Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato
Project Gutenberg's Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at Title: Apology, Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates Author: Plato Release Date: October 12, 2004 [EBook #13726] Language: English

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato



Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


Of all writers of speculative philosophy, both ancient and modern, there is probably no one who has attained so eminent a position as Plato. What Homer was to Epic poetry, what Cicero and Demosthenes were to oratory, and what Shakespeare was to the drama of England, Plato was to ancient philosophy, not unapproachable nor unapproached, but possessing an inexplicable but unquestioned supremacy. The authentic records of his life are meagre, and much that has been written concerning him is of a speculative nature. He was born at Athens in the year 427 B.C. His father's name was Ariston, and his mother's family, which claimed its descent from Solon, included among its members many Athenian notables, among whom was Oritias, one of the thirty tyrants. In his early youth Plato applied himself to poetry and painting, both of which pursuits he relinquished to become the disciple and follower of Socrates. It is said that his name was originally Aristocles, but that it was changed to Plato on account of the breadth of his shoulders and forehead. He is also said to have been an expert wrestler and to have taken part in several important battles. He was the devoted friend and pupil of Socrates, and during the imprisonment of his master he attended him constantly, and committed to writing his last discourses on the immortality of the soul. After the death of Socrates it is supposed that Plato took refuge with Euclides in Megara, and subsequently extended his travels into Magna Graecia and Egypt. Upon his return to Athens he taught those who came to him for instruction in the grove named Academus, near the Cephisus, and thus founded the first great philosophical school, over which he continued to preside until the day of his death. Above the entrance to this grove was inscribed the legend: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Here he was attended by persons of every description, among the more illustrious of whom were Aristotle, Lycurgus, Demosthenes and Isocrates.

The second charge he meets by a cross-examination of his accuser. or with doing so undesignedly.: "The Apologia. So great was the regard and veneration for him that it was considered better to err with Plato than be right with any one else. He prefers to stand upon his own integrity and innocence. . He neither denies nor confesses the first accusation. and that he believes in God more than he fears man. does not firmly grapple with either of the charges preferred against him. viz. the first time he has ever been before a court of justice. though unaccustomed to the language of the courts. He. and called him the Divine Plato." all of which have reference to the trial. undertaking his own defence. Plato was present at the trial. for which he could not be liable to punishment.Crito. therefore. The people of his time thought more of him than they did of all their other philosophers." "The Crito" and "The Phædo. and most of them are in the form of dialogues. The former he is said to have so seriously offended as to cause the tyrant to have him seized on his return home and sold as a slave. and Phaedo of Socrates. though seventy years of age. from which state of bondage he was. the other that he had corrupted the Athenian youth by his teachings. The writings of Plato are numerous. imprisonment and death of Socrates. and twice at the earnest solicitations of the younger. which would be absurd. Melitus. released by Anicerius of Cyrene. but shows that in several instances he conformed to the religious customs of his country. however. uninfluenced by the fear of that imaginary evil. The following pages contain translations of three of his works. Two charges were brought against Socrates--one that he did not believe in the gods recognized by the State. and no doubt gives us the very arguments used by the accused. by Plato 4 There is a story to the effect that Plato three times visited Sicily. once upon the invitation of the elder Dionysius. whom he reduces to the dilemma of charging him with corrupting the youth designedly. death. Socrates does not have recourse to the ordinary methods adopted by orators on similar occasions. the occasion being. "The Apologia" represents Socrates on trial for his life. as he says.

He convinces his listeners of the pre-existence of the soul. and. it is his duty to submit to the laws of Athens at whatever cost to himself. avails him nothing. had a fine been the sentence imposed. Socrates promises to follow the advice of Crito if. but they are still skeptical as to its immortality. second. When his friends arrive they find him sitting upon a bed rubbing his legs. therefore. and from this the conversation gradually turns to a consideration of the question of the immortality of the soul. and he is condemned by the judges to die by drinking the poisonous hemlock. however. would arrive forthwith. In the conversation which ensues Socrates argues that it is wrong to return evil for evil and that the obligations which a citizen owes to his State are more binding than those which a child owes his parents or a slave his master. and Socrates thereupon decides to submit to his fate. to acquit Socrates of the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth. In "The Crito" Socrates is represented in conversation with a friend of his named Crito. He is visited by a number of his friends. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. urging that its pre-existence and the fact that it is more durable than the body does not preclude the possibility of its . "The Phædo" relates the manner in which Socrates spent the last day of his life and the circumstances attending his death. upon a full discussion of the matter. the arrival of which was to be the signal for his death upon the following day. who had been present at his trial. Plato is said to have had two objects in writing this dialogue: First. to establish the fact that it is necessary under all circumstances to submit to the established laws of his country. and who had offered to assist Socrates in paying a fine. and to urge him to adopt the means of escape which had already been prepared. it seems right to do so. and. Crito has no answer to make to this argument. He remarks upon the unaccountable connection between pleasure and pain. Simmias and Crito. among whom are Phædo. which have just been released from bonds. by Plato 5 His defence. In the closing part of "The Apologia" Socrates is represented as commenting upon the sentence which has been passed upon him. Crito visits Socrates in his confinement to bring to him the intelligence that the ship. and as expressing his belief that in going to his death he is only passing to a better and a happier life.

pay it. For that they are not ashamed of being forthwith convicted by me in fact. that in which they said that you ought to be on your guard lest you should be deceived by me. Socrates bathes and takes leave of his children and the women of his family. but not after their fashion for they. In like manner. and let none of you expect otherwise. when I shall show that I am not by any means eloquent. and Phaedo of Socrates. so plausible were their arguments however. with choice phrases and expressions. For I am confident that what I say will be just. His limbs soon grow stiff and heavy and he lays himself down upon his back. they have said nothing true. At this his friends commence to weep and are rebuked by Socrates for their weakness. Having convinced his listeners. for surely it would not become my time of life to come before you like a youth with a got up speech. as being eloquent in speech. But of the many falsehoods which they uttered I wondered at one of them especially. but wherever there is life there is soul. consequently the soul is immortal. so to speak. heat while it is heat can never admit the idea of cold. I know not. and then begins to walk about. as. the same object cannot partake of both magnitude and littleness at the same time. then I would allow that I am an orator. but from me you shall hear the whole truth. this seemed to me the most shameless thing in them. therefore. Not indeed. For. if they mean this. nor adorned. O Athenians! how far you have been influenced by my accusers for my part.Crito. His last words are: "Crito. unless indeed they call him eloquent who speaks the truth." THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES. but you shall hear a speech uttered without premeditation in such words as first present themselves. arguments highly wrought. and do not neglect it. Athenians. He drinks the poison calmly and without hesitation. Socrates. as I affirm. argues that contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time. Above all . have said nothing true. we owe a cock to Æsculapius. Life and death are contraries and can never coexist. by Plato 6 being mortal. as theirs were. however. so that the soul contains that which is contrary to death and can never admit death. in listening to them I almost forgot myself. for example. Thereupon the officer appears and tells him it is time for him to drink the poison. still conversing with his friends.

and my first accusers. but of an orator to speak the truth. being themselves persuaded. as it appears to me. laying hold of many of you from childhood. not to be surprised or disturbed on this account. I am therefore utterly a stranger to the language here. of whom I am more afraid than of Anytus and his party. that it is not possible to learn and mention their names. and to give your attention to this. for it is not possible to bring any of them forward here. if I were really a stranger. First. and accused me of what is not true: "that there is one Socrates. then. as. . who. and for many years. for perhaps it may be somewhat worse. then. have persuaded others. when you were boys and some of you youths. O Athenians! if you hear me defending myself in the same language as that in which I am accustomed to speak both in the forum at the counters. Athenians. but those are still more formidable. all these are most difficult to deal with. although they too are formidable.Crito. however. and to consider this only. to disregard the manner of my speech. for they who hear them think that such as search into these things do not believe that there are gods. they said these things to you at that time of life in which you were most credulous. though more than seventy years old. I beg and implore this of you. therefore. 2. and has explored every thing under the earth. and makes the worse appear the better reason. and perhaps better. where many of you have heard me. and Phaedo of Socrates. so now I ask this of you as an act of justice. who occupies himself about celestial matters. a wise man. O Athenians! who have spread abroad this report are my formidable accusers. As. by Plato 7 things. and they accused me altogether in my absence. have persuaded you. and then against the latest accusations. and elsewhere. For many have been accusers of me to you.[1] Such. and the latest accusers. except that one of them happens to be a comic poet. whether I speak what is just or not. have persuaded you. For the case is this: I now for the first time come before a court of justice. nor to confute any. when there was no one to defend me. moreover. and have accused me now for a long time." Those. influenced by envy and calumny. and those who. But the most unreasonable thing of all is. you would have pardoned me if I spoke in the language and the manner in which I had been educated. who have asserted nothing true. In the next place. O Athenians! I am right in defending myself against the first false accusations alleged against me. for this is the virtue of a judge. these accusers are numerous.

Nevertheless. and there are many such among you. whom I have made mention of." Such is the accusation: for such things you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes. Let us. and that in making my defense I could effect something more advantageous still: I think. and acting many other buffooneries. in making my defense. as I have said. only let me not be prosecuted by Melitus on a charge of this kind. . then. of which I understand nothing whatever. and relying on which Melitus has preferred this indictment against me. Well. then. and to convict when there is no one to answer. Consider. that my accusers are twofold. and others long since. saying that he walks in the air. if any one of you has ever heard me conversing little or much on such subjects. and is criminally curious in searching into things under the earth. some who have lately accused me. and in the heavens. are of a similar nature. as many of you as have ever heard me conversing. by Plato 8 but it is altogether necessary to fight. it might be so. one Socrates there carried about. And from this you will know that other things also.Crito. let this turn out as may be pleasing to God. then. however. as it were with a shadow. and Phaedo of Socrates. and require you to inform and tell each other. I must make my defense. 3. and in teaching these same things to others. do they who charge me say in their charge? For it is necessary to read their deposition as of public accusers. I wish. I must obey the law and make my defense. if it were at all better both for you and me. What. and believe that I ought to defend myself against these first. and much more than these last. but I say it. and I am not entirely ignorant what the difficulty is. that it will be difficult. therefore. which the multitude assert of me. Nor do I say this as disparaging such a science. Well. Therefore tell each other. O Athenians! because I have nothing to do with such matters. "Socrates acts wickedly. O Athenians! and endeavor in this so short a space of time to remove from your minds the calumny which you have long entertained. and in making the worse appear the better cause. repeat from the beginning what the accusation is from which the calumny against me has arisen. if there be any one skilled in such things. for you heard them accusing me first. indeed. And I call upon most of you as witnesses of this.

giving them money and thanks besides. but I possess it not. "Evenus the Parian. yet be assured that I shall tell you the whole truth. indeed. therefore. to abandon their fellow-citizens and associate with them. Though this. Is there any one. "or not?" "Certainly. and require payment. what master do you intend to choose for them? Who is there skilled in the qualities that become a man and a citizen? For I suppose you must have considered this. is staying in the city.Crito. O Athenians! have acquired this character through nothing else than a certain wisdom. then? Whence have these calumnies against you arisen? For surely if you had not busied yourself more than others. "and whence does he come? and on what terms does he teach?" He replied. then. is this wisdom? Perhaps it is merely human . who can attach themselves gratuitously to such of their own fellow-citizens as they please. Socrates. and he would have been a groom or an agricultural laborer. if one should be able to instruct men. Tell us. to persuade the young men. if I possessed this knowledge. 5. what have you done. such a report and story would never have got abroad." He who speaks thus appears to me to speak justly. if you have heard from any one that I attempt to teach men." he answered. for he has two sons. and be very proud. O Athenians! is able. I therefore asked him. For each of these." And I deemed Evenus happy. by Plato 9 4. Prodicus the Cean. I hear. since you have sons. nor. Listen. But now. Perhaps." I said. what it is." I said. and I will endeavor to show you what it is that has occasioned me this character and imputation. that we may not pass a hasty judgment on you. since your sons are men. for five minae. by going through the several cities. is this true. "if your two sons were colts or calves. O Athenians. Socrates. "Who is he?" said I. who. There is also another wise man here. if he really possesses this art. and Phaedo of Socrates. However not one of these things is true. and teaches admirably. unless you had done something different from what most men do. Of what kind. and hire a person who would make them excel in such qualities as belong to their nature. And I too should think highly of myself. one of you may now object: "But. then: to some of you perhaps I shall appear to jest. and Hippias the Elean. like Gorgias the Leontine. son of Hipponicus. For I. For I happened to visit a person who spends more money on the sophists than all others together: I mean Callias. we should have had to choose a master for them. appears to me to be an honorable thing. a Parian. "Callias.

and for the purpose of calumniating me. but I shall refer to an authority whom you will deem worthy of credit. both to him and to many others who were . possessed a wisdom more than human. then. O Athenians! do not cry out). thinking that there. though you affirmed that I was the wisest. I went to one of those who have the character of being wise. in truth. What does the god mean? What enigma is this? For I am not conscious to myself that I am wise. by Plato 10 wisdom. For when I heard this. Hence I became odious. Having once gone to Delphi. this man appeared to be wise in the opinion of most other men. since he himself is dead. why I mention these things: it is because I am going to show you whence the calumny against me arose. then. For the account which I am going to give you is not my own. They probably. whom I have just now mentioned. and Phaedo of Socrates. Consider. And for a long time I was in doubt what he meant. and especially in his own opinion. he accompanied you in your late exile. I appear to be wise. and whosoever says I am. does he mean by saying that I am the wisest? For assuredly he does not speak falsely: that he could not do. how earnest in whatever he undertook. if anywhere. I reasoned thus with myself. then. speaks falsely. as I said. though in fact he was not so. for I am not acquainted with it. even though I should seem to you to speak somewhat arrogantly. But. and of this. what kind of a man Chærepho was. he ventured to make the following inquiry of the oracle (and. either much or little. having fallen into conversation with him. I thereupon endeavored to show him that he fancied himself to be wise. then. if I have any. 6. and show in answer to the response that This man is wiser than I. examined this man (for there is no occasion to mention his name. with considerable difficulty. and the associate of most of you. O Athenians! do not cry out against me. What. otherwise I know not what to say about it. and returned with you. O Athenians!). however. The Pythian thereupon answered that there was not one wiser. one of our great politicians. and of what it is. but really was not. I had recourse to the following method of searching out his meaning. his brother here will give you proofs. Having.Crito. for he asked if there was any one wiser than I. For I shall adduce to you the god at Delphi as a witness of my wisdom. in examining whom I felt as I proceed to describe. You know. I should confute the oracle. afterward. he was. You doubtless know Chærepho: he was my associate from youth. For in this.

it appeared necessary to regard the oracle of the god as of the greatest moment. and grieving and alarmed. that I was making myself odious. however. in order to discover its meaning. . I soon discovered this. And by the dog. but they understand nothing that they say. But I must relate to you my wandering. on account of their poetry. in which they were not. and that. For after the politicians I went to the poets. and at the same time I perceived that they considered themselves. 7. as well the tragic as the dithyrambic and others. in a word. that at the same time I might learn something from them. I reasoned thus with myself: I am wiser than this man. expecting that here I should in very fact find myself more ignorant than they. some of their poems. perceiving indeed.Crito. After that I went to another who was thought to be wiser than the former. therefore. for neither of us appears to know anything great and good. therefore. to be the wisest of men in other things. which appeared to me most elaborately finished. with regard to the poets. but he fancies he knows something. for these also say many fine things. I must go to all who had the reputation of possessing any knowledge. When I left him. although he knows nothing. In this trifling particular. and the labors which I underwent. because I do not fancy I know what I do not know. so I do not fancy I do. O Athenians! for I must tell you the truth. in the same way that I was to the politicians. and under the influence of enthusiasm. and others who were considered inferior more nearly approaching to the possession of understanding. For. that they do not effect their object by wisdom. by Plato 11 present. I am ashamed. and Phaedo of Socrates. in order that the oracle might prove incontrovertible. however. as I do not know anything. whereas I. O Athenians! to tell you the truth. in my researches in obedience to the god. After this I went to others in turn. almost all who were present could have given a better account of them than those by whom they had been composed. then. like prophets and seers. The poets appeared to me to be affected in a similar manner. Taking up. I came to some such conclusion as this: those who bore the highest reputation appeared to me to be most deficient. it must be told. Hence I became odious to him and to many others. under the persuasion that I was superior to them. therefore. I left them. but by a certain natural inspiration. and formed the very same opinion. I questioned them as to their meaning. I appear to be wiser than he.

then. who. for each. although they know little or nothing. I take the part of the god. both among citizens and strangers. and then. in behalf of the oracle. so that many calumnies have sprung from them. like Socrates. by Plato 12 8. and those the most grievous and severe. they find a great abundance of men who fancy they know something. that it was better for me to continue as I am. O Athenians! appears to be really wise. for those who are from time to time present think that I am wise in those things. therefore. knows that he is in reality worth nothing with respect to wisdom. for they knew things which I did not. if I think any one of them is wise. From this investigation. and when he appears to me not to be so. and among them this appellation of being wise. O Athenians! even the best workmen appeared to me to have fallen into the same error as the poets. therefore. in obedience to the god. At last. and Phaedo of Socrates. however. For I was conscious to myself that I knew scarcely anything. take great delight in hearing men put to the test. that man is the wisest among you. but I was sure that I should find them possessed of much beautiful knowledge. but made use of my name. possessing none. I have no leisure to attend in any considerable degree to the affairs of the state or my own. 10. and show that he is not wise. I went to the artisans. whether I should prefer to continue as I am. as if he had said. I therefore asked myself. and it is clear that he did not say this to Socrates. who have much leisure and belong to the wealthiest families. because he excelled in the practice of his art. but I am in the greatest poverty through my devotion to the service of the god. either of their wisdom or their ignorance. 9. I answered. following me of their own accord. and often imitate me. with respect to which I expose the ignorance of others.Crito. I go about and search and inquire into these things. And in this I was not deceived. or to have both as they have. and this mistake of theirs obscured the wisdom that they really possessed. putting me forward as an example. in consequence of this occupation. O Athenians! many enmities have arisen against me. . And. In addition to this. therefore. and themselves attempt to put others to the test. I think. thought that he was very wise in other most important matters. Still. to myself and to the oracle. young men. But. and in this respect they were wiser than I. and to mean this by his oracle: that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. The god.

under pretense of being zealous and solicitous about things in which he never at any time took any concern. I will next endeavor to give an answer." Such is the accusation. they have filled your ears. let us take up their deposition. Melitus being angry on account of the poets. that they may not seem to be at a loss. be willing to tell the truth that they have been detected in pretending to possess knowledge. rashly putting men upon trial.Crito. "that he searches into things in heaven and things under the earth. by Plato 13 Hence those who are put to the test by them are angry with me. and here. as he says. And if you will investigate the matter. and Phaedo of Socrates. "acts unjustly in corrupting the youth. Anytus on account of the artisans and politicians. that good and patriotic man. and that he makes the worse appear the better reason. This. Melitus. and Lycon on account of the rhetoricians. and not with them. But I. and I speak it without concealing or disguising anything from you. 11. they say such things as are ready at hand against all philosophers. I think. whereas they know nothing. as I said in the beginning. then. you will find it to be so. for a long time and diligently calumniating me. and to my later accusers." And when any one asks them by doing or teaching what. I think. To Melitus. to the charges which my first accusers have alleged against me. Therefore. that he does not believe there are gods. as there are different accusers. O Athenians! say that Melitus acts unjustly. and in not believing in those gods in whom the city believes. From among these. But that this is the case I will endeavor to prove . who corrupts the youth. being ambitions and vehement and numerous. and that these are its causes. With respect. much or little. because he jests on serious subjects. a most pestilent fellow. It says that I act unjustly in corrupting the youth. though I very well know that by so doing I shall expose myself to odium. So that. This. is a proof that I speak the truth. they have nothing to say. Anytus and Lycon have attacked me. let this be a sufficient apology to you. for they do not know. It is pretty much as follows: "Socrates. I should wonder if I were able in so short a time to remove from your minds a calumny that has prevailed so long. and that this is the nature of the calumny against me. but. and say that "there is one Socrates. either now or hereafter. let us examine each particular of it. but in other strange divinities. and speaking systematically and persuasively about me. however." For they would not. again. O Athenians! is the truth." it says.

and accused me: come. for it is evident that you know. Whether all. most excellent sir. Socrates. Socr. say. Socr. by Plato 14 to you. the laws? Mel. Certainly. Come. Melitus. by Juno! and have found a great abundance of those that confer benefit. having detected me in corrupting them. The laws. friend. Socr. you have cited me here. as you say. How say you. You say well. that you never took any concern about the matter? But tell me. the judges. and make them better? Mel. and inform the judges who it is that makes them better. for. Do you see. tell the judges who it is that makes them better. But what further? Can these hearers make them better. Socr. and have nothing to say? But does it not appear to you to be disgraceful. that you are silent. do you not consider it of the greatest importance that the youth should be made as virtuous as possible? Mel. and a sufficient proof of what I say. and others not? Mel. or not? . then. Melitus. but what man. I do.Crito. Socr. 12. tell me. who surely must first know this very thing. All. since it concerns you so much. Melitus? Are these able to instruct the youth. or some of them. then. and Phaedo of Socrates. Well. now. who makes them better? Mel. I do not ask this. These.

and you clearly evince your own negligence. The senators. Socr. both with respect to horses and all other animals? It certainly is so. Do not the bad work some evil to those that are continually near them. also. my friend. or very few. and Phaedo of Socrates. They. and the rest benefited them. as it seems. . Do you say so? Mel. in the name of Jupiter. I do assert this very thing. can. whether you and Anytus deny it or not. Melitus. that is. For it would be a great good-fortune for the youth if only one person corrupted. for I ask you nothing difficult. But. with respect to horses? Do all men make them better. by Plato 15 Mel. make them honorable and good. Melitus. therefore. Socr. do they spoil them? Is not this the case. Tell us further. Melitus. whether is it better to dwell with good or bad citizens? Answer. and is there only some one that spoils them? or does quite the contrary of this take place? Is there some one person who can make them better. you have sufficiently shown that you never bestowed any care upon youth. And what of the senators? Mel. Socr. However. do those who attend the public assemblies corrupt the younger men? or do they all make them better? Mel. but the good some good? Mel. except me. Socr. They too. You charge me with great ill-fortune. 13. Certainly. But answer me: does it appear to you to be the same. Melitus. in that you have never paid any attention to the things with respect to which you accuse me. the trainers? But if the generality of men should meddle with and make use of horses. but I alone corrupt them.Crito. All the Athenians. too.

But you shunned me. Melitus. then. good man. O Athenians! this now is clear that I have said. But if I corrupt them undesignedly. as one that corrupts the youth. then. 14. I shall cease doing what I do undesignedly. according to the indictment which you have preferred. or.Crito. how you say I corrupt the youth? Is it not evidently. by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes. Melitus. surely. whether do you accuse me here. much or little. Is there any one that wishes to be injured rather than benefited by his associates? Answer. and the good some good. that Melitus never paid any attention to these matters. Is there any one who wishes to be injured? Mel. by teaching these things. as to know that the evil are always working some evil to those that are most near to them. I corrupt the youth? Mel. nor do I think would any other man in the world. Designedly. and Phaedo of Socrates. then. I say. But either I do not corrupt the youth. However. Socr. . Certainly I do say so. by Plato 16 Socr. What. I shall be in danger of receiving some evil from him. tell us. and were not willing to associate with and instruct me. and yet I designedly bring about this so great evil. for the law requires you to answer. Socr. as you say? In this I can not believe you. I do it undesignedly: so that in both cases you speak falsely. but to take one apart. Come. but I have arrived at such a pitch of ignorance as not to know that if I make any one of my associates depraved. For it is evident that if I am taught. where it is usual to accuse those who need punishment. but you accuse me here. and teach and admonish one. and makes them more depraved. designedly or undesignedly? Mel. are you at your time of life so much wiser than I at my time of life. and not instruction. Thus. if I do corrupt them. but in other strange deities? Do you not say that. Melitus. No. for such involuntary offenses it is not usual to accuse one here.

by Jupiter. and suppose them to be so illiterate as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomene are full of such assertions. By those very gods. or shall I deceive him and all who hear me? For. those which the city believes in. in the orchestra. then. none whatever. For he seems. by Jupiter. in my opinion. And the young. of whom the discussion now is. and this it is that you accuse me of. by Jupiter. which they might purchase for a drachma. and am not altogether an atheist. to have composed an enigma for the purpose of making an experiment. and Phaedo of Socrates. however.Crito. do I appear to you to believe that there is no god? Mel. nor in this respect to blame). You fancy that you are accusing Anaxagoras. and thus you put a slight on these men. moreover. but others. like the rest of mankind. O wonderful Melitus. Socr. No. therefore. Socr. No. he clearly contradicts himself in the indictment. as if he should say. intemperance. learn these things from me. Socr. and contradict myself. that I introduce others. Melitus. and that I teach others the same? Mel. how come you to say this? Do I not. and so ridicule Socrates. You say what is incredible. Or do you say outright that I do not myself believe that there are gods. if he pretended they were his own. and the moon an earth. speak still more clearly both to me and to these men. as it were. as appears to me. especially since they are so absurd? I ask then. and wantonness. at most. Whether will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting. O Athenians! appears to me to be very insolent and intemperate and to have preferred this indictment through downright insolence. For this man. even to yourself. not. by Plato 17 Socr. For I can not understand whether you say that I teach them to believe that there are certain gods (and in that case I do believe that there are gods. my dear Melitus. Socrates is guilty . believe that the sun and moon are gods? Mel. I say this: that you do not believe in any gods at all. and that. Melitus. O judges! for he says that the sun is a stone.

