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Separation of Property & Admin of Common Property by One Spo

Separation of Property & Admin of Common Property by One Spo

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11/05/2012

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In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Sps Bernas Appeal from a decision of CFI Zamboanga (1965

) FACTS: In May 1962, petitioner-sps Jose Bermas, Sr. & Pilar Manuel Bermas executed an Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership & Sep of Property, after mutually agreeing to dissolve such. It states that they are and have been legally married since Dec 24, 1932, w/ 2children, both of age and married. During their marriage, they acquired 12 parcels of land and 2 bldgs. The purpose of this Agreement is to prevent friction, dissension and confusion among their respective heirs in the future, particulary because petitioner H Jose has 2 sets of children: 1 by former marriage, another by his present W. The result of this agreement/contract concerns the income derived from rentals and quitclaim that any property acquired by any or both of the parties shall pertain to him or her exclusively, or to both as co-owners, as the case may be. The petition was filed in June stating the above mentioned facts and that this voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage is allowed, under Art 191 of CC, subject to judicial approval. Moreover, the sps have no outstanding debts/obligs and the sep of properties would not prejudice any creditor or 3rd persons. Hearing was set in July and notice to that effect was published in a newspaper of gen circulation in Zamboanga City once a wk, for 3 consecutive wks. However, after the hearing, the court denied the petition on the ground that under CC Art 192, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once legal separation has been ordered and exceptions, under Art 191, are civil interdiction, declaration of absence or abandonment. And upon approval of the petition for dissolution, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. ISSUE: WON conjugal partnership may be dissolved w/o notification of children of the parties’ previous marriages HELD: No, in a proceeding for dissolution of a conjugal partnership under Art 191 CC, it is essential that children of previous marriages shall be personally notified of said proceeding. In this case, the names and addresses of children by previous marriage of Jose Bermas, Sr. have not been given and it appears that they have not been notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date of its hearing even though the danger of substantial injury to their rights would seem to be remote. At any rate, the rights of the children by the 1st marriage are still affected in the event that when there is doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between diff conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective sps. Decision appealed set aside. Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings. Alfonso LACSON, petitioner vs. Carmen SAN JOSE-LACSON & CA, respondents

Carmen San Jose-Lacson, plaintiff-appellant vs. Alfonso Lacson, defendantappellee Alfonso Lacson, petitioner-appellee vs. Carmen San Jose-Lacson, petitioner-appellant Appeal by certiorari fr. CA decision & resolution. 3 cases consolidated & decided on Aug. 30, 1968. Facts: • Feb. 14, 1953: Alfonso & Carmen were married. They had 4 children. • Jan. 9, 1963: Carmen left their conjugal home in Sta. Clara Subd., Bacolod to reside in Manila. • March 12, 1963: Carmen filed w/Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) for custody of all children & demanded support for them & herself. Sps reached an amicable settlement.

Apr. 27, 1963: CFI approved compromise judgment filed by sps in a joint petition stipulating that they have separated & that they mutually agreed upon dissolution of CP subj to judicial approval pursuant to CC Art.191. Terms of the mutual agreement are as follows: 1. Carmen waived any claims for share in prop held by Alfonso since they didn’t acquire prop of any consequence 2. After dissolution, they will own, dispose of, possess, administer & enjoy separate estates & earnings from any profession, business or industry as they may acquire w/o consent of the other. 3. Two elder kids, Enrique & Teresa, will stay w/dad while two younger, Gerrard & Ramon, will stay w/Mom. 4. Alfonso to provide Carmen w/monthly allowance of P300.00 for support of kids in her custody. 5. Sps will have reciprocal rts of visitation. Exchange custodies during summer vacation. Except that for 1963 summer, all 4 kids will stay w/Mom & elder 2 will be returned to dad on June 15, 1963. 6. They have no creditors. May 7, 1963: Carmen filed in JDRC motion stating that she entered into Joint Petition as only means to have immediate custody of minor children all below 7. She prayed for relief fr agreement re custody & visitation. She likewise prayed that her custody of children be confirmed pendente lite. Alfonso opposed & moved for dismissal of petition ongroudns of res judicata (thing/matter settled by judgment) & lis pendens (pending suit). JDRC dismissed case sustaining Alfonso’s grounds. Raised to CA w/c certified such to SC since only ques of law is involved. May 15, 1963: Carmen filed MFR re compromise judgment invoking same grounds as May 7 petition. Alfonso opposed & filed a motion for execution of compromise judgment & charge for contempt. CFI denied Carmen’s MFR & granted motion for execution and that Carmen may be held for contempt if she fails to deliver 2 elder children to Alfonso. Raised to CA w/c again certified case to SC. Carmen instituted certiorari proceeding before CA claiming that judge who decided May 15 petition committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution of compromise judgment in effect depriving her rt to appeal. She prayed for: 1. writ of prelim injunction to enjoin enforcement by contempt proceedings & other means, the writ of execution. 2. setting aside of compromise judgment after hearing.

