TOP RANKING OFFICERS (Leadership Cadres) OF THE NKVD, of the UKRAINIAN SSR, IN THE MID-1930s НАЧАЛЬНИЦЬКИЙ СКЛАД

НКВС УСРР У СЕРЕДИНІ 30-х рр. A Brief Translator's Introduction The importance of this document, and the reasons for translating it into English are: 1. The document identifies the names of the leaders of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD who were responsible for conducting the Red Terror in Ukraine as well as the Great Famine Genocide of Ukrainians, during the 1930s. 2. The material shows that less than 7% of the NKVD leadership in Ukraine was actually Ukrainian, hence debunking the myth that some Russian authors have created, suggesting that it was Ukrainians who killed Ukrainians in the Red Terror and specifically during the Famine Genocide of 1932-33. 3. The document also debunks the myth that these individuals were members of the “worker's proletariat”. In fact the vast majority, as defined by their social status, education and previous jobs, were from “suspect” parts of contemporary society. 4. The information presented on the fates of the majority of these individuals is that “justice” was served, in that most were ultimately killed in a purge by Stalin, although unfortunately not for the crimes that they had committed. This translation is a group effort involving friends of ToshuTrinity@Gmail.com , and members of WWW.UVO.CV.UA . If you have corrections to this document, or are interested in helping with ongoing translations, please email us. Please feel free to publish and share this document on line to the widest possible audience. This document is a direct translation from the Ukrainian version, “НАЧАЛЬНИЦЬКИЙ СКЛАД НКВС УСРР У СЕРЕДИНІ 30-х рр“ taken from the following web site: http://sbu.gov.ua/sbu/doccatalog/document?id=39281 . This is the website of the Security Service of Ukraine or SBU, whose predecessor was the KGB during the Soviet era. The Ukrainian document was printed in the Journal “ From the Archives of the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-KGB”, which was established by the Ukrainian government in 1992 and the first issue came out in 1994. All of the issues are currently available on line here: http://www.reabit.org.ua/magazine/ . The document is a result of the research done in the former Soviet KGB/NKVD and Cheka archives that reside within Ukraine.

The Journal is a collaborative effort of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), The National Academy of Education of Ukraine (NAN), Institute of Ukrainian History at NAN, and the Ukrainian Government Archive Committee. Its mission is to publish documentary material of previously closed security, special ops, and law enforcement archives, the biographies of Ukrainian dissidents of the 1960s-1980s, and the names of those who died in the prisons and concentration camps of the NKVD.

Vadym Zolotariov (Kharkiv) TOP RANKING OFFICERS (Leadership Cadres) OF THE NKVD, UKRAINIAN SSR, IN THE MID-1930s By their very nature and the functions that they perform in society and the state, security bodies traditionally belong to those government institutions whose status and prestige are the highest. It is quite natural, as neither society nor the state can allow any other situation without endangering their very existence. As to the “face” of state security bodies – as in any militarized organization, it has always been determined by their top ranking officers, the core of state security, and the basis of its existence. It is the top ranking officers that and embody the traditions of service; they are the environment that produces the continuity of generations which ensures the successful operation of security bodies. Therefore a comprehensive history of these repressive bodies cannot be created without a detailed study of their personnel and top command – because, according to Russian researchers N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, it is only by understanding the principles underlying the selection, placement, and rotation of the Cheka personnel, that can help us reconstruct the mechanisms of rule by terror and to see the “drive belts” used by the party oligarchy in exercising its power.i Based on the collection of biographical information on the personnel of the Department for State Security (UGB) of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the Ukrainian SSR, the author will attempt to provide a general description of the top command of the Ukrainian Cheka officers in the mid1930s, the time of the most powerful influence of state security bodies on the Soviet society. This category is comprised of officers who were awarded special ranks by the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) in 1935-36, from captain of state security and higher. Undoubtedly, they were the most qualified, experienced, and distinguished Cheka officers, the pride and glory of the Ukrainian NKVD. According to the decree of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) of Oct. 7, 1935 On Special Ranks for the Commanding Officers of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the Union of SSR, the following personnel ranks were introduced: sergeant of state security (here and below – GB), GB third lieutenant, GB second lieutenant, GB first lieutenant, GB captain, GB major, GB first major, GB 3 rd rank commissar, GB 2nd rank commissar, and GB 1st rank commissar.ii The TsIK and Sovnarkom Decree of Nov. 26, 1935, established the rank of GB general commissar, which was conferred on the USSR People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, Genrikh Yagoda. iii Meanwhile, special ranks were awarded to the officers of the GUGB NKVD USSR, GUGB NKVD of the Union republics, and the GUGB of the oblast Directorates of the NKVD (UNKVDs). As of July 3, 1936, special ranks of the GUGB had been conferred on 3,174 persons, which included: GB commissar 1st rank – one person, GB commissar 2nd rank – two, GB commissar 3rd rank – one, GB first major – six, GB major – 12, GB captain – 68, GB first lieutenant – 310, GB second lieutenant – 705, GB third lieutenant – 1,099, GB sergeant – 970 persons.iv In addition, a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian Cheka officers were not awarded any special ranks, yet continued working as secret police operatives and their assistants. The vast majority of such officers were found in the operative, special, and information and statistics departments of the UGB NKVD UkrSSR and the oblast UNKVDs. Thus, the author includes the following persons in the top command of the UGB NKVD UkrSSR (with posts occupied at the moment of award of the rank, and the source of biographical information given in the footnotes): GB commissar 1st rank