For I suppose you to assent. since I allow that there are demons? But if demons . then. as I besought you at the outset. but that there are things pertaining to horses? or who does not believe that there are pipers. is the act of one who is trifling. and in believing that there are gods. if demons are a kind of gods. Since. and this you have sworn in the bill of indictment. Melitus. But answer to this at least: is there any one who believes that there are things relating to demons. and Phaedo of Socrates. but does not believe that there are demons? Mel. and not make so much noise. And do you. There is not. 15. remember not to make an uproar if I speak after my usual manner. but that there are things pertaining to pipes? There is not. that I do believe and teach things relating to demons. or the children of gods? Do you admit this or not? Mel. in what respect he appears to me to say so. who believes that there are human affairs. then. by Plato 18 of wrong in not believing that there are gods. there is surely an absolute necessity that I should believe that there are demons. Is it not so? It is. whether they be new or old. I say it to you and to all here present. Socr. Is there any one who does not believe that there are horses. If. therefore. since you do not answer. Consider with me now. answer me. surely. I believe in things relating to demons. Is there any man. according to your admission.Crito. judges. then. I do believe in things relating to demons. and do ye. Certainly. How obliging you are in having hardly answered. And this. Athenians. and again that I do allow there are. But with respect to demons. I allow that there are demons. O best of men! for since you are not willing to answer. as you admit. but does not believe that there are men? Let him answer. Melitus. Socr. this is the point in which I say you speak enigmatically and divert yourself in saying that I do not allow there are gods. though compelled by these judges! You assert. do we not allow that they are gods.

and yet that there are neither demons. who so far despised danger in comparison of submitting to disgrace. either from nymphs or any others. whether he is acting justly or unjustly.Crito. and will. appears to me not to require a lengthened defense. not Melitus. not heroes. something to this effect." she said. condemn others also.[2] "My son. "death awaits you immediately after Hector. is utterly impossible. if you revenge the death of your friend Patroclus. and dreading much more to live as a coward. what man can think that there are sons of gods. but the calumny and envy of the multitude. And as to what I said at the beginning. friend. for that you should persuade any man who has the smallest degree of sense that the same person can think that there are things relating to demons and to gods. and Phaedo of Socrates. I think. be assured it is true. however. You do not say well. but should not think there are horses and asses. you will yourself die. and those good men. despised death and danger. and yet that there are not gods? For it would be just as absurd as if any one should think that there are mules. "May I die immediately . all those demi-gods that died at Troy would be vile characters. by Plato 19 are the children of gods. the offspring of horses and asses. and not avenge his friend. that there is a great enmity toward me among the multitude. in his impatience to kill Hector. or because you were at a loss what real crime to allege against me. then. who was a goddess. and the part of a good man or bad man. "Are you not ashamed. said. if I am condemned. for. However. 16. O Athenians! according to the indictment of Melitus. it can not be otherwise than that you have preferred this indictment for the purpose of trying me. ought to take into the account the risk of life or death. who is even of the least value. Perhaps. Socrates. as I think. And this it is which will condemn me. spoke to him. of whom they are reported to be. nor gods. as well all the rest as the son of Thetis. to have pursued a study from which you are now in danger of dying?" To such a person I should answer with good reason. but what I have said is sufficient. some one may say. Melitus. spurious ones. That I am not guilty. nor Anytus. on hearing this. and slay Hector. which have already condemned many others." but he. For. if you think that a man. according to your reasoning. that when his mother. and ought not to consider that alone when be performs any action. for there is no danger that it will stop with me.

and encountered the danger of death. through fear of death or any thing else whatsoever. maybe good. as if they well knew that it is the greatest of evils. he ought to remain and meet danger. But to act unjustly. and accuse me of not believing in the gods. fearing death. as I thought and believed. that I may not stay here an object of ridicule. who said that either I should not[3] appear here at all. and to disobey my superior. and at Delium. either thinking it to be better. telling you that if I escaped. I also think that I have not such knowledge. desert my post. on this condition. taking no account either of death or anything else in comparison with disgrace. at Amphipolis. by the curved ships. it was impossible not to put me to death. and if I should say that I am in any thing wiser than another. O Athenians! if. and . O Athenians! is nothing else than to appear to be wise. For to fear death. And how is not this the most reprehensible ignorance. "Socrates. it would be in this. for it is to appear to know what one does not know. I shall never. whether God or man. a burden to the ground?"--do you think that he cared for death and danger? For thus it is. like any other person. to think that one knows what one does not know? But I. there. when the generals whom you chose to command me assigned me my post at Potidæa. and then. strange indeed would it be. So that. before evils which I know to be evils. O Athenians! in this. O Athenians! in truth: wherever any one has posted himself. For no one knows but that death is the greatest of all good to man. in truth. or that. I then remained where they posted me. 17. if you should address me thus. I know is evil and base. but when the deity. or has been posted by his chief. therefore. differ from most men. but dismiss you. and Phaedo of Socrates. if I did appear. that you no longer persevere in your researches nor study philosophy. fear or shun things which. from disobeying the oracle. even if you should now dismiss me. by Plato 20 when I have inflicted punishment on the guilty.Crito. for aught I know. and thinking myself to be wise when I am not. however. but men fear it. assigned it as my duty to pass my life in the study of philosophy. as it appears to me. perhaps. would all be utterly corrupted. without being so. that not having a competent knowledge of the things in Hades. we shall not now yield to Anytus. not yielding to the instances of Anytus. and examining myself and others. your sons. I then should be acting strangely. studying what Socrates teaches. any one might justly bring me to trial. I should on that occasion.

Thus I shall act to all whom I meet. you will raise a clamor. perhaps. to take no care either for the body. but riches and all other human blessings. but I shall obey God rather than you. prior to or so much as for the soul. I shall not cease studying philosophy. by saying these things. how you may acquire them in greatest abundance. since I shall not act otherwise. as I said. even though I must die many deaths. stranger and citizen. For be well assured. saying. O Athenians! but continue to attend to my request. "O Athenians! I honor and love you. being such a man as I say I am. and Phaedo of Socrates. both private and public. you will derive benefit from listening. 18. but on no account do so. both young and old. from virtue. but I shall question him. not to murmur at what I say. then. my fellow-citizens. as I think. For neither will Melitus nor Anytus harm me. Be well assured. how it maybe made most perfect?'" And if any one of you should question my assertion. and affirm that he does care for these things. as I have been accustomed to do: 'O best of men! seeing you are an Athenian. nor . he misleads you. by Plato 21 if hereafter you are detected in so doing. you shall die"--if. but if any one says that I speak other things than these. because ye are more nearly allied to me. For I am going to say other things to you. then. and for your soul. O Athenians! either yield to Anytus. either dismiss me or not. these things must be mischievous. you should dismiss. but care not nor take any thought for wisdom and truth. And I think that no greater good has ever befallen you in the city than my zeal for the service of the god. or for riches. how it may be made most perfect. I shall reproach him for that he sets the least value on things of the greatest worth. me on these terms. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you. at which. And if he should appear to me not to possess virtue. I should say to you. or do not.[4] Therefore I must say. you will not injure me more than yourselves. and so long as I breathe and am able. sift and prove him. but to listen. both young and old. and honor. If. of a city the most powerful and most renowned for wisdom and strength. I corrupt the youth. but the highest on things that are worthless.Crito. but rather to you. if you put me to death. and exhorting you and warning any one of you I may happen to meet. and for glory. but to pretend that he does. this the deity commands. for. Murmur not. nor depart. I shall not at once let him go. telling you that virtue does not spring from riches. are you not ashamed of being careful for riches.

or deprived of civil rights. being such a person as I am. therefore. But that I am a person who has been given by the deity to this city. but that it is much more so to do what he is now doing. though it may be ridiculous to say so. 19. but I do so on your own behalf. for it is not like the ordinary conduct of men. and that I should constantly attend to your concerns. and requiring to be roused by a gad-fly. how ever. Now. therefore. and persuade and reprove every one of you. to endeavor to put a man to death unjustly. For. addressing myself to each of you separately. and had received pay for my exhortations. but now you see yourselves that my accusers. however. do not consider them so. for I do not think that it is possible for a better man to be injured by a worse. my poverty. who have so shamelessly calumniated me in everything else. He may perhaps have me condemned to death. Such another man. caring for you. you will not easily find such another. as any one might think. but never venture to present myself . to the city. and he or others may perhaps consider these as mighty evils. yielding to Anytus. O Athenians! will not easily be found. persuading you to the pursuit of virtue. and then you will pass the rest of your life in sleep. there would have been some reason for my conduct. altogether attached by the deity to this city as to a powerful and generous horse. if you will take my advice. that I should have neglected all my own affairs. it may appear absurd that I. will unthinkingly condemn me to death. will strike me. by Plato 22 have they the power. or elder brother. should send some one else to you. unless the deity. being irritated like drowsy persons who are roused from sleep. thus advise you in private and make myself busy. going about. perhaps. nor ever cease besetting you throughout the whole day. and Phaedo of Socrates. you may discern from hence. and. and to bring witnesses to prove that I ever either exacted or demanded any reward. somewhat sluggish from his size. O Athenians! I am far from making a defense on my behalf. namely. Perhaps.Crito. so the deity appears to have united me. and suffered my private interest to be neglected for so many years. that I may rouse you. lest by condemning me you should offend at all with respect to the gift of the deity to you. or banished. you will spare me. But you. like a father. have not had the impudence to charge me with this. I. And I think I produce a sufficient proof that I speak the truth. if you should put me to death. And if I had derived any profit from this course.

At that time I alone of the Prytanes opposed your doing anything contrary to the laws. For it is not possible that any man should be safe who sincerely opposes either you. which also Melitus. And this happened while the city was governed by a democracy. having sent for me with four others to the Tholus. through fear of death. and who prevents many unjust and illegal actions from being committed in a city. facts. but have been a senator: and our Antiochean tribe happened to supply the Prytanes when you chose to condemn in a body the ten generals who had not taken off those that perished in the sea-fight. as you afterward all thought. and take no part in public affairs. the Thirty. and to carry me before a magistrate. that you may know that I would not yield to any one contrary to what is just. Hear. I shall tell you what will be displeasing and wearisome. ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis. has set out in the indictment. if he will be safe for but a short time. what has happened to me. or any other multitude. when present. in violation of the law. I will give you strong proofs of this. I thought I ought rather to meet the danger with law and justice on my side. than through fear of imprisonment or death.Crito.[5] yet true. wishing to involve as many as they . by Plato 23 in public before your assemblies and give advice to the city. at the same time by not yielding I must perish. but never urges me on. O Athenians! never bore any other magisterial office in the city. This it is which opposed my meddling in public politics. and I voted against you. and it appears to me to have opposed me very properly. being a kind of voice which. that he might be put to death. to take part with you in your unjust designs. 20. always diverts me from what I am about to do. but it is necessary that he who in earnest contends for justice. O Athenians! if I had long since attempted to intermeddle with politics. For be well assured. should live privately. because I am moved by a certain divine and spiritual influence. For I. but what you value. and you urged and cheered them on. and they gave many similar orders to many others. and Phaedo of Socrates. The cause of this is that which you have often and in many places heard me mention. through mockery. This began with me from childhood. and should not have at all benefited you or myself. and when the orators were ready to denounce me. I should have perished long ago. not words. But when it became an oligarchy. And be not angry with me for speaking the truth. then.

in the smallest degree. if any one wishes it. neither to any other. for this is by no means disagreeable. and the very same in private. For that government. if the expression be not too rude. and to see me busied about my own mission. shall be found to be a man. 21. it were . nor to any one of these whom my calumniators say are my disciples. but when we came out from the Tholus. but if any one desired to hear me speaking. because I never either promised them any instruction or taught them at all. be well assured that he does not speak the truth. has been enjoined me by the deity. had aided the cause of justice. and. O Athenians! I have told you the whole truth. however. but I allow both rich and poor alike to question me. But this duty. then. if I have done anything in public. and have already corrupted others. Then. who has never made a concession to any one contrary to justice. as I ought. I. and brought back Leon. and. as I say. But if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all others have not. I showed. by dreams. But why do some delight to spend so long a time with me? Ye have heard. did not so overawe me as to make me commit an unjust action. and. whether he were young or old. by Plato 24 could in guilt. to answer me and hear what I have to say. O Athenians! nor would any other man have done so. if that government had not been speedily broken up. And for these. and not when I do not receive any. And of this you can have many witnesses. For if I am now corrupting some of the youths. was never the preceptor of any one.Crito. acting as becomes a good man. that they delight to hear those closely questioned who think that they are wise but are not. These things. and easily confuted if not true. had deemed this of the highest importance? Far from it. I never refused him. strong as it was. but I went away home. And perhaps for this I should have been put to death. whether any one proves to be a good man or not. not in word but in deed. But I. O Athenians! are both true. Do you think. but that all my care was to do nothing unjust or unholy. Nor do I discourse when I receive money. however. and by every mode by which any other divine decree has ever enjoined anything to man to do. and Phaedo of Socrates. 22. the four went to Salamis. that I should have survived so many years if I had engaged in public affairs. through the whole of my life. I cannot justly be responsible. by oracles. that I did not care for death.

Perhaps. however. . and many others of his relatives and friends. or if they were themselves unwilling to do this. but those who have not been corrupted. some among you will be indignant on recollecting his own case. father of Epigenes. and let him say it. Well. or other relatives. 23. you will find. let him now adduce them. my contemporary and fellow-burgher. men now advanced in life. having become advanced in life. whose brother is this Apollodorus. namely. these are pretty much the things I have to say in my defense. Crito. had discovered that I gave them bad advice when they were young. then. son of Ariston. Nicostratus. are here present. he then forgot to do so. whose brothers maintained the same intimacy with me. some one of whom certainly Melitus ought to have adduced in his speech as a witness. taking notice of this. may give his vote under the influence of anger. and Phaedo of Socrates. too. again. although I may appear to be incurring the extremity of danger. and. if their kinsman have ever sustained any damage from me. however. and that I speak the truth. father of this Æschines. or brothers. and Adimantus. Antiphon of Cephisus. so that he could not deprecate his brother's proceedings--and Paralus here. O Athenians! all ready to assist me. they should now rise up against me. I could also mention many others to you. then Lysanias of Sphettus. father of this Critobulus. who have corrupted and injured their relatives. Perhaps. then. brother of Theodotus--Theodotus indeed is dead. son of Demodocus. whereas I do none of these things. as Melitus and Anytus say. by Plato 25 fitting. that they know that Melitus speaks falsely. implored and besought the judges with many tears. some of their kindred. whose brother was Theages. their fathers. bringing forward his children in order that he might excite their utmost compassion. therefore. surely. except that right and just one. If. Many of them. may become more determined against me. For those who have been themselves corrupted might perhaps have some reason for assisting me. and Æantodorus. Athenians. There are those others. being enraged at this very conduct of mine. But. some one. If. when engaged in a cause far less than this. whom I see: first. their relatives. if he has anything of the kind to allege. son of Theodotus. should now call it to mind. however. that if any of them. accuse me. what other reason can they have for assisting me. I give him leave to do so. and others perhaps of the same kind. and have me punished.Crito. whose brother is this Plato. if he. quite contrary to this.

as thinking they should suffer something dreadful by dying. O Athenians! it does not appear to me to be right to entreat a judge. and Phaedo of Socrates. bring any one of them forward and implore you to acquit me. are in no respect superior to women. out of regard to my own character. It is. or to escape by entreaty. too. and whom they themselves choose in preference to themselves for magistracies and other honors. Whether or not I am undaunted at the prospect of death is another question. O Athenians! have relatives. so that any stranger might suppose that such of the Athenians as excel in virtue. then. nor from a rock. If. and three sons. For a judge does not sit for the purpose of administering justice out of favor. and with the reputation I have. and two boys: I shall not. but you should make this manifest. however.Crito. than him who quietly awaits your decision. and makes the city ridiculous. For it is commonly agreed that Socrates in some respects excels the generality of men. shall I not do this? Not from contumacy. should act in such a manner as I have often seen some when they have been brought to trial. therefore. for in so doing neither of us would act righteously. so that I. I think I may reasonably say to him: "I. to violate your oaths. whether true or false. Think not then. O Athenians! neither ought we to do who have attained to any height of reputation. and he is sworn not to show favor to whom he pleases. O Athenians! that I ought to adopt . suppose that there is--but if there should be. 24. but that he will decide according to the laws. but one ought to inform and persuade him. have relatives. I am not sprung from an oak. that you will much rather condemn him who introduces these piteous dramas. it would be shameful. ought you to suffer us. by Plato 26 any one of you is thus affected--I do not. for. have conducted themselves in a surprising manner. or fortitude. one now grown up. For these things. however. But. and yours. who appearing indeed to be something. it does not appear to me to be honorable that I should do any thing of this kind at my age. nor. should we do them. O best of men. right that neither should we accustom you." Why. Such men appear to me to bring disgrace on the city. too. but. O Athenians! nor disrespect toward you. and that of the whole city. and as if they would be immortal if you did not put them to death. reputation apart. those among you who appear to excel either in wisdom. but from men. then. but that he may judge rightly. to make use of that saying of Homer. nor should you accustom yourselves. or any other virtue whatsoever.

he would have been fined a thousand drachmas. and Phaedo of Socrates. The man. 26.] 25. thinking that I was in reality too upright a man to be safe if I took part in such things. if only three more votes had changed sides. popular oratory. I should teach you to think that there are no gods. then. For I did not expect that I should be condemned by so small a number. the votes being taken. nor holy. should accuse myself of not believing in the gods. that you have condemned me--as well many other circumstances concur in bringing to pass. and in reality. is far from being the case. by attending to which I should have been of no service either to you or to myself. and by my entreaties should put a constraint on you who are bound by an oath. but now. moreover. For clearly. moreover this. This. So far as Melitus is concerned. He thereupon resumes his address. but I much rather wonder at the number of votes on either side. for I believe. O Athenians! at what has happened--namely. But what shall I. Well. while making my defense. by Jupiter! on any other occasion.Crito. and. money-making. as it appears to me. for not having obtained a fifth part of the votes. if I should persuade you. by Plato 27 such a course toward you as I neither consider honorable. all the magistracies. that what has happened has not happened contrary to my expectation. and. but in order to confer the . I have been already acquitted. That I should not be grieved. and now especially when I am accused of impiety by this Melitus. O Athenians! award myself? Is it not clear that it will be such as I deserve? What. and I leave it to you and to the deity to judge concerning me in such way as will be best both for me and for you. and cabals that are met with in the city. conspiracies. as it seems. I therefore did not apply myself to those pursuits. awards me the penalty of death. however. or to pay a fine? for that I have purposely during my life not remained quiet. [Socrates here concludes his defense. he is declared guilty by a majority of voices. and not only have I been acquitted. but neglecting what most men seek after. as well. O Athenians! as none of my accusers do. nor just. but it is clear to every one that had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to accuse me. then. military command. but by a large majority. I should have been acquitted. and. is that? Do I deserve to suffer. on my part. domestic concerns.

for I have not money to pay it. O . then. maintenance in the Prytaneum. I am far from intending to injure myself. but I do. nor of the affairs of the city before he took care of the city itself. and of pronouncing against myself that I am deserving of punishment. Through fear of what? lest I should suffer that which Melitus awards me. do I deserve. a benefactor. and that he should attend to other things in the same manner. I think you would be persuaded. Perhaps. seeing I am such a man? Some reward. What. Being persuaded. that in capital cases the trial should list not only one day. the Eleven? Shall I choose a fine. however. and he does not need support. that I have injured no one. at least. If. and Phaedo of Socrates. though I can not persuade you of this. For if there were the same law with you as with other men. and. or in the two or four horsed chariot race: for such a one makes you appear to be happy. 27. endeavoring to persuade every one of you not to take any care of his own affairs before he had taken care of himself in what way he may become the best and wisest. but such is not the case. for we have conversed with each other but for a short time. is suitable to a poor man. by Plato 28 greatest benefit on each of you privately. I must award a sentence according to my just deserts. I appear to you to speak in the same presumptuous manner as I did respecting commiseration and entreaties. I thereupon applied myself to that object. but it is not easy in a short time to do away with. such a reward as would be suitable to me. What treatment. Shall I. a slave to the established magistracy. moreover. O Athenians! it is rather this: I am persuaded that I never designedly injured any man. shall I choose what I well know to be evil. great calumnies. I should indeed be very fond of life. of which I say I know not whether it he good or evil? Instead of this. award myself exile? For perhaps you would consent to this award. and from awarding myself any thing of the kind.Crito. and who has need of leisure in order to give you good advice? There is nothing so suitable. O Athenians! if. and to be imprisoned until I have paid it? But this is the same as that which I just now mentioned. to be so. then. I award this. and award that? Shall I choose imprisonment? And why should I live in prison. as I affirm. therefore. I am to be estimated according to my real deserts. in speaking to you thus. but many. O Athenians! as that such a man should be maintained in the Prytaneum. then. then. but I. and this much more than if one of you had been victorious at the Olympic games in a horserace.

is the case. for then I should have suffered no harm. Perhaps. and so to live. [The judges now proceeded to pass the sentence. and condemned Socrates to death. but that a life without investigation is not worth living for. by Plato 29 Athenians! if I were so devoid of reason as not to be able to reflect that you. Such. they will themselves drive me out. their fathers and kindred will banish me on their account. If. 28. live a silent and quiet life? This is the most difficult thing of all to persuade some of you. you would not believe me. who are my fellow-citizens. however. still less would you believe me if I said this. thinking I spoke ironically. and other things which you have heard me discussing. For I well know that. I say that this is the greatest good to man. wherever I may go. I amerce myself. But Plato here. If. and Apollodorus bid me amerce myself in thirty minae. therefore. Can you not. however. and if I do not repulse them. as I affirm. And if I repulse them. as they do here. it is impossible for me to live quietly. then. I were rich. when you have gone from us. indeed. But perhaps I could pay you a mina of silver: in that sum. then. I would amerce myself in such a sum as I should be able to pay. O Athenians! and Crito Critobulus. I amerce myself. and driven from city to city. have been unable to endure my manner of life and discourses. some one will say. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself deserving of any ill. examining both myself and others. whereupon he continued:] 29. . persuading the elders. and they offer to be sureties. O Athenians! though it is not easy to persuade you. For if I say that that would be to disobey the deity. however. the youth will listen to me when I speak. and Phaedo of Socrates. will easily bear them. to discourse daily on virtue. to you in that sum. Socrates. For the sake of no long space of time. Far from it. on the other hand. but now--for I can not. O Athenians! you will incur the character and reproach at the hands of those who wish to defame the city. and that. O Athenians! A fine life it would be for me at my age to go out wandering. and they will be sufficient sureties for the money. but they have become so burdensome and odious to you that you now seek to be rid of them: others.Crito. unless you are willing to amerce me in such a sum as I am able to pay.

had I lamented and bewailed and done and said many other things unworthy of me. ought so to be. nor do I now repent of having so defended myself. for I am now in that condition in which men most frequently prophesy--namely. But this is not difficult. O Athenians! who have condemned me to death. by which to avoid death. for observe my age. by which I might have persuaded you. what will be your fate. to the same persons. And I say this. but to those only who have condemned me to die. having so defended myself. too. but they condemned by truth. but my accusers. though I am not. am overtaken by the slower of the two. by Jupiter! . and Phaedo of Socrates. I say. perhaps. being slow and aged. and so do they. if a man dares to do and say every thing. that it is far advanced in life. and near death. Socrates. for it runs swifter than death. as guilty of iniquity and injustice: and I abide my sentence. then. O Athenians! to escape death. had I thought it right to do and say any thing. to death. that immediately after my death a punishment will overtake you. In the next place. for the sake of avoiding danger. being strong and active. O Athenians! that I have been convicted through the want of arguments. And there are many other devices in every danger. than to live in that way. to you. but it is much more difficult to avoid depravity. But neither did I then think that I ought. but such as you are accustomed to hear from others. and of the inclination to say such things to you as would have been most agreeable for you to hear. this would have happened of its own accord. For those who wish to defame you will assert that I am wise. by Plato 30 of having put that wise man. so that I might escape punishment. condemned by you to death. If.Crito. yet not of arguments. as I affirm. But I say this not to you all. to do any thing unworthy of a freeman. and I think that they are for the best. then. I desire to predict to you who have condemned me. For neither in a trial nor in battle is it right that I or any one else should employ every possible means whereby he may avoid death. wickedness. you had waited for a short time. And now I. and throwing himself on the mercy of his pursuers. These things. Perhaps you think. have been overtaken by the swifter. far more severe. Far otherwise: I have been convicted through want indeed. 30. but of audacity and impudence. when they are about to die. And now I depart. but I should much rather choose to die. for in battle it is frequently evident that a man might escape death by laying down his arms.

thinking you should be freed from the necessity of giving an account of your lives. while we are permitted to do so. you are much mistaken.Crito. either in what I did or said. then. by Plato 31 than that which you have inflicted on me. but now that has befallen me which ye yourselves behold. Stay with me. but for a man to take heed to himself how he may be most perfect. not to put a check upon others. But with you who have voted for my acquittal I would gladly hold converse on what has now taken place. The very contrary. and you will be more indignant. then. Having predicted thus much to those of you who have condemned me. For you have done this. however. though you did not perceive it. throughout this proceeding. nor in my address when I was about to say any thing. and which is supposed to be the extremity of evil. A great proof of this to me is the fact that it is impossible but that the accustomed signal should have opposed me. yet neither when I departed from home in the morning did the warning of the god oppose me. for I wish to make known to you. O Athenians! for nothing hinders our conversing with each other. opposed me. nor when I came up here to the place of trial. for this method of escape is neither possible nor honorable. I take my leave of you. while the magistrates are busy. What. Your accusers will be more numerous. opposed me if I was about to do any thing wrong. yet on other occasions it has frequently restrained me in the midst of speaking. and I am not yet carried to the place where I must die. and which any one would think. the meaning of that which has just now befallen me. and it is impossible that we think rightly who suppose that death is an evil. To me. inasmuch as they are younger. . and Phaedo of Socrates. do I suppose to be the cause of this? I will tell you: what has befallen me appears to be a blessing. and they will be more severe. as being my friends. even in the most trifling affairs. but that other is most honorable and most easy. 31. as I affirm. whom I have now restrained. For if you think that by putting men to death you will restrain any one from upbraiding you because you do not live well. then. But now it has never. O my judges! and in calling you judges I call you rightly--a strange thing has happened. will happen to you. so long. For the wonted prophetic voice of my guardian deity on every former occasion. unless I had been about to meet with some good.

and have no sensation of any thing whatever. would this be a sad removal? At what price would you not estimate a conference with Orpheus and Musæus. my judges? For if. son of Telamon. Hesiod and Homer? I indeed should be willing to die often. one shall find those who are true judges. Moreover. For to die is one of two things: for either the dead may be annihilated. my judges. what greater blessing can there be than this. that all the dead are there. would find them easy to number. but even the great king himself. and to question them. Æacus and Triptolemus. should be required. for in other respects those who live there are more happy than those who are here. and Phaedo of Socrates. or Sisyphus. or Ulysses. and are henceforth immortal. But the greatest pleasure would be to spend my time in questioning and examining the people there as I have done those here. there are a certain change and passage of the soul from one place to another. as it is said. by Plato 32 32. Minos and Rhadamanthus. for thus all futurity appears to be nothing more than one night. as it were a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream. if. and Ajax. I think. when I should meet with Palamedes. If. would not any one estimate the opportunity of questioning him who led that mighty army against Troy. I think that not only a private person. in comparison with other days and nights. but is not. I say it is a gain. For to me the sojourn there would be admirable. on arriving at Hades. to say how many days and nights he had passed better and more pleasantly than this night throughout his life. and who are said to judge there. would be an inconceivable happiness? Surely for that the judges there do not condemn to death. and who fancies himself to be so. And if it is a privation of all sensation. and any other of the ancients who has died by an unjust sentence. The comparing my sufferings with theirs would. at least. and what is said be true. therefore. death would be a wonderful gain. For I think that if any one. death is a thing of this kind.Crito. if this be true. we may hence conclude that there is great hope that death is a blessing. released from these who pretend to be judges. on consideration. death is a removal from hence to another place. having selected a night in which he slept so soundly as not to have had a dream. on the other hand. and having compared this night with all the other nights and days of his life. and such others of the demi-gods as were just during their own life. be no unpleasing occupation. what is said be . But if. and discovering who among them is wise. or ten thousand others whom one might mention both men and women--with whom to converse and associate. or. At what price.

