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Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? Author(s): Şerif Mardin Source: Daedalus, Vol. 102, No.

1, Post-Traditional Societies (Winter, 1973), pp. 169-190 Published by: The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024114 Accessed: 15/12/2010 18:28
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?ERIF

MARDIN Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?

Center-Periphery

just as certain societies have stronger centers centers are forged vary than others, the materials of which greatly between to con of attempts societies.1 The Middle East has had a long history even efforts struct the institutional of such centers, framework though resources were, more to marshall often than not, these "free floating"2 ex as an outstanding the Ottoman Here, emerges ephemeral. Empire a in the Ottoman There was, center ception. lasting supported Empire, a network of institutions. by sophisticated The methods the Ottomans and varied. By co used were ingenious in the elite individuals recruited at an early age from opting largely ruling them into the official class, by tightly religious minorities, by socializing not necessarily the system of taxation and controlling, though centralizing, "Society Yet land administration, and by dominating the religious the establishment, center and strong leverage in the spheres of justice and education, acquired in the dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy.8 These imperial achieve ments emerge even more in relation to the situation in clearly neighboring Iran. Iranian rulers were often jug merely "grand manipulators," gingerly over which were unable to establish con gling the many social forces they success in these matters a cannot fully be evaluated trol. But Ottoman by contrast with the institutions of its a fuller To establish simple neighbors.4 another comparison is in order, one that places the Ottoman perspective side by side with the emerging, Western centralized state, and its Empire
successor, the modern nation-state.

has

a center."

the form of government in the West which "Leviathan," emerged in the middle of the seventeenth and the later nation-state had century, a role to in the development of Ottoman At first institutions. play they were seen as rivals who were to excel in those areas beginning precisely where the Ottomans had traditionally for achievement. themselves prided the process of modernization, the Ottomans however, Eventually, during looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own Both
government.

Leviathan

and

the nation-state

are also

important

for Turkish

history

169

victory?was integration or the center was achieved. industrial the cities. during The Traditional System and periphery and economic life. an important social forces was more than anything difference from the institutional to estates for example. a introduced These identifica variety of political cross-cutting cleavages tions which for much of the flexibility of modern Western European provided center existed within a system of politics. The forces they present structural seem to vary from those the state in the West significantly shaped set in. place were accorded the franchise. the clash between generated was a contest that civilization man's cultivated the Ottoman stereotype and nomadism. ern state included what of centralization the process a series of confrontations that created to the mod with compromises leading the feudal nobility. In the Ottoman the nineteenth before these char century Empire seem to be acteristics and integration of multiple confrontation missing. Each time a compromise?or well articulated some of the peripheral force into the obtained. the core of the Empire. the linkages with peripheral in estates found a elements: medieval the lower classes parliaments. peripheral de facto. were when Until the confronta they "dependent recently."7 was the most center and tion between social cleavage important periphery to have Turkish and one that seemed survived more underlying politics in which than a century of modernization. the autonomy of periphery. in accorded." into the workers became while. a clash be the major confrontation Rather. between varied: nation builders conflicts between and owners between of the means and non-owners of localists. or the "privil?gi?s. may be called the forces of the periphery: and later. at the same time. Because state before modernization of its that shaped the Ottoman feudal antecedents. The state's of nomads contingent on the was But in with nomads endemic. urbanization and that all nomadic were between things There many were reasons the opposition why issue of Ottoman political of center .5 Also. recognition Western which were from the Lord or Prince"6 even "separate Europe. labor. obtaining integrated polity some status. Thus the feudal estates. was unidimensional. always tween the center and the In addition.170 because that ?ERIF MARDIN contrasts to Ottoman institutions. This paper takes up the ways this cleavage was perpetuated modernization. The confrontations and co-optations had been state and church. the burghers. periphery difficulty dealing more nomads and urban dwellers than this. One the outstanding became the always of urban dwellers with of these was the incompatibility large in Anatolia. production. These successive confrontations of their autonomous recognition had important consequences. The consequence of was that Leviathan were nation-state these compromises and the relatively even a one-sided structures. corporations.

as but by virtue of certain distinctive by certain For a long time. component set apart from the Those who opposed the officials. not only periphery by being. a siahs presented and well-remembered the threat. as well status characteristics. cleavage only deserving can still be seen in Eastern nomad and sedentary today population social structure. together with loosely related worlds. the official figured as a person with no ties and as to the goals of the ascriptive totally devoted implementing The establishment to accusations of was. One for a more complete integration when may count among these semi-autonomous groups the non-Moslem com in the more Thus. having excluded free-born Moslems from these posts. Turkey where so contrast those with settled agriculture thirteen provinces with sharply a in the four provinces and residues of with found economy pastoral nomadism. obviously. a of localism tolerated by the All of this occurred against background before social engineering insurmountable for Ottoman center. and regional particularisms. ecological general. this impediment to access rankled. symbolic distinguishing was re marks for a number of high?and low?officials that many were cruited from non-Moslem to establish This practice was designed groups. problems ment: the confrontation the Sultan and his officials on the one between on the other. barring certain exceptions. religious. open dynasty. becoming in Turkish). Ottoman became havens for pretenders provinces occasionally the the added onus of having served as a launching gained periphery pad for rebellions. In this ideal scheme. When long-lasting to the throne. syncretic cults. mes Turbulent sects. self-appointed religious heterodoxy.9 an ideal that of the bureaucrat the Sultan's slave (kul pattern. As the Empire dealt with expanded.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 171 A residue between of this basic of contempt. Friction also existed between the kul and the members of the religious establishment who. is studies since it is the territorial important for modern particularly of modern Turkey. therefore. and basic issues of the statistical data. religious by were the center and the periphery two very sense. stopped the Ottomans tasks. were segmentation. structure of Ottoman Anatolia hand. and the highly segmented munities controlled their leaders. one of the differences. set one of the primary of the Ottoman establish fragmentation. organizational encountered the seal of legitimacy the new social institutions by giving they a system of decentralized to local usages and by enforcing accommodation No attempt was made toward ethnic. This aspect of Ottoman social society. were closer Anatolia own .8 was the Another of the center-periphery component cleavage suspicion traces of a of the center towards the remaining and pre-Ottoman nobility a number in the star had risen of powerful whose families provinces The provinces were also hotbeds of intractable with that of the Ottomans. loose ties proved workable. speak. so to on the other side of the fence.

