Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Dr. M. Hodkiewicz

Contents
• • • • • • Definitions and background Design and Process FMEA Terminology The FMEA Process Discussion Future developments
Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 2

Learning Outcomes
• After this session you will be able to:
– Explain the role of FMEA/ FMECA in the AM lifecycle process – Identify key components in the FMEA process – Conduct and report on a simple FMEA exercise – Appreciate challenges with FMEA implementation – Appreciate how FMEA can be updated by integration into the routine maintenance environment
Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 3

Mikulak. and M. R. K. effects and criticality analysis. [4]MIL-STD-1629A: Procedure for performing a failure mode. Beauregard.E. 2005..J. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 4 . [2]McDermott. 1996: Productivity. R.R.. The basics of FMEA. The FMEA Pocket Handbook. [3]SAE J1739: Potential Failure Modes and Effects analysis References (1 of 2) in Design and Potential Failure Effects in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes Reference Manual .[1]Dailey. 2004: DW Publishing company. 1980.Draft for review.W.

D.Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment. [7]IEC 60050-191: International Electrotechnical Vocabulary . 1999. 24/7 Quality. [9] Macaulay. [6]ISO 14224: Petroleum and natural gas industries - References (2of 2) . 2003: Gulf Publishing. 1990.Dependability and Quality of Service.. 1995.. The Way things work. [8] MIL-STD-721C Definitions of terms for reliability and maintainability. 1988: RD Press.com. [10] What's wrong with your existing FMEAs. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 5 [5]Tweeddale. M. Managing Risk and Reliability of Process Plants.

S.fmeainfocentre.com/basics/fmea.weibull. Dhillon. Failure modes and effects analysis-Bibliography. Microelectronics MH1 Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 6 .htm • On-line paper: B.com/ • http://www.Software/Internet Resources • FMEA InfoCentre: http://www.

2006/07/16 .Slide 6 MH1 Add from Plant Maintenance web site Melinda Hodkiewicz.

Definitions and background .

and (c) document the process. It is complementary to the process of defining what a design or process must do to satisfy the customer”. (b) identify actions which could eliminate or reduce the chance of a potential failure occurring.What is FMEA? • MIL-STD-1629A [4]: “The purpose of FMEA is to study the results or effects of item failure on system operation and to classify each potential failure in terms of its severity” • SAE J1739 [3]: “A FMEA can be described as a systemised group of activities intended to: (a) recognise and evaluate the potential failure of a product/process and its effect. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 8 .

or piece of equipment by examining the sub-systems or components in turn. enabling the risks to be ranked” [From 5] Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 9 .Informal definition • “FMEA is a non-quantitative analysis that aims to identify the nature of the failures that can occur in a system. • FMECA is an extension of FMEA that assigns a ranking to both the severity of the possible effects and their likelihood. considering for each the full range of possible failure types and the effect on the system of each type of failure. machine.

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 10 . and focus attention on the related causes and effects.Philosophy • FMEA is a ‘common sense’ procedure. • The aim is to provide a framework/process to assist the thought process of a competent person engaged in identifying system or design problems. we can then identify situations when the equipment does not perform the required function. • The process focuses on what we want the equipment to do not what it actually is. By identifying what functions need to be achieved.

An example FMEA report Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 11 .

location or application • Identify monitoring and inspection practices for equipment • Identifying failure codes for the CMMS system • Part of the RCM process Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 12 . or new process • Modifications to existing design or process • Use of existing design or process in a new environment. new technology.For what activities is FMEA appropriate? • New designs.

Design and Process FMEA .

or to – A process function (process FMEA). Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 14 . – it can be applied to a particular equipment (design FMEA).Types of FMEA • FMEA can be applied to a physical entity or to a functional entity. • For example.

PACK P T P T M P GEARBOX PCV 2 LP STAGE COMPRESSION HP STAGE COMPRESSION P TO SUBSEA PIPELINE 2ND GAS EXPORT COMPRESSION TRAIN Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 15 . COOLER DEHYD. COOLER m HP SUCTION DRUM DISCH.Example ANTI-SURGE (LP) ANTI-SURGE (HP) PCV 1(LP) m LP SUCTION DRUM GAS EXPORT HEADER LP SUCTION COOLER P T P T LP DISCH.

assembly. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 16 . service and recycling requirements. • Used by Design Team. The customer for the design team may be the end user.Design FMEA (DFMEA) • Identifies functional requirements of a design • Evaluates the initial design for manufacturing. the design engineer of the higher level assemblies or the manufacturing process/assembly team.