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR, V. A. Balytskyiv; GB commissars 2nd rank: Director of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast K. M. Karlsonvi Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the UkrSSR Z. B. Katsnelsonvii; GB commissar 3rd rank Director of Department of Economics (EKO), UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. S. Mazoviii; GB first majors: Director of Special Department (OO), UGB NKVD UkrSSR M. K. Aleksandrovskyiix, Director of the UNKVD in Donetsk oblast V. T. Ivanovx, Director of the UNKVD in Dnipropetrovsk oblast S. N. Myronov-Korolxi, Director of the UNKVD in Odessa oblast O. B. Rozanovxii, Director of the UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast M. M. Tymofeievxiii, Director of the UNKVD in Kyiv oblast M. D. Sharovxiv; GB majors: Deputy director of Special Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR Yu. I. Brzhezovskyixv, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Donetsk oblast H. B. Zahorskyixvi, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast Ya. Z. Kaminskyi xvii, Director of Secret Political Department (SPO), UGB NKVD UkrSSR B. V. Kozelskyixviii, Director of the Department for Penitentiary Institutions, NKVD UkrSSR Ya. K. Krauklisxix, Deputy director of Department of Economics, GPU UkrSSR Yu. F. Kryvetsxx, Deputy director of Department of Transport (TD), UGB NKVD UkrSSR V. Ya. Levotskyixxi, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast P. V. Semenovxxii, Director of the UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast D. M. Sokolynskyixxiii, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Odessa oblast M. H. Cherdakxxiv, Director of Operative Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR P. H. Shostak-Sokolovxxv, Chief of Administrative and Economy Directorate (AKhU), NKVD UkrSSR S. M. Tsyklisxxvi; GB captains: Deputy director of Operative Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR M. Yu. Amirov-Piievskyixxvii, Director of Economic Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast L. S. Arrov-Tandetnytskyixxviii, Director of Secret Political Department, UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast I. Ya. Babychxxix, Deputy chief of Administrative and Economy Directorate, NKVD UkrSSR O. M. Bermanxxx, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Odessa oblast V. M. Bliumanxxxi, Director of Operative Department, UGB UNKVD in Odessa oblast Ya. D. Boretskyixxxii, Director-commissar of the Kharkiv School of the NKVD B. Yu. Borinxxxiii, Director of Korosten regional department of the NKVD S. I. Borysov-Lendermanxxxiv, Assistant director of Department of Transport of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast N. Ya. Boiarskyixxxv, Director of Division 1, Secret Political Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. S. Brukxxxvi,

Director of Poltava municipal department of the NKVD Y. A. Veprynskyixxxvii, Director of Division 9, Special Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR A. I. Heplerxxxviii, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast O. S. Hlukhovtsevxxxix, Director of Secret Political Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast M. I. Hovlychxl, Director of Department of Economics, UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast S. I. Holdmanxli, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Kyiv oblast H. A. Hryshyn-Kliuvhantxlii, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast V. A. Dvinianinovxliii, Director of the UNKVD of the Moldavian ASSR M. H. Dzhavakhovxliv, Assistant director of Secret Political Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. M. Dolynskyi-Hlozbergxlv, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Chernihiv oblast H. T. Donetsxlvi, Division director of the Department of Economics, UGB NKVD UkrSSR T. P. Dorozhkoxlvii, Director of Department of Economics, UGB UNKVD in Odessa oblast N. B. Yedvabnykxlviii, Director of Fire Security Department of the NKVD UkrSSR Yu. D. Yelkinxlix, Secretary of the NKVD UkrSSR O. H. Yevhenievl, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Donetsk oblast S. I. Zaslavskyili, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Dnipropetrovsk oblast M. O. Izvekovlii, Director of Trade and Production Department of the NKVD UkrSSR B. B. Kahanliii, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast Y. Ya. Kazbek-Kaplanliv, Director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast Yu. E. Kanievskyilv, Assistant director of Department of Economics, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast A. Ye. Karahanovlvi, Assistant director of Foreign Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. T. Karin-Danylenkolvii, Division director secret Political Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR Ya. L. Karpeiskyilviii, Director of Zaporizhia municipal department of the NKVD M. Ya. Klarov-Soloveichyklix, Director of the NKVD Special Department at the 45th Mechanized Corps Y. I. Kliuchkinlx, Director-commissar