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MARDIN Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?
just as certain societies have stronger centers centers are forged vary than others, the materials of which greatly between to con of attempts societies.1 The Middle East has had a long history even efforts struct the institutional of such centers, framework though resources were, more to marshall often than not, these "free floating"2 ex as an outstanding the Ottoman Here, emerges ephemeral. Empire a in the Ottoman There was, center ception. lasting supported Empire, a network of institutions. by sophisticated The methods the Ottomans and varied. By co used were ingenious in the elite individuals recruited at an early age from opting largely ruling them into the official class, by tightly religious minorities, by socializing not necessarily the system of taxation and controlling, though centralizing, "Society Yet land administration, and by dominating the religious the establishment, center and strong leverage in the spheres of justice and education, acquired in the dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy.8 These imperial achieve ments emerge even more in relation to the situation in clearly neighboring Iran. Iranian rulers were often jug merely "grand manipulators," gingerly over which were unable to establish con gling the many social forces they success in these matters a cannot fully be evaluated trol. But Ottoman by contrast with the institutions of its a fuller To establish simple neighbors.4 another comparison is in order, one that places the Ottoman perspective side by side with the emerging, Western centralized state, and its Empire
successor, the modern nation-state.
the form of government in the West which "Leviathan," emerged in the middle of the seventeenth and the later nation-state had century, a role to in the development of Ottoman At first institutions. play they were seen as rivals who were to excel in those areas beginning precisely where the Ottomans had traditionally for achievement. themselves prided the process of modernization, the Ottomans however, Eventually, during looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own Both
In the Ottoman the nineteenth before these char century Empire seem to be acteristics and integration of multiple confrontation missing. the burghers." into the workers became while. These successive confrontations of their autonomous recognition had important consequences. the autonomy of periphery.170 because that ?ERIF MARDIN contrasts to Ottoman institutions. ern state included what of centralization the process a series of confrontations that created to the mod with compromises leading the feudal nobility. The state's of nomads contingent on the was But in with nomads endemic. in accorded. Because state before modernization of its that shaped the Ottoman feudal antecedents. or the "privil?gi?s. always tween the center and the In addition. the clash between generated was a contest that civilization man's cultivated the Ottoman stereotype and nomadism. a clash be the major confrontation Rather. peripheral de facto. The consequence of was that Leviathan were nation-state these compromises and the relatively even a one-sided structures. This paper takes up the ways this cleavage was perpetuated modernization. were when Until the confronta they "dependent recently. the core of the Empire. a introduced These identifica variety of political cross-cutting cleavages tions which for much of the flexibility of modern Western European provided center existed within a system of politics. production. One the outstanding became the always of urban dwellers with of these was the incompatibility large in Anatolia. labor. recognition Western which were from the Lord or Prince"6 even "separate Europe. during The Traditional System and periphery and economic life. periphery difficulty dealing more nomads and urban dwellers than this.5 Also. industrial the cities. the linkages with peripheral in estates found a elements: medieval the lower classes parliaments. victory?was integration or the center was achieved. urbanization and that all nomadic were between things There many were reasons the opposition why issue of Ottoman political of center . may be called the forces of the periphery: and later."7 was the most center and tion between social cleavage important periphery to have Turkish and one that seemed survived more underlying politics in which than a century of modernization. The forces they present structural seem to vary from those the state in the West significantly shaped set in. corporations. Thus the feudal estates. between varied: nation builders conflicts between and owners between of the means and non-owners of localists. obtaining integrated polity some status. an important social forces was more than anything difference from the institutional to estates for example. The confrontations and co-optations had been state and church. Each time a compromise?or well articulated some of the peripheral force into the obtained. was unidimensional. place were accorded the franchise. at the same time.
cleavage only deserving can still be seen in Eastern nomad and sedentary today population social structure. speak. self-appointed religious heterodoxy. and the highly segmented munities controlled their leaders. becoming in Turkish). obviously. barring certain exceptions. ecological general. component set apart from the Those who opposed the officials. One for a more complete integration when may count among these semi-autonomous groups the non-Moslem com in the more Thus. were closer Anatolia own .8 was the Another of the center-periphery component cleavage suspicion traces of a of the center towards the remaining and pre-Ottoman nobility a number in the star had risen of powerful whose families provinces The provinces were also hotbeds of intractable with that of the Ottomans. open dynasty. having excluded free-born Moslems from these posts. problems ment: the confrontation the Sultan and his officials on the one between on the other. stopped the Ottomans tasks. one of the differences. This aspect of Ottoman social society. religious by were the center and the periphery two very sense. and basic issues of the statistical data. were segmentation. a siahs presented and well-remembered the threat. so to on the other side of the fence.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 171 A residue between of this basic of contempt. a of localism tolerated by the All of this occurred against background before social engineering insurmountable for Ottoman center. this impediment to access rankled. When long-lasting to the throne. organizational encountered the seal of legitimacy the new social institutions by giving they a system of decentralized to local usages and by enforcing accommodation No attempt was made toward ethnic. as but by virtue of certain distinctive by certain For a long time. syncretic cults. the official figured as a person with no ties and as to the goals of the ascriptive totally devoted implementing The establishment to accusations of was. In this ideal scheme. not only periphery by being. mes Turbulent sects. Friction also existed between the kul and the members of the religious establishment who.9 an ideal that of the bureaucrat the Sultan's slave (kul pattern. and regional particularisms. religious. together with loosely related worlds. symbolic distinguishing was re marks for a number of high?and low?officials that many were cruited from non-Moslem to establish This practice was designed groups. set one of the primary of the Ottoman establish fragmentation. Ottoman became havens for pretenders provinces occasionally the the added onus of having served as a launching gained periphery pad for rebellions. structure of Ottoman Anatolia hand. as well status characteristics. is studies since it is the territorial important for modern particularly of modern Turkey. therefore. As the Empire dealt with expanded. loose ties proved workable. Turkey where so contrast those with settled agriculture thirteen provinces with sharply a in the four provinces and residues of with found economy pastoral nomadism.