(2) developing failure codes or (3) engaged in RCM. then information from the design FMEA conducted by the manufacturer may be helpful. it is unlikely that you will be involved in a design FMEA process.• If you are the maintenance engineer in an oil and gas or similar facility. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 17 Design FMEA in the AM context . • However. if you are (1) troubleshooting equipment.

or even government regulations. process requirements. • Traditionally used by Manufacturing/ Assembly/ Process team. there is some overlap between HAZOP and Process FMEA for operational equipment Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 18 Process FMEA (PFMEA) . a service operation. potential product and process failures and the effects on the customer. • Identifies process/operational variables on which to focus controls. The customer can be a downstream team. • In the AM arena.• Identifies the process functions.

cranes. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 19 . PFMEA and MFMEA. • In AM. milling machines etc. machinery FMEA may be applied to important maintenance support tools such as lathes.Machinery FMEA (MFMEA) • This is a new category in the draft SAE J1739-2005 aimed at Plant Machinery and Tools. • There are similarities in approach between DFMEA.

Method. Machine. main systems Components. gauges Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 20 . Measurement. processes. Environment Tools. Material. Work stations. production lines. main systems Manpower. sub-systems. operator training.Relationship SYSTEM DESIGN PROCESS MACHINERY Components. sub-systems.

or (b) functional approach. • (b) The functional approach recognises that every item is designed to perform a number of functions that can be classified as outputs. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 21 . • (a) The hardware approach lists individual hardware items and analyses their possible failure modes.Approaches to FMEA • A FMEA may be based on a • (a) hardware/physical. The outputs are listed and their failure modes analysed. • For complex systems. a combination of (a) and (b) may be required.

1998. • FMEA identifies the most critical problems first paving the way for improved maintenance techniques • FMEA on installed equipment provides suggestions for redesign and ‘proactive maintenance’ – (From: Hastings. Reliability and Maintenance Course notes. FMEA is a direct approach to the reduction of maintenance costs through the elimination of faults that give rise to the maintenance task. QUT) Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 22 .Maintenance • For Maintenance Personnel.

Terminology .

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 24 .Terms & definitions (1) • Failure: Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function [7] • Required function: Function. or combination of functions. of an item which is considered necessary to provide a given service [7] • Failure mode: The manner by which a failure is observed. Generally describes the way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation [4].

chemical or other process which has led to failure [7] Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 25 . manufacture or use which have led to failure [7]. part misapplication. • Failure mechanism: Physical.Terms & definitions (2) • Failure cause: • (1) Circumstance during design. design defects. • (2) The physical or chemical processes. quality defects. or other processes which are the basic reason for failure or which initiate the physical process by which deterioration proceeds [4].

• Critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which causes an immediate cessation of the ability to perform its required function [6] • Non-critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which does not cause an immediate cessation of the ability to perform its required function [6] Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 26 . function. or status of an item [4].Terms & definitions (3) • Failure effect: The consequence a failure mode has on the operation.

determined by degree of injury.Terms & definitions (4) • Criticality: A relative measure of the consequences of a failure mode and its frequency of occurrence [4] • Severity: The consequence of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure. or system damage that could ultimately occur. property damage. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 27 .

• Undetectable (Hidden) failure: A postulated failure mode in the FMEA for which there is no failure detection method by which the operator is made aware of the failure [4]. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 28 .Terms & definitions (5) • Reliability [8]: The probability that an item will perform its intended function(s) for a specified interval under stated conditions.

The FMEA Process .

DEFINE SCOPE DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING ASSIGN OCCURRENCE (FREQUENCY) RATING IDENTIFY CONTROLS & ASSIGN DETECTION RATING CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT FMEA flowsheet CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION & ANALYSIS Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 30 .

Failure modes may be assessed at the hardware or functional level.1. IDENTIFY and list functions and the potential failure modes. sub-system. For the selected system or sub-systems. or a combination of both. Define the SCOPE of the study (System boundary) 2. components) 3. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 31 Steps in the FMEA process (from [3]) . Decide on the LEVEL of analysis (System.

Step 3 in the maintenance context
• IDENTIFY and list failure modes …
– Information on what failed and when on a specific piece of equipment or in a system should be available in the maintenance management system (CMMS) – Depending on the organization of the system and the data quality processes then there may be a failure code indicating the cause of failure.

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Continued …
4. For the selected system or sub-system and for each of the identified failure mode, identify the POTENTIAL EFFECT(s) on the machine, system or process and the relative importance (SEVERITY) of the effect(s).

