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Tarrytown Vill Fatality 2010 Narrative 12.16.10

Tarrytown Vill Fatality 2010 Narrative 12.16.10

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DIVISION OF SAFETY AND HEALTH

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SAFETY AND HEALTH BUREAU

INVESTIGATION NARRATIVE
REPORTING DISTRICT: INVESTIGATION TYPE COMPLAINT X ACCIDENT PROGRAMMED MONITORING FOLLOWUP OTHER ESTABLISHMENT NAME AND SITE ADDRESS Tarrytown Vill Fatality 2010 177 Sheldon Ave. Tarrytown, NY 10591 DATE(S) OF INVESTIGATION: 9-07-2010 INSPECTION NUMBER 306988031

SUMMARY On September 6, 2010, two employees of the Village of Tarrytown entered a manhole and died of asphyxiation. The first employee entered the manhole to clear a blockage in the sewer in connection with his duties within the Village’s Department of Public Works (“DPW”) and under the direct supervision of the DPW’s General Foreman, who observed him enter the manhole, fall off of the ladder, and lose consciousness. The second employee entered the manhole several minutes later to rescue the DPW employee, and did so in connection with his duties within the Tarrytown Fire Department (“FD”) and under the supervision of the Fire Chief, who was present at the site and aware that the DPW employee was unconscious and required rescue because he placed the calls for assistance.

The Village provided equipment to both DPW and the FD to protect employees from the asphyxiation and other hazards associated with entry into manholes and other regulated “permit-required confined spaces” and claimed to have a policy prohibiting DPW employees from entering manholes, but that equipment was not used, and the policy was not implemented, until after the second employee entered the manhole on

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September 6, 2010. At that point, the FD allowed two more employees into the manhole to conduct rescues using the wrong equipment for the job.

The events of September 6, 2010, identified failures on the part of the Village to provide training, programs and policies that the Village knew were required by law to protect its employees from the hazards that the Village knew were associated with manholes and other regulated “permit-required confined spaces.”

Opening conference Opening conferences were conducted on 9-07-2010 and 9-08-2010. At those conferences, credentials were presented and the PESH Act and the scope of the inspection were explained to the participants. Opening conference attendees were informed that the purpose of the inspection was to investigate the workplace fatality in accordance with NYS Labor Law Article 2 Section 27-a "Public Employee Safety and Health Act".

Present during the 9-07-2010 opening conference:

Scott Weaver, DPW General Foreman Michael Mcgarvey, Superintendent DPW William McGuire, CSEA Unit President Village of Tarrytown Jeff Hymen, CSEA OSH Specialist

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John Staino, CSEA Local 860 President Pat Russell, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Village of Tarrytown DPW

Present during the 9-08-2010 opening conference:

Michael Blau, Village Administrator Peter Saracelli Jr., Tarrytown Fire Chief John McGee, Tarrytown Fire Chief Nicholas L. Perrotta, Office of Fire Prevention and Control attended this meeting. The members of the Fire Department are not represented by a union therefore no union representatives were present.

The following materials were distributed and explained to participants during the opening conferences. SH 909 – PESH Act 12 NYCRR – Parts 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, and 820 SH 907 – Employer’s Rights and Responsibilities pamphlet SH 906 – Employee’s Rights and Responsibilities pamphlet SH 900 – Log and Summary of Injuries and Illnesses/recordkeeping information and forms (SH 900.1, SH 900.2) SH 905 – Consultation Assistance pamphlet SH 908 – PESH poster

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SH 918 – Penalty Information for Public Employers NYS Right to Know / Hazard Communication information Workplace violence law

The following information on the deceased employees was obtained from the employer. Name: Anthony Ruggiero Address: 67 Woodfield Terrace, Tarrytown, NY 10591 Date of Birth: 10/23/1962 Age: 47 years Sex: male Job Title: Road Maintenance Foreman Date of Employment: 10/20/1980 Time in Position: 5 years

Name: John Kelly Address: 38 Pine St., Sleepy Hollow, NY 10591 Date of Birth: 3/01/1959 Age: 51 years Sex: male Job Title: Firefighter Date of Employment: March 1977 Time in Position: 33 years

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Investigation

An accident investigation was initiated by the NYS Department of Labor Public Employee Safety and Health (PESH) Bureau at the Consolidated Engine Firehouse #1, 177 Sheldon Ave, Tarrytown 10591 on 9-07-2010. The investigation was conducted by Safety and Health Inspector, Douglas Dubner in response to information received on 906-2010 by phone calls to PESH from David Barry of Westchester Department of Emergency Services and Diana Cortez of Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

The purpose of the investigation was to evaluate the circumstances and events leading up to in the deaths of two Village of Tarrytown employees: Anthony Ruggiero, Tarrytown Village DPW foreman and John Kelly, Tarrytown FD volunteer firefighter.