[5] But for the authority of Stallbaum. and for conceiving themselves to be something when they are worth nothing. 94." that is. And what has befallen me is not the effect of chance. neither while living nor when dead. that to a good man nothing is evil. but thinking to injure me: in this they deserve to be blamed. for you to live. Thus much. ou l'on vous impose. if they appear to you to care for riches or anything else before virtue. xviii. but this is clear to me. If ye do this. reproach them as I have done you. I beg of them. Cousin. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. ver. although they did not condemn and accuse me with this intention. [3] See the "Crito. therefore. I should have translated dikanika "forensic." lib. nor are his concerns neglected by the gods. etc. or against my accusers. for not attending to what they ought. But it is now time to depart--for me to die. and if they think themselves to be something when they are nothing. FOOTNOTES [1] Aristophanes. But which of us is going to a better state is unknown to every one but God. literally. [2] "Iliad. 5. that now to die. and I bear no resentment toward those who condemned me. "he says nothing:" on se trompe. O my judges! ought to entertain good hopes with respect to death. and to meditate on this one truth. however. 33. [4] ouden legei. You. and be freed from my cares is better for me On this account the warning in no way turned me aside. O judges! paining them as I have pained you. both I and my sons shall have met with just treatment at your hands. Punish my sons when they grow up. by Plato 33 true. such arguments as an advocate would use in a court of ." sec.

and Phaedo of Socrates. by Plato 34 justice. He appears to have frequently visited his friend in prison after his condemnation. is expected to arrive forthwith. or a slave to his master. to free Socrates from the imputation of having attempted to corrupt the Athenian youth. Crito was one of those friends of Socrates who had been present at his trial. and having established the divine principle that it is wrong to return evil for evil. At length Crito admits that he has no answer to make. it should appear to be right to do so. however. CRITO. THE DUTY OF A CITIZEN. that the general principle appears only to be illustrated by the example of Socrates. to establish the principle that under all circumstances it is the duty of a good citizen to obey the laws of his country. These two points. Socrates thereupon. It has been remarked by Stallbaum that Plato had a twofold design in this dialogue--one. CRITO. He brings intelligence that the ship. having promised to follow the advice of Crito if. the other. had a fine been imposed instead of the sentence of death. at whatever cost to himself.Crito. and that the primary one. proposes to consider the duty of a citizen toward his country. finds him composed in a quiet sleep. and now. and that therefore it is his duty to obey the established laws. and takes occasion to entreat Socrates to make his escape. are so closely interwoven with each other. the arrival of which would be the signal for his death on the following day. OR. after the matter had been fully discussed. . the means of which were already prepared. goes on to show that the obligations of a citizen to his country are even more binding than those of a child to its parent. INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITO. SOCRATES. and had offered to assist in paying a fine. having obtained access to his cell very early in the morning. and Socrates resolves to submit himself to the will of Providence.

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


Socr. Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Is it not very early? Cri. It is. Socr. About what time? Cri. Scarce day-break. Socr. I wonder how the keeper of the prison came to admit you. Cri. He is familiar with me, Socrates, from my having frequently come hither; and he is under some obligations to me. Socr. Have you just now come, or some time since? Cri. A considerable time since. Socr. Why, then, did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting down by me in silence? Cri. By Jupiter! Socrates, I should not myself like to be so long awake, and in such affliction. But I have been for some time wondering at you, perceiving how sweetly you slept; and I purposely did not awake you, that you might pass your time as pleasantly as possible. And, indeed, I have often before throughout your whole life considered you happy in your disposition, but far more so in the present calamity, seeing how easily and meekly you bear it. Socr. However, Crito, it would be disconsonant for a man at my time of life to repine because he must needs die. Cri. But others, Socrates, at your age have been involved in similar calamities, yet their age has not hindered their repining at their present fortune. Socr. So it is. But why did you come so early?

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


Cri. Bringing sad tidings, Socrates, not sad to you, as it appears, but to me, and all your friends, sad and heavy, and which I, I think, shall bear worst of all. Socr. What tidings? Has the ship[6] arrived from Delos, on the arrival of which I must die? Cri. It has not yet arrived, but it appears to me that it will come to-day, from what certain persons report who have come from Sunium,[7] and left it there. It is clear, therefore, from these messengers, that it will come to day, and consequently it will be necessary, Socrates, for you to die to-morrow. 2. Socr. But with good fortune, Crito, and if so it please the gods, so be it. I do not think, however, that it will come to day. Cri. Whence do you form this conjecture? Socr. I will tell you. I must die on the day after that on which the ship arrives. Cri. So they say[8] who have the control of these things. Socr. I do not think, then, that it will come to-day, but to-morrow. I conjecture this from a dream which I had this very night, not long ago, and you seem very opportunely to have refrained from waking me. Cri. But what was this dream? Socr. A beautiful and majestic woman, clad in white garments seemed to approach me, and to call to me and say, "Socrates, three days hence you will reach fertile Pythia"[9]. Cri. What a strange dream, Socrates! Socr. Very clear, however, as it appears to me, Crito.

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


3. Cri. Very much so, as it seems. But, my dear Socrates, even now be persuaded by me, and save yourself. For if you die, not only a single calamity will befall me, but, besides being deprived of such a friend as I shall never meet with again, I shall also appear to many who do not know you and me well, when I might have saved you had I been willing to spend my money, to have neglected to do so. And what character can be more disgraceful than this--to appear to value one's riches more than one's friends? For the generality of men will not be persuaded that you were unwilling to depart hence, when we urged you to it. Socr. But why, my dear Crito, should we care so much for the opinion of the many? For the most worthy men, whom we ought rather to regard, will think that matters have transpired as they really have. Cri. Yet you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to attend to the opinion of the many. For the very circumstances of the present case show that the multitude are able to effect not only the smallest evils, but even the greatest, if any one is calumniated to them. Socr. Would, O Crito that the multitude could effect the greatest evils, that they might also effect the greatest good, for then it would be well. But now they can do neither; for they can make a man neither wise nor foolish; but they do whatever chances. 4. Cri. So let it be, then. But answer me this, Socrates: are you not anxious for me and other friends, lest, if you should escape from hence, informers should give us trouble, as having secretly carried you off, and so we should be compelled either to lose all our property, or a very large sum, or to suffer something else besides this? For, if you fear any thing of the kind, dismiss your fears; for we are justified in running the risk to save you--and, if need be, even a greater risk than this. But be persuaded by me, and do not refuse. Socr. I am anxious about this, Crito, and about many other things. Cri. Do not fear this, however; for the sum is not large on receipt of which certain persons are willing to save you, and take you hence. In the next

for the purpose. Surely one ought not to have children. a ridiculous consummation of the whole business. I have friends there who will esteem you very highly. you do not think right to spend my money. through fears of this kind. nor did you save yourself. nor let what you said in court give you any trouble. lest. by Plato 38 place. that if you went from hence you would not know what to do with yourself. since you profess to have made virtue your study through the whole of your life. and. they will meet with such a fate as chance brings them. Moreover. then if. had we but exerted ourselves a little. or one should go through the toil of rearing and instructing them. I think. whom. 5. besides the evil that will result. you will abandon. For in many places. Socrates. and this last circumstance. and beware. do not. and very many others. lest this whole affair of yours should seem to be the effect of cowardice on our part--your appearing to stand your trial in the court. hesitate to save yourself. the very manner in which the trial was conducted. therefore. your appearing to have escaped from us through our indolence and cowardice. So that. and have pressed. since you appeared when it was in your power not to have done so. and wherever you go.Crito. as it were. and. Besides this. and Phaedo of Socrates. and you press on the very results with respect to yourself which your enemies would press. as I said. too. has brought with him a sufficient sum for the very purpose. too. you appear to me to betray your own sons. you do not appear to me to pursue a just course in giving yourself up when you might be saved. as is probable. so far as you are concerned. though you ought to have chosen such a course as a good and brave man would have done. But you appear to me to have chosen the most indolent course. these strangers here are ready to spend theirs. sufficient. they will meet with such things as orphans are wont to experience in a state of orphanage. when it was practicable and possible. Simmias the Theban. and if you are disposed to go to Thessaly. who did not save you. do you not see how cheap these informers are. in their anxiety to destroy you. men will love you. One of them. so that no one in Thessaly will molest you. so that there would be no need of a large sum for them? My fortune is at your service. is ready. out of regard to me. and will insure your safety. so that I am ashamed both for you and for us who are your friends. Socrates. Think of these things. when it is in your power to rear and educate them. they be disgraceful both to you and to . Cebes.

By all means. therefore. am a person who will obey nothing within me but reason. though. I think. though in reality it was merely jest and trifling. it will be impossible and no longer practicable. as I just now observed. I desire then. therefore. in all human probability. on former occasions. it was rightly resolved. for in the following night the whole must be accomplished. by threatening more than it does now. by so much is it the more sad. therefore. We must consider. It was said. in common with you. that of the opinions which men entertain some should be very highly esteemed and others not. according as it appears to me on mature deliberation to be best. whether this plan should be adopted or not. so that if we are unable to adduce any better at the present time. By the gods! Crito. indeed. if we recur to the argument which you used about opinions. be assured that I shall not give in to you. but some we should. but of some we should. because this misfortune has befallen me. and confiscation of property. but now it has become clear that it was said idly for argument's sake. If we delay. My dear Crito. by how much the more earnest it is. whether it will appear to me in a different light. then. by those who were thought to speak seriously. And the reasons which I formerly professed I can not now reject. Consider. your zeal would be very commendable were it united with right principle. Socrates. advise. Socr. does it not appear to you to have been rightly settled that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men. And there is but one plan. may we consider the matter most conveniently? First of all. to consider. bonds and death. before it was necessary that I should die. but always. then. by Plato 39 us. and on no account refuse. there is no longer time for advising--your resolve should be already made. and the present calamity will not lead your judgment astray. even though the power of the multitude should endeavor to terrify us like children. that we ought to pay attention to some opinions. and whether we shall give it up or yield to it. and to others not. are out of all danger of dying to-morrow. otherwise. but they appear to me in much the same light. and Phaedo of Socrates. and others not? Nor yet the opinions of all men. How. For I not now only. with yourself. whether on former occasions it was rightly resolved or not. Crito.Crito. and I respect and honor them as before. now that I am in this condition. 6. and of others not? What say you? Is not this rightly . or whether. or the same. does not this appear to you to be well said? For you. be persuaded by me.

and to eat and drink. Cri. Socr. How should he not? . or of that one man only who happens to be a physician. but not those of the multitude. by Plato 40 resolved? Cri. And are not the good those of the wise. He ought. It is so. Therefore we should respect the good. He ought. therefore. Socr. but respects that of the multitude and of those who know nothing. pay attention to the praise and censure and opinion of every one. therefore. rather than to all others together. and Phaedo of Socrates. Yes. and disregards his opinion and praise. Well. It is. Come. then: how. Cri. so to practice and exercise himself. Socr. How can it be otherwise? 7. again. and the bad those of the foolish? Cri. Socr. Socr. if he disobeys the one. then. will he not suffer some evil? Cri. Socr. to fear the censures and covet the praises of that one. as seems fitting to the one who presides and knows. Clearly. but not the bad? Cri. Of that one only. were the following points settled? Does a man who practices gymnastic exercises and applies himself to them. or teacher of the exercises? Cri.Crito.

You say well. By no means. with all other things. but is impaired by what is unwholesome. if we destroy that which becomes better by what is wholesome. Clearly on his body. Socr. shall we not corrupt and injure that part of ourselves which becomes better by justice. but is ruined by injustice? Or is this nothing? Cri. But can we enjoy life when that is impaired which injustice ruins but justice benefits? Or do we think that to be of less value than the body. But of more value? . Come. can we enjoy life when that is impaired? And this is the body we are speaking of. ought we to follow the opinion of the multitude. for this it ruins. With respect then. By no means. Socr. Yes. then. not to go through them all. Socr. whom we ought to reverence and respect rather than all others together? And if we do not obey him. good and evil. Can we. Socrates. and Phaedo of Socrates. if there is any one who understands. is it not? Cri. too.Crito. 8. about which we are now consulting. to things just and unjust. base and honorable. Crito. Socr. enjoy life with a diseased and impaired body? Cri. then. through being persuaded by those who do not understand. and to respect it. whatever part of us it may be. and on what part of him that disobeys will it fall? Cri. The case is the same. by Plato 41 Socr. But what is this evil? Whither does it tend. or that of one. Socr. I agree with you. about which injustice and justice are concerned' Cri.

and would restore one to life. This. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle. some one may say. any one might say so. in truth. is clear. this consideration arises. since reason so requires. You say truly. of an outlay of money. if they could do so.Crito. must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned. Socr. 9. without any reason at all. And consider this. Much more. But as to the considerations which you mention. Socrates. this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before[10]. too. Socr. But. lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes. And should it appear to be just. the one. But we. Socr. reputation. It does. when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honorable and good. Cri. as well they who lead me as we who are led hence. Socr. How ever. my admirable friend. we shall not act unjustly in doing all these . moreover. that we are not to be anxious about living but about living well. my excellent friend. whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence. And does this hold good or not. even truth itself. or whether. It does hold good. whether it still holds good with us or not. and the education of children. who rashly put one to death. but what he will say who understands the just and the unjust. then. beware. we will make the attempt. whether it is just or not that I should endeavor to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. by Plato 42 Cri. We must not then. and Phaedo of Socrates. we will give it up. Crito. so much regard what the multitude will say of us. and their contraries. that to live well and Honorable and justly are the same thing? Cri. From what has been admitted. but if not. are not the multitude able to put us to death? Cri.

or not? Cri. therefore. and if you have any thing to object to what I say. cease. On no account. make good your objection.Crito. or suffer any thing else. observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die. For I highly esteem your endeavors to persuade me thus to act. my friend. old men as we are. Let us consider the matter together. my excellent friend. You appear to me to speak wisely. or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances. the beginning of our inquiry. and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions been dissipated in these few days. still is injustice on every account both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this. beyond all question. whether it is stated to your entire satisfaction. that we should on no account deliberately commit injustice. . And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly. Socr. and I will yield to you. stand as we then determined? Whether the multitude allow it or not. then. Socrates. rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly. Crito. to urge upon me the same thing so often. and whether we must suffer a more severe or a milder punishment than this. under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honorable to commit injustice. Surely not. and Phaedo of Socrates. been for a long time seriously conversing with each other without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the case. that I ought to depart hence against the will of the Athenians. but if not. Cri. 10. I will endeavor to do so. and have we. Cri. Socr. ought we to act unjustly. We do admit it. so long as it is not against my will Consider. but see what we are to do. as we have often agreed on former occasions. then. by Plato 43 things. Socr. Say we. and endeavor to answer the question put to you exactly as you think right. Cri.

Socr. or not? Cri. have no sentiment in common. Surely it is not right. But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated. Socr. or to do evil to any man. to whom these things appear true. Socr. while they look to each other's opinions. whether you coincide and think with me. Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury. to revenge one's self by doing evil in return. and must needs despise each other. then. But if you persist in your former opinions. is that right. and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me. and Phaedo of Socrates. Socrates. It appears not. Crito.Crito. and they to whom they do not. hear what follows. . It is not right. to return an injury. for I know that to some few only these things both do appear. But take care. therefore. as the multitude think. Socr. however one may have suffered from him. and think with you. For to do evil to men differs in no respect from committing injustice. to be true. and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point--that it is never right either to do an injury or to return an injury. Cri. or do you dissent from. Crito. both long since and now. since it is on no account right to act unjustly. then. Cri. What. by Plato 44 Socr. that in allowing these things you do not allow them contrary to your opinion. Cri. then. They. Consider well. By no means. I do persist in them. or when one has been evil-entreated. and will appear. say so and inform me. Speak on. then? Is it right to do evil. or not? Cri. You say truly. but if you in any respect think otherwise.

consider it thus. what do you purpose doing? Do you design any thing else by this proceeding in which you are engaged than to destroy us. and not be subverted. or by whatever name we should call it. by Jupiter! Socrates. through us. Socr. and that to those to whom we ought least of all to do it. for I do not understand it. would have much to say on the violation of the law. are we not doing evil to some. Socr. whether when a man has promised to do things that are just he ought to do them.Crito. and. at what we say. 12. Socrates. and the whole city. so far as you are able? Or do you think it possible for that city any longer to subsist. Observe. presenting themselves before us. and not passed a right sentence? Shall we say this. I am unable to answer your question. was it not agreed between us that you should abide by the judgments which the city should pronounce?" And if we should wonder at their speaking thus. "Wonder not. since you are accustomed to make use of questions and answers. the laws and commonwealth should come. or not? And do we abide by what we agreed on as being just. the laws. He ought to do them. what follows. or what else? Cri. I say next. then. then. take your . Then. Socrates. should say. but are set aside and destroyed by private persons?"--what should we say. which enjoins that judgments passed shall be enforced. Crito. then. come. what charge have you against us and the city. By departing hence without the leave of the city. For. and Phaedo of Socrates. Socrates. What. or do we not? Cri. "Tell me. 11. but answer. "Socrates. perhaps they would say. to these and similar remonstrances? For any one. Socr. if the laws should say. or evade his promise? Cri. If. in which judgments that are passed have no force. that you attempt to destroy us? Did we not first give you being? and did not your father. This. especially an orator. by Plato 45 Socr. while we were preparing to run away. or rather I ask. Shall we say to them that the city has done us an injustice.

if you happened to have one. or persuade it in such manner as justice allows. and all other progenitors. It seems so to me. 13. do you find fault with those laws among us that relate to marriage as being bad?" I should say. and educated through our means. and in doing this will you say that you act justly--you who. but that both in war and in a court of justice. venerable. do you think you may justly do to us in turn? Or had you not equal rights with your father. then. but that with your country and the laws you may do so. or master. so that if we attempt to destroy you. make virtue your chief object? Or are you so wise as not to know that one's country is more honorable. can you say. you also should endeavor. this must be done. thinking it to be just. nor many other things of the kind. and the education with which you were instructed? Or did not the laws. since you were born. nor. nurtured. the laws. "Consider. or put in bonds. or leave one's post. than mother and father. and appease one's country. and to suffer quietly if it bids one suffer. for justice so requires. then. as well you as your ancestors? And if this be so. rightly. Socrates. Socr. in reality. so far as you are able. much less to one's country? What shall we say to these things. when angry. then.Crito. or not? Cri. by Plato 46 mother to wife and beget you? Say." the laws perhaps might say. and one must not give way. and more highly prized both by gods. Crito? That the laws speak the truth. and your country. or if it sends one out to battle there to be wounded or slain. in return. "I do not find fault with them. when stricken. ordained on this point. to destroy us. neither to retort when found fault with. and sacred. enjoin rightly. "whether we say truly that in what you are now attempting you are attempting to do . rather than one's father. so as to return what you suffered. submit to. in requiring your father to instruct you in music and gymnastic exercises?" I should say. first of all. do you think that there are equal rights between us? and whatever we attempt to do to you. Well. but that to offer violence either to one's mother or father is not holy. and that one ought to reverence. and men possessed of understanding. that you are not both our offspring and our slave. or retreat. and Phaedo of Socrates. and either persuade it or do what it orders. whether to be beaten. and everywhere one must do what one's city and country enjoin." "Do you with those that relate to your nurture when born. to strike again.

and yet he does neither of these. but most so of all. "And we say that you. so strongly were you attached to us. but leave him the choice of one of two things. or to migrate and settle in another country. I especially made this compact with them. the laws. in your very trial. except on military service. and us. . of all the Athenians. and become acquainted with the business of the state. and so far did you consent to submit to our government. "Socrates. and we affirm that he who does not obey is in three respects guilty of injustice--because he does not obey us who gave him being. if he is not satisfied with us and the city. when he has arrived at years of discretion. nurtured. in consequence of your being satisfied with it. nor had you ever had any desire to become acquainted with any other city or other laws. and having imparted to you and all other citizens all the good in our power. by Plato 47 what is not just toward us. except once to the Isthmian games. none of us. or to do what we require. that any one who is not satisfied with us may take his property. But whoever continues with us after he has seen the manner in which we administer justice. though we propose for his consideration. O Socrates! will be subject to these charges if you accomplish your design. that you were satisfied both with us and the city. taking with him all his property. for you never went out of the city to any of the public spectacles. nor anywhere else. And if any one of you wishes to go to a colony. we now say that he has in fact entered into a compact with us to do what we order. instructed you. and in other respects govern the city. Moreover. both in other respects and in begetting children in this city. nor have you ever gone abroad as other men do. he neither does so. for. hinder or forbid him going whithersoever he pleases. For they would say.Crito. but we and our city were sufficient for you. nor does he persuade us if we do any thing wrongly. having made a compact that he would obey us. having given you birth. still proclaim. and go wherever he pleases. and because. by giving the power to every Athenian who pleases." And if I should ask. and because he does not obey us who nurtured him. either to persuade us. the laws. and Phaedo of Socrates. we have strong proof of this. and do not rigidly command him to do what we order." 14. and that not least of the Athenians. among all the Athenians. you especially would never have dwelt in it if it had not been especially agreeable to you. For we. "For what reason?" they would probably justly retort on me by saying that.

with the consent of the city. indeed. answer us this." they will say. you boasted yourself as not being grieved if you must needs die. nor any other of the Grecian or barbarian cities. you are neither ashamed of those professions. for both are governed by good laws. what you now attempt against its consent. if you should go to one of the neighboring cities. Socrates. beyond the rest of the Athenians." 15. First. and the compacts had not appeared to you to be just? You. if you pleased. and Phaedo of Socrates. though not in word?" What shall we say to this. So much. and you act as the vilest slave would act. though you did not enter into them from compulsion or through deception. the laws.Crito. Socrates. but you have been less out of Athens than the lame and the blind. and other maimed persons. it is evident. if you are persuaded by us. or of forfeiting their property. as you said. preferred neither Lacedæmon nor Crete. "What else. is pretty clear. the laws. and deprived of the rights of citizenship. however. We must needs do so. were you satisfied with the city and us. . Socrates. For that your friends will run the risk of being themselves banished. since you endeavor to destroy us. nor do you revere us. you will go there. Socr. what good you will do to yourself or your friends. and will not make yourself ridiculous by leaving the city. Then. therefore. Crito? Can we do otherwise than assent? Cri. death to exile. and might then have done. for who can be satisfied with a city without laws? But now will you not abide by your compacts? You will. then. which you several times said are governed by good laws. either Thebes or Megara. whether we speak the truth or not in affirming that you agreed to be governed by us in deed. in which you might have departed if you had been dissatisfied with us. by endeavoring to make your escape contrary to the conventions and the compacts by which you engaged to submit to our government. however. by violating these compacts and offending against any of them. "For consider. or from being compelled to determine in a short time but during the space of seventy years. And as for yourself. but you preferred. Now. "are you doing but violating the conventions and compacts which you made with us. then. by Plato 48 it was in your power to have imposed on yourself a sentence of exile.

having so changed your usual appearance. or on any thing else than justice. You will live. and such as have any regard for their country will look upon you with suspicion. have dared to have such a base desire of life as to violate the most sacred laws? Perhaps not. to Crito's friends. Will you. and Phaedo of Socrates. however. as if you had gone to Thessaly to a banquet? And what will become of those discourses about justice and all other virtues? But do you wish to live for the sake of your children. and perhaps they will gladly hear you relating how drolly you escaped from prison. with but a short time to live. should you not offend any one. "Then. you may have all this to say in your . for there are the greatest disorder and licentiousness. and as their slave. many things utterly unworthy of you. will it be worth your while to live? Or will you approach them. on subjects the same as you did here--that virtue and justice. so that they will appear to have condemned you rightly. by Plato 49 as an enemy to their polity. or on life. and you will confirm the opinion of the judges. will they be better reared and educated while you are living. when you arrive in Hades. and go to Thessaly. being reared here. then. should be most highly valued by men? And do you not think that this conduct of Socrates would be very indecorous? You must think so. Socrates." 16. and have the effrontery to converse with them. but if you go to Hades will they not take care of them? If. any advantage is to be derived from those that say they are your friends. O Socrates! be persuaded by us who have nurtured you. for whose is a corrupter of the laws will appear in all likelihood to be a corrupter of youths and weak-minded men. that. making them aliens to their country. regarding you as a corrupter of the laws.Crito. for your friends will take care of them? Whether. avoid these well-governed cities. if not so. and there rear and educate them. if you go to Thessaly. and the best-ordered men? And should you do so. But if you should. or in some other disguise such as fugitives are wont to dress themselves in. in a state of abject dependence on all men. legal institutions and laws. clad in some dress or covered with a skin. But what will you do in Thessaly besides feasting. and do not set a higher value on your children. though not with them. that you may rear and educate them? What then? Will you take them to Thessaly. in all probability. will they take care of them. though an old man. that they may owe you this obligation too? Or. we must think they will. And will no one say that you. Socrates. you will hear. too. But you will keep clear of these places.

