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AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA TITLE: The Sa|Almbandha—samuddesa (chapter on relation) and Bhart|Alrhari’s ´ philosophy of language SOURCE: Journal of the American Oriental Society v119 no1 p88-125 Ja/Mr ’99 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. ABSTRACT In connection with a recent work on the Sambandhasamuddes of the Vakyapadi ya, ´a I consider some major issues concerning Bhartrhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar might approach the Vakyapadi ya. I discuss theoretical principles which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with Bhartrhari and evidence from the Vakyapadi ya in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as Bhartrhari’s perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called sist a, who ´ use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sadhu) linguistic units (sabda) opposed ´ to incorrect linguistic units (asadhusabda, apasabda), that are viewed as corruptions ´ ´ (apabhramsa), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal ˙´ issue here is: do apas abdas directly signify meanings for s is t as when they ´ ´ communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a translation technique such that the apasabda used calls to mind a sadhusabda, which ´ ´ then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the Vrtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said - in the karika text.
ABBREVIATIONS

´ Ambakartri : see Raghunatha Sarma. - Bh: Mahabhasya: see Abhyankar. -´ ´- Darpana: see Joshi, Sadasiva Sastri . - Di pika I: see Bronkhorst. - Hel(araja): see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. - Jaimini yasutrarthasangraha: see Narayana Pillai. ˙ -mamsasutra of Jaimini: see Abhyankar and Joshi. -˙ - JS: Mi - Kala: see Tripat hi . - vyalankara: see Durgâprasâd and Pansîkar. - ˙ Ka ´ - : see Tripathi . - Kuñjika - - LM: Laghumañjusa: see Tripat hi . - Mbh: Mahabhasya: see Abhyankar. Nirukta: see Bhadkamkar. Nyayasudha: see Mukund Shâstri. - - Nyayasutra: see Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkati rtha et al. Paddhati: see Subramania Iyer 1966. - Pari ksa: see Joshi. - PLM: Paramalaghumañjusa: see Kapil Dev Shastri. -´ - RaPr: Ratnaprakasa on Mahabhasya: see Narasimhacharya. - Pañcika: see Subrahmanya Sastri. RjuP: Rjuvimala ´ ´ SBh: Sabara’s Bhasya on Jaiminisutras: see Abhyankar and Joshi. - rttika on Sabarabhasya: see Dvarikadas Sastri . - - - ´- ´ ´ ´ SlV: Slokava - - - -c TC IV.2: Tattvacintamani volume IV.2: see Kamakhyanatha TarkavagiRa. - rttika: see Dvarikadas Sastri . - - - ´- TV: Tantrava Uddyotana: Annambhat ta’s Uddyotana on Kaiyat a’s Pradi pa: see Narasimhacharya. - gesa’s Uddyota on Kaiyata’s Pradi pa: see Vedavrata. Ud: Na ´

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- VBh: Vaiyakaranabhusana: see Bhattacharya. - karanabhusanasara: see Joshi. VBhS: Vaiya -´ VBhS-Kasika: see Nandkishore Shastri. - kyapadi ya: see Aklujkar, Rau, Subramania Iyer. [Karika numbers are first - VP: Va given according to Rau’s edition, then according to Subramania Iyer’s edition, with page and line numbers from the latter.] VPT-ka: Punyaraja’s commentary on Vakyapadi ya, kanda 2: see Subramania Iyer i 1983. VPVr: Vakyapadi ya Vrtti: see Subramania Iyer 1966, 1983. 1. Bhartrhari’s Vakyapadi ya is, without any doubt the single most important work in the long history of Paninian grammar, after the works of the three munis: Panini, - tyayana, and Patañjali. It certainly is the most widely cited early treatise concerning Ka what scholars generally refer to as Indian “philosophy of grammar,” not only among subsequent scholars in India in various schools of thought but also among modern scholars.(FN1) Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the Vakyapadi ya and - bhas yadi pika. The work under review here, a revised version of - Bhartrhari’s Maha Houben’s doctoral dissertation, treats principally one section of the third kanda of the - kyapadi ya, the Sambandhasamuddesa,(FN2) where in eighty-eight verses Bhartrhari Va ´ treats questions concerning relations between linguistic items and meanings. The subtitle of his work reflects Houben’s main concern, to which the central part of the book is devoted: “The Sambandha-samuddesa, Translation and Discussion of ˙ ´ - rikas” (pp. 137-324), an annotated translation of the Sambandhasamuddesa, the Ka ´ - -´ followed by an appendix, “Hela ra ja’s Commentary ‘Praki rn apraka s a’ on the Sambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 325-424). The other two major sections of Houben’s ˙ ´ book are “Sambandha in some early Indian traditions and in Bhartrhari’s Philosophy of ˙ Language” (pp. 29-79) and “The Third Ka n d a and the immediate context of the Sambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 81-135). These are preceded by an introduction (pp. ˙ ´ 1-27); the book ends with a bibliography (pp. 425-48) and three indices: a general index (pp. 449-53), an index locorum (pp. 453-57), and an index referring to textcritical - observations on the Sambandhasamuddesa and Helaraja’s commentary (pp. 457-60). ´ Houben exhibits an impressively wide-ranging erudition together with considerable attention to philological detail and to what other scholars have said. This can be brought home more vividly by noting the contents of this work in greater detail. In his introduction, Houben takes up Bhartrhari’s life and time (pp. 3-10) and the Vakyapadi ya and its interpretation (pp. 11-22), then considers research that has been done on the Sambandhasamuddesa and the notion of sambandha, “relation” (pp. ´ 23-26). The introduction ends with a brief note on the present work (p. 27). The first major part of this book is divided into four sections. Most of the second - section concerning early grammarians is devoted to the Mahabhasya discussion on the - rttika siddhe sabdarthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte sabdaprayoge first part of the va ´ ´ - -˙ sastrena dharmaniyamh. In the third section, Houben considers views of Mi mamsa (pp. ´-˙ 46-47), Vaisesika (pp. 48-53), Buddhism (pp. 53-58), and “other schools: Samkhya, ´ Vedanta” (pp. 58-63) on the notion of “relation.” As Houben notes (p. 46), these discussions “... are mainly based on presently available secondary literature.”(FN3) The last section on sambandha in the Vakyapadi ya consists of four subsections in which the following topics are treated: the assumption that there is a beginningless relation between words and meanings (pp. 64-66), the relation between sounds and signifiers (pp. 66-75), “the intimate relation between sabda ‘language’, artha ‘reality’ and jñana ´ ‘knowledge’” (pp. 75-77), and “sam bandha and the primary unit in language” (pp. ˙ 77-79). Part two of Houben’s work is devoted to a description and discussion of the organization of the Vakyapadi ya’s third kanda.

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The third and largest part of Houben’s book consists of three sections: “General Remarks” (pp. 139-40), “Analysis of the Sambandha-samuddesa” (pp. 141-44), and ˙ ´ - “Translation and Discussion of the karikas” (pp. 145-324). The translation in turn is divided into two parts, each further subdivided into two parts, covering respectively - karikas 1-38, 39-51, 52-59, and 60-88. Houben first gives his translations, then deals with grammatical and semantic issues concerning terms and syntax, and finally - discusses the import of karikas—individually and in groups—in the light of what is said - rika text, in the available Vrtti(FN4) on the first and second kandas, elsewhere in the ka - and, even more extensively, in light of what Hela ra ja has to say. This leads to - redundancy. In the appendix containing the translation and comments on Helaraja’s - ´a - Praki rn apraka s the transliterated text of the eighty-eight ka rika s appears again, - rikas is repeated with occasional slight variations to Houben’s translations of these ka - take Helaraja’s interpretation into account, and there is additional discussion of what - raja says. Hela Houben’s book affords an opportunity to consider some major issues concerning Bhartrhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar—from whatever background that scholar be—might approach Bhartrhari’s major work. My discussion is organized as follows. First (section 2), I outline the theoretical principles Houben sets forth as the basis for his dealing with Bhartrhari, then (section 3) I consider evidence from the Vakyapadi ya in connection with Houben’s principles, chiefly what he refers to as Bhartrhari’s perspectivism. I subsequently take up (section 4) one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called sist a,(FN5) who use speech forms characterized as “correct” (sadhu) linguistic units ´ - dhusabda, apasabda), that are viewed (sabda) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (asa ´ ´ ´ as corruptions (apabhramá), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. ˙ The principal issue here is: do apasabdas directly signify meanings for sist as when ´ ´ they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a translation technique such that the apasabda used calls to mind a sadhusabda, which ´ ´ then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the Vrtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said - in the karika text.(FN6) Following this discussion, I take up (section 5) some points concerning Houben’s translation.(FN7) 2. As I said at the outset, I think Houben’s book demonstrates considerable learning. It is to be expected, then, that Houben will have his own particular views to propound and devote more attention to the views of some scholars than to those of others. The very breadth of the work and the attention paid to details both in the translations and in the annotations make it difficult to write a general review or to make critical remarks without seeming to be a nitpicker. What is more, in connection with a work such as this, there is the danger of being viewed as a “traditionalist” as opposed to a more open-minded “modern” scholar. Despite these risks, however, Houben’s book exhibits qualities—both good and bad—which invite such comments. 2.1 The most important chapter in the introduction is the second, concerning the Vakyapadi ya and its interpretation. Here, Houben expresses his doubts with respect to generally held opinions concerning how one should understand what Bhartr hari intended to set forth and postulates three principles which, he says (p. 16), “... clarify, in my view, a great deal of Bhartrhari’s thought, and particularly of his treatment of the notion of sambandha ‘relation’.” ˙ Houben accepts (p. 18) that “... Bharthari did have some theoretical preferences....” At the same time, he expends considerable energy arguing against some scholars who see certain basic ideas maintained and defended in the Vakyapadi ya. Thus, he remarks (p. 15): “According to Peri Sarveswara, the whole of the VP is to be

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- understood on the basis of the first four karikas ... But what would happen if we were to take first other parts of the VP into account and return next to these introductory - karikas?”(FN8) On the same page, Houben later remarks that in the course of his study of the Sambandhasamuddesa he became convinced that “... attempting to ´ understand Bhartrhari in the framework of “linguistic monism” would always leave some important characteristics of the VP unexplained.” 2.2. In the same section of his introduction, Houben postulates the three principles I alluded to earlier. He states them as follows (p. 16): “(a) different perspectives have their own validity; (b) there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity of words and discourse; (c) there is a permanent relation between linguistic unit and thing-meant.” Principle (a) is adopted as guiding the interpretation of Bhartrhari’s work. Houben takes a strong stance in saying that Bhartr hari’s approach to issues of language, meaning, and reality may be qualified as “perspectivistic,” not simply in that he takes - -˙ into consideration views proposed by Mi mamsaka, Vaisesika, and various Buddhistic ´ thinkers but also (p. 16) that “... the validity of different perspectives is accepted” and that “... the validity of a single perspective is limited.” In Houben’s opinion, earlier scholars have failed to appreciate properly Bhartrhari’s attitude. Thus, in connection with his first principle, he says (p. 17): The principle manifests itself first of all in the complex argumentative structure of Bhartrhari’s exposition. His awareness of the limits of each single approach to reality explains why the VP has become to a very great extent a samgraha, ˙ an encyclopedia of different existing views on linguistic and philosophical issues. The importance of this encyclopedic approach has not been fully realized by many interpreters and critics of Bhartr hari. In the case of the Sambandhasamuddesa we will see that some views which have been widely ˙ ´ considered as the view of Bhartrhari on the subject, occupy, in fact, a certain well-defined place in a whole range of different, and within their limits acceptable, angles of approach. Too often, Bhartrhari’s statements have been interpreted in a polemic instead of an encyclopedic framework (this point I hope to elaborate at other places, e.g., in Houben, forthcoming, e).(FN9) Houben goes on to modify this by noting (p. 18) that Bhartrhari did have some theoretical preferences, although he had a “basically constructive” attitude towards ideas of other thinkers.(FN10) Principle (b) is later (p. 19) put in a different manner: “The second principle says that it may be the case that there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity of words and theoretical discourse.”(FN11) Houben notes that this principle prevents the first one from leading to total skepticism or nihilism. He also remarks, touching more closely on the central topic of his book, that this principle explains “Bhartrhari’s arguing for the acceptance of a relation which by definition cannot be expressed as-it-is” in that “both the limits of language and a possible underlying reality are taken into account.” The third principle is one which Paninian grammarians maintained from the very beginning. Houben goes on (p. 20) to say that this has as a theoretical implication “... that thought and knowledge of a thing are always intimately, perhaps even inseparably, connected with language.” 2.3. In connection with the thesis for which he argues strongly, that Bhartrhari presents other positions in a spirit of equality, Houben also considers, in the last subsection of part 1, an important issue that is the centerpiece of the Vakyapadi ya’s - n d a: whether words (pada) and their meanings (pada rtha) are to be second ka considered real (sat) constituents of utterances/sentences (va kya) and utterance

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- meanings (vakyartha) or merely assumed units abstracted formally from indivisible utterances and utterance meanings for the purpose of grammatical description and discussion. The second kanda of the Vakyapadi ya is concerned with the various ways in which a sentence is defined. Concerning this kanda, Houben (pp. 78-79) makes three observations that are relevant to his study of the Sambandhasamuddesa. The ´ second of these is as follows (p. 78): ... in the second Kanda Bhartrhari discusses numerous views in a positive way, in accordance with his ‘perspectivism’ and his encyclopedic approach to theoretical problems. Much positive attention is therefore also paid to views which accept words as primary units....(FN12) One gets the impression that Bhartrhari does not try to establish one view to the exclusion of others, but wants to show different views in contrast with each other. Throughout the second Kanda he is extremely conscious of the value of different viewpoints. That Bhartrhari has still a preference for the sentence as the primary unit is not always very clear in the second Kanda, but it is emphasized in a few strategical places in the third Kanda. There, Bhartrhari refers to the process of apoddhara ‘abstracting from, analysis’ and to the idea of abstracting linguistic or semantic units from more comprehensive ones (3.1.1-2, 3.4.1-2, 3.7.164, 3.13.6, 3.14.144, 3.14.169). Among these places, only 3.1.1 refers to the sentence and the word and smaller linguistic units, in the other [sic] the emphasis is on the sentence meaning and the word meaning and/or word meaning and smaller semantic units. Houben goes on (pp. 78-79) to make his third point: if the sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddesa asks the ´ wrong kind of question. The question asked in this samuddesa is: what sort of relation ´ holds between words and their meanings? “The entire discussion in the Sambandha-samuddesa,” Houben argues, “becomes very tentative or hypothetical in ˙ ´ this light,” and he concludes his third point as follows: The validity of the discussion is limited by the acceptance of theoretical choices which are not without problems. It may be pointed out, moreover, that in the second Kanda Bhartr hari does not discuss just a single view in which the sentence is primary, but several views. What all views which accept the sentence as primary have in common is that the status of individual words (and corresponding word meanings) is strongly relativized. Houben ends this section (p. 79) emphasizing that, after all, those who upheld the primacy of constituent words included grammarians, the younger Bhartrhari among them: If it was so important to Bhartrhari to relativize the status of individual word meanings, one may wonder: who were the thinkers who did attribute a high - -˙ status to these? Interpreters of the VP have identified these with Mi mamsakas. In “Who are Bhartrhari’s padadarsins?” (Houben 1993) it has been argued that ´ the ‘upholders of the word’ include also grammarians and to some extent the author of the MbhD who may have been the young Bhartrhari. The tenor of Houben’s inquiry which shows through in these passages appears elsewhere, also, as when, in the final chapter of his summary of the third kanda, he includes the following among nine observations (p. 132): (2) In the third Kanda, as in the previous ones, there is a tendency to pay positive attention to quite divergent views, and usually there is no absolute commitment to one view to the exclusion of others. The approach to the different problems may be characterized as perspectivistic. (3) Against the background of this perspectivistic approach, there are still theoretical preferences. It seems possible to locate the preferences evinced in

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the third Kanda in the context of the discussions in the second Kanda. There, the main problems were: is the primary unit in language the word or the sentence? is the individual word meaning primary or the sentence meaning? The preference evinced there for the primacy of the sentence and sentence meaning implied that individual word meanings, if at all they are accepted, have no independent status. The primacy of the sentence is usually no explicit argument in the discussions in the third Ka nda. Only at a few places the reader is reminded of the idea that, in fact, the sentence and the sentence meaning are the primary units. Apart from these places, it may be said that in the third Kanda views in which word meanings are not well-defined individual basic units are generally preferred; there is no strong or absolute commitment to views which would imply word meanings as well-defined individual basic units. 3. The three principles which Houben sets forth are basic to his treatment of the materials in the Vakyapadi ya, and they are put in a manner that would appear to make disagreement difficult. It is nevertheless difficult to see how Houben can maintain some of his claims, at least in the strong versions he formulates, and some of what he says puzzles me. 3.1. Consider Houben’s reaction to Peri Sarveswara’s appreciation of the - introductory karikas (above, 2.1). One may choose to ask what would happen if, instead of starting from the beginning, we studied other parts and came back to the beginning. It is nevertheless reasonable that an author begin his work by presenting his general thesis, and it is also reasonable to let this be a background for one’s understanding of what follows. - 3.2. The Va kyapadi ya begins with a description of brahman in ka rika s 1-4. Bhartrhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: though brahman is memorialized in the Veda as one, so that there is no separation between it and powers, it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinct things by virtue of its several powers.(FN13) Moreover, the theme of imposition is also brought in at the beginning, where Bhartr hari says(FN14) that the six modifications—being born and so on(FN15)—which are the sources of differences in being have their basis in the time-power of brahman, a power on which parts are imposed.(FN16) Bhartrhari goes on to speak of the means of reaching this brahman, namely the Veda. Once more, he immediately strikes the note of unity versus diversity: although one, the Veda has been memorialized in a form appearing as though it had many “paths.”(FN17) - Subsequently, Bhartrhari outlines in three karikas(FN18) the topics which are to be covered in his work. Two types of meanings are distinguished: those which have a fixed nature and those which are obtained through extraction of partial meanings from putative complexes. Parallel to these are two kinds of linguistic units: those which are to be explained and those which serve to convey the former. Two kinds of relations are said to link linguistic units with meanings: a relation such that one is the cause and the other an effect and a relation such that a linguistic unit has the property of being naturally apt to make known a meaning. Moreover, such relations can connect linguistic elements and meanings in ways that can have two results: a relation serves as means with respect to merit or merely to the comprehension of meaning; the former holds for correct speech forms, whose use leads to merit, and the latter for incorrect forms in addition to correct ones. There can be no doubt at all that the Vrtti is correct when it says that the total content of the work which has been undertaken is summarized in these three verses.(FN19) There can also be no doubt whatever that the Vakyapadi ya itself distinguishes between linguistic units that are to be explained and those which serve as means to explain them in a grammar—Pa n ini’s

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- Ast adhyayi —and between meanings that are fixed and those which are abstracted through analysis. Again, there is the distinction between unity and division, now resulting from abstraction. No one has denied that Bhartrhari brings in many of points of view throughout the - kyapadi ya, but one cannot be faulted for considering it appropriate to appreciate the Va - entire work in the light of the introductory karikas. In addition, Bhartrhari makes it clear that he bases himself on a long tradition of usage and grammar. Thus, in VP 1.26, he says not only that the eight topics noted earlier are described in grammar both through indirect indications and direct statements but also that they are now followed according to tradition, to memorialize them. The Paddhati appropriately stresses that Bhartrhari here says he is not doing anything without precedent, only following a tradition in presenting the eight topics at issue, and that he does all this in accordance with tradition, so that there is no invention (utpreksa ‘fancy’) for the sake of novelty.(FN20) - Bhartrhari goes on to say, in accordance with the Mahabhasya,(FN21) that the correct linguistic units that are a means to merit are established from the tradition that stems from the sist as. Moreover, no one can render purposeless this settled situation, so that ´ sist as like Panini composed a smrti whose object is the correctness of speech.(FN22) ´ After stressing again that pure reasoning by inference cannot replace what is established through tradition, Bhartrhari completes the section in question by saying that sist as have undertaken grammatical teaching basing themselves on the teaching ´ that has no author—that is, the Veda—and smrti based on it.(FN23) - 3.3. Houben’s third principle as formulated is a restatement of what Katyayana and - later Panini yas have maintained. The theoretical implication Houben draws from this, on the other hand, is not obvious. It is one thing to say that a linguistic item like ghat a bears a permanent relation with a referent, a pot;(FN24) it is another thing to claim that one cannot have knowledge of such an entity without language, that all or most “cognitive episodes” are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.(FN25) It is well known that for Bhartrhari any cognition of anything in the world is permeated by language. This stance is compatible with accepting a permanent relation between linguistic items and what they signify, but it does not necessarily follow as a consequence of this acceptance. 3.4. I also think some caution is called for in connection with Houben’s first principle. As he recognizes, scholars before him have stressed Bhartrhari’s dealing with views of different schools of thought in a nonpolemical manner. Bhartrhari does not organize his work as a series of purvapaksa to be refuted, thus establishing his siddhanta. There is no repeated iti cen na, iti siddhantah, or iti siddhantitam. In this - n inian grammarians respect, Bhartr hari differs from such scholars as the Pa - - ˙ Kaun d abhat t a, and Na ges a;(FN26) ´ the Mi ma m sakas Jaimini and - caspatimisra;(FN27) Naiyayikas such as Jayantabhat t a and Gangesa;(FN28) and Va ´ ˙ ´ many other defenders of tenets maintained in particular schools. This does not mean, however, that Bhartrhari should be considered not to have held definite views of his own and to have argued—even in the Vakyapadi ya—against other positions. The closest parallel to his way of proceeding is, I think, to be found in the work which - serves as Bhartrhari’s major source of ideas to be developed, the Maha bha s ya. Patañjali also presents arguments for various points of view—for example, that a verbal base (dhatu) can be defined as signifying activity (kriya ) and being (bhava)—and interpretations of given sutras, without overtly and emphatically presenting a definitive - nta. Yet his very argumentation leads one to see—though not always—his siddha accepted view, since certain alternatives involve such a complex of principles and metarules to be applied that they clearly suffer from what commentators call pratipattigaurava ‘prolixity in understanding’ and certain others clearly do not harmonize - with what is said elsewhere in the Ast adhyayi , in varttikas and in the Bhasya.

