Art II sec 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable. Art III sec 5.

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Art VI sec 29(2). No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims.” This principle was recognized in the Malolos Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris, in the instructions of McKinley to the Phil. Commission… and finally embodied in the Constitution as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. Filipino’s enjoy both civil and religious freedom  guaranteed in the Consti o What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not merely religious toleration.

Establishment Clause
AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ Justice Laurel 1937 FACTS:

Religious Freedom:  Religious Freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. o Imploring “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a gov’t that shall embody their ideals…” in the preamble of the Constitution.  General Concessions indiscriminately accorded to religious sects: o Tax exemptions properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes o Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, etc. is assigned to the armed forces, penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium. o Optional religious instruction in public schools is allowed by constitutional mandate, etc.

On May 1936, respondent announced in the newspapers that he would order of postage stamps commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under Act No. 4052 (cited below) Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Phil. Independent Church (Aglipayan), seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the said Congress. o Petitioner alleges that respondent in issuing and selling the postage stamps violated the Constitutional provision on the principle of separation of church and state, specifically section 13, subsection 3, Art. VI which says: “No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination… or system of religion…”

PRESENT CASE:

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling the postage stamps. HELD: No constitutional infraction. History of Separation of Church and State:  “… our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for

Act No. 4052, from which draws authority to issue and sell the stamps contemplates no religious purpose, but gives the Director of the Posts the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” The present case was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular religious denomination. o The stamps were not issued for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to the church. o Purpose of the stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to the country”  officials took advantage of an internationally important event to give publicity to the Philippines and its people.  The stamp as actually printed instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila with the inscription “Seat XXXIII

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International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” What is emphasized is not the Congress but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. The propaganda resulting from the issuance and sale of the staff might redound to the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church but this was not the intention and is only incidental to the original purpose.  “We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.” There may have peen poor judgment in issuing and selling the stamp but a gap still exists between that and the unconstitutionality of the issuance and sale which was not filled by the petitioner.

wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos 4. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition. 5. Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation. 6. Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law. 7. Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image 8. The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel. After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. 9. Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Their main argument was it prejudiced members of the Catholic Church because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta. <Labo dud!> ) 10. Lower Court dismissed the complaints. ISSUES 1) WON that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions? NO

o

o

GARCES vs. ESTENZO FACTS: 1. On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia". lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " 2. On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day. It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day. It was ratified in a plebiscite. 3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the

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RATIO In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City. Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed. 2) WON the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium? (haba, hehe) NO

claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church, that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property. The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12. Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. (Lower Court’s decision affirmed)

LEMON vs. KURTZMAN (1971) This case was heard concurrently with two others, Early v. DiCenso (1971) and Robinson v. DiCenso (1971). The cases involved controversies over laws in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. In Pennsylvania, a statute provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools. The Rhode Island statute provided direct supplemental salary payments to teachers in non-public elementary schools. Each statute made aid available to "church-related educational institutions." Question Presented Did the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by making state financial aid available to "church-related educational institutions"? Conclusion

Ratio The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas. This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church. There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña

Yes. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger articulated a three-part test for laws dealing with religious establishment. To be constitutional, a statute must have "a secular legislative purpose," it must have principal effects which neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court found that the subsidization of parochial schools furthered a process of religious inculcation, and that the "continuing state surveillance" necessary to enforce the specific provisions of the laws would inevitably entangle the state in religious affairs. The Court also noted the presence of an unhealthy "divisive political potential" concerning legislation which appropriates support to religious schools. FACTS:

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This case is actually 2 cases involving two States, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. In each city, laws were enacted to provide aid for non-public schools and teachers. In both cases, the statutes were challenged for being violitive of the first amendment for creating an entanglement between church and state. RHODE ISLAND STATUTE: Purpose: Keeping elementary schools. the quality of nonpublic

2) 3)

financial support active involvement

It also stated 3 tests: 1) 2) 3) Statute must have a secular legislative purpose Principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion Statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion

Means: Direct payment of up to 15% extra salary to nonpublic school teachers. Qualifications: Teaching in a nonpublic school where average per-pupil expenditure on secular education is less than the average in the public schools. Teachers must teach only secular subjects and must not teach religion else lose the benefits accorded by the statute. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 25% of the State’s pupils. 95% went to RC schools. Teachers who applied: all come from these RC schools. PENNSYLVANIA: Purpose: Solve nonpublic school crisis due to rising costs. Means: Reimbursing nonpublic schools on expenditures for teachers’ salaries, textbooks and instructional materials. Qualifications: Limited to courses also taught in public schools. Also limited to secular subjects. Textbooks must be approved. Background of schools: Nonpublic schools: 20% of State’s pupils. 96% attended RC schools. ISSUE: WON the statutes enacted violated the first amendment re: separation of Church and State, and are therefore unconstitutional. HELD: Yes they do, and yes they are. (Rhode Island Statute struck down, Pennsylvania case remanded). RATIO: What is held to have been violated is the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. In this, the court stated 3 evils which this Establishment Clause was to protect against: 1) sponsorship

Addressing the 3 tests, the first one has been passed as the legislative intent/purpose is most definitely secular. However, the court states that “the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion”. As the schools taken into are church schools, they are seen as powerful vehicles for transmitting the Catholic faith. As such, this substantial religious character gives rise to entangling church-state relationships. Also adding to the danger is the particular type of aid (though the case doesn’t really say why). Also taken into consideration is the teachers’ means of teaching. There is no way of ascertaining if the teachers will inject a religious aspect into their teaching. Lastly is the fact that the schools and their teachers are subject to religious authority, and teachers are even told (in the “Handbook of School Regulations”) to stimulate interest in religious vocations and missionary work. Mostly, though, the court is most afraid of actual entanglement that will be caused through the implementation of the laws. Due to the need for surveillance and controlling measures (as the State must run through applications to see who qualifies), there is created the entanglement that the Clause protects against. “...the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role gives rise to entanglements...” The Pennsylvania statute goes even further, as it provides direct financial aid to these schools. Another consideration is the divisive political potential of the statutes. The court here stated that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. This refers to the division that will occur between those for and against state aid, thereby making it a political struggle. Here the state says that while political debate and division are normal, those predicated on religious lines are what the First Amendment sought to protect the country from. The court ends by saying that while the tax exemption challenge fell to over 200 years of universal practice, state aid has no such support. Also, these statutes create a direct entanglement, which was sought to be avoided. The constitution deems religion to be a private matter, so the government must exclude itself from such an area.

BOARD of EDUCATION vs. ALLEN

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(1968) Justice White FACTS: 1. A law (701 of the Education Law) of New York requires local public school boards to purchase textbooks and lend those textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven through 12; students attending private schools are included. The books loaned are "text-books which are designated for use in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education," and which "a pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends." Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 brought suit in the New York courts against James Allen because Allen would remove the members of the Board from office if they fail to lend books to parochial school students. The members of the Board contend that the law was invalid. The trial court held the law unconstitutional. The NY Court of Appeals held that 701 was not in violation of either the State or the Federal Constitution. The CA said that the law's purpose was to benefit all school children, regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only textbooks approved by public school authorities could be loaned. It considered 701 "completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the individual student and asking no question about what school he attends." Board of Education brought the case to the US SC.

educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose. The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools. 3. The record contains no suggestion that religious books have been loaned. Absent evidence, the SC cannot assume that school authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly discharge their duties under the law. In judging the validity of the statute on this record the Court must proceed on the assumption that books loaned to students are books that are not unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content. Everson v. Board of Education. The test for distinguishing between forbidden involvements of the state with religion: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. The Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education. The State's interest in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools maintained by a religious order (Pierce v Society of Siters). A substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function.

2.

4.

3.

5.

ISSUE: WoN the statute is a "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," and so in conflict with the 1st and 14th Amendments to the Constitution, because it authorizes the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools. DECISION: The law Constitution. RATIO: 1. The language of 701 does not authorize the loan of religious books, and the State claims no right to distribute religious literature. Although the books loaned are those required by the parochial school for use in specific courses, each book loaned must be approved by the public school authorities; only secular books may receive approval. The express purpose of 701 was stated by the New York Legislature to be furtherance of the is not in violation of the

COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY vs. ACLU & LYNCH vs. DONELLY FACTS: This concerns the constitutionality of 2 recurring holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh.

2.

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The first, a crèche depicting the Christian Nativity scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny Courthouse, w/c is the main, most beautiful, and most public part of the courthouse. The crèche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. The second was an 18-foot Chanukah menorah or candelabrum, w/c was placed just outside the City County building next to the city’s 45-foot Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign bearing the mayor’s name & containing text declaring the city’s salute to liberty. The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and removed each year by the city. Respondents (the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union & 7 local residents) filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from displaying the menorah on the ground that the displays violated the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. The CA for the 3rd Circuit ruled that each display violates the Establishment Clause because each has the impermissible effect of endorsing religion. WON display of crèche Establishment clause. YES WON display of menorah Establishment clause. NO violates violates

display, located in a private park w/n downtown shopping district. By a 5-4 decision, Court upheld inclusion of the crèche in the display, holding that it didn’t have the effect of advancing or promoting religion. J. O’CONNOR wrote a concurrence w/c provides framework for evaluating govt’l use of religious symbols: 1) O’Connor recognizes any endorsement of religion as invalid because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community; 2) She provides a method for determining whether the govt’s use of an object with religious meaning has the effect of endorsing religion. The effect of the display depends upon the message that the govt’s practice communicates: the question is what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display. That inquiry turns upon the context in which the contested object appears. The concurrence concluded that both because the crèche is a “traditional symbol” of Christmas, a holiday with strong secular elements, and because the crèche was “displayed along with purely secular symbols” (i.e. a Santa Claus House w/ a live Santa distributing candy; 40-ft Xmas tree; banner w/ “Season’s Greetings”, etc), the creche’s setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display and negates any message f endorsement of the Christian beliefs represented by the crèche. The concurrence and dissent in Lynch agree that: 1) govt’s use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs; 2) effect of the govt’s use of religious symbolism depends upon its context. ON CRECHE There is no doubt that the crèche itself is capable of communicating a religious message. The angel in the crèche endorses a patently Christian message: “Glory to God in the Highest” Court held in Lynch that the effect of a crèche display depends on its setting. Here, unlike in Lynch, nothing in the context of the display detracts from the creche’s religious message. The Lynch display comprised a series of figures and objects, each group of which had its own focal point. Here, in contrast, the crèche stands alone: it is the single element of the display on the Grand Staircase. Further, by permitting the display of the crèche in the main & most beautiful part of the building, the county sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to God. The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing its ownership by a Roman Catholic group demonstrates that the govt is endorsing the

ISSUE: 1. 2. RATIO:

The Establishment Clause • The Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..”

Lemon v Kurtzman provides 3 tests for determining whether a gov’t practice violates the Clause. A statute or practice w/c touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the Clause must 1) have a secular purpose; 2) neither advance nor inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect; 3) not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. The essence of the Clause: It prohibits govt from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.”

1. •

LYNCH V DONNELLY

ISSUE: WON the city of Pawtucket had violated the Establishment Clause by including a creche in its annual Christmas

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religious message of that organization, rather than communicating a message of its own. The Clause prohibits what occurred here: the govt’s lending its support to the communication of a religious’ organization’s religious message.

Govt may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the 1st Amendment, it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus. Lynch teaches that govt may celebrate Xmas in some manner and form, but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine as the Allegheny County did in displaying the crèche.

the fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In contrast, confining the government's own Christmas celebration to the holiday's secular aspects does not favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs. 2. • ON MENORAH The Chanukah menorah is a religious symbol. But its message is not exclusively religious. It is the primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both religious and secular dimensions. Its display doesn’t have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion given its particular physical setting. Its combined display with a Christmas tree & a sign saluting liberty does not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths (which is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone), but simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society. The widely accepted view of the Christmas tree as the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas season emphasizes this point. The tree, moreover, is clearly the predominant element in the city’s display by virtue of its size and central position. The placement of the menorah beside it is readily understood as a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of celebrating the season. Similarly, the presence of the mayor’s sign confirms that in the particular context the govt’s association with a religious symbol does not represent sponsorship of religious beliefs but simply a recognition of cultural diversity.

On Justice Kennedy’s opinion upholding the display of the crèche as permissible under the Clause

Kennedy says the display of the crèche is consistent with the Establishment Clause. He argues that this follows from the Marsh v Chambers decision, which sustained the constitutionality of a legislative prayer. He also asserts that the crèche, even in this setting, poses no realistic risk of representing an effort to proselytize, having repudiated the Court’s endorsement inquiry in favor of a proselytization approach. Court’s analysis of the crèche reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion. Court answered that history cannot legitimate practices like the crèche display that demonstrate the govt’s allegiance to a particular sect or creed. The proselytization test preferred by Kennedy is much the same as the endorsement inquiry except to the extent that the former requires an obvious allegiance between the government and the favored sect. *Endorsement inquiry: WON the practice demonstrates the govt’s support, promotion or endorsement of the particular creed of a particular sect *Proselytization test: WON the practice would place the govt’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize for a particular religion Court said that Kennedy misperceived a respect for religious pluralism as hostility or indifference to religion. The Constitution mandates that the government remain secular, rather than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or institutions, precisely in order to avoid discriminating against citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim that prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates against Christians in favor of nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts

LYNCH VS. DONNELLY - SUMMARY FACTS: The city of Pawtucket, R. I., annually erects a Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the city's shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity scene, which has been part of this annual display for 40 years or more. Respondents brought an action in Federal District Court, challenging the inclusion of the creche in the display on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the challenge and permanently enjoined the city from including the creche in the display. The Court of Appeals affirmed. ISSUE: WON display of crèche violates Establishment Clause. HELD:

• •

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Notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment Clause RATIO:

The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and state is a useful metaphor but is not an accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution does not require complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. This Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause comports with the contemporaneous understanding of the Framers' intent. That neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, nor the First Congress itself, saw any establishment problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily prayers in the Congress is a striking example of the accommodation of religious beliefs intended by the Framers. Our history is pervaded by official acknowledgment of the role of religion in American life, and equally pervasive is evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of religious expression and hostility toward none. Rather than taking an absolutist approach in applying the Establishment Clause and mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith, this Court has scrutinized challenged conduct or legislation to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith or tends to do so. In the line-drawing process called for in each case, it has often been found useful to inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion. But this Court has been unwilling to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area. Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the Christmas season. Focus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause. Based on the record in this case, the city has a secular purpose for including the creche in its Christmas display and has not impermissibly advanced religion or created an excessive entanglement between religion and government. The display is sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday recognized by Congress and national tradition and to depict the origins of that Holiday; these are legitimate secular

purposes. Whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and incidental, and is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional and executive recognition of the origins of Christmas, or the exhibition of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums. As to administrative entanglement, there is no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the content or design of the exhibition prior to or since the city's purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been necessary, and, since the city owns the crèche (worth $200), the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. Political divisiveness alone cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct, and, in any event, apart from the instant litigation, there is no evidence of political friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history of the city's Christmas celebration. It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche in the display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, the Executive Branch, Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so "taint" the exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol while hymns and carols are sung and played in public places including schools, and while Congress and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers, would be an overreaction contrary to this Nation's history and this Court's holdings.

EPPERSON vs. ARKANSAS J.Fortas FACTS: Susan Epperson, was employed by the Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at Central High School. Until 1964 the official textbook furnished for the high school biology course did not have a section on the Darwinian Theory. Then, for the academic year 1965--1966, the school administration, on recommendation of the teachers of biology in the school system, adopted and prescribed a textbook which contained a chapter setting forth 'the theory about the origin * * * of man from a lower form of animal.' The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university 'to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,' or 'to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches' this theory. Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position. The Arkansas statute was an adaption of the famous Tennessee 'monkey law' which that State adopted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Tennessee

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law was upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court in the celebrated Scopes case in 1927. Epperson faced at least a literal dilemma because she was supposed to use the new textbook for classroom instruction and presumably to teach the statutorily condemned chapter; but to do so would be a criminal offense and subject her to dismissal. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the 'anti-evolution' statute which the State of Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public schools and universities of the theory that man evolved from other species of life. ISSUE/HELD: W/O Not the statute violates the constitutional provisions respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting its free exercise (1st Amendment), and free speech ( 14th Amendment) . YES RATIO: Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion. There is and can be no doubt that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment. In the present case, there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens. It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is the law's reason for existence. Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to

the mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution. SCHOOL DISTRICT vs. SCHEMPP Justice CLARK FACTS: Applicable Amendments: 1. First Amendment, Establishment Clause: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. No. 142 – The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requires that at least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read without comment, at the opening of each Public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the request of his parent or guardian. The exercises are broadcast into each room in the building through an intercom system. This is followed by the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. Participation in the open exercises was considered voluntary. The student reading the bible must select the passages and read any form or version he chases. (King James version, Douay or the Revised Standard versions as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures) The constitutionality of the said statute was assailed by Edward Schempp, a member of the Unitarian faith who, along with his wife and children, questioned the validity of the statute, contending that his rights have been violated, under the 14th of table and to the Constitution of the United States. The children study in Abington Senior High School Schempp testified that he at first refused to exercise his prerogative of excusing his children from the morning exercises upon fear that his children would be labeled as odd balls. Their classmates would be liable for lumping religious differences and objections as atheism with immoral and un-patriotic overtones. Doctor Solomon Grayzel (witness for the appellees): The reading of such verses without explanation may be psychologically harmful to the children and may cause a divisive force in the social media of the school. Doctor Luther A. Weigle (witness for the defense): The Bible is a non-sectarian piece of literature within among the Christian faiths. The exclusion of the New Testament would be in itself a sectarian practice. The trial court struck down the practices and the statute requiring them after making the specific findings of fact that attendance to Abington and undergoing the practices were compulsory. The court further found that the reading of the verses without comment would constitute in effect a religious observance.