3.

awarding custody of 2 elder kids to her.

CA granted prayer #1. Alfonso filed an urgent motion for dissolution of prelim injunction. Denied. After hearing, CA granted petition for certiorari & declared null & void the compromise judgment re custody & rt of visitation & writ of execution. MFR of Alfonso, denied. Alfonso appealed to SC. Issue & Ratio: WON compromise agreement is in accordance w/law. YES with respect to sep of prop & dissolution of conjugal partnership. • Sep of prop (CC Art. 190) & dissolution of CP (CC Art. 191) are allowed provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Sps conformed w/such & they don’t appear to have creditors either. They’ve been separated-in-fact for at least 5 yrs & it’s but proper to sever their financial & proprietary interests. Court can’t force them to live w/each other & render conjugal rts to the other (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). • But in approving sep of prop & dissolution of CP, does not mean that Court recognizes nor legalizes de facto sep. It’s abnormal & fraught w/grave danger to all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). H & W are obliged to live together, observe mutual respect & fidelity & render mutual help & support (CC Art. 109). There’s virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples to abandon each other merely due to whims & caprices. Gen. happiness of married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, they become good h & w from necessity of remaining such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching duties w/c it imposes. (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo). NO with respect to custody & support of children. • All children, including the Enrique & Teresa, were below 7 then. • CC Art. 353 specifically commands that no mom shall be separated fr her child under 7 yrs of age unless court finds compelling reasons for such measure. • Ratio for Art 353: avoid tragedy where mom has seen her baby torn away fr her. Compelling reasons must be rare if mom’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If mom has erred such as in adultery, imprisonment & divorce will be sufficient punishment. Her moral deriliction won’t affect the baby who has yet to understand situation (Report of Code Commission). • Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by separating 2 elder children who were below 7 fr their mom was null & void for violating the provision. • No compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children fr Carmen. CFI decision on MFR re compromise judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts can’t proceed on mere insinuations. • Enrique & Maria are now above 7, thus issue re awarding their custody to mom has become moot & academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement re custody. Art. 356 of CC provides that every child is entitled to: 1. parental care 2. receive at least elementary education 3. moral & civic training by parents/guardians 4. rt to live in atmosphere conducive to his phys, moral & intellectual dev’t. Child’s welfare should not be subject to parents’ say-so or mutual agreement alone. Court should ascertain in whose custody the child can better be assured the rts granted by law. Evidence should be presented & court should not merely

rely on compromise judgment in determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of children. Besides, Enrique (11), since he’s now over 10, should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with (Sec. 6, Rule 99, Rules of Court). If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly support is insufficient considering that prices of commodities & services have increased & kids are now of school age. CFI may increase such amount accdg to need of each child.

Held: Decision remanded to CFI for further proceedings. YAPTINCHAY v. TORRES 28 SCRA 489 (1969) Facts: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965 alleging that: o Isidro had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (‘46-64—Taft Ave., Pasay City, and ’64-’65—Russel Ave., Pasay City) o Isidro died without a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with estimated value of about P500K; o Isidro left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion o On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together with others exclusively owned by Teresita. CFI granted such appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as special administratrix and of Josefina, as regular administratrix. After the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix who subsequently submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the deceased which included a house in North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal. This time, Teresita filed in another branch (Pasig Branch) of the Rizal, CFI an action for replevin and preliminary injunction for liquidation of the partnership supposedly formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro and for damages. Respondent judge Torres ordered issued a temporary restraining order that Virginia et. al. and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from interfering with Teresita’s rights to, and possession over the house now standing at North Forbes Park. Virginia et al opposed, on the grounds that: o exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased was already vested in the Pasay City, CFI Branch o the present liquidation case was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this 2nd case