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3.5. Although I agree that the Vakyapadi ya text calls for a great deal of study and that for any single student much may indeed remain unexplained, I also think that Houben has applied his first principle in a way that fails to pay appropriate attention to Bhartrhari’s defense of certain theoretically important positions. Consider in this context what Houben says about the second kanda (see 2.3). - nda, Bhartrhari devotes a large section (VP 2.64-87) to arguments in In this ka defense of the word and its meanings as valid. This section ends with a verse saying that all the principles of interpretation dealt with in what has preceded, principles that depend on word-meanings, would not serve to interpret sentences correctly if the individual word did not signify.(FN29) Thereafter begins a section the first verse of which asserts that there is no contradiction between what has been adduced requiring that one accept as real the individual words of utterances and the position stated earlier, that an utterance is an indivisible unit whose meaning also is indivisible. Even if the utterance meaning is indivisible, it is subject to having partial meanings extracted due to differences in expressive capacity one sees in different utterances.(FN30) One - - example will serve to illustrate. If A says to B (1) vanat pika ani yatam ‘a cuckoo should be brought from the forest’ and B does not know what pika means, the latter inquires about the meaning of this term alone, not about what the utterance means.(FN31) Therefore, one may claim, the word pikah is a separate independent constituent in (1), with its own distinct meaning. The answer to this is given as follows: a sentence such - - as (1) is totally distinct from a sentence such as (2) vanad rksa ani yatam ‘a bear should be brought from the forest.’ Nevertheless, people assume a similarity between - - the two: they know what the extracted words vanat, rksah and ani yatam mean and they assume that (1) and (2) share some parts, so that they inquire about the putative part they do not know. But this is merely an analytic procedure applied to a unit that is used as a single indivisible entity in communication. A parallel is drawn between this and the way in which people perceive entities like a gayal (gavaya) and Narasimha—Visnu as “man-lion.” Each of these is an entity sui generis. Accordingly, ˙ each is the object of a single cognition. Nevertheless, one understands in each a part that is similar to some entity of a different generic class: a cow and a man, respectively. Hence, one also understands (anupasyati ‘sees subsequently’) that in ´ each of these there is a part which, though not there, is supposed to be there, a part which is not well known as coöccuring with the other and which one has not seen with the other—namely, a horse and a lion. But a person who reasons this way is said to be confused, since what he is perceiving is a single indivisible entity in each case.(FN32) Bhartrhari does not just show that the arguments for assuming that words are the true units of communication can be refuted. He also emphatically argues against this position elsewhere, saying that, if a sentence meaning is considered not to arise directly from speech units, then a word meaning too will have to be dissociated from words, with the consequence that the direct relation between words and - -˙ meanings—which a Mi mamsaka too assumes to be permanent and not instituted by an individual—also will be given up.(FN33) - -˙ It is generally accepted that Bhartrhari is arguing here against Mi mamsakas. This is justified not only by the arguments advanced but also by the fact that Bhartrhari - -˙ directly alludes to the Mi mamsa principle of interpretation according to which the direct expression by an affix that something plays a contributing role in an act takes precedence over what is understood indirectly through inference based on what must obtain in order for a stated provision to be effective or through the coöccurrence of terms in an utterance.(FN34) It is also noteworthy that Kumarila reacts to arguments which appear in the - kyapadi ya. Thus, in connection with sequences like dadhy a naya ‘bring some Va

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curds’(FN35) Bhartrhari remarks as follows. Padas often lose through samdhi their presumed primitive forms. This being so, how can one determine the boundaries between padas? And how can one then discriminate a meaning for a word whose ´ boundary has not been grasped?(FN36) In his Slokavarttika, Kumarila sets forth the same argument in more detail while presenting the claims of those who maintain that a sentence alone signifies, as an indivisible unit. One should determine that a meaning M is associated with a word W through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka: if W is present, M is understood and if W is absent, the meaning M is not understood. Thus, - if one has raja (nom. s.) meaning ‘king’, then in the absence of this word, one should - - not understand this meaning. Yet it is understood when one says rajña (inst. s.), raja being absent. Similarly, if one associates the meanings ‘curds’ and ‘cow’ with dadhi and gauh, respectively, then these meanings should not be understood when one says dadhy atra and gam.(FN37) Kumarila goes on to answer such objections and to uphold the view that padas are the true units. Similarly, Kumarila reacts to the argument presented in VP 2.16 (see above, with note 33): even though a sentence meaning does not directly derive from words, this does not have as a consequence that the word meanings are not directly related to such speech units. The word meanings can have no other source and are not conveyed merely for their own sake but with the intention of conveying a relational sentence meaning, so that, through these word meanings a sentence meaning is indirectly related to words.(FN38) On the basis of the evidence, I think it is difficult to maintain that in the second kanda of the Vakyapadi ya Bhartrhari is granting equality to the view of those who maintain the principles of interpretation which are based on accepting words as the - - ˙ true units, namely Mi ma m sakas, or to deny that he is indeed arguing against - -˙ Mi mamsakas. 3.6. As noted earlier (§2.3), Houben says that the “upholders of the word” - -˙ (padadarsinah) are not just Mi mamsakas but also grammarians. In this context, it is ´ worth emphasizing something which Houben is aware of but downplays.(FN39) That grammarians could and did operate with words as constituents of sentences is beyond doubt. This does not mean, however, that Bhartrhari’s arguments against padadarsinah ´ are also aimed at grammarians. The issue actually comes down to something that is brought out clearly in commentaries. - Let us begin with the karika in which Bhartrhari contrasts the adherents of the two views in question, VP 2.57: abhedapu rvaka bheda h kalpita va kyava dibhih | - rva n abheda m s tu manyante padadars inah “Differences preceded by - ˙ bhedapu ´ nondifference are posited by those who maintain that the utterance is the unit of communication; those who maintain that the word is the unit of communication, on the - other hand, consider nondifference to be preceded by differences.” The previous karika sums up two alternatives under the position that there is an indivisible utterance:(FN40) whether one assumes that there is a permanence of putative composites or of a single generic unit, those who uphold this position say that a single entity has a single meaning,(FN41) which never deviates from it.(FN42) The first half of VP 2.57 thus links with this preceding verse, stating that those who maintain the primacy of a sentence as a single meaningful unit that is indivisible and has a single indivisible meaning nevertheless countenance division of such units into constituents, only these different constituents are fictitiously posited (kalpitah) and necessarily based on the true, whole, units. Those who maintain the opposed view say that the “wholes” are composite and are based on their constituent units. Under this view, it is appropriate that only words are based on the status of being real and sentences that are said to be single units are “fictitiously” posited. Punyaraja emphasizes this contrast.(FN43) Bhartrhari goes on in subsequent verses to treat the related issue of whether one should consider the continuously recited Vedic texts (samhitapat ha) as the source of ˙ - -

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the analyzed texts (padapat ha) or vice-versa.(FN44) The Vrtti on VP 2.58 notes some views which merit mention here. First, an absolute opposition is made such that either the samhita or the pada is permanent. According to some, the padas are products of ˙ - ras (lit., ‘makers of words’) or identical with words known from the oral tradition padaka handed down; for others, it is the samhita which is a product of a human tradition and ˙ the padas are eternal. Still others hold that both are equally eternal, but in different ways: the pada text is handed down as an eternal entity which serves to convey something else and the samhita text is handed down as an eternal entity that is ˙ thereby conveyed. Finally, some maintain that there is only one eternal tradition handed down, and that these are simply two aspects (sakti ‘powers’), of being divided ´ and undivided, which play the roles of being what conveys and what is to be conveyed.(FN45) 3.7. With this, it is appropriate to come back to what is said in the Vrtti on VP - 1.2-26 (see §3.2), since, as Helaraja rightly points out, the second kanda is where Bhartrhari reaches conclusions concerning the sentence as an object of explanation and its meaning as a fixed meaning.(FN46) The Vrtti explains in detail what is meant by apoddharapadartha (‘meaning gotten through extraction’), sthitalaksano ‘rthah (‘meaning whose character is fixed’), and anva khyeyah s abdah (‘linguistic unit that is to be explained’). An ´ - rapadartha—the meaning, e.g., of a case marker in a noun or a tense marker apoddha in a verb—has the following properties. It is absolutely fused in a single whole meaning, so that it is extracted from a putative complex in a guise that is gotten by inference and assumed, and only in this guise does its distinction from other abstracted part meanings become relevant. Such a partial meaning discriminated from other partial meanings has a form that is beyond normal communication.(FN47) Not merely is such a form outside the realm of actual communication, it is established generally in a way that the Vrtti speaks of as a fancy, thus emphasizing that it is an invented entity. In accordance with what they have understood, grammarians establish such partial meanings, which they reach through repeated exposure to them from their traditions.(FN48) Thus, under the assumption that different utterances contain the same component because of similarity in form, grammarians abstract component elements assumed to occur in what is actually an impartite linguistic unit and they do this for the purpose of carrying out grammatical operations which account for such whole units. The partial meaning that goes beyond normal communication is then adopted as what is signified by these component linguistic items abstracted through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka.(FN49) Clearly, this abstracted meaning (so ’yam apoddharapadarthah) enters into grammatical talk, as when a grammarian like Panini derives complex units from posited components. The Vrtti remarks that it also takes part in everyday talk involving parts, which is similar to that of a grammar.(FN50) That is, in everyday speech also speakers act as though sentences like those cited in §3.5 spoke of a distinct object, agent, and so on, separable from actions. Vrsabha notes appropriately that the Vrttikara says atyantasamsrst ah, with ayanta˙ ‘absolutely’, in order to exclude a whole preceded by parts which are combined.(FN51) In addition, since the whole meaning from which parts are extracted is a single whole without actual parts, the form in which such a part meaning is abstracted is said to be assumed, something to be inferred. That is, to begin with there are no real parts associated with distinct meanings, so that reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka that such and such a partial meaning is associated with a particular part of a larger unit is an assumption, not a given fact.(FN52) Further, in normal interaction, as when some one acts upon being told to do something or refrains from doing something, such communication takes place through whole utterance meanings, not discrete part meanings.(FN53)

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The Vrtti also says, with respect to the linguistic units characterized as those to be explained, that for some the explanation has the word as its boundary, for others the sentence.(FN54) That is, some grammarians derive words like purusa-s (‘the man’) and pac-a-ti (‘cooks’) individually, as though they could stand alone, and others consider the derivational procedure immediately to involve words as related to each other in sentences.(FN55) Now, saying a unit is to be explained amounts to saying its meaning has a fixed character. In fact, the Vrtti later says that in grammar the meaning of either a pada or a sentence is considered to be fixed.(FN56) On the other hand, the Vrtti also emphasizes that a meaning is fixed only relative to a sentence. Meaning divisions within padas vary. They are not necessarily linked to units with fixed boundaries, since they are abstracted in various ways by different grammarians, who divide padas differently.(FN57) That is, so far as actual communication is concerned, the utterance or sentence - kya) is viewed as the unit of communication and the unit of meaning is a single, (va indivisible utterance meaning. Utterances are broken up into words and words into smaller units for the sake of grammatical description, and such sub-sentential units are associated with meanings abstracted from utterances, but only in a grammar (sastre) ´can one legitimately consider a word an upper boundary of description or a word meaning a fixed meaning, just as only grammarians deal with items like bases and affixes. - 3.8. The Vakyapadi ya karikas make the very same points. Thus, after listing eight different views concerning what constitutes a sentence and a sentence meaning, as - - well as considering definitions of sentences proposed by Katyayana and in Mi mamsa, - nda starts by emphasizing the unity of the sentence and its meaning. the second ka Bhartrhari invokes as parallels the cognition of a variegated picture and the picture itself. As there is a single cognition which takes the entire picture into its purview, and this is then divided in imitation of the different things seen, there is the understanding of a sentence meaning in the same manner: there is one understanding, which is then artificially divided. There is a picture, which has a single overall form, but one describes it by means of colors blue and so on, which are distinct in character and represented as such. In the very same manner, a single sentence, which semantically is totally independent, is accompanied by an explanation by means of other words, which are semantically dependent.(FN58) Further, the extraction of words in a sentence is possible in the same manner that bases, affixes, and so on are divided from each other in a word.(FN59) Similarly, at the beginning of the third kanda Bhartrhari says that words are divided into two, four, or five classes by different thinkers and that such a division is made only on the basis of abstracting from sentences, just as one extracts bases, affixes, and so on from words. He also notes different positions concerning individual and generic property when one abstracts word meanings.(FN60) Of course, verses 24-26 are not the absolute beginning of the first kanda. However, they constitute a summary of the general topics to be covered. Consequently, it is appropriate to say that Bhartrhari introduces the first kanda with a statement of topics he will take up and each of the next kandas with a statement of his general thesis: that the unit of actual communication is the sentence, associated with a sentence meaning, that words and word meanings are abstracted from such sentences through the same reasoning grammarians use to abstract bases, affixes, and so on from words. 3.9. In sum, I consider that the evidence from the Vakyapadi ya(FN61) supports the position that Bhartrhari does indeed have a well-conceived theoretical stance, which he - -˙ upholds, and that he does indeed argue against scholars, such as Mi mamsakas, who do not accept the primacy of the sentence and of sentence meaning. That Bhartrhari

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also discusses many different views and variations on them should not obscure this point. Nor should one expect him constantly to remind his audience of this central thesis. It is sufficient that this is established firmly and that a diametrically opposed view is refuted in the second kanda, the subject of which is the sentence and its meaning. It is also sufficient to begin the third kanda with a statement which again emphasizes that classes of meanings and the particular sets of words with which they are associated are abstracted from sentences and their meanings. The remainder of the third kanda is devoted to discussing such individual categories as well as the ways in which complex terms—compounds and derivates with taddhita affixes—are viewed. Finally on this topic, we have to confront the third point Houben makes in his discussion of sambandha and the primary unit of language (see §2.3), namely that if the sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddesa asks the wrong kind of question. I consider that the material ´ considered above is sufficient to show that it is Houben who has missed the point. Bhartrhari can maintain that the sentence is the real unit of actual communication and still accept that through analysis one can and should abstract words and word meanings. This is necessary in order to carry out a grammatical description. Further, in everyday life people also accept words and word meanings, though here too these are to be considered abstracted from sentences and sentence meanings. In addition, there are scholars who accept the word and its meanings as the true units of communication. Accordingly, it is appropriate that, once he has established the primacy of the indivisible sentence, Bhartrhari proceeds to discuss classes of words and their meanings. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion of generic property - and individual as word meanings, since, as Helaraja points out, different scholars maintain that one or the other is the meaning of all abstracted words.(FN62) This includes finite verb forms, since, under the points of view Bhartrhari takes up, these too can signify a generic property that characterizes all instances of a given action and an individual instance of action (kriya) can also be viewed as a being (satta).(FN63) Given all this, it is proper to take up in the third samuddesa the possible views ´ concerning a relation between words and word meanings. 4. In VP 1.25 (see §3.2, with note 18), Bhartrhari speaks of correct and incorrect linguistic units in connection with merit and the comprehension of meaning. This point is linked with a series of issues, which were objects of discussion starting at least with Patañjali, concerning terms like (3) go (nom. sg. gauh) considered correct linguistic - units (sadhusabda) and related terms like (4) gavi , gon-, gota, gopotalika, considered ´ i - dhusabda, apasabda), both used in the same meaning incorrect linguistic units (asa ´ ´ (‘cow’). The following issues are treated: A. Are the types (3) and (4) equally old or is one to be considered derived from the other? B. If one is derived from the other, does type (3) derive from type (4) or (4) from (3)? C. At the time that both types (3) and (4) are in use, does everyone understand the meaning in question when either (3) or (4) is used? D. Is there a direct word-meaning relation between (3) and the meaning and also between (4) and the same meaning or is only one directly related, the other indirectly related, and for what reasons? It is agreed that both types of terms convey given meanings. On other points, there are disagreements. The discussions concerning terms of types (3) and (4) can be summarized as follows.(FN64) 1. If both (3) and (4) are inheritances from time immemorial, they both simply signify the meanings in question.

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2. On the assumption that terms of type (4) are corruptions (apabhramsa) of (3), a ˙´ conclusion compatible with this is that for those persons who know both types and are members of an élite stratum, the sist as: ´ 2a. Terms of type (3) directly signify meanings. 2b. Terms of type (4) indirectly signify meanings, through the intermediary of type (3).(FN65) 3. The fact remains that there are persons who normally communicate with terms of type (4). Accordingly, under 2, one has to assume further that the corruption which gave rise to (4) led to institutionalized terms that directly signify meanings at least for such speakers. Nevertheless, there are still two possibilities open: 3a. Type (4) now simply is part of usage and directly signifies, even for sist as. ´ 3b. Though institutionalized, type (4) is, by virtue of its origin, still considered to signify only erroneously. 4. These options are of import for considering whether or not both types of items bear sakti, which in turn has to do with what one defines as sadhu. ´ - dhu consists by definition in 4a. If both types (3) and (4) bear sakti, and being sa ´ bearing sakti, then the distinction between sadhusabda and apasabda is eliminated. ´ ´ ´ This is something neither grammarians nor others find desirable. 4b. Under 3b, it is possible not only to maintain that being sadhu consists by definition in bearing sakti but also still to maintain the distinction in question, since ´ items of type (4) do not truly bear sakti because they still are considered to signify ´ through error. 5. While maintaining 3a, the distinction between types (3) and (4) can still be maintained, if being sadhu (sadhutva) is defined in a different manner: 5a. Sadhutva is a property of that which can be explained according to the procedures of an authoritative grammar like Panini’s. 5b. Sadhutva is a property of that which is appropriate to the production of merit; that is, the use of a sadhu term entails merit which the use of an equivalent apasabda ´ does not. 4.1. Patañjali brings in (3) and (4) several times during discussions in the Paspasa. ´Thus, he notes that teaching correct linguistic units is briefer than teaching incorrect ones, since for each correct linguistic unit there are many incorrect ones. (3) and (4) - are cited as examples of this situation.(FN66) Now, in Paspasa vt. 6, Katyayana ´remarks that if there is merit in the knowledge of correct linguistic units there is also demerit (jñane dharma iti cet tathadharmah). Commenting on this, Patañjali makes two points. First, demerit obtains for one who knows correct linguistic units because such a person also knows incorrect ones. That is, even s t as, who use sadhu terms, are ´is presumed at least to know apas ´abda terms for everyday interaction. Further, because there are many incorrect terms for each correct one, greater demerit obtains.(FN67) Patañjali also makes the well-known and important observation concerning such terms: given that there is the same comprehension of a meaning through a correct linguistic unit and an incorrect one, the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended for merit: the meaning in question should be expressed by means of a correct term, not an incorrect one.(FN68) It is noteworthy that Patañjali not only contrasts correct and incorrect linguistic units using the respective terms sabda and apasabda but that when speaking of one single ´ ´ item like go as opposed to the group of items (4), he characterizes the latter as apabhrams a with respect to the former. That is, these are not merely treated as ˙´ incorrect speech elements contrasted with correct ones, they are also considered somehow to be corruptions with respect to the correct speech items. Patañjali thus - takes a stand on the questions A and B. Since items of the type gavi (FN69) are

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considered to be corruptions, it follows that only the correct linguistic units are to be considered eternal, so that only these bear an eternal relation with meanings.(FN70) - In addition, both Patañjali and Katyayana indicate—though not directly in connection with the issue of sabda versus apasabda—how one might consider at least some ´ ´ - ´ apasabdas to have arisen. In Sivasutra vt. 1, Katyayana gives several reasons why l ´ - nini’s aksarasamamnaya despite its restricted occurrence. One of must be taught in Pa these is to account for the citation of terms that result from incapacity. To illustrate, Patañjali gives the example l taka. Someone is named rtaka, so that this term is to be used when referring to him. Say some brahmana woman has used l taka instead and has done this out of incapacity, because she is unable to pronounce r. This is an error, so that l taka as pronounced by the woman is a corruption of rtaka. On the other hand, if someone else says, “the brahmana woman says l taka,” that person is quoting, so that he is not himself using an incorrect form.(FN71) - Further, since Patañjali states explicitly and Katyayana implicitly assumes that one who knows correct speech terms also knows their incorrect counterparts, question C is answered at least in part: at the time that both types of terms were in use, the sist as who used sadhusabdas also could use and understand apasabdas. ´ ´ ´ - bhasya, but all the issues The last question noted (D) is not dealt with in the Maha are considered elsewhere. - -˙ 4.2. Let us begin with Mi mamsakas and Naiyayikas. 4.2.1. As a purvapaksa, Jaimini states that there cannot be any settled division with respect to linguistic items such that only items of the type (3) go or of the type (4) - gavi , gon-, gota , gopotalika , etc., should be used, because there is no teaching i concerning the situation where such usage would arise.(FN72) That is, there is no teaching—such as Panini’s grammar—whose authority is accepted in this sphere, ´ whereby one could decide the issue. Sabara’s arguments are as follows. The question at issue is: are (3) and (4) equally means of knowledge with respect to the object possessed of a dewlap and so on? In other words, should one consider go to signify the object in question as the single term with unbroken tradition of usage and then consider the other terms (4) corruptions, or are all the terms to be considered equally without beginning?(FN73) The immediate answer is that all should be considered to signify the object in question without beginning. The reason given is that the meaning in question is understood from (4) and that there was similarly a relation between them and this meaning a hundred years ago, earlier than that, and earlier still, so that (4) and their relation with this meaning has no beginning. Moreover, it has already been established that there is no creator of a relation between words and their meanings, this being a fixed eternal relation.(FN74) Consequently, both (3) and (4) are to be considered sadhu in the sense that they bring about (sa dhayanti) the comprehension of the same meaning and both may be used in speaking. (3) and (4) thus have the status of synonyms, much like hasta, kara, pani ‘hand’.(FN75) Such terms are uttered for a direct purpose—to convey a particular meaning—not for some as yet unseen result that is to be brought about, and there is no teaching that instructs one to pronounce them for such a purpose. Therefore, it cannot be established that one term is sadhu and the others are asadhu.(FN76) ´ 4.2.2. Jaimini and Sabara refute the purvapaksa and establish a siddhanta on the basis of several arguments. A liguistic item can be such that an error has a part in it, since it is produced through articulatory effort.(FN77) It is thus possible to discriminate between (3) and (4) by considering the latter to result from errors in attempting to produce (3). A person may intend to jump on to dry land yet fall in the mud, to touch water once or once to spit out water with which he has rinsed his mouth, yet

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accidentally do this twice. In the same way, (4) can have come into use due to error and need not be part of an unbroken tradition of usage.(FN78) It is also contrary to principle that, unless otherwise definitively established, one assume more than one term for a single meaning.(FN79) Moreover, the choice is not arbitrary, since there is an authority concerning such usage that allows one to make a decision: the special authority of the learned.(FN80) A particular term that such authoritative persons teach alone as correct should be understood to be correct.(FN81) Further, people understand the meaning in question from (4) due to the similarity of these terms to (3), so that (4) do not have the capacity that (3) has to signify the same object in question.(FN82) Apabhram s a terms like (4) play a role in the ˙ ´ understanding of a meaning by bringing to light the capacity which properly belongs to ´ their origins alone.(FN83) S abara describes what is at play as follows. Due to - incapacity, someone pronounces gavi when he wishes to pronounce a form of the term go, such as gauh. Someone else understands that this person means to refer to an animal with a dewlap and so on, and that to this end he wants to pronounce gauh but - - instead pronounces gavi . Thus learning from this situation, others also say gavi when what they wish to refer to is the same animal. Thereby, this animal is understood from - - gavi , etc. For gavi and so on are similar to go.(FN84) Finally, Jaimini likens this to the situation where someone uses a form with a certain ending that is not appropriate, yet one understands what that person intends to say, thus recalling the form with the appropriate ending.(FN85) For example, someone might say asmakair agacchami “I am ´ coming from Asmaka,” using an instrumental instead of an ablative form. The ´ instrumental form asmakaih is heard. However, in accordance with what is intended, ´ the appropriate form asmakebhyah is recalled, and from this the meaning “from ´ - Asmaka” is understood. Similarly, when one hears ga vi and so on, one has a ´ recollection of go, and from this one understands the animal with a dewlap, and so on.(FN86) 4.2.3. The situation where a hearer interprets an incorrect form in the way noted can thus be treated as the first step in establishing for later generations that items of type (4) directly signify, without an intermediate step of recalling an equivalent of type (3). Such usage is then traced back to accidents in conversations where one speaker makes a mistake, another knows what that person intends to say, concludes that he meant to use a particular term and himself understands the intended meaning from that term. Still other persons assume that the form which was accidentally used actually directly signifies the meaning in question. This scenario is envisaged by others also. ´- - Commenting on Prabhakara’s Brhati to JS 1.3.8.29,(FN87) Salikanatha says that what Prabhakara intends to convey is the following. A person A, wishing to utter the - word go, utters gavi instead, due to a fault in his articulating speech organs or to not being mindful or a similar reason. Through context, the adult B with whom A is talking understands what A intends to say, so that he understands the object signified by go and continues his conversation with A. The conversation is witnessed by two other people, who have not acquired the understanding that go is related as signifier to the object in question. These two mistakenly determine that B had directly understood this - meaning from gavi and not through the intermediary of go. They therefore mistakenly - vi is itself a signifier, and in this conviction they continue to use this conclude that ga term in their conversations with others. Following their usage, other children then - converse using gavi , since they had not acquired the knowledge associating any other - word with the object in question. In this way, the use of gavi is established as having a particular beginning.(FN88) 4.2.4. Similar considerations are found later also, as in the Tattvacintamani, where Gangesa argues against assuming that apabhramsa terms as much as samskrta terms ˙ ´ ˙´ ˙

