lots is a real action affecting title to real property which should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City where the mortgaged lots are situated. appealed to the SC. its properties and assets are in custodia legis and may. it should have been instituted in Quezon City where the encumbered lots are situated. Section 2(a).890.000.Civil Procedure Digest Lucena bank amounting to P11. to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. Copies of that letter were furnished the Lucena bank and the San Pablo Colleges. To honor the check would have been tantamount to allowing a depositor (San Pablo Colleges) to make a withdrawal but the Lucena bank could not entertain withdrawals without the consent of the Central Bank examiners.000 as attorney's fees. . 2. Moreover. Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that "actions affecting title to. or for partition or condemnation of. did not bother to take up his problem with the said examiners. or foreclosure of mortgage on. the complaint and counterclaim would be dismissed. Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order directing the Lucena bank to turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative. the receiver. The motion was denied. A2010 Avena -Monetary Board had decided to liquidate the Lucena bank. 1962. -Counsel for the Lucena bank on January 30. 1963. shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies" . the Central Bank as liquidator.000. and to pay the Hernandez spouse P25. and Jose S. pursuant to section 29 of its charter and on the assumption that the Lucena bank was insolvent. Prof. that it might reopen in January. 1962 the check for P6. 1964 informing the Associate Superintendent of Banks of the judicial deposit of the check. as the action allegedly involved title to real property.Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance at Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena. The executive vice-president told Hernandez that the bank could not yet honor the check because it had not resumed its banking operations. -The Lucena bank. the Central Bank. Payment by check was a disbursement. the Central Bank and its employee. therefore. the Lucena bank was no longer in a position to honor withdrawals and that had Hernandez paid cash. ISSUE/S 1. Hernandez sent another letter and enclosed the original check (duly endorsed) with his letter to the bank sent by registered mail and special delivery. Inc. as liquidator.000 and attorney's fees of P3. -Lower court ordered the Lucena bank or the Central Bank. Letter was returned to Hernandez because the bank's manager was allegedly in Manila. 1962.000 as moral damages (not P10. the San Pablo Colleges chose to issue a check for that amount to Hernandez. The vicepresident said that when Hernandez presented the check. It contended that there was improper venue because. -Instead of filing a consignation complaint. could not be accepted.. 22 . the loan would not be due until March 21. according to the Lucena bank's executive vicepresident. He again requested that his mortgage be cancelled. The Associate Superintendent of Banks in his answer returned the check to Hernandez and informed him that. That letter was received by the bank. Hernandez enclosed the check with his letter to the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance at Lipa City. which check was drawn against the Lucena bank. and so the check sent by Hernandez. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10.16. or for recovery of possession.Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss. The executive vicepresident wrote to Hernandez and informed him that the check could not be honored for the time being because of adverse events that had disrupted the bank's operations. Hernandez was advised to settle his account by paying cash or by means of a check drawn against a bank other than the Lucena bank. Apparently. -Among the accounts receivable of the Lucena bank inventoried by the Central Bank's representative was the account of Hernandez. his payment would have been accepted. 1962 for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank. anyway. 50019 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Hernandez announced to the Associate Superintendent of Banks in his letter that he was going to deposit the said check in the Court of First Instance of Lipa City on or before December 26. and that. 1967 offered to compromise the case by stipulating that the Central Bank would apply the check in question to the mortgage debt of Hernandez if the balance of the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges would be enough to cover the amount of the check of P6. be reached only by motion or petition in Civil Case No. It further contended that since the Lucena bank is under liquidation and is in the hands of a receiver. 1963 Hernandez informed the Central Bank that he had sent to the Lucena bank on April 25. -Hernandez again asked the bank when he could deliver the check. Undeterred. Martinez as receiver. to cancel the mortgage. -Disregarding that suggestion. the check could not be applied to the payment of Hernandez' loan because the bank was already closed when he received the check. WON Lucena bank had not lost its juridical personality after it was placed under liquidation thus making it not fall under the jurisdiction of the liquidation court HELD 1. that it was awaiting the outcome of a case filed by the bank against the Central Bank. The vice-president explained that because there was a run on the bank its assets were exhausted.000 as prayed for in the complaint) plus P1.000 and that. Victoria A. To implement the resolution of the Monetary Board for the Liquidation of the Lucena bank. Hernandez again mailed the check to the bank with the request that his mortgage be cancelled. What the vice-president meant was that by reason of the letter of the Central Bank Governor dated June 16. In a letter dated October 29.That conditional and equivocal compromise offer fizzled out because the lawyers of Hernandez and the Central Bank did not assent to it. the check was drawn against the current deposits of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank which was in the process of liquidation. real property. to accept and honor the check. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27. by virtue of that compromise. Instead of withdrawing P6. He sent to the bank by registered mail a photostat of the check and a letter inquiring whether the bank would honor the check and when he could go personally to the bank for that purpose. No it is a personal action.000 from that deposit.

They are in possession of the mortgaged lots. at the election of the plaintiff (Sec. to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness. against which the check Prof. . Hence. the action is primarily to compel the mortgagee to accept payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. it could be brought in a place other than the place where the mortgaged lots are located. In the course of the liquidation. On the other hand. the Superintendent of Banks. It is a personal action and not a real action. San Juan. Hernandez. Republic Act No. Thereafter. At the time the Hernandez spouses filed in 1964 their consignation complaint the Lucena bank was already under liquidation. Hence. it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and should act as umpire and arbitrator in the allowance and disallowance of claims. 265. or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides. and that its liquidation is undertaken with judicial intervention means that. S. The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or the place of abode and not necessarily to the legal residence or domicile (Dangwa Transportation Co. file a petition in the Court of First Instance. Victoria A. 576). The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. does not involve the title to the mortgage lots. in personam and not necessarily an action in rem. No.. therefore. They argue that their action is not an action in rem and. finds a bank to be insolvent. contentious cases might arise wherein a full-dress hearing would be required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Plaintiffs' title is not in question. So. In the instant case. The fact that the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business. That action.000 was drawn. The mortgagee has not foreclosed the mortgage. as far as lawful and practicable. Q. the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property.Civil Procedure Digest Note that the rule mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage but does not mention an action for the cancellation of a real mortgage. upon information submitted by the Superintendent of Banks. properties and papers. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. 23 for P6. the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were residents of San Juan. "Sabido es que uno de los deberes primordiales de un depositario es hacerse cargo inmediatamente de todo el activo y pasivo de un banco" (Luy Lam & Co. Cubao.). it is indicated in the promissory note and mortgage signed by them and in the Torrens title covering the mortgaged lots that their A2010 Avena residence is at 11 Chicago Street. it shall forbid the bank to do business and it shall take care of its assets according to law. if possible should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of Banks and control his operations. as a receiver. Rule 4). 128). or for partition or condemnation of. vs. upon order of the Monetary Board and under the supervision of the court. while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself. January 31. 056 evidencing the deposit of the San Pablo Colleges in the Lucena bank in the sum of P11. which is a personal action to compel the defendants to honor the check in question and to cancel the mortgage. Francisco S. when the Monetary Board. the liquidation court is the competent tribunal to pass upon the issue as to whether the Hernandez spouses could validly pay their mortgage debt by means of the check of the San Pablo Colleges. which in their brief they characterize as their legal residence and which appears to be their domicile of origin. as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4. it shall through the Solicitor General. the venue of plaintiffs' personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. Cubao. the actual residence may also in some cases be the legal residence or domicile.. 1977. which is not expressly included in the enumeration found in section 2(a) of Rule 4. vs. Hence. Inc. shall convert to money the bank's assets. The plaintiffs did not testify during the trial. Batangas might be the place where the plaintiffs have their domicile or legal residence but there is no question that 11 Chicago Street.16. In a real action. the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property. all claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. 11 Chicago St. So. L-22795. Batangas. the Superintendent of Banks. The Central Bank points out that the redemption action of the Hernandez spouses would ultimately affect the funds and property of the Lucena Bank. 943-4). Sarmiento. In this case. In that case. Mercantile Bank of China. We hold that the trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas.890. C. that its assets are turned over to the Superintendent of Banks. The liquidation court or the Manila court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Hernandez spouses. (Of course. which apparently is the place where the said lots are located. the action in this case. Quezon City is their place of abode or the place where they actually reside. 71 Phil. The plaintiffs in their brief confound a real action with an action in rem and a personal action with an action in personam. The Manila court in its order of March 28. Hence. 573. 2. a real action may at the same time be an action. The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience only one court. the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages.. they have no testimony in the records as to their actual residence. Cubao. real property. for conversion into cash. Among the assets turned over to the receiver was the outstanding or unpaid account of the Hernandez spouses which appears in the inventory as: "393. if the Monetary Board finds out that the insolvent bank cannot resume business with safety to its creditors. Quezon City. or. A real action is not the same as an action in rem and a personal action is not the same as an action in personam. all of its assets. 1963 had ordered the officers of the Lucena bank to turn over to the Central Bank or to the receiver. instead of against the person (1 C. Under section 29 of the Central Bank Act. a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession. 2[b]. And among the papers or obligations turned over to the receiver was Ledger No. should have been filed in Quezon City if the plaintiffs intended to use their residence as the basis for their choice of venue. It was that check which the Hernandez spouses had issued to pay their mortgage debt to the Lucena bank. In a personal action. J. praying for the assistance and super vision of the court in the liquidation of the bank's affairs. The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank. or foreclosure of a mortgage on. 75 SCRA 124.

De Midgely and Pastor both filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction BUT further alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise have not been made ON ACTIONS IN REM Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely.The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. hence. HELD NO Ratio Docket fees should be paid upon the filing of the initiatory pleadings. The service of summons by publication is required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. 1999.Petitioner Juana Go purchased a cashier’s check of P500K from the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However. No.On Feb. caused the extraterritorial service of summons to half siblings living in Spain to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor. for cogent reasons to be determined by the trial judge. RTC. . 1999 and P20K every month thereafter until the full amount of docket fees is paid. However. which was denied by FEBTC. A2010 Avena CB V. . CA (supra) FACTS Consolidated cases. So. which justified the dishonor and refusal to replace check. Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. 151942. Tong deposited it with the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ already erased. in the interest of justice and because of the huge amount of outlay involved (the Court considers the business climate and the peso crunch prevailing). Go’s son. unless the corresponding docket fee and legal fees for the monetary claims of P55M are paid for.Civil Procedure Digest DispositioN. GO V TONG G.Tong’s lawyer requested that the check be replaced with another payable to ‘Johnson Tong-Final Settlement/Quitclaim’ with same amount. staggered payment thereof within a reasonable period may be allowed. Tong filed complaint against FEBTC and Go at RTC Manila. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident. the court may allow the payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Later. PANGANIBAN. ‘subject to the condition that it shall remain deposited until the disposition of the case. On Go’s instruction. hence. the prayer for an increase in the amount of MD and ED sought to be recovered from P2. filed a criminal complaint against Tong falsification of the check.15. . 5. Reasoning An action commences from the filing of the original complaint and the payment of the prescribed docket fees. Where the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee. it was not honored. Unless grave abuse of discretion is demonstrated. The case is dismissed without prejudice to the right of the Hernandez spouses to take up with the liquidation court the settlement of their mortgage obligation.One of the defenses of FEBTC and Go: Tong cannot prosecute his Supplemental Complaint. regarding the Prof. allowed Tong to first deposit P25K on or before Dec.5M to P55M and praying for the award of AD of P58K. -in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential. . . Issue was payment of the correct docket fee.Case pending.Tong filed ‘Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint’ which Supplemental Complaint alleged that Sps. Go’s ‘used’ their son to file the criminal complaint against him which caused damages. Sr. RTC granted the motion and admitted the Supplemental Complaint. and the same should be dismissed. The criminal complaint was dismissed. Costs against the plaintiffs appellees. George. November 27. Victoria A. the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period. SO ORDERED. RULING ON COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION -It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading. allowed the release of petitioners’ P500K deposit to Tong.’ MFRs of FEBTC and Go were denied.” FEBTC and Go filed MFR but was denied. RTC.Go filed a Manifestation of Deposit and deposited to the RTC Clerk of Court P500K representing the amount of the check. 2003 NATURE Petition for review on Certiorari FACTS . WHEREFORE. ISSUE WON respondent judge and the CA erred in allowing private respondent to pay the docket fee on a staggered basis. where the filing of COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION . the discretion of the trial judge in granting staggered payment shall not be disturbed.R. but the payment of the prescribed docket fee. . The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. It means that in every case. that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. acting on the verbal motion of Tong’s counsel. FEBTC and Go answered that erasure was intentional. the trial court judgment is reversed and set aside. . 24 In personam/ in rem/ quasi in rem DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS (SUPRA) FACTS Half-brother appointed as administrator. this case. and “only then shall the deposits be considered as payment of docket fees. the bank charges to be paid by his client-Tong. the cashier’s check bore the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ after the name of payee Tong allegedly to insure that Tong would honor his commitment that he would no longer ask for further payments for his interest in the ‘informal business partnership’ which he and she had earlier dissolved. Hence. private respondent Tong.

and that under Manchester Development Corporation vs. . upon payment of deficiency docket fee. private respondents filed a complaint for “Recovery of Ownership and Possession. while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation. considering the close relations of the parties. 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS . . non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional.R. . he cannot thereafter challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case.Trial ensued but on June 24. Removal of Construction and Damages” against Bertuldo. . this petition. . As to the contention that deficiency in payment of docket fees can be made as a lien on the judgment. Sometime in March 1980.On August 25. all surnamed Balane own a 1. Hence.On September 22. No. Atty. the trial court observed that the Order dated March 22.Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds: (a) said motion was filed more than seven years from the institution of the case. they allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use a portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental of P100. . the trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from the records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees.After the submission of private respondents’ opposition and petitioners’ rejoinder. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground issued the second assailed Order on August 13. having already ruled that the complaint shall be expunged. petitioners argued that the payment of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken. 25 HEIRS OF HINOG V MELICOR G. Tomas and Honorio. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo. Moreover. (c) collectible fees due the court can be charged as lien on the judgment.In their Rejoinder.Private respondents Custodio. It was further alleged that the private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main subject matter of the case cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership. Petalcorin has not complied with Section 16. 1999. designated as Lot No. (b) Atty.The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne out of the fact that petitioners principally assail the Order dated March 22. Victoria A. 1999 which reinstated the case was not objected to by petitioners within the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26.After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents. Petitioners opposed the reinstatement but on March 22. private respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case. petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not vest the court with jurisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the correct docket fees. Petalcorin]. executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of private respondents. essentially denying petitioners’ manifestation/rejoinder. the trial court issued the first assailed Order reinstating the case. . Disposition Petition is DENIED. Instead. Atty. the motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners. April 12. there is no valid case and the complaint should not be admitted for failure to pay the correct docket fees.It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter which does not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court. petitioners went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied.On January 21. 1998.square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte. even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. After the expiration of the ten-year period. Rufo. . 1999. 1998. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. 1980. the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. despite receipt thereof on March 26. Atty. or after more than three months have passed. possession and removal of construction. petitioners manifested that the trial court having expunged the complaint and nullified all court proceedings. V Asuncion) In other words. in due time. as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 1999. the trial court Prof. 1999. Bertuldo died without completing his evidence. The trial court held that the issues raised in such manifestation/rejoinder are practically the same as those raised in the amended motion to expunge which had already been passed upon in the Order dated January 21. 140954 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. 1999. . .00 only. 1999.399. more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. (Sun Insurance Office Ltd. Cortes. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court in its third assailed Order dated October 15. and (d) considering the lapse of time. A2010 Avena that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees.On July 14. 1714. petitioners are effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction. they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2.On January 28. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party whom he is representing [this was later on complied with by Atty. . Bohol. ISSUE WON grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees HELD NO . Veronico G. It is an interlocutory order since there leaves something else to be done by the trial court . 1999. did they raise the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so. 1999. 1999.Accordingly. that there should be no case to be reinstated and no case to proceed as there is no complaint filed. 1999 which they never sought reconsideration of. . 1999. Sulpicio A. which is against the policy of the Court. Court of Appeals.Civil Procedure Digest the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee.

While the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation. more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made. whoserave abuse of official discretion is the subject of suit. prescribes in thirty years. May 30. the court declared Emma Imperial winner of the first place ISSUE WON the courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical competition HELD No. the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago. A2010 Avena Bengzon. while Patricia Liñgat (second placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of petitioner before. The remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith to certiorari. the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action. and with his father as counsel. If at all. 1970 NATURE Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato dismissing.Civil Procedure Digest with respect to the merits of the case. is a sixth grader at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City scheduled to be graduated on May 21st. Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case. alleging that one of the judges had fallen into error in grading her performance. District Supervisor and Academic Supervisor of the school. Jr. If fraud or malice had been proven. Six days later. but to continue with the case in due course and. (2) That the teachers of the school had been made respondents as they compose the "Committee on the Rating of Student for Honor". 1952 NATURE Original Action in the Supreme Court. as third honor. As stated before. Emma asked the court of first instance of that province to reverse the award. and from the subsequent order of the court a quo denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order of dismissal. Victoria A. Santiago. its Civil Case No. the Manchester rule does not apply. the respondent judge reasoned out that where there is a wrong there is a remedy and that courts of first instance are courts of general jurisdiction. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees. even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case. by instituting the civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA 32 SCRA 188 BARREDO : MARCH 30. yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria".. at most. and over the objection. when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government. by the circumstance that the latter. Jr. They were in good faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of court. Only when the court issued such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order. which is disputed. Certiorari FACTS: In an oratorical contest held in Naga. a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury. SANTIAGOs alleged that: (1) Plaintiff-petitioner Teodoro C. had been prejudiced. 26 CAUSE OF ACTION. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. 1965 with the honor rank of third place. Not against the other judges Disposition. except in Grade V wherein she ranked third. while the other defendants were included as Principal. This is one of them. Jr. there was error on the part of one judge. injunction and damages on the ground that the complaint therein states no cause of action. and judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. when an unfavorable verdict is handed down. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest. first honor was given by the board of five judges to Nestor Nosce. (3) That Teodoro Santiago. The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. Reasoning. Jr. but three days before that date.Plainly. Jr.. and private respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of the prescribed docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate assessment because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. After a hearing. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School. it would be a different proposition. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. . to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. represented by his mother. Camarines' Sur. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case. the reinstatement of the complaint was just and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents. while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement. Thus. 2012 for certiorari. For that matter it would not interfere in literary contests. while his closest rival had been so much benefited. The above-named committee deliberated and finally adjudged Teodoro C. was a pupil in Grade Six at the Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Santiago. and second honor to Emma Imperial. of the other four judges of the contest. as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. beauty contests and similar competitions Prof. DEFINED FELIPE V LEUTERIO 91 Phil 482 FACTS -Appellant Teodoro Santiago. . . (4) That Santiago. against the committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place. being a real action. Jr. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21. on a motion to dismiss. 1965. The Court held: “We observe that in assuming jurisdiction over the matter. -When the school year was about to end the "Committee On The Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class.

Civil Procedure Digest Socorro Medina. and to the Academic Supervisor. before the tribunal. the question brought before the court had already become academic. .It is evident.000. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. duress. (9) That petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal. upon the foregoing authorities. such as the changing of the final ratings on the grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Liñgat. (7) That there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score. the graduation exercises of the Sero Elementary School for the school year 1964-1965 was held on May 21. and (2) that even assuming the propriety of the action. Taiwan Tekkosho. Dispositive. .Plaintiff brought an action in court to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho. Upon receipt of a copy of the above-quoted order. Petitioners appealed ISSUE/S WON the said committee of teachers does falls within the category of the tribunal. for the sum of P140. In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist: (1) that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal. but the same was dismissed.' A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. board. which is an instance of the unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in the disputed selection of honor pupils they made. . wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of discretion and irregularities. and actually spent thereon the repairs the sum of P26. the petitioner moved for the reconsideration thereof. The motion to dismiss was granted. (5) That the committee referred to in this case had been illegally constituted as the same was composed of all the Grade VI teachers only.The present action is to recover the reasonable . or officer exercising judicial functions contemplated by Rule 65 HELD: 1. in whose name the title was registered before the war. which does not belong to the legislative or executive department. such function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. no cause of action exists) Reasoning. with the same protested list of honor students. Victoria A. After liberation. 1952 NATURE Action to recover piece of property FACTS . there is no other speedy and adequate remedy under the circumstances. SAGRADA V NATIONAL COCONUT CORP. (2) the tribunal.27. and as to appeal to higher authorities will be too late. or officer exercising judicial functions. control. Before a tribunal board. to enjoin the respondent teachers from officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of May of that year 1965. The Court then required the respondents to answer the petition within 10 days but respondents moved for the dismissal of the case instead on the grounds A2010 Avena (1) that the action for certiorari was improper. which is very unnatural. and intimidation. or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in Grade VI.00. The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was executed under threats. During the Japanese occupation. In this jurisdiction certiorari is a special civil action instituted against 'any tribunal. and. The defendant was authorized to repair the warehouse on the land. during the pendency of the suit. it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made. board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary. that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the amount of P10. and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought. and it was agreed that the title issued in the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled and the original title of plaintiff re-issued. 27 that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. L-3756 LABRADOR. the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession. (6) That there are direct and circumstantial matters. but said officials "passed the buck to each other" to delay his grievances. This was opposed by petitioner. and when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant herein.There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. in turn. board. and (10) The petitioners prayed to the Court to set aside the final list of honor students in Grade VI of the Sero Elementary School for that school year 1964-1965. June 30. with costs against appellant. (8) That the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased and replaced with the words "second place". NO (therefore. LC: denied injunction -As scheduled. and. resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil. the exercise of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. . board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations. or at least. which shall be proven during the trial.898.R. was coached and tutored during the summer vacation of 1964 by Mrs. (3) the tribunal. and recover its possession.The land belongs to the plaintiff. in violation of the Service Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers in Grades V and VI. and thereupon title thereto issued in its name. G. the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation. During the year 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodianship agreement with United States Alien Property Custodian. board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine what Prof. board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end. for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national. to the District Supervisor. and custody thereof under section 12 of the Trading with the Enemy Act.000. that the so called committee on the rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned task.

DANFOSS V. SEPT. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION G. LTD. such that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. is hereby reversed. Because judge HAD jurisdiction and did not exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. (MINCI) before the RTC of QC. copy furnished plaintiff CCC. That means that their factory was . and 3.the ground of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners is that the complaint of the respondents does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. the Taiwan Tekkosho. 28 MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO V BARRIOS 79 PHIL 666 FERIA. namley. Spanish Civil Code. 1946. there was no omission on the part of the defendant in vilation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs to be paid. 1948. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. and against the claim or title of. Victoria A. However. Disposition Wherefore. the part of the judgment appealed from. act or omission of defendant in violation of said legal right. with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise. Branch 80. There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan Tekkosho. on 9 November 1997. when defendant-appellant took possession. the SC holds that the facts stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the present case do NOT entitle the petitioner to said reliefs. reiterated its demand that every delay in the shipment of the two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter will cause substantial losses in its operations and requested for the early work out and the immediate shipment of the frequency converter to avoid further loss to the company. WON complain of the respondents states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action HELD 1. must arise from any of the four sources of obligations. informed the other MINCI through fax transmission. because EO No. NO. the enemy owner. these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiffappellee. (Article 1089. to February 28. is temporarily suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Government. A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of another. 1947 NATURE Petition for certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent judge denying the motion to dismiss the complaint of respondents FACTS . 32: Enforcement of payment of payments of all debts and other monetary obligations payable within the Philippines. but a trustee of then Government of the United States. to the late of judgment on February 28. correlative obligation of the defendant. Therefore. crime. The said purchase is covered by a Purchase Order which indicated the delivery date to be within eight (8) to ten (10) weeks from the opening of the letter of credit. In this case. that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control.Civil Procedure Digest rentals from August. alleging that: (1) CCC purchased from MINCI two Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter for use in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant. 1946. DANFOSS. (2) CCC through a letter dated 7 November 1997. NO Ratio. A2010 Avena 1949. Reasoning. the owner. 2. except debts and other monetary obligations. respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls. in actions of certiorari. entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential Proclamation. Prof. ***BUT (not related to topic Cause of Action): even if the complaint of the plaintiffs respondents states no cause of action. . and its essential elements are: 1. 9 2005 NATURE This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure of the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. its obligations. can only determine WON the court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. 143788 CORONA. Costs of this appeal shall be against the plaintiff-appellee. Inc. to the date it vacated it. in its own right. to the exclusion of. even if defendant-appellant were liable to the Alien Property Administration for rentals. No Ratio If defendant-appellant is liable at all. 1998. which sentences defendant-appellant to pay rentals from August. the plaintiffappellee herein. So… disposition: Disposition Petition is denied. Alien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the United States. Neither was there any negligence on its part. the Alien Property Administration.R. that the reason why DANFOSS has delivery problems was that some of the supplied components for the new VLT 5000 series did not meet the agreed quality standard. contract or quasi-contract. Neither is it a trustee of the former owner. ISSUE/S 1. law. This Court. legal right of plaintiff. The Alien Property Administration had the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title. 32 said debts are not yet payable or their payment cannot be enforced until the legal cessation of the moratorium. December 3.On November 5. WON defendant is liable for rent of the said period HELD 1. because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the payment of the defendants’ debts until after the termination or legal cessation of the moratorium provided in EO No. CCC executed and opened a letter of credit under in favor of DANFOSS INDUSTRIES PTE. because it entered the premises and occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof. as though it were the absolute owner. which is still in force. From August. ISSUE/S 1. but by express provision of law.) Reasoning Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all. or negligence. 1946. the date when the defendant began to occupy the premises. FACTS . but to the United States Government.respondents filed a complaint seeking to recover amounts of money due to them from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war.

hence. we rule that the same failed to state a cause of action. Cause of action. .On February 17.064. . And at that moment.Of the five causes of action pleaded. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. . Union Glass and Pioneer Glass. no definite commitment was received by plaintiff CCC from defendants MINCI and DANFOSS for the delivery of the two unit Frequency Converter. How could respondent hold petitioner liable for damages (1) when petitioner had not yet breached its obligation to deliver the goods and (2) after respondent made it impossible for petitioner to deliver them by cancelling its order even before the agreed delivery date? -Section 1 (g). -Disposition. Union Glass moved for dismissal of the case on the ground that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit. CCC surmised that defendants MINCI and DANFOSS could not be able to deliver the two (2) unit Frequency Converter within the maximum period of ten (10) weeks period from the opening of the Letter of Credit. we hereby GRANT the petition. Part of the assets transferred to the DBP was the glass plant in Rosario.As security. Likewise. to which Union Glass filed a rejoinder. 2.Danfoss filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but it was denied. On appeal to the CA. -By reason of the delay to deliver. Thereafter. In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action. Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its assets to the DBP in addition to the mortgages executed by some of its corporate officers over their personal assets. a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: xxx xxx xxx (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action.Hofileña filed a complaint before the SEC against the DBP. The proceeds were used in the construction of a glass plant in Rosario. Civil Case pending before the RTC of Quezon City. plaintiff CCC was compelled to look for another supplier.000. this appeal. Pioneer Glass had obtained various loan accommodations from the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP]. and to get three regular seats in the corporation's board of directors. there was no clear message when normal production will resume. ISSUE WON the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quo of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action. 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for damages against A2010 Avena petitioner. Branch 80.When Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer meet its financial obligations with DBP. petitioner had not violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen. Ratio.The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss in its order[4] dated May 28. the court can render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. . Victoria A. CCC informed MINCI in a letter dated 13 November 1997. -ON CAUSE OF ACTION: A cause of action is defined under Section 2. the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. Hofileña prayed that the dacion en pago be declared null and void and the assets of the Pioneer Glass taken over by DBP particularly the glass plant be returned. the latter also denied Danfoss’ petition for lack of merit. Cavite. which DBP leased and subsequently sold to Union Glass and Container Corporation. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not. Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them. it entered into a dacion en pago agreement with the latter. For this purpose. – A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. However. Cavite. Since 1967. as one of the conditions in the Purchase Order. 2000 and its resolution dated June 7. Union Glass filed this petition in the SC. Through the conversion into equity of the accumulated unpaid interests on the various loans DBP was able to gain control of the outstanding shares of common stocks of Pioneer Glass. only the first cause of action concerned Union Glass as transferee and possessor of the glass plant. defined. whereby all its assets mortgaged to DBP were ceded to the latter in full satisfaction of the corporation's obligations in the total amount of P59 million. Based on this apprehension. WHEREFORE. DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. 1983 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul and set aside the order of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) FACTS . Unable to secure a reconsideration of the Order as well as to have the same reviewed by the Commission En Banc. Rule 2 of the same Rules Sec.Civil Procedure Digest canvassing for another supplier. .SEC Hearing Officer Eugenio Reyes granted the MTD for lack of jurisdiction. he reversed his original order. Grounds – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. and the operation of seven silica mining claims owned by the corporation.00 due to the time lost and delay in the delivery of the said two (2) unit Frequency Converter/Inverter. the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. HELD YES. . it cancelled its order six days prior to the agreed date of delivery. Respondent Hofileña filed her opposition to said motion. . is hereby DISMISSED. Reasoning. of the plaintiff’s intention to cancel the said order. November 28. As a consequence thereof. The assailed decision of the CA dated February 11. 1999. . Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides that: Section 1. -Due to this information received. and also from other local and foreign sources which DBP guaranteed. CCC has suffered an actual substantial production losses in the amount P8.*** -It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. .Carolina Hofileña is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass Manufacturing Corporation. a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of silica mines and the manufacture of glass and glassware. When respondent sued petitioner for damages. Prof. upon a MFR. 29 MISJOINDER UNION GLASS V SEC (Hofileña) 126 SCRA 32 ESCOLIN. admitting the facts alleged. 1999.

Petitioner is definitely not a natural person.Such action. it cannot be joined as party-defendant in said case as to do so would violate the rule on jurisdiction. such procedure however is subject to the rules regarding jurisdiction. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative function of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations. it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: a) Devices and schemes employed by or any acts. defendant filed a Motion for Dismissal of Action (Demurrer to Evidence) based on plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue. nor is it a juridical person as defined in the New Civil Code of the Philippines. . PARTIES Who may be parties JUASING HARDWARE V MENDOZA 115 SCRA 783 GUERRERO. their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. The descriptive words "doing business as Juasing Hardware' " may be added in the title of the case. the controversy must pertain to any of the following relationships: [a] between the corporation. shall be suspended to await the final outcome of the SEC case. as is customarily done. of the board of directors. . trustees. defendant stated that she "has no knowledge about plaintiff's legal personality and capacity to sue as alleged in the complaint. and between such corporation. Victoria A. Since Union Glass has no intra-corporate relationship with Hofileña. (2) Other corporations. 2035. permit or license to operate is concerned. members. allows the joinder of causes of action in one complaint. partnership or association and the public. 44.However. 4 The law does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. Revised Rules of Court) Reasoning .In her Answer. b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations. members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission. its officers or partners. . (3) Corporations. . The allegations in the body of the com.Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court . Ratio In order that the SEC can take cognizance of a case. Defendant contended that Juasing Hardware is a single proprietorship. [b] between the corporation. for the issue of the validity of the dacion en pago posed in the SEC case is a prejudicial question. July 30. 4. partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality. NOTE: The jurisdiction of the SEC is delineated. Prof. the defect of the complaint is merely formal. filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against Pilar Dolla. Plaintiff filed an Opposition and moved for the admission of an Amended Complaint. .After plaintiff had completed the presentation of its evidence and rested its case. between and among stockholders. amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the A2010 Avena interest of the public and/or the stockholders partners. 30 . Who may be parties. Questioned orders of SEC. NO. created by law. . Thus. Disposition Petition GRANTED. partnership or association of which they are stockholders. members or associates. Sec. partners or associates themselves. partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity. by Sec 5 of PD 902-A: SEC. respectively. separate and distinct from that of each shareholder. venue and joinder of parties. business associates. 1." . Reasoning While the Rules of Court.Civil Procedure Digest ISSUE 1. institutions and entities for public interest or purpose. partnerships or associations. not a corporation or a partnership duly registered in accordance with law. MFR was likewise denied ISSUES WON the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case and refused to admit the Amended Complaint HELD YES Ratio A defect in the designation of the parties may be summarily corrected at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. (Sec. between any or all of them and the corporation. plaint would show that the suit is brought by such person AS proprietor or owner of the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware". 5. Hofileña's complaint against the latter can only prosper if final judgment is rendered in SEC Case No. partnership or association and the state in so far as its franchise. set aside. not substantial. [c] between the corporation. and therefore is not a juridical person with legal capacity to bring an action in court. if instituted. partners. and [d] among the stockholders. the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the action against Union Glass. Rule 10. Substitution of the party plaintiff would not constitute a change in the Identity of the parties.The complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing Hardware.The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that t he real controversies 4 Art. partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and devices. Hofileña's complaint against Union Glass for cancellation of the sale of the glass plant should therefore be brought separately before the regular court. partnership or association and its stockholders. 1982 NATURE Special Civil Action for certiorari FACTS . The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions. partner or member. or officers. c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors. annulling the dacion en Pago executed in favor of the DBP. which applies suppletorily to proceedings before the SEC.Juasing Hardware. officers or managers of such corporations. WON the SEC has jurisdiction over the case and not the regular courts HELD 1. alleging to be a single proprietorship duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines and represented by its manager Ong Bon Yong.Judge Mendoza dismissed the case and denied admission of the Amended Complaint.-Only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action . members or associates.

Gonzales deposited balance w/ the court and filed motion for execution. SEC. Reasoning Although the Dabons are not parties to the specific performance case. Prof. A2010 Avena ISSUE/S 1. 2. wrote Pres. any finding of extrinsic fraud would adversely affect their ownership and could be basis of annulment of judgment. JR. Macaraig. filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the TC. GONZALES V. Ratio A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. CAPARAS 225 SCRA 568 SEPARATE OPINION AQUINO [concurring] . the assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance.Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge). doing business under the tradename.T. CA issued resolution restraining TC from implementing its decision. SENOY. Risonar (Registrar of Deeds). .Civil Procedure Digest between the parties are presented and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. Failure to implead Aristotle Manio renders the proceedings in the specific performance case null and void. . Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COAudit Chairman Domingo (that the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality. Ratio An action should be brought against the real party in interest. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case. 2006 NATURE Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals FACTS .The Dabons. WON the Dabons can seek annulment of the TC judgment HELD 1. 31 DEAN JOSE JOYA. . In this case.According to the agreement. .Gonzales filed complaint (action for specific performance) against Manio sps. Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no interest in the judgment of the TC. v.Director of National Museum Gabriel S. the lot is owned by Aristotle. Casal issued Parties in interest CARILLO. Reasoning . and in the body of the complaint the personal circumstances of Ong Hua should be stated. Juasing Hardware. FACTS: . the owner of the land. w/c was w/drawn bec decision wasn’t served on defendants.. Gonzales said she pd downpayment to Priscilla because she had an SPA from her son Aristotle. authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing the auction sale of 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos.Gonzales insists that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC’s judgment bec they’re not parties to the specific performance case. . However. 1993 NATURE: Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale by Christie’s (of NY) of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank.S. Senoy and Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs sought. EXEC.TC ruled in favor of Gonzales. September 26. 2. seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought fr Priscilla Manio. Hence. hence. The real party in interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit. Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of 12 mn. PCGG. BELLOSILLO/ August 24. Guyot (Clerk of Court). YES. and Gonzales. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. CA (DABON AND DABON) GR No. Aquino. Senoy (Deputy Sheriff). the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government. GUYOT. CATALINO MACARAIG. Victoria A. PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the 82 Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as the silverware contained in 71 cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines. ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA. and. RISONAR.Pres. WON there was basis to annul the decision of the TC.PCGG through its new Chairman David M. They alleged that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons as the real parties in interest.It should appear in the amended complaint (a copy which was not attached to the petition) that the plaintiff is Ong Hua or Huat. This rule applies with more reason and with greater force when the amendment sought to be made refers to a mere matter of form and no substantial rights are prejudiced. PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U. . their disposal was prohibited by law. Gonzales knew of the sale of lot by Aristotle Manio to the Dabons yet Gonzales did not include the Dabons in her petition. But the Dabons insist that they are parties in interest bec they are buyers. Carillo. Sec. his relatives and cronies. and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement. CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL. owners and possessors of the contested land. . et al. their son. 121165 QUISUMBING.TC’s decision became final and executory. this petition by Gonzales. claiming to have bought the land fr Aristotle. Guyot. through Exec. Disposition Petition is denied. & PCGG CHAIRMAN MATEO A. YES. The specific performance case brought by Gonzales to the TC named Priscilla Manio and husband as defendants. . Castro. What is essential is that he can prove that the judgment was obtained by fraud and he would be adversely affected thereby. Jr.. This is extrinsic fraud.

90777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati. OPOSA V FACTORAN 224 SCRA 792 DAVIDE JR.The sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13.the true owners thereof -whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties . only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question.After the oral arguments of the parties. Inc. ISSUE: WON the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review over this case. . v.On motion of petitioners.-Obviously.. and Chairman Mateo A. this petition. L-75287) . and (Pascual v. -As regards Taxpayer’s Suit: Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Rule 3.302. Jr. 32 . Moreover. The term "interest" is material interest.Tañada v. that there must be an actual case or controversy. Hence.R.Civil Procedure Digest a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. .This is premised on Sec.R. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.) .T. L-29341) . the incumbent Executive Secretary. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. Prof. Legaspi v. HELD: NO. . which were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum (the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. 12 more were joined as additional petitioners and Catalino Macaraig.Moreover. which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Tuvera : There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing.The Court will exercise its power of judicial review -AS regards Mandamus: it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. or a mere incidental interest (House International Building Tenants Association. . Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned.SC: we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action. Civil Service Commission: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under the 1987 Constitution. -In the case at bar. Comelec: The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry.The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government. an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree.604. The paintings and silverware. namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party. Secretary of Public Works) when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. . as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution. 1993 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari of the dismissal order FACTS The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. Tamayo. G. REASONING: A2010 Avena . No. National . as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. . petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G. that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Caparas were impleaded as additional respondents. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. . and.A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. Victoria A.Dumlao v. which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. No. in his capacity as former Executive Secretary. (Sustiguer v. the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks was DENIED on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus. Intermediate Appellate Court. JULY 30. the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. of the Rules of Court. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). DISPOSITIVE: The petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED. 2.

(2) Cease and desist from receiving. Inc. Olanday. with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order" against Olanday. for themselves. land. the judicious disposition." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. at the same time. KINDS OF PARTIES Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties ARCELONA V. Jr. Needless to say. as hereinafter expounded. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.R. -Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. accepting. such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. 1997 NATURE Petition for review FACTS -Olanday. non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of. . The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines. was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. et al. renewal and conservation of the country's forest. Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition. 90-777 is a class suit HELD YES. the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes. petitioners lodged this petition for review . 33 generations. . representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to — (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court. -A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed between Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday. The principal plaintiffs therein. . inter alia. utilization. fisheries. but have also joined the latter in this case. (PENI). management. his agents. considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature. et al. the Honorable Angel C. CA (FARNACIO) G. Dispositive Petition granted. Factoran. Alcala. use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests. In the said order. -Three days thereafter. has a special and novel element. (petitioners) are co-owners proindiviso of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents. -This case." -The original defendant. Oct." Nature means the created world in its entirety. maintenance of security of tenure plus damages. the lessee (Tandoc) surrendered possession of the leased premises to the lessors. -Private Respondent Moises Farnacio was appointed in turn by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the same fishpond. before Respondent Regional Trial Court. The case was intended to maintain private respondent as tenant of the fishpond. off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration. Jr. the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several. it becomes impracticable. Again. et al. for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations. a domestic. to bring all of them before the court. the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children. it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: ". engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources." and granting the plaintiffs ". however. Hence. namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include. the latter being but an incident to the former. filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds.. all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12. ordering defendant. Put a little differently. Consequently. et al. Such a right. Challenged order set aside. are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. -RTC ruled in favor of Farnacio -IAC affirmed with slight modification -SC sustained IAC -Petitioners filed with CA a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment. every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. processing. respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. renewing or approving new timber license agreements. development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future Prof. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can." Consequently. the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. not only was the defendant's claim — A2010 Avena that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained.Civil Procedure Digest Capital Judicial Region. Farnacio instituted Civil Case for "peaceful possession. CA said to implead RTC -Dissatisfied.. Victoria A. mineral. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network. now the principal petitioners. No. but to all citizens of the Philippines. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. In their Opposition to the Motion. since the parties are so numerous. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. wildlife. inter alia. waters. -Subsequently.. -After the termination of the lease contract. file a class suit. (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). . 2. ISSUE WON Civil Case No. taxpayers. His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary. if not totally impossible. 102900 PANGANIBAN. and entitled to the full benefit. Secretary Factoran.

1981 to January. Cerezo alone. all persons standing in the same even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Foronda ("Foronda"). Palanca. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary. March 23. -Petitioner appealed by certiorari to the SC ISSUE .643. and thus the defendant in possession of the property might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment. each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. 37 Phil. 25).. and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible Reasoning Mrs. WON all the co-owners pro-indiviso of a real property indispensable parties? HELD 1. -It was further averred in said motion that although another person. so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation. unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.R. an indispensable party. TUAZON G. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation. Aquino. YES. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. 1982. was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10. -Mrs. were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land. either as co-plaintiffs or as codefendants. but only mutual representation. Ratio Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of indispensable parties. a challenge on the ground of lack of jurisdiction may be brought up anytime. -RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. jurisdiction over Foronda is not Permissive Joinder FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS 144 SCRA 377 FERIA. aside from extrinsic fraud? 2. as in this case.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various occasions from August to October. a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not parties to the suit.Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Avena position. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors. thus. WON a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (over the subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) and denial of due process.212.00. either of the parties is indispensable. Therefore. WON Fronda is an indispensable party HELD 1. 1983. 74 Phil. Rule 38). Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. -At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss.' (I Moran's Rules of Court 1950 Ed.NO.643. Victoria A. Hence. his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. Cerezo"). Where the obligation of the parties is solidary. Disposition PETITION DENIED. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda.00. there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of the litigation. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS -Country Bus Lines passenger bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle. and under Section 19(8) of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos (P20. Fernando Calion.212. ISSUE 1. 697. 1981. Mrs. Banco Español-Filipino v. 29. 141538 CARPIO. or (b) it has been obtained by fraud. Its exercise must strictly comply with the legal requisites.00). 2. 1 & 2.000. all of them must be impleaded. There is no merger or renunciation of rights. 921). September 24. citing Anuran v. as owner of the bus line. Such jurisdiction normally refers to jurisdiction over the subject. p. Cerezo. Under the present procedure. CEREZO V. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. -On December 15. Cerezo. counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only P11. her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Reasoning Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Sotelo. 34 ISSUES 1. it is also primary and direct. Prof. YES.00 representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions from March.1986 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the order of the RTC of Baguio FACTS -Petitioner Remedio Flores filed a complaint with the RTC of Baguio: his first cause of action was against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right against the defendant to include with him. counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Ratio COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. Reason of public policy which favors the stability of judicial decisions are (sic) mute in the presence of fraud which the law abhors (Garchitorena vs. 38 Phil. -tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. aside from the reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. otherwise. Ratio. and bus driver Danilo A. Reasoning As held by the Supreme Court. No. as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10. and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Disposition PETITION GRANTED.