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The court rejected the defense’s argument that the children were allowed to excuse themselves via their parents’ request, saying that it did not mitigate the obligatory nature of the ceremony. This was still in violation of the establishment clause in that it threatens religious liberty by putting a premium upon belief as opposed to non-belief, rendering sinister, alien, and suspect the beliefs, ideals, and even morality of the petitioners. ISSUE: WON rule 142 of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional under the violation of the Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. HELD: Yes. RATIO: I. It is true that religion has been closely identified with American history and government. This background is evidence today in our public life through the continuance in our oaths of office from the Presidency to the Alderman of the final supplication, “So held me God.” Indeed, only last year, an official survey of the country indicated that 64% of our people have church membership while 3% profess no faith at all. This is not to say, however that religion has been so identified with our history and government that religious freedom is not likewise as strongly imbedded in out public and private life. Nothing but the most telling of personal experiences in religious persecution could have implanted such belief. Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati: (J. Alphonso Taft) First, the court has decisively settled the First Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ has been made wholly applicable to the States under the 14th amendment. Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over the other.

The former forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom to choose a belief cannot be restricted by Law. The latter protects the freedom to exercise the chosen form of religion. This it embraces two concepts: Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act. (Cantwell v. Connecticut) Public Schools are organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain strict and lofty neutrality as to religion. McGowan v. Maryland: The First Amendment did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. Engel v. Vitale: The establishment and free exercise clauses in certain instances overlap. The former does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws directly operate to coerce non-observing individuals or not. The former works also on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion. The neutrality of which the Court’s cases speak thus stem from the recognition from history of the tendency of religious sects to fuse governmental and religious functions or cause a concert of dependence of one upon the other placing State support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies. Test for Establishment Clause: 1. Existence of a secular legislative purpose 2. The primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Test for Free Exercise Clause: 1. Proof of the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against anyone in the practice of religion. We agree with the trial court’ finding as to the religious character of the exercises and are thus in violation of the establishment clause. It is also insisted that unless religious exercises are permitted a ‘religion of secularism’ is established in schools. We agree that a religion of secularism cannot be established in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus preferring belief over non-belief. While the Free Exercise clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the state to practice beliefs.

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IV.

II.

Justice Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton: The First Amendment’s purpose was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding any form of public aid or support for religion. III. Interrelationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses:

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ENGEL vs. VITALE 04/03/62 Black, J. FACTS: Repondent Board of Education of Union Free School District 9, acting under New York State law, composed a prayer that was to be recited at the start of each class that went: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." The program was supported by the NY State Board of Regents. The parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting that use of this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their children. NY CA sustained an order of the lower state courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents' prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents' objection. petitioners appealed. petitoners: prayer violates the non-establishment of religion clause in the 1st Amendment (the State's use of the Regents' prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State.) respondents: prayer is "non-denominational"; the program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room; to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. ISSUE: WON the prayer is a religious exercise, the establishment of which is prohibited by the 1st amendment HELD: YES. There can be no doubt that the prayer is a religious exercise; the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the NonEstablishment Clause. the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. In an effort to explain the clause, the court looked at the history of the separation of church and state saying that " it is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America" In England where

there was a state religion, many people who held contrary beliefs were unable to exercise such. By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leaving the government of this country in the hands of the people rather than in the hands of any monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say -- that the people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office. Under that Amendment's prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious activity. The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. re: respondents first argument Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. re: respondents second argument It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance. Reversed and remanded.

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ZELMAN vs. SIMMONS-HARRIS FACTS: Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program gives educational choices to families in any Ohio school district that is under state control pursuant to a federal-court order. The program provides tuition aid for certain students in the Cleveland City School District, the only covered district, to attend participating public or private schools of their parent's choosing and tutorial aid for students who choose to remain enrolled in public school. Both religious and nonreligious schools in the district may participate, as may public schools in adjacent school districts. Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid is spent depends solely upon where parents choose to enroll their children. The number of tutorial assistance grants provided to students remaining in public school must equal the number of tuition aid scholarships. In the 1999-2000 school year, 82% of the participating private schools had a religious affiliation, none of the adjacent public schools participated, and 96% of the students participating in the scholarship program were enrolled in religiously affiliated schools. Sixty percent of the students were from families at or below the poverty line. Cleveland schoolchildren also have the option of enrolling in community schools, which are funded under state law but run by their own school boards and receive twice the per-student funding as participating private schools, or magnet schools, which are public schools emphasizing a particular subject area, teaching method, or service, and for which the school district receives the same amount per student as it does for a student enrolled at a traditional public school. Respondents, Ohio taxpayers, sought to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. The Federal District Court granted them summary judgment, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. ISSUE: WON the program offends the Establishment Clause. NO. RATIO: (a) A government aid program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause if it is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice. Under such a program, government aid reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. (b) It is neutral in all respects towards religion, and is part of Ohio's general and multifaceted

undertaking to provide educational opportunities to children in a failed school district. It confers educational assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion and permits participation of all district schools--religious or nonreligious--and adjacent public schools. The only preference in the program is for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and have priority for admission. Rather than creating financial incentives that skew it towards religious schools, the program creates financial disincentives: Private schools receive only half the government assistance given to community schools and one-third that given to magnet schools, and adjacent public schools would receive two to three times that given to private schools. Families too have a financial disincentive, for they have to copay a portion of private school tuition, but pay nothing at a community, magnet, or traditional public school. No reasonable observer would think that such a neutral private choice program carries with it the imprimatur of government endorsement. Nor is there evidence that the program fails to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options: Their children may remain in public school as before, remain in public school with funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a religious school, obtain a scholarship and choose to attend a nonreligious private school, enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. The Establishment Clause question whether Ohio is coercing parents into sending their children to religious schools must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a scholarship and then choose a religious school. Cleveland's preponderance of religiously affiliated schools did not result from the program, but is a phenomenon common to many American cities. Eightytwo percent of Cleveland's private schools are religious, as are 81% of Ohio's private schools. To attribute constitutional significance to the 82% figure would lead to the absurd result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in parts of Ohio where the percentage is lower, but not in Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs most sorely needed. Likewise, an identical private choice program might be constitutional only in States with a lower percentage of religious private schools.

TILTON vs. RICHARDSON FACTS: • The Higher Education Facilities Act was passed in 1963 in response to a strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities to meet the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education. The Act authorizes federal grants and loans to "institutions of higher education" for the construction of a wide variety of "academic facilities." But expressly excludes "any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship, or

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• •

. . . any facility which . . . is used or to be used primarily in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of divinity . . . ." no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or the programs of a divinity school. If, during this period (a period of 20 years), the recipient violates the statutory conditions, the United States is entitled to recover an amount equal to the proportion of its present value that the federal grant bore to the original cost of the facility. Four church-related colleges and universities in Connecticut receiving federal construction grants under Title I were named as defendants. Federal funds were used for five projects at these four institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield University; (4) a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. Appellants attempted to show that the four recipient institutions were "sectarian" by introducing evidence of their relations with religious authorities, the content of their curricula, and other indicia of their religious character. Appellee colleges introduced testimony that they had fully complied with the statutory conditions and that their religious affiliation in no way interfered with the performance of their secular educational functions.

religious activity." Every analysis must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or absent. There is only a cumulative criteria which is this: Against this background we consider four questions: a) does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? Yes

~> United States require that the youth be assured ample opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual capacities. This expresses a legitimate secular objective entirely appropriate for governmental action. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion. The Act itself was carefully drafted to ensure that the federally subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institutions. It authorizes grants and loans only for academic facilities that will be used for defined secular purposes and expressly prohibits their use for religious instruction, training, or worship. None of the four church-related institutions in this case has violated the statutory restrictions. There had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed facilities; no religious symbols or plaques in or on them; used solely for nonreligious purposes. There is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities. Schools were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom rather than religious indoctrination. b) is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? Yes, in effect will help advance religion. This part held unconstitutional.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. 2.

WON Act authorized grants to churchrelated schools  yes WON religion clauses of the consti have been impaired  in part, yes but the entire act is not unconsti * Vacated and remanded.

RATIO: 1. We are satisfied that Congress intended the Act to include all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation with or sponsorship by a religious body. The Act makes no reference to religious affiliation or nonaffiliation. Under these circumstances "institutions of higher education" must be taken to include church-related colleges and universities. Court have noted the internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. the Establishment Clause sought to protect: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in

~> We note that an institution applying for a federal grant is only required to provide assurances that the facility will not be used for sectarian instruction or religious worship "during at least the period of the Federal interest therein(20 years). This obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that period. If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion. So this part was held unconstitutional. c) does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement with religion? No. the entanglement is very much lessened for three reasons. (application of strict scrutiny)

2.

~> these four schools subscribe to a well-established set of principles of academic freedom, and nothing in this record shows that these principles are not in fact followed. In short, the evidence shows institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant higher education mission is to provide their students with a secular education. Their purpose is not religious

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indoctrination so there is less likelihood than in primary and secondary schools that religion will permeate the area of secular education. This reduces the risk that government aid will in fact serve to support religious activities. ~> The entanglement between church and state is also lessened here by the nonideological character of the aid that the Government provides. Neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities, or materials are supplied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they attend. Facilities are religiously neutral. ~> Government aid here is a one-time, singlepurpose construction grant. There are no continuing financial relationships or dependencies. *these three taken together shape a narrow and limited relationship bet church and govt to become in danger of realizing the substantive evils against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect. d) lastly, does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion in violation of the 1st amendment? No. except of course that part of 20year limitation… ~> Appellants, however, are unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.

ISSUES: 1. Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy? Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief? 2. Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 3. May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?" HELD & RATIO: 1. NO. SJS miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the respondents. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the SJS was violated by the petitioners & what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. There was no concise & direct statement of the ultimate facts on which it relies on its pleading for its claim. SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioners below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable them to elect men to public office who would in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government" & "posing a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the people’s faith in the electoral process; & reinforcing their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be violative of the separation clause. Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the petitioners to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right. There is no factual allegation that SJS’ rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right. Even if the court relaxed the requirements of locus standi in view of its transcendental importance, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway.

VELARDE vs. SOCIETY for SOCIAL JUSTICE J. PANGANIBAN FACTS:

• •

A case was brought by respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against petitioner Mike Velarde, together with Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin, Erano Manalo, Bro. Eddie Villanueva & Eli Soriano in the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the rresolution of "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions”. The trial court opined that the "endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause." However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision after its essay on the legal issue. Thus, petitioners filed separate Motions for Reconsideration on the assailed decision questioning whether or not the decision of the lower court was proper & valid in lieu of procedural deficiencies & substantive issues

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2. NO. The Constitution commands that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor." Elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The significance of factual finding lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. Such is intended to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. Essential Parts of a Good decision: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Statement of the case Statement of the facts Issues Court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved Dispositive portion

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify. Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that "the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned."

MARCELINO ARIAS vs. UP BOARD of REGENTS

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA

The assailed decision did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion. It is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void. 3. Religious Leaders’ Candidates for Public Office Endorsement of

The Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. It failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.

FACTS: o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippines agency established in November of 1898 o the defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be excercised in conformity with the provisions of R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the city of manila o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and selling bibles and gospel porionms thereof throughout the Philippines o the acting city treasurer nformed plaintiff that it was conducting business of general merchandise, without providing itself with the necessary mayors permit and municipal license, in violation of various ordinances, and asked the plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the corresponding license and fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the sum of Php 5,821 o plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the license fees but at the same time filed a complaint to the courts o plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee before the war, nor does the American bible society in the U.S pay license fee or sales tax for the sale of the bible. o however a witness for the appellees was able to prove that the American bibler society in fact does profit from the sale of the Bible. ISSUES:

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(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid?.YES!!! (2) whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society? Sayang pero YES invalid! HELD: *The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any bearing on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect. *The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature. *The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature. *(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise

of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all 'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus be denied the needy. . . . *It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. *Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. Reversed and Remanded

GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION (1959) Montemayor J FACTS: RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rules (Department Order 8)says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan). Petitioners children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.

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Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued. ISSUE: WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional

This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the students although attendance in schools is mandatory turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories. Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to attend school. Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society and community life he becomes a member and must give up some of his rights for the general welfare just like everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the state. Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religious pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoes not include liberty to expose child to ill health. This case was decided after Barnette, supra. SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flag salute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatory regulation applicable to members of all religions. State carried out duty to supervise educational institutions and teach civic duty. Petitioners do not question the right of the school to conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the attempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the greater student population. There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an understanding that anti-war religious believers will not be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the courts. DISPOSITION: decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. No costs.

HELD: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional RATIONALE: The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield. What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol of Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. The determination whether a ceremony is religious or not is left to the courts not to any religious group. Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boy scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education. Take it or leave it. Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were members of Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that war and preparations for war are gainst God's wishes. They did not take required military service training which was requirement to graduate. Court said that they were not being drafted to attend university. University did not violate due process when it required the mil service. Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs Witness children were expelled from school for refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils in flag ceremony did not infringe due process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided court.

ERBALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT March 1, 1993 Ponente: Griño-Aquino, J: FACTS: All the petitioners in these two cases are school children who are members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by DECS Department Order No. 8 (July 21, 1955) which makes the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

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ISSUE: Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private) for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony. RATIO: It has been held previously in the case of Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a system of complete separation between church and state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance and therefore saluting it is not a religious ceremony. The requirement of the flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of country, etc., is a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to students and teachers regardless of their religion. While the necessity to develop such respect for the flag and respect for the country still persists until today, there is recognition that religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in German vs. Barangan) Two-fold aspect of religious profession:  Freedom to believe – absolute as long as confined to the realm of thought  Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts affecting the public welfare Petitioners contend that while they did not participate in the flag ceremony, they did not engage in any disruptive behavior that would offend those who choose to participate but rather they just quietly stood at attention during the flag ceremony to show respect to their countrymen. Therefore, in the absence of a grave and present danger which is the sole justification for a prior restraint on the exercise of religious freedom, according to Teehankee in his dissent in German vs. Barangan, there is no warrant to justify their expulsion. What petitioners seek is only exemption from the flag ceremony and therefore the virtues (e.g. patriotism, respect for human rights, love of country, etc.) they are supposed to imbibe from their participation in the flag ceremony, they can get in their study of the Constitution, the democaratic way of life and form of government, the history and culture of the Philippines, the life of our heroes, etc. To force a small religious group through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities which are precisely the values the court in Gerona feared will be lost by exempting some members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to participate in the flag ceremonies.  let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country… is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)

 expulsion of the members will violated their right as citizens under the Constitution to receive free education which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education applicable to all.  in closing, the court hopes that it will not take another foreign invasion of our country for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag as what happened during WWII.

NEWDOW vs. U.S. CONGRESS FACTS:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Newdow is an atheist whose daughter attends public elementary school in the Elk Grove Unified School District ("EGUSD") in California. In accordance with state law and a school district rule, EGUSD teachers begin each school day by leading their students in a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance ("the Pledge"). The California Education Code requires that public schools begin each school day with "appropriate patriotic exercises" and that "the giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America shall satisfy" this requirement. To implement the California statute, the school district that Newdow's daughter attends has promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent part: "Each elementary school class recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day." (students are led by teachers) Newdow does not allege that his daughter's teacher or school district requires his daughter to participate in reciting the Pledge. Rather, he claims that his daughter is injured when she is compelled to "watch and listen as her state employed teacher in her state-run school leads her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there is a God, and that ours is 'one nation under God.' He challenges the constitutionality of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag. Newdow argues that the addition of these words by a 1954 federal statute to the previous version of the Pledge of Allegiance (which made no reference to God) and the daily recitation in the classroom of the Pledge of Allegiance, with the added words included, by his daughter's public school teacher are violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

ISSUES: WON the added phrase “under God” constitutes a violation of the U.S. Consti? HELD:

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Yes. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with our holding. Plaintiff to recover costs on his appeal. RATIO: Court used three tests to determine the validity of the added words. Lemon test To survive the "Lemon test," the government conduct in question (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Historically, the primary purpose of the 1954 Act was to advance religion, in conflict with the first prong of the Lemon test. The federal defendants "do not dispute that the words 'under God' were intended" "to recognize a Supreme Being," at a time when the government was publicly inveighing against atheistic communism. o the federal defendants argue that the Pledge must be considered as a whole when assessing whether it has a secular purpose. They claim that the Pledge has the secular purpose of "solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society." o Court said: As was the case with the amendment to the Alabama statute in Wallace, the legislative history of the 1954 Act reveals that the Act's sole purpose was to advance religion, in order to differentiate the United States from nations under communist rule. "The First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion." - Defendants: The phrase 'under God' recognizes only the guidance of God in our national affairs. Court: This alleged distinction is irrelevant for constitutional purposes. The Act's affirmation of "a belief in the sovereignty of God" and its recognition of "the guidance of God" are endorsements by the government of religious beliefs. The Establishment Clause is not limited to "religion as an institution"; this is clear from cases such as Santa Fe, where the Court struck down student-initiated and studentled prayer at high school football games.. The Establishment Clause guards not only against the establishment of "religion as an institution," but also against the endorsement of religious ideology by the government. Because the Act fails the purpose prong of Lemon, we need not examine the other prongs.

-

Similarly, the school district policy also fails the Lemon test. Although it survives the first prong of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes, the school district had the secular purpose of fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon prong asks whether the challenged government action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as discussed above, particularly within the confined environment of the classroom, the policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible message of endorsement to some and disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and fails the Lemon test

Justice O’ Connor’s “endorsement test” In the context of the Pledge, the statement that the United States is a nation "under God" is an endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. . To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibility, liberty, justice, and -- since 1954 -monotheism. The text of the official Pledge, codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a position with respect to the purely religious question of the existence and identity of God. Furthermore, the school district's practice of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aims to inculcate in students a respect for the ideals set forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state endorsement of these ideals. Although students cannot be forced to participate in recitation of the Pledge, the school district is nonetheless conveying a message of state endorsement of a religious belief when it requires public school teachers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the current form of the Pledge. “Coercion test” on the principle that "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so." - Although the defendants argue that the religious content of "one nation under God" is minimal, to an atheist or a believer in certain non-JudeoChristian religions or philosophies, it may reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a "religious orthodoxy" of monotheism, and is therefore impermissible. The coercive effect of this policy is particularly pronounced in the school setting given the age and impressionability of schoolchildren, and their understanding that they are required to adhere to the norms set by their school, their teacher and their fellow students.