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Continued …
4. continued. The effects could include: – Injury to people – Damage to the environment – Damage to equipment – Loss of production – Reduced quality of production – Increased cost of operation

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Continued …
5. Assign an (OCCURRENCE) ranking to each failure mode 6. For each failure mode for each element, identify CONTROLS – The means of preventing the failure by design, operating and maintenance practices, and management. – The means of detecting the failure and responding effectively to it – The means (if any) of limiting the impact of the failure, particularly by design changes.
Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 35

Continued ..
7. For each of the controls assign a DETECTION ranking 8. Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each effect 9. Prioritise the failure modes for action (RANKING) 10. Take ACTION to eliminate or reduce the high risk failure modes 11. Calculate the resulting RPN as the failure modes are reduced or eliminated.

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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DEFINE SCOPE DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING ASSIGN OCCURRENCE (FREQUENCY) RATING IDENTIFY CONTROLS & ASSIGN DETECTION RATING CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT FMEA flowsheet CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION & ANALYSIS Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 37 .

Selecting the team • Have you got representatives from all the stakeholders? • Do you have a facilitator? • Are the team members familiar with the subject but from diverse vantage points? Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 38 .

Setting up the meeting • • • • • • • • Provide advance notice Who will record meeting minutes? Who will facilitate? Establish ground rules Provide and follow an agenda Evaluate meetings Who will you report the results to? Allow no interruptions Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 39 .

the group rank the ideas Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 40 .Brainstorming rules [1] • Participants must be enthusiastic and give their imagination free reign • The recorder must be given time to record ideas • The ideas must be concisely recorded and placed in clear view of participants • Idea evaluation occurs after the session • Set a firm time limit • Clearly define the problem you want solved • The moderator must keep the group on subject and moving • When time is up.

for example: [6]. • This may be agreed with by the team for a specific FMEA.Selecting systems/subsystems and components • It is important to have an agreed taxonomy when breaking systems down into sub-systems and components. or they may choose to use a taxonomy described in a Standard. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 41 .

Deciding level for analysis [6] Subunit Maintainable item Power transmission Gearbox Variable drive Bearings Seals Lubrication Coupling to drive Coupling to driven unit Pump unit Support Casing Impeller Shaft Radial bearing Thrust bearing Seals Valves Piping Cylinder liner Piston Diaphragm Control & monitoring Control Actuating device Monitoring Valves Internal Power supply Lubrication Reservoir Pump with motor Filter Cooler Valves Piping Oil Miscellaneou s Purge air Cooling/ heating system Filter/ Cyclone Pulsation damper Flange joints Others Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 42 .

Generally describes the way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation [4]. • Be explicit so it is clear when a functional failure has occurred. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 43 Defining functions and failure modes . or combination of functions. • Failure mode: The manner by which a failure is observed.• Required function: Function. of an item which is considered necessary to provide a given service [7].

• Question: What are some possible functional failures? Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 44 .Defining functions and failures • Equipment: Diesel Engine Crankshaft • Function: To convert reciprocating force from pistons and connecting rods into rotational force through the bearings and crankshaft to the drive coupling at a maximum rate of up to ‘x’ kW per cylinder at up to ‘y’ rpm continuously or ‘z’ kW per cylinder at ‘w’ rpm for up to ‘v’ hours in 12.

Functional failure • Function: To convert reciprocating force from pistons and connecting rods into rotational force through the bearings and crankshaft to the drive coupling • Functional Failure: Unable to convert and transmit any force from the pistons Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 45 .

• Existing controls (1): Daily fuel dilution test.Failure mode (1 of 2) • Failure Mode (1): Damaged crankshaft axial alignment bearing (ball race) due to lubrication • Failure Effect (1): Crankshaft will float axially and foul on crankcase. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 46 failure . misalignment of gear drives. change oil and filters as required. weekly oil screen.

Replace bearing as required. • Existing controls (2): Routine vibration monitoring. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 47 . Crankshaft will float axially and foul on crankcase. misalignment of gear drives.Failure mode (2 of 2) • Failure Mode (2): Damaged crankshaft axial alignment bearing (ball race) due to bearing material failure • Failure Effect (2): Same as (1).

