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National Drug Control Strategy. Strengthening Communities’ Response To Drugs And Crime.

National Drug Control Strategy. Strengthening Communities’ Response To Drugs And Crime.

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Published by Anna Zhizhilkina
National Drug Control Strategy. Strengthening Communities’ Response To Drugs And Crime. How Governement Criminalize Marijuana by Facts and semiFacts and Myths and Emotional Stereotypes Manipulation.
National Drug Control Strategy. Strengthening Communities’ Response To Drugs And Crime. How Governement Criminalize Marijuana by Facts and semiFacts and Myths and Emotional Stereotypes Manipulation.

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Published by: Anna Zhizhilkina on Dec 12, 2010
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In 1993 ONDCP and NSC conducted a compre-
hensive interagency review of the international
cocaine situation. This review, which provided
the foundation on which this Administration’s
international strategy was built, resulted in a Pres-
idential Decision Directive (PDD) stating that
the international cocaine industry represents the

•A serious national security threat requiring an
extraordinary and coordinated response by all
agencies involved in national security;

The long-term objective
of the United States and
of this Action Plan is to
encourage all nations,
especially the major drug
producing and drug
transit countries, to meet
all their antidrug



•A threat that is severely damaging the social
fabric of this and many other nations’ societies;

•A threat to democracy, human rights, and the
environment that requires a major foreign poli-
cy response by the United States.

The PDD directed a three-pronged international
drug control strategy that emphasized assisting
institutions of nations showing the political will
to combat narcotrafficking, destroying the narco-
trafficking organizations, and interdicting nar-
cotics trafficking in both the source countries and
transit zones. The PDD called for a controlled
shift in focus of cocaine inter-
diction operations from the
transit zones to source coun-
tries. The logic behind this
shift is that it is more effective
to attack drugs at the source of
production rather than once
they are in transit to the United
States. The Administration
now is implementing this new
cocaine strategy. To be success-
ful, the United States must strengthen and build
greater counternarcotics cooperation bilaterally
and regionally with its Latin American partners.
This will require the requisite levels of funding to
support full implementation of the international
drug control program, including the interdiction
component. Interdiction program capability must
be maintained until source country program capa-
bility has become effective. In the past, erratic
funding has inhibited the ability to fully imple-
ment the international drug control strategy.
These fluctuations also have shaken the faith of
America’s counternarcotics partners in America’s
reliability as a dependable partner. This faith
must be restored.

The Controlled Shift

In the 1994 National Drug Control Strategy, the
Administration announced its intention to begin
a shift in interdiction emphasis, from activities
primarily focused on the transit zones to a stronger
focus on the source countries. This shift has

begun, and will continue in this Action Plan. It is
intended to provide a more targeted and better
focused effort in areas where the drug industry is
more concentrated and most vulnerable.

The controlled shift underscores the commitment
to maintain a tough stance against the interna-
tional narcotics trade in an era of tighter budgets
and changing trafficking patterns. Instead of
relaxing efforts, the Federal agencies have
responded with steps to optimize the use of exist-
ing interdiction assets. For example,

•Intelligence capacity has been improved to
better support and focus U.S. interdiction
efforts. Random air or sea patrols to locate
drug smugglers, which are very expensive and
produce limited results, have been reduced.

•Interdiction resources, especially maritime
assets, have been better deployed to allow a
more timely response to intelligence-cued tar-

•Detection and monitoring capabilities have
been improved by replacing transit zone sur-
veillance systems in the Caribbean Basin Radar
Network with a radar sensor system (the Relo-
catable Over the Horizon Radar [ROTHR])6
that covers a wider area.

•The cost of detecting and monitoring drug traf-
ficking aircraft has been decreased through the
use of radar-equipped vessels that are signifi-
cantly cheaper to operate than the U.S. Navy
vessels previously used for this purpose.