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2) (Reversed and Remanded) ANUCENSION vs. NLU FACTS: In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between Hacienda Luisita and the United Luisita Workers’ Union in 1962, the parties stipulated that, except for those who were members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the time of the agreement, all employees would be required to join the Union and must stay in the Union to be able to retain employment in the Hacienda. In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni Cristo sought resignation from the Union pursuant to a circular given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting any of their members from joining any outside association or organization. Members of Inglesia were told that they would not lose their jobs pursuant to RA 3350, that says that members of religious sects that prohibit affiliation may not be laid off simply on grounds of their non-affiliation with any worker’s union. Later this number went down to 115 due to 2 of them having already been deceased and 27 not having been in the Union to begin with. The Union then infomed the Hacienda that the 115 members have resigned and demanded for their immediate lay-off due to the stipulations of the CBA. The Union even proceeded to go on strike until the 115 workers were laid off. Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations struck down the statute. Petitioners here have appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1) 2) HELD: 1) 2) RATIO: 1) Petitioners claim that the Court of Agricultural Relations should have had jurisdiction as the Hacienda is of an agricultural nature, not an industrial one. Here the Court says that the agricultural nature of the Hacienda is unquestionable. As such it is clear that the Court of Agricultural Relations should have had jurisdiction. No it did not. The Court of Agricultural Relations had jurisdiction. No, RA 3350 is not unconstitutional. WON the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction. WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of RA 3350 was attacked the Union and struck down by the Court of Industrial Relations on the following grounds: A) it abridges the freedom of workers to form associations B) it impairs the obligation of contracts C) it discriminates in favor of the religious sect Inglesia ni Cristo in violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting legislation for the support of any religious sect D) it denies equal protection A) On the first claim, the Court said that both the Consti and RA 875 (the original Industrial Peace Act, later amended by RA 3350) recognized freedom of association. RA 875 provides for the forming, joining or assisting of labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining. The court also said that this right to join also includes the right not to join or to abstain from joining any union. The court explains, however, the idea of a closed shop, wherein an agreement of this nature binds employees to the union bargained with. “Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn”. However, RA 3350 included the exception with regards to religious sects that prohibit affiliation. Here, the members are not being prohibited as they may still join, neither are they being coerced to join. Therefore, there is no curtailment of the freedom of association. B) With regards to impairing the obligation of contracts, the Court said that legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Here the purpose is to insure freedom of religion, prevent discrimination, and protect the members of those religious sects. Also stated by the Court is that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. C) The Court cited Aglipay v. Ruiz where they stated that the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. The purpose of RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and

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temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. D) The Court here discussed on equal protection, not being a guaranty of equality. It allows classification. Here we see that the classification is based on real and important differences, as religious beliefs are not mere beliefs or ideas, bit are motives of certain rules of human conduct. Such classification is therefore valid.

the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.”

ISSUES: 1. WoN the Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” Assuming it has the power, whether or not the Board gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.

2.

IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA 1996 Ponente: Puno FACTS: 1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) has a television program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired on 2 TV channels. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in 1992, INC submitted to the BRMPT (Board) the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as “X” or not for public viewing on the ground that they “offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.” Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the Board. First, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal and the Office of the Pres. reversed the decision of the Board. Second, petitioner filed a civil case against the Board with the RTC Quezon City. INC alleged that the Board acted w/o jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring INC to submit the VTR tapes of its program and x-rating them. The Board invoked its power under P.D. 1986 in relation to Art. 201 of the RPC. The RTC ordered the Board to grant the INC the permit for all the series of the “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” program. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied. The CA reversed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review DECISION:

The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of the Board to review the TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” is AFFIRMED. Its decision sustaining the action of the Board xrating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

2.

RATIO: Issue 1.

3.

4.

The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all “television programs.” the Board has the power to “approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x x The law also directs the Board to apply “contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard” to determine those which are objectionable for being “immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime.” The SC rejects INC’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the

5.

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belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State (Isagani Cruz)

“attacks against another religion” in x-rating the

(Cruz) It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.

religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986 will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s television program. The ground “attack against another religion” was merely added by the respondent Board in its Rules.iThis rule is void for it runs smack against the doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech.

Issue No. 2

The evidence shows that the Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” other religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the CA as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the CA as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.

Respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the Board is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law. PAMIL vs. TELERON

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion The Board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner INC simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

MCDANIEL vs. PATY • The respondents cannot also rely on the ground (April 19, 1978)

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Ponente: CJ Burger FACTS: McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional convention. An opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was isqualified from serving as a delegate by a Tennessee statutory provision establishing the qualifications of constitutional convention delegates to be the same as those for membership in the State House of Representatives, thus invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision barring ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever." That court held that the statutory provision violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. and for a judgment striking his name from the ballot. Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that 4 of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate. Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on the ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by a vote almost equal to that of three opposing candidates. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon "religious belief" and restricted "religious action . . . [only] in the lawmaking process of government where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause . . . ."The state interests in preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel political activity along religious lines, resulting from clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause. ISSUE/HELD: W/O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever from serving as delegates to the State's limited constitutional convention deprived appellant of the right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. YES RATIO: The disqualification of ministers from legislative office was a practice carried from England by seven of the original States; later six new States similarly excluded clergymen from some political offices. The purpose of the several States in providing for disqualification was primarily to assure the success of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state. Prior to 1776, most of the 13 Colonies had some form of an established, or

government-sponsored, church. In light of this history and a widespread awareness during that period of undue and often dominant clerical influence in public and political affairs here, in England, and on the Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were held by some that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep clergymen out of public office. As the value of the disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some types of public office gradually abandoned that limitation. The essence of this aspect of our national history is that in all but a few States the selection or rejection of clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed as something safely left to the good sense and desires of the people. The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions. Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention. Yet under the clergydisqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. The Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily, not at religious belief, but at the status, acts, and conduct of the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to believe" is inapposite here. The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on ministers is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality. However widely that view may have been held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day, the American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of antiestablishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts. The challenged provision violates appellant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his religion on the surrender of his right to seek office. Though justification is asserted under the Establishment Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that if elected to public office members of the clergy will necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart those of another contrary to the anti-establishment principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.

GERMAN vs. BARANGAN (March 27, 1985) Ponente: J. Escolin

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FACTS: On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees and who were members of the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow tshirts, they marched down said street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. Along the way, however, they were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area. When their efforts to enter the church became apparently futile, they opted to stay outside, kneeling on the sidewalk in front of the barricades and prayed the Holy Rosary. Afterwards, they sang Bayan ko with clenched fists of protest against the violation of their rights and thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse. ISSUE  HELD: 1. WON petitioners’ constitutionally protected freedom to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the 1973 Consti) was violated  NO 2. WON petitioners’ freedom of locomotion was violated (Sec 5, Art IV of the 1973 Consti)  NO RATIO: 1. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners' attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Undoubtedly, the yellow tshirts worn by some of the marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-government slogans strongly tend to substantiate respondents allegation. These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code

admonishes: "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties… observe honesty and good faith." Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats and foreign guests transacting business with Malacañang. The restriction is also intended to secure the several executive offices within the Malacañang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. These offices include communications facilities that link the central government to all places in the land. Unquestionably, the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of the executive branch of the government, which petitioners' mass action would certainly disrupt. Cantwell v Connecticut: The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment embraces two concepts –freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus: The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

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2. Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of which have already been discussed, is allowed under the fundamental law, the same having been established in the interest of national security. Petition dismissed. Teehankee, dissenting: I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the right of free worship and movement is a preferred right that enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to prior restraint except where there exists the clear and present danger of a substantive evil sought to be prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger in this case. 1. The right to freely exercise one's religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. Freedom of worship, alongside freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary—even more so than on the other departments—rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy." 2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent punishment of any illegal acts committed during the exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic rights is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent. 3. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger that would justify prior restraint and bar a group of persons from entering the church of their choice for prayer and worship lies on the military or police officials who would so physically restrain them. Indeed, there is no precedent in this time and age where churchgoers whose right of free exercise of their religion is recognized have been physically prevented from entering their church on grounds of national security. On the other hand, it does not lie within the competence or authority of such officials to demand of churchgoers that they show and establish their "sincerity and good faith… in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship and of locomotion" as a precondition, as seems to be the thrust of the majority decision.

Respondents themselves in the Solicitor General's comment admit that "true, there were only about 80 persons in petitioners' group on October 2 and this number could hardly pose the danger feared," but expressed the fear that petitioners' ranks could within hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful dispersal becomes impossible as in recent demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full control and there is no question as to the capability of the security forces to ward off and stop any untoward move. They had placed an advance checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and could stop the flow of people in the church if they deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacañang.

CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT

COMMONWEALTH vs. TWITCHELL (1993) WILKINS, J. FACTS: David and Ginger Twitchell appeal from their convictions of involuntary manslaughter death of their 2 1/2 year old son Robyn. Robyn died of the consequences of peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel which had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly known as Meckel's diverticulum. There was evidence that the condition could be corrected by surgery with a high success rate. The defendants are practicing Christian Scientists [CS] who grew up in CS families. They believe in healing by spiritual treatment. During Robyn's five-day illness they retained Nathan Talbot. As a result of that consultation, David Twitchell read a church publication concerning the legal rights and obligations of CS in Mass. That publication quoted a portion of General Laws Sec. 1, as then amended, which accepted remedial treatment by spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with physical care. HELD: • Parents have a duty to seek medical attention for a child in Robyn's circumstances, the violation of which, if their conduct was wanton or reckless, could support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter and that the spiritual treatment provision [STP] did not bar a prosecution for manslaughter. However, special circumstances in this case would justify a finding that the Twitchells reasonably believed that they could rely on spiritual treatment without fear of criminal prosecution. But since this defense has not been presented to the jury, the judgement must be reversed and remanded.

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ISSUES: WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to provide medical services to a child. - YES • The duty to provide sufficient support for a child is legally enforceable in a civil proceeding against a parent. A breach of that duty is a misdemeanor. Where necessary to protect a child's well-being, the Commonwealth may intervene, over the parents' objections, to assure that needed services are provided. Parental duty of care has been recognized in the common law of homicide in this Commonwealth. There is also a common law duty to provide medical services for a child, the breach of which can be the basis, in the appropriate circumstances, for the conviction of a parent for involuntary manslaughter. WON the STP bars any involuntary manslaughter charge against a parent who relies on spiritual treatment, and who does not seek medical attention for his or her child (even if the parent's failure to seek such care would otherwise be wanton or reckless conduct). - NO • STP provides no complete protection to a parent against a charge of involuntary manslaughter that is based on the parent's wanton or reckless failure to provide medical services to a child. Sec.1 concerns child support and care in a chapter that deals with the Commonwealth's interest that persons within its territory should not be killed by the wanton and reckless conduct of others. It is unlikely that the Legislature placed the STP in Sec. 1 to provide a defense to common law homicide. The act that added the STP was entitled "An Act defining the term 'proper physical care' under the law relative to care of children by a parent." The amendment's concern seems focused on the subject matter of sec.1 and certainly not directed toward changing the common law of homicide. •

physical, educational or moral care and guidance shall be punished." The STP was added in 1971. Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1 any reference to willful failure to provide necessary and proper physical care and limited any violation to matters of failure to support. Nevertheless, the STP was retained. Because of the 1986 amendment, the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside of sec. 1 that it did not have before. The STP refers to neglect and willful failure to provide proper physical care as bases for punishment. These concepts do not underlie involuntary manslaughter. Wanton or reckless conduct is not a form of negligence. Wanton or reckless conduct does not involve a willful intention to cause the resulting harm. Involuntary manslaughter does not require willfulness. Thus, the STP in sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary manslaughter.

Sec.1

reads:

"xxxx any parent of a minor child xxxxx who willfully fails to provide necessary and proper physical, educational or moral care and guidance xxxxx or who fails to provide proper attention for said child, shall be punished xxxx. A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or lack proper physical care for the sole reason that he is being provided remedial treatment by spiritual means alone in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof."

A predecessor of sec. 1, enacted in 1882, provided that "whoever unreasonably neglects to provide for the support of his minor child shall be punished by fine or by imprisonment." Statute was rewritten in 1909 to impose a duty of physical care of children on parents. In 1954, sec. 1 was amended to state that "any parent of a minor child who wilfully fails to provide necessary and proper

WON the failure to extend the protection of the STP to them would be a denial of due process because they lacked "fair warning" because they were officially misled by an opinion of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth. - YES • Atty Gen, who is statutorily empowered to give his opinion upon questions of law, gave an opinion which answers a general question "whether parents who fail to provide medical services to children on the basis of religious beliefs will be subject to prosecution for such failure." An average person might read the Atty Gen’s comments as being a negative answer. It is true that the answer comes to focus on negligent failures of parents, and we know that wanton or reckless failures are different. • Atty Gen: “The Massachusetts child abuse reporting law does not specifically address itself to the relationship between the religious beliefs of the parent and failure to provide medical care. Sec. 1 is a criminal statute and it expressly precludes imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent for failure to provide medical care because of religious beliefs. However, the intent of Chap 119 is to require that children of such parents be provided services whenever the need arises. Under Chapter 119, children may receive services notwithstanding the inability to prosecute the parents.” • Although the Twitchells read a CS publication called "Legal Rights and Obligations of CS in Mass" which relied on the above opinion. That opinion was arguably misleading because of what it did not say concerning criminal liability for manslaughter • Although it has long been held that "ignorance of the law is no defense", there is justification for treating as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an official statement in an official interpretation of the public official who is charged with the responsibility for the interpretation or enforcement of the law. ( aka "entrapment by estoppel." ) • There is special merit to such a rule if religious beliefs are involved and if the defendant was attempting to comply with

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the law while adhering to his religious beliefs and practices. CASE REMANDED because some ‘Questions of Fact’ need be answered: o Whether a person would reasonably conclude that the Attorney General had ruled that sec. 1 provided protection against a manslaughter charge. o Whether the defendants reasonably relied on the church's publication and on the advice of the Committee on Publication.

community, physically and emotionally. During this period, the children must acquire skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the Amish community. (eto US SC ratio na) 1. The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. In applying strict scrutiny, it was not shown that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Fundamental right to religion is protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance. Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. 2. Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal education requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs. It was necessary for the court to determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent not merely philosophical nor personal. In this case, the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not conformed to this world . . . ." This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. This virtually determines their entire way of life. Values and programs of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion. Wisconsin law contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child. Furthermore, Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. The compulsory-attendance law carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. 3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy

ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR

WISCONSIN vs. YODER

FACTS: Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law (which requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to send their children to public or private school after they had graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that the Amish provide continuing informal vocational education to their children designed to prepare them for life in the rural Amish community (children ages 14 and 15). The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely believed that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life and that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their children by complying with the law. ISSUE: WON the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. HELD: Yes. RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC upheld their decision naman)

their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. It poses danger of the censure of the church community and endanger their own salvation and that of their children. These religious belief were held to be sincere. Expert witnesses (scholars on religion) testified that this concept of life aloof from the world and its values is central to their faith. Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious concepts. Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs because it takes them away from their

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of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of the overall interests that the State relies on in support of its program of compulsory high school education. In light of this showing, and weighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of police power but religiously grounded conduct is protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment. Re discrimination: A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place of their longestablished program of informal vocational education would do little to serve those interests. Separated agrarian community is the keystone of the Amish faith. That they would become burden to society should they leave the community and join the mainstream world with educational shortcomings is highly speculative. 4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society. The dissent argues that a child who expresses a desire to attend public high school in conflict with the wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no reason for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case. The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed desires. Parents have a right to direct the religious

up-bringing of their children which may be subject to limitation ] if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. But in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the arguments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society as a whole. we cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the State. (overinclusive) affirmed. U.S. vs. BALLARD FACTS:

-

Respondents, Edna W. Ballard and Donald Ballard were convicted of using and conspiring to use the mails to defraud. The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged a scheme to defraud by organizing and promoting the I Am movement through the use of the mails. The charge was that certain designated corporations were formed, literature distributed and sold, funds solicited, and memberships in the I Am movement sought 'by means of false and fraudulent representations, pretenses and promises' Misrepresentations: o That the words of 'ascended masters' and the words of the alleged divine entity, Saint Germain, would be transmitted to mankind through the medium of the said Guy W. Ballard, Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard through their high spiritual attainment and righteous conduct. That the respondent were able to cure hundreds of people of diseases classified either curable or incurable.

-

-

o

-

Each of them, well knew that all of said aforementioned representations were false and untrue and were made with the intention on the part of the defendants, and each of them, to cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to be defrauded, and to obtain from persons intended to be defrauded by the defendants, money, property, and other things of value and to convert the same to the use and the benefit of the defendants, and each of them. Defense: There was a demurrer and a motion to quash each of which asserted among other things that the indictment attacked the religious beliefs of respondents and sought to restrict the free exercise of their religion in violation of the Constitution of the United States.

-

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-

Lower Court: Did not want to rule on the truth or validity of the religious claims made by the respondents but rather limited the scope of the case to this issue: “WON these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they should be acquitted. I cannot make it any clearer than that”

o

(3) The part of the scheme concerning phonograph records sold by respondents on representations that they would bestow on purchasers 'great blessings and rewards in their aim to achieve salvation' whereas respondents 'well knew that said * * * records were manmade and had no ability to aid in achieving salvation.'

o

'If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe that Jesus came down and dictated, the jury should find them guilty.

-

-

The Lower court convicted the respondents. The latter, initially acquiesced to the verdict but soon filed for a motion for retrial since the withdrawal of the issue of truth and verity would run contrary to the nature of the indictment itself. “'it was necessary to prove that they schemed to make some, at least, of the (eighteen) representations * * * and that some, at least, of the representations which they schemed to make were false” Court of Appeals reversed the decision and granted a new trial, with one judge dissenting.

