' ..




This is the first of two articles which Dr.

Darin has prepared on the problems of federation in the Middle East. The second article, "Form of Middle East Federation," will appear in the October issue.

T he economic development which has

taken place in the world in recent years, particularly the tremendous advances in technology and atomic research, has led to the formation of large economic blocs capable of progressing rapidly by the exploitation of modern scientific techniques, which demand the investment of large sums of capital. The large amounts of money required in order to apply 20th century technology to the development of a country's natural resources do not allow small countries to exploit their natural resources fully. Unless they are

------------_ -~

DlL BAlM DAJ.IN-DllABKIN settled in Is. lIel in 19}4, alter comp1dilll hit .tuclies .. the UniTenities of Warsaw .nd LfOII. He it lHTins It the premtt time II economK ....,_ on housing IlId immi~nt .bsorption to the MiDiItrf of tIIIor. He _ written:

CMrMlffisritl of CtnutIItONr1 ~I (1939), 1114,/1-"«' .. ,./IIitJII (I""), .. worb on hoasill8.

members of some powerful politicoeconomic group, they are forced to come within the sphere of influence of one of the Great Powers.

The union of several underdeveloped countries cannot of itself provide auto; matic solutions for chronic economic and social ills. But the establishment of a common economic and political framework facilitates the final solution of the problems by overcoming the internal differences and conflicts, which fritter away the small nations' energy and means. Economic resources previously devoted to armament and defense can be diverted into the constructive channels of economic development.

Further, the broader area of .dioD makes possible efficient economic planning and scientific research. Joint ICtion by several small countries allows them to utilize constructive outside .w in the most efficient manner and tD preserve their political incleper .... more effectively tIdo eadt ClDUIIIIp could of itt own k't'Oftl

The I1IOIt recent dewlopmeldl ..

WI!Ih!rft Europe. the dIlIl1I' 0 tI tilt ~ v.tbt and the .....


:-.rw OVl'LOOK

of history turns faster today than it did ,1 hundred years ago.

h fields, . 1 lannlOg in ot er

towuJ centra P . recognition

'al of the growing

are typll . f the creation of

h ecesslty or

of ten . . s Des ite the cen-

large elonomd.l~ MOCE· 'I'm ~nd hostility

tury.old tra Itlon 0 th

between the countries of Europe,. e

historic dream of Europe~n regl~nal

. . g true in our time.

cooperation IS comm .'

Thus the unity which the NaZIS tned

to achieve through Germany's violent domination of Europe is being attained through the free and voluntary recognition by the nations of Europe of its desirability.

The historical process of the creation of large blocs of countries can be achieved by violence through military or economic conquest, or by the free association of nations. The voluntary association of several small nations into one large political bloc frequently comes after a long period of conflicts of interest, clashes and wars. In practice, most of the existing federated states which serve as examples of cooperation and understanding between nations and racial groups, were at one time the scenes of intense struggles between the groups which later set up the common political framework, Examples of this process include Switz. erland, Canada, South Africa and the United States of 'm '

" enca,

Thus the existence of tension and even wars between nations does not annul the nn .. 'b'l·

• r-·_I I tty of unitino them

In a common f "

d.... U -'__ ramework at a later

.. e. nvcr the . fl

~nkat <Iv In uenee of the rapid

in, ~ lIIees 01 the era ft live

~ loa" ~ which fotmerly

Pftiods 0( time tab ._ tapIdIy, The wheet

In the current international sitllatiol1 when the Great Powers, and i~ particular the United States and the U,S.S.R., are struggling for world con. trol, the Middle East is torn between two opposing trends, One of these is the progressive trend towards the union of the area, expressing the desire of Middle East countries to overCOme their political weakness and economic stagnation. This movement is nourished by ancient traditions and the common language, culture and religion of most of the nations of the region. The op· posing trend has as its goal the pre· servation of national and political autonomy and the maintenance of the status quo. This too derives its inspiration f rom the past, from the conflicts between the Moslems and the minority religious groups and tribal differences, and from the unequal rates of economic progress among the nations of the Middle East

These two opposing trends, the Iederative and the divisive, take on the form of a conflict between intellectual circles, who are inclined to favor union, and the small group of large propertyholders and feudal rulers who are anxious to preserve the social status quo and their unchallenged control of polio tical affairs in their own countries. and who resist any infiltration of progressive influences from the more socially·conscious countries in the region.

1be existence of widespresd differ· ences ~ the nations of the area, and tbe trend towards their diminatiOlL

deri' t<:gi, in I

I .


ner im in fOI th, of tho ab




deri"t; extra significance from the strategic changcs which have taken place in the ;leca, in the era of the struggle

between world powers.

Since early times the Middle East, as the meeting place of three continents, has been of tremendous strategic unportance. The struggle for influence

• n and control of the area has continued for generations. In the 20th century the economic and strategic importance of the Middle East has increased with the discovery that the region contains about tv.·o-thirds of the world's oil reserves, and produces 20% of the world's (rude oil.

In addition, the Middle East is the only part of the world where Soviet Russia is not bordered by socialist Eastern bloc countries or neutralist countries, such as Finland. Russia is therefore particularly sensitive to security and military de"elopments In this region.

This increased strategic importance

turns every local conflict into a clash between the Great Powers. Armed hostility between Middle East nations is liable to threaten not only the peace of the region. but also the peace of the entire world. The resolving of internal conflicts and the development of the area into a united Middle East bloc, which will serve as a neutral LOne between the world powers, is therefore not only a matter of great importance for the region as a whole but a vital ~t{'" in the achievement of world peace.

and politic..! checkerboard. Beside oilwealthy, thinly.populatld countries such <IS Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, there are denscly.populilted, oil-poor countries such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel. Industrialized countries such as Egypt, Israel and Syria adjoin countries without any modern industry whatsoever, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan .

Although Syria and Lebanon have attained a relatively high stage of social and political development, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are still feudal autocratic monarchies; Iraq and Jordan are monarchies supported by military dictatorships which suppress the forces of social progress; Egypt is governed by a military dictatorship with ambitions in the direclion of social reform.

The diverse communal structures existing in most Middle East countries arc factors operating against union. Countries with a homogeneous population, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Jordan, are bordered by countries like Lebanon which contain various religious groups kept at peace by a mutual political agreement. 30% of Syria's population consists of minority religious groups. and Egypt and Iraq also contain minority groups.

These considerable racial and religious differences should be taken into account when determinin~ the nature of eventual Middle East union. But they cannot prevent union. In the same way that emotional. tactical and rhetorical slogans will not further the cause of Middle East federation, the unde· niable obstacles in the way of this eventual goal will not be able to pre. vent its attainment.

,. .

T he road from sectionalism to regional union is not an easy one. The Middle East is an economic, social


No federal ullio~l has ever (ome into b<ing as the result of homagene· ous conditions in tbe various mu,vuluat flations or in the area. Even today the

b<tween northern and southern

ft~y is enormous. The differe~cc~ ~(.:t:n the various r.lCl\ll and rcltgtOUS groupS in India, between the va~io~s nations in the Union of SOCIalIst Soviet Republics, between the Northern U.S.A. and the Deep South are equally


The 5UCCt:'SS of the union of various

nations and races into one economic and cultural framework is determined in pradice by the economic and social development of the common organiza· tion. To the degree that this collective framework is able to solve chronic social ills and to raise the cooperating nations to a higher stage of social progress, it can improve the relations between the members of the federation, weakening the divisive factors and strengthening the federative trends. Thus the central problem in the creation of a Middle East Federation is not the mastering of political weaknesses and the establishment of a strong political bloc, which would constitute a goal in itself, but the creation of conditions which would permit the solution of economic and social problems within the common framework.

What a~e the area's principal eco-

normc and social problems ? _~",., most characteri~ic phenamenon - ODe which . ' .. II found in all Middle

of ~ ie .tIIe low .andard

maJority of the popu.

l;,l,tion, the low. national product, the great >\ifference between the wealtby upper cla"CS and the mass of peasants

and workers.

In 195~ the annual pcr capita in-

come was LE (Egyptian Poands) 39 in Egypt, LE57.J in Turkey, .1£106.7 U1 Italy, LE239·7 in France, LE284.2 in Britain, and LE799 in the U.S. *

But even these significant figures do not reveal the true state of affairs. National income is the average between the' income of a thin stratum of enormously wealthy individuals and that of millions of workers and pea· sants whose real annual income is con .. siderably lower than the national average.

The figures on land allocation offcr further proof of the enormous differences existing between the various classes in agriculture, which is the mainstay of most Middle East countries.

In Egypt, in 1952, 72% of all the landowners, or 2,018,000 families, owned 13% of the land - an average of 0.4 acre each. 2,100 landowners, constituting 0.1% of the total, owned 19.8% of the land - an average of 550.9 acres each. 188 of these owned plots of more than 1.000 acres, the average in this group being 2,600 acres.

. In Iraq. the Commisioncr of Agriculture III 1952·53 mentioned the large land <S.tates, without d<'tailing their areas. F.gures revealed. however, that '92 c,tates were from 1,250 ~


• Syriaon per capital income was s" "'

that of ,,__ .m. It to

I... ""'511"; and Studian income WlS than half

hectares. i hectares. 1: ranging fro and 21 ' 50,000 h' estates of and two each (or area of amounts social str unchecke, have led lahin art large lar charged that a I

hC\.i..1re;,JII in site, J.Ild 10·1 over ~,OOO hccures. 131.ndowners possessed estates r,nging from 12,00 to 2~,OOO hectares, jnd 2 \ estates between 25,000 and ~O,O<JO heaares. Five of these owned estates of 1 ~O,OOO to 2~O,OOO hectares and two more than 250,000 hectares .Jeh (or more than the entire cultivated area of Israel!). Despite the large amounts of cultivable land in Iraq, the social stnacture of the country and the unchecked activities of the bndlords ha<e led to a situation in which the FelIJhin are forced to rent land from the I.rge landowners. The amount of rent charged can be gathered from the fact that a 1952 land law forbids a land, owner from taking more than half the value of the produce as rent. The 'landI..., families who migrate to Baghdad, city of splendor and palaces, pay £L5 moothly (out of a weekly income of £2) as rent for the piece of land near the royal palace on which they erect their .",.ooden huts. It is no wonder that the infant mortality rate is 250/0, and that only half the children born in Iraq succeed in reaching the age of 1 O.

The intensive economic progress which took place all over the world after World War II left its mark on the Middle East, and caused various important developments: the discovery and exploitation of the oil resources industrial development, irrigation of I~rge tr8£ts of land, the beginning of agrarian reform, the broad~ing of educational ptOBram5 and a rise in health standards.

.1 hectare .. 2.' IIC~,

Oil is the deci,ive Factor in tho

Middle East, and its imporlance

h a s heen hdghtened by the rise in world oil needs after World War II. The unprecedented production ol the Middle East's oil wells, combined with the low wages paid to workers, guaranteed the foreign oil companies profits which were much larger than those from other oil-producing territories. The average daily production from one Middle East well is 5,000 barrels, com'pared with 225 in Venezuela a~d 12 in the United States. This is the principal rcason for the huge investments in Middle East oil fields, the fierce competition for prospecting licenses and the political and military complications of the area.

According to one estimate, during the 10 ycar1 betwen 1946 and 195~. $2,440 million was invested in the development of Middle East oil.

The Middle East, which produced 7,~'Yo of the world's oil in 1945, was producin!': 16.9% in 1950 and 20.9% in 1955. The income of the Middle East countries from production, refining, transport and other activities connected with oil production reached $9iO million in 1956, Although in a sense all the region's nations benefit from the presence of oil in the area, the relatively small incomes accruing to Syria and Jordan as payments from the pipelines crossin,!! their territory, or to lebanon from her oil refinery, cannot be <ompared with the colossal Income of the oil-producing countries.

The foil_log ~ of pOpllatkMls and oil ~ues ntuttftt8 t11e disproportions UIIOI18 the Mtfonl fA file )(iddie l!ut


I'<EW or Tl.O(}K

'Iii!. MJl)DLE








Kuwait Neutral Zone


~udi Arabia


120,000 )2,9H,OOO H,146,OOO ~,200,OOO l,tl27,OOO 200,000

3~,0000 7,000,000 2·j,112,OOO

the list of oil-rich Firsr place in

counteie I!-. taken br Kuwait. with a f'of'ul.lhon of only 200,000 souls.

IlIlontril'it with the hl~.1!e incomes of the oil- producing countnes, Egypt, whose population has grown from 9.7 million In 1897 to 19 million in J 947 and J2.9 million in 19~~, has been forced to execute development projects without haVing access to large amounts of capital. The situation in Syria is similar, The main problem fadng these two countries is the urgent need to increase the area of cultivable land and crop rroJu(tion.Whereas Syria has large areas of uncultivated land oWilting soil arne- 1.0ratlOO, All the available f.rtile land on Enpt IS nploited for crop produc tion, on<! large irrigation scheme. are n<ttssary if this am. i. to ~ increa~. Tht plan currentJy being l!Xecu~ calls Iv tIte irri .... of W,OOO h«tares of .. in the Nile Delta within thNe yqn, thus resclrinll a total of 126,000

II.roduelion ut t'r"d~ t'_,trol 11-166 ( ThoUHan?'.

ot met.etc tons 1

us!: Of
hA~T IN()L'S'fR
A.proJ.im.h' f.t.'Y!,t
oil revenues
;n !lome
fo\mtriee log
(J965) in I stat!
£I,OOU,OO(l Syria
32 T he <.:L
73.S mcnt
of the lIf
100 tllcr(idl ci
12 liberal pI
100 afkcttd 1,507 J,HOO 10,156 ,1,095 30

1~,982 1,676 \877 .fR,20l 310

hectares of irrigated land. The erection of the Aswan High Dam would increase Epypfs cultivable area by 30%.

It is estimated that the total irrigated area in Syria rose from 323,000 hectares in 1945, to 508,000 hectares in 1954. This expansion of irrigated area was tarried out primarily by private funds, only 48,000 hectares being developed under Government auspices. At the present time work is proceeding on the Ghnb scheme, which will drain 26,000 hectares and irrigate (,~(),()O(). Several small sc ltcmes an: <11:-00 under way.

The Ira'li Development Fund

has made possible the utilization of the waters of the Tig"s and Euphrates nvers, the construction of dams to prevent floodwater damage and the preparation of ~lO,OOO hectares of land (or irrigation hy 19'8.

The fil!Utes of industrial electrical consumption are al,o of interest, as illustrating t~ comparati~ deltree of indu.trial d~lopment.



1950 1955
Egypt 540 ~96,8
Iraq ~,i.9 331.9
lsrac l L·\O,(\ 301.9
SyrjJ. 27.6. ·J6.8
Turkey 5,;7.2 970,0 T he c.:(onomi( and inuustrial dev elopmcnt has led to the strengthening or the upper CL1SSCS, indllstrialists, commen ial ci rclcs 'and some members of the liberal professions. but has not radically ;lff(:cttu the situation of the mass of workers and peasants, who exist on an o:trt'"J11cly low standard of living.

The .lgrarian reform in Egypt indirated .1. shift in this situation in the direction of social changes. But its s(ope V..lS Iimired. and it affected only 7% of the total (uiti\Jt{:d area. Nevertheless, it is of import.mrc as representing the first attempt to change the land ownership situation of any Arab country.

[11 Syria and Iraq, which have large areas o( uncultivated land, one of the central problem. is the allocation of this untilled land to landless families and the creation of new farms with Government capital.

Any brief 'iun'cy of economic development and social problems in the Middle East must tourh on the deep ..dictions inherent in the area, and 1ft partirular the basic rontrad ktion ~~ ~ rt~on's potential economic ~ and the tremendous need for

dnelopment projects and

iil." ... '1I .. tM _ial and political ccuntrWI,

No lOllntrr ill till' ~lidJll,; East is ~'dPi;l.bk 01 solving its prL)bkms by indcpvu ... lent actiou alone. The tasks art too gCt"2t, the time too short, the l~lrital rt:sOu[c{"s available to each (OllOtrr s<"paratdy too small. The fedu.ltio!l of all the States ill the Middle East wOllld lead to the realizer ion of the changes necessary for economic progress.

Cooperation bct"reen the nations of

the area wil l not only mean the concentration of all the Middle East's tcsources, but wilt make possible an actual increase in the il_J!;ricultur:al and industrial potential of the area. The combination of the oil-producing countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq and the scientific and technological skill of Egypt and Israel, combined with the educational experience of Egypt, Lebanon and Israel, will greatly hasten the progress of the entire region. Economic cooperation will free countries from the burden of the arms race, and enable them to usc their limited resources entirely for productive purpos.es

The Middle East ,,,ill require outside capita I and technical assistance, But its appearance as an organized regional unit will permit its lOoperation with both great world blocs. on the basis of the neutralization of the area, the elimination of all the military has es and the gU3rantecin~ of the rights of countries dependent on the area (e.g. Western Europe'S fuel needs). This is • tremendous and visionarv task, replete with difficulties, but its achievement opens the way to the Itreater future of the Middle East,



'1M present article on The PrOJpUIJ of F.derdli(J" is the second of two articles 00 the problems of Middl~ wt Federation. The first appeared in the previous issue.