o

Teresita was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute. Virginia et. al thus prayed the Teresita and all others in her behalf be made to cease and desist from disturbing Virginia’s possession of the North Forbes Park house and to order removal from the house of the employees employed by Teresita, to keep Teresita et. al. from entering the house and any other real property registered in Isidro’s name and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by of Virginia’s rights and powers of administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro and/or in the latter's possession at the time of his death. The Court granted Virginia’s prayers considering the Forbes Park property is really under the responsibility of Virginia as the appointed Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro. This was amended adding that Virginia et. al are enjoined from selling, disposing or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case, considering that present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the Teresita and the deceased. Teresita’s MFR was denied hence this petition Issues: WON preliminary injunction may be granted (in relation to Teresita’s prayers) Held: NO. Petition dismissed and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dissolved and set aside.  Injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not been clearly established. In the verified petition before this Court, Teresita avers that construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by her and deceased, Teresita even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor. But in her amended complaint she had said that she acquired through her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as North Forbes Park house. Virginia et. al. dispute Teresita’s claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house. Maintaining that construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased without Teresita's intervention and with his own personal funds. Note that it was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro the Forbes Park house was among the properties of the deceased placed under Virginia’s administration that respondent judge issued the injunction order. Thus, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.  Furthermore, grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although Teresita’s presented loans that she had contracted during the period when said house was under construction as proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would correlate such loans to the construction work—the evidence, on the contrary were indicative that the loans she obtained from the bank were for purposes other than the construction of the home. Thus, the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on Isidro’s lot (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during his marriage with Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix. RELEVANT PART: Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Art. 144, CC be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through

their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. Juaniza vs. Jose [March 30, 1979] Appeal from the decision of the COFI Facts:  Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney that was involved in an accident with a freight train. Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos but for the past 16 years he has been cohabitating with Rosalia Arroyo.  COFI ordered Jose and Arroyo to jointly and severally pay Juaniza (plaintiff) 1,500 plus interest  A motion for reconsideration was filed by Arroyo praying that she should not be liable to pay for damages since the decision was based on the erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage , are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied. The court based their decision on Article 144 of the CC which provides that when a man and a woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership Issues: 1. WON Article 144 of the CC is applicable where one of the parties in a commonlaw relationship is incapacitated to marry. 2. WON Rosalia who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held liable for damages with the registered owner. Ratio 1. No  Co-ownership that is contemplated in Article 144 of the CC requires that a man and the woman living together must not be in any way incapacitated to contract marriage.  Jose was legally married to Socorro and as such he was incapacitated to contract marriage with Arroyo.  Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney because it belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. 2. No Arroyo is not the registered owner of the jeepney cannot be liable for damages. Only the legal owner of a public service is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages in his lifetime. Ist M with Rosario Diaz – two children: Jr. and Pedro (both predeceased their father) 2nd M with Basilia Berdin – seven children As a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) the proceeds of his life insurance went to petitioner Berdin and their children as he had named them his beneficiaries in the policy. He failed to designate who would receive his retirement insurance benefits though. As a result, his first W Rosario filed a claim with GSIS asking that such should be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra. Berdin and her children also asserted that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance benefits. GSIS resolved the conflict by ruling that the legal heir was his widow, Rosario Diaz, who is entitled to ½ of the retirement benefits. One the other hand, his second wife Basilia as his widow should be entitled to the remaining ½. Basilia Berdin, filed an action in the CFI as she was unsatisfied with the GSIS ruling. CFI ruled that when two women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of out wedlock will be regarded as legitimate children and each family shall be entitled to ½ of the estate (LAO vs DEE TIM). CFI ruled the same way GSIS did. Basillia and her children appeal. WON retirement insurance benefits should be awarded to the 1st or 2nd W.

Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila (1949) FACTS: Cirila Layson de Tamboan and Emiliano Tambaoan have been married since Nov 1909. In 1941, H Emiliano left the conjugal dwelling and went to live w/ mistress, now defendant, Mercedes by whom he begot 2 children. They lived together until Dec 1946. Cause of conflict: In May 1941, the rights of one Laureano Ferrer, as purchaser on monthly installment of lot No 6, Blk No 49 in Sta Mesa Heights Subdv. were transferred to Mercedes. In the Deed of Transfer, Emiliano signed for the transferee Mercedes. Later on, they built a residential hse on the lot w/ contractor Franscisco del Rosario. After the payment of the last installment, Deed of Sale was executed by Gregorio Araneta, Inc in favor of “Mercedes Oliquino, married to Emiliano Tambaoan.” In Dec 1946, Emiliano having become paralytic and unable to support his mistress, the latter separated from him. She filed a petition w/ CFI to change the status in the above title from “married to Emiliano Tambaoan” to “single.” Emiliano opposed claiming to be the owner of the H&lot covered by the title. Court granted her petition. An action was instituted by legal W Cirila Layson v. mistress Mercedes and Emiliano seeking that the properties (i.e. H&lot) be adjudged conjugal property of her and H, and that defendant Mercedes be ordered to reconvey the same to the conjugal partnership. Lower court ruled in her favor. Defendant Mercedes brought this appeal. ISSUES: 1. WON subject property is owned by Mercedes or by Emiliano 2. If owned by Emiliano, WON alienation as gift/present to Mercedes is legal HELD: Mercedes claims that it was through her and her sisters’ earnings as dressmakers that they were able to buy a laundry business. And it is w/ this busi’s income of PhP50/mo that she was able to purchase the H&lot. The document of sale for the lot in question was stolen. She offers testimonies of her sister, Prima Oliquino, and one Pedro Guerrero, who paid the fees of the contractor and carpenter. Emiliano, for his part, claims that he purchased the lot directly from Laureano Ferrer who is his witness. He said that at that time, he was employed in the Hawaiian & Phils Assoc, a sugar corp, earning PhP1k/mo. He also had a transpo busi w/c he derived another PhP1k/mo. Contractor Del Rosario, as his witness, further states that indeed it was Emiliano who paid him the contract price and told him that he was buying the lot for his “querida.” ⇒ As between the 2 opposing versions supplied by oral evidence, the trial court gave more credence to Emiliano’s version for it is more consistent and natural. It was given by witnesses Ferrer & Del Rosario who have no motives to distort the truth and who were directly involved in the purchase and construction. It was not strange for a man like Emiliano, who had the meansfor it, to buy a lot and construct a house for his mistress w/ whom he was living under the same roof and by whom he begot 2 children.

Half should be awarded to each of the spouses since the 2nd M was contracted in good faith and since the 1st M’s conjugal partnership (since M wasn’t dissolved or declared void) has not ceased or the 1st W lost her status as putative heir of her H. Thus they are both entitled to a share in his estate upon their H’s death. Moreover, with respect to the 2nd W, inasmuch as the CP formed by the 2nd M was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, the only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the 2 nd W to her share of ½ in the property acquired by her and her H and consider the other half as pertaining to the 1st CP. Consuegra became part of the GSIS system around 1943. When Consuegra designated his beneficiaries in his life insurance he could not have intended those beneficiaries of his life insurance as also the beneficiaries of his retirement insurance because the provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when Com Act 186 was amended by RA 660 on 1951. Life insurance and retirement insurance are two distinct benefits separately and distinctly offered by GSIS. Retirement is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee for his old age, incapacity, after rendering service in the govt for a required number of years. In cases like the one at bar, retirement benefits will accrue to the estate of the employer and will be given to his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiaries are named. Cirila Layson de Tamboan v. Mercedes Oliquino & Emiliano Tambaoan

⇒ ⇒ ⇒ ⇒

Mercedes and her sisters have no sufficient income and it is doubtful that Emiliano would let the appellant take the little earnings of her siblings to buy the H&lot where they would live. Hence, the H&lot are conjugal property. It is evident that it was granted by way of a gift or present. However, such alienation, being in violation of CC and in fraud of the W, is illegal and shall not prejudice her and her heirs. The gift is held invalid insofar as it prejudices the W. Pursuant to Art 1412 & 1419 CC, its nullity cannot be determined until after liquidation of CP and it is found to encroach upon the W’s portion in the partnership. This alienation should be declared illegal and noted/recorded in the register & in the cert of title of the defendant and appellant. Judgment modified. Maxey vs. CA [May 11, 1984] Petition for certiorari to review CA decision