The United States contends that respondents acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs and that their consent bars them from insisting on a different course once that one turned out to be unsuccessful

o

-

Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. That case stands for the proposition that, apart from situations involving an unfair trial, an appellate court will not grant a new trial to a defendant on the ground of improper introduction of evidence or improper comment by the prosecutor, where the defendant acquiesced in that course and made no objection to it. In fairness to respondents that principle cannot be applied here

ISSUE: WON the 1st Amendment precluded the court from judging upon the truth, verity, and validity of the beliefs of the respondent. Yes, decision reversed. of the Court of Appeals

-

Supreme court: Ruled that Johnson v. United States cannot be applied in the case at bar. The real objection of respondents is not that the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Their demurrer and motion to quash made clear their position that that issue should be withheld from the jury on the basis of the First Amendment. o We do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Whatever this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment precludes such a course, as the United States seems to concede. The First Amendment has a dual aspect. It not only 'forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship' but also 'safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.' Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. 'Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.' Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men

-

Misrepresentations Supreme Court: o

ascertained

by

the

o

(1) A portion of the scheme as to healing which we have already quoted and which alleged that respondents 'had in fact cured either by the activity of one, either, or all of said persons, hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments'; (2) The portion of the scheme relating to certain religious experiences described in certain books (Unveiled Mysteries and The Magic Presence) and concerning which the indictment alleged 'that the defendants represented that Guy W. Ballard, Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard actually encountered the experiences pertaining to each of their said names as related and set forth in said books, whereas in truth and in fact none of said persons did encounter the experiences';

o

o

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o

The First Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in that position.

submit to induction. In his Selective Service System form he stated that he was not a member of a religious sect or organization; he failed to execute section VII of the questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the definition and he appended a statement that he felt it a violation of his moral code to take human life and that he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the state. Conscientious Objector 'personal scruples against war' Individual belief--rather than membership in a church or sect--determined the duties that God imposed upon a person in his everyday conduct; and that 'there is a higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to God.' Thus, while shifting the test from membership in such a church to one's individual belief the Congress nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing from armed service those who believed that they owed an obligation, superior to that due the state, of not participating in war in any form. ”religious training and belief” 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.' In assigning meaning to this statutory language we may narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from the definition. The section excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no part of it. These judgments have historically been reserved for the Government, and in matters which can be said to fall within these areas the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the state. 'The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation.' By comparing the statutory definition with those words, however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase 'Supreme Being' for the appellation 'God.' And in so doing it is also significant that Congress did not elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority which it chose to designate as 'Supreme Being.' By so refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that even the word 'God' had myriad meanings for men of faith: '(P)utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount duty. The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.

U.S. vs. SEEGER FACTS: Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his 'religious' belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, 'rather than answer 'yes' or 'no"; that his 'skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God' did 'not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed. He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished 'between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs' and was, therefore, an 'impermissible classification' under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction. On his appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not believe in a Supreme Being as required He explained that his religious *168 and social thinking had developed after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be 'partly spiritual' and, therefore, 'partly akin to the Supreme Reality'; and that his 'most important religious law' was that 'no man ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim came within the requirements of s 6(j). Because it could not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment. Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District of California on a charge of refusing to

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The test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?

(1971) Per curiam FACTS: Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War. To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a ‘conscientious objector’. The local draft board turned down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still classified him as eligible for unrestricted service then passed it on to Justice Dep’t. FBI made an inquiry. Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a conscientious objector because of testimony from ‘inquiry’ of petitioner, parents, attorney and religious minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless Justice Dep’t advised denial of request. Appeal Board denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim. Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted. ISSUE: HELD: RATIONALE: In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show 1) that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form; 2) that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief; 3) and that this objection is sincere. In applying the test, the Selective Service System must be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious sect, if any, to which he may belong. Justice Dep’t believed that Clay did not satisfy any requirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces. He objects to certain types of war in certain circumstances, rather than a general scruple against participation in war in any form. 2) Clays religion did not preclude fighting for the US because of political and racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to participate in war in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious objector only surfaced when drafting was imminent. He has not shown ‘overt manifestation’ of his opposition. However, in this Court, the gov’t has conceded that petitioners belief are based on religious training. His beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on the tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands them. The gov’t also conceded that it no longer questions the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer who decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from FBI inquiry was convinced of his sincerity and recommended his classification as a conscientious objector. Justice dep’t was wrong to disregard such a finding. Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is clear that the dep’t was wrong.

ISSUES: W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them from induction in U.S military training? HELD: Seager Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.' He did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.' He decried the tremendous 'spiritual' price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's thoughts: 'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God * * *'. Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations. It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term 'Supreme Being.' But as we have said Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore affirm the judgment. Peter It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged 'some power manifest in nature * * * the supreme expression' that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied, 'you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use.' We think that under the test we establish here the Board would grant the exemption to Peter and we therefore reverse the judgment in No. 29 Jakobson The Court of Appeals found that the registrant demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm that judgment.

CASSIUS CLAY (MUHAMMAD ALI) vs. U.S

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This case then falls in Sicurella vs US. There, the Court was asked to hold that an error in an advice letter prepared by the Justice Dep’t did not require reversal of a criminal conviction because there was a ground on which the Appeal Board might properly have denied a conscientious objector classification. This Court refused because in cases where it is impossible to determine exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the Selective Service System demands, at least, that the gov’t not recommend illegal grounds. (in other words: the grounds must be clearly legitimate from the first and finding a clearly legitimate ground afterwards won’t work.) DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed. Ali is free! SEPARATE OPINIONS Douglas, concurs: Sicurella vs US: Congress couldn’t possibly mean conscientious objector must go to ‘participation in war in any form’. Negre v Larsen: Petitioners church did not oppose war in Vietnam but provided guidelines for unjust wars. His conscience did not allow him to go to Vietnam. Court said screw his conscience, go and fight! Clay is different. As a Muslim he follows Koran. Koran proclaims jihad by believers against nonbelievers. All other wars are unjust. Clays believes only in war sanctioned by the Koran. Therefore, it becomes a matter of belief, of conscience, of religious principle. Harlan, concurs in the result: Justice dep’t gives bad advice. Not all conscientious objectors are weasels trying to get out of fighting in Vietnam.

BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT J. Peter Byrne I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment protects academic freedom but there has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law. Author’s definition of academic freedom: non-legal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors through professional channels against administrative or political interference with research, teaching and governance. Of constitutional academic freedom: essence is the insulation of scholarship and liberal education from extramural political interference  insulate the university in core academic affairs from state interference II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS

Concern is only with the substantive protection of academic freedom by the 1st Amendment isolating which has been difficult because 1) courts have used legal doctrines not based on academic freedom to protect liberties of professors and students; 2) courts have declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many forms of classroom speech that seem at first blush to implicate general principles of free expression. Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give a university the authority to hire and fire without government interference those very individuals apparently granted a personal right to write and teach without institutional hindrance.  Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension between the independence of a scholar's judgment and the university's evaluation of her professional competence. A. Academic Speech

Academic Freedom
ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS EDUCATION Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

Students and junior professors (considered neophytes in the field) suffer real punishment for speech deemed inadequate by the masters. Compared to general civil society where the 1st Amendment opposes prior and subsequent restraint based on determination if the speech is valuable or not. The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on its commitment to truth (however partially understood by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism.  society ought to strive towards speech that is truthful.

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Academic freedom resembles other free expression values insofar as it protects the individual scholar's point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects those structures that permit the individual scholar to engage with others in collective scholarship

of gentlemen for elite professions.  The change is usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by scientific endeavor. Changes in the structure enlarged the status of the faculty – now highly-trained professionals. Yet low salary and uncertain tenure remained  They were no longer dependent on the will of clergymen but answerable to businessmen. Academic freedom became rallying cry for professors seeking more control over their professional lives.

B.

Student Speech and Extracurricular Political Activity

The term "academic freedom" should be reserved for those rights necessary for the preservation of the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of disinterested scholarship and teaching. First Amendment rights w/c should not properly be a part of constitutional academic freedom: 1) no recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of constitutional academic freedom, because none of them has anything to do with scholarship or systematic learning (e.g. wearing of armbands, demonstrations, etc.)  while the Constitution affords students at public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of academic freedom at all. 2) the right of a professor to participate in political activity off campus and on her own time without institutional reprisal should not be viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom  academic freedom should be understood to include only rights unique or necessary to the functions of higher education; exist as a necessary incident to university's commitment to the pursuit of truth and the controvertibility of dogma. C. Tenure Tenure is not equal to academic freedom but it promotes academic freedom since it requires public airing of explicit and categorically neutral reasons for dismissal.  does not protect academic freedom of untenured since they will direct their scholarship to those likely to be accepted by the tenured. III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION ACADEMIC FREEDOM Early History and Structure OF

C.

Development Freedom

of

the

Concept

of

Academic

Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees or regents. Professors demanded that no ideological test be applied and evaluation done by professional peers. The American concept of academic freedom emerged from this ideological and practical conflict between academic social scientists and their lay employers. American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP) insisted on a clear distinction between speech that was academic and that which was merely political or sectarian. AAUP’s vision of academic freedom: 1) noble vision of the academic calling; 2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control over universities; 3) concept of peer review according to professional standards.

D.

The Challenge of other Academic Values

Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideas that aren’t scientifically demonstrable and that students must receive a coherent education in the traditions of civilized thought, writing and art. The democratic value in higher education reflects the demands placed on our colleges and universities by the society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social mobility and general prosperity.

E.

A.

Professional Standard

Competence

as

a

Regulatory

The structural elements that would give shape to academic freedom were established early: legal control by non-academic trustees; effective governance by administrators set apart from the faculty by political allegiance and professional orientation; dependent and insecure faculty.

The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good faith of the professorate and on its collective ability to distinguish between scholars who disagree with accepted findings and those who do not understand them.  what defines competence? When this question arises trouble develops. Without agreement about basic paradigms, competence loses much of the neutrality that might ordinarily be assumed, as there may be no shared criterion for evaluation.

B.

The Rise of the Scientific Research Value

Higher education began to be seen as scientific training for practical jobs rather than moral training

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IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM AND THE SCHOLAR

ACADEMIC INDIVIDUAL

The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve these disputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of a candidate denied tenure by faculty vote, a court would need to determine what, in fact, are the requirements for tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements, and whether the faculty rejected the candidate for some non-academic reason. Such an inquiry, backed by the coercive power of the state, would put the department or school into intellectual receivership, with the court determining the appropriate paradigms of thought.  Courts then should only ascertain if the administrators can establish that they in good faith rejected the candidate on academic grounds. The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role to excluding non-academics from imposing ideological criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to impose substantive limits on academic administrators who in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PROTECTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy: university freedom for teaching and scholarship without interference from government is a positive right and that the state here had failed to provide a compelling justification for questioning an academic about the content of a lecture  the four essential freedoms" of a university--to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study Three significant oddities about the plurality and concurring opinions in Sweezy: 1) never before had the Court suggested that academic freedom was protected by the 1st Amendment. 2) Frankfurter’s decision looks solely to nonlegal sources to describe the contents of acad. freedom 3) Although the content of acad. freedom was drawn from non-legal sources, they praised acad freedom by stressing the social utility of free universities. Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant rhetoric but also with an ambiguous description of the relationship between academic custom and positive legal right. The Court's decision not to ground its ruling on a positive right of academic freedom, moreover, presaged the Court's refusal to give this right the practical force that its rhetorical enthusiasms promised. Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, the Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of academic freedom increases the ambiguity already created by basing the case's holding upon vagueness. However, despite their analytical shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academic government officials to prescribe political orthodoxy in university teaching and research. Constitutional Academic Freedom and the State Action Doctrine: An Aside Faculty and students at state universities enjoy extensive substantive and procedural constitutional rights against their institutions while faculty and students at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, the state action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against institutional infringements for half the nation's academics and denies it to the other half for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the realities of academic life

While the right to institutional academic freedom has arisen at the time in our history when universities have been most subject to federal regulation, no federal regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in holdings and rules

A.

The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic Freedom

Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a limitation on the grounds or procedures by which academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgment that universities must and should distinguish among speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and a pioneering inquiry into which university administrative decisions the First Amendment should protect. Thus, core academic administrative decisions-determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study-cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without impairing the unique virtues of academic speech. When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.

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Academic Abstention It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend common law rules of liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's good faith performance of its core functions. The recognition of authority over internal affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree of common law autonomy. Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised to constitutional status, so that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the special needs or prerogatives of the academic community. State Constitutional Law The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state universities seems to have contributed to the development of the federal right of institutional academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the persistence of the view, inherent in academic abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the special needs and values of universities, even when erected and supported by the state. Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best be seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so far as to deprive the university of control over its academic destiny. This principle has been fashioned by courts, explaining why they restrain themselves from imposing farreaching constitutional or common law duties on the university. As such, it represents academic abstention raised to a constitutional level. Institutional Academic Freedom and the First Amendment And what are the indigenous values served by universities? 1) the university is the preeminent institution in our society where knowledge and understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness. 2) The disinterested search for knowledge fosters a manner of discourse that, at its best, is careful, critical, and ambitious 3) The university aspires to instill in those entering adulthood a capacity for mature and independent judgment. Preserving the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of academic freedom. These goals give intellectual and educational expression to the vision of human reason implicit in the Constitution.

Who are do be protected by constitutional academic freedom? Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of professors (understood as the core of the doctrine developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional autonomy. VI. CONCLUSION

Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy has come to be understood as the four freedoms offered by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The four freedoms adequately express the degree of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they recognize that liberal studies involve more than the simple act of speaking--that they require "'that atmosphere which is most *340 conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. This requires security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the hiring of competent people, and the reward of excellence. Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility that academics might attain the goals of learning and scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.

SWEEZY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE June 15, 1957 Ponente: Warren, CJ: FACTS:  Defendant, Paul Sweezy, was convicted of contempt for failure to answer questions asked by the Attorney General of New Hampshire  In 1951 a statute was passed by the New Hampshire legislature to regulate subversive acts. In 1953, legislature adopted a joint resolution authorizing the attorney general to make full and complete investigations with respect to violations of the subversive activities act of 1951 which includes among others authorizing him “to act upon his own motion and upon such information as in his judgment may be reasonable or reliable.” o Statute defines a person to be subversive if he, by any means, aids in the commission of any act intended to assist in the alteration of the constitutional form of gov’t by force or violence.

Sweezy was summoned to appear on two separate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of subversion in connection with the membership of his wife in the Progressive Party, an article he wrote wherein he affirmed that “he styled himself as a ‘classical Marxist’ and a ‘socialist’”,

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and a lecture he delivered on March 22, 1954 for a humanities course at the university.

overthrow of the Government, never knowingly associated with Communists in the State, but was a socialist believer in peaceful change…  He refused to answer questions regarding: 1) a lecture given by him at the University of New Hampshire, 2) activities of himself and others in the Progressive political organizations, and 3) “opinions and beliefs,” invoking the constitutional guarantees of free speech SC stated that: For society’s good – if understanding be essential need of society— inquiries and speculations into the natural sciences, into anthropology, economics, law, etc. must be left as unfettered as possible except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.  exclusion of governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university. Cites a quote from the Open Universities in South Africa: “In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end… A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, it ideal being the ideal of Socrates – ‘to follow the argument where it leads.’ This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs… Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge… It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university – to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”

Petitioner answered most of the questions but declined to answer certain questions about his knowledge regarding the Progressive Party in his 1st appearance and about the lecture he delivered and his opinions or beliefs in his 2nd appearance stating only that he hat never been a member of the Communist Party. Because of his continuous decline to answer he was cited in contempt.

ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of due process of law under the 14th Amendment HELD: Yes.  It is recognized that the right to lecture or associate are civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution but they are not absolute rights. o In this case, it is believed that there was an unquestionable invasion of the petitioner’s liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression – areas in which the government should be extremely reticent to tread.  To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. 

In this case, the record does no reveal what reasonable or reliable information led the Attorney General to question petitioner (no showing of probable cause) therefore, if the interrogation of the Attorney General was in fact entirely unrelated to the object of the legislature in authorizing such inquiry, the Due Process Clause would preclude the endangering of constitutional liberties and can be treated as an absence of authority to conduct the inquiry. Because of this there can be no showing of a sufficient state interest to infringe the constitutional rights of the petitioner.

The inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizen’s political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meager a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and the petitioner’s relations to these.

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:  Whether the Attorney General of New Hampshire acted within the scope of the authority given him by the state legislature is not for the US SC to determine but is a matter for the decision of the courts of that State. Petitioner as mentioned answered most of the questions asked of him, making it known that he had never been a Communist, never taught the violent GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino 1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-

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76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; reason in the letter: Pet.’s frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class although she ahd the requisite intellectual capability 3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology — which would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 6. Considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue studying or not? Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit Ratio: 1. Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to admit the pet. -That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to

admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.

- technical aspect of admissions: the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Being admitted to the school is a privilege and not a right. -There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.

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2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. -It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments - For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution - philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines 3. Court further discusses “academic freedom” that its reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. - Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." - Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." (2 types) - "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner.

There was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this decision.

ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP J. Vitug FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student in Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PRO and acting Secretary of the student council, he was asked to sign Resolution No. 105, which would increase tuition payments by 20%. He refused to sign and asked for a 2week period to talk it over with his fellow officers. After they met on the matter, the council presented a 9-point proposal. With an assurance that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105. PHCR then announced that its application to increase school fees was approved by DECS. The student council then filed a motion for consideration. DECS then put the implementation on hold pending talks on the matter. In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelo being on the list. As such, he was expelled and not allowed to enroll for the next semester on the following grounds: * Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007; * No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course; * Official Admission Credential not yet submitted; * Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in the registration card. Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued Order No. 9 which stated: . . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students to continue attending their classes to protect their interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined.

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In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-named students be re-admitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this case/issue. PHCR did not comply with the directive. Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not being admitted was due to his being against the increase on tuition payments. Respondent school invokes academic freedom in the expulsion of Isabelo. ISSUE: WON Isabelo’s expulsion was within the school’s academic freedom. HELD: NO RATIO: Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, which upheld the rule that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student. Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. With regards to contracts, the court said that the contract between student and school is not one that is only on a semestral basis, but the student has a right to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. Finally the court says that the punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. There is, however, an administrative determination to be made whether petitioner does indeed deserve to be a senior in PHCR. Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings.

However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996th resolution reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission. After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination required in any college of the University is within the authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the autonomous campus." In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned before the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, which was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed three years in the college. Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students, upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college.” The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting where it denied the appeal of the students by a vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them. The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the

REYES vs. COURT of APPEALS (Ponente: Medialdea, 1991) FACTS: Respondent-students as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the NMAT which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.