Latifundia existed. advancement Some the Empire was most official careers were made when vigorous. Moslem The contrasted. was this was a feature of the way by merit. a transmission of official status. land could only be fraud.10 The bases of the distinction between the official elite and the periphery were to be found in economic as well. were to administrative subject they special. but. The suggestion but action was restricted by three major considerations. placed were enforce social stratification all de sumptuary regulations through over the nodal to maintain of society the state's authority points signed relations and to build a corresponding image of paramountcy. but it was also an aspect of Ottoman legitimacy: were the first citizens of the realm. One aspect highlighting the difference between all types of officials the operation of the bureau both rural and urban.11 politics in their administrative extensive wielded be power capacity. political over the economy was a further The tight control established by the state in the Ottoman of the primacy of Officials example Empire. It was with indirect privileges of access only after the or the of official patronage its nadir that the practice reached Empire influence exerted by court circles seem to have become more important. On the contrary. cratic core of the state. its members of officials provided this second pool for the recruiting only to officialdom. was the center and the periphery between confrontation not. During moder it was of the center. in fact. been perpetrated.172 ?ERIF MARDIN The and institution was thus religious the periphery. Conversely. by peasant by expropriated the original under which the land had been circumventing understanding state was always alert to the that such fraud had granted. costs for the administrator's certain and other office employing personnel the wielders of expenses. cause of their kul status. while In some regions land had been granted in others. law and lacked the "civil rights" of the Moslem In a wider population. due to hereditary however. by and large. Officials were not variables subject was to taxation. per . not the merchants. Its arrogation of the major control of the economy it its control of the commerce of foodstuffs. when their income the Empire compared flourishing to This was partly attributable favorably with that of the richest merchants. by the state. was and the masses. but families with a history of service to the state held privileged positions. He could alienate land when he chose. as freehold. little land was given out in freehold. power. and because of the identified with secularizing the increasingly periphery. policies to the life of the lower classes. daily on the border line between the center nization. The Sultan had full property rights land outside the cities. but most relatively and could.12 the entire life-style of the patrimonial official and free-born perspective.13 Property on arable were included in this system. Conversely. on land it tried to and the strictness with which ownership. when of them were usurped be confiscated necessary. the limitations and society.

Today. Even economic of the Sultan as a provident father had a tangible reality. politics to death for reasons of state.16 for peasants These aspects of the style of state domination and of official status and culture together made up a cluster. and politics grim things from which kept in Turkish. singularly one one Two elements. successful. This particularly as part the urban masses could also be counted urban.15 The periphery only institutions that trained members of the establishment?the religious train its own institutions. an awareness best illustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite was true of the lower classes. In this code the set of which kept officials alert to the erosion by the of principles periphery an the achievements of the center occupied On the other important place. above all. rural or For much of the nomad official culture. on the other hand. as persons with whom the central officials had many of they points and also as rivals who tried to get the greatest possible share of the contact. This connotation is the one which still retained grim siyaset in a study carried out in 1968 and 1969. the entire mechanism of the Sultan. officials. and siyaseten kail means siyaset means apart. for in this matter at the height of the Ottoman power. When in the "fiefs" worked long it the state could re-assert itself. may be isolated positive. a cultural the ruling class was compact. saw such as locally powerful hand. negative. A number of changes away from the original system of military run to favor notables in this respect. by in into Ottoman culture in particular was diffused Iranian bureaucratic and Arabic stitutions. the seizure of land by not have the power?or the will?to did oppose notables. but in earlier official conderrmation parlance a synonym for a death sentence rea siyaset (politics ) was also imposed for sons of state. there were by the myth of the majesty access on the common mortal's to the symbols of restrictions placed or settled. . varied counter-culture. when the image of the periphery. urban. this was. tried to protect the consolidation individual of land. an institutional code. both rural and culture. the forces of the periphery. this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the in the cities influenced Rulers and officials were heavily periphery. Not surprisingly. population. such as the Iranian. the were the populace court. regions the Finally. phenomenon. urban cultures the culture of earlier.14 peasant holdings by adopting statutes to hamper its control was bolstered and economic The state's claim to political by to the heterogeneity Relative of the periphery.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 173 was based on the feudal system in operation of property petuation rights state in many at the time of the Ottoman conquest. families. title to cultural preeminence. as it did during the nineteenth century. For example. On the one hand. the periphery developed ing extremely but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status. of the state was permeated here. the rulers adopted languages?Persian were to the lower classes ?that and worked these into the foreign benefited from one of the educational official culture.

particularly a cultivator with time of the rise of the Empire close ties to the being peasant. While European comparable was in their role as agents for the center. Despite status still had no autonomous influence and authority. and the state was to use them. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an awareness of the burdens the center. signs that in squeez the local notables were no less interested where this occurred. plunderers with the peasant heavily burdened officials and the periphery?especially a of "Oriental despotism. of the fragmentation of the dis its own code parate elements that entered into it.174 ?ERIF MARDIN meant for the center?which less agricultural surplus and other values for themselves.18 system the normal fief holder at the efficient integrative mechanism. only those notables enough are some There up to the state could gain greater autonomy. increased autonomy acquired defiance of state power or by outright could only be obtained rebel by to stand rich in land and powerful lion. counterbalanced Among linkages with the periphery which of recruitment of free-born these one may count the regular system into some parts of officialdom. this attitude often obliged but the lack of any real softened. public works subprovincial real hinge and the wide net of the religious institution?the foundations. this potential During between the center and the materialized both only sporadically. a center of military "fiefs" was The between and periphery." the mark showed type of taxes?increasingly from the grimness of Sultanic rule in earlier different exploitation basically it to the earlier system only in the way times and comparable perpetrated elite and those excluded from it. Because of the periphery. these notables to that of the their legitimacy feudal nobility. periphery of social forces and because of the because of the normal fragmentation this possibility. particularism spelled an and identi role in the periphery. ripheral sharing When local notables were used in an official capacity. forms of the pe the many different a negative stance were similar only in view of officialdom.19 the Empire that Ottoman officials and that the relation between society. however. it was to begin to develop much later. In fact. of anyone for outside officialdom legitimization kept alive the potential The world-view tension. only with the became of their decline own It was of .20 Thus. the judicial system penetrating Moslems to the of the tradition and charitable level. Like the governing the cleavage between relied on local notables who emerged wise. important "primordial groups"17 played fication with such a group was one of a variety of forms that this peripheral stance could take. the local population increasingly at this juncture to articulate the growth of their local interests. have been called What localism. imposed by of those opposing the state's incursions into the economic if not a code that and social life of the periphery made up an attitude and heterodoxy. for violent confrontation the heyday of the Empire.