I have nothing to say. then. nor will it be better for you when you arrive there. or more just. be assured. Cri. But now you depart. does it appear to be better. persuade you to do what he advises. but by men. Crito. Socr. then. by Plato 50 defense before those who have dominion there. will not receive you favorably knowing that you attempted. Desist. Let not Crito." 17. and let us pursue this course. if you do depart. since this way the deity leads us. rather than we. if you should say any thing contrary to these. and us--both we shall be indignant with you as long as you live. or any of your friends. so far as you were able. so long as I retain my present opinions. For neither here in this life. having violated your own compacts and conventions which you made with us. if you do what is proposed. your country. then. These things. And the sound of these words booms in my ear. you think that you can prevail at all. I seem to hear as the votaries of Cybele[11] seem to hear the flutes. or more holy to yourself. and evil for evil. Socrates. If. my dear friend Crito. the laws." 1 IX. to destroy us. not by us. you will speak in vain. say on. Be sure. having thus disgracefully returned injury for injury. however. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. and there our brothers. unjustly treated. and makes me incapable of hearing any thing else. and having done evil to those to whom you least of all should have done it--namely. the laws in Hades. FOOTNOTES [6] See the Phædo sec 1. yourself. your friends. [7] A promontory at the southern extremity of Attica [8] The Eleven [9] See Homer's "Iliad. v 363 . But. but should you escape.

and be happy in proportion to . Socrates explains his reason. would have made a fable from it. and may not leave it without his permission. [11] The Corybantes. This remark reminds Cebes of Socrates's having put some of Æsop's fables into metre since his imprisonment. seems a contradiction to Simmias. The main subject is that of the soul's immortality. The question itself. This dialogue presents us with an account of the manner In which Socrates spent the last day of his. This. priests of Cybele. and rubbing his leg. what has induced him to do so. and adds that Æsop. for the satisfaction of the poet Evenus. he says that he or any philosopher would be willing to die. who in their solemn festivals made such a noise with flutes that the hearers could hear no other sound. proposes to plead his cause before them. "Is not Evenus a philosopher?" and on the question being answered in the affirmative. arises simply and naturally from the general conversation that precedes it. He remarks on the unaccountable alternation and connection between pleasure and pain. Simmias expresses his surprise at this message. and he asks. is still found to hold good. by Plato 51 [10] That is to say. INTRODUCTION TO THE PHÆDO. which Socrates takes upon himself to prove with as much certainty as it is possible for the human mind to arrive at. to which Simmias agrees. which had just been freed from bonds. and quit the service of the best of masters. Whereupon Cebes objects that in that case foolish men only would wish to die. they find him sitting up in bed. and to show that there is a great probability that after this life he shall go into the presence of God and good men. though none could be better suited to the occasion.Crito. and concludes by bidding him tell Evenus to follow him as soon as he can. but Socrates explains it by showing that our souls are placed in the body by God. Socrates. again. therefore. and how he met his death. on which Socrates asks. the principle which we had laid down in former discussions that no regard is to be had to popular opinion. though perhaps he would not commit violence on himself. had he observed it. and Phaedo of Socrates. life. When his friends visit him in the morning for the purpose of spending this his last day with him.

proposes to inquire into the probability of the case. strong from weak. therefore. indeed. and pursues virtue and wisdom for their own sakes. is entirely occupied in meditating on death.Crito. and on these grounds he did not repine at leaving his friends in this world. And. therefore. since they estimate the value of all things by the pleasures they afford. Death and philosophy have this in common: death separates the soul from the body. and freeing itself as much as possible from the body. slow from swift. and no longer exists anywhere. and in like manner life from death. but can not help entertaining doubts of what will become of the soul when separated from the body. Whereas the philosopher purifies his mind from all such things. that souls departing hence exist in Hades. not virtue itself. since the senses are the source of ignorance and all evil. a fit employment for him under his present circumstances. that it is a general law of nature that contraries are produced from contraries--the greater from the less. but is a lover of his body. by Plato 52 the purity of his own mind. They embrace only a shadow of virtue. and its truth is confirmed by this. He begins[12] by stating that philosophy itself is nothing else than a preparation for and meditation on death. most men are temperate through intemperance. Socrates. and Phaedo of Socrates. philosophy draws off the mind from bodily things to the contemplation of truth and virtue: for he is not a true philosopher who is led away by bodily pleasures. His first argument[14] is drawn from the ancient belief prevalent among men. for they could not be produced again if they did not exist. it must follow that our souls are there. heat from cold. with what success he should shortly know. then. can such a man be afraid of death? He who grieves at the approach of death can not be a true lover of wisdom. being persuaded that in another he should meet with good masters and good friends. for the common opinion is that it is dispersed and vanishes like breath or smoke. This course Socrates himself has pursued to the utmost of his ability. and are produced again from the dead. Upon this Cebes[13] says that he agrees with all else that had been said. If this be true. they abstain from some pleasures that they may the more easily and permanently enjoy others. and vice . The mind. that is to say. How.

Things perceived by the eyes. drawn from reminiscence. all nature would in time become dead. and dying from life to death. To explain this more clearly. and not only are we thus reminded of sensible objects. as well as the pre-existence. for that nothing hinders but that. that knowledge is nothing but reminiscence. by awaking to being awake. so that the soul. the good. the immortality. before it became united to the body. thus the sight of a lyre or a garment reminds us of a friend. but insist that he has not shown it to be immortal. and therefore the soul must have existed before. the new state. and other senses bring up the thought of other things. by Plato 53 versa. and had knowledge. he proceeds to show that what is changed passes from one state to another. thirdly. But in case Simmias should not yet be satisfied. his second argument. that if their former admissions are joined to his last argument. of its truth by calling to mind an argument used by Socrates on former occasions. just as if people did not awake out of sleep all would at last be buried in eternal sleep. and Phaedo of Socrates. and have no sensitive existence. of the soul has been . the just. it may be dispersed at the dissolution of the body. and. Simmias and Cebes[17] both agree in admitting that Socrates has proved the pre-existence of the soul. as from a state of sleep. of every thing which we say exists without the aid of the senses. only passes to another state. the soul must have existed. To which Socrates replies. ears. whence it follows that the mind did not acquire this knowledge in this life. and if this is so. of the beautiful. and so undergoes three different states--first. but of things which are comprehended by the mind alone. Socrates[16] proceeds to enlarge on this. In like manner birth is a transition from a state of death to life. then the transition. but must have had it before. according to the popular opinion.Crito. Whence the conclusion is that the souls of men are not annihilated by death. in short. If it were not so. and adds that he is further convinced. We daily find that we are carried from the knowledge of one thing to another. by the act of dying. Cebes[15] agrees to this reasoning. For we have formed in our minds an idea of abstract equality. for we use them only in the perception of individual things. the actual state.

and unchangeable. therefore. and so may perish with the body. yet objects that it is not. he says. then. but harmony is produced after the lyre is formed. For if it is true that any thing living is produced from that which is dead. which is invisible. and then proceeds[20] to show. the other invisible. and it is by no means clear that this is not its last period. The soul. say of virtue and vice in the soul? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord? If so. otherwise it could not be produced again. but Socrates. by Plato 54 sufficiently proved. What. to a thing being capable of dispersion it must be compounded of parts. there are two kinds of things--one compounded. is nothing but a harmony resulting from a combination of the parts of the body. The former objects that the soul. Still Simmias and Cebes[19] are unconvinced. therefore. then. And Cebes. he will contradict himself. the other simple The former kind is subject to change. as the harmony of a lyre does when the lyre itself is broken. must be indissoluble. is meant by being dispersed but being dissolved into its parts? In order. but when it abstracts itself from the body it attains to the knowledge of that which is eternal. to remove the apprehension that the soul may be dispersed by a wind. The one is visible.[18] to examine that doubt more thoroughly. immortal. that is to say. However. there are various degrees of harmony. the latter not. for it is admitted that one soul is not more or less a soul . But. though he admits that the soul is more durable than the body. the fallacy of Simmias's objection. therefore. as it were. in a moment. being uncompounded and invisible. further. Socrates proceeds. wanders and is confused. then the soul must exist after death. And. It was before admitted. what will a person who holds this doctrine. exhorts them not to suffer themselves to be deterred from seeking the truth by any difficulties they may meet with. immortal. These objections produce a powerful effect on the rest of the company. and can be comprehended by the mind alone. that the soul existed before the body. in his third argument. but every soul is as much a soul as any other. according to Socrates's own showing. and Phaedo of Socrates. and the soul. but may in time wear out. that the soul is harmony. undismayed. so that the two cases are totally different. when it employs the bodily senses. of necessity immortal.Crito. Now.

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


than another, and therefore one can not he more or less harmonized than another, and one could not admit of a greater degree of virtue or vice than another; and indeed a soul, being harmony, could not partake of vice at all, which is discord. Socrates, having thus satisfactorily answered the argument adduced by Simmias, goes on to rebut that of Cebes,[21] who objected that the soul might in time wear out. In order to do this, he relates that, when a young man, he attempted to investigate the causes of all things, why they exist and why they perish; and in the course of his researches, finding the futility of attributing the existence of things to what are called natural causes, he resolved on endeavoring to find out the reasons of things. He therefore assumed that there are a certain abstract beauty and goodness and magnitude, and so of all other things; the truth of which being granted, he thinks he shall be able to prove that the soul is immortal. This, then, being conceded by Cebes, Socrates[22] argues that every thing that is beautiful is so from partaking of abstract beauty, and great from partaking of magnitude, and little from partaking of littleness. Now, it is impossible, he argues, that contraries can exist in the same thing at the same time; for instance, the same thing can not possess both magnitude and littleness, but one will withdraw at the approach of the other; and not only so, but things which, though not contrary to each other, yet always contain contraries within themselves, can not co-exist; for instance, the number three has no contrary, yet it contains within itself the idea of odd, which is the contrary of even, and so three never can become even; in like manner, heat while it is heat can never admit the idea of its contrary, cold. Now, if this method of reasoning is applied to the soul, it will be found to be immortal; for life and death are contraries, and never can co-exist; but wherever the soul is, there is life: so that it contains within itself that which is contrary to death, and consequently can never admit of death; therefore it is immortal. With this he closes his arguments in support of the soul's immortality. Cebes owns himself convinced, but Simmias, though he is unable to make any objection to the soundness of Socrates's reasoning, can not help still

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


entertaining doubts on the subject. If, however, the soul is immortal, Socrates proceeds,[23] great need is there in this life to endeavor to become as wise and good as possible. For if death were a deliverance from every thing, it would be a great gain for the wicked; but since the soul appears to be immortal, it must go to the place suited to its nature. For it is said that each person's demon conducts him to a place where he receives sentence according to his deserts. He then[24] draws a fanciful picture of the various regions of the earth, to which the good and the bad will respectively go after death, and exhorts his friends to use every endeavor to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life, "for," he adds, "the reward is noble, and the hope great." Having thus brought his subject to a conclusion, Socrates proposes to bathe himself, in order not to trouble others to wash his dead body. Crito thereupon asks if he has any commands to give, and especially how he would be buried, to which he, with his usual cheerfulness, makes answer, "Just as you please, if only you can catch me;" and then, smiling, he reminds them that after death he shall be no longer with them, and begs the others of the party to be sureties to Crito for his absence from the body, as they had been before bound for his presence before his judges. After he had bathed, and taken leave of his children and the women of his family the officer of the Eleven comes in to intimate to him that it is now time to drink the poison. Crito urges a little delay, as the sun had not yet set; but Socrates refuses to make himself ridiculous by showing such a fondness for life. The man who is to administer the poison is therefore sent for; and on his holding out the cup, Socrates, neither trembling nor changing color or countenance at all, but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, asked if he might make a libation to any one; and being told that no more poison than enough had been mixed, he simply prayed that his departure from this to another world might be happy, and then drank off the poison, readily and calmly. His friends, who had hitherto with difficulty restrained themselves, could no longer control the outward expressions of grief, to which Socrates said, "What are you doing, my friends? I, for this reason, chiefly, sent away the women, that they might

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


not commit any folly of this kind; for I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up." When he had walked about for a while his legs began to grow heavy, so he lay down on his back; and his body, from the feet upward, gradually grew cold and stiff. His last words were, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it." "This," concludes Phædo, "was the end of our friend--a man, as we may say, the best of all his time, that we have known, and, moreover, the most wise and just." FOOTNOTES [12] Sec. 21-39. [13] Sec. 39, 40. [14] Sec. 40-46. [15] Sec. 47. [16] Sec. 48-57. [17] Sec. 55-59. [18] Sec. 61-75. [19] Sec. 76-84. [20] Sec. 93-99. [21] Sec. 100-112. [22] Sec. 112-128.

by Plato 58 [23] Sec. THEN SOCRATES. but he was unable to tell us any thing more. What was the reason of this. What. made a vow to Apollo on that occasion. 129-131. then. with Socrates on that day when he drank the poison in prison. and Phaedo of Socrates. PHÆDO. It is the ship. therefore. Ech.Crito. Phæd. And did you not hear about the trial--how it went off? Ech. Were you personally present. An accidental circumstance happened in his favor. nor has any stranger for a long time come from thence who was able to give us a clear account of the particulars. Phædo. 2. OR. for the poop of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos chanced to be crowned on the day before the trial. Phædo? Phæd. except that he had died from drinking poison. [24] Sec. But what is this ship? Phæd. 132-145. CEBES. and how did he die? for I should be glad to hear: for scarcely any citizen of Phlius[25] ever visits Athens now. SIMMIAS. some one told me this. Echecrates. Ech. and saved both them and himself. and I wondered that. in which Theseus formerly conveyed the fourteen boys and girls to Crete. APOLLODORUS. Ech. Yes. did he say before his death. PHÆDO. or did you hear an account of it from some one else? Phæd. AND CRITO. he appears to have died long afterward. They. I was there myself. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. Echecrates. as it is . FIRST ECHECRATES. as it took place so long ago. as the Athenians say.

When they begin the preparations for this solemn embassy. they send yearly to the god. whether speaking myself or listening to some one else. 5. on the day before the trial: on this account Socrates had a long interval in prison between the trial and his death. Ech. indeed. I was. is always most delightful to me. And what. both from his manner and discourse. you have others to listen to you who are of the same mind. like one present at the death of a friend. but some. for I was not impressed with a feeling of pity. that if they were saved they would every year dispatch a solemn embassy to Delos. I am at leisure. Take the trouble. they have a law that the city shall be purified during this period. However. from that time to the present. by Plato 59 said. but that when he arrived there he would be happy. Phæd. Phædo. as I said. if any one ever was. wonderfully affected by being present. and will endeavor to give you a full account. endeavor to relate every thing as accurately as you can. for the man appeared to me to be happy. Ech. and this occasionally takes a long time. that it occurred to me that in going to Hades he was not going without a divine destiny. indeed several. 3. when the winds happen to impede their passage. and that no public execution shall take place until the ship has reached Delos. but did he die destitute of friends? Phæd. Echecrates. And indeed. And this was done. unless you have any pressing business. and Phaedo of Socrates. For this reason I was entirely uninfluenced by any feeling of pity. Phædo. 4. which. were the circumstances of his death? What was said and done? and who of his friends were with him? or would not the magistrates allow them to be present. Phæd. so fearlessly and nobly did he meet his death: so much so. Ech. as would seem likely to be the case with one present on so mournful . and returned to Athens. The commencement of the embassy is when the priest of Apollo has crowned the poop of the ship. to relate to me all the particulars as clearly as you can. were present.Crito. By no means. for to call Socrates to mind. then.

Phæd. was sick.Crito. this Apollodorus was present. was entirely overcome by these emotions. Æschines and Antisthenes. by Plato 60 an occasion. 7. And all of us who were present were affected in much the same manner. moreover. and some others of his countrymen. Apollodorus. too. Of his fellow-countrymen. Cebes and Phædondes. Ech. nor was I affected by pleasure from being engaged in philosophical discussions. when I considered that he was immediately about to die. He. and his father. for our conversation was of that kind. No. I think that these were nearly all who were present. now. what do you say was the subject of conversation? . Menexenus. Ech. and from Megara. a kind of unusual mixture compounded of pleasure and pain together. the Theban. How should I not? 6. Hermogenes. Ech. Phædo? Phæd. Simmias. for you know the man and his manner. But who were present. I think. were also there: Plato. Ech. Well. Ech. Yes. and I. at one time laughing. as was our custom. Were any strangers present? Phæd. at another weeping--one of us especially. and Phaedo of Socrates. for they were said to be at Ægina. Ctesippus the Pæanian. Euclides and Terpsion. was troubled. Was any one else there? Phæd. But an altogether unaccountable feeling possessed me. But what! were not Aristippus and Cleombrotus present? Phæd. Epigenes. as well as the others. then. Ech. and Critobulus. Crito.

and announcing to him that he must die to-day. Accordingly we came. holding his little boy. united their heads together. then. and not to enter until he had called us. and the porter." But Socrates. and said such things as women usually do on such occasions--as. meeting early in the morning at the court house where the trial took place. and sitting by him. pain. your friends will now converse with you for the last time. when he could not do so. wishing to reconcile these warring principles. and usually spent the day with him. when we left the prison in the evening. for on the preceding day. let some one take her home. in that they will not both be present to a man at the same time! Yet if any one pursues and attains the one. We therefore urged each other to come as early as possible to the accustomed place. sitting up in bed. But Socrates. 8. but as soon as it was opened we went in to Socrates. my friends." he said. which men call pleasure! and how wonderfully is it related toward that which appears to be its contrary. since I suffered pain in my leg . and rubbed it with his hand. coming out. I will endeavor to relate the whole to you from the beginning. by Plato 61 Phæd. as appears to be the case with me. told us to wait. and as he rubbed it. and you with them. for it was not opened very early. looking towards Crito. "Socrates. and Phaedo of Socrates. and Xantippe." But in no long time he returned. As soon as Xantippe saw us she wept aloud.Crito. he is almost always compelled to receive the other. said: "What an unaccountable thing. "For. said: "Crito. wailing and beating herself. Here. as if they were both united together from one head. and bade us enter. On that occasion. for it was near the prison. and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after. "the Eleven are now freeing Socrates from his bonds. however. we met earlier than usual. On the preceding days I and the others were constantly in the habit of visiting Socrates. we heard that the ship had arrived from Delos. "that if Æsop had observed this he would have made a fable from it. drew up his leg. who used to admit us. When we entered. "And it seems tome. we found Socrates just freed from his bonds." Upon which some of Crito's attendants led her away. we waited every day till the prison was opened. conversing with each other. how the deity." he said. that seems to be. you know her. 9." 10.

I therefore put into verse those Fables of Æsop. when he asks me again--for I am sure he will do so--tell me what I must say to him. as those who cheer on racers. And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in. But now since my trial took place.' it said. Cebes. For they were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream visited me. but now pleasure seems to have succeeded. "that I did not make them from a wish to compete with him. several other persons asked me. with what design you made them after you came here. interrupting him. with respect to the poems which you made. by putting into metre those Fables of Æsop and the hymn to Apollo. and discharge my conscience. then. and especially Evenus recently." Hereupon Cebes. so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in--namely. you have done well in reminding me. ought to make fables. for I knew that this would be no easy matter. whereas before you had never made any. or his poems. you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus. and knowing that I was not skilled in making fables. and Phaedo of Socrates. 'apply yourself to and practice music. 11. yet always saying the same thing--'Socrates. but do so. and which first occurred to me. since philosophy is the highest music. by Plato 62 before from the chain." "Tell him the truth. it appeared to me that if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music. and I was devoted to it. appearing at different times in different forms. for that it would be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. considering that a poet.' 12. and not discourses. then. Thus." . and were known to me. and the festival of the god retarded my death. if he means to be a poet. if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. I first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present." he replied. which were at hand. and after the god.Crito. but that I might discover the meaning of certain dreams. said: "By Jupiter! Socrates. If therefore. to apply myself to music. I ought not to disobey it.

say that it was not right to do this." . "What. to-day. then. they say. by saying that it is not lawful to commit violence on one's self. by Plato 63 13. to Evenus. when he lived with us. Socrates. What else can one do in the interval before sunset?" "Why. for so the Athenians order. as it seems. I have heard I have no scruple in telling. Cebes! have not you and Simmias. then." said Simmias. Cebes.Crito. however. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about to travel there to inquire and speculate about the journey thither. Cebes then asked him. "What is this. and bid him farewell. Perhaps. and. as you asked just now." rejoined Socrates. "and so will every one who worthily engages in this study." "What. who have conversed familiarly with Philolaus[26] on this subject. to follow me as soon as he can. from what I know of him. what kind we think it is. heard?" "Nothing very clearly. and Phaedo of Socrates. speak only from hearsay. Socrates. "What do you mean. is not allowable." "I. but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one. Socrates. then. But I depart." And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground. I am pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your advice. what. and in this posture continued during the remainder of the discussion. he will not commit violence on himself. for that. "is not Evenus a philosopher?" "To me he seems to be so. indeed. then. and several others. "Then he will be willing." To this Simmias said. but that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?" 14. "Tell this. have heard both Philolaus. Socrates." said he. do they say that it is not allowable to kill one's self? for I. and if he is wise. which you exhort Evenus to do? for I often meet with him.

of all other things. that at some times and to some persons only it is better to die than to live. yet still. "Therefore. yet that these men for whom it is better to die--this probably will appear wonderful to you--may not without impiety do this good to themselves. and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape. however." said Socrates. if what we said just now is agreeable to reason--that it is God who takes care of us. it will appear wonderful to you. The maxim. Cebes. and Phaedo of Socrates." said Cebes." 17. and that we men are one of their possessions. "if one of your slaves were to kill himself. it is not unreasonable to assert that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a necessity of doing so. such as that now laid on me. Socrates. "for perhaps you may hear. by Plato 64 15. and that we are his property.[28] "Jove be witness!" "And.Crito. as is the case in all other things. Probably. should you not be angry with him. indeed. Does it not seem so to you?" "It does." said Socrates. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern . you should consider it attentively. indeed.[27] and it never happens to a man. This. gently smiling. then. appears to me difficult to be understood. is a universal truth." replied Cebes. but must await another benefactor. speaking in his own dialect. without your having intimated that you wished him to die. and not easy to penetrate. appears to be an absurdity. "Perhaps. if this alone.[29] that we men are in a kind of prison. given on this subject in the mystical doctrines. indeed. in this point of view. however. to be well said: that the gods take care of us. said. "Then. perhaps. appears to me. and should you not punish him if you could?" "Certainly." 16." said he. "This. that philosophers should be very willing to die. But what you said just now." he replied. Then Cebes. "appears to be probable. it has some reason on its side. "it would appear to be unreasonable.

" said Socrates. but I . if I did not think that I should go." "You speak justly. Socrates. I should be wrong in not grieving at death. and is not at all willing to admit at once any thing one has said. therefore he would fly against all reason. the gods--is not consistent with reason. the contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case. first of all. the gods. always searches out arguments. be assured I can positively assert this. and. "But. but the foolish to rejoice. "Come. then. and. though I would not positively assert it. But a foolish man might perhaps think thus. for with what design should men really wise fly from masters who are better than themselves." said he. So that. be assured. appeared to me to be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes. you see." Whereupon Simmias replied. "Simmias and Cebes. looking toward us. next. for surely he can not think that he will take better care of himself when he has become free. Thus. but should cling to him as much as possible. Socrates. among men who have departed this life. that he should fly from his master." "Certainly. 19. and Phaedo of Socrates. but a man of sense would desire to be constantly with one better than himself. and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one.Crito. That. if I can any thing of the kind. "I will endeavor to defend myself more successfully before you than before the judges. For. as if I were in a court of justice. among other deities who are both wise and good. I hope to go among good men. because you so easily endure to abandon both us and those good rulers. said. as you yourself confess. however. Socrates. on this account. Cebes appears to me now to say something to the purpose. I am not so much troubled." replied Simmias. indeed. "for I think you mean that I ought to make my defense to this charge. for it becomes the wise to be grieved at dying." 18. and so readily leave them? And Cebes appears to me to direct his argument against you. but now. "Cebes." he proceeded. on hearing this. I shall go among gods who are perfectly good masters. by Plato 65 them who are the best of all masters--namely. better than any here.

by Plato 66 entertain a good hope that something awaits those who die. and let him attend to his own business. if you can persuade us to believe what you say. appears to me." "Never mind him. "but what he who is to give you the poison told me some time ago. or would you impart it to us? For this good appears to me to be also common to us. then.Crito. even thrice. if occasion require. "but he has been some time pestering me. "What." he said. that they aim at nothing else than to die and be . Simmias and Cebes. "But first let us attend to Crito here. otherwise. my judges. then. and prepare to give it me twice." 20." To which Socrates replied. this comes to pass." "For as many as rightly apply themselves to philosophy seem to have left all others in ignorance. and see what it is he seems to have for some time wished to say. "Let him alone. it will be far better for the good than the evil." "What else. to have confidence. and that. when he is about to die. and that. on good grounds. as was said long since. and Phaedo of Socrates." "I will endeavor to do so. "would you go away keeping this persuasion to yourself. of the reason why a man who has really devoted his life to philosophy." 21. "But now I wish to render an account to you. How. or. I will endeavor to explain. and to entertain a firm hope that the greatest good will befall him in the other world when he has departed this life." he rejoined." said Crito. and at the same time it will be an apology for you. "I was almost certain what you would say. that I should tell you to speak as little as possible? For he says that men become too much heated by speaking. Socrates. Socrates. and that nothing of this kind ought to interfere with the poison." answered Crito. those who did so were sometimes compelled to drink two or three times." said Simmias.

Crito. such as meats and drinks?" "By no means. indeed. if they heard this. and that they are by no means ignorant that they deserve to suffer it. "Consider. you have made me do so. Do we think that death is any thing?" "Certainly. Simmias. and in what sense they deserve death. Upon this. "Is it any thing else than the separation of the soul from the body? And is not this to die. "But what? about the pleasures of love?" "Not at all. "By Jupiter! Socrates." 22." he replied. said. I think. when it arrives. except in asserting that they are not ignorant. Simmias. 23. If this. Does it appear to you to be becoming in a philosopher to be anxious about pleasures. for thus. my good friend." "And. and Phaedo of Socrates." he said. and speak to one another. it would surely be absurd to be anxious about nothing else than this during their whole life. and for the soul to subsist apart by itself separated from the body? Is death any thing else than this?" "No. But. we shall understand better the subject we are considering." replied Simmias. for they are ignorant of the sense in which true philosophers desire to die. as they are called. though I am not now at all inclined to smile. by Plato 67 dead. then. but. would think it was very well said in reference to philosophers. and that our countrymen particularly would agree with you. is true. that true philosophers do desire death. to be grieved at what they have been long anxious about and aimed at. smiling. for the body to be apart by itself separated from the soul. then." . they would speak the truth. but this. whether you are of the same opinion as I. Socrates." said Simmias. for I think that the multitude. and what kind of death. "let us take leave of them.

"What." "Does not. "And it appears. much less can the others be so. or not. above all other men. and be occupied about his soul?" "It does. these bodily senses are neither accurate nor clear. and Phaedo of Socrates. who say that we neither hear nor see any thing with accuracy? If. and other ornaments of the body except so far as necessity compels him to use them?" "The true philosopher. or are they such as the poets constantly sing. by Plato 68 24." 25." "You speak very truly. then." he continued. evidently free his soul as much as he can from communion with the body?" "It appears so. for they are all far inferior to these." "First of all. if any one takes it with him as a partner in the search? What I mean is this: Do sight and hearing convey any truth to men." "But what with respect to the acquisition of wisdom? Is the body an impediment. "the whole employment of such a man appear to you to be. in such matters. does he seem to you to value or despise the possession of magnificent garments and sandals. . however. but to separate himself from it as much as possible. not about the body." he answered." he replied. that he who takes no pleasure in such things. Do they not seem so to you?" "Certainly. does not the philosopher. does not deserve to live. then.Crito. and who does not use them. to the generality of men. but that he nearly approaches to death who cares nothing for the pleasures that subsist through the body. then? Does such a man appear to you to think other bodily indulgences of value? For instance. "appears to me to despise them. Simmias.

have you ever seen any thing of this kind with your eyes?" "By no means. not communicating or being in contact with it. nor sight. and. "When. "But what as to such things as these. it aims at the discovery of that which is." "You say truly." "Must it not. then. nor pain. then. in these cases. be by reasoning." said he. Simmias? Do we say that justice itself is something or nothing?" "We say it is something." 27. so far as it can. by Plato 69 26. "does the soul light on the truth? for when it attempts to consider any thing in conjunction with the body. and Phaedo of Socrates. it is plain that it is then led astray by it." "And surely the soul then reasons best when none of these things disturb it--neither hearing. and flee from it. then." he replied. by Jupiter!" "And that beauty and goodness are something?" "How not?" "Now. and seek to retire within itself?" "It appears so. despise the body. taking leave of the body. if at all.Crito. then. . the soul of the philosopher. but it retires as much as possible within itself." "Such is the case. nor pleasure of any kind." "Does not. that any of the things that really are become known to it?" "Yes.

