SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. PROSPERO ABALLA G.R. No. 149011 June 28, 2005 Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.

: FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Sunflower) entered into a one-year Contract of Service and such contract is renewed on a monthly basis until terminated. Pursuant to this, respondent Prospero Aballa rendered services to SMC. After one year of service, Aballa filed a complaint before NLRC praying that they be declared as regular employees of SMC. On the other hand, SMC filed before the DOLE a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses. Hence, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of SMC. Aballa then appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the appeal finding that Sunflower is an independent contractor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRC·s decision on the ground that the agreement between SMC and Sunflower showed a clear intent to abstain from establishing an employeremployee relationship. ISSUE: Whether or not Aballa and other employees of Sunflower are employees of SMC? HELD: The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work. In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor, only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The Contract of Services between SMC and Sunflower shows that the parties clearly disavowed the existence of an employer-employee relationship between SMC and private respondents. The language of a contract is not, however, determinative of the parties· relationship; rather it is the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case. A party cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a contract, the character of its business, whether as labor-only contractor or job contractor, it being crucial that its character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by statute. What appears is that Sunflower does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. On the other hand, it is gathered that the lot, building, machineries and all other working tools utilized by Aballa et al. in carrying out their tasks were owned and provided by SMC. And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to the aquaculture operations of SMC. As for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the principal business of the employer has been jurisprudentially recognized. Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent

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business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, SMC, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC. All the foregoing considerations affirm by more than substantial evidence the existence of an employer- employee relationship between SMC and Aballa. Since Aballa who were engaged in shrimp processing performed tasks usually necessary or desirable in the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment. They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to the difference between the wages and benefits given them and those accorded SMC·s other regular employees.

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Philippines Bank of Communications vs. NLRC {G.R. No. L-66598, December 19, 1986 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc. (CESI) entered into a letter agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook to provide "Tempo[rary] Services" to petitioner Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven (11) messengers. The contract period is described as being "from January 1976—." The petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service rate of P18, " on a per person basis. Attached to the letter agreement was a "List of Messengers assigned at Philippine Bank of Communications" which list included, as item No. 5 thereof, the name of private respondent Ricardo Orpiada. Ricardo Orpiada was thus assigned to work with the petitioner bank. As such, he rendered services to the bank, within the premises of the bank and alongside other people also rendering services to the bank. There was some question as to when Ricardo Orpiada commenced rendering services to the bank. As noted above, the letter agreement was dated January 1976. However, the position paper submitted by (CESI) to the National Labor Relations Commission stated that (CESI) hired Ricardo Orpiada on 25 June 1975 as a Tempo Service employee, and assigned him to work with the petitioner bank "as evidenced by the appointment memo issued to him on 25 June 1975. " Be that as it may, on or about October 1976, the petitioner requested (CESI) to withdraw Orpiada's assignment because, in the allegation of the bank, Orpiada's services "were no longer needed." On 29 October 1976, Orpiada instituted a complaint in the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and failure to pay the 13th month pay provided for in Presidential Decree No. 851. This complaint was docketed as Case No. R04-1010184-76-E. After investigation, the Office of the Regional Director, Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor, issued an order dismissing Orpiada's complaint for failure of Mr. Orpiada to show the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the bank and himself. Accordingly, on 2 April 1984, the bank filed the present petition for certiorari with this Court seeking to annul and set aside (a) the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Dogelio dated 12 September 1977 in Labor Case No. RB-IV-1118-77 and (b) the decision of the NLRC promulgated on 29 December 1983 affirming with some modifications the decision of the Labor Arbiter. This Court granted a temporary restraining order on 11 April 1984. The main issue as litigated by the parties in this case relates to whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioner bank and private respondent Ricardo Orpiada. The petitioner bank maintains that no employer-employee relationship was established between itself and Ricardo Orpiada and that Ricardo Orpiada was an employee of (CESI) and not of the bank. Issue: Whether or not Orpiada is an employee of the bank or the Agency? Decision: Turning to the power to control Orpiada's conduct, it should be noted immediately that Orpiada performed his sections within the bank's premises, and not within the office premises of (CESI) As such, Orpiada must have been subject to at least the same control and supervision that the bank exercises over any other person physically within its premises and rendering services to or for the bank, in other words, any employee or staff member of the bank. It seems unreasonable to suppose that the bank would have allowed Orpiada and the other persons assigned to the bank by CE SI to remain within the bank's premises and there render services to the bank, without subjecting them to a substantial measure of control and

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supervision, whether in respect of the manner in which they discharged their functions, or in respect of the end results of their functions or activities, or both. Under the general rule set out in the first and second paragraphs of Article 106, an employer who enters into a contract with a contractor for the performance of work for the employer, does not thereby create an employer-employes relationship between himself and the employees of the contractor. Thus, the employees of the contractor remain the contractor's employees and his alone. Nonetheless when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with the Labor Code, the employer who contracted out the job to the contractor becomes jointly and severally liable with his contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent of the work performed under the contract" as such employer were the employer of the contractor's employees. The law itself, in other words, establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a limited purpose, i.e., in order to ensure that the latter get paid the wages due to them. The definition of "labor-only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules must be read in conjunction with the definition of job contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules. The undertaking given by CESI in favor of the bank was not the performance of a specific — job for instance, the carriage and delivery of documents and parcels to the addresses thereof. There appear to be many companies today which perform this discrete service, companies with their own personnel who pick up documents and packages from the offices of a client or customer, and who deliver such materials utilizing their own delivery vans or motorcycles to the addresses. In the present case, the undertaking of (CESI) was to provide its client-thebank-with a certain number of persons able to carry out the work of messengers. Such undertaking of CESI was complied with when the requisite number of persons were assigned or seconded to the petitioner bank. Orpiada utilized the premises and office equipment of the bank and not those of (CESI) Messengerial work-the delivery of documents to designated persons whether within or without the bank premises — is of course directly related to the day-to-day operations of the bank. Section 9(2) quoted above does not require for its applicability that the petitioner must be engaged in the delivery of items as a distinct and separate line of business. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED and the decision promulgated on 29 December 1983 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 11 April 1984 is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

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242 .Tabas et al VS. Petition granted. then. " The petitioner's had been charged with "merchandizing [sic] promotion or sale of the products of [California] in the different sales outlets in Metro Manila including task and occational [sic] price tagging. In this connection. Livi. The respondent company then denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the company and the petitioners. meaning to say. that is. No. Neither Livi nor California can therefore escape liability. The bare fact that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with workers to pursue the latter's own business. it appears that the petitioners prior their involvement with California Manufacturing Company were employees of Livi Manpower service." California's purported "principal operation activity." The nature of one's business is not determined by self-serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law." an activity that is doubtless. that "[c]ost of living allowance and the 10 legal holidays will be charged directly to [California] at cost ". had simply supplied it with the manpower necessary to carry out its (California's) merchandising activities. as a placement agency. assuming one exists. rendered a piece of work it (California) could not have itself done." Issue: Whether the petitioners are California's or Livi's employees? Held: There is no doubt that in the case at bar. an integral part of the manufacturing business. or otherwise. It is not. as if Livi had served as its (California's) promotions or sales arm or agent. L-80680 January 26. Livi performs "manpower services". which assigned them to work as "promotional merchandisers. 1989 Facts: Petitioners filed a petition in the NLRC for reinstatement and payment of various benefits against California Manufacturing Company. California Manufacturing Company G.R. and notwithstanding the provision of the contract that it is "an independent contractor. We hold that it is one notwithstanding its vehement claims to the contrary. and that "[p]ayroll for the preceeding [sic] week [shall] be delivered by [Livi] at [California's] premises. an independent contractor. using its (California's) premises and equipment." The agreement provides that: California "has no control or supervisions whatsoever over [Livi's] workers with respect to how they accomplish their work or perform [Californias] obligation" It was further expressly stipulated that the assignment of workers to California shall be on a "seasonal and contractual basis". it contracts out labor in favor of clients. Pursuant to a manpower supply agreement. we do not agree that the petitioners had been made to perform activities 'which are not directly related to the general business of manufacturing.

No. Shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses. Hon Blas F. Repomanta and Moralde filed a complaint with the NLRC . Ople in his Capacity as Secretary of Labor . The National Labor Relations Commission. Decision: In the Mafinco Trading the court explain that an independent employment and contractor is one who exercise independent employment and contractor to do a price of work according to his methods without being subject to control of his employer except as to the result of work. 1976 Facts: Rodrigo Repomanta and Mafinco Trading Corp. March 25. The NLRC sustained the Motion and dismissed the Complaint on Appeal to the Secretary of Labor the decision was reversed. 243 . executed a peddling Contract whereby Repomanta agreed to buy and sell “ Cosmos Soft drinks. L 37790. shall be responsible for damages caused to third person.R. Issue: Whether the work is part of the employer’s general business supplier of soft drinks. Ruling: A Contract whereby one engage to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers. shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of soft drinks is not a contract employment. Rodrigo Repomanta and Rey Moralde G.Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. sole distributor of Cosmos Soft drinks . Shall post a bond to protect the manufacturer against losses. Ruling: A Contract whereby one engage to purchase and sell soft drinks on trucks supplied by manufacturer but providing that the other party (peddler) shall have the right to employ his own workers. shall obtain the necessary licenses and permits and bear the expenses incurred in the sale of soft drinks is not a contract employment. Mafinco filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction because Repomanta and Moralde were not its employees but were independent Contractor. Rey Moralde entered into a similar Contract the Contracts Provide that such were to remain in force for one year unless sooner terminated by either party upon 5 days notice to the other. shall be responsible for damages caused to third person. Pursuant to said Mafinco terminated the Peddling Contract .

The respondents disputed the Ministry's jurisdiction over Basiao's claim. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking cognizance of. and this conferred jurisdiction on the Ministry of Labor to adjudicate his claim. Basiao and Associates." plus 10% attorney's fees. affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. Some four years later. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MELECIO BASIAO. 1979. rules that under the contract invoked by him. Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner. This conclusion renders it unnecessary and premature to consider Basiao's claim for commissions on its merits. No. Basiao thereafter filed with the then Ministry of Labor a complaint against the Company and its president. at the time of his termination... 1980.. as well as all its circulars . he would receive "compensation. 1989 FACTS : Petitioner entered contract with Basiao for insurance policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and regulations" of the Company... as the Company would have it.. not by the Labor Arbiter in a labor case. G. He ruled that the underwriting agreement had established an employer-employee relationship between him and the Company. contrarily. Basiao sued the Company in a civil action and this. therefore.. Hence. in the form of commissions .R. After vainly seeking a reconsideration. (him) in favor of the respondent company .. The Labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned found for Basiao. thereby placing his claim for unpaid commissions within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under the provisions of Section 217 of the Labor Code. prompted the latter to terminate also his engagement under the first contract and to stop payment of his commissions starting April 1. but by the regular courts in an ordinary civil action. (the Company's) Rate Book and its Agent's Manual. being without jurisdiction to do so. LTD.. the complaint sought to recover commissions allegedly unpaid there under.. and adjudicating. equivalent to the balance of the first year's premium remaining unpaid. the parties entered into another contract — an Agency Manager's Contract — and to implement his end of it Basiao organized an agency or office to which he gave the name M. or. as Basiao asserts. Said official's decision directed payment of his unpaid commissions ". but a commission agent. that under said contract Basiao's status was that of an independent contractor whose claim was thus cognizable.INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. said claim.. as did the respondent NLRC in affirming the Arbiter's decision. the present petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE: Whether.. as provided in the Schedule of Commissions" of the contract to "constitute a part of the consideration of ." and the "rules in .. and those which may from time to time be promulgated by it. asserting that he was not the Company's employee. plus attorney's fees.. HELD: The Court. vs. 84484 November 15. the Company terminated the Agency Manager's Contract. he had become the Company's employee by virtue of the contract invoked by him. an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action. In May. he was later to claim. 244 . in April 1972. Without contesting the termination of the first contract. but an independent contractor and that the Company had no obligation to him for unpaid commissions under the terms and conditions of his contract. while concurrently fulfilling his commitments under the first contract with the Company.. This decision was. on appeal by the Company. (said) agreement. of all the insurance policies solicited by .

the appealed Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is set aside. 245 . and that complaint of private respondent Melecio T. No pronouncement as to costs.WHEREFORE. VI0010-83 is dismissed. Basiao in RAB Case No.

assuming arguendo that the NLRC may exercise jurisdiction over the said subject matter under the circumstances of this case. the labor arbiter sustained the claim of petitioner for P17.G. JOSE M. It does not even appear that a notice of such call has been sent to petitioner by the respondent corporation. the same is not yet due and payable. the NLRC has no jurisdiction to determine such intra-corporate dispute between the stockholder and the corporation as in the matter of unpaid subscriptions. On December 19.07 on the ground that the employer has no right to withhold payment of wages already earned under Article 103 of the Labor Code. petitioner was appointed President and General Manager of the respondent corporation. This controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.00.R. 1986. the alleged obligation is not enforceable.000. 80039 April 18. the unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by the corporation for payment. on January 2. What the records show is that the respondent corporation deducted the amount due to petitioner from the amount receivable from him for the unpaid subscriptions. accordingly. He made an initial payment of P37.. 1975. ISSUE : Does the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) have jurisdiction to resolve a claim for non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation? Assuming that it has. In a decision dated April 28.500 shares of respondent corporation at P100. 1985. respondents. his cost of living allowance. The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of the corporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the wages and others due to petitioner is not contrary to law.93.00 per share or a total of P150.060. However. petitioner. Petitioner questioned the setoff alleging that there was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription and that. 1987. morals and public policy. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. the balance of his gasoline and representation expenses and his bonus compensation for 1986. Private respondents admitted that there is due to petitioner the amount of P17. Upon the appeal of the private respondents to public respondent NLRC.439. vs.060. petitioner instituted with the NLRC a complaint against private respondents for the payment of his unpaid wages. he resigned. 3 No doubt such set-off was without lawful basis.07 but this was applied to the unpaid balance of his subscription in the amount of P95. On September 1. 2 Private respondents have not presented a resolution of the board of directors of respondent corporation calling for the payment of the unpaid subscriptions. 1986. FACTS : Petitioner was employed in respondent corporation. 1 Secondly. MIRASOL and INTRANS PHILS. 246 .500.00. INC. On August 28. 1987.. can an obligation arising therefrom be offset against a money claim of an employee against the employer? HELD : Firstly. if not premature. No. APODACA. the decision of the labor arbiter was reversed in a decision dated September 18. 1989 ERNESTO M. respondent Jose M. As there was no notice or call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions. Mirasol persuaded petitioner to subscribe to 1. Petitioner and private respondents submitted their position papers to the labor arbiter.