How will the federative organization of Middle East nations be able to solve the area's chronic problems: the raising of the standard of living of the general population, agrarian reform, industrialization, the problem of Egypt's surplus population, the speeding up of development programs, social progress and changes in the social structure?

The experience of the development of relatively backward countries who have {reed or are freeing themselves from the yoke of colonialism has shown that only a sovereign state i, able to concentrate the n«csury financial reo sources and to direct them into productive channds.

The establishment of a federative

DR. HADf D-UIN-DRABKIN it _.. -- - ............ iIIImipIat ....,. a. to tbr MiIIiIcry 01 lMr. AmaaI tbr boob .. ... wriWD _ C"--rbtk, .,

C~"',_" &tnu.kl (1"", I~ -',,~ (1""".,..", ...... ...

state, or some other form of regional unification capable of mobilizing all tilt potentialities of the region for the be. nefit of the nations of the area, will accelerate the solution of the region', problems. A Middle East Federation is not merely the sum total of all the nations in this area, but a new entity much more powerful than tilt sum of its parts.

The establishment of a central author. ity wiU make it possible to 00_ the incomes from oil by reducing the profits of the oil companies and ceerespondingly increasing the reveoua accruing directly to the oil-prodlJCia& countries. By a more efficient aM constructive utilization of the rqioo'. oil revenues, the central authority will make it pouible to use theIe IuJt sums of additional capital for ...,. ment projects in the non-oil ~ countries, without mlucio, the Ie.enues of the oi1-procIadnI '*' 9 ill thenlha.

Mid6 .. PeIIention ...

lIP the .... eOlII" ", -

...... ]1 I ....

..... T Ti'

Syria, Egypt and the majority of the population of Jordan are in favor of the immediate establishment of the p0- litical union of all the countries of the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq and a considerable section of the population of Lebanon are opposed. In reality Syria, and not Egypt, is the center of the nationalist movement whose aim is regional union. Syria was the cradle of the Arab nationalist movement which was born within the framework of the Ottoman Empire. Since that time Syria has been the focus of the regional union movement. In recent years the Socialist Renaissance Party" Ba' atb" which, under the leadership of Akram Hourani, constitutes one of the most important political groups in Syria, has made the achievement of regional federation one of its central aims. With affiliates in other Arab countries and an overall executive body, the structure of this party is adapted to this task.

The idea of political union is supported in Syria by commercial and industrial circles, workers and intellectuals. The traditional attitude in favor of union is strengthened by Syria's geopolitical location, on the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Israel and Lebanon. Regional union will end Syria's present state of isolation. In the past the aspirations towards regional union were prompted by opposition to the plan for the union of Syria with Iraq and Jordan (the "Fertile Crescent" project).

Eg,p' had for decades not participated in the reBional Arab nationalist l!lO\'ttnent. She in<ked leU withia the boundaries of the Ottom.n Empire.



of progressive influences from Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. The mutual contact and influence between the nations of the region will facilitate the introduction of agrarian reforms. The concentration of capital in one political framework would speed up the execunon of irrigation and industrial projects, and thus solve the problems of Egypt's surplus population and the settlement of Iraq's desert lands. It would ease the solution of the problem of the Palestinian ref ugea by enabling their resettlement and their employment in industrial enterprises in countries with large reserves of state land.

The reduction of defense budgets in the area would make it easier for Israel to speed up its industrial and agricultural development and to contribute her share towards the solution of the refugee problem by absorbing a number of refugees in Israel and by paying appropriate compensation to the remainder.

Countries possessing a higher level of technique and specialization could utilize their advantages for the benefit of the area. The forces of social progress in the more developed countries, such as Syria, Israel and Lebanon, would tend to raise the social and political 3tandJ.rds in countries with traditions Of dictatorship or olis:archy.

Obviously the transition (rom auto-

n<lll'lOm statehood to regional unity ",11 imolve the overcoming of many "des. The specific conditions in ad! country ~ its attitud

~(~, eto

such c

interest federat III ind ronfli popula and th who 01 gave e: the gel which ceived

The suppo Jordan C2U5C influm, opposit ~ u tbri,


but eOJoyed an autonomous development under British rule, W,thin the Arab League Egypt has maintained a balance of power through her opposition to the Iraqi Hashemite dynasty's ambitions in connection WIth the plan for the 'Fertile Crescent." The present regime in Egypt. aspiring to institute changes in Egyptian society and faced with the problem of Egypt's surplus population, sees a possible solution in the program for regional federation - which will allow the utilization of part of the revenues of the oil-producing countries for this purpose, In addition, Middle East federation will strengthen Egypt's political position in the world, as its size assures it a prominent role in any such combination.

J ordan, a country without any sound

economic foundation and existing almost entirely on foreign aid, is more interested in joining a Middle East federation than in continuing to exist as an independent nation. There is a sharp ronflict between the majority of the population, which favors federal union, and the royal court and the sheikhs, ,.,-he oppose it. The people of Jordan ga VI' expression to these aspirations in the general elections held Wt year. io which the Socialist "Ba' MIT' Party received ~O% 01 the ~,

The arda dole to Kin& HaJSCin. ... a ltV' ." die _"kill 01 Eutem ..... _ owc-I co (ed.eratien be-

ol ... few 01 Iosiag their • JercI-aMn 1OCiety, Their ....... tBaIUf'AJed .., f" ................ ,... ... III ... ,.__

Lebanon, as a small WWltry without any industry, which lives on tude banking. [emittance! from emigrant: and tourism. requires the poSSibility of development WIthin a broader political framework. But the attitude towards the form of regional union is determined by the social structure of Lebanon, with its many minority groups and religious communities. The State exists on the basis of a permanent agreement between the various religious groups, which provides for equal rights for all religions and the maintenance of numerical and political balance between Moslems and Christians. The Moslem inhabitants and a section of the Christian population are in favor of political regional federation; but the Maronite (Christian) minority opposes this violently, out of fear of domination by the Moslem majority and possible injury to the rights of the Christian minority. The prevailing economic conditions, added to the balance of internal forces, has thus caused Lebanon as' a state to be opposed to political federation, but no country was more active within the Arab Leap in pressing for broad economic uoioa embracing all countries of the ~

l,tUf has aspired to union with Syria and JordAn from the day 01 iIs establishment UDder the ~ 4rnasty. She cncoa~ die poIiIiaII forces in Syria and Jordaa which f ... the "Pertile Ctacmt· ,..;.t. ~

wbidt optt*I air r...; IIIrfIlaIp.

IIIJlPOdI ~ ....

Ibm_'" .. fttl it

MiMe I!a 'I1It ... ,_ tr til ..... ~ ..


boundaries agdinst out, ide influenct:S. Saudi Arabia has no interest in political union. The cooperation existing within the framework of the Arab League suffices for her. It allows her to receive teachers and instructors from Egypt, without binding herself to anything more far-reaching, The rulers of Saudi Arabia are not prepared to share their fabulous incomes with the inhabitants of their own country, and will certainly not agree to share them with other nations. The monopolistic oil companies and the governments behind them constitute powerful factors interested in maintaining the social backwardness of the oil-rich countries, in order to protect the concessions obtained by bribing the ruling classes. Thus in reality it is the colonial powers who represent the chief opposition to federation.

Yemen, like Saudi Arabia, is one of the most backward countries in the Arabian Peninsula. Seeking to protect herself from any foreign and progressive contacts, Yemen joined even the Arab league only after much hesitation. Her rulers' fear of social reforms which would be forced upon them as the result of the infiltration of modern democratic concepts places Yemen among the countries opposed to Middle East federation.


rtant political factors, Ius pre-

tIDPO . f hi dream

vented the realizatron 0 [15

of Iraq's, On her part, Iraq is oppo~ed

f of regIonal federation

to any orrn

which will increase Egypt' s stan~~ng in the area. This Iraqi oppoSltton defeated the attempts of other Arab countnes to increase the strength and authority of the Arab League. The opposition of Iraq and of the colonial powers behind her constitutes the most serious obstacle to the realization of Middle East federation. Economically speaking, Iraq does not need federation. She has large revenues from her oil fields, extensive land reserves, and great development potent ial, She is prepared to use the surplus from her oil revenues to further federation under her leadership, but is unwilling to allow exploitation of her economic superiority in order to achieve a wider union under Egyptian domination.

The main Iraqi opposition to the plan for regional federation comes from the ruling circles of the King's court, the sheikhs and the large landowners. The peasants in general are indifferent. It is the intellectual circles

who generally favor and acti,-ely support regional federation. Their strug~lc for federation is linked to their struAAle against the dictatorial regime, against social re3ction and colonialism, and in support of social reforms and progress.

S audi /fr.rh;a ttlld tbe fJrilldpttl.

Itles of the Persian Gulf countries, Where feudalism and backwardness ~ail and which miG)' huge oil ~es that are dissipated by d!eir .", Ire inteI_ed in dosinf' their


be of






lsrael occupies a special place in the question of Middle East federation. The nations of the area regard Israel as a foreign body ... hiCh must be eli. minated.. Israel. on tbe other hand. regards hmcll 15 a besieged fom. compelled to be in a ~ of ..... readilreS5 :t~in. altadc fl'OfJl hrr hoItIe


e:;. It ng


a'ill ith



. hOOrs Without a modus vivendi

neig . .

] I and the other natIOns

between srae '11

of the area, the Middle East V:I

never attain independence and urury, and it will remain a prey to powerful outside forces. Israel's development and stability has proved that its eXls~:~e must be accepted as a fact of Mi e East politics, and it should be regarded as one of the partners in the future Middle East Federation.

Is there even a faint possibility that Israel will be allowed to participate in the proposed Middle East Federation I Paradoxically, it will be easier to reach a settlement between Israel and her Arab neighbors within the f ramework of regional union than to make peace between Israel and anyone of the Arab states.

Israel is situated in the center of the region, and any effective regional plan without her participation is unfeasible. Hate, bitterness and war between neighboring countries are passing phenomena. Geography commands adjoining countries to live at peace. The relationships with distant or foreign powers are the result of the coincidence of mutual interests, and this too is a passing phenomenon. The countries of .1 region must learn to turn to one another for economic aid and mutual assistance.

Israel, for her part, will realize that she is part of an area which is tending towards unification, and that this unity will be achieved sooner or later. For thls reason a strong trend of Israeli opinion recognizes the need for Israel to build her future as an inseparable

part of the region, and to struggle together with all progressive groups in the neighboring countries for the realization of Middle East federation.

]srael's agreement to join this federation would mark a radical change

in her relations with her neighbors. By this step she will demonstrate her desire to free herself from dependence on outside factors, to become an integral part of the region in which she is found, to develop on the basis of cooperation and unity with other Middle East countries and to allow her territory, located strategically in the heart of the area, to be used for transport and communication projects vital to the whole area and to Israel in particular, This mutual agreement will facilitate the solution of the other problems in Israeli-Arab relations, which can only be solved within the framework of the proposed federation.

T he tremendous differences between

the social development of the region's countries, the distrust with which each country regards its neighbors and the fear of foreign domination do not permit the practical realization of federation in the immediate future. The crystallization of constructive forces in every Middle East country, and their mutual cooperation, will prepare the ground for the eventual federative state.

But until the establishment of the federative state, the countries of the Middle East cannot afford to rest content with the Arab League as the only basis for r~ooal cooperation. The Aab Leape is in dfed • ~onal c:wncil

step, without taking into account the attitudes of the other states, and the activity of the enlarged political unit within the framework of the Arab League for the comprehensi ve political union of the area as a whole.

2) The gradual realization of the political union of the entire area by the establishment of a regional economic federation as the first and most immediate stage.


N E\'<' 00 TLOO K

of sovereign states who have agreed to cooperate in certain fields. Their resolutions are effective to the degree that the Governments of the countries concerned approve and act upon them. Thus the decisions of the Arab League are recommendations rather than resolutions binding all member states.

Despite this inherent weakness in the constitution of the Arab League, which severely limited its work in the economic and social fields, the mere existence of a common regional framework representing a popular movement in all Arab countries has led to results whose importance should not be underestimated. First and foremost, the League was able to prevent the differences between its members breaking out into open warfare. It maintained the balance of power in the region, and obviated the creation of partial blocs which could have led to conflict. The League succeeded in uniting the countries concerned into il unified group, at least for purposes of diplomatic representation to the world at large. But despite the constitutional faults mentioned above, the Arab League would have achieved even more if foreign powers had not exploited the differences between its members and turned the Middle East into an arena of opposing ideolOgies.

In the present cirrumstanccs, in which over-all political federation cannot yet be achieved, and in which the Ani:> ~ is no lon~r adequate ~ the new and prftling tab which h. ..., two pottibilities exile:

I) TIle achie ....... of poIitlal turioII ......... -.-,,01 ...

Syria and Egypt are working towards a joint political federation, in the hope that King Hussein's rule in Jordan will shortly collapse, to be replaced by a government whose supporters will demand that Jordan join the EgyptianSyrian union. The federation established as the result of the union of these three countries could exert poli tical and military pressure on the other states of the area, and would thus hasten the establishment of the Middle East Federation.

Outwardly, this solution seems the most logical possible. Is it reasonable to expect nations who are ready for federation to delay their plans indefinitely because of the refusal of other nations to acquiesce in their projects. But in reality the union of these: three countries will not solve any of the area's burning problems.

This federation of three non-oil-produdn~ (ountri~, who ~i,h to unite in order to exert prellUre on the rich oil.producing countries, witl lICIt be ... to IIJt;e the IaMCIIDk or lOdal ....... of My of the pUtid....., CWMttII. ,... ......ne.t "peNt ... - f ..........

........ ....., ....

. . ' --

............ .., die adler

......... .., 'I1I8Ie ...... .......... d I 1"_ walt will be

.................... "'........ .., •• !mm..-

....... ,...JardIa w.c, 'l'biI uti-:

IiIIiIIt .1 *. fII three c:euatrics

__ ,\?;eeI, aaIbual fir --

--_ ..

.. I6WIe East, will

... .... tile ~ J4idd.III J!aIt

.. n i. .., Oft die .......,.

it".' ......

-. ..



w orld publl( opInIOn. 111t: oil comP.llllc£ wil! not agree lightly ro the loss oi their profits, and this is the principal reason why [hey He encourug.ng the forces opposed to Middle Easr federation.

The establishment of J. f<:glOnal development fund will provide the foundation for economic union, whose function will be the creation of a common market by the abolition of customs between Middle East countries, the improvement of communications and, consequently, the stepping up of internal trade. Obviously this program too must take into account the economic interests of the various countries and safeguard branches of economy liable to be damaged by inadequate planning and preparation in the application of the common market.

The;: functions of the Regional Ec0- nomic Authority would indude the planning of development projects in the various countries, the encouragement of scientific research, the exploitation of natural resources, the increase of energy potential and the training of sciennsts and technicians.

The Auiliority's ability to hasten the economic and social development of the region will depend on the degree of po_ litical and military calm that will prevail. The elimination of tensions and the creation of conditions of political stability ace in reality dependent not on the countries of the area alone but also on the foreign powers who are enga~ in a struAAle for control of the region. As long as the great ..... C" do not reach an a~reement on

the status quo III the Middle £.15t, they will seek countries or poiitiol grou·.

hei . ps

to serve t err rnrerests, with r~sultant

Jural to the J.fO a, J. whole.

A successful struggle on the part of the nations of the Middle East for the neutralization of the area and its insulation from the Great Power conflict would render a Great Power agreement more likely. This in turn would make it possible to transfer the authority for supervising the limitation of armed forces in the Middle East countries to the Higher Regional Authority. The reduction of armaments will permit capital resources to be directed into constructive channels.

The tension in the Middle East. which threatens to turn it into another pre.World War 1 Balkan region, is a potential danger to the peace of the entire region and to the world at large.

There are no real conflicts between the nations of the area, and no basis for the prevailing animosities. The peoples of the area are interested in a constructive effort to raise the standards of living, in peace and in re!(ional unity. The entire region is in dire need of an immediate constructive change of direction. Cooperation between the progressive forces of the area can act as an antidote to the forces of reaction. conflict and division, and hasten the historic task of the nations of the region: the realization of a Middle East Federation based on the equality and cooperation of all the nations of the area, irrespective of religion or ethnic background, in order to fOiller Is economic, !IOCiai and cultural ~

) .

'e and piet' nab' to I cleo will



our ti our


1. Are yell in f.{'or of • COJDJllon political framework for tbe state.

of tbe Middle East; if you are, what form do you think this framework should take '!

2. Do you think Israel should join this common fra.ework, ud if

... ill wllat way T


WEMBEIl OF KNESSET for !be Progressive Putr. member of the &mrtn-e of tbt, Pross-ne Party.