In the Village of Tarrytown, DPW is responsible for the operations of the Village sewer system. This system consists of a series of underground pipes leading to a wastewater treatment plant. This piping system has manhole entrances from street level, which allow access to these underground pipes. The permit-required confined space standard [29CFR 1910.146(c)] requires that employers evaluate their workplace to determine if any spaces are permit-required confined spaces. If permit-required confined spaces are found the employer must inform their employees by posting danger signs or other effective means. If the employer decides that their employees will not enter permit-

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required confined spaces then the employer must take effective measures to prevent their employees from entering permit-required confined spaces.

PESH conducted a programmed inspection at the DPW in 2007. During this inspection, management was asked if they entered any permit-required confined spaces. General Foreman Scott Weaver responded that they did not. He stated that they had purchased Jet Vac trucks to clear the blockages in the sewer lines. In addition, in 2007 management provided a course by Compliance Solutions entitled permit-required confined space entry to the employees of the DPW.

A walkaround investigation of the scene was conducted on 9/07/2010. Participating in this walkaround were:

Scott Weaver, DPW General Foreman Michael Mcgarvey, Superintendent DPW William McGuire, CSEA Unit President Village of Tarrytown Jeff Hymen, CSEA OSH Specialist John Staino, CSEA Local 860 President Pat Russell, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Village of Tarrytown DPW

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The investigation site consists of a manhole located behind the firehouse. The hole is located on a grassy hill, approximately 80 feet from the roadway and approximately 5 feet from the firehouse. The manhole was open for the investigation. The cover is approximately 2 feet in diameter. There are metal rungs used to descend into the hole. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver stated that the hole was 20 feet deep. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver and Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca were witnesses to the event. They described the events of this accident. DPW Superintendent Michael McGarvey stated that they did not have a permit-required confined space program. Mr. McGarvey stated that he believed that a training session that the employees and he took in 2007 constituted their complete permit-required confined space program. The confined space course syllabus and course attendance sign in sheet were provided to the investigator. Part of the course program was an overview of the requirements of the confined space standard

A meeting was held on 9/08/2010 at Tarrytown Village Hall Participating in this part of the walkaround were

Michael Blau, Village Administrator Peter Saracelli Jr., Tarrytown Fire Chief John McGee, Tarrytown Fire Chief Nicholas L. Perrotta, Office of Fire Prevention and Control attended this meeting.

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Fire Chief Saracelli stated that the Tarrytown FD does not have a permit-required confined space program. On 9/06/10, he called in the emergency after Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero went into the manhole. The Fire Chief stated that Firefighter John Kelly was not ordered to enter the manhole by his supervisors nor was he told to stop when he began to enter. The FD’s confined space rescue equipment, including a tripod, carabineers, air blower and four-gas meter, was used to extract the two men from the manhole. Fire Chief Saracelli stated that this equipment is only meant to be used in emergencies for the initial period of time before the specialized technical rescue teams arrive. Fire Chief Saracelli stated that the FD has a good training program and that they have all the elements of a respirator program and he would supply those records.

On 9/21/2010, the investigation continued at the Tarrytown DPW site. Participating in this part of the walkaround were:

Scott Weaver, DPW General Foreman Michael Mcgarvey, Superintendent DPW William McGuire, CSEA Unit President Village of Tarrytown Jeff Hymen, CSEA OSH Specialist Pat Russell, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Village of Tarrytown DPW