Article 113 of the Labor Code allows such a deduction from the wages of the employees by the employer. (b) For union dues. 1987 is hereby set aside and another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondents to pay petitioner the amount of P17. to wit: ART.Lastly. only in three instances. Wage Deduction. 1986. except: (a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer. the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the NLRC dated September 18. An obligation arising from non-payment of stock subscriptions to a corporation cannot be offset against a money claim of an EE against an ER 247 . 113. — No employer.07 plus legal interest computed from the time of the filing of the complaint on December 19. the NLRC cannot validly set it off against the wages and other benefits due petitioner. with costs against private respondents. and (c) In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance.060. in his own behalf or in behalf of any person. assuming further that there was a call for payment of the unpaid subscription. in cases where the right of the worker or his union to checkoff has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned. 4 WHEREFORE. shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees.

Metrobank classified employees into those receiving less than 100 per day and those receiving more.R. No. J. Petitioners argue that the method of implementation created a wage distortion within the employees of Metrobank because the differences in the salaries of the employee classifications were substantially reduced. Issue: Whether or not there was wage distortion? Held: There was wage distortion. 102636 VITUG. Subsequently. 248 . a law was passed increasing the minimum wage.Metrobank Union vs NLRC G. Those receiving more were not covered by the implementation of the new law but only the increase as agreed upon in the CBA. length of service.:p Facts: Metrobank entered into a CBA with Petitioner. or other logical bases of differentiation. granting a P900 increase in wages. Ratio Decidendi: Wage Distortion means a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contradiction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills.

Operations were resumed on 14 September 1984. The agreement. refused to take back the 205 dismissed employees.00 per day to all regular workers effective June 16. J. As a result of the implementation of such wage orders and the increases brought about by the effectivity of the CBA. while the above wage developments were unfolding. Meantime. 103586 July 21. The Company directed some 205 workers to explain the reduction in their work output. On 19 June 1985. the Company. 3.National Federation of Labor vs. which was approved by the NLRC En Banc. 1984 up to June 30. granted the 205 employees "financial assistance" equivalent to thirty (30) days' separation pay. 3 The Fifth Division of the NLRC in effect found that while a wage distortion did exist commencing 16 June 1984. Issue: Whether a wage distortion occur due to the implementation of Wage Orders? Held: We believe and so hold that the re-establishment of a significant gap or differential between regular employees and casual employees by operation of the CBA was more than substantial compliance with the requirements of the several Wage Orders (and of Article 124 of the Labor 249 . Petitioner Union then went on strike alleging a lock-out on the part of the Company and demanding rectification of the wage distortion. there was no more significant differential between regular and non-regular/newly regularized employees. the Company suspended operations on 16 August 1984. As a response to its decreasing productivity levels.00 wage increase effective 1 May 1984: On motion for partial reconsideration filed by the Company. the Union and the Company reached an agreement with respect to the lockout issue. No. 4.: Facts: Between 1 November 1983 and 1 November 1984. On 11 November 1987. Wage Orders Nos. The case was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") for compulsory conciliation. the NLRC En Banc rendered a decision which in effect found the existence of wage distortion and required the Company to pay a P1. the above quoted portion of the NLRC En Banc's decision was reconsidered and set aside by the NLRC Fifth Division. NLRC G. FELICIANO. 1994 THIRD DIVISION. the Company experienced a work output slow down. 1984 or a total of fifteen (15) days. the distortion persisted only for a total of fifteen (15) days and accordingly required private respondent company to pay "a wage increase of P2. however.R. The workers failed to comply and they were accordingly issued notices of dismissal by the Company. This left unresolved only the wage distortion issue." 4 The rest of the decision of 11 November 1987 was left untouched. 5 and 6 were promulgated increasing the statutory minimum wages of workers with differing increases being specified for agricultural plantation and non-agricultural workers.

SO ORDERED. provided some elaboration of the notion of wage distortion: As used herein. length of service. 4. 250 . or other logical bases of differentiation. 9 (Emphasis supplied) From the above quoted material. the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Decision: We conclude that petitioner NFL has not shown any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC in rendering its decision (through its Fifth Division) dated 16 December 1991. 3. The NLRC En Banc was in serious error when it disregarded the differential of P3. 5 and 6 was a "distortion" (or "compression") which ensued from the impact of those Wage Orders upon the different wage rates of the several classes of employees.60 which had been restored by 1 July 1985 upon the ground that such differential "represent[ed] negotiated wage increase[s] which should not be considered covered and in compliance with the Wage Orders. Thus distortion ensued where the result of implementation of one or another of the several Wage Orders was the total elimination or the severe reduction of the differential or gap existing between the wage rates of the differing classes of employees. No pronouncement as to costs. This classification is reflected in a differing wage rate for each of the existing classes of employees.Code). The wage distortion anticipated in Wage Orders Nos." 11 The Wage Orders referred to above had provided for the crediting of increases in wages or allowances granted or paid by employers within a specified time against the statutorily prescribed increases in minimum wages. it will be seen that the concept of wage distortion assumes an existing grouping or classification of employees which establishes distinctions among such employees on some relevant or legitimate basis. That this re-establishment of a significant differential was the result of collective bargaining negotiations. a wage distortion shall mean a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills. In relation. rather than of a special grievance procedure. NLRC in its Resolution dated 11 November 1987. is not a legal basis for ignoring it. WHEREFORE.

as exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the Manila Mandarin Hotel. On January 15. The relevant Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders were invoked during the said trial. 251 . allegedly resulting from underpayment of wages. Second Division. 1996 MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION. No. the Manila Mandarin Employees Union (hereafter UNION). Inc. length of service. Hence this petition. and on March 25. The Labor Arbiter eventually ruled in favor of the UNION. 1987. and the MANILA MANDARIN HOTEL. ISSUE: On October 30. however it was later reversed by the Commission. or other logical bases of differentiation. respondents. and the failure of MANDARIN to implement the corresponding increases in the basic salary rate of newly-hired employees. vs.A review of the records convinces this Court that respondent NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that no wage distortion was demonstrated by the UNION. 1987. filed with the NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint in its members' behalf to compel MANDARIN to pay the salary differentials of the individual employees concerned because of wage distortions in their salary structure allegedly created by the upward revisions of the minimum wage pursuant to various Presidential Decrees and Wage Orders.R.G. HELD: There was no wage distortion that existed. petitioner. Wage distortion is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates results in the elimination or severe contraction of Intentional quantitative differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage structure based on skills. 1986. 108556 November 19. the UNION filed its Position Paper amplifying the allegations of its complaint and setting forth the legal bases of its demands against MANDARIN. (hereafter MANDARIN). it filed an Amended Complaint presenting an additional claim for payment of salary differentials to the union members affected. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT WAGE DISTORTION EXIST.

ruled that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02 by failing to implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. Sr. On March 5. this Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from enforcing the writ of execution. upon petitioner's motion. the Secretary of Labor dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed the Order of Regional Director Martinez. we amended the TRO by also enjoining respondents from enforcing the Decision of the Secretary of Labor and conducting further proceedings until further orders from this Court. DIRECTOR RICARDO S. 1997. petitioner moved for reconsideration to set aside the writ of execution. the Regional Wage Board issued Wage Order No. Sr. 4 On July 16. petitioner vs. No. 2 amending the earlier wage order.: Facts: On September 12 and 13. RO2-02-A. On April 3. 1994. Sr. 1994. Quisumbing.CAGAYAN SUGAR MILLING COMPANY. petitioner appealed to public respondent Labor Secretary Leonardo A. the sheriff seized petitioner's dump truck and scheduled its public sale on March 20. On October 8. 1995. labor inspectors from the DOLE Regional Office examined the books of petitioner to determine its compliance with the wage order. 1994 Order. He ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency in the salary of its employees in the total amount of P555. On March 10. Regional Director Martinet. 1998 PUNO. J. 3 On February 12. On the same date.. On March 4. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. petitioner maintained that it complied with Wage Order No. Martinez. 128399 January 15. In an Order dated December 16. private respondent CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION moved for execution of the December 16. 1997. this petition. 1997. 1996. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. RO2-02 as it paid the mandated increase in the minimum wage.133. G. At the hearing at the DOLE Regional Office for the alleged violation.41. Hence. MARTINEZ. public respondent Regional Director Ricardo S. 5 In the case at bar. granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). respondents. and CARSUMCO EMPLOYEES UNION.R. They found that petitioner violated the wage order as it did not implement an across the board increase in the salary of its employees. petitioner contends that: Issue: WAGE ORDER RO2-02 IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF 252 . SR. On January 6. 1997. the DOLE regional sheriff served on petitioner a notice of garnishment of its account with the Far East Bank and Trust Company.

these allegations were not denied by public respondents in their Comment. 253 . Sr. RO2-02-A is concerned. we hold that RO2-02-A is invalid for lack of public consultations and hearings and nonpublication in a newspaper of general circulation. SO ORDERED. Hence. shall proceed to determine whether a Wage Order should be issued. Public respondents' position is that there was no need to comply with the legal requirements of consultation and newspaper publication as Wage order No. RO2-02-A merely clarified the ambiguous provision of the original wage order. Petitioner clearly complied with Wage Order RO2-02 which provided for an increase in statutory minimum wage rates for employees in Region II. 1996. The Decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is not just to expect petitioner to interpret Wage RO2-02 to mean that it granted an across the board increase as such interpretation is not sustained by its text. that petitioner violated Wage Order RO2-02. and. Indeed. Wage Order. the Regional Board shall investigate and study all pertinent facts. In sum. Any such Wage Order shall take effect after (15) days from its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation in the region. the Regional Wage Board had to amend Wage Order RO2-02 to clarify this alleged intent. The record shows that there was no prior public consultation or hearings and newspaper publication insofar as Wage Order No. Public respondents insist that despite the wording of Wage Order RO2-02 providing for a statutory increase in minimum wage.THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. Art. the real intention of the Regional Board was to provide for an across the board increase. in violation of Article 123 of the Labor Code. — Whenever conditions in the region so warrant. they urge that petitioner is liable for merely providing an increase in the statutory minimum wage rates of its employees. dated October 8. In fact. Martinez. The contention is absurd. We likewise find that public respondent Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the findings of Regional Director Ricardo S. 123. is set aside for lack of merit. Held: the petition is GRANTED. based on the standards and criteria herein prescribed.

254 . by providing for full-time boards to police wages round-the-clock. Republic Act No.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17. by the floor-wage method). and second. as follows: Section 1. ECOP appealed to the National Wages and Productivity Commission.00) per day. Held: The Commission noted that the increasing trend is toward the salary-cap method. the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No.ECOP vs. NCR-01-A amending Wage Order No. 1990. National Capital Region. On November 14. 1990. 6727. 1990.00 daily in the National Capital Region. ECOP opposed. Precisely.R. apparently. which has reduced disputes arising from wage distortions (brought about. premises considered. dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order. 96169 September 24. the Commission promulgated an Order. the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. 1991) Facts: On October 15. On November 6. WHEREFORE. the Board issued Wage Order No. so did the Personnel Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP). all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125. increasing the minimum wage by P17. 6727 was intended to rationalize wages. No. The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) moved for reconsideration. NCR-01. Issue: The Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP) is questioning the validity of Wage Order No. NCR-01-A dated October 23. the Commission denied reconsideration. first. On October 23. The Court is of the opinion that Congress meant the boards to be creative in resolving the annual question of wages without labor and management knocking on the legislature's door at every turn. promulgated pursuant to the authority of Republic Act No. NCR-01. by giving the boards enough powers to achieve this objective. 1990 of the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board. 1990. NWPC (G.

the following presidential decrees were in effect: (a) P.00 KLASE IV (15-17 TAON) P60. then headed by Mrs. 4.0 ANG ANTAS NG PAGPAPASUWELDO SA MGA GURO SA MATAAS NG PAARALAN AY UMAALINSUNOD SA PARAAN NG PAGRARANGGONG KALAKIP NITO BILANG "TAKDA" AT AYON PA RIN SA SUMUSUNOD NA HALAGA NG PAGPAPASUWELDO (IPATUTUPAD SA AÑO-ESCOLAR 19831986): PAGSUBOK A (1-3 TAON) P51. petitioner.D No.00 KLASE V (18-21 TAON) P63. petitioner and the union. DRILON. 1389 dated May 29.00 (22 PATAAS) P70. Lim. in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and MEYCAUYAN COLLEGE FACULTY AND PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION (MCFPA). entered into a collective bargaining agreement for 1983-1986.00 (6-8 TAON) P53.MEYCAUAYAN COLLEGE.00 KLASE II (9-12 TAON) P54. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. (b) P. Prior to said recognition or on July 17. FACTS: Petitioner is a private educational institution duly organized and existing under Philippine laws. Teresita V. 1980 providing for an increase in the minimum daily wage rates and for additional mandatory living allowances. vs. and operating in Meycauayan. Article IV thereof provides: SALARY SCALE IV. 1983. 1713 dated August 18.D.00 When the collective bargaining agreement was entered into.00 KLASE III (13-14 TAON) P57. Bulacan. 1978 adjusting the existing statutory minimum wages. its board of trustees recognized the Meycauayan College Faculty and Personnel Association as the employees union in the Meycauayan College. respondents. 1987. 255 .50 KLASE 1 (4-5 TAON) P52. On January 16. No. and .