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directly signify. Having concluded that only a sam skr ta term bears the signifying ˙ relation (sakti), which is secondarily transferred to apabhramsa terms, Gangesa has an ´ ˙´ ˙ ´ opponent object: how can mlecchas and others of their kind, who do not know samskrta terms, impose the sakti of such terms on other terms? This is answered by ˙ ´ recounting how one considers the erroneous attribution of sakti to apabhramsa terms ´ ˙´ in times long past.(FN89) Due to neglect, some person A, instead of using go as he - should, uses gavi . A does this while conversing with B, who already has learned (vyutpannah) the signifying relation between go and a cow. B understands what A intends, so that he concludes that the latter meant to use go, and he understands the meaning ‘cow’ from this correct term, thus carrying out his conversation with A. There is also a bystander, a child who wants to learn (vyutpitsuh) the relation between the - word and the meaning in question. He considers that B has understood ‘cow’ from gavi - alone, so that he acquires the understanding of gavi as bearing the signifying relation with a cow (gosaktatvena). Moreover, this individual then serves as a model for others ´ - to learn that gavi is so related to a cow. In this way, it is established erroneously that apabhramsas have direct signifying relations with meanings.(FN90) ˙´ 4.3. It is thus admitted that at some stage apabhramsa terms also directly signify ˙´ meanings. Now, even if one insists that the signifying relation that holds between terms - of type (4) gavi , etc., is ultimately due to an error, the fact remains that this relation - does hold. At the stage where gavi and such do signify, persons who use such terms and do not know their sam skr ta equivalents—indeed do not know Sanskrit at ˙ all—cannot be said to understand a meaning through recollecting a samskrta term. ˙ - Moreover, at this stage there can no longer be any question of error. Later Panini yas - yikas and Mi mamsakas. - -˙ set out such arguments in opposition to Naiya 4.3.1. Kaundabhatta presents the following arguments.(FN91) Under the assumption that sakti consists in a term’s bringing a meaning to mind (bodhakatvam),(FN92) it is ´ - possible to say that vernacular terms like gavi also have sakti, because these too ´ convey meanings. Since there is thus no difference between items of types (3) and (4) in that both have this property, the latter also can be considered to be sadhu, contrary to the accepted view.(FN93) - - The answer Naiyayikas and others have to this objection is given in the karika - dhur anumanena vacakah kaiscid isyate.... “Some consider it appropriate that an asa ´ asadhu term convey(FN94) a meaning by calling to mind(FN95) a sadhu term.”(FN96) - rikas from the Vakyapadi ya are cited in support of this position. In addition, four ka According to these verses, an apabhramsa item that is used where a sadhu term is ˙´ to be used serves as a means whereby a given meaning is expressed, but not directly: it is separated from the apabhramsa term by the sadhu term. Apabhramsa terms thus ˙´ ˙´ are causes for the understanding of meanings to arise through the intermediary of recalling sadhu terms; they bring the meaning of a correct term to one’s understanding by apparently identifying with it.(FN97) An analogy is drawn with how adults understand a baby. A child learning to say amba amba ‘mommy, mommy’(FN98) makes a mistake in speaking and might say something indistinct, like bambamba.(FN99) Those who know the proper linguistic units, however, determine the meaning meant once the distinct form has been recalled. Apabhrams a terms, ˙´ moreover, are not accepted, in teaching that continues tradition,(FN100) by authoritative persons who serve as models, in the way that synonyms are accepted.(FN101) Of course, actual usage is the main source for concluding that a given term has the capacity to signify a certain meaning and this is the same for both types of terms. Kaun d abhat t a therefore goes on to summarize reasons for considering that apabhramsa terms do not directly signify meanings, as follows. First, if terms of both ˙´

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types (3) and (4) were considered directly to signify, one would have to conclude that all of them possess the capacity to signify, which involves prolixity. Moreover, they cannot be considered synonyms in the same way that sadhu terms with the same meaning are said to be synonymous. The latter occur as synonyms in all speech - areas, but terms like gavi , gon-, and so on are restricted in their distribution, each used i - -˙ in a different area. Accordingly, Naiyayikas and Mi mamsakas conclude that being a sadhu item consists in having the capacity directly to signify.(FN102) Kaundabhat ta then notes that in the second half of the verse cited above—that is, - ´ vacakatva vis es e va niyamah pun yapa payoh —Bhat t oji states his own view. The following is said to be the intention of this passage. If apabhramsa terms did not have ˙´ the capacity to signify, there would not be any verbal cognition from them at all. Nor does such a cognition arise from recollecting the associated sa dhu term, since speakers of a lower stratum, pamaras, who do not know sadhu terms, also understand - dhu terms. Moreover, such meanings from apabhram s a terms and not from sa ˙ ´ understanding does not arise due to erroneous assignment of signifying capacity, since no factor enters into play that would cancel what could be the false assumption that apabhramsa terms convey meaning, so that the knowledge that such terms directly ˙´ convey meanings is not falsely acquired and the knowledge that arises from hearing the terms also is not an error.(FN103) To buttress this position with what is said by - earlier authority, two more karikas from the Vakyapadi ya are invoked. As interpreted by Kaundabhatta and his commentators, the first verse says the following. Apabhramsa ˙´ terms acquired the status of being established as everyday usage due to a continuous tradition of speaking among faulty speakers.(FN104) Among such speakers, a sadhu term does not signify.(FN105) Of course, this means that being sadhu cannot be considered equivalent to being - dhu is said to consist in lending itself to the a meaning signifier. Hence, being sa production of merit, and being asadhu is said to consist in lending itself to the - - production of demerit. The last part of karika 38 of the Vaiyakaranasiddhantakarika thus states that a restriction is provided by the grammar with respect to merit and demerit.(FN106) - ´ 4.3.2. Nagesa too argues strongly that sakti resides not only in sadhu terms but ´ also in apabhramsa terms, because verbal exchange, which is the main source for ˙´ learning the relation between speech units and meanings, is the same for both.(FN107) - That is, whether a form like gauh or gavi is used, one learns from usage that each is related as signifier to a cow. - ´ In addition, Nagesa also argues against those who maintain that a meaning is understood from an apabhram s a term through recollecting a related sa dhu ˙ ´ term,(FN108) and he too has his opponents cite VP 1.177ab and 179 (see note 101) in support of this position.(FN109) Anumanena in VP 1.177ab signifies a type of knowledge, namely remembering, so that the verse speaks of a recollection whose objects are sadhu terms. Those who know sadhu terms have such a knowledge of these from an apabhramsa because the latter can recall the former due to its similarity ˙´ with it, since it has such a sadhu term as its source. The first arguments advanced against this view concern people who know both sadhu and apabhramsa usage. To begin with, such people are known to understand ˙´ what apabhrams terms signify even without recalling corresponding sadhu terms. ˙ ´a There are also some who may not know particular sadhu terms for certain meanings. Yet they still understand what is meant by the apabhramsa terms. The position being ˙´ maintained would entail the unjustifiable consequence that those who do not know sadhu terms signifying given meanings could have no understanding of those meanings from the apabhramsa terms.(FN110) One could, to be sure, say that upon hearing an ˙´

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apabhramsa term for which they do not know a sadhu equivalent, such persons would ˙´ assume that there must be some such term, so that they too understand a meaning only indirectly through such recollection.(FN111) This is not acceptable. The recollection of a sadhu term from an apabhramsa cannot be considered truly to bring ˙´ a meaning to mind. For a verbal cognition to take place appropriately, one must perceive directly a signifying element characterized by a particular sequence of sounds that defines the item in question as signifier of a given meaning. This is not true of anything remembered, which is not perceived as actually uttered at the moment.(FN112) Nor does one have a recollection so vague that the entity signified by the apabhram s a item in question could be considered as referred to by a ˙ ´ - pronoun.(FN113) For example, if someone says gagari m anaya “bring a pot,” one does not understand the meaning of gagari m(FN114) by recollecting tam (‘it’ [fem. acc.]). Finally, and most generally, it is known that only an actually uttered term has the property of producing a verbal knowledge, so that it is not possible for such a knowledge to arise from a recalled sadhu term that is not actually uttered.(FN115) - ´ Nagesa next takes up arguments which invoke error in connection with persons who know only apabhramsa usage. The claim is advanced that pamaras use a word like ˙´ - instead of the sadhu word ghat a ‘pot’ and understand this meaning from it. gagari However, this results from a continuous error. Thus, one accounts for an erroneous attribution of sakti to gagari , although one does not learn a true sakti for this term. At ´ ´ some time, someone mistakenly used gagari instead of ghat a, and this error continued up to the present. This is unacceptable. Mistaking one term for another requires some similarity. The sakti that is said to reside in a term like ghata is learned not only with ´ respect to an object qualified by the generic property of being a pot but also associated with a distinct sequence of sounds. One can see no property common to gagari and ghat a, so that claiming an error that continues to the present cannot be justified.(FN116) This problem is circumvented in the manner outlined earlier (§§4.2.1-4). As before, moreover, here too the Vakyapadi ya (1.177ab) is invoked.(FN117) This too is refuted on the grounds that it is not possible to decide on the basis of given terms that certain ones are apabhramsas relative to particular samskrta terms simply on the basis of ˙´ ˙ what each signifies. Nor is it appropriate to say that those are samskrta terms which ˙ sist as acknowledge to occur universally, as opposed to apabhramsas, which have ´ ˙´ restricted dialect distribution, since it is accepted that sist a usage also has dialect ´ distribution: savati is used as a verb meaning ‘go’ in the Kamboja country but in the ´ Arya country only the derivate sava- ‘corpse’ is used. Accordingly, apabhramsas have ´ ˙´ sakti.(FN118) ´ - ´ What is more, Nagesa finally notes, it is because of this that one sees that when - dras, and children have a doubt concerning the meaning of a sadhu term women, su ´ used, they determine what is meant through the apabhramsa.(FN119) ˙´ - ´ Further, Nagesa conceives of the property of being sadhu (sadhutva) in the same way as Kaund abhat t a (§4.3.1): this is a particular generic property, revealed by grammar, that resides in a speech unit qualified by a particular meaning and defines - such a unit’s having the capacity to produce merit.(FN120) The Paramalaghumañjusa also considers that sadhutva can consist simply in being what is to be explained by - nini’s grammar.(FN121) Pa 4.4. As has been shown, the Vakyapadi ya is invoked in the course of arguments supporting two positions: that apasabdas/apabhramsas signify only indirectly, through ´ ˙´ the intermediary of recollected sadhusabdas, and that both equally signify. Let us now ´ consider more closely VP 1.175-83 and 27 together with the Vrtti. - 4.4.1. The first two of these karikas state what authorities consider appropriate (icchanti ‘desire, wish’) to call an apabhramsa: a linguistic unit, such as gon-, that is ˙´ i

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devoid of the purification endowed by proper grammatical formation, uttered when one wishes to use, for example, gauh. Authorities consider such an item an apabhramsa ˙´ under particular circumstances: when it is linked to a particular meaning. Terms like asva and gon- are treated as apabhramsas if they are used in particular meaning: asva i ˙´ ‘horse’ instead of asva, and gon- ‘cow’ instead of go. Such items are sadhu terms, ´ i however, when used in another sphere, that is, in other meanings. In all such cases, being sa dhu is determined by a difference in the meaning that conditions usage.(FN122) For example, gon- used with reference to a receptacle that holds a i certain amount of grain, etc., and asva referring to someone who does not have money (a-sva) are sadhu.(FN123) In addition, gon- and asva can be sadhu terms used i also with reference to a cow and a horse, for a reason other than what usually determines the use of these terms for such animals: a cow is likened to a goni because it has a lot of milk, so that it shares a property—holding a large amount—with the receptacle called gon-, and a horse is spoken of as lacking money.(FN124) i - VP 1.175 speaks of terms considered to be apabhramsa. Moreover, a term like gavi ˙´ is an apabhramsa in that it is used when a speaker intends to say gauh. That is, this ˙´ - is viewed as a corruption, and the Vrtti remarks that apabhramsas like gavi are used ˙´ due to a speaker’s incapacity, inattention, or similar cause. Further, these corruptions have sources, namely the sadhusabdas which a speaker intends to use in the first ´ place. The Vrtti on VP 1.175 not only notes this but also cites the author of the Sangraha, who says that any apabhramsa has a correct linguistic unit as a source. ˙ ˙´ Moreover, ultimately, there is no independent apabhrams lacking such a source ˙ ´a (aprakrtih ): every apabhram s a has a sa dhu term for its source. It is, of course, ˙´ undeniable that not every use of apabhram s terms is due to error, since some ˙ ´a - speakers simply use gavi and so on as normal everyday terms. This is explained as a generalization. Due to their becoming well known, some apabhramsas achieve the ˙´ status of being normal everyday terms and thereby gain independence.(FN125) - 4.4.2. Once apasabdas like gavi are considered ultimately to be corruptions of ´ sadhu terms, with which they coexist in a setting where speakers of the accepted norm must interact with others who use apas ´abdas normally, two views immediately are possible. First, one may refuse to grant status to apabhramsas, so that for sist as a ˙´ ´ translation situation obtains: they interact with those who use apabhramsas normally ˙´ but they understand in terms of their own usage—something akin to a “pidgin.” Alternatively, they may accept a true diglossic status, using the accepted norm among themselves and interacting with others in their own vernacular. Of course, this is a question of degree, and if the speakers of the vernacular do not also control the model speech at least to some extent the s t as themselves actually must interact in the ´is vernacular. VP 1.177 operates with the model in which apabhramsas signify indirectly. They ˙´ serve to make meanings understood, but only by bringing to mind sadhu terms, with which they are seemingly identified; only in this manner do they serve to bring to light the meanings of such terms.(FN126) The Vrtti brings out how this indirect signification takes place by invoking the parallel of gestures like constricting one’s eyes.(FN127) Apabhramsas used in the sphere of sadhu terms make a meaning understood through ˙´ the intermediary channel of sadhu terms, just as gestures such as constricting the eyes convey meanings through people’s being acquainted with conventions, so that the gestures themselves seem to take on the form of these conventions and are well established as such.(FN128) Although these gestures appear to convey meanings directly, this is only because conventions have been set such that they are understood to convey what certain utterances signify; the utterances which describe what these gestures will convey by convention are directly connected with the meaning, and it is

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only because one identifies the gestures and the conventional utterances that they seem to convey meaning directly.(FN129) Similarly, apabhrams ˙ ´as do not directly convey meanings. They only appear to do so because they are identified with the true direct signifiers. The Vrtti notes explicitly that VP 1.177 is stated in order to say that apabhramsas do not have direct signification.(FN130) ˙´ 4.4.3. Although apasabdas might be considered corruptions of sadhusabdas, they ´ ´ nevertheless do indeed signify meanings, even should one insist that they do so - indirectly. Therefore, the question comes up: why are apabhramsas like gavi and so ˙´ on not recognized as synonyms of sadhusabdas like go? In this context, the behavior ´ is invoked of authoritative persons referred to as sist a, who serve as models for ´ speech and other modes of behavior. In connection with such issues, which depend on lore traditionally handed down, no governing cause is stated other than the - established custom of how these sist as behave. If gavi and so on were indeed merely ´ alternative expressions to go and so on, s t as like Panini would allow them also to ´is be made known by rules of their grammars—that is, would allow for their explanation by such rules—and they would use them.(FN131) They do neither. Further, a sadhu term is one which is used for a meaning, which is what prompts the use of words, on the assumption that it directly signifies such a meaning (pratyaksapaksena), and a meaning which directly prompts the use of words is conveyed by sadhu terms.(FN132) Hence, Bhartrhari says what he does in VP 1.178.(FN133) - 4.4.4. The next three ka rika s concern how apabhram s as originate and are ˙ ´ propagated to the point where they attain full status among certain speakers. The first situation is the familiar one. A child learning to talk makes mistakes because it does not yet have the full capacity of all its articulatory organs; even though it exerts itself to speak clearly in the desire to produce the correct word it has been told, it produces an indistinct sound. Adults listening to what the child is saying, on the other hand, determine the distinct word that is at the source of the indistinct sound made by the child and consider only that to be connected with a meaning, not its corruption produced by the child. Similarly, some meaning is expressed by an apabhramsa which ˙´ - dhu term should be used, but this is not directly expressed. It is is used when a sa separated from the apabhramsa by the sadhu term.(FN134) ˙´ The Vrtti here speaks of speech or language which has become mixed. In this language, apasabdas are used in the sphere of sadhu terms, but sist as, who know ´ ´ - dhu terms through them, and it is only through these sadhu grammar, understand sa terms that they consider the meaning as being expressed. An asadhu term is thus nothing more than a means of knowing other terms, just as smoke is a means of knowing fire.(FN135) There are others, however, for whom the reverse holds, as is stated in VP 1.181, the Vrtti on which says the following. Apabhramsas, being used repeatedly by women, ˙´ - dras, ca n d a las and such, reached the status of being fixed among negligent su ´ speakers, so that conversation using them became more commonly established among such speakers. Moreover, now when a doubt comes up consequent on someone’s use of a sadhu term, one determines what is meant by means of the apabhramsa of that ˙´ - dhu term to be the direct signifier and term. Further, people thus consider only the asa they set the sadhu term on the side of what serves to recall another term.(FN136) - 4.4.5. The final karikas of the first kanda deal with three positions. The first of these - verses begins with a transition from what was said in the previous karika. It speaks of this divine speech which has been defiled(FN137) by incapable speakers and goes on to note the contrary thinking on this issue of those who view speech as not being eternal (anityadarsinam).(FN138) There are thus far two positions. A third position is ´ - brought up in the second karika. Under this view, there is a continuous unbroken

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stream of both sorts of speech units—sadhusabda and apasabda—so that there is no ´ ´ question of one deriving from the other. Nevertheless, these come down distinguished from each other, so that if a certain term is used when one means to express a meaning through another that term does not signify that meaning.(FN139) The Vrtti on VP 1.182 begins by recounting what is known from accepted tradition. In the beginning, the speech of self-luminous men was as free from any apabhramsas ˙´ as it was from falsehood and such. Over time, however, due to its being associated with the memory of continuous repetition of earlier faults, speech went on getting mixed with apabhramsas to the point where this reached the state of being the norm, ˙´ so that for speakers of this time such speech was treated as original, not a deviation from a norm.(FN140) This is one extreme view. Others go to another extreme. They maintain that there is no continuum of eternal sa dhu speech forms (anityavadinah)(FN141) and accordingly do not accept that sadhu terms are sources of - dhu speech is established purely by convention, just merit. These people say that sa as rules are established in contests between wrestlers, and that the set of sadhu terms is derived from the vernacular original in that it has its source in that.(FN142) Moreover, this set of sadhu forms is considered a modification that is established later,(FN143) and is determined by confused men(FN144) according to accent, grammatical formation, and such.(FN145) Finally, the Vrtti considers another position, that both types of speech forms equally come down in an unbroken tradition. Even those for whom there is no primal age or a divine speech which was unmixed with apasabdas accept an unbroken tradition, ´ handed down by the sist as, establishing a difference between sadhu and asadhu ´ terms, just as they accept such a tradition, similarly handed down, establishing that some women may be approached and others not. Since this distinction is thus set, - whether a well-established asadhu item like gavi or one which, like asva, is a mistake and not well established, is used when one wishes to signify something using another particular term—namely go or asva—both fail to signify in and of themselves. Whether ´ a meaning is understood through the intermediary of a sadhu term or, as with conventional gestures such as constricting one’s eyes, there is an immediate understanding of a meaning for people who have become confused by repeated use of asadhu terms, what comes about is an understanding but nothing more.(FN146) - This is understandable from the point of view of a Panini ya, for whom the grammar serves to establish a restriction such that in particular circumstances one who can should express himself using sadhu terms only. To be sure, there are and may well - dhu terms also, but for this person they do not signify if a always have been asa speaker with whom he is engaged in conversation intends to communicate in the high speech. Note, moreover, that, in consonance with the entire tradition that the Vakyapadi ya represents, the Vr tti does not countenance still another view, which possibly could also be entertained under the thesis that both sadhu and asadhu terms come down in an unbroken continuum. This is that someone wishing to speak in the - vernacular and accordingly to use a term like gavi or gon-, might instead mistakenly i use a term like gauh.(FN147) For, even if apas abdas are not considered to be ´ deviants of sadhusabdas and are granted equal antiquity, they are not granted equal ´ status. There is always an assumption that, if a mistake in usage takes place, it consists in using an apas ´abda instead of an intended sabda. This is maintained not ´ - -˙ just by grammarians but also by Mi mamsakas; see §4.2.2. This is also understandable - in terms of how these usages coexisted. At least from the eras of Katyayana and Patañjali, correct Sanskrit usage coexisted with vernacular usage, viewed as relatively incorrect, and Bhartrhari considers this distinction to be carried on by sist as. When ´ speaking vernaculars to contemporaries, then, such speakers would hardly be viewed

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as using Sanskritic forms by mistake. Nor was a sist a’s use of apasabdas in informal ´ ´ contexts viewed as damning. On the contrary, it is in the context where chaste usage is absolutely required—especially in ritual—that lapses into vernacular are censured. By ending the first kanda in the way he does, Bhartrhari nicely rounds things out. - For he thus harkens back to a karika (VP 1.27) which immediately follows his summary of what will be dealt with (see §3.2, with notes 18, 19). The Vrtti on VP 1.27 draws a parallel between the established distinction of sadhu and asadhu usage, which comes down in an unbroken tradition, and other such established traditions. These concern: other means of achieving merit, which are positively enjoined; practices like killing living beings, telling lies, and stealing, which are forbidden; and acts like hiccuping, laughing, and scratching, which are neither enjoined nor forbidden. These all come down in unbroken traditions and are not subject to doubt.(FN148) In a comparable manner, VP 1.158 reiterates that Panini’s grammar is a smrti, a work which hands down a memorialized tradition, that is determined by the uninterrupted - tradition of usage by sist as.(FN149) The Vrtti on this karika again draws a parallel with ´ the distinctions carried on in other smrtis—between what may be eaten or not eaten ´ and so forth—and grammatical tradition. Sist as do not transgress the way of proper behavior that is set forth in these other traditions, and the grammar is a similar smrti, whose domain is what speech should and should not be used.(FN150) 4.4.6. As was noted earlier (see §4.3.1, with note 96), VP 3.30 also plays an important role in discussions concerning sadhu and asadhu items. What the first half of this verse says accords with what was said in VP 1.180cd (§4.4.4, with note 134). The second half, on the other hand, assumes that sadhusabdas and apasabdas do not ´ ´ differ in that both signify, so that a restriction is stated with respect to merit and demerit: only the use of sadhusabdas gains one merit. This is reconcilable with the ´ position that apabhramsa terms have come to gain established status over time, as ˙´ portrayed in VP 1.181, except that here the understanding of meaning directly from an apasabda is not restricted to those speakers that are considered incapable. This is ´ also reconcilable with the third view treated at the end of the first kanda, such that sabdas and apas ´ ´abdas are both considered to have come down in a continuous stream. 4.4.7. To summarize what can be said on the basis of the Vakyapadi ya passages considered here: Bhartr hari recognizes, as did his predecessors, that both sadhusabdas and apasabdas are used and that the latter predominate. He also takes ´ ´ three possibilities into consideration concerning their relative status: Apasabdas are accounted for as corruptions (apabhramsa) of sadhusabdas, and ´ ˙´ ´ at one primeval time there was a divine speech unsullied by such impurities. Both apasabdas and sadhusabdas have existed as far back as one can go, and ´ ´ there is no use insisting that the former derive from the latter through some sort of error. What people call apasabdas are actually part of the natural speech of people, ´ without the adornment of grammar, and sadhusabdas have arisen from them via ´ grammatical analysis. Bhartrhari also has to admit, as did Patañjali, that even s t as can understand ´is meanings from apasabdas as well as sadhusabdas. That is, although there was among ´ ´ s is t as an accepted high speech, they also used vernaculars in their everyday ´ encounters. Here too, however, there are different approaches: There is, to begin with, what we may call the translation thesis. A s is t a ´ considers the apasabda a corruption and understands a meaning only indirectly, ´ by recalling a sadhusabda that is linked directly as signifier with the intended ´ meaning. For those who are not part of the s t a tradition, it is not only true that ´is