MicIdI.e East federatioo is a polio 1. tical idea which is attractive to -r pcupie in tbe St2tc of Israel. nr idea spmb to oar ha.rts, first of .. __ of the potmtialities for

.-e - """";1iMjgg of whidl it ......... 'M_ 01 the .... of tile ....... aa...,.aatbe~ ............... 01 .... _ilil .......... ..........

• , 1 5 .....


operation with the young states of the .. dark continent" can sen-e as a strik· ing proof and ratification of this aim and ability, It is self-understood that the motives of greater nearness and necessary proximity could foster even JDOr! remarkable revelations of such coopera' tion whenever some politiaI framrwork will provide a wide and attndiw field for this in the Middle East iIsdf, dose to home.


~e arc .. universal people even today, nd our national concepts are not com \deJy free of "trans-state" and inter~JtiOoal potentialities able to rise and to look beyoad the limits of our borJ"rS. Every plan of federation which will speak honestly and convincingly to our fundamental universalist inclinations could win many followers among our pc-ople.

.1. Israel is a young democracy, but a .ery developed one, open to streams of new thought and able to adapt herself quickly to the new winds blowing in the world. These aims hint at the historic need to form even-wider political frameworks in order to guarantee: peace and p-olitical cooperation as well as to utilize the modern scientific means for the benefit of economy and society. There are none like the citizens of Is'ael so well able to understand how much the states of the Middle East need deep and varied cooperation, go- 109 :l.I far as the significant federative unification, and how much Israel nn only hope to gain from the prosperity, the quiet and the potential possibilities of regional cooperation, whether it be according to the example of the Euro~ Market, NATO, etc.

~, Everything that we have said above !emIS very fine, but its realizatIOn wauld be I very hard nut to crack even if the relationship! in the Middle .. war .. prnailing today bet-

.... tile of Watem Europe,

How IIIiIIcb difficult it it when the

..... 7 P' ID MidIIIe I!at, not

...,..._ .t\ftIb ItIteI

.. __ _ IftII

_ *

states rame-

nd if

of the strikis aim d that


!ericoct , imroa: inisaI







Arab states th~InseJ ves

cateu and di ' are 50 compli_

Isturbed. The only dev I

ment whicl e op-

1 We can foresee at all .

of co IS one

nquest and of mutual di .

anu sediti U IssensJOn

on. uder these conditions dO.t'SJ)'1 the idea seem to

be only • mIrage?

6. The question which occupies us most IS whether the plan for a Middle East federation could serve at least

id as an J ea ;'1 potentia, whose dlief achieve-

ment would be not in the realization of its immediate aim (which seems unrealistic), but in serving, In the meantime, as a positive influence pointing towards and educating for a common path which we can all follow It seems to me that the chief difficulties of this idea today do not lie in the question: How shall we be able to or know how to give up some of the forms of national independence and some of the rights of sovereignty - given, of course, similar concessions on the part of our partners in federation. I also do not think the difficulty lies in finding solutions to the problems of the stages, proportions and guarantees for federative existence which must be worked out over quite an extended

. d The chief difficulty lies in the penD,

fact that throughout the Arab states we do not hear even the slightest echo

f desire to sit down at one table

o any of

in order to discuss the probl~

peace, and first of all. to estabt.~ ~ lationships of dISCUSSion JD<I ncpiI . Doesn't this make only • modcery


01 the "hoIe idea ? " '-

The futare ef IIII8Icind ,-

7, , • __...., ......

== it ao ..... ..., TIle"



. . of atomic power will compel hutton. . -eration- The develop· .nterOJt.oClJI coo] . . ill reo

f the world elOnUIll} w

ment 0 .' first of all

uire regional cooperatIOn,

'I ntries sharing common ag· bdween (OU J'

C(1.terhl1ICll and climatological con r-

'l'h" need for irrig.,tton and the

tI0DS. ..

exploitation oi the great rivers ~l.lke water-federations necessary. It will force this on the states of the Nile and the Jordan. The United Nations and the rich and developed West, so vitally mrerested in the integration of the region, could supply both the positive economIC means for fulfillment of such cooperation, as well as the political (negative) guarantees to prevent harmful exploitation, domination or the loss of fundamental independence. All this still lies within the future. But where is peace today?

ARCHBISHOP GEORGE HAKIM SPIRITUAL HEAD of the Greek-Catholic Church in Israel.

(_Archibi,hop Hakim". replie> to the srrnpos~um were gJven dUring an interview in W~(h he also answe,.d ether questions. In or r to mamtam the unity of the Interview We are publi,hing it in fDIt.).

the policy it advocated. How~

er, I believe that the Arab point of vi

both inside and outside Israel, has : been discussed dearly or studied deeply enough.

Q: Are you in favor of a common political framework for the states 01 the Middle East?

Are you in favor of Israel's integra. tion within such a framework?

A.' No Arab can answer Such a question in the same way as a non. Arab. I do think that all the Middle East states should be linked together in some type of federation. But Arab feel ing would be that Israel has first to be accepted in the Middle East, and unfortunately Arabs say that Israel, especially under the leadership of Mr. Bcn-Gurion, has done nothing to reo move the impression that she is an outsider in the region. This is why Arabs feel that a Middle East fedenI ion with Israel is not possible unless Israel changes its present position and policy.

The chief grievances of the Arab., against Israel are:

I ) The situation of the Arab reo fugecs. So far Israel has given only oral promises without rrgistering any real deeds;

2) The various Israeli attarks on Arab countries, partirularly in tht

Sinai campaign; .

3) The situation of the Arab minonty inside Israel, its su£fl'ring5 under the Military Gevemment, an(1 all other discriminatory laws enad~ tpiast them, to clepriw thtlll

tIIeir PftlPlltieI. fct

,... ...... lite "litinB

Israel to take a J1 and to offer the They feel that : peale ate only vc not even taken s(

Q: In your should Israel take you mentioned ?

A: Inside Is, things which caul, in order to give in the State. The merit of the A ral force from Bar'am villages, the a especially for to travel within

If these things as a resul t, the Israel is really better. relations abroad will start ing that peace possible.

The basic thing feel that she can a Middle East



Israel to t"l.e .1 real step towards peace lnJ to offer them ptale with justice, fhe) feel that the prc><'nt offers of pelte ere only verbal and are therefore not even taken seriously.

Q: In your opinion, what steps should Israel take towards the just peace you mentioned ?

A: Inside Israel there are many things which could and should be done in order to give the Arabs confidence in the State. These include the resettlement of the Arab citizens expelled by force from Bar'arn, Ikrit and other Arab villages, the availability of work, especially for intellectuals, the freedom to travel within Israel, and so on,

lf these things are done, and when, as a result, the Arabs will feel that Israel is really anxious to establish better. relations with them, then Arabs abroad will start thinking and believing that peace with Israel is indeed possible.

The basic thing is that Israel should feel that she can gain more by being a Middle East country, in every sense of the term, than by beiog an extension of Europe or America. 10 years of hatred aimed against Israel will need many years before its memory can be wiped out by peaceful relations.

At the moment in which we are living the Anb countries are undergoinll a progressive, industrial, agricultural, cultural, and ev .. n political evolution.

bnel would be wise to seize any 0CCIIiae whicb praentJ itself in order r. QIae ID 110 ..,eament with her .\rah ~ ..,. if ... __

................ _ ...

cessions aL d .

, L saenfices. The Arab

tnes are making wide . . ccun-

civilization d . stnde! toward

an achLevement N

can predict who . 0 One mak . t progress they will e In the next 19 Or 20

they 'II h years, when

WI ave nearly 80 'II'

habitants, Israel havi rnr Ion in

mg a populatLon of

perhaps 3 million. These thoughts can

gIve the feeling that it is in Israel's interest to act now .. _

Q: Do you think that the recent talks in Florence were fruitful ?

A ,: It is premature to express any OpInIOn, The information at hand reo garding the events subsequent to the withdrawal of the Israeli delegates is scant and contradictory. It is not clear whether any serious discussions took place between these delegates and the Arabs who attended the conference, nor, indeed, whether these Arabs had any official capacity.

However, Israel should avail itself of every opportunity to contact Arab representatives for friendly conversation on matters of common interest. Nothing but good will ensue from such meetings. It would be wise to include in the Israeli delegations Israeli Arabs of gcod reputation and sound standing, and of an independent

line of thought. ,

Q: Could you tell us s,)methmg

, comml1nit~ in Israel ?

about your I li

.A: Tlte Greek Roman Catha (

it in Israel is the largest

CommunI Y

it in the country,

Christian communI Y . .-~rtee

9 000 mostly ID va I '

numbering 1, ' thoSe

The boUndaries of the State ~

. but we haft 110

of my dIocese, !III! 42 ~

IQUdl of Jaffa. There ..

0lIl QuId! ruPI ! orpIIIrIIII'

a common 5tates of

.l's inte~ra_ k?

er such a as .. nonMiddle

Arab re-






f. d 1 in Nazareth), an old aged

Hal Jan. Haif

. Acre a sick- home rn at a

home H1 ,

. seminary in Nazareth, where

JOct a . .

I_ - I' vourhs ate trained for the priest-

Uc;l I . th

hood. The churches and schools In e

villages are financed by rent from church property and donations from members of the church, with very little help Irorn the Government. However, we obtain official help in many spheres, notably from the Ministry for Religious Affairs. But the improve. ment in the economic situation of the local Arab population has been overshadowed, to a large extent, by many grievances, hardships and injustices.

In respect to religious education, particularly, many promises have been made, but have not been kept, and we are sorry to say that official Arab schools are nearly irreligious schools. In many official spheres, our community should have its rights more clear! y respected ... We hope that better rclations will be created in the coming ye:l!S, to the benefit of all concerned.

Aubrey Hodes


.;:;:rn:ARY GENERAl. and Member of sot for "racti Commllni,t Party.

vision carried out by conflictin .

. g 'Ill·

perialist powers JO aCcord with

f "d··d d I the

maxim 0 IVI e an ru e." It was

. h . f qd

rernarns t e expression 0 the will o£

the Arab peoples for \lnity, in order by their joint efforts, to win nation~ f reedom, to defend it and to make it firm.

The Arab peoples themselves will determine the political framework best expressing their striving for unity. The test of reality will guide them in pre. serving or discard ing one form or an. other. But beyond any shadow of a doubt the Arab peoples want to unite their forces and efforts in all the spheres of life in the face of the in. cessanr pressure, intervention and threats of imperialism. From the Suez War of aggression against Egypt to the Amen. can and British military invasion of Lebanon and Jordan the peoples of the Middle East learned one lesson: antiimperialist unity. The strivings of the Arab peoples for unity and the objective interests of the defense of nstional independence, social progress and the cause of peace in OUf region lead us to support the movement for the anli· imperialist unity of the Arab East. As one believing in the theory of Mant· ism-Leninism and appreciating the differences in the conditions and in the political, economic and cultural strUC' tures which have come into being amotts the peoples of the regIon. epecially because of the division forced Il'flOn the Arab peoples by the f.orei~ ~rs r 'W6u1d see a federatlOll .

, at

~~ If!d cftmocr.tic sUteS

* __ &!It fir lily other form ttltil ~ M liihrtd cutti·

tions and guarant and undisturbed country, as the n promoting the b: peoples of the rei

However, whate tical framework I region may be, for anti -imperiali interest and symr it is based on an ,I independence, I aggressive rnilitarj (the first step oj national gOVernml leave the of economic velopmentof co-existence dung, Cairo

not .. ind:ependc~ ptnds on the ~st Arab ~ prior be lite NiatJ--iIlI

conflicting IIll. cord with th

J " e e. It Was and

of the will of

unity, in ord

. et,

to win national

and to make it

themselves will framework best for unity. The e them In pre. e form or an. shadow of a

want to unite in all the

tion and threats e Suez War of

to the Ameri. invasion oi peoples of the e lesson: antie strivings of unity and the defense of na-



!Ions and guaranteeing the democratic This fact . 21

'od undisturbed development of each . IS a result of h .

• and obJectiy . " t e historical

(ountry, as the most fitting form for e conditions f

ment and the ." 0 develop.

rumoting the basic interests of the e activity f h

Ph' forces which still de o. t e political

peoples of t e region. our people' I termme the life of

whatev e th 10 srael Th .

However, . r e common poli- Israel's integ t' .. e question of

tio.! fnunework of the lands of the imperialist mov IOn In the Arab anti-

. may be the Arab ement for unit . h

regiOn " movement ever, one whi h . . Y IS, ow-

for anti·imperialist unity deserves our for us f IC IS also particularly vital interest and sympathetic support since . ~ rom all possible points of

VICW, tncluding that of th I

it is based on anti- imperialism, nation. f h e sett emenr

o t e Israeli·Arab conflict Th .

31 independence, the opposition to the . . e VItal Importance of this quC'stion is, however.

aggressi\'e military blocs of the West t h d b

rna c e y the size of the difficulties

(the first step of the new republican 10 t h h

I spat , t e most basic of which

national government of Iraq was to arc domestic. It is well·known that the leave the Baghdad Pact), the defense dominant elements in our country reo oi economic autonomy and cultural de- veal an extremely inimical attitude in velopment - according to the principles word and deed, towards the Arab anti-

of co-existence in peace of the Ban- imperialist movement for unity, to-

dung, Cairo and Accra Conferences. wards the movement for the national

This movement is therefore progressive emancipation of the Arab peoples. We and meets the fundamental interests need only recall the vanguard role not only of the Arab peoples alone played by Israel in the aggressive rnilibut of all peoples desiring world peace. tary adventure of the French and Bri-

2. As for your second question, it tish against Egypt two years ago, or seems to me that raising the question the propaganda for the military interof the "framework" is liable to divert vention of the Western powers against OIl( attention from the complex of prob- Iraq after the revolution, and 88&inst !ems which Israel must solve before we the U.A.R., as well !lS the permission will be able to tackle this question. The granted for tilt passl.fle of the British problem of the political framework is forces to Jordan through Israel only re-

not .. independent one. Its answer de- cently. . .

....... ob] «live meanin& of thIS atti·

peads 011 the actual and existing anti· 1"" circles

~ Arwb IIIOftIIKnt. The fun- tude on the part of the. nUin~

. btad is that the nationll ifItaaIS -..a prior ~ must therefore 10 M iff<i with thcIK .. the ........, __ .I • ...:~.l. of It- of 1 ... 1 are . ent 1 __ ..... !.l

..... .........., dedininl pl9'wW ... ~

lid tit i .... 1DeM of aU the eE ~ ~ to III IojIiaII

...... tI ~... f~ Ia. _iIl~.'"

.............. ,."... ... ~ ... -,...... .... .,

.... ...,. • ..... fer'" -

au.-'" ~ .,. ....

_,.".. -r---


differences, role 10 (OSienll.S

mmant n the Middle

arrels, and tensIOn I • , •

'II. d nong these the ,it)putc Erst, mclu lUg I .1 d the Arabs. The betView Israe ;10

I look with J1lger at the help

prop es hci enemy __ unperialism, and

L!IVCII t elf c , exam Ie of

the revolt in Iraq was an p

this anger. This help appears sevenfold more serious when it IS rendered by the newest and youngest force In the region - Israel.

Before we can speak of Israel' s 10- tegrarion within the political framework coming into being in the Middle East we must, if we do not want to scatter dust before OUf eyes, discuss first the preparation of the conditions and the changes in Israel's position Within this region. This requires first of all a fundamental change in Israel's policies in the direction of peace, independence and neutrality; the end of the Military Administration and the guaranteeing of full equality of rights to the Arab population in Israel; the cessation of cooperation with imperialism and an alignment with the Arab peoples struggling against it and for their and Our freedom; the readiness

to allow Arab refugees to return to Israel and to find a solution of the Palestine question on the basis of the IIIIItUaI ~gnitiOQ of tilt two •

teR3ttd . 10·

. ~Ies of the jUq and lesal

II8tiona1 nBhts of the two I

the Jews Ind the peep es -

to __ . Arabs; the readinas

_,.._ ..... with the

UIIftIn. n. ~ f So-riet

r-:"" .... "-.: __

-._....... r-_el

..... .... tt. ANb JIIOpItI

- .•. ,.. ..

~..., ..

.... ...

ueI's position and fUlure In the

, regIon.

I am completely convinced that I

I, srad

has another a ternahvc, une offe'

h ibil. flOQ

lite .IIlJ t e poSSI I Ity ot as"", '

, ".ce [u.

ture, whose fulfillment depends fi'll

and foremost on our people. I haYe pointed out this alternatiVe and th path which could promise understand~ ing, friendship, help and the future of the region.

The most critical danger to the eXIst. ence and future of Israel are found in its adventurous pro- imperialist policies, These domestic dangers fertilize the soil for external dangers. The efforts of

all who feel national responsibility in Israel must be directed towards over. coming the deep contradiction between the existing pro.imperialist, anti- Arab and anti-Communist climate in Isnel and the political climate of the Arab countries which is one of anti-imperul , ism, progressive nationalism and sym. pathy for the Soviet Union.