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


"Did you ever lay hold of them by any other bodily sense? But I speak generally, as of magnitude, health, strength and, in a word, of the essence of every thing; that is to say, what each is. Is, then, the exact truth of these perceived by means of the body, or is it thus, whoever among us habituates himself to reflect most deeply and accurately on each several thing about which he is considering, he will make the nearest approach to the knowledge of it?" "Certainly." 28. "Would not he, then, do this with the utmost purity, who should in the highest degree approach each subject by means of the mere mental faculties, neither employing the sight in conjunction with the reflective faculty, nor introducing any other sense together with reasoning; but who, using pure reflection by itself, should attempt to search out each essence purely by itself, freed as much as possible from the eyes and ears, and, in a word, from the whole body, as disturbing the soul, and not suffering it to acquire truth and wisdom, when it is in communion with it. Is not he the person, Simmias, if any one can, who will arrive at the knowledge of that which is?" 29. "You speak with wonderful truth, Socrates," replied Simmias. "Wherefore," he said, "it necessarily follows from all this that some such opinion as this should be entertained by genuine philosophers, so that they should speak among themselves as follows: 'A by-path, as it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,' because so long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable hinderances on account of its necessary support; and, moreover, if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom. 30. For nothing else than the body and its desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars among us arise on

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


account of our desire to acquire wealth: and we are compelled to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved to its service; and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able, by reason of it, to discern the truth. It has, then, in reality been demonstrated to us that if we are ever to know any thing purely, we must be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul; and then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of--wisdom--when we are dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. 31. For if it is not possible to know any thing purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of body, we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?" "Most assuredly, Socrates." 32. "If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going, there, if anywhere, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been, as it were, purified." "Certainly," said Simmias.

Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on all sides apart from the body, and to dwell, so far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered, as it were, from the shackles of the body?" "Certainly," he replied. 33. "Is this, then, called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?" "Assuredly," he answered. "But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly are especially and alone desirous to deliver it; and this is the very study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?" "It appears so." "Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has endeavored throughout his life to live as near as possible to death, then, when death arrives, to grieve? would not this be ridiculous?" "How should it not?" "In reality, then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy rightly, study to die; and to them, of all men, death is least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to go to that place where, on their arrival, they may hope to obtain that which they longed for throughout life? But they longed for wisdom, and to be freed from association with that which they hated. 34. Have many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of their seeing and being with those whom they have loved? and shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes

and if this be so. but in holding them in contempt. 36." he continued. "that which is called fortitude. they will appear to you to be absurd. "Would not this. and keeping them in subjection. would it not be very irrational." he resumed. and Phaedo of Socrates. if he be in truth a philosopher. and not gladly go there? We must think that he would gladly go. does not this belong to those only who most despise the body.Crito. as I just now said. then. be grieved at dying." he said. for he will be firmly persuaded of this." he replied. "For." "How so. "be a sufficient proof to you with respect to a man whom you should see grieved when about to die. also. "that all others consider death among the great evils?" ." he replied. one or both of these. by Plato 73 this very hope. by Jupiter!" he replied. "if you will consider the fortitude and temperance of others. which even the multitude call temperance. but a lover of his body? And this same person is probably a lover of riches and a lover of honor. that he will nowhere else than there attain wisdom in its purity. and live in the study of philosophy?" "Necessarily so. Simmias. except in Hades. Socrates?" "Do you know." he said." "It certainly is as you say." he answered. if such a man were to be afraid of death?" "Very much so. that he was not a lover of wisdom. "And temperance. my friend. that he shall nowhere else attain it in a manner worthy of the name. eminently belong to philosophers?" "By all means. and which consists in not being carried away by the passions. "Does not. 35. then.

they master others. they abstain from some.Crito. are present or absent. And though they call intemperance the being governed by pleasures. and everything else of the kind. consider whether such virtue is not a mere outline and in reality servile. whether pleasures and fears. are not those among them who keep their passions in subjection affected in the same way? and are they not temperate through a kind of intemperance? And although we may say. perhaps. that in a certain manner they become temperate through intemperance." "All men. are brave through being afraid and fear. nevertheless the manner in which they are affected with respect to this silly temperance resembles this." "Certainly. to barter pleasures for pleasures. and the greater for the lesser. do the brave among them endure death when they do endure it. temperance and justice. by being mastered by some pleasures. by Plato 74 "They do indeed. pains for pains. fearing to be deprived of other pleasures. consider that this is not a right exchange for virtue. for. except philosophers. that this is impossible. in a word true virtue. and Phaedo of Socrates. for which we ought to barter all these things. "Then. yet it happens to them that. but that that alone is the right coin. possessing neither soundness nor truth. like pieces of money. though it is absurd that any one should be brave through fear and cowardice. and desiring them. and for this and with this everything is in reality bought and sold Fortitude. through dread of greater evils?" "It is so. subsist with wisdom." 37. therefore." "But what. being mastered by others. and this is similar to what was just now said. But the really true virtue is a purification from all such . wisdom. fear for fear. "My dear Simmias. but when separated from wisdom and changed one for another." "So it seems. and." he answered.

are a kind of initiatory purification 38. fortitude and wisdom itself.Crito. I shall meet with good masters and friends. said "Socrates." "You say truly. being persuaded that there." said Socrates. and vanishes like breath or smoke. but he that arrives there purified and initiated shall dwell with the gods 'For there are. But to the multitude this is incredible If. "is the defense I make. justice. These last. whether such is probably . since if it remained anywhere united in itself." he added. and possesses activity and intelligence. on good grounds. that the soul of a man who dies exists. But whether I have endeavored rightly. by Plato 75 things. I have to the utmost of my ability left no means untried. no less than here. there would be an abundant and good hope. I have succeeded better with you in my defense than I did with the Athenian judges. Socrates. Simmias and Cebes. taking up the discussion. and Phaedo of Socrates. that what you say is true 40. "but what shall we do? Are you willing that we should converse on these points." When Socrates had thus spoken. and freed from those evils which you have just now enumerated. But this probably needs no little persuasion and proof. Cebes. but few inspired'. 'many wand-bearers. are no other than those who have pursued philosophy rightly that I might be of their number. in my opinion. but in reality to have intimated long since that whoever shall arrive in Hades unexpiated and uninitiated shall lie in mud. however." 39. do not repine or grieve at leaving you and my masters here. and that immediately it is separated and goes out from the body it is dispersed. but what you have said respecting the soul will occasion much incredulity in many from the apprehension that when it is separated from the body it no longer exists anywhere. and temperance. Cebes.' say those who preside at the mysteries. then. And those who instituted the mysteries for us appear to have been by no means contemptible. for that I. it is well. all the rest appears to me to be said rightly. and is no longer anywhere. but is destroyed and perishes on the very day in which a man dies. and have in any respect succeeded. "Such. as it appears to me. if it please God--very shortly. on arriving there I shall know clearly. but have endeavored to the utmost of my power.

which we now call to mind. with respect to every thing that is subject to generation. "You must not. and Phaedo of Socrates. then. but also with respect to all animals and plants. whether the souls of men who are dead exist in Hades. and the just to the unjust." "Certainly. can there be any other consequence than that our souls are there? for surely they could not be produced again if they did not exist. for instance. 42. for instance. then. even though he were a comic poet. would say that I am talking idly. Let us see whether they are not all so produced. This is an ancient saying. if it should in reality be evident that the living are produced from no other source than the dead. "consider this only with respect to men." . and return hither again. there will be need of other arguments. it afterward became greater?" "Yes. wherever they have any such quality. the honorable is contrary to the base. by Plato 76 the case or not?" "Indeed. when any thing becomes greater. that souls departing hence exist there. and this would be sufficient proof that these things are so." said Socrates." replied Cebes. or discoursing on subjects that do not concern me. in a word. and." "I do not think. that the living are produced again from the dead. is it not necessary that. 41. Let us consider this. then. But if this is not the case." said Cebes. As. If you please. from being previously smaller.Crito. as. Let us consider it in this point of view. we will examine into it." he continued. or not. and so with ten thousand other things. if you wish to ascertain it with greater certainty. And if this is so. whether it is necessary that all things which have a contrary should be produced from nothing else than their contrary. and are produced from the dead. "that any one who should now hear us. no otherwise than contraries from contraries. "I should gladly hear your opinion on these matters.

must it not become so from better? and if more just. "sufficiently determined this. from being previously greater. by Plato 77 "And if it becomes smaller. then? If any thing becomes worse. from more unjust?" "How should it not?" "We have then. for instance. and from that other back again? for between a greater thing and a smaller there are increase and decrease." he replied." "What next? Is there also something of this kind in them. between all two contraries a mutual twofold production. . 43." "What. from one to the other. afterward become smaller?" "It is so. the other to decrease?" "Yes. as to be produced from each other. even though sometimes we have not names to designate them. to grow cold and to grow warm. contraries from contraries?" "Certainly. and Phaedo of Socrates." he replied. swifter?" "Certainly. weaker? and from slower. that all things are thus produced. "And must not to be separated and commingled. will it not. of necessity. "And from stronger. and do we not accordingly call the one to increase. and be subject to a reciprocal generation?" "Certainly. and every thing in the same manner. yet in fact be everywhere thus circumstanced.Crito." he replied." he said.

then?" said Socrates. then." he replied. sleeping?" "Certainly. Have I sufficiently explained this to you or not?" "Certainly. then. the other to awake. produced from each other. "will describe to you one pair of the contraries which I have just now mentioned." "And that they are produced from each other?" "Yes. both what it is and its mode of production: and do you describe to me the other. "What?" "Death." he answered. and that the modes of their production are." "Do you. and Phaedo of Socrates. as waking has its contrary. "has life any contrary. the other to be roused. then. and from sleeping awaking is produced. "Are not these. and are not the modes by which they are produced two-fold intervening between these two?" "How should it be otherwise?" "I then." he said. I say that one is to sleep. since they are contraries. the one to fall asleep.Crito." continued Socrates. and from awaking sleeping. by Plato 78 "What. is produced from life?" . 44. "describe to me in the same manner with respect to life and death? Do you not say that life is contrary to death?" "I do." "What.

" "Thus." said he "is produced from death?" "I must needs confess." said Socrates. "Our souls. then. "if there is such a thing as to revive. by Plato 79 "Death. then. therefore." he replied." "Therefore.Crito." he proceeded. is not one of them very clear? for to die surely is clear." he replied. "What. then. "What is this?" "To revive. but. "exist in Hades. to their mode of production. will not this reviving be a mode of production from the dead to the living?" "Certainly. we have agreed that the living are produced from the dead. O Cebes! living things and living men are produced. "that life is." "It appears so. then." he said. "shall we not find a corresponding contrary mode of production. then. and Phaedo of Socrates. no less than the dead from the living." "From the dead." he said. shall we do?" he continued. or will nature be defective in this? Or must we discover a contrary mode of production to dying?" "By all means. there appears to . is it not?" "Certainly." he replied." "With respect. "What. this being the case." "So it seems.

and Phaedo of Socrates. as it were. Socrates.Crito." he replied. if. and did not turn round again to the other. and after they are dead should remain in this state of death. Socrates.' 46. and cease to be produced?" "How say you?" he asked. by Plato 80 me sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily exist somewhere. O Cebes!" he said. there should be such a thing as falling asleep. "It is by no means difficult. for instance. "as it seems to me. but no reciprocal waking again produced from a state of sleep." "For. and not revive again. you know that at length all things would show the fable of Endymion to be a jest." replied Cebes. and it would be thought nothing at all of." "See now. such undoubtedly is the case." he said "that this must necessarily follow from what has been admitted. but generation were direct from one thing alone into its opposite. my dear Cebes. and we have not admitted these things under a delusion. from whence they are again produced. "that we have not agreed on these things improperly. "but you appear to me to speak the exact truth. and nothing alive? For if living beings are produced from other things. for it is in reality true that there is a reviving again. or retrace its course. because everything else would be in the same state as he--namely. I think. and living beings die. that doctrine of Anaxagoras would soon be verified. asleep. be in the same state. Likewise. "It appears to me. as it appears to me. revolving. would it not necessarily follow that at length all things should be dead. in a circle. Cebes. "to understand what I mean. but never separated. that the living are produced from . for if one class of things were not constantly given back in the place of another. do you know that all things would at length have the same form. 'all things would be together." 45." he continued. And if all things were mingled together. if all things that partake of life should die. what could prevent their being all absorbed in death?" "Nothing whatever.

"according to that doctrine. that if any one be reminded of any thing." 48. however. by Plato 81 the dead. he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before. that men. interrupting him. and that the condition of the good is better. unless our soul existed somewhere before it came into this human form. if one leads them to diagrams. describe all things as they are. and Phaedo of Socrates." he said. "And. that the souls of the dead exist. indeed." "But. Moreover. and that a most beautiful one. or any thing else of the kind. from what Cebes has begun to say. to be reminded. For do you doubt how that which is called learning is reminiscence?" "I do not doubt. if they had not innate knowledge and right reason. interrupting him. and. Cebes. "by one argument. which you are frequently in the habit of advancing. nevertheless. I almost now remember. and am persuaded." "But if you are not persuaded in this way." said Cebes. they would never be able to do this." 47. when questioned (if one questions them properly) of themselves. "It is proved. it is then most clearly apparent that this is the case. so that from hence. "what proofs are there of these things? Remind me of them." "I do it thus" he replied: "we admit. if it is true. "but I require this very thing of which we are speaking." said Simmias. according to this it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. I should like to hear now how you would attempt to prove it. and of the evil worse. the soul appears to be something immortal. "see if you will agree with us in considering the matter thus. But this is impossible. Simmias. . however. that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence." "Certainly." said Simmias." said Cebes.Crito. indeed. Socrates. also." said Socrates. for I do not very well remember them at present. surely.

then." "How not?" "Do you not know. that when knowledge comes in a certain manner it is reminiscence? But the manner I mean is this: if any one. "Is not. indeed. from lapse of time. but different. that lovers when they see a lyre.Crito. and Phaedo of Socrates." ." he said. "Do we. by Plato 82 49. the knowledge of a man is different from that of a lyre. should we not justly say that he remembered that of which he received the idea?" "How mean you?" "For instance. they both recognize the lyre. "something of this sort a kind of reminiscence. one has now forgotten?" "Certainly. and that when one sees a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Cebes?" "Certainly. "But what?" he continued. some particular thing. but also form an idea of something else. especially when one is thus affected with respect to things which. by Jupiter!" said Simmias." he replied. of which the knowledge is not the same. or perceiving through the medium of any other sense. then. and so in an infinite number of similar instances. upon seeing or hearing. seeing Simmias. and receive in their minds the form of the person to whom the lyre belonged? This is reminiscence: just as any one. should not only know that. or any thing else which their favorite is accustomed to use. and not thinking of them. is often reminded of Cebes. 50." "An infinite number. are thus affected. then. admit this also. or a garment. "Does it happen that when one sees a painted horse or a painted lyre one is reminded of a man.

" he replied. 51. as regards likeness. we have from these formed an idea of that which is different from these--for does it not appear to you to be different? Consider the matter thus." "But when one is reminded by things like. is it not necessary that one should be thus further affected. and partly from things unlike?" "It does. nor any thing else of this kind. "And do we know what it is itself?" "Certainly. by Plato 83 "And does it not also happen that on seeing a picture of Simmias one is reminded of Simmias himself?" "It does. indeed. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. "Whence have we derived the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we have just now mentioned. then. Do not stones that are equal. nor one stone with another. equal. according to all this. so as to perceive whether. then. "Consider. or not?" "By Jupiter! we most assuredly do allow it. or stones. and that from seeing logs." replied Simmias. and at another not?" . or other things of the kind." he replied." said Socrates." he replied. "if the case is thus. Do we allow that there is such a thing as equality? I do not mean of one log with another. "Does it not happen. that reminiscence arises partly from things like. and logs sometimes that are the same. appear at one time equal. this falls short or not of the thing of which one has been reminded?" "It is necessary. but something altogether different from all these--abstract equality. do we allow that there is any such thing.

" "But it makes no difference. from its being like or unlike them?" "Certainly. "Are we affected in any such way with regard to logs and the equal things we have just now spoken of? And do they appear to us to be equal in the same manner as abstract equality itself is. you form." he replied. "What. then. therefore. the notion of another." "These equal things. at any time. . have you not formed your idea and derived your knowledge of it?" "You speak most truly. from these equal things. "must necessarily be reminiscence. on seeing one thing." he said. "Is it not. this. as it appears. or not at all. Socrates. of being such as equality itself is?" "They fall far short." he said." "Certainly. whether like or unlike. "When. from the sight of it. Socrates." he replied." he said." "However." 52. "and abstract equality.Crito. as to this?" he continued. "which are different from that abstract equality. therefore." he said. or do they fall short in some degree. are not the same?" "By no means. and Phaedo of Socrates. then. by Plato 84 "Certainly." "But what? Does abstract equality ever appear to you unequal? or equality inequality?" "Never.

then? Are we affected in some such way. if we were to refer to it those equal things that come under the senses. on beholding some particular thing. and observe that all such things aim at resembling that." "What. or some other of the senses. we must perceive. or how shall we say it is?" "Even so." "However. but falls short of it. that we perceived this. or touch. we began to see.Crito." "It is necessary. on first seeing equal things. then." "For they are the same. and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight. but failed in doing so. Socrates. and use our other senses. so far as. we must have had a knowledge of equality itself--what it is. that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality. but is inferior to it--do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles. our argument is concerned. or not. at being like something else that exists. but fall far short of it. and yet fall short of it. with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?" "Assuredly. by Plato 85 "Do we admit." 53. then." "Such is the case. and hear. and Phaedo of Socrates. though imperfectly?" "It is necessary. as that which I now see. that when one." . that we must have known abstract equality before the time when. we admit this too." "Before. therefore. and can not become such as that is. by means of the senses. "Moreover. we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality. perceives that it aims. for I say the same of them all.

and possess our other senses?" "Certainly. For to know is this. therefore. having once had it. and the holy. the just." "It seems so." "But did we not. both in the questions we ask and the answers we give. and should always retain it through life. So that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born. but all things of the kind. then. the good. Simmias. in one word. as soon as we were born. as it seems. not only the equal and the greater and smaller. . we were born possessing it. by Plato 86 "This necessarily follows." he replied. for do we not call this oblivion. before we were born. before we possessed these. we should always be born with this knowledge. and. we have said. both before we were born and as soon as we were born." "Such is the case. and Phaedo of Socrates." "But. from what has been already said. Socrates. Socrates." "We must have had it. having this before we were born. see and hear.Crito. we must have had a knowledge of abstract equality?" "Yes. the loss of knowledge?" "Assuredly. respecting every thing which we mark with the seal of existence. we knew. when one has got a knowledge of any thing. "If. we did not constantly forget it. to retain and not lose it." 54. for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself." "And if.

Socrates." "Such." he replied. Simmias: that we are born with knowledge. "But if. and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. "And do all men appear to you to be able to give a reason for the things of which we have just now been speaking?" "I wish they could. as I said. through exercising the senses about these things. then. which he had forgotten." said Simmias. and we retain it through life. by Plato 87 55." "For this appeared to be possible. is the case. one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this knowledge. either by seeing or hearing. or employing any other sense. for one having perceived any thing. certainly. Socrates. So that. having had it before we were born. "Which. should we not say rightly?" "Certainly." 56. we lose it at our birth. and this learning will be reminiscence. "but I am much more afraid that at this time to-morrow there will no longer be any one able to do this properly." "But what? Are you able to choose in this case. and afterward. or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else than remember. do you choose. or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?" "At present." . would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember. and Phaedo of Socrates. or not?" "He needs must be able to do so.Crito. to form an idea of something different from this. and what do you think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things that he knows. we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed. Socrates. I am unable to choose.

then. what they once learned?" "Necessarily so. "Unless. and if we compare these things to it. Simmias?" he proceeded: "If those things which we are continually talking about really exist. it necessarily follows. Simmias." he said. separate from bodies." "Assuredly not." "Our souls. as we have just now admitted. then. for this period yet remains. the beautiful. my friend. Socrates. then. and to this we refer all things that come under the senses.Crito. existed before they were in a human form. and possessed intelligence." "Before. we receive this knowledge at our birth. therefore." "When did our souls receive this knowledge? Not surely. that as these ." "Do they remember." "Be it so. I was not aware that I was saying nothing to the purpose. by Plato 88 "Do not all men. But at what other time do we lose it? for we are not born with it. Simmias. Do we lose it. then?" "Yes. the good. at the very time in which we receive it? Or can you mention any other time?" "By no means." "Does the case then stand thus with us. Socrates. since we were born into the world. "seem to you to know these things?" "By no means. and Phaedo of Socrates." 57. and every such essence. and to be our own. as finding it to have a prior existence.

Simmias. I think. that when we are dead it will exist no less than before we were born. and all the rest that you just now spoke of. as the beautiful. and formed from some other source." "This has been even now demonstrated. when it has come. it will still exist does not appear to me to have been demonstrated. and." "He is sufficiently persuaded." said Socrates." said Simmias. that our soul existed before we were born. Socrates. and the argument admirably tends to prove that our souls exist before we are born. which Cebes just now mentioned. 59. "if you will only connect this last argument with that which we before assented to. by Plato 89 exist. Yet I think he is sufficiently persuaded of this. "but that popular doubt. that our soul existed before we were born. Socrates. the good." he continued. when we are dead. and being destroyed?" "You say well." said Simmias. and yet. before we are born. For what hinders it being born. the case is sufficiently demonstrated. the soul is not dispersed. "for it is necessary to persuade Cebes too. But whether. so far as I am concerned. when a man dies. whether." "But how does it appear to Cebes?" said Socrates. so likewise our soul exists even before we are born.Crito. its then also dying itself. neither the latter?" 58. still stands in our way. that every thing living is produced from that which is . and our souls also." said Cebes. For I hold nothing so clear to me as this. Simmias and Cebes. and existing before it came into a human body. if the demonstration is to be made complete. "although he is the most pertinacious of men in distrusting arguments. "for it appears that only one half of what is necessary has been demonstrated--namely. "Most assuredly. but it is necessary to demonstrate further. this discussion will have been undertaken in vain. "there appears to me to be the same necessity. and this is the end of its existence. that all such things most certainly exist. and is separated from this body. just as that essence does which you have now mentioned. but if these do not exist. is it not so? And is there not an equal necessity both that these things should exist. and if not the former. and Phaedo of Socrates.

" Upon this Cebes. "but. but in a violent storm. by Plato 90 dead. endeavor to persuade him not to be afraid of death. "until you have quieted his fears. and to be afraid. There are also many barbarous nations. as if we were afraid. how is it not necessary for it also to exist after death." "This shall be done. . said. and from being dead. or rather not as if we were afraid. like children. let us return to the point from whence we digressed. "and in it surely there are skillful men. sparing neither money nor toil." rejoined Cebes." said Cebes. for perhaps you could not easily find any more competent than yourselves to do this. not in a calm. Cebes. "can we procure a skillful charmer for such a case. seeking such a charmer.Crito." he replied. and Phaedo of Socrates. What you require. as of hobgoblins. has been already demonstrated. to be produced from nothing else than death. You should also seek for him among yourselves. smiling." said Socrates." "But you must charm him every day. Let us. as there is nothing on which you can more seasonably spend your money. since it must needs be produced again? 60. on the soul's departure from the body. "Greece is wide." "It will be agreeable to me. and it is necessary for it when it enters into life. if it is agreeable to you. then. "Endeavor to teach us better. for how should it not?" "You say well. now that you are about to leave us?" 61. all of which you should search through. However. lest. both you and Simmias appear to me as if you wished to sift this argument more thoroughly." "But whence. though perhaps there is some boy[30] within us who has such a dread. the winds should blow it away and disperse it. Socrates. For if the soul exists before. then. and is born. Socrates." he said. especially if one should happen to die.

Whether is essence itself. then." said Socrates. and for what not. "to ask ourselves some such question as this: to what kind of thing it appertains to be thus affected--namely. that things which are always the same. lest it should be so affected. or does it sometimes change? Does equality itself. and each several thing which is. and never undergo any variation at all under any circumstances?" "They must of necessity continue the same and in the same state. ever undergo any change. both in our questions and answers. to be dissolved in the same manner as that in which it was compounded. And after this we should consider which of the two the soul is." said Cebes." said Cebes. then. garments. but that things which are constantly changing. "Does it not. and in the result should either be confident or fearful for our soul. the beautiful itself. to be dispersed--and for what we ought to fear." "Let us return." "You speak truly." he said. appertain to that which is formed by composition. and are never in the same state. to be thus affected. or other things of the kind. and if there is any thing not compounded. and in the same state. 62. then. however small? Or does each of them which exists. and Phaedo of Socrates. does it not appertain to this alone. then. are uncompounded. continue always the same. of which we gave this account that it exists. such as men. "But what shall we say of the many beautiful things. always the same. are compounded?" "To me it appears so. not to be thus affected?" "It appears to me to be so. "Is it not most probable. if to any thing." said he. "to the subjects on which we before discoursed. whether equal or beautiful. and in the same state. horses. being an unmixed essence by itself. and is naturally compounded. or . 63. Socrates. by Plato 91 "We ought.Crito.

" "These." he asked. soul?" "Nothing else. then. the other invisible?" "We may. then. Socrates. and Phaedo of Socrates. "that it is to the visible. 64." "Come. and are not seen?" "You say what is strictly true. but the visible never the same?" "This. or perceive by the other senses." he said." he replied. either with respect to themselves or one another?" "These. too. on the other. so to say. you can touch. "we may assume. by Plato 92 of all things synonymous with them? Do they continue the same. "And the invisible always continuing the same. .Crito." he replied. or see." replied Cebes. "never continue the same. on the one hand. "that there are two species of things." replied Cebes. "To which species." he continued. on the other hand. shall we say the body is more like." he said. you can not apprehend in any other way than by the exercise of thought. if you please. or. but those that continue the same. quite contrary to the former. are they never at any time." he said. "We may assume." "But what of the soul? Is it visible or invisible?" "It is not visible to men. for such things are invisible. and more nearly allied?" "It is clear to everyone. body. and. then. the one visible. "is there anything else belonging to us than. then. the same.