as freehold. Conversely. was this was a feature of the way by merit.172 ?ERIF MARDIN The and institution was thus religious the periphery. power. He could alienate land when he chose. was and the masses. but.11 politics in their administrative extensive wielded be power capacity. by the state.10 The bases of the distinction between the official elite and the periphery were to be found in economic as well. costs for the administrator's certain and other office employing personnel the wielders of expenses. It was with indirect privileges of access only after the or the of official patronage its nadir that the practice reached Empire influence exerted by court circles seem to have become more important. but most relatively and could. little land was given out in freehold. Latifundia existed. During moder it was of the center. Moslem The contrasted. were to administrative subject they special. but families with a history of service to the state held privileged positions.13 Property on arable were included in this system. but it was also an aspect of Ottoman legitimacy: were the first citizens of the realm. by and large. daily on the border line between the center nization. One aspect highlighting the difference between all types of officials the operation of the bureau both rural and urban. Its arrogation of the major control of the economy it its control of the commerce of foodstuffs. Conversely. political over the economy was a further The tight control established by the state in the Ottoman of the primacy of Officials example Empire. when of them were usurped be confiscated necessary. The suggestion but action was restricted by three major considerations. by peasant by expropriated the original under which the land had been circumventing understanding state was always alert to the that such fraud had granted. Officials were not variables subject was to taxation. advancement Some the Empire was most official careers were made when vigorous. when their income the Empire compared flourishing to This was partly attributable favorably with that of the richest merchants. cratic core of the state.12 the entire life-style of the patrimonial official and free-born perspective. not the merchants. due to hereditary however. and because of the identified with secularizing the increasingly periphery. On the contrary. The Sultan had full property rights land outside the cities. land could only be fraud. was the center and the periphery between confrontation not. while In some regions land had been granted in others. on land it tried to and the strictness with which ownership. policies to the life of the lower classes. law and lacked the "civil rights" of the Moslem In a wider population. its members of officials provided this second pool for the recruiting only to officialdom. placed were enforce social stratification all de sumptuary regulations through over the nodal to maintain of society the state's authority points signed relations and to build a corresponding image of paramountcy. cause of their kul status. been perpetrated. the limitations and society. in fact. a transmission of official status. per .
A number of changes away from the original system of military run to favor notables in this respect. phenomenon. as it did during the nineteenth century. politics to death for reasons of state. This connotation is the one which still retained grim siyaset in a study carried out in 1968 and 1969. tried to protect the consolidation individual of land. the rulers adopted languages?Persian were to the lower classes ?that and worked these into the foreign benefited from one of the educational official culture. families. urban. Today. this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the in the cities influenced Rulers and officials were heavily periphery. when the image of the periphery. officials. Even economic of the Sultan as a provident father had a tangible reality. there were by the myth of the majesty access on the common mortal's to the symbols of restrictions placed or settled. urban cultures the culture of earlier. and politics grim things from which kept in Turkish.14 peasant holdings by adopting statutes to hamper its control was bolstered and economic The state's claim to political by to the heterogeneity Relative of the periphery. population.15 The periphery only institutions that trained members of the establishment?the religious train its own institutions. and siyaseten kail means siyaset means apart. by in into Ottoman culture in particular was diffused Iranian bureaucratic and Arabic stitutions. as persons with whom the central officials had many of they points and also as rivals who tried to get the greatest possible share of the contact. the periphery developed ing extremely but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status. For example. such as the Iranian. In this code the set of which kept officials alert to the erosion by the of principles periphery an the achievements of the center occupied On the other important place. This particularly as part the urban masses could also be counted urban. negative. for in this matter at the height of the Ottoman power.16 for peasants These aspects of the style of state domination and of official status and culture together made up a cluster. but in earlier official conderrmation parlance a synonym for a death sentence rea siyaset (politics ) was also imposed for sons of state. the seizure of land by not have the power?or the will?to did oppose notables. an institutional code. a cultural the ruling class was compact. successful. When in the "fiefs" worked long it the state could re-assert itself. the were the populace court. above all. this was. the entire mechanism of the Sultan. may be isolated positive. saw such as locally powerful hand. . the forces of the periphery. On the one hand. both rural and culture. an awareness best illustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite was true of the lower classes. on the other hand. Not surprisingly.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 173 was based on the feudal system in operation of property petuation rights state in many at the time of the Ottoman conquest. rural or For much of the nomad official culture. singularly one one Two elements. of the state was permeated here. title to cultural preeminence. regions the Finally. varied counter-culture.
particularly a cultivator with time of the rise of the Empire close ties to the being peasant. ripheral sharing When local notables were used in an official capacity. of the fragmentation of the dis its own code parate elements that entered into it. imposed by of those opposing the state's incursions into the economic if not a code that and social life of the periphery made up an attitude and heterodoxy. important "primordial groups"17 played fication with such a group was one of a variety of forms that this peripheral stance could take. particularism spelled an and identi role in the periphery. however.174 ?ERIF MARDIN meant for the center?which less agricultural surplus and other values for themselves. increased autonomy acquired defiance of state power or by outright could only be obtained rebel by to stand rich in land and powerful lion. Because of the periphery.20 Thus.18 system the normal fief holder at the efficient integrative mechanism.19 the Empire that Ottoman officials and that the relation between society. While European comparable was in their role as agents for the center. In fact. of anyone for outside officialdom legitimization kept alive the potential The world-view tension. periphery of social forces and because of the because of the normal fragmentation this possibility. Like the governing the cleavage between relied on local notables who emerged wise. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an awareness of the burdens the center. forms of the pe the many different a negative stance were similar only in view of officialdom. Despite status still had no autonomous influence and authority. counterbalanced Among linkages with the periphery which of recruitment of free-born these one may count the regular system into some parts of officialdom. it was to begin to develop much later. this attitude often obliged but the lack of any real softened. plunderers with the peasant heavily burdened officials and the periphery?especially a of "Oriental despotism. the local population increasingly at this juncture to articulate the growth of their local interests. only with the became of their decline own It was of . have been called What localism. these notables to that of the their legitimacy feudal nobility. public works subprovincial real hinge and the wide net of the religious institution?the foundations. and the state was to use them." the mark showed type of taxes?increasingly from the grimness of Sultanic rule in earlier different exploitation basically it to the earlier system only in the way times and comparable perpetrated elite and those excluded from it. signs that in squeez the local notables were no less interested where this occurred. a center of military "fiefs" was The between and periphery. this potential During between the center and the materialized both only sporadically. for violent confrontation the heyday of the Empire. the judicial system penetrating Moslems to the of the tradition and charitable level. only those notables enough are some There up to the state could gain greater autonomy.