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petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before the SC. ISSUE: WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the petitioners. – NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine. RATIO:

categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Considering such antagonistic conditions, We can empathize with the students' mental anxiety and emotional strain in their three years in college in the company of some professors who looked down on them as academic pretenders. Furthermore, the students were pressed for time as they have only one more year before graduation. These circumstances combined with the advice of the U.P. President unduly influenced the students to write this reconciling letter.

1.

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4.

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The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear: to the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of administration of the university and to the UC the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university. The University Code grants to the College Faculty the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the approval of the autonomous UC. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenforceable. At the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S and University President’s approval. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). The UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly. The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners' arguments that the BOR's 1031st is contrary to justice and equity because the students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to admission. In their letter to the Faculty, The student's aforesaid feeling does not amount to a

U.P. vs. COURT of APPEALS Ponente: J. Romero FACTS: Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review on certiorari the Order of the lower court denying the motion to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of its professors for alleged derogatory statement uttered concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwelling inhabitants of the rain forest of Mindanao. August 15-17, 1986: The "International Conference on the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. Jerome Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Dept of Anthropology was the designated conference chairman. He presented therein the "Tasaday Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading anthropologists who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested that the "discovery" in 1971 by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication made possible by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to pose as primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers. In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. He likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television documentary showing interviews with natives claiming to have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays. Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th Int’l Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several dailies. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of action: 1. defendants' conduct and statements that the Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprived them of their peace of mind and defiled the Tasadays' “dignity and personality”

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2.

defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicity-seeking persons, thereby besmirching their reputation and causing them serious anxiety 3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny plaintiff Tasadays' personality and their existence as a distinct ethnic community within the forest area reserved under the Proclamation (No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud their rights thereunder 4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign to vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of "false and perjured 'evidence' to debase and malign" them, caused them to incur attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages at the "amount equivalent to defendants' combined salaries for two (2) months, estimated at P32,000.00." Procedural crap: Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against the UP professors stating the above causes of action. UP filed a motion to intervene, stating that the UP profs were under their supervision. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. With the MFR denied in the lower court, they filed a petition for certiorari for gadalej, which was dismissed by the SC. Meanwhile, UP filed a motion to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck off the record. In the CA, everything else was denied, because petitioners’ allegations were not stated in the complaint. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE  HELD: 1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of the UP profs’ petition for certiorari  NO 2. WON the UP professors are covered by the protective mantle of Academic Freedom  YES, but UP should have defended its profs in the course of the trial case, instead of trying to terminate the proceedings prematurely Hence, the CA’s denial of the profs’ motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded. RATIO: 1. Super daming procedural crap… nakakahilo. While it is true that the instant petition and the previous case revolve around the issue of WON the lower court correctly denied the motion to of the UP profs, there is an aspect of the case which takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action). The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and subject matter in two cases. Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in the previous case is not a hindrance to the application of res judicata because the situation is akin to the adding of other parties to a case which had been

finally resolved in a previous one. UP was not an original party-defendant in the original suit, but it intervened and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate academic freedom, both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the same interests in the two petitions. However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same complaint were filed in this case and they were separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen and Salazar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its limits the requirement of identity of subject matter. 2. Academic Freedom UP has no cause of action because there are insufficient allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the same allegations in its original complaint because that has been previously struck off the record by the lower court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is affected by the complaint simply because it was not an original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a study on the Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the motion to dismiss the complaint against Salazar and Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the allegations of the complaint. On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged a fraud. This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was improper. Coming to the defense of its faculty members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle of academic freedom. However, it should have championed the cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial of the case. It erred in trying to abort the proceedings at its inception through the device of filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been inflicted on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still invoke and prove the special defense of institutional academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Paño and in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.

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Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to notice of subsequent proceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether issues have been joined. With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not within the province of the court to make pronouncements on for these are matters beyond its expertise.

RTC declared the Order invalid because it deprived San Diego’s of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power. ‘Angles’ of the Case : 1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the ‘three-flunk rule’ is a valid exercise of police power. - In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the constitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admission to medical schools to those that initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical school, Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point: - The test is the reasonable relation between the lawful method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR as condition for admission to medical schools, and the lawful subject – the securing of the health and safety of the general community. - The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. - The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes also covers the admission to the practice. - For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the lawful subject is the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools by upgrading through selectivity in the process of admission like limiting admission to those who passed the NMAT (lawful method). - Furthermore, the use of admission tests is widely used in the United States (Medical College Admission Test) and in other countries with more educational resources than that of the Philippines. - Ultimately, the measure contributes to the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate the medical profession. - Test for the valid exercise police power involves the concurrence between: a. b. the interest of the of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

DECS vs. SAN DIEGO J. Cruz The basic issue of the case is whether or not a person who failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) thrice, in violation of the ‘three-flunk rule’, is entitled to take it again. FACTS: Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE times and flunked all of them [Court found that he actually failed FOUR times – a ‘misplaced persistence’ like a ‘hopeless love’]. When he applied for the FIFTH time, the DECS and the Director of Center for Educational Measurement rejected his application on the basis of the ‘three-flunk rule’: MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] Order No. 12, Series of 1972: ‘A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.’ San Diego went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test. Through a petition for mandamus, he invoked his rights to academic freedom and quality education. He also raised the issues of due process and equal protection. By agreement of the parties, he was allowed to take the NMAT.

2. Right to quality education is not absolute - While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor… A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who want to be a lawyer

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may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised and advised. - San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that there are other people who are more prepared than him, considering the crowded medical schools that we have today.

3.

The order does not violate the equal protection clause - A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things. There are substantial distinctions between medical students and other students who are not required to take the NMAT and not subjected to the three-flunk rule. The medical profession have a delicate responsibility towards society that warrants a different treatment towards them.

standardization and regulation of the medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education composed by representatives from education government institutions, private medical specialty societies, association of medical schools and dean of the UP College of Medicine. The one of the administrative functions of the Board is to prescribe requirements for admission with necessary rules and regulations for proper implementation. The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility given by the Board. b. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT as an additional requirement for the issuance of the certificate of eligibility. proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMA, and administering the NMAT.

c. d.

Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. Court said that San Diego’s intellectual capacity is not ‘depreciated’, rather, he may be meant for another calling. The rule is intended to avoid a nation of misfits – square pegs trying to fit into round holds. The decision of the RTC declaring MECS Order No. 12 invalid is reversed.

The petition was denied by the RTC and the NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted that the petitioners were not able to present a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. ‘Angles’ of the case: 1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medical Act of 1959], and MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners. - The petitioners cited ‘State Policies’ which include Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II, Section 17 on the priority to education. They also cited Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase ‘right of ALL citizens to quality education.’ Furthermore, the NMAT requirement is challenged as a violation of the ‘fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements’ stated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3). - Court said that the petitioners did not demonstrated how the measures provided by the Board collide with these relatively specific State policies. In short, they were not able to present a prima facie case with regards to the State Policies angle. - About the ‘right of all citizens to quality education’, this phrase should not be construed as compelling to State to make quality education available across the board. Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so far that the citizens were able to quality under ‘fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.’

TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ J. Feliciano FACTS: Teresita Tablarin and other students, in their behalf and in behalf of other applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken or taken but failed the NMAT during 1987-88 and for the future years to come, wants to be admitted into schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, Tablarin and company either did not take or failed the NMAT which is required by the Board of Medical Education (Board) and conducted by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the CEM from: a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the ‘Medical Act of 1959’ provides that one of its objectives the

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2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medical Act of 1959], is not an undue delegation of legislative power. - The general principle of non-delegation of powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare – a delegated power may not be further delegated by the person to whom such power is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule of the separation of and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government. However, this rule was made to adapt to the complexities of the modern government referred to by Justice Laurel in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission. This is known as the principle of subordinate legislation. - Standards for subordinate legislation may be expressed or implied. The body of the statute and the goal to standardize and regulate the medical profession satisfy the necessary standards required. 3. The NMAT is not an “unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement” which results in a denial of due process. - The petitioners did not specify what factors in the NMAT support their claim. If they are questioning the burden imposed by the NMAT, which would pertain to the utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then these are matters that should be addressed by the administrative and legislative bodies – not by the Court. 4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid exercise of the police power of the State. - Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power of the sovereign to promote the important interests and needs – the general order of the general community. - The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of police power: concurrence test between lawful subject and lawful method. 5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed by the Board after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges does not violate the equal protection clause. - The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a flexible measure that takes into consideration changes of different factors that would merit a commensurate change in the cut-off score like: number of students who reached the cut-off score in the previous year, available slots, average scores, level of difficulty of the examination. Setting a permanent cut-off scores would result to unreasonable rigidity. HOLDING:

Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical schools are not unconstitutional impositions. Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

NON vs. JUDGE DAMES FACTS: • Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re-enroll because they participated in student mass actions against their school the preceding sem • On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present in their classes • Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower court considered that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be re-enrolled. “The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx” • In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that would not put the college in a bad light. • Judge Dames’ decision considering these facts said that what the students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school. ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. YES RATIO: • In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one semester and contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is deemed terminated. • However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions

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This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis-à-vis the right of school officials to discipline them. The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting grievances disorder is more or less expected because emotions run high. That the protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Consti is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my be barred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies. Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school. Constitutional freedom of free speech and assembly also not absolute. However, imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. (procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right to ans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them, right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly considered) The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Consti allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 and 137 of the respondent school’s manual, a student is enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessary for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 gives the students the right to continue their course up to graduation. Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights. In Villar, the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say they are graduating students and if there are any deficiencies these do not warrant nonreadmission. Also there are more students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. And some of the petitioners had no failing marks. The court held that the students were denied due process in that there was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse

• •

them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to the offense committed with due process. But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced. Moot and academic. They’ve already suffered enough.

ALCUAZ vs. PSBA Justice Paras: FACTS: • Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances with regards to “not being able to participate in the policymaking of the school”, despite the regulations set by the admin with regards to protest actions • During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. • court ordered the school authorities to create a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, who made recommendations which the school adopted • a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing and answering the complaints • petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process when they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly. • Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice. ISSUE: A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ? B. WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents HELD: A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process. 1. There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for

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'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties." 2. The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Standards of procedural due process are: a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; b. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and e.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed at the beginning of each school Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration. Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the school when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an investigating body. 4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986. Findings of the investigating committee: 1. students disrupted classes

2.

petitioners involved were found to be academically deficient & the teachers are found to have committed various acts of misconduct.

5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution. Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless : 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence; 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; 4. when palpable errors are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. .B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable. 1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction. 2. respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic

A. Non- impairment of Obligations of Contracts
Art III sec 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Civil Code Art 1306 The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem

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convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
PADILLA ARTICLE: A CIVIL LAW Article 1306 (Civil Code)- The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. The article was taken from Article 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code. The old provision stipulated that an agreement between contracting parties was the law between them, and such an agreement must be complied with in good faith. Under the old article, limitations to the freedom of contract included those against law, morals or public order. Article 1306 adds those contrary to good customs and public policy to these limitations. The freedom to contract is protected under the constitutional clause that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The author explains that Liberty includes the freedom to contract. He illustrates this through the case of People vs. Pomar, where the Court held that “The right to enter into lawful contracts constitutes one of the liberties of the people of the state… A citizen cannot be compelled to give employment to another citizen, nor can any one be compelled to be employed against his will. Liberty includes not only the right to labor, but to refuse to labor, and consequently, the right to refuse to make such contracts… To enter into legal contacts freely and without restraint, is one of the liberties guaranteed to the people of the state.” Also, freedom of contract is both a constitutional and statutory right. Parties to a contract are free to stipulate terms and conditions. However, freedom of contract is not absolute, and is subject to several limitations. The limitations to the freedom of contract are those against: a) Law (The parties cannot stipulate against the law, because the law is supreme and is always deemed to be an integral part of every contract. It may be possible to compromise a liability coming from a civil case, but this is not possible with a liability arising from a criminal case.) b) Morals c) Good Customs d) Public Order e) Public Policy Valid Stipulations include those onerous stipulations in leonine contracts, stipulations in bond that surety’s liability is solidary and primary, stipulations limiting liability on bond, etc.

HOME BUILDERS & LOAN ASSOC. vs. BLAISDELL 01/08/34 Hughes, C.J. FACTS: Minnesota passed a moratorium law providing that in a time of emergency, parties may seek judicial relief with respect tp the foreclosure of mortgages & execution sales of real estate, in that sales may be postponed and periods may be extended. The statute leaves it to the court's discretion as to the length of time that it will give an applicant "as it will deem just & equitable." The Act is to remain in effect "only during the continuance of the emergency and in no event beyond May 1, 1935." No extension of the period for redemption and no postponement of sale is to be allowed which would have the effect of extending the period of redemption beyond that date.The section also provides that the time for redemption from foreclosure sales theretofore made, which otherwise would expire less than thirty days after the approval of the Act shall be extended to a date thirty days after its approval, and application may be made to the court within that time for a further extension as provided in the section. By another provision of the Act, no action, prior to May 1, 1935, may be maintained for a deficiency judgment until the period of redemption as allowed by existing law or as extended under the provisions of the Act has expired. Prior to the expiration of the extended period of redemption, the court may revise or alter the terms of the extension as changed circumstances may require. Blaisdell, under the statute, applied for an order extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale. Their petition stated that they owned a lot in Minneapolis which they had mortgaged to appellant; that the mortgage contained a valid power of sale by advertisement and that, by reason of their default, the mortgage had been foreclosed and sold to appellant on May 2, 1932, for $3,700.98; that appellant was the holder of the sheriff's certificate of sale; that, because of the economic depression appellees had been unable to obtain a new loan or to redeem, and that, unless the period of redemption were extended, the property would be irretrievably lost, and that the reasonable value of the property greatly exceeded the amount due on the mortgage, including all liens, costs and expenses. Though initially denied by the district court, upon appeal the extension was granted by the state supreme court, The state court upheld the statute as an emergency measure. Although conceding that the obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the court decided that what it thus described as an impairment was, notwithstanding the contract clause of the Federal Constitution, within the police power of the State as that power was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which the legislature had found to exist. PETITIONERS: the moratorium law is contrary to the contract clause (Art 1, S 10) and the due process and equal protection clauses (14th Amd). ISSUE-HELD:

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WON the moratorium law is constitutional-YES RATIO: At the outset the court made it very clear that except for the time factor, no other aspect of the mortgage relation was altered. The indebtness remains; in fact, the mortgagor still has the right to the rentals for the time when the period is suspended. The court then discussed the historical backgorund of the contracts clause vis-a-vis the concept of emergency powers. Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of emergency, and they are not altered by emergency. While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. Although an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed. In Wilson v. New, the constitutional question presented in the light of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. In other words, there must be a compelling state interest coupled with a narrowlytailored means to achieve it. The "non-impairment of contracts" clause came to life because at the time the Constitution was being drafted, the drafters were mindful of the fact that there have been an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations. Legislative interferences had been so numerous and extreme that the confidence essential to prosperous trade had been undermined and the utter destruction of credit was threatened.But as J. Johnson wrote in Ogden v Saunders, to give such a sweeping protection to the sanctity of contracts could not have been the intent of the Constitution, given the fact that law has over a hundred examples wherein a contract may be vioded.Societies exercise a positive control as well over the inception, construction and fulfillment of contracts as over the form and measure of the remedy to enforce them. Therefore there is a need to determine: what is a contract? What are the obligations of contracts? What constitutes impairment of these obligations? What residuum of power is there still in the States in relation to the operation of contracts, to protect the vital interests of the community? The obligation of a contract is "the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement." Sturges v. Crowninshield. The laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its

terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement. Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against invasion.Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy. But there is a distinction betwwen an obligation & a remedy as pointed out in Sturges: The distinction between the obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct. It is competent for the States to change the form of the remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. No attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, and those which, under the form of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. The general doctrine of this court on this subject may be thus stated: in modes of proceeding and forms to enforce the contract, the legislature has the control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided it does not deny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions or restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. Into all contracts, whether made between States and individuals, or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise not out of the literal terms of the contract itself; they are superinduced by the preexisting and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations or of the community to which the parties belong; they are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur. Thus, the economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. Sa madaling sabi, police power measure ang nasabing batas. Taking all of this into account, the court concludes: 1)that there was an "emergency" in Minnesota that warranted the enactment of the moratorium law; 2)the

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statute addressed a legitimate need, the protection of a basic interest of society (here the protection of the economic system and the justness of giving debtors time; 3)the conditions are not unreasonable; 4)the legislation is temporary in operation. Petition dismissed, affirmed. judgment of Minn SC

RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN Bautista Angelo, j.: FACTS: August 20, 1941 Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land situated in the city of Manila for P9,600. P4,800 paid outright, P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7%. To secure the payment of the balance of P4,800, a 1st mortgage over the parcels of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. New title was issued in favor of Placido J.Esteban with a mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Esteban failed to pay. On Aug 2, 1949, Rutter instituted this action in the CFI to recover the balance, interest, and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged. Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint, but set up a defense the moratorium clause embodied in RA 342. He claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted on Aug 20, 1941; that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission [PWDC] for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under sec 2 of RA 342, payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of 8 years from the settlement of his claim by the PWDC, and this period has not yet expired. ISSUE: WON RA 342, approved by Congress on July 26, 1948, if declared applicable to the present case is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts  YES, unreasonable period (see subissue). RATIO: RA 342 o Sec 2: all debts and other monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941 shall not due and demandable for a period of 8 years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the PWDC; o sec 3: should the provision of section 2 be declared void and unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the

provisions of EO 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by EO 32, dated March 10, 1945, shall continue to be in force and effect Moratorium (def’n) - is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power" The test of the constitutionality of the moratorium statute: It is required that the period of a suspension of the remedy be definite and reasonable. Impairs the obligation of contracts? Yes, but it is justified as a valid exercise of police power. Chief Justice Hughes says: Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government to secure the peace and good order of society. State power must be consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The constitutional prohibition should not be construed as to prevent limited and temporary interpositions with respect to the enforcement of contracts if made necessary by great public calamity. Blaisdell case has its limitations: o impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by making the remedy futile. o propriety of the remedy. The rule requires that the alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy hardly pursuing Blaisdell summary: Police power may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts SUB-ISSUE: WON the period of 8 years which RA 342 grants to debtors is unreasonable under the present circumstances.  YES RATIO: The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar. Case at bar: These obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of EOs 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 8-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least 12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems unreasonable, if not oppressive. And the

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injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief. Reconstruction and rehabilitation has swept the country since liberation. it can now be safely stated that the financial condition of our country and the people have returned to normal. This is so not only as far as observation and knowledge are capable to take note but also because of the official pronouncements made by the Chief Executive.