Socrates. to the nature of men. that the soul. immortal. either by means of the sight or hearing. and wanders and is confused." "Is it. and. then. think you?" "To that of men. and constantly continue the same with respect to those things. or any other sense (for to examine any thing by means of the body is to do so by the senses). eternal. Socrates. through coming into contact with things of this kind? And is this affection of the soul called wisdom?" "You speak. "in every respect. well and truly. then. through coming into contact with things of this kind?" "Certainly. and the body. say this too. by Plato 93 "But we speak of things which are visible. "And did we not. when it employs the body to examine any thing. and reels as if intoxicated. does it approach that which is pure. and Phaedo of Socrates. continue constantly with it. and unchangeable." "What. some time since. is more like the invisible than the body. shall we say of the soul--that it is visible. invisible?" "Yes. then." "The soul. and has the power. is then drawn by the body to things that never continue the same. or not visible?" "Not visible." . as being allied to it." "But when it examines anything by itself." 65. or not so. and does it cease from its wandering.Crito. the visible?" "It must needs be so." he said. or to some other nature. so long as it subsists by itself.

that the soul resembles the divine. by Plato 94 "To which species of the two. then. And. these conclusions follow." "Consider it also thus. uniform. and which never continues in the same state. then. my dear Cebes. but the mortal obey and be subservient?" "To me it does so. is most like that which is human. dissoluble.Crito." he replied. that the soul is in every respect more like that which continues constantly the same than that which does not so. does the soul resemble?" "It is clear. both from what was before and now said. that. from this method of reasoning. Socrates. then." "But what as to the body?" "It is more like the other. Socrates. in this way." . "whether. nature enjoins the latter to be subservient and obey. when soul and body are together. multiform. but that the body. I think. mortal. intelligent. the former to rule and exercise dominion. which of the two appears to you to be like the divine. Cebes. and Phaedo of Socrates. on the other hand. Can we say any thing against this. but the body. and which always continues in the same state. and which the mortal? Does it not appear to you to be natural that the divine should rule and command. indissoluble. does the soul appear to you to be more like and more nearly allied?" 66." said he. "even the dullest person. that the soul is most like that which is divine. to show that it is not so?" "We can not." "Which. from all that has been said. the mortal. "Every one. immortal. unintelligent. would allow." "Consider.

and Phaedo of Socrates." 68. "that when a man dies. Is it not so?" "Yes. however. on the contrary. and especially so if any one should die with his body in full vigor. if God will. taking nothing of the body with it." he said. the body. which is exposed to sight. be immediately dispersed and destroyed. does it not appertain to the body to be quickly dissolved. I ask. by Plato 95 67. and some parts of the body. immortal. as most men assert? Far from it. to be altogether indissoluble or nearly so?" "How not?" "You perceive. such as the bones and nerves. as constantly studying this (but this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy aright. pure and invisible. to which it appertains to be dissolved. even though it does decay. the divine. then? Since these things are so. excellent. when separated from the body. nevertheless. and which we call a corpse. the invisible. and every thing of that kind.Crito. my soul also must shortly go)--can this soul of ours. . to fall asunder and be dispersed. as those that are embalmed in Egypt." "Does not the soul. depart to that which resembles itself. immortal and wise? And on its arrival there. but remains for a considerable time. as one may say. and in reality to study how to die easily). "Can the soul. but having shunned it. my dear Cebes and Simmias. then. and which goes to another place like itself. which is invisible.[31] for when the body has collapsed and been embalmed. "What. and therefore truly called the invisible world. the visible part of him. when in this state. and at a corresponding age. But the case is much rather thus: if it is separated in a pure state. then. are. but to the soul. would not this be to study how to die?" "Most assuredly. and gathered itself within itself. being such and of such a nature. as not having willingly communicated with it in the present life. does not immediately undergo any of these affections. it remains almost entire for an incredible length of time.[32] to the presence of a good and wise God (whither.

which the intercourse and communion of the body. having been accustomed to hate. fears." "That is probable. I think. as it is said. free from error. wild passions." "Certainly. which one can touch and see. do you think that a soul thus affected can depart from the body by itself. have made natural to it. and. but what is dark and invisible to the eyes. by Jupiter!" said Cebes. does it not in truth pass the rest of its time with the gods? Must we affirm that it is so. and having served and loved it. so as to think that there is nothing real except what is corporeal. as having constantly held communion with the body. and employ for sensual purposes. through desires and pleasures. earthly and visible. being such images as those souls produced which have not departed pure from the body. about which. wandering. ignorance. and been bewitched by it. they are visible. and Phaedo of Socrates. 69. indeed." he replied. "But. through constant association and great attention. my dear Cebes. among monuments and tombs. which is intellectual and apprehended by philosophy. also. as is said of the initiated." "We must think. Cebes. on which account. by Plato 96 is it not its lot to be happy." . and uncontaminated?" "By no means whatever. if it departs from the body polluted and impure. but which partake of the visible. by possessing which such a soul is weighed down. Socrates. certain shadowy phantoms of souls have been seen.Crito. or otherwise?" "So. and drink and eat. and all the other evils to which human nature is subject. fear. and drawn again into the visible world through dread of the invisible and of Hades. that this is ponderous and heavy. "But I think it will be impressed with that which is corporeal. and shun this.

to animals having the same habits as those they have given themselves up to during life. those who have given themselves up to gluttony. whither each will go. wantonness and drinking. Cebes. by Plato 97 70. they are again united to a body. "It is evident. will be clothed in the species of wolves.Crito. through the desire of the corporeal nature that accompanies them. as is probable. then. "as to the rest. "are not they the most happy. Do you not think so?" "You say what is very probable. Socrates?" "For instance. and not that these are the souls of the good. or . "Probable indeed. will probably be clothed in the form of asses and brutes of that kind." "And that such as have set great value on injustice. tyranny and rapine. who have practiced that social and civilized virtue which they call temperance and justice. or wasps. "How not?" "Of these. "into such as these. but of the wicked. and do they not go to the best place. paying the penalty of their former conduct. without philosophy and reflection?" "In what respect are these the most happy?" "Because it is probable that these should again migrate into a corresponding civilized and peaceable kind of animals. and which is produced from habit and exercise. such as bees perhaps. and Phaedo of Socrates." he replied. and have put no restraint on themselves." said Cebes." he said. according to the resemblances of their several pursuits?" 71." he continued. then. hawks and kites! Where else can we say such souls go?" "Without doubt. which are compelled to wander about such places. which was evil. and they are united. evident. and they wander about so long until." "But what do you say these are." "Is it not.

to pass into the rank of gods." "For it would not become them to do so. the lovers of wisdom know that philosophy. they who care at all for their soul. and do not give themselves up to them. and do not spend their lives in the culture of their bodies. those who philosophize rightly. and perceiving. by Plato 98 ants. or even into the same human species again. the strength of the prison. dreading disgrace and ignominy. that it arises from desire. as also is that through the ears and the other senses. 73. so that he who is bound as much as possible assists in binding himself. Socrates. Cebes. and sunk in utter ignorance. "The lovers of wisdom know that philosophy. Socrates?" "I will tell you. "It would not. receiving their soul in this state." "How. but. and endeavors to free it. nor. by Jupiter!" he rejoined. And on this account." "But it is not lawful for any one who has not studied philosophy. 72. persuading an abandonment of these so far as it is not absolutely . do they then abstain from them.Crito. again. proceed not in the same way with them. and compelled to view things through this. receiving their soul plainly bound and glued to the body. "Wherefore. but only for the true lover of wisdom. then. like those who are lovers of power and honor. as the generality of men and the lovers of wealth. and not directly by herself." "It is probable. not fearing the loss of property and poverty. too. despising all these. being convinced that they ought not to act contrary to philosophy. as through a prison. and departed this life perfectly pure. as being ignorant whither they are going. abstain from all bodily desires." says Cebes. following her wherever she leads. I say. but in accordance with the freedom and purification she affords. and persevere in doing so. by showing that the view of things by means of the eyes is full of deception. gently exhorts it." he replied. my friends Simmias and Cebes. and Phaedo of Socrates. and from these become moderate men. they give themselves up to her direction.

with respect to what she herself understands of things that have a real subsistence. and to be similarly nourished. in consequence of its forming the same opinions with the body. and causes it to become corporeal. to possess similar manners. are they not?" "Certainly. and which differ under different aspects. and advising the soul to be collected and concentrated within itself. by Plato 99 necessary to use them. 74. he does not merely suffer such evil from these things as one might suppose. thinking that she ought not to oppose this deliverance. and is not conscious of it." "In this state of affection. though it is not so. and to consider nothing true which she views through the medium of others. The soul of the true philosopher. this he suffers. grieved or influenced by desire. griefs and fears. and Phaedo of Socrates. Socrates?" said Cebes. and the worst of all. But these are chiefly visible objects.Crito. but that which is the greatest evil. therefore. as it were. "That the soul of every man is compelled to be either vehemently delighted or grieved about some particular thing. then." "But what is this evil. nails the soul to the body. is not the soul especially shackled by the body?" "How so?" "Because each pleasure and pain. and. to consider that the thing about which it is thus strongly affected is most real and most true.[32] for that a thing of this kind is sensible and visible. at the same time. considering that when any one is exceedingly delighted or alarmed. such as either being sick or wasting his property through indulging his desires. it is compelled. so that it can never pass into Hades in a pure . deeming those things to be true whatever the body asserts to be so. but that what she herself perceives is intelligible and invisible. For. and to believe nothing else than herself. and delighting in the same things. having a nail. accordingly abstains as much as possible from pleasures and desires. I think. and fastens it to it.

Simmias and Cebes. At length Socrates. while it strictly attends to these things. and not subject to opinion. and shall be free from human evils." 76. and being nourished by it. "What think you of what has been said? Does it appear to you to have been proved sufficiently? for many doubts and objections still remain if any one will examine them thoroughly. Socrates. by Plato 100 state. weaving a kind of Penelope's web the reverse way. then. contemplating that which is true and divine." "You speak most truly. From such a regimen as this the soul has no occasion to fear. lest. and one like itself. 75.Crito. perceiving them. If. do not hesitate both yourselves to speak and express your opinion. and make her work void. and no longer have an existence anywhere. I have nothing to say. When Socrates had thus spoken. and not for the reasons that most people say. But the soul of a philosopher would reason thus. and so quickly falls again into another body. and Phaedo of Socrates. Cebes. Do you think as they do?" "Assuredly not. a long silence ensued. but if you are doubting about this. and grows up as if it were sown. being torn to pieces at its departure from the body. and so did most of us. truly. if it appears to you in any respect that it . those who are truly lovers of wisdom are moderate and resolute. but must ever depart polluted by the body. and pure. and that when it is freed it should give itself up again to pleasures and pains. it should be blown about and dissipated by the winds. but Cebes and Simmias were conversing a little while with each other." said Cebes. you are considering some other subject. and that when it dies it shall go to a kindred essence. and being always intent on this. said. to bind it down again. and would not think that philosophy ought to set it free. and consequently is deprived of all association with that which is divine. On the contrary." "No. and uniform. therefore. "For these reasons. it thinks that it ought to live in this manner as long as it does live. effecting a calm of the passions. and Socrates himself was pondering upon what had been said. and following the guidance of reason. as he appeared.

I will tell you the truth: for some time each of us. in turn. But neither do these birds appear to me to sing through sorrow. On this account. "Bless me. being in doubt. and say that they. For it appears to me. upon hearing this." Upon this Simmias said. sing their last song through grief. has been urging and exhorting the other to question you. therefore. or swallow. lest it should be disagreeable to you in your present circumstances. But he. rejoicing that they are about to depart to that deity whose servants they are. though they have been used to sing before. 78. by Plato 101 might have been argued better. and said. it is right that you should both speak and ask whatever you please. with difficulty. gently smiled. foreseeing the blessings of Hades. which. could I persuade other men that I do not consider my present condition a calamity. "Indeed. they say. sing then more than ever. but you are afraid lest I should be more morose now than during the former part of my life. too. Socrates. or is afflicted with any other pain.Crito. but we were afraid of giving you trouble. I appear to you to be inferior to swans with respect to divination. belonging to Apollo." 77. But I. from a desire to hear our doubts solved. and sacred to the same god." "You say well. but. as it seems. and he. that to know them clearly in the present life is either impossible or . when they perceive that they must needs die. in my opinion. and to call me in again to your assistance. and. belie the swans too. and that I have received the power of divination from our common master no less than they. they are prophetic. if you think you can be at all benefited by my help. how far he does not assent to what has been said. and they do not consider that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold. who. probably as it does to you with respect to these matters. But men. or the hoopoes. And. "and both I will tell you what are my doubts. they sing and rejoice on that day more excellently than at any preceding time. and that I do not depart from this life with less spirits than they. so long as the Athenian Eleven permit. not even the nightingale. indeed. Simmias. and Phaedo of Socrates. sing lamenting through grief. Socrates. since I am not able to persuade even you. nor yet do swans." said Simmias. lamenting their death. consider myself to be a fellow-servant of the swans. through their own fear of death.

but he might say that the harmony must needs subsist somewhere. taking the best of human reasonings and that which is the most difficult to be confuted. that our body being compacted and held together by heat and cold. For I think. when I consider the matter. for there could be no possibility that the lyre should subsist any longer when the chords are burst." he answered. When any one. but that the harmony. both with myself and with Cebes. so to sail through life. has either broken the lyre. and embarking on this. then. and perish before that which is mortal. "Perhaps. what has been said does not appear to have been sufficiently proved. then. since you bid me do so. and Phaedo of Socrates. as one who risks himself on a raft." Then said Socrates. very beautiful and divine. should become extinct. but the lyre and its chords are bodies. either to learn from others how they stand or to discover them for one's self. and its chords. but tell me in what respect it was not sufficiently proved. I. on a surer conveyance. with respect to these things. should subsist.Crito. on examining them in every point of view. nor shall I blame myself hereafter for not having now told you what I think. when they . he might maintain from the same reasoning as yours that it is necessary the harmony should still exist and not be destroyed." "In this. by Plato 102 very difficult: on the other hand. and a lyre. so as not to desist until. that harmony is something invisible and incorporeal. not to test what has been said of them in every possible way. or cut or burst the chords. you have the truth on your side. which is of the same nature and akin to that which is divine and immortal. compounded and earthly. and of corporeal form. and akin to that which is mortal. shall not now be ashamed to question you. 80. our soul is the fusion and harmony of these. which are of a mortal nature. and that the chords. therefore. in a well-modulated lyre. for to me. and that the wood and chords must decay before it can undergo any change. if both these are impossible. and with less risk. that you yourself have arrived at this conclusion. unless one could be carried more safely. dryness and moisture. that we consider the soul to be pretty much of this kind--namely. or. however. Socrates. one has exhausted every effort. or some divine reason. my friend. 79. For we ought. and other such qualities. "because any one might use the same argument with respect to harmony. Socrates. is the part of a very weak man.

in order that." he continued. or. but that the remains of the body of each person last for a long time. too. objects to our argument.' reason might say. what we shall say to this reasoning. then. any one of you is more prompt than I am. demonstrated. Consider. we may then uphold our own argument. since you see that when a man dies his weaker part still exists. and to be liable to the same objection that we mentioned before." said Cebes. "the argument seems to me to rest where it was. we may give up to them. through diseases and other maladies. that the soul is not stronger and more durable than the body. Socrates. if any one should maintain that the soul. 'do you still disbelieve? for. it is evident that when our bodies are unduly relaxed or strained. but that it still exists anywhere when we are dead does not appear to me to have been clearly proved. just as other harmonies which subsist in sounds or in the various works of artisans. although it is most divine. said. for it appears to me to excel very far all things of this kind. nor do I give in to the objection of Simmias. that . of necessity. however. what he. so as to cause your unbelief. I do not deny has been very elegantly. If. and Phaedo of Socrates. being a fusion of the several qualities in the body. "say what it is that disturbs you." "I will tell you. then. For I. till they are either burned or decayed. very fully. then. and then when we have heard them. for he seems to have handled my argument not badly? It appears to me. does it not appear to you to be necessary that the more durable part should still be preserved during this period?' Consider. if not. the soul must. For. and smiling." 81. by Plato 103 are well and duly combined with each other. if they appear to speak agreeably to truth. too. why does he not answer. "Simmias indeed speaks justly. that our soul existed even before It came into this present form. looking steadfastly at us. If. then. some time intervening. as if any one should advance this argument about an aged weaver who had died. as it seems. Cebes. stand in need of an illustration. as well as Simmias. that before we make our reply we should first hear from Cebes. 82.Crito. and. then. perishes first in that which is called death. the soul is a kind of harmony. if it is not too much to say so. whether I say any thing to the purpose in reply to this. 'Why. then. immediately perish. therefore. we may consider what we shall say. Come. as he was generally accustomed to do. for the argument appears to me to have been put thus.

and quickly rot and vanish. as a proof. and should grant to him that not only did our soul exist before we were born. for he would say that each soul wears out many bodies. for it is impossible for any one of us to perceive it. 84. should exhibit the garment which he wore and had woven himself. and to believe that when we die our soul still exists somewhere. For. I suppose. then. and perish before this alone. And I think. foolishly. if any one should concede to him who admits even more than you do. 83. but before the last. for if the body wastes and is dissolved while the man still lives. and he who should say the same things concerning them would appear to me to speak correctly. For this weaver. by Plato 104 the man has not yet perished. unless he is able to prove that the soul is absolutely immortal and . which of the two is the more durable. it follows that every one who is confident at the approach of death is foolishly confident. since that which is less durable has not perished. it must necessarily follow that when the soul is dissolved it must then have on its last garment. which brings destruction to the soul. and yet it does not on this account follow any the more that a man is inferior to or weaker than a garment. he would think it demonstrated that. that it is entire and has not perished. but when the soul has perished the body would show the weakness of its nature. If. and from being often born. But I do not think. he would not yet concede that it does not exhaust itself in its many births. but that even when we die nothing hinders the souls of some of us from still existing. the soul might admit this same illustration with respect to the body. this be the case. however. that this is the case. that it can hold out against repeated births--if he granted this. and at length perish altogether in some one of the deaths. the man is preserved. especially if it lives many years. having worn and woven many such garments. and Phaedo of Socrates. and if any one should disbelieve him. and. perished after almost all of them. So that it is not by any means right to place implicit reliance on this argument. that is constantly in use and being worn. and continuing to exist hereafter. that the soul is more durable. but the body weaker and less durable. beyond all question. for every one must think that he who argues thus argues. and do you consider what I say. Simmias. and dying again--for so strong is it by nature. but the soul continually weaves anew what is worn out. But he would say that no one knows this death and dissolution of the body. should any one answer that the species of man is much more durable. but perhaps still exists somewhere. the species of a man or of a garment.Crito. he would ask.

and encouraged us to accompany him. By the gods! Phædo. Upon this. but I especially admired this in him--first of all. Indeed. as you confess was the case with yourselves. in the next place. after we had been fully persuaded by the former arguments. affably. and approvingly. as it were. has now fallen into discredit. and in being mentioned. and consider the argument with him. all of us who had heard them speaking were disagreeably affected. Echec. it occurs to me to ask myself some such question as this: What arguments can we any longer believe? since the argument which Socrates advanced. as we afterward mentioned to each other. 86." 85. that he cured us so well and recalled us. and. or lest the things themselves should be incredible. both now and always. otherwise it necessarily follows that he who is about to die must be alarmed for his soul. not only of the arguments already adduced. that our soul is a kind of harmony. and which was exceedingly credible. for fear lest we should not be fit judges of anything. Relate everything to me as accurately as you can. but of such as might afterward be urged. as it were. and vanquished. that he so quickly perceived how we were affected by their arguments.Crito. . for. too. while I am now hearing you. seemed disconcerted at all. when we were put to flight. lest in its present disunion from the body it should entirely perish. too. it has reminded me. of some other argument which may persuade me that the soul of one who dies does not die with the body. because. they seemed to disturb us anew. and to cast us into a distrust. therefore. that I. that he listened to the argument of the young men so sweetly. and Phaedo of Socrates. or not. and maintained it sufficiently or defectively. For this argument. lastly. I can readily excuse you. was formerly of the same opinion. Phæd. Echecrates. and whether he. produces a wonderful impression on me. so that I stand in need again. That he should be able to say something is perhaps not at all surprising. I was never more delighted than at being with him on that occasion. Tell me. as if from the very beginning. but calmly maintained his position. by Jupiter! how Socrates followed up the argument. though I have often admired Socrates. by Plato 105 imperishable.

not to suffer my hair to grow until I had renewed the contest. first of all." he replied." "I do call on you. How was that? Phæd. Phædo. "both I ought to cut off mine and you yours. Socrates. to play with my hairs--"To-morrow. "not as Hercules upon Iolaus. if our argument must die. I will tell you: I happened to be sitting at his right hand." I said. if I were you." he answered. "That we do not become. And I. would take an oath. "as your Iolaus. often. and the arguments were to escape me. 88. "perhaps." "It will make no difference. Stroking my head." "Call upon me. "To-day. for no greater evil can happen to any one than to hate reasoning. and laying hold of the hair that hung on my neck--for he used." "What?" I asked. then. as some become haters of men." he said. But hatred of reasoning and hatred of mankind both ." "But. near the bed. and vanquished the arguments of Simmias and Cebes. you will cut off these beautiful locks?" "It seems likely. "even Hercules himself is said not to have been a match for two. then. "But." "Why so?" I asked.Crito. but he himself sat much higher than I. we must beware lest we meet with some mischance. but as Iolaus upon Hercules. 87." he replied. by Plato 106 Echec." said I. and we are unable to revive it. upon a low seat. "Not if you are persuaded by me. then. while it is yet day. as the Argives do." he said." I said. "haters of reasoning. and Phaedo of Socrates.

but in this they do resemble . and from having considered him to be a man altogether true. and Phaedo of Socrates." I replied. white or black? Do you not perceive that of all such things the extremes are rare and few. and after him another. or any thing else? and. "Is it not a shame?" he said "And is it not evident that such a one attempts to deal with men without sufficient knowledge of human affairs? For if he had dealt with them with competent knowledge." 89. by Plato 107 spring from the same source. "that if a contest in wickedness were proposed. "Do you not think. "How say you?" I asked. Have you not perceived that this happens so?" "Certainly. having frequently stumbled. and thinks that there is no soundness at all in any of them. beautiful or ugly." I said." he said. finding him depraved and unfaithful.Crito. even here very few would be found pre-eminent?" "It is probable. swift or slow. For hatred of mankind is produced in us from having placed too great reliance on some one without sufficient knowledge of him. and especially from those whom he considered his most intimate and best friends. at length." I replied. and that those between both are most numerous. "In the same manner. for I was just now following you as my leader. "but in this respect reasonings do not resemble men. then. after a little while. so he would have considered that the good and the bad are each very few in number. as the case really is. and then. And when a man has often experienced this. "It is so. "as with things very little and very large Do you think that any thing is more rare than to find a very large on a very little man." he continued. sincere." he replied. and faithful. but that the intermediate are abundant and numerous?" "Certainly. again. he hates all men. or dog.

when there is a true and sound reasoning. And I seem to myself on the present occasion to differ from them only in this respect. and that we ought vigorously and strenuously to endeavor to become sound.[34] and especially they who devote themselves to controversial arguments. on account of my death. that what they have themselves advanced shall appear true to the persons present. as is the case with the Euripus. when any one believes in any argument as true without being skilled in the art of reasoning. by Plato 108 them. "Would it not. for I shall not be anxious to make what I say appear true to those who are present. since I am in danger.Crito. like those who are utterly uninformed 91. through grief. Phædo" he said "be a sad thing if. at one time being so and at another time not. but are anxious about this." "You speak perfectly true. you are aware. and never continue in any one condition for any length of time. through lighting upon such arguments as appear to be at one time true and at another false. except ." I said. when they dispute about any thing. but I. but at length. of not behaving as becomes a philosopher with respect to this very subject." "In the first place. and let us not admit into our souls the notion that there appears to be nothing sound in reasoning. and then shortly afterward it appears to him to be false." he said. For they. but much rather that we are not yet in a sound condition. not blame one's self and one's own want of skill. but as a wrangler. at the present time. and thereupon pass the rest of one's life in hating and reviling arguments and so be depraved of the truth and knowledge of things that exist?" "By Jupiter!" I said. 90. and so on with one after another. should anxiously transfer the blame from one's self to the arguments. and Phaedo of Socrates. then. then. one should then. and such as one can understand. "let us beware of this. are in a constant state of flux and reflux. at length think they have become very wise and have alone discovered that there is nothing sound and stable either in things or reasonings but that all things that exist. care nothing at all for the subject about which the discussion is. "it would be sad. indeed. you and the others. on account of your whole future life.

pay little attention to Socrates. as I think. on leaving the last body. the destruction of the soul. my dear friend. "and others not. assent to it. since the body never ceases decaying Are not these the things. for that would be bad. "I now proceed to my argument. is in doubt. which we have to inquire into?" They both agreed that they were. this being the case. depart leaving my sting behind. Thus prepared. and. "But let us proceed. as being a species of harmony. if you will be persuaded by me. that the soul is more durable than the body. then. then. though more divine and beautiful than the body. itself also perish. oppose me with all your might. "do you say about that argument in which we asserted that knowledge is reminiscence. I shall. "Whether. our soul must necessarily have existed somewhere before it was inclosed in the body?" . remind me of what you said. but if nothing remains to one that is dead. Do you. but that it may appear certainly to be so to myself. But this ignorance of mine will not continue long. like a bee." he proceeded. and Phaedo of Socrates." 92. but he argued that it is uncertain to every one. should perish before it. by Plato 109 that may happen by the way. and if I appear to you to say any thing true. and that. Simmias and Cebes. But Cebes appeared to me to grant me this. if I should appear to have forgotten it For Simmias. so that this very thing is death. whether when the soul has worn out many bodies and that repeatedly. Simmias and Cebes. at least." he said "First of all." they replied. it is well to be persuaded of it. If what I say be true. during the interval before death be less disagreeable to those present by my lamentations. taking good care that in my zeal I do not deceive both myself and you.Crito. but will shortly be put an end to." he continued "do you reject all our former arguments. but much more to the truth. and not others?" "Some we do. or some of them only." "What. and observe how interestedly. however." he continued. it does not. and fears lest the soul. then. For I thus reason. but if not.

" he said. and should very much wonder if I should ever think otherwise on that point. For surely you will not allow yourself to say that harmony was composed prior to the things from which it required to be composed Would you allow this?" "By no means. and now persist in it. will this argument accord with that?" "Not at all. "if in any argument. or the soul harmony?" "The former by far. exist." "And I. harmony is produced." replied Cebes "was both then wonderfully persuaded by it. indeed.Crito. "This of yours." "Then." he replied. but first the lyre." said Simmias. then. "you must needs think otherwise. "And yet. if this opinion holds good. that harmony is something compounded. and the chords. and that the soul is a kind of harmony that results from the parts compacted together in the body. "Do you perceive. then. there ought to be an accordance in one respecting harmony. "is not in accordance. "I. too." said Simmias. but that it was composed from things that did not yet exist? For harmony is not such as that to which you compare it. by Plato 110 93. my Theban friend. and. which of these two statements do you prefer--that knowledge is reminiscence. then. Socrates. "that this result from what you say. "am of the same mind. when you assert that the soul existed before it came into a human form and body." he said. "for the latter occurred to me without demonstration. and the sounds yet unharmonized. How. Socrates" he replied. and Phaedo of Socrates." said Simmias. through a certain probability and speciousness ." Socrates said. and first perishes. however. Consider. 94. as in no other argument." he said. last of all." "There ought.