of the Kyiv inter-regional GUGB NKVD School M. B. Kornievlxi, Director of Special Department, UGB UNKVD in Donetsk oblast D. S. Leopold-Roitmanlxii, Director of Kherson municipal department of the NKVD V. Ya. Leialxiii, Deputy director of Department of Transport, UGB UNKVD in Donetsk oblast V. I. Liashyklxiv, Special authorized representative for the UNKVD in Kyiv oblast B. A. Mankinlxv, Student of the High School at the GUGB NKVD USSR D. M. Medvedievlxvi, Assistant director, UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast I. D. Morozovlxvii, Assistant director, Special Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast Y. S. Naidmanlxviii, Deputy director, Special Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast N. Sh. Novakovskyilxix, Deputy director, UNKVD in Dnipropetrovsk oblast V. I. Okruilxx, Director of Department of Economics, UGB UNKVD in Donetsk oblast D. V. Orlovlxxi, Director of Secret Political Department, UGB UNKVD in Odessa oblast H. M. Osinin-Vinnytskyi lxxii, Assistant director of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast Ya. A. Panlxxiii,

Director of Staff Department, NKVD UkrSSR Ya. V. Pysmennyilxxiv, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast M. T. Prykhodkolxxv, Deputy director, Staff Department of the NKVD UkrSSR Ya. I. Raikhshteinlxxvi, Director of Special Department, UGB UNKVD in Odessa oblast A. M. Ratynskyilxxvii, Acting director of Secret Political Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR P. M. Rakhlislxxviii, Director of Special Department, UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast L. Y. Reikhmanlxxix, Assistant director, Department of Economics, UGB NKVD UkrSSR O. I. Ryklinlxxx, V. M. Rozovlxxxi, Special authorized representative for the NKVD UkrSSR N. L.Rubinshteinlxxxii, Assistant director of Special Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. I. Samoilov-Besydskyilxxxiii, Deputy director of the UNKVD in Chernihiv oblast S. I.Samovskyi lxxxiv, Director of Operative Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast A. Ya. Sanin-Zaturianskyilxxxv, Director of Foreign Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR A. V. Sapirlxxxvi, Director of Mykolaiv municipal department of the NKVD O. K. Uralets-Ketovlxxxvii, Director of Special Department of the 12th Mechanized Brigade Ya. Yu. Fleishmanlxxxviii, Director of Kryvyi Rih municipal department of the NKVD M. H. Khannikovlxxxix, Director of Artemivsk municipal department of the NKVD M. I. Sheludchenkoxc, Director of Zhytomyr regional department of the NKVD Yu. S. Shatovxci, Division director, Secret Political Department, UGB NKVD UkrSSR O. M. Sherstovxcii, Deputy director of the UNKVD of the Moldavian ASSR R. E. Shturmxciii, Assistant director of Secret Political Department, UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast L. T. Yakushevxciv. There were no other individuals with similar ranks in the NKVD UkrSSR at that time. Therefore, we can definitively say that the subject of our research is complete and impartial. We were able to find out the following data concerning the composition of the top command: year and place of birth; social background; national identity; education; civil profession; length of party service; employment immediately preceding work in the secret police; length of Cheka service; governmental awards. Age. Two Cheka officers (2.22%) were born in 1888, three (3.33%) in 1890, one (1.11%) in 1891, three (3.33%) in 1892, one (1.11%) in 1893, eight (8.88%) in 1894, three (3.33%) in 1895, ten (11.11%) in 1896, nine (10%) in 1897, ten (11.11%) in 1898, five (5.56%) in 1899, ten (11.11%) in 1900, four (4.44%) in 1901, eleven (12.22%) in 1902, two (2.22%) in 1903, two (2.22%) in 1904; for six individuals (6.67%) there is no available information concerning their DOB. The average age for the top command of the NKVD UkrSSR was 38.2 years (19 individuals (21.11%) were aged 32 to 35, 44 individuals (48.89%) were aged 36 to 40, 16 individuals (17.78%) 41 to 45, and five individuals (5.56%) were aged 46 to 48). Thus, on the whole, Cheka leadership was comprised of mature, experienced individuals with extensive knowledge of life. The events of 1937-39 resulted in a decrease in the average age for the top Cheka officers. It is the younger generation of Cheka officers that the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, GB Commissar General Yezhov depended on, as he was exterminating the Soviet and party leadership. The People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, GB commissar 1 st rank Beria also relied on the young generation of Cheka officers when he, in his turn, was exterminating Yezhov’s personnel and de facto creating anew the apparatus of the Soviet secret police. We would like to mention that three Cheka officers, N. L. Rubinshtein, O. M. Berman, and O. Ya. SaninZaturianskyi, had provided incorrect date of birth in all their official papers, which was only revealed after

their arrest. Rubinshtein, whose duties as a special authorized representative for the NKVD UkrSSR involved watching over ideological purity of the Cheka ranks, explained that he added seven years to his DOB “for childish motives.”xcv It must have been those same childish motives that prompted him to become head of the Red terror commission in Kyiv in the summer of 1919.xcvi As to Berman, he wrote that he had added four years to be able to join the Red Armyxcvii, while Sanin took three years off after being released from forced labor camps. Remarkably, sometimes a Cheka officer’s age is hard to deduce even from his private documents. Thus, the personal record of the UkrSSR People’s Commissar of 1937-38, GB commissar 2nd rank I. M. Leplevsky features as many as three dates of birth. His typewritten CV carries the year 1895, in his testimonial the year is 1896, while the GPU Statement of Service and the