Lim." The dispositive portion of the Secretary's order of September 9. Pampanga. 4 dated May 1. who held the managerial position of registrar of the college. a notice of strike on the ground of unfair labor practice alleging therein violation of the collective bargaining agreement particularly the provisions of Article IV thereof on salary scale. (b) Wage Order No. ISSUE: 1.800 a month. 3 dated November 7. the union filed with the Department of Labor and Employment. 1614. the latter unintentionally got a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and discovered that Article IV thereof had not been implemented by the petitioner. And while the relief sought for violation of a standards law or decree is primarily for restitution of (an) unpaid benefits. 1634 and 1713 into the basic pay of covered workers in the private sector. Moreover. (c) Wage Order No.D. During the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Regional Office No. the following were issued: (a) Wage Order No. and (d) Wage Order No.D. Nos. the relief sought for violating a CBA is ordinarily for compliance and desistance. 1987 states: 256 . 1983 increasing the minimum daily living allowance in the private sector. 1987. that in 1987. 1983 just before the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into. which are over and above the agreed salary scale contracted for between the employer and the employees in a collective bargaining agreement.00 after integrating the mandatory emergency living allowance under P. It appears. preclude the employees from claiming the difference between their old salaries and those provided for under said salary scale.(c) P. III in San Fernando. 1984 integrating as of said date the emergency cost of living allowances under P. there is no provision in the aforecited Presidential Decrees providing that compliance thereto is sufficient compliance with a provision of a collective bargaining agreement and vice-versa. 1984 increasing the daily living allowances. 1751 dated May 14. Teresita V. 1984 increasing the cost of living allowance of workers in the private sector whose basic salary or wage is not more than P1. had turned over the presidency of the union to Mrs. Nos. Wage Order No. RULING: "Non-compliance with the mandate of a standards law or decree may give rise to an ordinary action for recovery while violation of a collective bargaining agreement may even give rise to a criminal action for unfair labor practice. 2 increasing the mandatory basic minimum wage and living allowance was also issued on July 6. Whether increases in employees' salaries resulting from the implementation of presidential decrees and wage orders. No. The union admits herein that its members were paid all these increases in pay mandated by law. 1980 increasing the statutory daily minimum wage at all levels by P4. Consequently. Fe Villarico. 6 dated October 26. on March 27.D. however. 5 dated June 11. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered workers. shortly after union president Mrs.

257 . 1984-1985 and 1985-1986 including the differential for the 13th month pay for the same period. As correctly ruled by public respondent. is the intention of the parties. The parties increased the teachers' salary or rate per period. Hence. From this unrebutted allegation. The union members might have been aware of the existence of the collective bargaining agreement but that fact that their president was actually a management employee being petitioner's registrar. Consequently. 5 The petition has no merit. — Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years. including collective bargaining agreements. Beneficiaries thereof are therefore. Immediately thereafter. Although the collective bargaining agreement covers school years 1983 to 1986. they shall be forever barred. Article 291 (now Art. The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. provides: Offenses. the Management of Meycauayan College is hereby ordered to: 1) Strictly effect the payment of salaries of the union members in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. the union sought its implementation. Hence. it is immaterial that the means by which said goal is achieved is through the alteration of the salary scale. All unfair labor practices arising from Book V shall be filed with the appropriate agency within one (1) year from accrual of such unfair labor practice. a copy of the agreement was only made available to the union in 1987. by right. we examined the record and found the undisputed allegation of private respondent that the collective bargaining agreement herein involved was entered into by the parties to improve the plight of the teachers by increasing their salary. otherwise. On the issue of prescription. entitled to the fulfillment of the obligation prescribed therein. as the key to the interpretation of contracts. it is clear that the parties wanted to attain one goal — increase the salaries of the teachers on the basis of their length of service. 290) of the Labor Code herein invoked by petitioner. a collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. 2) Pay the covered union members salary differential computed by subtracting the salary actually paid and received by them per period provided in the collective bargaining agreement for school years 1983-1984. Such refusal would constitute an unfair labor practice. to deny binding force to the collective bargaining agreement would place a premium on a refusal by a party thereto to comply with the terms of the agreement. The one-year prescriptive period is inapplicable in this case because of peculiar factual circumstances which petitioner has not denied.WHEREFORE. by drafting a salary scale "based on the length of service" of the teachers and eventually came up with Article IV aforequoted. 291) would be unfair and prejudicial to the union members particularly those who have served petitioner for a number of years who stand to benefit most from the salary scale. Nevertheless. to apply the provisions of Article 290 (Art. It is distinct from an obligation imposed by law. they must have been deterred from demanding its implementation earlier.

Article 264(g). Costs against the petitioner. therefore.the decision of the Secretary of Labor is hereby AFFIRMED and the temporary restraining order of February 15. now Article 263(g) of the Labor Code is broad enough to give the Secretary of Labor the power to take jurisdiction over what appears at first blush to be an ordinary money claim. This decision is immediately executory. they assume the character of an unfair labor practice and are. Claims for pay differentials may have that character but. 258 . if they arise out of a violation of a collective bargaining agreement.1989 is LIFTED. well within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor to decide. as earlier stated.

The inspection revealed that petitioner was guilty of underpayment of wages. complainants worked for less than eight hours. there would have been no need for petitioner to make an offer increasing the wage to P45. MELENCIO Q. petitioner.G.R. Moreover. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was justified in paying an amount less than the statutory minimum wage.00 per day if complainants were indeed piece rate workers. as it claimed and if their wages were not underpaid. Findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but finality. Held: Petitioner would have us overturn the factual finding of public respondents that its employees are daily paid workers. Alex Edicto and Delia Pahuwayan. Finally. TRAJANO. HON. 982767 February 15. vs. Summary Petitioner submitted its position paper claiming that it should be classified as an establishment with less than 30 employees and with a paid-up capital of P500. 1995 COCOFED (Kalamansig) and/or CRISPIN ROSETE. CRESENCIANO B. Sultan Kudarat. Region XII. Accordingly. Cotabato City.00 or less as evidenced by the assessment of the municipal treasurer. . A three (3) year actual payrolls from March 1985 to February 1989 showing the daily actual payment made by the respondent to involved workers are substantial evidence against the mere memorandum issued by the respondents on the matter. a coconut plantation utilized as a demonstration farm for replanting and/or training area for coconut farmers. No. Facts: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation operates petitioner COCOFED (Kalamansig). Moreover. . a minimum of four and maximum of six. Further. On November 15. Director IV. there is absolutely nothing in the records which show that petitioner's employees worked for less than eight hours. 1988. located in Kalamansig. Undersecretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. . This we are unable to do for the payrolls submitted by it support the latters' position. a complaint inspection was conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment. respondents.000. as found by public respondents. BALANAG. WHEREFORE. the petition is DISMISSED 259 . notice of inspection results was issued: requiring petitioner to effect restitution or correction within five (5) days from notice. Regional XII. emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and 13th month pay. DOLE. such payrolls submitted by respondents are not mere summaries of daily efforts of workers but these are daily records showing workers actual daily rate. Cotabato City in response to complaints filed by two of petitioner's employees.

200.A.048. 3) 3) For the third year which will be paid on January 16. representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day prior to the effectivity of R.. Upon completion of the inspection on March 10. 1987. 7 AND CEBU OXYGEN-ACETYLENE & CENTRAL VISAYAS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (COACVEA) respondents. he found that petitioner committed violations of the law as follows: 1. 1988 — P300 to each covered employee. 6640. DRILON OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. On December 14. On February 22. GANCAYCO.. (COACO) petitioner. No. Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988. 1986 — P200 to each covered employee. pursuant to Inspection Authority No. J. Under payment of 13th month pay for the year 1987. Republic Act No. 058-88.A. ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR CANDIDO CUMBA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT. in sum. No. REGIONAL OFFICE NO. and 2. Section 8 of the implementing rules prohibits the employer from crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under a collective bargaining agreement against such wage increases mandated by Republic Act No. a Labor and Employment Development Officer. No. 1988. commenced a routine inspection of petitioner's establishment. SECRETARY FRANKLIN M.G. and based on payrolls and other records.00). 1989 CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO. 1) For the first year which will be paid on January 14.. 82849 August 2. No.00). 1988. INC.A. 2) For the second year which will be paid on January 16.R. ISSUE: The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement. FACTS: Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees. Cebu Oxygen. 1987-P 200 to each covered employee. vs. HELD: 260 . 6640 in the aggregate amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND AND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P83. 6640 in the aggregate amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND AND FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P48. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage. Under payment of Basic Wage per R. 6640 covering the period of two (2) months representing 208 employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day prior to the effectivity of R.

it is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of law it is designed to implement. However. which prohibits the employer from crediting the anniversary wage increases provided in collective bargaining agreements. This decision is immediately executory. 261 . The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640. 6640. is hereby declared null and void in so far as it excludes the anniversary wage increases negotiated under collective bargaining agreements from being credited to the wage increase provided for under Republic Act No. the petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic 6640. the amount that should only be credited to petitioner is the wage increase for 1987 under the CBA when the law took effect. 6440. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. WHEREFORE. The implementing rules cannot provide for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law. is correct. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. do not prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage increases for purposes of compliance with Republic Act No. 6640. 3 Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including anniversary wage increases should be considered in determining compliance with the wage increase mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.As to the issue of the validity of Section 8 of the rules implementing Republic Act No. The law itself cannot be expanded by such regulations. The wage increase for 1986 had already accrued in favor of the employees even before the said law was enacted.

and. premium pay for holiday work. so those who failed to comply were placed on "AWOL" status. DE LA SERNA. Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its contractual obligations to its clients/principals. illegal deductions. Adamson & Adamson. 1990 GRIÑO-AQUINO. rest days and Sundays. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor Code provisions. Private respondents alleged in their position paper that their latest monthly salary was P1. some 48 security guards threatened mass action against it. Earlier. the parties were required to submit their position papers. 156 SCRA 768. 1986. 1986. they must also be paid backwages. petitioner deducted P100 as administrative cost and P20 as bond. that since private respondents were relieved or constructively dismissed. G. Petitioner in its reply argued that complainants were estopped from denying their quitclaims on the ground of equity. No. and in support thereof. They alleged that management pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed. and holidays were paid in cash.: FACTS: On July 8. The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his decision in the case. Later. petitioner relieved and reassigned the complaining guards to other posts in Metro Manila. HON. and that complainant's allegation of coercion or threat was a mere afterthought. it submitted the "Quitclaim and Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. that from this amount. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers Parel. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process? HELD: The petition has no merit. they did not have any intention of waiving their rights under the law. DIONISIO C. that service incentive leaves not availed of. non-payment of night shift differential. 1986. service incentive leaves. night shift differential. seventeen (17) complainants repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. Those relieved were ordered to report to the agency's main office for reassignment. J. Only few complied. Petitioner. rest days. It further alleged that complainants who rendered over-time work as shown by their time sheets were paid accordingly. overtime pay. and 13th-month pay. 262 . contended that on July 21. on the other hand. a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others charging the petitioner Odin Security Agency (hereafter "OSA"). that being high school graduates. that they were not paid their premium pay and overtime pay for working on the eleven (11) legal holidays per year. 87439 February 21. vacation and sick leaves. on October 21. complainants fully understood the document they signed.ODIN SECURITY AGENCY vs. When conciliation efforts failed.R.600. six (6) of the seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaims again executed quitclaims and waivers. underpayment of wages.

. . provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship. 152 SCRA 237). it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits. a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor standards cases. and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned. and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims. the petition is dismissed and the orders dated March 23. 263 . submitted a position paper. to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty. Under the present rules. Decision.) WHEREFORE. and filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 23.. Since petitioner herein participated in the hearings. Amores. (p. 1988 and March 13. 1989 of the Undersecretary of Labor are hereby affirmed. 5. Furthermore. 1988 decision of the Labor Undersecretary.Inc. vs. it was not denied due process. The temporary restraining order earlier issued by this Court is lifted. it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief. No costs.

1995. 1994. 1995 having been denied by Order of October 10. 1995. HELD: 264 . Article 128 provides: ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction over the said case.00 as the basis of the wage adjustment. set aside the order of the Regional Director and remanded the records of the case "for recomputation of the wage differentials using P 5. requested the SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. it argued that if it had any obligation. 1994. entered into an agreement1 to provide security services to respondent Social Security System (SSS).7 the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner is not the real party in interest and has no legal capacity to file the same. it should have been dismissed. Jr. by Order of June 22. contends that Article 128. The SSS moved to reconsider the September 16. the present petition was filed. 1994. doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency. Jaguar. petitioner contending that the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion Petitioner thus contends that as the appeal of SSS was filed with the wrong forum.. the Regional Director modified his September 16. 1994 Order by reducing the amount payable by the SSS to petitioner. petitioner.URBANES VS. On June 29. By Order of December 9. not Article 129. The Secretary of Labor. the amount of which should be paid DIRECTLY to the security guards concerned. by letter of May 16. SEC OF LABOR FACTS: Petitioner Placido O." And the Secretary held petitioner’s security agency "JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY liable for wage differentials. on the other hand. NCR-03. petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of Wage Order No. In its position paper. NCR-03 which was issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act On June 24. In any event." Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary’s Order of June 22. 1994 Order of the Regional Director. The SSS. Urbanes. petitioner pulled out his agency’s services from the premises of the SSS and another security agency. 1994. is applicable to the case. it was to the security guards. took over.281. praying that the computation be revised.