Leaking. Slips. Intermittent signal. • For electrical equipment – No signal.Examples of failure modes • For mechanical equipment – Cracked. Deformed. Inadequate signal. Drift. Loss of structural support. Oxidised. Disengages too fast. Sticking. Failure to transmit torque. Loosened. Fractured. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 48 .

hydraulic fluid External leakage process medium Internal leakage Leakage in closed position Plugged/choked Minor in-service problems Other Unknown .high Operation without demand Overheating Parameter deviation Abnormal instrument reading Structural deficiency Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 49 Failure mode BRD HIO LOO ERO VIB NOI ELU ELP INL LCP PLU SER OTH UNK Definition Breakdown High output Low output Erratic output Vibration Noise External leakage lubricant.Process Failure modes (from [4]) Failure mode FTS STP SPS FTC FTO FTR DOP FTF AOL AOH OWD OHE PDE AIR STD Definition Fail to start on demand Fail to stop on demand Spurious stop Fail to close on demand Fail to open on demand Fail to regulate Delayed operation Fail to function on demand Abnormal output – low Abnormal output .

Examples of design failure causes • • • • • • • • • Improper tolerances Incorrect (stress or other) calculations Wrong assumptions Wrong material Lower grade components Lack of design standards Incorrect algorithm Insufficient lubrication capability Excessive heat Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 50 .

Skipped steps Processing errors Set up errors Missing parts Wrong parts Processing incorrect work piece Mis-operation Adjustment error Equipment improperly set-up 11 Poor control procedures 12 Improper maintenance 13 Bad ‘recipe’ 14 Fatigue 15 Lack of safety 16 Hardware failure 17 Failure to enforce controls 18 Environment 19 Stress connections 20 Poor FMEAS Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 51 equipment 10 Tools improperly prepared . 8. 7. 5. 9. 4. 6.Examples of failure causes in manufacturing & process 1. 2. 3.

• • • • • • • Yield Fatigue Material instability Creep Wear Corrosion Chemical oxidation Example of design failure mechanisms Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 52 .

Examples of design controls • • • • • Prototype testing Design reviews Worst case stress analysis FEA Fault tree analysis Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 53 .

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 54 .ACTIVITY • Workshop activity to identify functions and failure modes • The aim of this activity is to see how the functions are broken down and assessed at the different levels.

Bicycle for (Male) Commuter [from 3] • List some design objectives (functions) of a regular commuter bicycle • For two of the functions identify potential failure modes? Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 55 .

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 56 .Bicycle example continued • Identify some of the sub-systems of the bicycle • For one subsystem: Identify at least two functions and failure modes.

DEFINE SCOPE DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING ASSIGN OCCURRENCE (FREQUENCY) RATING IDENTIFY CONTROLS & ASSIGN DETECTION RATING CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT FMEA flowsheet CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION & ANALYSIS Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 57 .

Recording the FMEA process Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 58 .

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 59 . sub-system or component. within the scope of the individual FMEA. Some companies may have standard tables.Severity (S) • A relative ranking. or a redesign of the process. Examples of suitable tables are available in the literature. • A reduction in Severity can be achieved by design change to system. • The rank depends on the evaluation criteria.

Severity Tables (from [1]) Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 60 .

Occurrence is usually based on ranking charts and is a relative rating within the scope of the FMEA.Occurrence (O) • This is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism (listed in the previous column) will occur. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 61 .

Occurrence Tables (from [1]) Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 62 .

Controls • (1) prevent to the extent possible the failure mode or cause from occurring or reduce the rate of occurrence. or • (3) detect the failure mode or cause should it occur. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 63 . or • (2) detect the cause/ mechanism and lead to corrective action.

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 64 . Detection is a relative ranking within the scope of the FMEA.Detection ranking (D) • A rank associated with the best type of control listed in the previous column.

Detection Tables (from [1]) Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 65 .

Risk Priority number • RPN = (S) x (O) X (D) • Within the scope of the individual FMEA. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 66 . the resulting value (between 1 and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns identified by the process. This allows the highest ranking items to be identified and addressed.

• Actions taken and resulting revised ratings • After a preventative/corrective action has been identified. The intent of the action is to reduce rankings in the order of preference: severity. estimate and record the resulting S. O and D rankings. All revised rankings should be reviewed to see if further action is necessary. high RPN issues. occurrence and detection. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 67 .Action plans • Recommended action(s) • Corrective action should be addressed at high severity.

Design FMEA actions • An increase in design validation/ verification actions will result in reduction of ‘detection’ ranking only • Occurrence ranking can be effected by removing or controlling the causes or mechanisms through design revision • Design revision can also affect severity ranking Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 68 .

DEFINE SCOPE DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING ASSIGN OCCURRENCE (FREQUENCY) RATING IDENTIFY CONTROLS & ASSIGN DETECTION RATING CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT FMEA flowsheet CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION & ANALYSIS Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 69 .

Discussion .