Letter of Commendation gives [I would prefer the plural form here as two documents are mentioned, the Statement of... and the Letter of...] the date as 1894.xcviii Leplevsky’s other private papers do not help make the situation clearer. Filling out the form for the AllUkrainian Central Executive Committee membership, he personally wrote down his date of birth as 1894 xcix, the VKP(b) member’s registration form No. 0855591 carries 1896 as the year of birth c, while in his criminal investigation record the year is 1894ci. Little wonder that some researchers date his birth back to 1894 cii while others, to 1896ciii. Place of birth. Most top Cheka officers – 50 (55.55%) – were born on the territory of present-day Ukraine (16 – in Kherson Governorate, 12 – in Kyiv Governorate, six – in Poltava Governorate, five – in Kharkiv and Katerynoslav Governorates respectively, two – in Chernihiv and Podillia Governorates respectively, one in Volhynia and one in Tauric Governorate); 15 (16.67%) were born in Russia (three of them in Kursk and Orel Governorates respectively, two – in Smolensk and St. Petersburg Governorates respectively, one in Viatka, Voronizh, Ekaterinburgh, Perm, and Tula Governorates respectively); six (6.67%) were born in Belarus (two in Vitebsk and Minsk Governorates respectively, one in Hrodno and one in Vilno Governorates); three (3.33%) were born in Latvia (all in Lifland); two (2.22%) came from Poland, one (1.11%) from Moldova (Bessarabian Governorate). We failed to find out the place of birth for the remaining 13 persons (14.45%). 16 individuals came from governorate capital cities (five from Kyiv, three from Kharkiv, two from Katerynoslav, Riga, and St. Petersburg respectively, and one from Voronizh and Chernihiv respectively). 27 individuals were born in povit(provincial) (district) centers (among them, nine in Odessa). National identity. The ethnic composition of the NKVD top command was as follows: Jewish – 60 (66.67%), Russian – 13 (14.44%), Ukrainian – 6 (6.67%), Latvian – 3 (3.33%), Polish – 2 (2.22%), Belorussian – 1 (1.11%), no information available – 5 (5.56%). We would also like to remind you that the ethnic composition of the population of the Ukrainian SSR as of 1926 was as follows: 75.4% Ukrainian, 8.1% Russian, 6.5% Jewish, 5.0% Polish, 1.5% German,

1.1% Moldavian and Romanian, 0.5% Bulgarian, 0.5% Tatar and Turkic, 0.3% Hungarian, 0.3% Greek, 0.2% Belorussian, 0.07% Armenian, 0.5% - other nationalsciv. Therefore, any talk of the Ukrainianization of the secret police (often claimed by some Russian researchers cv) is absolutely unfounded. The low proportion of Ukrainian nationals among the top NKVD UkrSSR command can be accounted for, in our opinion, by the latent anti-Ukrainian politics of the contemporary Soviet leadership. Although quite a lot of Ukrainians served in the Ukrainian NKVD, they mostly occupied rank and file positions. Besides, many Cheka officers of Ukrainian descent identified themselves as Russians, both for career reasons and for fear of being accused of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” People’s Commissar Balytskyi himself set an example. Thus, filling out the form for an Autobiographical Questionnaire for a Member of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of Soviets in the January of 1922, he personally identified himself as Russiancvi, just like in the GPU Statement of Service which dates back to 1927cvii. Later, in all personal documents he indicated his ethnicity as Ukrainian cviii, while after the arrest in 1937, he again identified himself as Russiancix. We will also develop another fact. According to the Records of the Session of the Commission for Purging the Primary Organization of the GPU UkrSSR of May 25, 1934 through March 19, 1935, which are now kept in the State Archive of Kharkiv oblast (fund No.99, list No.3, case No.354), in the spring of 1934, in party organizations of the Secret Political Department (30 persons) and the Department of Transport (65 persons) of the GPU UkrSSR there was not a single Ukrainian (in the lists of communists on the staff at the Special Department and the Department of Economics ethnic identity was not mentioned), although there are quite a few people with Ukrainian surnames among Cheka personnel in the Department of Transport: K. D. Andriichuk, A. I. Bilyk, D. O. Bolonenko, H. I. Harkusha, K. P. Holovko, O. F.Zadoia, K. S. Kurpas, V. Ya. Lysenko, P. I. Netrebko, Ya. H. Nosko, F. M. Perepelytsia, V. P. Pashchenko, F. P. Sashchenko, I. I. Tkachenko, Yu. A. Chornysh, P. P. Yurchenko. Even the then director of the Department of Transport of the GPU UkrSSR S. M. Tsyklis, whose father was Jewish and mother, Ukrainian, identified himself as Russian, just to be on the safe sidecx. Not only Ukrainians would conceal their ethnic identity. For instance, O. B. Rozanov at the interrogation of Aug. 17, 1937, testified to the following: “In all my official and party papers I am registered as Rozanov, Oleksandr Borysovych, Russian. My real surname is Rozenbart, and my name is Abram. I am Jewish. I changed my first and last name in 1918, while working for Semen Shvarts, authorized representative for the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. I did that on the sanction from Shvarts and Kaminsky, chief of the Kursk Governatorial Cheka. The latter arranged for the registration of my new surname. “I started to identify myself as Russian somewhat later. In all my subsequent documents I started to identify myself only as ‘Rozanov, Oleksandr Borysovych, Russian,’ informing that I had no alias. I did that out of false shame, but not because I wanted to conceal my ethnicity.” cxi Unfortunately, Rozanov’s memory must have failed him, because in certain documents, e.g., the questionnaire of the delegate to the 11 th Congress of the CP(b)U he personally identified himself as Ukrainiancxii.