It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code. reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws. it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement.We agree with the respondent that the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. 265 . private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and damages on account of petitioner's alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard Service Contract. In its complaint. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts.

it knew that the converted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13. which was promulgated on May 1. an international flight stewardess of respondent.Flight attendant applicant must be single. VS. 266 . 1974 to take effect six months later. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations. or on November 1.. RULING: Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent’s policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. considering the peculiarities of their chosen profession. PAL Case No. respondent Philippine Air Lines invoked its policy or regulation as follows: “D. was discharge from the service on account of her marriage.ZIALCITA. 1973 when Presidential Decree No. was promulgated. 132. the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. In appropriate cases. 1977 (Office of the President Decision FACTS: Complainant Zialcita. invoking Article 136 of the Labor Code. Flight attendants will be automatically separated from employment in the event they subsequently get married. complainant questioned her termination on account of her marriage based on the policy above quoted. All along. he shall be regulations require any employer to xxx: “(d) determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like. In separating complainant Zialcita. et al. February 20. which reads: x x ISSUE: Whether the termination of the services of complainant on account of marriage is legal. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor in challenging the validity of the policy. 1974. 679.. RO4-3-3398-76. We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondents.” On the other hand. A close look at section 8 of said decree. otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law. Which is allegedly in conformity with the following provision of law: “Art. which amended paragraph (c ) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. – The Secretary of Labor shall establish standards that will insure the safety and health of women employees. is fair and reasonable. 148. Facilities for women. Flight Attendants. reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code. like flight attendants.

in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established. with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code. all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. such as those of flight attendants. Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations.It cannot be gainsaid that. 267 . It is logical to presume that. the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. True.

No. while still single. In March 1972. And supposed letter of resignation based on the same considerations as the pre-employment agreement is equally illegal and void. exemplary and other damages. she married Gualberto . Plaintiff and her husband.female employees in the project at Nocnoc Island Surigao as separated the moment they get married. 268 . claims moral . Defendant further claimed that plaintiff was employed in the project with oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Ruling: The assignments of error are subsumed in the simple question as to whether the termination of the employment of Olympia Recreo Gualberto by reason of her marriage was valid or not. et al vs. defendant her that it considered her resigned effective April 15. Whether pre employment agreement or company policy. the same is void.R. Marinduque Mining Industrial Corporation CA G. was employed in 1971 by defendant as company dentist in its Surigao Nickel Project. 52753-R June 28. In the same month. The efforts of defendants distinguish between a verbal pre -employment agreement of the project engineer and the plaintiff on the other hand and Company policy on the other do not impress as at all.Olympia Gualberto. who alleges he was forced to resign because of his wife’s illegal dismissal. invoking a policy of the firm to consider . an electrical engineer in the same project. 1972.due lack of facilities for married women . 1978 Facts: Plaintiff.

the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows: 269 . HELD: The petition is devoid of merit. ordering the respondent. Not satisfied therewith. 94951 April 22. Florendo D. INC. Hence. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer.. After the parties submitted their position papers as required by the labor arbiter assigned to the case on August 24. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. 1987. 1988. on January 17. Davao del Norte. ISSUE: Whether or not the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the said firm. NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the appealed decision. Inc. respondents.00 a month. In the beginning. petitioner appealed to NLRC. 1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara.42. Asirit. Book 3 of the Labor Code. while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry. On December 18. on May 18. On March 11. the herein petition for review by certiorari. She was permitted to go on leave for medication. to pay the complainant a total amount of P55. 1991 FACTS: Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company. However. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2.00 to persuade her to quit her job. with the main thrust that private respondent should be treated as a mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner. 1982.00 which was eventually increased to P5. private respondent filed a request for assistance with the Department of Labor and Employment. she was paid on a monthly basis at P250. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SINCLITICA CANDIDO. Maco. as amended.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575. 1988 the latter rendered a decision. but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. 1988. petitioner. she accidentally slipped and hit her back on a stone. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. vs. G. Apex Mining Company.000. Inc. Section l(b). No.000. Under Rule XIII. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4.161. she was paid on a piece rate basis..APEX MINING COMPANY.R.

like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities. laundry women. domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature. Hence. The foregoing definition covers family drivers. the payment of separation pay to her is in order. yayas. Private respondent Candida is therefore. who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof. and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper. No pronouncement as to costs.The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person. service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. WHEREFORE. The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. domestic servants. houseboys and other similar househelps. the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case. the petition is DISMISSED and the appealed decision and resolution of public respondent NLRC are hereby AFFIRMED. gardeners. they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular employee. 270 . whether male or female. whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit. In such instance. the definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company. entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be interested in returning to her work for valid reasons.

On 21 December 1998. it being made clear therein that respondent will cover "the retainership the Company previously had with Dr. De Vera was an "independent contractor" and that he "was not dismissed but rather his contract with [PHILCOM] ended when said contract was not renewed after December 31. The parties agreed and formalized respondent’s proposal in a document denominated as Retainership Contract which will be for a period of one year subject to renewal. De Vera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He likewise professed that since he was not conversant with labor laws. 1996". modifying that of the NLRC by deleting the award of traveling allowance. Inc. On De Vera’s appeal to the NLRC. At the crux of the controversy is Dr. INC. He averred that he was designated as a "company physician on retainer basis" for reasons allegedly known only to Philcom. De Vera’s status vis a vis petitioner when the latter terminated his engagement. while respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its employees. Said contract was renewed yearly. renewal of the contract was only made verbally. With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC in its order of 27 February 2001. informed De Vera of its decision to discontinue the latter’s "retainer’s contract with the Company effective at the close of business hours of December 31. and ordering payment of separation pay to De Vera in lieu of reinstatement. for the years 1995 and 1996. vs. alleging that that he had been actually employed by Philcom as its company physician since 1981 and was dismissed without due process. 1996" because management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company premises. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision. Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. the latter. On 22 January 1997.00 a month. Reyes came out with a decision dismissing De Vera’s complaint for lack of merit. is a corporation engaged in the business of communication services and allied activities.9 Philcom then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS. However. The turning point in the parties’ relationship surfaced in December 1996 when Philcom. Eulau" and that respondent’s "retainer fee" will be at P4. The retainership arrangement went on from 1981 to 1994 with changes in the retainer’s fee. on the rationale that as a "retained physician" under a valid contract mutually agreed upon by the parties. RICARDO DE VERA Petitioner Philippine Global Communications. thru a letter bearing on the subject boldly written as "Termination – Retainership Contract". like any other regular employees of Philcom. K. in a decision dated 23 October 2000. (PhilCom). he did not give much attention to the designation as anyway he worked on a full-time basis and was paid a basic monthly salary plus fringe benefits. reversed that of the Labor Arbiter. Issue: 271 . On 12 September 2002.000. on a finding that De Vera is Philcom’s "regular employee" and accordingly directed the company to reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges and with full backwages from the date of his dismissal until actual reinstatement.

that even as the contracts entered into by the parties invariably provide for a 60-day notice requirement prior to termination. effective at the close of business hours of 31 December 1996. Be that as it may. and this is admitted by both parties. 272 . Ruling: With the recognition of the fact that petitioner consistently engaged the services of respondent on a retainer basis. so can petitioner put an end. the 60-day notice requirement has become moot and academic if not waived by the respondent himself. WHEREFORE. therefore. accounts of petitioner had already been garnished and released to respondent despite the previous Status Quo Order29issued by this Court. as shown by their various "retainership contracts".Whether or not “retainership contracts” could be set as a defense by employees in protecting their right of security of tenure. to their retainership agreement as therein provided. For sure.27 We note. the same was not complied with by petitioner when it terminated on 17 December 1996 the verbally-renewed retainership agreement. however. The 21 December 1998 decision of the labor arbiter is REINSTATED. with or without cause. the record shows.28 that execution of the NLRC decision had already been made at the NLRC despite the pendency of the present recourse. To all intents and purposes. the petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Jr.. and she was 20 years old. 273 . Believing that the deceased’s fatal illness having been contracted during her employment was service-connected. It was pointed out that the illness of Flordeliza was not caused by employment and employment conditions. 1982. the GSIS. a compensable illness means illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees’ Compensation Commission. Issue Whether or not the deceased’s illness under PD 626.Jose B. Employees’ Compensation Commission & Government Service Insurance System (National Power Corporation) May 11. she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. Dissatisfied with the respondent’s decision of denial. 1981 she was manager of the budget division. Sarmiento vs. Jose B. 1988 GR No. or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. Sarmiento filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626. J. denied the claim. compensable? Held Under PD 626. The respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS’ decision. On September 9. L-65680 Gutierrez. At the time of her death on August 12. The deceased’s illness was a cancer known as “differential squarrous cell carcinoma”.: Facts The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. 1981. through its Medical Services Center. and sought treatment in various hospitals. And on August 12. Jose Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. it found that the deceased’s death is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. Held: The Court saw no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers. JR.R. 2. she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. L-58445 April 27. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then. the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. her memory. The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. among others. About four years later. liver Vinyl chloride workers. 1975. wood products lymphatic and blood forming vessels. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. she sought medical treatment in Manila. GUTIERREZ. Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer. 17. Camarines Norte regional office on March 17. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability.. On January 1. nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills. No. J. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. sense of time. vision. What the law requires for others is proof. respondents.G. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences). we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable.: Facts: The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet. and brain plastic workers. By that time. and reasoning power had been lost. Issues: 1. Cancer of the lungs. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws. RARO. 1975. 274 . 1989 ZAIDA G. namely —Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment 16. vs. industry carpenters. the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. petitioner. The new law discarded.

The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed . the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. therefore. as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available. WHEREFORE. the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. 275 . We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.The law.

namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be. No. Hence. confronted him regarding his tour of duty. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when it reversed the ECC’s decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and. Obviously. ISSUE: Whether or not the SPO2 Alegre’s death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations. Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex. and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is. J. it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. On December 6. as 276 . he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail.: FACTS: Private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband. At any rate. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. therefore. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. Jr. that of ferrying passengers for a fee. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE. In its decision on August 7. 1995. SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre. 1994. he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio. compensable. HELD: Taking together existing jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits. 128524. ROMERO. 626. vs. In fact. the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death. the GSIS. Ilocos Sur. On account of her husband’s death. the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. April 20. was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan. petitioner.. (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions. he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected which was later on affirmed by the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC. that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected. respondents. 1999] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS).[G.R. the 24-hour duty doctrine. denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s death.

In other words. although not on official line of duty. the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which. are nonetheless basically police service in character. serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.applied to policemen and soldiers. 277 .

136200 June 8. On September 16. The accident that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. In fact. and if the injury is sustained elsewhere. Quezon City. cannot be given due course. for dinner. petitioner was standing along Santolan Road. On their way home at around 9:30 PM. the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the intersection of N. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Neither was appellant performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. Under the present compensation law. the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and] in the course of his employment. with the Government Security Insurance Service. No.G. respondents. PANGANIBAN. petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. that the employee is executing an order for the employer. 1985. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. however. The Issues: In his Petition. he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA. 2000 CELERINO VALERIANO. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM. As a result of the mishap. Quezon City. appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work. permanent total. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his official duty. his claim under PD 626. HELD: Injuries and Resulting Disability Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total. disability. when he met a friend by the name of Alexander Agawin. petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment. petitioner. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link between the contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as fireman. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Apparently.: The Facts: Celerino S. as amended. Sometime on the evening of July 3. vs. J. or permanent partial.R. 1985. 10 For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable. it 278 . they must have necessarily resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. that the injury is sustained at the place where his work requires him to be. Due to the strong impact of the collision. injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following questions: WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED. Were Petitioner's Injuries Work-Connected? The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied.

and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can. No pronouncement as to costs. Thus. WHEREFORE. The injury and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred. nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. in certain cases. not dual. 279 . As a matter of general proposition. for injury to be compensable. "work-connection. be. That he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends — is clear from the records of the case. while the words "in the course of" refer to the time. the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto. and are descriptive of its character. . and is best expressed in the word. . we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable. at a place where the employee may reasonably .should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary. if it can be proven that at the time of the injury. Thus. place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. His injuries were not acquired at his work place. an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident. exclude clearly work-connected injuries.

but while using a customary means of ingress and egress. (2) in applying the "proximity rule. or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts. At the time of the killing. the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment. Pablo. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly. According to the IDECO. to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer. like Pablo. while walking on his way home. injuries sustained off the premises of the employer." simply stated. RULING: The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule. who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO. No. while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home. who. is that "in the absence of special circumstances.. L-26341 FACTS: At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29. as an incident of the employment. ISSUE: Whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. was shot to death in front of. Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez. The slayer. had finished overtime work at 5:00 p. going to. i. vs.e. Martin Cordero. or during his employment. was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. hired.R."7 This rule. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed..m. 1960. on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. and (4) where the employer. November 27. an employee injured in. and about 20 meters away from. (3) where the employee is charged. and was going home. 1968 280 . The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record." and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. but also premises leased. whether he arrives early or late. there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. not only to include premises owned by the employer.8 We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception. supplied or used by him. with some duty or special errand connected with his employment. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION G. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises. admits of four well-recognized exceptions.ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO. (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress. another employee. however. Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. the main IDECO gate.