and the second consisted of accomplishing the same for the nation-state. through a bles into politics. By then the lower because of the timidity and incompetence in Istanbul had for some time witnessed classes the Westernization of Ottoman to copy the statesmen and the Palace through various attempts France. however. some of Western manners. ground for a complete picture we should also of this and similar revolts. on the cultural alienation dwell of the masses from the rulers. During later of modernization.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 175 than was the state. the artisans of Istanbul had so-called Patrona revolt. but at least they saw it was in their ing the peasants services that interest to provide those minimum kept the system going. of integration began to be seen after 1908. but this was rebellions the an effort to first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: a Westernize and administrative military organization propounded by section of the official elite. some order into the mosaic Moslem of the elements bring periphery?to structure of the Empire. When and the libertinism of eighteenth pomp of Versailles century to arms to prevent re called of traditional ways. these "discrete elements" in the "national Finally. following to take a minorities. this aliena riphery phases to be tion was compounded. play The first was the integration of non-Moslem within the groups periphery. With its of of exchanges the Turkish Republic made the situ policy population. beginning The national of the non-Moslem of the Otto integration components man was more than achieved Empire by losses of anything by default. in the had to be brought "into meaningful territory" participation political was not initiated until the middle of the system. Turkish modernists have concentrated upon the back exclusively of political indeed."22 This last development the first tangible co-optation twentieth of nota century. Ottoman Modernization During the Nineteenth Century stood out as demanding in the solution problems the nineteenth All were related to the century. accompanied by aping and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Western ization. Through to a been asked to contribute that fizzled out military campaign heavily of the Palace. the Republic simpler. was an aspect intrigues by statesmen which. of the pe from the center. ation even In the years the exchange. However. of estrangement One urban form of a new of the Ottoman type in Istanbul in 1730 in the form of the from the center appeared periphery their guilds.21 There had been many in Istanbul before. Empire during a state modeled to build reformers' after the nation attempt into and all brought the relations of the center with the state. the subversion they sponded. the nineteenth and early twentieth territory during century century. might have continued suspicious view of non-Moslem Three outstanding Ottoman Ottoman .

the motley population of Asia Minor appears to have or been perfectly content with tribal and racial designations. As nationalism. the Sultan to Ottoman bring to the Moslem attempted periphery a sense of its center." "Tcherkess. Sultan Abdulhamid of the the remaining nomads to settle down.." and "Lezgi" were reality of the Empire. a in Anatolia The name was government process any. and of his reign. unification feeling previously and all little. therefore if unification many of name had little vitality. political it is usually of Moslem the national overlooked. As is well underlined the Sir William unity with by a dream Pan Islamism was not so much Ramsay. right to call themselves by however. the in the tendency an old historic title. of a national or imperial unity to which he belonged. and therefore there was no general name by which the Unity of the Empire could be ex pressed. I am not aware." gerated.176 but ?ERIF MARDIN in rare cases did constitute the substance only minority problems of an outstanding issue. . So far as I can of tribes learn there in the the existed country. integration Although was as much as that of the non-Moslem of a components just problem of the Turkish the Tanzimat reform policy. Whether Abd ul-Hamid attached any importance to the adoption of one name or general designation for the Moslem subjects of the Empire. to real and . The Turkmen Avshahr was satisfied to be Turkmen or Avshahr. partial population a and educational unification tried to enforce of cultural They policy other areas of the Empire where much clearer ethnic cleavages throughout . through reforms. Abdulhamid's policy of as an effort to establish some form of of uniting all Moslems proto an to unite his people around idea. The architects ( 1839 set a foundation stone here had already their fiscal and 1876). . nomad in while had no desire and were not accorded the Jews and certain heretic Moslems a name appropriate to imperial Turks..24 of success at national should not be exag But Abdulhamid's unification At the turn of the century. still words that referred to the social "Arnaut. There did. and did not think so far as I know. took over at a time when The Young Turks (1908-1918) only this of the of Asia Minor unification had been achieved. by his policy gave strength to a natural Empire." "Kurd. unity in exist a name which a Turkish-Moslem Empire. Islamic-Imperial Ramsay notes: Until very recent times. attempting wide adoption as I can assert to out find should carry name of an imperial from positive knowledge. but at least it is in Perhaps evitable name to that a process such to as he was give expression is a marked feature the it. "Arab. sat very lightly on Christians." "Laz.23 By the third quarter of the nineteenth administrative century. and the diffusion of it was a fact of Ottoman long before Abd ul-Hamid. groups. At the periphery by compelling same time. it was outside the sphere of his interest ." "Abaza. semi-nomad The tie to the Sultan country. state was an the Ottoman in the daily life of the increasing presence periph II (1876-1909) tried to continue the integration ery. gradually This established name was itself the as name an expression Osmanli.

and it remained trying to establish to the end of one party often latent?issue of Kemalist although Policy rule in 1950. they also seem to have represented glory to be a the forces of the periphery reacting against what they considered of Young Turk rule and a policy of centralization. to undermine what support they might incipient for decen for their regime. but long permeated after the middle of the nineteenth instance. In the earliest ing Anatolia the movement for national stages of organizing independence.25 years in power and appear within. following forces in Ankara the Ottoman withdrawal from World War I. Mustafa (Ataturk). provincial to acquire a not a it never began periphery uniformity?if unity?which one facet of this was the new focus of had had before. gradually as notables interest of all types and origin took an increasing transformed. did not begin with a clean slate. groups were nationalism combined partly overlaps taken up under Social Cleavages The tion in the Nineteenth Century saw the end of the nineteenth of the penetra century beginning into certain more of market values regions of Anatolia. opposition provincial theme of their sidered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main as well as outside. his nationalist were surrounded for the govern by insurgent groups supposedly working ment of the Sultan Mustafa these groups pro Kemal. These to the the developments placed parties center-periphery cleavage in a new confrontation that embodied of the earlier clash. who for Turkey. the determination the total picture. but elements also partly transformed the nature of that conflict. For century changed of the nineteenth of reform century architects . While opposed by of a rebel against the Sultan and claimed their aims to be the elimination to work for the greater of Islam. and client rela patronage began Patronage a structural transformation tions had Ottoman politics. While uniformity the notables' another facet involved the new ubiquity of the activities. The problem of politically structure this segmented integrating only with the of national and may thus be integration problem a separate heading. in economic In this respect. Lack of integration. demands have gathered as well as con to what were tralized administration. the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a strong undercurrent the architects of Kemalism among as a fundamental? their own center. developed was the of local notables' earlier basis influence Thus. tier of the the upper pursuits.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 177 and Their better ineptitude organized. Between continuation 1920 and 1923. Anatolia. With in the new this transformation centered regard area within which to operate. to the notables. force: the greater penetration of the state into the opposing periphery. existed and local to redeem limited his objectives Kemal Thus.