However, the shift in focus so far has not included
any direct shift in resources from the transit zones
to the source nations. In fact, Congress has acted
to reduce both the international and interdiction
budgets by more than $500 million since Fiscal
Year (FY) 1994, leaving insufficient funds to
expand source country initiatives while attempt-
ing to sustain existing transit zone programs.7

addition, some critics of the Administration’s
international strategy have noted the reduction in
Federal drug control resources from their peak in
FY 1992. This decline is misleading in that it

To be successful, the
United States must
strengthen and build
greater counternarcotics
cooperation bilaterally
and regionally with its
Latin American partners.




reflects mostly nuances of the Federal budgeting
cycle rather than a real decline in resources for
program operations. A substantial level of capital
procurement and operating resources was included
in earlier interdiction budgets. Some of what
appear to be reductions in interdiction funding in
current budgets actually reflect the natural end of
capital acquisition programs begun in the mid-

International Cooperation

In addition to the controlled shift in the focus of
interdiction activities to source countries, empha-
sis on international cooperation will continue as a
key to this comprehensive Action Plan for
Strengthening Interdiction and International
Efforts. The United States has sought efforts to
enhance international cooperation in Peru,
Colombia, Bolivia, Mexico, and Caribbean, Cen-
tral American, and spillover countries.


Any consideration of counternarcotics policy
in Latin America must begin with the under-
standing that Peru is central to the illegal
cocaine industry. More than 60 percent of the
world’s supply of coca is grown in Peru. So long
as coca production remains this concentrated,
counternarcotics success will require progress
in Peru. While the Fujimori Administration
has taken steps in the right direction, Peru
must seriously intensify its counternarcotics

Peru has for the first time adopted a compre-
hensive national counternarcotics strategy—
an important step in the further development
of a successful counternarcotics program. This
strategy calls for strengthening the judicial sys-
tem; building counternarcotics institutions;
reducing coca cultivation through alternative
development; and increasing emphasis on pre-
vention, treatment, and rehabilitation. Imple-
mentation of this Peruvian strategy will begin
this year. Its goals include initiating a cam-
paign aimed at reducing the level of addiction
in 1996; designating areas for limited legal coca

cultivation in 1996; providing alternative eco-
nomic development to 50 percent of the cur-
rent coca growers by the year 2000; and
achieving a 50-percent reduction in the cur-
rent level of addiction by the year 2000.

Peru also has outlawed the cultivation of
opium poppy and has been strong and decisive
in its efforts to contain poppy cultivation.
With the assistance of Colombia, the kingpin
Carlos Demetrio Chavez Penaherrera (a.k.a.
“El Vaticano”) was arrested, convicted, and
sentenced to a 30-year prison term. The gov-
ernment of Peru has pursued joint police-mili-
tary counternarcotics programs, which have
increased its capability to
disrupt the traffickers’ oper-
ations by denying them the
use of numerous airports and
seizing substantial quantities
of cocaine base and precur-
sor chemicals.

The government of Peru is
working to address the prob-
lem of corruption and has
taken actions against several
senior military officers
involved in corruption. Peruvian authorities
are working hard to exercise more control over
their air space to prevent narcotraffickers from
having unrestricted use of light aircraft to
transport their cocaine base. The decision by
Peru to allow the use of potentially deadly force
against aircraft suspected of narcotics traffick-
ing in Peruvian airspace made real-time intelli-
gence sharing by U.S. personnel a problem
under U.S. law. This required, in response, a
change in U.S. law to allow for continued sup-
port of the Peruvian air interdiction efforts.
The Administration joined with Congress in
making the necessary legislative change, and
the United States again is able to fully support
this aspect of the Peruvian counternarcotics

While Peru’s accomplishments during the past
year are encouraging, the country remains the
world’s largest producer of coca, and there con-

In addition to the
controlled shift in the
focus of interdiction
activities to source
countries, emphasis on
international cooperation
will continue as a key to
this comprehensive
Action Plan.