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The JetVac truck, the smaller jet truck and the confined space equipment, including a tripod, a four-gas meter, an air pump and safety clamps were inspected. A discussion concerning the confined space equipment, hazard assessment and PPE took place. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver stated at the discussion that employees do not enter manholes. He stated that the purpose of the JetVac truck and the smaller jet truck was to clear the manholes from outside of the holes. The JetVac is a special truck that is used to clear sewer clogs using water pressures of greater than 1500 psi. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver stated that the confined space equipment was purchased in 2007 after the permit-required confined space course was taken by the DPW employees. They wanted to have the equipment to go along with the training. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver stated that the confined space equipment was not needed because employees never entered the confined spaces. It was established during the examination of the confined space equipment that the equipment was used twice since its purchase. Maintenance Mechanic Utility Charley Ralph said that he used the confined space equipment twice, and management did not deny this information. Interviews were conducted with DPW employees. During these interviews Pat Russell of CSEA was present. The employees agreed to let her be present during the interviews. The interviews established that the employees did enter permit-required confined spaces when it was needed and that the employer was aware that the men did enter permit-required confined spaces. The employees were never told not to enter the permit-required confined spaces. A recent incident reveals this. An employee stated that he was ordered to take a photograph inside of a 25 foot deep permit-required confined

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space on September 3, 2010. He says that Superintendent DPW, Michael McGarvey and Village Administrator Michael Blau wanted the photos.

No written certification of hazard assessment for tasks requiring personal protective equipment was completed. The men were issued safety glasses, hearing protection, headgear, reflective vests, and gloves. No formal training was given concerning this equipment. Respirators were not required to be worn by the DPW employees.

Additional information was obtained in phone conversations. Superintendent Michael McGarvey stated that Village Administrator Michael Blau did request that the DPW obtain photos on 9/03/10. The photos needed to be taken 25 feet inside a pipe. Mr. McGarvey acknowledged that a 25 foot pipe is a permit-required confined space. General Foreman Scott Weaver stated that the two firemen that rescued the men from the manhole on 9/06/10 had to remove the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) cylinder from its backframe in order to fit through the manhole entrance. The SCBA cylinder was tied to a rope and positioned over the rescuers head. Heinz Ahlers, a representative of NIOSH, states that the use of the SCBA as described by the Village of Tarrytown would be outside of the NIOSH approved configuration.

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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

This sequence is taken from witnesses’ accounts and the 911 call recording.

On 9/06/2010 at 3:52:05 pm Scott Weaver, General Foreman of Village of Tarrytown DPW received a call from Tarrytown Police stating that there was sewage backing up at 200 Sheldon Ave. Tarrytown. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver went to the address and the owner of the house told him that village sewer must be clogged. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver called for his DPW workers to work on the sewer clog. DPW employees Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero, and Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca arrived at the DPW garage where DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver was now waiting. Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca drove the JetVac truck to the area with the sewer clog. Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero drove to the area in the Village Foreman’s car. Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero was the foreman for the Sewer and Water Department. He specifically worked maintaining the sewer system. After trying to use the JetVac truck at three manholes in the area, the clog was still not clear. Then Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca drove the truck to the Consolidated Engine Firehouse, where there are three more manholes. There is a manhole in front of the firehouse, one in the firehouse and one in the back of the firehouse. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver and Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero arrived at the firehouse. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver called Fire Chief Peter Saracelli, to

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unlock the firehouse, which would allow the workers to get access to the manhole that was located inside the firehouse. The Fire Chief Peter Saracelli and Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. arrived within five minutes. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver asked Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. to move the fire truck out of the fire house so that it would not be blocked by the JetVac truck. Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca moved the JetVac truck to the front of the firehouse and tried to jet out the clog in the manhole in front of the firehouse. He ran out of water, but did not clear the clog. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver opened up the manhole inside the firehouse to see if the jetted water was breaking through to this manhole. It was not. Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Bruce Conca and Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero went to a nearby fire hydrant to fill the JetVac truck with water. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver, Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr., and Firefighter John Kelly went to the back of the firehouse to gain access to the third manhole. It is located on a grassy hill five feet from the rear of the firehouse and approximately fifty feet from the street. Firefighter John Kelly arrived at the firehouse on his own. He was not called to the scene. The men cleared foliage away from the manhole so they could open the cover. Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero arrived back at the firehouse, after he finished assisting in filling the JetVac truck with water. He went up to the manhole where the other men were clearing the foliage and waiting for the JetVac truck to arrive. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver was using his phone to call for the smaller sewer jet truck, because it would be easier to jet the manhole on the hill with the smaller truck. Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero went to the hole and removed the cover. Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero looked into the hole and said