inaugurated transmission belt of administration through locally elected councils work with time. these men became more clearly involved with the periphery. we see Where they stood for administrative and for a continuation decentralization of local control over culture. military well as by offering new benefits service. into the new periphery by imposing obligations?taxes. the number in the Ottoman of positions ad ministrative increased after 1876. while officials.28 But the view of Islam cial touchstone of the Ottoman was shared by patrimony non-religious notables.178 to make citizens ^ERIFMARDIN out of the and to bring subjects of the Ottoman Empire.27 middle system had been considerably and lower-rank officials were in a The fashion. one may this new stratum of notables. what had thus become was not an of the of Lum ogy periphery idiosyncratic merely proposal One reason for this is clear: modern institutions had educational penulema. dimension had again been unifying added to the peripheral a characteristic ideol code. the men of who had no other basis of status religion than their standing as men of as the cru religion. con ing with provincial governors. the pre-modern. property owners and also to the class of local "influentials. land the individuals ?roads. With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. cultural between the center and perpetuated cleavage the periphery. though modified tinued throughout the nineteenth notables thus became more century. which. increasing tion. This was true for especially the poorer clerics. in fact. where these pursuits a second had become link between established and notables important. their influence can be traced. an Islamic. various registration procedures?as the of justice. periphery centralist in 1864. meant an attempt to the hold that men of keep religion had estab lished over the system of values and symbols. only paid desultory a notables thus established symbiotic relation with the officials. Modernization of Turkish educational institutions had be on the those of the officials." However. regulation registration?placed in the in closer contact with the administrative and judicial periphery Before the gradual penetration into the of a system of process. notables still served as a administration. In addition.26 the between the lower classes?the the clearly hinge peasantry?and officials. Largely because of the hold that the state still maintained over the economy. notables began to appear in the ranks of Ottoman and in political parties parliament. the great majority of the provincials?even of in or fluential provincials?were unable to send their children to unwilling the state . This was as much a for the advance acquired necessity ment own interests of the notables' as it was one for the of rendering services to their clients. Among also the provincial men of a number of whom were place religion. and bribing a new dimension. their belonged influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through in involvement Faced with seculariza religion and education. To this extent. This role. the new economic of the notables. The provinces of the gun with lay margin world of elite education.

were elements.29 sector of education was much easier for chil Entrance into the modern dren with fathers who were already part of the class of reformist officials. bureauc in racy was also changing century. The applicability sense that "bureaucratic" such as hierarchical structure. the critical view of the provinces of civilization and of cultural of media sharply. man were also in this new sense of persons of the periphery capital part in joining the stream of modernization. the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy or "sultanic"30 were to a "rational" bureauc called "patrimonial" giving way in the formula is limited. both upper and lower classes. One section of the Ottoman bureaucracy had been attuned taken to the re quirements early relatively in reform century." Most significant. of this Weberian racy. or even any In one of the key new educational part of the bureaucracy. What ones were to the be able to packed off capital with hopes that they would a channel of communication with official circles. 1. uncompromising Modernization as the Westernization of the Bureaucrat to compromise with Ottoman statesmen. by its recruitment of a large portion of students from less privileged families. however. complexes. provincial world as a whole. to Islam. thus became was the fact that the "reaction. to its cultural pa the "little" and the "great" culture. No doubt the decentralist united by an Islamic opposition notables found this development The lower classes in the Otto heartening. This reformist during the nineteenth as the earliest nodal of reform the modernization point of modernization and had the leadership selected bureaucracy of the educational . than "rational" claims. as a backwater In this military milieu. A clinging was the to the center's inability to it trimony. however.000 students schools) providing (religious tional equivalent. The modernization emerged life in Turkey generally the gap between increased. rather than decreased.963 students in the modern opposed in 451 Medrese the tradi 12. However. its extension to middle school and by of education family socialization.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 179 data we have today suggest that only the brightest modern schools. was now including increasingly to secularism. although obliged powerful to see them acquire real autonomy: this notables. In 1903 in the establish were area that had had some of Konya?an province development?there as to sector of secondary education. By the Turkey during the nineteenth that could be end of that century. such as rewards based on per much more evident formance. who had difficulties In this new was a new and found unity. the periphery by challenged intellectually more type of bureaucrat. the military for more than school socialization counted schools. response province's integrate into the new cultural The provinces centers of framework. were never resigned was the core of the code of the traditional bureaucrat.

out a to the earlier official. did believe actively at the end of the nineteenth were staffed by persons administrative and governmental character posts ized more by their loyalty to the Sultan than by their ability. century Ottoman a well-trained. in maneuvers that large military units engage with live ammuni bition tion near the to eliminate The attitude these contradic seeking Capital.32 Nevertheless. The new conflict resulted from administrative which was partly the revival. on individuals who countered It is as directives. An at shoring up a direct relation between to establish the state and the tempt was made citizen. for while product he also relied the Sultan worked hard to rationalize Ottoman bureaucracy. was a of the Sultan's policy of half-way modernization. They as nation-state to the Sultan's more gradual?sometimes timid? compared the diffu impatience approach.31 sources. to oppose who began bureaucrats and the military." In a way. tions and for a "closure" of the system might be called "national" looking as to the earlier.180 ?ERIF MARDIN over institutions preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy. ideology opposed state. The national bureaucrat's partly reflected into the Ottoman sion of nationalist These ideas had ideologies Empire. Ottoman of "reason of bureaucratism. in many ways comparable brought product a new dimension the penetration With of the state into the provinces. national bureaucrats a modern to establish felt at odds with the Sultan was in their impatience state in allowed much less time for the elaboration of the Turkey." which was directed to aims very similar to those of Ottoman the nineteenth statesmen. they reforming But to this opposition officials to notables we must of reformist add still another source of opposition which began to appear toward the end of the nineteenth mod century. More it ernization during precisely. cratic elite the guided by was was now formed earlier elite in molds then It that perpetuated. school-trained. man in a new form. in reformers succeeded bureau producing knowledgeable a view of the "interests of the state. the Sultan younger that the highest century. No doubt the new intransigence . that there should the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. During creation of credit institutions and other facilities made a reality of the idea of the state as a provident father. was added to the traditional concern with the center. the subjects. When these re notables preempted invited the antipathy of statesmen." A further point at which the new. an affected part of the Ottoman intellectual establishment and created not to be found among earlier reformers. of an ideal of Otto be no intermediate be statesmanship allegiances tween the Sultan and his the later stages of reform. Taking the French model of the "Grandes Ecoles. As for the the Sultan's modernist reforms did not fit in well with his prohi military. his achievement-oriented were in reaching access to the unclear how successful yet higher positions to the moderni institution Science?an of the School of Political graduates zation of which the the Sultan had given his full support.