So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible. no federal question arises. 281 . are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer. (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer.e. in both liberal and narrow states. (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home. even though on a fixed salary. whether in a public (e.. trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track).even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Hence.. (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. i. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states. The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. dependent on their own peculiar circumstances. and killed by a train. Off-premises injuries to or from work. a deaf worker. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island. and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets.g. travelling workers. There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified. (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home. all its streets are protected premises. the employer's street car) or private conveyance.

worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City. Alano. we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent.m. it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. On November 29. She was at the place where.R.1987). her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. L-47521. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently. p. brother of the deceased. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION G. HELD: In this case. 1988 FACTS: Dedicacion de Vera. but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. to 5:30 p. as the petitioner puts it. No.R. Pangasinan. As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation. Clemente v. 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision. 1976.M. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a. at 7:00 A. L-48594 March 16. The claim was.." 282 . August 31. 12) ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Dedicacion de Vera can be compensable. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules). Generoso C. (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Government Service Insurance System (G. filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children.m. however. this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.ALANO vs. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission. No. She was there because her employment required her to be there." On July 19. she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. On June 27. a government employee during her lifetime. denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law. (Rollo. while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school. 1977.

Workmen's Compensation Commission. From the foregoing informations. slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck. that at about 5:06 A. you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM G. ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment? HELD: We held that 'where an employee.M. to 10:00 P. We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work. But. Rizal. of the following day. and. as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive. as amended. while thus attempting. is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent. vs. On 18 June 1986. attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work. J. his sack of rice. he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.M. while on your way home. when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan. As a result. to 283 . after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a sack of rice and that.M.: FACTS: Salvador Lazo. the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. On his way home. Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment.M. 1986. at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986. the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. 26 SCRA 102.M. 103. that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded.R. Upon review of the case. the present recourse. 78617 June 18. If the employee be injured while passing. His claim. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986. 1990 PADILLA. For the injuries he sustained.'And. however. 1 It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening.SALVADOR LAZO vs. is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate. the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986. it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. The fact standing alone. where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed. with the express or implied consent of the employer. on June 18. in a later case. to 5:06 A. resulting in his death. you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P. was denied by the GSIS for the reason that — It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P. Hence. for which reason his death is compensable. No. petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626. Manila. after working hours.

or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision.

284

G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980 GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents. MAKASIAR, J.: FACTS: Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim. Petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in TondoBinondo, Manila near a dirty creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System. On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved: Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that your ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s ailments are causally related to her duties and conditions of work, hence, she is entitled to disability benefit from the GSIS.

HELD: Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the

285

physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED 1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.

286

G.R. No. 94167 January 21, 1991 MABUHAY SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND SKIPPERS MARITIME CO., LTD., petitioners, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION) AND CECILIA SENTINA, respondents. FACTS: Romulo Sentina was hired as a 4th Engineer by petitioner Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. (MSSI) for and in behalf of co-petitioner, Skippers Maritime Co., Ltd. to work aboard the M/V Harmony I for a period of one year. He reported for duty aboard said vessel on July 13, 1987. On January 16, 1988 at about 3 p.m., while the vessel was docked alongside Drapetona Pier, Piraeus, Greece, Sentina arrived aboard the ship from shore leave visibly drunk. He went to the messhall and took a fire axe and challenged those eating therein. He was pacified by his shipmates who led him to his cabin. However, later he went out of his cabin and proceeded to the messhall. He became violent. He smashed and threw a cup towards the head of an oiler Emmanuel Ero, who was then eating. Ero touched his head and noticed blood. This infuriated Ero which led to a fight between the two. After the shipmates broke the fight, Sentina was taken to the hospital where he passed away on January 17, 1988. Ero was arrested by the Greek authorities and was jailed in Piraeus. On October 26, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for payment of death benefits, burial expenses, unpaid salaries on board and overtime pay with damages docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 88-10-896. POEA rendered a decision favoring Sentina. A motion for reconsideration and/or appeal was filed by petitioners which the respondent First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) disposed of in a resolution dated March 31, 1990 dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN EMPLOYER IS REQUIRED TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS TO AN EMPLOYEE WHO RAN AMUCK THAT RESULTED TO HIS DEATH. HELD: The mere death of the seaman during the term of his employment does not automatically give rise to compensation. The circumstances which led to the death as well as the provisions of the contract, and the right and obligation of the employer and seaman must be taken into consideration, in consonance with the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. There are limitations to the liability to pay death benefits.

287

inflicting injury on the latter. Thereafter. the circumstances of the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. he returned to the messhall picked up and broke a cup and hurled it at an oiler Ero who suffered injury. such death is not compensable.When the death of the seaman resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life. First he challenged everyone to a fight with an axe. when as in this case the seaman. or committed an unlawful aggression against another. so that in his own defense the latter fought back and in the process killed the seaman. By the same token. in a state of intoxication. ran amuck. No doubt a case of suicide is covered by this provision. Thus provoked. the oiler fought back The death of seaman Sentina is attributable to his unlawful aggression and thus is not compensable. and it is directly attributable to the seaman. 288 .

P18. INC.R. Inc. FIRCROFT SHIPPING CORPORATION and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE CO.. 1996 INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES. P130. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and CONSTANCIA PINEDA. 115497 September 16. Inc. ISSUE: Are the local crewing or manning agent and its foreign principal (the shipowner) liable for the death of a Filipino seaman-employee who. vs. the point of hire.00 and a leave pay of 2 1/2 days per month.00 as death compensation benefits.000. respondents are hereby jointly and severally held liable to pay the complainant the following amounts: 1. was killed in transit while being repatriated home? HELD: Petitioner's reliance on De Jesus is misplaced.. seaman Jeremias Pineda. WHEREFORE. the Ship Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone. Thailand. J. Joson. 1994 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dismissing the appeals of petitioners and affirming the decision dated November 16. PANGANIBAN. Through the termination of 289 . respondents.: FACTS: The proceedings below originated as a claim for death compensation benefits filed by Constancia Pineda as heir of her deceased son. that on October 2. INC.00 as burial expenses. 2. These claims arose from the responsibility of the foreign employer together with the local agency for the safety of the employee during his repatriation and until his arrival in this country. he met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman in Bangkok. owned and operated by its foreign principal.G.00 plus fixed overtime rate of US$83. Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties with a monthly basic salary of US$276. Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels.. 1989. and its foreign principal. No. Fircroft Shipping Corporation and the Times Surety and Insurance Co. The instant petition seeks the reversal and/or modification of the Resolution dated March 30. petitioners. as the death and burial benefits being claimed in this case are not payable by the Employee's Compensation Commission and chargeable against the State Insurance Fund. in view of the foregoing consideration..e. which ordered that. The following facts were found by the POEA Administrator: As can be gathered from the records of the case.. it was alleged that deceased seaman. after having been discharged.000. i. that considering that the deceased seaman was suffering from mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life by his fellow seamen. against Interorient Maritime Enterprises. "MV Amazonia". 1992 of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator Felicisimo C.

on and off the job. nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone. WHEREFORE. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who. 290 . Duration of Insurance Coverage. the responsibility of the foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiring subsisted. knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder. sick or otherwise lost their usefulness. provided that in no case shall the duration of the insurance coverage be less than one year. — The minimum coverage shall take effect upon payment of the premium and shall be extended worldwide. is appalling to say the least. Costs against petitioners. and disposed of them when the latter had grown old. 4. but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the safe return of said worker. premises considered. still. Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment clearly provides for the duration of the mandatory personal accident and life insurance covering accident death.the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai. for the duration of the worker's contract plus sixty (60) calendar days after termination of the contract of employment. Section 4. (Emphasis supplied) The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a returning employee. Such attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs. the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision assailed in this petition is AFFIRMED. dismemberment and disability of overseas workers: Sec.

and the vessel turned to comb the surrounding area for Dublin. 3 She also filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a complaint against NAESS 4 for payment of death benefits to US$74. 73441 September 4. Hence. NAESS is bound to pay cash benefits for loss of life the of workers enrolled therein. by whom he had one child. the equivalents of said sums in Philippine pesos at prevailing rates of exchange. this appeal.00 under both paragraph 17 of the cited Special Agreement and what she claimed to be the also applicable Singapore Workmens' Compensation Ordinance. holding Dublin's death compensable under said Special Agreement and ordering NAESS to pay complainant and her child compensation benefits totalling US$31.00 and her attorneys of record fees amounting to US$3. or he killed himself in a moment of temporary aberration triggered by remorse over the killing of the second cook. Under a Special Agreement in the employment contract. collected the amount of P75. Held: It makes no difference whether Dublin intentionally took his own life. Inc.000. Issue: Whether or not the POEA and the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adjudging that death by suicide is compensable. or he accidentally fell overboard while trying to flee from imagined pursuit. An alarm was immediately raised. For the death of Dublin his widow Zenaida. Brazil to Port Said. born January 22. Ivy. which last possibility cannot be ruled out considering the state of the evidence.512. with an express affirmance of the POEA decision. Rodolfo Fernandez. J. No. while the vessel M/V DYVI PACIFIC was plying the seas enroute from Santos. 1971.NAESS Shipping Philippines. 1983.00. After some time his floating body was briefly sighted.00 under Clause A of the ITF Collective Bargaining Agreement.962. There is no question that NAESS freely bound itself to a contract which on its face makes it unqualifiedly liable to pay compensation benefits for Dublin's death while in its service.R. fatally stabbed the second cook. Pablo Dublin the vessel's chief steward. Egypt. between the International Workers Federation (ITF) and NAESS Shipping. NLRC G.. then ran to the deck from which he jumped or fell overboard. vs. but it disappeared from view even as preparations to retrieve it were being made. NARVASA. 291 . 1987 FIRST DIVISION. NAESS filed a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed by the NLRC for lack of merit. The POEA rendered judgment for the complainant.: Facts: On the night of September 3. and was never seen again although the search went on through the night and was called off only at 6:00 o'clock the next morning. during a quarrel.196.

it was not a consequence of his killing of the second cook. No law or rule has been cited which would make it illegal for an employer to assume such obligation in favor of his or its employee in their contract of employment. On Dublin's part.regardless of whether or not it intended to make itself the insurer. entitlement to death benefits resulted from his death while serving out his contract of employment. . contract. of Dublin's life. said Resolution is affirmed.00 for attorney's fees made in the decision of the POEA and affirmed in the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission herein complained of. modified only to set aside and vacate the award of US$3.. should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations. no matter what their form may be. If the latter's death is also compensable. insofar as the factual and legal bases of such liability is concerned. Rodolfo Fernandez. that is due to the solitary fact of his death while covered by a similar contract.196. whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. This argument. Thus. not precisely to the fact that he met death at the hands of Dublin That both deaths may be related by cause and effect and NAESS is the single obligor liable for compensation in both cases must. 292 . To compel payment of death benefits in this case would amount not only to rewarding the act of murder or homicide. SO ORDERED. for contracts are obligatory. if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. carries within itself the seeds of its own refutation. in confusing the legal implications and effects of two distinct and independent agreements. Decision: WHEREFORE. in the legal sense. with costs against petitioner NAESS. but also inequitably to placing on NAESS the twin burdens of compensating both the killer and his victim. be regarded as purely accidental circumstances. who allegedly had also been employed under a contract with a similar death benefits clause.. which are the private laws of the contracting parties.

Considering that the petitioner has already availed of benefits for already twenty-three months shows that he was unable to perform any gainful occupation for more than 120 days. 85024 SARMIENTO. Held: Petitioner was suffering from permanent total disability.R. or accustomed to perform. He claimed for income benefits from GSIS. that he was trained for. J.:p Facts: Petitioner was formerly employed. 293 . Permanent total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness.Vicente vs Employees Compensation Commission G. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was suffering from permanent total disability. Upon his medical examination with Veterans Medical Center. No. His request was granted but only for permanent partial disability. he was diagnosed as having permanent total disability. or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. Upon further requests of petitioner. he applied for an optional retirement giving as reason his inability to continue working is due to his physical disability. but means the disablement of the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work. Ratio Decidendi: Petitioner availed of optional retirement which requires the proof that one is physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service. At the age of forty-five. extensions were given but no grant was made as to his permanent total disability claims. or a work of similar nature.

vs. Still unsatisfied. Thoracic & Peripheral Surgery. Lopez. the petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him and prayed that the same be extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his attending physician. Facts: The petitioner. The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits claim for payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 85024 January 23. Dr. On March 14.C. J. On August 5. the petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA probably thrombosis of the left middle cerebral artery. as indicated in the latter's Certification. the said manager informed the petitioner that his request had been denied. the petitioner was granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months benefits.C. 1981) under the provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. who had diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from: Osteoarthritis. No. 626. Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease. ** F. F. Quezon City). As a consequence of his motion for reconsideration. he applied for optional retirement (effective August 16. *** (Section Chief. 1991 Parties: DOMINGO VICENTE. 1981 up to March 1983. Both applications were accompanied by the necessary supporting papers. on September 10. 1987. Surgical Department. and Left Ventricular Hypertrophy. and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of government service. the petitioner sought reconsideration and as a result of which. Later. Cardiomegaly. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION. Veterans Medical Center.R.S. his case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).D.S. 1987. Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner.P.. insisting that he (petitioner) should be compensated no less than for "permanent total disability. and classified him as being under "permanent total disability. Avelino A. Sarmiento." 294 . 1981. respondent. 1987. among them being a "Physician's Certification" issued by the petitioner's attending doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. petitioner.G. at the age of forty-five. as amended. and on the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation" of the Medical Services Center of the GSIS. General. Undaunted. giving as reason therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability..I. was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City." The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16. the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on November 6. M. Hilaga Avenue. multiple. 1616." On June 30. Domingo Vicente. 1986. or on October 1. 1983.

as the proper evaluation of an employee's degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical experts who have specialized on the subject." And. the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. Decision: WHEREFORE." The findings of the petitioner's attending physician is not binding on the GSIS. Respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is accordingly ORDERED to award the petitioner the benefits corresponding to his permanent total disability. "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification. Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensability. There being no showing that the petitioner's disability is "temporary total" as defined by the law. 1988. Issues: The respondent Commission argues that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from "permanent total disability. the inescapable conclusion is that he suffers from permanent total disability. the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal. the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer. "[N]o physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency.On August 24. On this score. Further. This kind of disability is precisely covered by Section 2(b). Held: Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled. For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service. the decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability." The fact that the petitioner was granted benefits amounting to the equivalent of twenty-three months shows that the petitioner was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. under good behavior. to 20 more years in service. 295 . the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. nor on the Commission. categorically certified that the petitioner was classified under permanent total disability.