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“shitter’s clogged”. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver stated that he was at the picnic table, less than twenty feet from the manhole, using his cell phone to call for the smaller sewer jet truck, when he saw Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero enter the manhole. He did not tell Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero not to enter the manhole. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. stated that DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver, Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. and Firefighter John Kelly had left a picnic table that was located approximately twenty feet from the manhole and then proceeded over to the manhole prior to Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero’s entrance into the manhole. Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero then went into the hole. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver, Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. and Firefighter John Kelly were now standing right behind Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero, and they watched as he descended into the manhole. In both of these accounts, DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver did not stop Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero from entering the manhole. They looked down into the hole and Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero was at the bottom of the manhole. They believed he fell while descending. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. suggested that he go in after Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver said “no”. He told the Firefighters to get boots, rope, and the gas meter from the fire truck. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver yelled to Fire Chief Peter Saracelli to get an ambulance. At 6:36:14 pm Fire Chief Peter Saracelli walked away from the noise, then he called Tarrytown Police to request that Tarrytown Volunteer Ambulance Corp. come to the scene and he also requested that the alarm be put on to have the FD respond to the scene.

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Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. brought the fire truck near to the manhole. The truck stored the rope and gas meter. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. brought the rope, and meter to DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver. Firefighter John Kelly replaced his sneakers with boots which he obtained from his pickup truck. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver was tying the gas meter to the rope. Firefighter John Kelly started to go down into the hole. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver was watching Firefighter John Kelly as he entered the manhole and he did not stop him. Fire Chief Peter Saracelli was only several feet away from the manhole as Firefighter John Kelly entered the manhole, but he did not prevent this entry. Firefighter Kelly went in before the gas meter was ready to be used. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. saw him descend. When he was half way down, Firefighter John Kelly looked up, rolled his eyes back and fell down into the hole. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. said it was three minutes from the time Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero fell in the hole until the time Firefighter John Kelly went into the hole. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver told Fire Chief Peter Saracelli that they had two victims down and needed two ambulances and additional responders.

At 6:42:05 pm Fire Chief Peter Saracelli called police to ask for rescue team for two people in manhole. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver said that no one else was to enter the manhole. At this time the gas meter was tied to the rope and lowered down into the hole. The meter’s alarm went off. DPW General Foreman Scott Weaver said that it read 14% oxygen at the bottom of the hole. Firefighter Sean Scogna Jr. said that it read 11.4% oxygen. These readings were clearly below the required levels needed to

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enter a confined space without SCBA. The Fire Department responders arrived five minutes after. The ladder truck had the tripod for confined space rescue. It was set up and fresh air was pumped into the hole. Assistant Fire Chief Eugene Gasperre had donned a SCBA respirator facemask. The airpack assembly was not worn in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. It was attached to a rope and supported by workers outside of the hole. This was done so he could fit into the hole. He was not attached to the tripod with rope. As he descended into the hole, the SCBA tank was lowered so it was just over the fireman’s head. A cylinder with oxygen and a respirator mask was tied to a rope and lowered into the hole. This was for the victim to use. When he reached the bottom of the hole, he placed the respirator on Firefighter John Kelly and tied off Firefighter John Kelly with another rope and Firefighter John Kelly was pulled up. Fire Chief Gasperre climbed out of the manhole. Then Fire Captain Felix Sartario entered the manhole in the same manner to retrieve Road Maintenance Foreman Anthony Ruggiero. Fire Chief Peter Saracelli was directly involved in these rescue procedures, according to his statement to the police. He knew that his employees were entering the manhole and he knew that the Village did not have a permit-required confined space entry program.

Witness interviews

An interview was conducted with Scott Weaver, General Foreman, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown Village Hall on 9/13/2010 @ 11:00 AM. DPW General

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Foreman Scott Weaver submitted a statement that he previously made to the Tarrytown Police Department. He signed this document in the presence of the PESH investigator and then answered additional questions from the investigator. The witness was asked about the events leading up to, including, and following the accident.

An interview was conducted with Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown Village Hall on 9/13/2010 @ 11:45 AM..The witness was asked about the events leading up to, including, and following the accident.

An interview was conducted with Sean Scogna Jr., Tarrytown Fireman, Village of Tarrytown FD, at Tarrytown FD Headquarters on 9/16/2010 @ 5:15 PM. Also present at the interview was Mr. Sean Scogna Sr. The witness was asked about the events leading up to, including, and following the accident.