NEWSWEEK.) . 35 Class suit NEWSWEEK V IAC (NFSPI et. the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. -Under the present law. after a careful scrutiny of the complaint. exclusive only of interest and costs. the former rule applied only to cases of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff.” As worded.NEWSWEEK filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that --(1) the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law. . If any demand is for damages in a civil action. not in each. showed a deliberate and malicious use of falsehood.-All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist. whether jointly.Complainants therein alleged that said article. under Section 6 of Rule 3. prohibition with preliminary injunction FACTS .-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved. irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that. join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint. it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction. -Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the former rule under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows: Where there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint. In such cases. 1986 NATURE Special action for certiorari. the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint. exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine. Victoria A. Disposition The order appealed from is affirmed. Inc. . but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties. each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts. of the causes of action. seeks to annul the decision of the IAC sustaining the Order of the CFI Bacolod City.. (Question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence. 6 Application of the totality rule. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and.They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages. It supposedly portrayed their island as a place dominated by big landowners who not only exploited the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers. each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. if instead of joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties. the amount thereof must be specifically alleged. the test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands. whether as plaintiffs or as defendants. but also brutalized and killed them.. . except as otherwise provided in these rules. the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. filed in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental.Civil Procedure Digest WON the application of the totality rule in Sec 33(1) 5 of BP 129 and Section 116 of the interim rules is subject to permissive joinder of parties under Sec 67 of Rule 3 HELD Petitioner maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim Rules. the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek. incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8. al.It was alleged that they committed libel by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the Feb 23. irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. However. 7 Permissive joinder of parties. but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in aconnection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. May 30.Initial complaint: Private respondents. much less support a cause of action. However. taken as a whole. "where the claims or causes of action joined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties. irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. Needless to state also. severally. or in the alternative. embodied in the same complaint.500 members and several individual sugar planters. as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. . where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action. in cases of permissive joinder of parties. A2010 Avena cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. -This argument is partly correct. the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. -There is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant joined in a single complaint. and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state. the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action. the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action. There is no difference between the former and present rules in 5 Provided.) 142 SCRA 171 FERIA.That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties. CFI denied Newsweek’s Motion to Dismiss complaint for libel. . Prof. may. it was also applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties defendant. as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3. and such amounts for moral. the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all. -In the case at bar. . consequently. and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule.Petitioner. -In other words. the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact. -Under the former rule.

nor seek the registration of the titles to the land in its name. EO 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903).MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the lessees. the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class. affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the personality of the individual defamed. ISSUE WON the petition filed by respondent with the trial court states a cause of action against petitioner/ WON respondent has personality to sue HELD YES The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.MIAA argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. 2. the CA annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the suit. 1965 up to May 24. if need be. it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class. . i.Thereafter. the RTC denied the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The petition sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned and to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the Prof. The CAA entered into individual lease contracts with its employees for the lease of portions of a 4-hectare lot situated in Rivera Village. now the NAIA. invoking the provisions of PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016. maintenance and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA). . Polistico). WON this case is a class suit HELD 1.e. without pronouncement as to costs. transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA. control. operation. . CLASS SUIT . As a result. claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual Development Plan intended for airport-related activities. Moreover.Civil Procedure Digest . Consolidated Bank and Trust Co.) or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. the individual members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. individual group member's reputation. and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in- . considered as the representative of the lessees. .. or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from evicting the members of Rivera Village Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. The MIAA denied the request. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. as distinguished from the members thereof. or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. 1990 at P20 per annum as rental. there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific. FACTS -The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration.Upon appeal.NO CAUSE OF ACTION because no allegation that anything contained in the article regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents. requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members. the lease contracts have already expired. It is evident that the larger the collectivity. September 30. 15812 of the CFI Negros Occidental is dismissed. that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as respondent homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest. ISSUE 1. It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees. WON respondents failed to state a cause of action 2. NO Ratio It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. among others. merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its members.Respondent filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA) with the RTC of Pasay. so that he can bring the action separately. The CA ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. 00 SCRA 00 Tinga. management. 36 property in favor of the members of the homeowners association. A2010 Avena MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION. Allegedly. the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The trial court held. creating MIAA. that libel can be committed only against individual reputation. . . The homeowners association.After the preliminary. the Board Resolution presented by respondent shows that it was only the board of directors of the association. 2005 NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the MIAA assailing the Decision of the CA which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings. purportedly representing the lessees. and vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the MIA. YES Ratio Defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast. Disposition The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No.INC. The leases were for a 25-year period to commence on May 25. Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay City. Victoria A. respondent homeowners association.

i." Obviously. conductor. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. WON the complaint should be dismissed due to the death of the plaintiff. however. if successful in the litigation. There is. and where an assignment is effected pendente lite. Sec. 1962: Action for recovery of damages was filed by Severo del Castillo. Panfilo R. be included in the complaint. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs.Civil Procedure Digest interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall. 3. Where an assignable right has been transferred before action brought. Disposition Prof. the original plaintiff. notably because the petition does not allege the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit. 112 SCRA 629 MELENCIO-HERRERA. Victoria A. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. DEL CASTILLO VS. The civil case in the RTC of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED. Amended Complaint was admitted by the court. the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association. would . JAYMALIN. the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. that is. this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly. 12. 4. likewise. the father of the victim. represented by its President. against the driver. the proceeding ought to be instituted in the name of the assignee. even if he had already assigned his rights before he died 2. It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Representatives as parties. and the owner companies. ISSUE 1. As correctly noted by the CA. Court ordered plaintiff’s counsel to verify existence of heirs willing to be substituted as parties-plaintiffs. hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. In order to maintain an action in a court of justice. This rule. In Board of Optometry v. is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed. through its President. the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence. Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued. a “Deed of Assignment” was executed by Severo in favor of his son-in-law Wenceslao Haloc of all his rights in the proceedings in 1960 so plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process. March 17. the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the association. is not authorized to do so. 37 The instant petition is GRANTED. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. not being a heir of Severo. Although the names of the individual members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition. in fact.e. which provides: Sec. NO Ratio. The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners association. Chiutena. the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. and because it was brought only by one party. Essentially. the beneficiary must be A2010 Avena included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. he or she or it must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person. 1982 NATURE Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI which dismiss the case for Damages due to the death of plaintiff FACTS 1960: Deaf-mute Mario del Castillo fell upon alighting the bus of the respondents and died. that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Colet. an executor or administrator. ET AL. Wenceslao had no personality to continue the case. such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. a guardian. it was held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit. it is proper to have the assignee substituted for the original plaintiff. the requisites therefor not being present in the case. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust. or a party authorized by law or these Rules. or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. Counsel for Motion for Annulment Proceedings after having learned that plaintiff Severo already died without resting his case. Sr. upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "All necessary action to the Court of Justice and other related acts necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the Association. the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec.. which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. 1966: Severo died. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity. merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit brought by the homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who. however. If such substitution should not be effected and the transfer of the right of action should not be brought to the attention of the court.. CFI: dismissed original and amended complaints due to the death of Severo. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity. and its application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and practicalities. Allegedly. It must be stressed that an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. In this case. Moreover. WON damages should have been awarded HELD 1. substituting Wenceslao as party-plaintiff. 3.

which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law.00 as attorney's fees. Reasoning. In Barrameda vs Barbara. said appellant failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint required of him. plus P2. as in this case. it is a situation where plaintiff. a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court. 10 years after the execution of said document. it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to that effect. the substantial plaintiff and real party in interest became Haloc. would similarly be void. Severo had transferred his rights as plaintiff to Wenceslao Haloc but after the assignment the case continued in Severo's name and there was no immediate and formal substitution of party plaintiff. had died. This is but a formality. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a copy of the said TC order. while alive. declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordering Gojo to receive the P810 and to restore possession to the defendants and allowing them to redeem the same. however. the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed. Goyala further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. as stated in the deed. Hence.000 for death of victim. 3 of Rule 17. with his now deceased wife Antonina sold to Gojo a 2.000.00 as damages for death. the amount of P12. J. after the assignment. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. the true intention of the parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure payment. alleging that they had obtained a cash loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that to guarantee payment. which was granted by the TC. Antonina. A2010 Avena purchase price. Gojo filed a case with the CFI against Goyala by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. had assigned his rights to another. but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered.: Oct. No costs. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3. amounts to lack of jurisdiction. 17. without interest. which further required Goyala to submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court. -Goyala filed an answer to the petition. WHEREFORE. is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land for P750 by a “Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale”. 2. The rights of Severo to claim damages for his son were transferable. 16. said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one. although the deed was executed in the form of a pacto de retro sale. without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules. and P2. Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the document of mortgage be declared so. Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on the parcel of land in question. Rather. Rule 3 (Sec. that petitioner be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of respondents in accordance with A1606CC. TC rendered favorable judgment on appellee’s counterclaim. -While it is true that under Sec. By way of counterclaim. the decision appealed from is set aside GOJO V GOYALA 35 SCRA 557 Barredo. Prof. He further prayed for P1800 per annum until the final termination of the case for the fruits of said property and in the case that the instrument be deemed a true pacto de retro sale. and the fact remains that. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on "death of a party" are applicable. SO ORDERED. -Appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said appellee’s counterclaim. The deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in addition to the VENUE . The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations. the repurchase to be made within one year. the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery. principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. Appellant opposed the motion but the TC dismissed the complaint. Should have been remanded to CA for determination of amount of damages but due to pendency of case for 13 years + put an end to controversy.000 atty’s fees Disposition. the SC held that an order to amend the complaint. Court imposed P12. Failure to exercise extraordinary care for the safety of its passengers even after being apprised of the fact that the victim was a deaf-mute. WHEREFORE. This is not a case where the provisions of Section 17. ISSUES Parties: Re contractual money claims / Dismissal by claimant / Compulsory counterclaim/ Answer: Defenses WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s counterclaim HELD YES. prompting the TC to issue an order requiring counsel for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint substituting Antonina with one of her successors in interest as party defendants. 1970 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon FACTS -Appellee Segundo Goyala.000. and not a pacto de retro sale. 30. Gojo alleged that the period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in the Registry of Property. Articles 1764 and 2206 of the Civil Code.Civil Procedure Digest hold the fruits of the action as a sort of trustee for the use and benefit of his assignee. -Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named defendant. new law). Victoria A. with Severo as a sort of trustee of whatever fruits the litigation would bring. the proper procedure would have been for the transferee to have been substituted for the transferor as plaintiff. YES Reasoning. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies. in which case. to pay Wenceslao Haloc. before the proper substitution of parties as directed by Sec. and defendants hereby ordered jointly and severally. for such non-compliance. certified the same to the SC. 38 -Appellant appealed to the CA.

The proper venue is the CFI of Manila. whether or not its erroneous assumption of jurisdiction may be challenged by a foreign corporation by writ of certiorari or prohibition. and is the publisher of "Time". to some individuals. the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published. Enriquez. and HELD 1." -People v. 2. Ratio: Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.Antonio J. In case of doubt. Witnesses fear for their lives because the trial was to be held near the town where the accused were powerful. to protect the interest of the public service when the offended party is a public officer. 39 disruption of public service do not appear indubitable . wherein the defendants allegedly impute to plaintiffs the commission of the crimes of graft and corruption and nepotism. . (Subject of the petition: The orders for the taking of the said depositions. If it has no jurisdiction. and where it confers jurisdiction upon a particular court.Respondent court deferred the determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits. INC. Y. respectively. in case the libelous article was first printed or published outside the Philippines. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. AND TO BETRAY THE VERY PURPOSE FOR WHICH COURTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. Reyes: "…TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO PROCEED TO TRIAL IN A LOCALITY WHERE ITS WITNESSES WILL NOT BE AT LIBERTY TO REVEAL WHAT THEY KNOW IS TO MAKE A MOCKERY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. venue was fixed under Republic Act No. is an American corporation with principal offices at Rockefeller Center. objectively viewed. for venue and jurisdiction are not dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party. New York City. they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives. Accused were granted bail. Reasoning: a. of an essay.where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense. as amended by Republic Act No. in its issue of 18 August 1967. REYES 39 SCRA 303 REYES. J. considering that the action was instituted by public officers whose offices were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication.Time Inc. as previously stated. . Whether or not. that jurisdiction is likewise exclusive.B. entitled "Corruption in Asia". N. relying upon the provisions of Republic Act 4363 (According to this law. . May 31. It was granted by Judge Reyes and he also issued a writ of attachment on the real and personal estate of Time.Villegas and Enrile filed a Motion for leave to take the depositions "of Mr. PROCEDURE . the remedy is exclusive. in connection with the activities and operations in the Philippines of the petitioner. and the writ of attachment are sought to be annulled in the petition. Cesar B. . Victoria A. the court having considered that the grounds relied upon in the motion do not appear to be indubitable. actions for damages by public officials for libelous publications against them can only be filed in the courts of first instance of the city or province where the offended functionary held office at the time of the commission of the offense. Inc. . 1971 NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition. b. with preliminary injunction. Inc. vs. Because of this fear. Prof. with offices in the City of Manila) filed a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking to recover from the herein petitioner damages upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time (Asia Edition) magazine. Relevance: Change in venue ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. as well as .. The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." -The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. is not applicable to actions against nonresident defendants. 4363. 4363.. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. Muller & Phipps (Manila) Ltd. the witnesses had been receiving threats on their lives. No. Gutierrez. FACTS . and because questions involving harrasments and inconvenience. Information filed against Mayor. (Textual and strict interpretation of the law) The rule is that where a statute creates a right and provides a remedy for its enforcement. may.". for deferring determination of the motion to dismiss. issued and to prohibit the said court from further proceeding with the said civil case. unless otherwise provided. -The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. to annul certain orders of the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile (Mayor of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance and concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs. .Petitioner Time. the venue provisions of Republic Act No 4363 should be TIME.Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. J. and "Mr.L. and for re affirming the deferment. (Intent of the law) The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced by an out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable. under the provisions of Republic Act No. -there may be cases where the fear.) ISSUES 1. it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue A2010 Avena ..Civil Procedure Digest PEOPLE v. 4363. be less than terrifying. The respondent judge issued an order re affirming the previous order of deferment for the reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act No. 'The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations. Also. Anthony Gonzales. a weekly news magazine. Time-life International". Chief of Police and other accused. by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the discharge of his duties. but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. . and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila.L.Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the deferment. the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published). and moreover. 4363 the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an allegedly libelous publication. MAYOR PABLO SOLA (page 8) FACTS -Bodies found in Mayor Sola’s hacienda. pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is." .B.

2004 NATURE Special civil action of certiorari FACTS . Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Subsequently. even before trial on the merits is had. however. Reasoning. clearly enough. Even the most cursory reading of the order of dismissal can lead to no other conclusion except that it should be affirmed.Civil Procedure Digest deemed mandatory for the party bringing the action. Pacita de los Santos under Pasture Lease Agreement No. The provision contained in paragraph 22 of the "Mobile Service Agreement. 2. the instant petition is GRANTED.On various dates in 1996. May 7. 10403 aforesaid. it cannot suffice for a reversal. the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling. Rule 4. The motion to dismiss was granted based on the documents attached to their motion by Judge Cecilia Muñoz Palma. The added stipulation that the subscriber "expressly waives any other venue" should indicate. Delfino C. Ratio: The action of a court in refusing to rule. would appear to anchor its decision on the thesis that the subscription agreement. .Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the CA. the RTC denied petitioner's MTD and required it to file an answer within 15 days from receipt thereof. His new counsel.On 05 April 2001. But such an agreement is not per se inefficacious.In an order. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration. or for improper venue. PLEADINGS In General: Manner of making allegations in pleadings Actionable document SANTIAGO VS DE LOS SANTOS 61 SCRA 146 FERNANDO." . being a mere contract of adhesion. The infirmity of the case is incurable. the intent of the parties to consider the venue stipulation as being preclusive in character. apparently accepted and signed by respondent. of the order of the trial court.CA saw no merit in the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the TC. Santiago seeks for the decision to be reversed. The application is opposed by the Director of Lands." Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue. . is in excess of jurisdiction and correctible by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate Court. Such an agreement would be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent. dismissed the suit.PILTEL filed a MFR. does not bind respondent on the venue stipulation. DISPOSITION The writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case No. Victoria A. which applications were each approved and covered. A contract of adhesion is no exception. but are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties. 1305. citing a common provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that "Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the relationship between PILTEL and subscriber shall be in the proper courts of Makati. of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing. that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto. on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them." a standard contract made out by petitioner PILTEL to its subscribers. Reasoning It would be useless and futile to go ahead with the proceedings if the court had no jurisdiction. by six mobiline service agreements. Tecson applied for six (6) cellular phone subscriptions with petitioner Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PILTEL). the firm of Luna and Manalo. . . de los Santos on the ground that the property applied for is part of the public domain. Metro Manila. and that it is entered into before the filing of the suit. now an Associate Justice of this Court. 40 A contract duly executed is the law between the parties. The rule instead is that. however. November 22. is thorough and comprehensive. Pacita V. If. respondent filed with the RTC of Iligan City. before the filing of an action. A2010 Avena Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other venues. or deferring its ruling. through registered mail. 1974 FACTS Santiago applied for registration of a parcel of land located in San Mateo. The appellate court. such ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it. Disposition WHEREFORE. TC denied the MFR. Respondent court is further commanded to desist from further proceedings in Civil Case No. Lanao Del Norte. on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. HELD NO. the stipulations are not obscure. Rizal. . Yes. and they are obliged to comply fully and not selectively with its terms. ISSUE WON the order of the lower court should be reversed. which was not the case here. Notwithstanding the vigor with which the appeal is being prosecuted by new counsel. ISSUE/S WON parties may stipulate on the venue of any litigation between them HELD YES Ratio Section 4. unless the question of venue should be waived by the defendant. 10403. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Supreme Court is made permanent. In its subsequent order. should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion. but the appellate court denied the motion. a complaint against petitioner for a "Sum of Money and Damages. Prof. In this appeal. de los Santos and the Director of Forestry which motions are principally based on the allegation that the property applied for is a portion of the public domain which was leased to Mrs. PILIPINO TELEPHONE V TECSON 00 SCRA 00 VITUGJ. motions to dismiss the application were filed by the oppositor Pacita V. and its orders issued in connection therewith are hereby annulled and set aside.

that said contract is also the basis NAMARCO's present complaint.. should be ignored. Juanito was one time the lessee of the timber area sought to be registered by Santiago. which. just and demandable claim has compelled it to file the instant action. uninterrupted. January 31. he could not have succeeded any better. that when NAMARCO filed its answer to the complaint. does not fall under the category of compulsory counterclaim..L. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to the claim that he had been in open.To insure payment. . the NAMARCO to specifically perform its obligation under the contract of sale by delivering to the FEDERATION the goods subject-matter of the contract as are involved in the complaint.. therefore.FEDERATION moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action alleged therein is barred forever. FEDERATION deposited P200. peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner It is a familiar doctrine. no less than the law. the appealed order of November 17. What was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest.. alleging that after the NAMARCO had delivered a great portion of the goods listed in the Contract of Sale. But in the motion to dismiss of de los Santos. call for precisely the conclusion reached by the then Judge Muñoz Palma. In support thereof." 13 Well could Justice Cardozo observe: "A system of procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the warrant of clear necessity. ." 6 Even if there had been a full hearing on the case. not lifted as to her and that she has no interest to oppose the application although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a pasture lease agreement in her favor. "Rules of pleading are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. Alto Electronics Corp.Civil Procedure Digest The pleading left no choice to the then Judge Muñoz Palma except to dismiss the case. Victoria A. it was alleged that the son of Santiago. in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal. Juan T. 1894 up to the present. .001. "should give way to the realities of the situation.SC: The Contract of Sale was valid. and praying that the FEDERATION be ordered to pay the NAMARCO the costs of merchandise plus damages. it did not set up any counterclaim therein.The FEDERATION and some of its members filed a complaint against the NAMARCO for specific performance and damages." . whether objection is interposed by the party or not . A2010 Avena There was no denial of such allegation. therefore. that the CFI promulgated the decision in said case ordering. Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his client's case of such an admission.” Attached to such pleading were the documents. . among others. 1972 after NATURE Appeal by defendantfrom a decision of the Court of First Instance ordering said defendant to pay the plaintiff FACTS .. . as the same evidence would not support or refute both. 5 "that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him.CFI ordered the NAMARCO to specifically perform its obligation in the Contract of Sale. by delivering to the FEDERATION the undelivered goods. There was no choice then for the lower court except to dismiss the complaint. 41 The Claim Counterclaim/cross-claim answer NAMARCO v. WHEREFORE. FEDERACION 49 SCRA 238 ANTONIO. that the deliveries of the merchandise were effected through the fault or negligence of one of its personnel. 1961. .031. the portion of the said parcel of land subject of this registration which was claimed as part of the public forest has already been released by the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes as evidenced by its order dated August 10. the NAMARCO accepted three domestic letters of credit for the account of the FEDERATION. 42684.B. Arive." according to Justice J. the result would not have been any different. in the language of the then Judge Palma." Dispositive. The present counsel of Santiago tries to extricate himself from a predicament of his own making by arguing that the motion to dismiss of Pacita de los Santos is not entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry. which wrote: “. uninterrupted.. the deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. Reyes in Joe's Radio & Electrical Supply v. is conclusive and binding. and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith. Santiago Prof. . . it refused to deliver the other goods mentioned in the said contract. who was administratively charged therefor. When those issues are already clear before the court. public. that NAMARCO's failure to set it up as a counterclaim in its answer does not constitute res judicata.NAMARCO opposed the motion to dismiss contending that its claim for the recovery of the cost of merchandise delivered to the FEDERATION is not necessarily connected for specific performance and. that the present claim is not necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of Civil Case No. although thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes. What is important is that the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. 1961 of the then Judge Muñoz Palma is affirmed. "show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain.000 as partial payment and the balance shall be paid on cash basis upon delivery of the duly indorsed negotiable shipping document covering the same and . It is quite obvious then that the facts. the FEDERATION alleged it filed a case for specific performance to enforce compliance with the contract of sale. Technicalities. FEDERATION is a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.NAMARCO is a GOCC organized and existing under and by virtue of RA 1345. Costs against appellant Luis R.They entered into a Contract of Sale which says that the Management of NAMARCO was authorized to import items worth $2. pursuant to section 6 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. It would clearly appear that Santiago could not in truth show that there was such an open. found guilty and accordingly dismissed.NAMARCO: FEDERATION'S act or omission in refusing to satisfy the former's valid. peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner from July 26.

Namarco's present claim arise out of or was necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the Federation's action in Civil Case No 42684 within the contemplation of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. which usually will be granted in order to enable the parties to litigate all the claims that they have against each other at one time thereby avoiding multiple actions.We therefore rule that NAMARCO's present action. for one. evidently had been issued earlier by the court. . . the question that arises is.I agree that the Court rule for the present that for a counterclaim to be considered as barred.The counterclaim must be existing at the time of filling the answer. 42684). if a party should acquire a matured counterclaim after he has pleaded. with the permission of the court.LC issued an order holding "in abeyance" action on the motion to dismiss till after the trial on the merits. under the above provisions. before the defendant has started presenting his evidence. NAMARCO's claim having accrued or matured after the service of its answer in the earlier case is in the nature of an afteracquired counterclaim which under the rules is not barred even if it is not set up in the previous case as a counterclaim.The FEDERATION filed a rejoinder reiterating that the requirements on the rule of compulsory counterclaim are present. the FEDERATION. a counterclaim acquired by plaintiff after he has replied to a counterclaim by defendant is not compulsory under Rule 13(a). 42 included in the same case by way of supplemental pleading before judgment under Section 4 of former Rule 10 of the Rules (now Sec. would prefer supplemental counterclaims. By way of counterclaim. they must be deemed barred? . Otherwise stated. the defendant should just the same be compelled to allege it in such a supplemental pleading in those cases where his claim accrues before trial has began or at the latest. At the precise time that Namarco filed its answer in Civil Case No. This is derived from the language in the rule limiting its application to claims the pleader has 'at the time of serving the pleading. such that if not interposed. 42684. HELD . In other words. An after-acquired counterclaim. However. 42684. that said cause of action accrued before judgment was rendered by the trial court.NAMARCO filed an answer to the FEDERATION'S counterclaim specifically denying the material averments thereof and maintaining that the present action is not barred by Civil Case No. ISSUE WON this action of NAMARCO for the collection of the payment of the merchandise delivered to. . the FEDERATION sought P50. This construction is not only explicit from the language of the aforecited provisions but also serves to harmonize the aforecited sections of Rule 10. An after-acquired counterclaim. however. must it have to be done in the case of counterclaims that do arise from the same transaction or occurrence. even if it arises out of the same transaction as does plaintiff's claim.000. . be presented as a counterclaim . . to sustain Namarco's position in this appeal.000. .A counterclaim may be asserted under Rule 13(e) only by leave of court.A counterclaim has been held to be compulsory if there is a logical relationship between it and the main claim. .Under Section 4 of Rule 10 of the old rules. . . (e) is permissive in character. However. A2010 Avena . even if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. it was not yet certain that the Federation would not pay or that payment of its sight drafts would not be effected by the bank.00 as attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation. Namarco's cause of action had not yet matured then.The party need not assert a counterclaim that has not matured at the time he serves his pleading. And the same may be allowed unless the case has progressed so far that it may be inconvenient or confusing to allow the additional claim to be pleaded. Similarly. as well as P17.Thus a party who fails to interpose a counterclaim although arising out of or is necessarily connected with transaction or occurrence of the plaintiff's suit but which did not exist or mature at the time said party files his answer is not thereby barred from interposing such claim in a future litigation. Rule 13.It was the element of time herein involved that somehow induced me at the beginning to be inclined. a counterclaim which either matured or was acquired by a defendant after serving his answer may be set up in a supplemental pleading later before judgment." .Civil Procedure Digest . 42684 on October 15. . (Civil Case No. albeit reluctantly.00 as damages for improper issuance of a writ of attachment which writ. though not at the commencement of the action for under Section 3 of the former Rule 10. is already barred as a consequence of the failure of NAMARCO to set it up as a counterclaim in the previous case. from that point of view.But even assuming for the nonce that NAMARCO's present claim is logically related to the claim of the FEDERATION in the previous case. dissenting: . that the first requirement that the counterclaim arises out of or is necessarily connected with the contract of sale subject-matter of NAMARCO's cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint itself. That phrase can only have reference to the time of the answer. Since this may be done or not in the case of counterclaims not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. with section 4 of the same rule which provides that "a counterclaim .' A counterclaim acquired by defendant after he has answered will not be considered compulsory. However such claim may with the court's permission be Prof. specifically denying other allegations and consistently with its position averred as affirmative defense that NAMARCO's failure to assert its claim against the FEDERATION before judgment in Civil Case No. now Section 9 of Rule 6. which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his pleading may. It is also clear. 1960 constituted a bar to the institution of the present action. the cause of action thereof must have already accrued at the time the answer is filed by the defendant. need not be pleaded supplementally. is one of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that a counterclaim is compulsory and must be asserted if it arises out of the same transaction as the opposing party's claim. BARREDO. is not barred by its failure to assert it as a counterclaim the previous case." . my position is that the claim of Namarco in this case did arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject . the after-acquired claim is not considered a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) and a failure to interpose it will not bar its assertion a later suit.FEDERATION filed its answer to the NAMARCO's complaint admitting some material averments of the complaint. by supplemental pleading before judgment. Victoria A. Rule 13(e) provides that he may obtain the court's permission to include it in a supplemental pleading under Rule 15(d). . although I. . 9 Rule 6). but not yet paid by. Certainly a premature counterclaim cannot be set up in the answer. the counterclaim or cross-claim which a party may aver in his answer must be one which he may have "at the time" against the posing party.

The decision of the RTC is dismissing the case is a final order and the proper remedy against such final order is appeal and not certiorari.Petitioner filed a complaint for nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial settlement. a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand and Prof. Apparently. 2000.MARTINEZ. or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions. As its very name denotes.Civil Procedure Digest matter of the Federation's anterior action. 2. Yes. Manuel Sy. it is quite evident that when Namarco filed its answer to the Federation's action. As a general rule.Petitioner subsequently filed with the same RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint to invoke her right to exercise legal redemption over the property. which is the exercise of the right of legal redemption accorded to co-owners of property. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the cause of action in the Supplemental complaint is entirely different from the original complaint. on the hypothesis that the contract were binding. the the purpose of obtaining a favorably judgment. foreclosure sale. and the issue as to whether it precluded petitioner as alleged co-owner from exercising the right of legal redemption. A supplement exists side by side with the original. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify. at any rate. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties. is germane to and intertwined with the cause of action in the Complaint for the nullification. No. either simultaneously or successively. and tax declaration against respondents on May 20. The CA ruled in favor of the petitioner under the ordinary appeal but a motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and the CA has yet to rule on this reconsideration motion. Victoria A. Both appeals raised essentially the same issues. The relief prayd for in the Supplemental complaint. This means that as of the time Namarco filed its answer contesting the legality or validity of the contract. it was incumbent upon it to then and there seek recovery of whatever it had delivered thereunder. It is but a continuation of the complaint. are new matters that occurred after the filing of the original complaint. . (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case. The complained alleged that the questioned partition which was executed by her mother was unenforceable since at the time of the execution the petitioner was only 15 years old and that no court approval was secured. . The right of legal redemption as co-owner is conferred by law and is merely a natural consequence of co-ownership. a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the primary pleading. in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling. 2006 NATURE Consolidated petitions for review on Certiorari FACTS . mortgage. even if the trial court decides in her favor. It does not replace that which it supplement. the formers' cause of action could not have been considered as already matured when it filed its answer. the petitioner can still the same. enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. the redemption period would have lapsed already and would not form part of the decision since it is not prayed for. the relief being founded on the same facts. In such a case. there would have been no need for it to file this counterclaim. Petitioner filed this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC. 43 Amended pleadings and Supplemental YOUNG VS SPOUSES SY GR No.The whole trouble with Namarco's pose in this a appeal lies. it was immaterial to Namarco's recovery of the purchase price of goods it had already delivered under the contract that there was in said contract any term for the payment thereof. but inasmuch as. a writ of certiorari sill not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. Moreover. the consolidation of the title over the property in the name of the respondent. WON the denial of the Motion to admit supplemental Complaint is valid 2. . the petitioner had asked for postponements opening the door for a claim by the respondents of non-suit. however. ISSUE/S 1. Due to non-payment the property was foreclosed and sold to respondents as highest bidders. Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 with the SC. One of the appeals an ordinary appeal and the other is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed four months after the first. From that point of view. much less alleged in the original complaint. and that. (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for. September 26. A2010 Avena as security (mortgage). that the said complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies. (Article 1412 (2). in the fact that in its answer to the Federation's complaint. Also as petitioner correctly pointed out. its cause of action for the recovery of the price of the delivered goods was already existing and could have been the subject of a counterclaim. Forum shopping consists of filling multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action. Civil Code) or Namarco was in pari delicto (Article 1411. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA. the RTC dismissed the case upon motion of the respondents on the ground of failure to prosecute. In this case. As far as Namarco was concerned. hence the special civil . The petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. id).With regard the original action. The other appeal was dismissed on the ground that judgment of the RTC can only be appealed via an ordinary appeal and not by certiorari. Hence petitioner’s cause of action for legal redemption as embodied in the supplemental complaint stems directly from and is an extension of her rights as co-owner of the property subject of the complaint. WON the dismissal of the petition for certiorari with regard the original action is proper HELD 1. This supplemental motion was denied by the RTC on December 28. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not alternative or cumulative. regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata. 2000. the respondents could oppose the exercise since it would not have been included in the decision over the original complaint. Such being the case. (This is where it becomes more interesting) Petitioner filed two appeals with the CA. The deed of sale has been filed with the Register of Deed and the respondents obtained n their name a tax declaration over the property. those goods had been delivered illegally and should have been immediately returned unless their value had been paid for. Her mother obtained a loan from the spouses respondents and used the property that the issues jpined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. it pleaded the defense of illegality or nullity of the contract. 157745 AUSTRIA.

6). the present action having been filed on June 20. because unlike a third-party complaint. and in multiplicity of suits.000. namely. 1959 > Republic of the Philippines filed suit against the Central Surety & Insurance Company and Mangoba. as amended by Republic Act 3828 which took effect on June 22.July 5. and (2) dismissing the third-party complaint. or the value of the property in controversy. loss. indemnity. Since the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the complaint.000 (atty’s fees) . 1963 > the third-party defendants answer: defense that the case is premature as the main case has not yet been terminated. 1963 > Surety filed its answer: (1) that its bond cannot be made liable beyond the amount of P5. the trial court dismissed the entrenched in our law that jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally terminated 2. does not exceed P10. 1963 dismissing the third-party complaint is set aside. See. the thirdparty defendants. Petition for the admission of the supplemental order is granted. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the main action 2. This must be so because jurisdiction over the main case embraces all incidental matters arising therefrom and connected therewith. manager of the bond department stating that Po Kee Kam who was the subject of deportation proceedings in whom the bond was made in favor of. Disposition Petition for the non-suit is denied. the third party defendants be ordered to reimburse . Sec.December 2. WON the trial court had jurisdiction over the thirdparty complaint HELD 1. . This is a firm judicial policy. exclusive of interest.Civil Procedure Digest action of certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available. executed an indemnity agreement in favor of the Surety to indemnify it for damage.December 3. A third-party complaint may likewise be likened to a cross claim under Rule 9. with leave of court. 1963 > Surety filed a third-party complaint.000. 12." (Rule 6. when Republic Act 3828 took effect. etc. or the value of the property in controversy. in respect of his opponent's claim. It is likewise true that the demand therein made does not exceed P10.July 30. The trial court is directed to admit said complaint. Victoria A. but may claim itself exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the opposing party's claim" (Rule 6.CA: Surety interposed its appeal from the order dismissing its third-party complaint and from the decision ordering it to pay the Republic the amount of P5.October 23. (2) that it is not liable for attorney's fees in the absence of any stipulation to that effect. But the third-party complaint is an ancillary suit which depends on the jurisdiction of the court over the main action. exclusive of interest. a situation obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. October 26. A2010 Avena third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction that the third-party complaint was filed after the passage of RA 3828 conferring original jurisdiction on the Municipal Court in civil cases involving not more than P10. 1963.00 . The principle is at once apparent. pursuant to section 44 of Republic Act 296. (3) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case as the amount involved is only P5. Disposition the order dated December 2. and that the third-party complaint refers to a claim of only P6. against Po Kee Kam and Tony Go alleging that for consideration of the bond. vs. that where an action is ancillary to a main action over which a court has jurisdiction. Republic claims P5. Talisay-Silay Milling Co. expenses etc and that in the event judgment is rendered against it.It is true that the third-party complaint was filed after the effectivity date of RA3828.000 under the bond and P1.000 (amount of bond) and P1. Petitioners urge that a rule similar to the rule on counterclaim be adopted. and therefore the case should have been remanded to the municipal court. contending that the trial court erred in (1) not declaring itself without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action. with interest .. the decision dated December 3.. . section 5. 1963 > upon verbal motion of the third party defendants. did not appear in such proceedings despite notice to the Surety. is not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance if it were an independent action. REPUBLIC V CENTRAL SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY 26 SCRA 741 CASTRO. a counterclaim "need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. to obtain consistent results from identical or similar evidence. it necessarily follows that it likewise had jurisdiction over the third-party complaint which is but an incident thereof. 1968 NATURE FACTS . et al: The third-party complaint is but a continuation of the main action. and. therefore.000.September 7. subrogation or any other relief.It is not disputed that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter on June 20.000 as attorney's fees) and a court of first instance is vested with jurisdiction only over cases in which the demand. and to do away with the serious handicap to a defendant of a time difference between a judgment against him and a judgment in his favor against the third party defendant.00.000) it is cannot be argued that the court's jurisdiction over the case was lost on June 22. 1963 when the complaint was filed with it. This constituted a violation of the conditions of the bond causing the forfeiture of the bond made by the Surety in favor of the government.000. A contrary rule would result in "split jurisdiction" which is not favored. .Even though the total amount involved is only P6. because the rule is firmly Prof. YES .) The aim is to avoid the actions which should be tried together to save the time and cost of a reduplication of evidence. YES . 1963 > TC ordered surety to pay the Republic P5. 1963. 44 Third Party Complaint.000. It is of no moment that summons was served and that the case was heard and decided after the effectivity of Republic Act 3828. et al. its purpose being merely to seek "contribution.000 (P5.000.000. But a third-party complaint cannot be likened to a counterclaim which must be within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case. CIR. But it certified the case to SC pursuant to Sec 2 Article VIII of the Constitution and Sec 17(3) of RA 296 where jurisdiction of TC is in issue ISSUES 1. no independent jurisdiction is needed to enable the court to take cognizance of the ancillary action. and (4) that the Republic has no cause of action. 1963 is modified in the sense that the third-party defendants are hereby .000. exceeds P10. 1963 (two days before the effectivity of Republic Act 3828 which broadened the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts to include cases in which the demand.. .

CFI: Court made out the ff tests: (1) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff’s claim is based. Neither does it abridge. such transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and Asian where the equipment leased from Monark was used by the petitioner.Asian contruction leased from Monark Equipment several pieces of equipment which it failed to pay for. Victoria A. indemnity.) – party defendant. There is no causal connection between the claim of Monark. (b) on the ground of direct liability of the 3rd-party defendant to the plaintiff. which in turn failed to pay Asian for the same. etc. Monark in turn filed a motion for summary judgment. – Where an answer fails to tender an issue. Asian. . 2. the trial court did not err in rendering judgment on the pleadings against it. The 3rd-party complaint is actually independent of. COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM/CROSS-CLAIM CALO appellant. . or other reliefs to off-set or to pay the amount of money” claimed by Monark. thus preventing multiplicity of suits. and the failure of Becthel to pay the balance of its account to Asian after the completion of the project. . sustaining the disallowance of the 3rd party complaint on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not arise out of the same transaction on which Monark’s claim was based. May 17. YES Ratio Section 1. called the 3rd (fourth. in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation. the allegations in the original complaint and the 3rd-party complaint must be examined. This is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial right. NO Ratio Section 11.Asian appealed to CA.” Reasoning Purpose of the rule: permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a 3rd-party which he. claimed that it used the leased equipment to perform services in favor of Becthel.Capayas v. with leave of court. would assert in another action. enlarge. . the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.AJAX INTERNATIONAL. (2) whether the 3rd-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant. WON judgment on the pleadings is proper HELD 1. 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA FACTS . indemnity. . A 3rd-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution.fact that Asian used the equipment it leased from Monark in connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive basis for the filing of a 3rd-party complaint against the latter. defendantappellee . Judgment ordered Asian to pay Monark P5 million plus interest . otherwise. for contribution. Rule 34: “Judgment on the pleadings. Bringing of a 3rd-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to plaintiff. although the 3rd-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction.” Reasoning The denial of the petitioner’s motion with leave to file a third-party complaint against Becthel is without prejudice to its right to file a separate complaint against the latter. . Rule 6 provides: “3rd (fourth. 45 ASIAN CONSTRUCTION V CA (MONARK EQUIPMENT) 00 SCRA 00 CALLEJO. INC. and (3) whether the 3rd-party defendant may assert any defenses which the 3rd-party plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiff’s claim. on motion of that party. sufficient that pleadings show Prof. This right to file a 3rd-party complaint against a 3rd-party rests in the discretion of the trial court. WON a 3rd-party complaint is proper 2. ISSUE/S 1. A2010 Avena action.Considering that the petitioner admitted its liability for the principal claim of the respondent in its Answer with Third-Party Complaint. the claims of Monark against Asian arose out of the contracts of lease and sale. There is no showing in the proposed 3rdparty complaint that Becthel knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by Asian for the said project . subrogation. or whether the 3rd-party claim. etc. such that were it not for the rule. although arising out of another or different contract or transaction. Asian claims that it needs to implead Becthel for “contribution. or (c) the liability of the 3rd-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant.3rd-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery against the 3rdparty defendant.) – party complaint is a claim that a defending party may. although admitting the its indebtedness to Monark. the court may.RTC: Motion of Asian for leave to file a 3 rd part complaint was denied. CA affirmed. file against a person not a party to the possibility of recovery. subrogation or other relief from the 3rd-party defendant.Prerequisite to the exercise of right: some substantive basis for a 3rd-party claim is found to exist. whether the basis be one of indemnity. separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. MFR was also denied. otherwise.There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution. direct judgment on such pleading. contending that there were no genuine issues raised.In this case. subrogation or any other relief. is connected with the plaintiff’s claim.Civil Procedure Digest ordered to pay to the Surety whatever sums the latter will pay to the Republic by virtue of the judgment appealed from. it would have to be filed separately from the original complaint. indemnity. or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the 3rd-party defendant. Disposition Petition is denied. despite demands. defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant. subrogation. – A 3rd (fourth. contribution or other substantive right. but motion of Monark for summary judgment granted (RTC considered this as motion for judgment on the pleadings). etc. In determining the sufficiency of the 3rd-party complaint.The defendant may implead another as 3rd-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution. or.)party complaint. However. admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. vs. Monark then filed in the RTC an action to recover a sum of money amounting to P5 million plus 12% interest. although the 3rd-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction. subrogation or any other relief. indemnity. . in respect of his opponent’s claim. . Asian filed a motion to file and admit answer with 3rd party complaint against Becthel Overseas Corp.

Otherwise. said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one. when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City. When this failed. 860. -Goyala’s. as this Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. a judgment by default was entered. 37071.. -Appellant appealed to the CA. -On January 23. for the document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale. Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership.200 ft. Plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. the same was found short of 300 ft. presupposes that the amount involved is within the said court's jurisdiction. Consequently. IV-93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal court. 37071 was among those included in the assigned account. The pendency then of said civil case could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. Gojo was also declared in default in re Goyala’s counterclaim. against plaintiff Calo. when applied to the municipal court. which is to settle all related controversies in one sitting only. the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery. Charge Order No. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default.85 per foot. There is no question that it arises out of A2010 Avena the same transaction which is the basis of the complaint in Civil Case No. even if the counterclaim in excess of the amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up. -Instead of filing an answer. the reason underlying the rule.00. and a writ of execution issued. the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to the loan. Disposition Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12.420. -Goyala’s spouse died. 1968 NATURE Petition for certiorari. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these GOJO V GOYALA Page 26 NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon . being beyond its jurisdiction. a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case No. defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the ground. TC dismissed complaint. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. 46 FACTS -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a mortgage). ISSUE WON plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the earlier case HELD No. which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law. it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855. principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint. ON COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations.000. 1961. plaintiff Calo. 1. 1962.000 as attorney's fees. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire jurisdiction. 3 of Rule 17. March 13. Victoria A. certified the same to the SC. but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is entered. 860. Prof. For. IV-93062 was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International. she instituted the present appeal. assisted by her husband. -While it is true that under Sec. for Gojo to be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas. Inc. for P3. Galmes we would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of. the defendant cannot obtain positive relief. The transaction was evidenced by Charge Order No. damages and expenses of litigation. Besides. VI93062.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. Inc. of wire rope. TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party. Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition. prohibition and mandamus on decision of CFI of Agusan dismissing the complaint of Calo FACTS -Sometime on May 7. plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax International. the previous litigation did not really settle all related controversies. a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court. for P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that. (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3. -The dismissal of Civil Case No. -On November 20. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed the case. Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. TC ruled in favor of Goyala. it need not be filed there. does not obtain. Reasoning The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred. According to plaintiff Calo. Marcos Calo. This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for either completion of delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. 1959.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12. if ever the document be deemed a pacto de retro sale. and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused.2 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. as in this case. IV93062 in the municipal court of Manila is predicated on the supposition that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the latter case. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. of John Shaw wire rope at P2. Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining balance of his counterclaim.Civil Procedure Digest 22 SCRA 996 BENGZON. Subsequently. the lower court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint. Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due. inter alia. Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order. 860 by the court a quo because of the pendency of Civil Case No.

or. 1. would similarly be void. No.Civil Procedure Digest Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. Victoria A. 417). The motion praying for leave to implead additional parties(Chavez et al) to his counterclaim was granted in a resolution dated June 8. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. before the proper substitution of parties as directed by Sec. 1989.No. The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of another ? such as trustees ? in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Appellant. 1989 resolution. the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. at page 586) Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith. and Juan Ponce Enrile. -The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. for reconveyance. however. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies. for such non-compliance. 47 Barred if not set up CHAVEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN G. -To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients. 2. Supp. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. 14. 155. the Republic of the Philippines. Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. 17. however. among others. 20. January 24. 1987. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Rules Service. -The charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. Borja. we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the action. Cameron. and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike.8 . p.. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences. not against the party plaintiff itself. respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages. Moreover. reversion and accounting. Jr. 21. (103 SCRA 388 [1981]). even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 29 F. new law). 91391 GUTIERREZ. "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo. 1989. he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case. to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Instead of filing an answer. 924-925) . the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No.WON it is proper to implead Chavez (as SolGen) petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile HELD 1. is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint. On January 30. In a later resolution dated November 2. without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common. As counsel of the Republic. Bautista. No. as contended by the private respondent. in their personal capacities or otherwise.WON Chavez (SolGEn)is immune from suit 2. ISSUES 1.July 31. respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution which deferred The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government until after trialRespondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. He cites the case of Borja v. through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 16. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. 1991 FACTS . 1989. We were referring. exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1.since he is simply the lawyer in the case. Rule 3 (Sec. -After the denial of his motion to dismiss. the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer. restitution and damages. other than his professional fees. 2 Fed. without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules. Thereafter. the decision appealed from is set aside A2010 Avena reconsider the June 8. amounts to lack of jurisdiction. JR. In the present case. 8 Prof. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties. Petitioner’s claim -no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. In the case of Tiu Po v. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. Executive Order No. the SC held that an order to amend the complaint. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases.R. The actions governed by Articles 19. all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. Disposition WHEREFORE. p. In Barrameda vs Barbara. (id.

Branch I on August 23. the registered owner of the disputed parcel of residential land containing an area of 585 square meters and situated at San Agustin. were substituted as parties-plaintiffs." This was followed by another order dated October 6. Despite his repeated written demands for her to surrender possession of the property. Don Juan Cojuangco died intestate. 1985.00 in the process. Branch XV. together with nephews and nieces. Branch XV. Malolos. Bulacan. herein petitioner Cojuangco's right of possession over the land was upheld. according to the municipal trial court) the parents of private respondent Purificacion Villegas. . thus transforming the suit into an "accion publiciana" which is properly cognizable by courts of first instance (now regional trial courts). should not. 1986. On September 16. ISSUES 1. instead of being referred to Branch XV which had earlier issued the writ of demolition. 1986. As early as 1922 in the case of Cabigao v. his wife Lualhati. Villegas refused. .Civil Procedure Digest stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. After her parent's death. On February 5. was raffled to another Malolos branch of Prof. COJUANGCO vs. constructed a residential house and later a structure housing a bakery on the aforesaid lot. Del Rosario. cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases. HELD 1. a temporary restraining order enjoining Cojuangco and particularly the sheriff "from enforcing or implementing the Order of Demolition issued in Civil Case No. Whether or not Villegas can successfully raise an independent action to assert that she and her predecessors are builders in good faith and that they are entitled to recover the value of improvements on the lot. Ratio. The twin orders are now the subject of the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that they have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Reasoning. prompting Cojuangco to institute ejectment proceedings against her before the Municipal Trial the Bulacan Trial Court. On appeal to the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Malolos. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting.000. 1979. Villegas' claim to recover compensation for improvements made on the land is essentially in . NO. NATURE The instant petition for certiorari and prohibition raises the ultimate issue of whether or not the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment case may be stayed by a co-equal court in order that the right of indemnification and retention of an alleged builder in good faith may not be rendered meaningless or illusory in an independent civil action for specific performance. 1986) to effect the transfer of her personal properties and to remove the improvements on the subject lot to which motion the court acceded. Don Juan Cojuangco. 1986. much less with their orders or judgments. the inferior court was reversed insofar as it had erroneously denied jurisdiction over the ejectment case. The various branches of the court of first instance of a province or city. 1983. In its decision dated June 30. 2. a writ of demolition was issued against Villegas. In the trial court's order of October 22. On July 29. She also leased out a portion of the land to Siapno Appliances at P600. before the lapse of the grace period. It was understood that they could remain on the land with his blessings and without paying rentals on condition that they would vacate the premises when needed by the owner. 1986 granting a writ of preliminary injunction. with the acquiescence of Don Juan Cojuangco. PURIFICACION VILLEGAS 184 SCRA 374 FERNAN. this Court laid down the doctrine that "no court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction.00 a month without the knowledge and consent of Don Juan Cojuangco. herein petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. FACTS Petitioner Lualhati Aldaba Cojuangco is the widow of Don Juan Cojuangco. herein petitioner. the inferior court dismissed the action for ejectment for lack of jurisdiction. 1979. After entry of judgment was made on November 20. Bulacan. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. This latter act apparently destroyed her congenial relations with the landowner because soon thereafter. The trial court then ordered Villegas to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to herein petitioner Cojuangco. 7042-M . 1978. Victoria A." Reasoning. renovating the same and spending P300. 9094-M against petitioner Cojuangco and the provincial sheriff "for specific performance with urgent prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. who did not oppose the ordered demolition but instead asked the lower court to give her more time (forty days from August 7. Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on compulsory counterclaim provides the answer. which the court granted on June 30. A2010 Avena Court (MTC) of Malolos. 1986. The case was elevated to the appellate court and to the Supreme Court and in both instances. having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction. where she filed a motion for execution of the judgment." This case. specifically Branch XVII which issued on the same day. Villegas remained in the property. through his attorney in fact. Villegas filed a separate civil action docketed as Civil Case No. Villegas asserted an adverse claim of ownership. Many years back (about sixty years. the transaction or occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's or co-party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. It cited the unassailable fact that Villegas and her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the subject land for no less than sixty years and that in addition. demanded that she leave the property. Whether or not the respondent court validly issued an injunction 2. It states: "A counterclaim or cross-claim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with. NO Ratio. 48 LUALHATI A. September 16. Rule 9.