but at least they saw it was in their ing the peasants services that interest to provide those minimum kept the system going. however. Empire during a state modeled to build reformers' after the nation attempt into and all brought the relations of the center with the state. ation even In the years the exchange. some of Western manners. some order into the mosaic Moslem of the elements bring periphery?to structure of the Empire. of the pe from the center. but this was rebellions the an effort to first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: a Westernize and administrative military organization propounded by section of the official elite. these "discrete elements" in the "national Finally. play The first was the integration of non-Moslem within the groups periphery. Through to a been asked to contribute that fizzled out military campaign heavily of the Palace. of estrangement One urban form of a new of the Ottoman type in Istanbul in 1730 in the form of the from the center appeared periphery their guilds.21 There had been many in Istanbul before. Ottoman Modernization During the Nineteenth Century stood out as demanding in the solution problems the nineteenth All were related to the century. and the second consisted of accomplishing the same for the nation-state. During later of modernization. this aliena riphery phases to be tion was compounded. However. on the cultural alienation dwell of the masses from the rulers. the subversion they sponded. through a bles into politics. of integration began to be seen after 1908. the artisans of Istanbul had so-called Patrona revolt. ground for a complete picture we should also of this and similar revolts.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 175 than was the state. following to take a minorities. When and the libertinism of eighteenth pomp of Versailles century to arms to prevent re called of traditional ways. was an aspect intrigues by statesmen which."22 This last development the first tangible co-optation twentieth of nota century. in the had to be brought "into meaningful territory" participation political was not initiated until the middle of the system. the Republic simpler. beginning The national of the non-Moslem of the Otto integration components man was more than achieved Empire by losses of anything by default. the nineteenth and early twentieth territory during century century. accompanied by aping and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Western ization. Turkish modernists have concentrated upon the back exclusively of political indeed. With its of of exchanges the Turkish Republic made the situ policy population. By then the lower because of the timidity and incompetence in Istanbul had for some time witnessed classes the Westernization of Ottoman to copy the statesmen and the Palace through various attempts France. might have continued suspicious view of non-Moslem Three outstanding Ottoman Ottoman .
and did not think so far as I know." "Abaza. gradually This established name was itself the as name an expression Osmanli.. Islamic-Imperial Ramsay notes: Until very recent times.23 By the third quarter of the nineteenth administrative century. sat very lightly on Christians. and therefore there was no general name by which the Unity of the Empire could be ex pressed. So far as I can of tribes learn there in the the existed country. As nationalism. "Arab. unity in exist a name which a Turkish-Moslem Empire. partial population a and educational unification tried to enforce of cultural They policy other areas of the Empire where much clearer ethnic cleavages throughout . Whether Abd ul-Hamid attached any importance to the adoption of one name or general designation for the Moslem subjects of the Empire. . took over at a time when The Young Turks (1908-1918) only this of the of Asia Minor unification had been achieved." gerated. right to call themselves by however. There did.. semi-nomad The tie to the Sultan country. the in the tendency an old historic title.176 but ?ERIF MARDIN in rare cases did constitute the substance only minority problems of an outstanding issue. but at least it is in Perhaps evitable name to that a process such to as he was give expression is a marked feature the it. by his policy gave strength to a natural Empire." and "Lezgi" were reality of the Empire. The architects ( 1839 set a foundation stone here had already their fiscal and 1876). integration Although was as much as that of the non-Moslem of a components just problem of the Turkish the Tanzimat reform policy. and the diffusion of it was a fact of Ottoman long before Abd ul-Hamid. the Sultan to Ottoman bring to the Moslem attempted periphery a sense of its center. Sultan Abdulhamid of the the remaining nomads to settle down." "Laz. unification feeling previously and all little. of a national or imperial unity to which he belonged.24 of success at national should not be exag But Abdulhamid's unification At the turn of the century. groups. The Turkmen Avshahr was satisfied to be Turkmen or Avshahr." "Tcherkess. a in Anatolia The name was government process any. nomad in while had no desire and were not accorded the Jews and certain heretic Moslems a name appropriate to imperial Turks. and of his reign. As is well underlined the Sir William unity with by a dream Pan Islamism was not so much Ramsay. state was an the Ottoman in the daily life of the increasing presence periph II (1876-1909) tried to continue the integration ery. therefore if unification many of name had little vitality." "Kurd. the motley population of Asia Minor appears to have or been perfectly content with tribal and racial designations. . still words that referred to the social "Arnaut. political it is usually of Moslem the national overlooked. attempting wide adoption as I can assert to out find should carry name of an imperial from positive knowledge. to real and . I am not aware. it was outside the sphere of his interest . through reforms. Abdulhamid's policy of as an effort to establish some form of of uniting all Moslems proto an to unite his people around idea. At the periphery by compelling same time.
With in the new this transformation centered regard area within which to operate.25 years in power and appear within.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 177 and Their better ineptitude organized. and it remained trying to establish to the end of one party often latent?issue of Kemalist although Policy rule in 1950. While uniformity the notables' another facet involved the new ubiquity of the activities. to undermine what support they might incipient for decen for their regime. existed and local to redeem limited his objectives Kemal Thus. developed was the of local notables' earlier basis influence Thus. they also seem to have represented glory to be a the forces of the periphery reacting against what they considered of Young Turk rule and a policy of centralization. who for Turkey. but elements also partly transformed the nature of that conflict. While opposed by of a rebel against the Sultan and claimed their aims to be the elimination to work for the greater of Islam. In the earliest ing Anatolia the movement for national stages of organizing independence. provincial to acquire a not a it never began periphery uniformity?if unity?which one facet of this was the new focus of had had before. groups were nationalism combined partly overlaps taken up under Social Cleavages The tion in the Nineteenth Century saw the end of the nineteenth of the penetra century beginning into certain more of market values regions of Anatolia. Anatolia. and client rela patronage began Patronage a structural transformation tions had Ottoman politics. Lack of integration. in economic In this respect. Between continuation 1920 and 1923. The problem of politically structure this segmented integrating only with the of national and may thus be integration problem a separate heading. his nationalist were surrounded for the govern by insurgent groups supposedly working ment of the Sultan Mustafa these groups pro Kemal. the determination the total picture. tier of the the upper pursuits. These to the the developments placed parties center-periphery cleavage in a new confrontation that embodied of the earlier clash. to the notables. For century changed of the nineteenth of reform century architects . opposition provincial theme of their sidered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main as well as outside. gradually as notables interest of all types and origin took an increasing transformed. force: the greater penetration of the state into the opposing periphery. following forces in Ankara the Ottoman withdrawal from World War I. demands have gathered as well as con to what were tralized administration. Mustafa (Ataturk). did not begin with a clean slate. but long permeated after the middle of the nineteenth instance. the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a strong undercurrent the architects of Kemalism among as a fundamental? their own center.