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meaning is understood directly from what sist as call apasabdas, it is also true ´ ´ that even if they can communicate with sist as, in case of doubt they understand ´ through their apas abda, just as the s is t a may understand through the ´ ´ - dhusabda. intermediary of sa ´ A sist a might have to admit that he can indeed understand a meaning directly ´ from an apasabda, even if this is a corruption and all the more so if it has as ´ unending a tradition of usage as does any sadhusabda, but that is all he will ´ admit. He will not go so far as to grant that the apasabda actually signifies in ´ the same manner as does a sadhusabda.(FN151) ´ - - 4.5. Helaraja’s comments on VP 3.30 reflect closely what is said in the karikas and Vr tti discussed in §4.4. He begins with what is, in effect, a paraphrase of VP 1.182(FN152) and notes that for learned persons(FN153) speech that has become defiled signifies not directly, as a corrupt speech, but only once it has had its original undefiled form made known. He specifies that the learned do not determine a meaning directly from an apasabda, so that for them there is no relation between apasabdas ´ ´ - raja then alludes to the tradition mentioned in the Vrtti on and meaning.(FN154) Hela VP 1.182 concerning the primeval time when speech was devoid of apabhramsas and ˙´ to the Sangraha’s statement that any apabhramsa has a correct linguistic unit as its ˙ ˙´ source, while emphasizing that apabhramsas do not signify, that they only bring to ˙´ mind a sadhu term due to similarity, and that it is from sadhu terms that meaning comprehension results.(FN155) He immediately goes on, however, to speak of what prevails nowadays: impurities of speech have gained general currency in the same manner as falsehood and such, due to the prevailing lack of merit, so that meaning is indeed directly understood from apas ´abda without the intervention of sadhu terms. Although this is so, one concludes that only sadhu terms are means of attaining merit, on the authority of teachings that say one should not use mleccha speech—apasabdas—that one should speak only using sadhu terms. Accordingly, the ´ grammar follows suit and teaches these alone.(FN156) Further, since it is accepted that a diversity of entities is preceded by a unity and it is also true that there is a multiplicity of human views because they are not restricted, one concludes that a group - of apasabdas like gavi , gon-, and so on, has a single sadhusabda (go) for a source ´ i ´ and not vice versa.(FN157) Thus, an apasabda has as its source a sadhusabda, which ´ ´ is the object of knowledge.(FN158) In addition, as the ultimate stage of knowledge is identical with the undifferentiated Brahman,(FN159) so the stage of the sadhusabda is ´ the stage of knowledge, and as differentiation in the ultimate knowledge is false (vitathah ‘contrary to fact’), so is the apabhram sa stage of speech that consists in ˙´ impurities false in contrast to the true form of speech that lacks these impurities. Accordingly, there is a difference in conception (vikalpah) that depends on whether one is considering the ultimate or something else.(FN160) - - - - Helara ja then goes on to consider the Maha bha s ya’s evam ihapi sama na ya m - ´ arthagatau s abdena ca pas abdena ca (see 4.1), concerning which he says the ´ following. This is stated only with respect to the stage of speech characterized as ignorance. Since Patañjali states arthagatau (“there being a comprehension of a meaning”),(FN161) the possibility that he might be saying that apas ´abdas signify is not - granted respect.(FN162) What is meant, says Helaraja, is the following. Granted, to be sure, in the stage of speech characterized as ignorance, people communicate for the most part with apasabda, so that there may well be just a comprehension of meaning ´ - through both sabda and apasabda. According to Helaraja, then, it is considered that ´ ´ Patañjali’s statement, of course, shows he concedes that one understands a meaning through both, but not that an apasabda is thereby on a par with a sadhusabda as a ´ ´ - signifier. However, Helara ja continues, because such usage is generally current,

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Bhartrhari says it does not make a difference between sabda and apasabda so far as ´ ´ concerns comprehension of meaning, and the grammar establishes a restriction concerning merit and sin.(FN163) - 4.6. Houben emphasizes VP 3.3.30 and the associated karikas from the first kanda - in arguing that Helaraja has not understood Bhartrhari’s position, that the author of the Vrtti need not represent what Bhartrhari thought, and that those who have followed these commentators are mistaken. Thus, arguing against Virendra Sharma, Houben says (p. 25): - ´ Sharma notes that Kaunda Bhat ta and Nagesa hold corrupt forms to be directly expressive, and say that it is the view of the grammarians. Sharma argues that this would be an alteration of the traditional view of the grammarians - ´ (1977:239-249). In my view, however, Kaunda Bhatta and Nagesa agree on this - rika 30), while it is point with both Bhartrhari and Patañjali (cf. discussion of ka - Hela ra ja who (following the ancient Vr tti) deviates from the traditional grammarian’s view. The discussion of VP 3.3.30 to which Houben refers actually is fairly short, approximately five pages (pp. 237-42). 4.6.1. Concerning VP 3.3.30cd, in particular, Houben says (p. 238): “The second - line of karika 30 of our chapter, devoted to the other view, tells us two things: (1) there is no difference between correct and incorrect words in being significative or expressive of a meaning; (2) there is a restriction with regard to merit and demerit.” He goes on to note that the same points are made in VP 1.27, then remarks (p. 239): “The point that there is no difference between correct and incorrect word in being significative, is - moreover elaborated in karikas 181-183.” Houben’s position is that one should not - accept the interpretation of the karikas found in the Vrtti (p. 239): - rikas are interpreted on the basis of the ancient Vrtti. However, Usually, these ka - on the basis of the karikas in their own context one has to arrive at different conclusions, conclusions which are moreover in perfect accord with some relevant remarks by the author of the MBhD. This passage is therefore one of the reasons to keep what is said in the Vrtti strictly separate from what is said - in the ka rika s, in whichever way one decides the authorship of these two works.(FN164) Houben nevertheless admits that to him parts of VP 1.182-83 (see notes 138-39) are not absolutely clear and remarks (p. 239): “What is not directly clear from the Sanskrit, is which opposite opinion is being referred to in 182cd. Nor is the exact meaning of ubhayesam and avicchedad clear.”(FN165) There is much in Houben’s discussion that I find less than acceptable. Let me begin with a general point. I consider it objectionable that in a book of 460 pages, with verses cited twice and translations repeated, the author could not take a few pages to present in full his arguments concerning VP 1.181-83; that instead he merely tells us he intends to discuss problems on another occasion, although he wishes readers to accept his conclusion that the Vrtti does not represent what Bhartrhari intended. The arguments Houben does set down, moreover, are not cogently formulated. Thus, he says (p. 240): - In the light of the preceding karikas 181-182, however, it is very likely that 183 was intended to refer also to the tradition of ‘incorrect’ Prakrit words (which were the original and correct words according to the other group). In view of the fact that in some circles in Bhartrhari’s time (fourth or fifth century CE) the ‘incorrect’ Prakrit forms were cultivated, and in the light of 181, which seems to refer to - this situation, karika 183 would then also refer to someone who wanted to pronounce an ‘incorrect’ Prakrit word, but knew only the corresponding ‘correct’ Sanskrit word.

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The first of these verses clearly says that apabhramsas gained established status ˙´ over time, with the result that for some speakers sadhu terms are not signifiers. - Houben does not demonstrate, however, how the two karikas make it “very likely” that the final verse intended to convey what he claims. Moreover, although it is beyond dispute that vernaculars were indeed generally used, it does not follow that VP 1.183 thereby concerns speakers who wished to use a vernacular form but mistakenly used a Sanskritic one instead. Houben should have taken into consideration the repeated - statement in the first-kanda karikas and Vrtti that the distinction between sadhu and - dhu terms is an accepted tradition and the view among Panini yas and others that - asa misuse involves the use of apasabdas where sadhusabdas should be used. ´ ´ 4.6.2. Houben’s arguments concerning the particular issue whether asadhu terms signify or not could also do with more precision. He says (pp. 240-41): - What is important is that karika 183 contains no indication whatsoever that Bhartrhari would not [emphasis in original] accept that in some circumstances “incorrect” words express their meaning directly. It was precisely the point of 181 that ‘incorrect’ words may be expressive among some speakers. And at two other places, 27 in the first Kan d a and 30 in the Sam bandhasamuddes a, ˙ ´ Bhartrhari allows that “incorrect” words express their meaning directly. The Vrtti, however, suggesting that in 182 a different view is being discussed (different from the two views referred to in 181),(FN166) denies that “incorrect” words can be expressive. On this view, according to the Vrtti, the “incorrect” word, whether it has become well-established (as in the situation described in 181) or not (as in 175-180, where the speaker does intend to pronounce the correct word), is by no means expressive of the meaning (na va cakau bhavatah). What VP 1.27 says is that asadhu terms are those which are contrary to sadhu ones—either in that they are not established from a tradition handed down by sist as ´ or in that they are not means of achieving merit—although there is not a distinction between both types in that they both convey meaning.(FN167) This does not say explicitly that both signify meaning directly. Even under the thesis that asadhu terms signify indirectly, it is still true that they signify, so that they do not differ in this respect from sadhu terms.(FN168) Similarly, VP 3.3.30 also says that there is no distinction between the two types of terms in that they both have the property of being signifiers, but again this does not necessarily mean that both directly signify. Nor can one say that vacaka refers only to a direct signifier. This would be incompatible with VP 1.178, - which says of asadhu terms that they are not directly signifiers and uses saksad - cakah. If vacaka meant only ‘which signifies directly’, then avacaka would refer to ava - an item that does not signify directly, so that saksat ‘directly’ would be otiose. Similarly, - can mean ‘signify, express’, without specifying whether this is done directly abhi dha or indirectly, so that VP 1.180 can say that a certain meaning is signified by an asa dhu term indirectly, as separated from its signifier by the correct term (sadhuvyavahitah), which directly signifies it. Of course, vacaka and abhidhayaka can also refer specifically to direct signifiers. Thus, VP 1.183, in which abhidhayakah occurs, says with respect to a term used when one wishes to use another one that it does not signify the meaning. The verse specifies the particular condition under which this holds. The Vrtti (see note 146) uses vacaka, but also goes on to stress that in both cases there is a mere understanding (sampratyayamatram) of the meaning in -, which has become established, seemingly question. That is, an apas ´abda like goni signifies, but this is in the way that conventional gestures convey meanings, and an apasabda like asva for asva signifies only through the intermediary. ´ ´ In connection with the same issue, Houben (pp. 241-42) appeals to the - - Mahabhasyadi pika:

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As for the MBhD, its author evinces an awareness of both the view that incorrect words are not expressive (MBhD 1:10.14-15) and the view that they - are (MBhD 1:26.13-14, 27.34-35). The author of the MBhD, as the karika-author - raja, does not advocate an absolute and unlike the author of the Vrtti and Hela denial of the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances expressive. In footnote 380 (p. 241), appended to this passage, Houben criticizes Virendra Sharma, saying: “Sharma (1977: 147-148) mentions only MBhD 1: 10.14-15 as ‘proof’ of Bhartrhari’s denial of direct expressive powers to incorrect words, and neglects the other two places which would have compelled him to modify his position.” In footnote 377 (p. 241), appended to the text where Houben says “Bhartr hari allows that ‘incorrect’ words express their meaning directly,” he remarks: “Exactly the same attitude - is evinced in the MBhD 1: 26.13-14 and 27.4-5.” The Di pika passages are as follows: I.10.14-15: apabhrams - ye [te] tv apy apratyayakah | esa eva pakso naite ˙ ´a - yayanti ti “But terms that are apabhramsas ... are not meaning conveyors. pratya ˙´ The position is just this: these do not convey meaning.” I.26.13-14: evam arthavabodham prati sarvo ’rthah s abdam apas abdam ca ˙ ´ ´ ˙ - sau pratyayyo netereneti niyamah kriyate “In the same prayunkte | tatra sabdena ˙ ´ way, any meaning provokes both a s abda and an apas abda for the ´ ´ understanding of a meaning. This being so, a restriction is formulated: that is to be made understood with a sabda, not with the other.” ´ - I.27.4-5: yady apy esah paksah syat sadhuvad apasabda api vacakah ity evam ´ api drst am phalam tulyam arthavabodhah | iha tv adrst am phalam abhyudaya iti ˙ ˙ “Though this view too is possible, that apasabdas signify as sadhu terms do, ´ nevertheless, they have the same direct result: the comprehension of a meaning. In this case, however, there is an unseen result: prosperity.” Clearly, the second passage speaks of a restriction that a meaning is to be conveyed (pratyayyah) by one term and not by another, but it does not expressly say anything about an apasabda signifying directly. The last passage does indeed use ´ vacakah. However, as noted earlier, this too does not mean that the term in question necessarily signifies directly. Accordingly, I think Houben’s use of “directly” is exaggerated. It is also an exaggeration to insist that the Vrtti does not allow that apasabdas do signify directly under particular circumstances. The Vrtti on VP 1.181 ´ - (note 136) certainly does admit, as does the karika, that for speakers among whom apabhramsas have become established, they signify and sadhu terms do not. ˙´ In sum, I find that Houben’s discussion of this issue lacks cogency. In addition, I consider less than straightforward the strategy of argumentation adopted in approaching the texts in question. Towards the beginning of his book, Houben makes it clear (p. 7) that he considers the author of the Vrtti to be someone different form - the author of the ka rika s, whom he considers identical with the author of the - bhasyadi pika. Subsequently (p. 13), he recommends caution and remarks: “Even - Maha for someone who would like to establish continuity and unitary authorship of the two works, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the two in order to prove this point.” In his commentary on VP 3.3.30, he maintains the sharp distinction between the works but, as can be seen from what I have said, he also abandons a great deal of his caution. Here Houben argues on the basis of his own interpretations, which are supported by saying “it is very likely that” VP 1.183 meant to say what he - thinks it did and, negatively, that this karika does not contain any indication that Bhartrhari would not accept that apasabdas can signify directly. Houben does not ´ demonstrate that what he considers likely is supported by evidence and is not merely a feeling on his part. Yet, starting from his own interpretation, he goes on to argue that - - Helaraja has somehow misrepresented what the karika text says.

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4.6.3. The materials thus presented constitute for Houben (p. 241) “... the - background against which Helaraja’s commentary on 30 should be evaluated.” As - noted in §4.6.2, Houben characterizes Helaraja as advocating “an absolute denial of the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances significative.” Here - again, he has exaggerated and his presentation lacks subtlety. Helaraja’s comments on -˙ VP 3.3.30 (see §4.5) immediately set the tone by speaking of the learned (vidvamsah). For him, it is they who do not determine a meaning directly from an apasabda, so that ´ - there is no relation between such a term and a meaning. Now, when Helaraja says - cakah), he clearly means they are not direct that apabhramsas are not signifiers (ava ˙´ signifiers, since he immediately goes on to note that such terms bring sadhu terms to mind, from which one has a comprehension of meaning. He then speaks of the stage at which apabhramsas have become established, and relates this to what Patañjali ´ - says. In addition, Helaraja makes explicit the circumstances under which apasabdas ´ - dhusabdas: at the stage alluded to in VP 1.181 signify meanings directly, just as do sa ´ and the Vrtti thereto. It is also with this very stage in mind that Helaraja first brings in Patañjali’s comments (see §4.1) that a restriction is established such that one should use only sadhusabdas to signify meanings, which are equally understood from the use ´ of such terms and apasabdas. ´ - - Houben remarks in particular on what Helaraja says concerning the Mahabhasya’s - nayam arthagatau s - - pasabena ca. In his comments on VP 3.3.30, sama ´abdena ca ´ Houben notes (p. 241): “From the use of arthagatau ‘in the understanding of meaning’ - Helaraja wants to infer Patañjali’s reluctance to accept that incorrect words have a capacity to express the meaning.” Later (p. 366), Houben translates the pertinent - phrase from Helara ja’s commentary as follows: “From the expression arthagati, “understanding of meaning” [it is clear that] [Patañjali] is unwilling to accept that incorrect words have expressive power towards their meaning.” He also remarks (p. 366, note 697): “Note the plural in reference to Patañjali, whereas Bhartrhari is referred - - to by Helaraja in singular.” Of course, having Helaraja say that Patañjali does not wish - to accept that apasabdas signify directly suits Houben’s thesis, under which Helaraja ´ in effect denies what Patañjali actually intended and interprets the issue in accordance with the Vakyapadi yavrtti, as opposed to the Vakyapadi ya itself. On the other hand, - Houben simply asserts that Helaraja’s avakarnayanti refers to something Patañjanli did. - raja elsewhere comparably refers to the Bhasyakara in the He does not show that Hela - plural. In fact, Helaraja frequently refers to Patañjali, using bhasyakara and bhasyakrt and, as far as I can ascertain, always in the singular.(FN169) In view of the evidence, -´ it is obviously not appropriate to consider that avakarnayanti in the Praki rnaprakasa on VP 3.3.30 has reference to Patañjali. Instead, it is proper to consider this an instance - of an impersonal third plural form (see note 162). That is, Helaraja here is reporting an opinion he knows of, one which agrees with what is said in the Vrtti on VP 1.183 - (see note 146). Helaraja also notes immediately thereafter that the author of the text speaks of a non-difference in usage due to the fact that apabhramsas have become ˙´ established and that under these circumstances the grammar provides a restriction such that one should use only sadhu terms to signify meanings in order to gain merit. 4.6.4. All this is in accord with what is said throughout the Paninian tradition. - tyayana begins by saying that the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended Ka for merit. Patañjali explains this and says that the restriction is stated showing that, although there is the same understanding of meaning through an apasabda as well as ´ a sabda, only the use of the latter results in merit. It is possible that in saying this ´ Patañjali considered that both types of terms signified meanings directly. On the other hand, it is also important to see that Patañjali does not discuss this issue, so that a definitive conclusion is not possible. One can only surmise that this point may not even have been a source of contention for Patañjali.

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As I have noted (§4.4), Bhartrhari elaborates on the issue of sadhu and asadhu usage in a manner which can be understood as reflecting thinking that occurred over - -˙ the years not only among grammarians but also among Mi mamsakas and others (see §4.2), including differences of opinion on whether apasabdas signify directly or ´ indirectly and for whom, as well as on whether apas ´abdas are to be considered truly corruptions (apabhramsa) of sadhusabda and how they came about if they are so ˙´ ´ treated. On the other hand, Bhartrhari does not enter into discussions concerning relative brevity and prolixity in assuming that several apasabdas signify a meaning ´ signified by a single s ´abda, although we know this dispute goes back much earlier, - -˙ - since one finds it in Jaimini’s Mi mamsasutras (see §4.2.2). Further, by the time of - Helaraja, the question of relative brevity and prolixity, centering around whether a sakti ´ - dhusabda had probably already should be assumed for an apasabda distinct from a sa ´ ´ come to have considerable importance in arguments, although this does not play an - important role in the Vakyapadi ya or in Helaraja’s commentary.(FN170) As shown above (§§4.2.4-4.3), this issue came to play a large role in discussions concerning - ´ sadhu and asadhu terms. In this context, let us consider Nagesa’s comments on the Pradi pa to Bhasya I.8.21-22. As I have pointed out (note 168), Kaiyata contrasts two positions: that apabhramsas have come to be established through usage, so that they ˙´ signify directly without calling to mind their sadhu counterparts, and that they simply - dhu terms. Nagesa associates the first position with the - ´ signify in the same way as sa view already set forth in VP 1.181, but he puts this in terms familiar from Nyaya discussions: apabhrams as convey meaning through erroneous attribution of s ˙´ ´akti (saktibhramena). He also describes, in a manner that is familiar, how this comes about ´ - (see §§4.2.3-4.2.4): A mistakenly says ga vi where gauh should be used and B understands the intended meaning by remembering the sadhu term gauh , but a - bystander C takes it that B has understood the meaning directly from gavi , thus mistakenly attributing to this the capacity to signify a cow. The error that has this - ´ source is subsequently continued.(FN171) Nagesa then notes that Kaiyat a brings in the second position because there is no decisive factor to show that apabhramsas gained ˙´ their ability to signify in this manner, so that s akti resides also in vernacular ´ terms.(FN172) - ´ It is patent, I think, that although Nagesa does indeed subscribe to the position that apabhramsa terms signify as directly as do sadhu terms, he does not say exactly what ˙´ - Bhartrhari says. He is concerned with the situation, noted by Helaraja (see §4.5, with note 156), such that apas ´abdas have already achieved currency and some speakers - communicate with these only. The arguments in the Mañjus a are also specifically - -˙ aimed at Mi mamsaka and Naiyayika opponents, and the issue of prolixity in assuming separate sakti relations between individual apasabdas and a single meaning occupies ´ ´ an important position. In addition, recall that, although Kaundabhat ta cites VP 3.3.30 - - from Bhat t oji’s Siddhantakarikas (see §4.3.1), he does not attribute the karika to Bhartrhari, despite the fact that he subsequently cites verses which he does explicitly attribute to the Vakyapadi ya. Moreover, the first half of VP 3.3.30 now is said to represent the position of Naiyayikas and others, the second half Bhattoji’s siddhanta. Given that Bhartrhari quite unpolemically entertains the view that apasabdas signify ´ through calling to mind their sadhu equivalents, Kaundabhat ta’s presentation too cannot be said to agree in full with what Bhartrhari says. I therefore consider Houben’s bald - ´ assertion (p. 25) that “... Kaunda Bhatta and Nagesa agree on this point with both Bhartrhari and Patañjali ...” inappropriate and lacking in perspective. - 4.6.5. In sum, Houben’s discussion of VP 3.3.30 and related karikas which concern - dhu and asadhu terms is so intent on demonstrating different views on the status of sa that Bhartrhari definitely allowed for asadhu terms directly to signify that he overlooks

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something he himself makes the very basis of his own study, Bhartr hari’s “perspectivism.” With respect to this issue, as with regard to other major disputes, Bhartrhari does indeed present various points of view. He does not polemically attack other positions, but he shows a clear preference for one: whether asadhu terms are considered truly corruptions of sadhu terms, even if both come down in uninterrupted transmission, the latter are definitely given higher status. This is the tradition of sist as, ´ to which he adheres. -´ 5. To my knowledge, Houben’s is the first English translation of the Praki rnaprakasa - on the Sambandhasamuddesa. As he notes (p. 23), the karikas were translated into ´ - English earlier by K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), who also summarizes Helaraja’s comments. Concerning this work, Houben says (p. 23): “His translations suffice to give a general impression of the subject matter, but are not always precise and are - - sometimes more based on Helaraja’s commentary than on the karikas of the VP.” In some cases, Houben’s claim is justified, and he has based his translation on a rigorously established text, so that scholars must be grateful for his effort in producing a disciplined translation of two difficult texts. Houben deserves thanks also for the - detailed discussions which follow the translations of karikas. Nevertheless, as I think I have demonstrated, these discussions show that Houben is at times unjustifiably intent - on attributing misrepresentations to the Vakyapadi yavrtti and Helaraja’s commentary. Despite their rigor and usefulness, some of the translations also do not do full justice to the original and in fact do not compare all that well with those of K. A. Subramania Iyer. I am aware that translations are happy hunting grounds for nitpickers and what many would consider among the most excellent could be subject to criticism at the hands of a determined critic. With all due deference, however, I think it appropriate to consider three examples in Houben’s translation to make my point. 5.1. Houben’s translation of the VP 3.3.1 (pp. 145, 331) is: The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of the word] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these (namely, the cognition, external thing meant and own form) [with the words which are uttered] is well-established [p. 331: “thing-meant”]. K. A. Subramania Iyer’s translation of the same verse is (1971: 76) From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external object and the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed. Aside from the use of parentheses and brackets in one, both translations convey just about the same information, although I think one would have to accept that the second is clearer and more felicitous. One phrase which immediately strikes a reader in Houben’s translation is cognition of the speaker, as opposed to K. A. Subramania - Iyer’s intention of the speaker. Here Subramania Iyer follows Hela ra ja, who - ˙ paraphrases jñanam prayoktuh with prayoktur abhiprayah. This is appropriate. For the - rika speaks of. Bhartrhari is not talking translation conveys more precisely what the ka about any cognitive process or result of such a process. He is talking about a knowledge which a speaker has in his mind and wishes to convey to someone in words. Admittedly, this is a relatively minor point. Yet a translation should certainly aim to convey to readers the content of the original text in a way that is both precise and understandable, and currently fashionable jargon that fails to accomplish this aim should be avoided. 5.2. Consider now the same authors’ translations of VP 3.3.6ab (Houben, pp. 176, 341; K. A. Subramania Iyer, p. 81): Houben: As regards samyoga (connection) and samavaya (inherence), they (are - h:) are called by that word (sc. ‘relation’) because they have (as it tacchabda were) that property (sc. dependence).