Wolf and Sons v. 74262 PARAS. with an assessed value of P150. but the latter. After her death. Consequently. In her pleadings.e. the equities are more in favor of Cojuangco. We cannot agree. The respondent court is hereby ordered to DISMISS Civil Case No. 7042-M. simultaneously with the assertion that she was entitled to the parcel of land by right of inheritance. the alternative claim that assuming she was not legally entitled to the disputed lot.000. the theory being that what is barred by prior judgment are not only the matters actually raised and litigated upon. Said claim for compensation should have been presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. the reason why the counterclaim for indemnification was not made in the original action was because it became a "ripe issue" only after the ejectment proceedings. Go-Juno. she made various improvements and renovation thereon. and the parties agreed that Beatriz would remain in possession of the property but with the obligation of paying the land taxes due thereon.00. 1948 the deed of the sale was registered and. the Court held that a party may set forth as many defenses and counterclaims as he may have. The case was dismissed by the lower court after a trial on the merits and on appeal. de Unson and Beronica Capareda to recover the possession of Lot 74-B and the house erected thereon as well as reasonable rental for its use and occupancy from August 1. which was identified as Lot No. at least as a builder in good faith. the Carpenas notified Luciano of the sale and besides demanded of him the possession of lot 74-B. 16833 was cancelled and TCT No. The present action was commenced on April 11. -For its part. 9094-M and all proceedings held therein are declared null and void. -The rule on compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one time and in one action. the petition is granted.00. that she herself has lived there all her life and that in the honest belief that the land had been "donated" to her parents by her "Aunt Tecla". This decision is immediately executory. 1947 Beatriz sold her one-half interest therein to the spouses Demetrio Carpena and Salud Catindig for the sum of P5. Pelagia Cailles Vda. Dispositive WHEREFORE. -Since Villegas failed to set up such alternative defense (i. 1948. de Unson and Beronica Capareda who began occupying the same on April 2. Luciano Manalo and their children continued to occupy said house. Civil Case No. The sense of urgency is more pronounced in the case at bar where the ejectment case in favor of Cojuangco was decided in 1978 and subsequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. Villegas contended that the estoppel of judgment could only extend to those facts and conditions existing at the time the judgment was rendered and not to those which supervened before the second suit. 49 CARPENA VS MANALO GR No. The adjudication of the issue joined by the parties in the earlier case constitutes res judicata. the rejection thereof was a complete resolution of the controversy between the parties which bars a later case based upon the unpleaded defense. that the sale in their favor was valid and that by virtue of the same they became owners of the property subject matter thereof. The loss to Villegas is not sufficient to warrant a blatant disregard of established precedents especially when it is borne in mind that for more than half a century. filed an action against them to annul the sale made in their favor by Beatriz and to have himself declared owner of the property subject matter thereof (Civil Case No. in the case of Castle Bros. 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna by the Carpena spouses against Luciano Manalo. On November 5. 2004 was issued in the name of the Carpena spouses for the portion purchased by them. It appears that in 1945 a barong-barong was erected on Lot 74-B by a tenant occupying the same. 74-B of subdivision plan Psd-23230. Villegas repeatedly stressed that the residential house which her parents had constructed was already there on the questioned lot for as long as she could remember. as defense. Laguna. It is deemed barred if not raised on time and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. But the final victory continues to elude Cojuangco to this day due to a large extent to the legal maneuvers utilized by Villegas to forestall the inevitable. Obviously. whatever be their nature. was declared in her name for taxation purposes. Luciano Manalo. they prayed for the dismissal of the case and for damages. the landowner. the sale was made in the neighboring town of Sta. instead of acquiescing thereto. but also such other matters as could have been raised but were not. -The argument is untenable. Appellees . -And while it may be argued that the defense of being a builder in good faith would have been inconsistent with her claim of ownership. respondent trial court has attempted to justify its writ of injunction by stating that the impending demolition of Villegas' house and other buildings on the disputed property would render inutile her right as a builder in good faith. a builder in good faith is entitled to recover the value of improvements) and instead relied on the sole defense that she inherited the land A2010 Avena from her parents. 9194). Victoria A. -According to Villegas.00. but she died three months thereafter. 1948 Beatriz and Luciano were married. making considerable improvements thereon in the years 1952 and 1953. October 29. TCT No.. These may even be inconsistent with each other because what is sufficient is that each is consistent with itself. Prof. Villegas and her family have enjoyed the fruits of the land without paying a single centavo in return. Surely. Rosa. such declarations on the part of Villegas completely negate her absurd claim that the factual basis for her subsequent action arose after the ejectment suit became final. Costs against private respondent Villegas. as a result. Villegas should have set forth.Civil Procedure Digest the nature of a counterclaim since it is interwoven with the fact of possession. On May 22. and thereafter said improvement. Bulacan. -Thus. 1987 NATURE Action to recover possession FACTS Lot 74 of the Calamba Cadastre was co-owned Beatriz Manalo and her common-law husband. On August 30. Branch XV is ordered to immediately execute the decision in the ejectment case. she has the right to the value of the buildings and improvements which she and her parents had introduced on the land. The philosophy of the rule is to DISCOURAGE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. Defendant's answer in said case alleged. Two years thereafter the building was sold to Beatriz Manalo for P200. but in December 1954 Luciano Manalo sold it to Pelagia Cailles Vda. 1955. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos. the rule is explicit that the judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff to prevent further damages to him arising from the loss of possession. 13 -It bears emphasizing that in ejectment cases. Upon the death of their vendor. To keep the transaction from Luciano. the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

1955.000. In Berses vs. Their answer also interposed a counterclaim which they incorporated all the allegations made in their answer and further alleged that the plaintiffs had filed the action against them maliciously. The rents which appellants now seek to collect from appellees were for the occupancy of said property and of the house constructed thereon. Had the sale been annulled. The present is their appeal from this portion of the decision of the lower court ISSUE WON the action filed by Luciano Manalo is a compulsory counterclaim HELD Yes. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows: . for all legal purposes. In this connection they contend that their counterclaim against Luciano Manalo and his co-plaintiffs would have been for unlawful detainer and the collection of one month rent only. 9194. by way of counterclaim. It is thus obvious that the claim which they seek to enforce now as. in Support of Motion to Expunge from the Records And/Or to Dismiss Answer with Counterclaim. denied their motion.R. it would have meant that the Carpenas. appellants herein. Prof.550. because when the action was commenced Manalo had been in possession of the lot and house involved therein only for one month. April 18. such that said motion is hereby denied. the defendant must set up a counterclaim for the value of improvements made or introduced by him on the A2010 Avena property. considering that this is a criminal case wherein the civil liability of the acused (sic) is impliedly instituted therein. whereas the claim for rents in the present case is directed. appellees.00 representing the fair market value thereof. 1991. as well as the Opposition thereto. of course. As appellees had already vacated Lot 74-B. 1991. 9194. This is likewise untenable because a party may not evade the effect of the doctrine of res judicata by simply including additional parties. necessarily included the question of possession. with the filing of an Information against petitioners charging them with estafa for allegedly defrauding private respondent Epifanio Ceralde of the sum of P1. 473. of the accused through counsel. in the subsequent litigation or by not including as parties in the latter persons who were parties in the previous suit Disposition. and Comment on Supplement. It is obvious therefore that." FACTS . this Court finds no merit therein. pp.000. the same being compulsory counterclaim. however. As stated above. in the Order of August 21.00. 1991. without the consent of appellants. 9194 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna) was to annul the sale made by his wife. or more specifically on April 17. upon the registration of which a transfer certificate of title was issued in their name. Beatriz Manalo. 25 Phil. the Supplement.00. This notwithstanding. they failed to claim rents or compensation for the use and occupancy of the lot and house subject matter of the complaint filed against them. The Order of July 1. in favor of the Carpena spouses and to recover ownership of the property subject matter thereof. Appellants' claim for damages for the use and occupancy of the premises was. The record on appeal filed by Manalo in the aforesaid ease shows that the defendants (appellants herein) filed an answer in which they alleged that they were "the true and lawful owners of the parcel of land" subject matter of the action by virtue of the deed of sale executed in their favor by Beatriz Manalo. are all ordered expunged from the Records. the Memorandum filed by the Private Prosecutor. while if the court sustained the validity of the sale. moved the house in question to the adjoining lot. plus attorney's fees. Said case commenced on October 18. 9194. jointly and severally. instead of being ? as in the Berses case ? for the recovery of the value of improvements made on the property Appellants. Villanueva. That this ruling applies to the present case can not be disputed because the only difference between both cases is that in the one before us the counterclaim is for rents for the occupancy of the land sought to be recovered and of the house constructed thereon. Pelagia Cailles Vda. 1997 NATURE Petition filed under Rule 65 assailing the Orders of respondent Judge for being contrary to law and for having been issued in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 50 Lastly.Civil Procedure Digest herein alleged in their answer that the sale executed by Beatriz Manalo in favor of appellants covered only Lot 74-B and not the house erected thereon. it seems clear that the fact that the amount thereof was less than the jurisdictional amount for the Court of First Instance of Laguna did not deprive said court of authority to take cognizance of the same. dated February 12. 1990. Said answer prayed not only for the dismissal of the complaint but also for judgment declaring said defendants as true and lawful owners of the property in question" (Exhibit C.00 representing the value of the house. It follows that the same constituted a compulsory counterclaim which they should have pleaded in their answer filed in the aforesaid case.This petition emanated from a criminal case in the RTC of Manila. had no right to collect rents from the occupants of the lot and of the house aforesaid. Victoria A.500." Petitioners pleaded for reconsideration of said Order but respondent judge. thus: "ACTING on the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 17. they would have had such right. 1991. the lower court. This is not entirely correct. however. 102942 PANGANIBAN. to say the least. No. it was held that in an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. a matter necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence subject matter of the complaint filed against them in Civil Case No. still they could not have pleaded it as such in said case because it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the case was pending. otherwise his claim would be barred. filed an accion reivindicatoria which.000. which compelled the latter to file a supplemental complaint to recover from the former the sum of P2. after trial on the merits. dismissed for not having been set up in Civil Case No. de Unson and Beronica Capareda. reads: "THE Answer with Counterclaim filed by the accused through counsel. argue that even assuming that their claim constituted a mandatory counterclaim in relation to Civil Case No. 18-23). While the case was pending in the lower court. rendered judgment declaring appellant the owners of the house in question and sentencing appellees to pay appellants the sum of P1. appellants contend that there was absolutely no mutuality of claims because the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. thus causing them damages in the sum of P2. against Luciano Manalo. Decision affirmed CABAERO VS CANTOS G. The right to collect these rents or reasonable compensation being merely incidental to the counterclaim. 9194 were Luciano Manalo and the heirs of his deceased wife. the purpose of the action filed by Luciano Manalo (Civil Case No. appellants had.

for "procedural soundness. They contend that it is not only a right but an "outright duty" of the accused to file an answer with counterclaim since failure to do so shall result in the counterclaim being forever barred.500.500. and with intent to defraud." Thereafter. Co. and that the filing of said Information was unjustified and malicious.The Memorandum of the private prosecutor justified his Motion to Expunge the answer with counterclaim for two reasons: (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction over the answer with counterclaim for non-payment of the prescribed docket fees and (2) the "compulsory counterclaim against complainant is barred for failure to file it before arraignment.000. .respondent Judge Cantos granted the prosecution's motion to expunge and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. a joint business venture organized by accused AMADO F.000. Dismissing.550. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering that the answer with counterclaim of the petitioners in the criminal case.Petitioners invoke Section 1. representing the purchase price of 6 parcels of land located in Pangasinan which the Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation. to do so despite repeated demands made to that effect.. 51 receiving all the entries in a single case.500. respectively. The Payment of Filing Fees . Accused pray for such other reliefs. "if the records elevated x x x are incomplete and inaccurate.In their Opposition.00 as exemplary damages.. Ordering the complaining witness Ceralde to pay to the accused the following amounts: (a) P1.SC said: Considerations of due process prevent us from taking up the merits of this argument in favor of private respondent. Additionally. of a counterclaim at any time before judgment.Petitioners further allege that the Order failed to resolve the legal issues raised by the parties as it neglected to state the legal basis therefor ISSUE WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion.00 for and in its own behalf. but both accused. .00. they were not required to pay docket fees therefor.Civil Procedure Digest ". The respondent judge gave the contending parties time to submit a Memorandum and Comment or Opposition. the case was re-raffled to Branch VII presided over by respondent Judge Alfredo Cantos.000. (WON the accusedpetitioners who were charged with estafa may file an answer with counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses against the private complainant in the same criminal action.00 applied for by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation with Solid Bank." . petitioners filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the money loaned from Solidbank mentioned in the Information was duly applied to the purchase of the 6 parcels of land in Pangasinan. petitioners contended that their filing was within the proper period. purchased from the said company. 2.” . PEREZ had been authorized by the said Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation to receive the check for P1.) Preliminary Matters Litis Pendentia as a Defense . 1991.Atty. Hon.00 as attorney's fees. CABAERO is the Senior Vice-President. on appeal. once the said loan had been approved by the bank. in furtherance of their conspiracy and falsely pretending that accused CARMEN C. the Rules do not specifically provide for the period for filing of counterclaims in criminal cases. or quashing the information. and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. and (d) P20.. Israel. succeeded in inducing the cashier of said Solid Bank to release the same to accused CARMEN C. . each page of which shall be numbered and prepared for Prof. particularly Section 8 thereof.During the initial hearing on April 15. the prosecution verbally moved that the answer with counterclaim be expunged from the records and/or be dismissed.. with the understanding that the said amount would be returned to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE as soon as the loan for P1..000. Thus. (c) P100. inasmuch as petitioners' counterclaim was compulsory in nature." . and instead of turning over the said amount to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE. misapplied and converted the said amount to their own personal use and benefit. and the civil action impliedly instituted in the criminal action. together with all pleadings filed in relation thereto. of which said accused AMADO F. IAC laid down.certainly not in the Memorandum dated April 19. Victoria A. inhibited herself "out of delicadeza" from further hearing the case "considering that the complainant is a relative by affinity of a nephew of her husband. clerks of court are instructed to "keep a general docket." the rule that a counterclaim should be permitted in a criminal action where the civil aspect is not reserved. it is respectfully prayed that after trial judgment be rendered: A2010 Avena 1.C. Petitioners included the following prayer: "WHEREFORE. This cross-claim was never raised in the trial court -. submitted to the court a quo in support of respondent Ceralde's motion to expunge the answer with counterclaim." Consequently and ineluctably. CABAERO and the said EPIFANIO CERALDE. of which petitioners are stockholders and officers. whereas Section 3 of Rule 9 and Section 9 of Rule 6 allow the filing. The Rules require that "(a) motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available. the ground of litis pendentia which was not argued in the court a quo is deemed waived.On April 2. Ambrosio Blanco entered his appearance as private prosecutor." Thus. 1991. as litigation expenses. PEREZ. the said accused induced and succeeded in inducing the said EPIFANIO CERALDE to advance the total amount of P1. petitioners argued that this Court in Javier vs.Petitioners argue that under Rule 136 of the Rules of Court.Private respondent belatedly interposes litis pendentia to defeat the petition alleges that the present petition is barred by the cross-claim of the petitioners against Aqualand Ventures and Management Corporation.The Presiding Judge of the RTC of Manila.000. is released. (b) P500. Further. misappropriated. 1991.000. thereby enabling her to encash the aforesaid check. and shall enter therein all cases x x x.000. . . accused failed and refused.00 to be paid to M. Elisa R. Castro Construction. 90-53035 (filed against both petitioners and the private respondent by Solidbank). and still fail and refuse. legal and equitable in the premises.00 as moral damages. with leave of court. .petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. in Civil Case No. . be expunged from the records." . . Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. respondent Judge Cantos allegedly erred in expunging all records with respect to the Answer with Counterclaim for. there arises a grave danger that the ends of justice and due process shall not be served and instead frustrated.

in any case. Hence. Asuncion). Thus. An information. as already discussed. counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances are present: (1) that it arises out of. after the responsive pleadings have been filed. as was held in Javier.Civil Procedure Digest . if not waived or reserved. As categorically recognized in the case of Javier. Ceralde intended to prosecute his civil claim together with the criminal action. a claim for malicious prosecution or "grossly unfounded suit" as a compulsory counterclaim has no appropriate venue other than the same criminal case which is alleged to be a malicious suit. apply only to civil actions. 2) A judgment in a criminal action is not required to provide for the award of a counterclaim. For this reason. the answer is in the affirmative. As a consequence of these matters. petitioners filed their counterclaim in the same case. These were engendered by the obvious lacuna in the Rules of Court. vs. Basically. in hiring a private prosecutor. the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. This fact is precisely what the trial court still has to determine. The end result. Prof. 3) Allowing and hearing counterclaims (and possibly cross-claims and third-party complaints) in a criminal action will surely delay the said action. .The logic and cogency of Javier notwithstanding. Since under Section 1 Rule 111. will be delay and complication in the criminal action and even confusion among the parties.In justifying his Order. which contains no express provision for the adjudication of a counterclaim in a civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal case. The primary issue in a criminal prosecution that is under the control of state prosecutors is the guilt of the accused and his civil liability arising from the same act or omission.32. Ltd. apparently. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court. On the other hand. we do not imply any fault in Javier. affirmative defenses like res judicata. that is the reason why petitioners herein filed their answer with counterclaim for. some reservations and concerns were voiced out by members of the Court during the deliberations on the present case. and allowing the accused and other parties to submit evidence of their respective claims will complicate the disposition of the criminal case. Extending the civil action arising from the same act or omission to counterclaims. and (3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. as the Rules do not require them (as clarified in Sun Insurance Office. Some Reservations in the Application of Javier . as a protective measure. the rules on criminal procedure which authorize the implied institution of a civil action in a criminal case are. the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. or is necessarily connected with. 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission A2010 Avena of the accused. by their very nature. An accused learns of the implied institution of a civil action from the contents of an information. and the failure of a defendant to file an answer seasonably may result in his default in the civil aspect but not in the criminal. (NO) As held in Javier. the entry of plea during arraignment will no longer signal joinder of issues in a criminal action. it does not contain the ultimate facts relating to the civil liability of the accused. because the private complainant may still reserve his civil action at any time before the prosecution commences to present evidence. it will unnecessarily complicate and confuse the criminal proceedings. he may file a motion for bill of particulars or take advantage of discovery procedures. Judge Cantos ruled that "this is a criminal case wherein the civil liability of the accused is impliedly instituted therein.The Court agrees with petitioners that inasmuch as the counterclaim is compulsory. 33. Compulsory counterclaim is one which at the time of suit arises out of. or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. an answer in an ordinary civil action should be filed before the start of hearing. however. and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Hence. (2) that it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.e. if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without . an accused is not sufficiently apprised of the specific basis of the claims against him. The following problems were noted: 1) While the rules on civil procedure expressly recognize a defendant's entitlement to plead his counterclaim and offer evidence in support thereof. the counter-claim of the accused cannot be tried together with the criminal case because.. and damages under Art. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. includes recovery of indemnity under the RPC. there is no necessity to pay such fees. The counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. 7) The Rules of Court does not specify the reckoning date for the filing of an answer in an impliedly instituted civil action. in contrast. Main Issue HELD NO. is filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines. 52 5) In an impliedly instituted civil action. The counter-claim (and crossclaim or third party complaint. should not the accused have the right to file a counterclaim in the criminal case? Obviously. i. 10) Some members of the Court believe that a cause of action for malicious prosecution may be premature because there is as yet no finding of such wrongful prosecution. and will be barred in the future if not set up. prescription and statute of frauds which are deemed waived by failure to interpose them as affirmative defenses in an answer. 9) Confusion in the application of the rules on civil procedure will certainly encourage litigants to challenge before appellate courts interlocutory incidents of the impliedly instituted civil action. because hearing commences only after the issues have been joined. The real problem lies in the absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof. 4) Adjudication of compulsory counterclaims and/or related claims or pleadings logically includes the application of other rules which. cross-claims and third-party complaints. 6) Because an accused is not sufficiently apprised of the specific basis of the civil action against him. silent on this point and do not provide specific guidelines on how such counterclaim shall be pursued. the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime." This justification begs the question. Victoria A. it must be set up therein. 8) An accused can file his answer with counterclaim only after the initial hearing. The following matters may be invoked in connection with the filing of an answer with a counterclaim: the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath. --By the foregoing discussion.

premises considered.1. .The case of Ching Pue vs. MARCH 3.The CA therefore should have confined itself to the principal error raised in Cu's petition in (the duration of the extended term of the lease fixed in the decision of the MTC and affirmed by the RTC).442. A counterclaim may be compulsory or permissive. until there are definitive rules of procedure to govern the institution. the terms of which were: >>Cu will occupy Room 401 and rooftop of Room 442 of a bldg in Urbiztondo owned by Chan. .Cu’s lawyer tendered the payment in cash with notice to Chan that in case of non-acceptance. viz. The MTC’s decision: >>declared that the rooftop is included in the lease >>fixed the term of the lease until June 30. which has. necessarily. while Chan maintained that only Rm. the questioned Orders are hereby MODIFIED. At balance. It need not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. . acquire jurisdiction of such parties. with the same allegation that that the RTC erred in not fixing a longer period of extension of the lease.7.. trial courts should limit their jurisdiction to the civil liability of the accused arising from the criminal case. provided all the parties can be brought before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of any party. refused to collect the rental for Dec. with all judicious dispatch. and the counterclaim to the counterclaim. 1994 NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS .401 was leased and that the use of the rooftop was merely tolerated. Consequently. the lease contract between them. for lack of merit. 1983. Victoria A. The CA held that Chan had justifiable cause (Cu’s overstay) to refuse to accept the payment. the CA erred when it held that Chan's cause of action for ejectment could not be set up in a counterclaim. petitioner Felisa Chan and private respondent Grace Cu. 1992. Disposition WHEREFORE. already lapsed.A counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party. and considering further that Cu did not come to us on a petition for review to seek reversal of the decision therein and should thus be considered to have agreed to the dismissal of her consignation case.R. The ratio of the said case is that consignation is not proper where the refusal of the creditor to accept tender of payment is with just cause. .Both parties appealed to the RTC. 484. Cu insisted that she be allowed to use the rooftop of Rm. 1990: Cu filed a civil case for consignation with the MTC. . no counterclaim for ejectment could have been interposed therein. 1989. the term of the lease was extended to June 30. Considering that Chan did not file any petition for the review of the RTC decision and was. >>The premises shall be used as a learning center. In the ensuing exchange of communication. Cu maintained that the MTC should have fixed a longer period while Chan contended that the MTC erred in extending the term of the lease and in upholding the validity of the consignation. the same will be deposited in court by way of consignation. nevertheless. at one time and in one action. >>Term of lease is 1 year at a monthly rental of P2.1989 (turned jurisdiction. . At this point. Reasoning Sec. entered into a contract of lease.Nov. the parties must be deemed bound by the extended term. As fixed. 53 CHAN V CA (CU) G.1990 to vacate the premises. the complaint for consignation. 1990 .400. Gonzales is inapplicable because in Ching Pue the consignation cases were filed with the CFI which did not have jurisdiction over ejectment cases. the monthly eventually came to P3. prosecution and resolution of the civil aspect (and the consequences and implications thereof) impliedly instituted in a criminal case. not a counterclaim. In the instant case.80 in Jan. Chan’s MFR was denied by the CA and so she filed this instant petition. The Respondent RTC of Manila is DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of the criminal action and the civil action arising from the criminal offense that is impliedly instituted therein. but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought by the opposing party's claim. Cu then went to the CA on petition for review. ISSUE WON Chan’s action for ejectment set up in a counterclaim was proper HELD YES. RTC later affirmed the MTC.Civil Procedure Digest prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time. deemed to have agreed to the extension. The CA reversed and set aside the decisions of the MTC and RTC and dismissed. Chan answered with a counterclaim for ejectment. 1986. no written contract of lease was executed although Cu continued to occupy the premises. 1989: Chan locked the way to the rooftop. so that .Chan's counterclaim for ejectment is a compulsory counterclaim because it is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of Cu's complaint.The contract was renewed for the succeeding 2 years or up to Feb.15. 1992 >>held valid and legal the consignation by Cu . Chan eventually terminated the lease.On Feb. Counterclaims are designed to enable the disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties conflicling claims. if the presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication. Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the answer may contain any counterclaim which a party may have against the opposing party provided that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can. A counterclaim "is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action. Increasing every year. That period had expired six months before the CA promulgated its challenged decision.1. A2010 Avena down a check tendered by Cu) and gave Cu only until Jan. the ejectment was set up as a counterclaim in the MTC which has jurisdiction over it and Cu joined that issue and the incidents thereto by her answer to the counterclaim. The counterclaim of the accused is hereby set aside without prejudice. Chan gave Cu up to March. therefore. 109020 DAVIDE. It ruled that the MTC and RTC erred in passing upon the issue of ejectment raised in Chan’s counterclaim since an action for ejectment can only be initiated through a verified complaint. after which date. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 9. a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire Prof. **On Counterclaims . adding that the use of the rooftop posed danger to the students.Jan.

on the 22d day of May. the defendant is a plaintiff with respect to his counterclaim. A counterclaim stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules. the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in said case against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. situated at No." pledged to the defendant corporation as security for the payment of an indebtedness of P25. Goyala’s filed a counterclaim for Gojo to receive the amount due. . Manila. 1913. the entire amount of which was then past due and unpaid. he demanded the delivery thereof from the latter.on 8th day of May.).." .the defendant bank did not know and had been unable to ascertain whether "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. asked for and obtained from the Court of First Instance an attachment against the said bales of tobacco.572. 1913. .the sheriff notified it that the bales of tobacco were attached subject to the results of the complaint filed by Tec Bi & Co. . The bales of tobacco thus pledged were stored in the bodega of a third person. -Goyala’s spouse died. but was unable to do so due to the statement of the agent of said corporation. -Goyala’s. for Gojo to be ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of the Goyalas. 1916 FACTS: . which demand was refused by the bank.). an actor.” . 1913." misrepresented the quantity of the tobacco in the said warehouse at the time of the execution of said document of pledge. ." in favor of Tec Bi & Co.). . that the tobacco had been sold and that the proceeds of the sale had been applied upon the payment of the amount due to from "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd." in collusion with Messrs..).572. Sprungli & Co.). the keys to the said bodega. when same was sold under and by virtue of the document of pledge by the defendant bank for the sum of P12.). 1913. (I have no idea how many.96. allegations deemed admitted TEC BI & CO v CHARTERED BANK OF INDIA. -Appellant appealed to the CA. with legal interest from April 22. In short. and costs. the balance of the unpaid purchase price of the tobacco .on 16th January. the sheriff attempted to execute the judgment upon the bales of tobacco attached and in the possession of the defendant corporation..from said 1st day of February. Feb 5. the defendant corporation demanded and obtained from Messrs." in favor of the defendant corporation was not binding upon the plaintiff for the reason that it was not set forth in a public instrument as required by article 1865 of the Civil Code in order to be effective against. wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant ." claiming the payment of the sum of P11. Messrs. and that they tried to pay their debt to Gojo but Gojo refused. 1913. 214) of Calle David. the "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. AUSTRALIA AND CHINA 41 Phil 596 CARSON. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. 1913. as security for the payment of a loan and that it intended to sell the same. . 1913. . A2010 Avena Rule 8.on the 19th day of May. and there are two simultaneous actions pending between the same parties. Gojo the buyer alleged that the period for redemption has already lapsed so he filed a petition for consolidation of ownership. until the 15th of May.on the 5th day of May." with interest and costs. leaving a large balance thereof still due and unpaid.. the defendant becomes.Civil Procedure Digest when properly stated as such. for the sum of P11. .on the 22nd day of April.000 the bales of tobacco. alleging that it held possession of the tobacco under a pledge.. the plaintiff sold to the "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd." a quantity of leaf tobacco. Sprungli & Co. and discovered that of the 436 bales of tobacco there remained only those set forth in paragraph 4 of the answer. that the sheriff communicated the answer of the bank to the attorneys to Tec Bi & Co. as if it were an independent action.96 as Prof. Sorry. but that if such disposition was made it was without the knowledge or consent of the defendant bank. in respect to the matter stated by him.). 42 (now No. certified the same to the SC. 1913. third person. against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. . Disposition petition GRANTED. Sprungli & Co. or whether the difference between the amount described in the document of pledge and that found on hand on the 1st of February.36 which was applied on account of said loan. which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law.on or about the 1st day of February. the buyers who were alleging that they had obtained a cash loan from Gojo and the land allegedly sold to Gojo was only a security to the loan. ISSUE: WON the court erred in holding that the plaintiff did not waive any defect in the private instrument of ON DEFENSES . confirming the fact that it had in its possession the bales of tobacco specified in the notification. the plaintiff Tec Bi & Co. CA decision SET ASIDE. if ever the document be deemed a pacto de retro sale. Tec Bi & Co. the defendant corporation had been in the absolute and exclusive possession of the tobacco. TC ruled in favor of Goyala. TC ordered Gojo to amend the Complaint to substitute the spouse with one of her successors in interest as party.). but inasmuch as the bodega was locked and the sheriff was informed that the keys were in the possession of the bank. 1913. and in the meantime been disposed of by "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. that the pledge executed by "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd.) . TC dismissed complaint.).on the 7th of November 1912. Victoria A. for the document to be declared a mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale. . for P1800 per annum for the fruits of said property and that. and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the amount of the former's judgment against "La Urania Cigar Factory (Ltd. 1913. Gojo allegedly failed to submit the amended complaint so Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition. 54 The Answer Defenses GOJO V GOYALA Page 26 FACTS -allegedly a pacto de retro sale (the other party alleged it was a mortgage).722. Gojo was also declared in default in re Goyala’s counterclaim. the bank answered the notification of the sheriff.). 1913. who replied insisting upon the levy of the attachment.Court of First Instance found that the plaintiff's claim was a preferred credit under the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 1922 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after receipt of copy of TC order.

Judge Revilla denied the omnibus motion. Please see case re issues on credit. Section 10. prohibition and mandamus. as stipulated by the parties. SIP accumulated unpaid accounts. cannot be questioned. if a pleader alleges that two pesos were borrowed on one day and two more borrowed on another making five Pin all. . -PAC filed complaint. did not interrupt the running of the period for appeal. -PAC filed petition for certiorari. of the Rules of Court ISSUE (for this topic) 1. a stipulation as to the truth of the allegation set forth in the pleadings is not an admission of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the interest due by the borrower. judgment on the pleadings was proper. PEDRO REVILLA. 55 . Prof. NOTE: the case dealt with a pledgor-pledgee [credit] relationship. Attached w/ the complaint were two letters (Annexed A&B) from SIP’s lawyer. or set aside. apart from the context and to the exclusion of the specific allegations of fact. and that a denial for "lack of sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth" of the averments of the complaint is a specific denial and as such places in issue the allegations of the complaint so denied. w/ prayer for preliminary injunction w/ the CA. . These elementary principles have been quite fully developed in a great variety of cases arising on demurrers.100.PAC filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and for execution. deemed admitted.PAC presented its case and filed memoranda saying that SIP’s answer failed to tender an issue as said party "could not have denied knowledge of the account in the face of its written admissions. which gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. SIP did not oppose to this motion. so that it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove its allegations… . the truth of which. 2. CA said that private respondent could do no more than claim in its motion for reconsideration that the judgment of the trial court was contrary to Rule 8. contending that the MFR being pro forma. PAC filed an opposition to the MFR on the grounds that the decision was in accordance with law and the evidence. CA later dismissed the petition and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. AUG 8 1973 NATURE Appeal from the decision of the CA HELD 1 NO -The rule authorizing an answer to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and giving such answer the effect of a denial. and consequently it could no longer be modified. ." hence. CA. and by failure to object to its introduction in evidence. HON. the judgment became final and executory. That it admits the allegations in paragraph 1 insofar as its personality is concerned but is w/o sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the rest of the allegations. nor of a wrong conclusion of law based on the allegations of fact well pleaded. a stipulation of the truth of the allegations in the pleading does not amount to an admission by the opposing party that twice two make five. therefore. does not apply where the fact as to which want of knowledge is asserted is so plainly and necessarily within the defendant's knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be palpably untrue (as held in Capitol Motors Corporation v. and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of one hundred and ten pesos. saying that it would not be possible for SIP to settle in full its account of P97. the means of information concerning which are within the control of the . WON respondent’s answer constitute (allegation not deemed admitted) denial PHIL ADVERTISING COUNSELORS V.Civil Procedure Digest pledge by expressly admitting its genuineness and the correctness of its date by stipulation. that being the amount of the capital together with interest for the year for which the money was loaned. Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Again if a pleader alleges that one hundred pesos were loaned without interest for one year and had not been paid.952 08 in one payment and suggested that it (SIP) be allowed to settle its account by "periodic amortization".PAC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as the answer failed to tender an issue or "otherwise admits the material allegations of the complaint”. Then the case was set for trial on the merits. its answer had sufficiently denied the allegations of the complaint and placed them in issue.SIP filed answer stating: 1. HELD: A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is not an admission of the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn from other facts set out in the pleading." . nor of the truth of a general averment of facts contradicted by more specific averments. and the costs of suit. attorney's fees. and sufficiently dispose of the attempt of counsel to fix the attention of the court upon this single averment of the answer. Victoria A.SIP filed motion for reconsideration.03 with legal interest.SIP presented its case and filed memoranda saying that under Section 10. and that SIP had included PAC in its list of creditors "to whom payments are regularly scheduled." . ."an unexplained denial of information and belief of a matter of records. SOUTHERN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS GRN L 31869 ANTONIO. Judge Revilla denied the motion and set the case for pre-trial. and since SIP received notice of the decision. DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed A2010 Avena FACTS -Southern Industrial Projects (SIP) hired Philippine Advertising Counselors (PAC) to promote SIP’s products. Yabut) . Thus. correctness or accuracy of the allegations set forth in paragraphs 2 to 6 of plaintiffs complaint. The discussion here is limited to that pertaining to civil provision. That defendant is w/o sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth. TC ordered SIP to pay PAC the sum of P89. Judge Revilla granted MFR "in the interest of justice” and set the case for hearing on the merits.TC declared that said answer really failed to tender any issue and that the claims alleged in the complaint are.

9 of the Usury Law envisages a complaint filed against an entity which has committed usury. Disposition Appealed judgment reversed and set aside. which formed part of the complaint. . . and in which the existence and validity of petitioner's claim were unequivocally conceded. Inc. . . must be deemed to have been admitted.Sec.Civil Procedure Digest pleader. Sarmiento still failed to settle his indebtedness. however. evidenced by promissory note no. Additionally. Whether or not the said averments in the complaint were true.The trial court rendered its decision finding that plaintiff miserably failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence.126. Despite the demand. . for the defendant must aver positively or state how it is that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged. 56 PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION V CA (AMALIO L. applied for a loan from Philippine Banking Corporation in the sum of P4. The debtors asked for an extension of 3 months (April 30. and Southern Industrial Projects. they claimed that the additional interest as usurious.03.PBC filed a complaint for a sum of money against him.4 The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury. There was thus a failure on private respondent's part to deny the material averments of the complaint.000 to Olympic Sawmill without How to contest document . .000.The trial court rendered a decision finding the evidence adduced by the bank to be insufficient to substantiate its claim. as in the present. the defendant shall be deemed to have admitted the usury. to pay Philippine Advertising Counselors.Hence. including the contents of Annexes "A" and "B". prompting PBC to send him a letter of demand. In that case. Consequently. A2010 Avena interest. 1960 – Another loan document was drawn up wherein the obligation was increased by P6. The loan became due on January 31. .PBC filed a motion for new trial which the trial court subsequently granted despite the opposition of Sarmiento.TC: ordered Olympic Sawmill to pay Liam Law P10.000 plus the P6. for petitioner's complaint explicitly averred that the letters (AnnexA&B) were written by private respondent. the instant petition ISSUE LIAM LAW V OLYMPIC SAWMILL 129 SCRA 439 MELENCIO-HERRERA. Sarmiento. Sarmiento obligated himself to pay the amount with interest at the rate of 29% per annum. Disposition Judgment affirmed Prof. May 28.000 (to answer or attorney’s fees.CA affirmed with modification the trial court’s by deleting the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. the same. could not conceivably be unknown to private respondent. . not the plaintiff." Reasoning: The rule that a mere allegation of ignorance of the facts alleged in the complaint is insufficient to raise an issue. The case was dismissed. the amount of P89. Sarmiento denied that he received the proceeds of the loan transaction and prayed that the case against him be dismissed. seeds or agricultural products. for the recovery of the usurious interest paid. and costs. with legal interest until fully paid.A writ of attachment was then executed on real and personal properties of the defendant. . ISSUE WON the decision of the trial court was correct HELD YES Ratio Sec. The trial court reinstated its earlier dismissal of the case against Sarmiento and denied Philippine Banking Corporation’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. who is alleging usury. 62684.000 interest. Sarmiento Construction. is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. 1960 but was not paid on that date. plus 10% of the principal amount due by way of attorney's fees. The lack of taking an oath to an answer to a complaint will mean the admission of the facts contained in the latter. It has not been asserted that the letters attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the complaint which were sent to petitioner by the counsel of private respondent were not authorized by the latter. January 13. must be applied in this case. should be considered repealed with retroactive effect. Victoria A. 1984 NATURE Appeal from a Decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan FACTS . Interest can now be charged as tender and borrower may agree upon. the form of denial adopted by private respondent must be availed of in good faith and with sincerity and not resorted to merely for the purpose of delay or to confuse the adverse party as to what averments in the complaint are actually put in issue. 2004 NATURE Petition for review FACTS .L. .” . usury has been legally nonexistent. charged or received in violation of the provisions of this Act. Inc. 9 of the Usury Law states: “The person or corporation sued shall file its answer in writing under oath to any complaint brought or filed against said person or corporation before a competent court to recover the money or other personal or real property.100.Amalio L.For sometime. penalty charges of 1% per month and 25% of the total amount due would be charged against him.PBC appealed to the CA . or are readily accessible to him.Law loaned P10.Sarmiento signed the aforesaid promissory note together with the disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction provided by the bank. it was stipulated that if payment was not made upon maturity of the loan. As a matter of fact it has never been denied by private respondent that it was indebted to petitione. Defendants failed to pay their dues by April and when a action was instituted against them by Law in September. if the entity sued shall not file its answer under oath denying the allegation of usury.Pursuant thereto. The provision does not apply to a case.March 17. registered owner of A. In his answer. Although sanctioned by the rules. . . procedural in nature.Sarmiento failed to pay the obligation on maturity. SARMIENTO) SCRA CORONA. where it is the defendant. 1960). albeit thru its lawyer. legal interest and other costs). Reasoning .

Civil Procedure Digest
WON no proof was required of petitioner to establish the contents of the said documents because such judicial admissions of respondent created a prima facie case in petitioner’s favor HELD NO. - It is undisputed that respondent Sarmiento signed the promissory note and the accompanying disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction. But said pieces of evidence proved only the existence of such documents. There was even no question as to that because respondent Sarmiento himself admitted the due execution thereof. - The important issue was whether or not respondent Sarmiento actually received the proceeds of the subject loan so as to make him liable therefor, a matter which should have been ventilated before the trial court. - The trial court did in fact make a finding that the documentary evidence of petitioner failed to prove anything showing that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the loan. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusions of the trial court and declared:
A pre-existing obligation, it may be conceded, constitutes value and may, of and by itself, serve as valuable and sufficient consideration for a contract such as the loan sued upon. As an essential element of a contract, however, the same should have been satisfactorily proved by the appellant – particularly when, as in the instant case, the absence of consideration was precisely put in issue by the pleadings and was buttressed by both oral and documentary evidence. Having failed in this material respect, the appellant’s withdrawal of the amount supposedly credited to the appellee’s account was understandably interpreted by the court a quo as a termination/cancellation of the loan the latter applied for. Considering further that contracts without consideration do not exist in contemplation of law and produce no effect whatsoever (Article 1352, Civil Code of the Philippines), the trial, likewise, correctly dismissed the appellant’s case.

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applied. Moreover, petitioner failed to explain just exactly what said obligations were or to what extent the purported proceeds were applied in satisfaction thereof. What appeared clearly was that the proceeds of the loan were deposited then withdrawn the same day by petitioner itself, thus negating its claim that respondent actually received it. Petitioner therefore failed to establish its case against respondent Sarmiento. - Be that as it may, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. Barring a showing that the findings of fact complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, such determination must stand for the Court is neither expected nor required to examine or refute the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Disposition Petition DENIED.

Prof. Victoria A.

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Defense/objection waived KATON V PALANCA G.R. No. 151149 PANGANIBAN; September 7, 2004
NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing CA decision, and resolution denying MFR. FACTS -August 2, 1963: George Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification (forestagricultural land) of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island (~18has). -BFDO Puerto Princesa ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a homestead patent.
9 For other footnotes in this case: [14] The said section provides that “[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except as

9

- A statement in a written instrument regarding the payment of consideration is merely in the nature of a receipt and may be contradicted. Respondent Sarmiento denied having received the proceeds of the loan and in fact presented evidence showing that on the day petitioner claimed to have credited the subject amount, it was again debited or withdrawn by petitioner, admittedly upon the instruction of the officials from petitioner’s head office. - Petitioner attempted to controvert this fact by claiming that the proceeds of the loan were applied to respondent’s previous obligations to the bank. But there is nothing in the records showing that respondent had other obligations to which the proceeds of the loan could or should have been

otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.” [35] [37] §1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. §2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:

“SEC. 2. Parties in interest.- A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”

-Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the presence of George, his brother Rodolfo (deceased) and his cousin, Manuel Palanca, Jr., (respondent). During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by George and Palanca (alleged overseer of George) who went to the island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut trees. -The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by BFDO Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were included in the endorsement as coapplicants of George. Authorities noted that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public Land Act. -George Katon says: the whole Sombrero Island had been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his instance. -However land investigators of the Puerto Princesa District Land Office, later favorably endorsed the request of respondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island consisting of 5hectares each. -Subsequently, respondents filed their own homestead patent applications: Lorenzo Agustin (4.3has), Juan Fresnillo (8.5has), and Jesus Gapilango (??has). Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued a Homestead Patent No. and OCT for 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. -Katon filed Complaint for “Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for Reconveyance of Title” and prayed for reconveyance of the whole island in his favor, arguing that the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents were invalid for having been obtained through fraud. Respondent’s arguments: -Manuel Palanca asserts that he himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute; that about the time of such request, Fresnillo, Gapilango and himself already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous improvements; that Katon

Civil Procedure Digest
never filed any homestead application for the island; that Gabriel Mandocdoc never undertook the inspection and survey of the island; that he is not a mere overseer of Katon because he was acting for himself in developing his own area and not as anybody’s caretaker. -Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions, have declared such for taxation purposes and have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. They contend that Katon has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is concerned (an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant) and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time. -After filing their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by Katon of the RTC’s order to amend his Complaint (substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased Gapilango). MTD was granted. Katon’s MFR was denied. -Katon filed petition for certiorari before CA. Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, CA ruled on the merits & held that while Katon had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land. Also, granting arguendo that Katon had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Palanca’s title had been issued -On MR, CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with Katon that the TC had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily dismissing his Sept10, 1999 MFR, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion. Nonetheless, the complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the CA – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its “residual prerogative” under Sec. 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. CA said that from the allegations of the complaint, Katon clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the

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land to the public domain. It also ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. ISSUES 1. WON CA was correct in resolving the petition for certiorari based on an issue not raised in the petition (WON CA was correct in ruling on the merits) 2. WON CA was correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition (and eventually dismissing the case for prescription and lack of jurisdiction) HELD Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the TC, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the CA, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations. 1. This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the CA when he moved for reconsideration of CA’s Dec8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its Nov20, 2001 Resolution. -That should have been enough to settle the issue. The CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s issue moot. There is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying Katon’s MFR. -Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, [10] more so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case. 2. NO -CA’s “residual prerogatives” under Sec1 of Rule9 of the Rules of Court is different from the “residual jurisdiction” of TC over cases appealed to CA. -RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES: Sec 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court:

Prof. Victoria A.