"It does not." 95. as I think. appertain to harmony to take the lead of the things of which it is composed. and. as it seems. "It is. or to any other composition." "And indeed. both in geometry and all other subjects. Simmias. far from being the case that harmony is moved or sends forth sounds contrariwise. It is therefore necessary. I am fully and rightly convinced. indeed. then? Is not every harmony naturally harmony. therefore. nor suffer any thing else." he said. . But I am well aware that arguments which draw their demonstrations from probabilities are idle. neither to do any thing. they are very deceptive." he replied. to subsist in any other way than the very things do of which it is composed?" "By no means. by Plato 111 whence most men derive their opinions. so far as it has been made to accord?" "I do not understand you." He assented. but to follow them. then." He agreed. "But what. But the argument respecting reminiscence and knowledge may be said to have been demonstrated by a satisfactory hypothesis. that I should neither allow myself nor any one else to maintain that the soul is harmony." said he. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. "if you consider it thus? Does it appear to you to appertain to harmony. or is in any other respect opposed to its parts?" "Far. because the essence that bears the appellation of 'that which is' belongs to it. unless one is on one's guard against them. "What. as I persuade myself. For in this way it was said that our soul existed before it came into the body. besides what they do or suffer. But of this.

being harmony. but if in a less degree and less fully. a harmony. or less fully and in a less degree. than another?" "In no respect whatever. certainly." "But it has been already granted." said he." he said. 96. then. even in the smallest extent." he replied. who maintain that the soul is harmony. one soul is more fully and in a greater degree. but that the other is discordant. "Well. this very thing. then would it be inferior and less full?" "Certainly. and say that the one. what will any one say that these things are in the soul." "Of those." he said. then. would the harmony be greater and more full. and does not contain within itself another harmony?" "I am unable to say. and to be bad? and is this said with truth?" "With truth. and this is an admission that one harmony is not to a greater degree or more fully. "that one soul is not more or less a soul than another. the case with the soul that. then. contains within itself another harmony. "but it is clear that he who maintains that opinion would say something of the kind. "by Jupiter! is one soul said to possess intelligence and virtue. than another. virtue and vice? Will he call them another kind of harmony and discord. and to be good. is harmonized.Crito." . the good soul. and." replied Simmias. "if it should be in a greater degree and more fully made to accord. and Phaedo of Socrates. supposing that were possible. a soul. and another folly and vice. is it not so?" "Certainly. by Plato 112 "Whether. or to a less degree or less fully." "Is this.

therefore. and Phaedo of Socrates. therefore. which is perfectly such. by Plato 113 "And that that which is neither more or less harmony is neither more nor less harmonized: is it so?" "It is. again. "A soul." "But does that which is neither more or less harmonized partake of more or less harmony. if vice be discord. since it is not more or less this very thing. no soul will partake of vice. and virtue harmony?" "It can not." "Neither. can never partake of discord?" "Certainly not. can one soul partake of a greater degree of vice or virtue than another. it can not partake of a greater degree of discord or harmony?" "Certainly not." "Or rather. a soul. or an equal amount?" "An equal amount. Simmias. being its condition. according to right reason. for doubtless harmony." 97." "Such. if it is harmony. is not more or less harmonized?" "Even so. then.Crito. such being its condition. from what has been already said?" . can a soul which is perfectly a soul partake of vice. surely. than another." "And." "How can it.

" he replied." he replied. and resisting almost all of them through the whole of life. relaxation. both by gymnastics and medicine. and in ten thousand other instances we see the soul opposing the desires of the body." "But have we not before allowed that if the soul were harmony. and exercising dominion over them in all manner of ways. and that the argument would lead to this result. then." "Whether by yielding to the passions in the body." he said. if. if the hypothesis were correct. "of all the things that are in man? Is there any thing else that you say bears rule except the soul. by drawing it the contrary way. by Plato 114 "From this reasoning. when heat and thirst are present. partly . all souls of all animals will be equally good." said he. by hindering it from eating. ruling over all the parts from which any one might say it subsists. and never govern them?" "We did allow it. "But what. "And does it appear to you. they are by nature equally this very thing. Do we not?" "Certainly. at least." he said. "for how could we do otherwise?" "What. then? Does not the soul now appear to act quite the contrary. or any other affection to which its component parts are subject. and others more mildly. "to have been thus rightly argued. vibration. but would follow. and when hunger is present. that the soul is harmony?" 98. and Phaedo of Socrates. Socrates. "On no account whatever.Crito. or by opposing them? My meaning is this: for instance. especially if it be wise?" "I should say not. punishing some more severely even with pain. it would never utter a sound contrary to the tension. so as to hinder it from drinking. souls?" "It appears so to me.

nor with ourselves." "Therefore. "to be likely to find out." said Socrates. it were conversing with something quite different? 99. I wondered very much whether any one would be able to answer his reasoning. if a philosopher that is . and by what arguments. it appears so to me. lest some envious power should overthrow the argument that is about to be urged. Cebes. "do not speak so boastfully. as it seems. will be cared for by the deity. "Be it so. and capable of being led by the passions of the body. shall we appease this Cadmus?"[36] 100." "Such is the case. For when Simmias was saying what his doubts were." he replied. for you have made out this argument against harmony wonderfully beyond my expectation. my heart. therefore. then. I should not.' Do you think that he composed this in the belief that the soul was harmony. he chid his heart in the following words: Bear up. "we have already. These things. as being something much more divine than to be compared with harmony?" "By Jupiter! Socrates.[35] where he speaks of Ulysses--'Having struck his breast. is the sum of what you inquire you require it to be proved that our soul is imperishable and immortal. and Phaedo of Socrates. and partly admonishing the desires. but let us. ere this thou hast borne far worse. But how. for. try whether you say any thing to the purpose. my excellent friend. This. meeting hand to hand. sufficiently appeased this Theban harmony. therefore. as it appears. however. then." said Socrates. being itself of a different nature." "My good friend. that divine poet. we should neither agree with Homer. it is on no account correct for us to say that the soul is a kind of harmony. as if. be surprised if the arguments of Cadmus met with the same fate." replied Cebes. in the manner of Homer. It. appeared to me unaccountable that he did not withstand the very first onset of your argument. "You appear to me.Crito. by Plato 115 threatening. and not rather that it was able to lead and govern them. angers and fears. Just as Homer has done in the Odyssey.

for it appeared to me to be a very sublime thing to know the causes of every thing--why each thing is generated.Crito. and why it exists. then having paused for some time. whether when heat and cold have undergone a certain corruption. full of confidence and hope that after death he shall be far happier than if he had died after leading a different kind of life. I think. and can not give a reason to prove. but that its very entrance into the body of a man was the beginning of its destruction. for all this. and afterward. so that it passes through this life in wretchedness." "I do indeed wish it." 102. then. But you say that it is of no consequence whether it comes into a body once or often. But to show that the soul is something strong and divine. you may add to or take from it. "You inquire into no easy matter. then. Such. if any thing that I shall say shall appear to you useful toward producing conviction on the subject you are now treating of. as if it were a disease. considering first such things as these. that nothing may escape us. you say not at all hinders. but that all these things may evince. if you please." replied Cebes. But that. shall not entertain this confidence foolishly and vainly. for it is absolutely necessary to discuss the whole question of generation and corruption. not its immortality. 101. unless he is foolish. that the soul is immortal. Cebes. And I often tossed myself upward and downward. . and considered something within himself. that is what I mean. I will relate to you what happened to me with reference to them. "Hear my relation. but that the soul is durable. and knew and did many things." Cebes replied. Cebes. Socrates. and existed an immense space of time before. "I do not wish at present either to take from or add to it. I was wonderfully desirous of that wisdom which they call a history of nature. for it is right he should be afraid. said. When I was a young man. Cebes. by Plato 116 about to die. it was not at all the more immortal. and I purposely repeat it often. why it perishes. and Phaedo of Socrates. and. make use of it. If you please. and at last perishes in that which is called death. is the sum of what you say. and that it existed before we men were born. who does not know. with respect to our occasion of fear.

and the affections incidental to the heavens and the earth. I thought this was evident to every one--that it proceeds from eating and drinking. and that from these come memory and opinion. I judged that he was taller by the head. when. or fire. and." "But now. what is proper to them is added to the several other parts. and so on in the same proportion. and whether the blood is that by means of which we think. flesh is added to flesh. considering the corruptions of these. when each of these was separate from the other. why a man grows. I thought that I had formed a right opinion. "I am far from thinking that I know the cause of these. one horse than another. whether the one to which the addition has been made has become two. but that it is the brain that produces the perceptions of hearing. 104. for that. in the same way knowledge is produced. ten appeared to me to be more than eight by two being added to them. and smelling. or none of these. on seeing a tall man standing by a short one. then animals are formed. both on many other subjects and also this. bone to bone. or whether that which has been added. I at length appeared to myself so unskillful in these speculations that nothing could be more so. when in a state of rest. Such was my opinion at that time. have become two by the addition of the one to the other. and thus that a little man becomes a big one. for that I can not even persuade myself of this: when a person has added one to one. by these very speculations. again. as it appeared to myself and others. seeing. 103. for I then became. then the bulk which was small becomes afterward large. For. so very blind with respect to things which I knew clearly before. and that to which the addition has been made." said Cebes. when. and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by exceeding it a half. "Consider this further. For I wonder if. still more clearly than this. each . that I unlearned even the things which I thought I knew before. and Phaedo of Socrates. "what think you of these matters?" "By Jupiter!" said he. from the food. But I will give you a sufficient proof of this." said Cebes. And. or air. Does it appear to you correct?" "To me it does.Crito. by Plato 117 as some say. before. and in like manner. and from memory and opinion.

if this is so. or to suffer. moreover. but I mix up another method of my own at random. I was prepared no longer to require any other species of cause. and which said that it is intelligence that sets in order and is the cause of all things. I was delighted to think I had found in Anaxagoras a preceptor who would instruct me in the causes of things. or exists. and if he should say that it is in the middle. If any one. Thus reasoning with myself. by Anaxagoras. and if he should make all this clear to me. in a word. their division. or perishes. and. is the cause of its becoming two. and disposes each in such way as will be best for it. and Phaedo of Socrates. but now it is because one is removed and separated from the other. moreover. it is proper that a man should consider nothing else. according to this method of proceeding. in what way it is produced. whether the earth is flat or round. From this mode of reasoning. or exists. and they were not yet two. if any person should divide one. than what is most excellent and best." "But. the union by which they have been placed nearer one another. and I considered with myself. or perishes. that the regulating intelligence orders all things. for that the knowledge of both of them is the same. am I able to persuade myself that this. that he would. and it appeared to me in a manner to be well that intelligence should be the cause of all things. I was in like manner prepared to inquire respecting the sun and . or do any thing else. 105. as he said. For this cause is the contrary to the former one of their becoming two. explain the cause and necessity of its being so. when he had informed me. written. should desire to discover the cause of every thing. agreeably to my own mind. he must discover this respecting it--in what way it is best for it either to exist. but when they have approached nearer each other this should be the cause of their becoming two--namely.Crito. Nor do I yet persuade myself that I know why one is one. explain how it is better for it to be in the middle. why any thing else is produced. arguing on the principle of the better. 106. nor. both with respect to himself and others. 107. then. then. and showing that it is better for it to be such as it is. by Plato 118 was one. and the one was added to the other. first. would. and it necessarily follows that this same person must also know that which is worst. for then it was because they were brought nearer to each other. for this I can on no account give in to. having once heard a person reading from a book. Nor yet. I was delighted with this cause. and that he would inform me.

and have joints separate from each other. and their revolutions and other conditions. my friend." 108. assigning as causes voice. ether. and air. and the common good of all. having taken up his books with great eagerness. he would explain that which is best for each. when. however. by the dog! I think these sinews and bones would have been long ago either in Megara or Boeotia. he would introduce any other cause for them than that it is best for them to be as they are. because my body is composed of bones and sinews and that the bones are hard. that since it appeared better to the Athenians to condemn me. relaxing and tightening. that for this reason I am now sitting here. that in assigning the cause to each of them. as I advance and read over his works. And he appeared to me to be very like one who should say that whatever Socrates does he does by intelligence. and then. first of all. attempting to describe the causes of each particular action. being suspended in their sockets. the nerves. being capable of tension and contraction. And if. 109. and ten thousand other things of the kind. therefore. for. again. and many other things equally absurd. and Phaedo of Socrates. but makes the causes to consist of air. I therefore thought it better to sit here. nor assigns any causes for the ordering of all things. But if any one . enable me to bend my limbs as I now do. but. should say. cover the bones. "From this wonderful hope. omitting to mention the real causes. together with the flesh and skin which contain them. and water.Crito. he should assign other similar causes for my conversing with you. if I had not thought it more just and honorable to submit to whatever sentence the city might order than to flee and run stealthily away. I thought. that I might as soon as possible know the best and the worst. and to all in common. And I would not have given up my hopes for a good deal. and hearing. I meet with a man who makes no use of intelligence. But to call such things causes is too absurd. with respect to their velocities in reference to each other. The bones. but that the sinews. I read through them as quickly as I could. and more just to remain and submit to the punishment which they have ordered. borne thither by an opinion of that which is best. in what way it is better for both to act and be affected as it does and is. I was speedily thrown down. Hence. For I never thought that after he had said that these things were set in order by intelligence. by Plato 119 moon and the other stars. and from this cause I sit here bent up.

the generality of men appear to me to do. do you wish. that I should show you in what way I set out upon a second voyage in search of the cause?" 111. and more capable of containing all things. therefore. And I was affected with a similar feeling. but the power by which these things are now so disposed that they may be placed in the best manner possible. as if it were a broad trough. I. fumbling. and endeavoring to grasp them by means of the several senses. in the dark. that I ought to beware lest I should suffer in the same way as they do who look at and examine an eclipse of the sun. but to say that I do as I do through them. he would speak the truth. and was neither able to discover it myself. rests it upon the air as its base. when I was wearied with considering things that exist. they take no account of at all. this they neither inquire into. and making use of strange names. but they think they will some time or other find out an Atlas stronger and more immortal than this. that I ought to have recourse to reasons. unless they behold its image in water. Cebes. and that I act thus by intelligence.Crito. would be a great and extreme disregard of reason. the good. Perhaps. and whatever else I have. and Phaedo of Socrates. however. for I do not altogether admit that he who considers things in their reasons considers them in their . But when I was disappointed of this. and that another. I could not do what I pleased. then. and was afraid lest I should be utterly blinded in my soul through beholding things with the eyes. without which a cause could not be a cause. or some similar medium. nor do they think that it requires any superhuman strength. and to consider in them the truth of things. which. Wherefore one encompassing the earth with a vortex from heaven makes the earth remain fixed." said he. and not from the choice of what is best. "It appeared to me. as it were. nor to learn it from another. in what way it is. so as to denominate them as the very cause. "after this. and that which ought to hold them together and contain them. 110. this similitude of mine may in some respect be incorrect. then. for some lose the sight of their eyes. but another. For this would be not to be able to distinguish that the real cause is one thing. and in reality. It seemed to me. indeed. "I wish it exceedingly. should most gladly have become the disciple of any one who would teach me of such a cause." he replied. by Plato 120 should say that without possessing such things as bones and sinews.

by Jupiter!" said Cebes. which I deem to be the strongest. which if you grant me. by Plato 121 images. "what follows from thence. 113. laying down as an hypothesis.Crito. "not well. and to discover that the soul is immortal. wholly." "No. both with respect to the cause and every thing else. I dismiss all other reasons." "But consider. I proceeded thus. that there is a certain abstract beauty. confine myself to . For it appears to me that if there is any thing else beautiful besides beauty itself. it is not beautiful for any other reason than because it partakes of that abstract beauty. and magnitude." "But. and so of all other things. "I am now saying nothing new. but such as do not accord I regard as not true. and in a former part of this discussion." he replied. and allow that they do exist. and return again to those well-known subjects." continued he. But I wish to explain my meaning to you in a clearer manner." he continued. those other wise causes. or figure. or any thing else of the kind." "However. more than he does who views them in their effects. but I simply. whatever things appear to me to accord with this I regard as true. However." said Cebes. for I think that you do not yet understand me. to attempt to explain to you that species of cause which I have busied myself about. then. you may draw your conclusion at once. and Phaedo of Socrates. "since I grant you this. and I say the same of every thing. and on each occasion laying down the reason. Do you admit such a cause?" "I do admit it. I hope that I shall be able from these to explain the cause to you. never ceased to say. but what I have always at other times. and see if you can agree with me. but if any one should tell me why any thing is beautiful. for I am confounded by them all. either because it has a blooming florid color. "I do not yet understand. and goodness. and set out from them. "nor am I able to conceive. 112." he said. I proceed. and perhaps foolishly.

lest some opposite argument should meet you if you should say that any one is greater and less by the head. Does it not also seem so to you?" "It does. being afraid. and that it is monstrous to suppose that any one is great through something small. then. and not by number. and that the less is less by the very same thing. but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. that nothing else causes it to be beautiful except either the presence or communication of that abstract beauty. if any one said that one person is greater than another by the head. "Indeed. and that it is greater on this account--that is." he continued. I think. for I can not yet affirm this with certainty. and that the less is less by nothing else than littleness. and for this cause exceeds it. but that it is a safe answer both for me and any one else to give--that by means of beauty beautiful things become beautiful. but you would maintain that you mean nothing else than that every thing that is greater than another is greater by nothing else than magnitude. as. approve of it. smilingly. and. first. I think that I shall never fall. and on account of number? and that two cubits are greater than one cubit by half. and not by magnitude (for the fear is surely the same)?" . Should you not be afraid of this?" To which said Cebes. and adhering to this. and by littleness less things become less?" "Yes." "And that by magnitude great things become great. and greater things. by the very same thing. by whatever means and in whatever way communicated. that the greater is greater. and on this account less--that is. I should." 114. then. and the less less.Crito. and Phaedo of Socrates. on account of littleness. For this appears to me the safest answer to give both to myself and others. "You would not. next. that the greater is greater by the head. greater. "be afraid to say that ten is more than eight by two. by Plato 122 this." "Should you not. which is small. on account of magnitude.

or division when it has been divided. would you not dismiss him. "What. would you give one in a similar way. and would you not loudly assert that you know no other way in which each thing subsists. leaving them to be given as answers by persons wiser than yourself. Certainly. but. 115. as I now describe." "You speak most truly. you would avoid making confusion. and that in these cases you can assign no other cause of its becoming two than its partaking of duality. your own shadow and inexperience. . until you arrived at something satisfactory. But you. and refrain from answering him till you had considered the consequences resulting from it. for they are able.Crito. By Jupiter! Phædo. of unity. which should appear the best of higher principles. and other such subtleties. Echec. would adhere to this safe hypothesis. through their wisdom. to mingle all things together. make no account at all of this. fearing. in treating of the first principle and the results arising from it. if you really desire to arrive at the truth of things? 116. and what is to become one. and Phaedo of Socrates. and at the same time please themselves." said Simmias and Cebes together. whether in your opinion they agree with or differ from each other? But when it should be necessary for you to give a reason for it. but these divisions and additions. for he appears to me to have explained these things with wonderful clearness. at the same time. as it is said." he replied. they said so with good reason. than by partaking of the peculiar essence of each of which it partakes. and so it appeared to all who were present. as disputants do. I think. Echecrates. would you not beware of saying that the addition is the cause of its being two. nor pay any attention to it. and answer accordingly? But if any one should assail this hypothesis of yours. by Plato 123 "Certainly. For they. even to one endued with a small degree of intelligence. would act. by again laying down another hypothesis. Phæd. perhaps. and that such things as are to become two must needs partake of this. whereas you. you would dismiss. then? When one has been added to one. if you are a philosopher.

" he said. Simmias has the appellation of being both little and great. then. and to the other yielding a magnitude that exceeds his own littleness. and Phaedo of Socrates. who was absent. again. he next asked: "If. "you admit that things are so. smiling. when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates." he said.[37] and that other things partaking of them receive their denomination from them. by Plato 124 Echec. when these things had been granted him. is Simmias exceeded by Phædo. does he exceed Socrates because Socrates is Socrates.Crito. by exceeding the littleness of one through his own magnitude. and it was allowed that each several idea exists of itself. But what was said after this? As well as I remember. whether. And so it appears to me. but because Socrates possesses littleness in comparison with his magnitude?" "True." And at the same time. but because Phædo possesses magnitude in comparison with Simmias's littleness?" "It is so. again." "Nor. for Simmias does not naturally exceed Socrates in that he is Simmias. being between both." 117. do you not then say that magnitude and littleness are both in Simmias?" "I do. he said. and now hear it related. then. because Phædo is Phædo. but in consequence of the magnitude which he happens to have. "And yet." "Thus. however. but less than Phædo." He allowed it. "I seem to speak with the precision of a short-hand writer. "you must confess that Simmias's exceeding Socrates is not actually true in the manner in which the words express it. nor. it is as I say. .

but now we are speaking of those very things from the presence of which things so called receive their appellation. disturbed you?" . but that it is not disposed. And. calling them by the appellation of those things. and Phaedo of Socrates.Crito. For then it was said that a contrary thing is produced from a contrary. to perish. said. however. when it has actually come. "By the gods! was not the very contrary of what is now asserted admitted in the former part of our discussion. at the same time looking at Cebes. by sustaining and receiving littleness. "in every respect. I do not clearly remember who he was." 120. "You have reminded me in a manly way. and the less from the greater. either to flee and withdraw when its contrary. in like manner." said Cebes. having received and sustained littleness. and still continuing the person that I am. or." 119. while it is great. but one of two things. Just as I. but in this contingency it either departs or perishes. and of these very things we say that they are never disposed to admit of production from each other. "But I say it for this reason. perceive the difference between what is now and what was then asserted. my friend. while it continues what it was. but that magnitude in us never admits the little nor is disposed to be exceeded. "It appears so to me. that the very production of contraries is from contraries? But now it appears to me to be asserted that this can never be the case. and." Upon this Socrates." But some one of those present. the little. in a word. For then. but that. never endures to be little. nor is any thing else among contraries. you do not. to be different from what it was. wishing you to be of the same opinion as myself. For it appears to me. by Plato 125 118. approaches it. "Has anything that has been said. am this same little person. not only that magnitude itself is never disposed to be at the same time great and little. And. on hearing this. that a contrary can never become contrary to itself--neither that which is in us. but now. said. at the same time disposed to become and to be its contrary. having leaned his head forward and listened. the little that is in us is not disposed at any time to become or to be great. nor that which is in nature. that the greater is produced from the less. Cebes. we spoke of things that have contraries.

when it has admitted heat. "consider whether you will agree with me in this also. "I am not at all so disposed. ." "But this. "But. when cold approaches it. "You speak truly. further." "Most certainly. and Phaedo of Socrates." "And. and cold something different from snow?" "Yes. continue to be what it was. "we have quite agreed to this. while it is snow." he replied." he said. to continue what it was. can never. is apparent to you--that snow." "But heat is something different from fire. when it has admitted coldness. again. however." he said." "The same as snow and fire?" "By Jupiter! I do not. on the approach of heat. I by no means say that there are not many things that disturb me. it must either withdraw or perish?" "Certainly. that a contrary can never be contrary to itself. by Plato 126 "Indeed. as we said before. I think. but that it will never endure. must either depart or perish.Crito. Do you call heat and cold any thing?" "I do." he continued. fire and cold?" 121. snow and hot." "Then. but." said Cebes. that fire.

" . and Phaedo of Socrates. "the number two is not contrary to three. that though they are not the same as the odd." he continued. to become even?" "Most certainly. I say. but that even such things as are not contrary to each other. again. though not the same as the even. and suffer any thing whatever. because it is so constituted by nature that it can never be without the odd? But this. and yet always possess contraries." "Must it alone. is the case with the number three. but. "with respect to some of such things. Shall we not allow that the number three would first perish. together with its own name. "what I wish to prove. and the entire half of number." said he. but constantly retains its form so long as it exists. And. "And yet. yet each of them is always odd. then. What I mean will perhaps be clearer in the following examples: the odd in number must always possess the name by which we now call it." said Cebes.Crito. five. For consider with respect to the number three: does it not appear to you that it must always be called by its own name. of all things--for this I ask--or is there any thing else which is not the same as the odd. do not appear to admit that idea which is contrary to the idea that exists in themselves. indeed. as well as by that of the odd. "Observe then. which is not the same as the number three? Yet such is the nature of the number three. or not?" 122. that not only is the idea itself always thought worthy of the same appellation. perish or depart. but yet which we must always call odd. It is this--that it appears not only that these contraries do not admit each other. and many others." said he. must it not?" "Certainly. "How should I not?" he replied. two and four. are nevertheless each of them always even: do you admit this. while it is still three. by Plato 127 "It happens. and the whole other series of number. but likewise something else which is not. when it approaches. that idea itself. rather than endure.

Cebes. then. compel that thing not only to retain its own idea." he said." "It can not. "As we just now said. we assert." "Not only." "Would they not then. surely. "Do you wish." "You say very truly. by Plato 128 "Surely not. but also odd?" "Certainly. For you know. that whatever things the idea of three occupies must of necessity not only be three. if we are able.Crito. do ideas that are contrary never allow the approach of each other." . we should define what these things are?" "Certainly." "And is the contrary to this the idea of the even?" "Yes." he replied." he said. that the idea contrary to that form which constitutes this can never come. and Phaedo of Socrates. then." "To such a thing. "that. "be such things as. then. whatever they occupy." "But did the odd make it so?" "Yes. but also that of something which is always a contrary?" "How do you mean?" 123. but some other things also do not allow the approach of contraries.

then. For I say this because. fire to cold. "from the beginning. though it is itself contrary to something else. surely. For if you should ask me what that is which. and agree with me that it is so. does not any the more admit it. has no part in the even?" "None whatever." "I entirely agree with you. "and follow you. I should not give you that safe but unlearned answer. just as the number two does to the odd. though not contrary to some particular thing. but also that that which brings with it a contrary to that to which it approaches will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. then. then." "What. imitating my example. the number three. I said should be defined--namely. as. whether you would thus define. Consider. I see another no less safe one. will never come to the three?" "No. such as the half and the third part. besides that safe mode of answering which I mentioned at first. for it will not be useless to hear it often repeated. then. therefore. not only that a contrary does not admit a contrary. will cause it to be hot. and do not answer me in the terms in which I put the question. yet do not admit of the contrary itself.Crito. 124. nor ten. that of the odd. ." he said.[39] from what has now been said. in the present instance. if it be in the body." he said. Five will not admit the idea of the even. admit the idea of the whole. for it always brings the contrary with it. nor will half as much again. then. though not contrary to the even. its double." "Three. and many other particulars. by Plato 129 "The idea of the even. and Phaedo of Socrates. But call it to mind again. This double." "The number three is uneven?" "Yes.[38] yet will not admit the idea of the odd. if you follow me. but in different ones. nor other things of the kind." "Tell me again. what things they are which.

will never admit the contrary of that which it brings with it. "Answer me." he replied. will cause it to be diseased. and Phaedo of Socrates." "The soul." he replied. that it is fire. should I say that it is disease. "Is not this. nor. then. "What?" "Death. from what we have just now said. "Perfectly so. "what that is which. then. "Whether. if it be in number. But consider whether you sufficiently understand what I mean. "Does the soul. then. by Plato 130 that it is heat. then. if you should ask me what that is which. if it be in the body. always the case?" "How should it not be?" said he." he replied. then. should I say that it is unevenness." 125. the body will be alive?" "Soul. nor if you should ask what that is which. but one more elegant. when it is in the body. but fever." he replied." he said. is there any thing contrary to life or not?" "There is. as has been already allowed?" "Most assuredly.Crito. but unity. always bring life to whatever it occupies?" "It does indeed." replied Cebes. . and so with other things. will cause it to be odd.