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Subramania Iyer: Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. Here again, I think it is fair to say that Subramania Iyer’s translation not only is more felicitous but also more immediately conveys precisely what the text intends. The point made is that conjunction (samyoga) and inherence (samavaya) are spoken of as ˙ relations because they have a property which defines what a relation is, namely the property of being dependent. Subramania Iyer translates the Sanskrit taddharmanoh “because they have the attribute thereof,” but Houben translates “because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence).” He also devotes much of his commentary - on the karika to explaining this term, as follows (p. 177): In this interpretation, the first word taddharmanos is a Bahuvri hi going with - yayoh. Helaraja takes it as an upama-bahuvri hi, and tad in the - samyogasamava ˙ compound as a reference to sambhandha, the topic of the preceding three ˙ - rika s. This gives the following: sam yoga (connection) and samava ya ka (inherence) have as it were the property (sc. dependence) of this (relation). That the compound is interpreted as an upama-bahuvri hi is not without reason, for if it was a simple Bahuvri hi, there would be the suggestion that relation still does have an own property. And since upama-bahuvri his are not uncommon in Sanskrit, it is not far-fetched to interpret the compound this way, in a context in which identities and near-identities are of crucial significance. A translation without ‘as it were’ or equivalent would use less words, yet say more than warranted on the basis of the Sanskrit compound. In my translation, tad- in the compound is taken as a direct reference to the property of dependence. In that case, if ‘as it were’ is omitted there is still no suggestion that relation (pure and simple) is an entity having its own property. Because samyoga (connection) and samavaya (inherence) are dependent in some respects, but independent in other respects, the words ‘as it were’ have been added between parentheses. - Houben reiterates his difference with Helaraja in a note appended to his translation -´ of the Praki rn apraka s a.(FN173) I confess that I find the discussion cited above confusing. VP 3.3.5 says that there is no term which signifies a relation qua relation (svadharmena ‘in its own quality’)(FN174) and that, since a relation is absolutely dependent,(FN175) its characteristic form is not referred to by any particular nominal term. Accordingly, a relation does indeed have a property, dependence (paratantrya). Moreover, Houben does not justify choosing his interpretation of taddharmanoh. He does not demonstrate why one should choose to say that tad in this compound “refers - to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva in 4.” Helaraja’s interpretation is at least well grounded in Bhartrhari’s own diction. Taddharmanos tu tacchabdyam in VP 3.3.6 reflects a reasoning which is formulated in several places, both in grammar and in - Nyaya. For example, in the Mahabhasya on 4.1.48, Patañjali says that a term x is used with reference to some Y that is not X, a proper referent of x, for four reasons: because Y is located in or on X, because Y has a property or properties that X has, because Y is located near X, and because Y is accompanied by X.(FN176) In consonance with such usage, VP 3.3.6 says that conjunction and inherence are termed (tacchabdyam ‘the property of having that for word’, i.e., being so designated) sambandha because they have a property that characterizes a relation. The property - in question is being dependent on something else (paratantryam), as Helaraja rightly notes: one considers that the defining feature of a relation is being dependent; conjunction and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities, so that the term sambandha is used for them.(FN177) On the other hand, these are not absolutely dependent in that they can be independent entities served by other, - - dependent, ones. Hence, Helaraja takes taddharmanoh in the karika as equivalent to

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tasyeva dharmo yayoh .(FN178) Taddharman used here is then equivalent to taddharmadharma ‘which has a property that is (like) the property of X’, just as ust ramukha (‘camel-face’) used of someone who has a face like that of a camel is tantamount to ust ramukhamukha and tatkala used with reference to vowels that have - the time duration of a given vowel is equivalent to tatkalakala.(FN179) Of course, this means that tad of taddharmanoh refers to a relation (sambandha): taddharmah = tasya dharmah ‘property of that’ = sambandhasya dharmah ‘property of a relation’; taddharmadharma = taddharma iva dharmo yasya ‘something which has the property which is the property of that’. This makes good sense, since in VP 3.3.4-6 Bhartrhari is speaking of a relation and what its basic characteristic is, then speaks of what conjunction and inherence have in common with this. 5.3. Finally, consider Houben’s translation of a passage from the beginning of the -´ - Praki rn apraka s a on 3.3.2 (123.11-2): svaru pa vivekenaiva hy arthapara mars o ´ - nam ucyate vr ddhavyavaharat tathaiva sambandhavyutpatteh. Helaraja here - - ’bhidha says that only referring to a meaning as not distinguished from the term that signifies it is spoken of as signifying, and he gives a reason for this: because from the usage of elders the relation between signifier and meaning is learned (... -vyutpatteh) in this way alone. Houben translates (p. 333): “For we speak of ‘expression’ only if the thing-meant is grasped as being not different from the own form, because the relation arises in exactly that way [with the thing-meant being not different from the own form of the word] from the usage of the elders.” He thus interprets vyutpatti here to mean - ‘arising’. This is confusing. If Houben understands that in Hela ra ja’s view a - word-meaning ‘relation’ arises in the sense of being produced, then Helaraja is made to contradic what he says in his commentary on VP 3.3.1, where he emphasizes that the relation is not a matter of agreed convention established by men. How, then, should one understand that “the relation arises ... from the usage of the elders”? One - does not have to make the effort. For Helaraja is clearly using vyutpatti here in a well-known sense, with reference to learning a relation. Similarly, vyutpanna refers to one who knows the relation between a sadhu term and a given meaning, and vyutpitsu refers to someone who wishes to learn such a relation; see §3.7, with note 49; §§4.2.3-4, and note 110. - 6. In his work, Houben has undertaken both to translate rigorously the karikas of the Sambandhasamuddes a and to explain these in a historical and theoretical ´ - perspective. He has in addition not only translated Helaraja’s commentary on these - verses but also attempted to demonstrate that in important ways Hela ra ja has misrepresented what Bhartrhari meant to say and that he has done this by accepting interpretations found in the Vrtti. While attempting to maintain a neutral stance towards the question whether the author of the Vrtti is Bhartrhari himself, moreover, Houben nevertheless makes it clear that he considers the Vrtti to have misrepresented what is - said in important karikas of the Vakyapadi ya’s first kanda. Houben is to be admired for his ambitious undertaking and for his learning. For reasons given above, I nevertheless consider that his undertaking has not succeeded in some important respects. I think he exaggerates what he calls Bhartr hari’s “perspectivism.” He also depends too often on vague argumentation and assumption - when he attempts to demonstrate that the Vrtti and Helaraja have misrepresented Bhartrhari’s views. And, for all its rigor, Houben’s translation at times either fails to convey the intent of the Vakyapadi ya clearly or actually misunderstands what Bhartrhari - raja say. and Hela I suggest that, instead of seeking to find “our” interpretations of what Bhartrhari says as opposed to what we consider misrepresentations on the part of commentators like - Helaraja, we would do well patiently to consider with more receptive minds what all

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these authors say as well as full evidence from scholars representing other schools of thought on common topics of discussion.
ADDED MATERIAL

GEORGE CARDONA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA This is a review-article of: The Sambandha-Samuddesa (Chapter on Relation) and ´ Bhartrhari’s Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bhartrhari’s Sambandha-samuddesa in ´ - kyapadi ya with a Translation of Hela ra ja’s Commentary, - the Context of the Va -´ Praki rn a-praka s a. By JAN E. M. HOUBEN. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II. Groningen: EGBERT FORSTEN, 1995. Pp. 460 + xv. I wish to express here my gratitude to scholars who helped me by reading a draft of this review. I have adopted numerous suggestions Ashok N. Aklujkar made regarding both style and content. Edwin Gerow suggested important stylistic revisions, which I have also adopted. Claus Oetke helped me sharpen thoughts on “perspectivism” and translation. Had it been possible, I would have taken his cue and gone much more deeply into both these issues in general and in connection with Bhartrhari specifically. Jon Yamashita made several suggestions and corrected many typographic errors.
FOOTNOTES

1 For bibliographic information see Cardona 1976: 295-305; forthcoming, §4.2; and Ramseier 1993. 2 On the cover and the title page sam bandha appears—with m for the bindu representing anusvara—but elsewhere sambandha. I shall uniformly write sambandha. ˙ 3 I consider this section the weakest part of Houben’s book. Thus, in subsection 3.1 - -˙ (pp. 46-47), concerning Mi mamsa, he does not even mention Jaiminisutra 1.3.8.24ff., - vi , gon- are to be granted authority where the issue is taken up whether terms like ga i in the same way that go is; see below, §4.2. 4 In what follows, I shall refer to the Vrtti on the Vakyapadi ya and to the Vrttikara, although I accept that Bhartrhari is the author of both works, as well as of the - - Mahabhasyadi pika. Recent arguments that have been proposed to show that Bhartrhari and the Vrttikara are distinct are not acceptable, in my opinion. For literature and arguments against some recent claims, see Cardona forthcoming, §4.2.3. 5 These sist as are brahmanas characterized not only by their speech but also by their ´ moral behavior, and they inhabit a particular area in the subcontinent. See Cardona 1997: 550-54 (§834). In a more general perspective, s t as are the carriers of Vedic ´is traditions governing behavior. 6 Another topic that brings up this question is that of how word and meaning are identified with each other. Due to limitation of space, I do not take this up. 7 A comment is in order concerning the physical aspects of this book. In general, the production is good. There are typographical errors, as is to be expected in any book of this size, but misprints are relatively few and mostly self correcting. One error that is not appears on page 241, note 380, where a reference is given to “Sharma (1977: 147-148).” The correct reference is to pages 247-48. More surprising is the fact that in both copies which I received—one a review copy, the other a complimentary copy from the publisher—pages 145-60 are missing and pages 161-76 are duplicated. Fortunately, M. M. Deshpande did me the favor of copying and sending the missing pages, for which I thank him. 8 I have omitted only a reference to Peri Sarveswara Sharma’s article. 9 The article alluded to has been published: Houben 1992-93. 10 Similarly, Houben 1992-93: 2. 11 Italics in the original. 12 I have omitted references Houben gives here to two articles by him.

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- ˙ -´ 13 VP 1.2: ekam eva yad amnatam bhinnasaktivyapasrayat | aprthaktve ’pi saktibhyah ´ ´ prthaktveneva vartate. - ˙ - ´ -´ - 14 VP 1.3: adhya hitakala m yasya ka las aktim upa s rita h | janma dayo vika ra h s ad - vabhedasya yonayah. bha 15 jayate ‘is born’, asti ‘is, exists’, viparinamate ‘changes’, vardhate ‘grows’, apaks-yate i ‘diminishes’, vinasyati ‘perishes, ceases to be’. E.g., Nirukta 1.2. ´ 16 adhya hita- is equivalent to adhya ropita-, as the Paddhati notes (18.9-10): - hitah adhyaropitah kalah yasyah. adhya - ´ 17 VP 1.5: praptyupayo ’nukaras ca tasya vedo maharsibhih | eko ’py anekavartmeva - mnatah prthak prthak. sama - - -´ 18 VP 1.24-26: apoddharapadartha ye ye carthah sthitalaksanah | anvakhyeyas ca ye - ye capi pratipadakah || karyakaranabhavena yogyabhavena ca sthitah | dharme sabda ´ - ˙gam ye pratyaye can ˙ sambandhah sadhvasadhusu || te lingais ca svasabdais ca sastre ˙ ´ ´ ´ ´- h | smrtyartham anugamyante kecid eva yathagamam. ’sminn upavarnita 19 VPVr 1.24-26 (65.1): trisv apy esu slokesu prastutasya parisamaptih. ´ - kiñcid apu rvam kriyate kintu 20 Paddhati 64.21-23: smr tyartham iti: na maya ˙ - smaranartham ast apadarthi samanugama iti prakaranaprayojanam aha | yathagamam iti: - api tv agamanusareneti. notpreksaya 21 VP 1.27: s is t ebhya a gama t siddha h sa dhavo dharmasa dhanam | ´ - yanabhede vipari tas tv asadhavah. See below, $4.4.5. -arthapratya 22 VP 1.29: nanarthikam imam kascid vyavastham kartum arhati | tasman nibadhyate ´ - dhutvavisaya smrtih. sist aih sa ´ -´ 23 VP 1.43: tasmad akrtakam sastram smrtim ca sanibandhanam | asrityarabhyate ˙ ´˙ ˙ - dhutvavisaya smrtih. sist aih sa ´ 24 For the present discussion, it does not matter whether this referent is an individual or an individual qua member of a class delimited by a defining generic property, an external existent, or a mental entity. 25 See Houben, p. 20. 26 In the Vaiya karan asiddha ntaka rika , Vaiya karan abhu s an a, and - karanasiddhantamañjusa, as well as abbreviated versions of the last two, the - Vaiya - Vaiyakaranabhusanasara and Vaiyakaranasiddhantalaghumañjusa. -mamsasutra and Bhavanaviveka or Vidhiviveka. -˙ - 27 In their Mi 28 In their Nyayamañjari and Tattvacintamani. - kyesu ye dharmah padarthopanibandhanah | te sarve na prakalperan 29 VP 2.87: iti va padam cet syad avacakam. ˙ - - 30 VP 2.88: avibhakte ’pi vakyarthe saktibhedad apoddhrte | vakyantaravibhagena ´ yathoktam na virudhyate. ˙ - ˙ 31 VP 2.72: nirjñtartham padam yac ca tadarthe pratipadite | pikadi yad avijñatam tat ˙ ˙ kim ity a ˙nuyujyate “There are words whose meanings are understood, and when their meanings have been understood, one asks ‘what is ...’ concerning words whose meanings have not been understood.” I have translated with plural forms under the assumption that padam and so on are generic singulars. The issue of how to interpret words like pika—which are used among mlecchas but not among sist as—is taken up ´ - dhikaran a of Mi ma m sa su tras (JS 1.3.5.10: coditam tu - - ˙ - in the A ryamleccha ˙ prati yeta virodha t prama n ena), where the siddha nta is that such terms are to be understood in the meanings authorized by mleccha usage and not on the basis of etymological or grammatical analysis. - - ˙ - ˙ 32 VP 2.90-92: gavaye narasimhe capy ekajñanavrte yatha | bhagam jatyantarasyaiva ˙ sadrsam pratipadyate ´ ˙ aprasiddham tu yam bhagam adrst am anupasyati | tavaty ˙ ˙ ´ - dhah sarvatra pratipadyate tatha pikadiyogena vakye ’tyantavilaksane asamvidam mu ˙ ˙ | sadrsasyaiva samjñanam asato ’rthasya manyate. For 2.90b, I have accepted the ´ ˙ -

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- reading ekajña na vr te in accordance with Pun yara ja’s commentary, where he - nena abhinnena avrte visayi krte paricchinne sati “by one paraphrases this with ekajña knowledge: one that is not split up, when ... is covered: when ... has been made the object of ..., has been determined.” That is, a gayal or Narasimha is the object of a ˙ single undifferentiated knowledge. The reading shown appears also in K. A. ´ Subramania Iyer’s and Raghunatha Sarma’s editions, as well as in A. N. Aklujkar’s - unpublished edition. Rau’s edition, based on the karika manuscripts alone, reads - nad rte “without....” Under this reading, the verse speaks of one’s understanding ekajña a part that is similar to what pertains to a totally different generic class without actually having a cognition of such a part in a gayal or Narasimha. In Aklujkar’s edition, 2.90 ˙ - py instead of capy and 2.91 is: aprasiddham tu yad bhagam adrst am anupasyati has va ˙ ´ | tavat tv asamvidan mudhah sarvam na pratipadyate. ˙ ˙ - 33 VP 2.16: asabdo yadi va kya rthah pada rtho ’pi tatha bhavet | evam ca sati ´ ˙ - rthena hi yate. I have adopted the reading asabdo instead of sambandhh sabdasya ´ ´ Rau’s asabdo on the basis of the Vr tti. The argument advanced in this verse is ´- -˙ obviously against Bhat ta Mi mamsakas, who let individual words signify their meanings and then have these word meanings come into relation to yield a meaning that is not signified by any speech unit. See Cardona 1983: 148-51. - ˙ 34 VP 2.73: samarthyapraitam yac ca vyaktyartham anusajyate | srutir evanusangena ´ ˙ - dhika lin gava kyayoh . This alludes to what is said in JS 3.3.7.14: ba ˙ - - - ˙ s rutilin gava kyaprakaran astha nasama khya na na m samava ye pa radaurbalyam ´ ˙ - t, which is actually cited in the Vr tti on VP 2.75. Direct expression, arthaviprakarsa indirect inference due to the capacity of something said to serve as as indication that something else must obtain, use of a term with another in a single utterance, the mutual expectation between the meanings of terms, collocation, and the use of a derived term are placed on a scale such that each later factor has less weight than an earlier one in case of both coming into play for interpreting a given statement. The - ´ Vrtti on VP 2.73 (itas cavibhagapakso na yuktah | srutivakyasamavaye srutitvavisesena ´ ´ ´ - sambhavat) begins by noting that this gives another reason (itas ca) why paradaurbalya ´ it is not proper to consider an utterance as a single indivisible whole (avibhagapakso - kya come into play (srutivakyasamavaye), under this na yuktah). If both sruti and va ´ ´ view it is impossible to make a decision, because it is not possible that one be less strong than the other, since there is no distinction in that there is simply sruti. ´ Bhartrhari takes up the same issues in the Ja tisamuddes a (VP 3.1.75-76) and ´ considers also the possibility that the referents of both terms are directly linked to the action. These issues cannot be discussed here. 35 This example is given in Punyaraja’s commentary on VP 2.95. Punyaraja here also emphasizes that the argument is made against those who assume that only padas are -´real: yadi padany eva satyani tada dadhy anayetyadisamhitayam rupavinasat padasya ˙ - -˙ - - niyatasyabhave kam avadhim grhi tva tadartho vivicyatam ... ˙ - panase padanam syat katham cavadhikalpana | agrhi tavadhau sabde -´ - -˙ -36 VP 2.95: ru ˙ ´ - rtho vivicyate. katham ca ˙ - - - ´ 37 SlV, Vakyadhikarana 178: tatha rajarthavan drst o rajñety atra ca nasty asau | dadhi - pi mau vidmo dadhy atra gam iti. gaur iti na - - ´ 38 SlV, Va kya dhikaran a 230: as a bde ca pi va kya rthe na pada rthes v as a bdata | ´´- kyarthasyeva naitesam nimittantarasambhavah. -˙ va 39 Houben (1993: 160) remarks, “It should be pointed out that even according to the view that the sentence is the primary unit, it is acceptable to divide the sentence secondarily into words and these into smaller parts.” I cannot enter here into details - concerning passages from the Di pika. 40 Punyaraja introduces this, saying sphot apaksam apy upasamhartum aha “He says ˙ ... to summarize the position that an utterance is sphota.”

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41 K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition reads ekasyaivarthatam “only one has meaning,” which is found in the Vrtti on VP 2.75. - - -˙ 42 VP 2.56: nityatve samudayanam jater va parikalpane | ekasyaikarthatam ahur - kyasyavyabhicarin-m. This follows karikas (VP 2.54-55) summarizing the position that - i - va a sentence is a composite of words whose meanings enter into relations with each other and the view that the sequence of words itself constitutes the utterance. 43 VPT-ka 2.57. i - ´ 44 The contrasting views are set forth in VP 2.58: padaprakrtibhavas ca vrttibhedena - -˙ - ´raya. Bhartr hari goes on to varnyate | pada nam samhita yonih samhita va padas ˙ ˙ - - bhasya where Patañjali speaks of padas as products which discuss places in the Maha - authors of padapat has (padakarah) produce. - ñcit pauruseyany amnayapadani sabdesu smrtipaksasya va | - ´ 45 VPVr 2.58: tatra kesa kesañcit tu padarupa evamnayah samhita pauruseyi smrtipaksasya va | kesañcit tu ˙ - v ubha v apy etau sama mnayau padasamamnayas tu pratipadakatvena nityah nitya itaras tu pratipadyatvena nityah | kesañcin nityasyaikasyamnayasya dve ete nitye - gavibhagasakti pratipadakapratipattavyarupena vartete. - ´ vibha - - 46 Helara ja, introduction to VP 3.1.1: iha pada rtha s t akaparatva d va kyapadi yasya - n d ena prayojana dipada rthe nirn - te ’nantaraka n d opapa ditopapattibhir prathamaka i va kyatadarthayor anva khyeyasthitalaks an ayoh pada rthayor nirn - tatva t i - poddharapadavicarah prakramyate. tadaupayika - 47 VPVr 1.24-26 (65.1-3): tatrapoddharapadartho namatyantasamsr st ah samsargad ˙ ˙ - pena prakrtavivekah sannapoddhriyate | praviviktasya hi anumeyena parikalpitena ru - -- ˙ tasya vastuno vyavaharati tam rupam. 48 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 3-4): tat tu svapratyaya nuka ren a yatha gamam ˙ bhavanabhyasavasad utpreksaya prayena vyavasthapyate. ´- 49 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 4-6): tathaiva ca pravibha ge s abda tmani ka rya rtham ´ - ˙ - - - ˙ anvayavyatireka bhya m ru pasamanugamakalpanaya samuda ya d apoddhr ta na m - nam abhidheyatvenasri yate. This point is also emphasized elsewhere. VP 2.12 -´ sabda ´ states that vrsabha ‘bull’ (cf. rsabha ‘bull’), udaka ‘water’ (cf. udan ‘water’), yavaka - va ‘food made from barley’) contain meaningless parts; ‘food made from barley’ (cf. ya they are analyzed, to be sure, and this is done by reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka, but anvaya and vyatireka are merely a means allowing one to speak of such items in terms of grammatical operations describing them through derivation (bhagair - vrsabhodakayavakah | anvayavyatirekau tu vyavaharanibandhanam). anarthakair yukta - Commenting on this karika, Punyaraja remarks as follows: There is no understanding of the meaning of an element rsabha separately in vrsabha or that of udan, yava in udaka, yavaka. However, how would one who does not know be instructed in the grammar except through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka with respect to bases and affixes? Thus also, the only view that is appropriate is that an impartite sentence alone - ´ is a signifier (nahi vrsabhe rsabhasyodakayavakayor vodayavasabdayor arthanugamah -˙ kascid asti api tu sastre padasya prakrtipratyayayor anvayavyatirekabhyam vina katham ´ ´- dyeta | evañca niramsam eva vakyam vacakam ity eva yuktam). ajño vyutpa ˙´ ˙ 50 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 6-7): so ’yam apoddharapadarthah sastravyavaharam anupatati ´- stravyavaharasadrsam ca laukikabhedavyavaharam. sa ´ ´ ˙ - 51 Paddhati 64.26-65.1: apoddharan am sam sargapu rvakam iti pu rva vastha m a ha ˙ ˙ - gapurvakasamsarganisedhayatyantagrahanam. - atyantasamsrst a iti | vibha ˙ ˙ 52 Paddhati 65.10-12: katham niravayavatva t pr thakkriyety a ha anumeyeneti | ˙ - bhyam bhaganumanat | tav eva niravayave katham ity aha kalpiteneti -˙ - - anvayavyatireka - ´ | asatyatam anvayavyatirekayor aha. Much later, Nagesa again makes the same point - kye san ketagraha sambhava t tadanva khya nasya when he says (LM 14): ... prativa ˙ - laghu pa yena sambhava c ca kalpanaya pada ni pravibhajya pade