which.26 the between the lower classes?the the clearly hinge peasantry?and officials. one may this new stratum of notables." However. Among also the provincial men of a number of whom were place religion. while officials. With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. To this extent. only paid desultory a notables thus established symbiotic relation with the officials. inaugurated transmission belt of administration through locally elected councils work with time. their influence can be traced. Largely because of the hold that the state still maintained over the economy. notables still served as a administration. their belonged influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through in involvement Faced with seculariza religion and education. land the individuals ?roads. various registration procedures?as the of justice. these men became more clearly involved with the periphery. the great majority of the provincials?even of in or fluential provincials?were unable to send their children to unwilling the state .27 middle system had been considerably and lower-rank officials were in a The fashion. meant an attempt to the hold that men of keep religion had estab lished over the system of values and symbols. This role. dimension had again been unifying added to the peripheral a characteristic ideol code. increasing tion. the new economic of the notables. what had thus become was not an of the of Lum ogy periphery idiosyncratic merely proposal One reason for this is clear: modern institutions had educational penulema. property owners and also to the class of local "influentials.28 But the view of Islam cial touchstone of the Ottoman was shared by patrimony non-religious notables. into the new periphery by imposing obligations?taxes. Modernization of Turkish educational institutions had be on the those of the officials. military well as by offering new benefits service. cultural between the center and perpetuated cleavage the periphery. an Islamic. The provinces of the gun with lay margin world of elite education. we see Where they stood for administrative and for a continuation decentralization of local control over culture. con ing with provincial governors. the number in the Ottoman of positions ad ministrative increased after 1876. the pre-modern. notables began to appear in the ranks of Ottoman and in political parties parliament. the men of who had no other basis of status religion than their standing as men of as the cru religion. where these pursuits a second had become link between established and notables important. regulation registration?placed in the in closer contact with the administrative and judicial periphery Before the gradual penetration into the of a system of process. though modified tinued throughout the nineteenth notables thus became more century. In addition. in fact.178 to make citizens ^ERIFMARDIN out of the and to bring subjects of the Ottoman Empire. This was true for especially the poorer clerics. This was as much a for the advance acquired necessity ment own interests of the notables' as it was one for the of rendering services to their clients. and bribing a new dimension. periphery centralist in 1864.
complexes. however." Most significant. although obliged powerful to see them acquire real autonomy: this notables.29 sector of education was much easier for chil Entrance into the modern dren with fathers who were already part of the class of reformist officials. By the Turkey during the nineteenth that could be end of that century. the periphery by challenged intellectually more type of bureaucrat. uncompromising Modernization as the Westernization of the Bureaucrat to compromise with Ottoman statesmen. 1. The modernization emerged life in Turkey generally the gap between increased. In 1903 in the establish were area that had had some of Konya?an province development?there as to sector of secondary education. who had difficulties In this new was a new and found unity. was now including increasingly to secularism. of this Weberian racy. both upper and lower classes.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 179 data we have today suggest that only the brightest modern schools. the critical view of the provinces of civilization and of cultural of media sharply. the military for more than school socialization counted schools. response province's integrate into the new cultural The provinces centers of framework. to Islam. thus became was the fact that the "reaction. however.000 students schools) providing (religious tional equivalent. man were also in this new sense of persons of the periphery capital part in joining the stream of modernization.963 students in the modern opposed in 451 Medrese the tradi 12. A clinging was the to the center's inability to it trimony. as a backwater In this military milieu. its extension to middle school and by of education family socialization. No doubt the decentralist united by an Islamic opposition notables found this development The lower classes in the Otto heartening. to its cultural pa the "little" and the "great" culture. by its recruitment of a large portion of students from less privileged families. One section of the Ottoman bureaucracy had been attuned taken to the re quirements early relatively in reform century. rather than decreased. This reformist during the nineteenth as the earliest nodal of reform the modernization point of modernization and had the leadership selected bureaucracy of the educational . bureauc in racy was also changing century. What ones were to the be able to packed off capital with hopes that they would a channel of communication with official circles. The applicability sense that "bureaucratic" such as hierarchical structure. or even any In one of the key new educational part of the bureaucracy. the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy or "sultanic"30 were to a "rational" bureauc called "patrimonial" giving way in the formula is limited. were never resigned was the core of the code of the traditional bureaucrat. However. than "rational" claims. were elements. provincial world as a whole. such as rewards based on per much more evident formance.
the Sultan younger that the highest century.31 sources. They as nation-state to the Sultan's more gradual?sometimes timid? compared the diffu impatience approach. his achievement-oriented were in reaching access to the unclear how successful yet higher positions to the moderni institution Science?an of the School of Political graduates zation of which the the Sultan had given his full support." which was directed to aims very similar to those of Ottoman the nineteenth statesmen. No doubt the new intransigence . The national bureaucrat's partly reflected into the Ottoman sion of nationalist These ideas had ideologies Empire. national bureaucrats a modern to establish felt at odds with the Sultan was in their impatience state in allowed much less time for the elaboration of the Turkey. ideology opposed state. When these re notables preempted invited the antipathy of statesmen. an affected part of the Ottoman intellectual establishment and created not to be found among earlier reformers. on individuals who countered It is as directives. they reforming But to this opposition officials to notables we must of reformist add still another source of opposition which began to appear toward the end of the nineteenth mod century.32 Nevertheless. More it ernization during precisely. for while product he also relied the Sultan worked hard to rationalize Ottoman bureaucracy. cratic elite the guided by was was now formed earlier elite in molds then It that perpetuated.180 ?ERIF MARDIN over institutions preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy. was a of the Sultan's policy of half-way modernization. school-trained." In a way. During creation of credit institutions and other facilities made a reality of the idea of the state as a provident father. Taking the French model of the "Grandes Ecoles. to oppose who began bureaucrats and the military. tions and for a "closure" of the system might be called "national" looking as to the earlier. the subjects." A further point at which the new. did believe actively at the end of the nineteenth were staffed by persons administrative and governmental character posts ized more by their loyalty to the Sultan than by their ability. that there should the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. man in a new form. in many ways comparable brought product a new dimension the penetration With of the state into the provinces. Ottoman of "reason of bureaucratism. century Ottoman a well-trained. An at shoring up a direct relation between to establish the state and the tempt was made citizen. of an ideal of Otto be no intermediate be statesmanship allegiances tween the Sultan and his the later stages of reform. in reformers succeeded bureau producing knowledgeable a view of the "interests of the state. The new conflict resulted from administrative which was partly the revival. in maneuvers that large military units engage with live ammuni bition tion near the to eliminate The attitude these contradic seeking Capital. out a to the earlier official. was added to the traditional concern with the center. As for the the Sultan's modernist reforms did not fit in well with his prohi military.