1.

ORTIGAS vs. FEATI

Yes. Although the validity of the resolution was never questioned in the past proceedings, its validity was at least impliedly admitted from the facts. Sec 3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) empowers a Municipal Council “to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. It gives more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the community. The only exceptions are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case. Yes, the resolution as an exercise of police power by the municipality can supersede contractual obligations assumed by the defendants. While nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. Police power is the most essential, insistent & illimitable of powers, the greatest & most illimitable of powers. It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Its exercise may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Philippine Long Distance Company vs. City of Davao . police power "is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." Dobbins v. Los Angeles - 'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good. Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations - "We do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power. The state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. General - the laws and reservation of attributes of sovereign power are read into agreed upon by the parties. Thus not Auditor essential contracts only are

J. Santos (1979) FACTS: • March 4, 1952 – Ortigas & Co., a partnership involved in real estate particularly the Highway Hills Subd. along EDSA in Mandaluyong, entered into a contract of sale on installments over 2 parcels of land with Augusto and Natividad Angeles who later transferred their rights and interests to a certain Emma Chavez Under the agreement, it was stipulated among others that:
xxx this shall be used exclusively for residential purposes xxx

2.

Eventually, defendant Feati Bank and Trust company acquired the lots and started the construction of a building on the said lot devoted to banking purposes Ortigas then filed for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain & enjoin the defendant from continuing with the construction of the commercial bank in violation of the restrictions set in the contract of sale that was imposed by the plaintiff as part oif its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subd Defendant maintains that the area in question has been declared as a commercial and industrial zone by the Zoning Regualtion of RESOLUTION no. 27 on Feb 4, 1980 of the Municipal Councilk of Mandaluyong, Rizal Trial Court ruled in favor of defendant bank Feati holding that the restrictions set by plaintiff Ortigas were subordinate to Municipal Resolution 27 because of the municipal’s valid exercise of police power. It stressed that the private interest should “bow down to general interest & welfare.” Plaintiff appealed till it finally reached the SC

ISSUES: 1. WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power 2. WON the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by defendants HELD & RATIO:

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existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile – a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. Dolan vs. Brown - "A grantor may lawfully insert in his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the beneficial enjoyment of the estate. Resolution No. 27, in declaring that the western part of EDSA is an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area. Industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal council, was reasonably justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.

was renewed in July 1985, it became subject to BP 877, which had come into effect on June 12, 1985. Petitioner: BP 877 should not be given retroactive application because it would violate the impairment clause and the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Relying on Art. 16501, she also claims that sublease was not prohibited when it was concluded in 1976 and since it was valid at that time, it should continue to be valid even now. Also, she says her mom is the proper party defendant since her mom was the one who inherited the leasehold right from Servillano, the original lessee. ISSUE: WON the ejectment of lessee Virginia Suarez be allowed? HELD: Yes. Petitioner can no longer retain the leased lot since she is making a profitable business of subleasing it w/o the written consent of the landlord. RATIO According to Art.16872, if the period for lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from month to month if the rent agreed is from month to month. As the original contract of lease didn’t prescribe a fixed period and the rentals were paid monthly, the same should be considered renewable from month to month. When the sublease was renewed by Capuchino in July 1985, it became invalid under BP877, w/c already became effective. The law then, operated prospectively upon the new or renewed contract of sublease, w/c to be valid needed the written consent of the lessor. Moreover, BP877 provides that “all residential units (The Lot comes under this) the total monthly rental of w/c doesn’t exceed P480.00 as of the effectivity of this Act shall be covered.” Impairment clause (IC)3 is now no longer inviolate. More and more, interests of the public have become involved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the protection of the IC. As long as the contract affects public welfare one way or another so as to require the interference opf the State, then must the police power be asserted and prevail, over the IC.

JUAREZ vs. CA CRUZ, J.: FACTS: Lot 502 (hereafter known as The Lot) was leased in early 1900s to Serviliano Ocampo who built a house therein and lived there w/ his parents and sister Angela. When he died in March 1956, Angela took over the lease and stayed there with her children (including Virginia). In 1976, she moved to Virginia’s house and leased the lot to Roberto Capuchino. Meantime, Aranetas sold it to Susanna Realty. Inc. which sold it in 1985 to Cetus Dev’t Corp. After acquiring it, Cetus filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner on the ground that she violated BP877 by subleasing The Lot w/o its consent. Respondents: CA ruled that BP 877 (effective on June 12, 1985) was applicable because the orig’l contract of lease didn’t specify a fixed term and payment of the rental was made on a monthly basis. Contract was deemed terminated from month to month. Hence, when it

1

When in the contract of lease of thing there is no express prohibition, the lessee may subject the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the lessor.
2

If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month.
3

Impairment of obligation – any enactment of legislative character is said to “impair” the obligation of a contract w/c attempts to tgake from a party a right to w/c he is entitled by its terms, or w/c deproves him of the means of enforcing such a right.

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PVB Employees Union v. PVB – Contract is protected by guaranty only if it doesn’t affect public interest. Housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country. The regulation of rentals has long been the concern of the gov’t to prevent the lessor from imposing arbitrary conditions on the lessee while at the same time deterring the lessee from abusing the statutory benefits accorded to him. Purpose of BP877 is to protect both landlord and tenant from their mutual impositions that can only cause detriment to society as a whole. Here, rental on The Lot is only P69.70/mo. while the petitioner charges Capuchino a monthly rental of P400. While it is true that P400 covers the lot and building, the point is that she isn’t paying the lessor enough for the use of the lot in light of the total rental she is charging Capuchino for the use of building and lot. She has taken undue advantage of the rental laws by holding on to the leased premises although they no longer need them for their own residence or administering them to the prejudice of the landlord. BP877 is not an ex post facto law. It’s not penal in nature. Virginia is not being prosecuted under the said penal provisions as well. Angela is 92 yrs. Old and is now under the care of Virginia. Thus, it is Virginia who is proper party defendant. She has been receiving the rent from Capuchino and paying rent on the lot to Cetus. She has taken over the leasehold right for all intents and purposes.

After the trial the court rendered its decision ordering petitioner and all persons claiming possession over her to vacte the premises alluded to the complaint and to remove whatever improvement she introduced to the property. Rita moved for procedural appeals and of course the decision of the trial court was affirmed hence its elevation to the supreme court. 1. 2. W/o the lease of an apartment includes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed? YES W/o B.P 25 is contrary to the promotion of social justice policy of the new constitution? NO

ISSUE:

HELD: 1. The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome vs. Gotico where this court ruled that the lease of a building naturally leases the lot therein, and the rentals of the building includes those of the lot. 2. The objective of B.P 25 is to remedy the plight of the lessees, but such objective is not subject to the exploitation of lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premises without the consent of the owner. It must be remembered that the social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of the property owner, who under our constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away the rights from a person to give them to another who is not entitled thereto.

-

CALEON vs. AGUS DEVELOPMENT FACTS: • Private respondent Agus Development is the private owner of lot 39 block 28 situated in Lealtad Sampaloc when it leased the property to Rita Calleon for a monthly rental of Php 180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the owner of the lot, the petitioner sub-leased two of the 4-door apartment building for a monthly rental of Php 350.00 each. After learning of the sublease private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment, citing as ground thereof the provisions of Batas Pambansa blg. 25, section 5, which is the unauthorized subleasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required 60 day period from the promulgation of the new law.

B. Involuntary Servitude
Sec18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD [‘If all are to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence.’ – main opinion by Justice Malcolm] [‘They (Manguianes) are citizens of the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country.’ – dissenting opinion of Justice Moir] Malcolm, J.: FACTS: Under Section 2145, Revised Administrative Code, with prior approval of the Department Head, the

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governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when he deems it necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct non-Christian inhabitants to make permanent settlements on unoccupied public land – to be selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. In February 1, 1917, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted Resolution No. 25 which was presented by Provincial Governor of Mindoro Juan Morente Jr. The resolution presents that since several attempts and schemes of the past for the advancement of the ‘non-Christian’ people of Mindoro have failed, it is ‘deemed necessary’ to oblige the Manguianes to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement. The reasons for the resolution are: [1] failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro [2] the only successful method is to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement [3] protection of the Manguianes [2] protection of public forests [3] introduce civilized customs Governor Morente Jr. chose the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan, containing 800 hectares of public land for approximately 15,000 Manguianes. The resolution was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Executive Order No. 2 was then issued by the governor directing all the Mangyans in Naujan, Pola, Dulangan and Calapan [Rubi’s place] to take their habitation in the site not later than December 31, 1917. Section 2759¸Revised Administrative Code provides for an imprisonment not exceeding 60 days for those who refuse to obey the order. Rubi and his companions did not fix their dwelling within the reservation and they were punished with imprisonment. On the other hand, Doroteo Dabalos was detained by the sheriff of Mindoro because he escaped from the reservation. Rubi and the rest of the Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas corpus alleging that they are deprived of their liberty. They are also questioning the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Exposition of the Court (Baka magtanong si Dean) II. History [Court wants to say that the ‘reservation approach’ is not new and in fact ‘accepted’ in the past. In short, Court is saying that they deserve it.] A. Before acquisition of the Philippines by the United States During the Spanish period, the ‘Indios” were already ‘reduced’ [‘reducciones’] into ‘poblaciones’ [communities]. The purpose is to instruct them in the Catholic faith so that the Indios will forget the ‘blunders’ of their ancient rights and ceremonies – eventually allowing them to live in a ‘civilized

manner’. The crown offered tax exemptions for those who obeyed. Pueblos and reducciones were provided with basic facilities for survival. Lands previously owned by the Indios were not confiscated. Each town contained around 80 Indios supervised by an Indio mayor. Later, the Governor General issued a decree in 1881, saying that it is the ‘duty to conscience and humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races’. Provincial authorities should help the priests in their mission to civilize. To attain their mission, the Spaniards adopted the policy of ‘bringing under the bell’ [establish homes of Indios within the reach of the sound of the bell]. Incentives in terms of tax and labor reductions were offered. B. After the Acquisition of the Philipines by the United States President MacKinley’s Instructions was ratified by the Philippine Bill and the Act of Congress of 1902. In essence, these laws provide that the reservation approach was the same course used by US Congress in dealing with ‘tribes of North American Indians’. The approach was deemed a wise and firm regulation to ‘prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs’. Jones Law was later passed empowering the Philippine Legislature. The law established the Bureau of nonChristian Tribes that recognized the dividing line between the territory occupied by Christians and that of non-Christians. The distinction is latter recognized by special laws. C.D. Terminology and Meaning ‘Non-Christian tribes’ was common term used. Religious signification of the term was removed. The whole intent of the term is to denote the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants. It relates to degree of civilization rather than religious denomination. In United States v. Tubban, the term was used for an ‘uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated’. It was held that mere baptism in the Christian faith will not changed one’s degree of civilization. E. Manguianes They are placed in the ‘third class’ in the ‘four-stage’ classification approaching civilization used by the Philippine census. In local dialect, “Manguianes’ means ‘ancient’, ‘savage’ etc. III. Comparative – The American Indians [Court is saying that the ‘reservation approach’ was used also for the American Indians – which was perfectly ok.] The treatment for the Manguianes is no different form the methods used by the US Government in dealing with the Indian tribes. Their relationship is one ‘in a state of pupilage’ – between a guardian and a ward. Congress had plenary authority in this guardianship.

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The Indians were not treated as having a state or nation. They are treated as a ‘separate people’. Thus, the US Government is there to protect the Indians form the people of the State that harbor illfeelings against them. These laws were deemed political in nature not subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. In United States v. Crook, a group of Indians led by Standing Bear who fled from their reservation to avoid disease and starvation were issued habeas corpus after they were detained. Using this case, Rubi was then declared as a citizen of the Philippines, a ‘person’ within the Habeas Corpus Act. ISSUES: 1. WON there was Section 2145 involved an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial board of Mindoro. - NO. Judge Ranney declared that “the true distinction therefore is between the [1] delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and [2] conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.’ Section 2145 was issued under the second mode of delegation. - Section 2145 falls under the exception to the general rule sanctioned by immemorial practice: The central legislative body is permitted to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro. - The reason is that provincial officers are better fitted to select sites for reservations. 2. WON there was religions discrimination against ‘non-Christian tribes’ under Section 2145. - NO. It is clear that the Legislature meant that ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to ‘natives’ of ‘low grade of civilization’ and does not discriminate on account of religious differences. 3. WON the protection afforded by President MacKinley’s Instructions, the Philippine Bill and the Jones Law providing that no person ‘shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law’ extends to members of nonChristian tribes. - NO. Civil liberty can be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed ‘in a civilized community.’ It is a legal and refined idea, the offspring of high civilization. Considering the that the Manguianes do not have a civilized conception of liberty, they cannot claim the they were deprived of it. Furthermore, Section 2145 is applicable to all of a class. The classification based on degree of civilization is not arbitrary.

- Due process means that: [1] there is a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislature [2] that law is reasonable in its application [3] it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure [4] it is applicable to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class - Liberty as understood in democracies, is not license; it is liberty regulated by law. It is not unrestricted license. It is only freedom from restraint. It is not an absolute right. However, it is not limited to freedom from physical restraint. - Chief elements of the civil liberty are right to contract, right to chose one’s employment, right to labor and right of locomotion. 4. WON bringing the Manguianes into the reservation amounts to slavery and involuntary servitude. - NO. Slavery and involuntary servitude denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another. In the reservation, the Manguianes are working for no other but for themselves. - If the Manguianes are not in the reservation, there are vulnerable subjects to involuntary servitude of civilized communities who may take advantage of their ignorance. They are being protection from involuntary servitude and abuse. They are, through Bureau of nonChristian Tribes, slowly ‘fused’ with the civilized world – ‘bringing them under the bells’. 5. WON Section 2145 is a valid exercise of police power. - YES. Without attempting to define police power, it is the power co-extensive with self-protection. It is the inherent and plenary power to prohibit all things hurtful to the welfare of society. Thus, the law protects the forests from the illegal caingins [slash and burn agriculture in forested areas]. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. - The ‘whole tendency’ therefore of the Court is toward ‘non-interference’ on the political ideas of the legislature. - In fact, the Manguianes ‘liked the plan’. There were ‘encouraging reactions’ from the children who attended the schools. They were ‘eager’ to be receiving benefits of civilization in the reservations. HOLDING: Section 2145 of the Administrative Code is valid. Their confinement in the reservation does not amount to slavery and involuntary servitude. Habeas corpus cannot issue. Carson, J. concurring: - I agree that ‘non-Christian tribes’ denote a ‘low grade of civilization’. The test for civilizations has been: [1] mode of life [2] degree of advancement in civilization

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[3] connection or lack of connection with some civilized community - Degree of civilization can only increase by withdrawal of permanent allegiance or adherence to non-Christian tribes. Johnson, J., dissenting: - They were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. All persons in the Philippines are entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty. Moir., with Araullo and Street, dissenting: - The case of the Indian nations in the US cannot apply to this case because the Indian nations were considered a separate nations where the US dealt with them using treaties. Also, the reservations given to them were very large – about thousand of square miles. - In this case, the Manguianes are not a separate state. There are not treaties. They are Filipinos, legally speaking. They are entitled to all the rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. - The caingin argument will not lie because the fires never spread to the tropical undergrowth. These burnings are isolated – these are not great abuses meriting their ‘incarceration’. - The Manguianes have never been a burden to the State. They have not committed any crimes. In fact, they were described as ‘peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic’. When there are in reservations, there are more vulnerable to involuntary servitude. The needs for survival in an enclosed community like food and clothing would be tempting incentives for the Manguianes, who do not have the means to produce these things, to trade their freedom to involuntary servitude. - The majority claim that Section 2145 is substantially the same as Act, No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. However, the constitutionality of this earlier Act was not passed upon by the Court. - If the rationale of the Court is applied, then decapitation en masse will result. It will be an open air jail for all natives – even those who have proven their progress measured against standards of the civilized world like the Ifugaos and Tinguianes. - Like the case of Standing Bear in the US, I think that the Court should rule that the Manguianes were deprived of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

determination of the case. Court issued the compromise in their return to work order together with injunction 'company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any laborer affiliated with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined not to stage a walk-out or strike during the pendency of the hearing.' Afterwards gotamco filed another case w/ CIR because Kaisahan resumed the strike. Kaisahan filed a counterpetition saying that gotamco violated the terms first by certain discriminations, by not hearing grievances, by employing four new chinese laborers w/o authority of the court and in violation of sec 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 and by firing a certain Naximino Millan. CIR held that there was a violation of the court order by kaisahan, that there was no clear proof that gotamco employed 4 new chinese laborers and that Millan was a troublemaker and his petition for reinstatement was denied. Petitioner now contends that court order and sec 19 CA 103 is unconstitutional because it amounts to involuntary servitude. ISSUE: WON sec 19 CA 103 creates involuntary servitude HELD: It can't be involuntary servitude if a person voluntarily contracts employment and impliedly voluntarily puts himself under the province of sec 19 CA 103. RATIONALE: CIR: This section is presumed to be constitutional. Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all the people. ... Section 19 complements the power of the Court to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it by the different provisions of the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all questions matters, controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees", "to prevent nonpacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes" Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union: the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power that it possesses under section 4.