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- ˙ prakr tipratyayabha gakalpanena kalpita bhya m anvayavyatireka bhya m - gam sastramatravisayam parikalpayanti smacaryah “Since it is not - - tattadarthavibha ˙ ´ ˙ possible to grasp a conventional relation with respect to each sentence and also because it is not possible to describe each sentence in a brief manner, teachers fictitiously divided up words and, by assuming bases and affixes as separate parts in a word, posited such and such meaning parts—whose domain is solely the grammar—through assumed anvaya and vyatireka.” The assumption that one can thus carry out reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka with respect to putative parts in turn rests on the assumption that certain things that look similar are in fact the same. Bhartrhari makes this point frequently, as in VP 2.92 (see §3.5, with note 32); see also above with note 49. 53 Paddhati 65.15-16: yatah pravibhaktaih padrthair na pravrttinivrttilaksano vyavaharah ... samsrst air eveti. ˙ -´ 54 VPVr 1.24-26 (68: 5-6): anva khyeya s ca ye s abda h : kes a ñcit pada vadhikam ´ - ˙ - anvakhyanam vakyavadhikam ekesam. My earlier wording (Cardona 1976: 301: “... in addition to the sentence, some take syntactic units (pada) as the units to be analysed”) was poor, since one could misunderstand the intent. I should not have used ‘analysed’. 55 The Vrtti goes on to give examples such that Panini could be understood to work under the padasam ska rapaks a in addition to the va kyasam ska rapaks a. I cannot ˙ ˙ discuss this point here. - 56 VPVr 1.24-26 (77.1): sthitalaksanas tu sstre padartho vakyartho va. The Vrtti goes ´on to explain just what this meaning is. I do not think it is necessary to consider this here. - 57 VPVr 1.24-26 (66.4-67.1): tatha pu rvapada rtha uttarapada rtho ‘nyapada rthah pratipadikrtho dhatvarthah pratyayartha ity ekapadavacyo ‘py aniyatavadhir bahudha pravibhajya kaiscit kathañcid apoddhriyate. ´ - ´ah pravibhajyate | drsyabhedanukarena 58 VP 2.7-9: yathaika eva sarvarthaprakas ´ - kyarthanugamas tatha || citrasyaikasya rupasya yatha bhedanidarsanaih | ni ladibhih - -va ´ - -˙ samakhya nam kriyate bhinnalaks an aih || tathaivaikasya va kyasya nira ka n ks asya ˙ - ntaraih samakhyanam sakanksair anugamyate. In 2.7d, I have adopted - ˙ - -˙ sarvatah | sabda ´ - - ´ the reading vakyarthanugamas tatha, found in the editions of Raghunatha Sarma, K. - kyarthavagamas tatha, for two - A. Subramania Iyer, and Aklujkar, instead of Rau’s va reasons: this accords with 2.9d anugamyate and it is the reading reflected in Punyaraja’s commentary. - 59 VP 2.10: yatha pade vibhajyante prakrtipratyayadayah | apoddharas tatha vakye - nam upapadyate. K. A. Subramania Iyer’s and Raghunatha Sarma’s editions have ´ pada - ja’s T-ka. upavarnyate ‘is described’, which occurs also in Punyara i - kaiscit padam bhinnam caturdha pañcadhapi va | apoddhrtyaiva 60 VP 3.1.1.-2: dvidha ´ ˙ ˙ - - vakyebhyah prakrtipratyayadivat || padarthanam apoddhare jatir va dravyam eva va | -thau sarvasabdanam nityav evopavarnitau. - -˙ padr ´ 61 Due to space limitations, I have omitted discussing evidence from the - - Mahabhasyadi pika, which, though understandably scantier than the evidence from the Vakyapadi ya and its Vrtti, nevertheless is in harmony with it. - - ˙ - - 62 Helara ja 3.1.2 (8.4-5): tatha hi sarves a m api s abda na m padaru pa n a m ´ - - - - -˙ - namakhyatadisvabhavanam jativadimate jatir evartho na dravyam | dravyavadimate tu - tih. Helaraja goes on to say that the use of va ‘or’ twice in the - dravyam eva na ja - karika indicates a third view: that a term signifies an individual qualified by a generic property. This need not be discussed here. 63 What is more, as is pointed out in the Vrtti on VP 1.24-26 (67: 1-2: sthitalaksanas tu va kyaru popagrahah kalpitodde-s avibha go ´ vis is t a ´ ekah kriya tma - vicchinnapadarthagrahanopayapratipadyah), in the Panini ya scheme of things, the fixed

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- meaning that is linked to a sentence is an action (kriyatma), qualified by the karakas that participate in bringing this to completion, and this meaning is conveyed using the meanings of abstracted words as means. One such abstracted word is a verb form. Accordingly, a separate samuddesa is devoted to considering what an action is. ´ 64 In what follows, I will use sadhus abda (or simply s abda) and apas abda (or ´ ´ ´ apabhramsa where appropriate) to refer to terms of the types (3) and (4), respectively. ˙´ In accordance with usage in various schools of thought, I will also use sakti (‘power, ´ capacity’) as a cover term to refer to several things: the capacity that a given term has to produce a verbal cognition (bodhakatva) of a given meaning and a relation that holds directly between a given term and a meaning. The latter is considered to be a wish (iccha) that a given meaning be understood from a term or that a term produce the cognition of a given meaning as well as a signifier-significand relation (vacyavacakabhavasambandha). These positions are most prominently associated with - ´ Kaundabhat ta, the Naiyayikas, and Nagesa. 65 Conversely, if (3) is treated as derived from (4), the latter signify directly and the former signify indirectly, through the intermediary of (4). See §4.4.4. - - ´ - 66 Bh I.5.20-22: laghi ya ñ s abdopades o gari ya n apas abdopades ah | ekaikasya ´ ´ ´ - h | tad yatha gaur ity asya s abdasya ga vi gon - s abdasya bahavo ’pabhram s a ´ ˙ ´ ´ i gopotalikadayo ’pabhramsah. ˙ ´- 67 Bh I.10.6-8: jñane dharma iti cet tathadharmah prapnoti | yo hi sabdañ janaty ´ - apasabdan apy asau janati | yathaiva sabdajñane dharma evam apasabdajñane ’py ´ ´ ´ - bhu ya n adharmah prapnoti | bhu ya m so ’pas abda alpi ya m sah - - - ˙ - - ˙ adharmah | athava ´ sabdah | ekaikasya sabdasya bahavo ’pabhramash | tad yatha gaur ity asya sabdasya ´ ´ ˙ -´ ´ - vi gon- gopotalikadayo ’pabhramsah. See Cardona 1997: 549 (§833). ga i ˙´ - - - ´ 68 Bh. I.8.20-22: evam iha pi sama na ya m arthagatau s abdena ca pas abdena ca ´ - rtho ’bhidheyo napasabdeneti. See Cardona 1997: - ´ dharmaniyamah kriyate: sabdenaiva ´ 547 (§830). 69 Such items are not just nominals. They are also verb forms. Thus, in 1.3.1 vt. 12, - Katyayana says that one reason for listing verb bases in the Dhatupat ha is to prevent - tu from applying to a set of terms a n apayati and so on the class name dha - (bhuvadipathah pratipadikanapayatyadinivrttyarthah). Patañjali gives as examples also - vattati and vaddhati. These are clearly Middle Indic equivalents of Sanskrit ajñapayati ‘commands’, vartate ‘occurs’, and vardhate ‘grows’, with active rather than middle endings and phonological developments characteristic of Middle Indic. - - 70 From earliest known times, Panini yas maintained this, as is clear from Katyayana’s - rttika (siddhe sabdarthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte sabdaprayoge sastrena first va ´ ´ ´- dharmaniyamah). In accordance with this, as interpreted in the Mahabhasya, Bhartrhari - tras such as Panini, authors of varttikas and authors says that great rsis—authors of su of bhasyas—have handed down the tradition that linguistic units, their meanings, and - ´ the relations between the two are eternal (VP 1.23: nityah sabdarthasambandhas - - - -˙ - -˙ - - -˙ tatramnata maharsibhih | sutranam sanutantranam bhasyanam ca pranetrbhih). - nukaran a rthah | as aktya kaya cid bra hman ya r taka iti 71 Bh. I.19.21-23: asaktija ´ ´ proyoktavya l taka iti prayuktam | tasyanukaranam brahmany l taka ity aha kumary l taka ˙ - heti. ity a 72 JS 1.3.8.24: prayogotpattyasastratvac chabdesu na vyavastha syat. ´- vi gon - gopotalikety evama dayah s abda ´ 73 S Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.182-83): gaur ga i ´ - - - ˙ - - udaharanam | gosabdo yatha sasnadimati pramanam kim tatha gavyadayo ’py uta neti ´ ˙ - ramparyo ’rthabhidhayi itare ’pabhramsa uta - sandehah | kim atraikah sabdo ’vicchinnapa ´ ˙ ´sarve ’nadayah. ´ 74 S Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): sarva iti bru mah | kutah | pratyaya t | prati yate hi - - gavyadibhyah sasnadiman arthah | tasmad ito varsasate ’py asyarthasya sambandha ´

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- - - - asi d eva tatah parena tatas ca parenety anadita | karta casya sambandhasya nasti ti ´ - rthena sambandhah... vyavasthitam eva. Cf. JS 1.1.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasya ´ ´ 75 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): tasma t sarve sadhavah sarvair bha s itavyam | sarve hi - dhayanty artham yatha hastah karah panir iti. sa ´ 76 SBh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): arthaya hy eta uccaryante nadrst aya | na hy esam uccarane - stram asti | tasman na vyavatist heta kascid eka eva sadhur itare ’sadhava iti. sa ´ ´ 77 JS 1.3.8.25: s abde prayatnanis patter apara dhasya bha gitvam. I have taken ´ prayatnanispatteh as an ablative stating a reason. This is the first interpretation Kuma rila gives (TV II.211: prayatnanis patter iti - rvoktanyayavadharitaprayatnabhivyaktir eva hetutvenopadisyate), although he goes - pu ´ on to give alternative interpretations, which cannot be considered here. - ´ - ´ 78 SBh 1.3.8.25 (II.210-13): tatra paradhyetapy uccarayita yatha suske patisyami ti - - kardame patati sakr d upaspraks ya mi ti dvir upaspr s ati | tato ’para dha t pravr tta ´ - vyadayo bhaveyur na niyogato ’vicchinnaparamparya eveti. ga - ´ 79 JS 1.3.8.26: anyayas canekasabdatvam. Accepting many terms would require also ´ accepting many separate relations between these terms and the single meaning, thus resulting in prolixity. 80 JS 1.3.8.27: tatra tattvam abhiyogavisesat. tatra can refer to the items under ´ discussion or to the doubt concerning them. tattvam (‘being that’) is best interpreted to refer to the properties of being correct or incorrect. The property of being learned (abhiyoga) characterizes the authoritative learned (abhiyukta) speakers who institute restrictions, that is, the tradition of grammarians. Kumarila (TV II.215) and Somesvara ´ (Nyayasudha 310) explicitly bring in the connection with grammar. ´ 81 SBh 1.3.8.27 (II.215): ... yam abhiyukta upadisanty esa eva sadhur iti sadhur ity ´ avagantavyah | 82 JS 1.3.8.28: tadasaktis canurupatvat. See note 84. ´ ´ - - 83 TV 1.3.8.25 (II.214): yatha ca prakr tisa ru pyadva ren a pabhram s a h pra kr ti m eva ˙ ´- virbhavayanto ’rthapratipattav upayogam gacchanti tatha tadasaktis canurupyad - saktim a ´ ˙ ´ ´ ´ ity atra varnayisyate. See below concerning Sabara’s description of what occurs. - ´ 84 SBh 1.3.8.28 (II.228): atha yad uktam artho ’vagamyate gavyadibhyah ata esam - ˙ apy ana dir arthena sambandha iti tadas aktir es a m gamyate | gos abdam ´ ´ - rayitukamena kenacid asaktya gavi ty uccaritam | aparena jñatam sasnadiman asya - - - ˙ - ucca ´ - vivaksitah tadartham gaur ity uccarayitukamo gavi ty uccarayati | tatah siksitva ’pare ’pi ˙ ´ - snadimati vivaksite gavi ty uccarayanti | tena gavyadibhyah sasnadiman avagamyate - - - sa - -˙ ´ | anurupo hi gavyadir gosabdasya. As shown, Sabara says tadasaktir esam gamyate, ´ ´ - m must refer contextually to the apabhramsa terms gavi and so on, so that - and esa ˙´ tadasaktih has here to be interpreted as a sast hi tatpurusa (= tesam asaktih) in which ´ ´ - dhu terms like go, and as tad refers to sa ´akti denotes the absence of sakti which ´ pertains to them: apabhramsa terms lack the sakti which sadhu terms have. ˙´ ´ 85 JS 1.3.8.29: ekadesatvac ca vibhaktivyatyaye syat. ´ ´ 86 SBh 1.3.8.29 (II.228): ata eva vibhaktivyatyaye ’pi pratyayo bhavati | asmakair ´ - gacchami ty asmakaikadesa upalabhyate | asmakebhya ity eva sabdah smaryate | tato - a ´ ´ ´ ´ ’smakebhya ity eso ’rtha upalabhyate | evam gavyadidarsanad gosabdasmaranam tatah ´ ˙ - ´ ´ ˙ - snadiman avagamyate. The examples are well chosen: gavi and so on are Middle - sa Indic, and in Middle Indic the instrumental plural and ablative plural merge, with the form etymologically equivalent to the Old Indo-Aryan instrumental serving both functions. 87 The passage in question concerns the issue noted above. The claim is advanced - that there is no occasion to assume that the use of terms like gavi in signifying what is also signified by go had a beginning, since it is not recorded in any smrti that such terms had their relation with their referent created by someone. This claim is refuted

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- by showing how there can be a beginning for the use of gavi and so on. This occurs in the way that a child pronounces while wishing to utter something else; e.g., katta - - - - ˙ and vin n uh instead of karta and vis n uh . (Br hati III.143: ... na ca ga vya di na m - di nam iva sambandhasya karta smaryate | tasmad adimattaya avasara eva nasti - - - ghata - - | satyam yady avasaro na asti tv asau | dr s yate hi ba la na m ˙ ´ - ranecchayam api sabdantaroccaranam yatha kartecchayam katteti visnur - - -˙ anyasabdocca ´ ´ ˙ vinnur iti). 88 R juP III.143: idam atra bhipretam: kenacid gos abdam ucca rayituka mena ´ - - - - apat ukaran ena prama da dina va ga vi ty ucca ritam | tatra vr ddha ntaren a kenacit - dina tadi yam vivaksam avagamya gosabdartham prati tya tena vyavaharah - -˙ prakarana ´ ˙ - -˙ - -´ pravartitah | tatranyabhyam avyutpannabhyam bhrantyaivam avadharitam: gavi sabdad - nena yam artho ’vyavadha nena pratipanna iti | tatas ca tabhya m sa sna dimati - ˙ - eva ´ - -´ ˚ vacakatvam ga vi s ab dasya bhra ntyaiva vadha ritam | tatha vasa yinau tena s abdena ˙ ´ - rad bala apare ’vyutpattya vyavaharanti ty adimattaya - vyavahrtavantau | tadvyavaha vyavaharasiddhih. 89 I say this because Gangesa uses the perfect babhuva (see note 90). ˙ ´ - - -˙ -˙ 90 TC IV.2.642-43: nanu mlecchadi nam samskrtam ajanatam katham tacchaktyaropah ˙ ˙ - da d ga vi s abde prayukte - -´ | ucyate | kenacid gaur iti s abde prayoktavye prama ´ - ˙ vyutpannas tena gos abdam unni ya tato ga m prati tya vyavahr tava n | yatha huh : ´ - mbeti yada balah siksyamanah prabhasate | avyaktam ’tadvidam tena vyakte - -˙ amba ´ ˙ - ´ - -´ - ˙ -˙ - bhavati nirnaya iti | parsvasthas ca vyutpitsur gavi sabdad evayam gam prati tavan ity ´ - vi sabdam eva gosaktatvena prati tyanyesam vyutpadako babhuveti | tatah -´ - -˙ avagamya ga ´ prabhrty apabhramse saktatvabhramah. The reference is to VP 1.179 (see §4.4.4). ˙´ ´ Earlier (TC IV.641), Gangesa cites also JS 1.3.8.26 (see note 79) to buttress one of ˙ ´ - ´ the arguments against granting aprabhramsa terms the sakti relation. Nagesa portrays ˙´ ´ the same situation; see §4.6.4. 91 In order to shorten the presentation, I am taking the Vaiyakaranabhusanasara as - karan abhu s an a, as my basic source, giving abbreviated references to the Vaiya appropriate. For the same reason, I do not deal with what Bhat t oji says in his ´ Sabdakaustubha concerning what constitutes sadhutva and whether apabhramsa terms ˙´ signify—directly or indirectly—as well as what is said on the same topic in texts such as the Padamañjari and Uddyotana. - 92 VBh 218 (end of karika 37): tasmad bodhakatvam saktir iti mate na kascid dosa iti ˙ ´ ´ siddham. Although this sakti is indeed a capacity that resides in words as signifiers, ´ it is not strictly speaking a relation. - - - - ´ 93 VBhS 296: nanv evam bhasadito bodhadarsanad bodhakatarupa saktis tatrapi syat ˙ ´ - | tatha ca sadhutapi syat | saktatvasyaiva sadhutaya vyakaranadhikarane pratipadanat ´ - rika 38): nanv evam bhasadito ’pi bodhadarsanat tatrapi - .... VBh. 218 (introduction to ka ˙ ´ - - ´ - ´ - - - -˙ saktisvi kara avasyakah ... tatha ca saktimattvavisesad gavyadi nam sadhutapattih iti ced ´ ´ .... The allusion in the Vaiyakaranabhusanasara is to the section of the Jaiminisutras discussed above in §4.2.1. 94 vacakah, glossed (VBhS 296) as bodhakah. 95 anumanena. In the Vaiyakaranabhusana, Kaundabhat ta says this means ‘due to - dhu term’ or ‘due to erroneously attributing s akti’ (VBh. 218: remembering a sa ´ - ´ anumanena sadhusmaranat saktibhramad va). In his shorter work, he explains this with a parallel: apabhramsa terms serve for recalling sadhu terms (sadhusabdam anumaya ˙´ ´ “after recalling the sadhu term”) just as written symbols serve to recall spoken sounds; - they do not directly signify, so that they are not sadhu. VBhS 296: asadhur gavyadir -˙ anumanena sabdam anumaya vacako bodhakah kaiscid isyate | tatha ca lipivat tesam ´ ´ - dhusmarana evopayogo na tu saksattaddvacakatvam ato na sadhutvam iti bhavah. - sa Harivallabha (Darpana 296: anumanam atra smrtih anu pascan manam iti vyutpatteh ´ -

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- - na tu vyaptijñanam tacchunyanam api sabdabodhadarsanat) notes that anumana here ´´ - na in question is not inference through refers to recollection and that the anuma knowledge of pervasion, since one sees that even those who do not have a knowledge of pervasion as applicable to inference have a verbal cognition from asadhu terms. The Vrtti on VP 1.180 invokes the example of fire and smoke (see §4.4.4, with note 135), but this can be used as a parallel: an asadhu term calls to mind a sadhu term as smoke calls fire to mind. - - - -˙ 96 VBh 218: atra naiyayikadi nam samadhim aha prathamardhena: asadhur anumanena - ´ - vacakah kaiscid isyate | vaca-katvavisese va niyamah punyapapayoh. This is karika 38 ´ - karan asiddha ntaka rika . Although the verse is taken from the - of Bhat t oji’s Vaiya Vakyapadi ya (3.3.30), Kaundabhat t a treats it simply as part of Bhat t oji’s text upon which he comments. Given that Kaundabhat t a was Bhat t oji’s nephew, there is no reason to doubt that this was intended. In the Vaiyakaranabhusanasara, Kaundabhat ta - rika saying that Bhat t oji answers in two ways the doubt set forth introduces the ka -´ ` - ˙ - -˙ earlier (ity as an ka m dvidha sama dhatte). However, he later (VBhS 298: ida ni m - ha) introduces the second half of the verse saying that now Bhattoji states svamatam a his own view. 97 The interpretation preferred by commentators is that apabhram s a terms are ˙´ apparently identified with sa dhu terms: Paddhati on VP 1.177 (141) (230.20-21: - - ˙ tada tmyam iti: sa dhus abda tmata m pratipadya; Darpan a 297: gopada ucca ran- ye ´ i - - - karan a pa t avena ga vi ty ucca ritam | vastuto gopadam evedam iti ta da tmyena - - - - ´abda gava dipada rthasya praka s aka ity arthah; Pari ks a 297: -´ - bhasama na ga vya dis - - -˙ tadatmyeti: sadhutadatm-yaprakarakajñanavisesyatam prapya vety arthah. There is also ´ another interpretation, under which apabhramsa terms are identified with meanings just ˙´ -´ - - as sadhu terms are; e.g., VBhSKasika 422: tadatmyam upagamyeveti: arthatadatmyam ˙ - disabde grhi tvety arthah. In view of the comparison the Vrtti draws between gagarya ´ this identification and the way of communicating through gestures (see $4.4.4, with note 128), I consider the first interpretation preferable. 98 I assume that this has to do with a child learning to address its mother, so that the - mother uses the vocative; cf. Ramaprasada Tripat hi 1990: 129. Of course, ambambeti can also refer to the nominative amba repeated. - balah in VP 1.179a is known from commentators (e.g., 99 The reading bambeti yatha -´ VBhS-Kasika 423). See $4.4.4, with note 134. 100 smrtisastrena. In the first instance this encompasses grammars like Panini’s, but ´also includes other works, such as dictionaries, which have to do with the transmission of speech, and other authoritative works. There is also a reading smrtimatrena. 101 VBhS 296-97: uktam hi vakyapadi ye: te sadhusv anumanena pratyayotpattihetavah ˙ - datmyam upagamyeva sabdarthasya prakasakah na sist air anugamyante paryaya -´ - | ta ´ ´ - - - iva sadhavah | te yatah smrtisastrena tasmat saksad avacakah ambambeti yada balah ´- nah prabhasate | avyaktam tadvidam tena vyakte bhavati nirnayah | evam -˙ siksama ´ ˙ ˙ sadhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhramsah prayujyate | tena sadhuvyavahitah kascid artho ˙ ´ ‘bhidhi yate. These verses are cited in VBh 219 also after a short series of arguments that ends with na ca pabhram s a d bodho na sya d iti va cyam vyutpannasya ˙ ´- dhusmaranad bodhopapatteh | uktam hi vakyapadi ya agamasamuccayakandasese sa ˙ ´ “Nor should one say that there would be no cognition from an apabhramsa item, since ˙´ a cognition is accounted for from remembering a sadhu item. It has been said in the supplement to the Agamasamuccayakanda in the Vakyapadi ya.” The verses are VP 1.177-80. I have given them as they appear in Aklujkar’s edition, which differs slightly from Rau’s. - 102 VBhS 297-98: nanv apabhram s a na m sa ks a d ava cakatve kim ma nam ˙ ´- - ˙ ˙ ˙ - saktikalpakavyavaharades tulyatvad iti cet | satyam | tattaddesabhinnesu tesu tesu ´ ´

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- ´ ˙ -˙ saktikalpane gauravat | na ca paryayatulyata sankya | tesam sarvadesesv ekatvad ´ ´ - virahen a sarvatra s aktikalpana | na hy apabhram s e tatha | anyatha vinigamana ´ ˙´ - - - ˙ bhas a n a m parya yataya gan ana patteh | evañca s aktatvam eva stu sa dhutvam iti ´ - yikami mamsadi nam matam. Kaundabhat ta speaks of verbal communication and - -˙ - - -˙ naiya - so on (vyavaharadeh), since with respect to sadhu terms not only usage but also grammar and lexicon have authority. As can be seen the arguments are those considered earlier ($4.2.1). The claim that the same sadhu and apabhramsa terms are ˙´ differentiated in that the former are used everywhere is not acceptable even from - ´ Paninian tradition, as Nagesa later notes (see $4.3.2, with note 118). - ni m svamatam a ha va cakatva vis es e ceti | ayam bha vah : - ´ 103 VBhS 298-99: ida - ˙ ˙ apabhramsanam asaktatve tato bodha eva na syat | na ca sadhusmaranat tato bodhah ˙ ´- ´ - n avidus a m pa mara n a m api bodha t | tes a m sa dhor abodha c ca | na ca - ˙ - - ˙ | ta - saktibhramat tebhyo bodhah | bodhakatvasyabadhena tadgrahasyabhramatvat. Cf. VBh ´ - na m abodhakatve tato bodha eva na sya t | na ca 220: atrocyate: apabhram s a ˙ ´ -˙ sadhusmaranad bodhah | tam avidusam jayamanatvat tasmad ajayamanatvac ca ... - pi saktibhramat tato bodhah | bodhakatvasyabadhena tajjñanasyabhramatvat. - na ´ 104 These speakers are usually viewed as incapable of pronouncing in certain ways (viguna ‘lacking a quality’) due to some fault in their articulatory organs. E.g., Darpana, - - Pari ksa 300: vaigunyam ca karanapat avarupam. Vrsabha, on the other hand, says that ˙ the speakers can be faulty also due to inattention, laziness, and deprivations such as thirst, and hunger: Paddhati 232.25-233.1: vigun es v iti: [a]s akti[h ] ´ - dalasyatrtksudhadi. prama 105 VbhS 300: uktam ca vakyapadi ye: paramparyad apabhramsa vigunesv abhidhatrsu ˙ ˙ ´- gata yesu tesam sadhur avacakah | daivi vag vyavaki rneyam asaktair -˙ - | prasiddhim a ´ - abhidhatrbhih | anityadarsinam tv asmin vade buddhiviparyayah iti. The karikas cited ´ -˙ are the next-but-final verses of the first kanda of the Vakyapadi ya (1.181-82). VBh 220 introduces the same verses with uktam hi vakyapadi ye. Kaundabhat ta does not give ˙ - rika cited but does say that by avacakah is meant ‘which an exegesis of the first ka does not produce a verbal cognition of a meaning’ (abodhakah), and he notes that this is based on the position that the capacity in question consists only in producing a - - ´ cognition. VBh 220: avacakah abodhakah | bodhakatvasyaivoktari tya s aktitva d iti - vah; VBhS 300: avacakah abodhakah. I will take up the second verse in connection bha with the Vakyapadi yavrtti interpretation (see $4.4.5). - ˙ 106 VBhS 301-2: nanv evam sa dhuta tes a m sya d ity ata a ha niyama iti | ˙ - - ˙ pun yajananabodhana ya sa dhu na m sa dhubhir bha s itavyam iti vidhih | - pajananabodhana ya na sa dubhir iti nis edhah | tatha ca pun yajananayogyatvam - pa ˙ sadhutvam | tatra papajananayogyatvam asadhutvam. 107 LM 125: sa ca s ´aktih sa dhanes v iva pabhram s es v api áktigra hakas iroman er ˙´ ´ vyavaharasya tulyatvat. 108 LM 125-26: na ca sadhusmaranat tato bodhah ... iti vacyam. - 109 LM 125-26: te sadhusv anumanena pratyayotpattihetavah | ambambeti yada balah - n ah | avyaktam tadvida m tena vyakte bhavti nis cayah iti haryukteh | - ˙ s iks yama ´ ´ -˙ -˙ anumanam atra jñanam | sadhuvisayasmaranenety arthah | tadvidam sadhuvidam | - dhoh sadhuprakrtikatvat sadrsyena tajjñanam. - - ´ asa -˙ 110 LM 126: sadhusmaranam vinapi bodhanubhavat tadvacakasadhusabdam ajanatam ˙ ´ - napattes ca. The second objection could equally apply with respect to persons bodha ´ who know only apabhramsa usage. In my presentation, I have followed Vaidyanatha’s ˙´ - commentary on the assumption that, being Nagesa’s direct student, he reflects - ´ Kala the author’s intent. The Kala notes that there are two sorts of persons who are learned in Sanskrit usage (vyutpannah): those who know each particular Sanskrit word and those who are lacking in such detailed knowledge. The second objection is intended