Petitioners: Margaret Maxey asstd by Santiago Magbanua; Florence Maxey asstd by Ofrecinio Santos; and Lucille Maxey Respondents: Hon. CA & Sps Beato Macayra & Alacopue Monday. Facts: • 1903: Melbourne Maxey, a mem of 1899 US occupation forces & later on held high pos in prov’l gov’t & in Phil pub school sys, lived together w/Regina Morales (both deceased) in Davao. They lived as H & W & they had 6 kids among them are 3 petitioners. Kids claim they were married in a military fashion in 1903. Such claim rejected by trial & appellate courts. • 1911 & 1912: Melbourne acquired parcels of land, now in dispute • 1919: church marriage of Melbourne & Regina. Regina died subsequently. He remarried, Julia Pamatluan Maxey. • 1953: Julia using a pow of attorney sold properties in favor of sps Beato & Alacopue who took possession of land continuously up to present. • Jan. 26, 1962: petitioners instituted action for annulment of sale & for recovery of possession claiming that properties were common prop of their parents acquired during their lifetime thru joint effort & capital. They likewise claimed that sale was w/o their knowledge & consent. • Respondents claim that they purchased land in good faith w/reasonable belief that Melbourne was the real & exclusive owner. • RTC: declared sale as null & void and ordered respondents to return prop to petitioners + rent since 1953. Decision was based on CC Art. 144 w/c provides that when a man & woman live together as h & w w/o marriage or if such is void ab initio, properties acquired by either/both of them thru their work, industry or wages & salaries shall be governed by rules on co-ownership. It further stated that justice demands that wife be entitled to share of prop & not be considered as mere adornment/only for man’s comfort & passion (eww). • CA reversed. Declared prop as Melbourne’s exclusively thus sale was valid & respondents are absolute owners. No proof that these were acquired thru their joint efforts & taking notice of fact that Melbourne was in a pos to purchase prop by his own efforts, earnings w/o help of Regina. Gave credence to testimony of Regina’s sis-in-law w/c stated that Regina had no prop of her own & no source of income since she was unemployed. They demanded clear proof that Regina contributed to acquisition. Cited Aznar vs. Garcia. Evidence of both parties show that Melbourne acquired prop thru his own efforts & Regina had no means at all to contribute.

Issues & Ratio: 1. WON marriage in military fashion is legal. – NO. • Act No. 3613 w/c recognized military fashion marriages as legal was approved only on Dec. 4, 1929 & took effect 6 mos later, thus it can’t apply to a marriage that took place in 1903. • In 1903, Gen. Order No. 70 was the applicable law. It did not recognize marriages in military fashion. • CFI & CA findings that marriage took place in 1919 will not be disturbed 2. WON properties in dispute are exclusive prop of Melbourne. – NO. • Petitioners: even if acquired before marriage, prop are still conjugal because they were acquired thru joint efforts & industry of sps. They suggest that mom’s effort in performing her role as mother to them & wife to their dad were more than sufficient contribution to constitute parcels of land in ques as common prop acquired thru joint efforts. (True!) • CA: CC Art. 144 not applicable since codal provisions are non-retroactive where vested rts may be prejudiced/impaired. The prop were not acquired thru joint efforts. Joint efforts=monetary contribution (huh!). It further stated that woman’s lifetime dedication to the mgt of the household goes unremunerated & has no monetary value (grr..). It accepted respondents’ view that it was unlikely for Regina to contribute in acquisition of prop since she was jobless & she had no prop of her own unlike Melbourne who held pos of teacher, deputy gov, district supervisor & superintendent of schools. • Code Commission comment re retroactivity: No retroactivity if vested rts will be impaired. Vested/acquired rts should be determined by courts as each particular issue is submitted by applying transitional provisions. In case of doubt, Art. 9 governing silence/obscurity of law should be observed. Determining in what cases the old CC should apply & in what cases new one should be binding is left w/Court’s discretion. It’s likewise provided that newly created rts will be applied retroactively since it’s the exercise of sovereign pow of legislation. Such is called for by considerations of justice & pub policy. As long of course as it does not impair vested rts. • Vested rts were not prejudiced in this case. Prior to CC effectivity on Aug. 30, 1950, court has recognized rt to equal share in prop acquired during cohabitation thru joint efforts & industry of man & woman not legally married (Aznar v Garcia, Marata v Dionio, etc.) CC Art. 144 codified this law established by jud’l precedent w/modification that rules on co-ownership shall govern such properties, providing that prop acquired by either or both thru work/industry even if only man works shall be shared equally. This recognizes that it would be unjust & abnormal if woman who’s a wife in all aspects of relationship except for req’t of valid marriage must abandon home & kids and neglect traditional duties to earn a living or engage in business before rules on co-ownership would apply. • CC provisions premised on traditional, existing, normal & customary gender roles of Filipino men & women. Woman is the administrator & in-charge of running of household. Lack marriage does not change nature of respective roles. It’s woman who traditionally holds family purse even if she doesn’t contribute to filling such w/funds. • Wife holds purse, husband hands over paychecks & gets allowance in return & wife manages affairs of household. Best man is a woman as articulated by Gov Gen Leonard Wood. – Dean Irene Cortes Women’s Rts Under the New Consti, Woman & the Law