117572. 296 . No. G. 1998 FACTS: Private respondent Rosa Balais an employee of National Housing Authority suffered from Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Secondary to Ruptured Aneurysm. therefore. affirms the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals decreeing conversion of private respondent’s disability from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. the denial of the claim for permanent total disability benefit of private respondent who. she retired and filed for disability benefits. July 31. GSIS granted her application for temporary total disability and later was changed to permanent partial disability.R.R. 1996) In the case at bar. The court. which GSIS denied on the ground that her condition does not qualify for permanent total disability. Court of Appeals and R. For this reason. She again filed with GSIS an application for permanent total disability.GSIS vs. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause” (GSIS vs. Balais G. because of this she can no longer perform efficiently. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Rosa Balais is entitled of her permanent total disability? HELD: “A person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. January 29. for 38 long years during her prime had rendered her best service with an unblemished record and who was compelled to retire on account of her worsening conditioning would indeed subvert the salutary intentions of the law in favor of the worker. 116015. CA. No.

When he filed his claim on November 9. According to his medical evaluation report he was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis PTB. 1994. but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning capacity. a claim for compensation shall be given due course only when the same is filed with System three (3) years for the time the cause of action accrued. he filed his claim for compensation benefits on Nov. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent’s claim for compensation benefit had already prescribed when he filed his claim on November 9. private respondent filed with the Social Security System (SSS) a claim on the ground of prescription. accordingly. 1994? HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Private respondent Sanico. 626.” Permanent disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work. On appeal. 1991 due to his illness. On November 9. In this case the private respondent’s was terminated on December 31. “Disability should not be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity.EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SSS) vs. In disability compensation. December 17. Private respondent then elevated the case to the CA. 1994. The prescriptive period. it is not the injury which is compensated. private respondent’s claim was filed within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 201 of the Labor Code.R. FACTS: Private respondent Edmund Sanico was a former employee of John Gotamco and sons as a wood filler from 1986 until he was separated from employment on December 31.D. even long before. The SSS ruled that under Article 201 of the Labor Code. or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do.1994 was within. The prescriptive period for filing compensation claims should be reckoned from the time the employees lost his earning capacity. terminated from employment. 1991 due to his illness. EDMUND SANICO G. According to SSS the three (3) year prescriptive period on 21 September 1991 when his PTB first became manifest. 1994. J. In ruling that the private respondent’s claim was filed well within the prescriptive period under the law the CA reconciled Art. That “an action upon an obligation must be filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues and that private respondent’s filing of his compensation claim on November 9. is a social legislation whose purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability. due to his illness and not when the same first became manifest. 201 of the Labor Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code. It does not mean absolute helplessness. No. No. 134028. 9. P. 1999 Ponente: Kapunan. 297 . the claim had allegedly already prescribed. which reversed petitioner’s decision and granted private respondent’s claim for compensation benefits. as amended. illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. or work similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform. petitioner ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS.

from 1 July 1970 up to the time of his death on 21 June 1973. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Public Highways). BPH asserted that there was "[l]ack of causative relation of the illness alleged in [petitioner's] claim with the nature of the decedent's employment" and that petitioner had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 24. Act No. asked the WCU Regional Officeto dismiss petitioner's claim upon the ground that claim had been filed against the wrong party. all of them chose to rely upon the formal defenses discussed above. regarding the giving of notice and subsequent filing of claim. under the Workmen's Compensation Act. petitioner. controverted the claim of petitioner. Batangas Province. a claim for compensation under the applicable provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. IV of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU). vs. Artemio's employer at the time of his death being the Provincial Engineer's Office of the Provincial Government of Batangas. rather than the BPH. In a letter dated 26 June 1975. Facts: Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz of the Bureau of Public Highways (BPH). 3428. as amended). The certificate of death issued by Dr. filed with Regional Office No. Batangas Provincial Office. DE SUANES. In legal effect. Ruling: It is well settled that. The Court. But those defenses do not constitute evidence to overthrow the statutory presumption. 3428. The burden of proving non-compensability of the cause of death is shifted to the employer. is left with no alternative but to rule in favor of petitioner's claim. further. BPH. the decedent's illness was described as "Internal Hemorrhage due to Hypertension. Batangas. On 5 March 1975. petitioner is accordingly relieved of the burden of proving causation between the illness and the employment in view of the legal presumption that said illness arose out of the decedent's employment. Respondent Batangas Provincial Engineer had failed to discharge this burden. Salvacion Altamira of the Magsino General Hospital in Lipa City. 3 Petitioner's claim was referred by the WCU to the BPH which. therefore. however. attributed Artemio's demise to 'Cardio-respiratory Arrest due to Cerebrovascular Accident'. respondents. In this claim. 298 . The petitioner asks the Court to review and set aside the decision dated 31 December 1975 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC) Issue: Whether or not petitioner's Motion to Set Aside the Order of Dismissal issued by the WCC Referee was properly denied simply upon the ground that it had not been accompanied by an affidavit of merits. none of the respondents even attempted to present any evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability. Indeed. Department of Labor. no evidence was introduced by the respondents to offset that legal presumption. Artemio Suanes was a construction capataz in the Office of the Provincial Engineer.ROSARIO VDA. as surviving spouse of Artemio Suanes. petitioner. His Service Record further shows that thereafter. as amended.

he finished his contract and was discharged from the port of Dubai for repatriation to Manila. According to the Thai police. Pineda approached and tried to stab the police sergeant with a knife and that therefore he was forced to pull out his gun and shot Pineda.. and their failure to do so rendered them liable for the death of Pineda. the aforequoted provision of the Standard Format Contract of Employment exemption the employer from liability should not apply in the instant case. Thereafter. 1989 at around 4:00 P. public respondent upheld the POEA. Fircroft Shipping Corporation for a period of nine (9) months with additional three (3) months upon mutual consent of both parties. Firstly. the employer should pay compensation and death benefits of Pineda to his heirs.R. his attack on the policeman can in no wise be characterized as a deliberate.M. Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty on October 2. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G. we also agree that in light of the deceased's mental condition. attacked the Thai policeman when he was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties. 115497 September 16. vs. 1996 FACTS: Deceased seaman. the fact that the deceased suffered from mental disorder at the time of his repatriation means that he must have been deprived of the full use of his reason. Petitioners appealed the POEA decision to the public respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Pineda can claim death benefits and compensation against the employer. at the very least. The POEA Administrator rendered his decision holding petitioners liable for death compensation benefits and burial expenses. and that thereby. petitioners "should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed said seaman to travel home alone". Thailand. Indeed. his will must have been impaired. this recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari. owned and operated by its foreign principal. INC. HELD: Yes. On September 28. No. "MV Amazonia". and during said stopover he disembarked on and failed to join the connecting flight to Hongkong with final destination to Manila. Thus. 1994. Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as Oiler on board the vessels. His flight schedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok. 1989. Thus. In a Decision dated March 30. Secondly. willful or voluntary act on his part. The heirs of Pineda filed a claim for death benefits against herein petitioners. "the obligations and liabilities of the (herein petitioners) do not end upon the expiration of the contracted period as (petitioners are) duty bound to repatriate the seaman to the point of hire to effectively terminate the contract of employment. and apart from that.” 299 .INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES. According to the Supreme Court.

US$3. Abordo. III. No. this Board issued the questioned Order. funeral expenses. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. vs.T. US$30. Agreeing with said argument. US$500. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner . Ministry of Labor and Employment. ordering herein petitioners "to pay jointly and severally the following: I. In her complaint filed before this Board. The M. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services. The deceased." filed before the National Seamen Board.. G. he suffered an apoplectic stroke and died four days later or on 29 May 1978. 1979. Restituta C. after hearing the case.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. On December 11. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD. Petitioners appealed to the Ministry of Labor. He was receiving a monthly salary of US$850. Inc. the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. On the other hand. As an alternative. In their motion for reconsideration. L-54204 September 30.NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. of M. Abordo argued that the amount of compensation due her should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and 300 . should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. accrued leave pay and time-off allowances.: FACTS: Napoleon B. It is also ordered that payment must be made thru the National Seamen Board within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. being a matter of evidence.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency as funeral expenses. husband of complainant herein. respondents strongly argue that the law of Singapore should not be applied ISSUE: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case? HELD: We rule in the affirmative. was the 2nd Engr.000. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law. the Ministry rendered its decision in this case as follows: The facts in the main are not disputed. 1982 RELOVA. Abordo.110 or 10% of the total amount recovered as attorney's fees. respectively. must be alleged and proved. rendered judgment on June 20. this Motion for Reconsideration. II. Hence. J. 1979.600 (the 36-month salary of the decreased)) or its equivalent in Philippine currency as death compensation benefits. Cherry Earl" until that fatal day in May 1978 when. they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. In her complaint for "death compensation benefits. principal and agent.R. the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta .T. 25 which they claim should apply in this case. which is Singapore law. Abordo the sum of P30.00 at the time of his death. while at sea. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore.T. was employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and served as such in the vessel "M.

the technical rules of procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials. as enunciated in a long line of cases. For lack of merit. the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. 4 SCRA 1188). the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying that law. 301 . In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct and occurring whilst on board any vessel to which he may be assigned. the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied and the Order of tills Board dated 20 June 1979 affirmed. The "Employment Agreement" is attached to the Supplemental Complaint of Restituta C. Inc. this petition is DENIED. Furthermore. therefore. but not any other time. Article 20. (Emphasis supplied) In the aforementioned "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B. arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code. including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor. "in administrative proceedings.quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. whichever is greater. Singapore law was properly applied in this case. vs. the EMPLOYER win provide employee with free medical attention. the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to. As it is familiar with Singapore Law. Abordo was offered P30. involving employer-employee relations. it forms part thereof. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act.00 only by the petitioners. Abordo. It has always been the policy of this Board. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Social Security Commission. it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Labor Code of the Philippines. that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment. do not strictly apply. including hospital treatment. also essential medical treatment in the course of repatriation and until EMPLOYEE's arrival at his point of origin. Since private respondent Restituta C." (Oromeca Lumber Co. Thus. provides that the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims. neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. WHEREFORE. it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel.000. Moreover. Abordo and. Finally. Let execution issue immediately.

Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at large. Private complainants Narcisa Hernandez. the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to leave the country on a specified date.nêt ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of illegal recruitment. accused-appellants PUNO. FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large). There is no showing. which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. i. whether in his testimony or in that of his wife. We are not inclined to believe Mr.1âwphi1. together with Francisco Hernandez. HELD: In the case at bar. We are not convinced. J. We do not see any reason to doubt the truthfulness of their testimony.. Reichl's claim that he was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. KARL REICHL. Moreover.: FACTS: In April 1993. It has been held that truthtelling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. especially since they corroborate each other on the material points. vs. that private complainants threatened to harm them 302 . eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants. that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment. and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants. it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private complainants for the processing of their papers. although they did not have any license to do so. that they met with the three accused several times. accused. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants.e. plaintiff-appellee. The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee. spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. The minor lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accusedappellants in their brief do not impair their credibility. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad.

00. even if the spouses were staying in Manila. it appears that the three accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy. In fact. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours' drive from Manila. on the other hand. accused-appellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceeding P150. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper he was signing. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas employment. 303 . in Exhibit "C". Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. Yolanda Reichl. Furthermore. he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid the amount of P50. which was executed on a later date. it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in their recruitment business. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. Thus. Mr.000.000. This is an acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement abroad. There being conspiracy. each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his coaccused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution. claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners. 1992 until September 19. When he affixed his signature thereon. Such obligation arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants. However. and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21. in Exhibit "J". 1992. Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek employment for them in Italy.00. The acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. 1992.if he did not sign the document.

however. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he. Held: Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months of June. Upon examination of the records. 1996 while Ong remained at large. in turn. August and September in 1994 at Craftrade's office. The State Prosecutor. Issue is whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged. the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. and Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla. Estrella Calleja and Melvin Miranda. accused-appellant. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never received money from them.32 A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. Chowdury was arraigned on April 16. BULU CHOWDURY. He was convicted based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. licensed to recruit overseas workers. he recruited the complainants: Estrella B. No. Neither was he. he was employed as interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its license. Sasis. was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. At that time. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. Calleja. for employment in Korea without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Their payments were received by the agency's cashier.Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G. 129577-80 February 15. Miranda and Aser S. later dismissed the estafa charges against Chowdury and filed an amended information indicting only Ong for the offense. They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private complainants. that from the period of August 1994 to October 1994. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale. Chowdury appealed. The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis.R. vs. Melvin C. in his personal capacity. plaintiff-appellee. The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Josephine 304 . Facts: The accused worked as an interviewer at Cartrade Agency from 1990 until 1994.