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for the second type of speaker. Kala 127: nanu vyutpanna dvividha h - cakasamskr tavisesajñanavantah tadvikala s ca | tatra dyanam tatha bodhe ’pi -´ - - - ˙ tattadva ˙ ´ -yanupapattir datta | sa na yukta samanyajñapakatvena rupena tatsadhusmaranad - - dviti - t ata aha: tadartheti. bodhasambhava - 111 Kuñjika 125: etadarthabodhakam kiñcit sadhupadam bhavisyati ty anumanad bodha ˙ ˙ - karoti: nartheti. iti matam nira ˙ 112 LM 126: tadarthajña pakatvena smaran am tu na rthopastha pakam ˙ ˙ - vacchedakanupurvyagrahat. saktata ´ 113 LM 126: tadvacakasarvanamasmaranananubhavac ca. - ´ 114 In the present context, Nagesa brings into play gagari used in the same sense as ghat a ‘jug, water pot, jar’. It is also possible in other contexts to consider this an apabhramsa for gargari , known as a sadhu term synonymous with manthani , referring ˙´ to a vessel in which curds are put and churned; cf. Amarakosa 2.9.74: manthani ´ gargari same. 115 LM 126: uccaritasyaiva bodhakatvena smrtasadhuto bodhasambhavac ca. 116 LM 126-27: na ca saktibhramad bodhah purvapurvabhramac cottarottarabhrama iti ´ - mara n a m - - ˙ pa s aktyagrahe ´ ’pi tadbhramopapattir iti va cyam | - diru pa rthaniru pita y a - - dipadavr ttitvena gr hi ta ya - - ghat atvavis is t aghat a ´ ghat a - - bhinnanupurvi katvarupavisesadarsanasattvena sadharanadharmadarsanabhavena ca ´ ´ ´ - -padadau bhramanupapatteh. gagari - 117 LM 127-28: yadi tu asaktya kenacid gagari ti prayukte ’mbambetyadav iva ghata iti ´ - dhusabdasmaranat prayojyasya bodhe tat asthasya gagari sabdad evasya bodha iti -´ sa ´ bhramen a dyasya s aktibhramas tanmu lakas ca nyes a m api | tad uktam harin a : ´ ´ ˙ - datmyam upagamyeva sabdarthasya prakasakah | iti | ivasabdena tadupagamasya -´ ta ´ ´ - citam. Nagesa also has the defender of this view invoke JS 1.3.8.28 - ´ bhramatvam su ˙ ´ and Sabara (see §4.2.1), LM 130: tad uktam jaiminina: tadasaktis canurupatvad iti ˙ ´ ´ - - ´ tadbhas yakr ta ca tatroktari tya s aktibhrama ity ucyate.... The section cited here, beginning with yadi tu ... ity ucyate (“But if the following is said ...”) gives the argument refuted immediately afterwards (see next note). 118 LM 130-31: ... tada pratyekam tattatsam skr tasya tattadapabhram s ena ˙ ˙ ˙ ´ - virahat tesu saktih | na ca sakaladesasist aparigrhi tatvam vinigamakam | vinigamana ´ ´ ´ ˙ - - s avatir gatikarma kambojes u vika ra evainam a rya bha s anta itya dibha s yari tya ´ - patteh. The reference is to a Mahabhasya - tattaddesaniyatasamskrtesu saktisiddhyana ´ ˙ ´ - ´ passage (I.9.24-10.1), where Patañjali illustrates dialectal usage. Nagesa goes on to give an additional argument, involving Prakrit poetry, which I omit. -´ - - - ˙ 119 LM 131: ata eva stri s u draba la na m prayukte sa dha v arthasam s aye ˙ ´ - gesa reflects the kind of situation found tadapabhramsena nirnayah. Presumably Na ´ ˙´ nowadays among panditas, who speak and write Sanskrit with what amounts to native control but normally interact in a vernacular. In Varanasi, even rickshaw drivers control a register of Hindi and Bhojpuri that is fairly Sanskritized, so that they can understand a great many Sanskrit words. On the other hand, even the best pandita sometimes cannot make clear in Sanskrit alone something he wishes to explain and then resorts - - - ´ to invoking a term from the vernacular (... iti bhasayam). The situation Nagesa speaks of was known much earlier, since the Vrtti on VP 1.181 speaks of this: see note 136. See Aklujkar 1996, Deshpande 1979, Hock and Pandharipande 1976 for recent discussions of issues concerning the use of Sanskrit at various times in Indian culture. 120 LM 139: sa dhutvam ca vya karan avyan gyo ’rthavis is t as abdanis t ah ˙ ˙ ´ ´ - vacchedako jativisesah. - ´ punyajanakata - 121 PLM 49: sa dhutvam ˙ ca vya karan a nva khyeyatvam ˙ - vacchedakadharmavattvam va tadbhinnatvam asadhutvam. In accordance punyajanakata ˙ with manuscript evidence, I have emended tadbhinnam of Kapil Deva’s edition to tadbhinnatvam, which appears in my critical edition (§19).

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122 VP 1.175-176): sabdah samskarahi no yo gaur iti prayuyuksite | tam apabhramsam ´ ˙ - ˙´ - rthanives inam || asvagon ya dayah s abda h sa dhavo vis aya ntare | icchanti vis is t a ´ ´ ´ nimittabheda t sarvatra sa dhutvam ca vyavasthitam. I have kept the reading ˙ prayuyuksite, which appears in editions other than Rau’s. This has support from manuscripts as well as commentaries and is also syntactically preferable. The reading prayuyuksyate is Rau’s compromise accounting for prayuyuksate, prayuyumksate, and ˙ - rika manuscripts. prayuyuksite found in ka 123 VPVr 1.176/140 (229.9): avapane gon-ti svaviprayogabhidhane casva ity etayor i - dhutvam. avasthitam sa ˙ - - 124 VPVr 1.176/140 (230.1-3): tatha sa sna dimati hres a dilin ge ca nimitta ntara t ˙ - rayoh sadhutvam eva vijãayate | gon-va gaur pravrttayor anyatra visaye labdhasamska ˙ i - - - iti bahuks-radharanadivisayad avapanatvasa manyad abhidhi yate | tathavidyamanam i ˙ -pika (I.9.26-10.3) on the svam asya so ’yam asva iti. The same is said in the Di - Mahabhasya passage (I.2.19) where the verse yas tu prayunkte kusalovisese ... is ˙ ´ ´ cited: sa eva sabdo ’rthavisese kasmimscit sadhuh kasmimscid asadhur ity akhyayate ´ ´ ˙´ ˙´ - -´ ´ | yatha gon-sabdah sasnadimaty asadhuh | tathasvasabdah kesaradimati sadhur na i´ - ne sadhur naikasaphadilaksane | yadi tu gon-sabdo ’pi nihsva iti | asva iti nirdha ´ i´ - ntara t sa sna dimati prayujyate—gon - va gon - ti—sa dhur eva sya t | as ve - nimitta i i ´ - vasvas abdam dhana bha vad va rakam prayuñji ta sa sa dhur eva. The Vr tti on VP ´ ˙ ˙ - - 1.175/139 (229.5-6: te ca sa sna dimaty eva labdhasvaru pa h sa dhutvam vijahati | ˙ - - ˙ artha ntare tu prayujyama na h sa dhava eva vijña yante | na hy etes a m - pama trapratibaddham asa dhutvam) ends on the same note: terms considered ru corruptions of others lose their status as sadhu terms only when they have a particular form used with respect to a particular meaning, and the very same forms are recognized as sadhu when used in some other meaning; their not being sadhu is not linked solely to form. 125 VPVr 1.175/139 (229.1-5): sabdaprakrtir apabhramsa iti sangrahakarah | naprakrtir ´ ˙´ ˙ - dhur evapabhrams apabhrams ah svatantrah kascid vidyate | sarvasyaiva hi sa ˙´ ´ ˙ ´asya - dhitam apadyamanah svatantryam eva kecid apabhramsa - prakrtih | prasiddhes tu ru ˙ ´- - - labhante | tatra gaur iti prayoktavye ’saktya pramadadibhir va gavyadayas tatprakrtayo ´ - h prayujyante. ’pabhramsa ˙´ - 126 VP 1.177: te sadhusv anumanena pratyayotpattihetavah | tadatmyam upagamyeva - rthasya prakas akah. As Vr sabha notes, the ka rika is susceptible to different -´ - sabda ´ interpretations that depend on different syntactic connections. I consider the interpretation which takes anumanena in construction with sadhusu to be preferable both in that it maintains the integrity of the half-verse and in that the Vrtti on VP 1.180 agrees with this (see note 135). 127 Such gestures are considered to convey certain meanings without one’s having to - use words. In the Maha bha s ya on 2.1.1 (I.363.25-26) and 2.1.34-35 (I.388.3-4), Patañjali remarks that many meanings are understood without the use of words: - ´ antarena khalv api sabdaprayogam bahavo ’rthah gamyante ’ksinikocaih paniviharais ca ´ ˙ ... - - ˙ ´ - - ˙ 128 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.8-10): apabhram s a hi sa dhu na m s abda na m vis aye ˙ ´- na yathaivaksinikocadayah paricayad upagrhi tasvarupa iva prasiddhas tatha - prayujyama sadhupranadikayartham pratyayayanti. The same parallel is invoked in the Vrtti on VP ˙ 1.24-26 (72.3), 1.183 (235.5). - 129 Paddhati 230.25-231.1: yathaksinikocadayo [na] saksac chabdartham pratyayayanti ˙ - rvam san ketava kyam ... upagr hi tasvaru pa iveti: tasya san ketava kyasya - api tu pu ˙ ˙ ˙ - svarupam atmani nivesya tadrupatam apadya saksad iva pratipadayanti. ´ - - ˙ 130 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.9-10): tatra saksad abhidhanam neti slokantaropanyasah. ´ 131 Vr tti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.1-3): atha kasma d ete gos abdasya ´ - vya dayah pary a ya na vijña yante | na hi s is t asama ca raprasiddher anyad - - ga ´

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- etatprakares u smr tinibandhanes v arthes u nimittam abhidhi yate | ga vya dayas cet ´ - yah syur ete ’pi sist air laksanair anugamyeran prayujyerams ca. parya ´ ˙´ 132 Vrtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.3-5): yas ca pratyakspaksena prayojakesv ´ - - ˙ arthesv abhidheyesu pravartate sa sadhuh | saksat tu prayojakam vacyam artharupam ˙ - sadhubhih pratyayyate. Aklujkar suggests emending to asaksat and asadhubhih. On the other hand, tu can be justified, since there is a contrast in that the second sentence deals with the other side of the coin: the meaning that is to be signified in contrast to the term which signifies. - 133 Vrtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.5), VP 1.178: tasmad aha: na sist air ´ - ya iva sadhavah | te yatah smrtisastrena tasmat saksad avacakah. - - anugamyante parya ´ - 134 VP 1.179-181: amba mbeti yada ba lah s iks ama n ah prabha s ate | avyaktam ´ ˙ - m tena vyakte bhavati niscayah || evam sadhau prayoktavye yo ’pabhramsah tadvida ˙ ´ ˙ ˙ prayujyate | tena sadhuvyavahitah kascid artho ’bhidhi yate || paramparyad apabhramsa ´ ˙ ´- tr s u | prasiddhim a gata yena tes a m sa dhur ava cakah . I have - ˙ vigunes v abhidha accepted the readings ambambeti and prabhasate found in most editions, including Aklujkar’s. Rau has ambvambv iti and siksamano ’pabhasate. See §4.3.1, with notes ´ 98-99. - -˙ 135 VPVr 1.180/144 (232.8-10): sankirnayam vaci sadhuvisaye ’pasabdah prayujyante ˙ ´ - / taih s is t a laks an avidah sa dhu n pratipadyante | tair eva sa dhubhis tadartham ´ -yamanam pas yanti | anuma nam tudhuma ivagner asadhur itaresam. K. A. abhidhi ˙ ´ ˙ ´ Subramania Iyer and Raghunatha Sarma both have anumanas tu in the Vrtti text, but - nam, which appears also in this is an error. The Paddhati correctly has anuma Aklujkar’s edition. I have interpreted anumanam here as a derivate signifying an instrument. - -´ - 136 VPVr 1.181/145 (233.1-4): iha bhya sa t stri s u draca n d a la dibhir apabhram s a h ˙ ´- nah tatha pramadyatsu vaktrsu rudhim upagata yena tair eva prasiddhataro prayujyama vyavaharah | sati ca sa dhuprayogat sams ˙ ´aye yas tasyapabhrams ˙ ´as tena samprati - sadhum vacakam pratyaksapakse manyante sadhum nirnayah kriyate | tam eva ca ˙ ˙ ˙ - canumanapakse vyavasthapayanti. The karika directly states that since apabhramsas ˙´ had become established among such speakers, for them a sadhu term does not signify (sadhur avacakah). - - -137 Vrsabha (Paddhati 233.20: vyatiki rneti: sambhinna kalusyam upani ta) first glosses - -vyatiki rna with sambhinna (‘mixed, identical’), then adds kalusyam upani ta ‘brought to -rna to mean ‘mixed’, since it the state of being dirty’. The Vrtti also interprets vyatiki - uses sanki ryama n a (see note 140) in speaking of speech becoming mixed with ˙ apabhramsas. Elsewhere, Bhartrhari refers to the impurities that affect speech and for ˙´ -˙ - - ˙ which grammar is the cure (VP 1.14ab: tad dva ram apavargasya va n mala na m cikitsitam) as well as of the impurities affecting the body, speech and the mind, which are purified through teachings of medicine, grammar, and those teachings that concern the inner self (VP 1.174: ka yava gbuddhivis aya ye mala h samavasthita h | -˙ cikitsalaksanadhyatmasastrais tesam vis ´´uddhayah). These impurities of speech are apabhramsas. Accordingly, I have used “defiled” here. ˙´ - -˙ 138 VP 1.182: daivi vag vyatiki rneyam asaktair abhidhatrbhih | anityadarsinaam tv ´ ´ - de buddhiviparyayah. asmin va 139 VP 1.183: ubhayesam avicchedad anyasabdavivaksaya | yo ’nyah prayujyate ´ - bhidha yakah . The Paddhati (234.20-21: aviccheda d iti: s abdo na so ’rthasya ´ sadhvasadhuvibhagasmaranasyavicchedat) relates the continuity to the distinction made - dhu and asadhu terms: the recollection of these being distinct is without between sa - ˙ ´ - ´ interruption. Raghuna tha S arma (Amba kartri 1.183/155: ubhayes a m s abda na m - na ñ ca na dau sam sa re ’viccheda t) relates the continuity to s abda and - apasabda ´ ˙ ´ apasabda. ´

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-˙ - -˙ 140 VPVr 1.182/146 (233.7-234.2): sruyate: purakalpe svasari rajyotisam manusyanam ´ ´ - nrtadibhir asan -rna vag asi t tatha sarvair apabhramsaih | sa tu san -ryamana - - - - yathaiva ˙ki ˙´ ˙ki - ˙ - ˙ purvados a bhya sabha vana nus an ga t ka lena prakr tir iva tes a m prayoktn a m ru d him ˙ - gata. upa 141 The Vrtti says simply anityavadinah. In view of what it says subsequently, the view - dhu terms are not eternal. This is a view explicitly mentioned in question is that the sa - - in the Di pika on Mahabhasya I.6.12 (kim punar nityah sabda ahosvit karyah), where ˙ ´ -pika I.16.28-17.2): kecid evam manyante: ya evaite Bhartrhari contrasts two views (Di ˙ - - ´ - prakrtah sabdas ta evaite nityah | prakrtau bhavah prakrtah | anye manyante: iyam ˙ - vak | sa tu purusas - ´akter alasyad va praki rna yatha svasti ti siksamano balo - - ´ daivi ’nyathoccarayati ti “Some say that prakrta terms alone are eternal. These are prakrta in that they have their source in the original. Others maintain that divine speech has become mixed with impurities due to the incapacity or laziness of men, as when a child learning to say svasti pronounces this otherwise.” 142 Commenting on VP 1.12, the Vrtti says that what is meant by vacah paramo rasah ‘the highest essence of speech’ is the mass of words whose status as sadhu is established because they signify and are sources of felicity (VPVr 42.6-7: paramo rasah : va cakatva bhyudayahetutva c ca vyavasthitasa dhubha vah s abdasamu ho ´ ’bhidhi yate). In the present context, this very set of words is viewed differently, by those who do consider sadhu terms neither eternal nor sources of merit. For them, sadhu terms are not original but derivate, and the original stuff (prakrti) from which they derive as modifications (vikara) is the speech forms others call apasabda and ´ apabhramsa. Vrsabha (Paddhati 234.15-16: prakrtau bhavam iti: prakrtih svabhavah | ˙´ - h svabhavikah) notes that prakrti signifies something’s nature (svabhava), - - apabhramsa ˙´ but immediately goes on to say that apabhramsas are natural. That is, although from ˙´ the point of view of those who maintain that sadhu terms are eternal and original apabhrams as are corruptions and only apparently have the status of original stuff ˙´ (prakrtir iva), from another point of view these very terms are treated as established norms that are sources of artificial sadhu usage. 143 This is a view found elsewhere, as is well known. Thus, in his commentary on - - ˙ Kavyalankara 2.12, Namisadhu accounts for prakrta in several ways. He first describes it in the usual manner, as a derivate with the taddhita suffix an added to a pada N-7, with a seventh-triplet ending, to form a derivate meaning ‘located in X’ (tatra bhavah: - Ast adhyayi 4.3.53). He notes that prakrtam thus derives from prakrti-i and means prakrtau bhavam, and that the source denoted by prakrti here is the inherent speech activity of all creatures, without the adornment endowed by grammar and such. He - - ˙ then says that alternatively prakr ta is that speech itself (prakr teti: sakalajantunam - karanadibhir anahitasamskarah sahajo vacanavya parah prakr tih | tatra bhavam - vya ˙ ˙ saiva va prakrtam), then goes on to give other explanations; see Pischel and Jha - o imam vaya visanti etto ya nenti - 1965: 14 (§16). In the Gaüdavaho (93ab: sayala ˙ - vayao) Vakpati similarly says that all languages emanate from and go back to Prakrta. On tadbhava, see Kahrs 1992. 144 Vrsabha (Paddhati 234.16-18) remarks that sambhinnabuddhibhih refers to men who cannot discriminate between what women may be approached or not, what may be said or not, and so on, and that this amounts to speaking of heretics (nastika). He is not alone in considering that sambhinnabuddhi refers to a special type of person, a nastika; Kaiyata does too (Pradi pa II.389). - - -˙ 145 VPVr 1.182/146 (234.2-5): anityavadinas tu ye sadhunam dharmahetutvam na ˙ -˙ pratipadyante mallasamayadisadrs-m [sadhva]sadhuvyavastham manyante te prakrtau ´i - -˙ bhavam prakrtam sabdanam samuham acaksate | vikaras tu pascad vyavasthapitah ˙ ˙ ´ ´ yah sambhinnabuddhibhih purusaih svarasamskaradibhir nirn-yate. ˙ - i

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- 146 VPVr 183/147 (235.1-5): yesam api ca naiva purakalpo na ca daivi vag asanki rna ˙ - - cid a si t tes a m api gamya gamya divyavastha vad iyam sa dhvasa dhuvyavastha - kada ˙ - nityam avicchedena sist aih smaryate | tatranyasabdavivaksaya balapralapavad arthesu ´ ´ - no yah sabdo rudho yas ca na rudhas tav ubhav apy arthasya na vacakau prayujyama ´ ´ - bhavatah | tatra tu sa dhuvyavahita va bhavaty arthapratipattir abhya sa d va - na m aks inikoca divat sampratyayama tram ja yate. Aklujkar’s edition differs pramatta ˙ slightly from that of K. A. Subramania Iyer, which I have followed above. 147 For Houben’s position on VP 1.183 see §4.6.1. - 148 VPVr 1.27 (82.1-4): yathaiva nya ni dharmasa dhana ni - visist opadesaparamparyagamavicchedenagatany anabhisan ´ ´ ´ ˙kani yani vyavasthitani yatha - ni himsanrtasteyadi ni asist apratisiddhani ca hikkitahasitakanduyitadi ni - - - ca pratisiddha ˙ ´ - - ˙ tatha sadhvasadhuvyavasthanam apy anavacchinnaparampar yam anabhisankani yam ´ ˙ - gamad eva siddham iti. I have adopted here the text that agrees best with the yatha - Mahabhasya and the Paddhati. -149 sa dhutvajn a navis aya seyam vya karan asmr tih | avicchedena s is t a na m idam ˙ ´ - ˙ smrtinibandhanam. The second half of the verse is subject to different syntactic interpretations. If idam is coreferential with smrtinibandhanam and the latter is a sasthi tatpurusa, both refer to a composition relative to a smrti, a tradition. Under this interpretation, sist anam smrtinibandhanam is a construction of the type devadattasya ´ - -˙ gurukulam (“Devadatta’s teacher’s home”) such that sist anam is construed with smrti, ´ - referring to the recollection (smrtih = smaranam) of sist as. This recollection is carried ´ on without interruption (avicchedena). That is, sist as continue to carry on a tradition of ´ correct usage, which is memorialized in the grammar. On the other hand, if idam is considered to refer to the grammar (vyakaranam)—in accordance with vyakaranasmrtih of the preceding half-verse—and smrtinibandhanam is interpreted as a bahuvri hi, then this refers to the grammar as a work whose cause is the continuous recollection of sist as. ´ 150 VPVr 1.158/133 (212.8-213.2): yathaiv - bhaks yagamya gamyava cya va cya divis a ya vyavasthita smr tayah ya su - - - bhaks ya - - ˙ ´ - - nibaddham samacaram sist a na vyatikramanti tatheyam api vacyavacyavisesavisaya ˙ ´ - karanasmrtih | smrto hy arthah paramparyad avicchedena punah punar nibadhyate vya - - - -˙ - -˙ ´ - - prasiddhasamacarayam ca smrtav anibandhanasabdayam sistasamacaravicchedenaiva ´ smaryate. I have adopted Aklujkar’s reading instead of Subramania Iyer’s - - - -˙ prasiddhasamayacarayam. 151 This is made also a theoretical issue: must one grant sakti to apasabdas at the ´ ´ risk of prolixity or is there some way to avoid this? However, Bhartrhari does not go into this debate. - - - 152 Helaraja 3.3.30 (143.12-13): daivi vag asaktair vyavaki rna ... anumitamulaprakrtir ´ - m vacika. I have shown a lacuna where K. A. Subramania Iyer’s edition has - vidusa ˙ balavad andhadivad (“as that of a child, as that of a blind person”). Aklujkar suggests the emendation balapadambadivad (“as a child’s word amba and such”). Houben says (p. 364 note 687), “Emend to balavad ambadivad” and translates (p. 364), “like [the - ’ etc. [of incompetent persons] like children.” I suggest one should also word] ‘amba consider balabambadivad, which has support from testimonia (see notes 99, 134). - m. These are clearly the sist as, speakers who know correct speech. As 153 vidusa ´ Virendra Sharma suggests (1977: 235) these same learned persons can be referred to - by kaiscit in the karika, though Kaundabhatta and Bhat toji consider kaiscit to refer to ´ ´ other upholders of a particular view. -˙ - 154 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.13-14): na hi vidvamso ’rtham apasabdat saks ad avasyanti ti ´ - pasabdanam arthena kascit sambandhah. - na ´ ´ - 155 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.14-18): ata eva purakalpe ’nrtadibhir ivapabhramsair api rahita vag ˙´ - si d iti brahmakanda uktam | avacaka apabhramsah | te tu sadrsyat sadhusabdam - ´ a ˙´ ´