58

defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. -RESIDUAL JURISDICTION: Sec 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court10: The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the TC still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. -CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could not have been based on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules. -Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
10Rule41.“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. “A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. “In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. “In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.”

Civil Procedure Digest
complaint and the character of the relief sought. Katon prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca; and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner. -Q: did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? -Ans: The complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the TC could have exercised jurisdiction. -In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. -In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio. -In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. The complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property. -In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land, that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act. -Reversion? No. Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A private person may not bring an action for

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reversion or any other action that would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain. -The dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of action, a defense raised by respondents in their Answer. -Assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being timebarred. A. 1977, Feb21: a homestead patent and an OCT was issued to Palanca 1988, Oct6: filing of the complaint, way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property. B. Palanca’s title attained the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977. It is no longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so -on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or -an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or -even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or -even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings; or -where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. Disposition Petition denied. CA resolution affirmed. Complaint dismissed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.

Prof. Victoria A.

59

FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC. V CA (CABUCO-ANDRES) 265 SCRA 614 KAPUNAN; December 16, 1996
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. FACTS - Petitioner Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course and residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Biñan, Laguna. - December 29, 1992: Felipe Layos filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Application for Preliminary Injunction against Fil-Estate Realty Corporation (FERC) with the RTC of Biñan. It alleged that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and possessor of thwo parcels of land having a total area of 837,695 sq. m. located in Biñan, Laguna known as Lots 1 & 2 of Plan Psu-201. Layos claimed that the Southwoods project encroached upon the aforecited lands and thus his rights of ownership and possession were violated when FERC brought in men and equipment to begin development of the said properties. - February 2, 1993: FERC filed an Opposition to Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and explicitly stated therein that the developer is its sister company, FEGDI. - March 29, 1993: Judge Sultan of RTC Biñan issued an order denying the prayer for preliminary injunction in view of Layos’ inability to substantiate his right. - June 25, 1993: Layos along with his wife and other individuals filed another case for Injunction and Damage with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of San Pedro, this time against FEGDI. The complaint is basically identical to that filed in the Biñan case, except for changes in the number of party-plaintiffs and party-defendants and in the area size of the claimed landholdings. - FEGDI moved to dismiss the San Pedro case on grounds of litis pendentia, forum-shopping, lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. FEGDI argues that a similar complaint was previously filed with the RTC Biñan court. FEGDI also averred that the documents relied upon by the private respondents are of doubtful veracity and that they failed to pay the correct filing fees.

COMMON PROVISIONS
Re parts of pleading

only the allegations in the complaint must be considered. ISSUES 1. motions and the evidence on record. No.5M to be paid to the PNB. the RTC issued an Order enjoining the DBP and Atty.Judge Cabuco-Andres of San Pedro RTC denied FEGDI’s motion to dismiss. Nilo Galorport FACTS . the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered.000. After hearing private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction. As collateral. she failed to pay her loan with the DBP. The affidavit of self-adjudication is a vital part of the complaint that should be considered in the determination of whether or not a cause of action exists. Asuncion paid the PNB P900. he (and other individuals) filed an identical complaint for injunction and damages with preliminary injunction in June 1993. YES Ratio Reasoning Private respondents have indeed resorted to forum-shopping in order to obtain a favorable decision. HELD 1. the answer with counterclaim. petitions. because FEGDI voluntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing its answer and expressly stating that it is the developer of Southwoods. The test if sufficiency of the facts is WON admitting the facts alleged the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. and not FERC. the petitioner’s answer to the counterclaim and its answer to the request for admission. . Bessang.Respondents content that there is no identity of part-defendants since it was FERC in the Biñan case and FEGDI in the San Pedro case. Reed located in Malate. NO Ratio In the determination of WON the complaint states a cause of action. the bank’s deputized special sheriff. CA ordered an RTO enjoining Cabuco-Andres. The following requirements xxx shall be strictly complied with in the filing of the complaints. Nilo Galorport. Private respondents agreed.00 representing the unpaid balance of respondents’ loan. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure of one of the petitioners. . and Si-14769 is a survey number for the plan of a land parcel situated in Bo. from proceeding with the auction sale of the lots pending the final determination of the civil case wherein private respondents prayed for annulment of the contract and the TCTs transferring title over the lots to Asuncion Calceta. Private respondents executed a simulated deed of sale of their lots in her favor to enable her to mortgage the same with the DBP. petition. WON Layos is guilty of forum-shopping. failed to show that he is the bank’s authorized representative to file the petition for certiorari. This is erroneous.When the proceeds of the loan were released. 2. 2 Rule 9.R. However. or complaint-in-intervention. 147217 October 7. holding that Atty. 1994: RTC Biñan case was dismissed without prejudice on grounds of forum-shopping. Hence. Asuncion Calceta then made an initial payment of P273. . crossclaim. prompting the bank to foreclose the mortgage covering the 2 lots. In determining WON a complaint states a cause of action.Civil Procedure Digest . Nilo Galorport to sign the certification against forum shopping. 60 DBP v CA G. obtained a loan from PNB.00 to the PNB.000. etc) party complaint. as well as the Motion for Reconsideration. The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint.The land Psu-201 is an original survey for J. An examination would show that the San Pedro complains is simply an improved version of the Biñan complaint.Bibiana Guerra de Azarcon. It as also been held that under this ground the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed. the RTC had the opportunity to examine the merits of the complaint. this time with RTC San Pedro.There is no cause of action because Layos’ claim on the land in question is based on a fabricated document. . The Biñan court expressly recognized FEGDI as the defendant in the said case.The willful attempt by private respondent to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after it failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes grave abuse of the judicial process. and her late husband Inocentes Azarcon. Reasoning The San Pedro case also did not state a cause of action. WON the San Pedro case has cause of action. FEGDI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction with the CA. . Demosthenes Demecillo. counter-claim.DBP and Atty. Galorport filed an MFR but were denied by the RTC. It was but logical for said court to consider all of these pleadings in determining WON there was a sufficient cause of action in the petitioner’s complaint. SC-Administrative Circular 04-94: Revised Circular 29-91 applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and is intended to prevent the multiple filing of the petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other tribunals.However the CA and RTC limited itself to the allegations in the complaint proper of the San Pedro case in concluding that said complaint stated a cause of action. Prof. . third (fourth. Asuncion Calceta told Bibiana that she is willing to pay their loan if Bibiana would mortgage the lots to her. Manila. Branch Manager of the DBP at Tagbilaran City. . . 2. But they could not pay their loan. Respondents’ complaint is dismissed. The CA denied petitioners’ MFR. and after his prayer was denied in March 1993. DISPOSITION The petition for review on certiorari is granted. The bank extended the redemption period to allow Asuncion to apply with the DBP a loan of P3. they filed with the CA a petition for certiorari alleging that in granting the injunctive relief in favor of private respondents. Atty. or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. . they mortgaged 2 lots with the bank. Cagayan in the name of Gregorio Blanco . Victoria A. .January 25. This is unmeritorious. applications or other A2010 Avena initiatory pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the SC xxx.In the case of Marcopper Mining v Garcia.Regalado: The exception is provided in Sec. 2004 NATURE petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the DBP and Atty. including annexes. they being parts of the complaint. the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. herein private respondent. The pattern is undisputably revealed by the fact that after Felipe Layos instituted in 1992 a case for injunction and damages with application for preliminary injunction in the RTC of Biñan.

Victoria A. Rosemarie promised to comply with the demand but failed to do so.000.Civil Procedure Digest Petition is DENIED A2010 Avena Prof. and (3) the certification against forum shopping was defective. they having a common interest in the lots under litigation. Rosemarie lives with husband Manuel in Bataan. however. is their failure to attach a certified true copy of the resolution to their petition. if subjected to careful scrutiny would clearly show that the authority given to the latter is not only broad but also all encompassing that it includes the power and authority to institute both civil and criminal actions. Petitioners’ failure to submit proof that Atty.000 a month from 1993 to January 1999. To file criminal and/or civil complaints before the courts of justice in the Philippines to enforce my rights and interest[s]. Galorport contends that the signature of Atty. Their omission is fatal to their case. Petitioners explained in their MFR that in the verification of the petition for certiorari. 2. To ask. Rosario filed a suit against her. DBP is being sued as a mortgagee. . and Atty. (2) failure to state a valid cause of action. Rosemarie gave Manolito his monthly allowance ranging from P2. and mandamus. The certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty.They entered into an agreement whereby Rosario would send Rosemarie US$20. Manolito Galvez. Their interests are not the same. prohibition. This procedural flaw warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. documents and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the above purposes. An MFR was filed but was likewise denied. It was also denied. Demosthenes Demecillo. WON the certification of non-forum shopping executed by the plaintiff’s atty-in-fact is defective 2. to litigate and to terminate such proceedings. thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in WEE V GALVEZ 436 SCRA 96 QUISUMBING. The certification against forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners in a case. [and] 4. The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties." Atty. DBP’s deputized special sheriff. the bank’s Branch Manager at Tagbilaran City. 61 ISSUE WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari HELD NO Ratio The certification against forum shopping is fatally defective.In accordance with her agreement with Rosario. ISSUE/S 1. Disposition complaint. Demecillo only. sufficiently stated a cause of action.Petitioner Rosemarie Wee and respondent Rosario D. Nilo Galorport. represented by Atty. while he is impleaded as the bank’s deputized special sheriff who conducted the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.The Wees moved to dismiss the case based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made in accordance with Article 1515 of the Family Code.Rosario amended her complaint to add that “Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed” (mali talaga yung sinulat nila). Reasoning Petitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule 8. USA . juridical and/or corporation in the Philippines. documents. The interest to be earned therefrom would be given to Rosario's son. August 11. His contention lacks merit.000 to P4. Demecillo has been authorized by the DBP to file the petition is a "sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Courts are not expected to take judicial notice of corporate board resolutions or a corporate officer’s authority to represent a corporation. as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim. Demecillo stated under oath that he is the DBP’s incumbent Branch Head and its duly authorized officer. Rosario asked for the return of the US$20. may be incomplete or even grammatically incorrect as there might be a missing word or phrase. It likewise held that the questioned certification against forum shopping appended thereto was not so defective as to warrant the dismissal of the . the action being premature in the absence of previous earnest efforts toward a compromise. WON the amended complaint before the RTC states a cause of action HELD 1. The SPA includes: 1.000 and for an accounting. authorizing Branch Heads of the DBP to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping of all initiatory pleadings of the bank. and pleadings necessary for the accomplishment of the said purpose. 2. petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A of the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" is clearly insufficient. 3. Demecillo. . It was also denied. Reasoning The petitioners before the CA were the DBP. and the signing by only one of them is insufficient. 2004 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . a lacking word like "compromise" could be supplied by the rest of the paragraph. is sufficient since he and DBP are being sued jointly. When Rosemarie did not comply. To attend hearings and/or Preliminary Conference[s]. to make stipulations. half of said amount to be deposited in a savings account while the balance could be invested in the money market. as his allowance .The Wee couple brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari. as amended. However. To sign all papers. representing the DBP. but to our mind. adjust claims. Rosario lives in New York. Section 133 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. . What petitioners failed to explain. The sentence is incomplete. having been executed by an attorney-infact and not the plaintiff. YES Ratio It is true that the lead sentence of paragraph 9-A. No Reasoning The Special Power of Attorney executed by her in favor of Grace Galvez. The trial court accepted the amended complaint and dismissed the Wee’s motion to dismiss. A written demand was sent to her. Wee moved for an MFR. The Court of Appeals held that the complaint. Atty. They submitted a copy of a resolution passed by the DBP Board of Governors. to settle and/or enter into Compromise Agreement[s]. Specifically. sometime in 1995. Corollary with this power is the authority to sign all papers. Galvez are sisters. demand and claim any sum of money that is duly [due] from any person natural. not having been duly signed by both petitioners.

BARRIOS 00SCRA 00 FERIA. It is an axiom. such prayer will not make or convert the action of recovery. Victoria A. either for specific performance. Baguiaro paid only the sum of P25. ISSUE WON the court acted without jurisdiction HELD Yes. for instance. if he prays that the defendants be sentenced to perform the obligations imposed upon him by the contract the action is specific performance. 62 BAGUIARO V. 1946. -Baguiaro filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint or suit. and at the same time asked this Court to enjoin the respondent judge from taking further action in the case during the pendency of this petition. or vacate the lot in question. There is no such kind of action. according to respondent. leaving a balance of P25. because it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. the action is illegal detainer if filed within one year. paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise between the parties. the amended complaint and the attachments to the original complaint. In contracts of lease of a real estate. payable in advance. though the plaintiff is free to . and refuses to vacate or return the possession of the property leased to the lessor notwithstanding demand to do so. contends that the plaintiff's principal action is for breach of contract. -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the documents attached thereto. in civil procedure that if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law. In the instant case.680. -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. that the defendant owes the former a certain amount of money and did not pay it at the time stipulated. de Atas against Baguiaro. according to petitioners. the ejectment of the defendant and the payment by the latter of the damages due for the occupation of the land. -CFI motion to dismiss denied and sentencing Baguiaro either to pay two hundred fifty pesos (P250) or to vacate the lot in question. court acted without jurisdiction. since the court may only grant the proper relief according to law. For the month of October. in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Emiliana Tupas Vda. does not change the nature of the action. without the improvements which were burned during the war. it does not characterize or determine the nature of the Prof." a paragraph must necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. to pay a monthly rental of fifty pesos (P50) a month. -De Atas is the exclusive and absolute and registered owner of the following described property. of debt into one of recovery of personal property." or others to the same effect. in his opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss filed in the court below.Civil Procedure Digest deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action. beginning with the month of October. and prays that the defendant be sentenced to return a certain personal property to the plaintiff. 30 Aug. Hence. 1946 FACTS -Complaint filed on January 7. she found out that defendant had already begun the construction of a nipa and bamboo house with no approval from her. defendant was told sometime on October. or sentence the defendant to pay his debt to the plaintiff. forms a rhetorical unit. and if he prays that the contract be rescind the plaintiff's action is rescission. from the demand. and the court shall grant the proper relief. the action being either for the collection of rentals of a real estate which do not reach to two hundred pesos (P200) or for ejectment from the premises in jurisdiction over the subject of the litigation. that is. As the plaintiff is entitled is entitled only to one of the two reliefs. and that the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint. So if a plaintiff alleges. and has rented a part thereof to other persons. and for subsequent months Baguiaro has refused and still refuses to pay the said rentals of fifty pesos (P50). it is in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or construed. situated in the City of Iloilo. the words "and for such other relief as the law warrants. clearly show that a sufficient cause of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. The above lot. and in his answer to the petition for certiorari in this Court. -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to many sentences. -Petition for Certiorari on the ground the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter in trying and deciding the case. is assessed at P4. is what determines the nature of the action. and recovery or restoration of possession if filed after one year. 1945. According to our Civil Code. 1945. Breach of contract may be the cause of action. and that when plaintiff discovered this anomaly and violations of their verbal and initial agreement. although it is not the relief demanded. Baguiaro verbally solicited the permission of herein de Atas to construct a house of light materials on the lot of some three brazas wide and three brazas long just enough for them to sleep. and for such other and for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable. with costs against the defendant. Thus taken together. That the prayer of relief in the complaint seems to convey the idea that the plaintiff would agree to let the defendant continue in possession if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff. 1945. and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. -That sometime in the month of July. or rescission of the contract. if the lessee violates the terms of the contract by his failure to pay the rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease. or vacate the premises. we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action. And that is the reason why it is generally added to prayers for relief. or to vacate the lot in question. though not necessary. at a monthly rental of twenty pesos (P20). in their entirety. a breach of contract is accuse of action. Disposition Petition is denied. The attorney of the plaintiff. A2010 Avena told Baguiaro that she would think the matter. -Instead of constructing a house of three brazas by three brazas as above Baguiaro has built additions after additions to the house such that the present house constructed is twenty-eight and one-half feet on the front and forty-two and one-half feet on the side. -Prayer: defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of fifty pesos (P50) as monthly rentals for the lot occupied by him of the property of herein plaintiff. or performance. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences dealing with a single topic. and de Atas plaintiff's action. in spite of repeated demands. following the rule that documents attached to a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading. but not the action or relief itself.

Civil Procedure Digest
condone said payment. It is evident that the court can not authorize the defendant petitioner to continue in possession the land as lessee if he pays the rents or damages demanded by the plaintiff since such continuation depends not only upon the plaintiff's will but also upon that of the defendant. A judgment authorizing the defendant to continue as lessee for a certain and definite period of time after the judgment, will not bind the plaintiff to grant such lease nor the defendant to continue as lessee paying the monthly rental fixed by the court. A court cannot make and impose a contract upon the parties. Even assuming, arguendo, that the complaint may contain two alternatives or independent actions, one of forcible entry and another for recovery of rents or damages, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has no jurisdiction to entertain either one or both. It has no jurisdiction over the action of forcible entry, for it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace; nor over that of recovery of rents or damages, because the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint, which determines the court jurisdiction, is less than two hundred pesos (P200). According to the complaint, the petitioner had occupied the lot in question during the months of October, November, December and January when the complaint was filed, and the total amount of rents or damages claimed as due for that occupation at the rate of fifty pesos (P50) a month, minus the sum of twenty-five pesos (P25) which was paid on account of the rent for October, aggregate only one hundred and seventyfive pesos (P175). The fact that, in its judgment, the lower court has awarded the plaintiff the sum of P250, including the rent for February, and not the P25 paid on account by the petitioner for the month of October as alleged in the same complaint, did not confer upon the court jurisdiction over the case. If the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter according to the allegations in the complaint, it can not acquire it just because the rents claimed and those that may accrue during the pendency of the suit may amount to a sum within its jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would lead to the absurdity that the jurisdiction of the court depends not upon the allegations in the complaint, but upon a contingency which may or may not arise or occur. As the damages claimed in the complaint amounted to one hundred and seventy-five pesos (P175), could the lower court have sentenced the defendant to pay the amount claimed had the latter made a confession of judgment?

A2010 Avena
Disposition The respondent judge's decision in this case is set aside; with costs against the respondent Emiliana Tupas Vda. de Atas. So ordered. PARAS, J., dissenting: - The willingness of the plaintiff to let the defendant, herein petitioner Manuel Baguioro, retain possession of the land upon payment of the rent (which, plaintiff alleges, should be P50) is plainly repugnant to the theory that the principal purpose of the action is ejectment of the defendant or, in the language of section 1 of Rule 72, "the restitution of possession." Upon the other hand, giving such reasonable intendments to the allegations of the complaint as are consistent with and implied by the relief sought, the action may be one for the enforcement of a lease contract — implied or otherwise — in which the court is asked to fix the amount of the rent for want of corresponding stipulation. The claim that the rent ought to be P50, when considered with the prayer "for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court shall deem just and equitable," merely invokes the discretion and judgment of the court regarding the righteousness of said claim. -While the complaint may be treated ;as one for simple ejectment, in the light of some of its averments, the circumstance nevertheless does not prevent it from being an action — its denomination immaterial — that may be filed originally in the Court of First Instance, in view of the other allegations and the prayer. In the latter situation, matters contained in the pleading which are not necessary to, or are incompatible with, the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance may be considered surplusage. The complaint might have been awkwardly drafted, but unless the defendant was actually misled to his surprise or injury, it should be held sufficient. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil., 504.) It is needless to state that the nature of an action is determined by its allegations and prayer. As long as the complaint makes out a case cognizable by the Court of First Instance, the latter's jurisdiction will not be altered or taken away simply because the action cannot prosper. The judgment in this case was rendered after the defendant had been declared in default. HILADO, J., dissenting: -Liberally construed, as it should be (Rule 15, section 17), the plaintiff's complaint is susceptible of two constructions: as a complaint in ejectment, and as

Prof. Victoria A.

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one aimed at invoking the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in actions for possession of real property, as regards the plaintiff's land under section 56, paragraph 2, of Act No. 136. In choosing between these two constructions in justice to the learning and intelligence of counsel for the plaintiff, it seems to me that the court should have had no difficulty in concluding that he meant and intended to resort to the latter procedure, as he should be presumed to know such an elemental rule as that which confers upon the municipal or justice of the peace court exclusive original jurisdiction of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases within the first year following the accrual of the cause of action. -Even where the defendant employs, e. g., violence in taking possession of the plaintiff's land, the law does not compel the latter to resort to the summary remedy y furnished by Rule 72, section 1, just as it does not compel the plaintiff to file a criminal complaint for any criminal offense which the defendant may have committed with the use of such violence. The law grants the plaintiff of remedies, as well as a choice of courts, so long as he lays before the court of his choice the facts calling for a proper exercise of its jurisdiction. So that an undisputed owner of land who, as such, is by law entitled to its possession, and who is deprived thereof, e.. g., by force, while entitled to the summary remedy afforded by Rule 72, section 1, which according to said section he may resort to, is neither compelled to bring his case thereunder, alleging the characteristic circumstance of violence, lodging his action in the proper inferior court, nor forbidden to seek redress from the proper Court of First Instance by bringing his case under its general jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve . . . the possession of real property . . .", waiving the effects of the violence committed by the defendant as well as the summary remedy to which such characteristic circumstance may entitled, had simply alleging, as his cause of action, his ownership of the land, his right to its possession and the fact that he has been deprived of such possession by the defendant, regardless of the manner employed in such deprivation. The same law which does not compel the owner to bring a criminal action by reason of such violence does not compel him to bring a forcible entry suit by reason thereof. And it would be to my mind scandalous to affirm in a government of laws that in such circumstances the owner will be prevented from bringing his case under the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of the province without invoking the characteristic

Civil Procedure Digest
circumstance of violence. Of course, in an ordinary action commenced in the Court of First Instance, he will not be entitled to the summary proceedings, such as the immediate execution of the judgment, etc., provided for in Rule 72. So long as the plaintiff does not rely on any of the specific circumstances characterizing the action as one of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, it cannot be said to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal or justice of the peace court, even within the first year following the accrual of the cause of action.

A2010 Avena
- In 2001, MIPI and Gonzales filed MTD on the ff. grounds: [1] the complaint failed to comply with the requirements set forth under SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as regards certifications against forum shopping; and [2] there was noncompliance with a condition precedent for the filing of the case and/or the same failed to state a cause of action or was premature - RTC denied MTD and MFR of MIPI and Gonzales. CA granted the petition for certiorari and reversed RTC. CA ruled that CBC failed to comply with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as there was nothing in the records showing that the signatory of the certification against forum shopping was authorized by CBC. It referred to the Corporation Code and jurisprudence which state that corporations exercise their corporate powers through their board of directors and no person can bind the corporation without authority from the latter. CA denied CBC’s MFR. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE WON CBC’s failure to attach the requisite board resolution making Ms. German an authorized signatory of certifications against forum shopping was a fatal error and cannot be rectified by subsequent submission thereof. HELD NO Ratio The Court has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of these certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification. If the belated filing of the certification against forum shopping for compelling reasons in previous rulings is allowed, with more reason should the Court sanction the timely submission of such certification though the proof of the signatory’s authority was submitted thereafter. Reasoning The court has used the doctrine of stare decisis to enunciate this principle. The ff. cases were cited as authority: Shipside Incorporated v. CA, Ateneo De Naga University v. Manalo, and, Pascual & Santos Inc v. Tramo Wakas Neighborhood Association. At the meeting of CBC’s Board of Directors, the Board, in a resolution, approved, confirmed and ratified Ms. German’s authority.

Prof. Victoria A.

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Though the wording of the board resolution leaves much to be desired, it remains equally susceptible of interpretation in favor of Ms. German’s preexisting status as an authorized signatory. Disposition Petition is GRANTED.

CRUZ-AGANA V LAGMAN G.R. No. 139018 CARPIO; April 11, 2005
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - On 18 March 1996, petitioner filed a Complaint for annulment of title with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent. Petitioner claims that as the sole heir of one Teodorico Cruz, she is the sole owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3907. Petitioner further claims that the lot was fraudulently sold to Eugenio Lopez, Jr. who later on transferred the lot to respondent. - Respondent seasonably filed its Answer with compulsory counterclaim. Petitioner moved to dismiss respondent’s counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping. - In an Order dated 11 March 1999, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court reasoned that respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory and therefore excluded from the coverage of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved that the trial court reconsider its Order invoking the mandatory nature of a certificate of non-forum shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. On 25 May 1999, the trial court reversed its 11 March 1999 Order and dismissed respondent’s counterclaim for lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping. - Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims following the ruling in Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla. On 4 June 1999, the trial court again reversed itself and recalled its Order dismissing respondent’s counterclaim. The trial court ruled that the filing of a compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping. ISSUE

CHINA BANKING CORP V MONDRAGON INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 164798 PUNO; November 17, 2005
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - In 1994, respondent Mondragon International Philippines, Incorporated (MIPI), entered into a Lease Agreement with Clark Development Corporation (Clark)to develop the 232-hectare Mimosa Leisure Estate. They also entered into supplemental lease agreements to develop other additional areas. Part of the funds used for these projects was generated from loans obtained from petitioner China Banking Corporation (CBC). To secure these loans, MIPI executed promissory notes in favor of CBC. In addition, respondent Antonio U. Gonzales executed a Surety Agreement in favor of CBC in the amount of P100M. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis transpired. The ensuing shock to the Philippine economy affected MIPI’s ability to pay its obligations to CBC. - In 2000, CBC filed a complaint for a sum of money with RTC Makati City against MIPI and Mr. Gonzales. The certification of forum shopping was attached to the complaint. It was to the effect that: MERCEDES E. GERMAN, the Manager of Loans & Discounts Dept of the China Banking Corp certified that the defendant China Bank has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the SC, CA or before any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of her knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending, and that if a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before SC, CA or any other tribunal or agency, she undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days.

Civil Procedure Digest
WON a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer can be dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping HELD NO - Santo Tomas clarified the scope of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with respect to counterclaims. The Court pointed out that this circular is intended primarily to cover “an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief.” The distinction between a compulsory and a permissive counterclaim is vital in the application of the circular. The Court explained: It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that the circular in question has not, in fact, been contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by its very nature as being auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and as deriving its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer and not remain outstanding for independent resolution except by the court where the main case pends. Prescinding from the foregoing, the proviso in the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule “shall not be curable by mere amendment xxx but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,” being predicated on the applicability of the need for a certification against forum-shopping, obviously does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up. - The Court reiterated this ruling in Ponciano v. Judge Parentela, Jr. - Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular applies to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an “initiatory” or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff’s complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the complaint.

A2010 Avena
- Petitioner’s counsel fails or simply refuses to accept the distinction between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory counterclaim. This distinction was the basis for the ruling in Santo Tomas and Ponciano. The sole issue for resolution in the present case is whether respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. If it is a permissive counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is immaterial. - A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint.[9] It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive. - Respondent’s counterclaim as set up in its answer states: 3. That because of the unwarranted, baseless, and unjustified acts of the plaintiff, herein defendant has suffered and continue to suffer actual damages in the sum of at least P400,000,000.00 which the law, equity, and justice require that to be paid by the plaintiff and further to reimburse the attorney’s fees of P2,000,000.00; - It is clear that the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the filing of plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The counterclaim will require a relitigation of the same evidence if the counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner recognizes that respondent’s counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading. Disposition The decision petition is denied.

Prof. Victoria A.
FELICIANO; June28,1993

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FACTS: -J.J. Mining and Exploration Corporation ("J.J. Mining") executed and delivered to petitioner Perpetual Savings ("Bank") a promisory note in the amount of P750.000.00 payable in one lump sum upon maturity with interest at 23% per annum. The note also contained, inter alia, a clause providing for penalty interest at the rate of 3% , nor month on the amount due, compounded monthly. The promisory note was executed for J.J. Mining by respondents Jose Oro B. Fajardo and Emmanuel F. Del Mande. Messrs. Fajardo and Del Mundo are said to be officers of J.J. Mining. Upon maturity of the promissory note, neither J.J. Mining nor anyone else paid the amount of the indebtedness, notwithstanding petitioner's repeated written demands for payment. -petitioner Bank filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, against J.J; Mining, Jose Emmanuel Jalandoni and herein respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, for collection of the amounts due under the promissory note -Defendant's Fajardo and Del Mundo were impleaded as agents/or representatives of Defendant Corporation who were signatories in the Promissory Note or alternatively, in their personal capacities “if it be shown that they contracted the loan fully knowing that the Defendant Corporation would be unable to pay the same upon maturity, and/or that they used the proceeds of the loan foe their own personal benefit” -Respondent Fajardo and Del Mundo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint had failed to stated cause of action against them. RTC denied motion to dismiss. Fajardo and Del Mundo raised the case to the SC but SC referred case to CA. Respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, basically alleged that petitioner Bank's complaint did not set forth any cause of action as against them personally, and that Section 13, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on alternative defendants was not applicable to the case at bar. CA granted motion of Fajardo and Del Mundo ISSUE WON complaint of Perpetual Savings stated a cause of action against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo, as distinguished from J.J. Mining, on whose behalf they had purported to act. HELD

Re manner of making allegations PERPETUAL SAVINGS V FAJARDO 223 SCRA 720

mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal. among other the that petitioner Bank's complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents Fajardo and Del Mundo in their personal and individual capacities for the reason that. Cerezo may no longer avail of the remedy of annulment. Victoria A. a party must file the petition within four years from its discovery. Extrinsic fraud is not a valid ground if such fraud was used as a ground. The test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition as constituting a cause of action is whether or not. and he was not prevented by fraud." -The SC held that the CA was in reversible error. in their entirety.In its Decision. TUAZON (supra) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS -Bus collided with tricycle EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD When a party has another remedy available to him. not extrinsic fraud. NO. -Having examined the Amended Complaint in its entirety as well as the documents attached thereto. otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which has been lost thru inexcusable negligence. as there is no plain and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for her claim. CA said. in her last ditch attempt to evade liability. As a "short composition consisting of a group of sentences dealing with a single topic. Reasoning. Hence. EMMANUEL C. Mrs. following the rule that documents attached to a pleading are considered both as evidence and as part of the pleading. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction. a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule only if the ordinary remedies of new trial. Cerezo. it is in this light that the defective lead sentence must be understood or construed. in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment. Mrs. and if based on lack of jurisdiction. It was error for her to avail of a petition for relief from judgment. petition for relief from judgment. CARPIO) G. Allowance issues… ON MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS etitioners submit that the amended complaint violates Rule 8. Specifically. the amended petition for certiorari. the Court elaborated on this established standard in the following manner: 'The rule is that a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof. 66 Re Effect of Failure to Plead CEREZO V. Section 133 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. appeal. The sentence is incomplete. according to respondent. 2001. Cerezo could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief. 153696 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11. 2001. On January 22. forms a rhetorical unit. according to petitioners. Cerezo’s petition for relief became final and executory. which was denied with finality. accident. petitioners were served with the summons. Mrs. before laches or estoppel bars the petition. -A paragraph is "a distinct section or subdivision of a written or printed composition that consists of from one to many sentences. accident. Indeed. Disposition PETITION DENIED. If based on extrinsic fraud. Annulment is available only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the party. In the instant case. Reasoning there was no fraud. petitioners contend that the allegation in paragraph 9-A of the amended complaint that "Earnest efforts towards have been made but the same have failed" is clearly insufficient. Thus.R. Thus taken together. Mrs. thus requires the reader of the pleading to engage in deductions or inferences in order to get a complete sense of the cause of action. Court of Appeals. or excusable negligence that prevented Mrs. no evidence had been presented to support such alleged liability on the "so called alternative cause of action. one in US and one in RP who is taking care of the son of the sister in US." a paragraph must necessarily be construed in its entirety in order to properly derive the message sought to be conveyed. admitting the facts alleged. SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. 2006 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court FACTS: On January 3. was her ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment. a motion for new trial or a WEE V GALVEZ (supra) FACTS -this is regards the sisters. . filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment of the trial court. -Respondent rebuts by stating that the amended complaint as well as the annexes attached to the pleadings should be taken in their entirety. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or "Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.After the SC’s resolution denying Mrs. relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. It was quite premature for the Court of Appeals to consider evidence (or lack of evidence) outside the complaint since the trial had not yet started. clearly show that a sufficient cause of action as it is shown and stated that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. A2010 Avena complaint and the attachments to the original complaint. mistake.Civil Procedure Digest YES. he cannot avail himself of this petition. we find that the respondent has properly set out her cause of action. The allegations made by the bank could be proven on trial. Prof. together with a . which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court. In Rava Development Corporation v. Cerezo from filing an appeal. paragraph 9-A of the Amended Complaint deals with the topic of efforts made by the respondent to reach a compromise between the parties. the court can render a valid Judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. or could have been used as a ground. However.

the lower court. 2001. petitioners must have a meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the order of default set aside The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default. filed a motion to declare them in default. that under Section 3. 67 - - - - - - - - - ISSUE: 1. On March 2. Prof. petitioners filed a motion to admit answer. 2001. as previously scheduled. 2001 order but their motion was denied. issued an order dated February 12. (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default. Hearing of motion.Civil Procedure Digest copy of the complaint. upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in default. Therefore. declare the defending party in default. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders. The Court then ruled that there is no need. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. In an order dated February 16. Acting on the motion. 2001. they were unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer. Metrobank. On February 15. 4. and proof of such failure. It also ruled that for an order of default to be set aside. petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s motion to declare them in default. and the Orders denying their Motion to Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. 2001. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners. Victoria A. specifically provides: Sec." On the same date. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense is a meritorious defense. respondent judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of Metrobank’s evidence on March A2010 Avena 7. YES ReasoningSection 3. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law". Section 4. there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default. 2001. Clearly. 2001 order. and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by petitioners. CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the same. declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor. Metrobank opposed the motion. The notice of a motion is required when the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. the motion to admit answer was denied. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Carpio (or "respondent judge"). 3. unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. presided over by Hon. The motion was set for hearing on February 16. the trial court had properly declared them in default. 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the exparte presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7. (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule. petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default. 2001. respondent judge issued an order holding in abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default. Philip Pantojan but it was only on February 12. The purpose of a notice of a motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments. 4. on February 8. Pantojan. respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s motion for default On February 19. Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Emmanuel C. every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. On March 5. declare the defending party in default. declaring them in default and denying their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) Motion to Declare them in Default. and proof of such failure. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of . the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party should be with notice to the defending party. As petitioners failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. In filing motions. HELD: 1. 2001). Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March 5. Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was submitted for decision. they immediately sought the services of Atty. as amended. 2001 that they were able to meet with Atty. the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. 2001. 2001. it is provided that the court shall. the court shall. On that date (March 7. However. Default. claiming that upon receipt of the summons. as well as the answer. such error is not so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 2001. In an order dated February 20. February 15. arguing that said motion was rendered moot and academic by the February 12. to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in default. On February 27. Thereupon. Metrobank also chided petitioners for violating the threeday notice rule under Sec. 2001. Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare defendant in default. upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party. Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to admit answer. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. The CA further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled hearing of Metrobank’s motion. Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2001. 2001.

2001). The Order of Default of the Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is deemed ADMITTED. 2001. Philip Pantojan but it was only on February 12. they were unaware "of the consequences of delay in the filing of their answer. the trial court had properly declared them in default. 2001 declaring petitioners in default and setting the exparte presentation of Metrobank?s evidence on March 7. and proof of such failure. 2001. On February 27. - ISSUE: 1. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (or "Metrobank") filed a complaint for sum of money against spouses Humberto and Carmencita delos Santos (or "petitioners") before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. that under Section 3. the court shall. 2001. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court.R. Metrobank filed an opposition to petitioners’ motion to admit answer. 3. On that date (March 7. The Decision of the Court of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Victoria A. Pantojan. Emmanuel C. the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant. On March 5. Metrobank opposed the motion. declare the defending party in default. declaration of If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor. Petitioners alleged that not being "learned in law". 2001. respondent judge issued an order holding in abeyance the ex-parte reception of evidence pending resolution of petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default." On the same date. presided over by Hon. 2001. 2006 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court FACTS: On January 3. Default. 68 - - - It also ruled that for an order of default to be set aside. as well as the answer. arguing that said motion was rendered moot and academic by the February 12. The CA did not find the excuse proffered by petitioners. Petition for review is GRANTED. 2001. Metrobank presented its evidence and the case was submitted for decision. Thereupon. the motion to admit answer was denied. 2001. petitioners must have a meritorious defense or that something could be gained by having the order of default set aside The CA further found unmeritorious the contention of petitioners that they were declared in default without giving them ample time to file an opposition to Metrobank’s Motion to Declare them in Default. On March 2. there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may declare the defending party in default. respondent judge disregarded petitioners’ opposition to Metrobank’s motion for default On February 19. unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. petitioners filed an opposition to Metrobank’s motion to declare them in default. The motion was set for hearing on February 16. HELD: 1. 2001 that they A2010 Avena were able to meet with Atty. On February 15. Disposition. such error is not so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. February 15. Acting on the motion. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders. In an order dated February 16. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. and proof of such failure. on February 8. filed a motion to declare them in default. claiming that upon receipt of the summons. The CA further declared that even assuming that the trial court committed a procedural lapse in declaring petitioners in default before the scheduled hearing of Metrobank’s motion. and that since it is clear from the records that the reglementary period for filing an answer had expired with no responsive pleading filed by petitioners. upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party in default. petitioners filed a motion to lift the order of default. 2001. 153696 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ: September 11. Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to - - . it is provided that the court shall.Civil Procedure Digest such motion to the defending party. CARPIO) G. The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below. 2001 order. NO. SPOUSES DELOS SANTOS VS RTC (HON. Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2001. 2001. petitioners were served with the summons. WON LITIS PENDENTIA raised by petitioners as an affirmative defense is a meritorious defense. they immediately sought the services of Atty. 2001. As petitioners failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. 2001. Carpio (or "respondent judge"). 2001. In an order dated February 20. together with a copy of the complaint. issued an order dated February 12. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the March 5. EMMANUEL C. respondent judge issued an order denying petitioners’ motion to lift the order of default and setting the reception of Metrobank’s evidence on March 7. the lower court. as previously scheduled. Clearly. petitioners filed a motion to admit answer. upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party. it is not enough that the defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to be a sufficient ground for declaration in default. Prof. and the Orders denying their Motion to Lift the Order of Default and their Motion for Reconsideration. Metrobank. Metrobank also chided petitioners for violating the threeday notice rule under Sec. declaring them in default and denying their Opposition to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company’s (Metrobank) Motion to Declare them in Default. declare the defending party in default. CA denied the petition for lack of merit and accordingly dismissed the same. 2001 order but their motion was denied. 2001. YES ReasoningSection 3. 4. On January 22.

petitions. or that a contract be proved in a certain way. repudiation or renunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal partnership of gains. No. and 1405. Also. or any other power which has for its object an act appearing or which should appear in a public document. when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable. Tomacruz.hence this petition . so the order was erroneous. As plaintiffs into. the court must give the party plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint if he so chooses. actress Dauden-Hernaez. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. ISSUES 1. or reserve to the plaintiff the right to amend his complaint. INC. The Court then ruled that there is no need. Hence. 1. as the present rule on default requires the filing of a motion and notice of such motion to the defending party. Paeste v Jaurigue: “Amendments to pleadings are favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice.. transmission. (1280a) . even a private one.Upon motion of defendants. attached to the motion 11 Article 1356. In such cases. either public or private”. files a complaint to recover P14. respondent court dismissed the complaint because “claim of plaintiff was not evidenced by any written document. or should prejudice a third person. Prior to the present rule on default introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The purpose of a notice of a motion is to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time to study and meet the arguments. Section 4. 913). Disposition. it is not enough that the defendant failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period to be a sufficient ground for declaration in default. The first order of dismissal did not provide that the same was without prejudice to amendment of the complaint. vol. J. and not accompanied by an affidavit of merits. and that the second motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the period for appeal because it was not served on 3 days’ notice.. every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. The notice of a motion is required when the party has the right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. 2. In filing motions. .court denied the reconsideration and the leave to amend. (2) The cession.a second reconsideration was filed . as amended. against private respondents Hollywood Far East Productions (HFEP) and its President Valenzuela . . modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property. 1403. 4. denying reconsideration. the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be exercised. 1969 NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari to set aside certain orders of the CFI dismissing a complaint for breach of contract and damages. The Decision of the Court of Appealsis REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is DIRECTED to continue with deliberate speed with the proceedings in the case below. chattels or things in action are governed by STRIKING OUT PLEADINGS DAUDEN-HERNAEZ V ANGELES. which is violation of A 1356 because the contract sued upon was not alleged to be in writing. Petition for review is GRANTED. Hearing of motion. FACTS . and for admission of an amended complaint. (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public document. since a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. 49 Phil. that is. A motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading". No.court denied it as its allegations were more or less the same as the first motion.. specifically provides: Sec. at any time before a responsive pleading is served. a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course. provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The court further declared the dismissal final and unappealable. in whatever form they may have been entered Prof.the respondent court’s defense: The proposed amendment suffers from the same vital defect of the original complaint.Petitioner. 376). The Order of Default of the Regional Trial Court is SET ASIDE and the Answer filed by petitioners is deemed ADMITTED.Plaintiff sought reconsideration of the dismissal. under section 1 of Rule 17.Civil Procedure Digest declare the defending party in default. refusing to admit an amended complaint. Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.700 (the balance allegedly due to her for her services as leading actress). Rules of Court. 69 . . and the complaint was “Defective on its face” for violating CC A 1356 and 135811. ed.YES Reasoning Twhen a court sustains a demurrer or motion to dismiss. plus damages. the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the original dismissed complaint. All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds five hundred pesos must appear in writing. Contracts shall be obligatory. (Torres vs.L. A2010 Avena HOLLYWOOD FAR EAST PRODUCTIONS. The following must appear in a public document: (1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation. petitioner was within her rights in filing her so-called second motion for reconsideration. Article 1358. which was actually a first motion against the refusal to admit the amended complaint. as well as for containing defective allege. (3) The power to administer property. and VALENZUELA 27 SCRA 1276 REYES. 1952. p. without leave of court. However. Therefore. But sales of goods. that requirement is absolute and indispensable. (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule. April 30. Victoria A. Section 1 of the former Rule 18 on default is silent on whether or not there is need for a notice of a motion to declare defendant in default. and A 1358 in because the writing was absolute and indispensable because the amount exceeds P500. Moreover. 2 and 1405. WON xxx HELD 1. (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default. (Moran on the Rules of Court. However. the present rule expressly requires that the motion of the claiming party should be with notice to the defending party. sales of real property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403. WON the plaintiff-petitioner was entitled as of right to amend the original dismissed complaint 2. articles.B. and declaring the dismissal final and unappealable.

under Section 1(h). Victoria A. the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. It may be subject of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The complaint alleged. and the case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not at variance with this decision. no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice.529. None of them claimed that they raised any objections at the time when petitioner presented its evidence to prove its payment to PNB. losses or penalties which petitioner may pay or suffer on account of its guarantees. G. Aguirre (Aguirre). issued an Order suspending the case only . (iv) thereafter. in the higher interest of substantial justice and pursuant to the hornbook doctrine that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. respondent appellate court could not have Prof. Philippine British Assurance Co.959. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted the presentation of the said evidence. but the parties go to trial thereon.57 was paid by petitioner to the PNB through the account of the National Treasury to cover the principal loan and interests incurred by PII. (vi) respondents Solid and PBAC also refused to pay petitioner despite demand.D. Respondent BF Homes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it is undergoing rehabilitation receivership in the SEC and pursuant to P. Respondents contend that since they had already alleged the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as an affirmative defense in their answer.” Disposition The order dismissing the complaint is set aside. Nevertheless. Dela Rosa. an order dismissing an action may be appealed by ordinary appeal. Pilar Development Corporation (PDC) and Tomas B. B. introduces sufficient evidence to constitute the particular cause of action which it intended to allege in the original complaint.035. Hence. the testimony of petitioner's Treasury Department Manager and a debit memo from the PNB proving that petitioner had paid the PNB in the amount of P19. they shall be treated in all respects. (BF Homes). when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. Inc. (ii) PII. to pay or reimburse petitioner upon demand such amount of money or to repair the damages. petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence pursuant to Section 5. Likewise. No. Inc. seeking to amend the pertinent portions of the complaint insofar as it refers to the fact of payment and the amount paid by petitioner to PNB.256. During trial. and the plaintiff. Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court. A2010 Avena as against respondent BF Homes and denying respondent PII's motion to dismiss. more specifically.. thus in effect. 902-A. PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES. Inc. The record shows that respondents did not raise any objection when it presented evidence to prove payment to PNB. this petition. (v) PII refused to settle said obligations. Prior to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the motion to admit the amendment should not have been denied. BF Homes. as provided for in Section 5. Respondent PII also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. the trial court. Thereafter. INC. they shall be treated PHILIPPINE EXPORT vs. ISSUES: (1) WON an order dismissing a petition without prejudice should be appealed by way of ordinary appeal. The trial court. its treasury department manager. (2) WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner failed to state a cause of action for not alleging loss or actual payment made by it to PNB under its guarantees. that: (i) petitioner issued 5 Letters of Guarantee in favor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for credit accommodations extended by PNB to PII. 1985. through Judge Roberto M. without objection. (3) WON the complaint stated a cause of action.256. as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Lagman. 120384 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The SC issued referred the case to the Court of Appeals for disposition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied by Judge de la Rosa. Inc. 70 committed any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing CA-G. hearing on the merits ensued.R. 31483. A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by respondents reveal that none of them denied petitioner's claim that said evidence was presented before the trial court without objections having been raised by respondents. PNB called on the guarantees of petitioner. (Solid). (PBAC). (2) YES. Homes. representing the aggregate amount of the guarantees of petitioner called by PNB and the further sum of P351. 16 the Court gives due course to the present petition. Subsequently. Consequently. January 13. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.Civil Procedure Digest amended their complaint before it was answered.36. dismissing the case without prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Considering that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated in 1994. and the defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet the cause of action thus established. This is not plausible. (PII). petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo.517. (iii) on April 24. at that time presided by Judge Joselito J. reversing the Order issued by Judge Lagman five years earlier. It should be stressed that the amendment of the complaint was sought after petitioner had already presented evidence. issued the assailed Order. Acting on the motion to amend. PDC and Aguirre executed a Deed of Undertaking binding themselves. among others. Hence. jointly and severally. HELD: (1) NO (under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The Solid Guaranty.57 representing various fees and charges. SP No. petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari against the trial court. 2004 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against respondents Philippine Infrastructures. who testified that the amount of P19. The other respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings.R. Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court.57 pursuant to the guarantees it accorded to respondent PII. petitioner demanded from PII the immediate settlement of P20. an issue is joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been previously joined by the most perfect pleadings.F. However. It is settled that even if the complaint be defective.035. when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. there was no further need for them to raise an objection at the time the evidence was introduced.