Only a change in Israel policies can change Our status in the region and in

the international arena, can turn Israel toward the future, can integrate hCI within the objective historical procesl(l taking place before our eyes in the Near and Middle East, and throughout Asia and Africa. The scare propaganda of the Israeli rulers that the anti' imperial;,t Arab forces which they call "Nasserism," want O:ly the "liquidl· tion of Israel," is dangerous and bartll' lui to Israel. There is every ground to believe and to trust that understandJII& ... f~ 011 the part of JJtId ........ ...,.._.,. just.~ will .. _s .... lit uacJent,andjllf~ ..,,.~ '- ........ --

for Israel to tal conditions and .... itlun the cour need for a cha them in a COl, in the service homeland, in t ence and futur


overthrown or Egypt, jf the


ior Israel to take a b~lance of the new the in flue 27

d to unite all th f nee of national' t

conditions an e orees unity should b IS trends, Any

'h'n the country who understand the 2 Th ' e supra-national.

Wit 1 , ' ere IS no d b

ecJ for a changed policy - to unite to' oin a ou t that Israel needs

;hern in a common, patriotic struggle Bu; lsraella:::n::nf~derited grouping,

1'0 the service of the, people and the sh h I c ose whIch group e s ou d belong to, If th A b

homeland, in the service of our exist- p 't' e ra states

ems In their open hostility to her

ence and future, the natural Israeli trend wI'11 b t ds

, , , e owar

JOining a European and Med't

f ' I erranean

ederatlOn, This link need t b

no e ex-

pressed in constitutional forms, It could

develop out of parallel processes in the

economic field ("the European free trade area"). the strategic field (ties EDITOR OF INDEPENDENT MONTHLY, with France), and the political field, "BA'TEREM," formerly a member of Knes- If Lebanon and Jordan wish to preserve this independent existence, without being satellites of the U,S, and Britain, the way is open for them to form a confederation with Israel. I am certain that Israel would be interested in such a tie-up, If such a linking would be established, it could spread to other countries and form the nucleus of Il broader Middle East structure,

e region, at Israel offering "CUre fuds first

I have and the derstand. uture of


,et for Mapai,

The question is if the various forces which constitute the Middle East

are ripe for this development. At the moment the Middle East is nothing more than a loose geographical conception, Personally, I do not believe LD any confederate or federative union of the Middle East before Nasser is


overthrown or his power limited to Egypt, if the Egyptians want him,

A common framework for the countries of the Middle East is desirable, if It is based on lines parallel to the COIIImon organizational frameworks now being erected in Free Europe- The MiddJe East is linked economically. JlOIitican" ItIategicaU, and even cultur· au, to Bu.. Both the Russian and the American inflame. are external lIS far .. the Middla East is concerned,

'l1IeIt in oat time i. merel,.

.... ., ,..._. lit«

L,"l) --

......... 1 • ...

rocessct i in the , gboUt



~ .. , ... ..,



DOLE EAST and A .. b SPECIALIST ON M; h Israeli Arabic daily affairs, The .,hto, 0 Lot e f the editori.1 ,tafl "AI-Yom" and mernber 0

of "01"8""

f'rst question is er to the I

My an5W , , in fayOr

letely POSitive. I am

COIllp Iitica1 f~ for

of • common po Middle JIlt- ". ,. the stateS of ~ f~ I .. ., the form of this fk« .. ..

opI8kIft :- ..;. : ......




liberal as possible, protectin~ the existence of independent states In the

. Broad - because the framework

regIOn. .

must not be Arab alone, but must In-

clude the ArJb stares, Turkey, Iran a~d IsrJe!. Since the Arab states now rndude Egypt as one of the central dements, such a framework will inevitably extend beyond the Asian continent and include part of Africa. Here a number of very complicated questions are opened up. These include, for example, the membership of the Sudan (which may not be a good example for our purpose since the Sudan is a member of the Arab League), Ethiopia, SomaliIand and Libya (also a member of the Arab League). Especially difficult is the problem of Tunis and Morocco whose membership in the League is weak and problematical. There are grounds to believe that they joined on the assumption that the Arab League is at present not a political body. It is very possible they will join the French Union after the solution of the A!gerian problem. In any case there does not exist in this region today any real common political framework.

year proved even more conclusive!

the Arab world is filled with y that

. I di . quarrels

and interna contra !Chons whj

not make the existence of an ell do y spec'

Arab framework possible. Every Ia]

. attempt

to establish and to revive Such a f

'1JJie 'Work (the Arab League Or the A .

Empire desired by Abdul Nasser) ~ effect dlstur~s the unIty of theoretical and Ideological Pan-Arabism. The reo gion, however, as a whole, does have important common interests even if these are not always permanent.

What we have said of the need for as broad a framework as possible is also true of the need for one as liberal as possible in determining the future character of the united area. I think that 'We would be utopian if we were, for example, to suggest the form of confederation. This form would have be a third stage. The first would have to be an alliance or a treaty of friendship doing away with the existing blocs among the various states of the region in order to prepare the ground for the second stage - a Middle Eall League.

It is self-understood that I support Israel's integration in this pact as III active member_ Without undue pride J am sure tbat Israel could be II acti ve and devoted force, witb I minimum of spmaI interests, for thr furthc!~ of this aim and couU IIa'Ye the commoa iatemtJ of all tit peopIa of tile reJioa-

10 my opinion both the Arab League IIld the Baghdad Alliance are not real

or seriously , ,

, _ UDportant 10 the present

InternatlOllal situation. We find th fore almost ere. ~ 11le 811 empty field in thi.

tiOII;'" IiIbatkln alter the rno .. -

~ cIwm, tbe put


PAIrrJtat .. .--. tal

I'fIIJIcJeruJr WItt mCUJDI : .""

- ........ ..".., ""'" ... -



Development in th is century i

ment target is population, a new, high and living,

Thus, While their efforts fail, on the existing vailin, staDdard of bow primitive tllekJaclift


A symposium


1. Are you in favor of a common political framework for the st t f

the Middle East; if you are, what form do you think this fra~ee;o;k should take?

2. Do you think Israel should join this common framework, and if 80, in what way?

understand this yet. But I haven't abandoned my desire, hope and faith that despite this, and despite the outbreaks directed against us in recent years, a change will take place. I am ready to do whatever can be done to work for this reconciliation.

However, I must quality the phrase "whatever can be done." The truth is that when we examine the sheer wall placed in the way of Israeli-Arab contacts, it is impossible to see any breach or crack through which one can act. And we know by now that mere dedaratiens of good will haven't had any influence at all.

I do not lose sight of any of the

problems which stand in the way, IIld I am ready for all of us to contribute

I. ..._.. But this too is 0II1y

to so vtng lilY'"

possible if the I'q'~:e 01 tile

Arab stateS shoW tIJ,;r ......-..


MEMBER OF Kl"\lESSET for General Zionist Party.

I n answering these questions, I must

first make it quite plain that I regard the present situation as a historical tragedy. I am wholeheartedly in favor. not only of establishing contacts with the Arab states of the Middle East, but of good relations, mutual frankness, common understanding and joint efforts for the development of the region.

[ consider the Arab states' governments' failure to recognize our historic rights and our independent national existence as both a political and a practical error. Our rights are permanent ones, which will remain valid even without this agreement. It is only unfortunate that the Arab leaden don't


. which we

There is one quesuon o.n

d th t IS the recog-

must not budge, an a ..,

" " f the State of Israel, within Its

nrnon 0 d d

bo ders as an indepen ent an

present r , hittl d

"gn state This cannot be wru e

severer de' sub)' ect to conditions. It down or rna d

is the basis from which we can proc~ to all the necessary other steps. EvaSIOn of this fundamental issue is tantamo~t to blocking the entire road to an Improvement of the present situation.

The social, cultural, and economic situation justifies, and in fact cries out for, large-scale assistance and improvements. We are best placed to do this with honesty, goodwill and success. I say this even though I know only too well that the Arab states do not admit it. They speak about the Arab refugees, but are not prepared to admit that tens of millions of people in their countries live in conditions worse than those of the refugees. Political and sociocultural ties based on frankness and openness would produce an unexpectedly positive revolution in the Middle East, opening the door to a period of unparalleled prosperity. Military problems - which are necessarily in the forefront today - would be pushed to one side, bringing tremendous economic benefits to the whole area.

Prom-afICtuaI, historical standpoint, the probIan of the Arab refugees was cmttd DOt by us, but those who in'fIIded ..... oa May 14, 1948 and for ftrieus NIIDnI spIImd Oft the IIIISII fIWtt frvlJt dtit GIII!bJ. MeIawIaiIe

.... , ''''''''''p'''. ".,... 01 inmr .... f ... CIJIIa!n.

tration camps and the Arab COUntries have been absorbed. Facts have been created which cannot be changed with_ out causing additional shock and great_

er human suffering. The situation of the Arab refugees is certainly tragic, and it is a moral and human duty to solve this problem. A permanent ar, rangement must be made to enable these unhappy people to live an Orderly and normal life. As far as we know, the rulers of the Arab Countries, because of narrow political COnsiderations, are responsible for the fact that the refugee problem has not been solved yet. Our country, without distinction of party, has always announced its readiness to share in the necessary effort and financial assistance. The Arab states have large areas of land (in contrast to our country's land shortage) which could easily absorb all those who wanted to settle there, without harm to future development. If the Arab rulers, out of a sense of responsibility, dared to agree to these suggestions, we would certainly corne much closer to the final aim of removing the obstacles and beginning friendlier relations.

I am not losing sight of the fact that the Midd Ie East, like other parts of the world, is affected by global interbloc rivalry. It is obvious to everyone that the influence of the G!C&t Power struggle upon our area has oot helped the lOIution of its problems. PGisibly these fOlteS are interested in the prtIeot .. of l'IMion contiouinl

iii Jaaca it'"

their I .. DOt .. ttl, .".

on the part oess to cha consider th the :Middl should ric jection to which are selves or ,

:My coli Governmc certain tl parties be lit ion wo



the part of these powers of willing. on to ch.ll1ge their policies. But I do neSS

Ider rhat, intern:clly, the leaders of (OOS

the Middle East countries can and

should rid themselves of their subJCI.'tion to pol icies based on tactics ".hich are of no importance to oursehes or our neighbors.

~fy (olleJgues and I are not in the G<l,·ernment of Israel today. But I am cert3in that my party and the other parties both inside and outside the coalitIOn would be ready to undertake the ne<essaq effort. No external force could prevent the State of Israel from IDain:aining ties of peace and friendship with the Arab countries, and even from establishing broader and more significant links with them. The ques-tion is to what degree the other sidethe Arab countries - will be ready for this when the time comes.

I am not sure at the moment how to bridge this abyss between goodwill and the possibility of implementation. We can only regard this desire for peace as something which will not Tiithc:r, no matter what happens. Some schools of thought believe that any ttpression of peaceful intentions on oar part will be interpreted by the Arab leaders as a sign of weakness, Perlaps there is some truth in this, IIId this might inspire hopes in the IRinch of those who want • third or fGatth rouad, I naturally reprd this ....• triply from the ¥lew-

.... ., ev-..l 11m. In ""

... eedIiIW .. fw; we

............. ,-e .....

menr the plan f

S or peac ith

and enthusias e Wit honesty

m at the

OppOrtunity p moment the first

resents itself

Surveying the .

tallization of th present political crys. e area I

some f· ,regret that

o Its aspects

har-ino": prevent me from

s aCIng 10 the h .

. appmess I Would other

Wise have felt at th . -

e Increased unity

of the Arab states At th

. e moment no

one can tell what form th

de present

evelopments will tak T

e. wo regret-

able facts must be noted carefully:

1) The U.A.R.'s emphatic anti-Israel policy ;

2) The U.A.R.'s open and bidden activities in other states, particularly those of the Af ro-Asian bloc, to stir up their opposition and even hatred to Israel.

Again, I do not minimize the global struggle between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R But if those political trends in the Middle East which I have mentioned before would display the possibility of more understanding with Israel and a readiness for peace with her this would be welcomed. In the pr~ent situation, howC\·er. when various forces are publicly and secretly being mobilized against Israel, it is unders;andable that our sympathy is diluted with anxiety. If this would ,be a

iod of the initiation of desIrable

peC! d

and closer relations, we would be rea Y

to offer assistance and the same (011-

t 'bution to the united Arab ItIf'rS n , to each which we would hnc given

.._ stateS separately, Bat '" Me of t..-. itieaI cIeftIoF&rt

.... judge tmY pol ,........ .. fa the lIS '" wbed* It _







cl without adding that

,annat ose

f d to agree with those who

I .im orce ,

, ' that until the long-awaited


day of peace arrives we have to be strong enough to deter and repel every

I h "St .. means rni-

possible ons aug t. rang ,

litley strength as well as economic all~ social strength, It is incorrect to consider our efforts to guard ourselves as "aggressive," Even if there are some in Israel who support an aggressive policy, thcir numbers are small. The great majority of Israelis are not warloving. and want peace. Everything done with the knowledge or consent of public opinion is derived from defense considerations, even if this defense is sometimes an active one.

The entire Middle East is a region of fables and charm, Its development possibilities are endless, Why should the future of this historic region not be built by fraternal cooperation? Even

if we were not two stems from the same root, we would be obliged to unite our efforts. How much more, then, should we cooperate, who are of the same stock ! Viewed against what is happening in the world today, this would not be opposed to the needs of the people of the area, Who need to be united and cooperative. I have no doubt that if we could arrive at this development, it would affect the moods and policies of other parts of the world.

H~e my UlSWen to the above questioN - both emotionally and lo,ic. ally - are ~, POSitive, and cIe.

~ upon Cht reaclinea for dfOrt

by badt ....

Professor of Edue"tion at th b

e <lebrew lJ '

versity in ]erus;'tjcl11. nl_

was founded as ~ unit in an historica old established com Great Britain have through their no isolation and to st with a part of the The Jewish people ence among the nat a period of grow in,

Some of these fa states too, They al: of a very old peap al and religious hi a very important The links

One of the hidden laws do' , IIllnat<n Jewish history in the D' g

, laSPOra is the anachronism, Together W'tl

I !the loss of our own country We lost

' I ' OUr

own histories time, We were not

d ' f "J'f Only

riven out 0 our I e-space," but had

to build for ourselves a time dimenSion of our Own which was no longer COn. nected with our new dwelling places, So we drew with us our calendar With its special rhythm of the week and the year which reminded LIS of the tidings

of Palestine in the midst of the foreign surroundings. The Jew had to live a double life in two dimensions: in his old inherited rhythm and in the rhythm of his gentile neighbors.

The Zionist movement and the return of a central part of the Jewish people to our old homeland aims, int« alia, at overcoming this double rhythm which has caused many split personal. ities, especially in modern times, after the fairly closed Jewish society of medieval days broke asunder. In the Land of Israel we have only one calendar, only one week and only one year. In this sphere there is no longer any anachronism.

But it does still prevail in another very vital sphere: in that of politi<~, To a certain extent the State of Israel haa been an anachronism; it is one o! the youn,est states of the world. bIl it was founded by one of the olde!!

L. • , t but $iIl

PlOp.... 1VJth a very ancIen

YiIaI religious and cultural trsdition. 11



founded as a tiny geographical

\\'35 ical iod h

, ' an histone peno w en even

unIt In

old established commonwealths such as

t Britain have a tendency to break Grea

through their no longer so splendid

isobtion and to strengthen their links with a part of the European continent, The Jewish people won its independence among the nations of the world in a period of growing interdependence,

Some of these facts fit the new Arab states too, They also are new creations of a very old people, rich in its cultural and religious heritage, But there is a very important specific difference, The links between the Jews in Israel and those in the Diaspora are not of a spatial continuity, while the Arabs live together in one vast territory, True, there are strifes and even wars between them too, but still the tendency of unification seems to be stronger than that of separation, Only a few years have passed since the establishment of the new Arab states, and already we see them incorporated into two or three big blocs,

The problem is whether our state can maintain its existence without becoming integrated in this new unit of the Middle East. There is no certain answer to this vital question. It may be that we can maintain our bare existence even in isolation, but only at the price of an even more thorough militarization of our whole life, at the cost of OUr cultural, moral and economic level, ~ endangering. in the long run, our ~ with the Jewish diupora. and of " 8 iIOIatecl mm from tbe ..