305 . he performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some other cause.Ong. Furthermore. and to REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. His conviction. we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accusedappellant's conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. is without basis. IN VIEW WHEREOF. therefore. Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Hence. the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

In subsequent meetings. complainant Joan Merante. She also talked to the other complainants who have shown their positive interest to the employment in Korea.R. 2001) Facts: Sometime in February 1994. if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. met accused Nellie Cabais in Maharlika. Branch 6. convicting accused-appellant Nellie Cabais y Gamuelan of illegal recruitment in a large scale by a syndicate. Later on. and costs. 37 years old. Accused Cabais and Forneas tried to convince them to submit their applications so that RSEA could process them.00) pesos. persuading them to be contract workers in South Korea. Issue: Accused-appellant Nellie Cabais contends that she is not liable for illegal recruitment and estafa considering that she was merely an employee of Red Sea Employment Agency and did not actually recruit applicants. accused Cabais introduced to them a certain Korean named Harm Yo Hong who managed to persuade the complainants to apply as contract workers in South Korea. Baguio City. accused Cabais introduced accused Anita Forneas as her boss and the owner of RSEA. 129070 March 16. SO ORDERED. the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court. 306 . No. Thus. WHEREFORE.People of the Philippines vs. and sentencing her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of one hundred thousand (P100.000. Baguio City. Accused Cabais informed her that she was connected with Red Sea Employment Agency (RSEA). Held: An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal. together with his employer. Accused Cabais talked to complainants several times during the period of February 1994 up to May 1994. a Manila-based agency which was licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. Cabais (G. accused-appellant actively participated in the recruitment of the complainants. All of the complainants testified that they personally met accused-appellant and transacted with her regarding the overseas job placement offers.

Another meeting was held on August 16. Quezon City on August 12. plaintiff-appellee. LUZ GONZALES-FLORES. 1994. Philippines. Nos. Philippine Currency. He told them not to get impatient. On August 18. however. as recruitment fees. she was detained.000. Accused-appellant was investigated by the Baler Police Station 2 on November 11. Accused-appellant later saw complainant to collect the balance of P35.00.[17] 307 . he was told each time to have patience and to just wait for the call from Domingo or from Baloran. accused-appellant saw complainant again to collect the P25. April 19. Although complainant regularly followed up his application with accused-appellant. after requiring them to submit certain documentary requirements and exacting from them the total amount of P128. and helping one another. The applicants were told by Domingo that they would be employed as waiters and attendants in the luxury liner and asked them again to wait a while. Baloran and Domingo went to the compound where Felixberto and accusedappellant were residing and called Felixberto. 1994.000. 2001 MENDOZA. to wit: the said accused. 1994. No receipt was. the Malgapo spouses. unlawfully and feloniously defraud FELIXBERTO LEONGSON. Accused-appellant told him that she would turn over the amount to Baloran. Cloyd. 138535-38. Domingo. issued to Felixberto. Thereafter. and Jojo Bumatay. no receipt was given for the P25. confederating with several persons whose true names and true identities have not as yet been ascertained. such recruitment activities being done without the required license or authority from the Department of Labor. 1994 at the Mandarin Hotel in Makati City by accusedappellant.: Facts: That on or about the month of August. accusedappellant.00 balance. At the appointed date and place. handed it to Baloran.000. Baloran. did then and there wilfully. Two days later. vs. in Quezon City. and Larry. y CASTAÑEDA in the following manner. in turn.000. Complainant was told to give the money to accused-appellant at Wendy’s in Cubao.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. complainant and his wife delivered the amount to accusedappellant who. JR. As in the case of the first two payments. the Leongson spouses. by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said complainant to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ complainant abroad . and Jojo to a meeting. But Felixberto never heard from either one of these two.R. G.00. Ronald.00. the said accused. Mendoza. J. conspiring together. Felixberto paid the amount to accused-appellant four days later. Domingo told the applicants that he was the chief engineer of the luxury ocean liner where they would embark and repeated to them the salaries and other benefits which they would receive. 1994 as a result of the complaints filed against her by Felixberto.

promising or advertising for 308 . 1994. utilizing. and (3) that the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons. SENDON BECAUSE. THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AVAILING IN SAID CASES ARE DIFFERENT AS IN THE PRESENT CASE. and includes referrals. accused-appellant had no license or authority to engage in any recruitment activities.[24] Accused-appellant claims. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE JURISPRUDENCE AND AUTHORITIES CITED. enlisting. The allegation is untenable. PEOPLE VS. this was stipulated at the trial. she appeared before the NBI accompanied by a policewoman to comply with the subpoena issued regarding her complaint. 34 of the Labor Code. PEOPLE VS. hiring or procuring workers. AND II. accused-appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale. 13 (b) or in any of the prohibited activities under Art. WITH DUE RESPECT. she is hereby convicted of said crimes and is sentenced: SO ORDERED. MANOZCA. either locally or overseas. HONRADA. Hence. 1998. contracting. this appeal. contract services. the guilt of the accused for illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa in three (3) counts having been proved beyond reasonable doubt. According to NBI Agent Jesus Manapat.[22] In these cases.[23] In fact. the dispositive portion of which reads: Issue: Whether or not the accused guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? Held: WHEREFORE. Art. Q-94-59473. In Criminal Case No. accused-appellant’s complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. COMIA. TAN TIONG MENG. VILLAS AND PEOPLE VS. PEOPLE VS. 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines “recruitment and placement” as referring to any act of canvassing. individually or as a group.E. Accused-appellant contends thatI. Based on the evidence presented. I.On November 24. however.. the essential elements of which are: (1) that the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art. that she herself was a victim of illegal recruitment and that she simply told complainants about job opportunities abroad. according to the certification of the POEA. particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers. (2) that the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. PEOPLE VS.[21] The contentions are without merit. PEOPLE VS. [THE LOWER COURT] ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED ON VERY MATERIAL POINTS. transporting. the trial court rendered its assailed decision on November 23.

complainants were led to believe by accused-appellant that she could do something so that their applications would be approved. Baloran. even promising them jobs as seamen. or bureau. and Mendoza. their testimonies would have been adverse to accused-appellant.[27] In these cases. complainants could not present receipts for their payment because accused-appellant assured them she would take care of their money. business or imaginary transactions. However. Nor did she present Domingo. The same article further states that any person or entity which. As long as the prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonies and affidavits that the accused-appellant was involved in the prohibited recruitment. It is probable that had she presented any of these persons.000. or Mendoza to corroborate her statements. agency. made her ploy even more plausible.” which is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer. whether for profit or not. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code committed By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: (a) By using fictitious name.[34] In sum. Not one of the persons she included in her complaint to the NBI was ever presented in her defense in these cases. Baloran. accused-appellant’s defense is uncorroborated. or falsely pretending to possess power. locally or abroad. under Art. Both elements of the crime were established in these cases. influence. Despite their initial reluctance because they lacked the technical skills required of seamen. recruitment includes “referral. and Mendoza. The imposition on accused-appellant of the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100. Domingo. (a) accused-appellant defrauded complainant by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (b) complainant 309 . offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. credit. The presentation of the receipts of payments is not necessary for the conviction of accused-appellant. placement officer. or by means of other similar deceits.[25] The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant sought out complainants and promised them overseas employment. Thus. a conviction for the offense can very well be justified. complainants gave her their moneys.employment.00 is thus justified. Accusedappellant’s companions. She actively and directly enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad. and collected moneys from them. 13 (b) of the Labor Code. namely.[26] In these cases. because of accused-appellant’s misrepresentations. accused-appellant did more than just make referrals. in any manner. Accused-appellant contends that all she did was to refer complainants to Domingo. The failure of complainants to present receipts to evidence payments made to accusedappellant is not fatal to the prosecution case. More importantly. property. we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale. Baloran. Accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of estafa under Art. qualifications.

thus causing them damage and prejudice. Held: the decision of the Regional Trial Court.suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation as a result.. Q-94-59470. as maximum. to nine (9) years of prision mayor. (2) In Criminal Case No. to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. SO ORDERED. Mercado. Jr. as minimum. The award of moral damages should likewise be upheld as it was shown to have factual basis. Q-94-59472. as maximum. Ronald Frederizo. as maximum. as minimum. and (3) In Criminal Case No. to ten (10) years of prision mayor. Q-94-59471.[37] Complainants parted with their money upon the prodding and enticement of accused-appellant on the false pretense that she had the capacity to deploy them for employment abroad. accused-appellant is sentenced: (1) In Criminal Case No. 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 310 . Branch 77. with the MODIFICATIONS that. as minimum. In the end.[40] the fact that no receipts were presented to prove the amounts paid by complainants to accused-appellant does not prevent an award of actual damages in view of the fact that complainants were able to prove by their respective testimonies and affidavits that accused-appellant was involved in the recruitment process and succeeded in inveigling them to give their money to her. conversion and demand not being elements of estafa under Art. In accordance with the ruling in People v. and Larry Tibor is AFFIRMED. complainants were neither able to leave for work overseas nor did they get their money back. in the cases for estafa. finding accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa against complainants Felixberto Leongson. Quezon City. to 10 years of prision mayor. to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.[38] The issues that misappropriation on the part of accused-appellant of the money paid by complainants and their demand for the same were not sufficiently established are immaterial and irrelevant. to suffer a prison term ranging from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.

vs. promising or advertising for employment. Upon arraignment on August 18. With respect to complainants Jessie Bolinao and Rogelio Tibeb. The complainants recounted their respective experience with accused Linda Sagaydo. The accused-appellant made representations to each of the private complainants that she could send them to Korea to work as factory workers. hiring or procuring workers. the trial court rendered a decision convicting her of the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. Branch 59. and four (4) cases of estafa. individually or as a group. the decretal portion of which is quoted in the opening paragraph of this opinion. Nos. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons. individually or as a group. Bernabe filed with the Regional Trial Court. While accused admitted having received money from complainants Gina Cleto and Naty Pita. 1995. constituting a promise of employment which amounted to recruitment as defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. PARDO. locally or abroad. and (3) committed the infraction against three or more persons.: FACTS: On December 15.[G. Baguio City. whether for profit or not. 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. contracting. 1992. LINDA SAGAYDO. any of the following activities would constitute recruitment and placement: canvassing. Thus. separate informations charging accused Linda Sagaydo with one (1) case of illegal recruitment in large scale. on October 25. including referrals. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the complainants and rejected the denial of accused. 124671-75. 1992. Thus. she said she used their money to buy their plane tickets. this appeal. Sagaydo is guilty of one (1) case of illegal recruitment in large scale and four (4) cases of estafa.R. transporting. (2) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. the accused denied having received any money from them. offers or promises for a fee employment to two (2) or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. When asked why she was not able to return the money of Gina and Naty. HELD: “Illegal recruitment has been defined to include the act of engaging in any of the activities mentioned in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code without the required license or authority from the POEA. utilizing. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused. September 29. contract services. accusedappellant. From the testimonies of the private complainants that the trial court found to be 311 . enlisting. Baguio City Prosecutor II Estrellita P.” All the aforementioned requisites were present in this case. Under the aforesaid provision. Hence. plaintiff-appellee.” “This crime requires proof that the accused: (1) engaged in the recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 or in any of the prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code. accused said that she returned the plane tickets to the Tour Master travel Agency for refund but said agency did not make reimbursements. Article 13 (b) further provides that any person or entity which. The accused denied having recruited any of the private complainants. accused pleaded not guilty to all the five (5) charges against her. trial ensued. in any manner. Gina and Naty were not able to leave because the Korean government imposed a visa requirement beginning January. 1993. She claimed that they came to her voluntarily after being informed that she was able to send her three (3) sons to Korea. J.

there is no denying that accused-appellant gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send them abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. 312 . The conviction of accused-appellant LINDA SAGAYDO for illegal recruitment and estafa was sustained subject to the MODIFICATION on the penalties. mere denial of accused-appellant cannot prevail. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the complainants. per certification issued by the POEA Regional Extension Unit in Baguio City. the record showed that accused-appellant did not have the authority to recruit for employment abroad. As to the license requirement.credible and untainted with improper motives.

namely. plaintiff-appellee. they knew that they were applying for employment abroad through the Steadfast Recruitment Agency. Philippines. 1994. recruit and promise employment/job placement of 9 persons in Taiwan. He claims that he merely suggested to them the opportunity to work overseas but that he never advertised himself as a recruiter. 39. enlisting. in any manner. transporting. application forms and other documents for employment in Taiwan. for a fee. that any person or entity which. in the City of Baguio. whether for profit or not. i. 2000 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. without first obtaining or securing license or authority from the proper governmental agency.e." accused-appellant.27 On the other hand. as amended by Presidential Decree No. For his defense. and includes referrals. utilizing. undertaken by persons who have no license or authority to engage in recruitment for overseas employments is illegal and punishable under Art. did then and there willfully. offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons. hiring or procuring workers. placement officer or bureau.. hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad. promising or advertising for employment. He then offered to scout for a recruitment agency in Manila. Accused-appellant accompanied complainants to Steadfast Recruitment Agency in Manila. provided.G.: Facts: The information for illegal recruitment in large scale2 alleged — That sometime during and between the period from November. accused-appellant testified that when complainants sought his help. No. Issue: WON COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT Held: Accused-appellant claims the when complainants filled out their respective bio-data. 13(b) of the Labor Code. including the prohibited practices enumerated in Art. or. Accused-appellant is charged with violation of Art. "recruitment and placement" refer to any act of canvassing. The contention has no merit. vs.R. J. contract services. BENZON ONG y SATE alias "BENZ ONG. 119594 January 18. 2018. contracting. he advised them to go to the POEA but complainants claimed that they do not know anyone at said office. illegal recruitment is considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist. "referral" is employment as the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer. if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another. Under Art. locally or abroad. enlist. (b) when 313 . the above-named accused. contract. representing himself to have the capacity. 34 of said Code. (a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate. is considered engaged in recruitment and placement. unlawfully and feloniously. MENDOZA. which provides that any recruitment activity. 1993 to January. 38 of the Labor Code. On the other hand.