Social background. While analyzing the social background, the author used the classification employed in the official documents of the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU) – the so-called Service Records for the GPU Personnel: son/daughter of a worker/ poor peasant/ middle peasant/ employee/ artisan/ petty bourgeois/ noble/ personal honorary citizen, merchant, ecclesiastic, officer, landowner. 22 individuals (24.44%) were borne into families of administrators (in particular, two were sons of accountants, two – of shop assistants, one – son of an office clerk, and one – of a teacher), 18 (20%) descended from artisans (five were sons of tailors/dressmakers, three – of craftsmen, two – of handicrafters, one – of a cooper, one – of a docker, one – of a carter, one – of a mechanic, one – of a typesetter, one – of a shoemaker, one – of a plasterer, and one – of a photographer); 14 individuals (15.56%) came from families of workers; seven (7.78%) – from petty bourgeoisie; six (6.66%) – were of peasant origin; five (5.56%) descended from traders; four (4.44%) were borne into families of petty owners (two were sons of shop owners, one – son of a print shop owner, and one, son of a lessee). However, the author was unable to find out what the social background of 14 other individuals (15.56%) was. Social status. A thorough analysis of the civilian positions held by top leaders of the NKVD UkrSSR allows us to identify as many as 35 , which were grouped in the following way: employees – 26 (28.89%): seven shop assistants, four office clerks, two secretaries, two accountants, a dental technician, a Komsomol activist, an office manager, a projectionist, a proofreader, a musician, a delivery man, a civil servant, a timekeeper, a stage designer, a lawyer; workers – 25 (27.78%): eight plumbers, six industrial workers, three assemblers, two turners, two unskilled laborers, a metalworker, a foundry worker, a foreman, a nickel plater; nine artisans (10%): four typesetters, a watchmaker, a saddlemaker, a soap boiler, a parquet floor layer, a photographer; seven students (7.77%): three university students and four gymnasium ones; three teachers (3.33%); one grain grower (1.11%). Five individuals (5.55%) did not have any civil profession. For 14 individuals (15.55%) there is no available information. The data on social status and social background show that the majority of Cheka officers (60.22%) came from a “socially alien background:” employees, artisans, traders, petty bourgeoisie, and petty proprietors. These facts refute the popular thesis about the Cheka being manned by the best representatives of the working class. The human resources managers of the NKVD USSR were worried about socially alien elements comprising a considerable proportion of the Cheka personnel. Numerous documents from the Center emphasized the need for “filling the positions with industrial workers.” cxiii Future events confirmed the concern about the social composition of the NKVD staff being a favorable environment for “social purges” of the personnel. Education. Only four Cheka officers (4.44%) had higher education. Z. B. Katsnelson graduated from Law School at the University of Moscow, and had also been a non-degree student at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages. O. I. Ryklin, L. S. Arrov, and Ya. V. Pysmennyi graduated from the Kharkiv Institute of National Economy during the Soviet era (the latter two got degrees in law). Two more (2.22%) had not completed their higher education: V. A. Balytskyi did three years at the Law School of the University of Moscow, and was also a non-degree student at the Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages, from where he was sent to the front. Ya. A. Pan was, at one point in time, a student of the Institute of National Economy. 15 persons (16.67%) had secondary education, six (6.66%) had unfinished secondary education, 49 persons (54.44%) had elementary education, one (1.11%) had unfinished elementary education, and three (3.33%) were self-taught. It is noteworthy that the department directors of UGB NKVD UkrSSR M. K. Aleksandrovskyi and A. C.V. Sapir had no formal education whatsoever. The author has no information concerning the education of 10 remaining individuals (11.11%). Thus, a low level of education was a trademark of the top command of the NKVD UkrSSR, just like the entire Soviet state apparatus. Party membership. 82 Cheka officers (91.11%) were members of the VKP(b), one (1.11%), S. I. Samoilov, was a candidate for membership. There is no information available concerning the status of seven others (7.78%), but we can assume that in all likelihood they also were communists.