the provincial notables seemed Young more evil than or even for they had been for the traditional bureaucrats. Mustafa Kemal did not show his hand. instruction. Group however. and decentralist cut across group lines. which had become in influential after 1885. a diffuse ists were pitted was the party of against group which mainly notables led by alienated members of the official class. In the Young Turk reformers. religion.37 The of the Kemalists' to the Second symbolic expression opposition and to provincials focused on For the moment." Group of decentralization and economic and for the liberalism. Be schools. This group has been known as the "Second were aug Group." After these new men took the Sultan out of the picture. but the cluster cer group.36 On the other hand. they passed a statute prohibiting cause we have no studies of the composition and uniformity of this precise we cannot say much about their cohesiveness. Independence once within the again organ of the na periphery duality appears directing tional resistance movement.33 capital The old Ottoman motto of preservation of "religion and the state" thus in the Young Turk refurbished emerged slogan of "Union and Progress. the more radical elements among the Kemalists pro tested that in the new law of "the people" were not repre municipalities sented on municipal councils. Both sides claimed to be working but for the Second this expression had clear connotations people. the notables' bills aiming early parliament at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when currents were to be seen as a real separatist beginning circles of the threat. the Grand National Here the Kemal Assembly.35 tendencies whose membership a series of These men formulated extremely interesting policies regard the military. They the notables also accused of Bursa of having sold out to the Greek forces with whom the Kemalists were en a life or death for "the gaged in struggle. and religious practice. fitted in well with this attitude.34 view of science as the touchstone War of this center (1920-1922)." But in the Assembly they a mented more inchoate cluster of representatives with Islamist by larger. to control the and began to attach the to the tempted military gendarmerie were on the of the Interior. stating that the Ministry gendarmes preying civilian population. With the end of the War of and the victory of the Kema Independence it became easier to assume a hold over lists. whereas political core it had undertones Kemalist of plebiscitar?an and the state's democracy "intermediate" duty to eliminate groups.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 181 modernist of truth. as a tainly served rallying point against Kemalists. politics. ing representation. religious a five year residence to in an electoral They wanted requirement impose as a district as a prerequisite to for election candidacy they at deputy. Sophisticated political During the Turkish . education they strongly supported through religious the consumption of alcohol. the following to them much Turk Revolution.
the center had few means of realizing pendent the perennial Ottoman dream of working local through supine ideally In fact. this time connecting political parties. should be underlined. of whether political parties. At that time an ex the provinces. that beginning to Mustafa Kemal should have devoted his energies early 1930's. what into the ranks of the the provincial. the Kemalist revolu intermediaries for the benefit of the peasantry. when important political opposition was formed for the third time. problems." Regardless 1923 and 1946 the the sense of the the fact is that between periphery?in an area of was considered it potential provinces?was suspect. among party opposition discipline a Kurdish revolt in 1925. kept is that a sizeable portion of Given is remarkable all this tension. or even earlier. as well the Party of the Kemalists. the out from the that went party warning was "Do not go into the pro characteristic: Party Republican People's un our national to vincial towns or villages unity will be gather support: will be resurrected dermined. the same year because said to be its links with "religious re of what were had been the central than "Kurdishness. and religious reaction. linguistic It is no coincidence that and historical myths. the political center disaffection. a Law for the activities with whose coincided for wide powers Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government two years. the primary locus of the revolt in the town of Menemen. established lican People's Party. in a number of ways: by an organizational tion could have been achieved the notable was actively opposed. and because it under close observation. The Repub used with persuasion. light. successfully was an formed When its members. he personally into the picture at this time to forge a new national stepped identity for the Turks. was once more identified with treason the secularist aims periphery." and indeed this. in 1930. occurred from with multi-party received strong support periment politics which in a minor "Patrona" type the many groups opposing resulted Kemalism. more theme of the revolt. there was no link between Although It was suppressed the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations." action. the Kurdish them to the surface.39 The province.182 ?ERIF MARDIN were as intimidation. cultural matters. against in the in this of the Republic."40 meaning groups primordial "provincial as this argument was disingenuous. A second trauma. notable class was successfully co-opted This did not differ Party.38 the primary aim in the suppression of this Party seems to have Although in which it was made been the elimination of the context political rivals. compromise radically People's Republican at the time of the Young Turks. tactics. De from what prevailed as it was on the notables. the Party and the revolt. and/or by an ideology focussing . in which revolution and/or by providing on the real services to the lower classes. an In 1946 after Ataturk's death. It is understandable. The nightmarish fissions seen before and during the War of Independence rebellion brought had traumatic effects.
though it meant a very on notables. The characteristic Integration general approach behind . deeper. The movement the people. of the recall any members ruling elite having constructed an or Chinese of peasant mobilization. went Republic. given the large literature on the that ap village question in at the time and given the experiment of village institutes. Again. vestments in education. in some regions of Turkey. the builders of the Turkish Republic placed even of the state first in their priorities. The sistance. energies building of national rather than to radically altering the of the peas identity. Republican were channeled. masses. despite the populist themes which the Republic developed. This the perpetuation of dependence might have been wise decision. these are identify limited to a few radical teachers. It is this aspect of the bureau against the periphery?before everything cratic code that was profoundly unrevolutionary. peripheral the strengthening ideational of apprehending in these terms was the the consequence problem cast of the were "backward" and program: peasants Republican be changed by the laws of the land. The Re the single party through which People's Party.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 183 In fact. social as still depended Turkey. peared Turkey I do not." for which "toward was thin. in retrospect. In fact. As for attempts by officials to themselves with the peasant. the multiple show that what little capital recapture layers a genera there was came to be invested in institutions that would shape tion of true Kemalists at the center. derived not so much from what. This themselves perhaps unfair judgment. place ant in the system. which be used as a shorthand notation to might of this attitude. But the problem. This is fairly understandable in view of the limited re sources of the in fact. but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened?partly else. Russian operative theory style. was unable to establish contact with the publican policies so much rural masses.41 One would highly ture. new links and the for establishing opened up by the Republic possibilities between and peasants were not fulfilled. one that allowed and to survive despite the economic Turkey Yet this option seems to have been weakness of the new Republic. the meager government sector financed much of of the reconstruction surplus of the agricultural on the notables The peasant for credit. and. such as the only transforming unrealistic law?what Marxists would call the superstruc village from the top down Ottoman had been the by imposing regulations social engineering. of the bureaucratic The members class under the Republic had little an notion of identifying is with the peasantry. symbol of the as the "fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist peasant were devoted to the but Kemalist of symbols movement. however. protection. one has a feeling that the tradi tional Ottoman is relation with In the periphery being perpetuated. clamor had gone up in the first years of the Ankara government. military seem rational considerations.