.. .JtwisIt ,.... w • .., ......

e reewish inter

ythm on al; after

~ of

~ the


; one


f one



~othel' ~litiCS,Israel . e of

I, bGt oldeIt ....... _.


these t b

' 00, ut thi

differpnt in ~. IS Survival will be

d ind, and not ani '

egree, from the' Y In

revival hi

most important' w Ich was the

aIm of a

There is onl ur movement,

, y One way' a '

non in the ' ur Integra-

area as a wh 1 T

ish-Arab ,0 e. he Jew-

problem IS ver dOff

solve within th y I icult to

, e narrow framework of

the frontters of Israel Th

b ' ere may be

etter chances for I"

id a so utron in the

WI e framework of a confederation of

the Middle East States which includes Israel as an equal partner and which not only maintains but develops Its

collective personality, \

It is a far aim, admittedly, but it may be not farther than the Jewish State was 60 years ago when Herzl wrote his historic pamphlet. We should direct our policy towards it today, educate our youth and public opinion towards this aim, examine every possible practical step which could bring us nearer to it and, most important, avoid any step and any speech which could endanger its ultimate fulfillment. We should have the courage to face new possibilities, As Schumpeter put it:

"Carrying out a new plan and a~ing according to a customary one, arc things as different as making a road and v .. alk-

ing along it,"


f Kn-set and General Secretary

Member 0 "

of Mapam .

roblern of establishing • strong

The p . social. cul-

framework for economIC, • is reo

tara! and poIi::: ~dIt AI.'fb tated to the Of,

. '


ent for innational liberation movem

dependence and unity.

The progressive elements in the Zionist movement have always supported the aims of liberation and unity of the Arab national movement.

These elements, to which I and my comrades belong, never saw any contradicnon between the movement for Je· w ish national liberation expressed in Zionism and the aims of the Arab national movement. On the contrarywe have Ielt that understanding be. tween the two national movements was a condition Ior their success. The con. tradictions and conflicts between the two movements in the past and the present are not part of their essential nature, but are caused by external factors, especially by imperialism, which considered this region to be a basis for its domination and which was interested in division within the Arab camp and in constant tension between the national movements of both peoples.

The economic and technical advances in the world demand the accelerated development of the backward countries.

Liberation from the political and eCOnomic domination of imperialism opens the path for the development of thtSe COUntries and for the exploitation of their natural resources for thei r own benefit, as well as for the benefit of all the peoples of the region as a whole This liberation is at the same fme a pre-condition for the establish_ ment of .. ~ and l1IIited Woe of 111 die CQIntrfa of the region

ne _ ., • ~

'-ct ,..,.. of tile ,..


gion is the task of the hour.

The framework of the regi I ana u .

must take into aCCOunt the co n,oo

mllJon '

terests of all the peoples c In.

. oncerned

Great dIfferences of development" .

ate the various lands of the PI)· regIon, as, for example - Egypt arn] I

. . ra9· In

addition we must also take into con

sideration the fact that from tile I . sand. point of geography and econollJy th

region also inclUdes lands like I e

ran Turkey and Israel, which are not Arab

and which share common interests wilh the Arab countries.

Ira an era of cold war and global disputes between the Great Powers, the establishment of a framework of re gional unity is a condition for I common foreign policy for all the lands of the region.

The neutralization of the region, which is still subject to attempts 10 turn it into one of the bases of the global conflict, is a pre-condition for the establishment of a common frarn~ work. Neutralization can be of decisive importance, since under certain condi· tions, in the event of the cold war be· coming an armed conflict, neulraliza· tion of the region cou Id serve as tl< only possibility for maintaining i~ physical existence.

The second condition is the eXi'loill" tion of the natural resources, !D4 h J-,en:1i1 especially of petroleum, for t e

of all the peoples of the region. 01

A third condition is the ,I!ll3:antee and full equality for all the minoCltles~ democratic rule within the co .. "'" each """ •. ,


The autonomy of er on its special develo) condition for the es common framework.

Any attempt to lea mediate stages in the regional union by esta state of part of the co gion, will intensify th will be a disturbin~ establishment of the r

On the other hand, of all the countries 01 not be made a COl establishment of the

The regional

to every country, the region (and not <:ountries). The union the establishment of a work for all those

region and interested <levelopment On peace bors, must see herself


egional un' 101}

common il}.

concerned, pment separ. the regio!} and Iraq, I~

e into Con. m the stand. economy the s like Iran, e not Arab terests witlJ

and global

ion for a 11 the lands

the region, attempts to ases of the ndition for on frame-

, neutraliza· f.erve as the

I •

! taining lIS

~he exploita~rces, and : the benefit

ioe. guar~tJ norifid, .-

he t.tJI1IIffI# ,.. dIfIIlIII'/'



The autonomy of each country, based

't· special development, is another on I:::'

condition for the establishment of a

common framework.

Any attempt to lead over the inter. mediJte stages in the formation of the regional union by establishing a united state of part of the countries of the reo gion, will intensify the differences and ~Ill be a disturbing factor in the establishment of the regional union.

On the other hand, the participation of all the countries of the region can. not be made a condition for the establislunent of the union,

The regional framework must be open

to every country, people and state in the region (and not only to the Arab countries). The union will begin with the establishment of a common frame. work foe all those countries in the region which are willing to accept it.

Israel, situated in the heart of the region and interested in basing her development on peace with her neighbors, must see herself as part of the region and support the aims of regional unity, In our opinion there is no conflict between Israel's national aims and her readiness to join a federal regional framework. Her readiness and desire to become integrated in the region can hasten the attainment of a peace agreeIIIent between Israel and her neighbors. . It. chanlJC in (IrM!" foreilJD policy III the cliMction of IlftItralization win COntribate to the ret.lization of tim 8OIl.1t .._.,

...__ to me, hownet. ....

--.. ,...,.,..


not a little on chan .

of the Arab f ges In the attitudes

factor and a1

a the two ' so, of course

f· World blocs '

or Influence ' COmpeting

In the M'ddl

pam has b ,I e East. Ma-

een urglOg th

of the' e neutralization

regIon and Isra I' f integration within . e s ederative

It, following peace agreement between ' a

and ourselves. Upon enterino::h:e~!~~~~~

ment we expressed

, our reservations

concernmg the tendency f h .

. 0 t e maJor-

Ity, and espeCially of Mapai, to depend

on the West. We can not h

. ) oweve-

Ignore the fact that in his answer to

the letter from the head of the Soviet Government, Prime Minister Ben-Cu. rion suggested that the Soviet Union cooperate and aid in the attainment of an Arab-Jewish agreement. Thus, de. spite its inclinations towards the West, the majority in the Israeli government would also welcome any aid on the part of both the West and the East towards the attainment of peace. We do not doubt that our Prime Minister is ready to meet the head of the U .A.R. for negotiations on peace without any prior conditions, at any place and time,

Unfortunately, we are compelled to point out that Abdul Nasser has until now not revealed any desire to seek

peaceful solution, that a state of

a . betw Egypt

belligerency still prevaIls een

h tttropts to overcome

and us that tea .

, . ~ still contInue,

us by economIC """v.. . . .

h rdIS race whIch IS !R'

and that tea • : is still con-

tended IIgsinst us pnmanly,

tinuing. ... __ ~ It ~

1'''''' of (lie: wu·..,

In ~ 1&," Id be well to .CId

to me tMt It WDII the .......

to die IiJt 01 cooditioaI


in the Middle East of the arms race

by the Great Powers. This could be

'1' f ct in relax-

an I01port1nt auxr ,ary a or

h h d f the Govern-

ing tension. T e ea 0 .

ment of the Soviet Un JOn once called for a Summit Conference on the Middle East. There have not been any reactions to this suggestion on the part of the Arab states, though if they were realized an important step forward would be taken in preparing the ground for the confrontation of our representatives with the representatives of the Arabs for peace negotiations without any prior conditions.

As I have said, Mapam has for many years demanded our government's support for the demand for the neutralization of the region and a change in polIcy in the direction of Israel" s integration as a sovereign state and part of a federative union of the countries of the Middle East. I have no doubt that a greater readiness for negotiations on the part of the decisive factors in the Arab world would immeasurably strengthen Maparn's POSItion within the Israeli public as well as in the Government. Though we criticize the tendency of those who dominate our foreign policy towards dependence on the United States, I have no doubt that all the parties of the coalition

f .

ormlng OUt government share a strong

desire for ptaa and (or Israel's economic and poIitic:aI independence.

FInally. I WOIIId lib to COInnIent

tfIIIt withia tilt AnIb lYtionaI Iiberalila _1- .... II within the ...... _ ...........

ant elements arc positive and

. B . progres_

sive. ut we cannot Ignore the d

deriving from reactionary elem anger

. '. ents In

terested rn duectlng the strug I -

Iiberati f hei g e for

the I eratron 0 t elr heopl .

. r es Into

channels of mtolerance and chau ..

Vln'Stn To our great sorrow these negativ;

elements find support in the com .

peb. tion of the Great Powers for the

domination of the Middle East. An agreement between the Powers which would take into aCCOunt the legitimate interests of all the parties concerned is therefore apt to strengthen the mOre progressive elements and to weaken the negative and reactionary ones.

Thus a democratic union of the countries of the Middle East which will guarantee the free development of each of the separate countries and make possible their common effort for their mutual aims, is necessary in order to attain full freedom and the liberation of the region as a whole. Israel's participation in this union is both necessary and desirable. Both can be achieved only by the common effort of the pro. gressive forces within Israel, in the Arab world and throughout the Middle East, in order to achieve the conditions which will make this federation possible

The SymPOSium will be concluded next month with the contrlbutloJlll of MOIIhe Brem, M.K. (Ahdut},vrr dab) and Uri Anterf (Editor of"Hs' olam Hueh"). Dr. Haflll DIIrtn·J)rIr ... WIll ... ., the .........


.+h~ .. __ ...... ~ -

sojourn in Yathrib ed many }ewi<h ' this period. When ibeJ-. would ~ ~ not ~ ~of_


h" dis. On] of nt..~s Ot v.1billty ," 'V;'e


ts t ated "en. lists.



their thet, con-




1. Are ,;."'r"?dudlin ~av~r ,Of! a common political framework for the states of

the 1Y I e as; 1 you are, what form do you think th' f

should take? IS ramework

~, Do you think Israel should join this common framework and if

in what way? ' 80,


Member of Knesset for Achdut Ha'AvodaPoatei Zion Party.

yes. I am in favor of a common

political framework for the states of the Middle East to include all the states existing in the region at present and those destined to arise in the process of the development of the peoples that still do not have any political framework, like the Druze and the Kurds. The most proper form, in my oprmon, would be a broad and free framework similar to the British Commonwealth of Nations, preserving the SOvereignty of all the member states and their right to leave whenever they desire, 1De bases for this framework are free will, the readiness for mutual coopt'l'ation, and common interests.

2. It is clear that I am in favor of

Israel's part" , f

lelpatlon ID such. rame-

~, and I would advise stressing t~

definition "participation" rather than "integration," which always has political associations which are neither pleasant nor adaptable to the present situation. Integration is almost always connected in practice with pressure on the part of the integrator, and wherever there is pressure there is no equality, there is no cooperation, there is no free will. To the question: What is the path of Israel's participation in such a framework, my answer is clear: full recognition of Israel's existence, a permanent peace without infringing ~n her te~i. torial integrity, and her aim to bring back all the exiles. It is also clear thai Israel's particip.ttion requires and will require her to give aid and the frul~ of her social, cultural, and ecnnom,K experience to the general framework 10 order to transform it into a tool for

d to accelerate the d~OP-

peace an 'III

ment and progress of the re8JOll m




Editor of weekly magazine HdO/.1I1I Hazeb, and c r»; of the leaders of the Sem i tic Action Movement.

There is no longer any room in the present-day world for small states, since they are unable to maintain the proper economic, cultural and security levels. In this situation the choice before the small state is either to become the satellite of a superpower or to participate in the establishment of a federative framework based on the free will and cooperation of a number of small and medium states with a common background.

Such a framework can arise only by means of some common ideal, transcending the narrow field of politics. For example: the communist ideal of the Warsaw Pact states, the WesternAtlantic ideal of Western Europe.

In our area, only two ideals are possible as a basis for unification. These are:

The narrow Arab ideal, which can serve as the basis for a particularist Arab state;

The Semitic ideal, which can serve as the basis for the federation of the region as a whole, from Morocco to fran_ This ideal, based on common history and culture, makes possible the inclusion of non-Arab people, or peoples whIch have a specific character, such as Israel, the Kurds, the MaronItes, ftc. It makes possible the integratiGft of all the national movements or rrte teaJoe. I!ld espedaII, of the Heh-


rew and Arab nationalisms

, in a higher framework which 'WIll not be

anti-national but, on the Contrary

tional-progressive. ' na-

In my opinion the struggle i

n Our generation will be waged between

these two concepts, and it is the task of the progressive forces in Israel, Heb_ rew and Arab, to hold high the banner of Semitic union.


I srael's integration in this frame. work is vital for her future, her security and her development. Without it she will not absorb mass immigra. tion and will close all the channels of healthy national development.

The path towards rootedness in the region and towards integration within the framework of the Semitic union is the path of deeds, of a consequent and constant policy carried out over a period of years. The principles of this policy must be:

The full integration of the Arabs of Israel within the State; the abrogation of the Military Administration and all other oppressive and expropriatory laws so that the Arabs of Israel could fill their natural function as the bridge between Israel and the region;

Work for the unification of Palesti ne by the f tee federation of Israel and free Arab Palestine;

A solution for the refugee prob1eIII. by returning a part of them and par" Ing compensation to all the otherS; ~uPPOrt for the Arab national (ltfIf'ltnent throughout the resion. (rt1II Algeria to Or:nm

This ar


One State and Equal Citizenship

Mr. Sayigh's article* presents a true picture tion of the German reparations in 1965, and

of the line of thought of the Arab intelli- the possible change of the U.S. policy"

gentsia which molds and directs public opi- garding fund raising by the American Zionis:

nion in Arab countries on problems of na- organizations in consequence of the SPI"~

tional importance. He pointed out the danger of Arab nationalism in Saudi Arabia, whicl

of a "Diaspora" mentality being created in will sooner or later make its Government

Arab minds and hearts, the mischief under- realize that by its pro-American policy it i,

lying the slogan "the Arabs understand no- indirectly contributing to the strengthening 01

thing but force and we can supply that" Israel's foundations, are indications reflecting

coined by J=ish leaders, and the false illu- the danger of a policy based on the con.

sian of the fiction of the impossibility of tinuity of the present cold war _ occasion.

putting the clock back. He acknowledged the ally hot _ between Israel and the Arab

great achievements Israel carried out during states. It is, therefore, no wonder that Mr.

the last decade, and argued that to make these Sayigh has come to the inevitable conclusion

achievements a peaceful and lasting success that time is no healer, and that the Jews

the Jews must seek genuine peace with the must work for the achievement of peace and

Arabs, live with the Arabs of Palestine within wha~

It must be presumed that Mr. Sayigh had ever political unit the Palestinians live: .

in mind other potent and portent factors oper- 1t is wrong to infer from Mr. S'jlghl

.ling in favor of the Arabs when he ex- article any threat to annihilate Israel. ~

pressed the opinion that without peace the throw the Jews into the sea. In my opm::

Jews cannot make their remarkable achieve-- there is nothing more abhorrent to his !lII

ments a ~ceful and lasting success. He re- and for that matter to the mind of ~

{erred btld1y to the potential of the Ar~b educated and responsible Arab dun the d!

"'orld and the h' h , d' mini'

. . 13 rate at 1Irhith the Anbs -!ruction of Israel by force, or tile I .J

were Prog~log - s' .... T 'd' b v.'Il1'ld ~

wh' h ho . 10 •• 1 leant conS! enhons tion of the Jews from the AraJ

IC s uld lIJTe food f _.J" . ttg!1l ....