KAISAHAN vs. GOTAMCO (1948) ponente: Hilado J FACTS: Kaisahan staged a strike which paralyzed Gotamco. The two parties were brought to the Court of Industrial Relations. A compromise was made: kaisahan returns to work if Gotamco raises wages by P2 w/o meal plus the right to bring back little pieces of firewood front gotamco, until the final

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Sec 19 CA 103 does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. Whenever an employee enters into a contract of employment, under the said law he also voluntarily accepts those comditions prescribed in sec 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after Hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled ...". The employee has a free choice between entering into a contract of employment or not. Such an implied condition, negates the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing. The court is satisfied that there were formal hearings before the order was issued. As to public interest requiring that the court return the striking laborers, the economic and social rehabilitation of the country urgently demands reconstruction work from the late war that the government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible. The court construes the provision to mean that the very impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason that the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well stated by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need express statement in the order. Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations DISPOSITION: Affirm CIR decision. Kaisahan in contempt of court with costs.

FACTS: • The constitutionality of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue presented by the petitions for decision. o An essential element of the offense under BP 22 is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. It creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge when the check is dishonored by the bank if presented within 90 days from the date on the check. • BP 22 is aimed at stopping or curbing the practice of issuing worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. • Before the enactment of said statute, issueing worthless checks was punished under the provisions on estafa in the RPC but because of the reliance by the Court on the concept underlying the felony of estafa through false pretenses or deceit (i.e. the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud),checks as payments for pre-existing debts were not covered. o Statistics have shown that a greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts. o BP 22 addressed the problem frontally and directly making the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. Constitutional Challenges to B.P. 22: 1. offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2. impairs freedom of contract; 3. contravenes equal protection clause 4. unduly delegates legislative and executive powers 5. enactment is flawed since Interim Batasan violated consti provision prohibiting amendments on third reading. RATIO: Most serious of these challenges is that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights saying, “No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.” • Petitioners claim that the statute is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.

C. Imprisonment for NonPayment of Debt
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
LOZANO vs. MARTINEZ December 18, 1986 Yap, J:

Prohibition in the Bill of Rights was intended to prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu and was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto. In answering whether BP 22 violates the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes as an offense. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation

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which the law punishes. The law is not intended to coerce a debtor to pay his debt but is to prohibit under pain penal sanction the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation because of the deleterious effects it has on the public interest. o An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum in the exercise of the state’s police power. o The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. • It is not for the judiciary to question the wisdom behind the statute. It is sufficient that there exists a nexus between means and ends. HELD: We find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Regarding violation of freedom to contract: freedom to contract which is protected is freedom to enter into lawful contracts. Besides, checks are commercial instruments and cannot be categorized as mere contracts. Regarding violation of equal protection: contended that is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check and should also be punished since without his indispensable participation there is not crime. Unacceptable since it is tantamount to saying that swindled should be punished alongside the swindler. Regarding undue delegation: What cannot be delegated is the power to make laws which is the power to define the offense sough to be punished and to prescribe the penalty, it does not cover the contention that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the drawer but depends on the will of the payee in presenting the check to the bank for payment. Regarding violation of prohibition against amendments in 3rd reading: text approved by the body is the text approved on second reading.

with the crime of illegal detention. The said defendants, together with other persons unknown armed with revolvers and daggers, went one night about the middle of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan, situated in Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo, Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence took the said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this information, having given any information as to his whereabouts or having proven that they set him at liberty. The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty. The court below rendered judgment condemning each one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life imprisonment and payment of the costs of prosecution. Against this judgment the defendants appealed. Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor. The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment. ISSUE: WON article 143 has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment ? HELD: Yes. Judgment reversed. Defendants are found guilty of the crime defined and punished in by article 482 of the Penal Code, with AC of nocturnity with legal accessory penalties and payment of costs. RATIO: -This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person. And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of article 483 it is necessary to examine that system of procedure. In Escriche's Jurisprudence: Dictionary of Legislation and

D. Right Against Self Incrimination
U.S vs. NAVARRO

FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged

criminal prosecution is divided into two principal parts or sections which are, first, the summary, and second, the penalty stages. The principal purpose of the summary trial is to inquire whether a criminal act has been committed and to determine by whom the act has been committed — that is to say, the object is to get

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together all the date possible for the purpose of proving that an act falling within the sanction of the penal law has been committed by such and such persons. In the plenary stage the purpose is a contradictory discussion of the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the rendition of a judgment of conviction or acquittal. It may well be that although it appears in the summary stage of the proceeding that the act has been performed by the accused, still in the plenary stage it may be shown that the act was not really criminal or that there was a lawful excuse for its commission. The record of the summary proceeding should contain evidence of the commission of a punishable act, all possible data tending to point out the delinquent, a record of all proceedings connected with his arrest and imprisonment, the answers of the accused to the interrogatories put to him as to any other witness to obtain from him a statement of all he knows concerning the crime and those guilty of it. Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to the case in question, supposing that the crime had been committed prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58. The judicial authorities having reason to believe that someone has been illegally detained or kidnapped proceed to make a secret investigation of the case, arrest the suspected culprit, and demand of him that he give any information he may have concerning the act under investigation and to state whatever may have been his own participation therein. The evidence shows that someone has been taken away from home and has not been heard of again, and the facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he does so, and proves that the person detained was liberated by him, or that such person is living in such and such a place, then the prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a charge under the first or following sections of article 481, according to whether the facts elicited by the preliminary or summary investigation show only a detention in general, or for the specific periods of time indicated in the latter part of the section. But if the prisoner fails to prove the whereabouts of the person whom he is accused of making away with, or that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney has a case falling within the last paragraph of article 483. It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law that no prosecution under this article would have ever been possible without a concomitant provision of the procedural law which made it the duty of the accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483 was composed of three elements: (a) The illegal detention of a person by the accused.

(b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the summary investigation that this person had recovered his liberty. (c) A failure on the part of the accused in the course of the summary proceeding to prove that he had liberated the person detained, or to give information at that time of his whereabouts, or a refusal to give any evidence at all which left him in the same position as would an unsuccessful attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and which were necessary to overcome the prima facie case made out by the proof of the first two elements Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must exists before an information can be filed for a prosecution under this article. The real trial was the plenary and was very similar to out regular trial after arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and inquisitorial methods, was vastly different from our preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken away to question the accused and compel him to testify, then element (c) above indicated, would have always been lacking. And that right has been taken from the prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and by the guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be committed, because the possibility of adding to the element (a) arising from the act of the accused the other two elements equally essential to the offense has been forever swept away by the extension to these Islands of the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial investigation of crime. this case the prosecuting attorney charges the accused with kidnapping some person and with not having given any information of the whereabouts of that person, of having proved that he — the accused — has set him at liberty. To make out a case the Government must show that the prisoner has been guilty of every act or omission necessary to constitute the crime of which he is charged, and it will not be disputed that the exercise of an absolute right can not form part of a crime. In this case the Government has proved that the defendant was guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the rights of others by showing that he, with others, carried a certain individual away from his house against his will, the accused not being vested with authority to restrain his fellow-citizens of liberty. It is impossible for the Government to prove the other elements of the crime, because the acts necessary to constitute them must be anterior in point of time to the trial, and must constitute some breach of duty under an existing law. It has been demonstrated that the omission which, under the former law constituted the two remaining elements, is no longer penalized but is nothing more than the exercise of one of the most essential rights pertaining to an accused person.

- The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the United States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England.

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- It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. - It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person, which had long obtained in the continental system. (Jones's Law of Evidence, sec. 887; Black's Constitutional Law, 575.) Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar. If the defendant does not do certain things, if he does not make certain statements or proofs, he is severely punished. It may be said that the defendant is only required to speak on one point in the case, that the prosecution must prove the illegal detention, and that the burden of showing the whereabouts only is put upon the defendant. - it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that, the illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution, if he does not make certain proof, if he remains mute, then not only the presumption but the fact of guilt follows as a consequence of his silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted under American law. - It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged. -In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is contrary to the principles of free government; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes to despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom."

ISSUE: WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of Criminal Procedure. HELD: No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for is denied. RATIO: The court here acknowledged that there are a number of authorities that deal with the subject, though many are conflicting. Cited was the case of People v. McCoy, a case dealing in infanticide, where the court deemed it a violation of the Constitution to compel the defendant to submit her body to examination, being a violation of the right against selfincrimination. In State v. Height, J. McClain recommended that the general rule should be that “a defendant can be compelled to disclose only those parts of the body which are not usually covered”. The court in this case, progressive decisions. however, looks to more

Cited was the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where he said “based upon what he termed "an extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment," said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." The Philippine SC also seemed to limit the protection, stating that the limitation was to be "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. While the court agrees with the latter two interpretations, it does not attempt to draw any dividing line, as this would be too difficult to determine. This case, however, is seen as one of the most extreme cases which could be imagined. Quote: “For the nonce we would prefer to forget them entirely, and here in the Philippines, being in the agreeable state of breaking new ground, would rather desire our decision to rest on a strong foundation of reason and justice than on a weak one blind adherence to tradition and precedent.” Going into the history of the law, it is seen that it was made as a deterrent to “odious inquisitorial methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever-present temptation to commit the crime of perjury.” DUE PROCESS

VILLAFLOR vs. SUMMERS J. Malcolm FACTS: Petitioner Emeteria Villaflor here was charged with adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. She refused to obey and challenged the order on the ground of being in violation of the constitutional provision relating to self incrimination.

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Under the due process of law, every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his own body. However, superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the inherent which the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate. ELEMENTS/PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIAL (in case he wants to discuss this) The object of having criminal laws is to purge the community of persons who violate the laws to the great prejudice of their fellow men. Criminal procedure, the rules of evidence, and constitutional provisions, are then provided, not to protect the guilty but to protect the innocent. No evidence of physical facts can for any substantial reason be held to be detrimental to the accused except in so far as the truth is to be avoided in order to acquit a guilty person.

a 9 year-old girl. The RTC convicted him and sentenced him with the penalty of death. 2. Vallejo questions the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation. According to him, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and killed the girl and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating him up. He also claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle. He further claims that, although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was because the police had maltreated him. He did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been tortured because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not also present when he gave his confession to the police and signed the same. He claims that although the extrajudicial confession was in his own handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.

3.

4.

PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO (2002, per curiam) PERTINENT PROVISIONS: Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: "(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. "(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. "(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him." There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section. FACTS: 1. Accused Vallejo was charged with the crime of rape with homicide for the rape-slaying of ISSUE:

WoN the extrajudicial confessions of the accused are admissible as evidence as these were allegedly obtained through force and intimidation and without the aid of a lawyer. HELD: YES, these are admissible. The accused failed to support his contention that these were obtained through fraud and intimidation and that he was not assisted by proper counsel.

RATIO: • Vallejo cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.

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Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from making statements as anything he said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth Vallejo admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. In previous cases decided by the SC, the accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected to by the defense. In this case, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents.

OBITER: At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellant's guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.

BELTRAN vs. SAMSON Ponente: J. Romualdez (1929) FACTS: The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for, inasmuch as the order prayed for by the provincial fiscal and later granted by the court below, and against which the instance action was brought, is based on the provisions of section 1687 of the Administrative Code and on the doctrine laid down in case law The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58. The said provision is found in paragraph 3, section 3 of the Jones Law which (in Spanish) reads: "Ni se le obligara a declarar en contra suya en ningun proceso criminal" and has been incorporated in our Criminal Procedure (General Orders, No. 58) in section 15 (No. 4) and section 56. As to the extent of this privilege, it should be noted first of all, that the English text of the Jones Law, which is the original one, reads as follows: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. ISSUE/HELD: W/O Not writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, violates the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination. YES

The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Accused testified that he was made to stay in the municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July 10, 1999, during which time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the crime. However, accused was physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day. While the results show that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same are incompatible with his claim of torture.

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RATIO: Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may on cross-examination but compelled to write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. It was so held in the case of Bradford vs. People and Sprouse vs. Com. However, in the case of Sprouse vs. Com., the defendant voluntarily offered to write, to furnish a specimen of his handwriting. We cite this case particularly because the court there gave prominence to the defendant's right to decline to write, and to the fact that he voluntarily wrote. In this case, we are not concerned with a defendant, for it does not appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for the supposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination. This is only an investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of herein, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. With respect to the judgments rendered by this court and cited on behalf of the respondents, it should be remembered that in the case of People vs. Badilla (48

Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege, as they could certainly do. "The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it."

CABAL vs. KAPUNAN FACTS: Col. Maristela filed w/ Sec of Natl Defense a complaint charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with “graft and corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming…dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the President created a committee (3 former justices, 2 generals) to investigate the administrative charge and submit a report asap. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right against self-incriminatn. Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions. Cabal still refused. Committee referred matter to City Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal of contempt under section 580 of RAC. Respondent judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause. Instead petitioner tried to have charges against him quashed. Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to answer incriminatory ?s and take the witness stand. Thus, the issue is: ISSUE: WON the proceedings before the committee is civil or criminal, determining won Cabal may invoke right against self-incrimination HELD Yes. Although technically a civil proceeding, as a consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a penalty, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal in substance and effect. Hence, exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be witnesses against himself is proper. RATIO: The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of property of a public officer or employee which is out of proportion of his salary and other lawful income. Such forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a divestiture of property w/o compensation, imposed by way of punishment by the lawmaking power to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the commission of an offense, the effect of which is to

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transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to the sovereign power. Moreover, where the position of the witness is is virtually that of an accused on trial, as in the case at bar, he may invoke the right against selfincrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.

4.

WON the inquiry violates the petitioners’ right to due process. NO.

RATIO: 1. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers. 2 and 3. Sec 21, Art VI of the Consti provides: “The Senate… may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. With regard to the rights that shall be respected, it should be considered to refer to the Bill of Rights, particularly the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There appears no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 2124 (SR 212), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 212 is to look into the charges against PCGG filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the Constitution. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens; hence, such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts. In fact, the Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction. 4. One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Consti to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them (Chavez v CA). This extends also to respondents in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be compelled to testify.
4

BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE (20 November 1991) Ponente: J. Padilla FACTS: On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that: defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, alleged “cronies” of former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some bigbusiness enterprises such as MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon’s plea and voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case. YES. WON the SBRC’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose. NO. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into. YES.

Senate Resolution wherein the activities of PCGG be investigated on the ground, among others, that the Sandiganbayan has ordered the PCGG to answered charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a “get-rich quick” scheme.

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Held: Petition is GRANTED. The SBRC is enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

respondents before the Agrava board, to which the respondents objected. The Sandiganbayan resolved to admit all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies in view of he immunity given by PD 1886. Petitioners: (Saturnina & Reynaldo Galman, Tanodbayan) 1. said testimonies are admissible because the respondents failed to invoke before the Agrava Board the immunity granted by PD1886 2. non-invocation of privilege constitutes a valid waiver. 3. right against self-incrimination functions only criminal cases Repondents (Sandiganbayan, Ver, Olivas et.al) 1. evidences cannot be used against them as mandated by Sec 5 PD1886 2. without the immunity provided for in the 2nd clause of Sec 5, the legal compulsion imposed by the 1st clause of the same Sec would be unconstitutional for being violative of the right against self incrimination. ISSUE/HELD: w/n the testimonies of the respondents before the Board are admissible as evidence - NO RATIO: Though designated as a fact-finding commission, the Agrava board was for all intents and purposes an entity charged with the determination of the person/s criminally responsible so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. In the course of the investigation it is but natural that those who are suspected of the commission of the crime are to be called in. And when suspects are summoned & called to testify, they are not merely "sheding light' on the incident, they are in fact undergoing investigation (the crim law definition, which in this case can be analogized to a prelim investigation). Therefore, they are supposed to be read their rights (remain silent, etc) and are supposed to afford themselves the full protection of the law, which includes the right against self incrimination. In this case, because of PD 1886 compelling respondents to testify on pain of contempt, that option has effectively been eliminated. However, the rights of the accused, being constitutional rights, cannot be set aside. Their act of continuing to testify before the board cannot be accepted as a valid waiver of the right to remain silent, because in the first place they had no option to do so. The contempt power of the Board acted as a form of compulsion. Lefkowitz v NJ. The right against selfincrimination is not limited to criminal cases, for it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of te proceedings that controls. Cabal v Kapunan. The Court continues to rule that the private respondents were not merely denied of the afore-mentioned rights but more broadly the right to due process. While it is true that Sec 5 of PD 1886 provides some sort of immunity, analyzed closely, it will be shown that it is a form of "use immunity" (prohibiting the use of the witness' compelled testimony & its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness) but it grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned

GALMAN vs. PAMARAN Cuevas, J. 08/30/85 FACTS: After the death of Ninoy, Marcos issued PD 1886, creating the Agrava Fact-Finding Board to investigate on the tragedy. The statute gave the board broad powers, among them : Sec. 4 The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and impose appropriate penalties. A person guilty...including...refusal to be sworn or to answeras a witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or disposition when lawfully required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by the Board. Sec. 5 No person shall be excused from attending and testifying...on the ground that his testimony or evidence required of him may to incriminate him...but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual son testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment fro perjury committed in so testifying... Sec 12. The findings...shall be made public. Should it warrant the prosecution of any person, the Board may initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate gov't agency. Among those who were called in by the Board were private respondents Gen. Fabian Ver and Maj. Gen. Prospero Olivas. Eventually two reports came out of the Agrava Board and both were presented to Marcos; the majority report by board chair Justice Agrava and the minority report authored by 4 others. They were turned over to the Tanodbayan, who filed two informations for murder (for the death of Ninoy, another for Rolando Galman, the other dead person on the tarmac who was supposedly a Communist hitman) with the Sandiganbayan against private respondents herein charged as accesories, with several principals & 1 accomplice. In the course of the trial, the prosecuting Tanodbayan marked and offered as part of their evidence the individual testimonies of the private

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from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self-incrimination. This the Court said is contrary to due process, as they were not appraised of their rights and also because such a "confession/testimony" is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in Sec20, Art 4 of the Consti. In order to save PD 1886 from unconstitutionality, the Court held that in view of the potent sanction found in Sec4 of the said law on the refusal, the compelled testimonies are deemed immunized by Sec 5 of the same. Petition dismissed. Makasiar, C.J. concurring: There can be no implied waiver of the right against self incrimination. Also, because of the nature of the proceedings, the invitations to testify handed out by the Agrava board are effectively subpoenas, hence it takes the nature of a criminal proceeding. the respondents were under the impression it was not, thus they were not fully appraised of their rights. (Escolin, Dela Fuente, Alampay hold essentially a similar view) Concepcion, concurring: testimony cannot be used in any subsequent proceeding. (Plana holds a similar view) Teehankee, dissent: It is wrong to exclude totally and absolutely inadmissible the testimonies of teh private respondents. The right against selfincrimination in proceedings other than criminal is considered an option of refusal to answer, not a prohibition of inquiry. Thus, it must be invoked at the proper time (according to him, the proper time was during the testimony to the board); a person summoned to testify cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to appear as a witness, and no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling for a criminating answer is asked. Gonzales v Sec of Labor. Nor were the respondents in a criminal trial, they were ordinary witnesses. An ordinary witness before the Board could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to take the witness stand. Their right & privilege (which is not self-executory/automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntary or by subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke this personal privilege automatically results in loss ipso facto.