An interview was conducted with Pete Saracelli, Tarrytown Fire Chief, Village of Tarrytown FD, at Tarrytown FD Headquarters on 9/16/2010 @ 6:00 PM. The witness was asked about the events leading up to, including, and following the accident.

An interview was conducted with Charley Ralph, Maintenance Mechanic Utility, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown DPW on 9/21/2010 @ 11:30 AM. Also present at the interview was: Ms. Russell, CSEA. The witness was asked about DPW operations.

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An interview was conducted with Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown DPW on 9/21/2010 @ 12:00 PM. Also present at the interview was: Ms. Russell CSEA. The witness was asked about DPW operations.

An interview was conducted with Pedro Ramirez, Laborer, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown DPW on 9/21/2010 @ 12:20 PM. Also present at the interview was: Ms. Russell CSEA. The witness was asked about DPW operations.

An interview was conducted with William Mcguire, Motor Equipment Operator/ Road Maintainer, Village of Tarrytown DPW, at Village of Tarrytown DPW on 9/21/2010 @ 12:50 PM. Also present at the interview was: Ms. Russell CSEA. The witness was asked about DPW operations. Copies of statements given to police were also obtained and reviewed.

Discussion: Interviews of employees after the fatality indicated that they on several occasions had entered permit-required confined spaces to perform their duties. Employees indicated that management was aware of this practice and that they had never been instructed not to enter these spaces.

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During the course of the investigation management provided a permit-required confined space program that was developed for DPW. This program was developed in the 1990’s and was left to lapse when the last employee trained on the program retired in 2004.

The Tarrytown FD supplied materials when asked to produce their respiratory program. The material supplied did not constitute a respirator protection program. A respirator program requires that employees be trained in the proper use and limitations of the respirators required to be used by employees. On 9/06/10, Firefighter John Kelly clearly was not trained to use a respirator when entering the confined space. The third and forth men who entered the confined space were not trained to use respirators correctly. The respirators were not securely attached to the men and this could have caused the face piece to dislodge from the men’s face and expose the men to dangerous gases.

The Tarrytown FD members were exposed to the hazards of permit-required confined space entry without the benefit of a permit-required confined space entry program. Fire fighter John Kelly was not sufficiently trained to recognize the hazards the confined space posed. The FD purchased confined space rescue equipment (tripod, ropes, containers, multi gas meter) to use when called in on an emergency, until the technical rescue team arrives. Fire fighters interviewed indicated they had used the equipment to perform the rescue of the two men in the manhole on 9/06/10. The planned use of this equipment in emergencies would require a permit-required confined space program. The FD did not utilized the rescue equipment correctly. The three FD employees who

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entered the confined space, were not attached to the tripod. Firefighter John Kelly entered the confined space before the gas meter was used to test for safe gas levels. In 2005 the FD management made a request to have training for fire fighters on confined space entry. There is no evidence that this occurred.

The investigation into these fatalities determined that management in the Village of Tarrytown was aware of requirements of the permit-required confined space standard based on the development of a permit-required confined space program, training received, written request for training on confined space entry from the FD and purchase of equipment to support a rescue. The Village of Tarrytown exposed the employees of the DPW to the hazards of permit-required confined space entry by not prohibiting their entry into these spaces. The Village of Tarrytown exposed the employees of the FD by not developing a permit-required confined space entry program or provided necessary training.

Standard: 29 CFR Part 1910.146(c)(3) If the employer decides that its employees will not enter permit spaces, the employer shall take effective measures to prevent its employees from entering the permit spaces and shall comply with paragraphs (c)(1). (c)(2), (c)(6), (c)(8) of this section. Conditions observed: The Village of Tarrytown did not communicate to its employees that they can not enter the permit spaces. The Village of Tarrytown did not take

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measures to prevent its employees from entering permit spaces. Anthony Ruggiero entered the permit space in view of management. This is willful because the DPW produced a permit-required confined space program developed in the 1990’s to address the confined spaces in the DPW; acknowledged that employees entered permit-required confined spaces during the 1990’s; the village provided training to their employees on the hazards of permit-required confined spaces; they purchased confined space entry equipment; they purchased jet vac trucks to facilitate non entry; management representatives indicate the employees do not enter permit-required confined spaces but employee statements indicate that employees entered permit-required confined spaces which management was aware of and took no action. The employer did not produce any document or information that indicated that they instructed or informed their employees not to enter permit-required confined spaces. The employer should have done a survey of all spaces when they developed their confined space program; they did not effectively inform exposed employees of dangers posed by the confined spaces; they did not produce a method to give information to contractors who worked in their permit-required confined spaces. Determination: This is a Willful violation