COIl"M..~ or m'<Ultatlon an.1 1Irhich Israel in its entirety, is an In _ ....

cern. • DC tremendous rate of . f • I'm for cen[IU'"

the Arab population, the broa ~nc~se 0 IndiviSible pIIrt. The Jews I '101~

the Arab, d strides which 1Vjth the Arabs, under Arab rule. In ptJ"o

dustrializati~es lie ~i~ to1VAld. III' and undetstandins, in brotherhood aD~

dance of th, lIII_~lzaboa, the ahun· tn;OYiog tosethn- the bles.linss of ~

world ' ~ of the Arab ~ -.t....:__ die sufferings of tIJIt

• Its ~t1t _, JIOtaItiaIities the ~_.... ~'"

~·"'·'"'·iL;--ntb ....... " NI1r' ~- Then! is, theft!I~. no reason

otrnooK., ....., I",.

ould not rev sb the JewS we If. Zionist' tbeJC . h'

Mr. SaYI~ ,

both realistiC

logical ded on ents whid opm

ish minds gra

indicate the dangers anSlD1 state of isolat gulfing the C( recriminatlons zad in atteml Palestine pro! tions add fue and antagoOl problem will more strain~ insoluble. W tion of dispute on and equal

in 1965, and , policy reo

occasionthe At.;, r that Mr.

conclusion t the J~s peace and

~ithin whatlns Jive,

ru, Sayigh" : Israel and , y opinion,

~ his mind, !d of t'(ef1

Izao ~,~

~ ehml- ~ 1VOrld 01 ptePl ....

rr~~ 'illlO~




1 I

d not revive that peaceful co-existence shoUI Jews would face the realities and trim

'f the bi ,

J , Zionist am ItlOns.

their Sayigh's approach to the problem is

Mr, , I' b

th realistiC and ronstructrve. t IS ased

bo , al deductions from foreseeable devel-


on which should give thoughtful Jew-


, incls grave concern, because they clearly

ish J1l , diffi I' d

'leate the ever mounung I ICU ties an.

m 1 ets arising from the intensification of the

dang , , d h T

state of isolation, anlm~slty ~n ~Sh Ity ""

ulfing the country. It IS futile to indulge In

g 'olinations in distorting historical facts

recn }

nd in attempting to ignore the still existing

~alestine problem. Recriminations and distortions add fuel to the burning flames of hatred and antagonism, and ignoring the Palestine problem will render Arab-Jewish relations more strained, more complicated and more insoluble, What is needed is the concentration of Arab-Jewish efforts on solving the dispute on the basis of one political unit and equal citizenship and participation in the administration of the country, This is exactly what the late Dr. Magnes strove for, He strongly opposed the dissection of the country and indefatigably worked for the creation of a bi-national independent state, The events of the last decade have amply demonstrated his wisdom and almost prophetic vision, It is not too late for the Jews who worked hand in hand with him to muster sufficient courage and pursue his goal, for in it lies the peace of the region and the fraternity of the two peoples,

Mr, Sayigh's proposal marks a new departure from the traditional Arab policy, It is based not on whimsical wishes, but on reason, logic and far-sightedness, It is a practical offer for ~ solution of the problem which has hitherto successfully defied man's intelli· Bence and sagacity, Genuine peace and true brotherly harmony between the two peoples ire not attainable by international IMUUm, or by the establishment of societies and organizatioos propagating reliSious tolerlll1ce and ~ill8 and the like. The P.rtitiotl ReSOlutioo of 1947 failed to .rve one aspect

of the ....L d

the P,uulan. fa pom of flirt. It 1M e

Pn>hItm __ iatriatt .... iidtiJDIlIts

more antagonistic T .

of the two part" he Intransigent adherence

res to the'

which Mr S izh rr respective demand,

, ay Ig prudent! hi'

would not br; h y s eves aWay

ng t em one i '

"ccept.ble settl eta nearer to an

ement Henc M

suggestion It' 'd' e, t. Say;gh's

. IS In eed

regret that none' f ,a matter for deep with the 0 YOur correspondents d ea iI suggestIon objectiv I

the stereotyped I fey, Apart from

c amor Or dir t '.

- on Israel- t ec negotlatJons

sonabl I erms - none advanced a reae and workable alternative,

In hIS article 'The Cyprus M' I d

I I, irac e an the

srae I-Arab Dispute" (NEW OUTL

March A 'I OOK,

- pn 19S9), Dr, Ze'ev Katz laid out

a useful line of action. The flaw in his scheme is two-fold, The first is that he overlooked the artificiality of creating two small states in such a small country and their nonviability, which prompted the United Nations to provide in the Partition Resolution of 1947 for the economic union of the two states, The second is that he dealt with the problem as a conflict between Israel and the Arab states, and not between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews, He totally ignored the Palestine problem and proceeded to argue the case on the assumption that the Palestinian Arabs have no say in the matter, To follow the logic of the Cyprus precedent it is necessary to acknowledge that the Palestine problem stands unsettled; otherwise the whole structure on which he builds his plausible arguments tumbles down, The dispute is not between Israel and the Arab states. It is essentially between the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews, The Arab states are the 'ponsors, _protectors and defenders of the Palesttnt1n Arabs. The Cyprus example calls for. the r:-

f' , of Palestine the preservatIon of ,ts

uni JcatJon '. . ra

olitical entity under its tradluonal geog - p , d the declaration of the countphical name, an led by the twO ry as an independent state ru

. f the population,

,ectlons 0 nc the Palestine

Any earnest desire to solve settJetneIIt

dispute on the Jines of the C~~1tteJ

'11 not "",terialize unless I ~r

WI Arab ~ 10 ..... '

the rdWft Df the free2inI of the "iftlpIIr-

homes IIId landl,. ~, IIlCI tfle ,.....,._J tl erInI of the estles. .s.s.L t/fIIIIIIIIIIIt the eft) .. "" the U.s.-U



of 1947 - the partitioning of the country.

It is unreasonable to assume that the Ant refugees who have been willingly living in iodescribdble squalor and misery for the 1<1.': eleven years under the unshakeable belief Iholt they wiJJ return, would agree to any-


thing less than their rehabilitation . t:.nc~s[ral homes. r am not una~'ar~ ~~ t~.:~r culties and hardships entailed' . d,fh·

. b in thiS rep tri

non, ut genuine and lasting peace ba na-

price and the price must be paid " a how costly. • no D'.atttJ

We Need a Common Interest

The "miracle" of Cyprus (NEW OUTLOOK - March-April 1959) is in my opinion less a miracle and more a result of a specific situation which was bound to lead to an agreement between the contending parties. The difference between the Jews and Arabs on the one hand, and the Cypriots 00 the other, is that the latter have a mutual interest, a common homeland, which suffered from the instability and insecurity caused by the acts of violence. This brought the island to the verge of bankruptcy. All the parties, and especially the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of Cyprus, understood that the island could not prosper unless there was an agreement which would end the acts of terror and anti-terror. This was the reason ioc their readiness to sit round one table rn order 10 arrive at an agreed solution.

In our C"e the situation is, regrettably, different. What is the common interest which could mOVe t~ Arab leaders to sit cIowu wid! ... and find a solution :0 the btaeli-AIaO diJPUle? The ooly thiog wIIidI CllUId do this is the Arab mope problem. It It not sulficieatl, appreciaiN in lsneI chit dill filet tOIIId t. _"

lID ..,. dat A-. lID CODf ........ ~

Ia ., pcobIem ....

at ..., I. n '1; 01 _,...

..... ..._ ..

...... -".7" .

. ,...._.......... ..

..... ._ ......

states directly concerned. Cooperation between ourselves and Our neighbors On thi, question - independent of any peace talks or a peace treaty - 'would break down the wall of hatred between us and prepare the way for a discussion on other problem" after the psychological obstacles had been removed, with a view to reaching a red peace agreement later.

I would propose that the Israel Government call upon the Arab states and the nations of the world :0 tackle the refugee problem in earnest and to find a lasting solution. This appeal should state that Israel was ready, in accordance with the U. :-i. decisions, 10 take the refugees back Or pay them compensation, on one condition: that experts representing Israel, the Arab stale! and the U.N. discuss the project logtlbtr, examine ,,1/ Ibe adlll togetber, both in "ltd and the neighboring countries, and brill8 their conclusions to the govetDll'lelltS 0lII" cemed an<! the U.N. bodies.

The major objccme. in "" opiaioa. is 10 obtain cooperation ~ !be pGti<s • the buis of • mutually ~ ~ Mca_ without chis cvopentlaI ~ IIOt '- poIIihIe. AU !Ilk ..

INC ...... fw ,._n " "MIMe .. ,...

eadao" CII' .,... It "..

......... ft • ..... •


.............. tJ •


Ql 1.

2. in

atian betrs on this peaCe talks eak down d prepare problems had beer:

g a real

Governand Ihe

or pay on: that b state5 : log"her, : in Isrsel ~d bring !DIS COlt"

of dominating the Arab World from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans.

All these plans can be identified by three distinguishing marks:

All, without exception, despite the proclamations of their initiators and founders, were only political attempts at expansion and domination;

All were openly, either directly or indirectly, opposed to Zionism and to the establishment or existence of the

Jewish State ; .

Third - all failed.

It seerns to me that it is good. ~

'led A long as the conditions

they fal . S

. thi NI rt of the world do not change, In IS r-- . the

d such a miracle is still not on .

an . cannot favor the establish-

honZOll, we political fnme-

meat of any common the Middle .... work for the states of II!IJIIGd .--

.." ~tothe • de-

IftY .......... NItioaL I ,., dIiI

is: tile U-





1. Are you in favor of a common political framework for tb t t

the Middle East; if you are, what form do you think this efr~~e~o~ should take?

2. Do you think Israel should join this common framework, and if so, in what way?


Member of Knesset for the Herut Party.

The past attempts to create a framework of this kind are well known. They include Churchill's and Lord Curzon's dreams of establishing a British Middle Eastern Empire; the Hashemite idea (fostered in particular by King Abdullah) of uniting the "Fertile Crescent"; Sir Anthony Eden's establishment of the Arab League; the abortive program of "MEOO" (Middle East Defense Organization) to complement NATO; the Baghdad Alliance, which Iraq only recently finally decided to leave; the "federation" between Egypt IQ~ Yesnen; and the last attempt - which is not the 1ut link in the federative chain _ AbcIel N .... 's

........._ of die Uaited Anb .. PIIrIic • die lint *p is hit ......