Respondents-Judges: Judges Roan, Cansino, Clauag, Mencias, Jimenez FACTS: Upon application of respondents-prosecutors, several judges issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize documents and papers “showing all business transactions” of petitioners as the subject of the offense in violating “Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and the RPC.” Petitioners alleged that the search warrants are null & void as contravening the Constitution and Rules of Court (ROC) because: 1. they do not describe w/ particularity the documents, books, and things to be seized 2. cash money not mentioned in the warrants were actually seized 3. they were issued to fish evidence against the petitioners in deportation cases filed against them 4. searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner 5. the things seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with the law Respondents-prosecutors alleged: 1. the search warrants are valid & issued in accordance with the law 2. the defects, if any were cured by petitioners’ consent 3. the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners regardless of the alleged illegality of the searches and seizures The SC issued writ of prelim injunction prayed for. However, it was partially lifted insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards those seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized may be split into 2 groups: 1) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations, and 2) those seized in the residences of petitioners. ON FIRST GROUP Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the warrants and seizures made for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the

E. Unlawful Search & Seizure
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO PARTIES: Petitioners: Harry Stonehill, Robert Brooks, John Brooks, Karl Beck Respondents-Prosecutors: Hon. Jose Diokno (Sec of Justice), Jose Lukban (Acting Director, NBI), Special Prosecutors Cenzon, Plana, Villareal, and Asst. Fiscal Maneses Reyes

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corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. (Thus, the issues pertain to the second group…) ISSUES: 1. WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures are valid. NO 2. if invalid, WON said documents, papers, and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. NO RATIO: Art III, Sec 1, par 3: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon a probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ISSUE #1 Constitution requires: 1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manners set forth; and 2) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these has been complied with in the contested warrants. They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons named had committed a “violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and RPC.” In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against who it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental Const’l rights, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the quoted provision – to outlaw the so-called general warrants. The grave violation of the Consti made in the application for the search warrants was compounded by the description made of the effects to be searched for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights – that the

things to be seized be particularly described – as well as tending to defeat its major objective, the elimination of general warrants. ISSUE #2 The ruling in Moncado v. People’s court relied upon by respondents – that illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence must be abandoned. This ruling is in line with American common law rule that the criminal should not be allowed to go free just “because the constable has blundered” upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained (i.e. action for damages against searching officer). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule (exclusion of illegally obtained evidence), realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mapp vs. Ohio: All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution, is, by that same authority, inadmissible. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of the crime. But then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

A. Citizenship & Alienage
Art IV– CITIZENSHIP Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: [1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; [2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; [3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and [4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

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Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others. On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory.” Sometime in 1973: respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned. March 14, 1973: the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest issued therein. March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him. June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940. August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action. August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond. August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. September 4, 1990: petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case, alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss. September 6, 1990: respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela, presided by respondent judge Capulong for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint

BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA FACTS: July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and Benjamin. June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, then a twelveyear old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco. July 6, 1961: After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities. January 24, 1962: the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the Board of Special

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alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian. Argument of the Petitioners: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed the case in Valenzuela for forumshopping. Argument of the Respondents: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, prejudgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed On Appellate Jurisdiction Petitioners: under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry Respondent: petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts. Supreme Court: There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter. However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. Hence, B.P. Blg.

129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC. On the Bureau of Immigration’s jurisdiction to hear cases against alleged aliens and determine their citizenship Petitioners: Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings. Supreme Court: the Petitioners contention admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Judicial intervention, should be granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial intervention should be allowed. The competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals. Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. On Arrest as Necessary Consequence of Warrant of Exclusion Petitioners: the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962. Supreme Court: From a perusal of Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, is null and void for being unconstitutional. It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same. Moreover, respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special

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Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. The Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner recommending the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.” On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.. On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (procedural) Supreme Court: There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. In said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino.” In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961, he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on February 18, 1960; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." The petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time. Thus, in the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years. On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive) Respondent’s arguments on his citizenship: he has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino. He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him. Petitioner’s arguments on respondents alienage: Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid

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marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national. Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see Art. 26 of the Family Code). Thus, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. Moreover, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: “Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution…” This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian. WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting: On Appellate Jurisdiction I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies. However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine. On Respondent’s forum shopping William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counterpetition, he is now before this Court in an active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished when the two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian. On respondent’s citizenship The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines was made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 612108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented.

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Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners commanding the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their removal from the country on the first available transportation in accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were nationals. If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among the presumptions which the ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to establish his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why these presumptions should be liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to purported marriages celebrated in the Philippines. Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from Hongkong. That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated the deportation proceedings against him,

are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred by the void decision. On prescription I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises. Note that the fiveyear period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2), which reads: “Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.” Moreover, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION FELICIANO, J., dissenting: 1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts, however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission. 2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion remain valid and effective and enforceable against respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held that respondent William Gatchalian and his coapplicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines. 3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by immigration authorities

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in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants, which include respondent William Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be. 4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian, a detailed examination of the facts, including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural born Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven by respondent William Gatchalian and his coapplicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen. 5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with this Court which is charged with the application of the law as it is in fact written, but with the political branches of the Government. It is those departments of Government which must consider the desirability and wisdom of enacting legislation providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may be in the same situation as respondent William Gatchalian and his coapplicants. Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No. 3431-V-90; and to REAFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.

Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held to be essential to and complement the power to deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin code

ISSUE (PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD: • WON the President has the power to deport aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398 of Pres Quirino which authorized the Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of aliens during investigation (on the ground that such power is vested in the legislature and that there must be a legislation authorizing the same) ~> The Pres has the power to carry out order of deportation but may not order arrest during investigation. And no, power may not be delegated. RATIO: • Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses." • While it did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President can deport an alien is a clear indication of the recognition, and inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the existence of such power in the Executive. Under the present and existing laws, therefore, deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No. 613. SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation

• QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD FACTS: • In May 1952 petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board with having purchased US Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the money to Hong Kong and to themselves. • Warrants were issued but upon filing for a surety and cash bond they were released.

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therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613). • • Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to investigate- does it include authority to arrest? May it be delegated? Here’s the history… Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien under investigation Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951 reorganized the deportation board to issue the warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release <this is incompatible with….> 3. The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). • Justice Laurel said that this consti provision is not among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. This requirement — "to be determined by the judge" — do not specify who will determine the existence of a probable cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation. The extent of the curtailment of liberty dependent upon conditions determined by the discretion of the person issuing a warrant. In other words, the discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. an implied grant of power, considering that no express authority was granted by the law on the matter under discussion, that would

serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution. The guarantees of human rights and freedom can not be made to rest precariously on such a shaky foundation.

• •

WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO FACTS: • The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petiioners are presently detained at the CID Dentention Center. Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three motnhs of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Lahuna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. On March 7 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. On March 14 1988, petitioners filec an Urgent Petiion for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy. On April 4 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availes of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

ISSUES: Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1. There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act og 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised

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Administrative Code, which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. 2. Repondent violated Sevtion 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3. Mere confidential information made to the COD agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further alleged that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippines Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile. HELD: 1. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1 of Article III of the COnstistution” (referring to the 1935 Constituion) is not invocable herein. Respondent Commissioner’s warrant of Arrest is issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Cede.” Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. • The denial be respondent Commisioner of petitioner’s release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on thepart of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. • The use of the word “may” in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary Section 37 (a) is not constitutionally proscribed . The specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which are substantially identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. 2. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable •

cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. • Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on March 7, 1988 “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed. 3. The petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the COID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defines as “psycho-sexual perversion involving children”. “Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object”. • While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution). • Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or public interest The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measureaginst undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.

YU vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO 1989 FACTS In 1971 Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport, valid for 5yrs. He renewed it for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. On Feb 19, 1978, he was naturalized as a Phil. Citizen. On July 21, 1981 applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport by the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Sometime in April 1980, he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed like the Companies Registry in Hongkong. Commission on Immigration and Deportation are holding him and are about to deport him. He petitions for habeas corpus, seeking release from detention. ISSUE:

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WON he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport HELD: No RATIO: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner’s Phil citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to interference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Phil citizen 1) resumed and reacquired his prior status as Portuguese citizen, 2) applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and 3) represented himself as such in official documents after he had become a naturalized citizen of the Phils. Such is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Phil citizenship. Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil citizenship and has failed. As such, while normally the ? of WON a person has renounced his Phil citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary as the SC, no less, upon insistence of petitioner, looked into the facts and satisfied itself on WON petitioner’s claim to continued Phil citizenship is meritorious. Phil citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. Fernan and Gutierrez, dissent: Citizenship shouldn’t be held to have been lost in a summary proceeding such as this. Gutierrez and Cortes, dissent: Evidence was too informal.Mere use of foreign passport is not ipso facto express renunciation. One may get a foreign passport for convenience, employment, avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Full day in court must be given to petitioner. Disposition: Denied petition. Lifting of TRO on deportation procedure.

Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on January 26, 1988 seeking to disqualify the petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. The petitioner says that he allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten day reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time since when he first filed his petition for quo warranto it was treated as a pre-proclamation controversy and it was only on February 8, 1988 decided to treat his case as solely for quo warranto. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Considering that the sole issue raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him, this matter should normally end here. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall address it now in the same action. There are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner’s citizenship: 1. rendered by COMELEC on May 12, 1982 – petitioner found to be a citizen of the Phils. • no direct proof was presented that petitioner had been formally naturalized as an Australian citizen. • this conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in 1980. rendered by Commission on Immigration and Deportation on Sept. 13, 1988 – petitioner found to be an Australian citizen. • took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization on July 28, 1976. • That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a

2.

LABO vs. COMELEC August 1, 1989 Ponente: Cruz, J: FACTS:

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renunciation allegiance.

of

"all

other

requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The fact that petitioner has been disqualified does not by default make private respondent, the person who obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor of Baguio City. The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos states that, “…The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office…” On the importance of Phil. Citizenship: Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

The petitioner also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. The COMELEC in 1982 said that these mistakes did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship. This is rejected by the Court. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance. Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as an Australian citizen maed him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such an argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA no. 63 which enumerates the modes by which Phil. Citizenship may be lost: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was annulled after it was found that his marriage to an Australian was bigamous does not concern us here since that is a matter him and his adopted country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows: Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day… The petitioner claims that a mere technicality like citizenship should not be allowed to frustrate the will of the electorate. In any event, even unanimously, the people of that locality cannot change the

AZNAR vs. COMELEC Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990 FACTS: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections. On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. On January 27, he submitted a Certificate by then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that Osmeña is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to suspend the proclamation. Petitioner’s evidence to show Osmeña is a US citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.

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Osmeña: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu. Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. ISSUE: W/N Osmeña is a US citizen. NO Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy on Nov. 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed for his disqualification only on Jan. 22, 1988 which was beyond the 25 day period as required under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us (SC) to rule directly on the merits of the case. • There is lack of substantial and convincing evidence to support the assertion that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and therefore is disqualified from running.

respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered as an American under US laws do not concern us here. By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both cases the evidence, as well as by their own admissions, shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian citizens respectively and therefre no longer owe any allegiance to the Philippines. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Also the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. In any case it shall be dealt with by a future law which has not yet been enacted.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private

B. Juridical Persons
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra)

CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE FACTS:

1.

the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Organization — is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of which, according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a) founder members — who originally joined the

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2.

organization and have signed the preincorporation papers — with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating members — with "no right to vote or be voted for" — to which category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members, so made by the board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion" thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization — without any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary members. On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Bank of the Philippines — hereinafter referred to as the Bank — rendered an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of similar nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to be published in the newspapers the following:

6.

Announcement: xxx operations similar in nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES. Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and persons dealing with such institutions do so at their risk. 7.

Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal court had acted "with GADALEJ" because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a corporation . . ." - pending hearing of the case on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the alternative, if the acts complained of have been partially performed, that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be forthwith issued ex parte, ordering the preservation of the status quo of the parties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the documents and papers so far seized under, the search warrant in question. After due hearing, Judge Morfe issued. Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which was denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the present action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging that respondent Judge had acted with GADALEJ in issuing the order in question.

ISSUE: WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ? HELD: No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by Judge Morfe annulled. Writ of preliminary injunction issued by the SC made permanent with costs against the organization. RATIO: it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones. Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature of things, a condition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding each case, in much the same way as the question whether or not "probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order complained of whether respondent Judge opined that the above

3.

4.

5.

April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the coordination of "the investigation and gathering of evidence on the activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating contrary to law on May 18, 1962, a member of the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the Municipal Court of Manila a verified application for a search warrant against the Organization Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal court, issued the warrant commanding the search of the aforesaid premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon examination, under oath, of a detective of the Manila Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank

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mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that the Organization was engaged in the transactions mentioned in his deposition — deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however, a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion that said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.

-

-

Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an illegal banking transaction, of the kind contemplated in the contested action of the officers of the Bank, must always connote the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to denote a party whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is not necessarily justified. The law requiring compliance with certain requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks to protect the public against actual, as well as potential, injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of warrants to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise. The deposition of a member of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, that after close observation and investigation, the office of a savings and loan association, illegally engaged in banking activities, is being unlawfully used, is sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant. The failure of the deponent to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that the had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the savings and loans association, for the witness might be acquainted with specific transactions even if the names of the individuals are unknown to him. The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest clearly that the transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them.

It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws — as their "savings." and that the depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a cursory examination of said documents will readily show that anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and "participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine from time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the "participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the requirements of said Act, before the transactions in question could be undertaken. It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that, accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not been proven to be unreasonable.

-

-

-

C. State Action Requirement (who are subject to constitutional prohibitions)
PEOPLE vs. MARTI J. Bidin: January 18, 1991 FACTS: Appeal from a conviction under RA 6425, aka the Dangerous Drugs Act. Appellant Andre Marti and his common-low wife, Shirley Reyes, went to “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders” with 4 giftwrapped packages. Proprietress Anita Reyes attended to them and they presented the packages to be sent to a friend, Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland.

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When Anita asked if she could examine and inspect the packages, appellant refused saying that the packages merely contained books, cigars and gloves. The boxes were then packaged for shipment. Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, Job Reyes, husband of Anita, opened the boxes for final inspection (SOP). He smelled a peculiar odor and felt dried leaves inside one of the packages. He opened one of the packages and took several grams of the contents and sent a letter to the NBI requesting a lab exam of what he had found. NBI and Job Reyes went to the latter’s office and proceeded to open the packages, finding dry marijuana leaves. The NBI then took custody of the contents of the packages. Appellant could not be contacted, but was later “invited” by the NBI when he was claiming mail at the Central Post Office. On that same day, a forensic chemist in the NBI certified the contents of the packages as being marijuana leaves. ISSUE: WON the opening and seizure of the contents of appellant’s packages warranted an unreasonable search and seizure. HELD: No it did not. RATIO: Illegal search and seizure Sections 2 and 3 of Art. III provide for the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. These provisions were taken from the 4th amendment of the US constitution. In deciding WON the case at bar was an instance of an unreasonable search and seizure, the Court said that it was not, for the main reason that it was done by a private individual, namely Job Reyes. What the law contemplates is a protection against actions of the state against individuals, not those between individuals. Cases cited: Villanueva v. Querubin: “This constitutional right...refers to the immunity...from interference by the government...” Burdeau v. McDowell: “...its protection applies to governmental action...it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority...”

Walker v. State: “...search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals...” Bernas v. US: “...the governmental action.” Presence of NBI The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI did not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere observation is not a search. The search was conducted merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins: “where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure...” The Court here again stressed that “the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals” and this is seen in the intention of the framers as Bernas states that they are a protection against the State. In this case we see that the search and seizure was done by Job Reyes, a private individual. As such, the Constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked by the appellant. Other issues 1) Informed of rights – Court here said that he was informed of his constitutional rights by the NBI, and even availed of their Constitutional right not to give a written statement. Not being the owner of the packages – untenable as he gave his name as the owner. Also unbelievable that he would send a package for someone who he merely met in a bar. Moreover, appellant was also convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in Germany. amendment only proscribes

2)

PRUNEYARD vs. SHOPPING CENTER supra

BORJAL vs. COURT of APPEALS Justice Bellosillo, 1999 FACTS:

1.

State v. Bryan: A parking attendant searched an automobile and found marijuana without aid of authorities. Marijuana was deemed admissible.

Between May and July 1989, a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent Wenceslao. Neither did it refer to the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) as the conference therein mentioned. Wenceslao reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the

2.

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"organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns. In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, he refuted the matters contained in Borjal's columns. 3. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm. In turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character assassination. 4. Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven (publisher). The Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. He instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. The RTC decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1M for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to P200K for moral damages, P100K for exemplary damages, P200K for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit. The CA affirmed the decision but reduced the amount of the monetary award. The CA ruled that private respondent was sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with dubious ways;" that petitioner's claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The petitioners brought the action to the SC. 3.

of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed. It must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Wenceslao himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal attack. Publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable motive. Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for they are neither private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. The SC applied the Sullivan v NY Ties doctrine in considering the respondent as a public figure. The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. As its Executive Director and spokesman,

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ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was guilty of libel. – NO. RATIO: 1. In action for libel, the victim shall be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. There were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences. Borjal wrote about the so-called First National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified. Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity

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Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a public figure.

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The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. To be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not

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10. SC declares Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom. 11. Freedom of expression is man's birthright -constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an restricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

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