the more radical elements among the Kemalists pro tested that in the new law of "the people" were not repre municipalities sented on municipal councils. and decentralist cut across group lines." After these new men took the Sultan out of the picture. They the notables also accused of Bursa of having sold out to the Greek forces with whom the Kemalists were en a life or death for "the gaged in struggle. whereas political core it had undertones Kemalist of plebiscitar?an and the state's democracy "intermediate" duty to eliminate groups. ing representation. the Grand National Here the Kemal Assembly. they passed a statute prohibiting cause we have no studies of the composition and uniformity of this precise we cannot say much about their cohesiveness. which had become in influential after 1885. the provincial notables seemed Young more evil than or even for they had been for the traditional bureaucrats. a diffuse ists were pitted was the party of against group which mainly notables led by alienated members of the official class. Be schools.34 view of science as the touchstone War of this center (1920-1922). as a tainly served rallying point against Kemalists. religion.37 The of the Kemalists' to the Second symbolic expression opposition and to provincials focused on For the moment. stating that the Ministry gendarmes preying civilian population.35 tendencies whose membership a series of These men formulated extremely interesting policies regard the military. the following to them much Turk Revolution.33 capital The old Ottoman motto of preservation of "religion and the state" thus in the Young Turk refurbished emerged slogan of "Union and Progress. but the cluster cer group. Group however. politics. and religious practice. This group has been known as the "Second were aug Group. the notables' bills aiming early parliament at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when currents were to be seen as a real separatist beginning circles of the threat. education they strongly supported through religious the consumption of alcohol. Mustafa Kemal did not show his hand. Both sides claimed to be working but for the Second this expression had clear connotations people. fitted in well with this attitude." But in the Assembly they a mented more inchoate cluster of representatives with Islamist by larger. In the Young Turk reformers. Independence once within the again organ of the na periphery duality appears directing tional resistance movement. Sophisticated political During the Turkish .36 On the other hand. religious a five year residence to in an electoral They wanted requirement impose as a district as a prerequisite to for election candidacy they at deputy. With the end of the War of and the victory of the Kema Independence it became easier to assume a hold over lists. to control the and began to attach the to the tempted military gendarmerie were on the of the Interior." Group of decentralization and economic and for the liberalism. instruction.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 181 modernist of truth.

At that time an ex the provinces." action. in which revolution and/or by providing on the real services to the lower classes. of whether political parties. light. and because it under close observation. the Kurdish them to the surface. in 1930. there was no link between Although It was suppressed the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. linguistic It is no coincidence that and historical myths.182 ?ERIF MARDIN were as intimidation. the same year because said to be its links with "religious re of what were had been the central than "Kurdishness. It is understandable. more theme of the revolt. in a number of ways: by an organizational tion could have been achieved the notable was actively opposed. as well the Party of the Kemalists. The Repub used with persuasion. successfully was an formed When its members.39 The province. or even earlier. what into the ranks of the the provincial. he personally into the picture at this time to forge a new national stepped identity for the Turks. the out from the that went party warning was "Do not go into the pro characteristic: Party Republican People's un our national to vincial towns or villages unity will be gather support: will be resurrected dermined. the center had few means of realizing pendent the perennial Ottoman dream of working local through supine ideally In fact. was once more identified with treason the secularist aims periphery. this time connecting political parties. tactics. the Party and the revolt. established lican People's Party. compromise radically People's Republican at the time of the Young Turks. A second trauma. a Law for the activities with whose coincided for wide powers Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government two years. problems. when important political opposition was formed for the third time. cultural matters. notable class was successfully co-opted This did not differ Party. against in the in this of the Republic. that beginning to Mustafa Kemal should have devoted his energies early 1930's. and/or by an ideology focussing . De from what prevailed as it was on the notables.38 the primary aim in the suppression of this Party seems to have Although in which it was made been the elimination of the context political rivals. the Kemalist revolu intermediaries for the benefit of the peasantry. among party opposition discipline a Kurdish revolt in 1925. an In 1946 after Ataturk's death." Regardless 1923 and 1946 the the sense of the the fact is that between periphery?in an area of was considered it potential provinces?was suspect."40 meaning groups primordial "provincial as this argument was disingenuous. should be underlined. the political center disaffection. kept is that a sizeable portion of Given is remarkable all this tension. the primary locus of the revolt in the town of Menemen. and religious reaction. The nightmarish fissions seen before and during the War of Independence rebellion brought had traumatic effects. occurred from with multi-party received strong support periment politics which in a minor "Patrona" type the many groups opposing resulted Kemalism." and indeed this.

clamor had gone up in the first years of the Ankara government. peripheral the strengthening ideational of apprehending in these terms was the the consequence problem cast of the were "backward" and program: peasants Republican be changed by the laws of the land. The characteristic Integration general approach behind . of the recall any members ruling elite having constructed an or Chinese of peasant mobilization. The Re the single party through which People's Party. But the problem. which be used as a shorthand notation to might of this attitude. the multiple show that what little capital recapture layers a genera there was came to be invested in institutions that would shape tion of true Kemalists at the center. in some regions of Turkey. one that allowed and to survive despite the economic Turkey Yet this option seems to have been weakness of the new Republic. As for attempts by officials to themselves with the peasant. new links and the for establishing opened up by the Republic possibilities between and peasants were not fulfilled. place ant in the system. these are identify limited to a few radical teachers. despite the populist themes which the Republic developed.41 One would highly ture. in retrospect. Again. the meager government sector financed much of of the reconstruction surplus of the agricultural on the notables The peasant for credit. however. but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened?partly else. was unable to establish contact with the publican policies so much rural masses. protection. Russian operative theory style. derived not so much from what. masses." for which "toward was thin. peared Turkey I do not. such as the only transforming unrealistic law?what Marxists would call the superstruc village from the top down Ottoman had been the by imposing regulations social engineering. one has a feeling that the tradi tional Ottoman is relation with In the periphery being perpetuated. In fact. energies building of national rather than to radically altering the of the peas identity. Republican were channeled. of the bureaucratic The members class under the Republic had little an notion of identifying is with the peasantry. This the perpetuation of dependence might have been wise decision. symbol of the as the "fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist peasant were devoted to the but Kemalist of symbols movement. and. though it meant a very on notables. The movement the people. social as still depended Turkey. It is this aspect of the bureau against the periphery?before everything cratic code that was profoundly unrevolutionary. the builders of the Turkish Republic placed even of the state first in their priorities. went Republic.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 183 In fact. This themselves perhaps unfair judgment. military seem rational considerations. This is fairly understandable in view of the limited re sources of the in fact. vestments in education. given the large literature on the that ap village question in at the time and given the experiment of village institutes. deeper. The sistance.