was also promised greater freedom. Ataturk was to do with what he had not achieved trying ideology through political or a commitment to radical mobilization in social struc changes through ture. Turkey. private controls and angered by its enterprise. While showing ability for small but sustained the could see that it was paying for the prosperity of the growth. of element of d?j? had a fine understanding the Kemalists Altogether. legitimate politics. People's Party had been this date. we have only to look at the themes that won the alienation in the first multi Democrat Party 81 per cent of the seats in Parliament it would to the The new party promised services bring party elections. To the extent that regulation had always been a structuring maxim of Ottoman had an unmis rule. that local no surprising to and that the state was unable tables kept their hold over the peasantry. re a theoretical the Kemalist to the peasant commitment program. aspect certain contemporary masses schemes of modernization. their ideas about modernization organizational-mobilizational the publication Kadro activists which had a number of Marxist (1931-1934) in its ranks. closer to the center by side. already suspect as separatist. while peasant peated achieved from the top down. for a re mobilized of society. and abundance on the other. To show this periphery who had preempted that the issues that were so central to the opposition had their roots in the from the center. legislate to be seen in this The thinness of Kemalist ideology has light. some erstwhile and prominent of the Republican members by People's was not so much a party of notables as it was a Party in 1946. Just as the Kemalists missed of mod the mobilizational aspects see too well the nature of the net ernization. dependence political at most a "means Until the Republican 1946. an idea which also had an by integration vu. that it was being given speeches but being denied cities. by bureaucratic equally hampered on influence. drive a wedge into the unity of the periphery. an old Ottoman was to be advancement theme. periphery as consolation. was not brought a remarkable these policies. was in medium for public participation but this transformation politics." takably traditional took note of the component. The only current within Kemalism side of modernization which was . they also did not integrative or were unable to work of modern it into existence. Thus. tive state justice distributing But this time it was the stance. the haven of its religious it is not culture. bureaucratize and liberalize religious Finally. in regulation. society. concern of as a take his daily problems de peasants. when action. This was the old Ottoman ported by idea of the state being solicitous of the interests of its subjects: the protec on the one hand." After it became "a for political parties emerged. but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational that. party that a it speculated with political ideology which thought would be strongly sup the rural masses and by their patrons. practices.184 features In ?ERIF MARDIN of Kemalism show that this view of society was still preeminent. This was a hard burden to shift onto The Turkish country ideology. The Democrat founded Party.
the villager greater contact with as inferior. and client politics flour ished on a new level. Al relatively the notable-peasant whose framework was a common alliance. undeveloped Economic set the relation be power. building People's Party not have the time usually voted for the Democrat Party.42 On the contrary. of the masses portion brought into a relation with the center than had been possible under the meaningful People's Party. . identified being Party its four official founders were Ironically. Moreover. just as much part of the bureau cratic "class" as other members. People's Party to Islam achieved by the Democrat The high resonance Party's appeal as the culture of the in the light of acquires greater significance periphery a Behice Bor an in the 1940's. progressive People's Party's legislation had kept a rootless as some them from becoming but then. alliance was now continued be and the not to entice the peasants. Boran discovery by the Turkish sociologist came into found that as villages towns. regions. gratefulness.43 Party relegitimized sufficient The tween blows dealt 1950-1957 endeared to the power and the of the bureaucracy prestige to both the notables the Democrat Party under new conditions. of the Republican to believe. This was not the form of mobilization that the Re a have approved. rather than domination. and thus land redistribution major issue. debate between "real populists" and "bureaucrats. the growth of the judicial apparatus. The laws of the Republic. except changed the still such as Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. but it was undeniably would People's publican Party a form that a greater form of mobilization. together. increasingly tween notables saw new and villagers. The electoral cam to see his village ways began increasingly at just the right time to of the Democrat intervened paigns Party provide rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior. Deals.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 185 to it. might thought that the Republican earlier. Republican not have realized rural following might The Democrat that the very stemmed from the success of the of these bargains possibility Republican an economic in The workers. the electoral the periphery as seen in Democrat of the opposition. the lines of a established propaganda. opportunities much more pervasive than in the earlier situations. and the success in of the Republic the infrastructure of reforms had gradually building in the master-servant relation between patron and client. Party political platform especially in newspapers. The many transitional Democrat Islam and traditional rural values. who at infrastructure. for economic and bargains became trade-offs. proletariat. lost. members have continued is People's Party not an element in the of 1950's Turkey was still early politics. was not a land rich." This symbolic and cul tural paraphernalia?the and religious of mosques conspicuous patronizing rituals by members of the Democrat and the reluctant follow-up by Party the Republican that secularism was with protests Party?laced People's the Democrat with the culture of the periphery. and in the media. Smaller men notables surrounding success.
thus. worked than would rather well." and the periphery. 1960 once more underlined of a static order. and integration. . still believe observable direct. Whether decision: bureaucratic again. party they good reasons to claim the that the Republican Party represented People's the "demo Democrat "bureaucratic" the center. because the lism"?an attempt an issue was not so much down to the grass roots as providing getting means no confi alternative of fundamental change. In these straits. of the implications of planning this is a correct assessment creates is that of officials that the perception of regulation the polarity versus all others. whereas Party represented cratic" periphery. periphery is its short-run gratifications. the bureaucrats preservation now one There were with which could best cooperate. a new form: the preservers of the Pro center against acquired periphery order against those who wanted crustean. Even to get down to the grass roots?dissipated. progressive. People's no confidence in its methods of change. the elements lar support for the reestablishment that their down-to-earth. tween the center.186 ?ERIF MARDIN to either side would bring greater benefits that collaboration understanding state control. has recently of the Republic. placed to identify the recent ( 1971 ) intervention It was easy for the periphery in Turkish with a desire for a return to the rigidity of the military politics of the intentions behind the move or the popu of the old order. instead of future tasks in terms of organiza seeing its tion and mobilization. by planned advice than by toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing seem to have a lower classes. Planning once raises its ugly head. personal. And. the Republican Party stood fast for the People's selected it as the of Kemalist ideals.44 figured was All of the protests mounted by the Republican People's Party that it of democratic the real Party of change and the real supporter procedures were the latest appeal of a faction of the Party to "popu thus lost. Regardless of the of law and order. The grass roots had constitution in the in the outlined and populist policies dence democratic. The early Republican commented Celal Bayar. with of mobilization method more fewer risks than the Turkish bureaucracy's and presents sys tangible Insofar as the center's attitude tem of mobilization economy. regulation is irrelevant." as the source of sovereignty in the Kemalist only ideology. it of the Republican various because electoral program Party. now identified with the preservation The old polarization of the real "party of movement. deposed president of 1924 and the new the Turkish Constitution between that the difference of 1960 amounted to the consti after the revolution adopted as one of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals tutional legitimization source of to the "Turkish in addition who had earlier sovereignty people. change. they would identification with the plight of the over one's fate to the limbo of seems to relegate all control point. the cleavage be The Revolution of May 27.