Moreover. be convicted of estafa under Art.. (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. 13(b) or in any prohibited activities under Art. particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers. in which the criminal intent is not necessary. either locally or overseas. 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Art.illegal recruitment is committed in large scale. individually or as a group.e. There is no problem of double jeopardy because illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum. if it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. and (3) the accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons. the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. whereas estafa is malum in se in which the criminal intent of the accused is necessary. it is settled that a person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may. 314 . in addition. i. 34 of the Labor Code.35 WHEREFORE.

In People v. RULING: The Court reiterated the rule that the person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present. ISSUE: Whether the person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa. REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO G. and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person 315 . Romero we said that the elements of estafa were: (a) that the accused defrauded another abuse of confidence or by means of deceit.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. accused-appellant contends that the court a quo erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses considering that the amounts claimed to have been collected by him did not correspond to the amounts indicated in the receipts presented by the complaining witnesses. Nos.R. The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty as charged. 1996 FACTS: REYDANTE CALONZO Y AMBROSIO was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and five (5) counts of Estafa. 115150-55 September 27. .

in the court's opinion. Court of Industrial Relations 85 Phil 431. We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest. 40 Off. compensation. 3rd Supp." Statutes are cutting in on it. of course. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages. vs. Court of Industrial Relations. the appellant takes exception to the finding of the court below that Dee C. The power may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or administrative agencies. Gaz. Inc." contains the proviso that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. laborers is an implicit recognition of the correctness of the proposition. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. bloodshed and revolution in our country. "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties.. Inc. . Chuan and Sons vs. being subjected to restraints today.. Chuan & Sons. 1950 Facts: Dee C. Gaz. is capitalized with foreign descent. Chuan & Sons. "This privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional objective and . and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of.)1 "Commonwealth Act No." The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas. 40 Off. The petitioner's request for permission to employ additional. the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos. 103. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. January 31." 316 . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude. 319. By the same token. The regulations of the hours of labor of employees and of the employment of women and children are familiar examples of the limitation of the employer's right in this regard.. The power of the legislature to make regulations is subject only to the condition that they should be affected with public interest and reasonable under the circumstances.. Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Can the the Court of Industrial Relations intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions? Decision: The employer's right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. 324. 8th Supp. And so does Commonwealth Act No." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. . if such condition.Dee C. 173.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis. At the outset.

Issue: Whether respondent Limjoco is indeed an employee of the petitioner. and transfers of employees in private respondent's district. where a person who works for another does so more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work. Then on October 30. 87098 November 4. agreed upon that office expenses would be deducted from private respondent's commissions. In fine. 1974. SO ORDERED. In view of the foregoing premises. Petitioner would also be informed about appointments. vs. 1975. claiming for non-payment of separation pay and other benefits. there is nothing in the records to show or would "indicate that complainant was under the control of the petitioner" in respect of the means and methods in the performance of complainant's work. however. and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof. promotions. He selected his own personnel and the only reason why he had to notify the petitioner about such appointments was for purpose of deducting the employees' salaries from his commissions. goodwill and logo. Held: Private respondent was not an employee of the petitioner company. "the element of control is absent. As compensation. He was free to conduct his work and he was free to engage in other means of livelihood. He was also allowed to use petitioner's name. Private respondent was merely an agent or an independent dealer of the petitioner. private respondent is not entitled to the benefits prayed for. It was. we should not find that the relationship of employer and employee exists. As stated earlier.Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. On June 14. and the decision of the NLRC is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. He had free rein in the means and methods for conducting the marketing operations. and also illegal deduction from his sales commissions. 1996) Facts: Private respondent Benjamin Limjoco was a Sales Division Manager of petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica and was in charge of selling petitioner's products through some sales representatives. Consequently. No. private respondent received commissions from the products sold by his agents. the petition is hereby GRANTED. he filed a complaint against petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica with the Department of Labor and Employment. NLRC (G. private respondent Limjoco resigned from office to pursue his private business.R. 317 .

Basiao thereafter filed with the then Ministry of Labor a complaint 4 against the Company and its president. unless the termination is due to a violation of this contract. J. LTD. in April 1972. plus attorney's fees. as well as all its circulars .: FACTS : Pettitioner entered contract with Basiao for insurance policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and regulations" of the Company.. Hence.." were made part of said contract.. 1989 NARVASA. asserting that he was not the Company's employee.. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MELECIO BASIAO. After vainly seeking a reconsideration. of all the insurance policies solicited by . prompted the latter to terminate also his engagement under the first contract and to stop payment of his commissions starting April 1... except when the termination is due to disability or death in line of service. Without contesting the termination of the first contract. The Agent shall not have any right to any commission on renewal of premiums that may be paid after the termination of this agreement for any cause whatsoever. As to commission corresponding to any balance of the first year's premiums remaining unpaid at the termination of this agreement. less actual cost of collection. he was later to claim.. Either party may terminate this contract by giving to the other notice in writing to that effect. In May. but an independent contractor and that the Company had no obligation to him for unpaid commissions under the terms and conditions of his contract. 84484 November 15. in the form of commissions . he would receive "compensation. and those which may from time to time be promulgated by it.." plus 10% attorney's fees. Basiao and Associates." and the "rules in . 1979.. 1980. as provided in the Schedule of Commissions" of the contract to "constitute a part of the consideration of . at the time of his termination. involving criminal liability or breach of trust Some four years later. while concurrently fulfilling his commitments under the first contract with the Company. equivalent to the balance of the first year's premium remaining unpaid. the parties entered into another contract — an Agency Manager's Contract — and to implement his end of it Basiao organized an agency or office to which he gave the name M.INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. Basiao sued the Company in a civil action and this. (said) agreement.. The respondents disputed the Ministry's jurisdiction over Basiao's claim. This decision was.. affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission... vs.. (the Company's) Rate Book and its Agent's Manual. on appeal by the Company. It shall become ipso facto cancelled if the Insurance Commissioner should revoke a Certificate of Authority previously issued or should the Agent fail to renew his existing Certificate of Authority upon its expiration.R. G. the present petition for certiorari and prohibition ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship? 318 . (him) in favor of the respondent company . He ruled that the underwriting agreement had established an employer-employee relationship between him and the Company.. No. the Company terminated the Agency Manager's Contract. . Said official's decision directed payment of his unpaid commissions ".. The Labor Arbiter to whom the case was assigned found for Basiao. the Agent shall be entitled to it if the balance of the first year premium is paid. the complaint sought to recover commissions allegedly unpaid thereunder. and this conferred jurisdiction on the Ministry of Labor to adjudicate his claim...

and (4) the power to control the employees' conduct — although the latter is the most important element (35 Am. either expressly or by necessary implication. (3) the power of dismissal. that no employer-employee relation in the legal and generally accepted sense existed between it and Basiao. In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship. set no accomplishment quotas and compensated him on the basis of results obtained. the following elements are generally considered. left to his judgment the time. 319 . as did the respondent NLRC in affirming the Arbiter's decision. and was free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective. The Company's thesis. The Labor Arbiter erred in taking cognizance of. being without jurisdiction to do so. and adjudicating.. instead of employees of the parties for whom they workedThe Labor Arbiter's decision makes reference to Basiao's claim of having been connected with the Company for twenty-five years. He was not bound to observe any schedule of working hours or report to any regular station. the obvious reply would be that what is germane here is Basiao's status under the contract of July 2. is drawn from the terms of the contract they had entered into. (2) the payment of wages. 445). said claim. rules that under the contract invoked by him. There is no dearth of authority holding persons similarly placed as respondent Basiao to be independent contractors.HELD: The Court. place and means of soliciting insurance. but a commission agent. he could seek and work on his prospects anywhere and at anytime he chose to. an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action. 1968. . . Whatever this is meant to imply.. Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner. therefore. which. This conclusion renders it unnecessary and premature to consider Basiao's claim for commissions on its merits. Jur... namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. not the length of his relationship with the Company. made Basiao the master of his own time and selling methods.

private respondent. herein petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with the NLRC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. petitioners added another ground for seeking a dismissal of the complaint. accusing private respondent Sadac of abusive conduct. persisted in his request for a formal investigation. the Board of Directors. 00-11-05252-89. Private respondent Sadac is the General Counsel and Vice-President for the Legal Department of petitioner bank with a monthly salary of P8." Private respondent was removed from his office occupancy in the bank and ordered disentitled. 000. to any compensation and other benefits. nine lawyers of the bank's Legal Department addressed a "letter-petition" to the Chairman of the Board of Directors. the lawyers would resign en masse. Undaunted. inefficiency. Private respondent promptly responded and manifested an intention to file criminal. BANICO. CHUA. ORTIZ. HON. After learning of the filing of the complaint. a complaint. in his memorandum of 07 September 1989 to the individual members of the Board of Directors. 1997 EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION. Morales issued a memorandum to Sadac stating that due to the circumstances it has chosen the more compassionate option of waiting for his voluntary resignation from his employ with the Bank and that Atty. respondents.R. 5803 terminating the services of private respondent "in view of his belligerence" and the Board's "honest belief that the relationship" between private respondent and petitioner bank was one of "client and lawyer. First Division. J. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. LEONG. Private respondent.G. Mr. mismanagement. private respondent. Two days later. Pursuing their stand that the association between the bank and private respondent was one of a clientlawyer relationship. Director FRANCISCO C. even if the bank were to incur the tremendous expense of continuing to pay him his high salary just so it can continue to adhere to its compassionate policy of avoiding ruining the future of any of its officers by a possible dismissal for cause which is certainly bound to leak to the public. GO. The Board instructed management to take the necessary steps to "defend itself and all the members of the Board of Directors" from private respondent's complaint. LIMPE and Director PEDRO A. insisted on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them.: FACTS: On 26 June 1989. 102467 June 13. ROMULO. Mr. SADAC. 500.00. Romulo wrote back expressing that the charge where he have been constructively dismissed is likewise without basis because he is free to remain in the employ of the bank if he so wish. against herein petitioners for illegal dismissal and damages. Vice-Chairman & Director RICARDO J. stating that the report of Mr. Director PETER GO PAILIAN. Mr. petitioners. Veto has already been instructed and authorized by the Board to take over from him the functions that he is now performing in the Legal Department. and RICARDO L. on 09 November 1989. docketed NLRC Case No.00 and a Christmas bonus equivalent to a two-month salary. Banico submitted a report to the Board of Directors with the findings that the specific charges against Sadac are each proven and/or established by the same nature of evidence. that the rule governing the duration of private respondent's term was provided for by the Rules of Court and not by the Labor Code. civil and administrative charges against the nine lawyers. Petitioner Morales as well as petitioner Banico. furnishing the other members of the Board. plus an allowance of P4. VITUG. on 21 November 1989. met with the complaining nine lawyers in an attempt to resolve their differences. filed with the Manila arbitration branch of the NLRC. He then requested for a full hearing by the Board of Directors so that he could clear his name. ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. Banico contained libelous statements and its implementation would lead to an illegal dismissal. President & Director GEORGE L. ISSUE: 320 .. On 31 August 1989. Having been unheeded. GO. adopted Resolution No. In their reply. Chairman MANUEL L.B. Vice-Chairman & Director JOHN C. opposing the motion. However they were warned that if private respondent were to be retained in his position. vs. No. MORALES. Director RICARDO C. Director HERMINIO B. starting 10 August 1989. Convinced that reconciliation was out of the question. Director JULIUS T. Private respondent responded with a letter addressed to Board Chairman Morales.

of the Rules of Court." The Labor Arbiter concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action because a lawyer-client relationship should instead be governed by Section 26. HELD: Following an exchange of position papers and other pleadings. Book V. an employee may be validly dismissed if these requisites are attendant: (1) the dismissal is grounded on any of the causes stated in Article 282 of Labor Code. the questioned Resolution of the NLRC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: That private respondent shall be entitled to backwages from termination of employment until turning sixty (60) years of age (in 1995) and. the complainant was given the usual payslips to evidence his monthly gross compensation.00. The existence of an employer-employee relationship. The NLRC. Moreover. However. in the instant case. on appeal. Ordinary breach of trust will not suffice. in other words. Jr. of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. as employer. based its finding that there existed an employer-employee relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent on these factual settings: 4) 5) 6) In his more than eight years employment with the respondent bank. on 02 October 1990. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Rule XIV. (3) the power of dismissal. for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. the other petitioners being absolved from solidary liability. The power of control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof. Under the Code. with the control test generally assuming primacy in the overall consideration. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. that private respondent shall be paid an additional amount of P5. It held that private respondent was an employee of petitioner bank. the NLRC concluded differently. to retirement benefits in accordance with law. It is not essential. it must be willful and without justifiable excuse. This ground must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest.000. 321 . can effectively discharge. (2) the payment of wages. and that the liability herein pronounced shall be due from petitioner bank alone. and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct. Rule 138. WHEREFORE. between the bank and private respondent brings the case within the coverage of the Labor Code. otherwise. Mayor. No costs. thereupon. the dismissal will be rendered illegal. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code provides that "willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. The complainant contributed to the bank Employees' Provident Fund. and (2) the employee has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself as so required by Section 2 and Section 5.. that the award of moral and exemplary damages are deleted. withheld taxes due to the Bureau of Internal Revenue from the complainant's salary as employee. the bank enrolled the complainant as its employee under the Social Security System and Medicare programs.Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and the private respondent. It rendered a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. the following elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter was convinced that the relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent was one of lawyer-client based on the functions of the latter which "only a lawyer with highly trained legal mind. The respondent bank. it is enough that the former has the right to wield the power.

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