86-38169 be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 29). The date when a civil action is deemed commenced is determined by section 389 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ISSUE 1. the original complaint. Under section 389.R. 1936 an amended complaint was filed to which another demurrer was interposed but was overruled.The right to amend a pleading is not an absolute and unconditional right. On June 11. May 17. In this third amended complaint the placer claims were reduced. by itself. et al. that an amended complaint and the answer thereto take the place of the originals which are thereby regarded as abandoned. and the relief prayed for was about the same as that asked in the original complaint. Filing/ Service of pleadings. 1935. 71 SURIGAO MINING V HARRIS 68 PHIL 113 LAUREL. upon the other hand.It is true. since the plaintiff did not become the owner of the claims until after the original complaint was filed on October 24.Exhibits O and O-1 to 0-9 were presented. 148361 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. .. No. which is no cause of action whatsoever cannot by amendment or supplemental pleading be converted into a cause of action: Nihil do re accrescit ei qui nihil in re quando jua accresceret habet. to eleven. Reasoning Subject to certain qualifications and except as otherwise provided by law. Manila. With the exception of Exhibit O-7. . FACTS . DISPOSITIVE: The petition is GRANTED. Surigao Consolidated Mining Co. . judgments and other papers BAUTISTA V MAYA-MAYA COTTAGES INC G. Let the original records of Civil Case No. is of course not without any restriction. although the amount sought as damages was increased to P49. Respondents' obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents. Ratio Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced. . The mere inclusion in petitioner's original complaint of the allegation that the PNB had already called on the guarantees of petitioner is sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. 1935. plaintiff's right of action had not yet accrued." The original complaint was filed on October 24. when the action was commenced. an action commenced before the cause of action has accrued Prof. stated a valid cause of action. Surigao Mining filed a complaint claiming that it is the owner by purchase of 14 placer claims and that lode claims were staked by the defendants Harris. 29. The mining claims conveyed by Maximo Borromeo. the proceedings thus initiated are not subject to the arbitrary control of the parties or of the court. provided. Inc. . the date of the filing of the original complaint.On November 23. A2010 Avena had been validly and duly staked and located by the plaintiff or its grantors and predecessors in interest. to Surigao Mining under Exhibit O-9 were the same claims acquired by Maximo Borromeo. Exhibit O-7 is a deed of sale executed by Pablo Atillo in favor of Maximo Borromeo on January 23.. It is to be allowed in furtherance of justice under a sound judicial discretion.In this case. Amendments must be such. Surigao-Mainit Mining Syndicate. (3) YES. This judicial discretion. an objection on this ground is properly and seasonably interposed. all are deeds of sale in favor of Surigao Mining covering the placer claims and bear dates posterior to (AFTER) October 24. NO. Respondents' failure to object to the evidence at the time it is presented in court is fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever perceived defect the complaint had was cured by the introduction of petitioner's evidence proving actual loss sustained by petitioner due to payment made by it to PNB. The CFI granted the MTD.On October 24. for continuation of the trial on the merits. timely objection was made by counsel for the appellees upon discovery of the immaturity of the action. petitioner had become liable to pay the amounts covered by said guarantees when. the defendants moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that. 1935. 1935. . a copy of which was attached to the complaint. 1936 the CFI entered an order requiring Surigao Mining to amend its complaint so as to contain a detailed description of its placer claims. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint HELD 1. Disposition Order appealed from is AFFIRMED. and a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such later accrued cause of action is not permissible. . The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while it is pending is of no moment. however. which was taken from section 405 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California. Nov. Victoria A. as are necessary to promote the completion of the action begun.Before Surigao Mining could close its evidence. but must be dealt with in accordance with recognized rules of pleading and practice.Civil Procedure Digest in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 1939 NATURE Appeal from the order of the CFI of Surigao dismissing the complaint filed by Surigao Mining against Harris. That.000. and only such. 1935. the PNB called upon said guarantees. In the present petition. the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending. and Otto Weber on plaintiff's placer claims after the latter is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. 2005 NATURE . On January 9. under Exhibit O-7. as the original complaint alleges. The cause of action must exist at the time the action was begun. Clearly therefore. As soon as an action is brought and the complaint is filed. the action is deemed commenced upon the "filing of a complaint in the office of the clerk of the court in which the action is to be instituted. the defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the complaint was ambiguous and unintelligible. 1936.On January 13. a third amended complaint in which thirty-two other individuals were included as parties-defendant. 1935. Petitioner's cause of action against respondents stemmed from the obligation of respondents under their Deed of Undertaking. and the plaintiff will not be allowed by an amendment to introduce a cause of action which had no existence when the action was commenced.

ISSUE/S WON CA decision should be reversed HELD NO . . with application for a preliminary injunction. hence.Section 2. 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . Aquino is counsel of petitioner and there is nothing to show that he withdrew as counsel of petitioner. . . alleging that the amended complaint does not cure the defect in the original complaint which does not state a cause of action. as petitioner’s counsel on record. Aquino. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. .Clients are bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. disqualified under the Constitution from acquiring public alienable lands except by lease. 5 of Rule 13 of RoC. 2 mos later. regardless of whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. What the civil docket clerk of the trial court should have done was to resort to substituted service. Aquino was returned to sender.Atty. filed with the RTC a complaint for cancellation of petitioners’ title and damages. 141484 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ.MMCI. . . Arnold M.Petitioner went to CA on petition for certiorari. a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading. petitioner should be deemed as having no notice of the trial court decision since its counsel. respondent Judge resorted in causing the service of the decision to said counsel in open court. Reconsideration was also denied. and cannot be considered a real party in interest.Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a lot in Batangas. the copy of the decision mailed to him by registered mail although returned unserved is sufficient to serve as notice to him and to his client following Sec. Aquino was no longer its lawyer. . .RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss. may file an amended complaint even after the original complaint was ordered dismissed. CA found no abuse of discretion and dismissed the petition. respondent court issued assailed resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration or to quash writ of execution. although no notice of withdrawal as counsel was filed by him.This petition is filed by GCP. 72 GCP-MANNY TRANSPORT SERVICES INC. while copy sent to Atty. The only . seeking reversal of CA decision.As to petitioners’ contention that MMCI is barred from acquiring the subject lot. respondent’s theory of the case is substantially modified. was returned “unserved” being unclaimed. Jose de Luna entered his appearance as new counsel for the petitioner with motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion for execution or the quashal of the writ of execution on the ground that petitioner had not been duly notified. V. there would be no end to litigation so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced. who had not withdrawn as such.Petitioners had not yet filed a responsive pleading to the original complaint.” of execution was issued. in the case of a reply. Prof. suffice it to say that this is a matter of defense which can only be properly determined during the full-blown trial of the instant case. which is not a responsive pleading as contemplated by the Rule.Copy of decision sent to petitioner was returned because it had “moved” (residence). Aquino who refused to receive the same saying he was no longer counsel for petitioner. copy furnished to Atty. which petitioner received. as in this case. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Dispositive Petition DENIED. Aquino and petitioner which the court granted. then petitioner’s counsel.Private respondent filed a motion for execution of the judgment.CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. as a plaintiff. .Civil Procedure Digest Petition for review on certiorari assailing decision and resolution of the CA FACTS .RTC granted motion to dismiss. 2. . Petitioner states that copy of decision was personally delivered by Civil Docket Clerk of TC on Atty. and a lawyer’s mistake or negligence was admitted as a reason for the opening of a case. PRINCIPE GR No.Petitioner argues that: when a copy of the decision which the court sent to Atty. Writ at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure12 shows that before the filing of any 12 “SEC. he should file a motion to withdraw as such with the conformity of the client.Spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it does not state a cause of action.The case started when Recolizado filed complaint for damages for physical injuries sustained by him as passenger of GCP’s bus. They averred that respondent is a private corporation.MMCI filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for leave to file an amended complaint for quieting of title.Spouses filed their opposition. it was the duty of petitioner to notify the court that Atty. if a lawyer is going to withdraw as counsel for his client. Victoria A. RTC rendered decision in favor of Recolizado. What they filed was a motion to dismiss. Petitioner received a Notice of Demand for Payment from the deputies of the Ex-officio Sheriff of the RTC attaching thereto copies of the writ of execution and the decision. Respondent alleged that the technical description in petitioners’ title does not cover the disputed lot. when said lawyer appeared in the sala of respondent Judge for another case. Hence. . . A2010 Avena responsive pleading.Respondent in his Comment contends that since Atty. . provided that the order of dismissal is not yet final. Thus respondent. CA decision affirmed in toto. alleging that “without any color of right and through dubious means. .Petitioners filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. . – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or. contending that the amended complaint does not also state a cause of action and if admitted. If it were otherwise. . the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE WON the CA erred in holding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting respondent’s amended complaint HELD NO . refused to receive a copy of the same. Nov 11.” petitioners were able to obtain original title in their names. . Amendments as a matter of right.

Aquino. it also failed to ensure that it could be notified of the decision as soon as it was promulgated.. Orden proposed to purchase from Romero and her siblings a property located at Denver cor. assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property in order to give due course to his application. New York Sts. Corona Romero and her siblings executed a letter-contract to sell with private respondent Saturnino Orden. QC for the total amount of P17M. Not only did it fail to regularly check on the status of the case.Orden then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the QC RTC alleging that he has complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to demand from petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. . 2000. 142406 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. No. Orden caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT. Victoria A. then the said parties are bound by the provisions of A1475 of the Civil Code (The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. . . upon the mere filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice is annotated. 16. CA cited Sec. Prof. 1997. . Aquino. Aquino This is sufficient service of the decision on petitioner since service upon counsel of record at his given address is service to petitioner. in the complaint or answer filed in the subject litigation. Orden filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the resolutions of the RTC and asked for the reannotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT. SATURNINO S. petitioner Corona told him that she was rescinding the contract to sell. Aquino refused to receive a copy of the decision and no substituted service was effected does not erase the fact that a copy of the trial court decision had earlier been sent by registered mail to Atty.When Orden failed to pay the down payment. notice sent to petitioner itself is not even necessary. in substitution of said notice and that the law does not authorize a judge to cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation. . that . by ordering the reannotation of the notice of lis pendens. Jr. CORONA ROMERO vs. the Doctrine of Lis Pendens would be rendered meaningless if the private respondents are allowed to file a bond regardless of the amount. However. they said that the general rule is “a notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined except in cases expressly provided by statute. his infractions cannot be said to have deprived petitioner of due process. . a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents abused their discretion. While it may have lost its right to appeal.Ma.RTC: denied Orden’s MR.R. resulting in serious injustice to client. Neither did it hire a new lawyer soon after Atty. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. Right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process but only a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. it was not denied its day in court. subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contract. while Atty. Santos.” Second. R13 ROC). 73 COMPUTATION OF TIME SPS. the CA went against the doctrine in Villanueva vs. Third.Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint. the balance of P10M not later than December 19.The contract stipulated that private respondent shall pay petitioner the amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale. the parties may reciprocally demand performance. Petitioners’ contention.They filed a motion for the cancellation of lis pendens which the RTC granted in its Resolution saying that the evidence presented by Orden does not bear out the main allegations in the complaint and that he does not have any actionable right over the subject property there being no deed of sale executed between him and the defendants over the subject real properties as offered in the alleged agreement. Manuel Y. In this case.Petitioner was able to actively participate in the proceedings a quo. . Obiter Court reiterates the distinction between petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and petition for certiorari under Rule 65. . . Petitioner did not inform the court that it has severed its relationship with Atty.Petitioner was wanting in all these areas. overlooked the fact that the motion for cancellation was set for hearing on November 12.In said contract.) -CA denied Romeros MR on January 26. in the present case. 1996 and that Orden shall shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property. subsequent buyers of the subject property sold by Corona and her siblings. Fourth.From that moment. the trial court had sent a copy of the decision to petitioner’s known address. CONRADO and MA. in concluding that there was no hearing before the annotation was cancelled. 1997. .That Atty. 1998. Limsico. Even then. the CA. if there was indeed an agreement to sell between the petitioner and the private respondents-owners (which question of fact is not for this court to determine in this petition). When petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless. It should be recalled that a petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment while a petition under Rule 65 concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. counsel of petitioner. and Aloysius R.August 11. 2005 NATURE Petition for certiorari filed [R65] FACTS . . ORDEN G. was far from being vigilant in protecting the interest of his client. CA.The CA granted the petition on 4 grounds: First.77 of PD 1529-Property Registration Decree which provided for two grounds for the court to order the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens during the pendency of an action which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party. filed a motion for leave to intervene with the RTC and were admitted as defendants-intervenors. . when private respondent did not even assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property. Cubao. May 16. Court of Appeals where this Court held that the applicant must. Aquino allegedly ceased to be its counsel. A2010 Avena Disposition Petition is dismissed. . or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded (NOW SEC 14. .Civil Procedure Digest exception to the general rule is when the counsel’s actuations are gross or palpable. there is no reason to overturn well-settled jurisprudence.In cases where service was made on the counsel of record at his given address.Nov.

a simple reading of the complaint would show that such was Prof. In such event. the CA was correct in ruling that while the parties are locked in legal battle and until it becomes manifest that the grounds set forth in Sec. . CA: a notice of lis pendens is appropriate in the following: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate. SR. within which to file a petition for review of the said resolution with the Court of Appeals. lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated.The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment. On March 22. or requiring its transfer or sale. It is essential that the property be directly affected such as when the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession. P. pending the continuance of the action. HELD NO. 2002. or to enforce a lien. In due course. -Said annotation cannot be considered as a collateral attack against the certificate of title based on the principle that the registration of a notice of lis pendens does not produce a legal effect similar to a lien. 2002. (b) an action to quiet title thereto. of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate subsequently. a notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the title. 77. Inc. Court of Appeals where it was held that a notice of lis pendens may be annotated only where there is an action or proceeding in court which affects title to or possession of real property. the trial court should not allow the cancellation of the lis pendens.Yared vs. the National Amnesty Commission (NAC) issued a Resolution affirming that of the Local Amnesty Board. This is sufficient for purposes of annotating lis pendens. -Lim v. or an equitable estate or interest in. or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title. -To put the property under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens. Section 4 of NAC Administrative Order No. . 2002. the court a quo cancelled the notice of lis pendens even before it has been apprised of all the relevant facts of the case. 2. all a party has to do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property. Orden’s contention. or the enforcement of a lien. -Atlantic Erectors. the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio. Vera Cruz: Founded upon public policy and necessity.D. . . Orden in effect asks the court to order petitioners to fulfill their promise to sell the property for the amount of P17M. In their Reply. power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit. docketed as Criminal Case No. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the NAC. the petitioner filed an application for amnesty with the Local Amnesty Board for Metro Manila. which literally means pending suit. ISSUE WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation of the lis pendens. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon the filing of a case in court. and (2) to bind a purchaser. the petitioner had until December 7. . Reasoning.Civil Procedure Digest private respondent was duly notified but failed to appear. Series of 1999. Dispositive the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1988. vs. refers to the jurisdiction. 1997. 2004 NATURE Petition for review of the Resolution of the CA FACTS -On July 18. Victoria A. vs. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. and that he was able to file his opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens which the RTC considered before promulgating its Resolution dated November 26. 74 his intent. even on the basis of an unregistered deed of sale. per its Resolution dated November 13. 2002. and (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.There is no requirement that the party applying for the annotation must prove his right or interest over the property sought to be annotated.Magdalena Homeowners Association. It only protects the applicant’s rights which will be determined during trial. vs. They further maintain that the requirement of prior hearing was sufficiently complied with in this case and petitioners did not act in bad faith when she sold the subject property pending the outcome of this case since there was no outstanding injunction or restraining order which would have prevented her from doing so. 2002. On December 9. possession. vs. Petitioners have failed to show that the CA committed GAD. and until final judgment. . the petitioner was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.: Resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property but also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to. SEP 24. Thus. -By praying for the Romeros to be bound by the terms of their contract (ie. though the title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. Ilarde: Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. Inc. the petitioner filed a motion in the appellate court for an . LUZ V NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION 00 SCRA 00 CALLEJO. Heirs of Eugenio Lopez. -Under Rule III. or the right of possession to specific property. 427. Sr. No. Inc. Specific performance and damages). (c) an action to remove clouds thereon. 1529 exist.The rules merely require that an affirmative relief be claimed since a notation of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. Enriquez: Lis pendens. a copy of which was received by the petitioner on November 22. petitioners reiterate their arguments and cited AFP Mutual Benefit Association. a Saturday. bona fide or not. the board denied the said application. Herbal Cove Realty Corp. (d) an action for partition. such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal action. On August 26. a charge or an encumbrance against it. and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. 2000. -While Orden did not explicitly state that he was running after the ownership of the property. a specific real property.The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the litigation A2010 Avena within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. It is not necessary that ownership or interest over the property is proved.

On December 26. which provides that any extension of time to file the required pleading should be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that the said due date is a Saturday.3 -The Court clarified the provision when it issued A. HELD NO. Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court. 00-2-14-SC. -The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for granting the petitioner’s first motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file his petition for review. He reasoned that since he filed his motion for extension of time to file his petition for review on the said date. it merely applied. Sunday or legal holiday. which reads: Whereas. By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a judgment on compromise and by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case together with the Robellados. within which to file his petition. Sunday. the appellate court would have acted with grave abuse of its discretion. 2000. we cannot set aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not originally a party to a case may be acquired. the petitioner failed to file his petition for review.M. Reasoning. Sunday. December 7. How to compute time. 2002. -December 24. Dispositive Petition granted 75 SUMMONS modes of service 1. the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s second motion for having been filed out of time. jurisdiction over the defendants can be acquired by the court upon service of valid summons and upon voluntary appearance/submission of a person in court. or legal holiday. Voluntary submission RODRIGUEZ VS ALIKPALA (supra) FACTS -Spouses Tolentino were co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a compromise with Spouses Rebollado VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of judgment of the City Court. service in person TOYOTA CUBAO V. 2002 as prayed for by the petitioner. falls on a Saturday. CA (GUEVARRA) G. 2002 or until December 22. as clarified by the Court via its Resolution in A. No. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules. December 8.M. within which to file said petition. 00-2-14-SC. the Tolentinos effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the City Court. And even assuming that estoppel lies. reckoned from December 7. Under the circumstances. In so doing.R. the CA issued a Resolution granting the petitioner’s first motion for a fifteen-day extension counted from December 7. the aforecited provision applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday. and not from December 9. The petitioner alleged therein that he had just engaged the services of counsel who needed additional time to study the case and draft the petition. upon proper conditions. Sunday or legal holiday so that when a motion for extension of time is filed. Petitioner’s motion for a second extension of time to file his petition for review was filed out of time. NOW THEREFORE. or legal holiday. 2002. the filing of the said pleading on the next working day is deemed on time. Sunday. ISSUE WON the petitioner timely filed his second motion for extension of time to file his petition for review. -On August 19. October 23.Civil Procedure Digest extension of fifteen (15) days from December 9. Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted. the due date ceases to be the last day and hence. 2002. 2002 within which to file his petition. 3. -The extension granted by the Court of Appeals should be tacked to the original period and commences immediately after the expiration of such period. 2002. If the last day of the period. or until December 24. as thus computed. 2002. or by any applicable statute. -Jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be acquired by the court upon filing of the complaint. the CA has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension it granted from a date later than the expiration of such period.M. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday. December 7. or a legal holiday. 2003.M. or by order of the court. 126321 VITUG. However. 2003. for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar. of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Section 1. 2003. since the last day to file his petition was a Saturday. Section 1. The petitioner filed his petition for review with the Court of Appeals on January 10. the CA issued a Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion. the said motion was timely filed. 00-2-14-SC. instead of from Prof. 2002. the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday. the petitioner filed a second motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from December 26. and the next day. December 25. with fealty. to declare that Section 1. On the other hand. or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits. Had the CA granted the petitioner�s first motion for extension and reckoned the fifteenday period from December 9. No. a Sunday. in which case. voluntary appearance 2. 2003 Resolution claiming that. A2010 Avena the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. relying on A. thru the voluntary appearance of the person before the court. No. the time shall not run until the next working day. No. 2002. the last day for filing the petition was December 9. as amended. Section 1. the Court Resolves. On February 20. 00-2-14-SC issued on February 29. the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 20. the provision no longer applies. 2002 was declared a national holiday. Under the Resolution of this Court in A. 2002 was also a holiday. Victoria A. the Tolentinos are estopped the very authority they invoked. 2002 was a Sunday. No. 2002. -On January 13. Rule 22. 2002 or until January 10. 2002. Whereas. 2003. 1997 NATURE . regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday.

1992 -Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned unclaimed on account of petitioner's failure to claim the same despite the postmaster's three (3) successive notices on November 25. The RTC explained that petitioner had been unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner's wife. -No appeal having been taken by the petitioner.R. The Deputy Sheriff. VHF PHIL. the MeTC decision became final and executory. 138500 FACTS -VHF Phils filed an ejectment suit in the MeTC against Quelnan involving a condominium unit -MeTC in favor of VHF Phils. The constitutional requirement of due process. upon a finding that petitioner's petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond the 60-day mandatory period therefor under Section 3. exacts that the service (of summons) be such as may reasonably be expected to give the notice desired. implementing the writ. -TC in favor of Toyota . would have again been a denial to the defendant (herein private respondent) of his right to due process. Laguna. Disposition PETITION DENIED. but already too late in the day for him to get relief from that court. -VHF went to SC but SC remanded to CA -CA-in a decision dated September 17. Calamba. Regional Trial Court. unfortunately. Inc. however. -petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Laguna. the RTC granted petitioner's petition for relief and set aside the MeTC decision. thereunder alleging. The fact of the matter was that Guevarra evidently had been unaware of the proceedings before the RTC. instead. He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection therewith.” -Toyota claims that Guevarra had failed to file an ANSWER within the reglementary period. G. and stated that he was not aware of any case instituted against him.a writ of execution was issued to implement the decision. Rule 38 of the Rules of . Reasoning It is not here disputed that substituted service of summons has been resorted to by the process server but that. 1992 by substituted service" and that petitioner "failed to file his answer within the reglementary period". For the appellate court to have accepted the affidavit favorably on its face value. 1997. Guevarra turned over the vehicle but filed a certiorari petition before the CA claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because of a defective service of summons on him. -Process Server Antonio Rimas of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba. tore the summons and complaint in the ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble." in the case at bar. No. September 16. 1992 and December 11. Upon learning of the adverse decision. came out with a decision dated November 23. by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint but refused to sign. due process is served. -on its finding that "summons together with a copy of the complaint was served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25. without hearing. "the requirement of justice is answered. The appellate court neither abused its discretion nor was in error when it refused to consider the affidavit of the process server (declaring the concomitant facts required to be incorporated in the return) which was presented to it for the first time only as an annex to its Reply filed with the tribunal.Civil Procedure Digest Petition for review FACTS -Petitioner Toyota Cubao. -a writ of execution. thru her sister-in-law. private respondent appears to have been notified of the case for the first time only at the time the levy on execution of judgment was effected by the sheriff. Quezon City. Jr. Laguna. it read in full: "Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court. the server's return did not state the facts or the needed particulars that could justify the substituted service. National Capital Judicial Region. the writ of execution.YES. Chu. the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied. submitted to the trial court a return on the service.. -CA in favor of Guevarra-annulled and set aside the default judgment. this Court has held in Boticano vs. 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to his knowledge. he filed. has said that "Irregularities of this kind (substituted service) (might) be cured by proof that the copies (have) actually been delivered to the defendant. Once the service provided by the rules accomplishes that end. -Guevarra failed to make good the check -Toyota a civil case for collection of the unpaid account. 1996. 1992. -The check was dishonored. the herein attached original summon in the above entitled case with the information that it was duly served to the defendant DANILO A. Substituted service QUELNAN V.. The notice of levy was served on Guevarra personally but he refused to sign the receipt thereof. -trial court issued the summons to Guevarra at his address in 29 Burgos Street." Although Moran. WON service of summons is defective HELD 2. GARCIA. -petitioner filed the registry return card indicating receipt of the motion -trial court granted petitioner's Motion To Declare Defendant In Default and allowed an ex-parte presentation of petitioner's evidence. a notice of levy and a notice to vacate were served on petitioner's wife who acknowledged receipt thereof. December 7. on the Rules of Court. in a fit of anger. adding that he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on May 18. moved to declare Guevarra in default. through registered mail with return card. GLORIA CABALLES. GUEVARRA. at 29 Burgos Street. levied on Guevarra's Toyota Corolla. 2005 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari 76 4. -In a decision dated June 3. A copy of the motion was furnished Guevarra. The repair costwas paid by means of BPI Check drawn by Guevarra in favor of Toyota. Calamba. 1992. the levy upon execution and the sale at public auction of the vehicle-saying that substituted service of summons was not valid -Toyota went to SC A2010 Avena ISSUE 2. a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. Branch 92. undertook repairs on the car owned by private respondent Guevarra. Victoria A. expressed surprise over it. that he was never served with summons and was completely unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit. Prof.

conformably with Rule 13. (GUCCI). as attorney’s fees 5.000.00. who received the same on April 22. In such a case. 2003. if the addressee fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of the first notice. subsequent notices were sent by the postmaster on December 7. a certification that the registered mail was unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the sender after three successive notices was issued by the postmaster. 3.NO. service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. Samonte levied respondents’ house and lot and the same was scheduled to be sold at public auction on June 7. -On March 24. Hence. 1993. it was only on May 24. the trial court rendered judgment on September 15. For Aida Torres. -On May 4.516. the service of summons to Pagtalunan was in violation of Section 6. However. 2003. -The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. For sure. (Emphasis supplied) There is no doubt that under the Rules. this petition ISSUE WON summons was not validly served on the respondents. unless the court otherwise provides. Disposition PETITION DENIED. Voluntary Submission 3. and therefore the CA correctly annulled the judgment of the RTC . the writ of execution was issued on even date. 1992. Unfortunately. No. 1992 and December 11. reversed and set aside the RTC decision and reinstated that of the MeTC. September 15. 170926 YNARES-SANTIAGO. 2003. the petition was filed way beyond the 60-day period provided by law. hence. thereby allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex-parte -After presenting petitioner’s evidence ex-parte. by whom issued Modes of Service 1. Pagtalunan. 4.58 from April. Reasoning The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given address on November 25. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee. petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Bulacan for collection of sum of money and damages -Summons against respondents were served through their Secretary. The first notice to him by the postmaster to check his mail was on November 25. For Sheryl Ann Torres the amount of P15. Indubitably. Extra-territorial Service GUIGUINTO CREDIT COOPERATIVE. ISSUE 3. Thereafter. 2003 by Process Server Valeriano P. jointly and severally. CA AFFIRMED Prof. Necessarily. Sheriff Felixberto L. which reads: SEC. HENCE ITS DECISION CANNOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster. Nonilo Torres. 2. This means that the period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to run after five days from the first notice given by the postmaster. -On August 24. WON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER. 1992. INC V TORRES G. Service in Person 4. They availed of loans from the cooperative but were unable to pay on the due dates despite demands. 2005 when the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order. 10. there arises a presumption that the service was complete at the end of the said five-day period. In short. Substituted Service 5. 2005. To pay P10. which was granted and accordingly. petitioner was deemed to have knowledge of the MeTC decision on November 30.Civil Procedure Digest Court. 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid. 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid. the Court of Appeals annulled the judgment of the trial court on the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of respondents since they were not validly served with summons and neither did they voluntarily appear in court. Thus. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court because there was no explanation why resort to substituted service of summons was made. 2004 plus legal interest until the said amount is fully paid. or on November 30. -Petitioner thereafter moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief must be reckoned from such date (November 30. 2004. 2005. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief thus expired on January 29. 1992) as this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is presumed. Voluntary Appearance 2. Badato -On November 18. 1992. Costs of suit. Inc. -According to the appellate court.93 from April. service of said MeTC decision became effective five (5) days after November 25.80 from April. whichever date is earlier. service becomes effective upon the expiration of five (5) days therefrom. are members of Guiguinto Credit Cooperative. 77 SUMMONS – RULE 14 Contents. HELD 3. 1992. This is because a party is deemed to have received and to have been notified of the judgment at that point. petitioner filed a motion to declare respondents in default -TC granted said petition. R. when issued. it follows that service of a copy of the MeTC decision was deemed complete and effective five (5) days therefrom or on November 30. Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals FACTS -Respondents Aida Torres. A2010 Avena With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the postmaster on November 25. 1992.151. 1992. Victoria A. the amount of P163. It should be noted that petitioner was not represented by counsel during the proceedings before the MeTC. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing. Completeness of Service. For Nonilo Torres the amount of P278. ordering respondents to pay petitioner the ff: 1. and Sheryl Ann Torres-Holgado. 1992. or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have learned of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief with the RTC. The Return of Summons was filed on April 24. 1993. 1992. — Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. a certain Benita S.903. the appellate court held that respondents were deprived of their right to due process.

Honesto Bonnevie filed with the CFI Rizal a complaint against Philippine Bank of Commerce seeking the annulment of the Deed of Mortgage dated Dec 6. No explanation was stated in the Return why substituted service was resorted to through Pagtalunan. Since the substituted service was not validly effected. They assail validity and legality of the extrajudicial foreclosure on the following grounds: a) petitioners were never notified of the foreclosure sale. -In an action in personam. (3) service by publication. -Without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons. -Granting that Pagtalunan is the personal secretary of Aida Torres. Such service of summons is not binding upon respondents Nonilo and Sheryl Ann Torres whose relationship with Pagtalunan was neither readily ascertained nor adequately explained in the Return of Summons. or through the defendant’s voluntary appearance or submission to the court. the judgment by default. or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. no earnest efforts were made to locate respondent Aida Torres who was allegedly working abroad at the time summons was served on her person. P25T of which amount being payable to the Lozano spouses upon the execution of the document. the Court of Appeals correctly indecent. -Such requirements under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 must be followed strictly. trial and judgment without such service are null and void. NO. (2) personal service outside the country. therefore. service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein. and such impossibility of prompt service must be shown by stating that earnest efforts have been made to find the respondents personally and that such efforts have failed. there is no showing that the former had indeed a relationship of trust and confidence with the three respondents. haste to serve the summons at the first attempt without making sure that personal service was an impossibility because either the respondents had left for a foreign country or an unknown destination with no definite date of returning within a reasonable period. by publication and such other mode of service as the court may deem sufficient. -If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time. a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons. b) The notice of auction sale was not posted for the period required by law.History: Lozano spouses were the owners of the property which they mortgaged to secure the payment of the loan in the principal amount of P75T they were about to obtain from PBC. jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case.R. 1968. Disposition. faithfully and fully in order not to deprive any person of his property by violating his constitutional right to due process. also with leave of court. Victoria A. -The proper service of summons is a critical step in litigation because upon such service rests the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be strictly construed since it is an extraordinary method of service in derogation of personal service of summons. -This is because substituted service may only be availed of when the respondents could not be served personally within a reasonable period of time. -In the instant case. or in case of refusal. October 24. summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person. -In the absence of a valid waiver. c) publication of the notice of auction sale in the Luzon Weekly Courier was not in accordance with law. If efforts to find defendant personally makes prompt service impossible. 1966 executed in favor of the PBC by spouses Lozano. as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure made on Sept 4. the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. 1983 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA decision FACTS . Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7. . L-49101 GUERRERO. generally by the service of summons issued by the court. service may be personal. substituted. or had gone into hiding to avoid service of any process from the courts. -In the instant case. or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. as appearing in the Affidavit of Merit of Sheryl Ann Torres and attached to the Petition of Annulment filed before the Court of Appeals. substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of the said Rule.They then executed in favor of Bonnevie the Deed of Sale with Mortgage for P100T. the writ of execution issued by it. by tendering it to him. The order of default. -Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. availed of only under certain conditions imposed by the Rules of Court. there should be a report stating that Pagtalunan was one with whom respondents had a relationship of trust and confidence that would ensure that the latter will receive or be notified of the summons issued in their names. BONNEVIE V CA (Phil Bank of Commerce) G. If he is temporarily out of the country. It appears that the process server hastily and capriciously resorted to substituted service of summons without ascertaining the whereabouts of the respondents. -In these types of civil actions (in personam). and the P75T to PBC. -Where the defendant is a natural person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through coercive process. null and void.Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Avena ruled that since substituted service was availed of in lieu of personal service. Also. 78 HELD Yes. if not Prof. with leave of court. . . there was an undue. any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8. as well as the auction sale of the respondents’ properties levied on execution are. Petition is denied. Any substituted service other than that authorized under Section 7 is deemed ineffective and contrary to law. Service of such writ is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE/S 1. in business here. the Pasig Municipal Market and Pasig Municipal Hall. Ltd. They did not secure the consent of respondent Bank to the sale with assumption of mortgage. petitioners were placed on constructive notice.When the mortgage was executed by the Lozano spouses in favor of PBC. IVO prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from harassing IVO with their insistent demands to recognize the contracts entered into by Dominador and from portraying the IVO as one that defaults on its contracts and obligations and has fallen into bad times and from interfering with IVO's normal conduct of business.From April 28. YES Reasoning A mortgage follows the property whoever the possessor may be and subjects the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.Whether or not the notice of auction sale was posted for the period required by law is a question of fact. Mercado does not mean that notice should be published for three full weeks. Those contracts stipulate that any dispute between the parties will be settled through arbitration under the rules of either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) or the National Institute of Oil Seed Products (NIOP).944. 1987.387. and Pacific Molasses Co.A single act of posting (which may even extend beyond the period required by law) satisfies the requirement of law. Section 3.PBC then applied for the foreclosure of the mortgage. 3135 does not require personal notice on the mortgagor. the loan of P75T was not yet received them. Bonnevie made payments to PBC on the mortgage in the total amount of P18. had entered into several contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. intervenor Raoul. petitioner Raoul SV Bonnevie filed a motion for intervention.. .Also. which was granted. and disowned Dominador's allegedly illegal and unauthorized acts. (c) that it was notified for the first time about the alleged sale after it had foreclosed the Lozano mortgage. and are not engaged. the petitioners and 15 others. and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos.22. Petitioners voluntarily assumed it and are. 1968. nor do they have officers or agents. 1967 to July 12. and notice of sale was published in the Luzon Weekly Courier on June 30.. July 7 and July 14. auction sale was conducted a month after. therefore.PBC specifically denied most of the allegations: (a) that the defendant has not given its consent to the sale of the mortgaged property. It can no longer be entertained by this Court. The notice of sale was published in the Luzon Courier on June 30. he had transferred and assigned all his rights and interests in favor of intervenor Raoul without informing the Bank. that the property in question remained registered in the name of Lozano in the land records of Rizal and there was no entry. that the defendants have allegedly "harassed" IVO to comply with Dominador's contracts and to come to a settlement with them.Respondent Judge Soriano authorized IVO to effect extraterritorial service of summons to all the defendants through DHL Philippines Corp. the records show that copies of said notice were posted in three conspicuous places in the municipality of Pasig. Nevertheless. they are not licensed to engage. Dominador Monteverde. IVO also prayed that the defendants pay it damages worth more than P21M. 3135 merely requires that such notice shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks. 1988 NATURE Petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city. it is enough that "it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information. .The petitioners ( Dial Corp. Nalin sdn. or property in the Philippines. 1968 and notices of the sale were posted for not less than twenty days in at least three (3) public places in the Municipality where the property is located. initiated arbitration proceedings abroad. . IVO filed a complaint for injunction and damages (RTC Manila) against 19 foreign coconut oil buyers including the petitioners. The burden of proving that the posting requirement was not complied with is now shifted to the one who alleges non-compliance. YES Reasoning Act No. estopped from impugning its validity.. WON the mortgage executed by the Lozanos in favor of PBC is valid 2. and some have already obtained arbitration awards against IVO. July 7. 1968. . . The respondent Imperial Vegetable Oil Co. WON extrajudicial foreclosure is valid HELD 1. with whom Dominador had entered into contracts for the delivery of coconut oil. the petitioners were served with . (IVO) is a Philippine corporation which through its president. 1968. Costs against petitioners. such notice shall also be published once a FACTS .Civil Procedure Digest . that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers. Berisford Commodities. notation or indication of the alleged sale.On April 8. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated. Pursuant to that order. CA affirmed. .. May 31.) are foreign corporations (US. Such phrase. .00. bhb. that the Board of Directors of IVO removed Monteverde from his position as president of the corporation. as interpreted by this Court in Basa vs. 2. place of business. Because IVO defaulted under the contracts. Bonnevie then assigned all his rights under the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage to his brother." The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. . named in his place.13 Honesto 13 A2010 Avena Bonnevie was not entitled to any notice because as of May 14. Inc. . Rizal namely: the Hall of Justice. . They are not domiciled in the Philippines. and the property was sold to PBC for P84. IVO repudiated Dominador's contracts on the grounds that they were mere "paper trading in futures" as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was allegedly intended by the parties. Victoria A. MFR was also denied. Act No.To be a newspaper of general circulation. Prof.After petitioner Honesto Bonnevie had rested his case. Rodrigo Monteverde.CFI dismissed the complaint. that it is published at regular intervals. Disposition The appeal being devoid of merit. 79 DIAL CORPORATION v SORIANO (RTC Judge) 00 SCRA 00 GRINO-AQUINO. . the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. and July 14. UK and Malaysia). C & T Refinery Inc. (b) that the demand letters and notice of foreclosure were sent to Jose Lozano at his address.

133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines. namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs.e. The respondent court's finding that. and to recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such "harassment. wholly or in part. personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants. March 15. of the defendant located in the Philippines. the petitioners filed motions to dismiss the complaint against them on the ground that the extraterritorial service of summons to them was improper and that hence the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. 1. in excluding the defendants from any interest in such property for the reason that their transactions with plaintiff's former president are ultra vires. without submitting to the court's jurisdiction and only for the purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction over their persons. they opened themselves to suit before Philippine courts. real or personal. and has no resident agent on whom the summons may be served. Disposition. or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property." It assumed that the petitioners are doing business in the Philippines. which allegation the latter denied. Victoria A. not an action in rem or quasi in rem. The A2010 Avena action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants. "An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. specifically contractual rights that petitioners are enforcing against IVO" is specious for the "contractual rights" of the petitioners are not property found in the Philippines for the petitioners have not filed an action in the local courts to enforce said rights. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines. a mode of service which is resorted to when the defendant is not found in the Philippines. B. subpar. or which defendants claim liens or interests. so as to sustain a money judgment. Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment against a non-resident defendant who has no property in the Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in personam Prof. Sec. Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court: As a general rule. Even if they can be considered as such. (2) when the action relates to. 1968 NATURE Appeal from the orders of CFI Manila . They have not submitted to the jurisdiction of our courts. ISSUE WON the extra territorial service of summons was proper HELD NO. MONTALBAN V. while an action in remedies is an action against the thing itself. But. The orders of Judge Soriano are set aside. And one of the reliefs demanded consists. must be based upon personal service within the state which renders the judgment . actual or contingent. (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists." A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property.. when the defendant is not residing and is not found in the Philippines. The lower court invoked Section 33 of the Corporation Code which provides that a "foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunal on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. hence null and void. instead of against the person." Respondents' contention that "the action below is related to property within the Philippines. and that they may be served with summons and other court processes through their agents or representatives enumerated in paragraph 2 of the complaint. 80 over non-residents. As the civil case filed is a personal action. The complaint is dismissed as against the petitioners for failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over them. or the subject of which is.P. 1987. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides only 4 instances in which extraterritorial service of summons is proper. . the Corporation Code did not repeal the rules requiring proper service of summons to such corporations as provided in Rule 14 of the ROC and Section 128 of the Corporation Code. actual or inchoate. i. pursuant to Sec.Civil Procedure Digest summons and copy of the complaint by DHL courier service. The extraterritorial service of summons on the petitioners is held to be improper. legal or equitable. 21. or is intended to seize or dispose of any property. The court denied their motions to dismiss and upheld the validity of the extraterritorial service of summons to them on the ground that "the present action relates to property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines. property within the Philippines. the personal status of the plaintiff or the property of the defendant and their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. they have jurisdiction over the res." The petitioners' motions for reconsideration of that order were also denied by the court.On April 25. by filing motions to dismiss. Blg. The petition for certiorari is granted. does not transact business here. wholly or in part. for then. Hence this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. extraterritorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec. MAXIMO 22 SCRA 1070 SANCHEZ. in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest. is contradicted by its order authorizing IVO to summon them by extraterritorial service. Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders." Furthermore. in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines. not extraterritorial service. Interim Rules of Court. or which the plaintiff has attached. 129). the Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in personam. Venue in such cases may be laid in the province where the property of the defendant or a part thereof involved in the litigation is located. 3-a. In an action for injunction. is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach. the petitioners hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint that they are doing business in the Philippines without any license. "as foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines without a license. it may be validly tried by the Philippine courts. Section 17. and (4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of the plaintiff. nor any property in the Philippines in which the defendants have or claim an interest.

the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person so the trial and the decision were null and void. FACTS .Even if the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over De Midgely.The SC cited the Perkins case as a precedent. Orders affirmed. “When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. Maximo replied that he was not aware of the civil case against him and that he was acquitted in the criminal case. Maximo. Victoria A. Summons were served at the Malabon Parish where Fr. caused extraterritorial service of summons to be made through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid. it ruled that in a quasi in rem action jurisdiction over a non resident defendant is not essential. Prof. Fr. Spain..Quemada. They further alleged that earnest efforts . Maximo was in Europe when the summons were served. HELD No. or. Maximo of the issuance of writ of execution and demanded payment. Fr. resort to substituted service becomes a necessity. The judgment of the court would settle the title to the properties and to that extent it partakes of the nature of judgment in rem. 81 toward a compromise have not been made as required in the Civil Code in suits between members of the same family. The suit was to settle the question of ownership over certain properties and rights in some mining claims as Quemada believed that those properties belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor. Copy received by Fr. Maximo at the Malabon Catholic Church informing him of the lower court’s decision and requesting hi to comply with the decision. His verified motion was denied.The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by Ferandos indicating in the order that the action of Quemada was for the recovery of real property and real rights. was appointed as special administrator of the latter’s estate by the CFI of Cebu. Return to writ expressed that Fr. Alias writ of execution issued. ISSUE WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted service under Sec. The respondents were instructed to file their answer. . The Montalbans even wrote to Fr. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the Philippines) HELD *ON argument that Sec18 (in relation to sec17) is the sole provision that governs summons upon a defendant temporarily absent in an action in personam: substituted service – out of the Philippines . As such. Jr.Both De Midgely and Pastor entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as they are nonresidents. In that case. Petitioners filed suit against Fr. May 13. 2 months. . Rule 14 of ROC) therefore. Maximo in default. . The motion was denied by Judge Ferandos and he ruled that the respondents were properly summoned. Maximo. the more circuitous procedure delineated in Sections 17 and 18 is resorted to by a plaintiff if defendant’s dwelling house or residence or place of business in this country is not known. . service upon him cannot be had thereat upon the terms of Sec8. Maximo for damages. Bautista wrote to the Clerk of Court of CFI Manila informing him that Fr. Gerardo Maximo was involved in a motor vehicle accident where the son of the petitioners suffered injuries. if known. Fr. at their respective addresses in Alicante and Barcelona. Maximo is “financially hard up” and had no property. Because “public policy and sound practice demand that. who were all at that time citizens of Spain and residing in that country. It is. Sr. Certiorari and contempt. Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house in Caloocan allegedly belonging to Fr. The suit also named Atlas Mining as co-respondent. Jr. at the risk of occasional errors. -in suits in personam. If the motion is for any other purpose than to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person. and Maria Elena Achaval. it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. -On Plaintiff’s motion. judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Since personal service is impossible. -After 2 years.is but one of the modes of effective service to bring a defendant in court.Quemada. The normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by substituted service. he thereby submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court. he filed a complaint against his half siblings. MFR was rejected. and Sofia Midgely. Bautista was the one who received the summons. Fr. ISSUE/S WON Judge Ferandos gravely abused his discretion in denying De Midgely’s motion to dismissed based on the lack of jurisdiction over her person. entitled to respect. *ON fact that judgment has been long final: the judgment enjoys the presumption of regularity. The judgment is confined to the res (properties) and no personal judgment could be rendered against the non resident. Maximo was allegedly residing. allegedly the illegitimate son of Alvaro Pastor. her motion to dismiss was properly denied because Quemada’s action against her maybe regarded as a quasi in rem where jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant is not necessary and where the service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with the requirement of due process. 1975 NATURE Original Actions. . Quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owed by the parties or of some interest therein. Fr. Maximo admittedly learned of lower court’s decision and filed for ANNULMENT OF ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS on verified motion on the grounds that the summons were not duly served (based on then Sec. lower court declared Fr. Non quieta movere. The fact that she alleged as a ground for dismissal the lack of earnest effort to compromise is deemed as abandonment of her special appearance and as voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. The service of summons by publication is required merely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. Rule 7 and Sec18. It should be noted that the civil DE MIDGELY VS FERANDOS 64 SCRA 23 AQUINO.Civil Procedure Digest FACTS -Fr. on his own. Sr.” Disposition. unless striken down. . Maximo was in Europe.De Midgely filed this action with the Supreme Court. which effected the service of the summons through registered mail upon De Midgely and Pastor.7. sentenced Fr. -Deputy Sheriff of Rizal notified Fr. Maximo to pay for damages. However. Personal service A2010 Avena outside the country and service by publication are not ordinary means of summoning defendants. the spouses Alvaro Pastor.