As for the length of their party service, only eight Cheka officers (8.89%) had been party members since prerevolutionary times (K. M. Karlson, often referred to as “the party conscience of the Ukrainian party organization”, joined the RSDRP(b) in 1905, V. T. Ivanov and Ya. K. Krauklis did that in 1913, V. A. Balytskyi in 1915, M. B. Korniev, V. Ya. Levotskyi, B. A. Mankin, and O. B. Rozanov, in 1916). In 1917, nine of our pool joined the Bolshevik party (10%); during the Civil War (1918-20) 41 of them became party members (45.56%), of them: in 1918 – 10 persons (11.11%), in 1919 – 16 persons (17.78%), in 1920 – 15 persons (16.67%); in 1921-24, four individuals (4.44%) joined the VKP(b), of them in 1921 – two (2.22%), in 1923 – one (1.11%), in 1924 – one (1.11%); 14 persons (15.55%) became communists in 1925-28, of them in 1925 – two (2.22%), in 1926 – three (3.33%), in 1927 – five (5.56%); in 1928 – four (4.44%); six persons (6.66%) got party membership cards in 1929-32, of them in 1929 – one (1.11%), in 1930 – one (1.11%), in 1931 – three (3.33%), and in 1932, one (1.11%). Thus, most Cheka leaders (64,45%) joined the VKP(b) between 1905 and 1920 and must have been dedicated communists. They enjoyed a certain party authority not only in the Cheka environment, but also in the party and Soviet apparatus. As for the age when they joined the VKP(b), the situation is as follows: one person (1.11%), M. I. Hovlych, became a Bolshevik at the age of 15, one (1.11%) (L. S. Arrov) – at 16, four (4.44%) – at 17, five (5.56%) – at 18, nine (10%) – at 19, another nine (10%) – at 20, six (6.66%) – at 21, eight (8.89%) – at 22, nine (10%) – at 23, four (4.44%) – at 24, another four (4.44%) – at 25, six (6.66%) – at 26, one (1.11%) – at 27, two (2.22%) – at 28, three (3.33%) – at 29, four (4.44%) – at 30, another four (4.44%) – at 31, one (1.11%) – at 35, and one (1.11%) – at 37 (N. Sh. Novakovskyi). The average age at the time of joining the party was 22.6, that is, most of the top Cheka officers became communists at quite an early age, influenced by their revolutionary romanticism. Nine persons (10%) had been members of other parties prior to joining the VKP(b): four of them (V. A. Balytskyi, Ya. L. Karpeiskyi, Z. B. Katsnelson, and S. M. Tsyklis) had been Mensheviks, two (Ya. Z. Kaminskyi and V. Ya. Levotskyi) had been anarchists, another two (Ya. D. Boretskyi and Yu. Ye. Kanievskyi) had been members of the Jewish communist party, and one (S. T. Karin-Danylenko) was a borbist. Some might have had an “anti-party” past, for certain Cheka officers “forgot” to mention certain facts in their party records. Thus, in 1938 Ya. D. Boretskyi, division director of Department 1 at the UGB NKVD UkrSSR, was expelled from the party for concealing his past membership in the Jewish Communist Party. Nine Cheka officers (10%) were at one point in time expelled from the party, but later resumed their membership. Yu. D. Elkin and Ya.Yu. Fleishman were expelled for drinking, Y. Ya. Kazbek-Kaplan – “for ordering shoes with the use of coercion,” Ya. L. Karpeiskyi was expelled “as a descendant from a nonproletarian background,” Ya. V. Pysmennyi – for abusing red tape practices, S. M. Dolynsky dropped out “automatically, due to frequent travel on business,” N. Sh. Novakovsky – due to “procrastination of his guarantors,” M. I. Sheludchenko – due to a prolonged illness and the loss of documents, and B. V. Kozelskyi – “for being a passive party member.” Work experience prior to Cheka-GPU. 37 persons (41.11%) came to the Cheka from the Red Army ranks; nine (10%) had had civil occupations (two had been typesetters, one a teacher, one – a watchmaker, one – a shop assistant, one – an industrial worker, one – an actor, and one – an unskilled laborer); five (5.56%) had worked in the militia, another five (5.56%) had been engaged in the Soviet state apparatus, three (3.33%) had worked in the Party apparatus, another three (3.33%) had previously been unemployed, two (2.22%) had served in the Navy, another two (2.22%) had been Komsomol activists, two more (2.22%) had served on military revolutionary tribunals, two (2.22%) had joined the NKVD after graduating from a gymnasium, one (1.11%) had been a trade union official, one more (1.11%) had worked in the Workers and Peasants Inspection, one (1.11%) had worked in the economic management apparatus, and there is no available data for 17 persons (18.89%). 40 of them (44.44%) had joined the Cheka already being party members. 33 persons (36.67%) joined the NKVD as non-party members, for six (6.67%) the time of joining the party coincided with the start of their