, d 's weaknesses and Iimita-

~~~~y h I'th ill ~

" roger er w

rions. SItting Id neither our

countries of the wor " 'II b

hidden enerrues WI e

open nor our ,

the poisonous means against

able to use . I

hi h they employ in regiona

Israel w IC • •

, or which they propagate within


this geographical area. We must reber that it is because of Arab

mem . ,

't' that Israel does not partlClp-

OppOSJ Ion

ate in any of the bodies which the U.N. itself has organized in this area, such as regional bodies, committees and subcommittees. Because of this, our country has been attached to the U.N. 's European regional bodies, or to broader Mediterranean groupings,

This solution was, indeed, originally proposed only in order to break the present deadlock, But, in my opinion,

it is preferable for us from the standpoint of Our history, culture, political ties and the actual political and economic situation.

We do not belong to the Middle Eut, which Moscow calls the "Arab East," but to the historical and geographical unit of the Mediterranean. Israel', chances of fulfilling a role worthy of her in such a partnership are better and more desirable than any aim of integration into a Middle Eastern organization which, if it arises will be essentially under Arab dominat'ion

A . .

. m I .n favor of Israel', integration .n IUCh a fl'llnewodt? I astume that

~ question ~en to lOme confedera. tlon, federation or

reach· 'some mo~ far.

Ing lIftlon of die COUntries of the Middle l!att. Dfct tat .... &_ ..I

C4II!Je into ...... _ - VI "1IIeJ

-sla.,., .. ...,,_

.. tilt AtifJ .... , ... .... tfJIt


even if a miracle did take


the Arab states werc to . ~Q

revIse h

attitudes towards Israel I do t ~r

, nO! th',,"

that we could allow OU[selv 1,,<

es to d anything that Would affect I 0

:I iebr~

indepenc ence even in the ]'

. . ! Ight~t

Any quesnon of this SOrt ho\\, '

, ever'

only hypothetical and a ' IS

, cOCUpll'le

evasion of reality. Even more th '

. . an thiS

it is dangerous 111 Itself. For in '

Order for there to be room to weigh di

, IScuss

and to answer the question of th'

possibility of integration in any organie zation, there must first be some COrn, munity of interests between the candi, dates for this integration, a feeling of respect for the rights of others, and a great deal of experience in less close cooperation, and, of Course, mutual good will. As long as the Arab count. ries not only do not maintain good relations with us, but actually do not

recognize Our very existence and maintain an economic boycott, a sea blockade, and a cold war, and arc planning for what is called "a sccond round" - i.e. an invasion and an attempt to destroy us _ the very fld of raiSing the question and discussing it as if it were real, holds the danger of decreasing that measure of awareness and preparedness which the State of Israel must maintain towards its neigh. bors. This awareness and preparednels is the only "integration" allowed us ., this time.

Peaceful relations with die Attb ltatet .~ certainly desirable, to that; ClIl hope to complete the pnxe*II ftatioaaI miftJ Iftd fuU aaIeaIptfOI • ,,_.,.. -. We CldIIIIr .... ...,,.,...


take place

o revise ~Ild

do their

Qot tho

elves t Illk

feet Ii 0 do h ebre-w ~ Slightest

, oWever .. a ) rs complete te thaQ tho O. IS,

. r In Order

.'gh, discuss on of tll; any org~i_ SOme COI11_ the candi_ feeling of thers, ~d less close

, mutual

ab counr,

ain good

do not

ce and

second and an ,ery fact



. to an end to the state of war

OintJng - - -

P. the Arab states marntam against

~~ , ' h

11 1 the existing SItuation, owever,

US. n obljged to find allies on the e ~re

11, f common interests. A treaty with baSIS 0

seems to me to be the most

france ,

If' 'ent means of thwartmg the e ICI

essive aims of the Arab rulers and

3ggr I '

{ aving the way to a re axation of

o P d h '

the tensions an t e construction of

peaceful relationships between the Arab peoples and Israel.

Despite this, I do not want to deny the right to look for a "new outlook." This is not only a formal right derived Irom the freedom of thought and opinion, without which our lives would be in danger of ideological petrifaction, instead of being able to reinvestigate the bases of our thought and our political concepts from time to time. Such a reinvestigation will, however, lead us very often to a ratification of our existing viewpoints. As much as I try to understand and to appreciate ~he "new outlook," I can only find in It added conviction of the truth of what seems to me to be the political basis of the Herut movement.

:OSHE UNNA, M.K. c:mber of Knesset for the taus Patty,


I am def '

lDltely of the opinion that the

[ answers to the first part of Question

and the f-

shouJd . Irst part of Question II

~ to be m the aflirmati.e. It is dill!• _see how our couatry an attain

-:;:: would be IIICIN tbI8

.. wM:It


one of normal ' ,

not dictated b pohhcal existence (

f Y txter I One

a the dey I na dangers) d

e oprnent ' an

potential, with of its national

, Out est bl'

neIghborly rel ti . a Ishing good-

, a ,onsh,ps wi h

mg cOuntries, All oth . It the border_

which lead er hnes of thinking

Us to believe h

make other ch . t at we can

Olces SUch '

framework of a "U', as Joining the

"M di nlted Euro ..

e Iterranean F d . pe or a

e eratton"

me to be at b ,seem to

est only t measures which' ernPorary

certain ;ime Th mIght be useful for a db' ese proposals are un-

ou tedly the result f h

situation hi hot e present

" W IC really seems to offer

no SOlution other than one of I" I

. , po inca

conSiderations based 0 Fi d

nIxe and

fundamental factors.

It is characteristic of our situation that it is not difficult to reply in the aff irrnative to both these questions, as long as we remain within the framework of theory. But the gap between what is desirable and what is real is so great that these answers are almost pointless, In my opinion all the attempts to plot out a detailed way of achieving the final aim are futile. Thus I do not consider it possible to reply to the second part of the first question, which falls entirely within the sphere of practical politics, "

All the suggestions presented 10 this respect _ the handling of the refugee problem, the relationship ~r~ ,ls-

I' Arab population non-IdentiflCl-

rae s ' 1m-

tion with world blocs. etc. - are

portant in themSdves. ,and '": should be made in these cIir«tiCJ8L

• • • _LJ..I if there is I dirat _It IS dCJUIll'''' .. die ...... nectdI l!etWetft dICID

... h8 thIt it, If *' tilt -- _-

We Need a Common Interest (Continued from page 42)

miss'ons together with the Arabs? Why do between the interested parties in an erlon

·'''''"ri,. of ". M",,,,,. 01 ""f</, to (,' • .o"'ioo. I, on m, part, I.' ':

• "'" .. Old '"' N,. "". 'I Jeru- ",~,. " the ,=,", 01 ref,,,. to •

5alt"', on both 5ides of the Israeli'Jordanlan taken in by Israel can he {heN ubitrmlr

frontier, meet eVery month in order to elis- without the necessary data hal'iall bteI

CUss the malaria Situation Or other pres5ing (oxamined by Joint Refugee C<lmmissions of

~lth p~? ,

S"",,1dn the IY~ I propose, cIr<l 10

Co .,·t we lit ~ ia Joiat Refl1ftee If our Go~mt could be ~ .

~ trIlIb ... lOQs l Surei, the subjea of !he. r hike Chis SftJI, it would raise our rz

ss'oa. WVuld not ~ leu important) . the P 'derabl nd-

~IQ, III his aHl..t_ ,'a ... .,_ O. _.' 'a "'Dr.. COlIS. ~., ".,. de

""""~ ...... .., "'" W \J, Slitule aa ~ contribution 10

!alb 0( .. Deed ... --_ '""--'._ ..J "' ... .11.. 1>._ teIIIiOII, .. __

1011,_ - __ __ .... '" "....... ---.tJOII """'R' ""' _...

- .. - -- ...::-- '" 1sttet, Bet .....",.. lilt ~ipI



h'ch if taken, are liable one

measures WI, d

d to bring us closer towar s

of these ays '.

• 1 relations with the neIghboring

normar h

countries, At the very most, per aps,

d· g to these matters would mean

atten 10 .

removing obstacles in the path. Btlt. t~IS would not mean undertaking a POSitive activity.

What, then, can be done? I think that today it is only possible to state this final aim - the creation of a common framework for the nations of the area - as one which should direct our overall policy. In other words, even if present day-to-day policy cannot pursue tbis objective directly, we should abstain from any action directly opposed to it. We should try to create rungs in tbe ladder which leads to eventual rapprochement, and should make every effort to diS{;over and foster any evidences of progress in this direction. All other solutions should be regarded as perhaps essential for the present conduct of affairs, but they should be seem in their true light. It is possible that the very acceptance of these assumptions will already represent a


change in our practical pol"

the conversion of the h"" ICy. C:eltaiJu

-r-e of I

ing a settlement into a rn-' . reach .

. '>SlaOlC '.

is harmful to th,s political VISIOn

. apprO',l

All Obstades In the path to .....,.

which we can remove sho I!'ei(e tackled immediately, thOse III U d be

11 entlon!(j

above as we as others so th

' at th

do not, from the very start sp"- ey

, u<e any

attempt at rapprOchement Or foil

attempt at jOining the first thread any s.

We must make the pconle of I

r srael

recognize the vital need for alta' .

IQlllg this objective. We rnusr educate the

youth for the time when the Way to. wards it will finally be Opened and peace will become pOssible. TOday only few people recognize the importance 01 this aim; but a practical policy Cannot be carried out without the support 01 the general public, and certainly not against its opinion,

Perhaps all this does not amount to very much frOm the standpoint of I practicin,g Politician, But I am convinc. I'd that there is a wide field here for action, which may confer untold bles. sings 011 Israel and the entire area.


T be syn Midd.

liey C

. e!talll).

e of }

. reac.Q

slanic v'. - ISIOll approach

th to .

peace should be

.mentioned that th

ik ey

sp I' any

r foiJ any reads.

of Israel attaining ueate the

Way toned and day only rtance of


effort I that !OM




The symposium on the problems of Middle East Federation and the possibilities of Israel's integration within such a federation, published in the last few issues of NEW OUTLOOK, touches on one of the region's most fundamental problems.

In view of the disturbed political situation in this region, and especially the tense relations between Israel and her neighbors, it is pertioent to ask whether there is any practical value in this discussion.

The existing pattern of Israeli-Arab relations seems to answer this question with a decided negative. Everyone interested in Middle East peace must face this issue squarely and ask: what use is there in discussing a common regional framework at a time when most of ~e COuntries of the region, including

the Arab lands, are not prepared to recognize the existence of Israel as an a(c~pted fact ?

vil HOWever, if one day we shall be pri-

tgtd to witness the establishment of a JlOIitical framework whidI wiD in-

::::~ it Will DOt be the lint .... ....,.. of co.dsfe which

........ ".~,. ......

tions finding a solution to th . .

. elr pomts

of difference by establishing a common

federation. As a matter of fact, none of the existing federations were established because of ideal relations bet. ween their member states. The reverse is true: the facts of common geography and historic fate won the day only after long periods of mutual hostility. Neighboring countries and peoples, in the past and in the present, have been compelled to bring an end to armed conflicts which solved nothing and weakened both sides alike. And in many cases the solution was the establishment of a common political framework. It was in this way that the Union of South Africa, the U.S.A., Belgium, and even Switzerland - the symbol of fraternity and intermingling of cultures _ came into being.

In raising the question of Middle East Federation and the chances of

. . . the scheme, the

!srad's partiCipation 10 .mmediate

editors were not thinking of .'

political activity ~t of I'JI~=

Iit'-' line which would

a po K.lU (1JIIIltriII tJf

I_'s approach to the .....

the resiCJn in her ."._



d to reflect the different

In orcer h

d £ Israeli political thought, r e

rren so, f II the

' "ted representatives 0 a

editors mvr "d

l' ties as well as edirors an

lsraeh par " "

j't' al thinkers representmg vanous

po I JC , ,

ideological trends, to partrcrpate.

Twdv~ individuals took part in the symposium, They included seven Mernoers of the Knesser, three editors, and others,

The participants included members of all the coalition and opposition parties in Israel, from the Communist Party to Herut, which represents the extreme nationalist wing, It is interest. ing to notice that the opinions ex. pressed here by the participants are not always identical with their party's official stand,

Some of the political parties have a clearcur attitude towards Israel's relations with the Arab states; others have not yet Crystallized their definitive at. titude, The opinions expressed in Our symposium COver all shades of political thought On this topic, though not necessarily according to their weight in public opinion.

. All the partiCipants, with two excep_ hons, expressed their positive attitude tOWards the historic trend in the dirC(t. ion of regional unification, as well as their hopes for Israel's integration 300ner or later lVithin a common reBionaJ l


~n ,~ participants stressed that the I'e8ion • lIIIifiation cuuJd not be prompted hy any IIIrruw nationalism.

0ttIy same .... aJitIIIaoa to III the ~cllfIt"""~"'the

~ tIIdt ~ 10

·....., fII __ ....


mutual aid, In this way th

e reg'

the countries within it COuld IOn lIiQ

stronger and more capable of bet:1Irtie

I I ' aCcete

ed eu rura , econOmIc ar,d S"r' 1 I~,

"'-'3 dev I

ment, eop'

But the symposium also re I

' , , '''Caed ~

ietuig OpinIons conCerning th ' [,

'h e sIze o[

the federatIOn, t e form it shOuld t

the way the plan should he rate,

d h " eaJI11d

an t e stages In Its execution,

Most of the writers thOught that addition to the Arab COuntries or'; Middle East, the federation shOuld in, clude the non·Arab COUntries as \Velt_ such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. Thev also emphasized the need to plan [0; the eventual partiCipation of nation~ groups which have not yet won their independence, such as the Kurds and the Druze,

Some of the partiCipants suggested the inclusion of African Countries such as the Sudan, Ethiopia or Libya, One can, tributor, basing himself on the "Semitic ideal" as the foundation of the unio~ also included Morocco and Tunis,

The participants did not enter into details concerning the federation's ereetual authority, though here too the ex· change of opinions revealed a nwnber of different approaches, Some consid~' ed the establishment of a common polio tical f rarnework for the peoples of tht region as the task of a whole ~ tion, to be realized togtther with tht

• 'nflv-

region', liberation from foreign I dte

ence. Others placed the emphasi~ 011 !fir Prdimiaary ItaJell throush whldl

Middle Eat peaples would ha-.e 10 '= bela.. • poIitIcaJ federation ~

- au , .. ... .. aIIIIf'k. tfII1 .... _

tablished by es e Europe, as w

nwealth of mo

The oppom

tion negate tl interests amon Middle East. 1 federation to I any practical b can come abo future.

The sharpenn conflict at freed itself ir broadened points to a On the coupled with over the link the essential the Middle

ay the reD'

. olOn

It COuld bee lrld

able of °llle accele

;d SOCia! drat.


Iso reveal d

. e dif.

Ing the .

• SIZe of

Jt should tal.:

uld be e,

. realiZed


thought that .

'10 o.untries of the

!Jon should io. tries as well _

d Israel. They d to plan for n of national yet won their he Kurds and

ts suggested

bot enter into :eration' 5 even-

~e too the ex~ed a number k>me consider-

, common poli-

jeople5 of the ~hole genera-

, her with the

foreign illiIa~uis on the :b "hich ~ Ihlmto~ .. coati

.... -



r hcd by some of the nations of

cstab IS well as the British Com-

Europe, as .

'ealth of Nations.

mOow f' I

The opponents 0 regrona federa.

. cgate the existence of common

tloo n .

. sts among the countries of the


Middle East. They c~nsider the i~ea of

federation to be a pipe-dream, Without any practical basis, and do not think it can come about even in the distant future.

The sharpening of the Iraqi-Egyptian conflict at a period when Iraq has freed itself from Western influence and broadened its democratic character points to a latent opposition to union. On the other hand, this situation, coupled with the dissatisfaction in Syria over the link with Egypt, is proof of the essential value of federation for the Middle East. As we have seen, union between a larger country (Egypt) and a smaller country (Syria) has not been successful in creating one organic country capable of merging two disparate systems and economies.

All but one of the participants shared a positive evaluation of the possibility of establishing a common political framework in the Middle East. This evaluation was based upon their attitude towards the social processes takIng place in the region and upon their understanding that Israel's interests were lin.ked with regional union.

'Ibis fact i. extremely 1i8llificant. Fot

l. lon8 time Israeli public: opinion conSidered a8l'1IDIent amoog tile NJion's

Jleoples to be a tIIrat to the ......

~, .... pnf di¥itiGe, t'DnIIic:t

1Qcl"",_ ' Jt .. ._..


ing dear that th

h entwapp h'

s ared only b h roae IS not

y t e p ti

NEW OU'r'T ar IClpants in the

<LOOK sympo'

Minister David B . SHUll. Prime

ed, about six en-Gullon also dedar_

months ago that ..

would be mak ' we

dIng a serious . f

an gerous, mistake if ' I not a

that di ". We were to think

lVISIOn In the Arab cam .

our benefit" Th P IS to . .' us a large and influent_

ial sectton of Israeli p bli '.

u IC OplfllOn has apparently com t h

fri . e 0 t e Conclusion that

~Ichon betwCffi the peoples of the re.

gion often harms Israel, while ultimate agreement between the Arab states might even be to our benefit.

. These assumptions of the participants In the symposium and of the Prime Minister are based on many years' experience of Middle Eastern development. Whenever the conflicts between the countries in this part of the world grow sharper, each side tries to prove its loyalty to Arab nationalism by intensifying its attacks on Israel. When feelings are running high no public Arab figure or party dares to reveal any initiative for peace. But when these disputes become weaker, energy is diverted to constructive activities and the chances of showing interest in a peace settlement with Israel are improved.

The discussion revealed another char-

acteristic and positive phellOllJlellOll: ·...._ts

ith two exceptions the putiur-

w ... ...:...I_1....l of

regard Israel not as a LJ'I"'6~.-- .

W-tern influence bot as SA ~ ... . cooditioal ...... r

part of the region. Thll _ _ ___

_-I' fuNre lad II ..vitiOli of IIt_' of ",.a ••

teIIOft for their appl'O'll ._

jnteptioa in the ~ ~ ...

Sgaae of tJw .....


although today there arc few practical possibilities of Israel joining such a federation, the presentation of this question has practical value as a political approach influencing education and bringing ultimate realization nearer. They believe that one of the greatest diificulties in educating Israel's younger generation is the Arab countries' attitude towards this country. This attitude to Israel, as expressed in incessant pro· c1amations of hatred and appeals for military preparedness, is one of the main obstacles to any attempt to per· suade Israeli public opinion that reo gional federation is a desirable and possible goal. The petulant behavior of the Arab states makes the supporters of federation seem to be impractical and utopian dreamers. If these countries would change their uncompromisedly hostile attitude towards Israel, there would be a much greater chance of changing Israeli public opinion in favor of integration in a regional union.

Other participants pointed out that a modifkation of Israel's everyday policies towards it$ Arab minority - a change expressed in the granting of full civil equality, the abolition of the Military AdminiJtration, and an agreement to allow some refugees to return-could lay dw buit fIX • cblnge in the Arab countries' aetitude towardt Ismr, and thus prcpae the 8fOUDd fIX the cstabliJh.-.& 01 • common IXgaoization embncins aD tilt rqiocI'. couabics.

DIItIn, die cilia.... JOllIe of the

...". ,I-Mik dpiaoeal

tWr epWoa • In*ze._

r.a.., ,....., • cIIIaIt ill Aa6 ..... .............. ~ ....

Western aid and establi5h stro .

. h E oge, titS

WIt uropean countrie<; ~

how h . 1Ie1

ow ever, t ley saw as only t '


sitop-gaps which must be adopttd for

ack of choice, as long as the Arab boycott of Israel remains inflexible.

T he various opinions expressed in the

symposium attempted to cut the G9rd. ian knot of "What comes fint?" Is a change in the Arab attitude towards Isra. el an essential condition for changes in Israeli policy towards the Arab popula. tion of Israel ? Or is a change in Israeli policy a prerequisite of a change in the Arab attitude? Are Israel's ties with the West, and the fad: that the Arabs regard her as a Western base, the chief reason for the difficulty in coming to terms ? Or is it the hostile attitude of the Arab states that is pushing Israel into the arms of the West ; There is no doubt that this knot of mutual suspicions and the existence of constant tension and armed clashes cannot be unravelled without the evolution of some new political program. Perhaps a federal solution in which an autonomous Israel would be part of a common framework embracing the entire region could induce the two sides to discuss the disputed Wacs and find I solution to the festering conflict.

Israel's entry into • Middle &tt Federation would inYOlve CIJGSidmbIc saaili«s OR htr put - .mons odIm the IUtrtDder of aft ~ foreip poUq. ~ of her dewlap.... pmJ«II wfda thole dI lite 8IIire ,.... ad die ....... ellId' .. ...., ..... _..,........,,,.

~...",.. ....

difficult Io dition$, wI ber sovere of dedsior today are (lther han gi~ f problems and seem these pr that of th Middle E

~jty and for towards J'fObIem. Many


J . h II

eWIS Pal ..... ·

~,lne set off f

Table Confer . or the Round

ence In Lo d

people foresaw th n on, how many

State of Israel cb establishment of the

Th a are two

e realism years later ,

or utopianism f . programs . 0 political

IS measured by th .

ship to the soci I elf relation.

a processes taki la

and by the degree that ng p ce,

historical nee' . they derive from

esSlty. History h h

that the friendshi as SOwn

h . ch P between countries

WI. are, geographically speaking f

apart IS at· , ar

tansient phenomenon h'I

the hatred between nations jOi~~ ~; geography eventually disappears.

There have been not a few cases where programs at one time considered utopian have been fulfilled not very much later, when a change in the historical situation favored their realizstion, The utopian vision was then seen to have been only foresight of historic processes whose outcome could be foretold with reasonable certainty. History has brought the Arab and the Jewish peoples together in the same ge0- graphical area: a region in which the process of the integration of the sep~ate native peoples into a greater UnIty is constantly growing stronger. We believe that the result of these two facts will be the fulfillment of roday's utop-