The ratings and RPN number are subjective • 2. It can be difficult to control brainstorming sessions Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 71 . This cause may have a deeper cause. For each mode you must have a failure cause. Sometimes the cause and the mode are the same. The categorisation into failure mode and cause does not allow for thinking in terms of causal chains. the’ 5 WHYS’ or other processes.Drawbacks (1 of 2) • 1. • 3.

Drawbacks (2 of 2) • 4. However in real life. To assume otherwise expands the scope of FMEA considerably. Approach makes it difficult to allow for the interaction of two benign failure models. Legal ramifications: if you have identified a failure mode but you have not eliminated it. out of spec parts are common. are you culpable of negligence? • 5. FMEA often assumes that the part is ‘in tolerance’. • 6. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 72 .

Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 73 . they find them a pain to perform and labour intensive • Companies perform a FMEA study when it is too late.Common problems with FMEA (from [10]) • Engineers often do not follow a recognised standard and company format • Multiple descriptions of the exact same failure mode. cause or effect • No recommendations or corrective action for high RPM items • Inconsistent documents between parts of the study • No document control or revision control • Engineers don’t see a value in a FMEA.

Benefits of design FMEA (1 of 2) • Aids in objective evaluation of design. assembly. including functional requirements and design alternatives • Evaluating the initial design for manufacturing. service and recycling requirements • Increasing the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on the system have been considered in the design/development process. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 74 .

evaluating design changes and developing advanced designs Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 75 . to aid in analysing field concerns.Benefits of design FMEA (2 of 2) • Developing a ranked list of potential failure modes according to their effect on the customer (can be the assembly team). • Providing an open-issue format for recommending and tracking risk reduction actions • Providing future reference eg lessons learned. thus establishing a priority system for design improvements. development and validation testing/analysis.

Benefits of Process FMEA • Identifies the process functions and requirements • Identifies potential product and process related failure modes • Assesses the potential customer effects of the failures • Identifies process variables on which to focus process controls • Develops a ranked list of potential failure modes thus establishing a priority system for preventative/corrective action considerations • Documents the results of the analysis of the manufacturing. assembly or production process Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 76 .

Future developments .

Imes Group Ltd Dr Melinda Hodkiewicz. UWA Presented to Engineers Australia Conference. May 2006 .FMEA and Failure Analysis: Closing the Loop Between Theory and Practice Dr Joanna Sikorska.

and S values? Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 79 . D. • The Computerized Maintenance Management system (CMMS) records events/failures as/after they occur. • QUESTION: Is there benefit in a feedback loop from the CMMS to update the FMEA failure records and O. causes and effects based before they occur.Before and after events • FMEA identifies failure modes.

What happens now? • FMEA process: – – – – – – – – Proactive but subjective analysis of hypothetical Integrated into other methodologies Large upfront costs Results or benefits rarely substantiated Static process Non-inclusive Completed reports collect dust Data & process owned by engineering Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 80 .

used & disliked Data & process owned by ops/maintenance Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 81 .What happens now? • Failure analysis process & storage in CMMS: – – – – – – – – Retrospective & selective view of reality Hampered by bad/missing data Evolved functionality Dictated by accountants Interfaces ruled by codes & structure Poor integration with non-financial systems Widely distributed.

What happens now? • FMEA & CMMS data rarely linked &/or integrated • Why? – Different process owners – Non-uniform coding between FMEA & CMMS systems – Reporting may be at different hierarchy levels – Hierarchies may be different – Tradition Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 82 .

Issues to overcome • Structural issues – Consistency of coding & reporting – Adapt systems to users not administrators • Data quality issues – Ensure data is fit for purpose – Real-time data verification – Up-skill data collectors Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 83 .

Issues to overcome • Organizational issues – Implement cultural change – Include the disenfranchised – Increase frequency & quality of feedback – Improve status of data collectors • Technical challenges are trivial by comparison Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 84 .

What is our vision? • Living FMEA • Live links between theoretical (FMEA) & actual (CMMS) • Inclusive process. shared ownership for both datasets • Managed. audited & utilized data processes • Live feeds into various business improvement systems Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 85 .

How can we get there? • Living FMEA model • See Handout Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 86 .

Benefits • Aids prioritization & guides business response • Improves reliability analysis from: – Reduced reliance on free text – More consistent failure classification • Facilitates maintenance optimization • Uncovers disparity between theory & reality • Creates knowledge workers • Ensures a recorded. managed & auditable process Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 87 .

More benefits • Reviews & measures success of FMEA process • Maximizes return on FMEA investment • Supplies future FMEAs with objective data • Future studies become easier Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” 88 .

End .

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