" he replied. then. would the number three be otherwise than imperishable?" "How should it not?" "If." "What." "Is the soul. does not the soul admit death?" "No. by Plato 131 "What. it were also necessary that what is without heat should be imperishable. nor the musical?" "Unmusical. Socrates. then." he said. nor yet would it stay and admit the heat." ." he said. immortal?" "Immortal. But what do we call that which does not admit death?" "Immortal." 126. "And that which does not admit the just. then? How do we denominate that which does not admit the idea of the even?" "Uneven. safe and unmelted? For it would not perish. then. if it were necessary for the uneven to be imperishable." "Be it so." said he. therefore." he replied. "Be it so. that this has been now demonstrated? or how think you?" "Most completely. when any one should introduce heat to snow. "Shall we say. "Therefore.Crito. would not the snow withdraw itself. and Phaedo of Socrates. "Cebes. "and unjust.

"The deity. on the approach of the even. just as we said that three will never be even. we might easily have contended that. when the odd is destroyed. nor. "so far as that is concerned. the soul. that the even should succeed in its place? We could not contend with him who should make this objection that it is not destroyed. must also be imperishable. yet. if that which is immortal and eternal is liable to it. "speak thus of that which is immortal? if that which is immortal is imperishable. if we have allowed that it is imperishable. and if anything else is immortal. might we not?" "Certainly. and we might have contended in the same way with respect to fire. since. for the uneven is not imperishable. "In like manner. must be allowed by all beings to be incapable of dissolution. but would depart quite safe. nor will ever be dead. from what has been said already. But some one may say. for scarcely could any thing not admit of corruption." "Wherefore. again. "Must we not. though the odd can never become even by the approach of the even. by Plato 132 "You say truly. what hinders. 127." he said. will the odd." he replied. it would neither be extinguished nor perish. it is impossible for the soul to perish. when death approaches it." "But there is no need. there will be need of other arguments. I think. with respect to the immortal. that when any thing cold approached the fire. if not." "Of necessity. nor will fire be cold." 128. and Phaedo of Socrates. if this were granted us. in addition to its being immortal." ." said Socrates. nor yet the heat that is in fire. I think. heat. indeed. it will not admit death. "and the idea itself of life. of necessity. then. if that which is insusceptible of cold were imperishable." he said. as we have allowed. For." he continued. the odd and the three depart.Crito. and the rest.

who wishes either to speak or hear about these things. even though they are credible to you." he said. can the soul. having withdrawn itself from death?" "It appears so. death approaches a man. therefore. as it appears. "Cebes." he said." "Since. it were well for him not to be silent." "When. by the gods. then." he said. be so." said Simmias. therefore. and still more. from the magnitude of the subject discussed. should nevertheless be examined more carefully. and Phaedo of Socrates." "Therefore. by Plato 133 "By Jupiter!" he replied. "I have nothing further to say against this. but the immortal part departs safe and uncorrupted." said Socrates. "by all men. . and. as I think. you will inquire no further. "neither have I any reason to doubt what has been urged. or any one else. Simmias. nor any reason for doubting your arguments. indeed. and if this very point becomes clear. of necessity. indeed. and if you should investigate them sufficiently. the mortal part of him. and our souls will really exist in Hades. be any thing else than imperishable?" "It must." "Not only so." "The soul. "but you say this well. since it is immortal. that which is immortal is also incorruptible." "But. for I know not to what other opportunity beyond the present any one can defer it." "You speak truly. moreover. I think you will follow my reasoning as far as it is possible for man to do so. Socrates. is most certainly immortal and imperishable. yet. and from my low opinion of human weakness. the first hypotheses. I am compelled still to retain a doubt within myself with respect to what has been said.Crito. has any thing to say. dies. But if Simmias here.

and the danger would now appear to be dreadful if one should neglect it. having obtained the gods for its fellow-travelers and . it requires our care not only for the present time. "that we should consider this--. But the soul which has passed through life with purity and moderation. for he says that a simple path leads to Hades. to be delivered at the same time from the body. it would be a great gain for the wicked. is forcibly and with great difficulty led away by its appointed demon.[41] after vehement resistance and great suffering. and are the deeds of kindred souls. But there having received their deserts. when they die. and then proceed to Hades with that guide who has been ordered to conduct them from hence thither.Crito. after many and long revolutions of time. another guide brings them back hither again. is not such as the Telephus of Æschylus describes it. and having remained the appointed time. impure and having done any such thing as the committal of unrighteous murders or other similar actions. but now. when he dies conducts him to some place. on the very beginning of his journey thither. if there were but one. every one shuns it and turns away from it. nor safety. it is said that each person's demon who was assigned to him while living. having longingly fluttered about it for a long time. which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead." he said. both follows. For the soul goes to Hades possessing nothing else than its discipline and education. to an abode suitable to it. it is carried. my friends. and when these are completed. but it wanders about. nor could any one ever miss the way. by Plato 134 "But it is right. since it appears to be immortal.[40] 131. of necessity. But now it appears to have many divisions and windings.that if the soul is immortal. and will be neither its fellow-traveler nor guide. thus. and from their vices together with the soul. as I said before. and this I conjecture from our religious and funeral rites. except by becoming as good and wise as possible. And when it arrives at the place where the others are. which are kindred to these. and Phaedo of Socrates. The journey. and is not ignorant of its present condition. but that which through passion clings to the body. for there would be no need of guides. which we call life. The well-ordered and wise soul. where they that are assembled together must receive sentence. it can have no other refuge from evils. until certain periods have elapsed. but it appears to me to be neither simple nor one. oppressed with every kind of helplessness. then. For if death were a deliverance from every thing. then. but for all time. 130. For. and about its visible place.

and. further. to prevent it from falling. like ants or frogs about a marsh. Socrates? For I. indeed. too. besides." said he. seems insufficient for the length of the subject. 133." he said. However. settles each in the place suited to it. as I have been persuaded by a certain person. remains unmoved. for that there are everywhere about the earth many hollows of various forms and sizes into which there is a . that. then. In the first place. by Plato 135 guides. There are. That they are true. and the equilibrium of the earth itself. Simmias. have heard many things about the earth--not. "that it is very large. but that the similarity of the heavens to themselves on every side. 132. if the earth is in the middle of the heavens. and that we who inhabit some small portion of it. for a thing in a state of equilibrium when placed in the middle of something that presses it equally on all sides can not incline more or less on any side." said he. I should probably not be able to do it. and Phaedo of Socrates. nor of any other similar force. many and wonderful places in the earth." said Simmias. the form of the earth. "Yet. gladly hear them. it has no need of air. "in the first place." "But that will be enough. therefore." said Simmias. and it is itself neither of such a kind nor of such a magnitude as is supposed by those who are accustomed to speak of the earth. the art of Glaucus[42] does not seem to me to be required to relate what these things are. Simmias. "I am persuaded." Whereupon Simmias said. and even if I did know how. appears to me more than the art of Glaucus can prove. being equally affected all around. "I am persuaded of this. then. from the river Phasis to the pillars of Hercules. but. nothing hinders me from telling.Crito. and is of a spherical form. what remains to me of life." "Indeed." "And very properly so. and the different places in it. such as I am persuaded it is. I would. dwell about the sea. "How mean you. however. however. are sufficient to support it. those things which have obtained your belief. and that many others elsewhere dwell in many similar places.

through sloth and weakness. by Plato 136 confluence of water. but that the earth itself. for. but there are caverns and sand. those things in the upper regions of the earth would appear far more to excel the things with us. we think that we dwell on the surface of it. For this earth and these stones. For. nor has heard of it from any one else who has seen it. 135. it is well worth hearing. Since." said Simmias. by reason of our weakness and sloth. and the true earth. and imagine that we inhabit the upper parts of the earth. as things in the sea by the saltness. for nothing of any value grows in the sea. in whatever parts of the sea there is earth. are decayed and corroded. that we are dwelling in its hollows. and filth. dwelling in some hollow of the earth. being heaven itself. beholding the sun and the other stars through the water. then. as if the stars moved through this. Simmias. and. "we should be very glad to hear that fable. we are unable to reach to the summit of the air. behold what is here. and call the air heaven. But this is because. in which are the stars. nor. mist and air.Crito. on the other hand. just as if any one dwelling in the bottom of the sea should think that he dwelt on the sea. in a word. he would know that that is the true heaven. should imagine that the sea was the heavens. he would see--just as with us. That we are ignorant. But." . and the true light. so any one would behold the things there. and which most persons who are accustomed to speak about such things call ether. if we may tell a beautiful fable. having emerged and risen up from the sea to this region. is situated in the pure heavens. or. of which these things are the sediment. but. or. 134. should never have reached the surface of the sea. then. Socrates. and Phaedo of Socrates. nor are they at all worthy to be compared with the beautiful things with us. does it contain any thing perfect. what kind the things are on the earth beneath the heavens." "Indeed. nor. have seen how much more pure and more beautiful it is than the place where he is. emerging from the sea. could fly up thither. becoming winged. and if his nature were able to endure the contemplation. and mud in abundance. is the very condition in which we are. if any one could arrive at its summit. being pure. and are continually flowing into the hollow parts of the earth. and the whole region here. fishes. This. emerging from hence.

But there the whole earth is composed of such. as much as air excels water. as we do about the sea. then. some dwelling in mid-earth. and emeralds. There are also many other animals and men upon it. In this earth.Crito. and of wonderful beauty. grow in a manner proportioned to its nature--trees. and which painters use. all things that grow. which flow down hither together. its mountains and stones possess. being numerous and large. of which the well-known stones here that are so highly prized are but fragments. But the reason of this is. again. like those here. so that to behold it is a sight for the blessed. as it were. there is nothing subsists that is not of this character. hearing. And those very hollow parts of the earth. if any one should survey it from above. flowers and fruits. with gold and silver. of which the colors found here. copies. and those more in number and more beautiful than any we have ever beheld. for our necessities. 138. "First of all. exhibit a certain species of color. more white than chalk or snow. smoothness and transparency. in which gods really dwell. But that earth is adorned with all these. what water and the sea are to us. so that one continually variegated aspect presents itself to the view. and live for a much longer time than those here. Moreover. and every thing of this kind. and part of white. and. in like manner. in the same proportion. and. by Plato 137 136. my friend. being such. "this earth. 137. and in all parts of the earth. part of a golden color. is said to have the appearance of balls covered with twelve different pieces of leather. and even more beautiful than these. and ether air. they have abodes and temples of the gods. and not eaten up and decayed. in purity. and. and which are near the continent. the air is to them. and sensible visions of the gods. moreover." he continued. in one word. and voices and oracles. others about the air. jaspers. and . though filled with water and air. and what air is to us. But there. shining among the variety of other colors. and all of that kind. But their seasons are of such a temperament that they are free from disease. and far more brilliant and pure than these. that ether is to them. even animals and plants. and. and in other things. such as sardine-stones. for one part of it is purple. composed of other colors. and surpass us in sight. and smelling. and which produce deformity and disease in the stones and the earth. are. and others in islands which the air flows round. and other things of the kind: for they are naturally conspicuous. and more beautiful colors. because the stones there are pure. by rottenness and saltness. and Phaedo of Socrates. variegated and distinguished with colors. in like manner.

and there are immense bulks of ever-flowing rivers under the earth. and stars. and have passages through. some purer. are seen by them such as they really are. and the air and the wind around it do the same. by a certain oscillation existing in the earth. 'very far off. and some more miry.' which elsewhere both he and many other poets have called Tartarus. And as in respiration the flowing breath is continually breathed out and drawn in. but they severally derive their character from the earth through which they flow. and broader. But when again it leaves those regions and rushes hither. for they accompany it both when it rushes to those parts of the earth. some deeper and more open than that in which we dwell. is because this liquid has neither bottom nor base." "And. but others that are deeper have a less chasm than our region. the sun. and mighty rivers of fire. and others are shallower in depth than it is here. and Phaedo of Socrates. when filled. it again fills the rivers here. and fills them. and is that which Homer[43] speaks of. such. But all these move up and down. one of the chasms of the earth is exceedingly large. by which a great quantity of water flows from one into another. and many of liquid mire. both of hot and cold water. and the lava itself. indeed. Therefore. is the nature of the whole earth. therefore. as in Sicily there are rivers of mud that flow before the lava. For into this chasm all rivers flow together. some with narrower and some with wider channels. and a great quantity of fire. and moon.Crito. the water rushing in descends to the place which we call the lower region. but there are many places all round it throughout its cavities. And the reason why all streams flow out from thence. But all these are in many places perforated one into another under the earth. and the parts about the earth. and flow into it. as it were. And this oscillation proceeds from such natural cause as this. so there the wind oscillating with the liquid causes certain vehement and irresistible winds both as it enters and goes out. and from it flow out again. where is the most profound abyss beneath the earth. flow . 139. and perforated through the entire earth. just as men pump up water. too. it flows through the earth into the streams there. and from these the several places are filled. and these. as into basins. and when to these. according as the overflow from time to time happens to come to each of them. it oscillates and fluctuates up and down. and their felicity in other respects is correspondent with these things. 140. When. by Plato 138 such-like intercourse with them.

by Plato 139 through channels and through the earth. rivers. of which the largest. but does not mingle with its water. Styx. discharge themselves again. moreover. proceeds. and the lake which the river forms by its discharge. and. And this is the river which they call Pyriphlegethon. This river. folding itself round it. but not beyond. having fallen in here. having remained there for certain destined periods. and that which flows most outwardly round the earth. and received awful power in the water. near its source. 142. From hence it proceeds in a circle. when they have descended as low as possible. Opposite to this. but all of them flow in again beneath the point at which they flowed out. folding themselves once or several times round the earth. the fourth river first falls into a place dreadful and savage. and it is possible for them to descend on either side as far as the middle. boiling with water and mud. and. whose burning streams emit dissevered fragments in whatever part of the earth they happen to be.Crito. having severally reached the several places to which they are journeying. having gone round altogether in a circle. others only a little so. sinking beneath the earth. 141. are again sent forth into the generations of animals. and Phaedo of Socrates. and flowing in a contrary direction. again. there are many other large and various streams. but. some of them having gone round longer and more numerous places. it discharges itself into the lower parts of Tartarus. folding itself round. reaches the Acherusian lake. where the souls of most who die arrive. A third river issues midway between these. lakes. as it is said. which flows through other desert places. reaches both other places and the extremity of the Acherusian lake." "Now. passing under the earth. And some issue out directly opposite the place by which they flow in. some longer and some shorter. for in each direction there is an acclivity to the streams both ways. in an . they make seas. There are also some which. burning with abundance of fire. turbulent and muddy. and forms a lake larger than our sea. falls into a vast region. is called Ocean. others on the same side. is Acheron. like serpents. and. but directly opposite this. having its whole color like cyanus:[44] this they call Stygian. and. and fountains. and others round fewer and shorter. Then. they again discharge themselves into Tartarus--some much lower than they were drawn up. and. but among this great number there are four certain streams. sinking again from thence beneath the earth. folding itself oftentimes beneath the earth.

and embarking in the vessels they have. and thence again to the rivers. they who have . 144. or other similar crimes. opposite to Pyriphlegethon. But those who are found to have lived an eminently holy life. whence they never come forth. and when they are purified. and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. either from having committed many and great sacrileges. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable yet great offenses--such as those who. But when. when the dead arrive at the place to which their demon leads them severally. fall into Tartarus. through anger. but it. some those whom they slew. others those whom they injured. for this sentence was imposed on them by the judges. and meets it in the Acherusian lake from. being borne along. 145. and there dwell. or they who have become homicides in a similar manner--these must. and if they persuade them. and are freed from their sufferings. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life. proceeding to Acheron. as well those who have lived well and piously. And they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded those whom they have injured. or many unjust and lawless murders. and. of necessity. and to receive them. having gone round in a circle. through the magnitude of their offenses. and have been there for a year. according to his deserts. by Plato 140 opposite course to Pyriphlegethon. discharges itself into Tartarus. and Phaedo of Socrates. and have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed. these are they who. is Cocytus. they are set free. Its name. they go out. too. Neither does the water of this river mingle with any other." 143. "These things being thus constituted. they are borne back to Tartarus. arrive at the pure abode above. they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake. they arrive at the Acherusian lake. the homicides into Cocytus.Crito. on these arrive at the lake. and each receives the reward of his good deeds. the wave casts them forth. but if not. but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon. invoking them. first of all they are judged. But after they have fallen. as the poets say. a contrary direction. have committed any violence against father or mother. But those who appear to be incurable. as those who have not. and have lived the remainder of their life in a state of penitence. being freed and set at large from these regions in the earth as from a prison. And among these. there they cry out to and invoke. these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus.

for which reason I have prolonged my story to such a length. That. and worthy the hazard for one who trusts in its reality. You." "But. however. by Plato 141 sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy shall live without bodies. justice. fortitude." 147. Simmias. and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body. "Simmias and Cebes. When he had thus spoken. freedom. not with a foreign. but its own proper ornament--temperance. then. takes place with respect to our souls and their habitations--since our soul is certainly immortal--this appears to me most fitting to be believed. and it is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath. a man ought to be confident about his soul who. for the reward is noble. or any other matter. On account of these things. either this. as one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. as with enchantments. for the sake of these things which we have described. but what commands have you to give to these or to me. during this life. throughout all future time. "So be it. in attending to which we can most oblige you?" . for the hazard is noble. and who. and the rest. Socrates. 146. then. for it appears to me to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself. has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign from his nature. and truth--thus waits for his passage to Hades. that these things are exactly as I have described them does not become a man of sense." he continued. has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of knowledge. and Phaedo of Socrates." "To affirm positively. will each of you depart at some future time. indeed.Crito. and who. so as to acquire virtue and wisdom in this life. having thought that they do more harm than good. and it is right to allure ourselves with such things. nor at present is there sufficient time for the purpose. having adorned his soul. as a tragic writer would say. or something of the kind. either respecting your children. and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these which it is neither easy to describe. but now destiny summons me. Crito said. we should use every endeavor. and the hope great.

" he replied. you will do no good at all. When he . this I seem to have urged to him in vain. and yourselves. But that which I some time since argued at length. though I meant at the same time to console both you and myself. my friends. And. and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing to you. and will not live. and Phaedo of Socrates. then. that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself. but do you be sureties that." 148.Crito. and say that you bury my body. "most excellent Crito. and that earnestly. but shall depart. but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead. as it were. that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you. that Crito may more easily bear it. sincerely thinking that. he rose. and as you think is most agreeable to our laws. he said. but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed. then. whatever you do. and went into a chamber to bathe. we should pass the rest of our life as orphans. "if only you can catch me." he said. then. and who methodizes each part of the discourse. and looking round on us. as if I suffered from some dreadful thing. how severe it would be to us. You must have a good courage. I shall not remain." "We will endeavor. "nothing new that by taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine. "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges (for he undertook that I should remain). by Plato 142 "What I always say. "But how shall we bury you?" "Just as you please. For be well assured. and if you neglect yourselves. and I do not escape from you. at the same time smiling gently. and asks how he should bury me. may not be afflicted for me. even though you should promise much at present." he said." he said. so to do. 149. and considering it again. my sureties to Crito." When he had said thus. Be ye. and. or is carried out. conversing among ourselves about what had been said. that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with you. and Crito followed him. but he directed us to wait for him. nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out. when he sees my body either burned or buried. Crito. or is buried. in the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said. like those who are deprived of a father. "I cannot persuade Crito. when I die. therefore. We waited. though you should not now promise it." he said. and sometimes speaking about our calamity.

standing near him. And it was now near sunset. and proved the worthiest of men. Crito. said. and curse me. But when he came from bathing he sat down. "These men whom you mention. in being so . except to become ridiculous to myself. he turned away and withdrew. and endeavor to bear what is inevitable as easily as possible. when. shall not do so. and the women belonging to his family were come. that the sun is still on the mountains. meek. for they think they shall gain by so doing. Socrates. I am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me (for you know who are to blame). too. and have supped and drunk freely. if it is ready pounded. 150. looking after him. let us obey him. too. I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others. but with them. by order of the archons. said. after it had been announced to them. "Socrates. and some even have enjoyed the objects of their love." Then Crito said. and now how generously he weeps for me! But come. "And thou. and conversed with me sometimes. bursting into tears. he directed the women and children to go away. for he spent a considerable time within. let the man pound it. and Phaedo of Socrates. I have found to be the most noble. 151. but if not. But you. We will do as you direct. and then returned to us. And Socrates. and. therefore. farewell. "But I think. then the officer of the Eleven came in. and I. by Plato 143 had bathed. he said. and did not speak much afterward. on all other occasions during the time you have been here. Besides. "How courteous the man is! During the whole time I have been here he has visited me. for there is yet time. having conversed with them in the presence of Crito. and has not yet set." And at the same time. for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later.Crito. I know that others have drunk the poison very late. and. then. and excellent man of all that ever came into this place. do these things with good reason. with good reason. and let some one bring the poison. that they are angry with me. farewell. and his children were brought to him (for he had two little sons and one grown up). Now." Upon this Socrates replied. then (for you know what I came to announce to you)." At the same time turning to us. Crito. and given them such injunctions as he wished. I bid them drink the poison. Do not hasten.

"I understand you. But Crito. even before me. Be quiet. "than. Echecrates neither trembling. in spite of myself." he said." . in being deprived of such a friend. said. Go then. is it lawful or not?" "We only pound so much. came. and bear up. but. indeed. but when we saw him drinking." 152. "obey." And as he said this. nodded to the boy that stood near. said." he said. for this reason chiefly. "but it is certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods. And the boy. that they might not commit any folly of this kind. that my departure hence thither may be happy. as you are skilled in these matters. But Apollodorus. for I did not weep for him." 153. sent away the women. by Plato 144 fond of life." And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. so that. therefore. even before this. "What say you of this potion. nor changing at all in color or countenance. when none any longer remains. bringing with him the man that was to administer the poison. "Well. walk about until there is a heaviness in your legs. but. Thus far. and then. my good friend. 154. and sparing of it. having gone out and staid for some time." he replied. had risen up. on seeing the man. with respect to making a libation to any one. most of us were with difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping. covering my face. except Socrates himself. "What are you doing. Crito. who brought it ready pounded in a cup." he said. and Phaedo of Socrates. had not ceased weeping.Crito. bursting into an agony of grief. I wept for myself. And Socrates. and having finished the draught. And he having received it very cheerfully. which. when he could not restrain his tears. then lie down: thus it will do its purpose. therefore. But he said. and so may it be. Socrates. he pierced the heart of every one present. but for my own fortune. and do not resist. weeping and lamenting. my admirable friends? I. having heard this. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. he drank it off readily and calmly. I pray. looking steadfastly at the man. when you have drunk it. what must I do?" "Nothing else. the tears came in full torrent. "as we think sufficient to drink. we could do so no longer. as he was wont.

when. and then. And after this he pressed his thighs. when he said that his legs were growing heavy. [29] Of Pythagoras. And. we were ashamed. and. we owe a cock to Aesculapius. and Crito. for he had been covered over. at the same time. 155. "but consider whether you have any thing else to say." said Crito." "It shall be done. "Crito. FOOTNOTES [25] Phlius. uncovering himself. he who gave the poison taking hold of him. shortly after. he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. as we may say. Echecrates. he said (and they were his last words). after a short interval. was a town of Sicyonia. closed his mouth and eyes. perceiving it. and. therefore. ." To this question he gave no reply. by Plato 145 When we heard this. and restrained our tears. having walked about. "that it is better to die than to live. examined his feet and legs. [27] Namely.Crito.--a man. But he. Boetian for hioto. But now the parts around the lower belly were almost cold. lay down on his back. to which Echecrates belonged. in Peloponnesus. and the man covered him. the best of all of his time that we have known. pay it." [28] Hitto. having pressed his foot hard. was the end of our friend. moreover. and said that when the poison reached his heart he should then depart. the most wise and just. This. thus going higher. for the man had so directed him. [26] A Pythagorean of Crotona. he asked if he felt it: he said that he did not. and his eyes were fixed. and Phaedo of Socrates. he gave a convulsive movement. and do not neglect it. Then Socrates touched himself. but.

Socrates. which I can only attempt to retain by departing from the usual rendering of the former word. yet it appears to me to mean that. literally. [39] Sec." [38] That is. he must now deal with Cebes. [36] Harmony was the wife of Cadmus. xx. to single. having overcome Simmias. the ear a totally different one. the eye receives one impression of an object. [35] Lib. who is represented by Cadmus. [40] It is difficult to express the distinction between osia and nomima. [34] kai ahythis eteros kai eteros. the founder of Thebes. as they are different. he distrusts reasoning altogether. the latter. Simmias and Cebes. thus. "is something. and Phaedo of Socrates. but the senses. v. [31] That is. [32] In the original there is a play on the words Haides and haeides. compares his two Theban friends. with them. [33] By this I understand him to mean that the soul alone can perceive the truth. just as one who meets with friend after friend who proves unfaithful becomes a misanthrope. which may be taken in either sense. receive and convey different impressions of the same thing. "with one argument after another" Though Cousin translates it et successivement tout different de luimeme and Ast. 113. [37] einai ti. by Plato 146 [30] Some boyish spirit. at a time of life when the body is in full vigor. et rursus alia atque alia. 7. when a man repeatedly discovers the fallacy of arguments which he before believed to be true. to . The former word seems to have reference to the souls of the dead.Crito. and says that. that is. the advocate of Harmony. therefore.

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Crito, and Phaedo of Socrates, by Plato


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