and abundance on the other. was also promised greater freedom.184 features In ?ERIF MARDIN of Kemalism show that this view of society was still preeminent. their ideas about modernization organizational-mobilizational the publication Kadro activists which had a number of Marxist (1931-1934) in its ranks. The only current within Kemalism side of modernization which was . an idea which also had an by integration vu. To the extent that regulation had always been a structuring maxim of Ottoman had an unmis rule. tive state justice distributing But this time it was the stance. closer to the center by side. People's Party had been this date. was not brought a remarkable these policies. by bureaucratic equally hampered on influence. already suspect as separatist. aspect certain contemporary masses schemes of modernization. This was the old Ottoman ported by idea of the state being solicitous of the interests of its subjects: the protec on the one hand. they also did not integrative or were unable to work of modern it into existence. bureaucratize and liberalize religious Finally. some erstwhile and prominent of the Republican members by People's was not so much a party of notables as it was a Party in 1946. was in medium for public participation but this transformation politics. an old Ottoman was to be advancement theme. legislate to be seen in this The thinness of Kemalist ideology has light. While showing ability for small but sustained the could see that it was paying for the prosperity of the growth. that local no surprising to and that the state was unable tables kept their hold over the peasantry. the haven of its religious it is not culture. while peasant peated achieved from the top down. but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational that. private controls and angered by its enterprise. we have only to look at the themes that won the alienation in the first multi Democrat Party 81 per cent of the seats in Parliament it would to the The new party promised services bring party elections. of element of d?j? had a fine understanding the Kemalists Altogether. for a re mobilized of society. Turkey. in regulation." takably traditional took note of the component. society. Thus. legitimate politics. when action. Ataturk was to do with what he had not achieved trying ideology through political or a commitment to radical mobilization in social struc changes through ture. periphery as consolation. practices. To show this periphery who had preempted that the issues that were so central to the opposition had their roots in the from the center." After it became "a for political parties emerged. party that a it speculated with political ideology which thought would be strongly sup the rural masses and by their patrons. that it was being given speeches but being denied cities. dependence political at most a "means Until the Republican 1946. Just as the Kemalists missed of mod the mobilizational aspects see too well the nature of the net ernization. re a theoretical the Kemalist to the peasant commitment program. The Democrat founded Party. drive a wedge into the unity of the periphery. This was a hard burden to shift onto The Turkish country ideology. concern of as a take his daily problems de peasants.

the electoral the periphery as seen in Democrat of the opposition. was not a land rich. together. progressive People's Party's legislation had kept a rootless as some them from becoming but then. and client politics flour ished on a new level. identified being Party its four official founders were Ironically. members have continued is People's Party not an element in the of 1950's Turkey was still early politics. The laws of the Republic. Party political platform especially in newspapers. Republican not have realized rural following might The Democrat that the very stemmed from the success of the of these bargains possibility Republican an economic in The workers. . opportunities much more pervasive than in the earlier situations. debate between "real populists" and "bureaucrats. but it was undeniably would People's publican Party a form that a greater form of mobilization. gratefulness. lost. Moreover.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 185 to it. Al relatively the notable-peasant whose framework was a common alliance." This symbolic and cul tural paraphernalia?the and religious of mosques conspicuous patronizing rituals by members of the Democrat and the reluctant follow-up by Party the Republican that secularism was with protests Party?laced People's the Democrat with the culture of the periphery. This was not the form of mobilization that the Re a have approved. and the success in of the Republic the infrastructure of reforms had gradually building in the master-servant relation between patron and client. of the masses portion brought into a relation with the center than had been possible under the meaningful People's Party. and thus land redistribution major issue.42 On the contrary. who at infrastructure. regions. The electoral cam to see his village ways began increasingly at just the right time to of the Democrat intervened paigns Party provide rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior. proletariat. People's Party to Islam achieved by the Democrat The high resonance Party's appeal as the culture of the in the light of acquires greater significance periphery a Behice Bor an in the 1940's.43 Party relegitimized sufficient The tween blows dealt 1950-1957 endeared to the power and the of the bureaucracy prestige to both the notables the Democrat Party under new conditions. Deals. increasingly tween notables saw new and villagers. the villager greater contact with as inferior. Smaller men notables surrounding success. alliance was now continued be and the not to entice the peasants. rather than domination. The many transitional Democrat Islam and traditional rural values. and in the media. except changed the still such as Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. Boran discovery by the Turkish sociologist came into found that as villages towns. for economic and bargains became trade-offs. might thought that the Republican earlier. building People's Party not have the time usually voted for the Democrat Party. the growth of the judicial apparatus. of the Republican to believe. the lines of a established propaganda. just as much part of the bureau cratic "class" as other members. undeveloped Economic set the relation be power.

periphery is its short-run gratifications. In these straits. because the lism"?an attempt an issue was not so much down to the grass roots as providing getting means no confi alternative of fundamental change. by planned advice than by toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing seem to have a lower classes. Whether decision: bureaucratic again.44 figured was All of the protests mounted by the Republican People's Party that it of democratic the real Party of change and the real supporter procedures were the latest appeal of a faction of the Party to "popu thus lost. worked than would rather well. the cleavage be The Revolution of May 27. and integration. placed to identify the recent ( 1971 ) intervention It was easy for the periphery in Turkish with a desire for a return to the rigidity of the military politics of the intentions behind the move or the popu of the old order. tween the center. the Republican Party stood fast for the People's selected it as the of Kemalist ideals. personal. party they good reasons to claim the that the Republican Party represented People's the "demo Democrat "bureaucratic" the center. now identified with the preservation The old polarization of the real "party of movement. 1960 once more underlined of a static order. has recently of the Republic." as the source of sovereignty in the Kemalist only ideology. it of the Republican various because electoral program Party. progressive." and the periphery. they would identification with the plight of the over one's fate to the limbo of seems to relegate all control point. with of mobilization method more fewer risks than the Turkish bureaucracy's and presents sys tangible Insofar as the center's attitude tem of mobilization economy. And. a new form: the preservers of the Pro center against acquired periphery order against those who wanted crustean. thus. change. regulation is irrelevant. the bureaucrats preservation now one There were with which could best cooperate.186 ?ERIF MARDIN to either side would bring greater benefits that collaboration understanding state control. still believe observable direct. The grass roots had constitution in the in the outlined and populist policies dence democratic. Regardless of the of law and order. instead of future tasks in terms of organiza seeing its tion and mobilization. deposed president of 1924 and the new the Turkish Constitution between that the difference of 1960 amounted to the consti after the revolution adopted as one of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals tutional legitimization source of to the "Turkish in addition who had earlier sovereignty people. whereas Party represented cratic" periphery. . People's no confidence in its methods of change. of the implications of planning this is a correct assessment creates is that of officials that the perception of regulation the polarity versus all others. Even to get down to the grass roots?dissipated. the elements lar support for the reestablishment that their down-to-earth. Planning once raises its ugly head. The early Republican commented Celal Bayar.