career in the Cheka, but there are no more precise data. We were unable to obtain information for 11 persons (12.22%). Time of joining the Cheka-GPU. As for the time of starting their career at the VCheKa-GPU, in 1917 one person (1.11%) joined it; in 1918 – 12 persons (13.33%), in 1919 – 21 (23.33%), in 1920 – 20 (22.22%), in 1921 – 21 (23.33%), in 1922 – three (3.33%), in 1924 – one (1.11%). No information is available on 11 persons (12.22%). Seven persons (7.78%) joined the Cheka at the age of 17, six (6.67%) – at 18, six (6.67%) – at 19, six (6.67%) – at 20, 12 (13.33%) – at 21, another 12 (13.33%) – at 22, five (5.56%) – at 23, six (6.67%) – at 24, eight (8.89%) – at 25, three (3.33%) – at 26, two (2.22%) – at 27, one (1.11%) – at 28, two (2.22%) – at 30, and three (3.33%) – at 31. We were unable to find out anything about 11 persons (12.22%). The average age at the time of starting their career at the Cheka was 22.1 years. As we can see, all the top leaders of the NKVD UkrSSR joined the secret police during the years of the Civil War (60%) and the first years of the Soviet regime, served under Felix Dzerzhinsky, and therefore have every reason to be labeled Dzerzhinsky men. It is with the hands of the “true Dzerzhinsky men” that the top Party and Soviet leadership of the country exterminated its “class enemies” first, and then the free peasants and the “bourgeois nationalists” and, finally, the Party and Soviet apparatus. Governmental awards. 16 persons (17.78%) were awarded medals . The largest number of awards or Orders, five (three orders of the Red Banner, a Red Star, and a Red Banner of Labor of the Ukrainian SSR), were conferred on the People’s Commissar Balytskyi. It is curious that he got one of his Red Banners on Sept. 24, 1926, for participation in the flight Moscow – Teheran – Moscow. cxiv Two Ukrainian top Cheka officers had two governmental awards: S. N. Myronov had two orders of the Red Banner, and M. K. Aleksandrovskyi had a Red Banner and a Red Star. Nine persons held a single order of the Red Banner: L. S. Arrov-Tandetnytskyi, V. T. Ivanov, K. M. Karlson, Z. B. Katsnelson, Yu. F. Kryvets, S. S. Mazo, O. B. Rozanov, P. V. Semenov, and N. D. Sharov. Ya. V. Pysmennyi was awarded an order of the Red Star for successfully developing a dynamic aviation sector. The services of B. V. Kozelskyi, Ya. K. Krauklis, and M. M. Tymofeiev were marked with the order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Ukrainian SSR, in honor of the 15th anniversary of the VCheKa-GPU. Further fates. Our research would be incomplete if we did not mention the further fates of the Ukrainian NKVD leaders during the Great Purge of the 1937-38. That was the time when 42 persons (46.67%) were shot (all of the GB commissars 1st and 2nd rank, five out of the six GB first majors, seven out of 12 GB majors, and 28 out of 68 GB captains): director of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory V. A. Balytskyi; director of the Tomsk-Asino NKVD forced labor camp, K. M. Karlson, deputy director of the GULAG NKVD USSR and Dmitrov NKVD camp, Z. B. Katsnelson; deputy chief of the Red Army Intelligence, M. K. Aleksandrovskyi, deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs, GB commissar 3 rd rank V. T. Ivanov, director of the Second Oriental Department at the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, GB commissar 3rd rank, S. N. Myronov, director of the UNKVD in Voronizh oblast, O. B. Rozanov, director of the UNKVD in Stalingrad oblast M. D. Sharov, deputy director of Department 5 (Special), UGB NKVD UkrSSR, Yu. I. Brzhezovskyi, chief of the NKVD USSR Kulai camp,Ya. K. Krauklis, director of the UNKVD in Ordzhonikidze territory, GB first major Yu. F. Kryvets, deputy chief of the Directorate for Border and Interior Guards of the NKVD UkrSSR, brigade commander P. V. Semenov, chief of the Central Directorate of the USSR oil fleet, GB first major D. M. Sokolynskyi, director of the administrative department of the NKVD USSR Ivdelsk camp, S. M. Tsyklis, director of the UNKVD in Chernihiv oblast, P. H. Shostak-Sokolov, director of Department 1 (Guards) M. Yu. Amirov-Piievskyi, deputy chief of the Administration and Economics Directorate, NKVD UkrSSR O. M. Berman, director of Department 5, UGB NKVD UkrSSR, GB major V. M. Bliuman, assistant director, Deparment 4, UGB NKVD UkrSSR S. S. Bruk, director of the UNKVD in Amur oblast, M. I. Hovlych, director of the UNKVD in Vinnytsia oblast, H. A. Hryshyn-Kliuvhant, director of Zaporizhia municipal department of the NKVD M. H. Dzhavakhov, deputy director of the UNKVD in Dnipropetrovsk oblast S. M. Dolynskyi, chief of secretariat of the UNKVD in the Far East O. H. Yevheniev, director of Fire Security Deparment of the