Abel and Rallye filed no answer. jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident alien is not essential and service of summons is only required to satisfy due process. Salazar failed to pay. stating that pursuant to Sec. Inc. actual notice is not considered to be absolutely necessary (as held in Banco Espanol). to have at hand the available newspapers. Filinvest found that the mortgaged car had not been delivered to Salazar by Abel. Petitoner went on certiorari to the CA (Feb.R. 1987). Filinvest filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publicatio on Abel. by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the Phils. Petitioner was declared in default for failure to appear. June 3 1991 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS . it was held in De Midgely that in actions quasi in rem. belonged to the estate of the Late Pastor. Sr. -There is no specific proscription against resorting to SAHAGUN V CA (MADAYAG/FILINVEST CREDIT CORP. MFR. Victoria A. manager of Rallye Motor Co. Filinvest filed an MFR praying that said order be reconsidered and set aside and that Abel be declared in default and to deny petitioner's motion for leave. Such is required to physically acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and for purposes of fair play by informing him of the pendency of the action against him. to which this matter may be assigned after due raffle. Summons was supposedly served on Abel through publication in the Manila Evening Post according to the affidavit of publication of its president. hence this petiton. contradicting the Antipolo address stated by the TC. 17. for 3 successive days. -The TC denied the respondent's motion to declare Abel in default but directed it to "take steps to effect service of summons and complaint upon defendant. compelling Filinvest to sue. When the note matured. but not as to Rallye since summons had not been served upon it. and as such is an action quasi in rem.066." -Filinvest filed an amended complaint. "the summons be effected out of the Phils. through Abel. Reasoning The instant case is based on the attachment of defendant's property. The TC later dismissed the complaint of Filinvest for failure to serve summons extra-territorially upon Abel despite said order. TC granted petitioner time to file intervention and denied the motion to declare Abel in default. Although it would appear that publication should have been made in a newspaper in the US as it would most likely give notice to Abel. Filinvest filed a petition for review with the SC which was denied. YES Ratio As a nonresident defendant. 6. as well as its implementation sanctioned by the practice followed in this jurisdiction.. Petitioner had been continuously residing in said house and claims ownership. there is no guarantee that the absent owner shall receive the actual notice.Civil Procedure Digest case filed by Quemada is related to a testamentary proceeding as it was filed for the purpose of recovering the properties which in the understanding of Quemada.It was alleged that petitioner's spouse. 1985) which granted her petition for certiorari with prohibition and set aside the TC's aforesaid decision. NO. whose whereabouts in the US was unknown. and which were held by De Midgely and her brother. Petitioner filed her answer to the amended complaint. Rule 14. Still. questioning the jurisdiction of the . made it appear that his company had sold a motor vehicle to Salazar who issued a promissory note for the price and executed as security a chattel mortgage on said vehicle in favor of Rallye. assailing as grave abuse of discretion the declaration of default of Abel. 78328 REGALADO. having allegedly paid for it with her own earnings. Petitioner intervened. The court rendered judgment against Abel.) G. the court correctly ordered the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order. WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over Abel by the publication of summons in the Manila Evening Post HELD 1. which does not constitute a service of process in any true sense but serves as a means whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is subject to judicial proceedings and that he should take steps as he sees fit to protect it. -petitioner elevated the case to the IAC (Feb. as such. research the laws governing judicial processes in each state would be too taxing for the TC. Disposition Petition is dismissed A2010 Avena TC. CA dismissed the petition and a subsequent Prof. A writ of attachment was issued and levied on a house and lot in Las Pinas. 82 ISSUE 1.. as was Abel for failing to answer the complaint. such a sweeping doctrine would virtually unsettle a long standing interpretation of the aforesaid rule on extraterritorial service of summons by publication. Such is called constructive or substituted service. Even then. this time impleading petitioner and Rallye as additional defendants. Said defendant was ordered to file his answer in Court within a reasonable time (not less than 60 days after notice). Respondent court admitted the amended complaint and directed service of summons and the complaint upon Abel at a different last known address in Antipolo. with a confusing entry in the notice of order which stated the Las Pinas address. publication in the US would be all the more difficult as Abel's exact location is unknown. wherein summons by publication is allowed. Plaintiff is ordered to implead Rallye as co-defendant within 1 month from notice. (Rallye). so Filinvest filed a motion to declare them in default which respondent Judge Madayag of the RTC of Makati granted. ruling that petitioner was deprived of opportunity to present evidence (including evidence she and Abel had been living separately since 1970). Abel Sahagun (Alias Abelardo). assigned the note and chattel to Filinvest for valuable consideration. that the CoC send copies of the summons and tills Order by registered mail to last known address of said defendant in Las Pinas. 27. under law. ordering him to pay P97. registered in Abel's name. which the court granted.59 (equivalent to 25% of the principal obligation due as liquidated damages + 25% as attorney's fees). courts is limited to the res. Relief in an action against a nonresident defendant who chooses not to submit himself to Phil. Rallye. However. and since the suit involves real property wherein the defendant ostensibly has an interest and which the property has in fact been attached at the instance of private respondent. Considering this.

under the controlling decisions. Ferrer. Disposition Petition is granted SEPARATE OPINIONS Sarmiento.Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation (MFC) and private respondents. Quintin Calderon and Jose J. the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly.Motion for reconsideration (denied) ISSUE WON private respondents were properly served with summons HELD NO. who acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. 83 6. -The Court is not inclined to dismiss the case for noncompliance of private respondent to serve the amended complaint to Abel at his Antipolo address as there is prima facie justification for extraterritorial service of summons. [concurring and dissenting] -service of summons to the wrong last known address is a defect which cannot justify an order of default. It has been held that this method of service is in derogation of the common law. that Atty. which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint. and transmission of copies of the summons to the wrong address is a matter which the TC can more readily remedy. and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. his interest can be duly represented by the non-defaulting defendant since a common cause of action is involved. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. judgment condemning the res would yield the same result. there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was not their address they were no longer connected therewith." Thus. in behalf of private respondents Angelo King.CA reversed . LTA Building. Najomot. taken from Sections 398 and 399 of Act. that is. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the complaint does not . No. liability against the defendant. (denied) . April 12. Jr. they are. 17 was in part. is not likely to provide notice to a US resident. 190. 1989 NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS . Victoria A. it is only valid when effected in the territory in which the absent defendant may be found. if they refuse to receive the same. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code 5.Syquia Law Offices. through its Assistant Manager Mr. as to extrajudicial service of summons to a nonresident alien. assisted by their counsel. Jr. Assuming default were proper. filed a motion to set aside decision on the following grounds: a. especially considering A2010 Avena the increase in immigrant Filipinos. . KING 172 SCRA 131 GANCAYCO. Makati. the publication in the Manila Evening Post was defective as there was no showing that copies of the summons and the amended complaint were duly served at the defendant's last know correct address. and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Ratio Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC. By Publication -MODE OF SERVICE UPON CERTAIN DEFENDANTS 1. -However. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May 11. This statement should be made in the proof of service. Metro Manila. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement. and as such he reserves the right to be heard when his possessions are in peril. for the recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. but publication in a local newspaper should not altogether be interdicted since the rule specifically authorizes service of summons "in such places and for such time as the court concerned may order". nevertheless. as directors and officers of MFC. The impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. d. that they were not served copies of the decision of the court. This would lead to the fundamental injustice of trial in absentia. the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally on private respondents or. Although the court cannot award money by way of relief. Upon domestic private juridical entity PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK vs.The parties. submitted a Compromise Agreement for the approval of the court which was approved. Prof. . and e. -As to Banco Espanol and De Midgely: although the court acquired jurisdiction over the res. . Publication in the Phils. it is a method extraordinary in character. Keng Suy Wat. Reasoning The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected. that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction.Civil Procedure Digest foreign publication in the place where the defendant resides. 1983.Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th Floor. Nasario S.. The matter should be left to the sound discretion of the TC in each particular case since it has the facts before it. Even if Abel is declared in default. that they learned about the same only when it was being executed. b. Sec. 118 Perea Street. being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. which in turn were an adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure of California which states that personal service outside the state must be named and designated in the publication as most likely to give notice to the person to be served. (denied) . faithfully and fully. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be resorted to. Still. by tendering it to them. Hence. it will not preclude petitioner from presenting her own evidence. c. the res belongs to the defendant.Counsel for defendants filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" on the ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. J.

1966 to March 27. as agent for FMC with authority to execute Employment Contracts and receive. There was no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to. (2) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1. Mr. 2. considering the fact that it has no license to transact business in the Philippines as a foreign corporation. Bautista in the Malabon Church where Fr. inclusive. respondents filed MTD the subject petition on the ground that this Court has no Jurisdiction over the instant case. from securing redress in the Philippine courts (Marshall Co. but to prevent it from acquiring a domicile for the purpose of business without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the local courts. it is equally true the place of hire is established in Manila. Petition is DENIED A2010 Avena Management Corporation and J. He was in Europe when the summons were served upon Fr. the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no longer connected. Moreover. Maximo was sued by the parents of the child he injured during a motor vehicle accident. ISSUE/S 1. THE PETITION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER 2. as well as the recovery of his overtime compensation. 1964 to November. Catuira. the petitioner may be considered as doing busuness un the Philippines within the the scope of Section 14. The object of Sections 68 and 69 of the Corporation Law was not to prevent the foreign corporation from performing single acts. Catuira was a on officer representing petitioner in the Philippines. and on May 24. if a foreign corporation. 1966. 1967. 1965 to August. with full backwages. Such substituted service is not valid. Catuira. 1968.On May 3. 1979 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CIR FACTS -On July 1. 1965. Petitioner alleged that he was employed by respondents as (1) painter with an hourly rate of $1. the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons. that same corporation cannot claim exemption from being sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines. WON Court can acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the accused provided that they are domiciled beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government 2. 8 Rule 14 (on residents temporarily out of the Philippines) HELD . what is important is the fact that the contract of employment between the parties litigant was shown to have been originally executed and subsequently renewed in Manila. Hence. Rule 14 of the ROC in compliance with law. for as long as he remains an employee of FMC. WON petitioner has been 'doing business in the Philippines' so that the service of summons upon its agent in the Philippines vested the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction. Leonardo dela Osa sought his reinstatement. Dreyer are domiciled in Wake Island which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Government.75). not engaged in business in the Philippines. 46 Phil 70. as asserted by petitioner and not denied by respondents. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. legal services from and be bound by processes of the Philippine Courts of Justice. March 26.. Upon Resident Temporarily Abroad MONTALBAN V. (3) houseboy with an hourly rate of $1. inclusive. a fortiori. Instead. Disposition. Disposition WHEREFORE. the petitioner had to appoint Jaime V. Yes.Civil Procedure Digest appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation then. As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons. swing shift and graveyard shift differentials.33 from December. 2m Fr. 84 – WON the plaintiff appellant has been doing business in the Philippines. Aetna Casualty & Curety Company v Pacific Star Line Prof. he was declared in default and a decision was made in favor of the Sps. Elser & Co.Respondents filed on August 7. Victoria A. HELD 1. any dispute arising therefrom should necessarily be determined in the place or venue where it was contracted. It is a fact that when the summons for the petitioner was served on Jaime V. that respondent J. inclusive. Said motion was denied. 1967 their letteranswer without substantially denying the material allegations of the basic petition but interposed the following special defenses that respondents Facilities 3. S. 1967. Maximo was known to reside. and (4) cashier with an hourly rate of $1. and that the employment contract between petitioner and respondent corporation carries -the approval of the DOL. questioning the service of summons made ISSUE WON the summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent may be validly effected by substituted service under Sec. vs. Since was away when trial was being held. . in behalf of that corporation. 1964 to November. It was never the purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Philippines. Catuira he was still in the employ of the FMC. After 2y. is without power and authority of legal representation. While it is true the site of work is Identified as Wake Island. 1964. Upon Entity Foreign Private Juridical FACILITIES MANAGEMENT V DELA OSA 89 SCRA 131 MAKASIAR.40 from August. petitioner interposed an opposition thereto. . is not banned from seeking redress from courts in the Philippines. though an employee of respondent corporation presently stationed in Manila. 1968. Maximo questioned the validity of the judgment against him. V. MAXIMO (SUPRA) FACTS -Fr.26 from December. inclusive.25 from March.

jurisdiction may be acquired over his person under Sec8. courts have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country. Good Earth assailed the judgment as null and void. 78728 FELICIANO. against Artemio Baltazar and his vendees Aurora Galvez and BGB Development Corporation. Good Earth instituted a complaint for annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No. Rizal. down to a deed of sale over the subject lots allegedly executed by one Pedro Asedillo (for whose mother. Rizaliana Garments. Plaintiff is not duty bound to see to it that the person upon when service was actually made delivers the summons to defendant or informs him about it.R. Victoria A. 27 and 30. as an additional defendant. -A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence. to serve - - - - the summons and copy of the complaint upon the defendant Good Earth Enterprises. like the rights and privileges incident to domicile. 13 and 20 August 1977.On 1 April 1977. *interpretation of then Sec8 on substituted service: Same meaning shaped out by the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction where it was patterned (American Legal System). the parcels of land were acquired by Good Earth from successors-in-interest of Lorenzo Molera. Branch 28. Jurisdiction was based on the power to seize and imprison defendant. . They were titled in the name of Lorenzo Molera. at the given address. 85 - 4. on motion of Baltazar and upon finding that Good Earth had failed to file its answer within the sixty (60) day period counted from the day following the last day of the publication. the “defendant” means any resident of the country without distinction as to whether he is physically present or not. 191048. the same has failed as according to information defendant Corporation has never held office thereat and its present office address is unknown. the same court which had issued the judgment by default against Good Earth. One such incident of domicile is amenability to suit within the state even during sojourns without the state. a dwelling where he lives. Artemio Baltazar instituted Civil Case No. Subsequently the trial court. Publication of the summons and the complaint in the "Times Journal. where the state was provided and employed a REASONABLE METHOD for apprising such an absent party of the proceeding against him. Baltazar filed a motion for leave to serve the summons and a copy of the complaint upon therein defendant Good Earth by publication. Prof. 5552-P and for reconveyance. In suits in personam.The Deputy Sheriff of the trial court. Mr. supra: its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on WON the form of substituted service provided for such cases and employed is REASONABLY CALCULATED TO GIVE HIM ACTUAL NOTICE of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. 1866. 191048. though temporarily out of its territorial jurisdiction. PQ-7410-P. This will not affect the validity of the service. It is immaterial that defendant does not in fact receive A2010 Avena actual notice. Rizaliana Garments. No. Inc. *ON SERVICE OF SUMMONS & DUE PROCESS: the constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give reasonably calculated to give the notice desired -MILLIKEN V MEYER. Common Law (Power Concept of Jurisdiction): Jurisdiction of Courts to render judgments in personam was granted on their de facto power over defendant’s person. On the same date. It was urged by Good Earth that the suit commenced by Baltazar was an action in . Ernesto Pre. Reasoning. received a copy of the summons and complaint for service on Good Earth at its address set forth in the complaint 666 Muelle de Binondo. 5552-P against Good Earth for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of the parcels of land before the CFI. Baltazar lost no time at all in selling the land so titled in his name to Aurora Galvez. Inc. are not dependent on continuous presence in the state. These were done accordingly all without the knowledge of Good Earth. Baltazar traced his claimed rights from an alleged vast Spanish land grant to one Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. On 15 August 1965. Extraterritorial Service also allowed. Paranaque were adjudicated to Lorenzo Molera pursuant to the decree in a land registration case by the CFI of Rizal acting as a cadastral court. 3) decreed the cancellation of TCT No. and to BGB Development CorporationOn 9 August 1979. Governor General of Intramuros. 1988 Nature Petition for review on certiorari to annul CA decision FACTS . Disposition. in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. -on Sec18. declared Good Earth "as if in default" and allowed Baltazar to present his evidence ex parte 10 days later the trial court then issued the questioned judgment by default against Good Earth which: 1) declared Baltazar true and owner of the property covered by TCT No.Civil Procedure Digest YES. December 8. are ALWAYS amenable to suits in personam so substituted service is binding on absent residents. Baltazar had been a tenant sharing in the rice harvest from the lots) . HISTORY. under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1977. The trial court granted Baltazar's motion. particularly on March 25. Manila. (2) actions concerning IMMOVABLES: Courts of the situs have exclusive jurisdiction -FORGED DOCTRINE: Domiciliaries of a state. Orders affirmed. ." a newspaper of general circulation. the Deputy Sheriff pre-certified in his Sheriffs Return that: notwithstanding three attempts made by the undersigned Deputy Sheriff. -Continental Law: Principles of Roman Origin: (1) Suits in personam and those relating to MOVABLES – courts of the domicile of the defendant have general jurisdiction [Actor Rei Forum Sequitur]. 2) ordered Good Earth to reconvey that property to Baltazar and.Two parcels of land located in Barrio San Isidro.On 22 March 1977. according to CJ MORAN: Since resident of RP. upon the ground that the trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Good Earth. Inc. A transfer of Certificate title was issued in the name of Good Earth. for 3 consecutive weeks was effected on 6. Upon Defendant whose identity/whereabouts unknown BALTAZAR VS CA (GOOD EARTH ENTERPRISES) G. -MILLIKEN V MEYER: “The attendant duties. a local base to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. should Good Earth fail so to reconvey. The law presumes that for him. Good Earth later impleaded Baltazar's third vendee. Rule 14. which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. and 4) required the Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new TCT in the name of Baltazar.

upon the other hand. HELD − The regular mode of serving summons upon a private domestic corporation (i. petitioner acted as if the address of Good Earth was "unknown. a corporation is Identified with its agent or officer who under the rule is designated to accept service of process. N-70457. The sum total of what the Sheriff actually did.Civil Procedure Digest personam which required personal service of summons. rather. it cannot be regarded as a non-resident corporation. − It is not disputed that Deputy Sheriff Pre did not comply and did not attempt to comply with the requirement of Section 13 of Rule 14. the original registered owner of the subject lands. is thus vested in such officer or A2010 Avena agent. finally. petitioner did not pretend that Good Earth was at any time temporarily out of the Philippines. that the action instituted by Good Earth was barred by res judicata. The third situation is that of a resident of the Philippines who is temporarily out of the Philippines and who may be served with summons by publication under Section 18. that the address of Good Earth could be regarded as "unknown" within the meaning of Section 16 of Rule 14. became incontrovertible one year after its registration on 5 February 1959. considering that all the corporations quartered at 666 Muelle de Binondo are Ching family corporations. if at all. The first is the situation of an "unknown defendant" addressed by Section 16 of Rule 14. 86 assuming such a condition were possible. "The corporate power to receive and act on such service. It held that the trial court which issued the judgment by default had acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant Good Earth through service of summons by publication. Under Section 16." Petitioner claimed that Good Earth could not be found at the address appearing in the TCT issued in the name of Good Earth. by virtue of which OCT No. petitioner must show that the address of Good Earth was "unknown" and that such address "could not be ascertained by diligent inquiry. In any case. We believe and so hold that a litigant or process server who has not gone through the records of the SEC cannot claim to have carried out the "diligent inquiry" required under Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court for valid service of summons by publication upon a domestic corporation. it does not believe that the acts of Deputy Sheriff Pre satisfied the standard of diligent inquiry' established by Section 16 of Rule 14. and where the address of the defendant is unknown. a private corporation organized under Philippine law and hence registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission) is governed by Section 13 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. that Lorenzo Molera." A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. It was also urged by Good Earth that Land Registration Decree No. therefore. Good Earth. The second refers to situations where "extra-territorial service" is proper. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. BGB Development Corporation and Rizaliana Garments.. 5552-P was proper and effective to vest jurisdiction upon such court over the person of Good Earth. in other words. was to ask a security guard he found at 666 Muelle de Binondo and this security guard apparently pointed to the building directory where the name of Good Earth did not appear. of serving summons upon a private Philippine corporation is by personal service upon one of the officers of such corporation identified in Section 13.The trial court rendered judgment against Good Earth. hence. that service of summons of publication may be allowed under Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court in three 3 different situations. . reveal not just the correct address of the corporate headquarters of Good Earth but also the addresses of its directors and other officers. The first point that must be made in this connection is that the propriety of service of summons by publication is not dependent upon the technical characterization of the action being initiated as an action in rem or quasi in rem. and that defendants Galvez. − It may be noted. in other words. that Good Earth being a domestic corporation must have been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and that the SEC records would.17 and 18 of Rule 14 above will at once reveal that. governed by Section 17 of Rule 14. upon compliance with the requirements of the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. The court does not believe. Deputy Sheriff Pre should have known what every law school student knows. 1866 was issued to Lorenzo Molera. predecessor-in-interest of Good Earth. Since personal service of summons was clearly not effected upon Good Earth. that the record does not show that Baltazar sent a copy of the summons and the order for publication to Good Earth by registered mail to its last known address which . The propriety of service by publication is dependent. Since Good Earth is a corporation organized under the Philippine law. was not an indispensable party to the suit brought against Good Earth. Section 17 can find application only where the defendant is both a non-resident and not actually found in the Philippines. We note secondly." − In the case at bar. so far as to make it known to the corporation. − For the purpose of receiving service of summons and being bound by it. Hence this Petition for Review instituted by Baltazar and Galvez. service of summons by publication was improper and unwarranted in this case. .e. he would have found Good Earth which is a corporation owned or controlled by the Ching family. therefore. ISSUE WON the service of summons by publication upon respondent Good Earth was proper. appears to contemplate a defendant who is a natural person. Victoria A. Section 16 itself covers two (2) distinguishable situations: where the identity of the defendant is unknown. More importantly. service of summons by publication upon Good Earth could only be done under Section 16. that the suit brought by Baltazar against Good Earth was an action quasi in rem such that service of summons by publication was appropriate. did not dispute that 666 Muelle de Binondo. The regular mode.CA reversed TC’s decision and directed the defendants to reconvey the parcels of land in question to Good Earth free from all liens and encumbrances. Prof. we come to the question of whether the substituted service by publication purported to have been effected by the trial court in Civil Case No. − Even a cursory examination of Sections 16. therefore. Inc. Manila was its correct corporate address. were purchasers in good faith and for value. It is argued by Good Earth that had the Sheriff inquired at any of the offices actually found in the building at 666 Muelle de Binondo. Section 18.

.S. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. CV No. . Zambales.The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants.US invited the submission of bids for the following projects: 1. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U. . indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. who is one of the petitioners herein. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and. Navy. the present action must be considered as one . Repair fender system. as required by Section 21 of Rule 14. Disposition. A2010 Avena . to order the defendants to pay damages. NAVBASE Subic.The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign.The company received a letter which was signed by Dir. they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. Revised Rules of Court. the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America. PQ-7410-P fell into profound error in not setting aside and annulling the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No.The company sued the US and Messrs. 5552-P. 2. proprietary or non-governmental acts. and on what we have already stated.Eligio de Guzman & Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. ISSUE WON trial court has jurisdiction HELD NO.That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. 84 Phil. without its consent or waiver. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State Prof. that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. Southwest Pacific. Upon others MOTIONS IN GENERAL MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 US v. repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment.S. Philippines. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.US had a naval base in Subic. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U. 1985 NATURE Petition to review to set aside certain orders and restrain the respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. NAVBASE Subic Bay. Government. Victoria A. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. May 22. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. . . 00104 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that the trial court in Civil Case No. The company opposed the motion. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. We hold that the purported service of summons by publication upon Good Earth in Civil Case No. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline. and that the judgment there rendered by that court was null and void. US requested it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint. G. 779-M of the defunct CFI of Rizal. the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a public nature or character. . the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Decision dated 14 January 1987 of the Court of Appeals in C.. But State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines. 87 5. Lopez. FACTS . in the event that specific performance was no longer possible. Manila.The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of the sovereign state from its private. Inc.S.S.Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. .Civil Procedure Digest was 666 Muelle de Binondo. James E. Philippines. In that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. and repair to Leyte Wharf approach. They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated. its commercial activities or economic affairs. 5552-P was legally and constitutionally vitiated and hence invalid and ineffective to vest jurisdiction over the person of Good Earth upon the trial court. Contracts Division." . Collins. It vested no rights upon Baltazar and imposed no liabilities or burdens upon Good Earth. Department of the Navy of the United States. Alava Wharf at the U. Dollar already cited. It held: "On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America. 312 (1949). Naval Station Subic Bay. a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. WHEREFORE. Stated differently. Naval Station in Subic Bay. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No.A. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired. Galloway. RUIZ 136 SCRA 487 ABAD SANTOS.R. William I. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Naval Facilities Engineering Command." However.

A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen. April 26. is implied from its act of entering into a contract.S.S.should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind the shield of non-suability. it is deemed to have entered into a contract and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended to the level of the ordinary citizen. through its agency at Subic Bay . therefore. Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether naval. of enforcing a validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United States government.. as in the instant case. The opinion of the majority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of contractual obligations.in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of the award for the project by the United States government. he was terminated allegedly due to financial constraints being experienced by SEAFEC-AQD. He was supposed to NATIONAL UNION VS STOLT-NIELSEN 184 SCRA 682 MELENCIO-HERRERA.) .Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and dignity as a nation. and herein private respondent on the other. can conveniently seek protective cover under the majority opinion. which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. the efficacy of the contract between the U. plus moral damages and attorney’s fees with the NLRC. -The issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel SEAFDEC V NLRC (LAZAGA) (supra) NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the NLRC FACTS -SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization.Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach of its contractual obligation . Government.The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. through its agency at Subic Bay. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U. Victoria A. Where there is none. helpless and A2010 Avena without redress in his own country for violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government professing to act in its name. air or ground forces . The result is disastrous to the Philippines. Government. 532. .because the difficulty. Private Respondent Lazaga was hired as a Research Associate and eventually became the Head of External Affairs Office of SEAFDEC-AQD. However. denied ISSUES WON SEAFDEC-AQD is estopped from claiming that the court had no jurisdiction HELD NO Ratio. 1990 NATURE Petition to review. even on appeal. this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's consent.When the U. the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. Naval authorities at Subic Bay on one hand. Moreover. Estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. deleted attorney’s fees and actual damages -SEAFDEC-AQD filed MFR. 779-M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein. . the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center. 779-M is dismissed. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines.S.Civil Procedure Digest against the U. though not in name. -In their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM (NOT MOTION TO DISMISS). Prof. American authorities or any foreign government in the Philippines for that matter. Its consent to be sued. The principles of law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. dissents: . the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the United States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis. always looms large. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. .11 and that Lazaga was not entitled to the accrued sick leave benefits due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment -LA: for Lazaga -NLRC: affirmed LA. (2) Lazaga must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid (and clearances has not been paid) COUNTERCLAIM: Lazaga had property accountability and outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD amounting to P27. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her. 323. no agreement of the parties can provide one. thereby hampering the growth of Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the various U. confirmed the acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or shoreline in the Subic Bay area.S. the petition is granted. -The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Disposition WHEREFORE. if not impossibility. J. . Costs against the private respondent. 88 receive separation benefits but SEAFDEC-AQD failed to pay private respondent his separation pay so Lazaga filed a complaint for non-payment of separation benefits.In Syquia. SEPARATE OPINION MAKASIAR. was honored more in the breach than in the compliance.In the case at bar." (At p.S. Certiorari FACTS . dealing with the citizens of this country. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. SEAFDEC alleged that NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case because: (1) It is an international organization.

an interlocutory order cannot be the subject of a special civil action on certiorari and prohibition. Ulpiano. 194 F. 2005 NATURE Petition for review of CA Resolution under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court FACTS . WON the terms of the Charter Party. p. namely: Ulpiano. the remedy of prohibition would lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. WON the CA order setting aside the RTC order. the Balo’s took possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and consent. Clearly. 103 [2d Cir. Disposition Petition for certiorari is denied and the judgment of the CA is affirmed. these lands were originally owned by the spouses Eugenio Balo. . S. and Felicidad Superio. Moreover.21.. 460 F 2d 89. . The Balo spouses were survived by their two (2) children.. . "the bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods.469. 1960]. is valid 2. and as document of title passing-the property of the goods. L-25599. 89 BALO V CA (JUDGE ASIS. Pasagui-Balo. . for the contract is the Charter Party (Shell Oil Co.Carrier filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the claim the same being arbitrable as provided by the terms of the Charter Party dated 21 December 1984 between Shipper and Parcel Tankers. Sr. 790 F 2d 1209.. Sr.. Ltd. 23 SCRA 24). American International Underwriters. Garrido is the daughter of Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. GARRIDO) GR No. Ulpiano Balo.United Coconut Chemicals shipped on board MT Stolt Sceptre. Generally. Sr. the shipment was found to be totally contaminated and discolored. Nora Balo-Catano. Inc. Marine Tankers Corp. and is the law between the parties who are bound by its terms and condition provided that these are not contrary to law.RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and said that the complaint clearly states that the late Eugenio Balo. vs. therefore. The entire contract must be read together and its clauses interpreted in relation to one another and not by parts. .D. morals.plaintiff. the amount paid to the Shipper.Hence the appeal to the SC ISSUE/S 1. the case before us falls under the exception. . while the defendants are children of the late Ulpiano Balo. still. thru its Philippine Agent. only a receipt and not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire vessel. .The cargo was insured with National Union Fire Insurance. Yes. the latter likewise deceased. The complaint enumerates/annexes 13 tax declarations in the name of Eugenio Balo. Ulpiano repurchased the properties and has been openly. in cases where a Bill of Lading has been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped aboard a vessel under a charter party. HELD 1.R. Charter Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading (5th ed.. Transworld Oil. are Eugenio’s grandchildren. 2. Supp 161. Sr. exclusively and adversely in possession of the properties . Prof. The Carrier denied the claim but the Insurer indemnified said shipper.. According to her. assuming that she is the child of Maximino Balo (2) complaint does not show that estate have been settled and its obligations have been paid. As subrogee. Lydia Balo-Lumpas. Yes. Balo’s filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Failure to state a cause of action . failed to allege WON she is a legitimate child thus fatal considering A992 CC and to allow Garrido to inherit from the estate of the spouses Eugenio and Maria Balo in representation of her father Maximino Balo would be to permit intestate succession by an illegitimate child from the legitimate parent of his father. where it clearly appears that the trial Judge or Court is proceeding in excess or outside of its jurisdiction. This should include the provision on arbitration even without a specific stipulation to that effect.Y. . good customs. However. particularly the provision on arbitration. MIT Gilds. G. 4 April 1968. Sr. Her uncle and cousins were earnestly requested by Garrido that they come up with a fair and equal partition of the properties left by her grandparents. and the other petitioners. binding on the Insurer. 1986]. the insurer filed suit against Carrier before the RTC to recovery the sum of P1.complaint for Judicial Partition of Real Properties and Accounting with Damages was filed by Josefina Garrido against Ulpiano Balo. Greenstone Shipping Co. 1212 [5th Cir. who. Subsequently. Sr. and Maximino. Eugenio Sr.Upon arrival and after inspection. though daughter of Maximino.. the children of Ulpiano. The Bill of Lading becomes.El. public order and public policy (Article 1306.A. Leyte alleging that Garrido and Balo’s are the coowners of undivided parcels of land located at Mayorga. and the charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading. 1984]). vs. before RTC Abuyog.Garrido alleged in her complaint that immediately upon the death of her grandfather. Nida Balo-Moraleta. Ulpiano Balo is the son of Eugenio Balo. and Maria Pasagui Balo had two (2) children. A reading of the charter Party and the Bill of Lading shows that the Insurer is in fact bound to arbitration. Zaida Balo. Victoria A. The plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but issued a resolution on the Motion to Dismiss until trial on the merits since the ground alleged in said motion does not appear indubitable. American Steamship Agencies. Ministry of Commerce vs. the Bill of Lading incorporates by A2010 Avena reference the terms of the Charter Party. were already deceased.Carrier filed motion for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA seeking to nullify the RTC order which it set aside. It is settled law that the charter may be made part of the contract under which the goods are carried by an appropriate reference in the Bill of Lading (Wharton Poor.619. In lieu of an Answer.Garrido filed a complaint. and Ma.N. September 30. 588 F Supp [D. Judith Balo-Mandreza. 1972]. Leyte. 163 [S. vs. The Balo’s outrightly refused her proposal. and Maximino. Danilo Balo and Ronilo Balo. Civil Code). at the time of the filing of the complaint. Eugenio Balo. 129704 CHICO-NAZARIO. 71). While a Court Order deferring action on a motion to dismiss until the trial is interlocutory and cannot be challenged until final judgment. The plaintiff as an heir prays that these parcels of land be . (3) properties enumerated in the complaint were proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment against Eugenio and Maria Balo. No. Sr.Civil Procedure Digest . Jr. Home Insurance Co. an American insurance company. a tanker owned by Stolt-Nielsen Philippines 404 tons of distilled C6-C18 fatty acid from Batangas to Rotterdam Netherlands. which was interlocutory. but not as varying the contract between the charterer and the shipowner" (In re Marine Sulphur Queen.Insurer opposed the motion on the ground that it was not legally bound to submit the claim for arbitration as the arbitration clause in the Charter Party was not incorporated into the Bill of Lading.

who are now both deceased and after their death. To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. WON CA’s dismissal of the petition for certiorari filed by the Balo’s is valid 2. Sr. the Court does not dismiss the complaint but requires an answer and proceeds to hear the case on the merit. the later (sic) being already dead. Prof. After the filing of Comment and other pleadings.. the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction. both surnamed Balo. Sr.Balo’s filed an MFR which the CA denied ISSUES 1. and Ma. and is the father of all the other defendants in this case. or was otherwise abandoned HELD 1. (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. and no other. was waived. allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for partition may be found in private respondent’s complaint. or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff’s baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case . The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law. the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. That plaintiff is desirous that the above-described real properties be partitioned between her and defendants.Balo’s filed an MFR which the RTC denied .In a complaint for partition. the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion. That plaintiff is the daughter of the late Maximino Balo and Salvacion Sabulao.In her Complaint. Briz: proof of legal acknowledgment is not a prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed. the private respondent made the following assertions: That the afore-described parcels of lands were originally owned by Eugenio Balo. leaving several heirs. without her knowledge and consent. Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts upon which private respondent bases her claim. Sr. 90 . By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant. the case was deemed submitted for decision. As such. but said defendants refused and continue to do so without any justifiable cause or reason to accede to the partition of the said properties. If there is doubt to the truth of the facts averred in the complaint. . . Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That defendant Ulpiano Balo. Victoria A. namely: Ulpiano. assigning as one of the errors therefore the denial of the motion to dismiss.e. the allegation of illegitimacy and claim of absolute ownership are modifications and unreasonable inferences. That plaintiff has proposed to the defendants that the above-described real properties be amicably partitioned between them by mutual agreement in a very fair and practical division of the same. it should have proceeded to determine WON the trial court did commit grave A2010 Avena abuse of discretion as alleged by the Balo’s. It would be improper to inject into the allegation. WON the action for judicial partition and accounting has prescribed. aside from being the son of Eugenio Balo. the conveyance of his lawful . The Court is not permitted to go beyond and outside of the allegations in the complaint for data or facts.” No evidence may be alleged or considered to test the sufficiency of the complaint except the very facts pleaded therein. . and Maximino.Section 1. were inherited into two (2) equal shares by their two (2) children. The foregoing allegations show substantial compliance with the formal and substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as required under Section 1. is married to Felicidad Superio. Sr. the CA denied due course to the petition and accordingly dismissed the same and justified the dismissal in the following manner: It is an established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is basically interlocutory in character and cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. . When a motion to dismiss is denied. first. it behooves upon this Court to discuss the merits of the petition to put to rest the issues raised by the petitioners. the remedy is to take an appeal from said decision. the inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint. NO . who after her father’s death. WON the failure to allege the nature and extent of plaintiff’s title in a petition for partition is fatal to its cause of action 3. 2.. therefore. There is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. not the veracity. CA having failed in this regard. Instead. the plaintiff seeks. and second. the inquiry is into the sufficiency. i. Moreover. facts not alleged and use them as basis for the decision on the motion.Briz v. such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. Therefore. recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate. a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties. had inherited her father’s share of the inheritance. . and if any one of them should have died. Reasoning .Balo’s filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The defendants took possession of the above-described real properties immediately after the death of plaintiff’s grandfather Eugenio Balo. Pasagui-Balo. of the material allegations.Contrary to petitioners’ contention. Sr. CA should not have dismissed the petition outright as the same alleges grave abuse of discretion. Nothing is more settled than the rule that in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate.The general rule regarding denial of a motion to dismiss as a basis of a resort to the extraordinary writ of certiorari is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.Specific instances whereby the rule admits certain exceptions are provided as follows: Under certain situations.Civil Procedure Digest partitioned in accordance with Article 982 of the Civil Code which states: “The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation. NO. In a resolution. the proper procedure is to proceed with the trial and if the decision be adverse to the movant.

the court should dismiss the action. Sea-Land prayed for either dismissal or suspension of the 3rd party complaint on the ground that there exists an arbitration agreement between it and AMML . the annexes attached to the complaint may be considered. The crucial point is that collection of said damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land should be by arbitration. Reasoning To allow AMML's 3rd Party Claim against Sea-Land to proceed would be in violation of Clause 16. 2000 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari decision of CA FACTS .2. the action for partition should not be dismissed. In turn. AMML can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land as Containership Operator for whatever final judgment may be adjudged against it under the Complaint of Florex. but because no basis exists for requiring the defendant to submit to partition. Thus. In the light of the Agreement. An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed. the amount of damages not having been specified therein. either a principal carrier (with a AMML to hold Sea-Land liable under the provisions of the bill of lading issued by the Principal Carrier to Florex. CA. the court may and should order the partition of the properties in the same action. to sustain the 3rd Party Complaint would be to allow Prof. Hence.Sea-land filed a motion to dismiss the 3rd party complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. not under the bill of lading petitioner.2 of the Agreement. as containership operator. WON the 3rd party complaint should have been dismissed HELD YES Ratio AMML is barred from taking judicial action against Sea-Land by the clear terms of their Agreement. the clause provides that whatever dispute there may be between the Principal Carrier and the Containership Operator arising from contracts of carriage shall be governed by the provisions of the bills of lading deemed issued to the Principal Carrier by the Containership Operator. vs. the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.Civil Procedure Digest shares. Sea-Land filed petition for certiorari with CA: dismissed. they being parts of the complaint.However. In Fil-Estate Golf and Development. operator or charterer of containership on which the cargo is carried). the court considered the existence of the arbitration clause as binding between the parties. AMML was the principal carrier while Sea-land was the containership operator. when faced with such a suit “shall use all reasonable endeavours to defend” itself or “settle such suits for as low a figure as reasonably possible”. the 3rd Party Complaint should have been dismissed. AMML loaded the cargo to a vessel of Sea-land. averring that whatever damages sustained by Florex were caused by SeaLand. Florex delivered to AMML cargo of various foodstuffs. the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner. alleging that delivery was delayed. To brush aside a contractual agreement calling for arbitration in case of disagreement between the parties would therefore be a step backward. . AMML. issued to AMML. AMML can and should be held accountable by Florex in the event that it has a valid claim against the former. As summarized. share. Thus. . Also. this appeal. which actually received and transported Florex's cargo on its vessels and unloaded them. on the other hand.” Disposition Petition is granted. 3. .Arbitration being the mode of settlement between the parties expressly provided for by the Agreement. Under the Agreement. this Court ruled that in the determination of whether or not the complaint states a cause of action. SWAGMAN HOTELS V.” (bottomline.Sea-land Service Inc and AP Moller/Maersk Line (AMML) are both carriers of cargo and common carriers. AMML filed a 3rd Party Complaint against Sea-Land. Victoria A. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the property.AMML’s answer: even on the assumption that Florex was entitled to reimbursement. they could be. CA . under this arrangement. thus a ground for dismissal of the 3rd party complaint) Obiter: “CA did not err in reading the Complaint of Florex and AMML's Answer together with the 3rd Party Complaint to determine whether a cause of action is properly alleged. . Rather. the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties. and is recognized worldwide. Inc.During the lifetime of the contract. under which the latter is suing in its Complaint. March 2. On the other hand. “This Court has previously held that arbitration is one of the alternative methods of dispute resolution that is now rightfully vaunted as ‘the wave of the future’ in international relations. not because the wrong remedy was availed of. If. Pursuant to the agreement. Pursuant to Clause 16. Florex then filed a complaint against AMML for reimbursement of the value of the cargo . and exchange needed space for cargo in their respective containerships.3 of the Agreement. an action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determine portion of the properties involved. depending on the occasion. 91 SEA-LAND SERVICE INC V CA (A. as Containership Operator. They entered into a contract entitled “Cooperation in the Pacific.P. as Principal Carrier. contrary to what is contemplated in Clause 16.On the matter of prescription cited by the petitioners as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. it is clear that arbitration is the mode provided by which AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity from Sea-Land. it is noteworthy that the motion to dismiss filed by the Balo’s did not ipso facto establish prescription. A corresponding Bill of Lading was issued by AMML to Florex.RTC denied motion to dismiss. the consignee (not named in the case) refused pay for the cargo. . it was Sea-land who should be liable. MOLLER/ MAERSK LINE) 00 SCRA 00 YNARES-SANTIAGO. Disposition instant Petition is DENIED and the decision of CA affirming the Order of the RTC is affirmed A2010 Avena negotiable bill of lading or other contract of carriage with respect to cargo) or a containership operator (owner. As the Court of Appeals correctly held. NO . otherwise.” which is essentially a vessel sharing agreement whereby they mutually agreed to purchase.As the Principal Carrier with which Florex directly dealt with.

obtained from private respondent Neal B. both the Court of Appeals and the trial court found that a renegotiation of the three promissory notes indeed happened in December 1997 between the private respondent and the petitioner resulting in the reduction – not waiver – of the interest from 15% to 6% per annum. Christian had no cause of action because the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by the TC and CA is erroneous. citing Section 5. two of the promissory notes with the due dates of 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000 matured during the pendency of the case with the trial court. . Christian informed the petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amount of US$150. According to them. and 14 July 1997. respectively. a complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without A2010 Avena objection. Branch 59. petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel. even after judgment. The TC reasoned: When the instant case was filed on February 2. the trial court rendered a decision on 5 May 2000 declaring the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997 as already due and demandable and that the interest on the loans had been reduced by the parties from 15% to 6% per annum. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. it cannot be cured. RATIO: . no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999. its president and vice-president. they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Infante. private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. instead of quarterly. . filed an Answer raising as defenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations. Leonor L. which from then on was payable monthly. the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court.Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms of the three promissory notes and that the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the complaint was filed. Inc.: April 8. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings.Sometime in 1996 and 1997.In due course and after hearing. even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint. and (3) the repayment of the principal loans after three years from their respective dates. together with its president and vice-president. Under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. payable quarterly.With these findings of facts.Civil Procedure Digest G.000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable every three months. .On 2 February 1999. The term of the principal loans remained unchanged in that they were still due three years from the respective dates of the promissory notes.. a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation.It is undisputed that the three promissory notes were for the amount of P50.R. C. The interpretation of Section 5. Both courts also found that the petitioner had been religiously paying the private respondent US$750 per month from January 1998 and even during the pendency of the case before the trial court and that the private respondent had accepted all these monthly payments. the first and the second promissory notes have already matured. and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint. Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. as defendants’ obligation are not yet due and demandable then. 14 March 1997. 1999. and Atty.000 each and uniformly provided for (1) a term of three years.In its decision of 5 September 2003.The petitioner corporation.000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13. As of this date however. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed. but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. although.J. Victoria A. . Thus. .500. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty. he may nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable. which reads: Section 5. Thus. .The petitioner came to this Court harping on the absence of a cause of action at the time the private respondent’s complaint was filed with the trial court.. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of US$50. . (2) an interest of 15 % per annum. Without a cause of action. the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. In a letter dated 16 December 1998. Hegerty. none of the promissory notes was due and demandable. at the time the complaint was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999. 2005 FACTS: . The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. ISSUE: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case? HELD: No. 92 yet. Jr. . 161135 Davide. none of the three promissory notes was due Prof. payment is already due. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 7 August 1996. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. Hence. the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. the trial court did not dismiss the complaint. However. through Atty. but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.