Since this to the second facet of peripheral worked identity." "free floating" York: Collier. I should add that the picture is.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 187 Once my thesis is stated this simply. Periphery. The paradox was productive of a unifying national which unexpectedly skein. primordial culture. 1969). a of the in fact. a national in the sense of pro the center was so suspicious?produced unity it was used by the Democrat around common vincial unification themes. see Birthday. Organized of the of owners against non-owners The cross-cutting cleavages periphery. allegiances. more labor is not completely part complex. N. facilities from author the many is derived 1. stance?of which peripheral paradoxically. There both of new cleavages of the bureaucracy Certain members the periphery. Polanyi on His pp. parties and center But these are future aspects of Turkish politics. as made up of the periphery clearer outlines during modernization: as the center of a counter-official and the periphery groups. as well as fortuitous But the policies of the modernizers. Thus. and also for its operating one aspect of the cessors. A party representing have been Kurdish attempts at separate organization concerning rumblings is evidence and of dif heard for some time. developments. made available at Princeton "Centre and in in the Program the department initial formulation Eastern Studies. periphery with References This a Fellow sity and article was written while of Near for the author was in residence The that were Shils. My Edward The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Seventieth here 2. For (New p. is that this common code of the Party in its rise to power. S. highlight it was able to submerge in almost all of provincial Turkey. are an aspect of Turkish that could change means of production politics and has emerged. the Shi'ite minority the picture. within ferentiation are now aware of the demands and integrated of a differentiated quite to and some of them are defecting modern representing system. 117-130. code seem to have emerged two facets of the peripheral In retrospect. is still one of its extremely structural compo important periphery polarity nents. the periphery. passim. Both were b?tes noires of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. 1961). periphery not have emerged if the policies of the center toward the would probably had been more conciliatory. resources Macmillan. Free as University is grateful to the Univer to this end. 11 March 1961 Essays Presented (Glencoe: to Michael Press. 117. Eisenstadt. a nationwide for a party basis of allegiance also bureaucracy provided suc at the national Democrat level?the Party. The Political System of Empires . identity emerged code that ?if not to overcome aspect of the peripheral entirely?that as counter this identity harked back to primordial Later.

in the Economic East in M. Ibid. Diizeni (Ankara: to which Turkmen tradition. p. 23." 13 (December 1958). of Medieval Hellenism and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh (Berkeley: anthropologist. University (Cambridge: A. (1966). Press. the few who legal title to acquired they had gained control of these History. and For p. 6. R. University 206-218.I. the other of rural government. Cuisenier. 2. with assertive and compare the earlier more pp. 1970). See "Osmali Inalc?k. urban tradition direct University could which of of California still state Press. University passim. land acquired into shifted 45 World. pp. Gibb Oxford 4. cially Party Party Press. Structures. I owe see Halil of these features "The Rise of the Ottoman survey Inalc?k. Vol. and E. Ankara Osmanli Devletinde Hukuk Siyaseten Fakiiltesi Katl (Ankara: Ajans-Tiirk no. 221-228. in 1966: of 1971). See Gibb Islamic and Bowen." Etudes No. day's see Ismail Besikci. 14ff. important Seymour "Cleavage in An and Voter and Rokkan. S.188 3. 224. of Democratic Harper. Revolution. Abrahamian this expression who East Studies. "The Ottoman See Halil Economic Mind and Aspects Econ of the Ottoman Inalc?k. J. 20. 12. Society pp. I 1966). of 4/5th Turks. The Cambridge Islamic Lands Press. of Islam Day pp. pp. Vol. p. and 39-199. Society article "Devshirme" nuanced and Bowen. 2. 258-285. in Turkish was who an Universitesi Fakiiltesi Halil "Land Problems Inalc?k." to the Present the Rise Oxford (London: Press. The Central of Islam. eds. p. Bilgiler Mat p. 39-199 210-213. Vol. 1959).. 7.. See Dergisi. Islamic Society passim. Vol. E. A. I. Ahmet 1963) Halil Mumcu. For a ?ERIF MARDIN Empire. and Harold Bowen. Age 1-64. Friedrich. Islamic 1950-1967). For inWestern in our Europe Changing see Reinhard Social Order Bendix. the West. C. 19. Ankara 68-79. Friedrich." eds. 14. 295-323. in P. R. I. Padi?ah?. The pp." important element a it?usually resources. R. Eastern Anadolunun Turkey Dogu 1969). p. 9. uses it in a forthcoming article in the West. Holt. Introduction. pp. Systems Alignment: Lipset and Voter Cross-National Free York: (New Systems Alignment: Perspectives 1967). J. part I (London: University to Prof. pp. See Gibb University 11. 1660 Nation-Building (New York: Studies (New York: Wiley. of the Baroque. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. The Age of the Baroque 1610 The Age 1952). pp. tribes belong here 219-242." History 1970). See baasi. pp. the West.. here M. ownership tween center Officials and periphery.. No. Land ( 1955). Palmer. 1957-1969). Studies of the Middle from History omy. R. study of H. "There through the Fifteenth Centuries a French one of old a to descendant is the Turkey the Oghuz and pp. 180. 22-26 Rurales. are two truly Turkeys.. part 2 and compare with (London: Oxford Press. literature on in this Speros subject for the The time Decline of the formation of the Ottoman in Asia Empire Minor 8. Princeton and espe (Princeton: Press. 71. Bernard Lewis. the International Journal of Middle relevant aspects of the development and Citizenship. Y. Lambton. of the state 5.. general Ann K. the more 10. The is summarized Vryonis. 1-142. Yay?nlari. Cook. Universitesi Yayinlarindan Siyasal 13. ed. I. in the be boundary as well surreptitiously?as peripheral stance once The Muslim .