NKVD UkrSSR Yu. D. Elkin, director of Department 6 (Transportation) of the UGB UNKVD in Kyiv oblast Y. Ya. Kazbek-Kaplan, assistant People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of Belarusian SSR, GB major M. B. Korniev, director of Department of Roads and Transport, GUGB NKVD of the Southern Railroads D. S. Leopold, assistant director of the investigations department of the NKVD USSR, GB major I. D. Morozov, chief of the Penitentiary Directorate of the NKVD UkrSSR N. Sh. Novakovskyi, director of Korosten regional department of the NKVD V. I. Okrui, director of Department 3, UGB UNKVD in Donetsk oblast D. V. Orlov, deputy director of the UNKVD in the Far East, GB major H. M. Osinin-Vinnytskyi, director of Department 5, UGB NKVD UkrSSR V. L. Pysariev, director of Department 6, UGB NKVD UkrSSR, GB major Ya. V. Pysmennyi, director of Department 3, UGB NKVD UkrSSR A. M. Ratynskyi, director of Department 3, UGB NKVD of the Uzbek SSR, GB major P. M. Rakhlis, director of the Department for Defense Industry of the Chief Economic Directorate of the NKVD USSR, GB major L. Y. Reikhman, assistant director of Department 3, UGB UNKVD in Kuibyshev oblast O. I. Ryklin, special authorized representative of the NKVD UkrSSR N. L. Rubinshtein, director of Department 3, UGB NKVD UkrSSR, GB major S. M. Samoilov, director of Department 5, UGB UNKVD in Dnipropetrovsk oblast Ya. Yu. Fleishman, deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Tatar ASSR M. I. Sheludchenko (only the most recent posts prior to their arrests and new special ranks have been shown). Seven persons (7.78%) were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment: deputy chief of Directorate of Workers and Peasants Militia of the NKVD UkrSSR Ya. Z. Kaminskyi, director of Perm municipal department of the NKVD V. Ya. Levotskyi, chief of Directorate of the Nyzhnii Tambov NKVD camp S. I. Borysov-Lenderman, chief of Directorate of the Astrakhan inshore oil fleet N. T. Prykhodko, deputy director of Department 5 of the UGB UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast O. Ya. Sanin-Zaturiansky, assistant director of Department 3 of the UGB NKVD UkrSSR A. V. Sapir, People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Crimean ASSR L. T. Yakushev. Deputy director of the UNKVD in Chernihiv oblast A. I. Hepler died in the course of investigation; H. B. Zahorskyi hanged himself in Lukianivska prison. Two persons, director of the Secret Political Department UGB NKVD UkrSSR B. V. Kozelskyi and director of the UNKVD in Kharkiv oblast S. S. Mazo, shot themselves in their offices. A. M. Sherstov and Ya. A. Pan died a natural death in 1936 and 1939 respectively. Several persons went through investigations but were eventually released: director of Department of Roads and Transport, GUGB NKVD, at the Lazar Kahanovych Railroad, L. S. Arrov-Tandetnytskyi, chief of Directorate for Highways at the NKVD UkrSSR B. B. Kahan, and director of Fire Security Department at the NKVD UkrSSR S. T. Karin-Danylenko. We have unverified data testifying that director of Department of Roads and Transport, GUGB NKVD at the South-Western Railroad S. I. Zaslavskyi was also arrested but later released. We still lack information on the fate of the arrested chief of the NKVD Temnikov camp Yu. E. Kanievskyi. Similarly, the author is unaware of the fates of N. Ya. Boyarskyi (deputy director of the UNKVD in Sverdlovsk oblast in the summer of 1938), Y. A. Veprynskyi (director of Department 3 of the Far East camp (Dallag), NKVD USSR, since March, 1938), M. O. Izvekov (deputy chief of the Directorate for Workers and Peasants Militia, NKVD UkrSSR, since June, 1938), Yu. S. Shatov (assistant director of the UNKVD in Chernihiv oblast since the fall of 1937), and R. E. Shturm-Likhtenberg. In our opinion, the composition of the leadership cadre of the NKVD UkrSSR reflected, to some extent, the social, class, and ethnic structure of the Soviet state apparatus in Ukraine, as well as its educational level. The Cheka cadre, just like that of all state structures, was characterized by a vague social background, low level of education, non-Ukrainian ethnic identity, and various transgressions against the Party. On the one hand, this allowed the Soviet power structures to easily manipulate Cheka officers and force them to perform any criminal orders, and on the other, became the reason for the extermination of many of them.

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