facilities from author the many is derived 1. Both were b?tes noires of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. passim. The Political System of Empires . developments. stance?of which peripheral paradoxically. Free as University is grateful to the Univer to this end. 117. My Edward The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Seventieth here 2. are an aspect of Turkish that could change means of production politics and has emerged. Periphery. Since this to the second facet of peripheral worked identity. see Birthday. is that this common code of the Party in its rise to power. is still one of its extremely structural compo important periphery polarity nents. periphery not have emerged if the policies of the center toward the would probably had been more conciliatory. identity emerged code that ?if not to overcome aspect of the peripheral entirely?that as counter this identity harked back to primordial Later. more labor is not completely part complex. as well as fortuitous But the policies of the modernizers. S.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 187 Once my thesis is stated this simply. highlight it was able to submerge in almost all of provincial Turkey. Eisenstadt. within ferentiation are now aware of the demands and integrated of a differentiated quite to and some of them are defecting modern representing system. a of the in fact. N. the periphery. Organized of the of owners against non-owners The cross-cutting cleavages periphery. A party representing have been Kurdish attempts at separate organization concerning rumblings is evidence and of dif heard for some time. Polanyi on His pp. the Shi'ite minority the picture. 1969). The paradox was productive of a unifying national which unexpectedly skein. There both of new cleavages of the bureaucracy Certain members the periphery. code seem to have emerged two facets of the peripheral In retrospect. as made up of the periphery clearer outlines during modernization: as the center of a counter-official and the periphery groups. parties and center But these are future aspects of Turkish politics. a nationwide for a party basis of allegiance also bureaucracy provided suc at the national Democrat level?the Party. allegiances. 11 March 1961 Essays Presented (Glencoe: to Michael Press. I should add that the picture is. 1961). For (New p. Thus. a national in the sense of pro the center was so suspicious?produced unity it was used by the Democrat around common vincial unification themes. 117-130. resources Macmillan. periphery with References This a Fellow sity and article was written while of Near for the author was in residence The that were Shils. made available at Princeton "Centre and in in the Program the department initial formulation Eastern Studies." "free floating" York: Collier. primordial culture. and also for its operating one aspect of the cessors.
the West." Etudes No. the International Journal of Middle relevant aspects of the development and Citizenship.. 1660 Nation-Building (New York: Studies (New York: Wiley. 258-285. in P. C. The pp. tribes belong here 219-242.. Abrahamian this expression who East Studies.." to the Present the Rise Oxford (London: Press. The Central of Islam. ed. and 39-199. See "Osmali Inalc?k. University passim. pp.. pp. pp. Padi?ah?. I 1966). of Islam Day pp. 2. the few who legal title to acquired they had gained control of these History. 221-228. 9. ownership tween center Officials and periphery. p. 7. 71. No. The is summarized Vryonis. 2. See Gibb Islamic and Bowen. Studies of the Middle from History omy.I. Vol. the more 10. in the be boundary as well surreptitiously?as peripheral stance once The Muslim . "There through the Fifteenth Centuries a French one of old a to descendant is the Turkey the Oghuz and pp. I. University 206-218. The Age of the Baroque 1610 The Age 1952). part I (London: University to Prof. pp. Yay?nlari. and For p. Bernard Lewis. 1957-1969). urban tradition direct University could which of of California still state Press. of 4/5th Turks. part 2 and compare with (London: Oxford Press. S. Palmer. Vol. 295-323. Ankara Osmanli Devletinde Hukuk Siyaseten Fakiiltesi Katl (Ankara: Ajans-Tiirk no. general Ann K. 14. the West. are two truly Turkeys. I." eds. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. of Medieval Hellenism and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh (Berkeley: anthropologist. Cuisenier. Bilgiler Mat p." important element a it?usually resources. Revolution. R. J. Introduction. 23. Diizeni (Ankara: to which Turkmen tradition. University (Cambridge: A. See Dergisi. of the Baroque. Ahmet 1963) Halil Mumcu. Vol. 180. Eastern Anadolunun Turkey Dogu 1969). p. p. important Seymour "Cleavage in An and Voter and Rokkan. (1966). pp. I. For inWestern in our Europe Changing see Reinhard Social Order Bendix.188 3. Friedrich. the other of rural government. 224. 12.. See Gibb University 11. Y." 13 (December 1958). Structures. Cook. p. in the Economic East in M. Vol. Press. See baasi. Friedrich. 14ff. Society article "Devshirme" nuanced and Bowen. Age 1-64. "The Ottoman See Halil Economic Mind and Aspects Econ of the Ottoman Inalc?k. Land ( 1955). pp. 6. Holt. land acquired into shifted 45 World. Princeton and espe (Princeton: Press. Islamic Society passim." History 1970). uses it in a forthcoming article in the West. E. 39-199 210-213. in 1966: of 1971). 1970). The Cambridge Islamic Lands Press. Systems Alignment: Lipset and Voter Cross-National Free York: (New Systems Alignment: Perspectives 1967). Gibb Oxford 4. eds. 1959). Ibid. Ankara 68-79. in Turkish was who an Universitesi Fakiiltesi Halil "Land Problems Inalc?k. and Harold Bowen. R. I owe see Halil of these features "The Rise of the Ottoman survey Inalc?k. Islamic 1950-1967). here M. Universitesi Yayinlarindan Siyasal 13. study of H. Lambton. A. of Democratic Harper. R. with assertive and compare the earlier more pp. J. R. 19. day's see Ismail Besikci. For a ?ERIF MARDIN Empire. literature on in this Speros subject for the The time Decline of the formation of the Ottoman in Asia Empire Minor 8. of the state 5. 1-142. Society pp. 22-26 Rurales. cially Party Party Press.. 20. and E.