. . . the establishment of a

Ian VIsion - .

I· .:cal framework which will common po I"

include Israel and the Arab peopies.

get ties



difficult for Israel to accept these condilion;, which involve a reduction of her so,"ereignty and individual power of decision in favor of nations Who raday are her bitter enemies. On the other hand, the establishment of the regional federation would solve many probleros which create difficulties today and seem incapable of solution. One of these problems, to take an example, is that of the territorial continuity of the Middle East countries. Under federation, this problem would be solved automatically, without any reduction of Israel's territory.

Israel's status as a member of the federation would enable her to absorb immigrants according to the country's economic situation, and would guard her neighbors against any risk of territorial expansion. Similarly, when Israel will feel herself more secure from atUcks by her neighbors, she will have no justification for not granting the Arabs within her borders complete equality and a share in the government, and for not taking more active steps lowards the solution of the refugee problem.

Many in Israel and abroad may think it Wildly utopian to discuss Israel's attitude towards regional federation at ~is date. But let US take an analogy:

III 1946, when the representative of

rogram· tucb an ~ of a Ie entire I des to

: find a

1'b< (or ar (omp' of th f ecl

surro WOf




the the rel.


The first meeting of the "New Outlook Forum," sponsored by the Editors or this journal, was held on April 6, 1960 at Farmers' House in Tel Aviv. The discussion, under the above heading, was introduced by Dr. Haim Darin, the Chairman of New ON/look's Editorial Board, who was followed by the three speakers of the evening:

Mr. Michael Assaf, a member of the Editorial Board of Daua« and a well-known Israeli

student of Arab a£fain, Mr. AbdUl ~ZI' Z'ubi, Vice-Mayor of Nazareth and mem!>" of Neu) Oil/look's Editorial Board, and Mr. Moshe Shamir, one of the most prominent of Israel's writers and novelists. Th. three panel speakers were followed by dis. cussion from the floor. Because of the interest in this subject, we are publishing condensd versions of the discussion. - Ed i to r s.

a ov



tween states, even though a reasonable one is possible.

To what foreign situations can we compare the position of the Arabs in Israel? Perhaps best of all to those of Switzerland and Czechoslovakia. Switzer. land contains members of three minor· ities, each affiliated nationally to )Iron,!: political powers beyond her border;:

German, French and Italian. Cz('(hoslovakia once had a strong German min' ority which looked towards a pt'lt

aki SWttt· Germany outside Czechoslov la.

erland's solution was a positive onr and so we should look for ours a1on~ the !wiss pattern. TM C~ was n~_tllr same Eor Caecho&IcmItia, which ftll ..

.,.". .. aU the Gerans.

T he nationalist movement 15 one of

the necessary but most unfortunate phenomena in modern human life; the IOODer it completes its task and disap. ,.." the better it will be. There is JIO one just and true solution for the ClJllfficting problems of national ism; the -"'ist movement arouses the worst .... of human nature and thus makes ., ,. toIution impossible .

.... • both the Jewish and the movements remain as .. they ate now, will .,. found for



The Arabs In Israel are also searching for analogous situations. They rend to compare their position in Israel to that of the Jews throughout the world, and feel that their relationship towards the surrounding Arab world is like that of World Jewry towards Israel. In other words. they demand the right to a full- fledged Arab nationalist movement in Israel' a nght to belong to the Arab national movement. similar to the right World Jewry enjoys in its relationship to Israel.

I feel that this desire or demand is a great tragedy because the Jews all over the world wish Israel to live and prosper, while the Arab nationalists in all the surrounding countries wish the opposite. We do not know for how long Nasser and Kasem will maintain their burning enmity towards Israel and their denial of the State of Israel's right to exist. Most Jews in Israel do not be· lieve those who tell them that if they yield on one point or another the Arab states' attitudes will change. Most Jews do not believe that peace can be obtain. ed by making concessions to the Arabs.

I want a State of Israel in which the Jews and Arabs will live like the Germans and French in Switzerland; in which they will feel themselves to be free and yet do not belong to any German or French national movement beyond their borders. The Swiss Germans did not follow Hitler. There is no other Jewish state in the world, so that the attitude of the dispersed Jews to Israel is different and not like the attitude of the Arab nationalists toward the Arab countries.

41 Everything thlt (.10 be done for the Israeli Arab

s, untIi peace is attained

has alreadj' b •

. een done. or will be

achIeved' h

10 t e near future Mapai has

accepted the Arabs into the Histadrut

and -11

WI shortl y accept them into her

own party ranks. The last miserable remants _ of the Military Administration, WIll disappear

The Arabs have put themselves into a blind alley; it is impossible to support Arab nationalism and at the same time support Israel faithfully. If the Arabs of Israel do not show themselves able to accept that same national freedom enjoyed by the Germans and the French in Switzerland. I see only a dark future.


Twelve years ago we were a majority;

now we are a minority. Mr. Assaf compares us to the Germans in Switzerland. But do the Swiss Germans have brothers and sisters in Gaza, Lebanon. Syria and [ordan ?

I feel that I belong to the Palestinian

Arab nation; I want my children to feel the same way.

But nov.', what are the factors deter-

mining our position and future 15 Arabs in the State of Israel ?

These factors are the attitude of die-

Israeli Arabs themselves, Go.aoment policy, the Ittitucle of the Jews to - Arabs in Israel and the attitude of tilt-

Arab states tcJWttds the JcwiIII pIIIIIIe-

To • __ drpe tile JIrIIIi ,..

alB Wp .. tIIis ~ .., ---



ing the fact of Israel's existence (and this recognition exists for e"ery Arab with common sense). They need to wish to integrate themselves within Israeli society and to build their lives in this society, while at the same time preserv· ing their own culture and their cultural ties with the Arab world as a bulwark against assimilation.

But Government policy remains decisive in determining the future of the Arab citizens. If anyone strikes me, I shall strike him back; if I cannot do that T will curse him. The Israeli Government has apparently decided that it wants the Arabs to remain, but how - this has still to be decided. There is a Military Administration, and there is national social security. There is the expropriation of land; there arc good health services. The Military Administration strikes at our 'soul, our national self-reapect; the health services help our bodies. But our souls, our honor, arc more important.

1 also mentioned the factor of the Jewish people's attitude towards the Arab citizen. I haven't felt any discrimination against Arabs in Tel Aviv, but still a child in a Jewish school will tell his friend "Don't be an Arab '" It is not the teacher who Is at fault. If the Prime Minister states that the Arabs may be a fifth column, the Jew in the st~ will look at me with -picton. Il, on the contrary, the Prime MiftiStft' ~ to dmare that the Arabs .. &'DOlI citiRns, this 1roaId, tOl1l01l0W, IIff«t .. dI8d In 1dIIGd.

.. ,._. it .. alftftIcIe of

.... ]f.".

tians stop ships in the Canal th

' e a~

titude of the Jew towards the A "

. h cab

here, weaflng t e same headdress, ~

affected. Unfortunately, however I

. ' can

change attitudes here more eaSily than

I can in Egypt; here we are living un. der a regime which allows us to speak out and to state our demands.

But three of the keys are 10 OUr hands. I believe that if we open the fi rst th ree doors, we shall succeed uJ. timately also in opening the fourth _ the door to the Arab countries.


Free friendly discussion is the short-

est path to understanding, though each speaks for himself. We have to free ourselves from Assaf's exaggerated realism. I have still to be convinced of the great value of "realism" in history; that "realism" falls to the ground with the first change in reality. We have to look for some original ideas and to look for contacts between individuals beyond the barriers of party lines.

Assaf comforts us by saying that we are about to witness the end of discrimination - the "remnants of the Military Administration." There is no difference between us on that. But there remains the more serious problem of minority and majority, the prabkln of the individual and IKJt of the law.

I do not think that MicMel A!tIafs compartfOn 'tridI hItzertacd ~ • (jJC. Mt one. How 1ft the AftIIII ill JtrweI to Id .... It. 1M?... bill .,.. .. .. 'dllt ..... ...... .,

with tl Abu,,: home culture Ao.'Ol be no two p confu cept I rcct

a btl

the f hwn for

with their exclusive interest in Israel. Abdul Aziz Z'ubi says that Israel is his home, but that in character, history and culture, he is part of the Arab people. According to present concepts there can be no common dialogue between these two positions; there can only be armed conflict. If, however, we refuse to accept the present situation as the correct reality, we will be able to find a bridge between the two stands.

I question Mr. Assaf's prophecies for the future. The future is the result of human activity, of human will. Thought for the future is a natural part of human life.

Thus the comparisons with both Switzerland and with other places are not correct. Both of our nationalist movements are young and dynamic, in the prime of their youth and energy. They are at the stage of social and cultural development, with large and healthy appetites. Switzerland never knew a situation of conflict between growing and arising nationalist movements, and the situation in Switzerland is one of stagnation and satiety.

The question is how these two national movements can join their courses in order not to come into conflict with each other.

Mr. Assaf criticizes all nationalist movements and hopes for the day when these movements complete their task. In his opinion they are aggressive and narrow-minded. [ don't share this total .criticism of nationalism. We have to distinguish between different elements and between different movements. I

would not label the whole Zionist movement as aggressive. The large


OUr the uJ.

majority clings to a great and h

ideal f f' uman b 0 ratemlty and understanding

ctween peoples. The Arab national movement is now led by men who dis-

tort Its aims dId'

. . an ea It astray, but it

~s an historic and fundamentally positrve movement, which all men must respect. Who will dare tell the Israeli Arab that he is not allowed to feel himself part of his national movement? If we really believed that every national movement was aggressive, then the situation would be very tragic. But we don't have to believe that.

The solution begins in the simple human approach, because it is the man the individual, who is the basis. let us not look for comfort in political concepts. The Foreign Offices will not find a common language. Foreign Offices exist in order not to find such a common language, and our own Foreign Ministry has proved this. They play at politics without beginning to touch life itself. We have to think of human relations, in work, education and culture, and then we will be able to plan for the common existence of two growing, dynamic national movements which will not believe in enmity. Instead of turning our eyes to the culture of the lands beyond the sea we will look to the countries across the border, and to the human beings, our brothers the Arabs, within our own



_is and Arabs have a mutual fear of esch other; this fear rmrJt be removed. There was a ~ tJII!tIe



Cairo radio station recently in which the speaker said that this region will not liberate itself until the Moslems, Christians and Jews unite. When the Arabs about us, and we too, have leaders who are free of fear, we shall attain peace.

Michael Assaf's analogy of Switzerland does not apply, for many reasons. for one, the Germans and french in Switzerland have pretty much the same approaches to things. Here the situation is just the opposite. As one example, while the whole Arab world was aroused over the events in South Africa, official Israel hardly reacted.

Mr. Assaf is afraid of the leadership of the Arab people. The Arabs suffered for years because of their weak leadership. Now they have a strong leader in Abdul Nasser. 1 think it only natural that most of the Arabs look up to Nasser the way the Jews of America admire Ben-Gurion.


Michael Assaf's analysis is based on

the assumption that permanent hatred between the two national move. ments is inevitable. If he were to accept the assumption that it is possible to find a bridge between them he wouldn't find such a contradiction in the Arab minority' 5 feeling of belonging both to Israel and to the Arab national movement. Undentandins is possible, and no Arab poop can sene as a better bridge to \111 tq1t.~ than the A.rab minority .. ..... wIW:b IUffen die effects of

II I.",.

Mr. Assaf's alternatives

-se tion from the Arab world Or' pall.. . . tn"'!Uajih. 10 Israel - are not reallstic u 'J

. Cl, d

not point to any way to pass f ~

rom th

evil reality to a better future B e

. ut We

have to look to the future. Bow d

he envisage the future relationsh' <lei

IPS of Jews and Arabs ? If he is so pessimis.

tic, why is his own party mOVing, as he says, towards the abolition of the remnants of the Military Government)

The improvement in their economic situation actually increases the Arabs' resistance to the degradation and dis. crimination in which they live today. If this degradation and discrimination did not exist, the Arabs in Israel could absorb Israeli culture and serve as a bridge for understanding between the two cultures.


Every national movement is aimed against someone else. We tend to think that peoples that have suffered are better able to understand the suffering of others, Unfortunately this isn't true. Instead, they are fanatical in turn, The Poles discriminated against other minorities. The Ukrainians have been cruel to other weaker peoples. The Jews apparently have suffered the same fate - we have suffered and we Itt unable to be tolerant. The Arabs in their tum have denied the Kurds thf right to a national 1tIte.

PeopM. ~, IearD frotA JIiIItOq. ..mich CCIIDpIIfa ...,. .. __ ...

~~O-.n, .. "'''''''

never Y"~ ntones be: (;i~ht 111l\'\ nom)' :Li11 them 111

Di~L,lI minonty nates, at J.gJ.in::ot


1 he I <d




a e


never yielded her rights to the territories beyond the Oder, she absorbed eight million refugees within her economy and did not insist on keeping them in refugee camps.

Discrimination agai nst a national minority harms the nation that discriminates, and at least for that reason I am agumst discrimination.


T he national movement of an oppresed people is also a force for free-



dam. There

was once an agreement be-

tween Weizm

ann and Emir Feisal On

cooperation betwen the d'ff

Pe 1. . 1 erent

op es III the region Tad h

to go be ond. '.. ay we ave . Y the limits of narrow

nattonalism and seek f' .

within the f or. integration

rarne of the liberation of the Middle East.

In the last analysis we have to start, as Moshe Shamir said, with the relationships between man and man. Perhaps our most important task is to educate the younger generation to mutual respect.


Mr. ELIEZER LIVNE'S article, presented below, was written in reaction to the discussion held in the Israel Knesset, following a motion by some of the opposition parties to

T he Knesset debate on the Military government was very interesting, for one than one reason.

The results of the voting - 42 in favor of continuing the Military Government, 24 against, and 27 ahstentions -- proved that there was a clear majority of 51 to 42 against the Military Government. Those who abstained declared they saw public and moral harm in continuing the Military Government, but that reasons stemming

abolish the Military Government. We are presenting it as another aspect of the discussion presented in the previous pages.

- Editors

from considerations of party politics prevented them from voting against it.

The Prime Minister's actions were no Jess revealing. He opened his speech in justification of the "Government" by declaring that "this country may see nationalist disturbances and bloodshed not only between Jews and Arabs, but also between the various minorities.". This was rather a strIftgt

• All quoeaaonl are from die ,11ft • 4111: report of .. Dead.


prophecy to come from the mouth of the Head of the Government. In contradirrion to Mr. Bcn-Gurion's forecast, there has been very little bloodshed between national group~ and communities in this country, The most imporunt rook place in Kafr Kassern, a village subject to the Military Government, which did not act to prevent 'disturbance" and "bloodshed," to say the least,

Mr. Ben-Gurion did not succeed in revealing any connection between the existence of the Military Government and the prevention of infiltration (which is supposed to be its main justification). Most of the violent infiltrations occurred before 1956, at a time when the :Military Government was still in full force, Since then infiltration has decreased considerably, despite the fact that the Military Government has been limited and relaxed, We should apparently be able to deduce from this fact that it actually increases Infiltration. However, this deduction is just as unfounded as the opposite as. sumption that the "Government" prevents it, The truth is that the Military Government does not deal with military affairs and is not a factor affect- 109 infiltration. whose increase depends mainly on the policies of the neighbor; ing countries. When Mr. Abdul Nasser decided that he had more effective 'lrays of "embittering Israel's existence" (m Mr_ Ben-Gurioo's words), inf.ltratlOII cIecn!a.d to a minimllm.

Nt Ben-Guriolt ...... _ III his

... w.n die K..et liD die ,.,. "'.!II"I' 'I .... aiIIW ...

.,... II-

ready been large-scale infilrrahons wluch were abetted by the IOhabitants 0

n th, border, and I don't blame them, 1h

did indeed act against the law, ~ 1 can understand them.. If an Israeli Arab gives shelter to infiltrators, from the juridical point of view I will bnng him to trial and pur him II} priSOn. From the human point of view, how_ ever, I will understand him, I might do the same in his place". I can understand the intentions of those givlOg shelter to infiltrators, even when the Iatter do not come for material gain but in order /0 embitter the !ife of the State of Israel and its existenrs" These remarks, including the idea contained in the last sentence, were not a slip of the tongue, Mr. Ben,Gurion repeated them three times during his address, What conclusions will international. Arab and Jewish public opinion draw from them? I believe the conduioos are clear, and as far as the last two factors are concerned, they were probably intended by the speaker.

International public opinion, induding the U.N., will cooclude that violent infiltration and its terrible results are "natural" and "human," From the formal point of view the mfiltrators and those who hide them tranSgress against Israeli law (something which even those sending the fedt/.W" do not doubt); from a patriotic pow! of view, however. they may be justi· fiN_ Mr. 8en-Gurion understands tbedl and would do die same in their pIace-' The Israeti ptattsts .,.mst the adS cl

til. ~ """,." .... ..

• W .-


... gc.t..orpn;' relativ

frltratc cnoc: will ( the "

Mr. tend



_gent. of the Arab gov rnments which organize the infiltration will now be r lJ.t i vel} easier, No matt r what th infiltrators do or how mwderous their olctions, the representatives of the U.A.R. will only h a v e to quote the words of the: Head of the Government of Israel. Mr. Ben-Gurion certainly did not intend any such result.

.. .. ..

the most



to the majority party declared that "the

, Government fIves US the Feel-

l\flllt;lfY 'I' "

. f d'scrimination and 111l:'lua Ity.

illg 0 I .

. this however he and hIS corn-

DB~~' ' ..

J J'J not vote Jar the abolition

ra cs I

of the Military Government SIOl'C "it

was not the intention of those who raised the subject of discussion to serve the Arabs of Israel." Even jf we assume that the parties raising the question didn't intend to "serve" thc Arabs of Israel, but themselves, why must an Ar.lb .M.K., who believes that the Military Government causes discrimination and inequality, abstain from struggling for its abolition?

I am not qualified to speak for the parties which raised the problem of the Military Government in the Knesset. But I am one of the tens of thousands of Jewish citizens who oppose the Military Government and are ashamed of it, not because we want to "serve" the Arabs of Israel. We want to serve Israel, and the Military Government affects us as citizens and as Jews. It cultivates a superfluous and corrupt administration, forms a fortress of arbitrariness and legal discrimination, and is not dependent upon the normal civil authorities of the country. The Military Government is dangerous for the Jews no less, and with the passage of time, much more than it is for the Arabs. It does not fill any military need and it deals, unfairly, with a range of non-military matters: the distribution of the lands of Israeli Anbs to prlYi1eged J~, who Ie .. .. liD • IomI Anbt ia Ntn, the , ._ ." WIIIk ,..... .... tmtI

the authorities In diff~rent f' I

. Ie ds

accompanied by discriminatlo ' aU

isan pressure. The Militaryn a~d part.

, . k' OVtrn

rncnt s marn tas IS to keep , .

as ('nan

Arabs as possible dependent Y

. , '. upon the

dominant party s Institutions e

, nterPl! ses and protection, Because of thO

IS, llli the other parties arc opposed to i

Their opposition is legitimate, c'Ve~ f rom a party point of view.

The Jewish citizen who wants to do away with the Military Government, wants to serve his country, his people's honor and freedom, He is repelled by the rot and ugliness. He isn't always sure whether he is also fulfilling the desires of all Israeli Arabs. There are some Arabs who want the tension bet. ween the state and its Arab citizens to continue, believing that this tension is natural and helpful to Arab nation. alism. These people will not be pleased by the abolition of the Military Government. They arc interested in any wound or insult which can fan the flames of mutual hatred.



P' S

It is one of the aims of the Military Government 1I0t to allow our Arab citizens to express thei r free will, and to compel them to elect hangers-on. From this point of vicw it may be only natural that this Arab spokesman in the Knesser and his comrades abstained from voting against the Military Government. If it were abolished they might no longer be able to be Members of JCnes. set, fulfilbns their p&r1latnefttaty tstb by abstairuDS on matters ~ their own communft1 IDd .... tIlClOfoCl ••• .., ..... __ ......

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