105-157. I. Kramers.. Societies and Gibb ibid. p. from Max Weber. 712. p. (2). first ed.: Harvard University Press. session. 1966). 1966). p. Ben de Yazdim: Milli M?cadeleye Giris Istibdat 13 ser. 808. pp. and eds. the time of May the Young 24-25. Political Princeton (Princeton: Press. (Princeton: pp. University Japan and Turkey 46-48. Ramsay. passim. For man 27. part Hukuku Tanzimat: 1." Belleten. and "Ottoman M. See M. 24." 1966). 16. 1910. 5). see Halil "The Nature of Traditional the earlier of notables Inalc?k. Instanbul 81-98. For (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi. (Glencoe. See See zimat the pp. in the Otto pp. ve For Toplumsal Siyasal this concept. 329. Turks. 1971). of Islam.. see Roderic Princeton H.. see Geertz. University Uygulanmas? ve Sosyal Tepkileri. C. Between under pp. For Old 18." Political 23. Press. Iskit. 623-690. and Myron Weiner. I. Fakiiltesi Universitesi Edebiyat Karamanlilar. Server Bas?mevi. 30. 325. 1911. 1962). 212-217. I take Claus this Wittich. Dunya Celal (Istanbul: Baha Matbaase. "Conclusions: The of Parties Impact in LaPalombara Parties and Weiner. M. 1876 the Administrative Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: University Birinci Mesrutiyet Tarihi VIII: Ziya Karal. 22. For later developments Old and New: The Ottoman Stanford Shaw. ve and see Clifford New States Islamic ?mer in Geertz. 229. 1730 passim. Society Lutfi "The Free and see of Islam I. terminology eds. Aktepe. 3 vols. 26. ve Reform 1963). importance in Robert Mod E. and (1858) p. 247 1274 tarihli "Turk Toprak Barkan. Yapi p. F. Turkey. Revolution" Integrative Press. B. pp. eds.. 14 (March Tarih Dergisi. pp. 409. 1971). 959 ff." Encyclopedia Ozer Kbyde Ozankaya. 1963). See on Joseph Political LaPalombara Development. Sevin? "Askeri.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 189 15. see also the 71st Parliament. 1964). 28 "Tanzimat?n (1964)." Tan Yil d?n?m? M?nasebetiyle 20.. Nesriyat Turkiyede p. Devirleri 136-171. in Arazi Kanunamesi. Vol. History" Encyclopedia Mehmet Sahabeddin "Semsuddin Bey Devrinde Tekindag. For the Kultur 17. 113. Turks. 413. (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Empire 21. p. Davison. Bayar. For 96th provincial and 97th April opposition sessions to of secularism the Ottoman at ( 1915-1916). 1940). See 3. p. Matbaasi. the West. Ward and Dankwart Rustow. Political Society. Munir Fakiiltesi Yay?nlar? G. 475. W. 19. 1968). Mass. "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of Its Causes and Effects. .. Tarihinde Y?z?nc? ed. Patrona No. Yay?nlar?ndan. Press.. Hareketleri Tarihine bir Bakls (Istanbul: Devlet 1939)." in ernization Princeton Press. Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge. Law of 1864. Isyani: 1958)." Proceedings of the British Academy 25. 451. See Halil Development Inalc?k. Bowen. Enver 1907 Tarihi 28. (New York: Economy Bedminister and and Roth Guenther Society. 29. Osmanli tarih kurumu (Turk (Ankara. No. p. traditional in situation (Ankara: setting 1968-69. Vol. 16. Vol. IV.

F. "Yeni 1971). Emergence. basimevi. Orhan Okay. 35. Roos. Behice Boran. 90. property. on notables primarily Vol. Szyliowicz. script edition boards Zabit Turkiye II. "The Estimates in the First Turkish of Private Republic Internal Rates of Return International on Educational Journal In 1923-1960. vestment T.. On Millet the Press. 60-117. Z. M. Recruitment World Role The "Elite of the Mulkiye. on article of Modern 14 of On the party program. on notables Ceridesi." This in higher data per cent of graduates posts P. 1 (April 1970). I. 43/3-8-1336.190 31. "Ba?vekilim Adnan Menderes. pp. 1971). Partiler. . Siyast Lewis." Belleten. nevertheless 44. Roos. Managers L. 40. Celal Bayar. and Unwin. Turkiyede see Bernard the revolt Oxford University The Press. University Kazamias. 449. in the Quest Education and (London: for Modernity Turkey to this information 12." 43. Dissertation." it Hurriyet. service. but 1945). military protecting 38. Second de Yazdtm. Turkey 20. II. 386. Tar?k Turkiyede 1952). p. note by Joseph in L. Birlik." in Demokrasi Yolunda (The Hague: 1964). 34. 2nd ed. 35 (January Pasan?n ?s?ginda K?mil here pp. I was alerted 1966). pp. 42. Turkey. [Ad?var]. 266. 1969. 1928). Biiyuk Millet 182-183. The Turkish Ordeal see Vol. Tunaya. Hareket note Yay?nlar? 1. See Celal On the Bayar. See M. Osman Faruk Logoglu. pp. and Noralou in Harvard tion Organization Mass. (London: See Tunaya.. interpretation (April is also at variance is "significant. 33.. Y api Arastirmalarl Toplumsal out that 218-219. 538-539 and Halide Edib Century 36. p. See Lewis.D. p. 1969). Besir Fuad (Istanbul: Vol. evading in as persons interested ibid. 29/6-7-1336. 85. Vol. On Zabit 37. 156-176. "Partiler ve Mill? 41. p." Turkey: concur that 10 cannot with his but 23 Politics. June 29. Siys? Partiler (Istanbul. (New York: Meclisi Ceridesi municipal Meclisi the gendarmerie by the civilians Latin I. 135. p. 304. ?zelli. SERIF MARDIN Siyasal durumu. 417. of p. 617 The Emergence 1968). Andreas Allen Belgelerin pp. pp. Princeton (Ankara: this was of Turkey p. Unpublished "Ismet Ph. 32. Ben Group. Ibid.: and Elites (1950-1969) (Cambridge. 110-111. Turk a tarih transitory 1970. Press. Boran points served the Democrat Party well. Kurumu situation 1945-1965. 433." of Middle East Studies. In?n? and the Political Modernization University. p. 39. II. 260. p. K?pr?f?. p. see II. control 183. p. 1971). p. with that given of Moderniza by Leslie Jr. passim. their see not being of the people T?rkiye representative Biiyuk Vol. Ill.

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