tinues to be concern over reports that cultiva-
tion is spreading outside traditional growing
areas. Seedbed eradication is a first step, but it
must be followed by efforts that will reduce and
eventually eliminate illegal coca cultivation.
Peru must begin to take these steps if it is to
gain the support of the United States and the
international community in providing alterna-
tive development as an integral part of its erad-
ication program. Strong law enforcement
efforts in coca growing areas will create the
incentives for successful alternative develop-


Colombia has been an important ally of the
United States in the fight against the cocaine
cartels. However, Colombia is now at a cross-
roads and must intensify its
efforts against the drug trade. In
1994 Colombia continued its
efforts to develop the capability
of its own law enforcement
institutions to conduct indepen-
dent operations against drug
traffickers. In 1994 these law
enforcement organizations
seized 60 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine
base and destroyed 434 cocaine-processing lab-
oratories, both of which are increases over
1993 performance but fall short of the levels in

Colombia has recently stepped up its poppy
eradication program and begun an aerial coca
eradication program that is strongly opposed by
the traffickers, who have organized farmer
demonstrations against it. However, Colombia
must persist because its eradication efforts
establish an important precedent for the entire
region. Continuation of these efforts will be an
important test of Colombia’s political will to
conduct a serious counterdrug effort.

Colombia also has taken positive steps to devel-
op a chemical control program. In 1994 a suc-
cessful raid on a major international chemical
supplier resulted in (1) significant seizures that
caused shortages in the supply and availability

of essential and precursor chemicals, and (2)
short-term drastic increases in the prices of
those chemicals that remained available.

Narcotics-related corruption remains a major
concern in Colombia, and the Colombian
Government must be relentless in its efforts to
reduce and eliminate the drug organizations’
ability to intimidate and corrupt government

Colombia is working to exercise control over
its airspace and prevent unrestricted use by
traffickers of light aircraft to move cocaine
products. However, Colombia’s lack of direct
investment in the procurement of equipment
to accomplish this remains a weakness. As was
the case with Peru, Colombia’s decision to use
potentially deadly force against suspected nar-
cotics trafficking aircraft required a change in
U.S. law to allow for continued U.S. support of
these efforts.

There are other areas of serious concern. In a
decision rendered by the Colombian Supreme
Court, the use and possession of user amounts
of some drugs was, in effect, legalized. This
action creates a dangerous climate for the
health and well-being of Colombian citizens.
Attempts by the Samper Administration to
reverse this decision were rejected by the
Colombian Congress. In addition, the Colom-
bian Government has not arrested or prosecut-
ed any leaders of the drug cartels, and there
continues to be talk of entering into lenient
plea bargaining agreements. Little action has
been taken to force the traffickers to relinquish
their illicit gains, and—worst of all—the
Colombian Government has not been able to
guarantee the safety of witnesses and their fam-
ilies or to make effective use of U.S.-supplied
evidence. As a result, the U.S. Government
has suspended evidence-sharing with Colom-
bia in new drug cases.

The new Colombian Administration has stated
its intention to continue a vigorous campaign
against the narcotics industry. The United
States is prepared to assist Colombia in this
regard. However, only Colombia’s action can

Colombia has been an
important ally of the
United States in the fight
against the cocaine




demonstrate that it has the political will and
commitment necessary to fight the drug traf-
ficking organizations operating from its soil.


The situation in Bolivia remains mixed. The
country was granted a “vital national interest”
certification in 1994 because of the United
States’ assessment that some key counternar-
cotics performance deficiencies precluded a
“full” certification. It was judged to be in the
best interests of the United States to continue
cooperation with Bolivia, to build on progress
that has been made in some key areas, and to
continue to press for coca eradication and a
workable mechanism through which to extra-
dite drug traffickers.

Bolivia’s president has announced his intent to
eliminate all illegal coca in the Chapare region
through an alternative development and eradi-
cation program. However, the government of
Bolivia has been slow in developing a concrete
plan of action.