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anumapayanti tebhyo ’rthasampratyaya iti | tatha ca sangrahaka rah s abdaprakr tir ˙ ´ apabhramsa iti. See notes 125, 140. ˙´ -˙ - -˙ 156 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.18-144.1): adyatve tv adharmabahulyad anrtadivad vanmalanam - d hih | tatha ca vyavadha nenaiva pas abdebhyo rthaprati tau na mlecchitavai ru ´ - - na pabha s itavai sa dhubhir bha s itavyam iti s a strapra ma n ya t sa dhu na m eva ´- ngatvam iti tadanusrtih sastrena. “na mlecchitavai ...” is an implicit reference to dharma ˙ ´ - Mahabhas ya I.2.7-8. The phrase tadanusr tih sastrena “following after them by the ´grammar” is like sist air anugamyante in VP 1.178 (see §§4.3.1, 4.4.3). ´ 157 eva ‘only’: “that apasabdas are preceded by an unsplit sadhusabda is alone ´ ´ concluded.” The view expressed accords with Bhartrhari’s emphasis on granting primacy to indivisible units from which parts are abstracted; see §3.2. Similarly, in the - - - -˙ ´ -´ Dravyasamuddesa (VP 3.2. 16: vacya sa sarvasabdanam sabdas ca na prthak tatah ´ ´ - | aprthaktve ca sambandhas tayor nanatmanor iva), Bhartrari stresses the unity in the - ), that is, in Brahman, of all words and all things signified: that ultimate being (satta - ultimate original source (para prakrtih) spoken of in the preceding karika is what all words signify and these words themselves are not distinct from it, so that there is a relation between them only as though it were between two separate entities, although there is no true distinctness. 158 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.1-3): tatha ca bhedasya bhedapu rvakatva t - niyamenanantatvad apas - nam abhinnasa dhusabdapurvakatvam eva purusavikalpa ´abda ´ - nisci yata iti sabdaprakrtir apasabdah siddha iti sabda eva vidya. Helaraja literally says ´ ´ ´ ´ - ), but this is surely to be that the sabda alone is knowledge (s abda eva vidya ´ ´ understood as based on a s ´abda’s being the object of knowledge (vidyavisayah), as - tha Sarma (Ambakartri 3.3.30, p. 260). The usage is comparable to ´ noted by Raghuna Bhartrhari’s speaking of a sentence meaning as a flash of knowledge (pratibha), since it is the object of a single cognition. 159 The ultimate level of speech in Bhartrhari’s system is identical with Brahman; see the literature referred to in Cardona 1976: 302 with note 359. 160 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.3-5): tad atra yatha vidya vastha bhinnabrahma tmika tatha - dhusabdavastha vidya yatha ca vidya yam bhedo vitathah tathapabhrams avastha - - ˙ sa ´ ˙´ - ˙malarupeti paramarthataditaravasthapekso vikalpah. van 161 He does not also say arthabhidhane “there being a signifying of a meaning.” ´ ´ 162 avakarnayanti. Cf. avakarnya in Sisupalavadha 15.67: abhidhaya ruksmam iti ma - suter -ritam | vacam anunayaparam sa tatah sahasavarkarnya -˙ sma gama iti prtha i niriyaya samsadah. “After delivering himself of the harsh statement and hearing with ˙ ´ ´ scorn Yudhis t hira’s conciliatory ‘Don’t go’, (S is upa la) quickly left the assembly.” Mallinatha notes that avakarn ya means “after hearing without respect” (anadarena - ). I take avarkarnayanti as an impersonal third plural of the type ahuh ‘... say’. srutva ´ See §4.6.3. - ´- - 163 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.5-9): avidyadasapeksam eva samanayam arthagatau sabdena ´ - ´ - capasabdena ceti bhasyam | arthagatav iti vacanad arthabhidhanam apasabdanam ´ - yam bhuyasapasabdair vyavaharad arthaprati timatram bhaven -˙ - ´ - - avakarnayanti | avidya ˙ - ´ namety arthah | rudhatvat tu vyavaharasyavisesam granthakara aha | tatra ca sastram ˙ ´˙ - makam: sa dhus abdair eva rtho vaktavyo na pas abdaih evam kriyama n am niya ´ ´ ˙ abhyudayakari bhavati ti. 164 This is accompanied by a note (373) in which Houben refers the reader to “‘Bhartrhari and the ancient Vr tti’ (forth-coming, c)” for additional discussion of the problem of authorship. His bibliography lists (p. 437) under “Houben” an entry “forthc., b ‘Bhartrhari’s Vakyapadi ya and the ancient Vrtti’,” which one must assume is meant. An article entitled “Bhartrhari’s Vakyapadi ya and the ancient Vrtti (1): The Vrtti and Vrsabhadeva’s Paddhati on Vakyapadi ya 1.46a atmabhedam / atmabhedas ...” and an ˙

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´ addendum to this entitled “Postscript: A note on Pt. Raghunatha Sarma’s interpretation of VP 1.46 and Vrtti” are scheduled to appear in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Houben kindly sent me copies of these papers, and, with the author’s permission, I have discussed them in §4.2.3 of Cardona, forthcoming. 165 Houben’s translation of VP 1.182 is (p. 239), “Divine speech is nowadays (iyam) mixed up by incompetent speakers. But the propounders of the impermanent have with regard to this doctrine the opposite view.” 166 In view of the content and the citation from the Vrtti given at the end of this paragraph, one must conclude that “182” and “181” are errors for “183” and “182.” 167 sis t ebhya a gama t siddha h sa havo dharmasa dhanam | arthapratya yana bhede ´ -tas tv asadhavah. As the Paddhati points out, asadhu terms can be contrary by vipari - virtue of either of these (81.22-23: vipari ta iti: s is t opdes apa ramparyen a navasthita ´ ´ - dhanam va). adharmasa ˙ - 168 The Paddhati (81.21-22: yady api sa ks a d anuma neneti ca bhedas tatha py - yanam abhinnam sa dhu na m asa dhu na m ca tulyam) points this out. - - - - - ˙ arthapratya Similarly, commenting on Bh I.8.21-22 (see note 68), the Pradi pa notes that, although under one thesis apabhramsas do not signify directly, they nevertheless still signify ˙´ indirectly, through the intermediary of sadhu terms. Kaiyat a goes on to note that some apabhramsas have gained established status through continuous transmission, so that ˙´ they convey meanings directly, without calling sadhu terms to mind. He also remarks that some maintain apabhramsas signify directly jsut as do sadhu terms. Pr I.35: yady ˙´ - ks a d api sa apabhram s a ˙ ´ na va caka s tatha pi smaryaman asa dhus abdavyavadha nena rtham pratya yayanti | kecic ca pabhram s a h ´ ˙ ˙ ´- nirudhim agatah sa dhusabdan asma rayanta evartham pratyayayanti | paramparaya ´ ˙ - dhusabdavad apabhramsa api saksad arthasya vacaka iti. See - anye tu manyante: sa ´ ˙´ §4.6.4. 169 bhas yakarah: III.1: 235.16 (aha), 236.21-22 (manyate), 279.12, 296.18 (aha), - cast e), 305.18-19 (codayati), 336.23 (na pratyacaks-ta), 338.25-339.1 299.4-5 (pratya i - ha), 104.14-15 (samarthayate), 301.20 (manyate); III.2: 30.11 (necchati), 99.22-24 (a (aha), 353.11, 361.17-18 (natra niradiksat), 374.18 (praha), 374.25 (praha), 402.27 - didesa), 408.9-10 (pratyacakhyau); bhas yakarena: III.1: 107.14, 201.14, 202.6-7, (a ´ 328.21; III.2: 3.2, 20.2, 124.3, 127.12, 127.16-17, 138.19, 166.4, 167.20, 314.27, 336.24, 356.15, 360.21, 386.7, 410.5; bhasyakrta: III.1: 235.17-18; III.2: 22.7-8, 287.6; bhasyakarasya: III.1: 352.11, III.2: 285.7, 340.14-15, 349.5, 371.23-24. References are to pages and lines of K. A. Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. These references are available from the indices to these volumes, although only the stem forms bhasyakara, - syakrt appear in the indices. I have given references only to passages where bha - Helaraja uses case forms of these terms, omitting places where these appear in derivates. I have also cited in parentheses verb forms, where these occur. 170 It is probable that Bhartr hari used s ´akti not merely in the sense of power or capacity but more specifically in the sense of the capacity inherent in a word to signify its meaning. I say this because a passage such as the Vrtti on VP 2.226 speaks of extracting sakti from the meaning of a whole compound, which is associated with many ´ - - saktis (VPVr. 2.266 [p. 247]: samudayarthad anekasakteh saktyapoddharena...). That ´ ´ ´ -bhava, tatpurusa, bahuvri hi, and dvandva compounds are described by some is, avyayi in terms of semantics, such that they are respectively compounds whose principal meaning is that of the prior term, the last term, neither term, and both terms. The whole is associated with a single meaning but one can extract partial meanings. 171 Ud I.35: niru d him a gata iti : te ca s aktibhramen a bodhaka iti bha vah | ´ - vi ti prayukte gaur iti sa dhus abdasmaran a t s aktibhramas cettham : kenacid ga ´ ´ ´ - -´ prayojyasya bodhe ’pi tat asthasya gavi sabdad evasya gobodha iti bhramah tanmulako - m api bhrama iti. ’nyesa

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- -´ 172 Ud I.35: vastuto vinigamakavirahad bhasasabdesv api saktir evety aha : anye tv ´ - s a on the Maha bha }Alsya passage under discussion - iti. Similarly, the Ratnapraka ´ - - directly remarks that Patañjali’s saying samanayam arthagatau serves to refute those pseudo-scholars who maintain that apabhramsas do not signify directly, as do sadhu ˙´ terms, and instead do so indirectly, through serving to recall sadhu terms. This is - sya passage in question, because it conflicts with experience and with what the Bha based on this, has to say and also because the understanding of meaning which arises from apasabdas for pamaras, who do not know sadhu terms, cannot have the ´ - - recollection of sadhu terms as intermediary. RaPr I.91: samanayam arthagatav iti : - na m sa dhus abdasma rakatvena rthabodhakatvam na tu sa ks a t - ˙ - etena apabhram s a ˙ ´ ´ ˙ sa dhus abdavad ´ iti vadantah pan d itam manya ˙ nirasta h anubhavena - lakaprakrtabhasyena ca virodhat sadhusabdan ajanatam pamaranam apasabdair -˙ - tanmu ´ ´ jayamanasyarthabodhasya sadhusabdasmaranadvarakatvasambhavac ca. ´ - 173 Page 341, note 567: “... According to Helaraja tat in taddharmanos refers to tasya sambandhasya; in my interpretation it refers to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva ˙ in 4.” 174 nabhidhanam svadharmena sambandhasyasti vacakam | atyantaparatantratvad ˙ - pam nasyapadisyate. That is, as Helaraja notes, only a genitive ending is used in - - ru ˙ ´ conveying a relation qua relation. 175 atyantaparatantratvat. Houben (pp. 170, 340) translates the second half of VP 3.3.4, “Because it is extremely dependent, its form cannot be pointed out”; earlier, K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971: 80, “Being extremely dependent, its own form is never cognized”) also translated using “extremely” for the Sanskrit atyanta. Both would have - done better using “absolutely.” For, as Helaraja points out, what is at issue is that a relation is absolutely dependent, so that one can never refer to it separately as a relation by means of a term other than a genitive ending. In this respect, a relation differs from a quality (guna), which, though dependent, can be referred to as a quality by means of a distinct term. For example, one can say s ´uklam rupam ‘the color white’. ˙ 176 Bh II.218.14-19: katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati | caturbhih prakarair ˙ - tsthyat taddharmyat tatsami pyat tatsahacaryad iti | - - - atasmin sa ity etad bhavati : ta ta tsthya t ta vat : mañca hasanti girir dahyate | ta ddharmya t : jat inam ya ntam ˙ ˙ - ha | brahmadatte yani karyani jat iny api tani kriyanta ity ato jat- brahmadatta ity a i - - brahmadatta ity ucyate | tatsa mi pya t : gan ga ya m ghos ah ku pe gargakulam | ˙ - - ˙ tatsahacaryat : kuntan pravesaya yast-h pravesayeti. The Bhasya on 6.1.37 (III.32.12) ´ i ´ also mentions such extended usage due to Y being intended for X (tadarthyat), and - tras. Cf. also Nyayasutra this relation too is used frequently in interpreting terms in u 2.2.62. 177 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.10-11): paratantryam sambandhalaksanam iti samyogasamavayayor ˙ ˙ dravyagunadisu tattvat sambandhasabdapravrttih. ´ 178 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.11): tasya sambandhasyeva dharmah paratantryalaksano yayos tau taddharmanau. - 179 Cf. Mahabhasya on 1.1.70 (I.180.18-19): uttarapadalopo ’tra drast avyah | tad yatha us t ramukham iva mukham yasya so ’yam us t ramukhah kharamukhah evam ˙ ˙ - lakalas tatkalah tatkalasyeti. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here tatka how such compounds are obtained and interpreted without assuming deletion of a term. - Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev. 1962-72. The Vyakarana-Mahabhasya of Patañjali, edited by F. Kielhorn, third edition ... Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev, and Ganesh Ambadas Joshi. 1976. - -˙ - ´rama Sanskrit Series 97). Pune: ´ ri jaiminipran-tam Mi mamsadarsanam ... (Anandas S i ˙ ´ -´ Anandasrama.

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Aklujkar, Ashok N. 1996. “The Early History of Sanskrit as a Supreme Language.” In Houben (1996a), pp. 59-85. Aklujkar, Ashok N. n.d. Critical edition of the Vakyapadi ya with the Vr tti and - raja’s Praki rnaprakasa on the Sambandhasamuddesa. [I have a computer file of -´ Hela ´ this through Aklujkar’s kindness.] Bhadkamkar, H. M. 1985. The Nirukta of Yaska (with Nighant u) Edited with Durga’s Commentary, by ... assisted by R. G. Bhadkamkar, volume I (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 73). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. [Reprint of 1918 edition.] Bhate, Saroja, and Johannes Bronkhorst. 1993. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartr hari, University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992. Asiatische Studien 47.1. Bern: Peter Lang, 1993. (Reprint 1994, 1997: Bhartrhari Philosopher and Grammarian, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari, (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass. - ´ Bhattacharya, Manudeva. 1985. Brhadvaiyakaranabhusanam of Sri Kaund Bhatta [A - karanamatonmajjanam], Edited with ‘Rupali ’ - -Commentary on Bhat t ojidikshita’s Vaiya Notes and Appendix. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarbharati Prakashan. - - Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1987. Mahabhasyadi pika of Bhartrhari, fascicule IV: Ahnika I. Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 28. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Cardona, George. 1976. Panini, a Survey of Research. The Hague: Mouton. [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.] Cardona, George. 1983. Linguistic Analysis and Some Indian Traditions. Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures, first series. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Cardona, George. 1997. Panini, his Work and its Traditions, volume I: Background and Introduction, second edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Cardona, George. Forthcoming. Recent Research in Paninian Studies. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Deshpande, Madhav M. 1979. Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An Historical Reconstruction. Ann Arbor: Karoma. ´ Durgâprasâd and Wâsudev Laxman Sâstrî Pansîkar. 1928. The Kâvyâlankâra (A ´ - Treatise on Rhetoric) of Rudrata with the Commentary of Namisâdhu. Kavyamala, 2. - gar Press. [Reprinted 1983: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.] Bombay: Nirnaya Sa - - - ´- - ´ ´ Dvarikadas Sastri , Svami . 1978. S lokavarttika of S ri Kumarila Bhat t a with the - yaratnakara of S ri Pa rthasarathi Misra. Prachyabharat Series 10. - ´ Commentary Nya ´ Varanasi: Tara Publications. Hock, Hans Henrich, and Rajeshwari Pandharipande. 1976. “The Sociolinguistic Position of Sanskrit in Pre-Muslim India.” Studies in Language Learning 1.2: 105-38. Houben, Jan E. M. 1992-93: “Bhartrhari’s Perspectivism (3): On the Structure of the Third Kanda of the Vakyapadi ya.” Sambodhi 18: 1-32. Houben, Jan E. M. 1993. “Who are the Padadarsins?” In Bhate and Bronkhorst 1993. Pp. 155-69. Houben, Jan E. M. 1996. Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language. Brill’s Indological Library, volume 13. Leiden: E. J. Brill. -´ ´- ´ Joshi, Sadasiva Sastri . 1939. The Vaiyakaranabhusanasara by M. M. Sri Kaunda - Harivallabha, the Pari ksa Commentary by - ´ Bhatta with the Darpana Commentary by Sri ´ Bhairava Misra, and a short Commentary by Sri Krisna Mitra, with Tin ´ ´ ˙arthavadasara by - Khuddi Jha Sarma. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 133. Benares: Chowkhamba. - ´ - ´ Sri Kahrs, Eivind, 1992. “What is a tadbhava word?” IIJ 35: 225-49.

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- - - -c Kamakhyanatha TarkavagiRa. 1901. The Tattva-Cintamani by Gangec a Upadhyaya, R - da to Pramana-catust aya-pramanyavada, - part IV-volume II: Cabda-Khanda from Vidhiva R - - -c with the Commentaries of Mathuranatha TarkavagiRa and Jayadeva Mic ra; and with R - tava da and Nañva da of Maha mahopa dhya ya Raghuna tha C iroman i. the A khya R Bibliotheca Indica, new series, nos. 900, 908, 915, 918, 921, 927, 935, 943, 955, 960 & 977. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal. [Reprinted 1990: Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan.] Kapil Dev Shastri. 1975. Na ges abhat t a-kr ta ´ - karan asiddha nta-paramalaghumañju s a (mu la grantha anuva da evam - Vaiya - sami ksatmakavyakhya). Kurukshetra: Kurukshetra University. Mukund Shâstri. 1901-4. Nyâyasudhâ, a Commentary on Tantravârtika by Pandit Sômeshwara Bhatta. Benares: Chowkhamba. Nandkishore Shastri. 1934. Vaiyakarana Bhushan Sar of M. M. Kaund Bhatt with Kashika and Darpana Commentaries by Pt. Hari Shastri and Pt. Hari Vallabha Shastri, Explanatory Note by Pt. Guru Prasad Shastri. Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala, 10. Benares: Bhargava Pustakalaya. - Narasimhacharya. 1973-83. Commentaires sur le Mahabhasya de Patañjali et le -pa de Kaiyata: Mahabhasyapradi -pavyakhyanani. Publications de l’Institut franc ais - - Pradi R d’Indologie, 51.1-10. Pondichéry Institut franc ais d’Indologie. R - Narayana Pillai, P. K. 1951. Jaimini yasutrarthasan ˙graha of Rsiputra Paramesvara, ´ part I: Adhyaya 1 Pada i to Adhyaya III Pada iii. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 156. Trivandrum: University of Travancore. Pischel, Richard. 1965. Comparative Grammar of the Prakr t Languages by R. - . Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Pischel. Translated from the German by Subhadra Jha ´ Raghunatha S arma . 1963. Va kyapadi yam, Part I (Brahma-Ka n d am), with the - kartri by Pt. Raghunatha Sarma. ´ Commentary Svopajñavrtti by Harivrsabha and Amba - Sarasvati Bhavana Grantha-mala, 91. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. [Reissued with new pagination, 1976, 1988.] ´ Raghunatha Sarma. 1974. Vakyapadi yam, Part III (Pada Kanda, Jati, Dravya and -´ - Sambandha Samuddesa) with the Commentary Prakasa by Helaraja and Ambakartri by ´ - tha Sarma. Sarasvati Bhavana Grantha-mala, 91. Varanasi: Sampurnanand - ´ Pt. Raghuna Sanskrit University. Ramseier, Yves. 1993. “Bibliography on Bhartrhari.” In Bhate and Bronkhorst, pp. 235-67. Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. Bhartr haris Va kyapadi ya: Die Mu laka rika s nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pada-Index versehen. AKML XLII. 4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. - -Sharma, Virendra. 1977. Vakyapadi ya-sambandhasamuddesa Helaraji ya vyakhya ke ´ - sa mem eka vivecanatmaka adhyayana (Vakyapadi ya Sambandha-Samuddesa: A praka ´ ´ - ra ja). Panjab Critical Study with Special Reference to the Commentary of Hela University Indological Series, 9. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vishva Bandhu Institute of Sanskrit and Indological Studies, Panjab University. - - ˙ Subrahmanya Sastri. S. 1962. Br hati of Prabha kara Mis ra [on the Mi ma m sa ´ ´ ´- - Sutrabhasya of Sabara] with the Rjuvimala Pañcika of Salikanatha, part III: Adhyaya I - das 2, 3, 4 and Adhya ya II, Complete. Madras University Sanskrit Series, 24. Pa Madras: University of Madras. Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1963. Vakyapadi ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of - raja, Kanda III, Part 1. Deccan College Monograph Series, 21. Poona: Deccan Hela College. Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1966. Vakyapadi ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentaries Vrtti and Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva. Deccan College Monograph Series, 32. Poona: Deccan College.

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Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1971. The Vakyapadi ya of Bhartrhari: Chapter III, Part i. English translation. Poona: Deccan College. Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1973. Vakyapadi ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of - raja, Kanda III, Part II. Poona: Deccan College. Hela Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1983. The Vakyapadi ya of Bhartrhari, An ancient Treatise on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, Containing the T-ka of Punyaraja and the i Ancient Vrtti, Kanda II, with a Foreword by Ashok Aklujkar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. - ra na tha Nya ya-Tarkati rtha, Amarendramohan Tarkati rtha and Hemantakumar - Ta Tarkati rtha. 1936-1944. Nya yadars anam with Va tsya yana’s Bha s ya, Uddyotakara’s ´ - rttika, Vacaspatimisra’s Tatparyat-ka & Visvanatha’s Vrtti. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, Va ´ i ´ 18, 29. [Reprinted 1982: Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.] - - ´ Tripa t hi , Ra maprasa da. 1990. Vaiya karan asiddha ntalaghumañju s a of S ri - ´ - ´ Nagesabhat t a [Part One] with Three Commentaries: ‘Kuñjika’ by Sri Durbalacarya, - ’ by S ri Ba lambhat t a and ‘Sarala ’ (Hindi Commentary) by Sri Ra maprasa da - - ´ ´ ‘Kala - Tripat hi . Ganganathajha-Granthamala, 12. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. ˙ - - bhagavatpatañjaliviracitam Vya karan a-Maha bha s yam ´ Vedavrata. 1962-63. S ri ˙ rtena-bh asyapradi podyotena ca vibhusitam). 5 volumes. Gurukul Jhajjar (Rohatak): - na-Sahitya-Samsthanam. - Hariya ˙