Yaptinchay vs. Torres: real contribution does not only include earnings from wife’s profession, occupation or business but also her contribution to family’s material & spiritual goods thru caring for kids, administering household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing husband from household tasks & performing traditional duties of housewife. (True! True!) 3. WON Art. 144 CC is applicable. – YES. • No showing that vested rts would be impaired/prejudiced. • Vested rt: prop w/c has become fixed & established & is no longer open to doubt/controversy. It’s an immediately fixed rt of present/future enjoyment as distinguished fr expectant/contingent rt (Bright Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda). • Alleged exclusive rt of Melbourne is not vested since it stood against concurrent rt of Regina or her heirs to a share thereof. Prop were sold in 1953 when CC was in effect. • Buyers don’t have vested rts either since ½ of prop was still open to controversy on acct of legitimate claim of Regina to her share. Held: Petition granted. CA decision reversed & set aside insofar as ½ of prop is concerned. Respondents ordered to return ½ of prop to heirs of Regina. Return of ½ of purchase price & payment of rents will be ruled out due to equitable considerations. VALDES v. RTC 260 SCRA 221 (1998) Facts:  Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on Jan. 5, 1971  In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage in the Quezon City RTC, pursuant to Art. 36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations) which the trial court granted.  Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art. 147, FC, and to comply with the provisions of Art. 50-52, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision.  Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction of compliance with Arts. 50-52 asserting that the FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."  Trial court thus clarified that considering that Art. 147 explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own their family home and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.  In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common by the exspouses, the provisions on ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the issue of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this Court has already declared the marriage as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129 of the FC finds no application. Petitioner’s MFR was denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that Art. 50-52 should be controlling Issue: WON provisions Arr. 50-52 are controlling

Held:  No. Trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by the provisions of Art. 147 (a remake of Art. 144, CC) or Art. 148, FC.  The particular kind of co-ownership in Art. 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.  Art. 147 has clarified Art. 144, CC and now expressly provides that: o Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and o In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation (Art. 147) or declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50, 51, FC). When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.  The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between commonlaw spouses.  In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between commonlaw spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. Note: Might wanna check out difference bet. Art. 147 and 144, p. 228.

Carino vs. Carino [February 2, 2001] Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts:

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SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages the first was on June 20 1969 with Susan Nicdao with whom he had two children. The second was on November 10, 1992 with Susan Yee. November 23, 1992 – he passed away under the care of Susan Yee. She paid for medical and burial expense. Yee and Nicdao both filed claims for monetary benefits and financial. Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCIU, Commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig. Yee was able to collect P21,000 from GSIS Life, GSIS burial, SSS burial December 14, 1993 – Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against Nicdao praying that the latter be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” Nicdao failed to file her answer and the trial court declared her in default. Yee admitted that i. her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased ii. She claims that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. iii. She contends that the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void an initio because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. The marriage certificate bears no marriage license number and she presented a certification dated Marc 9, 1994 from the Local Civil Registrar that states that no record of marriage license of the deceased and Nicdao. Trial court ruled in favor of Yee Nicdao filed an appeal with the CoA but the decision of the trial court was affirmed. 2.

marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao was sufficiently overcome Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. The nullity of the marriage of Nicdao with the deceased does not validate the marriage of Yee because their marriage was solemnized without a judicial decree declaring the 1st marriage void. Two marriages are void and as such the applicable property regime is governed by provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.” Article 148 of the Family Code refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man – Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions Actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime Marriage of Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage and as such article 148 of the FC is applicable. The P146,000 are renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. It could not be said that Yee contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the monetary benefits Intestate succession the death benefits shall pass to his legal heirs. Article 147 of the Family Code governs unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license Under Article 147 wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto

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 Issues: 1. WON article 148 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Yee. YES 2. WON article 147 is applicable to the marriage of the deceased with Nicdao. YES Ratio: 1.  Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.  For purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. 

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Under the CC valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The marriage of Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such

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