R. in turn.” Elements of a Cause of Action A cause of action. The Complaint capitalized merely on the fact that the vehicle -. while petitioner had the corresponding obligation to honor that warranty.Such interpretation of Section 5.” TEST In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action admitting the truth of the facts alleged. 93 GOODYEAR V. this Section allows a complaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without objection during the trial. The underlying reason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer for complaints which are immature. a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial. because it did not allege any act or omission that petitioner had committed in violation of his right to the subject vehicle. Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneous. the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed. The Third-Party Complaint filed by Sy is inadequate. he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996 and 14 March 1997. extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. . it “must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.was “a stolen vehicle. Inc. an Isuzo JCR 6-Wheeler. holding that that the Third-Party Complaint had stated a cause of action. petitioner did not make good its warranty in the Deed of Sale: to convey the vehicle to Respondent Anthony Sy free from all liens. encumbrances and legal impediments. 154554 PANGANIBAN.Sy informed Goodyear. a groundless suit. such cause of action was already extinguished. Goodyear moved for reconsideration.according to the records of the PNP. the truck was hijacked on April 30. therefore. CA granted the appeal. and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding.” The pleading did not contain Nature Petition for Review under Rule 45 Facts In 1983 Goodyear Philippines purchased from Industrial and Transport Equipment.Goodyear filed a motion to dismiss on March 24. sold it to Jose L.the appended annexes or documents. and sustained by the Court of Appeals. can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?” To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint. This hijacking was reported to the Philippine National Police (PNP) which issued out an alert alarm on the said vehicle as a stolen one.Goodyear requested on July 10. 1998. A2010 Avena DISPOSITION: The petition is hereby GRANTED Prof. and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. Goodyear was impleaded as third-party defendant in the third-party complaint filed by Sy on January 9. . Victoria A. it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause of action when he filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three promissory notes was due yet. which CA denied. .Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities. thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.It was later on recovered also in 1986. 1986. Lee on January 29. Thus. The Regional Trial Court [(RTC)] resolved to dismiss the third-party complaint because it does not expressly show any act or omission committed by the third party defendant which violates a right of the third party complainant. 2005 Issues WON the third-party complaint states a cause of action against Goodyear Held No. but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial. The reported hijacking of the vehicle was a legal impediment that prevented its subsequent sale. Instead. the third element is missing.Civil Procedure Digest According to the trial court. or admissions in the records. 1996. the PNP in Legazpi City impounded the vehicle and charged Lee criminally. Lee filed an action for rescission of contract with damages against Sy on December 4.However. . 1998 on the twin grounds that the third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action and even if it did. Second. 1997 the PNP to lift the stolen vehicle alarm status. Thus. The court may consider -. which became due during the pendency of the case in view of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during the trial.Nov 9. and 3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. This notwithstanding. 1997 because he could not register the vehicle in his name due to the certification from the PNP Regional Traffic Management Office in Legazpi City that it was a stolen vehicle and the alarm covering the same was not lifted.A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. The Third-Party Complaint filed by Sy is inadequate. The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. other pleadings of the plaintiff.” Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint “warrants its dismissal. 1997. because it did not allege any act or omission that petitioner had committed in violation of his right to the subject vehicle. SY G. has these elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff. Goodyear sold it to Anthony Sy on September 12. In the present case. Such an action is prematurely brought and is. which is an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.Sy. Reasoning: A cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.in addition to the complaint -. Thus. First. which should be dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. . 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right. Respondent Sy had a right to protect and a warranty to enforce. which was a stranger to the case -.

-On August 10. over a million pesos. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. with her sister Ildefonsa Morcal and other members of their family occupied. Note that the case arose from the protest filed by respondents against petitioner’s free patent application for the subject unregistered agricultural land.420 square meters. 75402. Branch 64. 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel. private the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. ISSUE WON the petition should be given due course HELD NO. The impugned Orders of the DENR Regional Office are subject to review by the DENR Head Office. the Complaint is insufficient on its face. without even going into the veracity of its material allegations. we are convinced that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals when it sustained the trial court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint seeking to nullify the questioned DENR Orders for petitioner’s failure to exhaust the proper administrative remedies. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion. Petitioner alleges the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply because there is urgent need for judicial intervention and because what is involved is a small piece of agricultural land. A2010 Avena respondents Antonio Laviña (now deceased) and Teresita Laviña protested the free patent application. Records show that the land in question consists of 2. Having been in possession of the said land for almost forty (40) years. the vehicle belonged to a person other than petitioner. and its value of over a million pesos is certainly substantial and not insignificant. Petitioner cannot circumvent this procedure by simply invoking a supposed loss of faith in the said agency. The Deed of Sale between petitioner and Respondent Sy was attached as Annex A to the Third-Party Complaint filed by the latter against the former. 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered. no doubt a sizable parcel of land. we see no urgent need for judicial intervention. speedy and adequate remedy. No contrary assertion was made in the Complaint. petitioner filed Free Patent Application No. The Spouses Antonio and Teresita Laviña were directed to file the appropriate public land application covering the other half of the lot in question particularly the northern portion thereof. identified only as Lot No. none of the foregoing exceptions may be availed of. However. NATURE For review on certiorari are the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. 5441 CENRO Case No. regardless of its agricultural nature and the fact that it is located in a remote area. Thereafter. cleared and planted seasonal crops on the land up to the time it was declared as public land on May 14. Likewise. She insists the issue of jurisdiction has been settled when the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents. and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. to the applicability of the doctrine.[9] -There are exceptions. 8) when strong public interest is involved. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in Prof. 1990.R. Clearly. No 157830 . -Neither are we prepared to sustain petitioner’s claim that exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be complied with on the ground that the value of the disputed parcel of land is allegedly insignificant. Morcal’s motion for reconsideration was denied. 9) when the subject of the controversy is private land. Among the established exceptions are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal. at the time of its sale to Respondent Sy. 476 SCRA 508 (2005) QUISUMBING. situated at Barangay Cagsiay. In sum. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter eventually affirmed the TC. 1993. 94 ANGELITA MORCAL VS. Regional Office No. ANTONIO LAVIÑA ET. their family declared the land for taxation purposes and began planting coconut and other fruit bearing trees. -Petitioner contends the trial court is vested with the power to rule on the substantial rights of the parties in this case.840 square meters. all of 2. Hence. Victoria A. CV No. She maintains that the Regional Executive Director of the DENR did not commit any palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. which she believes would not reverse itself. 5) when the claim involved is small. The Deed stated that petitioner was the absolute owner of the subject vehicle. Dispositive. 7) when there is no other plain. IV of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in DENR IV Case No. on September 11. FACTS -The case involves a parcel of unregistered land with an area of 4.Civil Procedure Digest “sufficient notice of the cause of action” against petitioner. however. The trial court. PASCUAL VS PASCUAL G. -However. the matter comes within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the DENR in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. private respondent contests petitioner’s claim that the disputed land is very small. (IV-3) 14661 in 1976.R. 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention. -In this case. 2056-Cad-245. the trial court correctly observed that the Complaint had failed to show that. dismissed petitioner’s civil action and sustained DENR. IV of the DENR decreed the reduction of the area covered by the FPA. AL.420 square meters. No connection was laid out between the owner’s sale of the vehicle and its impounding by the PNP. Quezon. She adds she has lost trust in the DENR as a body. 1941. J. private respondent Teresita Laviña counters that petitioner’s failure to pursue and exhaust the proper administrative remedies was fatal to her cause. however. 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal. -Petitioner Angelita Morcal. for failure to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Ratio. That the police did not lift the alert status did not make petitioner less of an owner. The trial court Decision sustained the Orders issued by Regional Office No. Petitioner then filed with the Regional Trial Court a civil action to nullify the two Orders of the DENR Regional Office. she alleges that the same is valued at a considerable amount. Mauban Quezon. 91-02. which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mauban. however.

Pascual or any other mode of payment/and/or dispute resolution. Roxas. Isabela.5 hectare parcel of rice land owned by Felimon Emperado.The complaint alleges that spouses Crisanto (now deceased) and Javier have been tenant-cultivators of a 5. Petitioner argues that since he. herein respondent with the RTC for damages and injunction. the dispute shall be filed before the A2010 Avena barangay where the property is located.” -Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the abovesaid order was denied.D. a permanent resident of the United States of America. Pascual filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code. Reasoning. 95 there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections 2 and 3 of P.” Hence. By the assailed Order of February 10. would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest” as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and misunderstood by respondent. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate court. is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides. PHILVILLE proposed to buy the land for conversion into a housing subdivision. Being a real party in interest. the Attorney-in-fact is therefore obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court.D. the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.Petitioner. Besides. he citing Agbayani v.A. T-271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. . “Ordinarily. 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. (4). a holder of a free patent. is the real party in interest. Hence.) To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No.Sometime in 1977. Victoria A. 13. since the plaintiff-herein petitioner. Pascual for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of complaint in court under R. Vira. Isabela. hence. -In fine. Roxas. . Roxas. 7160 (the Local Government Code) FACTS .A. contracts/documents which may be necessary relative to the above acts. reading from the tenor of the provisions of the Special Power of Attorney. ( 2. – The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: xxxxx -In the 1982 case of Tavora v. To execute and sign any and all papers.D. 2003. Pascual. Veloso the Court held that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays. except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other. the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. T271657 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages . ISSUE/S WON the dismissal of the case by the RTC is valid HELD NO Ratio. Spouses Javier. regardless of the residence of the parties. 2002: (1. PHILVILLE VS JAVIER 00 SCRA 00 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ. prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing in court. Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity. It stated that : -RA 7160 repealing P. and since he actually resides abroad. Belen The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read: SEC. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 “All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated. appointed Sagario as his attorneyin-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10. the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality. said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira.) To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant. noncompliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P. 2007 NATURE Instant petition for review on certiorari FACTS .This case traces its antecedents to a verified complaint filed by Mercedes Javier. . 2002 (pursuant to the SPA) before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a complaint for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. as contended by respondent. not his attorney-in-fact Sagario. it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of the same place. 7160 is incorrect. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. and he substitute (sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. The Attorneyin-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R. Dec. November 17. When real property or any interest therein is involved. The petition is granted. Intermediate Appellate Court. where the property is located. Exception Thereto. 2005 NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the February 10. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). Sec. This order stated that “Consequently. Prof. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement. Among the terms agreed upon by the parties was that the Javiers would be given a . Sagario is a resident of Vira. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 408. In the case of Royales vs.Sagario filed on October 14. PHILVILLE and Emperado then entered into a Kasulatan ng Pagsasalin at Kusang Loob na Pagsusuko. Impleaded as defendant was PHILVILLE Development and Housing Corporation (PHILVILLE). the complaint filed against her by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M.Civil Procedure Digest CARPIO-MORALES. the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute. the real party in interest. Dispositive.Defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. 3. the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property. (3). the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R. -[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion. She contends that there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. Isabela. To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff.

therefore.PHILVILLE moved to dismiss the original complaint alleging that the plaintiff had filed a protest with the Land Management Bureau seeking the revocation of the free patent issued to Emperado and the reversion of the land to the public domain. and that the proposed amendment is the subject of another civil case between the same parties pending before another branch of the trial court. .PHILVILLE filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Appellate Court. Biliran to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed. In her attached amended complaint. Petitioners then brought the matter to the . Hence. the matter may then be brought to the regular courts. This prompted her to interpose an appeal to the CA which reversed the order and remanded the cast to the trial court. petitioners refused to pay their just and valid obligations to private respondent and her husband . v.19. Prof. . x x x renders the complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss. and (3) plaintiff is estopped from filing the complaint. we note that PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss the complaint was filed after it had filed its answer. (g) That the complaint states no cause of action.000 square meter lot as a disturbance compensation. the petition is DENIED. Inc. DEC. the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been constituted for purposes of settling the matter. (2) where the complaint does not state a cause of action. 1508. clear that if efforts of the barangay captain to settle the dispute fails. as correctly pointed out by the CA.the trial court granted PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss . which did not pass upon the issue of the alleged noncompliance with P. decided the appeal on the merits and rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. the Pangkat was not constituted. Grounds. 169 SCRA 5 66. and instead. However.D. However. The efforts of the barangay captain of Naval. Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court then applicable provides: “SEC. . the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement. In Bejer vs. . the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable settlement. PHILVILLE specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and raised the following affirmative and special defenses: (1) the complaint fails to state a cause of action.The trial court denied the motion. Private respondents likewise alleged that despite the confrontations before the barangay chairman. In the instant case. ISSUE WON the CA erred in reversing the challenged Orders of the trial court dismissing the complaint of Mercedes. Rafor. it has been established that there was no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. (h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid. it was held that “failure to avail of conciliation process under P. this Court interpreted “within the time for pleading” to mean within the time to answer. the instant petition for review on certiorari.” “In the case at bar. (j) The suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made.55. Petitioners appealed to the RTC. . (e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. Court of Appeals.” In J.Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the MTC of Naval to which private respondents interposed the counterclaim that petitioners also had existing obligations to them: one for alleged maintenance and repair of petitioners’ boat and another for the cost of 2 tires that petitioners allegedly misappropriated. When the case was again set for hearing. Rule 11. 1.M. 1508 on conciliation. (d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue. a Certification to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favor of respondent spouses Diu. Ratio Section 1. (c) That venue is improperly laid. .Private respondent Pagba purchased on credit various merchandise from petitioners’ (Wilson and Dorcita Diu) store in Naval. 115213 REGALADO. or otherwise extinguished. are: (1) where the ground raised is lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. This prompted Mercedes to sue PHILVILLE for damages. . instead of giving them a single lot measuring 2. Biliran all valued at P7..The only exceptions to the rule.000 square meters.Respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands.The MTC dismissed the complaint for noncompliance with the provisions of P. she alleged that the Kasulatan did not express the true agreement of the parties and that the sale is void as it was executed within the 5-year prohibitive period from the issuance of the free patent. (2) it does not allege that the parties resorted to conciliation proceedings before the barangay. Accordingly. Victoria A.000 square meters each located far apart. 862. Reasoning Under Section 1. the time to answer is 15 days after service of summons upon the defendant. (3) prescription.Mercedes filed a motion for leave of court to amend her complaint.Civil Procedure Digest 2.D.D. and (4) where the evidence that would constitute a ground for the dismissal of the complaint was discovered only during the trial. . . the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File Action. (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. what they received were 2 separate lots of 1. None of the foregoing grounds is present in PHILVILLE’s motion to dismiss.Mercedes filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order but it was denied.D. NO. (i) That the claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds. holding that the proposed amendment is inconsistent with the cause of action in the original complaint. HELD NO. Tuason & Co. – Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the following grounds: A2010 Avena (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or over the subject of the action or suit. If no conciliation or settlement has been reached pursuant to the aforesaid rules.” DIU V CA (BUSHNELL AND PAGBA) G. 96 Barangay Chairman of Naval and so the case was set for hearing but private respondents failed to appear. abandoned. Dispostition WHEREFORE. (b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit. .Private respondents then went to the CA and said appellate court set aside the judgment of the RTC on the ground that there had been no compliance with P. 1508 but instead. 1508.R. waived.In its answer. 1995 NATURE Appeal by certiorari from judgment of CA which set aside the RTC’s FACTS . The CA said thus: “It is.

Reasoning P.D. In their position paper. their sham insistence for a meeting before the pangkat is merely a ploy for further delay. however. The CA judgment is SET ASIDE. They defined the main issue as WON the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against defendants. Manila. confrontation before the Lupon Chairman OR the Pangkat is sufficient compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to appear before the pangkat caused any 14 - and collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. She also appended a Statement of Account. he shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 1999. the barangay chairman or punong barangays is himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Govt. . Code are also applicable to this case. 1991.63. wherein: 1) Pablo undertook to pay Berba P3000 every tenth of the month until fully paid. .D. and 3) Pablo will pay P3450 as monthly rental. the parties manifested that despite earnest efforts.No complaint x x x shall be filed or instituted in court x x x unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat.410 (B)14 of the Local Govt. The lessees failed to pay the rentals due. which she leased to Josephine Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. Code.Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Avena prejudice to the case for private respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before the barangay chairman and. Although no pangkat was formed. PABLO 474 SCRA 686 CALLEJO. there was substantial compliance with the law. and by May 1999. they averred that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate to File Action from the Lupon. . before the effectivity of the Local Govt. Berba through counsel wrote to lessees. . failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement has been reached. A house was constructed on the lot. Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5. and should not be used as obstructions therein.D.818. CONCILIATION.115. Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat. 15 SEC.From the facts. the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis. On June 21. 410.The Court noted that although the basic complaint was filed by petitioners on July 10. no amicable settlement was reached. Prof. especially since they did not pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue. 97 ISSUE WON the confrontations before the Barangay Chairman of Naval satisfied the requirement in P. 1508. Code. 1999 between her and Pablo. there was substantial compliance with the precondition (for filing the claim) HELD YES. their defense founded thereon is deemed waived. Sta. the lessees still had a balance of P71. or when P. the procedural provisions of the Local Govt. Also.While no pangkat was constituted. defendants admitted they stopped paying rentals because of financial distress. In their answer. During the pre-trial conference. the conciliation procedure under P. covered by a lease contract. 2) Pablo will voluntarily leave the leased premises upon failure to pay. Victoria A. Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. demanding payment of the arrearages and to vacate the house within 30 days from notice. Under the factual antecedents. On this score. defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing - - - - BERBA V. On May 2.The Court further reasoned that the failure of Pagba to specifically allege in their Answer that there was no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constituted a waiver of that defense. 2001. as well as the circumstances obtaining and peculiar to the case. If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him. . Berba filed a complaint for eviction - SEC. In her position paper. on top of the P3000. Roxas St. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and noncompliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135.(a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court. Upon its expiration. their arrears amounted to P81. On June 5. Disposition petition GRANTED.1508 which does not require strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. Ratio Under Sec. As of May 2001. 1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code. otherwise she will sue them. Berba. Sec. it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. Berba filed a complaint against Pablo and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the MTC of Manila for unlawful detainer. 2001. By way of special and affirmative defenses. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense. 1992. RTC judgment is REINSTATED.412 of the Local Government Code. which took effect on Jan. . should be construed together with Sec. Code which mandates that the barangay chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Ana. 1508 was still in force.41215.1.716. which appeared to have been approved by the Punong Barangay and the members of the Lupon.D. Technicalities should not be made to desert their true role in our justice system. 412. it is undeniable that there was substantial compliance with P. The lessees ignored the demand. 2005 Nature Petition for review on certiorari Facts Estela Berba was the owner of a parcel of land located at M. By May 2000. (b) x x x. and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.D. November 11. - - - .

When Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the back rentals. and as such. . -Sustiguer and Aposaga filed for annulment of the sale on installment and award of said lot against the Govt of Bacolod and Tamayo. The court allowed her withdrawal as plaintiff. or an action in the MTC for the enforcement of the settlement. The RTC ruled that under Sec 408 of the Local Government Code. Victoria A. - A2010 Avena CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the RTC decision. reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice. such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code. SUSTIGUER V TAMAYO -Sustiguer and Aposaga both claimed that they were qualified and entitled to purchase a subdivision lot in Bacolod for the reason that they possess the preferential right to buy it from the Govt of Bacolod. hence Berba’s complaint was premature. Malate. Berba averred there was no need of a prior referral to the Lupon. They were not impleaded by Berba as partiesrespondents before the Lupon. .5 years and 5 months after the complaint was filed. Upon failure to comply with the agreement. MTC ruled in favor of Berba.. defendants insisted that Berba’s action in the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the Lupon. Manila. Berba had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction from the premises. He prayed that he be allowed to submit a written memorandum in support of his affirmative and special defenses. 149. The defendants filed a motion for the recall of the Order. G. Berba’s complaint against the Heirs of Carlos Palanca was premature. RTC denied Berba’s MFR. 29341 FERNAN. all chances of amicable settlement were effectively foreclosed. It was also claimed that Tamayo maliciously filed for unlawful detainer against Aposaga and Sustiguer .R. On motion of Berba. Ana Manila. and recalls that conciliation proceedings before the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5. but before the court could resolve the motion. parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement. -lower court dismissed the complaint of Sustiguer for lack of cause of action . being the actual occupants of the lot. 8 kilometers away from the barangay in Sta. In her reply. and cited Sec 408(f) of the Local Government Code. Sustiguer filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule 19.Civil Procedure Digest of the complaint. Zone 6 in Sta. The action of Berba against Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5. The same lot was sold to Jose Tamayo. 1999. RTC issued an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal. unless otherwise provided therein. the petitioner filed an action against Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals. the Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property to Berba on May 20. claiming that Sec 408 of Local Government Code should be construed liberally together with Sec 412. were not bound by it.Tamayo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative and special defenses and to dismiss both the complaint and complaint in intervention (of Villamarzo) invoking Sec 5 of Rule 16. parties who reside in the same city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.they agreed that the award of the lot be given to Aposaga and that a down payment of 20% of the total cost of the lot shall be made (or else the lot will be awarded to other applicants) -Aposaga failed to pay the price. No. while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873. However. 1999. Ana where the defendants lived. This agreement had the force and effect of a final judgment. - - - Disposition Petition denied. Held NO - - - - Berba and Pablo executed the Agreement which was approved by the Lupon. She then filed petition for review with CA. RTC granted the appeal. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the requisites of the law. Under Sec 408 of the Local Government Code.Sustiguer filed a manifestation that the withdrawal of Aposaga as party-plaintiff in Civil Case 6528 and as party defendant in Civil Case 7512 does not change the status and character of the said cases considering that she was merely accommodated by her codefendant in occupying the lot in question. the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of Maligaya St. they were not privy to the agreement. Prof. AUG 21 1989 NATURE Appeal to order by CFI FACTS 98 - - Issue WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition and declaring that there was no substantial compliance with the mandate of the law with respect to prior referral to the Barangay Court. Defendants appealed to the RTC. claiming that Tamayo was not qualified to apply for the award nor to purchase the lot under Ordinance No. 7512 (unlawful detainer case)" declaring she is no longer interested in its prosecution. instead of filing a motion before the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement. 2002. In their Appeal Memorandum. pointing out that she resided in a barangay in Malate. . Moreover. Aposaga filed a "Motion to Withdraw in Case 6528 (annulment of sale)” and “Confess Judgment in Civil Case No. -Tamayo filed his memorandum on the issue WON Sustiguer has any cause of action against the defendants.

the said ground for dismissal of the complaint may be heard preliminarily as if a motion to dismiss had been filed pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. detailed Licaros’ participation in the alleged unholy conspiracy. . -When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest.The rule is that when the motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. 7 of the 11-member Board of Directors were CB nominees. served as governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines from 1970 to 1980 during the presidency of Marcos.The Sandiganbayan ruled that the argument of petitioners that Licaros could not be held personally liable was untenable because the GBTC assets had been acquired by Tan through a public bidding duly approved by the Monetary Board. to favor the Marcoses and the Lucio Tan Group who acquired said GBTC assets for only P500. as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. Domingo and Licaros allegedly conspired with each other and gave Tan. who only paid P500. . no evidence may be allowed and the issue should only be determined in the light of the allegations of the complaint.September 3. .000. al. petitioners’ predecessor-ininterest. this argument was a matter of defense that could not be resorted to in a motion to dismiss. The dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action is proper under the circumstances. . As a general rule. This was not fulfilled by Tan. assisted by Office of SolGen. Hence. now known as the Allied Bank. an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree. Records show that instead of a preliminary hearing. raising as grounds (1) lack of cause of action and (2) prescription.Rule 3.March 25. Thus it was erroneous for Sustiguer to claim that the lower court should have conducted a trial on the merits instead of dismissing the complaint upon a mere motion. CFI denied. .2 “Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.Licaros had allegedly facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets of GBTC worth over P688 million at that time. et. 23 other persons who had purportedly acted as their dummies. Licaros was not impleaded in this Complaint or in the subsequent Expanded Complaint. accounting and damages against Marcos and alleged crony Lucio Tan. . his estate represented by his heirs was impleaded as a party defendant for the purpose of obtaining complete relief. among others. 1977 – GBTC was declared insolvent and placed under receivership. reiterating earlier allegations in the Expanded Complaint.The heirs of Licaros filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. the rule provides that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the complaint and no other. including CB Governor Licaros) had fraudulently acquired the assets of the General Bank and Trust Company.Aside from the main defendants (Marcos. nominees or agents. . al. .00. one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. -Although the ground of lack of cause of action was pleaded by Tamayo as one of his special and affirmative defenses in his answer. October 18. Licaros.A public bidding was held for the shares of GBTC. and that did not constitute a valid ground for dismissal. the parties filed their respective memoranda on the issue WON Sustiguer has a cause of action. According to the anti-graft court. Disposition dismissal of complaint for lack of cause of action as well as the order denying MFR affirmed Prof.Gregorio S. 1983. . 2001 . Victoria A. ISSUE WON dismissal of complaint was proper HELD YES . . the test being whether the court can render a valid judgment from the facts set forth. . et. which impleaded the Estate/Heirs of Licaros for the first time. . The complaint was to recover ill-gotten wealth which was allegedly acquired and accumulated in flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers. the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action.000 and attached a letter from PNB president Domingo. she not being the real party-in-interest. .The Amended Complaint. . restitution. that Tan (with the connivance of some government officials.September 13.4 years after the original action was filed. wife Imelda and Tan). filed a complaint for reversion.Civil Procedure Digest -Sustiguer filed MFR and new trial claiming that the dismissal of the complaint is contrary to law as there was no preliminary hearing and that she still has a valid cause of action even after the withdrawal of Aposaga from the case as she was suing in her own right as an awardee entitled to the award in question.July 17. 1991 .Sustiguer is not entitled to the relief prayed for. RP filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and for Admission of a Second Amended Complaint. . 2004 FACTS . Marcos. reconveyance. 99 HEIRS OF LICAROS V SANDIGANBAYAN 440 SCRA 483 PANGANIBAN. Tamayo took this procedural step by filing a motion for preliminary hearing and thereafter to A2010 Avena dismiss the complaint and the complaint in intervention. -Sustiguer’s interest cannot be categorized as material interest within the meaning of Rule 3. GBTC got into financial difficulties and a loan was extended to it by CB amounting to P310 million. favors. . It is well-settled that where the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. . He died on August 3.In extending this loan. 1987 – PCGG." -The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. or a mere incidental interest. . the CB took control of GBTC when the latter executed an irrevocable proxy of 2/3 of the bank’s outstanding shares in favor of the CB.Despite the allegation.It alleged.In 1976.The Sandiganbayan held that the averments in the Second Amended Complaint had sufficiently established a cause of action against Licaros. . Among the conditions was the attachment by the bidder of a letter of credit.2 considering that it is contingent upon the final execution of the contract of sale on installment in favor of Aposaga.

sufficiently extensive to include all acts and all incidents incidental. Victoria A. . and accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by the decedent during his lifetime. petitioners were seeking the quieting of their original titles that would ultimately lead to the cancellation of private respondents’ unlawfully issued and void free patent titles on the same private land. may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? So rigid is the norm prescribed that if the court should doubt the truth of the facts averred. and (2) the acquisition was done through a public bidding and in good faith. as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The paramount issue hinged on his acts as Central Bank governor.This charge of "conspiracy" casts a wide net. it must not dismiss the complaint but require an answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits. ISSUE WON the motion to dismiss should have been granted on the grounds of: Lack of cause of action Prescription HELD 1. had conspired with the main defendants in facilitating the allegedly questionable transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan.Petitioners are seeking the dismissal of the present case. . (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect and not to violate that right. . October 18.The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that Licaros. a director. Whether these allegations are true or not is beside the point. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true. These contentions are evidently matters of defense. the plaintiffs discovered that defendants applied for a free patent and fraudulently and anomalously secured titles on the portions of the same parcels of land from the Bureau of Lands . another respondent.Civil Procedure Digest .It was immaterial that Licaros was not a business associate of the main defendants and not an officer.Petitioners filed motions for reconsideration of the said order and inhibition of the presiding judge. and not in a mere motion to dismiss. . the question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.” . They principally invoked petitioner’s lack of legal . .Private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners had neither the legal personality nor the authority to institute the proceedings for cancellation of title.Plaintiffs. plus damages and attorney’s fees. laches or estoppel. during his lifetime. Disposition Petition dismissed Prof. to whom the case was re-raffled after Judge Quitain’s inhibition. or a stockholder of any of the defendant corporations. .RTC motu propio dismissed the complaint because only the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General can file a case for cancellation of title on the ground of fraud in the processing and issuance of the said title .The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint A2010 Avena clearly and unequivocally outlines its cause of action against Licaros. In essence. Fausto Tancuntian. Jr. for their truth is hypothetically admitted. granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside the order of dismissal.The instant action for reconveyance.Judge Salvador Ibarreta.” . shall not be barred by prescription. FACTS . . because (1) the actions imputed to Licaros as Central Bank governor were allegedly official acts of the members of the Monetary Board acting as a collegial body. more particularly for conspiring with the main defendants to prejudice the Republic. . which would have required the participation of the Director of Lands or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) through the Solicitor General. Reasoning . .Petitioners clarified that they were not asking for the reversion of subject private land to the public domain. related to or arising from the charge of systematic plunder and pillage against the main defendants Ratio An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription. NO Ratio It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action. 2004 NATURE Petition for review under Rule 45 for the reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court dismissing an action for cancellation of title and damages for alleged lack of legal personality of petitioners. filed their answer to the complaint. alienating and disposing the subject properties or any portion thereof during the pendency of the case. while Jofre Saniel.Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that “the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees. Macario Tancuntian and Cristina Cayang are beneficial owners of that parcel of land .A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created. for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. particularly his participation in an allegedly illegal conspiracy with Marcos and Domingo to give undue advantage to Tan’s bid for the GBTC assets. 100 TANCUNTIAN V GEMPESAW 00 SCRA 00 CORONA. of Branch 8 of the Davao City RTC. In reinstating the complaint Judge Ibarreta reasoned that “it was error for the court to have dismissed the case without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed by private respondents. Reasoning . from them or from their nominees or transferees. They also sought the cancellation and nullification of all the titles of the subject properties in the names of respondents as well as the reconveyance thereof to petitioners. restitution. et al.Sometime in May 1994. filed a motion to dismiss.Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from selling.The intent of the constitutional provision presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances and the primordial state interests involved in cases of such nature. the veracity of which must be determined in a full-blown trial (or in a pretrial stipulation). and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff.Respondents Vicente Gempesaw.

or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Petitioners contend that the suit they initially filed in the RTC of Davao City was not an action for reversion (wherein the real party in interest would have indeed been the Republic of the Philippines) but rather an action for cancellation of titles with damages. the inclusion of the Republic of the Philippines as the real party in interest was unnecessary. it still involves the same issue raised in the earlier civil case (validity of their marriage) and prays for the same remedy (declaration of nullity). it was only the Government through the Solicitor General or his duly authorized representative who could institute the reversion proceeding. legal personality to A2010 Avena character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified.Eventually.Petitioners filed this petition. since the problem was “double titling. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the . they are entitled to the opportunity to defend their titles and present their side of the controversy since their titles date even earlier than those of the patent holders-respondents. 141528 AZCUNA. every action must be presented or defended in the name of the real party in interest. . -After said decision attained finality. This can only mean. For her part.Since. Rule 3.Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala vs. Disposition Petition GRANTED. Conformably with our ruling in Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala. -RTC granted MTD and dismissed the case forforum shopping and multiplicity of suits. October 31. the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land.1995: Oscar P. this time alleging that his marriage with Alcantara was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.Civil Procedure Digest personality and authority to institute the action for cancellation of their titles. the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. . . ISSUE WON the petitioners have institute the proceedings. Prof. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action.Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court and held: There is no dispute that the titles registered in the names of the defendants-appellees are free patent titles issued by the State through the Bureau of Lands. Alcantara filed an answer with a MTD praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.Petitioners thus pray for the cancellation of titles and free patents fraudulently secured by respondents over the same parcels of land which were already registered to them through OCTs which were still intact and in their names at the time of the issuance of respondents’ allegedly void titles. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of title to the defendant. citing Alcantara’s alleged psychological incapacity. Victoria A. . could not have been validly disposed of by the Government. . the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. as evidenced by OCT No. They stand to be benefited or injured by whatever decision the court may decree. The land subject of the controversy is titled either in their names or that of their predecessors-in-interest. Hence. After trial on the merits. Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Section 2. Judge Ibarreta issued an order dismissing the complaint. 101 MALLION V ALCANTARA G.A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Heirs of Honorio Dacut: An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action for reversion. plaintiffsappellants cannot as for cancellation or reconveyance.” . . this petition. On the other hand. Hence. In such a case. Mallion filed on July 12. as the case may be.This legal dispute does not involve an action for the reversion of land to the public domain but one for the cancellation of null and void free patents over private land. and as such. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules. . ROC FACTS -Oct24.Respondent Saniel asserted that since the action was for the cancellation of the original certificates of title issued to them through free patent.In an action for reversion. . . In this connection. in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. petitioners are therefore the real party in interest in this case. not being owners. then they have the legal personality to sue respondents. the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. in her comment.R. petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. Mallion’s MFR was also denied. No. much less grantors. CA dismissed the appeal for failure of Mallion to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. counters that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground. a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake.Petitioners claim continuing ownership over the subject parcels of land since 1976.Furthermore. 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. petitioners are the real parties in interest under the rules. Mallion filed a petition with RTC San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code. Parties in interest . 0-328 and 0-329 in their names. RTC denied the petition upon the finding that Mallion failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC San Pablo City. that the free patents and OCTs issued to respondents in 1990 and 1991 were null and void because the land was their private property.Petitioners insist that since the land in question was already private land at the time it was issued a free patent by the Bureau of Lands. . that is. petitioner claims that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition. -Alcantara. Thus. Respondent HELD YES . according to petitioners. . -Mallion argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same.

-Parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. that is. -Litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief. -A party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. and of causes of action. and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 102 -Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration. Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy. The first case was Dinglasan v Lee Bun Ting. But in the earlier case. the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. . a thing or matter settled by judgment. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. 1977 NATURE Original petition in the SC. Costs against petitioner. a thing judicially acted upon or decided. but the RTC and CA found that the sale was absolute. ISSUE WON a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity is bar to a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license HELD: YES -Res judicata. provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. In both petitions.Civil Procedure Digest thus contends that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. it is apparent that petitioner is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits. the two actions are considered the same.identity of parties. Art XIII.The Supreme Court held that even if Lee Liong violated the Constitution.000. defined: a matter adjudged. After the sale Lee Liong constructed a concrete building which he used for his lumber business and his residence. a parcel of land situated in Capiz. the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. petitioner has the same cause . -In this jurisdiction. Another contention was that the sale is null and void as it violated the 1973 Constitution. the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the earlier decision dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. the concept of res judicata is embodied in Sec47(b) and (c) of Rule 39 of ROC. namely: (1) public policy and necessity. FACTS . The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time. which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation. effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. the Court upheld the sale. the sale cannot be deemed null and void because at the time of the sale. A2010 Avena -Based on this test. On June 27. 1956.Petitioners sought for the declaration of nullity of the sale.The case involves a question of res judicata. -This doctrine is a rule which pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law. For this reason. &(2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. -test to determine whether the causes of action are identical: ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions.Petitioners sold to Lee Liong. Moreover. Certiorari with preliminary injunction. Sec. respondent asserts that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been raised during the trial in the first case. 5 (that foreigners cannot own land in the Philippines). a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. SO ORDERED. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. for P6. DINGLASAN V LEE BUN TING . and the doctrine of pari delicto applied. -Furthermore. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first. Perez v. (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. April 22. The vendor was equally guilty. Victoria A. and (4) there is -. the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. Prof. By definition. Petitioners contend that the sale was a conditional sale with the right to repurchase. LEE BUN TING V ALIGAEN 76 SCRA 416 ANTONIO. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. Judge Rafael Dinglasan (an assistant attorney at the DOJ) knew of the said Constitutional provision. The doctrine of in pari delicto barred petitioner-appellants from recovering the title to the property in question and renders unnecessary the consideration of the other arguments presented. a Chinese citizen (predecessor of Lee Bun Ting). Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final.between the first and the second actions -. The present case seeks for the reversal of the decision in aforementioned case. of subject matter. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court. . CA: the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action. one of the plaintiffs. .

Reasoning . the following requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final. private respondents Dinglasan et al. while 49(c) refers to conclusiveness of judgment. It also debunked the erroneous survey and technical description foisted by petitioners as not the fraud contemplated under Sec. economy and judicial time and the interests of litigants. 1968 Aligaen of Capiz CFI denied the motion to dismiss.. . . (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest. filed a complaint on JULY 1. .R. and (4) there must be between the first and second actions. 49(b) (b) In other cases the judgment or order is. 1956.a subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but not to an old one finally and conclusively determined by the people. which allows the reconveyance of fraudulently registered land. as well as the peace and order of society. whether civil or criminal. 103 . with costs against private respondents. They sought the reconveyance of the disputed area and the cancellation of the OCT to reflect the consequent reduction in area. on the basis of the decision of the SC in Philippine Banking Corporation v Lui She. v Lui She HELD NO. (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits. litigating for the same title and in the same capacity. Victoria A. alleging that the issues have definitely been settled in the Dinglasan case. After a preliminary hearing. Damages and Injunction against respondents the Avilas and the Provincial Sheriff. 131191 TINGA. there exists res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of VILLARINO v AVILA G. Parties should not be allowed to litigate the same issue more than once. it is binding on all inferior courts. . the first judgment is conclusive in the second case. No. and that the trial court therein had no jurisdiction over the disputed area since it had already been covered by an OCT issued in the name of petitioners.The Court pointed out the absence of policy governing lands sold to aliens in violation of the Constitutional prohibition. . and the action and relief prayed for are identical—annulment of sale and recovery of the parcel of land. the land be surrendered.Reasons of public policy. (However. and that they be paid P2K monthly until the return of the property.146 square meters. there is no statement which would have the effect of reopening and changing previously adjudicated rights of parties and finally settled cases (meaning there is no express prohibition against changing previous cases).Petitioners spouses Villarino filed an action for Annulment of Title. 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the order of dismissal of the RTC FACTS . that Lee Bun Ting receive P6K as restitution for the land. between a pending action and one which has been finally and definitely settled. The Avilas moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of res judicata. The claimed that in the case of Philippine Banking Corporation. and of causes of action. The respondents again asserted that the sale violated the Constitution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants. . the names of the parties involved were the same. They prayed that the complaint be dismissed. RES JUDICATA A2010 Avena . The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. . et al. They prayed that they be declared the legal owners. PRESENT CASE . Petitioners opposed the application of the Avilas for the registration of Lot No. petitioners averred that the registration of Lot No. identity of parties.On Oct. Sec. 10. 1968 for the recovery of the same parcel of land (subjectmatter of the previous case). .Civil Procedure Digest . The CA upheld the incontrovertibility of the decree of registration one year after its issuance.In the present case. (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA. or was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.Lee Bun Ting reiterated their defense of res judicata on the basis of the decision of the SC on June 27. v Lee Bun Ting. Ratio It is clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of the SC cannot retroactively be applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had. Rule 39. 967 encroached upon Lot No. conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by the title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding.Twelve (12) years later. ISSUES WON petitioner’s complaint is barred by res judicata HELD YES Ratio For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action. 967 on the ground that a portion of Lot No. et al. judicial orderliness. 968 is the adjacent property belonging to petitioners. When there is no identity of causes of action. ISSUE WON the case Rafael Dinglasan. there is identity of parties. even if there is identity of parties but no identity or cause of action.The doctrine of res judicata applies where. 53 of PD 1529. subject matter and cause of action. that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon it face to have been so adjudged. J. Prof. Lot No. and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify. contending that the RTC erred in dismissing the case based on res judicata.A motion to dismiss was filed by Lee Bun Ting on the ground of res judicata. 968 to the extent of 2.49(b) refers to bar by prior judgment. the RTC issued the order dismissing the case. all require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction. September 26. In their complaint.Petitioners filed the instant petition. Reconveyance. could be relitigated in view of the subsequent decision of the SC in Philippine Banking Corp. but only an identity of issues. Once the judgment of the SC becomes final. with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto. 967 was based on an erroneous survey and technical description. of subject matter. They argued that the judgment in the land registration case is not yet final because the aggrieved party can still avail of the remedy of reconveyance and recovery of damages. DISPOSITION Certiorari is granted.

the lot is owned by Aristotle. Senoy and Risonar are not interested parties because they would not benefit from the affirmative reliefs sought. CA (DABON AND DABON) (supra) NATURE Review on certiorari of decision of Court of Appeals FACTS . who separated fr ACCRA.TC’s decision became final and executory. 104 performance case. 967. Disposition Petition DENIED. Ratio An action should be brought against the real party in interest. organization and acquisition of business associations/orgs. PCGG set conditions for exclusion of the petitioners: . claiming to have bought the land fr Aristotle. YES. 10538 KAPUNAN. They alleged that the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over their persons as the real parties in interest. Reasoning All the elements of res judicata in the mode of bar by prior judgment are present. Sometimes. But the land registration court debunked the opposition and upheld the application. They acquire info relative to assets of clients and their personal/biz circumstances. But the Dabons insist that they are parties in interest bec they are buyers. In this case. 2. Gonzales said she pd downpayment to Priscilla because she had an SPA from her son Aristotle. Victoria A. Only Gonzales remains as genuine party-petitioner in this case. The rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. That was precisely the content and thrust of petitioners’ opposition to the Avilas’ land registration application. What is essential is that he can prove that the judgment was obtained by fraud and he would be adversely affected thereby. Gonzales knew of the sale of lot by Aristotle Manio to the Dabons yet Gonzales did not include the Dabons in her petition. Ratio A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.Gonzales filed complaint (action for specific performance) against Manio sps. seeking execution of deed of sale of property she bought fr Priscilla Manio. . filed before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment and orders of the TC. There is no question that said decision was an adjudication on the merits. WON the Dabons can seek annulment of the TC judgment HELD 1. 1996 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS . However. . owners and possessors of the contested land. Petitioners could have appealed the decision of the land registration court. In this case. Senoy (Deputy Sheriff). . Reasoning Although the Dabons are not parties to the specific Prof. Petitioners point out that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the disputed portion as this had already been decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth including shares of stocks in certain corporations.disclosure of identity of clients submission of docs substantiating lawyerclient relationship submission of deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Sheriff finally served a copy at an ungodly hour of 12 mn. Petitioners claim that the disputed portion is covered by their title. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini. w/c was w/drawn bec decision wasn’t served on defendants. Failure to implead Aristotle Manio renders the proceedings in the specific performance case null and void.Named petitioners herein are Carillo (Presiding Judge). and Gonzales. any finding of extrinsic fraud would adversely affect their ownership and could be basis of annulment of judgment. but that it was erroneously included in the survey and technical description subject of the Avilas’ land registration application. 2. . Disposition Petition is denied. Petitioners’ cause of action in the civil case would call for the determination and adjudication of ownership over the disputed portion. they do not claim any proprietary interest in said shares.The Dabons. Reasoning . .R. YES. The real party in interest is the one who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the one entitled to the avails of the suit. No. their son. Priscilla had no interest on the lot and can have no interest in the judgment of the TC.TC ruled in favor of Gonzales. Guyot (Clerk of Court).ACCRA lawyers said it was in furtherance of legit lawyering and they became holders of shares of stock only as incorporating or acquiring stockholders. Hence. Carillo. ISSUE/S 1. CARILLO V. A2010 Avena . ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of said corps involved in sequestration proceedings. REGALA V SANDIGANBAYAN G. The specific performance case brought by Gonzales to the TC named Priscilla Manio and husband as defendants. WON there was basis to annul the decision of the TC. This is extrinsic fraud. . Their failure to do so rendered said decision final and executory. members of the firm act as incorporators or stockholders. The subject matter of the civil case was the same property that was the subject matter in the LRC case. filed a separate answer. Guyot. September 20.ACCRA lawyers filed a counter-motion that PCGG also exclude them as parties-defendant as it did to Roco. ACCRA Law Firm performs legal svcs incl. the owner of the land. Risonar (Registrar of Deeds).Civil Procedure Digest judgment.This is an offshoot of the complaint before the Sandiganbayan through the PCGG against Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.PCGG filed Third Amended Complaint w/c excluded respondent Raul Roco because he promised to reveal identity of principal/s for whom he acted as nomineestockholder . and as such. Petitioners and respondents were the same party litigants. CA issued resolution restraining TC from implementing its decision.Gonzales insists that the Dabons have no right to seek annulment of the TC’s judgment bec they’re not parties to the specific performance case. this petition by Gonzales. an issue already passed by the land registration court when it confirmed the Avilas’ title over Lot No. Gonzales deposited balance w/ the court and filed motion for execution.

Goyala executed a mortgage in favor of the petitioner on the parcel of land in question. Yes Ratio . the repurchase to be made within one year. Info relating to the identity of client may fall w/in privilege when client’s name itself has independent significance such that disclosure would reveal client confidence. the said name would furnish the only link that would be necessary to convict an individual of a crime.It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. the true intention of the parties was for it to be a mere mortgage to secure payment.Respondents failed to show that Roco actually revealed the identity of his clients. Quite obviously. .It is also privileged when govt’s lawyers have no case against an atty’s client unless. It does not attach until there is a client. with his now deceased wife Antonina sold to Gojo a 2. Reasoning . Revelation of the name would provide the link for prosecution to build its case. HELD 1. Reasoning . . Victoria A. disclosure would lead to establish the client’s connection w/ the very fact in issue.It is also privileged where disclosure would open the client to civil liability. Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them. 10 years after the execution of said document. ISSUE/S 1.Sandiganbayan denied exclusion of petitioners fr the PCGG case. . That denial is now being questioned. Also. After all. NO. Yes .Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of the relationship. Privilege exists only after atty-client relationship has been established. as a general rule.EXCEPTIONS .GENERAL RULE: .the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint . where none otherwise exists. -Goyala filed an answer to the petition. there are alternative sources of info available to prosecutor w/c does not depend on utilizing a defendant’s counsel as convenient and readily available source of info. by revealing the client’s name. . know his adversary.5 hectare parcel of agricultural land for P750 by a “Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale”. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with petitioners -. although the deed was executed in the form of a pacto de retro sale. . First. . Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. a client thinks he might have previously committed something illegal and consults atty abt it. other situations could qualify as exceptions.Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for w/c he sought the lawyer’s advice. . the link bet the offense and the legal advice/svc was duly established by no less than the PCGG itself. that petitioner be . Gojo alleged that the period for repurchasing had expired and ownership had become consolidated in him and that for purposes of recording the consolidation in the Registry of Property. making the denial of the ACCRA lawyers’ exclusion from the PCGG case a violation of equal protection clause.Lawyer-client confidentiality and loyalty exists not only during relationship but even after termination of the relationship. Hence.Civil Procedure Digest . respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint 2. No such substantial distinctions exist. Clearly.Due process requires that the opposing party should. By way of counterclaim. as stated in the deed. In this case. The deed also indicates that the vendee paid another P100 in addition to the purchase price. respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the “bigger fish” as they say in street parlance. WON lawyer-client confidentiality applies in this case 3. He further prayed for P1800 per annum until the final termination of the case for the fruits of said property and in the case that the instrument be deemed a true pacto de retro sale. PCGG shld show that Roco was treated as a species apart fr the Prof. . If client were made to choose bet legal representation w/o effective communication and disclosure and legal representation w/ all his secrets revealed then he might be compelled to stay away from the judicial system or lose right to counsel.Apart fr the exceptions above. WON there is a cause of action against the defendants 2. 105 ACCRA lawyers on basis of classification w/c made substantial distinctions based on real differences. it was necessary that a judicial order be issued to that effect. Goyala further claimed that he and his wife attempted to pay the debt but petitioner refused to receive the sum and cancel the mortgage. Such being the case. . 3. The instant case FALLS UNDER AT LEAST 2 EXCEPTIONS. alleging that they had obtained a cash loan of P810 from Gojo payable w/in one year w/o interest and that to guarantee payment. petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Gojo filed a case with the CFI against Goyala by way of a petition for consolidation of ownership of said land. .It is diff when the client consults atty for illicit purposes.Court is trying to avoid fishing expedition by the prosecution. Goyala prayed that petitioner receive the P810 and that the document of mortgage be declared so. thus. WON Roco and the ACCRA lawyers are similarly situated.Court has right to know that client whose privileged info is sought to be protected is flesh A2010 Avena and blood. Disposition Decision of the Sandiganbayan annulled and set aside DISMISSAL BY CLAIMANT GOJO V GOYALA (supra) NATURE Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Sorsogon FACTS -Appellee Segundo Goyala. seeking advice on how to around the law.It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. and not a pacto de retro sale.The right to counsel of an accused is also involved in this issue.PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the said conditions.