Ben de Yazdim: Milli M?cadeleye Giris Istibdat 13 ser. 325. Political Society. 623-690. Tarihinde Y?z?nc? ed. 1964)." Proceedings of the British Academy 25. Kramers. "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of Its Causes and Effects. Bowen. Instanbul 81-98.. 16. 247 1274 tarihli "Turk Toprak Barkan. Dunya Celal (Istanbul: Baha Matbaase. Enver 1907 Tarihi 28. Ramsay. See M. p. 105-157. and (1858) p. of Islam. For the Kultur 17. 19. 1966). pp. Yapi p. 1730 passim. 24. Nesriyat Turkiyede p. 1968)." Belleten. 26. Matbaasi. terminology eds. 3 vols. Server Bas?mevi. For (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi. Society Lutfi "The Free and see of Islam I. from Max Weber. 712. . 113. ve and see Clifford New States Islamic ?mer in Geertz. 1876 the Administrative Empire 1856-1876 (Princeton: University Birinci Mesrutiyet Tarihi VIII: Ziya Karal. Turkey. and eds. traditional in situation (Ankara: setting 1968-69. ve Reform 1963). see Geertz.CENTER-PERIPHERY RELATIONS 189 15. See Halil Development Inalc?k. p. W. 1971). Revolution" Integrative Press. eds.. p. Hareketleri Tarihine bir Bakls (Istanbul: Devlet 1939). 29. IV. importance in Robert Mod E. 229. 1963). Between under pp. 451. 16. Devirleri 136-171. see Roderic Princeton H. (New York: Economy Bedminister and and Roth Guenther Society. in the Otto pp. Law of 1864. Aktepe. passim. M.. the time of May the Young 24-25. first ed. Davison. See 3. pp. University Japan and Turkey 46-48." Political 23. Ward and Dankwart Rustow. Sevin? "Askeri." in ernization Princeton Press. session. B. 1911. (Glencoe. Political Princeton (Princeton: Press. I. See on Joseph Political LaPalombara Development." 1966). 1962). For Old 18. (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat Empire 21. the West. (2). "Conclusions: The of Parties Impact in LaPalombara Parties and Weiner. Mass. see Halil "The Nature of Traditional the earlier of notables Inalc?k. Press. Osmanli tarih kurumu (Turk (Ankara. (Princeton: pp. Vol. No. p. 413. For man 27. For 96th provincial and 97th April opposition sessions to of secularism the Ottoman at ( 1915-1916). History" Encyclopedia Mehmet Sahabeddin "Semsuddin Bey Devrinde Tekindag. Yay?nlar?ndan. Munir Fakiiltesi Yay?nlar? G. part Hukuku Tanzimat: 1. 475. Bayar. Turks.: Harvard University Press. 1971). 959 ff. For later developments Old and New: The Ottoman Stanford Shaw. 30. Isyani: 1958). Turks. I. 1966). C. ve For Toplumsal Siyasal this concept. Vol. p.. 212-217. 22. See See zimat the pp. Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge. and "Ottoman M. Press. 28 "Tanzimat?n (1964). 1910. in Arazi Kanunamesi. 5). see also the 71st Parliament. I take Claus this Wittich." Encyclopedia Ozer Kbyde Ozankaya. 14 (March Tarih Dergisi. Vol. University Uygulanmas? ve Sosyal Tepkileri. Fakiiltesi Universitesi Edebiyat Karamanlilar. 1940)." Tan Yil d?n?m? M?nasebetiyle 20. Societies and Gibb ibid. 329. pp. and Myron Weiner. Iskit.. 409. p. F. Patrona No.. 808..
interpretation (April is also at variance is "significant. 260. evading in as persons interested ibid. ?zelli.190 31.. 85. Turkiyede see Bernard the revolt Oxford University The Press. Turkey 20. p. Recruitment World Role The "Elite of the Mulkiye. (London: See Tunaya. p. pp. On Zabit 37. and Unwin. Ibid. I was alerted 1966). see II. 39. 42. 1971). Orhan Okay. The Turkish Ordeal see Vol. SERIF MARDIN Siyasal durumu. Behice Boran. 34. 449. basimevi. Boran points served the Democrat Party well. Turk a tarih transitory 1970. K?pr?f?. "The Estimates in the First Turkish of Private Republic Internal Rates of Return International on Educational Journal In 1923-1960. Andreas Allen Belgelerin pp. p. Tar?k Turkiyede 1952). 32. On Millet the Press. control 183. 386. p. Celal Bayar. Siyast Lewis. Osman Faruk Logoglu. 60-117. 33. pp. 417." in Demokrasi Yolunda (The Hague: 1964). 304. . pp. Turkey. Partiler. 29/6-7-1336. passim. Managers L. M. but 1945). Biiyuk Millet 182-183. p.: and Elites (1950-1969) (Cambridge. 433. F. Unpublished "Ismet Ph. Vol. 35. Kurumu situation 1945-1965. and Noralou in Harvard tion Organization Mass. nevertheless 44." Belleten. 40. Emergence. Besir Fuad (Istanbul: Vol. 110-111. Roos. on notables Ceridesi. Y api Arastirmalarl Toplumsal out that 218-219. their see not being of the people T?rkiye representative Biiyuk Vol. military protecting 38. 135. 538-539 and Halide Edib Century 36. [Ad?var]. 156-176. See M. 2nd ed." of Middle East Studies. p. 90." Turkey: concur that 10 cannot with his but 23 Politics. Ill. of p. I. June 29." it Hurriyet.D. pp. note by Joseph in L. In?n? and the Political Modernization University. 35 (January Pasan?n ?s?ginda K?mil here pp. "Partiler ve Mill? 41. II. with that given of Moderniza by Leslie Jr. 617 The Emergence 1968). Tunaya. 1971). 266. p. on notables primarily Vol. "Ba?vekilim Adnan Menderes. "Yeni 1971). p. See Lewis." 43.. Princeton (Ankara: this was of Turkey p. Z. Roos.. (New York: Meclisi Ceridesi municipal Meclisi the gendarmerie by the civilians Latin I. Ben Group. Siys? Partiler (Istanbul." This in higher data per cent of graduates posts P. Birlik. p. 1969. Szyliowicz. vestment T. 1928). II. 1969). service. Press. 43/3-8-1336. Hareket note Yay?nlar? 1. Dissertation. Second de Yazdtm. on article of Modern 14 of On the party program. See Celal On the Bayar. in the Quest Education and (London: for Modernity Turkey to this information 12. 1 (April 1970). property. University Kazamias. script edition boards Zabit Turkiye II. p.
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