Standard: 29 CFR Part 1910.146(c)(4) The employer failed to develop and implement a written permit required confined space program that complies with this section for employees entering permit spaces. A written permit required confined space program identifies and evaluates the hazards of permit spaces before employees enter them;

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develops means, procedures and practices for safe permit space entry; evaluate permit space atmospheric conditions and training on working in permit spaces.

Conditions observed: The Village of Tarrytown did not implement a written confined space program, and it did require that Fire Department employees enter permit spaces. Fire Fighter Kelly went into a confined space to rescue Anthony Ruggiero; two firefighters went in to retrieve Anthony Ruggiero and John Kelly during which time management was present and did not stop their employees from entering and did not have a permit-required confined space program. A written confined space program would have required that the gas levels be tested before employees entered the manhole, SCBA be worn before entering the manhole if oxygen levels were below the required levels, and that employees would be attached to the tripod before entering the manhole. This is willful because the village is aware of the need for a confined space program given the development of the DPW plan; they approved the purchase of confined space entry equipment; Chief Peter Saracelli indicated that they plan to answer emergency calls involving confined space rescue. Determination: This is a Willful violation

Standard: 29 CFR Part 1910.132(d)(2) Conditions observed: The Village of Tarrytown did not provide written certification of their evaluation of hazards for tasks requiring personal protective equipment. Determination: This is a Serious violation

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Standard: 29 CFR Part 1910.134(c)(1) Conditions observed: Village of Tarrytown failed to establish and implement a written respiratory protection program with worksite specific procedures for any workplace where respirators are necessary to protect the health of an employee or whenever respirators are required by the employer. The employer did do medical evaluations and Fit testing of their employees, but they did not have the required procedures documented. An explanation of the proper use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and the limitations of the use of SCBA was not included in a written respirator program. Effective training in the correct use of SCBA was not included in a written respirator program. Determination: This is a Serious violation.

Exit Conference An exit conference was conducted on 9/07/2010. Present during the exit conference:

Scott Weaver, DPW General Foreman Michael Mcgarvey, Superintendent DPW William McGuire, CSEA Unit President Village of Tarrytown Jeff Hymen, CSEA OSH Specialist John Staino, CSEA Local 860 President

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Pat Russell, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Bruce Conca, Heavy Motor Equipment Operator Village of Tarrytown DPW

All parties were informed that the investigator’s report and proposed violations, if any were subject to review and approval by the Director, NYSDOL Division of Safety and Health. A closing conference would be conducted after completion of the review and approval process.

A second exit conference was conducted on 9/08/2010. Present during the exit conference:

Michael Blau, Village Administrator Peter Saracelli Jr., Tarrytown Fire Chief John McGee, Tarrytown Fire Chief Nicholas L. Perrotta, Office of Fire Prevention and Control attended this meeting.

All parties were informed that the investigator’s report and proposed violations, if any were subject to review and approval by the Director, NYSDOL Division of Safety and Health. A closing conference would be conducted after completion of the review and approval process.

Closing Conference

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A closing conference was conducted on 12/16/2010. Present during the closing conference: Michael Blau, Village Administrator Scott Weaver, DPW General Foreman Michael Mcgarvey, Superintendent DPW William McGuire, CSEA Unit President Village of Tarrytown Jeff Hymen, CSEA OSH Specialist John Staino, CSEA Local 860 President Pat Russell, CSEA Labor Relations Specialist Peter Saracelli Jr., Tarrytown Fire Chief John McGee, Tarrytown Fire Chief Pico Ben-Amotz, Deputy Commissioner of Labor, New York State Department of Labor

The following materials were distributed and explained to participants during the closing conference in addition to observations made during the walkaround portion of the investigation.

DOSH 904 - Closing Conference Pamphlet

ORDERS ISSUED: X YES NO DOSH 914 (12-09)

CSHO NAME (TYPED) Douglas Dubner

DATE PREPARED 12/16/2010

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