On the same date. Peligro -submitted separate withdrawals of appearance. Goyala filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that notwithstanding the lapse of 43 days after appellant’s receipt of a copy of the said TC order. Jaime L.Civil Procedure Digest ordered to execute a deed of resale in favor of respondents in accordance with A1606CC. amounts to lack of jurisdiction. and Dioscoro G. It was further held in Ferriera vs Gonzales that the continuance of a proceeding during the pendency of which a party thereto dies. before the proper substitution of parties as directed by Sec. On the same date. 16. 2001. In Barrameda vs Barbara. Atty. Nazareno to Attys. principally because the issues raised in the counterclaim are deemed automatically joined by the allegations of the complaint.m. certified the same to the SC. 2002. separate Notices were sent by Atty. Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. 2002. This Motion was deemed submitted for resolution but was eventually denied by the trial court in an Order. January 7. Nazareno filed via registered mail a Submission to the RTC . (As in Sec 20 of Rule 3. petitioner attached the Affidavits of Attys. which upon finding that the said appeal involves purely questions of law. Its counsels -. prompting the TC to issue an order requiring counsel for the plaintiff to submit an amended Complaint substituting Antonina with one of her successors in interest as party defendants. The Certification as regards Atty. Sultan Kudarat. 17. -Appellee filed a motion to declare appellant in default in respect of said appellee’s counterclaim. the law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. said appellant failed and neglected to submit the amended complaint required of him.. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution. and its Supplement) dated January 16. Rule 3 (Sec. a Complaint for damages against Jonathan Landoil International Co. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. declaring the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale an equitable mortgage and ordering Gojo to receive the P810 and to restore possession to the defendants and allowing them to redeem the same. a copy of which it eventually received later in the day. Ana Peralta-Nazareno. at 3:10 p. 2002.before Atty. The appellant contends that there is no occasion for the TC to declare him in default in respect of appellee’s counterclaim as said counterclaim falls within the category of compulsory counterclaim which does not call for an independent answer as the complaint already denies its material allegations. -Appellant appealed to the CA. 2002. advising it that they had filed a Motion to Strike Off from the records the Notice to Take Deposition. Antonina. V. for them to examine the transcript of their testimonies. respondents sent petitioner a fax message via JRS Express. TC rendered favorable judgment on appellee’s counterclaim. Mario and Peligro. a notary public acting as deposition officer. without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with the rules. Peligro alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received a copy of the Order intended for him. At 12:00 noon of the same day. is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order dismissing the said complaint. affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record. Victoria A. the deposition-taking proceeded as scheduled -. ISSUES WON TC erred in declaring plaintiff in default with respect to defendant’s counterclaim HELD YES. Mario and Peligro. Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City. At 9:30 a. 106 JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS PRE-TRIAL JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO. would similarly be void. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision. Mario Jr. whose absence during the pretrial had led the trial court to declare it in default. as witnesses.at the Business Center Conference Room of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Makati City -. on January 28. Favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be enforced in the manner provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. It is now settled that a plaintiff who fails or chooses not to answer a compulsory counterclaim may not be declared in default. ("JLI" -Petitioner). WHEREFORE. new law). To its Supplement. 3 of Rule 17. said provision cannot apply when the order ignored is a void one.Attys. -Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner. -While it is true that under Sec. RTC issued an Order directing respondents to file their written comment on the Motion to Quash and scheduled the hearing thereon for February 1. -Petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination of Attys. Petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. On January 29. 2001. a complaint may be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the plaintiff fails to comply with an order of the court. Inc. The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. and asking it not to proceed until the RTC would have resolved the Motion. as in this case. it filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash. the decision appealed from is set aside Prof. 2004 NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 FACTS -Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu (Respondent) filed with the RTC of Tacurong City. Parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Appellant opposed the motion but the TC dismissed the complaint. The Certification pertaining to Atty. but will be allowed to continue until final judgment is A2010 Avena entered. On the same day. the SC held that an order to amend the complaint. the death of the defendant in a contractual money claim does dismiss such action for recovery. It filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice regarding the public auction sale of its properties.m. petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution. had died. for such non-compliance. -Counsel for Goyala filed a manifestation informing the TC that the named defendant. which further required Goyala to submit his evidence before the Clerk of Court. MANGUDADATU 00 SCRA 00 PANGANIBAN. Mario stated that he had personally received his copy on December 21. Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial. which was granted by the TC. August 16.

The pertinent rule states: Section 4. Appearance of parties." This procedure was followed in the instant case. or (2) newly discovered evidence that. Meanwhile CA issued a Resolution denying the Petition for Prohibition. There is a disputable presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. not being final. 2002 RTC Resolution and the December 4. The lapse of time -. and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Resolution dated February 21. In its Omnibus Motion for New Trial. 2000 ex parte presentation of evidence. 2001 promulgation of the Decision-. With regard to Atty. (2) Reply to respondents’ Vigorous Opposition to the Motion to Quash. denying the Motion to Quash. the collaborating counsel. together with the documentary exhibits marked during the deposition-taking. it received a copy of respondents’ Motion to Set Auction Sale of Defendant’s Levied Properties. Having failed to do so. Hearing on the Motion to Quash. Liberality is the rule in considering a motion for reconsideration. (2) a transcript bearing their signatures. Too late was the challenge that it made after the Decision had already been rendered. Unless the reopening of the case is clearly intended for delay. Rogelio Fernandez.shows the negligence of petitioner and its counsels. Finally. since no withdrawal of appearance had yet been granted. 2000 pretrial. it is their duty to notify the party they represent. we have ruled .It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The explanation offered by petitioner as regards the absence of its counsel from the pretrial is therefore unacceptable. (3) a copy of the Notice to Take Deposition delivered to her. 2001 Writ of Execution." but "to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and [for] the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. -These grounds relied upon by petitioner cannot properly secure a new trial. No. ISSUES (1) whether petitioner received the Order denying its timely filed Motion for New Trial. Judgments based on an ex parte presentation of evidence are generally frowned upon. On this basis. could not be the subject of a writ of execution. and (4) a copy of the Notice signed by respondents’ counsel. HELD 1. petitioner fails to convince us that it has not received the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial.was an error of judgment not reviewable by certiorari or prohibition. 2004.Civil Procedure Digest attaching (1) a Certification that the witnesses had been present and duly sworn to by her. 2000. -. it alleged that the Board of Directors had terminated his legal services on August 4. In the present case.[33] It thus concluded that the judgment. courts should be liberal in setting aside orders barring defendants from presenting evidence. Victoria A. lawyers are deemed to be the representatives of their clients. An improvident termination of legal services is not an excuse to justify non-appearance at a pretrial. Counsels are not the only ones required to attend the pretrial. The Rules of Court does not prohibit the filing of a motion for a new trial despite the availability of a motion for reconsideration. 2000 pretrial to the September 5. and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been A2010 Avena impaired. Mario was sick. Until their formal withdrawal is granted. seeking to hold in abeyance the February 21. Petitioner also failed to justify the absence of both its counsels. But as far as the trial court was concerned. accident. The appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant is also mandatory. his absence from the pretrial was still not excusable. It should have also justified its own absence therefrom. A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of (1) fraud. his presence would have afforded him an opportunity to make a formal withdrawal of appearance. it ruled that between the denial of a lawyer and the certification of a postmaster. While notice of the pretrial is served on counsels. -In addition to the foregoing facts. In its motions and petitions filed with this Court and the lower courts. petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration after the trial court had allowed respondents’ ex parte presentation of evidence. petitioner argued that its counsel Atty. While he could no longer represent petitioner. as they would be subject to the counsel’s will. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. and until the June 19. But the failure to file the latter motion -. would probably alter the result. the period to appeal had not yet lapsed.when the latter disregarded two witnesses’ oral depositions -. Fernandez may have been notified of the termination of his services on August 7. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefore or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement. -The Proper Remedy under the new Rules. 107 meaningless. without resort to technicality. The appellate court also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court -. It is readily apparent that petitioner is raising factual issues that this Court does not review. the defendant’s remedy is a motion for reconsideration. An affidavit of merit is not required to be attached to such motion. it had ample opportunity to challenge the Order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence.from the August 8. and that. with reasonable diligence. 2002. since trial had already been terminated. it had no valid ground to request a new trial. the consequence of non-appearance without cause at the pretrial is not for the petitioner to be considered "as in default. Atty. the rules of procedure would be rendered Prof. Otherwise. -The rationale for this requirement of compelling the parties to appear personally before the court is to exhaust the possibility of reaching a compromise. and (3) Opposition ad Cautelam to respondents’ Motion to Strike Off the Notice to Take Deposition. petitioner submitted its (1) Formal Offer of Exhibits. because the defense has already been laid down in the answer. a fact that allegedly constituted excusable negligence for his failure to appear at the August 8. (2) whether the taking of oral depositions was proper under the circumstances. he continued to be petitioner’s counsel of record. if presented. attesting that it was a true record of their testimonies. Ruling of the Court of Appeals = It ruled that petitioner could no longer avail itself of a deposition under Rule 23 of Rules of Court. Petitioner alleged that since it had not received the Order denying its Motion for New Trial. the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial.without due cause -is a factor in determining whether to apply the liberality rule in lifting an order that allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence. Hence. Prior to the trial court’s resolution of the case. To the trial court’s order allowing the ex parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff. petitioner did not explain why it had failed to file a motion for reconsideration. the latter would prevail. It is best for the trial court to give both the plaintiff and the defendant a chance to litigate their causes fairly and openly.

or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing. thereby expediting the trial. depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge. In Dasmariñas Garments v." Limitations would arise. and (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party. or in such a manner as to annoy. or managing agent of a public or private corporation. the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. in lieu of their actual presence at the trial. unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. depositions should be allowed.Civil Procedure Digest that the postmaster’s certification prevails over the mere denial of a lawyer. or imprisonment. 2. speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just. or is out of the Philippines. 2001 Motion for Early Resolution. This rule is applicable here.not arbitrarily. it could have opposed their Motion for Execution by requesting the RTC to resolve the Motion for New Trial. after an answer has been served. or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court. that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable. and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried. fraudulent. -. Rule 23. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure. capriciously or oppressively -. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury. No. may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof. any part or all of a deposition. provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is. convenient. Use of Depositions. to allow the deposition to be used. -The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. 2001 Motion for Execution and November 21. that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4. it is well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. embarrass. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false. A2010 Avena 4. further. or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age. whether or not a party. Victoria A. its taking should not be allowed." There can be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments." Depositions are allowed. Petitioner has failed to establish its non-receipt of the trial court’s Order denying its Motion for New Trial. deposition has advantages. to the end that its purpose may be attained. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. thereby encouraging settlements out of court. or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry. though. without leave of court if an answer has been submitted). under the circumstances specified hereunder: Section 4. as an attribute of discovery. and for errors and irregularities in the deposition. or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena. Prof. or (5) upon application and notice. and clears the docket of many cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried. 6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial. Given these unrebutted facts. or the trial court could have been informed by petitioner of the latter’s non-receipt of the Order resolving respondents’ Motion. prevents delays. absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party. if the examination is conducted in bad faith. infirmity. Rules of Court). the Motions filed by respondents should have alerted it of such issuance. it is unbelievable that petitioner did not know that a ruling on the Motion for New Trial had already been issued. Reyes. The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended. and provided. It makes available in a simple. may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead. saves the time of the courts. As a rule. and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not have been proved. Otherwise. partnership. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pretrial or before it. or. so far as admissible under the rules of evidence. we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies through deposition. It expedites the disposal of litigation. when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated. 7. Thus. sickness. "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action. However. The right to object to their admissibility is retained by the parties. At the very least. As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial. the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part . director. no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. whenever necessary or convenient. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses. and sham claims and defenses. 5. is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged. x x x 2. (c) The deposition of a witness. -The Rules of Court and jurisprudence. 108 When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party. A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action. 2001 Order submitting the Motion for Execution for resolution. 3. (b)The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer. however. without such leave. as follows: -1. except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all. with leave of court if the summons have been served. It must be exercised -. or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. in accordance with any one of the following provisions: (a)Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness. This Court notes the trial court’s finding that petitioner received a copy of respondents’ September 24. and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence if the witness were present and had testified in court. -Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding. do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. as well as the trial court’s September 28.At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.

although respondent Baybay qualified his reaction by telling the court that he would first have to inform his lawyer and the co-defendants of the said proposal. SO ORDERED. respondents were not actual residents of Brgy Tagnipa where the "road right of way" was . it is the failure of the defendant. 2006 NATURE Petition for review FACTS . A judgment of default against a defendant who failed to attend pre-trial. 109 the pre-trial that would serve cause to allow plaintiff to present evidence ex parte. CA where the Court held that if every error committed by RTC were to be a proper object of review by certiorari. 2001 Resolution. despite the fact that trial has already been terminated. Petitioners filed MFR with Motion to Admit Additional Exhibits. It bears stressing that nothing in the Rules of Court sanctions the presentation of evidence ex parte upon instances when counsel for defendant is absent during pretrial. WHEREFORE. The provision also provides for the instances where the non-appearance of a party may be excused. counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation of Willingness to Settle With Request for Cancellation. petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with CA. Sect. expressing disappointment towards his attitude. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat. 4 imposes the duty on litigating parties and their respective counsel during pre-trial. Sr. that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. CA resolved on the merits. However. So. who is the father of the counsel for petitioners. however. . Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. the trial court considered and weighed -. Since the RTC would only consider the evidence presented by respondents. disallowing as it does any meaningful defense petitioners could have posed.Nothing in the ROC authorizes a trial judge to allow the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte on account of the absence during pre-trial of the counsel for defendant. 4 provides for PAREDES V VERANO G.Alleging that petitioners had blocked the passage way in violation of the Compromise Agreement.meter-wide right of way in favor of Paredes for a consideration of P6K. Nothing. No. then trial would never come to an end and the appellate court dockets would be clogged with petitions challenging every interlocutory order of the TC. In the Compromise Agreement. denied having violated the Compromise Agreement. or even any defendant who failed to file an answer. Alago and Baybay (plaintiffs-petitioners) against Verano and Hinunangan (defendants-respondents). . They alleged that like them. It concluded that the acts of Judge Kapili did not constitute grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. A2010 Avena established and that respondent Hinunangan had already sold his only remaining lot in the vicinity to petitioner Paredes .The order of RTC allowing respondents to present evidence ex parte was undoubtedly to the detriment of petitioners. and not defendant's counsel. . which was denied by RTC.MFR dismissed. Rule 18 ROC. Baybay's counsel moved to reset it to another date on account of a conflicting hearing. respondents filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners. Apart from manifesting his willingness to settle the complaint. Petitioners asked Judge Kapili to inhibit himself from the case.Before the new pre-trial date. It culminated in a judgment by compromise. In its February 21.that its Order denying the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Petitioners elevated case to CA and SC but to no avail. As previously explained.Pre-trial was initially set and reset and reset again. RTC was informed of a proposed settlement between the parties. The Rules do not countenance stringent construction at the expense of justice and equity Reasoning . v.against all other evidence -. the order strikes at the heart of the case. The RTC then commented unfavorably on the absence of petitioners' counsel. Ampeloquio. implies a waiver only of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations but not all their other rights. "for failure of the defendants’ counsel to appear before RTC. Despite their depositions. and co-defendant Alago. CA dismissed it for failure to attach duplicate original copies of the annexes to the petition other than the RTC Orders and for failure to submit such other pleadings relevant and pertinent to the petition. Private respondents and their counsel were present. but was denied . In the pre-trial. but not their counsel. Petitioners answered. RTC again reset the pre-trial date. petitioners' counsel suggested to the opposing counsel that he be informed of the terms of the proposed settlement. petitioners' counsel requested the cancellation of the 23 Jan 2004 hearing. Disposition. CA noted that Baybay had made it clear that he would never enter into any amicable settlement without the advice of his counsel. . The judge denied the motion . and any party may introduce any other parts. ruling that under Sec 5. We note. in Sec.CA cited Sps.R. the place of hearing. however. Victoria A. with all defendants themselves present. even though the case had already reached SC over the denial of MTD.But the hearing pushed through on 23 Jan 2004.A complaint for the establishment of a right of way was filed at RTC Maasin by Paredes. was present in court along with the other defendants. petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt. to appear at Prof. petitioner Baybay. Hinunangan granted a 2. adverting to the documents previously missing from the petition but attached to the motion. October 12. a deposition can still be properly taken. .So.Civil Procedure Digest introduced. is a ground to declare defendants in default and to authorize plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. Costs against petitioner. the Petition is DENIED.Petitioners next filed MTD for lack of cause of action. and not that of petitioners.164375 TINGA. Petitioners filed MFR. So were Baybay and Paredes. HELD NO Ratio The absence of counsel for defendants at pretrial does not ipso facto authorize the judge to declare the defendant as in default and order the presentation of evidence ex parte. and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. ISSUE WON the absence of the counsel for defendants at the pre-trial. The RTC allowed respondents to present their evidence ex parte. . even making note of the fact that not once had the counsel appeared before the RTC. In Rule 18.

In Civil Case No.00 by way of attorney's fees.61 and ordering plaintiff to return said amount to defendant. raffled to Branch 6. in the RTC of Tacloban City. Accordingly. 2006 NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS . and not their respective counsel. thereby evincing their consent thereto. 1993. 138701-02 GARCIA. Likewise. the titles and docket numbers of both cases. Subsequent orders of the court which emanated from Branch 6 also bear.270. as early as six months prior to the promulgation of Judge Francisco’s decisions in the two cases. Basilio G.000. 1993. IAC. 110 plaintiffs the sum of P625. -The Court also cited cases and discussed why although they have similar facts are inapplicable or do not constitute a precedent to the instant case. No.00) allegedly made by the spouses to BG Magno. Instead. The parties did not move for a reconsideration of the two decisions nor did they call the attention of Judge Francisco on the absence of an order for consolidation of the two cases. the presiding judge of Branch 6 to which only Civil Case No.Indeed. raffled to Branch 8 of the court. to collect on the principal amount of P1. 5. Chaves. (See original) .In the CA. RTC and CA rulings reversed.The spouses Roque Yu. when the petitioners' new counsel entered his Formal Appearance. In other words. the caption thereof indicated the docket numbers of both cases. kinds of trial a. One was Civil Case No. more so when the judgment issued is adverse to their cause. 5823. when the respondents filed a Motion to Lift. 1993 the court rendered its decision i favor of the defendant on both cases. Sr. with 12% interest per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid. to collect upon loans and advances (P3. The success of Magno's business gave birth to the Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises.235. Sr. instead of P620. whereby the latter agreed to supply Magno with building materials he may need in his construction business.Due process dictates that petitioners be deprived of their right to be heard and to present evidence to support their allegations if. .134. and only if. the two (Roque Yu. The records show that there appears to have been a previous agreement to either transfer or consolidate the two cases for decision by the presiding judge of Branch 6. plus costs of suit. the fact remains that no opposition or objection in any manner was registered by either of the parties to the same.00. . in the caption thereof was also written the docket numbers of both cases. It is. in the caption thereof. They may not now make a total turn-around and adopt a contrary stance. 1979. 5822 pending in Branch 8 in the absence of a motion or order of consolidation of the two cases HELD YES . and Magno) entered into a joint venture.G. Petitioners may not now question the transfer or consolidation of the two cases on appeal. There being a manifest lack of such basis in this case. and the other was Civil Case No. The relationship between Yu and Magno began in 1975 and continued until Magno's death on August 21.Civil Procedure Digest a sanction should the parties or their respective counsel be absent during pre-trial. there appears to have been a transfer or consolidation of said cases in Branch 6 and the parties knew of it. YU V MAGNO CONSTRUCTION G. 5823. therefore.61. they directly interposed their respective appeals to the CA. Inc. the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and the further sum of P50. In Civil Case No. The two separate decisions of even date were penned by Judge Getulio M. Africa v. . Victoria A. v. defendant B. SSS v. . 5822. 1993.R. Mangudadat. Nonetheless. A2010 Avena agreement with Leyte Lumber through Roque Yu. 5823 was raffled. and Asuncion Yu are the controlling stockholders of Leyte Lumber. Magpay. and the caption thereof similarly indicated the docket numbers of both cases. on October 29. The better and certainly more prudent course of action in every judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide on the merits rather than dispose of a case on technicalities .000.There was nothing irregular in the procedure taken. the two cases on appeal were consolidated. Notably. already too late in the day for the petitioners to question the competence of Judge Francisco to render the separate decisions in the two cases.While counsel is somewhat to blame for his nonattendance at pre-trial. and by DELETING the award of exemplary damages in the sum of P200. .87 for construction materials claimed to have been obtained on credit by BG Magno.00 in favor of defendan. there exists sufficient basis in fact and in law to do so. Disposition Petition is granted. incidentally the operative act which gave birth to the controversy at bar. it would be most unfair to penalize petitioners for what may be the deficiency of their lawyer when the consequent penalty has no basis in law.575.239. the appealed decision is MODIFIED by declaring that defendant B. the petitioners instituted two separate complaints for sums of money with damages and preliminary attachment against the respondents. Magno entered into a verbal .G. albeit the actual date when the two cases were consolidated or transferred does not appear on record. made an overpayment in the amount of P631. with Yu as President and Magno as Vice President. Petitioners' previous counsel of longstanding (whose representation dates back to the filing of the two complaints in 1979) filed his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on October 30.Owing to this fruitful relationship..000. consolidated/ separate trial SPS. ISSUE WON Branch 6 had jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. COURSE OF TRIAL 1. Jonathan Landoil International Co. trial proper 2. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises. Instead. October 17. petitioners would be unjustly denied of the opportunity to fully defend themselves should the Court affirm the questioned orders which were evidently issued by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion. Sr. Magno Construction and Development Enterprises. what Section 5 penalizes is the failure to appear of either the plaintiff or the defendant.On January 30. is ordered to pay Prof. Francisco. Inc.000. During his lifetime. 1978. Engr. the Great Pacific Construction Company (GREPAC). 5822.On June 17. Dissolve and Quash the Writs of Attachment with Branch 6 on January 20. for they knew of it and did not question the same in the court below. instituted by Leyte Lumber against BG Magno and the Estate of Basilio Magno. with interest of 12% per annum from promulgation hereof until fully paid. the penalty is provided for in Sec. filed by the Yu spouses against BG Magno and the Estate of Basilio Magno. These cases are: UCPB v. Inc..

1999 and since then respondent has not even commenced presenting its evidence on the merits. to prevent delays. which is overpayment. involve the same or like issues.817.Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 2000. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court. They even conducted a relocation survey. upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. In the instant case. Victoria A. 156822 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ. they involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical parties and no other. it may order all the actions consolidated.On February 8. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1. trial by commissioners ANGARA v FEDMAN G. The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. Batangas . It is the means by which the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. to clear congested dockets. 5822.The ordered consolidation of cases. to our mind. a broad part of the evidence and testimonies in one case was totally adopted or reproduced in the other by either or both parties. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. the RTC issued subpoena ad testificandum to the three Geodetic Engineers who composed the Board of Commissioners to testify in connection with their individual reports. the assailed decision is AFFIRMED. in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants (citing 1 CJS 13421343). Consolidation. respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions.27 in Civil Case No. they cover the same period of transacting continuous business that spans four years. . and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence. Nasugbu. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. all other . .R. 1347). gives the most perfect opportunity for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts of justice between the parties before it.Civil Procedure Digest . The two cases were filed just a few months apart. 5823. . reiterating the P50. being multi-sala courts. The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. and deleting the award of attorneys’ fees to the petitioners in Civil Prof. respondent and the DENR -On June 22. its Branches 6 and 8 possessed jurisdiction to try either or both cases on their own. However. the RTC ordered the dismissal of the case due to the failure of the respondent to prosecute its case for an unreasonable length of time. but to give it effective facility in righteous action. 5822. the RTC reconsidered the order of dismissal. alternatively. the pre-trial was conducted on January 20.00 award of attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No. 1996. in fact. b.” . they relate to simple issues of fact that are intimately related to each other. It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can be urged against procedure today is that it so restricts the exercise of the court's powers by technicalities that part of its authority effective for justice between the parties is many times an inconsiderable portion of the whole. 111 Case No. In other words. the respondents (as defendants therein) claim. 1996. 2000. and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Rule 31 of the Rules of Court: “Section 1. in both cases. October 18. respondent filed a complaint for Accion Reinvindicatoria and/or Quieting of Title against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. to guard against oppression and abuse. provided that the court has jurisdiction over the case to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties (citing 1 CJS." Disposition Judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the assailed CA decision by setting aside and deleting the award of the respondents’ counterclaim in the amount of P142.000. It is designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.A court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act. they entailed the presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesses. and assuming that there is such an encroachment. . event or transaction. -On September 27. -petitoner on the other hand claimed that he is the lawful owner. the said parcels of land do not encroach on respondent's property.The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits. in other words. And the trial court. claiming to be the rightful owners of the land currently occupied by petitioner. In all other respects. The RTC also reminded respondent that the case was filed as early as February 8. NO. . it is a means to an end. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. crystallizes into reality the thinking of our predecessors that: ". 2004 NATURE: Motion for Reconsideration FACTS: . essentially the same defense. It is that one which. and its action in consolidating A2010 Avena will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. he nevertheless had acquired title thereto by virtue of acquisitive prescription -RTC ordered the constitution of committee of three surveyors composed of geodetic engineers representing the petitioner.The next logical questions are: Is the consolidation of the two cases (Civil Case Nos. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. 5822 and 5823) a procedural step which the court a quo could have properly taken? Is it a remedy available within the context of the surrounding circumstances? We answer both questions in the affirmative. to simplify the work of the trial court. -petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion praying that judgment be rendered on the basis of the commissioners' report and.

or corporation or otherwise). at its portion. As to the insistence of respondent that the RTC ordered a "joint survey". either upon the law or the facts of the case -Petitioner failed to demonstrate his claim that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's prayer for rendition of judgment based on the commissioners' report. Manager may. or furnishings used in connection therewith. shall receive a bona fide offer from a third party acceptable to Owner. b. -In this case. within twenty one (21) days of its receipt of such offer and said financial data. Consequently. created a Panel of Commissioners has done its job and the chairman submitted his report on the basis of his evaluation of the separate surveys conducted by the members. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness. does not define what a joint relocation survey entails nor does it lay out the steps or procedures in conducting the same.. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction. *issue of certiorari (important to note) . this too was rejected. Hence. 1976.). The RTC." Considering that the issue involves principally a factual and technical matter for which the RTC. that is. or any interest in Owner (whether a partnership. the Court of Appeals chose to delve into the wisdom and soundness of the orders of the RTC. (HII) entered into a management contract with New Riviera Hotel and Development Co. entered into an agreement whereby 2/3 of . other information as may be reasonably requested by Manager. Victoria A." The order constituting the panel of commissioners. -A battle of semantics is principally being waged before this Court. On the other hand. 1986. intervention HOLIDAY INN V SANDIGANBAYAN 186 SCRA 447 MEDIALDEA: June 8. The RTC held that according to respondent there was no joint survey conducted by the commissioners as ordered by it and as agreed upon by the parties. It may adopt. and prepare one report.It must be emphasized that the petition before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. who is perceived to be the controlling stockholder of the company. could not have been contemplated by the RTC since the commissioners nominated by the parties insisted on two different methods or approaches for the survey. Article 18 of said agreement stipulates: ARTICLE 18 RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL If Owner. calendar of cases On January 1. however. wherein the commissioners literally go out together. or which Owner does not promptly reject. to purchase the Premises or any part thereof. hence the report of the commissioners cannot be the basis of the judgment. 1976. - - - 3. PCGG and Roberto S. Because of numerous controversies and conflicts resulting in operational problems regarding NRHDC. -According to petitioner. Inc. or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 1990 112 NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari (treated as a special civil action for certiorari) FACTS: On January 1. or the business conducted in connection therewith. (HIP) On April 22. purchase said interest of said Owner on the terms of said offer. or in the buildings. this is a "simple case of an alleged 'encroachment' or 'overlapping' of property boundaries. the assailed orders of the RTC are but resolutions on incidental matters which do not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. (NRHDC) for a period of ten (10) years. incidents/ processes a. which literally means one that is conducted physically together or in the presence of one another. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. as understood by respondent. the present Motion for Reconsideration ISSUE: WON CA erred in rejecting the appeal HELD: no. -Petitioner reiterates his arguments in the petition that a joint survey. Owner shall deliver to Manager an executed original copy of such offer and agrees concurrently therewith to deliver to Manager an financial information (including but not limited to. one where the act complained of was issued by the court. respondent subscribes to the pronouncement of the RTC that the record is replete with explicit motion and orders of the court calling for joint survey. at any time or times during the term hereof. or require the parties to present further evidence Prof. NRHDC was sequestered by the PCGG which subsequently appointed fiscal agents and/or placed an operating team to monitor the activities of said corporation. Court denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error. reject the report or recommit it with instructions. the Court is perplexed that. Inc. Petitioner argues that undue emphasis was placed on the words "joint relocation A2010 Avena survey. petitioner submits that there is nothing in the order of the RTC defining or specifying what a "joint" survey is. certified balance sheets and operating statements) involved and such. Inc. overlooking the nature of the petition before it. modify. simply ignored the report on the technical and lame excuse that the Panel of Commissioners did not conduct a "joint survey." -petitioner submits that the RTC cannot simply ignore the commissioners' report without considering its merits simply because the parties agreed that the same is not final and binding. NRHDC and HII assigned all their rights under the above mentioned agreement to petitioner Holiday Inn (Phils. equipment. petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was rejected by the RTC. without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Rules of Court clearly provides that the trial court is not bound by the findings of the commissioners or precluded from disregarding the same. They are interlocutory orders since there leaves something else to be done by the RTC with respect to the merits of the case. Petitoner filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. at the instance of the parties. Petitioner argues that the RTC should have considered the merits of the report and acted on its recommendation instead of rejecting it outright without any cause or reason. Holiday Inn.Civil Procedure Digest persons who will be adversely affected by the relocation survey be impleaded as parties -RTC denied the said Omnibus Motion. Benedicto. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. however. in resolving the petition before it. conduct a survey in the presence of one another. Petitioner submits that the term "joint survey" does not rule out a survey that is coordinated and linked together resulting in a joint finding and recommendation.

1986. 2 and 14. 1976. Defendants resisted the claim stating it was barred by the statute of limitations. The two are independent and unrelated issues and resolution of either may proceed independently of each other. The subject-matter of petitioner's proposed complaint-in-intervention involves basically. Benedicto in conspiracy with former President Ferdinand Marcos. together with 7 others intervened and alleged in their Answer-inIntervention that the area being claimed by Espiritu came about by natural accretion and that the Reclamation Contract is null and void. a PCGG case.e. alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth amassed by Roberto S. Cavite. 1988. 1990 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review decision and order of RTC Cavite. Holiday Inn. . Rosario. As the Solicitor General stated. The proposed complaint-in-intervention attached to the motion-in-intervention questions the termination of the management agreement without the corresponding prior notice and/or right of first refusal under Article 18 of the Agreement. and wherein NRHDC was included as among the firms sequestered. has not shown how the termination or continuation of its management contract would be legally affected by a finding of whether or not Roberto S. and all incidents arising from incidental to. Inc.. intervenors asked that they be allowed to present evidence to prove their defense. regarding their allegations. On July 14. NO Reasoning Sec. as amended by the Office of the President.Civil Procedure Digest the members of the Board of Directors of NRHDC shall be nominees of the PCGG and 1/3 thereof shall be nominees of Mr. Prof. Cavite and Mayor Enriquez to enforce their agreement contained in a Reclamation Contract. 2. i. and original A2010 Avena jurisdiction subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court The court a quo issued a temporary restraining order on November 16.At the pre-trial conference. HIP initiated on November 2. December 20. Corp. Section 26 of the Constitution. the entity which reclaimed the land in question. Yet. 1988 an action for intervention in Sandiganbayan.. 2 of Rule 12 tells us that a person may intervene in proceedings in progress if that person has a legal interest in the success of either of the parties. the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned Resolution denying HIPs motion for intervention for lack of jurisdiction since HIP has flied the present petition contending that. or against both or when a disposition of the property involved would affect the prospective intervenor. Upholding the legality of Benedicto's acquisition of the sequestered property is not a guarantee that HIP's management contract would be upheld. the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases civil or criminal. Br. 1988. in which case it is not per se. incidental to. such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive. FACTS . where the original parties and intervenors were present. J. Benedicto. Contending that there was breach of Article 18 of its original management agreement with NRHDC.e. 1976 agreement thereof to an indefinite period "on its existing terms and conditions" with either party having the right to terminate the agreement upon six (6) months prior written notice to the other party On May 10. Benedicto lawfully acquired RIVIERA. as well as all incidents arising from. as sequestered by PCGG entered into an agreement (addendum) extending the terms of their January 1. Petitioner likewise prayed for recovery of unpaid management fees under the agreement.. based on the Addendum/Agreement of July 14. Evidently.The principal litigants submitted to the court their compromise agreement. and Article XVIII. Benedicto has no bearing on the legality of the termination of the management contract by NRHDC's Board of Directors. . 113 - ISSUES 1. - ORDONEZ V GUSTILO 192 SCRA 469 PARAS. the complaint is not directed against PCGG as an entity. which extended the terms and conditions of the original agreement of January 1. where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.Herein petitioner. NRHDC served upon HIP a letter advising that the management agreement shall be terminated six (6) months from said date. for only the Board of Directors of NRHDC is qualified to make such a determination. WON the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioner’s proposed complaint-in-intervention HELD 1. or related to such cases and (b) cases filed by those who wish to question or challenge the commission's acts or orders in such cases. 1988. Plaintiff prays that a portion of the foreshore land of the town be conveyed to him as assignee of Salinas Dev’t. On November 11. an interpretation of contract. but against a private corporation. intervenors continued to present evidence. the barangay captain of Tejeros Convention. 1. It was latter learned that the letter of termination was brought about by NRHDCs decision to have New World Hotel Philippines (NWHP) manage the property in lieu of HIP.On the other hand. Dispositive. The question of whether or not the sequestered property was lawfully acquired by Roberto S. HIP and NRHDC. TC approved and rendered a decision in accordance therewith.Respondent Espiritu filed complaint for specific performance and damages against respondents Municipality of Rosario. Dismissed. (SADECO). 1988. whether or not the right of first refusal could and/or should have been observed. or related to. NO Reasoning The original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to (a) cases filed by the PCGG. Victoria A. i. a sequestration case. WON petitioner has a legal interest sufficient to justify its intervention 2. pursuant to the exercise of its powers under Executive Order Nos. Cavite City. Espiritu and defendant municipality manifested that they would submit to a compromise agreement at a latter date. petitioner's proposed complaint-inintervention is an ordinary civil case that does not pertain to the Sandiganbayan. Gustilo. . 16. . - - - - .

by leave of court. 1999.Civil Procedure Digest . the present rule simplifies the procedure in the sense that notice of pre-trial is served on counsel. 114 that their absence during the scheduled pre-trial was for a valid cause -Hence. the admission. ordinary appeal. Before the motion could be heard. exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of P170. this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court ISSUE: WON RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not considering Agulto’s motions for reconsideration regarding the pre-trial. intervenors filed a motion to set aside the compromise agreement. A2010 Avena AGULTO v TECSON G. Tecson filed an action for damages against petitioners Rolando Agulto. 1999. inasmuch as it has already become final and executed. in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three days before the date of the pre-trial. dispense with notice of pre-trial. Its absence will render the pre-trial and subsequent proceedings void. the respondent William Z.e. ISSUE/S WON trial court erred in stopping/preventing the intervenors from further presenting evidence in support of their Answer-in-Interevention. however. 2005 FACTS: -On August 25. for lack of merit. and that the area in question came into being through the natural action of the sea. Employee advised petitioner’s counsel that the suggested setting was not yet official as it would depend on the calendar of the court and the counsel of respondent. The CA also held that the petitioners failed to show Prof. All pending issues will become moot and academic once a compromise submitted by the parties is approved by the trial court. Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the RTC issued an order allowing the respondent to present his evidence ex parte -Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 17. The continuation of reception of intervenor’s evidence would serve no purpose at all. 1999 order -CA dismissed the petition. the petition is DISMISSED. should they succeed in proving that the contract is null and void. under Section 6. the parties are required to file with the court and serve on the adverse party. Respondent judge denied. i. Costs against petitioner. -More specifically. or demanding something adversely to both of them. -During the scheduled pre-trial on April 29. The counsel served with notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party he represents. Reasoning A judgment approving a compromise agreement is final and immediately executory. Maxima Agulto. 1999. -The pre-trial proceeded on June 17. For failure of petitioners to appear at the pre-trial and to submit their pre-trial brief. Disposition WHEREFORE. RTC dismissed Tecson’s complaint (failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time).. still the decision of the lower court could no longer be set aside. subpoena d. a condition precedent is the service of notice of pre-trial. which was gracted.000. HELD 1.R. It does not.2 years later. It is only when a party has no counsel that the notice of pre-trial is required to be served personally on him. Judge Gustilo also terminated the proceedings and ordered the case to be closed.” Ratio Intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main action. sending a notice of pre-trial stating the date. time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. the defendant will be groping in the dark as to when exactly he is supposed to file his pre-trial brief. the trial court’s order allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte without due notice of pre-trial to the defendant constitutes grave abuse of discretion -Although the failure of the defendant to file a pretrial brief has the same effect as his failure to appear at the pre-trial (this is. the parties cannot reasonably be expected to know the date of the pre-trial. Tecson filed a motion for reconsideration. however. under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings. the correctness and propriety of the decision based upon the compromise agreement would be strengthened. or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff. it was previously ruled that the final dismissal of the principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary action. their respective pre-trial briefs. But without prior notice of pre-trial. Hence. Otherwise. c. -Thus. by which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings. Intervention is defined as a “proceeding in a suit or action by which a third party is permitted by the court to make himself a party. 1999 decision in favor of respondent. Clearly. 1999.145276 CORONA. Victoria A. Rule 22 . Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the other hand. either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint.November 29. They claimed that they were not notified of the pre-trial held on June 17. Thus. 1999. 1997. Cecille Tenoria and a certain Maribel Mallari in the RTC of Quezon City. Court required the parties to appear during the pre-trial conference scheduled on January 21. -Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CA on November 24. 1999. however. No. It ruled that the proper remedy was appeal by writ of error. NO. Should intervenors fail to prove that the Reclamation Contract is null and void and that no actual reclamation was made. 1999 order of the RTC. reset to April 29. not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between the others. the court rendered its July 12. Counsel for Agulto suggested that it be re-scheduled on June 17. They claimed that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the September 24. the notice of pre-trial should be served on counsel. HELD: YES -Under the present Section 3. the date of the pre-trial is the reckoning point for the filing of the pre-trial brief. the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof). -Thus. petitioner Rolando Agulto and his counsel were informed by an employee of the RTC that the presiding judge was on leave. and service is made on a party only if he has no counsel. Agulto filedan answer claiming that Tecson had no cause of action and alleged malicious prosecution. Petitioners were ordered to pay respondent moral damages. The pre-trial was.

Victoria A. Atty. Carpio. The allegations that he has a "meritorious defense" and a "good cause" are mere conclusions which did not provide the court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the case. petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. i. 2002 as previously scheduled. A2010 Avena ISSUES: (1) WON petitioner’s motion for new trial was filed out of time. On April 21. Dissatisfied. the trial court ordered that petitioner's right to present evidence is deemed waived and the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Bañares moved to postpone the hearing to February 28. 2003. 2003. However. 2006 NATURE: Petition for Review FACTS: Private respondent First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC) filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment against Robert Juan Uy (Robert). accident.” Rule 41. 2001. After the filing of the respective Answers of FMISC. 2003. G. Carpio. HELD: (1) NO. Under the Rules. must be read in conjunction with Section 1. as collaborating counsel during the hearing on October 25. The CA dismissed the petition and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. the next working day. September 27. Midland Integrated Construction Company (MICC) and petitioner Elpidio Uy. must be shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a new trial. but in each instance. among others. which he may prove if the petition were granted. On February 28. 115 The hearings scheduled on April 26. (3) WON the motion for new trial should be granted. Petitioner's motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention the evidence which he was prevented from introducing. thus impairing his rights to due process. 2003 with petitioner's conformity. the time shall not run until the next working day. the negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearings for the reception of evidence is inexcusable. Robert and MICC. Atty. this Petition. Section 1. counsel for petitioner arrived late. through his lawyers. because April 19. and not mere opinion or conclusions of law. the check was dishonored upon presentment and despite demands. The initial hearing set on February 28. affidavits showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove in case a new trial is granted. Bañares withdrew his appearance on January 8. because a new trial would serve no purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil or ineffective. The hearing was reset six more times. (2) YES. petitioner. appeared but he requested for a resetting. A scrutiny of the records discloses that while the Motion for New Trial was received by the trial court on April 28. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. Atty. nor did it allege that such evidence would change the outcome of the case. Section 9. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Bañares. 2001 and May 10. 2002. 2003.R. Atty. FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP. petitioner's new counsel. reveals that it was filed and served by registered mail on April 21. petitioner's counsel's failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings is without justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As such. During the sixth scheduled hearing on February 28. 2002. On April 4. petitioner received a copy of the Decision. Hence. Jr.00 in favor of FMISC to cover payment for deformed steel bars delivered by the latter to petitioner and private respondents MICC and Robert. (3) NO. filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence. (2) WON a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to overturn the denial of a motion for new trial. Atty. 2001 was cancelled because petitioner allegedly had influenza. the filing by the petitioner of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals from the denial of the motion for new trial by the trial court is proper. the date on the Registry Receipt attached to the Affidavit of Service as well as that stamped on the envelope which contained the copy of the motion. the moving party must show that he has a meritorious defense.811. following the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday. hearings were thereafter conducted for the reception of their respective evidence. 2001 but no evidence was presented. However. it cannot be a ground for new trial. Rule 37 provides that a motion for new trial may be filed within the period for taking an appeal based. The records disclose that the hearings were postponed or cancelled without any justification. 167245 YNARES-SANTIAGO. the trial court accommodated the requests for postponement or resetting in order to accord petitioner due process. the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and in favor of FMISC. moved for the cancellation and resetting of the presentation of his evidence. petitioner through Atty. 2001. 2003. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial defense. 2001 were cancelled and moved to October 25. 2003. On March 7. Lucas C. Rule 41 which provides that “no appeal may be taken from an order denying a new trial or reconsideration. The trial court scheduled the hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence seven times. Section 1.” Thus. mistake or excusable negligence must be accompanied by affidavits of merits. Petitioner's Affidavit of Merit did not contain clear statements of the facts constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given the chance to introduce evidence. 2001 but it was cancelled because petitioner had influenza. Bañares arrived late. the Rule requires that motions for new trial founded on fraud. Under the circumstances. On December 13. Bañares. In addition.. the motion was actually filed on time it having been filed on April 21. The initial reception of petitioner's evidence was set on February 28. 2001 and December 13. In the instant case.e. 2003. Robert and petitioner refused to pay. Thus. a Sunday. Rule 22 of the Rules of Court states that if the last day of the period thus computed falls on a Saturday. An affidavit of merit should state facts. Instead. or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits. . Jr. The complaint arose from petitioner’s issuance of a check in the amount of P695. on excusable negligence. 2002. On February 14. MICC. No. a Monday. Section 1 further provides that: “where the judgment or final order is not appealable.Civil Procedure Digest UY vs. the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Rule 37 of the Rules of Court which provides that the remedy to an order denying a motion for new trial is to appeal the judgment or final order. the hearing was cancelled. the last day for filing the same was a Saturday. Prof. Upon motion of FMISC.

Civil Procedure Digest A2010 Avena Prof. was present but did not present any evidence. Gross negligence is not one of the grounds for a motion for a new trial. DISPOSITIVE: The Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Atty. Still. Instead. petitioner was given several opportunities to be heard and to submit evidence but he squandered them. we find that petitioner's and his counsel's negligence are concurrent. We cannot declare his counsel's negligence as gross as to liberate him from the effects of his failure to present countervailing evidence. . appeared as collaborating counsel. Atty. inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance. In one occasion. Jr. Molina. The right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense. petitioner was absent but his lawyer. 116 Petitioner's argument that his counsel's negligence was so gross that he was deprived of due process fails to impress. petitioner was absent allegedly due to influenza. petitioner's counsel's inexcusable neglect did not amount to petitioner's deprivation of due process of law. During the initial hearing for the reception of his evidence. Molina was absent but Atty. During the succeeding scheduled hearings. no evidence was presented but a resetting was again requested. . motions for postponement or resetting were made. Carpio. In the instant case. Victoria A. Finally. Besides.

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