Alternative development programs continue,
especially in the Chapare region, where foreign
donors assist in building roads and other infra-
structure. Also, cooperative law enforcement
efforts between the United States and Bolivia
have resulted in the use of air routes in and out
of the Chapare region being essentially denied
to the traffickers.

Unfortunately, not all U.S. efforts have met
with such success. Bolivian eradication of coca
through either forced or voluntary means is at a
standstill. Although the government has taken
a strong public stance against corruption, it
remains endemic. The Government of Bolivia
needs to develop the requisite political will to
deal decisively with these problems, to reject
the coca industry, and to withstand the consid-
erable pressures of coca proponents.


Mexico is a key gateway for illicit drugs enter-
ing the United States. Although distracted by

other political and economic matters—the
national presidential campaign, the assassina-
tion of presidential candidate Collosio, and the
Chiapas uprising—Mexico must give the prior-
ity to counternarcotics efforts it once did. The
new Zedillo Administration has stated its
intention to resume Mexico’s vigorous cam-
paign against the narcotics industry; anticor-
ruption efforts must be an integral part of this

Government officials are pushing ahead with
plans to develop a professional antidrug police
force and to upgrade their ability to intercept
and seize trafficker aircraft.
In 1994 the interdiction
program continued, with
opium and marijuana
seizures increasing over
1993. However, cocaine
seizures were somewhat
lower than their 1993 record, reflecting larger
cocaine shipments from South America and
the fact that past successes here have forced the
traffickers to change their tactics. With every
change in their methods, counternarcotics
forces must adjust to meet the new challenge.

The opium eradication effort continued, yet
net Mexican opium production is up. The
counternarcotics partnership between the U.S.
Government and the Mexican Government
resulted in the signing of a money laundering
agreement that constitutes an important step
by Mexico to address the use of its financial
institutions to launder drug profits.

Mexican traffickers have become the number-
one source of the chemical base ephedrine to
supply clandestine methamphetamine labora-
tories in the western United States. Addition-
ally, these traffickers have established a
growing number of methamphetamine labs just
south of the U.S. border. Mexican police offi-
cials are handicapped by the lack of action by
the Mexican Congress to provide an effective
chemical control law.

Mexico is the pivotal nation for drugs entering
the United States. As a result it is crucial that

Mexico is a key gateway
for illicit drugs entering
the United States.



Mexico (1) possess the ability and the will to
disrupt the trafficking organizations operating
within its borders, (2) interdict drugs before
they cross the border to the United States, and
(3) seize the financial assets laundered in their
nation by traffickers. The United States’ bilat-
eral agreements with Mexico in these areas will
reflect these expectations.

Caribbean, Central America, and
Spillover Countries

The pressures applied to the narcotics industry
in the source countries of Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru have caused illicit cartels to look to
neighboring countries (princi-
pally Brazil, Ecuador, and
Venezuela) for a political
atmosphere that is more con-
ducive to their trade. The drug
cartels are increasing their
operations in these countries
and must be challenged before
they develop their infrastruc-
ture and political influence.
The United States must assist
these governments in recogniz-
ing the potential threat posed
by the narcotics industry and the importance of
taking early prevention action.

This same level of threat exists in the nations
of the Caribbean Basin, where traffickers are
broadening their trans-shipment operations
and expanding their levels of influence. These
small nations individually are no match for the
powerful, sophisticated, and well-financed traf-
fickers. These nations recognize the signifi-
cance of the threat and have requested U.S.
assistance in developing a regional counternar-
cotics program that will coordinate their efforts
into a unified response. The United States will
actively assist the Caribbean nations in devel-
oping this regional effort and will work to
establish a high degree of cooperation between
them and the counternarcotics programs of the
Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area and the Joint Intera-
gency Task Force East.

Central America continues to be a key link in
the trans-shipment of cocaine and the launder-
ing of drug profits. The United States must
continue to work with these nations to
strengthen their political will to fight drug traf-
ficking, to enhance their domestic capabilities
to interdict cocaine, to prosecute money laun-
derers, and to create environments hostile to
illicit drug activities.

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